NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 21-3075

____________

SHELDON HANNIBAL,

Appellant

v.

SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI; SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI;

DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-00619)

District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

October 17, 2023

____________

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PHIPPS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 17, 2024)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, a Pennsylvania inmate serving a life sentence for first-degree murder 

and conspiracy to commit murder challenges the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus on four grounds. He claims that he was denied Brady materials, had evidence of 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

another crime introduced against him in violation of due process, and was convicted based 

on erroneous jury instructions. He also argues that those errors, even if not independently 

prejudicial, were in aggregate enough to deny him a fair trial. For the reasons below, we 

will affirm the District Court’s denial of habeas relief.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At about 1:30 in the morning on October 25, 1992, Peter LaCourt and his friend, 

Barbara Halley, were walking up an interior stairwell in the Cambridge Mall public 

housing high-rise in North Philadelphia. LaCourt encountered Sheldon Hannibal and a 

fifteen-year-old girl, Tanesha Robinson, who were sitting on the steps between the second 

and third floors having a conversation. LaCourt offered to sell Hannibal a gold chain. 

Hannibal asked to see the chain, and LaCourt handed it to him. But after examining the 

chain, Hannibal concluded that it was fake and began punching LaCourt.

Both LaCourt and Halley tried to get away. Halley was successful: she ran down 

the stairs to the guard booth in search of help. LaCourt was not. As he started to run away 

down the hallway of the building, Hannibal pulled out a gun and threatened to kill him, so 

he quit running. Hannibal then approached LaCourt and began hitting him with the gun.

During this conflict, Larry Gregory emerged from one of the apartments on the floor 

with his own gun. He joined Hannibal in beating LaCourt. LaCourt pleaded for his life –

offering the chain and all his money. 

Those offers were not enough. Robinson, who had observed the events from near 

the stairwell, at that point turned to run upstairs to her cousin’s sixth-floor apartment. As 

she was doing so, she “heard a lot of gunshots.” Trial Tr. at 90:15–16 (Mar. 4, 1994) (A1234). And once she reached her cousin’s apartment, she looked out the window to see 
3

Hannibal and Gregory fleeing in a gray car. From the guard station, Halley heard the 

gunshots, and she returned to find that LaCourt had been shot.

LaCourt died from the gunshot wounds, and the Commonwealth charged Hannibal 

and Gregory with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Hannibal was 

held in pretrial detention and Gregory was released on bond. At two preliminary hearings 

in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, Robinson provided her account of the 

events surrounding LaCourt’s death. 

By the time of the joint trial for both Hannibal and Gregory, however, Robinson had 

been killed. Her preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record at trial. Other law 

enforcement witnesses corroborated portions of her testimony by testifying about 

recovering pieces of a gold chain in the stairwell and finding LaCourt’s dead body on the 

stairway with a total of six gunshot wounds, including wounds to his head and back. Also, 

Halley testified to what she had seen and heard. But no one testified to seeing Hannibal 

actually shoot LaCourt. 

The Commonwealth, however, had more to its case. It also had Hannibal’s alleged 

jailhouse confession. According to the testimony of an inmate, James Buigi, during 

Hannibal’s pretrial detention between late October and November 1993, he and Hannibal 

shared Cell 50 at the Philadelphia Industrial Corrections Center, referred to as the ‘PICC.’ 

Buigi testified that after a few days, Hannibal was “comfortable” enough with Buigi to ask 

him if he knew anything about the law. Trial Tr. at 22:19 (Mar. 1, 1994) (A-896). Buigi 

responded, “somewhat,” Trial Tr. at 107:15 (Feb. 28, 1994) (A-854), and then Hannibal 

asked if he could be convicted of first-degree murder without a witness, since “his witness 

was one of the girls that got killed in the Cambridge Mall.” Trial Tr. at 107:21–22 (Feb. 28, 

1994) (A-854). Hannibal told Buigi that Robinson “ain’t see me when I shot [LaCourt], 
4

all she seen was when I pistol-whipped him.” Trial Tr. at 113:9–11 (Feb. 28, 1994) (A860). Still, Hannibal considered Robinson to be “the only witness that can hurt [him] in 

the trial,” Trial Tr. at 122:8–9 (Feb. 28, 1994) (A-869), so “he told one of his friends that 

he needed [her] out of the way,” and he heard later that it was taken care of. Trial Tr. at 

122:6–8 (Feb. 28, 1994) (A-869). In sharing that information with Buigi, Hannibal did not 

know that Buigi and LaCourt had been friends. And the day after that conversation, Buigi 

reported Hannibal’s statements to law enforcement. 

In partial corroboration of Buigi’s testimony, the Commonwealth called two 

corrections officers as witnesses. One testified that he was “positive” that Hannibal and 

Buigi shared Cell 50 at the PICC, for a few weeks starting in late October or early 

November of 1993. Trial Tr. at 22:5 (Mar. 8, 1994) (A-1420). Another officer gave a 

similar account, testifying that he remembered Hannibal and Buigi sharing Cell 50 in late 

October and early November because Hannibal “was annoying.” Trial Tr. at 32:18 (Mar. 8, 

1994) (A-1430). 

Also, in corroboration of Hannibal’s alleged confession that he had a friend who 

“took care of” Robinson, Trial Tr. at 122:21 (Feb. 28, 1994) (A-869), the Commonwealth 

called two additional witnesses. One of them, twenty-one-year-old Terrence Richardson, 

who resided in Cambridge Mall in 1992 and 1993, testified that he asked Hannibal’s codefendant, Gregory, about his case, and Gregory responded, in reference to Robinson, 

“[t]hat snitch ass bitch got to die.” Trial Tr. at 76:25–77:1 (Mar. 3, 1994) (A-1133–34).1 

Richardson further relayed that he was in Gregory’s apartment on August 3, 1993, the day 

before Robinson’s death, with a few other men as they planned to kill her. The second 

1 Hannibal argues that Richardson recanted during post-trial motions in Gregory’s case, 

but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the recantation was unreliable. 

Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 222 (Pa. 2016).
5

witness was the detective who found Robinson’s body on August 4, in her cousin’s sixthfloor apartment under some clothing with a close-range gunshot wound through her head. 

The detective also testified that he found the bodies of two other young women who 

happened to be with Robinson in the apartment: twenty-year-old Jean Robinson, who was 

found in a bedroom with the back of her head blown off, and seventeen-year-old Latoya 

Cook, who was found on a sofa with a gunshot wound to the head. Two feet from Cook’s 

body was her six-month-old baby, who was crying but otherwise uninjured. 

In allowing the admission of this evidence over Hannibal’s objection, the trial court 

issued limiting instructions to the jury. At the outset of the jury charge, the trial court 

acknowledged the evidence connecting Hannibal with the deaths of the three girls but 

stated that that evidence was for the “limited purpose . . . of tending to show a 

consciousness of guilt.” Trial Tr. at 127:14–15 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1585). The trial court 

admonished the jury that it “must not regard this evidence as showing that these defendants 

are persons of bad character or criminal tendencies from which [it] might be inclined to 

infer guilt in this case.” Trial Tr. at 127:17–20 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1585). And it reiterated 

that the jury must not “consider the evidence concerning the witness’ killing as evidence 

that the defendants killed the victim in this case. The only thing it is for is to be used as a 

possible consciousness of guilt.” Trial Tr. at 128:18–22 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1586). 

After the Commonwealth rested, Hannibal testified. He denied having an 

altercation with LaCourt, taking LaCourt’s chain, possessing a gun, and shooting LaCourt. 

He also disputed that Buigi was his cellmate. Instead, although he recounted that he was 

in Cell 50 from the end of October through November 1993, he testified that his cellmate

was a “Puerto Rican guy named June.” Trial Tr. at 32:17 (Mar. 7, 1994) (A-1314). 
6

At the time of trial, Hannibal did not know that the prosecutor had access to 

additional prison-housing information. Records from the PICC reported that in October 

and November of 1993, multiple prisoners – including Buigi (under an alias), but not 

Hannibal – occupied Cell 50. Those same records indicated that during that time, multiple 

occupants were assigned to the same bed, while the other bed went unassigned.

Later, while the case was pending on appeal, the prosecutor obtained more prison 

housing information. In response to the prosecutor’s letter asking if Hannibal and Buigi 

had shared a cell in October and November of 1993, the Director of Classification, 

Movement, and Registration for the Philadelphia Prison System responded that the two 

men were in the same cellblock at a different institution (not the PICC) between August 

and mid-October 1993. 

At the close of trial, the judge instructed the jury about the charges for conspiracy 

to commit murder and for first-degree murder. For conspiracy, the judge explained the 

requirement that a defendant have the specific intent to commit a crime: 

[T]o find a defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime, you must be 

satisfied initially that the following two elements of conspiracy have been 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that a defendant has agreed with 

another person or persons that they or one of them would engage in conduct 

which constitutes the crime in this case, or that they have agreed to aid 

another person in the planning or commission of the crime. Second, that the 

defendant, a defendant, his co-conspirator or accomplice did so with the 

intent of promoting or facilitating commission of the crime. 

* * *

You may find a defendant guilty of a crime as a conspirator if you are 

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt first that the defendant agreed with the 

others to commit the crime . . . and that the defendant agreed with the intent

of promoting or facilitating [its] commission . . . .
7

Trial Tr. at 144:16 – 145:3, 146:2–8 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1602–04) (emphasis added).

2

 As 

far as the mental state required for a conviction on the murder charge, the judge instructed 

that the jury must be satisfied that “the defendant, his accomplice or co-conspirator did so 

with the specific intent to kill and with malice.” Trial Tr. at 135:24 – 136:1 (Mar. 9, 1994) 

(A-1593–94) (emphasis added). The conjunction ‘or’ suggested that Hannibal could be 

convicted regardless of his own mental state if his co-conspirator had the specific intent to 

kill with malice, and the jury requested clarification. In response, the judge modified the 

mental state instruction so that the jury had to be satisfied “that he, the person who is being 

evaluated, did so with [the] specific intent to kill and with malice.” Trial Tr. at 6:1–3 

(Mar. 10, 1994) (A-1620) (emphasis added). 

The jury found both Hannibal and Gregory guilty of conspiracy and first-degree 

murder for the killing of Peter LaCourt. On March 11, 1994, the jury sentenced Hannibal 

to death and Gregory to life in prison. 

By way of postscript, the Commonwealth, after introducing evidence associating 

Hannibal and Gregory with Robinson’s death and securing guilty verdicts against both men 

for LaCourt’s murder, prosecuted two other men for murdering Robinson and the other 

women in the sixth-floor apartment. One of the two men convicted of those murders was 

the man identified by Richardson as being in Gregory’s apartment during the planning.

2 The trial judge also instructed that:

A defendant does not become an accomplice merely by being present at the 

scene or knowing about the crime. He is an accomplice if with the intent of 

promotion or facilitating a commission of the crime he encourages, requests, 

solicits or commands the other person to commit it or he aids, agrees to aid 

or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it.

Trial Tr. at 133:3–10 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1591) (emphasis added). 
8

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After receiving a death sentence for first-degree murder, Hannibal took an automatic 

appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 722(4), 

9711(h)(1); Pa. R. App. P. 702(b), 1941. He made five arguments, three of which are 

relevant to this case. First, he asserted that the jury instructions were erroneous under 

Pennsylvania law. Second, he contended that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

subpoena prison housing records. And third, he argued that it was fundamentally unfair 

for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence connecting him to Robinson’s murder. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court independently reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence for 

the first-degree murder conviction, and then rejected each of Hannibal’s arguments. 

Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 753 A.2d 1265, 1271, 1272 n.11 (Pa. 2000). 

Hannibal then filed a separate civil action to collaterally challenge his conviction 

and sentence under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 

§§ 9541, 9542. In addition to reiterating several of his previous arguments, including the

three identified above, Hannibal claimed that the Commonwealth violated its duty to 

disclose exculpatory materials under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by not 

producing the correspondence between the prosecutor and the prison director as well as the 

prison housing records for Cell 50 at the PICC. The Court of Common Pleas denied that 

petition. Hannibal appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court without any 

success. See Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 203 (Pa. 2016).

In July 2017, Hannibal sought relief in federal court. In his habeas petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, he raised eight claims. Some 

of those challenged exclusively his death sentence. Although it had defended Hannibal’s

death sentence for over twenty-five years, in February 2020, the Philadelphia District 

Attorney’s Office stipulated that Hannibal was deprived of effective assistance of counsel 
9

at the sentencing phase of trial. In response, the District Court vacated the death penalty, 

but on the Report and Recommendation from the Magistrate Judge, it denied all of

Hannibal’s challenges to his conviction. Through a timely appeal, Hannibal now invokes 

the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to contest that final decision. See id. §§ 1291, 

2253(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). 

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Hannibal raises four collateral challenges to his conviction. He argues 

that under Brady, the Commonwealth should have disclosed two sets of exculpatory 

materials: the prison housing records for Cell 50 at the PICC and the correspondence 

between the prosecutor and the prison director regarding Hannibal and Buigi’s cell 

assignments. Hannibal also contends that the trial court committed a due process error by 

admitting evidence connecting him to Robinson’s death. Hannibal further asserts that at 

the close of trial, the court violated his due process rights by giving improper instructions 

to the jury about the mental state requirement for first-degree murder. Finally, Hannibal 

argues that these errors compound so that their cumulative effect compels habeas relief.

As codified in statute, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 

commonly abbreviated as ‘AEDPA,’ supplies the standard of review for a habeas petition 

brought by a person held in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment. See generally

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 

1214, § 104 (codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2254). That standard, which may be 

referred to as ‘AEDPA deference,’ constrains the scope of federal court review of “any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d); see also Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 378 (2022) (characterizing federalcourt review of a state-court ruling on the merits as “highly circumscribed”). As to the 
10

facts, a federal court will grant relief only if the state-court decision “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). With respect to the law and its application, a federal 

court cannot grant relief unless the state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States.” Id. § 2254(d)(1). If, however, the claimed violations of federal 

law were not adjudicated on the merits by a state court, and review in federal court is not 

otherwise foreclosed (such as by a failure to exhaust or procedural default), then AEDPA 

deference does not apply, and a federal court reviews the claim de novo. See Cone v. Bell, 

556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). 

A. The Brady Claims

Hannibal leads with the contention that exculpatory documents regarding the prison 

housing arrangements were withheld from him in violation of Brady. Specifically, he 

claims that he was owed the prison housing records about Cell 50 and the correspondence 

between the prosecutor and the prison director. The common premise for both Brady

claims is that the documents would have been material to Hannibal’s case by allowing him 

to undermine Buigi’s testimony that he and Hannibal were cellmates at the PICC in late 

October and early November 1993. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 

154 (1972) (explaining that the duty under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence includes 

impeachment evidence); Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 2009). 

In ruling on Hannibal’s PCRA petition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not 

consider the merits of his Brady claims.3 But it did consider and reject Hannibal’s 

3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held on collateral review that Hannibal waived his 

Brady claims by not raising them on direct appeal. Hannibal, 156 A.3d at 210; see 42 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. § 9544(b). But Hannibal filed his direct appeal in 1997, before the 1998 

decision in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998). Pre-Albrecht, waiver 
11

ineffective assistance claim premised on counsel failing to subpoena the Cell 50 records. 

It determined that those records were “inaccurate on their face, containing several obvious 

errors” – including showing multiple prisoners occupying one bed while the other bed went 

unused. Hannibal, 156 A.3d at 210. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded 

that the records would have had no impeachment value. Id.

That conclusion qualifies as an on-the-merits ruling on the materiality element of 

the Brady claim. That is so because both claims have a common legal requirement – a 

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if Hannibal would have 

had access to the records. Compare Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 107 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(explaining that the prejudice prong of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires 

a showing of “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)), with Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (explaining 

the materiality element of a Brady claim requires a showing of a “reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different” (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985))). And in 

this instance, both claims turned on the same factual issue – the impact of not having the 

Cell 50 records to impeach Buigi on Hannibal’s trial. Based on the legal congruence of 

the claims and the common underlying factual premise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 

resolution of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue qualifies as an on-the-merits ruling 

with respect to the materiality element of Hannibal’s Brady claim. See Albrecht v. Horn, 

485 F.3d 103, 116 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying AEDPA deference when the state court did not 

under Pennsylvania law was “not an adequate basis for a finding of procedural default.” 

Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). 
12

address the merits of the claim “in the ordinary sense” but instead “examined the merits in 

the context of the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance” claim). 

Thus, under AEDPA deference, the question narrows to whether the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the Cell 50 records would not have altered the 

outcome of the trial. It did. The Cell 50 records are facially inaccurate and would have 

minimal, if any, impeachment value. The court also considered the contrary testimony of 

the guards, who both remembered Hannibal and Buigi sharing Cell 50 during the relevant 

timeframe. It also recognized Hannibal’stestimony – in contradiction to the prison housing 

records – that he was housed in Cell 50 (although he disputed sharing it with Buigi). So, 

it was reasonable for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to conclude that any attempted 

impeachment efforts using the inconclusive Cell 50 records would likely not have changed 

the jury’s mind.4

The portion of Hannibal’s Brady claim premised on not receiving the 

correspondence between the prosecutor and the prisoner director also fails. On de novo

review (because the Pennsylvania courts did not consider this issue), see Cone, 556 U.S. at

472, the correspondence was not material. It related to Hannibal and Buigi’s incarceration 

at a different penal institution at a different time (August through early October of 1993, 

not late October through November of 1993), so it provided no credible basis for 

impeaching Buigi. Thus, Hannibal’s lack of that information did not alter the outcome of 

his trial or appeal.

4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also included an ‘even if’ argument – even if the Cell 50 

records had some impeachment value, their withholding was not consequential because 

they would have provided a basis for impeaching Hannibal’s own testimony. That is an

uncertain proposition because it assumes that Hannibal would still have testified if he had 

the Cell 50 records. But given its determination that the Cell 50 records provided no 

meaningful basis for impeachment, it is not necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of 

that secondary basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination.
13

B. The Introduction of Evidence Associating Hannibal with 

the Murder of Tanesha Robinson

Hannibal also argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by allowing 

the introduction of evidence linking him to Robinson’s murder. On direct appeal, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed that challenge and upheld the admission of the 

evidence. Hannibal, 753 A.2d at 1272 n.11 (A-560). That ruling therefore receives 

AEDPA deference.5 

Under that standard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling was not “contrary to” 

or “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). After reviewing Hannibal’s 

claim that his “trial was unfair” based on the introduction of evidence associating him with 

Robinson’s murder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling, 

reasoning that the evidence was properly admitted as part of the history of the case and to 

show consciousness of guilt. Hannibal, 753 A.2d at 1272 n.11 (A-560); see also id.

(explaining that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of this 

evidence because there was “no basis to object . . . .”). And according to the United States 

5 On collateral review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court divided on the question of whether 

the due process issue concerning the admission of this evidence had been previously 

litigated on the merits. Hannibal, 156 A.3d at 203, 234, 236 (A-703, A-730, A-731). 

Despite the fractured reasoning, that court ultimately affirmed the PCRA court’s ruling that 

the issue had been litigated on direct appeal and was therefore not cognizable on PCRA

review. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9544(a)(2); see also In re Int. of O.A., 717 A.2d 490, 496 

n.4 (1998) (explaining that, “[w]hile the ultimate order of a plurality opinion . . . is binding 

on the parties in that particular case, legal conclusions and/or reasoning employed by a 

plurality certainly do not constitute binding authority”); A-670–71 (PCRA opinion). So,

although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision on collateral review was later than its 

ruling on direct appeal, it is not the relevant decision for purposes of AEDPA deference. 

See Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that federal courts should 

look to “the state courts’ last reasoned opinion on” an issue if a higher state court either 

does not address or does not “supplement[] in a meaningful way” the reasoning relevant to 

that issue).
14

Supreme Court, the admission of evidence of another crime is not “so extremely unfair” as 

to violate “fundamental conceptions of justice” where it was “at least circumstantially 

valuable in proving petitioner’s guilt” and the judge provided a limiting instruction. 

Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352–53 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 

431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)). In this case, the admission of evidence regarding Hannibal’s 

involvement in Robinson’s murder was important to corroborating Buigi’s testimony that 

at Hannibal’s direction, his “boys” “took care of” the witness, and it evidenced Hannibal’s 

consciousness of guilt. Trial Tr. at 122:24–25 (Feb. 28, 1994) (A-869). Thus, it was at 

least circumstantially valuable in proving Hannibal’s guilt. The more prudent course may 

well have been for the trial court to have excluded evidence of the other two victims and 

the presence of an infant. But under AEDPA deference, with the two limiting instructions 

from the trial judge that the information should be considered only for consciousness-ofguilt purposes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of this challenge was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined 

by the Supreme Court. 

C. The Jury Instructions on Specific Intent for First-Degree 

Murder

Hannibal argues that the jury instructions violated his right to due process by 

minimizing the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, specifically by allowing a finding that 

he was guilty of first-degree murder based on the intent of his codefendant, Gregory. See

Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 416 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that jury instructions that 

“relieve[] the Commonwealth of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt . . . every element of the offense” violate due process); see also Williams v. Beard, 

637 F.3d 195, 223 (3d Cir. 2011). On collateral review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

upheld the jury instructions, which would normally implicate AEDPA deference 
15

considerations. But when a state court’s rationale is less than clarion, it is permissible to 

sidestep AEDPA deference if the claim would fail under de novo review. See Berghuis v. 

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (“Courts can, however, deny writs of habeas corpus 

under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review when it is unclear whether AEDPA deference 

applies, because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or 

her claim is rejected on de novo review.” (citation omitted)). And here, that path of de 

novo review is appropriate.

At the time of Hannibal’s trial, a requirement for first-degree murder under 

Pennsylvania law was that “each co-conspirator must individually be found to possess the 

mental state necessary to establish first degree murder—the specific intent to kill.” 

Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 464 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (1982). And Hannibal’s contention that the 

initial jury instruction and the follow-up clarification did not clearly instruct the jury on 

that point of law is non-trivial.

6

Still, any error in the instructions on first-degree murder would have been harmless 

because in convicting Hannibal of conspiracy to commit murder, the jury had to find that 

he acted with the specific intent to kill. See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 

2005) (explaining that an error in a jury instruction is harmless unless “the error had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” (quoting 

6 The initial instructions could have conveyed to the jury that Hannibal could be guilty of 

first-degree murder even if only co-defendant Gregory had the specific intent to kill. Trial 

Tr. at 135:18–136:1 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1593–94) (setting forth the third element of firstdegree murder by listing the subjects disjunctively, as the defendant, “his accomplice or

co-conspirator” who must have killed the deceased “with the specific intent to kill and with 

malice” (emphasis added)). The clarifying instruction, which stated that the mental state 

was required of “the person who is being evaluated,” although seemingly curative, did not 

specify whether ‘the person being evaluated’ referred to Hannibal or his co-defendant, 

Gregory. Trial Tr. at 5:19–6:3 (Mar. 10, 1994) (A-1619–20). 
16

Smith, 120 F.3d at 417)). The trial court’s instruction for conspiracy to commit murder 

expressly stated that guilt depended on a specific intent to kill: “to find a defendant guilty 

of conspiracy to commit a crime, you must be satisfied initially that . . . the defendant, a 

defendant, his co-conspirator or accomplice [conspired] with the intent of promoting or 

facilitating commission of the crime.” Trial Tr. at 144:16–145:3 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1602–

03). Although that instruction was also in the disjunctive, the trial court later made clear 

that co-conspirators and accomplices must act with specific intent. It explained that the 

jury could find guilt as a conspirator if it was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt first that 

the defendant agreed with the others to commit the crime . . . and that the defendant agreed 

with the intent of promoting or facilitating [its] commission . . . .” Trial Tr. at 146:3–8 

(Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1604) (emphasis added). And for guilt as an accomplice, the trial court 

further explained that a defendant “is an accomplice if with the intent of promotion or 

facilitating a commission of the crime he encourages, requests, solicits or commands the 

other person to commit it or he aids, agrees to aid or attempts to aid the other person in 

planning or committing it.” Trial Tr. at 133:5–10 (Mar. 9, 1994) (A-1591) (emphasis 

added). So, under any scenario, to find Hannibal guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, 

the jury had to conclude that he had the specific intent to kill LaCourt. 

Thus, even if the instructions on first-degree murder were deficient as to the need 

for Hannibal to have the specific intent to kill LaCourt, the instructions viewed in their 

entirety reveal that, in finding Hannibal guilty of conspiracy, the jury must have found that 

Hannibal had acted with a specific intent to kill. Any error in the instruction for firstdegree murder would therefore not have had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence 

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 712 (quoting Smith, 120 F.3d 

at 417); see also id. at 710 (holding that even in the presence of misleading jury instructions 
17

on the specific intent requirement for first-degree murder, a guilty verdict on a charge of 

conspiracy to commit murder, for which the jury was required to find a specific intent to 

kill, sufficed to render the error harmless).

D. Cumulative Error

Finally, Hannibal invokes the cumulative error doctrine to argue that the combined 

effect of the trial court’s errors – even if independently harmless – deprived him of a fair 

trial. Under the cumulative error doctrine, “errors that are not individually reversible can 

become so cumulatively,” United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 154 (3d Cir. 2019), 

if they “so infected the jury’s deliberations that they had a substantial influence on the 

outcome of the trial.” Id. (quoting United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 

1993)). Errors can accumulate either by virtue of their relatedness, such that they “amplify 

each other in relation to a key contested issue in the case” or by virtue of their combined 

magnitude such that, when aggregated, “unrelated errors sufficiently undermine[]

confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. (first quoting Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 

1221 (10th Cir. 2013), then quoting Grant v. Trammell, 727 F.3d 1006, 1026 (10th Cir. 

2013)). Either way, cumulative errors do not warrant reversal where the “remaining

evidence of guilt [is] overwhelming.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Copple, 

24 F.3d 535, 547 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994)). 

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Hannibal’s claim of cumulative 

error, Hannibal, 156 A.3d at 234, and so AEDPA deference applies. That conclusion was 

not unreasonable in light of the ample evidence supporting Hannibal’s responsibility for 

LaCourt’s death. 

De novo review confirms that result. The only potential error relates to the jury 

instructions. Yet, with only an isolated instance of potential error, and without any 
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combination of errors, there is no basis to compound errors, and principles of cumulative 

error – under either the relatedness or the combined magnitude methods – do not apply 

here. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court judgment denying 

habeas relief on the grounds challenged herein.