United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1996 OPERATION DESERT

STORM

Evaluation of the Air

War

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/PEMD-96-10

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Program Evaluation and

Methodology Division

B-271993 

July 2, 1996

The Honorable David Pryor

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Commerce

House of Representatives

This study responds to your request that we comprehensively evaluate the

use and effectiveness of the various aircraft, munitions, and other weapon

systems used in the victorious air campaign in Operation Desert Storm in

order to aid the Congress in future procurement decisions.

Over 5 years ago, the United States and its coalition allies successfully

forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The performance of aircraft and their munitions,

cruise missiles, and other air campaign systems in Desert Storm continues

to be relevant today as the basis for significant procurement and force

sizing decisions. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) Report on

the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) explicitly cited the effectiveness of advanced

weapons used in Desert Storm—including laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and

stealth aircraft—as shaping the BUR recommendations on weapons

procurement.1

This report is an unclassified summary of our classified report. The table

of contents for that report is included in appendix I to provide an outline

of the breadth of our evaluation.

Background Operation Desert Storm was primarily a sustained 43-day air campaign by

the United States and its allies against Iraq between January 17, 1991, and

February 28, 1991. It was the first large employment of U.S. air power

since the Vietnam war, and by some measures (particularly the low

number of U.S. casualties and the short duration of the campaign), it was

perhaps the most successful war fought by the United States in the 20th

century. The main ground campaign occupied only the final 100 hours of

the war.

1

Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: October 1993), p. 18.

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The air campaign involved nearly every type of fixed-wing aircraft in the

U.S. inventory, flying about 40,000 air-to-ground and 50,000 support

sorties.2

 Approximately 1,600 U.S. combat aircraft were deployed by the

end of the war. By historical standards, the intensity of the air campaign

was substantial. The U.S. bomb tonnage dropped per day was equivalent

to 85 percent of the average daily bomb tonnage dropped by the United

States on Germany and Japan during the course of World War II.

Operation Desert Storm provided a valuable opportunity to assess the

performance of U.S. combat aircraft and munitions systems under actual

combat conditions. Unlike operational tests or small-scale hostilities, the

air campaign involved a very large number of conventional systems from

all four services used in tandem, which permits potentially meaningful

cross-system comparisons. The combat data in this report can be seen as

an extension of the performance data generated by DOD’s operational test

and evaluation programs that we have previously reviewed.3

Objectives To respond to your questions about the effectiveness of the air campaign;

the performance of individual weapon systems; the accuracy of contractor

claims, particularly in regard to stealth technology and the F-117; and the

relationship between the cost of weapon systems and their performance

and contributions to the success of the air campaign, we established the

following report objectives.

1. Determine the use, performance, and effectiveness of individual weapon

systems in pursuit of Desert Storm’s objectives, and in particular, the

extent to which the data from the conflict support the claims that DOD and

weapon contractors have made about weapon system performance.

2. Describe the relationship between cost and performance for the weapon

systems employed.

3. Identify the degree to which the goals of Desert Storm were achieved by

air power.

2

Support sorties comprised missions such as refueling, electronic jamming, and combat air patrol.

3

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy

Weapon Systems Prematurely, GAO/NSIAD-95-18 (Washington, D.C.: November 1994); Weapons

Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change, GAO/NSIAD-93-15 (Washington, D.C.: December

1992); Weapons Testing: Quality of DOD Operational Testing and Reporting, GAO/PEMD-88-32BR

(Washington, D.C.: July 1988); Live Fire Testing: Evaluating DOD’s Programs, GAO/PEMD-87-17

(Washington, D.C.: August 1987); and How Well Do the Military Services Perform Jointly in Combat?

DOD’s Joint Test and Evaluation Program Provides Few Credible Answers, GAO/PEMD-84-3

(Washington, D.C.: February 1984).

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4. Identify the key factors aiding or inhibiting the effectiveness of air

power.

5. Identify the contributions and limitations of advanced technologies to

the accomplishments of the air campaign.

6. Determine whether the unique conditions of Desert Storm limit the

lessons learned.

Summary Operation Desert Storm was a highly successful and decisive military

operation. The air campaign, which incurred minimal casualties while

effecting the collapse of the Iraqis’ ability to resist, helped liberate Kuwait

and elicit Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions. However, our analysis of

the air campaign against strategic targets revealed several air power issues

that require attention before the next campaign. First, the effectiveness of

air power in Desert Storm was inhibited by the aircraft sensors’ inherent

limitations in identifying and acquiring targets and by DOD’s failure to

gather intelligence on the existence or location of certain critical targets

and its inability to collect and disseminate timely battle damage

assessments (BDA). Pilots noted that infrared, electro-optical, and laser

systems were all seriously degraded by clouds, rain, fog, smoke, and even

high humidity, and the pilots reported being unable to discern whether a

presumed target was a tank or a truck and whether it had already been

destroyed. The failure of intelligence to identify certain targets precluded

any opportunity for the coalition to fully accomplish some of its

objectives. And the reduced accuracies from medium and high altitudes

and absence of timely BDA led to higher costs, reduced effectiveness, and

increased risks from making unnecessary restrikes.

Second, U.S. commanders were able to favor medium- to high-altitude

strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability, rather than

weapon system effectiveness. This was because of early and complete air

superiority, a limited enemy response, and terrain and climate conditions

generally conducive to air strikes. Low-altitude munitions deliveries had

been emphasized in prewar training, but they were abandoned early. The

subsequent deliveries from medium and high altitudes resulted in the use

of sensors and weapon systems at distances from targets that were not

optimal for their identification, acquisition, or accuracy. Medium- and

high-altitude tactics also increased the exposure of aircraft sensors to

man-made and natural impediments to visibility.

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Third, the success of the sustained air campaign resulted from the

availability of a mix of strike and support assets. Its substantial weight of

effort was made possible, in significant part, by the variety and number of

air-to-ground aircraft types from high-payload bombers, such as the B-52,

to platforms capable of delivering guided munitions such as the stealthy

F-117, to high-sortie-rate attack aircraft such as the A-10. A range of target

types, threat conditions, and tactical and strategic objectives was best

confronted with a mix of weapon systems and strike and support assets

with a range of capabilities.

Fourth, despite often sharp contrasts in the unit cost of aircraft platforms,

it is inappropriate, given aircraft use, performance, and effectiveness

demonstrated in Desert Storm, to characterize higher cost aircraft as

generally more capable than lower cost aircraft. In some cases, the higher

cost systems had the greater operating limitations; in some other cases,

the lower cost aircraft had the same general limitations but performed at

least as well; and in still other cases, the data did not permit a

differentiation.

Fifth, “one-target, one-bomb” efficiency was not achieved. The air

campaign data did not validate the purported efficiency or effectiveness of

guided munitions, without qualification. On average, more than 11 tons of

guided and 44 tons of unguided munitions were delivered on targets

assessed as successfully destroyed; still more tonnage of both was

delivered against targets where objectives were not fully met. Large

tonnages of munitions were used against targets not only because of

inaccuracy from high altitudes but also because BDA data were lacking.

Although the relative contribution of guided munitions in achieving target

success is unknowable, they did account for the bulk of munitions costs.

Only 8 percent of the delivered munitions tonnage was guided, but at a

price that represented 84 percent of the total munitions cost. During

Desert Storm, the ratio of guided-to-unguided munitions delivered did not

vary, indicating that the relative preferences among these types of

munitions did not change over the course of the campaign. More generally,

Desert Storm demonstrated that many systems incorporating complex or

advanced technologies require specific operating conditions to operate

effectively. These conditions, however, were not consistently encountered

in Desert Storm and cannot be assumed in future contingencies.

Lastly, many of DOD’s and manufacturers’ postwar claims about weapon

system performance—particularly the F-117, TLAM, and laser-guided

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bombs—were overstated, misleading, inconsistent with the best available

data, or unverifiable.

Scope and

Methodology

Scope In this report, we evaluate the aircraft and munitions that we deemed to

have had a major role in the execution of the Desert Storm air campaign

by virtue of their satisfying at least one (in most cases, two) of the

following criteria. The system

• played a major role against strategic targets (broadly defined),

• was the focus of congressional interest,

• may be considered by DOD for future major procurement,

• appeared likely to play a role in future conflicts, or

• even if not slated currently for major procurement, either was used by

allied forces in a manner or role different from its U.S. use or used new

technologies likely to be employed in the future.

These criteria led us to assess the A-6E, A-10, B-52, F-111F, F-117A, F-15E,

F-16, F/A-18, and British Tornado (GR-1).4

 We examined both guided and

unguided munitions, including laser-guided bombs, Maverick missiles,

Tomahawk land-attack (cruise) missiles (TLAMs), and unguided “dumb”

bombs.

We assess the effectiveness of various U.S. and allied air campaign aircraft

and weapon systems in destroying ground targets, primarily those that fall

into the category of “strategic” targets.5

 We focused our analysis on

strategic targets in part because they received the best documented BDA,

although there was substantial variation from target to target and among

4

The AV-8B, A-7, and B-1B were not included. Both the AV-8B and the A-7 were excluded because of

their relatively few strikes against strategic targets. The B-1B did not participate in the campaign

because munitions limitations, engine problems, inadequate crew training, and electronic warfare

deficiencies severely hampered its conventional capabilities.

5

In Operation Desert Storm, some targets were clearly strategic, such as Iraqi Air Force headquarters

in Baghdad, while others, essentially the Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait theater of operations, could

be considered both strategic and tactical. For our purposes, we concentrated on the effects achieved

by the air campaign before the start of the ground offensive, including successes against ground forces

in Kuwait. Unlike most previous large-scale conflicts, the air campaign accounted for more than

90 percent of the entire conflict’s duration. Therefore, what we have excluded from our analysis is the

role of air power in supporting ground forces during the ground offensive (“close air support”), as well

as such nonstrategic missions as search and rescue.

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target types in the quantity and quality of BDA. The 12 categories of

strategic targets in Desert Storm are listed in appendix II.

Historically, studies of air power have articulated differing points of view

on the relative merits of focusing air attacks on targets deemed to be

strategic (such as government leadership, military industry, and electrical

generation) and focusing them on tactical targets (such as frontline armor

and artillery). These contending points of view have been debated in many

official and unofficial sources.6

 In this study, we did not directly address

this debate because data and other limitations (discussed below) did not

permit a rigorous analysis of whether attacks against strategic targets

contributed more to the success of Desert Storm than attacks against

tactical targets.

Methodology

Data Sources A primary goal of our work was to cross-validate the best available data on

aircraft and weapon system performance, both qualitative and

quantitative, to test for consistency, accuracy, and reliability. The data we

analyzed in this report are the best information collected during the war.

They were compiled for and used by the commanders who managed the

air campaign. These data also provided the basis for postwar DOD and

manufacturer assessments of aircraft and weapon system performance

during Desert Storm. We balanced the limitations of the data, to the extent

possible, against qualitative analyses of the systems. For example, we

compared claims made for system performance and contributions to what

was supportable given all the available data, both quantitative and

qualitative.

We collected and analyzed data from a broad range of sources, including

the major DOD databases that document the strike histories of the war and

cumulative damage to targets; numerous after-action and lessons-learned

reports from military units that participated in the war; intelligence

reports; analyses performed by DOD contractors; historical accounts of the

war from the media and other published literature; and interviews with

participants, including more than 100 Desert Storm pilots and key

6

Examples include: Edward C. Mann, III, Thunder and Lightning (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air

University Press, April 1995); John A. Warden, III, The Air Campaign (Washington, D.C.:

Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989); and Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air

Campaign Against Iraq (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, April 1995).

Page 6 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
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individuals in the planning and execution of the war.7 We also interviewed

key Desert Storm planners and analysts from a wide spectrum of

organizations, both within and outside DOD. (See appendix III.)

After we collected and analyzed the air campaign information, we

interviewed DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and service representatives and

reviewed plans for the acquisition and use of weapon systems in future

campaigns to observe how the lessons learned from Desert Storm have

been applied. Our analyses were also reviewed by several experts on

either air power issues in general or the conduct of Operation Desert

Storm in particular. (See appendix IV.)

Data Analysis To compare the nature and magnitude of the power that Operation Desert

Storm employed against strategic targets to the nature of outcomes, we

analyzed two databases—the “Missions” database generated by the Air

Force’s Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) research group (to assess

inputs) and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA’s) phase III battle

damage assessment reports (to assess outcomes). The Missions database

represents a strike history of air-to-ground platforms and ordnance in the

Persian Gulf war.8

 There are data on 862 targets, with basic encyclopedia

(or BE) numbers, that together comprise more than 1 million pieces of

strike information. The phase III reports provided the best cumulative

all-source functional BDA for each strategic target available to planners

during the course of the war.

To determine the use of aircraft and munitions in achieving air campaign

objectives, we used the Missions database to determine weight-of-effort

7

We did not select pilots randomly, given constraints on their availability, travel, and time. The only

requirement was that a pilot had flown the relevant type of aircraft in a Desert Storm combat mission.

In most cases, the pilots had flown numerous missions. The purpose of interviewing pilots was to

receive as direct input as possible from the aircraft and munition user rather than views filtered

through official reports. In U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Limits on the Role

and Performance of B-52 Bombers in Conventional Conflicts, GAO/NSIAD-93-138 (Washington, D.C.:

May 1993), we assessed the B-52 role in detail. Where they were relevant, we incorporated the data and

findings from that report into our comparisons. The British government denied our requests to

interview British pilots who had flown in Desert Storm. However, we were able to obtain some official

assessments of the British role in the air campaign, and we interviewed U.S. pilots about their

interactions with British pilots.

8

GWAPS researchers compiled a very large computerized database on aerial operations in the Persian

Gulf war from existing records. It documents aircraft strikes on ground targets, number and type of

ordnance, date, and time on target information, target names and identifiers, desired mean point of

impact, and additional mission-related information. It contains strike history information across the

duration of the air campaign for most of the air-to-ground platforms that participated.

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(WOE) and type-of-effort measures (TOE) at two levels.9 First, we calculated

WOE and TOE at the broad level of the target category for each of the 12

strategic target categories shown in appendix II. Second, we calculated

WOE and TOE for each aircraft and TLAM across the 12 categories.

We used phase III reports on fixed strategic targets to determine the

extent to which the functional capabilities of the target had been

eliminated. To correlate outcomes on targets with the input to them, we

matched phase III data with data in the Missions database. For strategic

targets where both BDA and WOE/TOE data existed, we sought to assess the

relationship between the WOE and TOE data representing campaign inputs

with phase III BDA data representing campaign outcomes, at the target

level.10 While this methodology has limitations, no other study of Desert

Storm has produced the target-specific input-outcome database that can

be derived from merging these sources.

Study Strengths and Limitations This analysis of the campaign and aircraft and munitions use and

effectiveness benefited from our use of the most comprehensive strike and

BDA data produced from the Persian Gulf war, a previously untried

methodology to match inputs and outputs on targets; additional qualitative

and quantitative data obtained from Desert Storm veterans and

after-action reports to corroborate information in the primary databases;

and our utilization of the results of other Desert Storm analyses, such as

the Gulf War Air Power Survey.

This study is the first to match available Desert Storm strike and BDA data

by target and to attempt to assess the effectiveness of multiple weapon

systems across target categories. Despite the data limitations discussed

below, our methodology provided systematic information on how weapon

systems were employed, what level and types of weapons were required to

achieve success, and the relative cost-effectiveness of multiple platforms.

The reliability and validity of these findings are strengthened by our use of

interviews, after-action reports, and other Desert Storm analyses to better

9

Variables that comprise the WOE measure include (1) the quantity of BE numbers to which platforms

were tasked, (2) the quantity of strikes that platforms conducted, (3) the quantity of bombs that

platforms delivered, and (4) the quantity of bomb tonnage that platforms delivered. Variables that

comprise the TOE measure include (1) the quantity of bombs that were guided bombs, (2) the quantity

of bombs that were unguided bombs, (3) the quantity of bomb tonnage that was guided, and (4) the

quantity of bomb tonnage that was unguided.

10This methodology was discussed with DIA analysts who were familiar with both the Missions

database and the phase III reports. They identified no reason why this methodology would not result in

valid comparisons of inputs and outcomes. In addition, they believed that the utilization of WOE and

TOE variables would alleviate data problems previously encountered by analysts conducting strike

BDA.

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understand platform performance variables and place the results of our

effectiveness analyses in the appropriate context.

Our analyses of campaign inputs (from the Missions database) and

outcomes (from the phase III reports) against ground targets have

limitations of both scope and reliability imposed by constraints in the

primary Desert Storm databases. Systematically correlating munition

inputs against targets to outcomes was made highly problematic by the

fact that the phase III BDA reports did not provide a comprehensive

compilation of BDA for all strategic targets and could not differentiate the

effects of one system from another on the same target.11

We sought to work around data limitations through qualitative analysis of

systems, based on diverse sources. Claims made for system performance

were assessed in light of the most rigorous evaluation that could be made

with the available data. We have explicitly noted data insufficiencies and

uncertainties. Overall, data gaps and inconsistencies made an

across-the-board cost-effectiveness evaluation difficult. However, there

were sufficient data either to assess all the major claims made by DOD for

the performance of the major systems studied or to indicate where the

data are lacking to support certain claims.

We conducted our work between July 1992 and December 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Conclusions We reached the following conclusions from our review of the air

campaign:

• DOD’s future ability to conduct an efficient, effective, and comprehensive

air campaign will depend partly on its ability to enhance sensor

capabilities, particularly at medium altitudes and in adverse weather, in

order to identify valid targets and collect, analyze, and disseminate timely

BDA.

• A key parameter in future weapon systems design, operational testing and

evaluation, training, and doctrine will be pilot and aircraft survivability.

• The scheduled retirement of strike and attack aircraft such as the A-6E,

F-111F, and most A-10s will make Desert Storm’s variety and number of

aircraft unavailable by the year 2000.

11Such assessments, system by system, were not the objective of these reports. Since targets were

generally assessed only episodically and, in most cases, after being hit by numerous diverse aircraft

and munitions over a period of time, it was impossible to know which munition from which aircraft

had caused what amount of damage.

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• The cost of guided munitions (now estimated to be over $58 billion), their

intelligence requirements, and the limitations on their effectiveness

demonstrated in Desert Storm need to be considered by DOD and the

services as they determine the optimal future mix of guided and unguided

munitions.

DOD and associated agencies have undertaken initiatives since the war to

address many, but not all, of the limitations of the air campaign that we

identified in our summary (see pp. 3-4) and conclusions. We have not

analyzed each of these initiatives in this report; however, we briefly

describe those that apply to one or more of our conclusions below.

First, DOD officials told us that the most sophisticated targeting sensors

used in Desert Storm (which were available only in limited quantities)

have now been deployed on many more fighter aircraft, thereby giving

them a capability to deliver guided munitions. However, the same

limitations exhibited by these advanced sensor and targeting systems in

Desert Storm—limited fields-of-view, insufficient resolution for target

discrimination at medium altitudes, vulnerabilities to adverse weather, and

limited traverse movement—remain today.

Second, DOD officials told us that to address the Desert Storm BDA analysis

and dissemination shortcomings, they have created an organization to

work out issues, consolidate national reporting, and provide leadership;

developed DOD-wide doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures;

established more rigorous and realistic BDA training and realistic exercises;

and developed and deployed better means to disseminate BDA. However,

DOD officials acknowledge that additional problems remain with improving

BDA timeliness and accuracy, developing nonlethal BDA functional damage

indicators (particularly for new weapons that produce nontraditional

effects), and cultivating intelligence sources to identify and validate

strategic targets. Moreover, as our analyses of the air campaign revealed,

timely and accurate BDA is crucial for the efficient employment of

high-cost guided munitions (that is, for avoiding unnecessary restrikes).

Therefore, acquisition plans for guided munitions must take fully into

account actual BDA collection and dissemination capabilities before a final

determination can be made on how much to acquire.

Third, DOD officials told us that survivability is now being emphasized in

pilot training, service and joint doctrine, and weapon system development.

Pilot training was modified immediately after the air campaign to meet

challenges such as medium-altitude deliveries in a high antiaircraft

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artillery and infrared surface-to-air missile threat environment. Service and

joint doctrine now reflect the lessons learned from Desert Storm’s

asymmetrical conflict. Several fighter aircraft employment manuals

specifically incorporate the tactics that emphasized survivability in the

campaign. DOD and service procurement plans include new munitions with

global positioning system guidance systems, justified in part by their

abilities to minimize the medium-altitude shortcomings and adverse

weather limitations of Desert Storm while maximizing pilot and aircraft

survivability.

Fourth, DOD officials told us that although Desert Storm’s successful

aircraft mix will not be available for the next contingency, DOD and the

services have made plans to maintain an inventory of aircraft that they

believe will be more flexible and effective in the future. Flexibility will be

anticipated partly from the modernization of existing multirole fighters to

enable them to deliver guided munitions (the aircraft systems being retired

are single-role platforms), and their effectiveness is expected to increase

as new and more accurate guided munitions are put in the field. However,

we believe that strike aircraft modernization and munition procurement

plans that include increasing the number and variety of guided munitions

and the number of platforms capable of delivering them require additional

justification.12

Recommendations Desert Storm established a paradigm for asymmetrical post-cold war

conflicts. The coalition possessed quantitative and qualitative superiority

in aircraft, munitions, intelligence, personnel, support, and doctrine. It

dictated when the conflict should start, where operations should be

conducted, when the conflict should end, and how terms of the peace

should read. This paradigm—conflict where the relative technological

advantages for the U.S. forces are high and the acceptable level of risk or

attrition for the U.S. forces is low—underlies the service modernization

plans for strike aircraft and munitions. Actions on the following

recommendations will help ensure that high-cost munitions can be

12In Desert Storm, 229 U.S. aircraft were capable of delivering laser-guided munitions; in 1996, the

expanded installation of low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pods on

F-15Es and block 40 F-16s will increase this capability within the Air Force to approximately 500

platforms. The services have bought or are investing over $58 billion (then-year dollars) to acquire 33

different types of guided munitions totaling over 300,000 units. (See U.S. General Accounting Office,

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development,

GAO/NSIAD-95-95 (Washington, D.C.: June 1995).) Air Force plans reveal that nearly 62 percent of all

interdiction target types in a major regional conflict in Iraq could be tasked to either guided or

unguided munitions today (1995) but that will fall to approximately 40 percent in 2002. Concurrently,

the percentage of targets to be tasked to only guided munitions will increase from 19 percent in 1995

to nearly 43 percent in 2002.

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employed more efficiently at lower risk to pilots and aircraft and that the

future mix of guided and unguided munitions is appropriate and

cost-effective given the threats, exigencies, and objectives of potential

contingencies.

Specifically,

• In light of the shortcomings of the sensors in Desert Storm, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense analyze and identify DOD’s need

to enhance the capabilities of existing and planned sensors to effectively

locate, discriminate, and acquire targets in varying weather conditions and

at different altitudes. Furthermore, the Secretary should ensure that any

new sensors or enhancements of existing ones are tested under fully

realistic operational conditions that are at least as stressful as the

conditions that impeded capabilities in Desert Storm.

• In light of the shortcomings in BDA exhibited during Desert Storm and

BDA’s importance to strike planning, the BDA problems that DOD officials

acknowledge continue today despite DOD postwar initiatives need to be

addressed. These problems include timeliness, accuracy, capacity,

assessment of functional damage, and cultivating intelligence sources to

identify and validate strategic targets. We recommend that the Secretary of

Defense expand DOD’s current efforts to include such activities so that BDA

problems can be fully resolved.

• In light of the quantities and mix of guided and unguided munitions that

proved successful in Desert Storm, the services’ increasing reliance on

guided munitions to conduct asymmetrical warfare may not be

appropriate. The Secretary should reconsider DOD’s proposed mix of

guided and unguided munitions. A reevaluation is warranted based on

Desert Storm experiences that demonstrated limitations in the

effectiveness of guided munitions; survivability concerns for aircraft

delivering these munitions; and circumstances where less complex, less

constrained unguided munitions proved equally or more effective.

Agency Comments The Department of Defense partially concurred with each of our three

recommendations. In their response to a draft of our report, DOD did not

dispute our conclusions; rather, they reported that several initiatives were

underway that will rectify the shortcomings and limitations demonstrated

in Desert Storm. Specifically, they cited (1) the acquisition of improved

and new precision-guided munitions, (2) two studies in process—Deep

Attack/Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) and Precision Strike Architecture

study, and (3) several proposed fiscal year 1997 Advanced Concept

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Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) as programs capable of correcting

Desert Storm shortcomings. In addition, DOD emphasized the importance

of providing funds to retain the operational test and evaluation function to

ensure the rigorous testing of our weapons and weapon systems. (See

appendix V for the full text of DOD’s comments.)

We agree that the actions cited by DOD address the shortcomings in

sensors, guided munitions, and battle damage assessment we report here.

However, the degree to which these initiatives are effective can be

determined only after rigorous operational test and evaluation of both new

and existing munitions and after the recommendations resulting from the

Deep Attack/Weapons Mix and Precision Strike Architecture studies have

been implemented and evaluated. Moreover, we concur with the

continuing need for operational test and evaluation and underscore the

role of this function in rectifying the shortcomings cited in this report.

DOD also provided us with a list of recommended technical corrections.

Where appropriate, we have addressed these comments in our report.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after its

date of issue. We will then send copies to other congressional committees

and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to others

upon request.

If you have any questions or would like additional information, please do

not hesitate to call me at (202) 512-3092. Major contributors to this report

are listed in appendix VI.

Kwai-Cheung Chan

Director of Program Evaluation

 in Physical Systems Areas

Page 13 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Contents of Classified

Version of Report

16

Appendix II 

Twelve Strategic

Target Categories in

the Desert Storm Air

Campaign

17

Appendix III 

Organizations We

Contacted

18

Appendix IV 

List of Consultants

19

Appendix V 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

20

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

26

Page 14 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Contents

Abbreviations

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

BDA Battle damage assessment

BE Basic encyclopedia

BUR Bottom-up review

C3 Command, control, and communications

DAWMS Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

ELE Electrical facilities

GOB Ground order of battle

GVC Government centers

GWAPS Gulf War Air Power Survey

LANTIRN Low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night

LGB Laser-guided bomb

LOC Lines of communication

MIB Military industrial base

NAV Naval facilities

NBC Nuclear, biological, and chemical

OCA Offensive counterair

OIL Oil refining, storage, and distribution

SAM Surface-to-air missile

SCU Scud missile facilities

TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile

TOE Type of effort

WOE Weight of effort

Page 15 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix I 

Contents of Classified Version of Report

Letter

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix II: The Use of Aircraft and Munitions in the Air Campaign

Appendix III: Aircraft and Munition Effectiveness in Desert Storm

Appendix IV: Cost and Performance of Aircraft and Munitions in

Desert Storm

Appendix V: Desert Storm Campaign Objectives

Appendix VI: Basic Structure of Iraqi Integrated Air Defense

System

Appendix VII: Pre-Desert Storm Missions and Actual Use

Appendix VIII: Weight of Effort and Type of Effort Analyses

Appendix IX: Target Sensor Technologies

Appendix X: Combat Support Platforms

Appendix XI: The Experience of F-16s and F-117s at the Baghdad

Nuclear Research Facility

Appendix XII: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix XIII: Major Contributors to This Report

Glossary

Page 16 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix II 

Twelve Strategic Target Categories in the

Desert Storm Air Campaign

Abbreviation Target category

C3 Command, control, and communication facilities

ELE Electrical facilities

GOB Ground order of battle (Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait

theater of operations, including the Republican Guard)

GVC Government centers

LOC Lines of communication

MIB Military industrial base facilities

NAV Naval facilities

NBC Nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities

OCA Offensive counterair installations

OIL Oil refining, storage, and distribution facilities

SAM Surface-to-air missile installations

SCU Scud missile facilities

Page 17 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix III 

Organizations We Contacted

Organization Location

Air Combat Command Langley Air Force Base, Va.

Center for Air Force History Washington, D.C.

Center for Naval Analyses Alexandria, Va.

Central Intelligence Agency Langley, Va.

Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C.

Department of Air Force, Headquarters Washington, D.C.

Embassy of the United Kingdom Washington, D.C.

Foreign Science and Technology Center Charlottesville, Va.

Grumman Corporation Bethpage, N.Y.

Gulf War Air Power Survey (research site) Arlington, Va.

Institute for Defense Analyses Alexandria, Va.

Lockheed Advanced Development

Corporation

Burbank, Calif.

McDonnell Douglas Corporation St. Louis, Mo.

Naval A-6E Unit Oceana Naval Air Station, Va.

Naval F/A-18 Unit Cecil Naval Air Station, Fla.

Navy Operational Intelligence Center, Strike

Projection Evaluation and Anti-Air Research

(SPEAR) Department

Suitland, Md.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, D.C.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C.

Rand Corporation Santa Monica, Calif.

Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C.

Survivability/Vulnerability Information

Analysis Center

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

Texas Instruments Dallas, Tex.

U.N. Information Center Washington, D.C.

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Headquarters Norfolk, Va.

U.S. Central Air Forces, Headquarters Shaw Air Force Base, N.C.

U.S. Central Command, Headquarters MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

U.S. Space Command Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base, Colo.

4th Tactical Fighter Wing Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C.

48th Tactical Fighter Wing RAF Lakenheath, U.K.

49th Fighter Wing Holloman Air Force Base, N.Mex.

57th Test Group Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

363rd Fighter Wing Shaw Air Force Base, S.C.

926th Fighter Wing (reserve) New Orleans Naval Air Station, La.

Page 18 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix IV 

List of Consultants

Our draft report was reviewed by the following consultants. The final

report incorporates appropriate changes based on their questions,

comments, and suggestions.

Dr. John Ahearne, Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society

Dr. Eliot Cohen, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of

the Johns Hopkins University

Vice Adm. Robert Dunn, U.S. Navy (ret.), independent consultant

Dr. Grant Hammond, Air War College

Brig. Gen. Edwin Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), U.S. Marine Corps

History and Museums

Col. Clinton Williams, U.S. Army (ret.), independent consultant

Page 19 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 20 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

Page 22 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

See comment 8.

Page 23 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the March 28, 1996, letter from the

Department of Defense.

GAO Comments 1. The acquisition of new precision-guided munitions may well provide

new capabilities that overcome the limitations observed in Operation

Desert Storm. However, the degree to which these new munitions may

overcome the limitations of existing munitions can only be determined

after rigorous operational test and evaluation of both new and existing

munitions.

2. The Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study will not fully address the

implications of our findings concerning the strengths and limitations of

guided and unguided munitions. DAWMS is an analysis of the full range of

precision-guided munitions in production and in research, development,

test, and evaluation that will determine the number and types of

precision-guided munitions that are needed to provide a complementary

capability against each target class. By analyzing only precision-guided

munitions, the study does not address the benefits realized from

92 percent of the munitions delivered in Operation Desert Storm. The

premise of the DAWMS does not acknowledge the ambiguous results from

Desert Storm regarding munitions effectiveness, the cost and operational

trade-offs between guided and unguided munitions, and the demonstrated

preference for unguided over guided munitions against several strategic

target categories.

3. The Precision Strike Architecture study was designed to define a

“system of systems” for precision strike by

• defining the mission,

• identifying the component systems,

• developing a concept of operations,

• facilitating opportunities for system evolution,

• creating criteria for establishing choices among alternatives, and

• determining costs.

The resulting architecture for precision strike is a plan that addresses the

limitations in strike capabilities demonstrated in our report. However, the

degree to which the sensor and other precision strike shortcomings are

alleviated cannot be known until a new precision strike architecture is

implemented and tested.

Page 24 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

4. We strongly acknowledge the need to maintain a rigorous operational

test and evaluation capability to ensure that commanders, planners, and

operators are aware of both the strengths and weaknesses of existing and

new weapon systems under a variety of combat conditions.

5. While the physical limitations of all sensors, including laser and

forward-looking infrared, may have been known before Desert Storm, they

were not necessarily fully acknowledged by DOD or its contractors either

before the conflict or in reports to Congress after the coalition’s victory.

6. Our recommendation addresses the demonstrated intelligence

shortcomings in performing BDA and in identifying strategic targets in

Operation Desert Storm. It is not apparent that the scope of the Deep

Attack/Weapons Mix Study is sufficient to address DOD’s need to cultivate

intelligence sources that can identify and validate strategic targets in

future scenarios.

7. Part of the significance of the munitions use data from Desert Storm is

that it reveals patterns of use when perfect BDA does not exist. For

example, we found in Desert Storm that multiple strikes and weapon

systems were used against the same targets; more munitions were

delivered than peacetime test capabilities would indicate as necessary;

determinations of whether target objectives were met were frequently

unknown; and when objectives were met, the specific system responsible

could not be determined. These observations should temper one of the

primary expectations of the DAWMS: that a growing inventory and

increasing capabilities of weapons will reduce the sorties required for

deep attack missions.

8. We recognize that where DOD concurs with the premises of our

recommendations, it does so based on information other than the analyses

we conducted of the Desert Storm air campaign. Owing to these

differences, the solutions pursued by DOD may not fully address the needs

perceived by GAO. Therefore, although the scope of the specific studies and

ACTDs indisputably address our recommendations, the degree to which

they result in solutions to Desert Storm shortcomings and limitations

cannot be known until the resulting changes and innovations are

operational.

Page 25 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

Program Evaluation

and Methodology

Division

Winslow T. Wheeler, Assistant Director

Jonathan R. Tumin, Project Manager

Jeffrey K. Harris, Project Manager

Carolyn M. Copper, Social Science Analyst

Venkareddy Chennareddy, Referencer

(973443) Page 26 GAO/PEMD-96-10 Operation Desert Storm Air War
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