COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Agee and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

LOUIS E. METCALF, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1208-01-4 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 APRIL 2, 2002 

CLAIRE K. METCALF 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jane Marum Roush, Judge 

 Peter M. Fitzner (Matthews, Snider, Norton & 

Fitzner, on brief), for appellant. 

 Stephen R. Pickard (Law Offices of Stephen R. 

Pickard, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Louis E. Metcalf, Jr. (husband) appeals a decision of the 

trial court finding him in contempt of court and requiring him to 

maintain Claire K. Metcalf (wife) as the primary beneficiary of 

"at least" $100,000 of his life insurance benefits. We conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion in finding husband in 

contempt and dismiss the case. 

BACKGROUND

 Husband and wife were divorced by decree entered on July 27, 

1981. The final decree affirmed, ratified and incorporated the 

parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA). Paragraph 4(b) of 

the PSA provides: 
Life Insurance. Husband shall continue to 

maintain Wife as the primary beneficiary of 

$100,000.00 of his existing life insurance 

for such time as husband is responsible to 

pay Wife the alimony or spousal support 

pursuant to the terms of paragraph "1," 

above. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Paragraph 1 of the PSA provides that husband shall pay wife 

spousal support until the death of either party or until wife 

remarries. Husband continues to pay wife spousal support 

pursuant to Paragraph 1 of the PSA. 

 At the time the parties entered into the PSA, husband had 

three life insurance policies. These included individual life 

insurance policies, respectively, of $10,000 and $20,000 in 

original death benefits and a group term policy through his 

employer with a death benefit of $75,000. This later policy 

increased in value to over $100,000 as husband's compensation 

increased. When husband retired in 1990, the employer-provided 

policy ceased; however, he received another life insurance 

policy with a death benefit of $7,500 from his employer as part 

of his retirement benefits. Husband designated his present 

spouse as the beneficiary of that policy. 

 In April 2001, the trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause, 

ordering husband to show cause why he was not in violation of 

Paragraph 4(b) of the PSA. At the time of the April 5, 2001 

hearing, husband had maintained wife as the primary beneficiary 

of only the $20,000 life insurance policy that he owned at the 

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time the parties signed the PSA which now carried a death 

benefit of about $34,800. Husband had allowed the $10,000 

policy to lapse while he was still employed since the employer 

group term policy death benefit had increased to over $100,000. 

 The trial court initially ruled that "the use of the word 

existing" in Paragraph 4(b) is ambiguous. Husband argued the 

meaning of "existing" was clear and limited to the policies 

existing when the PSA was signed. As there was no ambiguity, 

husband argued the court had no basis to take parol evidence to 

define the meaning of § 4(b) of the PSA. The trial court 

disagreed and heard parol evidence from the parties concerning 

their intent at the time they entered into the PSA. 

 After hearing the parol evidence, the trial court stated 

that the term "existing maybe is ambiguous for me," but not for 

the parties. The trial court concluded, based on the parol 

evidence, that the intent of the parties in 1980 when they 

entered into the PSA was that husband did not have to obtain 

additional life insurance at that time, but "he had a continuing 

obligation to maintain at least $100,000" worth of insurance 

benefits for wife for as long as the spousal support remains 

due. However, the court found that husband had failed to 

fulfill this obligation. Therefore, the trial court found 

husband in contempt of court and ordered that husband name wife 

as the beneficiary of "at least" $100,000 worth of life 

insurance. The trial court also awarded wife attorney's fees. 

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ANALYSIS

 Husband's initial argument in the trial court was that the 

agreement was not ambiguous and that "existing life insurance" 

were those policies "existing" when the agreement was signed. If 

husband is correct, the trial court's finding of contempt would be 

plainly wrong as no contempt would lie at this time under that 

reading. However, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether 

or not the agreement is ambiguous as found by the trial court for 

the disposition of this appeal. 

 Assuming, but specifically not deciding, the agreement is 

ambiguous, the subsequent finding of contempt and award of 

attorney's fees was erroneous. 

 "As a general rule, 'before a person may be held in contempt 

for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms 

as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be 

expressed rather than implied.'" Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8, 10, 235 

S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977) (citation omitted). "This is also the rule 

followed in Virginia." Id. "'The process for contempt lies for 

disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be decreed.'" 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 While it may be that, when the parties entered into the PSA, 

they intended that husband would maintain wife as the beneficiary 

of $100,000 worth of his life insurance policies for the 

duration of his spousal support obligation, even if that 

required husband to acquire additional policies after the 

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parties signed the PSA, this was not expressed in definite terms 

in the agreement as incorporated into the divorce decree. "If the 

duty existed at all, it arose only by implication." Id. Because 

husband "did not violate a clearly defined duty imposed upon him 

by the [PSA] and the decree, his actions did not constitute 

contempt." Id. at 10-11, 235 S.E.2d at 309. Accordingly, we 

reverse the trial court's finding of contempt and its award of 

attorney's fees to wife. We remand this case to the trial court 

for the entry of such order or orders as may appear appropriate to 

the trial court to ensure that any counsel fees paid by husband 

under the order appealed from are returned to him. We dismiss 

this case from our docket. 

 Reversed and remanded. 

 

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