### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Fe brua ry 9, 200 9 S es sio n
RON HENRY, ET AL 

### . v. CH ERO KEE C ONS TRU CTION AN D S UP PL Y COMPANY, INC.

Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Je ffe rson County No. 20403 IV O. Duane Sloan e, Judge

No. E2008-01655-COA- R3-CV - FILED MARC H 26, 2009

Ron Henry a nd Linda He nry (“ Plaintiffs”) sued Cherokee Construction and Supply C ompany, Inc

. (“D efe ndant”) alleging damage s sustained when a wall i n the hom e that Def endant constructed f

or Plaintiffs collapsed. De fendant filed a motion for summ ary judgment. The Trial Court enter ed an or de r fi nd ing a nd ho ldi ng that Pla int if fs ’ c la im wa s ba

rr e d by the fo ur ye ar statut e of r epo se co n tained in Tenn. Code A nn. § 28-3-201, et seq. , a n d g r a n t i n g D e f e n d a n ts u m m ar y j u d g m e n t. Pla int if fs app e a l to thi s Co urt. W e a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d; Case Re manded

D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J., and C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., joined.

Douglas T. Jenkins, Rogersville, Te nnessee for the Appellants, Ron Henry and wife , Linda He nry. Cha rl e s G . T a ylo r, II I, Kn ox vil le , Te nn e sse e fo r the Ap pe lle e , Che ro ke e Con str uc tio n a ndSup ply Company, Inc.

OP IN ION-2- Bac kgr ound

In app ro xim a te ly 199 3, Pla int if fs pu rc ha se d a n u nimpr ov e d p arc e l of re a l pr op e rt y in Je ff e rs on Cou nty , Te nn e sse e
. Pla int if fs the n co ntr a c te d with De fe nd a nt fo r D e fe nd a nt t o b uil d a ho us e on thi s land . The a gr e e me nt re qu ir e d Plai nti ff s to pay the a c tua l cos t of lab or a ndma te ri a ls and De fendant to oversee the project for a fixed fee of $20,000. On Novembe r 13, 1995, De fenda nt file d a N o ti c e o f Co mp le ti o n f o r Pl a in ti f

f s ’ h o u s e in th e Re g is te r o f D e e d s o f f ic e f or Jef fer son County.
InAu gu st o f 2 00 3, a ft e r a hea vy do wn po ur

of rain, a wa ll i n Pl a int if

fs ’ h ou se c oll aps e d f

ill ing Pla int if

fs ’ b a se me nt w ithmud , w a te r, a ndde bris. Pla int if fs fi le d this su it a ga ins t De fe nd a nt i n A ug us t of

20 05 , alle gin g, in p e rt ine nt p art : 4. Inor de r to r e c e ive the ir payme nt u nd e r the c on tr a c t, D e fe nd a nt, thr ou gh its office r or employee, D ouglas R. Moody, filed a notice of completion of the job on November

13, 1995 and other wise r epre sented to Plaintiffs that the job was complete; 5. In fa ct, the job was not complete and Plaintiffs now cha rge that the notice of c omp le tio n w a s: (a) made in the course a nd scope of Def endant’ s business as a re sidential contra ctor; (b ) f a lse inf orma tio n w hic h w a s n e gli ge ntl y s up pli e d b y th e De fe nd a nt; (c) intended to influenc e and guide the Plaintiff to make the f inal payment to D e fe nd a nt; (d ) j us tif ia bly re lie d u po n b y Pl a int if fs ; (e ) the pr ox imate c aus e of Pla int if fs ’ s e ve re fi na nc ia l lo ss; 6. The foundation exterior of the house ha d no t b een f inished by Defe ndant beca use i t, among ot her things, had not been water proofe d, grave lled [sic], or filled wi th c on c re te . T he fr e nc h d rains we re no t c omp le te . I n p ro vid ing the fa lse inf orma tio n r e ga

rd ing c omp le tio n, Pla int if fs a lle ge that D e fe nd a nt f

a ile d to e xe rc ise rea sonable care or competence in obtaining information of completion of the job, and Def endant f ailed to exe rcise r easona ble ca re or competenc e in commu n i ca t i ng information of c ompletion; 7. On or a

bout August 2, 2003, the Plainti ffs discove red the ir house h ad not be e n c omp le te d b y w a te rp ro of ing the e xte ri or

ba se me nt wa ll of the ir ho me wh e n s a id wall collapse d causing seve ral thousand dollar s to be expe nded by Plaintiffs repla cing damage d property and re pairing their home;....
Discover y commenc ed an d b o t h P l ai n t i ffs g av e d ep o s i t i o n s
. T h e f o l l o wi n g questions and answ ers we re e licited during the deposition of Ron Henry: Q. It is your position that the plans called f or re bar that wasn’t put in?-3-

A. As fa r as I know, yes. That is just, I m ean it doesn’t call for na ils to go i nto the wood, but I mea n that is just good construction. Q. Is it your position that [Defe ndant] intentionally left these items out, the rebar ? A. No , n ot at a ll. Q. You’r e saying that their me n did it because of l ack of supervision or something lik e that? A. I don’t know w hy it wasn’t done. Q. But you’re not saying that [ Def endant] somehow or other int entionally left it out to m ake e xtr a

mon e y o r any thi ng lik e that? A. No , I a m no t a c c us ing the m of that. During Linda He nry’s de position, t he following testimony was given: Q. Do you have any personal knowledge your self of anything that you’re c laiming that [ De fe nd a nt] didwr on g o r n e gli ge ntl y th a t c aus e d th is p ro ble m? A. No. Q. An d y ou wo ulda gr e e with yo ur husb a nd , y ou do n’ t f e e l li ke [D e fe nd a nt] intentionally did anything wrong? A. No , d e fi nit e ly n ot.
Def endant f iled a motion for su m m ar y judgment asserting that Plaintiffs’ suit was barr ed by the f

our y ea r statute of r epose c ontained in Tenn. Code A nn. § 28-3-201, et seq

. Def en d an t ’s m o tion further state d that Plaintiffs could not util ize the e xception to the four year statut e of re po se , w hic h a

pp lie s if a de fe nd a nt is g uil ty o f “ fr audor fr aud ule nt c on c e a lme nt, ” be c aus e bo th P la int if

fs “con cede d u nd e r o a th that th e y h a ve no e vid e nc e that [ De fe nd a nt] or a ny of its employees did a nything ‘intentionally’ to cause the plaintiffs’ allege d damage .”

The Trial Court held a hearing and then enter ed it s order on July 16, 2008 finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ claim was barr ed by the four year statute of re pose conta ined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-201, et seq. , a ndgr a nti ng De fe nd a nt s umm ary jud gme nt. Pla int if fs app e a l to thi s Co urt.
Discussion Although not stated exac tly as such, Plaintiffs raise two issues on a ppeal: 1) w hether the Trial Court erred in a pplying Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 201, et seq. , and granting summ ary judgment to Defe ndant; and, 2) w hether the Trial Court er

red in findin g that the wrongf ul conce alment exc eption found in Tenn. Code A nn. § 28-3-205 doe s not apply in this case.

Our Supre m e Court has descr ibed the proc ess for r eviewinga trial c ourt’s g rant of summa ry jud g me nt a s f

oll ow s: The standa

rds g overningan appe llate cour t’s revie w of a motion for summary j u dg ment are well settled. Since our inquiry inv olv e s pur e ly

a qu e sti on of law, no pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss-4- a tta c he s to the low e r c ourt ’s jud g me nt, and our t a sk is c on fi ne d to revie wing the re cord to de termine whether the r equire ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P

. 56 have be en met. Se e Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W .2d 49, 50 -5 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Cow de n v . Sov ra n B an k /Ce ntral S

ou th , 816 S. W. 2 d 7 4 1 , 7 4 4 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 1 )

. T e n n e s s e e Ru le o f Ci v il Pr o c e d

ure 56.04 provides that summary judgme nt is a

p p r o priate where : (1) ther e is no ge nuine issue with reg ard to the material fact s releva nt to the claim or de fense contained in the motion, se e By rd v . H all , 847 S

. W

. 2 d 2 08, 210 (Tenn. 1993) ; and (2) the moving pa rty is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law on the undi s p u t ed fac ts. See Anderson v. Standard Re gister Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1993). The movingparty h as the burde n of provingthat its mot ion s a t i s f i e s th e s e r e qu i r e m e n t s. S ee Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 811 S.W .2d 523, 5 2 4 (T enn. 1991). W hen the pa rty seekingsummary judgme nt makes a pr operly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving pa

rty to se t f orth specific fac ts e stablishing the exist ence of dis pute d, mate ri a l fa c ts wh ic h mus t be re so lve d b y the tr ie r o f f

a c t. Se e By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d at 215. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Plaintiffs argue on a

ppeal that the Trial Court er red in a pplying Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 by transforming “the c ase f rom a ne gligent misreprese ntation case into a construction defe ct ca se,” and in doing so a pplied the wrong statute. As pertinent to this issue, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 8- 3- 20 2 p ro vid e s: 28-3-202. Limitation of ac tions. – All actions to rec ov er d am ag es for a ny defic iency in the de sign, planning, supervision, observation of c onstruction, or construct io n o f a n imp r o v e me n t to r e a l p r o p e r ty , f o r in ju r y to p r o p e r ty , r e a l or persona l, arising out of any such d ef i ci en cy, or f

or injury to the per son or for wrongful de ath arising out of any such def iciency, sh all be brought a gainst any person pe rforming or furnishing the desi g n, planning, supervision, observation of construction, const ru ction of, or land surveying in connec tion with, such an improvement within four (4) year s after substantial co m p l et ion of such an imp ro ve me nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-202 (2000)

.

As our Supreme Court has instructed: “[ T]he designation given to a ca use of a ction do e s n o tn e c e s s ar i l y o r

c o n c l u s i v e l y d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 2 a pp lie s. Rather, we m ust look to the substantive allegations of the complaint.” Chrisman v

. Hill Home De v., Inc. , 978 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tenn. 1998) . The Chrisman Court found t hat an a ction couche d as nuisance was a ctually “a n ‘ac tion[] to rec over damages for any def iciency in the design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, or construction of an improvement t o rea l property.’ ” Id.-5-

at 541 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-202 (1980) ). The Chrisman Cou rt fu rthe r n ote d th a t th is Court hadap p li e d T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 2 to b ar a s u it th a t i n c lu d e d c laim s f

o r f r au d u le nt misrepre sentation and bre ach of expr ess war ranty, a nd one that included c laims for strict liability, br e a c h o f i mpl ie d a nde xp re ss w arr a nti e s, a nd mis re pr e se ntatio n a ndstate d: “ Li ke nu isanc e , th e se claims do not require proof of negligence , yet the statue of repose applies with e qual ef fec t to all of them.” Id . at 540 (discussing Lonning v. Jim Walter Home s, Inc. , 725 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 87 ) ( inc lud ing c la ims o f f r a u du le nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n a ndbr e a c h o f e xp re ss w arr a nty ); Pr ide ma rk Custom Plating, Inc. v. Upjohn, C o. , 702 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ( including claims of strict liability, breach of

implied and expre ss warr anties, and misre prese ntation)).
Plaintiffs a

rgue that they have not sue d for damage s resulting from a c o n struction defe ct but instead have sued for “a ne gligent mi s re p re sentation of complete ness and Notice of Completion.... ” Plaintiffs argue that their claim is based upon the Notice of Completion being negligently filed bec ause D efe ndant had not ac tually c ompleted the construction as require d by the a gr e e me nt b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. After a ca ref ul and thorough re view of the rec ord on ap p eal, we conc lude that rega rdless of how Plaintiffs’ claim is c ouched, the case at hand is an action “to r ecove r dama ges for any def iciency in the design, planning, super vision, observation of construc tion, or construction of an improveme nt to real prope rty, for injury to pro perty, re al or pe rsonal, arising out of any such defic iency....” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-202 (2000) . The mate rial substantive allegati o n s of Plaintiffs’ complaint relate to Def endant’ s alleged ne gligence in the construction of the hous e. As such, the Trial Court did not err in applying Tenn. Code A nn. 28-3-202.

We, the ref

ore, ne xt must consider whethe r the Trial Court erre d in fin d ing that the wrongful c oncea lment exce ption found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205 does not apply i n this case. Inpe rt ine nt p art , T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 8- 3- 20 5 p ro vid e s: The limitation hereby pr ovided shall not be ava ilable as a defe nse to any pe rson who shall have been guilty of fraud in pe rforming or furnishing the desig n , p l an ning, su pervi sion, ob se rv a tio n o f c on str uc tio n, c on str

uc tio n o f, or

la ndsu rv e yin g, in c on ne c tio n w ithsu c h a n impr ov e me nt, or to any pe rs on wh o s ha ll w ro ng fu lly conce al any suc h cause of ac tion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-205(b) (2000).

Pla int if fs a dmi t in the ir

brie f o n a

pp e a l th a t th e y “d o no t and can n ot a c c us e [De fendant] of fr aud or f raudule nt conce al ment; however , Plaintiffs do acc use it of burying and hiding the fac t that it did not finish this j ob acc ording to contra ct.” Plaintiffs attempt to rely upon the portion of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205( b) that provides that the statute of repose will not be available “to any pe rson who shall wrongfully conce al any such c ause of action.” T enn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205( b) (2000)

.

As our Supreme Court stated in Con ley v . S tat e :-6-

[W] e begin our analysis by re viewing fa miliar principles of statutory c onstruction. Our “ primary goa l in interpreting statutes is ‘to asce rtain and give eff ect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.’ ” Ste war t v . S tat e , 33 S

. W.3d 785, 791 (Tenn. 2000) ( quoting Gle aves v. Checker Cab Trans it Corp. , 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000) ). Whe n the s tatutory language is unambiguous, we apply its plain and ordinary me aning. Pl an ne d Par e nth oo d of Mid

dle Te nn . v. Su nd

qu ist , 38 S.W.3d 1, 24 (Tenn. 2000). When the statutory language is ambiguous, we must look to ot her source s, such as legislative history, to determine the intent and purpose of the legislature. Id

. Con ley v . S tat e , 141 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tenn. 2004)

.

By its pl ain and unambiguous language , Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-205( b) provides that the statute of repose will not be available “ to any per son who shall wrongfully conc eal a ny such cause of ac tion.” Howeve r, Plaintiffs’ cla im with rega rd to this issue is predicated upon the assertion that Def endant wr ongfully conce aled c onstruction defe cts and the fac t that the job was not finished according to the contra ct. As this Court stated in Register v. G oad : “ T h e c o n c e a l m e n t r e f e rr e d to in the statute is not concea lment in the original construction, but r ather a conce alment by defe ndant of plaintiff’s c ause of

action once it arises.” Register v. G oad , 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3104, at *9 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. A u g
. 2 3, 1985), no appl. perm. appeal filed . Plaintiffs make no allegation that De fe nd a nt did a ny thi ng to c on c e a l the c aus e of a c tio n on c e it aro se
. Ra the r, th e “conc e a lme nt” c omp la ine d o f b y Pl a int if fs oc c ur re d inthe origi na l c on str

uc tio n it se lf . As s uc h, Pla int if fs ’ c la im fo r w ro ng fu l c on c e a lme nt f a ils

. Further, “[ w]he re c oncea lment is relied on to toll the statute of limitations i t must be ev id e n c e d , inth e ab s e n c e o f a f id u c ia r y r e lati o n s h ip , b y s o me o v e r t a c t o r a f f irmative repr esentation.” Ogles v. C & S Builders, Inc. , 198 4 Te nn . App . LEX IS 30 42 , at **5 -6 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Aug. 3, 1984), no appl. perm. appeal filed

. The recor d on appea l reve als that both Plainti ffs testif i ed t h at t hey do not ac cuse D efe ndant of doing anything intentionally. In the abse nce of an alleged ove rt ac t or aff

irmative re prese ntation, Plaintiffs cannot rely upon the wrongf ul conce alment exce ption to the statute of repose . We f ind no err or i n the Trial Court’s holding that the wr ongful conce alment exc eption found in Tenn. Code A nn. § 28-3-205 doe s not apply in this case.

As th er e i s no genuine issue of materia l fac t and Def

endant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based upon the expiration of the statute of re pose, we aff irm the Trial Cou rt ’s gr a nt o f s umm ary jud gme nt t o D e fe nd a nt.
Conclusion The judgment of the T rial Court is aff irmed, and this cause is remande d to the Trial Court for collection of t he costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed a gainst the Appellants, Ron Henry and wife , Linda He nry, and the ir surety.-7- ___________________________________ D. MICHAEL SWI NEY, JUDG E