mm 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Go vernors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
MOVING THE FORCE: 

Desert Storm and Beyond 

SCOTT W. CONRAD 

McNair Paper 32 

December 1994 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

[] President: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

[] Director: Hans A. Binnendijk 

Publications Directorate & NDU Press [] Fort Lesley J. McNair 

[] Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 ra Phone: (202) 475-1913 [] Fax: (202) 475-1012 

[] Director: Frederick Kiley [] Chief, Publications Branch: George C. Maerz. 

[] Editors: Jonathan W. Pierce, Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Editor for this volume: Mary A. Sommerville 

[]Secretary: Laura Hall [] Circulation Manager: Myma Morgan, Internet 

MorganM@NDU.edu 

Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. Conrad is an Army Transportation Corps Officer who is 

currently serving as the Chief of Strategic Mobility at the newly formed Naval Doctrine 

Command---4he first Army officer assigned to the command. LTC Conrad is a graduate 

of Bowling Green State University and earned master's degrees from the University of 

Puget Sound and the Naval War College. He wrote this monograph while a Senior 

Fellow at the National Defense University. 

INSS publishes the McNair Papers to provoke thought and inform discussion on issues 

of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present current 

topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, 

international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and 

coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those 

of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. 

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with 

credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. A courtesy copy 

of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated. 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISSN 1071-7552 
Contents 

Preface ............................... 1 

. NOTHING HAPPENS UNTIL SOMETHING 

MOVESi ............................. 3 

Three Levels of Movement ............... 9 

The Theater Commander's View at the 

Terminal Port ..................... 10 

. PREPARATION FOR DESERT STORM .... 13 

Transporting a Highly Mobile Armor Force °.. 13 

The Decision to Increase Ammunition Supplies i5 

Iraq's Advantage: Strategic Geography and 

Surprise ......................... 17 

The Saudi Decision to Allow Access ....... 17 

Iraqi Isolation Versus the U.S.-led Coalition .. 18 

The Right Force, the Wrong Scenario ...... 19 

The Four U.S. Objectives ............... 20 

. MOVING THE FORCE IN DESERT STORM . 23 

A Systems Approach .................. 24 

Everything in War is High Priority ......... 26 

Closing the Window of Vulnerability ........ 28 

One Hand Tied ...................... 29 

Balanced Strategic Force and Mobility ...... 33 

Shortage of Surge Sealift ............... 35 

An Inefficient Distribution System ......... 38 

Gaining Air Supremacy ................. 39 

The Luxury of Time to Deploy Forces ...... 40 

The Key to Victory: A Decisive Force ...... 42 

Lean and Mean We Were Not! ........... 43 

Forward Basing and Pre-positioning ....... 45 

Trucks Are Power .................... 46 

iii 
. MOVING THE FORCE IN FUTURE 

CONFLICTS .......................... 5! 

The Afterglow of Desert Storm ............ 54 

Improving Strategic Surge Lift and Prepositioning Capability .................. 55 

The Broken Link Between industry and 

Government ...................... 60 

Integrating Operational Transport into the 

Mobility Strategy ................... 61 

Streamlining the Force .................. 68 

Exploiting America's High-Technology 

Advantage ....................... 70 

Figures 

1, Map of Saudi Arabia .................. 14 

2. Joint Theater Movement Control Agency: 

Strategic-Operational Interface ......... 65 

Notes ................................ 77 

iv 
MOVING THE FORCE: 

Desert Storm and Beyond 

PREFACE 

Without oil, no engine can run. Movement is the oil that enables 

America's military forces to sustain an operation, and nothing 

happens until something moves/ As America's military priorities 

are reordered, the ability to move quickly, sustain forces 

anywhere in the world, and pre-position equipment and materiel 

near likely areas of crisis is more important than ever. Because 

of the apparent ease of movement during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, however, decisionmakers may, in the afterglow of 

the Desert Storm victory, be prone to misinterpret the lessons of 

the Gulf War and fail to address movement capabilities properly 

for the future. A good example is a recent Congressional 

decision to divert ftmds froin slated ~anprovements to the Army's 

afloat pre-positioning capability to the building of an amphibious 

assault ship. 

The capacity to foster global stability and defend our national 

interests depends upon correct long-range planning tor transport. 

Logistics---especially mobility--has long been a bill payer for 

combat equipment, so perhaps a reappraisal is in order. Lessons 

of the Gulf War can help reshape America's defense transportation system for the post-Cold War era. Commitment to a 

balanced and unified mobility strategy should provide the most 

cost effective, rapidly deployable, and sustainable combat 

capability. Regional f0cus--particularly in a multiple-conflict 

scenario--and reduced forward presence will significantly 

increase America's reliance on movement in the future. Careful 
2 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

restructuring of military movement capabilities will lessen the 

risks of distance and time in an unstable world and contribute to 

the economic well-being of the nation. To do less might invite 

confrontation with adversaries willing to test the substance and 

purpose of our reach. 
• 

NOTHING HAPPENS UNTIL 

SOMETHING MOVES! 

In a tale of war, the fierce glory that plays on red triumphant bayonets 

dazzles the obsetwer. Nor does he care to look behind to where along 

the thousand miles of rail, road and river, the convoys are crawling to 

the front in uninterrupted succession. Victory is the beautiful, bright 

colored flower. Transportation is the stem without which it would 

never have blossomed. 

Winston Churchill 

The River War, 1899 

The death knell of superpower communism was also a signal to 

those who would listen that America's 40-year strategy of global 

containment was shifting to one of supporting regional stability. 

After those 40 years of planning on a U.S.-Soviet standoff, what 

actually drove us to war was a regional flashpoint. We may 

debate whether Desert Storm represented the last page of the 

Cold War or the first of the "new world order," but of one thing 

we can be certain: The function of movement that had so often 

taken a back seat in American military planning was suddenly 

thrust into the forefront. The massive Persian Gulf War 

deployment was perhaps the greatest in the history of the world. 

The brevity of waming time, the massive size of the force, the 

lack of pre-positioned equipment, the immense distance from the 

United States to the Arabian Peninsula, and the threat of 

imminent Iraqi attack required more lift in a shorter period than 

ever before. General Jimmy D. Ross, then the U.S. Army's 

3 
4 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, likened the feat to "moving 

the entire population, and all movable objects, from Atlanta, to 

Saudi Arabia"--a distance of well over 8,000 milesJ On the 

battlefield, transporters then spearheaded the now famous "Hail 

Mary" flanking action, sealing tile Gulf War victory. 

While the accomplishments of Gulf War transporters-- 

truckers, stevedores, movement controllers, terminal operators, 

pilots and merchant mariners, alike--were truly Herculean, lack 

of transportation was the key limiting factor in our eventual Gulf 

War victory. The mark of a successful movement system is one 

invisible to combat forces; it is gauged by how little it influences 

the commander's actions and available options. Because of the 

constant concem and impact of transportation shortages, such w~.~ 

not the case in Desert Shield or Desert Storm. 

In July 1990, with the Soviet Union in disarray, the U.S. 

military faced major budgetary cutbacks--the so-called "peace 

dividend." The desert war, however, provided a reality check: 

Perhaps America should maintain the capability to project a 

decisive land force to distant shores, after all. Throughout the 

buildup, many had recognized that all the planning, training, and 

equipping imaginable would not get forces to the fight. Only the 

capacity to deploy anywhere, with the right mix of firepower and 

support, in sufficient time would do the job. The Gulf War's 

successes aside, various aspects of our movement capacity did 

not measure up to this test. 

With fewer forces, based primarily in the United States, we 

may not have the luxury of 6 months to respond decisively to a 

future regional contingency. We will need more reliable and 

more rapid sealift, airlift and pre-positioning than we had during 

Desert Storm. While we may never again mount the scale of 

forces levied against Iraq, the Gulf War remains a model for 

contingency transportation planning in future regional conflicts. 

Furthermore, because the mobility decisions ahead affect all 

forces jointly, the decisions on lift should be made jointly, not by 

individual services. 

Although Gulf War deployment triumphs were highly 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 5 

publicized, its shortcomings were not. Logistical lessons are 

often the most quickly forgotten aspects of any conflict. During 

crisis, there is no opportunity for reflective analysis of the lessons 

that the event teaches. Ultimately, the victor will recall the 

successes, and forget failures and the contribution of good luck 

along the way to success. If we believe, though, that our side 

was the source of all meaningful understanding of the war, then 

we have missed a vital point. Aspiring adversaries will surely 

exploit Iraq's mistakes in future conflict. In victory, our greatest 

danger is to learn and apply the wrong lessons. 

Desert Storm provides a benchmark for future military 

planning. Is there common ground that the Gulf War shares with 

past experiences that may draw us to follow or avoid these 

lessons in the future? If so, how will we use this knowledge? 

Our nation has a track record of demobilizing poorly, 

probably because of a traditional American aversion to large 

standing forces. The trend has been for government to 

demobilize rapidly and massively, turn attention to the civilian 

economy in an effort to stimulate it, then hasten a retum to 

peacetime production. This trend usually has led to toleration of 

a less-than-ready military capability° As General George C. 

Marshall described it, "We have tried since the birth of our 

Nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. 

This course has failed us utterly." 

Because of our military history, trite phrases now abound 

regarding the poor decisions made during retrenchment and 

downsizing: 

* Don't prepare tofight the last war. 

* You are destined to repeat the mistakes of the last 

conflict if you do not learn from them. 

* No more Task Force Smith's (referring to the debacle of 

unprepared and ill-equipped soldiers first deployed to Korea in 

July 1950). 

The demobilization decisions made in the "in-between years" 

have traditionally led to poor preparedness to fight the next 

conflict, no doubt convincing adversaries of our vulnerability. 
6 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

Yet, if we can learn from Desert Storm, America will accomplish 

a responsible drawdown, while maintaining necessary capabilities. 

Too often in our military past, peacetime systems and 

procedures have been replaced by wartime pandemonium--as if 

that's the way it's supposed to be. Somehow, ad hoc logistics has 

become America's standard operating procedure in war. In stark 

contrast to tactical doctrine, which is studied and finely honed, 

logisticians often support that doctrine by the seat of their pants 

and relegate movement to the art of improvisation. And we have 

proven to be great improvisers! High technology and the myriad 

new roles and missions, however, may not allow the ad hoc to 

continue serving us so well. 

Desert Storm euphoria should not overshadow an accurate 

assessment and clear articulation of transportation successes and 

failures. What worked and what did not work? What 

capabilities are worth preserving, or improving upon, and which 

are not? What uniquely occurred or, unexpectedly, did not 

occur? Answering these questions is the basis of this work. 

As we embark on a course to meet tomorrow's defense 

challenges, will tight budgets, a renewal of the Fortress America 

view, or the apparent transport success of the Gulf War convince 

decisionmakers to neglect building this nation's military 

movement capability? At a time when America's military 

priorities are being reordered, we must answer this critical 

question: Is the ability to move quickly, sustain forces anywhere 

in the world, and pre-position equipment and materiel near likely 

areas of crisis still important? The capacity to foster global 

stability and defend America's national interests rests upon the 

outcome of this debate. 

The military spending decisions ahead will be fraught with 

difficult tradeoffs. Logistics--especially mobility--has been a 

traditional bill payer for combat equipment. Despite the robust 

defense budgets of the 1980s, actual improvements in the nation's 

military mobility never kept pace with the requirements identified 

in many Congressionally mandated mobility studies. As we 

downsize, the Services' temptation will be to take the traditional 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 7 

salami-slice approach, making defense cuts equaUy across-theboard. This will leave us with less of everything, including lift. 

The demobilization of a nation calls for dramatic action. 

Otherwise, defeat in future conflicts is sealed. Warnings from 

the Final Report of the Army Service Forces after World War II 

ring true today: 

It is inevitable that the human tendencies to revert to old habits of 

thought and action, to promote segmentary interest, to protect the 

established order, to resist change, to be swayed by sentiment, will 

exert powerful influences. These tendencies have no place in our 

efforts to ensure our Nation's security. Realism demands that we 

rise above lesser motivations and loyalties and work always for the 

highest good of the Nation. 2 

America's military now confronts a declining budget, 

shrinking manpower, increasing weapon costs, erosion of the 

available industrial base, slow access to high-tech advances, and 

increasing dependence on foreign sources. In the midst of these 

challenges, our stewardship has to target resources where they 

count the most: to empower the National Security Strategy. If 

moving the force--providing robust transportation support--is 

considered an essential enabling requirement, our commitment 

should provide the most cost effective, rapidly deployable and 

sustainable combat capability--the most logistical bang for the 

buck. We must reforge links with industry, secure quick access 

to state-of-the-art technology~ achieve lower costs with higher 

quality, and assure rapid response to crisis demands. 

We have undergone a remarkable strategic metamorphosis in 

an amazingly short period. The free world has moved from a 

high-threat, highly stable conflict environment, to one of low 

threat, but low stability. The risk of conflict with the Soviet 

Union once provided a benchmark for defense planning. The 

road to meet the next threat is not signed so well. The Middle 

East continues to simmer, as does the Western Hemisphere, the 

Pacific Rim, Eastern Europe and the Horn of Africa. While the 

United States now has no major adversaries, it lives in a world 
8 MOVING THE FORCE: Dose,d( Storm and Beyond 

that is more unstable than ever. The Department of Defense 

estimates that by the year 2000, 15 developing nations will have 

ballistic missiles; eight of these may be nuclear-capable. An 

estimated 30 nations will have chemical weapons and 10 more 

will have biological weapons. More than a dozen developing 

nations already possess large and capable armored forces. 3 

Clearly, we should not assume that future conflicts, even in lesser 

developed areas, will be low intensity or low risk. We may face 

very well armed adversaries. 

The shape of conflict is changing as well. It may be waged 

with little or no allied backing, and with unknown host nation 

support or infrastructure. Any fighting that we do will probably 

occur far from our borders, in lands that cannot adequately 

receive our ships and planes° Can our forces get there quickly 

enough? Will the power we project be effective upon arrival, be 

sustainable, and able to quickly defeat any enemy? On the 

leading edge, the Army Strategic Mobility Program ambitiously 

establishes critical deployment time lines for one major regional 

contingency: The lead brigade must be on the ground in 4 days; 

the first light division by day 12; two more heavy divisions in 

place by day 30; and the full corps (five divisions and all of their 

support elements) must close by day 75. 4 This schedule calls for 

well-equipped mobility power because if we cannot project 

contingency forces rapidly, they will not deter or shorten 

conflicts. 

A quantum leap in the type of conflict we can expect to 

encounter is on the horizon. Massive armored warfare will be 

eclipsed by intervention operations of rapidly deployable, but 

.highly lethal, forces. This leap commands an equally bold shift 

in our framework for moving forces and the priority we set for 

the mobility tools we will use to move them. Although it will be 

very, tempting to further cut the "tooth-to-tail" ratio as defense 

dollars shrink, the order of the day must be cold calculation and 

a pragmatic assessment of what is truly essential for the 

warfighting CINC to win decisively on tomorrow's battlefield. 

Transportation has ,been a critical factor in strategy since 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 9 

fighting men carried equipment on their backs and lived off 

countries where they were engaged. It has grown more important 

as the scope of hostilities has widened, and the burden of military 

equipment and supplies has increased. 5 Transportation enables 

any operation to begin and end, and nothing happens until 

something moves. Movement includes transport of forces, their 

equipment, and their logistics requirements to the battlefield. 

More than just the use of sea, air and land, it also includes 

planning, setting priorities, controlling, and allocating 

transportation resources. Movement is the glue that binds 

sustainment and all other battlefield functions together. 

THREE LEVELS OF MOVEMENT 

• Strategic Movement involves transporting forces, their 

accompanying equipment~ and supplies from the United States 

and other theaters to the theater of operations. Sealift, airlift, and 

the pre-positioning of supplies and equipment form the strategic 

mobility triad. Each has advantages and disadvantages, and each 

technique's strengths compensate for the other's limitations. 

Sealift has the largest capacity and is inexpensive, but it is slow 

and relies on available ports and open sea lanes. Airlift is fast 

and flexible, but is expensive and has limited capacity. For 

example, the first two fast sealift ships deployed to Saudi Arabia 

arrived 3 weeks after initial alert, but they carded more 

equipment and cargo than all aircraft had delivered to that point. 

Airlift depends upon available airfields and open air routes. Prepositioning, either afloat or on land, places cargo and equipment 

closest to where they may be most needed in advance, thus 

minimizing onward movement. It was the pre-positioned ships 

of the Marine Corps and Army that saved the day during the 

early stages of Desert Shield. They delivered sufficient military 

supplies when not much else was available in the theater of 

operations. 

• Operational Movement marshals available military and 

host-nation transportation assets--watercraft, airplanes, trains and 

tracks--to provide reception and onward movement of forces and 
10 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

their logistics support within the theater. Operational movement 

varies from theater to theater. In a European scenario, the 

conflict is with civilian traffic over an extremely crowded 

transportation network~ In a regional conflict, the challenge may 

be just the opposite---dealing with a limited movement capacity 

unable to support heavy and oversized equipment demands. 

Normally accessible ship off-loading cranes and other materialshandling equipment may be scarce or nonexistent. Host nation 

support may also be insufficient to augment military 

transportation. 6 Ports in the theater of operations represent me 

transition point between strategic and operational movement. 

• Tactical Movement affords combat units the ability to 

position forces and critical supplies on the battlefield with 

assigned trucks or helicopters, before, during and after 

engagements with the enemy. As might be expected, available 

transportation assets at this level are significantly less than at the 

operational level. 

THE THEATER COMMANDER'S VIEW AT 

THE TERMINAL PORT 

Because movement is logistics' bridge between strategy and 

tactics, the commander's perspective is vital. The words of that 

quintessential operator and logistician Rear Admiral Henry Eccle 

resonate: 

The logistic viewpoint is essentially that of the commander. The 

command point of view is that logistics itself has no purpose other 

than to create and to support combat forces, which are responsive 

to the needs of the commander. The end product of logistics lies 

in the operations of combat force. 7 

It's useful to review military operations from the viewpoint 

of a warfighting CINC. The planning process--from drawing 

arrows on the map to putting troops on the ground--is a long and 

difficult one. Envision what might be needed most to support the 

next operation. How can you effectively shape the strategic 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 11 

landscape through combat power and logistics? What capability 

is necessary to accomplish operational aims? What are the 

movement requirements? 

• Look outward. How quickly must the force be in place 

to be effective? Do you count on any waming time? How big 

a force and what of type of force do you need to get the job done 

decisively? 

• Look inward. After their arrival, over what routes and 

distances must forces move to reach operational and strategic 

objectives? What support can the host nation render? How long 

and at what pace do you need to sustain the force--what is the 

time line for conflict termination? 

These are crucial questions that movement directly affects. 

The answers are critical from the vantage point of the theater 

conmlander. "A higher commander must think BIG," Field 

Marshall Slim once advised. Although the tendency may be to 

apply the broad brush approach ("Get there fast with lots of 

stuff!"), detailed planning is essential. 

We have too frequently come to believe that armies can 

magically move anywhere, in any direction, at almost any speed, 

once their commanders have made up their minds to do so--as 

if it were all a giant board game. Perhaps this perception is due 

to the great military history saga--or maybe CNN. However, in 

reality, commanders cannot do so, and, according to the 

distinguished scholar Martin Van Creveld, failure to recognize 

this fact has probably mined more campaigns than enemy actions 

have.8 

How will America face tomorrow's challenges to its vital 

interests, or respond to the requests of our allies or the United 

Nations? The resources that we now assign to improving our 

global reach and operational agility---our movement capacity-- 

will define us as a nation into the 21st century. In March 1994 

testimony before Congress, regional CINCs left no doubt that 

shortage of lift was their number one concern--a "show stopper 

for a two-war scenario." Improving these capabilities will 

increase our options in any given scenario by reducing 
12 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

limitations. Only through such an effort will the United States 

maintain its freedom to achieve national aims--the ultimate 

purpose of any strategy. 
11 

PREPARATION FOR 

DESERT STORM 

This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait. 

President George Bush 

August 5, 1990 

On August 2, 1990, forces from Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait 

and successfully seized control of the Emirate within 24 hours. 

Iraq's battle-tested army of one-million men was touted as the 

world's fourth largest. It was equipped with some 5,500 tanks, 

5,000 armored vehicles, 5,700 tank transporters, 5,000 support 

vehicles, 700 modem combat planes, and vast supplies of guided 

missiles and artillery pieces. ~ They appeared formidable. 

TRANSPORTING A HIGHLY MOBILE 

ARMOR FORCE 

The less a unit weighs, the easier it is to move strategically. But 

there's a catch: Upon arrival, its ground mobility depends on how 

mechanized the unit is. That is why light and medium forces 

have predominated in America's initial response during recent 

military interventions. The basis for this predomination has been 

their rapid deployability--not the overwhelming firepower those 

units brought to the battlefield. In a world now demanding 

potential response across the spectrum of conflict and 

peacemaking, this logic is flawed---we have designed too few 

forces capable of rapid deployability. The United States must be 

able not only to project a light or medium force quickly to 

13 
(Source: Association of the U.S. Army, Institute of Land Warfare, Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm: The Logistics Perspective, Special Report, 

September 1991.) 

demonstrate American presence and resolve, but also to confront 

regional armies rapidly, including armies possessing hundreds or 

thousands of tanks with strong anti-armor power. The strategic 

deployment ramifications of these force capabilities are 

significantly different: The former force requires available surge 

airlift; the latter calls for pre-positioning and fast sealift to move 

the force. 

The Gulf War proved to be one of highly lethal, set-piece 

battles requiring many tanks and attack helicopters, and the 

requisite ships to get them there. The most mobile force on the 

battlefield includes armored and mechanized infantry divisions 

whose primary weapons are the M! Abrams Main Battle Tank 

(weighing over 67 tons), and the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

(weighing about 33 tons combat loaded). These systems usually 

deploy by sea because they are so large. (For example, only one 

M1 can be transported aboard the gigantic C-5 Galaxy). This 

14 
SCO'FI'W. CONRAD 15 

force is the most draining on strategic mobility resources because 

of heavy weight, associated high volumes of ammunition, and 

support requirements. 

Strategic mobility has eroded as the force has steadily put on 

weight. According to the Armed Forces Journal, the weight of 

a mechanized division has grown 40 percent since 1980. During 

Operation Desert Shield, the defensive phase of the Gulf War, 

each division required 345,000 gallons of diesel fuel, 50,000 

gallons of aviation fuel, 213,000 gallons of water, and 208 40- 

foot trailers of other supplies ranging from barrier material to 

ammunition each day, During the 100-hour offensive of 

Operation Desert Storm, a single division consumed 2.4 million 

gallons of fuel transported on 475 5,000-gallon tankers----eight 

times the amount sold by the average service station in a month. 2 

We make our weapon systems more effective so they can put 

more rounds on target, in less time. Target acquisition and fire 

control processes are at the moment the limiting factors to 

maximum effectiveness. Soon, lack of strategic transport to 

deploy equipment and battlefield transport to move the additional 

ammunition will replace them as limiting elements. 3 Awareness 

of this problem has resulted in an emphasis on how to get more 

fuel and ammunition forward faster and has focused the 

acquisition community on pursuit of more capability° Unless we 

improve strategic lift and operational transport, the United States 

will have an even harder time getting forces to war in the future. 

Taking the longer view, it may be wise to concentrate technology 

efforts on lightening the heavy burden of high mobility and 

reducing fuel and ammunition consumption, while improving 

lethality. 

THE DECISION TO INCREASE 

AMMUNITION SUPPLIES 

Because of the ammunition-intensive environment of the mobile 

battlefield, commanders want as much as they can get. When 

15 
16 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

planning work began on offensive operations, General H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf decided to "up" the requirement for ammunition on 

the ground--from 30 days of supply to 60 days. The cascade 

effect of this decision upon transportation was tremendous. From 

additional shipping to the associated people, everything increased. 

According to Lieutenant Generai William, Pagonis, who headed 

the Army's logistical, effort in the Gull just the unused 

ammunition that remained in the sands after the fight amounted 

to 250,000 tons--about two-and-one-half times the weight of the 

newest aircraft carrier. 4 Eventually, over 220,000 tank cannon 

rounds were moved to the themer, only 3,600 rounds of which 

were actually fired. 5 Just as in the past, instead of asking, "How 

much do we need?" the emphasis was on "How much can we 

get?" (Not surpisingly, this emphasis has not been corrected in 

more recent operations. The Army used nine ships to deploy 

equipment and supplies from the United States and Europe to 

support Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Almost 18 percent 

was reloaded and returned to origin without use--representing 

more thall all entire fast sealift ship [FSS] worth of cargo. 6 ) 

IRAQ'S ADVANTAGE: STRATEGIC 

GEOGRAPHY AND SURPRISE 

Iraq's sinister attack on and seizure of Kuwait was bad enough, 

but along with the defeated nation, the tyrant held hostage much 

of the world's oil supply. Regional hegemony, if not global 

control of the precious commodity, loomed real. The free world 

was galvanized and the prospect of intervention seemed 

inevitable. During that first week in August, 1 1 Iraqi divisions 

were in, or deploying to, Kuwait. 7 They appeared to be massing 

for further advance against the region's linchpin, Saudi Arabia. 

Iraq's armor force was already positioned and poised for further 

advance. Gulfs and oceans separated Saudi Arabia from friendly 

nations that could bring a comparably heavy force to the fray. 

16 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 17 

Spade work had fortunately begun in the fall of 1989 to 

counter a regional threat to the Arabian Peninsula--a shift away 

from the previous U.S.-Soviet confrontation scenario. In spring 

1990, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had prepared a 

preliminary plan that roughly outlined the necessary forces and 

basic strategy for such a defense. By July 1990 this outline plan 

was in the f'mal stages of development, but still without the 

resources of identified forces and transportation. To test the plan, 

CENTCOM's Commander in Chief Gen. Schwarzkopf conducted 

a wargaming exercise, Internal Look 90. It provided a clear 

vision of how the United States might defend Saudi Arabia and 

greatly facilitated an American response. Demonstrating that we 

at least had a plan gave the Saudis a sense of U.S. resolve when 

the aggression occurred. 8 

THE SAUDI DECISION TO ALLOW ACCESS 

King Fahd, Saudi Arabia's head of state, at first demurred against 

American attempts to use his coumry as a stronghold. Key U.S. 

envoys (including Gen. Schwarzkopf and Secretary of Defense 

Dick Cheney) ultimately convinced him of the approaching 

danger. Eventually he requested U.S. military assistance to deter 

such an attack and defend his nation. If the United States had 

not gained ready passage to the ports of Saudi Arabia, its 

determination to deploy forces may have been far more tenuous. 

There were few viable military options. American forces could 

have been forced to move slowly over flae unsecured beaches of 

Kuwait, or let Iraqi aggression go unchecked. 

Saddam Hussein viewed his "bold annexation of Iraq's 19th 

province" as a means to assume the mantle of leadership of the 

Arab world. By annexing Kuwait, he also gained 40 percent of 

the world's oil reserves---oil that could help resolve his country's 

pressing economic problems. 9 Others saw it differently, and the 

brutal aggression was so wanton that it greatly simplified the task 

to muster world response and unify a coalitiorL 

17 
i8 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

The United States believed that the unprovoked attack 

threatened the world's oil supply and decided to "redress a great 

wrong. ''1° To Arab neighbors who became part of the coalition, 

conflict appeared inevitable, if distasteful. Saddam's fanaticism 

and deception had already worn thin with them. Others 

throughout the world less threatened by Iraq nevertheless feared 

the potential long-term repercussions of doing nothing. Forces 

of America and 38 other nations therefore took on the task of 

deterring Iraq from further attack. The entire United Nations, 

even the Soviet Union and China, backed the responses and did 

not interfere with the U.S.-led military operations. 

Once President Bush decided to intervene, public sentiment 

for action appeared unwavering. Americans stood with the world 

community against aggression. If there were to be war, 

American soldiers would fight side-by-side with the soldiers of 

other nations to evict Iraq from Kuwait. 

IRAQI ISOLATION VERSUS THE U.S.-LED 

COALITION 

Iraq was denied freedom of action largely because it had no 

meaningful strategic alliances, but the alliances forged over the 

years brought America essential strategic access. Besides Saudi 

Arabia's cooperation, more than 80 percent of deploying flights 

flowed through en-route staging bases in Spain and Germany. 

Global deployment required overflight agreements from many 

governments. At this critical time, European countries also made 

key transportation contributions to supplement America's 

resources--then fully employed moving U.S.-based forces. 

While some nations contributed money, many others provided 

critical operational transportation assets to attain coalition 

membership (e.g., barges, tank transporters, trucks, and land 

rovers). These assets proved indispensable to the total success of 

the war effort, and they made the war less expensive for the 

United States to prosecute. 

18 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 19 

Previous to Desert Shield~Desert Storm, there had been lip 

service but precious little real accomplishment toward 

interoperability. So the United States remained self-reliant for all 

equipment and resupply. There was almost no sharing of 

supplies and equipment among allies in the operational theater, 

which further drained U.S. transportation resources. Having 

witnessed the success of Desert Shield~Desert Storm, Americans 

may not be willing to support future violent intervention without 

the added strength of a coalition. Indeed, resource considerations 

alone militate toward this conclusion. 

THE RIGHT FORCE, THE WRONG 

SCENARIO 

Events in the Arabian desert in 1990-91 had their basis in a 

nearly 50-year-old commitment by the United States. In 1943, 

President Roosevelt declared, "The defense of Saudi Arabia is 

vital to the defense of ',he United States. ;'1~ President Carter 

conceived the Rapid Deployment Force concept in 1979, aiming 

to protect America's national interests in the Middle East. 

President Reagan gave the concept teeth when he activated the 

very real, if not fully manned, U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) in 1983. Previous Middle Eastern operation plans 

had focused on responding to a potential Soviet onslaught into 

Iran. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, though envisioned by a few, 

surprised many policy makers and military planners. 

On August 6, 1990, President Bush ordered U.S. forces to 

commence deployment as part of Operation Desert Shield (to 

emphasize that it shielded Saudi Arabia from further attack). 

Ironically, it was ultimately the right force for the wrong 

scenario---Fulda Gap and Kola Peninsula replaced within the 

blink of an eye by Wadi A1-Batin and the Persian Gulf. 

Following Vietnam and the Soviet buildup in Germany, U.S. 

Army doctrine had taken on a distinctly Central European flavor. 

There, a significant transportation infrastructure was in place, and 

19 
20 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

although substantial, America's presence was as a part of a larger 

alliance. The anticipated warning time and support structure of 

a war in Europe caused many to discount the notion of preparing 

for a come-as-you-are war. The Gulf War should by now have 

changed this mind set. 

Our ability to project forces rapidly and massively, halfway 

around the world---contemplated but never accomplished--was 

put to the ultimate test. Within days, the nation energized its 

defense mobility resources. 

THE FOUR U.S. OBJECTIVES 

• Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi 

forces from Kuwait 

• Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate govemment 

• Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 

• Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens 

abroad. ~2 

Noticeably absent from the list was perhaps our true vital 

interest--preservation of access to oil. Many coalition members 

had similar motivation. America's objectives also did not 

directly address a desire to balance military power in the region. 

This balance had significantly shifted in Iraq's favor because of 

its successful war with Iran. Finally, although rallying public 

opinion included branding Saddam Hussein "another Hitler," 

stated policy did not include his removal from power. 

The JCS translated these political aims into four military 

objectives: 

• Develop a defensive capability in the Persian Gulf region 

to deter Saddam Hussein from further attacks 

• Defend Saudi Arabia effectively if deterrence failed 

• Build a militarily effective coalition and integrate coalition 

forces into operational plans 

• Enforce the economic sanctions prescribed by UN Security 

Council Resolutions. 13 

20 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 21 

These initial objectives did not include forceful restoration of 

Kuwait's rightful government, if sanctions failed. This option 

would require the deployment of a significantly larger force, one 

that the United States could not, initially, move to the battlefield. 

The overall intent of deterrence and defense options was to 

confront Iraq with tlae prospects of unacceptable costs and a 

widened conflict with the United States. 14 Initially, this called for 

deploying a force at least equal to Iraq's that should have been 

able to deploy quickly. 

21 
m 

MOVING THE FORCE 

IN DESERT STORM 

I can't give credit enough to the logisticians and the transporters who 

were able to pull this off. 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf 

February 27, 1991, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 

Pre-hostility estimates suggested that a potential adversary's 

armor columns could reach defensive positions near the Saudi 

Arabian port at A1-Jubayl in just 4 weeks (19 days of prehostility buildup and 9 more days of movement to reach the 

objective). 1 To counter this threat, planners calculated that 

adequate forces would take at least 17 weeks to deploy--too late 

to defend Saudi Arabia, much less deter aggression. 2 

The Army's lead elements launched their deployment to 

Saudi Arabia on August 7 (designated as C-day, for the first day 

of deployment). This began Phase I of the fastest buildup and 

movement of combat power across the greatest distances in 

history. 3 Distances were immense--7,000 airlift miles and 8,700 

sealift miles from the east coast of the United States. During that 

first deployment phase, which lasted from August 7 until 

November 8, the United States moved about 1,000 aircraft, 60 

Navy ships, 250,000 tons of supplies and equipment, and 240,000 

military personnel to the Gulf. 4 By historical contrast, the United 

States airlifted 168,400 to Vietnam in 1965, during the most 

intense 1-year buildup of that conflict. 5 In the first month of the 

Korean Conflict, America sealifted 79,965 tons of equipment and 

cargo. 6 We moved over 21⁄2 times that amount--300,000 

23 
24 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

tons--during those first 30 days of the Gulf War] 

While impressive in gross terms, these numbers conceal that 

it took over 11⁄2 months to get the first full heavy division, the 

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), in place. Nearly 7 months 

passed before a sustainable force, capable of offensive operations, 

was fully positioned, in large part because of transport 

limitations. 8 Hardly rapid! 

On the other side of the coin was the success story- of the 

afloat pre-positioning ships---particularly those of the Marine 

Corps' Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons (MPS) that were 

completely outfitted with two Marine Expeditionary Brigades 

(MEB). Each squadron contains 30 days of supplies and 

equipment for a MEB of about 16,500 Marines. To deploy the 

Marines and marry them up with an MPS requires 249 C-141 

sorties. Amazingly, it would take about 4,500 sorties to deploy 

a force of that size without the MPS ships. Arriving just 10 days 

after call-up, this was our most responsive means of delivering 

necessary supplies and equipment in the first days of Desert 

Shield. 9 The MPS ships took less than hall: the time to deliver 

their cargoes than if transported directly from the United States. 

A SYSTEMS APPROACH 

The massive amount of cargo and people to be moved to any 

theater in war requires an automated systems approach to plan 

and execute deployment. The purpose of the strategic planning 

process is to produce a scheme that will effectively project the 

right blend of combat and support forces to a theater of 

operations--in time. Joint planners incrementally synchronize the 

movement of forces because there isn't enough transport to move 

them all simultaneously. Terminal ports would be deluged unless 

this phasing were accomplished. 

Running computer simulations of the transportation 

requirements (forces and cargo that must be moved, and the time 

line for their arrival), and capabilities (strategic lift assets 

allocated and available) produces the sort of information that 

allows automation to manage deployments more simply. If the 
SCOFF W. CONRAD 25 

simulations identify a transportation shortfall, planners devise 

ways to eliminate bottlenecks or redesign the plan to fit the 

limitations. Ultimately, they determine if forces will arrive on 

time and if support can be fumished. 

Because the Saudi Arabian defense plan was not yet 

finalized, much of the deployment data had not yet been 

automated, so the deployment execution system was not brought 

on line as intended. Early in Desert Shield, most of the 

movement was managed manually; planners improvised, making 

up the force deployment list as they executed it. 

Without having stood the test of the iterative planning 

process, or the benefit of fully functional automation to simplify 

the deployment, airlift and sealift did not operate at full capacity. 

Deploying units often didn't know where or when to meet their 

deploying aircraft, or marry up equipment with departing ships. 

This caused some planes to fly virtually empty or with low 

priority cargo, and single tmit's equipment to be carried on 

multiple ships. Later, in the last mad rush to push troops into the 

theater, synchronization of troop and equipment arrival became 

low priority. The air war started with 30,000 VII Corps 

soldiers--a lucrative target--still waiting at the ports for their 

equipment. 

Midstream revisions in the unit movement flow priority, 

caused by the constantly and quickly changing operational 

situation in Saudi Arabia, created havoc for the computers, not to 

mention the affected units and transport assets. Ask a transporter 

about the scene of converging units and cargo---often of 

unknown origirr---that began to appear at air and seaports such as 

Dover, Jacksonville, Charleston, Savannah, and Bayonne 

beginning in mid-August. It was bedlam. Because of the nonotice nature of the conflict and the constantly revised 

prioritization of unit deployments, planning and execution were 

frequently simultaneous acts. 

The magnitude of this operation required an automated means 

to turn on certain types of forces for deployment and tum off 

others. In an engaged theater, the operational situation changes 
26 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

moment to moment, so our deployment system must have the 

capability to adjust accordingly. But at some point, changes to 

the unit deployment sequencing must stop. All deploying units 

are directly affected by the on-again, off-again nature of most 

deployments. And, as a senior Desert Storm logistician noted, "I 

found that the people I was requesting on Day One were not 

necessarily the people I needed most when they arrived on Day 

Six. ''1° 

When Iraq attacked Kuwait, the CENTCOM Commander 

quickly reviewed the bidding. With a focus on rapidly injecting 

deterrent combat power, it became clear to him that something 

had to give: There simply wasn't enough quickly available 

strategic lift to move the range of forces necessary to attain stated 

objectives--the requirement was greater than the capability. 

There was the very real threat that Iraq would exploit Saudi 

Arabia's vulnerability and continue the drive south. The theater 

commander had to figure out what he could live without for the 

short run to defend Saudi Arabia, and he decided that the answer 

was logistics. Thus, Schwarzkopf made the early decision to 

front load mobile combat units into Saudi Arabia. This order had 

tremendous impact upon movement. 

EVERYTHING IN WAR IS HIGH PRIORITY 

Initially, most cargo-capable aircraft were flying into major 

deployment sites to move units. As the number of forces in 

Saudi Arabia grew, the logistics system provided more and more 

cargo for air movement. Because units at war are authorized to 

order supplies at the highest priority, the airlift system--flying 

only high priority cargo--was saturated and could not keep pace 

with demands. By December 1990, there were more than 7,000 

tons of cargo on the ground at just one of the air hubs--Dover 

Air Force Base---exceeding total airlift capacity by sixfold. 

Despite efforts at the highest military levels to reduce the volume 

of cargo that requisitioners and shippers wanted to ship by air, 

the amount of cargo entering the airlift system grew. 

The airlift system could not cope with the volume coming 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 27 

into air bases. So there was no priority among the cargcr----except 

first in, first out. The priority system was not accomplishing its 

purpose. Out of this chaotic situation was borne Desert 

Express--a new priority system within one that was floundering. 

It was modeled after commercial overnight air express delivery 

services. Initially, it entailed a daily C-141 flight from 

Charleston Air Force Base, flying whether full or not. When the 

plane landed in Saudi Arabia, it was unloaded and the cargo was 

put aboard waiting intra-theater aircraft for immediate delivery to 

the customer. 

To ensure that further backlogs did not subvert the system, 

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) attempted to 

provide discipline by allocating pallet spaces to each of the 

Services. As forces continued to increase, and high priority 

requisitions grew, another Desert Express flight was added, and 

a European Express was committed when units began to arrive 

from Germany. Despite these attempts, the movement system 

remained clogged. 

Movement of units in the desert, from one supporting 

organization to another, often resulted in the same supplies being 

ordered three or more times--all on high-priority requisition. By 

January 1991, the volume of air cargo was out of control. 

Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense had to activate the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage II, to acquire more civilian 

aircraft to haul the backed up air cargo. Strategic plans had long 

envisioned air hauling but 5 percent of all cargo--and only the 

highest priority. In the Gulf War, military and civilian aircraft 

hauled three times that amount--15 percent of all cargo. 1~ 

This was certainly not a new experience for American forces. 

Within 3 three weeks after the Korean Conflict began, it became 

obvious that many of the lessons learned during Worm War II 

had been forgotten. More than one-half of the initial requisitions 

were listed as top priority. Because this priority required air 

transportation, large backlogs of shipments quickly accumulated 

in U.S. ports. Air cargo capabilities could accommodate only a 

fraction of the amounts requested. Flooding the supply ~ystem 
28 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

with top-priority requisitions was self-defeating. Cargo jammed 

air bases in the United States and sat therefor months, although 

it could easily have been delivered in less time by seaiift. Two 

years after the start of the Korean War, an Army general 

inspected the port of Pusan. He reported that, despite prolonged 

hard work, one-fourth of the supply tonnage stored there had still 

not been sorted out. 12 

CLOSING THE WINDOW OF 

VULNERABILITY 

In the initial stages of the conflict, there was just a thin line of 

Saudi forces along the border with Kuwait. Saudi Arabia would 

remain vulnerable until decisive, mobile power could arrive. 

Until these forces could be deployed, Saudi Arabia faced a 

window of vulnerability to the threat of Iraqi attack. As the 

curtain raised on Desert Shield, the theater commander's military 

options were limited by the time required to move heavy forces 

over significant distances. Available strategic transport could not 

meet his required delivery dates. Because of this, holding the 

key desert ports and airfields was weighed to be more important 

than closing logistical power into the theater of operations. 13 

This decision, though apparently prudent, nearly became our 

Achilles' heel. 

Allocating the most and the fastest strategic lift to combat 

units results in a force that is critically unsustainable for some 

period. It also throws an already complex operatiorv--the 

synchronized buildup of a theater support structure---out of kilter. 

Our ability to rapidly deploy forces depends largely on strategic 

air and sealifl and the capacity to throughput forces at ports of 

debarkation. In Desert Shield, the early preferential movement 

of combat forces delayed organizing theater support that future 

operations would dictate. Logistics forces necessary to clear 

ports and airfields, as well as ammunition handling and supply, 

were not available, which limited operational choices. Deployed 

units became tied to host-nation sources and the strategic lifeline. 

The initial support structure was built on an ad hoc basis. 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 29 

Resulting impromptu design was then tied to a defensive posture. 

It was severely stretched when called on to support the offensive 

in Operation Desert Storm and showed early signs of fatigue after 

only 100 hours of intense combat) 4 

The first show of force units in theater, from the 82nd 

Airborne Division, lacked significant mobility, survivability, or 

sufficient firepower to match an Iraqi armored assault. In many 

ways they were no more than a speed bump in the path of the 

fourth largest army in the world. It was, however, one of the few 

forces that could deploy quickly enough to the region. Because 

the 82nd is lighter and less mobile than heavy forces, and 

normally deploys with only a few days of supply. CENTCOM 

planners believed that most of its requirements could be met by 

the host nation. When they arrived in Saudi Arabia, they created 

an immediate demand for resupply, but, with the deployment of 

the airbome division, the line in the sand was drawn. 

One reality of modem warfare emerged: Forces poised for 

rapid deployment grow markedly when faced with a protracted 

conflict. (This observation has been further reinforced during our 

recent Somalian experience). Upon alert, steps were taken 

throughout the 82nd Airbome Division to increase on-hand 

equipment and supplies not normally authorized--especially 

additional antitank weapon systems. This added significantly to 

the transportation requirement and highlighted the propensity to 

rely on early employment of light forces instead of designing a 

rapidly deployable force with more firepower. 

ONE HAND TIED 

Host-nation support requirements were heightened beyond 

original estimates because of the decision not to deploy the 

normal complement of XVIII Airborne Corps logistics elements 

until later. This result was not a surprise. America's military has 

a long tradition of tying one hand behind its back, logistically, 

and then wondering why we commit the same mistake in every 

war. 

Early in 1942, the strategic situation of World War H was 
30 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

precarious. The Russians, long on manpower but short on 

equipment and supplies, were reeling under German blows. It 

was imperative for the Allies to keep Russia in the war and 

actively fighting the bulk of the German land forces. The urgent 

situation required the shipment of badly needed trucks, tanks, and 

guns through the costly northern supply line in the Persian Gulf. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff decided that an attack would be 

made in North Africa in late 1942, and postponed the planned 

cross-channel assault----chert known as Bolero. 15 

The United States was already preparing earnestly for Bolero 

and was committed to the shipment of available troops and 

supplies to the United Kingdom. The early concept of Torch, the 

North African operation, envisaged a joint British-American task 

force to be mounted from the United Kingdom. Considerations 

influencing the early plan were the availability of troops in 

Britain, the short line of communications from England to North 

Africa, the corresponding savings in shipping, and the reduction 

of vulnerability to submarines. 

The plan's logistic disadvantages soon became apparent. 

Sufficient supplies were not on hand in the United Kingdom to 

completely support the American portion of the force. The 

available supplies were not properly warehoused and so were not 

totally useful. This resulted from too few American service troops 

to sustain depot operations in the United Kingdom. Preference 

had been given to the deployment of combat and construction 

troops and antiaircraft units to England. Because of a lack of 

iogisticians, it was impossible to unload supplies from the United 

States, to segregate and store them, and to outload them for 

Africa. 

Meanwhile, troops in the United Kingdom were completing 

their training, receiving their equipment, and moving to ports for 

embarkation. However, much of the equipment that had been 

shipped for these units could not be located in the British Isles 

because it had not been properly identified and stored, thus 

requiring duplicate shipments from the Unites States. This 

further glutted the already tenuous transportation network. 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 31 

Although the receiving capabilities of the North African ports 

and beaches were adequate, the Navy's inability to provide 

enough escorts for cargo convoys required a change in the 

operational plan, which meant that iess cargo could be moved. 

In late September, two movement alternatives were presented: 

(a) Reduce the size of one British task force from 167,000 to 

100,000, and provide full equipment and reserve supplies for all 

forces; (b) employ the original number of men and reduce the 

equipment for the U.S. task forces by approximately 50 percent, 

mainly in general purpose vehicles. Since the mission was 

originally conceived to be occupational, the second alternative 

was accepted. 

After capturing initial objectives on the North African coast, 

the British Task Force turned east toward Tunisia. It quickly 

outraced its supply support because of the lack of rail and 

highway transportation. The rapid buildup of Axis forces in 

Tunisia and eastern Algeria forced the British to halt, consolidate 

their supplies, and await reinforcements. Railroads were single 

track and had little usable rolling stock. The decision to leave 

vehicles in the United States, based on a mission of occupation, 

proved inauspicious when it became a campaign of movement. 

The North African campaign clearly proved that combat 

forces depend directly upon the capacity of their lines of 

communications. Early emphasis upon maximum quantities of 

combat troops and equipment at the expense of service troops 

and equipment had been faulty. Only after correcting this .fault 

could the campaign be pressed to its successful conclusion. 

More recently, as Joint Task Force 120 prepared to enter 

Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury, virtually no 

consideration was given to logistics. The 82nd Airborne 

Division's habitual support relationship with XVIII Airborne 

Corps' 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) was severed. 

In essence, this meant that most of the Army element's 

Iogisticians were taken out of the loop. Unlike other services 

that are predominantly self-supporting, Army divisions need a 

"slice" of logistical support to accompany them. While the 82nd 
32 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

could fight upon its arrival in Grenada, it could not sustain itself 

for more than 3 days, Of course, Grenada has become 

synonymous with ad hoc jointness because logistics was nearly 

totally lacking. 

Finally, in the "will we ever learn" category." During our 

recent involvement in Operation Restore Hope, the AtTny' s lOth 

Mountain Division (Light lnfant~. ) initially deployed to Somalia. 

These light fighters faced a fate similar to the one the 82nd 

Airborne Division had met in Operations Urgent Fury and Desert 

Shield. The mountain division, expected to provide self-contained 

logistics, was initially ill-equipped to overcome the logistical 

nightmare of Somalia. Problems associated with the download 

of the pre-positioned ships and operations of the sea and air 

ports of debarkation were directly attributable, once again, to the 

late deployment of key transporters. 

If Iraq had continued its attack in early August, prior to U.S. 

presence, Saudi Arabia would surely have been lost. Sufficient 

American forces could not have been brought to bear quickly 

enough to defe~ld it. Equally importmat, had Saddam Hussein 

chosen to invade Saudi Arabia after the first U.S. troops hit the 

ground, this light force--the only type in the Army that can be 

deployed by air--would probably have been quickly overrun. 

Oniy reinforcing with heavy armored forces that arrived weeks 

later diminished the force imbalance. In the future, we need 

forces with strategic and operational reach, plus the lethality to 

fight outnumbered and win. 

Iraq's strategy of inaction, and the monumental efforts of 

deploying units, and military and civilian transporters, allowed 

the window of vulnerability to be narrowed by early October. 

The local commander was then satisfied that a successful defense 

could be mounted. 

Time became an unforeseen ally. Deployment of forces 

necessary to execute this primary objective had taken nearly 2 

months to complete. Fortunately, the threatened Iraqi assault 

never appeared. Ability to quickly overcome distance with a 

sizable force has always been an underpinning of U.S. strategic 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 33 

success. In Desert Shield, inability to surge mobile forces en 

masse was our most insurmountable obstacle. 

What are the implications? 

• There are few places in the world that possess the wealth 

of resources comparable to the Gulf States. Yet even with this 

host-nation support, the absence of firm support agreements 

complicated planning. It placed U.S. and other coalition combat 

forces at risk when deployed without the full complement of their 

organic and supporting logistical organizations. As in the past, 

the fog of war affected the strategic situation. 

• The intent of the military operation shifted from defense 

to offense to eject an invader. The early decision to deploy 

shooters constrained the effective establishment and ongohag 

support of the theater logistics structure. 16 An unsustainable force 

may be deployed for legitimate reasons. But the associated risks 

of failure in combat and inability to support continuous, lengthy 

operations, should be recognized. 17 Except when forced entry is 

required, units critical to the throughput of follow-on forces 

should be deployed first. 

• Finally, light forces are not as light as advertised when 

facing a heavy threat. This leads to underestimating already 

critical strategic lift requirements within a system that is unable 

to meet the planned theater requirements (much less the 

unplanned). 

BALANCED STRATEGIC FORCE AND 

MOBILITY 

The debate now wages over how we should restructure our 

forces. There are those who advocate lighter, more easily 

deployable forces, and others who argue for mobile, more 

survivable formations. We often frame force structure decisions 

by comparing the faster delivery times of air with those of the 

slower sea deployment. But, other than the light divisions, 

closing a ground combat force into most regions of the world 

will likely involve sealift, unless we have pre-positioned massive 

amounts of materiel. When logistical support is included in the 
34 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

movement requirement, the deployment time difference between 

light and heavy combat forces is much less pronounced. Even 

the light fighters will require sealift. In fact, when the size of the 

force exceeds initial airli~ capacity, the rapid deployability 

advantage of light forces almost disappears. Is This advantage 

should weigh into the force structure calculus. 

Today's force structure cannot afford redundancy, yet we 

must also avoid preparing for only one type of conflict. Desert 

Shield might not have become Desert Storm if the paratroopers 

of the 82nd Airbome Division had had to fight Republican Guard 

tanks without the M1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles of VII 

Corps. 

Just as a threat-driven mix of light and heavy forces is 

essential, each leg of the strategic mobility triad must be balanced 

in order to provide America the power to respond aggressively to 

regional crisis. Sealift, airlift, and pre-positioning are mutually 

exclusive aald bring distinctive and necessary traits to our 

movement arsenal. Airlift will always play the paramount role 

in delivering people and high priority cargo early. Sealift is the 

key to deployment of any force larger than one light Army 

division. Once the deployment requires sealift, the weight to be 

moved is less important than the early availability of capable 

ships. 19 Pre-positioning of the right supplies and equipment in or 

near crisis locations enables sharp reductions in response time 

and total required lift. 

In the zeal to save defense dollars, however, some have 

suggested tradeoffs among components of the triad--for example, 

Air Force C-17 long-range transport planes for fast sealift ships, 

or vice versa. But, as the congressionally mandated Mobility 

Requirements Study of 1992 concluded, "To support national 

interests, deployment capability must increase through expanded 

investment in sealift, pre-positioning, and transportation 

infrastructure in the United States, and in sustained investment in 

aircraft. ''~0 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 35 

SHORTAGE OF SURGE SEALIFT 

Shortage of easy to load, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) fast sealift 

ships meant that the sought-after heavy combat units would have 

to deploy incrementally. Sealift shortages resulted in slow 

buildup of heavy forces during September and October. 21 

Within America, the decline of the shipping industry--ship 

building, manpower and shipyards---has led to reliance upon 

available allied and foreign flag shipping. For example, of the 

359 ships that formed America's steel bridge to Saudi Arabia 

during Desert Shield~Desert Storm, 180 of the 212 chartered 

vessels flew foreign flags. Twelve ships were on loan from 

allies. 22 In planning for the future, there is danger that foreign 

ships will not meet military needs (RO/RO ships versus 

commercially preferred tankers) and may not be there when we 

need them most. 

Since 1987, only two noncombatant ships have been built in 

America, leaving the United States with a shortage of merchant 

mariners. This widely recognized shortage would likely stifle 

unilateral crisis response. As we look over the horizon, these 

facts raise the question: Can America go it alone in sealift, a.~ 

the 1987 National Securi~ Council Directive 28 mandated? The 

answer is quite clearly no. If we seek global responsiveness, 

unconstrained by the intemational marketplace, renewal of 

American sealift is critical. The historical parallels are ironic. 

For some years prior to World War II, it had been recognized 

that a national emergency deployment would require large 

numbers of merchant ships. During the war, the availability of 

sealift set the tempo for deployments. Campaigns were often 

delayed because of the lack of merchant shipping. From World 

War II on, a reserve merchant fleet was built up. It was 

mobilized for both Korea and Vietnam, but by the 1970s, the 

ships, built mostly during World War II, were no longer viable. 

As long as the only important contingency was a NATO war, this 

situation seemed acceptable; materiel would be carried by ships 

of the other NATO allies, and even by important Asian allies 

such as Korea and Japan. However, the situation changed 
36 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert, Storm and Beyond 

radically with acceptance of the CENTCOM mission in 

Southwest Asia. There, the United States might well have to 

build up forces on its own. Allies might even deny it the use of 

their ships. After all, the NATO allies" record of assistance in 

U.S. military operations in the Middle East was less than 

encouraging. 23 

Other factors contributed to the slow pace of the deployment. 

One was the glut of stuff that piled up at piers and marshaling 

areas, virtual iron mountains, caused by !ack of in-transit asset 

visibility through the transportation pipeline. Two views, from 

different conflicts, prove that our !eaming curve building up to 

conflict is as steep as our forgetting curve after conflict: 

Lieutenant General Gen. William Pagonis, who commanded 

the theater's ad hoc 22nd Support Command, recounts that one 

of his biggest challenges was handling the thousands of 

containers throughout the Gulf War buildup. Shippers were 

intent to fill every 40-foot container to the brim to assure that 

ship capacity was maxed out--good sense because of the known 

shipping shortage. This practice, though, became a real drain on 

terminal resources. Most of the containers were intended for 

multiple consimaees or were loaded with unidentifiable loads. 

Some 28,000 of the 41,000 arriving containers had to be opened 

pierside to find out their contents. Then, many were hauled 

2,000 miles out into the desert just to find that most of their 

contents really belonged to units near the ports. Pagonis was 

caught on the homs of a dilemma. Shippers were trying to get 

as much cargo to Saudi Arabia as quickly as possible. The 

mission was being disrupted because port operators and truckers 

in the theater of operations were swamped, z4 This had a 

cascading effect that highlighted shortages of storage space, 

materials-handling equipment (MHE), and trained equipment 

operators. It also dramatically demonstrated what can happen 

when visibility of incoming cargo is lost. Ultimately, because 

units lost confidence in the distribution system, they submitted 

multiple supply requisitions on the same items. This reaction 

further choked the system and slowed the delivery of critical items. 
SCOTT W, CONRAD 37 

A choked distribution system was symptomatic of a problem 

that has historically plagued logisticians. As the House 

Government Operations Committee concluded in 1970, "Supply 

support to Viemam was at once a demonstration of superb 

performance and appalling waste. ''z5 Lieutenant General (Ret.) 

Joseph Heiser, who was Pagonis's counterpart for much of the 

Vietnam Conflict, agreed. First with the Most became a banned 

motto in Heiser's !st Logistical Command. It represented, to 

Heiser, the philosophy that had created the logistical mountains 

to be found in Vietnam in 1968--almost 2 million tons--of 

which only about a third could even be identified. 26 No one 

makes the point more clearly than Heiser: 

In three different wars, I've faced many different, serious logistics 

problems. In each war, because supplies were low or nonexistent 

or could not be located, we lost critical time getting the support 

required by the combat troops. The worst situation is to arrive at 

combat with an excess of noncritical items and a shortage of 

critical items. For five years we struggled to determine what we 

had on shore in Vietnam. By that time too much of it was left for 

the North Vietnamese. I hope they are still trying to sort it OUt! 27 

As in the Gulf War, the United States faced two logistical 

challenges during the Korean War. The first involved moving 

enough supplies and equipment to sustain the forces deployed to 

stop the initial North Korean offensive. The second involved the 

reconstitution of reserve stocks and continued sustainment of UN 

forces. 

Korean distribution was based largely on World War H 

experience. Initial shipments to Korea were rushed and normal 

procedures were mostly ignored. While a shortage of sealift 

ships forced the activation of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, 

ships moving from Japan and the United States jammed Korea's 

harbors, creating delays. With no discipline in the system, 

unnecessary cargo was often delivered while critical items waited 

to be unloaded. As a result, available shipping was inefficiently 

utilized. Some sat in harbors as long as 25 days; the average in- 
38 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

port time during the Korean War was 22 days. Fortunately, the 

North Koreans never acquired active heavy duty naval craft with 

strong offensive capability. Early distribution to forward areas 

was complicated by rapid movements of combat forces and lack 

of associated transportation systems° 

AN INEFFICIENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 

Like so many other aspects of the Gulf War movement epic, 

what was a heralded success story from one vantage point 

frequently obscured a known shortfall at another. This is a 

defining point to the theater commander's perspective discussed 

earlier. To the commander, it is inconsequential that gross 

amounts of tonnage are being off-loaded at the ports; he wants 

to know, "Is it the right stuff?." Like the difference between 

information and intelligence, the cargo we deliver must be 

meaningful to carrying out the commander's plan. If it is not, we 

are reduced to moving mountains of stuff! 

The Gulf War was waged from an allied country with a 

magnificent logistical base. With ongoing U.S. assistance, the 

Saudi government has built a huge and modem complex of 

military installations. The terminal ports in Saudi Arabia are a 

transporter's dream. They are second to none in throughput 

capacity because the country imports nearly everything it uses, 

and the Saudis have built facilities for just such a contingency. 

Persian Gulf seaports at Ad-Dammam and AI-Jubayl are among 

the most modem in the world (e.g., Ad-Dammam can berth and 

off-load 39 ships simultaneously, including the gigantic fast 

sealift ships). Airports at Dhahran, Riyadh, King Fahd, and King 

Khalid Military City are equally impressive. 

Can America deploy a similaa" force into developing countries 

with inadequate ports, or where access has been denied? Most 

worldwide ports could not have handled the types and volume of 

ships and planes offered up. For example, few seaports can berth 

a fast sealift ship because of its tremendous size. Future 

intervention thus may require a much slower alternate method of 

cargo discharge--such as over-the-shore, without the benefit of 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 39 

a fixed port. This capability is rarely practiced on major 

exercises--particularly outside the United States--because of 

lack of equipment and shortage of trained people. 

As spectacular as the Saudi ports are, our military found that 

the country had limited improved roadways away from the coast 

and almost no logistical infrastructure to sustain the gigantic 

inbound force. Saudi Arabia is half a globe away--with a 

climate and landscape notoriously inhospitable to humans and 

equipment. But the desert provided the most advantageous 

terrain to showcase U.S. strengths in armor and air power. The 

desert floor and wadis eased the tactical freedom of movement so 

essential to win the ground war. 

GAINING AIR SUPREMACY 

Had Iraq been planning a follow-on attack, intelligence reports 

suggested the most likely avenue of approach was along the 

Saudi coast road. This high-speed road from AI-Kha~i to A1- 

Jubayl and Ad-Dammam 28 seemed tailor-made for an armor 

attack. Such an advance would offer the most lucrative targets 

in the port complex, desalinization plants, oil refineries and other 

coastal facilities. Loss of, or serious damage to, the port facilities 

would have made any force buildup in theater extremely difficult. 

In many ways, this coastal port complex was Saudi Arabia's 

center of gravity. 

If Ira(] had taken Saudi ports, strategic access would have 

been denied to the allies, and Saudi Arabia would surely have 

fallen. Unbelievably, the enemy did not attempt to capture, 

disrupt, or destroy the port complex. As the coalition began 

massing ships, planes and tanks in Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein 

did little to respond. He took few steps to impede the coalition's 

preparations for war--there was no serious interdiction of the sea 

lanes or air routes. (Ironically, threats of releasing his terrorist 

"hit squads" sent a chill through the airline traveling public and 

freed up precious air transport assets for the deployment). He 

allowed the coalition to assemble, acclimate and train in Saudi 

Arabia for 5 months. Then, he allowed them to attack. His 
40 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

inaction was often perplexing--but provided the coalition with an 

unexpected advantage. That a country would initiate a conflict, 

then passively wait for the other side to lose interest, is nearly 

unprecedented. 

THE LUXURY OF TIME TO DEPLOY 

FORCES 

The key variables in movement are requirements (forces), 

capabilities (ships, planes, etc.) and time. By giving us time, Iraq 

minimized the effects of our capabilities' shortfall--but we 

should not count on simiiar enemy strategy in the future. As the 

weeks passed, Saddam Hussein showed no signs of abiding by 

the UN resolutions calling for his withdrawal from Kuwait. 

Operation Desert Shield appeared to have met its objective of 

deterring an Iraqi drive into Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, though, was 

still under Iraqi occupation. By mid-October, some 435,000 Iraqi 

soldiers, supported by more than 3,600 tanks, almost 2,400 

armored persormel carriers, and more than 2,400 ai/illery pieces 

occupied KuwaiL 29 Besides other coalition partners, American 

forces then opposing those 27 Iraqi divisions in October, 

consisted of XVIII Airborne Corps (with 41/3 Army divisions), I 

Marine Expeditionary Force, three carrier battle groups and one 

battleship battle group, an amphibious task force, and over five 

fighter and bomber wing equivalents. 3° Our ability to defend 

Saudi Arabia then appeared secure. Even with superior 

weaponry, however, coalition forces did not yet have the 

overmatching forces to drive Iraq from Kuwait. 

The Gulf War was unique, as shown by the movement stage 

evolution: 

• There was no enemy sea or air threat, which enabled 

freedom of strategic movement and allowed our forces to deploy 

to the region without disruption. 

• This was to be a war fought in open terrain, well suited 

for coalition air and armor power, requiring significant and rapid 

resupply but allowing nearly uncontested convoy movement on 

limited road networks. With the advent of the Global Positioning 
SCOFf" W. CONRAD 41 

System, the key impediment to cross-country mobility--lack of 

identifiable landmarks--vanished. 

• Unlike nearly any other scenario, the battlefield was to be 

free of noncombatants--easing unimpeded movement along 

otherwise congested main supply routes. 

• The coalition knew generally where the enemy was, its 

numbers and disposition of equipment. The reverse was not true. 

This situation is best exploited by concentrating movement assets 

in concert with the advance of the battle. 

• No enemy safe havens or sanctuaries were to be honored, 

minimizing potential diffusion of the sustainment effort. 

• Though the battlefield was to be nonlinear, the battles 

would be set-piece and ~quire the synchronization of combat 

power, movement and sustainment. 

Compare this movement scenario with past conflicts, such as 

Korea or Vietnam, or to possible future ones in a regional setting. 

Obviously, the United States cannot be assured of such 

accommodating terrain, ports, freedom of movement, or enemy 

strategy in future conflicts. 

The deck was clearly stacked in our favor. Iraq negated the 

key advantages it possessed, surprise and strategic geography. 

The UN embargo reinforced Saddam's intent to keep the Iraqi 

army in fixed positions. This minimized fuel consumption and 

wear and tear on its equipment. However, it did not free Kuwait. 

By quickly projecting a symbolic presence, we had engineered a 

delay. The static situation afforded America invaluable time for 

more movement--a strategic pause. Iraq's inaction opened the 

door to enable the joint force commander to inject an offensive 

potency. So, at the end of October, the National Command 

Authorities decided to increase force levels for deployment to 

Saudi Arabia, thus changing the strategic calculus. No longer 

was an equal force sufficient; to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait 

an overmatching force would have to be employed. Ultimately, 

U.S. expansibility--the power to generate forces--provided the 

joint force commander the capacity to eject Iraq from Kuwait. 
42 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

THE KEY TO VICTORY: A DECISIVE 

FORCE 

Many agree that our major error in the Viemam Conflict was 

applying U.S. power gradually. The hope was that the enemy 

would realize what it was up against and sue for peace. Instead, 

North Vietnam used this gradualism to improve its strategic 

advantage. Post-Vietnam doctrine has focused on the fast 

concentration of American firepower to destroy the enemy's 

military power and will to fight. (At the strategic level, this fast 

concentration of firepower relies heavily on sufficient and rapid 

deployabilily, now wanting). For example, the latest version of 

the Army's doctrinal bible, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, 

recognizes that the American people "expect quick victory and 

abhor unnecessary casualties" and "reserve the right to reconsider 

their support should any of these conditions not be met." Senior 

decisionmakers remembered all too well the "underkill" approach 

that ultimately led to U.S. failure in Vietnam. They were intent 

that it not be repeated in the Persian Gulf. This required the 

employment of a decisive force. The impact upon movement 

was dramatic, and fortunately, the enemy allowed the time and 

freedom of access to make this strategy attainable. 

At Cold War force levels, and with significant forward 

presence, the United States was readily able to exercise strategic 

leverage around the world. Today, force levels on the horizon 

make this unrealistic. What risks will America accept in one 

region to assure strategic reach to other theaters? While the 

lengthy Gulf War deployment may have appeared simple, 

imagine future deployments that could occur simultaneously and 

with no notice. Current surge lift capacity would be helpless to 

mount a decisive offensive formation in one theater, much less 

respond to multiple flashpoints. 
SCO'FI'W.,CONRAD 

LEAN AND MEAN WE WERE NOT! 

It took more strategic lift than estimated to transport forces to the 

Gulf War. This trend, established in Phase I deployments, only 

got worse during Phase II. While planning data have been called 

into question, deploying units simply took much more equipment 

and supplies to war than was anticipated in peacetime exercises. 

To illustrate, in mid-October, U.S. decisionmakers pondered 

the potential for transition from the defense to deploying an 

offensive capability--a second wave--primarily from forward 

based units in Germany. Transportation planners were charged 

to quickly determine the time and lift required (almost 

exclusively by sea) to move an additional corps to the Middle 

East. Requirement estimates of 8 million square feet of cargo 

space were based on available type unit planning data. Planners 

told policy makers, "If the green light is given tomorrow, we can 

move the force by the 15th of January." This was, not 

coincidentally, the deadline date later established by the United 

Nations for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. The decision was 

delayed, however, for 3 weeks, until the President's November 

7th speech--wasting precious deployment time. 

Despite the delay, transporters successfully moved over 8 

million square feet of equipment and cargo by the mid-January 

set deadline. There was only one problem: They weren't 

completed--not by a long shot! Finally, by early Marclr---after 

the conclusion of the ground war--all equipment was finally 

closed into Saudi Arabia. All told, about 151⁄2 million square feet 

of cargo was moved as part of that second wave--nearly double 

the original estimate. To put this into perspective, imagine 130 

football fields laid end to end, as far as the eye can see--about 

9 miles. Now envision those fields filled with bumper-to-bumper 

and door-to-door equipment and cargo. This provides a sense of 

just the additional gear--that above the planned 

requirement--added to the deployment burden. Critical to this 

planning, though, was that there was no distinction made between 

deployment to a protracted scenario--such as the Gulf 

War--versus a short one, like Grenada. 
44 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

Desert Shield splashed reality in the face of the American 

forces' lean and mean delusion. It is very easy now to suggest 

that the deploying units should not have been allowed to inundate 

the movement system, but units believed that this was to be 

protracted war in a bare base environment--and they took action 

to fill real or perceived shortfalls accordingly. Without effective 

control mechanisms in place and accurate identification of lift 

requirements--both for long and short scenarios--deploying 

organizations will clog the transportation network. Commanders 

want to take everything necessary to survive and win on the 

battlefield. Because the transportation requirements determination 

process does not effectively differentiate between exercise and 

actual crisis response movement, nor between long and short 

scenarios, the real thing was sluggish instead of a seamless flow. 

These problems are not new! The simple comments in 

World War II's Final Report of the Army Service Forces speak 

volumes to our continuing inability to resolve the requirements 

determination problem: 

War is unpredictable and does not lend itself readily to precise 

long-range planning; however, a better system must be developed 

for estimating troop requirements and anticipating the deployment 

of units---one that will provide the logistician time and a firm basis 

for producing munitions and equipping the forces needed to 

implement strategic and operational plans? ~ 

On November 8, Phase II deployments began with the 

President's announcement that the theater would be reinforced by 

approximately 200,000 additional military personnel. So what 

already had been done once now had to be repeated. Most of the 

forces deployed during the second wave were forward based in 

Germany and thus were closest to the pending fray--with a truly 

viable forward presence. These included VII Corps headquarters, 

two armored divisions, and an armored cavalry regiment. 

(Ironically, many of these were deactivated immediately upon 

war termination and redeployment). Other American forces 

moved during this phase included over 400 U.S. Air Force 
SCOFF W. CONRAD 45 

aircraft, three carrier battle groups, a battleship battle group, and 

the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Riley, Kansas): 

(The strategic dichotomy of deploying forward based units as 

well as those stationed in America's heartland, did not go 

unnoticed. Base locations such as Fort Riley and Fort Carson, 

Colorado, and others are strategically inefficient because they add 

the significant leg of continental United States movement. While 

these posts served a useful purpose in America's westward 

expansion, they are not well suited for today's quick response 

deployment of heavy forces). With the deployment of these 

forces, there could be no doubt that the coalition was readying to 

go on the offensive. 

FORWARD BASING AND 

PRE-POSITIONING 

Forward basing of forces and pre-positioning of equipment and 

supplies were critical to our employment of an offensive strategy 

because they partially offset the requirements for greater strategic 

lift. The forward presence of over 300,000 U.S. forces in 

Europe, as well as the four divisions' pre-positioned equipment, 

had camouflaged the previous strategic lift shortfall. The value 

of forward basing combat power in strategically located areas was 

proved in this instance. 

Are we in for trouble in the future? Since the conclusion of 

the Gulf War, the Army has decreased forward basing from 

nearly 40 percent of all Army units to less than 20 percent. 

Simultaneously, large-scale amounts of pre-positioned equipment 

and supplies have been removed from forward sites in Europe. 

We can no longer count on the transport slack that prepositioning large scale amounts of equipment and supplies 

afforded us in NATO. The global demands of regional focus and 

reduced forward basing will yank this slack instantly taut. A 

tough movement situation has gotten worse. 

By mid-January, all units that were to participate in the 

liberation of Kuwait had arrived in Saudi Arabia or were en 

route. The movement stage was set. The total U.S. movement 
46 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

effort to the Persian Gulf was impressive. By all modes, 

transporters moved: 

• Four million tons of dry cargo--about the weight of 40 

modem aircraft carders 33 

• 31,800 tons of mail--that would cover 28 football fields 

in mail 6 feet deep 34 

• 12,435 tracked combat vehicles and 117,157 wheeled 

vehicles 35 

• Over 41,000 containers that, if laid end to end, would 

have stretched 188 miles 36 

• In excess of 6 million tons of petroleum products 

• Over nine divisions worth of troops (about 560,000) and 

equipment. 37 

The coalition's intense air campaign was launched on January 

17, 1991, and the "thunder and lighming" of Operation Desert 

Storm had begun. The campaign wore down the Iraqi military, 

taking away their ability to detect mounting movement of massed 

coalition forces in what Gen. Schwarzkopf called the "Hail Mary 

play." Lt. Gen. Pagonls, who engineered much of the movement, 

best captured the unparalleled scope of this operation: 

Simply put, the two Army corps and all their equipment had to be 

trucked westward and northward to their jumping-off points for the 

assault. VII Corps was trucked 330 miles across the desert, and 

XVIII Airborne Corps leapfrogged more than 500 miles west and 

north. This required us to assemble a fleet of nearly 4,000 heavy 

vehicles of all types, many of which had to be contracted for. Just 

before the ground assault began, peak traffic at a checkpoint on the 

northernmost of these supply routes approached 18 velficles per 

minute, seven days a week, 24-hours a day. This volume of traffic 

was sustained for almost six weeks. 3s 

TRUCKS ARE POWER 

Although the Army deployed nearly 75 percent of its truck 

companies in support of only 25 percent of its combat divisions, 

there was still insufficient ground transport to move the force. 39 

Many believe that had the war gone longer than 100 hours, 
SCOTT W° CONRAD 47 

combat operations would have come to a quick halt until the 

logistical tail caught up. 4° While supplies were then more 

plentiful in the theater, the ground transport was insufficient and 

lacked necessary mobility for a quickly moving force. Former 

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin suggested that by the end of the 

lO0-hour ground war, "We were pretty much at the end of our 

string in being able to fight this thing. ''41 Historically, armored 

and mechanized battles and campaigns have been slowed or even 

halted due to the inability of support forces to provide adequate 

fuel and ammunition resupply--exacerbated by the steady 

increase in requirements of these battlefield commodities since 

World War I. Even in our most recent operations, such as 

Restore Hope in Somalia, prioritization of competing 

requirements was a problem that transcended all other facets of 

the operation. Our long-term experience dictates the early, highlevel emphasis on theater combat service suppo~ force 

requirements and their prioritization as theater imperatives rather 

than as mere competitors for apportioned lift. 

Whether irony or a forgotten lesson of history, we nearly met 

the fate of so many in the past. A similar circumstance had 

defeated another desert warrior in North Africa in I941--Field 

Marshal Erwin Rommei was outfoxed by logistics. He pumped 

plenty of combat power into the port at Tripoli, but continued to 

overextend resupply lines. Only about 10 percent of Rommel's 

fuel requirements for his tanks was delivered during the critical 

days when the fate of North Africa hung in the balance. What he 

needed could have been delivered. This was proved the next 

year when German equipment and supplies poured into Tunisia 

in response to the American landings in Africa, but it was too 

late. Rommel's promising opportunity for decisive victory 

evaporated because transportation had been badly planned, and 

clear organizational channels for logistics support had never 

been established. There simply were not enough trucks to sustain 

the fast paced offensive. Supplies piled up at the wharves while 

shortages grew at the,front. 42 

Who can forget Patton' s pursuit of retreating German forces 
48 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

through France in the late summer of 1944? Patton's Third 

Army (interestingly, the forerunner of the Army's Gulf War 

contingent to CENTCOM) was seizing everything in sight. It was 

spread over a 700-square mile area extending from the port of 

Brest in the west to the banks of the Seine River in the east. 

Initially, Third Army had accomplished in 19 days what planners 

had thought wouM take at least 75. A logistical halt was to 

occur, but the opportunity for greater gains convinced Supreme 

Allied Headquarters to continue. The pace grew faster and 

snowballed---some would say out of control. On September 12, 

General Patton's advance came to a halt due to lack of fuel, 

ammunition, and the transportation to distribute those supplies. 

The breakneck pace, length of required sustainment, and 

inaccurate consumption estimates had clearly caught planners by 

surprise. Ironically, it had been Patton who had defeated an 

initiative to add a supply battalion, equipped with 96 2~-ton 

trucks to each armored division. Patton's shortsightedness 

returned to haunt him. 43 

Most modem American military trucks were designed for the 

Cold-War European scenario, where road networks are prevalent 

in nearly every square kilometer. They are incapable of moving 

off-road in a theater with not much more than a dirt track road 

system. During the Army's armor modernization of the 1980s, 

its transportation fleet had not kept pace. In the zero-sum game 

of defense spending, we had bought more tanks and fewer trucks° 

Nowhere was this more apparent than with heavy equipment 

transporters (HETs). It was argued that Europe had plenty of 

railroads to carry tanks eastward to combat areas, so the few 

HETs in the inventories of the Army and Marine Corps were 

relegated to evacuating disabled tanks. Our Gulf War Army 

divisions had an average of only six tank transporters apiece 

(compared to over 350 M1 tanks assigned to each of these 

divisions). While the Army was able to acquire the support of 

others, it had only 112 of its own HETs available in the theater, 

and the Marines but 34 (compared to Iraq's 5,000+ tank 

transporters). '~ 
SCOTT Wo CONRAD 49 

In Saudi Arabia, HETs saved us from two major problems: 

First, wear and tear on our tanks, second, wear and tear on the 

fragile roads. If our tanks were driven on the 120 ° hot roads, for 

example, the resulting damage to the roads would have made it 

impossible to move the precious logistical bases up to the front. 

The mountains of supplies would then have continued to pile up 

at Dhahran. The theater Army's head logistician explained: 

Logisticians are paid to look at reaiity. We might not have made 

it in the Gulf without the HETs that Saudi Arabia, Germany, Egypt, 

and the Eastern bloc so generously provided. In how many 

contexts can we count on our allies, let alone our former Warsaw 

Pact adversaries, to equip our armed forces~ 5 

Also troubling was that most trucks deployed had very little 

off-road mobility and were ineffective in moving supplies over 

long distances in the desert. This constrained the fast-paced 

forward offensive of the ground campaign. Trucks designed for 

the German autobahns did not fare well on the sandy desert 

wadis, and there weren't enough drivers for the round-the-clock 

operation. Peacetime manning had reduced many transport 

battalions to 60 percent of authorized personnel. 46 

The much anticipated coalition ground campaign began on 

February 24, massively moving to reclaim Kuwait and deliver a 

devastating defeat to the Iraqi Army. Prompted by the 

widespread destruction, President Bush declared a cease-fire on 

February 28, only 100 hours into the ground war. Stated political 

and military objectives had been attained--an apparent victory! 
11 

MOVING THE FORCE 

IN FUTURE CONFLICTS 

Preparation for the preservation of our freedom must come in 

peacetime, and we must pay for it in money and inconvenience. The 

alternative is payment in blood and extinction. 

General Brehon Somervell 

U.S. Army Services Commander, World War II 

Had Saddam Hussein been a good military tactician, he could 

have manipulated our weaknesses and caused a prolonged, costly 

battle much longer than the 3-day routing. Future enemies need 

only exploit the lessons of the Gulf War to disrupt America's 

deployment and sustainment by: 

• Capturing, disrupting, or destroying rival ports to slow or 

eliminate U.S. ability to close and sustain equipment and forces. 

• Mining harbors to prevent amphibious assaults or overthe-shore cargo discharge, taking advantage of American 

weakness in mine clearing. (At sea, the lack of U.S. 

minesweeping ships may have been a factor in our decision not 

to stage an amphibious landing into Kuwait.) 1 

• Interdicting sea and air lanes to bottle up the movement 

flow of U.S. forces and equipment. (Iran recently bought three 

Russian submarines, with an option to buy two more). 

• Employing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons on 

ports and main supply routes. 

• Taking first strike action and follow through, before the 

United States can deploy forces. 

• Employing terrorism or other means to destroy or disrupt 

51 
52 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

key American ports, intermediate staging bases and coalition 

ports. 

To avoid these pitfalls, U.S. strategy will have to face these 

new realities: 

• Geography separates America from most of our vital 

interests by long distances over water, requiring a viable means 

of long-range strategic lift. 

• Crisis response strategy requires more strategic lift that 

cap. quickly surge, and the ability to place necessary war 

materials nearer to a potential battlefield. We had to rely on 

others during the Gulf War;, their assistance may not be available 

the next time around. 

• The United States will never have enough lift for all 

scenarios, but the U.S. role on the world stage demands sufficient 

capability to project a decisive force to at least two regional 

flashpoints in time to ensure success. 

• To save cost and lives, we will need to go with enough 

force to get the job done quickly. 

• The defense budget will continue to shrink. 

• Pressure will increase to find economies of scale to save 

acquisition and transportation costs. 

• Few regional scenarios have sufficient infrastructure to 

support U.S. force requirements. 

• The value of information, communication and space 

systems will a play a critical role in optimizing the global 

transportation network. 

• Americans will work more closely with our allies in 

intervention operations. 

• Increasing the distances forces must travel increases the 

transportation requirement. As forward presence decreases, the 

likelihood of strategic deployment from the continental United 

States increases. Surge lift--quickly available transport--will thus 

take on ever increasing importance. 

• It is not economical for the civilian transport industry to 

maintain a capacity to move massive amounts of heavy military 

equipment--a requirement without commercial application. 
SCOT[" W. CONRAD 53 

America's next conflict may not call for the full mobilization of 

the armed forces. So, unlike the Gulf War, we cannot expect to 

rely so heavily upon commercial transportation to support future 

deployments. Only increased organic military transport can meet 

this challenge. 2 

• The capability to deploy sufficient forces quickly 

provides an early response to crisis. This early response will 

reduce the forces required later, when more lift options may be 

available to deploy them. 3 

• The duplicate supply systems among the Army, Navy Air 

Force and Marines complicated and slowed the movement flow. 

Such inefficiencies and redundancies, if not corrected, will plague 

us again in future operations, at the expense of timely 

deployment and effective sustainment. 

• Our Desert Shield~Desert Storm success, as in past 

conflicts, was accompanied by inefficient logistical, particularly 

movement, practices. Too much was accomplished by placing a 

terrific strain on a tenuous movement system. Not enough can 

be attributed to sound organization and efficient procedures. 

Compared to the Cold War model, there is a paradigm shift 

in the type of conflict we can expect to encounter. This 

commands a major change in our framework for moving and 

sustaining forces, and the mobility tools we will use to project 

that power. Transportation has been, perhaps, the most 

frequently limiting factor of modem war, including our recent 

endeavor in the Persian Gulf. There's always been the hope that 

on the day of reckoning everything would somehow come 

together. As national security strategy evolves, the United States 

will have less warning time to react to regional flashpoints. 

America will rely more acutely than ever upon viable strategic 

and operational mobility. 

THE AFTERGLOW OF DESERT STORM 

Tile basis of tiffs nation's defense--a U.S.-Soviet 

confrontation---has disappeared. In its place is a host of potential 

regional flashpoints, and domestic agendas throughout Europe 
54 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

and in the United States have altered previous priorities. 

In the afterglow of Desert Storm~ the United States may be 

lulled into a false sense of security, but the reasons that brought 

us together will rarely exist in the future. Our regional military 

alliances, no longer challenged by the Soviet threat, may fail to 

provide a reliable basis for strength, and the United States should 

prepare to act alone when vital national interests are at stake. 

In any regional scenario requiring the intervention of a 

tailored military force, the key to eventual success is the ability 

to arrive in a logistically immature theater before hostile forces 

and to self-sustain for a reasonable period and fight--or make 

peace--immediately. But the Gulf war was unlike past conflicts, 

in which the United States had time to organize adequate support 

bases or had the convenience of established regional presence, the 

Gulf War was different. Although the region had been the focus 

of strategic planning since the fall of the Shah of Iran 1979, there 

was no American presence to speak of, The Gulf War model 

probably more closely resembles what the United States can 

expect in future conflict, as forward basing decreases. To that 

end, the times ahead will not be business as usual: 

• American forces will need to be more mobile, flexible, 

lethal, and sustainable from long distances, in moving past a 

global strategy that focused on containment to one of rapid 

response to a regional crisis. While the threat may be harder to 

define, the essential elements of global reach are not. Smart 

planning and efficient spending can overcome the challenge of 

achieving these capabilities, within the bounds of decreasing 

budgets, reduced force levels, and shrinking forward basing. 

• To break the traditional military spending mold, the focus 

of the national power lens should be fixed on potential economic 

gains, not just military threats. Uniquely among the elements of 

mobilization, strengthening military movement capacity directly 

contributes to the well-being of the nation. Renewing 

infrastructure--highways, ports, and railheads--increasing 

manufacturing--ships, aircraft, and tracks--and exploiting 

transportation technology, all create jobs and help grow our 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 55 

nation's economy. 

• Preparations should continually improve ways to save 

transportation, acquire additional lift platforms where absolutely 

necessary, and adopt techniques to lighten the cargo load. In 

these ways we could also reduce inventories--reaping tremendous 

procurement and warehousing costs savings. This will require a 

new approach to integrate disparate elements into a balanced and 

unified mobility strategy. We cannot afford to relearn the 

logistical lessons of the past--including Desert Storm--by 

repeating the same mistakes through omission or commission. 

The work of Gulf War logisticians---particularly transporters-- 

was truly miraculous. But we must not continue to flounder in 

crisis, as we have historically done. We can no longer afford it. 

A security strategy based on our ability to respond quickly to 

any regional crisis relies heavily on rapid global reach for its 

viability. The growing military threat posed by many developing 

nations would probably exceed current U.S. mobility power, 

especially if the United States faced two regional flashpoints 

simultaneously. (Such was the conclusion reached by the Naval 

Logistics 2001 Wargame conducted in January 1994.) America 

must bridge this requirement-capability gap to enable intervention 

where and when necessary--while saving cost, time, and 

potential casualties. 

IMPROVING STRATEGIC SURGE LIFT 

AND PRE-POSITIONING CAPABILITY 

Limited strategic lift and pre-positioning constrain the number of 

forces that U.S. leaders can send to a crisis area quickly. Of the 

power that theater commanders need most, strategic lift ranks at 

or near the top of their critical items list. Because the United 

States will probably not have enough forces immediately on the 

scene of future conflicts or other nontraditional missions, strategic 

lift will determine the scope and duration of our commitment. 

This dictates balanced intertheater mobility--with increased 

forward deployed equipment and supplies, additional fast sealift 

capacity, aircraft that can operate from unprepared sites, and 
56 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

continued civil air access. Cost-benefit and risk analysis, and the 

warfighting CINC's needs assessment, are guiding considerations 

for improvement. 

The actions taken during the first 2 weeks of a conflict are 

crucial to preventing the enemy from gaining key theater 

objectives. Swift political action and the demonstrated ability to 

move forces eases the task of regaining lost territory and, 

ultimately, defeating the enemy. Because they significantly 

shorten deployment times, pre-positior',ing and airlift can best 

minimize that early risk. Rapid deployers, if equipped with 

overwhelming lethality, can hold the line while we build a 

decisive force capable of offensive operations. Sealift best 

addresses this need. 

Pre-positioning 

Short of forward-based forces in the theater of operations, afloat 

pre-positioning provides essential quickness, strategic agility and 

flexibility to swing to different regional scenarios. Afloat prepositioning is less costly and better able to close heavy forces 

than airlift. It provides a low-keyed, but ever-ready response to 

crisis. Often overlooked, this may be the simplest way to gain 

necessary strategic leverage. Land-based pre-positioning could 

make a big difference if close enough to the fray. It more likely 

would provide the edge in building up a decisive force. 

Pre-positioning unit equipment requires designated units 

possess at least two sets--a budgetary nightmare during normal 

times. But, as we downsize, enough equipment should become 

available to pre-position. For afloat requirements, ships should 

be obtained through short-term renewable lease with U.S. firms. 

Avoiding outright purchase will require a much smaller capital 

investment. 

Afloat pre-positioning advantages abound. The transportation 

savings of both time and lift are tremendous. Land-based prepositioning may require the permission of the host-nation to 

withdraw in a time of crisis, and in many scenarios the 

permission may not be guaranteed or may sacrifice valuable 
SCO'FF W. CONRAD 57 

waming time. Conversely, at sea pre-positioning would remain 

in American hands and allow the U.S. to commit the equipment 

to other theaters. In short, the flexibility and speed afforded by 

afloat pre-positioning fit perfectly into a strategy requiring quick 

response to regional crisis. 

Sealift 

America's maritime industry, once a formidable national 

resource, now relies on allied and foreign-flag shipping. Without 

coordinated govemment and private sector reinvigoration, the 

United States will possess limited ability to decisively respond to 

crisis via sealift. Past policy has been to maintain a few select 

units on fully mobile status and require the rest to use largely 

inactive sealift. The current state of the American maritime 

industry, along with the National Military Strategy's requirement 

for rapid global agility, renders this inviable. Lessons learned 

from the Gulf War, coupled with the follow-on Mobility 

Requirements Study (MRS), have generated enough momentum 

to begin to scratch the surface in shipbuilding. The MRS 

indicates, however, that standing pat will result in a further 15 

percent reduction of available seaiift by 1999. 4 If this continues, 

the future feasibility of deploying a heavy ground force and 

ground-based air forces to a distant battlefield is almost nil. As 

the warfighting CINCs have pointed out to Congress, "Forget 

about supporting two major regional contingencies." This 

essential element of national power is now dormant, with no new 

strategic sealift construction in over 30 years. 

Without a viable merchant fleet, the United States cannot 

maintain the merchant mariners needed to crew whatever ships 

it buys or charters and cannot maintain the shipbuilding and ship 

repair industries necessary to maintain the largest governmentowned fleet. 5 

There are several reasons for the decline of American-flag 

shipping, which has fallen to 4 percent of all U.S. commerce. ~ 

Dwindling economic markets and skyrocketing operating costs 

have forced U.S. shippers to register their vessels under foreign 
58 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

flags, to take advantage of lower labor and other costs. 

Additionally, the commercial shift has been toward more and 

larger container ships, which comprise about 70 percent of all 

commercial shipping. The military has not embraced these 

container ships, resulting in fewer U.S. flag carriers, fewer 

shipyards, fewer merchant mariners (whose average age is now 

over 55 years), and fewer ships suited to handling military cargo] 

A balanced approach to revitalize the maritime industry is 

necessary: 

• Acquire existing RO/RO ships with Maritime 

Administration acquisition funds. 

• Construct modem diesel-propelled RO/RO ships in U.S. 

shipyards with funding already appropriated by congress for 

strategic sealifl. 

• Refurbish and renew the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) 

fleet. This sustainment fleet, with too few militarily useful ships, 

provided lackluster performance during the Gulf War (of the 74 

RRF vessels activated, only 22 met their recall times), and the 

trend continued during the Restore Hope mission to Somalia, 

during which two of the nine RRF ships deployed were 

significantly delayed en route with mechanical problems. 

• While nothing will help the merchant marine like an 

increase in U.S.-flagged ships, a merchant marine reserve will 

ensure sufficient seamen are available during crisis. Additionally, 

a tax incentive along the same lines as a recently announced 

British plan is needed to energize the nearly depleted merchant 

marine; under the British plan, once at sea, sailors and their 

employers are not liable for federal taxes. 

We now organize for emergency sealifl one way and for 

emergency airlift another. Perhaps we should standardize the 

two. Most U.S. military airlift is performed by reservists drawn 

from the civilian airline industry, and emergency capacity is 

provided by civilian airliners of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF) and chartered civilian airliners. There is no vast fleet of 

idle govemment-owned airliners waiting for an emergency. In 

the case of sealifl, the contention is that voyages are so long that 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 59 

the civilian shipping industry could not quickly divert a large 

portion of its strength to meet an emergency; airliners can be 

diverted much more quickly. However, does that argument 

validate the rationale that it is uneconomical for the United States 

to maintain a sealift capacity--similar to CRAF--that could pay 

at least partly for itself?. Realistically, we may be able to call on 

only a fraction of the overall shipping fleet immediately, but the 

rest of the fleet is valuable insurance against losses. That Iraq 

made no attempt to intercept or destroy shipping bound for Saudi 

Arabia should not delude us into believing that such action is not 

possible in future crisis. 8 

Airlift 

Changing world geopolitics and an aging military air fleet point 

to the need for improved airlift. The workhorse of the Air Force 

fleet, the C-141, flew a year's worth of service life in only 7 

months during the Gulf War. 9 The wings have been, quite 

literally, flown off the C-141 fleet. Many of the planes have 

been grounded for overhaul and were unavailable when needed 

for recent operations in Somalia and Egypt. 

An answer to our rapidly aging C-141 fleet is the C-17. 

Although subject to controversy since development, the C-17's 

unique capabilities cannot be matched by recently proposed 

civilian substitutes. By design, it can bypass congested 

destination airfields and move large quantities of supplies and 

equipment directly to forward areas. It is estimated that the C-17 

will increase access to over 6,000 airfields worldwide that are 

currently inaccessible to C-141s and C-5s--an approximate 300 

percent increase. This means more versatility in responding to 

crisis and greater speed in closing a force into a bare base 

theater. For example, recent estimates show that if the C-17 had 

replaced the C-141 during Desert Shield~Desert Storm, we could 

have met our airlift deployment requirements 20 to 35 percent 

faster. ~° Similar analyses of the Somalian Restore Hope 

operation indicate that--had the C-17 been available for cargo 

movement--it would have improved the level of throughput by 
60 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

41 percent; it could have delivered cargo more effectively by 

making use of a number of smaller airfields. The aircraft's lower 

manpower requirements, reduced operating costs, and exceptional 

ground maneuverability make the C-l? an efficient and effective 

choice to provide lfigh-capacity strategic mobility and tactical 

forward airfield delivery. 

The CRAF program is based on military accessibility to U.S. 

commercial air carriers, who maintain modified aircraft in the 

fleet for considerably longer than 5 years. Today, over 30 

percent of the U.S. commercial air fleet is leased, and this could 

reach 60 or 70 percent within the next 10 years. H Leasing 

provides airlines greater flexibility to change aircraft types and 

saves large capital costs associated with purchasing aircraft. Like 

the shipping industry, increasing segments of the aircraft 

industry--through expanding ownership of flying or leasing 

firms--are controlled by foreign corporations. These facts raise 

the specter of further decline in the CRAF, since foreign-owned 

aircraft are excluded from participating. In addition, the 

flexibility inherent in the leasing option will work against fleet 

stability that is so essential to CRAF. 

The needs of the airlines no longer parallel those of the 

national defense. In crisis, can the United States rely on the 

provision of commercial aircraft controlled by the corporations of 

other nations? What occurs in board rooms around the world 

will inextricably control our ability to conduct independent 

military action. 

THE BROKEN LINK BETWEEN INDUSTRY 

AND GOVERNMENT 

An underlying current emerges. America's contingency 

transportation capacity has become a hostage to domestic and 

intemational economic forces that have little to do with the 

realities of national defense. There is no mechanism in place to 

maintain the essential link between industry and government, but 

our ability to adequately respond to future crises relies on 

reforging this link. 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 61 

Service advocacy has frequently hindered acquisition of 

strategic lift assets, to wit: Airlift and sealift are not the stuff of 

Air Medals or Navy Crosses. Weapon systems---carriers and 

fighters--have usually taken primacy at the expense or strategic 

mobility. 

As we drawdown, and the competition for acquisition dollars 

grows, the Services will naturally gravitate toward supporting 

high-tech weapon systems. Why not take the burden of Service 

parochialism out of the strategic mobility equation by passing 

budgetary responsibility for strategic lift to the U.S. 

Transportation Command? Vest that command with the 

responsibility to prepare, justify, and execute a separate mobility 

budget line. 

INTEGRATING OPERATIONAL 

TRANSPORT INTO THE MOBILITY 

STRATEGY 

No capability requires bolstering more than the wide spectrum of 

operational transportation. This is where the rubber meets the 

road for the warfighting CINC. Many necessary improvements 

extend beyond the foxhole, all the way to the producers and 

depots. An overarching battlefield distribution system that 

integrates in-transit asset visibility of cargo in the transportation 

pipeline, increased and improved ground lift capability, and 

smarter allocation of transport resources is necessary. For 

instance, what good is knowing where the goods are unless we 

have enough trucks to get them to the customer units? 

In-transit Asset Visibility 

Our distribution system, which includes supply and 

transportation, is based on Cold War thinking and antiquated 

technology. In the Central Front scenario, units knew exactly 

where they were to locate, where they would draw their support, 

and over what routes and by what schedule they would move-- 

everything was neat and predictable. Well, things have changed. 
62 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

Progressing from a Cold War supply point logistical system that 

relies on getting the goods to fixed locations, to one that is 

distribution based, would focus on getting the goods to customer 

units, wherever they are at in the theater of operations. To 

accomplish this, though, logisticians must know where critical 

supplies are and direct them where most needed. Otherwise, we 

will continue to do no more than react and improvise, instead of 

anticipate support requirements. 

The battlefield is mobile and transitory, and that is America's 

warfighting strength--but our logistics hasn't quite caught up. 

When units move, we don't use available technology to track and 

update their actual battlefield locations. With this meaningful 

information, updated through secure satellite links, battlefield 

distribution can become seamless, not accidental. Without it, we 

are reduced to aimless movement, like the mailman trying to 

guess where you've moved without a forwarding address. In 

Desert Storm, those thousands of containers filled with 

undeliverable goods proved to be a vast waste of resources we 

cannot afford in the future. 

Many believe that Gulf units lacked supply discipline. 

Critics allege that because of repetitious supply ordering, the 

distribution pipeline became glutted. While duplicate 

requisitioning did occur, mere mention of this hides the important 

troth: Units lost confidence in the distribution system to deliver 

the goods. Unlike combat operators who were deluged with 

information, logisticians thirsted for it. Without timely and 

accurate requisition status, up-to-date unit location information, 

or sufficient ship, aircraft, and container manifest visibility, 

logisticians could not optimally support battlefield operations. 

The former commander of the Army Materiel Command, General 

William G.T. Tuttle, Jr., (Ret.) described it well: 

We could get parts to the arrival ports, but there we lost asset 

visibility. We have done little to improve our distribution process 

since Viemam, and we have seen similar--though not as 

poor--results on other occasions. We should tolerate this no 

longer. United Parcel Service and Federal Express can tell you 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 63 

precisely where your package is located in their system at any 

given time. Similar processes could be applied to track combatessential components or even to monitor the location of entire 

units. I~ 

Today, shippers around the world expect not only dock-todock service, but transportation tracking from producer to 

consumer. In world shaping matters, America's military should 

not accept less. To produce total asset visibility of critical cargo 

items through the transportation pipeline, the needs of DoD must 

merge with the available distribution technology of the civil 

sector. Otherwise, we will be left, once again, to lost confidence 

in the distribution system and moving mountains of stuff. 

Tuttle's battlefield movement scheme would 

employ satellite systems, and querying transponders on each 

shipment unit that would relay time-tagged locations to digitized 

map displays in movements management centers and report unit 

movements to command posts. Each shipment unit would have its 

unique identity. The movements management teams could then 

forecast arrivals reroute convoys around enemy action or obstacles, 

or take other actions necessary for the reliable delivery of cargo or 

units, all through position control. This process applies equally well 

to the strategic deployment and sustainment systems. 13 

The cost to get this system up and running will be high, but 

the rewards in logistical support to the warfighting CINCs, 

inventory and storage cost efficiency, elimination of support 

redundancies, and improved sustainability will quickly 

overshadow the initial sticker shock. 

Joint Theater Movement Control Agency 

Future conflicts will be short-notice ones requiring quick and 

lethal response. There will be no time to get things organized, 

so to win, forces must hit the ground running. Because no 

service can effectively prioritize the needs of another service, 

efficiently allocate all transportation on land, sea, air, and inland 
64 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

waterways, or arbitrarily deconflict movement access or priorities, 

a Joint Theater Movement Control Agency is necessary. This 

movement agency would: 

• Provide interface with the U.S. Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM) to maintain in-transit visibility of units, 

personnel and equipment through the emerging Global 

Transportation Network 

• Coordinate strategic movement to the theater through 

USTRANSCOM 

• Ensure unrestricted movement through theater air and 

water terminals ~4 

• Exhaust all available host-nation support movement 

capability 

• Integrate command and control for quick redirection of 

reinforcement and materiel flows---especially common-item 

support for people and equipment 

• Oversee the execution of theater transportation priorities 

• Direct theater transportation operations. 

Currently, there is no such joint theater organization to 

manage transportation for the CINCs. Too much depends on the 

ready ability to operate in war the way we have trained in peace 

to rely on ad hoc logistics. To formalize (not provisional-ize), 

stand-up, and minimally staff similar Joint Theater Movement 

Control Agencies for each theater will eliminate this problem. 

Intra-theater Transport 

Palletized Load System. Streamlining the transportation 

"push" of supplies and equipment forward should be the goal of 

an efficient movement system. We have never fully integrated 

ground mobility and materials-handling procedures, and 

equipment that could eliminate in-transit unloading and 

reloading--until now. The Palletized Load System (PLS), 

recently approved for limited procurement, is a 10-wheel drive 

total distribution system able to move 33 tons of supplies faster, 

with greater mobility, and at less cost than previous methods. 

The driver can load and unload the demountable flatrack from the 
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66 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

cab of the vehicle, without a crane or forklift, in less than 2 

minutes. With consideration for budget pressures, PLS can get 

the job done with fewer people and greater efficiency because it 

replaces thousands of conventional trucks, forklifts and cranes. 

Flatracks that conform to international shipping standards could 

be tailored as far back as the ammunition plants and supply 

depots in the CONUS then moved aboard RO/RO vessels on the 

host PLSs. Finally, these afloat pre-positioned PLSs could be 

driven off ships in crisis-tom ports, directly to forward units. 

Delivery without delays builds victory--true inventory in motion. 

Take this concept a step further using high technology and 

battlefield pre-positioning--a technique known as "caching." 

Squads of PLS vehicles loaded with essential supplies could 

"orbit" the battlefield, awaiting delivery instructions. Equipped 

with global positioning systems and satellite command control, 

the trucks could be directed to precise locations to drop their 

loads, forming caches, just before needed by advancing units. 

Transponders or radio transceivers mounted on the flatracks 

would allow units to readily locate and identify these caches by 

satellite monitoring devices or simple radio receivers. This PLScache concept would provide an impetus away from delivering to 

fixed supply points, and anticipate battlefield distribution needs. 

Unlike the past, logistics would enable, instead of halt, the 

initiative. PLS would create faster, more efficient support for 

ground forces and greater value for the U.S. taxpayer. 

Heavy Equipment Transporters. If we are to wage mobile 

warfare, the key lesson of the Gulf War is that we need more 

HETs. Heavy divisions should have enough to move a brigade 

with a single lift. Besides the operational advantage of 

agility--the capability to move heavy forces rapidly--HETs 

preserve tank combat readiness, extend service life, and decrease 

expensive operating costs. 

The cost advantages are enormous: To move the tracked 

vehicles in a heavy brigade-sized task force just 1 mile, under 

their own power, costs over $180,000, based on life-cycle, permile operating costs. The price is just $15,000 to move them 1 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 67 

mile on HETs--a savings of over $165,000 per mile) 5 While 

cost is not normally a crucial factor in determining warfighting 

requirements, this staggering savings increases the quantity and 

quality of training affordable during the peace. 

Other Equipment. Provide warfighting CINCs with enough 

of the right transport assets to get the job done. Equip 

contingency forces with trucks able to operate off-road---like the 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT)--instead of 

commercially designed vehicles unsuited to traverse sparse road 

networks. To maintain battlefield momentum and initiative, these 

vehicles will have cross-country mobility equal to the units they 

support. 

Containerization of logistical unit equipment and sustainment 

supplies would streamline the movement process. The inherent 

advantages are obvious: Containers are easier to load on ships, 

increase throughput capability, and decrease cost. There are far 

more container ships available to load them on, in a contingency, 

than old fashioned breakbulk ships. Most commanders, though, 

fight against this. They know that there is not enough materialshandling equipment to off-load the boxes in most regional 

scenarios. To overcome this often overlooked shortfall, we 

should create at the operational level container handling and 

processing units outfitted to control container operations, and 

deploy these units early. Additionally, on a larger scale, develop 

and practice a joint theater container management policy for 

deploying units to build discipline into the container movement 

system. 

Ad-Dammam, Saudi Arabia, is not a typical ship discharge 

operation in a regional setting. For example, Mogadishu, 

Somalia, could receive the military cargo of only one or two 

RO/RO ships at a time. Competition for berths with relief cargo, 

lack of warehousing space, and constrained airfield operations 

further exacerbated the deployment situation. Logistics-over-theshore (LOTS) operations proved impossible because we were 

desperately short of LOTS equipment, and what there was could 

not handle the heavy seas. Strengthened and increased LOTS 
68 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

equipment is essential to gain greater entry into most worldwide 

ports. 

STREAMLINING THE FORCE 

After the military draws down, U.S. planners will have too little 

force structure to afford the redundancy of designating certain 

forces to specific regions. With fewer available forces, there will 

be greater need for efficient employment; therefore, we should do 

the following now: Adapt force structure to be rapidly 

deployable and, with a minimum of preplanned adjustments, 

capable of fighting across the spectrum of future conflict. Tailor 

forces so that the functions most difficult to achieve after the 

beginning of hostilities, such as logistical support, receive higher 

priority than those that can be quickly developed. Shift some 

support units, particularly those that speed theater buildup, from 

the reserves to the active force to increase readiness. In these 

ways we can focus our transport effort and limited resources. 

Unless checked, the widespread use of cheaper unguided 

ordnance, rather than more expensive precision guided munitions-smart bombs--will continue to grow. The costs to stock 

and move ammunition within and to the theater are high, and 

amounts are significant. Unguided ordnance can be justified only 

when the combat effect sought is prolonged neutralization, 

harassment, or reconnaissance by fire. 16 We should place greater 

reliance on smart munitions to decrease the demand on strategic 

lift to move large stocks of less accurate munitions and delivery 

systems. 

Additionally, as described earlier, the threat allocation 

process--determining how much ammunition is really needed to 

achieve objectives--has run amuck. For example, there were 78 

amino-laden ships still awaiting off-load the day the Gulf War 

ended, and of 3.2 million rounds of 155mm howitzer shells 

moved to Saudi Arabia, 2.9 million had to be returned. 

Correcting this problem will allow more strategic lift for the 

rapid buildup of U.S. forces. 

FinaUy, based on their proven lethal advantage over the 
SCOFF W. CONRAD 69 

nearest adversary, restructure armored units with fewer tanks. 

This will lighten the load of projecting armored formations and 

lessen requisite support structure. Taking this a step further, we 

need an improved and easily transportable capability to defeat 

armor and other hard targets, such as a medium-weight armored 

gun system. 

Transportability 

For too long, transportability----equipment design to reduce 

mobility requirements--has been an afterthought in the 

acquisition process. Just as roles and missions redundancy has 

come into question, DoD has to really scrutinize and enforce the 

transportability of each piece of developing equipment. While 

lethality is the order of the day, we carmot afford mobility 

guzzlers any longer. 

Collective Security 

Our continued promotion of collective security arrangements 

should focus on stabilizing fragile regional relationships and 

mitigate America's shrinking forward presence. Paramount to 

these accords is that they gain us strategic access. The 

importance of staging bases and overflight rights cannot be 

overestimated in planning for future operations. Additionally, the 

relevance of developing equipment hlteroperability with allies 

will increase as these ground forces drawdown and multinational 

corps are formed. This can lead either to greater resource 

efficiencies or continued lack of standardization. The latter is 

no longer affordable. While coalitions may be ad hoc, firmly 

established alliances could make the strategic difference in the 

next confrontation. 
70 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

EXPLOITING AMERICA'S HIGH 

TECHNOLOGY ADVANTAGE 

Consider this prediction: 

Warfare will become more mobile, more mechanical, more 

destructive, more dependent upon science and technology. The 

rapid movement of troops and equipment to threatened points 

throughout the world will be of the utmost importance) 7 

No, not the words of some military futurist, but the logistics 

lessons of World War II. Truer today than ever before, 

exploration of new technologies should aim at easing the logistics 

burden of long-distance commitments. We should exploit our 

technological edge to enable U.S. contingency forces to overcome 

the constraints of time, distance, and decisive force, in reacting 

to contingencies. Lift-saving third-wave technology might 

include: 

• Enhanced command, control, communications and 

intelligence (C3I) 

• Directed energy weapons that do not require significant 

ammunition supply 

• Reduced combat vehicle fuel consumption through use of 

solid fuels, electric drive and lightweight composite materials 

• Enhancement of already existing satellite-aided ground 

positioning systems for sustainment vehicles 

• Space shuttle delivery of essential payloads 

• Weapons that require fewer people and need less 

transport, like robotic tanks 

• Electric transcription of personal mail and use of 

microfiche to and from the battlefield to replace bulky and 

burdensome mail procedures 

• Expanded versatility of the plentiful container ship fleet 

• Efficient miniaturized devices placed on mechanized 

vehicles to draw water from the moisture content in the 

air--reducing the need to move water forward 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 71 

• Recycling or eliminating water altogether in laundry, 

bath, and decontamination operations 

• Lightening of the force and reducing requirements 

through the use of advanced materials technologies. 

Throughout military history, attitude has played a pivotal role 

in technological advance and innovation. Traditional attitudes 

have caused failures to recognize the importance and impact of 

technological changes, and delayed the application of this 

technology. From adherence to trench warfare and reluctance to 

give up the horse, to failure to recognize the impact of firearms 

on close formations, the conservative military axiom "If it ain't 

broke, don't fix it" has frequently ruled strategy. This threat to 

innovation has delayed or stopped testing of key technologies that 

would have resulted in battlefield effectiveness--shortening 

conflict and saving lives. The real challenge, as Sir Basil Liddell 

Hart posited during World War II, is not to put a new idea into 

the military mind but to put the old one out. To maintain the 

edge, we cannot--we must not--accept the status quo. 

The Role of Enhanced C31 

Perhaps the greatest strides toward transportation savings can be 

made in the areas of precision munitions (as previously 

discussed) and enhanced Cal. Imagine the possibilities: If we 

can increase the probability of a hit by a factor of two, then the 

number of guns firing can be reduced by half, without affecting 

the effectiveness of the support. Now, to take this a step further, 

if our forces can also reduce the number of targets that have to 

be engaged by shooting only at what must be destroyed, we can 

further reduce the number of guns required. 18 

When the [lumber of guns is lowered, it logically follows that 

the required amount of combat service support will decrease 

proportionally. If the number of rounds fired can be halved, tlds 

will also reduce the number of vehicles required to transport the 

rounds, the amount of repair parts required, the number of 

support troops, and so on. 

Improving C3I will reduce the demand on logistics in other 
72 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

ways as well, by streamlining the use of resources such as fuel. 

Today, reserves sometimes move two or three times in response 

to an attack that never materializes. If our forces have a better 

idea of what's really occurring on the battlefield, unnecessary 

movement toward an unclear objective can be reduced--and 

refueled less. Forces can be concentrated at the decisive points 

without attempting to react to all the possible enemy courses of 

action. Reducing this uncertainty on the battlefield also decreases 

the amount of required combat service support. 

Jointly, America's military can use evolving technology to 

integrate sea-based (231 systems, such as Ae~s, with firing units 

ashore--Hawk, Patriot, and Theater High Altitude Air Defense 

System. This will certainly lessen the load for ground 

commanders and instill all-service battlefield connectivity. 

As the United States proved in the Gulf War, our method of 

preparing for the uncertain demands of battle is to stockpile as 

many supplies as possible. American forces have a tendency to 

create the proverbial iron mountains of repair parts, ammunition, 

and all else before beginning operations. If enhanced C3I allows 

us to predict the time and place of demand much more 

accurately, then we can reduce stockages without accepting 

higher levels of risk. 19 Moving resources costs transportation, so 

if we reduce resource requirements, movement savings follow. 

Traditionally, the price of American battlefield mobility has 

been a heavy logistical tail that often limits the very mobility that 

it supports. While today's forces have significant tactical 

mobility, their dependence on heavy logistical support greatly 

limits their operational and strategic mobility. If high technology 

can enhance CeI, smaller, more lethal, highly mobile formations 

can operate with less support along limited avenues of approach 

that would restrict today's forces. 

The bottom line is that enhanced C3I will unburden the 

strategic power projection of mobile forces and change the face 

of battlefield lethality. Force packages, truly more lean and 

mean, will be able to travel far more unconstrained by the 

traditional limiting factor of war---transportation. 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 73 

High-Tech Theater Resupply 

A different approach will be necessary for theater resupply. 

Large surface effect ships of 1,000 to 2,000 tons capacity with 

self-defense armament could load farther off shore, perhaps from 

larger ships of 20,000 to 40,000 tons displacement. The speed 

and flexibility of such ships would totally redefine theater 

logistics as to routes, timing, echelons of stockage, required 

supply quantifies, and vulnerability to enemy attack. 2° 

Container ships could take on new military utility if we 

determine new ways to optimize them. These vessels, plentiful 

in numbers and availability, have so far been an almost untapped 

military resource. Military adaptability, nearly an oxymoron in 

the past, must see the light of day if commercially available 

systems are to be transformed into military applications. 

One such application is to integrate multistack 

containerization technology, available in the highway and rail 

industries, to make intermodal vehicle movement from home 

station to the baltlefield an efficient and economic process. 

Along with the PLS concept that relies on flatracks, this would 

add greater usefulness to readily available container ships. 

Another unique container ship application is called Arapaho. 

This system modifies portions of a container ship's cargo deck 

with an easily installed flight deck and commercial containers. 

Arapaho underwent sea trials in 1982. It was easy to transport 

(since it is portable) and effectively accepted the day and night 

takeoff and landing of six various types of helicopters at sea. 

These trials demonstrated the complete compatibility of the 

Arapaho modules with commercial ships to provide an air 

capability at sea. A much more expensive variation on this 

theme was recently used in Uphold Democracy in Haiti, as Army 

helicopters were placed on the flight deck of a Navy aircraft 

carder. 

To accommodate the Arapaho system, a host merchant ship 

retains 70 percent cargo-carrying capability and sacrifices roughly 

30 percent of payload commonly carried on deck to specialized 

containers. These commercial containers, installed in virtually 
74 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

any desired configuration, provide C3I, hangars for aircraft, repair 

shops, fuel storage, and messing and berthing. Using existing 

hulls, the system is stored ashore and quickly assembled aboard 

ship. Only modules necessary for a given mission need be 

installed. Altemative modules can provide dual-mission 

capability, maximizing return on inveslment. No new ship 

construction is required and savings are accrued by keeping host 

vessels in private hands for operation and maintenance. Some 

Arapaho applications include: 

• Power projection and indigenous defense of the 

equipment of a rapid deployment force loaded on container ships 

equipped with Army or Marine helicopters. 

• Over-the-beach logistic support with cargo helicopters 

taking off from the decks of Arapaho-equipped container ships. 

• Platform and assets for insertion into/extraction from a 

regional flashpoint. 2~ 

Harnessing America's Movement Resources 

Lest we forget: High technology, in the abstract, does not win 

wars. Well-led, well-trained and well-equipped people will 

always carry the day. The movement lessons of the Gulf War, 

if properly learned, can help reshape America's defense 

transportation system in the post-Cold War era. A crucial 

question of any realistic analysis of those lessons is this: How 

will forces be moved in a future characterized by regional crisis 

and reduced forward presence? Certainly, America will rely 

more than ever on efficient and timely movement of the force. 

The slightest delay or inefficiency in hamessing our movement 

resources may cost us victory. To carefully restructure military 

capabilities will reduce the risks of distance and time in an 

unstable world. 

Such restructuring can no longer be "planned" for the outyears, with little hope of actual execution. We must now 

prioritize the actions of the movement strategy, follow through, 

and accomplish them one bite at a time: 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 75 

• First, place afloat pre-positioning of ground equipment 

and supplies as the number one priority. This includes not only 

ship procurement and construction, but stockage and 

maintenance, as well. 

• Front load significant quantities of smart munitions in 

these pre-positioned packages to maximize lethality in the initial 

stages of conflict. This will save critical transport resources, so 

essential to putting fighting forces on the ground, now 

encumbered by hauling massive amounts of less effective 

unguided bombs. 

• Next, get on with the C-17, a linchpin of global reach 

strategy. 

• Concurrently, refine the requirements determination 

process. World events will no longer tolerate operators who 

command, "Give me all you've got" because the cost in money, 

time, equipment, supplies, and transportation is enormous. 

Nothing should short the warfighting CINC of his capability to 

decisively defeat any potential adversary, so theater-specific 

computerized battlefield simulations ought to focus on providing 

accurate supply estimates of crisis requirements. 

• Within the Army, carry out plans to acquire trucks with 

the same mobility capability as the armor equipment they 

support. This should be a full-up fielding--not the traditional 

trickle down of equipment, in which units receive only about l/a 

of the power that is actually required. Get the PLS out into the 

users' hands so that combat commanders and logisticians can 

weave its yet untapped distribution potential into battle plans and 

doctrine. Procure enough capable tank tranporters to get the job 

done fight. The hodgepodge of HETs provided by allies during 

the Gulf War won't be there the next time around. 

• Through it all, stay the course of a movement vision. 

Revise the instruments of the vision along the way, based on new 

technology, but remain focused on the ultimate objective: To 

provide the warfighting CINC with the capability to move the 

force in order to win on tomorrow's battlefield. Toward the new 

world order, that battlefield may be a regional crisis with singular 
76 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

U.S. intervention, as a part of a NATO or coalition peacekeeping 

or peacemaking force, or a major natural disaster team. But the 

need for rapid and sufficient transport is no less great in any of 

these scenarios. 

To execute a credible crisis response strategy, a world power 

must be able to readily surge strategic mobility, and reliably 

move equipment and supplies on the battlefield. There is sober 

logic in demonsU'ating that development of these capacities is 

among the strongest possible deterrents to conflict. And there is 

good economic sense in suggesting that America's fiscal renewal 

will be enhanced by reinvestment in the military transportation 

base. After all, military and economic strength will define our 

future. 

In moving the force beyond Desert Storm, it is vital that we 

assure America's strategic role in the world by shaping 

movement preeminence. To do so prudently provides, perhaps, 

the greatest conventional deterrent to war and strengthener of 

peace--global reach. To do less invites confrontation with 

adversaries willing to test the substance and purpose of that 

reach. 
Notes 

Chapter 1. NOTHING HAPPENS UNTIL SOMETHING MOVES! 

1. Lt. Gen. Jimmy D. Ross, Today's Challenge: Tomorrow's 

Army (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 1992), 6-1. 

2. Lt. Gen. LeR. Lutes, Logistics in World War ll--Final Report 

of the Army Service Forces (Washington, DC: War Department, July 

1947), 251. 

3. Col. Joseph J. Collins, "Desert Storm and the Lessons of 

Learning," Parameters (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Autumn 

1992), 87. 

4. Maj. Gen. Fred E. Elam and Lt. Col. Mark Henderson, "The 

Army's Strategic Mobility Plan," Army Logistician (May-June 1992), 

3. 

5. Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, 

Organization, and Operations in World War H (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 2. 

6. Col. Gilbert S. Harper, "Army Logistics in 2010," Army 

Logistician, September-October 1991, 20. 

7. RADM. (Ret.) Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National 

Defense (Washington, DC: NAVMC 2799, 1959, reprinted 1987), 9, 

18. 

8. Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from 

Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 

3. 

Chapter 2. PREPARING FOR DESERT STORM 

1. Michael Klare, "Pax Americana Redux," in The Gulf War 

Reader, Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds. (New York: Times 

Books, 1991), 470. 

2. Joseph Galloway, "The Point of the Spear," U.S. News and 

World Report, March 11, 1991, 41; and, Charles Lane, et. al., "The 

Killing Ground," Newsweek, January 28, 1991, 30. 

3. Murray Hammick, "Logistics Comes of Age," International 

Defense Review (July 1992), 665. 

4. Lt. Gen. William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Boston: 

77 
78 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

Harvard Press, 1992), 13. 

5. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: 

Final Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, April 1992), vol. 

II, F-21. 

6. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope: 

Lessons Learned Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: November, 1993), II2. 

7. Ibid., vol. I, 38. 

8. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: 

Interim Report to Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, July 1991), 1-8. 

9. James Blackwell, et. al., Interim Report of the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies Group on Lessons Learned from the 

Gulf War (Washington, DC: CSIS, July 1991), 1. 

10. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the Congress, 

vol. I, iii. 

1 i. Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, "From Rapid Deployment to 

Massive Deployment," in The Gulf War Reader, 34. 

12. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the 

Congress, vol. I, 38. 

13. Ibid., 40. 

14. Ibid., 43. 

Chapter 3. MOVING THE FORCE IN DESERT STORM 

1. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the 

Congress, vol. I, 43. 

2. Ibid., 40. 

3. Ibid., vol. II, E2. 

4. Ibid., vol. II, E-16. 

5. Association of the United States Army, Special Report: 

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm The Logistics Perspective 

(Arlington: AUSA, September 1991), 4. 

6. The first month of the Korean buildup was July 1950. U.S. 

Army Chief of Transportation Briefing: Operation Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm (Fort Eustis, VA: August 1991). 

7. The f'trst month of the buildup was August 7-September 7, 

1990. General Accounting Office Report: Operation Desert 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 79 

Shield~Desert Storm (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1991). 

8. Blackwell, 34. 

9. Maj. Mark L. Hayes, "Sealift: The Achilles' Heel of our 

National Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette (November 1992), 72. 

10. Pagonis, 125. 

11. Col. Edward T. Fortunato, The Breakdown of a Priority 

System---A Logistics Case Sudy (Washington, DC: Industrial College of 

the Armed Forces, April 1992), 1-13. 

12. Lt. Col. David C. Rutenberg and Jane S. Allen, ed., The 

Logistics of Waging War (Gunter Air Force Station: Air Force 

Logistics Management Center, 1986), 137. 

13. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to 

Congress, vol. I, 41. 

14. Col. Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian 

Gulf War (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

1992), 20. 

15. Lutes, 35-38. 

16. Craft, 21. 

17. Michael D. McManus and Frederick M. McNamee, Logistics 

Management Institute Report: Relationships Between Mobility, 

Sustainability, and Firepower (Bethesda: LMI, February 1991), iii-iv. 

18. Ibid., 12. 

19. Ibid., 13. 

20. Department of Defense, The Mobility Requirements Study 

(Washington, DC: GPO, January 23, 1992), vol. I, ES-2. 

21. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the 

Congress, vol. I, 59. 

22. U.S. General Accounting Office, Part of the National Defense 

Reserve Fleet is No Longer Needed, Report to Congressional Requesters 

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), 16. 

23. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait 

(Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1991), 100-101. 

24. Pagonis, 206. 

25. U.S. Congress, Military Supply Systems: Lessons from the 

Vietnam Experience, House, 91st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: 

GPO, October 1970), 3. 

26. Lt. Gen. fRet.) Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., A Soldier Supporting 

Soldiers (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States 

Army, 1991), 151. 
80 MOVING THE FORCE: Desert Storm and Beyond 

27. Ibid. 

28. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the 

Congress, vol. I, 40. 

29. Ibid., 51. 

30. Ibid., 103. 

31. Lutes, 249. 

32. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the 

Congress, vol. I, 103. 

33. Gen. Hansford T. Johnson, Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Transportation Command, Presentation to the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Armed Services (Washington, DC: March 13, 1992), 1. 

34. Pagonis, 2. 

35. Ibid., 6. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Johnson, 1. 

38. Pagonis, 9. 

39. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the 

Congress, vol. II, F-2. 

40. Joel Nadel, "Logistics Lessons," in The Gulf War Reader, 168. 

41. Rick Maze, "Storm Report: Logistics Hit Their Limit," Army 

Times (May 4, 1992), 10. 

42. Headquarters, Combined Arms Support Command, 

"Sustainment Imperatives in History--Integration: Rommel's Nemesis," 

Army Logistician (March-April 1992), 10. 

43. Maj. Anthony H. Kral, "Sustaining Patton's Pursuit," Army 

Logistician, January-February 1991, 26-30. 

44. General Accounting Office, GAO Report: Operation Desert 

Storm--Transportation and Distribution of Equipment and Supplies in 

Southwest Asia (Washington, DC: GPO, December 26, 1991), 10. 

45. Pagonis, 203-204. 

46. U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Report on the 

Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: GPO, April 23, 1992). 

Chapter 4. MOVING THE FORCE IN FUTURE CONFLICTS 

1. U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Report on the 

Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: GPO, April 23, 1992). 

2. Johnson, 4-5. 
SCOTT W. CONRAD 81 

3. Lt. Cdr. Robin E. Rathbun, "Strategic Mobility for the 1990s: 

The Mobility Requirements Study," Strategic Review (Summer 1992), 

4-5. 

4. The Mobility Requirements Study, vol. I, ES-6. 

5. Friedman, 103 

6. Doug Bandow, "Merchant Marine Sinks Oceans of Money," 

The all Street Journal, September 12, 1988, 20. 

7. Kent N. Gourdin and Lt. Col. Robert E. Trempe, "Contingency 

Transportation in a Changing World: Meeting the Challenge," Logistics 

Spectrum(Spring 1992), 11. 

8. Friedman, 104. 

9. Gen. Hansford T. Johnson, "The Defense Transportation 

System," Defense Transportation Journal (October, 1991), 56. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Gourdin and Trempe, 11. 

12. Gen. William G. T. Tuttle, Jr. (Ret.), "Sustaining Army 

Combat Forces Part II," Array Logistician, November-December 1991, 

12-13. 

12. Ibid., 14. 

14. Herb Coen, "Joint Service Movement Control Doctrine---An 

Idea Whose Time has Come," Transportation Corps Bulletin (July 

1990), 33. 

15. Joe A. Fortner, Capt. Jules T. Doux and Capt. Mark A. 

Peterson, "Bring on the HETs!" Military Review (January 1992), 42. 

16. Dave McCurdy and John G. Rowland, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies Report--Conventional Combat Priorities: An 

Approach for the New Strategic Era (Washington, DC: CSIS, May 

1990), 37. 

17. Lutes, 251. 

18. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf War and 

Beyond (Washington, DC: The Institute for International Studies, 1992), 

48-49. 

19. Ibid., 48. 

20. McCurdy and Rowland, 55. 

21. Scott W. Conrad, "Arapaho: The Army-Navy Game," Military 

Review (May 1988), 79-80. 
McNair Papers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, 

home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the 

National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort 

was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant 

General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as 

"Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, 

was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe 

under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 

25 July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. 

For information on the availability of specific titles, contact the 

Circulation Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, 

Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 30219-6000 (telephone: 

commercial 202/475-1913; DSN 335-1913). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 

1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World. February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. M,-mwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador. May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 
13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, 

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria' s Quest for Security After the Cold 

War, February 1993. 

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in 

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, lnteroperability: A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations 

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, European 

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States, 

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security 

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green. Redefining the U.S.-]apan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond, 

December 1994. 
jFQ 

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