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310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

James E. Taylor, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed November 12, 2021. No. S-21-096.

1. Appeal and Error. It is a fundamental rule of appellate practice that an 

alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued 

in the brief of the party asserting the error to be considered by an appellate court.

2. ____. A generalized and vague assignment of error that does not advise 

an appellate court of the issue submitted for decision will not be 

considered.

3. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of a criminal 

case from the county court, the district court acts as an intermediate 

court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examination of the 

record for error or abuse of discretion.

4. Courts: Appeal and Error. Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error 

appearing on the record.

5. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors 

appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is 

neither arbitrary, capricious, not unreasonable.

6. Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently reviews 

questions of law in appeals from the county court.

7. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. When deciding appeals 

from criminal convictions in county court, an appellate court applies the 

same standards of review that it applies to decide appeals from criminal 

convictions in district court.

8. Trial: Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. An appellate court 

will sustain a conviction in a bench trial of a criminal case if the properly 

admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is 

sufficient to support that conviction. In making this determination, an 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

11/12/2021 08:08 AM CST
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the 

credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh the evidence 

presented, which are within a fact finder’s province for disposition. 

Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Ordinances: Appeal and Error. Interpretation of a municipal ordinance 

is a question of law, on which an appellate court reaches an independent 

conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.

10. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The interpretation of statutes and regulations presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews 

de novo.

11. Statutes: Intent. When interpreting a statute, the starting point and 

focus of the inquiry is the meaning of the statutory language, understood 

in context.

12. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

13. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning 

into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of 

a statute.

14. Drunk Driving: Words and Phrases. As used in Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 60-6,196 (Reissue 2010), the phrase “under the influence of alcoholic 

liquor or of any drug” requires the ingestion of alcohol or drugs in an 

amount sufficient to impair to any appreciable degree the driver’s ability 

to operate a motor vehicle in a prudent and cautious manner.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Susan 

I. Strong, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court 

for Lancaster County, Joseph E. Dalton, Judge. Judgment of 

District Court affirmed.

Joe Nigro, Lancaster County Public Defender, and James 

Sieben for appellant.

Robert E. Caples, Assistant Lincoln City Prosecutor, for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ., and Thompson, District Judge.
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

Papik, J.

The State prosecuted James E. Taylor for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting driving under the influence. The 

State’s theory was that Taylor was driving while impaired 

by his prescription medication. Taylor was convicted in the 

county court and unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to 

the district court. He now appeals again, arguing that the State 

could not establish a driving under the influence conviction on 

the theory he was under the influence of prescription medications and that the evidence was otherwise insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree with Taylor’s arguments and 

therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

The State charged Taylor with several offenses arising out 

of a traffic stop in Lincoln, Nebraska, in July 2019. The sole 

charge relevant to this appeal was that Taylor violated Lincoln 

Mun. Code § 10.16.030 (2017), a certified copy of which is in 

our record. That ordinance makes it “unlawful for any person 

to operate or be in the actual physical control of any motor 

vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor, or of 

any drug.”

At trial, the State called the police officers who completed 

the traffic stop, Matthew Stegman and Bryan Gruber. Stegman 

testified that because he was training Gruber, they were riding 

together that night. Stegman and Gruber testified that just after 

11 p.m., they saw a vehicle driving on a Lincoln street with its 

headlights off. While following the vehicle, the officers saw it 

cross the centerline and strike a curb. Gruber initiated a traffic 

stop. Taylor was the vehicle’s only occupant.

Stegman testified about his interaction with Taylor during the traffic stop. Stegman asked Taylor why his headlights 

were not on and why he struck the curb. Taylor responded 

that he thought his headlights were on and that he fell asleep 

while driving. Stegman also testified that when he asked 

Taylor whether he had taken any medications or drugs recently, 

Taylor responded that he had taken some prescription pills. 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

Stegman observed that Taylor had “somewhat slurred speech” 

and appeared “overtired” and not “completely aware of what 

[was] going on.”

Stegman testified that he then asked Taylor to get out of 

the vehicle so that he could administer field sobriety tests. 

Taylor’s performance on several field sobriety tests indicated 

that he was impaired. Gruber testified that while Stegman was 

administering the field sobriety tests, Taylor was “basically 

falling asleep periodically during the test.” The officers did not 

smell any alcohol on Taylor’s breath, and Taylor denied using 

alcohol. A preliminary breath test did not detect any alcohol on 

Taylor’s breath.

As a result of Taylor’s driving and his performance on the 

field sobriety tests, the officers transported him to another 

location so that he could be evaluated by a drug recognition 

expert (DRE). Prior to the DRE evaluation, Taylor submitted 

to a formal breath test on a DataMaster machine, which also 

showed no indication of alcohol. After Stegman read Taylor his 

Miranda rights, Taylor also agreed to be interviewed. During 

this interview, Taylor again acknowledged recently taking medications. He informed the officers he was taking the medications for mental and behavioral health reasons and provided 

the names of those medications. The medications included 

Seroquel and Effexor. According to Stegman, Taylor stated that 

when taking the medications, he did get “sleepy,” but that he 

felt he could still drive safely.

Sgt. Max Hubka, the certified DRE who evaluated Taylor, 

also testified. He described the multistep DRE protocol, which 

included performance tests of Taylor, the formation of an 

opinion by Hubka, and toxicology. Hubka observed that during the evaluation, Taylor appeared tired and stated that he 

was tired. Hubka also observed that Taylor’s speech was 

slow, “with a slight slur to it.” Hubka testified that Taylor told 

him what prescription medications he had taken that evening 

and that they included Seroquel and Effexor. Hubka testified 

that based on his training, he knew those two medications to 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

be central nervous system (CNS) depressants. Hubka testified over Taylor’s objection that the term “CNS depressants” 

refers to a category of drugs that “slow[] the processes of the 

body.” According to Hubka, CNS depressants would include 

antidepressants and antipsychotics and Seroquel is an anti

psychotic medication.

Hubka also testified over Taylor’s objection that in his opinion, Taylor was under the influence of CNS depressants. Hubka 

based this opinion on Taylor’s performance on field sobriety 

tests, inability to stay awake, slightly slurred speech, and poor 

balance, as well as Taylor’s agreement with Hubka’s opinion 

that Taylor was not safe to drive and his admission that he had 

ingested multiple types of CNS depressants before driving.

A forensic scientist in the Nebraska State Patrol Crime 

Laboratory testified that she analyzed a urine sample provided 

by Taylor. She explained that her analysis was governed by 

177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7 (2007), a certified copy of which 

was received in evidence. Over Taylor’s objection, she testified that in Taylor’s urine sample, she detected venlafaxine, the 

generic term for Effexor, which she characterized as a “mild 

CNS depressant.” She also testified that she detected que

tiapine, the generic term for Seroquel, and explained that quetiapine is an antipsychotic medication with “CNS depressant 

side effects.”

In his defense, Taylor called a friend he had visited immediately before the traffic stop. She testified that Taylor had 

fallen asleep at her residence, but she denied seeing him use 

any drugs or medications and did not believe he was “high” or 

under the influence.

Taylor also testified in his own defense. He testified that for 

at least 5 years prior to the traffic stop, he had prescriptions 

for and had been taking Effexor and Seroquel. Taylor could not 

recall ever being told by a doctor that the medications should 

not be used prior to driving and testified that the labels on the 

medication bottles directed only that those taking the medications should use caution while driving.
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

The county court found Taylor guilty of driving under the 

influence of drugs and sentenced him accordingly. Taylor 

appealed that conviction to the district court. Taylor challenged 

several of the county court’s evidentiary rulings and argued 

that the county court had erred in finding him guilty without sufficient evidence. The district court affirmed Taylor’s 

conviction.

Taylor then appealed the district court’s decision, and we 

moved the case to our docket.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Taylor’s appellate brief sets forth two numbered assignments 

of error. The second assigned error is that the district court 

erred by finding that there was sufficient evidence to support 

the conviction of driving under the influence. We will analyze 

Taylor’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence below.

[1,2] Taylor’s first assigned error is more general. He asserts 

that “[t]he district court erred by affirming [Taylor’s] conviction in county court of driving under the influence as a matter 

of law.” It is a fundamental rule of appellate practice that an 

alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be 

considered by an appellate court. State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 

759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). A generalized and vague assignment of error that does not advise an appellate court of the 

issue submitted for decision will not be considered. Id. Taylor’s 

assertion that the district court erred “as a matter of law” without any elaboration as to the nature of that error is the type of 

generalized assignment of error that we do not consider.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[3-7] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, 

the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and 

its review is limited to an examination of the record for error 

or abuse of discretion. State v. Valentino, 305 Neb. 96, 939 

N.W.2d 345 (2020). Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

error appearing on the record. Id. When reviewing a judgment 

for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry 

is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported 

by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, 

nor unreasonable. Id. But we independently review questions 

of law in appeals from the county court. Id. When deciding 

appeals from criminal convictions in county court, we apply 

the same standards of review that we apply to decide appeals 

from criminal convictions in district court. Id.

[8] An appellate court will sustain a conviction in a bench 

trial of a criminal case if the properly admitted evidence, 

viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient 

to support that conviction. State v. Montoya, 304 Neb. 96, 

933 N.W.2d 558 (2019). In making this determination, we do 

not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility 

of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh the evidence 

presented, which are within a fact finder’s province for disposition. Id. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[9,10] Interpretation of a municipal ordinance is a question 

of law, on which we reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Wilkison v. 

City of Arapahoe, 302 Neb. 968, 926 N.W.2d 441 (2019). The 

interpretation of statutes and regulations presents a question of 

law which we review de novo. Id.

ANALYSIS

Taylor makes two arguments to challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support his conviction for violating the city of 

Lincoln (the City) driving under the influence ordinance. His 

first argument depends on his interpretation of the ordinance. 

Taylor contends that while the State’s theory at trial was that 

he was under the influence of his prescription medications, 

those medications do not qualify as “any drug” under the 

ordinance, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence of 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

an essential element of the crime. Alternatively, he argues that 

even if his prescription medications qualify as “any drug,” 

there was insufficient evidence that he was under the influence 

of those prescription medications. We address each of these 

arguments below.

Taylor’s Prescription Medications Qualify 

as “Any Drug” Under Ordinance.

As we have noted, the municipal ordinance at issue criminalizes the operation or actual physical control of a motor 

vehicle while under the influence of “alcoholic liquor, or of 

any drug.” This language mirrors a state statute, Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 60-6,196(1)(a) (Reissue 2010). Another statute authorizes cities and villages to enact ordinances in conformance 

with § 60-6,196. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.07 (Reissue 

2010).

While the City ordinance refers to driving under the influence of “any drug,” Taylor argues that a person can be convicted of violating the ordinance only if the State proves that he 

or she was under the influence of one of seven drugs listed in a 

definition of “drug” contained within a regulation promulgated 

by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS). Under that regulation, “Drug means any of the following. Marijuana, cocaine, morphine, codeine, phencyclidine, 

amphetamine, or methamphetamine.” 177 Neb. Admin. Code, 

ch. 7, § 001.13. He contends that the prescription medications 

he admitted to taking on the night at issue are not among the 

substances listed in the regulation and that therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

Taylor’s understanding of the ordinance rests on a theory 

of delegation. He contends that the Legislature authorized 

DHHS to promulgate rules governing the driving under the 

influence statutes and ordinances and that DHHS has, in an 

exercise of that authority, chosen to limit the definition of 

“drug,” as it appears in those statutes and ordinances, to the 

seven substances listed in the above-quoted regulation. Taylor 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

claims his theory of delegation is supported by Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 60-6,201 (Reissue 2010). That statute sets forth certain 

requirements for chemical tests of blood, breath, and urine, 

and it directs that if tests are made in conformity with those 

requirements, the results “shall be competent evidence” in a 

prosecution for violating a driving under the influence statute 

or ordinance. See § 60-6,201(1). Among those requirements is 

a provision that “[t]o be considered valid,” such tests “shall be 

performed according to methods approved by [DHHS].” See 

§ 60-6,201(3).

[11-13] Taylor’s argument requires that we interpret the 

City’s driving under the influence ordinance as well as the 

driving under the influence statutes mentioned above. We apply 

the same principles to interpret ordinances that we do to interpret statutes. See Walsh v. City of Omaha Police & Fire Ret. 

Sys., 277 Neb. 554, 763 N.W.2d 411 (2009). When interpreting a statute, the starting point and focus of the inquiry is the 

meaning of the statutory language, understood in context. In 

re Guardianship of Eliza W., 304 Neb. 995, 938 N.W.2d 307 

(2020). Our analysis begins with the text, because statutory 

language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and 

an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain 

the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and 

unambiguous. See id. Neither is it within the province of the 

courts to read meaning into a statute that is not there or to read 

anything direct and plain out of a statute. Parks v. Hy-Vee, 307 

Neb. 927, 951 N.W.2d 504 (2020). Applying those rules here, 

we are not persuaded by Taylor’s argument.

Taylor has not pointed to any statutory language providing DHHS with authorization to define the phrase “any drug” 

as it appears in § 60-6,196(1)(a) or in municipal ordinances 

authorized by § 60-6,197.07. Neither has he identified any 

language in either § 60-6,196(1)(a) or the City ordinance 

incorporating the DHHS regulation definition of “drug.” The 

sole statute upon which Taylor relies for his delegation argument, § 60-6,201, does give DHHS a role to play in driving 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

under the influence prosecutions, but that role is limited to 

approving methods and techniques for valid chemical tests. 

See § 60-6,201(3). And, consistent with that limited role, the 

DHHS definition of “drug” upon which Taylor relies appears 

in a regulation setting forth methods and techniques for detecting drug content in urine among those suspected of driving 

under the influence. See 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 7. In sum, 

the interpretation Taylor advances would require us to read 

meaning into either the driving under the influence statutes 

or the City ordinance. That is not how we interpret statutes or 

municipal ordinances. See, Parks, supra; Walsh, supra.

While we find no support for Taylor’s interpretation of the 

phrase “any drug” in the City ordinance, the question remains 

whether, under that language, the State could establish a conviction under the ordinance on a theory that Taylor was under 

the influence of his prescription medications, Effexor and 

Seroquel. We find that it could.

The parties agree that the phrase “any drug” is not defined 

by the municipal ordinance. Accordingly, we are obligated to 

interpret the phrase according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 

See Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. v. Danielle O., 303 Neb. 

268, 928 N.W.2d 407 (2019) (holding that undefined statutory 

terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning).

The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “drug” would 

encompass Taylor’s prescription medications. In everyday 

English, it is common to refer to any prescription medication 

as a prescription “drug.” Taylor’s medications are no exception. See, e.g., In re: Seroquel Products Liability Litigation, 

542 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2008) (referring to “the 

prescription drug Seroquel”); Jackson v. Brotherhood’s Relief 

& Comp. Fund, 273 Neb. 1013, 1015, 734 N.W.2d 739, 743 

(2007) (referring to “a prescription drug called Effexor”). See, 

also, brief for appellant at 21 (“Effexor and its generic counterpart, [v]enlafaxine, are commonly prescribed drugs”).

To be sure, words like “prescription” or “illegal” can modify 

the term “drug” and thereby refer to different subcategories 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

of substances, each of which bears the label “drug.” The 

ordinance before us, however, does not limit its coverage to 

illegal or some other subcategory of drugs. To the contrary, it 

makes it unlawful to drive under the influence of “any drug.” 

Lincoln Mun. Code § 10.16.030 (emphasis supplied). As we 

have previously recognized, the word “any,” read naturally, is 

expansive and refers to all that fall within a particular category 

“of whatever kind.” See Rouse v. State, 301 Neb. 1037, 1044, 

921 N.W.2d 355, 361 (2019), quoting Ali v. Federal Bureau 

of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 128 S. Ct. 831, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 

(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). On this basis, we 

interpreted the statutory phrase “‘any law enforcement officer’” to cover “all law enforcement officers.” Rouse, 301 

Neb. at 1043, 921 N.W.2d at 361. In much the same way, we 

interpret the phrase “any drug” in the City ordinance to refer 

to all drugs, “of whatever kind,” including Taylor’s prescription medications.

Record Contains Sufficient Evidence 

That Taylor Was Under Influence 

of His Prescription Medications.

[14] Taylor next claims that even if his prescription medications qualify as “any drug,” there was insufficient evidence in 

the record that he was under the influence of those medications 

for purposes of the ordinance. We have said that as used in 

§ 60-6,196, the phrase “under the influence of alcoholic liquor 

or of any drug” requires the ingestion of alcohol or drugs 

in an amount sufficient to impair to any appreciable degree 

the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle in a prudent 

and cautious manner. See State v. Daly, 278 Neb. 903, 775 

N.W.2d 47 (2009). We see no reason not to apply the same 

standard to determine whether there was evidence that Taylor 

was “under the influence of . . . any drug” for purposes of the 

City ordinance.

The record unquestionably contains some evidence to support the State’s position that Taylor’s ability to drive safely 
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STATE v. TAYLOR

Cite as 310 Neb. 376

was impaired as a result of his prescription medications. As 

recounted above, there was evidence that Taylor was driving 

at night with his headlights off, that he crossed the centerline 

of the road, that he struck a curb, that he admitted he had 

fallen asleep while driving and was very tired, that he showed 

impairment on field sobriety tests despite having no alcohol in 

his system, that he admitted to taking his prescription medications earlier that night, and that a urinalysis confirmed the 

presence of those prescription medications in his system. In 

addition to all this, Hubka, a certified DRE, testified to his 

opinion that Taylor was under the influence of his prescription 

medications.

In the face of all this evidence, Taylor maintains that there 

was insufficient evidence that he was under the influence of his 

prescription medications. He argues that some of the evidence 

summarized above was inadmissible. He points to evidence 

that he was tired on the night of the traffic stop and claims that 

was the reason for his poor driving. Finally, he makes a public 

policy argument that a person should not be convicted of driving under the influence if he or she is shown only to be under 

the influence of medications taken as prescribed.

Each of Taylor’s arguments is unavailing. Taylor did not 

assign error to the district court’s resolution of his claim that 

the county court received inadmissible evidence, so that issue 

is not before us. See State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759, 936 

N.W.2d 747 (2020). His claim that he was driving poorly only 

because he was tired invites us to evaluate explanations and 

reweigh evidence, neither of which are properly a part of an 

appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. 

Montoya, 304 Neb. 96, 933 N.W.2d 558 (2019). Furthermore, 

given the evidence in the record that Taylor admitted that his 

prescription medications made him “sleepy,” it is not clear 

that evidence that Taylor was tired is even helpful to his argument that he was not impaired by his prescription medications. Finally, Taylor’s general public policy argument is not 

relevant to the sufficiency of the evidence and, indeed, is 
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Cite as 310 Neb. 376

not even properly directed to this court. See Rogers v. Jack’s 

Supper Club, 304 Neb. 605, 614, 935 N.W.2d 754, 762 (2019) 

(“we are not tasked with selecting what we believe is the best 

policy. It is the function of the Legislature, through the enactment of statutes, to declare what is the law and public policy 

of this state”).

Viewing all of the evidence summarized above in the light 

most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of 

fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor’s 

ingestion of his prescription medication had impaired to an 

appreciable degree his ability to operate his vehicle in a prudent and cautious manner. We therefore reject Taylor’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his driving 

under the influence conviction.

CONCLUSION

We find the district court did not err in affirming Taylor’s 

driving under the influence conviction. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed.

Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.