SIGAR Audit-10-3S Anti-Corruption/Rule of Law Page 1 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed For a More Strategic Approach 

to U.S. Judicial Security Assistance 

On December 18, 2009, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a 

report assessing U.S. judicial security assistance to Afghanistan (SIGAR Audit-10-3). Due to the sensitive 

nature of the issues discussed in the report, distribution was restricted to relevant agency and 

congressional officials as Controlled Unclassified Information. SIGAR is providing the following 

unrestricted summary of the report’s findings and recommendations for public distribution. Sensitive 

information that could endanger U.S., allied, and Afghan lives and interests have been removed from 

this summary.

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

SIGAR Audit-10-3 assessed U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in the area of judicial security with a focus on 

support to the Judicial Security Unit (JSU)1

SIGAR Audit-10-3 is part of a series of SIGAR audits addressing U.S. efforts to strengthen Afghanistan’s 

anti-corruption capabilities and the rule of law. 

and plans for a broader judicial security program. We

examined: (1) the approach used by U.S. agencies to provide judicial security assistance, and (2) the 

factors that could affect the efficacy of such assistance. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, 

and Washington, D.C., from July to November 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. During the course of the audit, SIGAR provided a letter to the U.S. Embassy on 

October 11, 2009, outlining issues that needed immediate attention. The Embassy responded to these 

concerns in a letter dated November 5, 2009. When preparing the final report, we considered written 

comments from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and incorporated information based on technical comments 

from the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense. 

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

The United States has been the single largest contributor to Afghanistan’s justice sector, investing more 

than $160 million in the last two fiscal years. An effective judicial sector is essential to establishing rule 

of law and good governance in Afghanistan. However, several reports and assessments highlight the risk 

that Afghan judicial officials face in performing their duties. Enhancing the security of judicial officials is 

an important element of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and Afghanistan’s National 

Anti-Corruption Strategy.

 1 Afghanistan’s Judicial Security Unit has also been referred to as the Judicial and Witness Security Protection Unit, 

the Court Security Unit, and the Afghan Marshals Service in documents provided by U.S. agencies. 
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Since 2007, the United States has provided training and infrastructure support to the JSU, a specialized 

unit of the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan under the Ministry of Interior. U.S. agencies that 

provide assistance include the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Defense (DOD), and State. The U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS), a component of DOJ, mentors and trains JSU personnel in courtroom and 

personal security. DOJ also provides advisors to Afghan judicial institutions. DOD designed, funded, and 

built a $4.5 million compound in Kabul to house and support the JSU. Completed in May 2009, the 

compound consists of barracks, offices, a dining facility, and medical building. The State Department’s 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will fund the JSU compound’s 

operations and maintenance, as well as procure its furniture, fixtures, and equipment. The U.S. Embassy 

in Kabul’s Rule of Law office is involved in interagency and international discussions on justice sector 

issues. 2

The U.S. and Afghanistan governments have begun discussions on the provision of additional judicial 

security assistance. Discussions included proposals from both governments on the scope, size, funding, 

and implementation phases of a broader judicial security program.

U.S. Assistance Lacks Key Elements of a Strategic Approach

U.S. judicial security assistance lacks key elements of a strategic approach and has at times been 

uncoordinated. Best practices for implementing federal programs include such elements as leadership, 

agreed upon standards, assessment of risk, and a planning process that takes into account requirements 

and stakeholders. Taking a strategic approach to program implementation promotes transparency and 

helps ensure that the program is based on a sound plan that can achieve results and reduce potential 

risks to U.S. investments.

• Lead Agency to Coordinate U.S. Assistance

Several U.S. agencies are responsible for developing, funding, and implementing U.S. judicial 

security assistance, but no single agency or individual has been officially designated to lead or 

coordinate U.S. efforts, which contributed to delays in opening the JSU compound. Moreover, 

there was no consensus among these agencies as to which agency should serve in that capacity.

Best practices have shown that a lead agency or coordinator can serve as a focal point for 

integrating multi-agency efforts and ensuring effective program implementation. The U.S. 

Embassy proposed that its Rule of Law office be designated as the coordinator for future judicial 

security assistance in response to a letter SIGAR sent to the U.S. Embassy.

• Judicial Security Standards

The U.S. and Afghan governments have not established judicial security standards. As a result, 

initial U.S. and Afghan proposals for a broader judicial security program varied widely in terms of 

size, scope, and cost. Commonly accepted standards help ensure organizational, management, 

and budgetary decisions are made consistently across organizations involved in a multi-agency 

or international effort. They also provide the basis for defining program requirements. 

 2 Although we did not examine the full extent of international assistance for judicial security in Afghanistan, we 

note that the U.S. government has coordinated with the French and British governments in planning and 

implementing its judicial security assistance.
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• Judicial Security Assessments

Although we are not able to discuss U.S. or Afghan efforts in conducting security assessments, 

we note that threat and risk assessments are important initial steps in defining and prioritizing 

program requirements. These assessments are necessary to determine, among other things, 

the number of security personnel and quantity and type of equipment needed to protect judicial 

personnel. 

• Planning for JSU Compound

Although construction of the $4.5 million JSU compound was completed in May 2009, it 

remained dormant without water, electricity, or furniture for more than six months because of 

delays in funding its operations and maintenance and in purchasing furniture, fixtures, and 

equipment. Two factors contributed to these delays. First, requirements for operating and 

furnishing the compound were not included in the construction contracting documents.

Identifying specific funding and other resources required to implement a program is a standard 

strategic planning practice. Second, not all stakeholders were involved early in the planning 

process, in part, because there was no lead agency to coordinate such efforts. Involving 

stakeholders in the planning process can help in identifying and fulfilling such requirements. 

Because operations and maintenance and furniture, fixtures, and equipment requirements were 

not identified early in the planning process, USMS and INL spent several months refining 

requirements for the compound and deliberating over contract implementation. Following the 

clarification of requirements, cost estimates for operations and maintenance exceeded the 

allocated funding level.

Additional Challenges Could Hinder Plans for a Broader Judicial Security Program 

As U.S. agencies work with Afghan officials to develop a broader judicial security program, they will 

likely encounter several issues related to planning, manpower, command structure, and jurisdiction. For 

example, the Afghan government’s initial proposal estimated costs for salaries, uniforms, equipment, 

and vehicles, but did not include infrastructure requirements for facilities to train the security force or to 

provide offices throughout Afghanistan. In addition, the Ministry of Interior has agreed to loan 

additional personnel from another unit to the JSU. However, questions remain over the command 

structure for these additional personnel. In its technical comments, the Combined Security Transition 

Command – Afghanistan said that command structures issues had been resolved. 

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDED

Action is needed to ensure that progress made in establishing the JSU is not lost and that 

implementation challenges are mitigated as the United States and Afghanistan work together to develop 

a broader judicial security program. The United States could otherwise run the risk of committing to an 

investment greater than anticipated or building a security force that the government of Afghanistan 

cannot sustain.

SIGAR made a total of six recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and INL. We 

recommended that the U.S. Ambassador designate a lead agency or office with responsibility for 

coordinating the planning and implementation of multi-agency U.S. judicial security assistance. We 

further recommended that the designated lead agency or office: (1) assist Afghan government partners 

in establishing judicial security standards and developing appropriate job descriptions for members of 

current and future Afghan judicial security forces; and (2) fully involve important stakeholders in the 
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planning process, especially those stakeholders who could provide potential funding for infrastructure, 

equipment, or operations and maintenance. Other recommendations are not included in this summary.

The U.S. Embassy concurred with the report’s findings and recommendations and outlined actions that 

have been taken in response to our recommendations. These actions include the appointment of a lead 

agency and the establishment a multi-agency planning team with relevant stakeholders. While we

welcome the actions already taken, we reiterate the need for working with Afghan government partners 

to establish security standards. Collectively, our recommendations can help U.S. agencies determine the 

size, scope, and implementation phases of a judicial security program that is based on prioritized needs 

of key judicial officials. To prioritize these needs, however, U.S. and Afghan officials need to establish 

security standards and conduct security assessments based on those standards.

ABBREVIATIONS

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

JSU Judicial Security Unit

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

USMS United States Marshals Service 

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-007A).
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SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202