IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2083

Filed September 4, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRANDON MICHAEL HOLLOWAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, 

Zachary Hindman, Judge.

A defendant appeals the district court’s sentencing decision. AFFIRMED.

Gregory F. Greiner, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., Badding, J., and Telleen, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2024).
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TELLEEN, Senior Judge.

Brandon Holloway pled guilty to carrying a firearm on school grounds, a 

class “D” felony, and second-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI), an 

aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 321J.2(2)(b), 724.4B (2023). The 

plea agreement allowed the parties to argue for any authorized sentence. The 

ensuing presentence investigation report recommended suspended prison 

sentences and probation. At sentencing, the State recommended incarceration, 

highlighting the circumstances of the crimes and Holloway’s criminal history. In 

turn, Holloway requested a deferred judgment “because of the impact of a felony 

conviction on his career and his future.” He explained he was suspended from his 

employment upon his arrest and was told he would not be allowed back with a

felony conviction.1

After considering Holloway’s rehabilitation, the need for protection of the 

community from further offenses, the nature and circumstances of the offenses, 

Holloway’s criminal history and personal circumstances, and the information 

contained in the presentence investigation report, the district court determined “the 

defendant is not a good candidate for a deferred judgment.” The court adjudged 

Holloway guilty of the offenses and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 

1 This explanation is not entirely consistent with what Holloway told the 

presentence investigator. According to the presentence investigation report—to 

which Holloway did not offer any “corrections, deletions, or additions”—Holloway 

reported he was unemployed at the time of his arrest in this matter, having been 

terminated from his job several months prior due to an arrest in an independent 

matter in South Dakota. He noted he planned to attempt a return to that 

employment if granted a deferred judgment, but the employer had advised it “may 

or may not make an exception to hire him back.”
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imprisonment, suspended but for the mandatory minimum of seven days in jail on 

the OWI conviction. See id. § 321J.2(4)(a). 

Holloway now appeals, arguing “the district court abused its discretion by 

entering judgment on the felony matter.” In other words, he claims the court 

abused its discretion when it denied his request for a deferred judgment on the 

charge of carrying a firearm on school grounds. We review sentencing decisions 

for correction of errors at law and “will not reverse the decision of the district court 

absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State 

v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). Sentencing decisions “are cloaked 

with a strong presumption in their favor.” State v. Grandberry, 619 

N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). Our job is not to “second guess” 

those decisions but instead determine whether they are “unreasonable or based 

on untenable grounds.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. 

In claiming he should have been granted a deferred judgment, Holloway 

argues he “provided the district court with important mitigating factors, including 

the fact that he would lose his employment with a felony conviction,” and “[h]is 

positive employment history should have been given significant weight when 

determining whether to grant a deferred judgment.” But a sentencing court is not 

required to specifically acknowledge each mitigating factor urged by a defendant. 

See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). In reality, Holloway is 

simply asking that we substitute the decision of the district court with our own, 

which we cannot do. See State v. McCalley, 972 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Iowa 2022). 

Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.