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75–955 PDF 2001

PROTECTING AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD: U.S.

CITIZENS, BUSINESSES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 3, 2001

Serial No. 107–16

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

——— ———

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

TOM LANTOS, California

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

——— ———

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

THOMAS COSTA, Professional Staff Member

JASON CHUNG, Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 3, 2001 ................................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Bergin, Peter, Director, Diplomatic Security Service, co-chairman, Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of State; Michael

Waguespack, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Operation

Support, Federal Bureau of Investigations; Dianne Andruch, Managing

Director, Overseas Citizens Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S.

Department of State; and Leonard Rogers, Acting Assistant Administrator, Humanitarian Response, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................................................................................................... 139

McCarthy, John M., cochairman, Overseas Security Advisory Council;

Robert F. Littlejohn, first vice president, International Security Management Association; Ambassador James K. Bishop (Ret.), director,

disaster response and resource committee, Interaction; Frank J.

Cilluffo, senior policy analyst, Center for Strategic and International

Studies; and Dr. Bruce Hoffman, director, Washington Office, RAND

Corp ................................................................................................................ 36

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Andruch, Dianne, Managing Director, Overseas Citizens Services, Bureau

of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 177

Bergin, Peter, Director, Diplomatic Security Service, co-chairman, Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of State, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 142

Bishop, Ambassador James K., (Ret.), director, disaster response and

resource committee, Interaction, prepared statement of ........................... 82

Cilluffo, Frank J., senior policy analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies, prepared statement of ..................................................... 94

Hoffman, Dr. Bruce, director, Washington Office, RAND Corp., prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 111

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 8

Littlejohn, Robert F., first vice president, International Security Management Association, prepared statement of .................................................... 57

McCarthy, John M., cochairman, Overseas Security Advisory Council,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 40

Rogers, Leonard, Acting Assistant Administrator, Humanitarian Response, U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 197

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Waguespack, Michael, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Operation Support, Federal Bureau of Investigations, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 165

(1)

PROTECTING AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD:

U.S. CITIZENS, BUSINESSES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS

AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Putnam, Gilman, Platts, Otter,

Kucinich, and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;

Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Alex Moore, fellow;

Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and

Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. PUTNAM [presiding]. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International

Relations’ hearing entitled, ‘‘Protecting American Interests Abroad:

U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Non-governmental Organizations’’ is

hereby called to order.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Shays from Connecticut for an opening

statement.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During our hearing on counterterrorism strategy last week, witnesses described a significant new contextual element of U.S. security planning in the post-cold war world: widespread resentment

fostered by our global military and economic dominance. Unable to

challenge our preeminence by frontal assault, our adversaries vent

their frustrations through sidelong, or asymmetrical, attacks on

Embassies, naval vessels, and other valuable, but vulnerable, national assets.

Individuals and corporate facilities are also at risk. As diplomatic

and military facilities abroad are hardened against attack, terrorists and transnational criminals look for softer targets. American

businesses and tourists have always been potential symbols and

valuable pawns in the deadly game of international terror, kidnapping, and ransom. Today, more than ever, private interests abroad

are the victims of publicity-hungry, cash-starved terrorists.

An effective, comprehensive national security policy to combat

terrorism should acknowledge this harsh new reality and include

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the private sector in programs to prevent, as well as respond to,

lawlessness aimed at Americans abroad. Nongovernmental organizations [NGO’s], performing humanitarian missions in some of the

most isolated, devastated parts of the world should have access to

security information and training to minimize the risks of their inherently dangerous work.

So we asked our witnesses this morning to describe current Federal efforts to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and businesses

overseas. They will describe some recent progress toward greater

awareness of new threats and closer public/private cooperation to

prevent loss of life and property.

But the nascent effort faces significant challenges coming to

grips with the dynamic, multidimensional, interconnected problems

of economic espionage, cybercrime and fanatical terrorism that ignore old rules and old boundaries. Many corporations are reluctant

to report extortion and kidnapping, calculating the costs of official

entanglements and attendant publicity to be higher than the ransom. Definitional and jurisdictional barriers can impede the flow of

information and fragment Federal efforts to help.

Kidnapping and ransom insurance premiums should not be a

routine cost of doing business abroad. A U.S. passport should not

mark our citizens as targets. We look to our witnesses today to

help us understand how national security policies and programs to

counter terrorism can operate more effectively to protect American

lives and property abroad.

All those testifying this morning bring considerable expertise, experience, and breadth of perspective to our discussion.

I thank you for your time and for your assistance with the subcommittee’s ongoing oversight of terrorism at home and abroad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. We’re also pleased to have the chairman emeritus

of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman from New

York.

Would you like to have an opening statement?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome—first of all, I want to tell you how much we

appreciate your conducting this hearing at this time. It’s particularly important since we just concluded a hearing with Chairman

Shays on antiterrorism.

I want to welcome our distinguished panelists who are here with

us today. I want to thank them for taking the time to be with us.

As our world has drawn closer together over the last 30 years as

a result of improved travel and communications, Americans have

benefited from these improvements perhaps as no other nation on

Earth. Advances in travel, communication, however, are available

to all. And those who would harm American interests have occasionally turned their hate or greed against our American citizens

abroad in recent years.

For example, a total of 12 Americans were killed and 18 injured

in 14 terrorist attacks just in Israel in the West Bank, in Gaza, between September 13 and November 17 of last year. There were

some 37 Americans kidnapped in 1999, not to mention the many

who were not reported.

Threats against Americans abroad range from physical harm to

unfair economic practices that include stealing intellectual property

and computer hacking. It is among the first and most important

functions of the consular officials of our diplomatic service to provide aid and assistance to American citizens abroad.

With regard to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, any agency representing our government overseas should join with our Department of

State to promote the safety of Americans. And our recent hearing,

conducted by Chairman Shays, underscored the fact that we had

over some–40 agencies that have some responsibility in terrorism,

but without any proper central control, without any proper agency

that would handle all of these and bring them together in some

centralized function.

In combating the scourge of terrorist attacks directed against our

people abroad, timely information-sharing among responsible agencies is certainly a logical and appropriate response. It’s for that reason that many of us on this committee feel that we should be

adopting a centralized system of control of the agencies that are

spread out throughout our government.

I’m interested to hear from our witnesses today and how they believe our Nation may better work to improve the economic and

physical security of our citizens who work abroad, live abroad, have

businesses abroad.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you very much.

I’m pleased to welcome the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich from

Ohio, for an opening statement.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Members

of the committee, good morning. Good morning to the witnesses.

I’m glad to have all of you here.

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Last week, the subcommittee held a hearing on combating terrorism. The focus of that hearing was on threats to governmental interest. The focus of today’s hearing is on threats to nongovernmental interest. This includes violence against U.S. citizens, U.S.

companies and, importantly, nongovernmental organizations.

With respect to the last group, I’m particularly interested in finding out what specific U.S. programs are designed to help human

rights groups and others delivering humanitarian assistance.

You know, certainly some of the questions that are being posed

here today I think we need to go over and pay close attention to.

You know, what threats do you face? How does the U.S. Government address those threats? And, third, what could the U.S. Government do better? I think that these are some of the logical and

compelling questions which we will be reviewing today.

Just as we need a comprehensive assessment of the threat

against governmental interests, we also need to ensure that resources to protect nongovernmental interests are allocated efficiently.

I also think it would be helpful if in our discussions today we

could address the root causes underlying threats to the security of

nongovernmental interests; in other words, to describe incidents

that we’ve faced is important, and the manner in which the U.S.

Government responded is important, but also, I think it would be

helpful to address some of the motivations which might be behind

those confrontations, such as U.S. foreign policy.

The actions of U.S. companies may affect security issues. For example, oil company executives point out that their employees have

been kidnapped repeatedly in Nigeria. But these officials do not address some of the extenuating circumstances that deal with those

kidnappings, such as human rights abuses by the oil companies.

That’s something that I think needs to be looked at; otherwise we

are dancing in the dark here on some of these security issues.

I’d like to submit for the record several reports issued by Human

Rights Watch that criticize oil companies for their role in harsh

treatment of workers who attempt to raise grievances, the exploitation of natural resources of indigenous populations and environmental damage caused by their enterprises.

In one case from January 4, 1999, Human Rights Watch reported

that the Chevron Co. supplied helicopters and boats to Nigerian security forces that attacked two communities, killed several people,

and burned several villages.

Last week, several witnesses testified there’s a growing sense of

resentment against the United States. Since this resentment sometimes manifests itself as violence against nongovernmental, as well

as governmental, interests, perhaps a greater focus on the cause of

the resentment would be in order.

I’m certainly proud to be a Member of the U.S. Congress here,

representing my constituency and my country. I’m also interested

in what my country can do that would be better to protect citizens

abroad.

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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will submit my full statement for the record.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, sir. Without objection, the reports will

appear in the record after your statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. At this time, I ask unanimous consent that all

members of the subcommittee be permitted to place any opening

statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days

for that purpose.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Gentlemen, welcome. We appreciate your being with the committee at this time. As you know, this is a hearing, and we must swear

you in. If you would, please stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworns.]

Mr. PUTNAM. I note for the record that the witnesses responded

in the affirmative.

At this time, we’ll recognize Mr. John McCarthy, cochair of the

Overseas Security Advisory Council, to begin our testimony. And

because the panel is so large, we would ask that you maintain,

within some reason, the 5-minute rule.

Welcome.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN M. McCARTHY, COCHAIRMAN, OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL; ROBERT F.

LITTLEJOHN, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; AMBASSADOR JAMES

K. BISHOP (RET.), DIRECTOR, DISASTER RESPONSE AND RESOURCE COMMITTEE, INTERACTION; FRANK J. CILLUFFO,

SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; AND DR. BRUCE HOFFMAN, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE, RAND CORP.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you for allowing me to testify at this time before this congressional

subcommittee.

I’m here in my capacity as cochairperson of the Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of State, representing the

private business sector. Perhaps it would be fitting at this point to

briefly furnish some background information concerning OSAC and

the role it plays in American business.

Both the State Department and private industry have a common

interest in protecting their assets and their people. The U.S. Department of State, through OSAC, has been able to build a bridge

between the public and private sectors. By teaming together in

OSAC, private industry and the public sector have discovered

synergies from which both are able to fulfill their obligations.

The goal is very simple: Working together in OSAC, security information is exchanged and analyzed so that the best security practices can be used to address overseas security concerns and better

protect the U.S. citizens and assets.

There are many accomplishments associated with OSAC—with

the OSAC partnership, many of which will be articulated later by

Peter Bergin, the cochair of OSAC for the public sector.

One of the most important responsibilities of American business

is to supply a safe and secure workplace for its employees. In the

United States, the task is easier than it is overseas. Today, many

U.S. companies, particularly those in the extractive industry do

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business in high-risk areas of the world. In Colombia, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Angola, U.S. citizens daily face the hard reality of personal security for themselves and their families. Civil war, threats

of kidnapping, extortion and terrorism are real problems for business and Americans working in high-risk areas overseas. The security departments of globally involved American companies must

have efficient security plans and programs to neutralize security

threats and allow employees to focus on their job responsibilities.

Crisis management and emergency response teams, kidnapping

and extortion plans, emergency and evacuation programs, as well

as good physical security profiles are key to an excellent employee

and asset protection program.

My colleague, Mr. Robert F. Littlejohn, vice president of global

security, Avon Products, representing American business through

the International Security Management Association, will furnish

you more information on the life safety issues just mentioned.

Since Mr. Littlejohn will be addressing employee asset protection

in depth, I will cover the other security challenges faced by American business when it decides to do business outside the United

States, and provide some proposed and currently practiced measures that have applied to meet these challenges.

Much of America’s businesses are no longer limited to the U.S.

marketplace. As a result, the business risk analysis for these global

companies becomes more complicated. The constants that America

takes for granted—political stability, honest law enforcement, fair

and impartial administration of justice—now become variables.

Due diligence inquiries are the vehicles that American business

uses to make informed decisions concerning the feasibility of entering into an overseas business venture. Conducting due diligence inquiries in foreign countries is a problem particularly in emerging

nations. Trying to determine indepth background information concerning a foreign country’s political system and commercial environment is difficult because of the lack of good and accurate

records.

Further, the laws of the country sometimes prohibit disclosure of

the type of information that is part of the public domain in the

United States.

Without accurate information concerning the commercial environment in a particular company or the individual who will be a

future business partner, investment opportunities may be lost.

Whether a company is controlled by organized crime, is an instrument for money laundering, is a reverse engineering expert, or otherwise engaged in matters which test the ethics, values, and laws

of the United States is a proper subject for due diligence inquiries.

The intelligence units of the U.S. Government have excellent

methods of gathering this type of information which can benefit

American business and help avoid running afoul with the laws of

the United States and the host country in which it seeks to do

business. It is here that OSAC and other government agencies can

play an important role in making classified information available

to the business community in the following manner.

Business and security specialists who are cleared and authorized

by the U.S. Government could review the information for its business value. If they decide that the information has a business value

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and should be shared, it would be their responsibility to sufficiently

sanitize it so that it still has business intelligence value, but its

dissemination does not compromise national security.

Information concerning terrorist affiliation, organized crime associations, fraudulent and illegal business practices will be examples

of the information American business needs to make an informed

business decisions. Other information including, but not limited to,

indigenous insurgent affiliation, associations with unsavory political figures, and those engaged in extortion or other crimes that endanger the lives of individuals would also be valuable when conducting due diligence inquiries.

The globalization of American business was made possible in

large part through the computer technology developed mainly by

American scientists and engineers. Computers are now commonplace, portable, and an indispensable part of the commercial world.

The computers and the intellectual property they communicate and

store is vulnerable to all kind of attacks. Even though viruses are

planted by hackers and they attack them, or cyber-thieves try to

steal their stored patents and trade secrets, computers are the

main means of communication and file distribution for American

global business.

Protection of the computer from unauthorized invasions is a top

priority for American business, and it has joined with government

efforts to devise plans and efforts to ward off unwanted attacks.

Not to do so would threaten the basic fabric of national security.

But American business is struggling against a tough adversary

when battling against computer attacks and theft of intellectual

property. In fact, it has been said that the world economic battle

of the 21st century will be over the intellectual property rights.

This is not speculation; the battle has begun.

Protection of computers and the intellectual property they contain is a national security issue of gigantic proportions. It must be

remembered that the United States is no longer solely a manufacturing economy, it is also an information and ideas economy. If

America cannot adequately protect its intellectual property, it could

suffer dire economic consequences.

The U.S. Government, through OSAC, does an excellent job in

sharing information regarding international crime and terrorism

with U.S. business interests, but much more is needed to help the

U.S. companies so they can protect their intellectual property and

trade secrets. The government must become increasingly mindful of

the dynamics of computer technology and intellectual property protection and develop programs to assist the U.S. companies in protecting their intellectual property and trade secrets.

One such attempt by the government turned out to be essentially

meaningless. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, championed as

the solution to a serious theft of intellectual property, could potentially provide the perpetrator with just the information they are attempting to steal.

More serious and meaningful legislation and other programs

need to be put in place by the government. More information is

needed to be shared with private industry on how to protect its

computers and intellectual property.

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Other initiatives that can be launched by the public and private

sector to build defenses against computer intrusion and protect intellectual property are as follows.

Continue the OSAC initiative since it has been highly instrumental in protecting U.S. business interests abroad; ensure the permanency of the OSAC charter and support legislation establishing and

ensuring its budget; enact a mandate to supply information to

OSAC so that it can continue to be the premium supplier of American business; provide relief from encryption and export restrictions; ensure that fines are assessed for violators for agreed-to protection programs; the United States must be able to respond

extraterritorially to intellectual property violations since some of

the countries will be unwilling or unable to respond to cyber attacks; ensure that the FBI, which investigates most of the violations of computer law is adequately staffed, trained, and equipped

to meet the vast, changing technical environment in 2001 and beyond; crack down on pirated software, CDs, and movies; develop

treaties, bilateral and multilateral conventions and agreements; encourage common international statutes and laws; encourage nationstates to improve their judicial capacities and political will; support

global anticorruption legislation and activities; and, provide technical advice to nations seeking help in implementing economic reforms.

Overall, we have to make protection of intellectual property

rights a core issue in our relations with the many foreign governments in order to ensure a level playing field for American business.

The spread of transnational crime makes conducting business in

a foreign environment also more difficult. Advanced fee schemes,

credit card fraud, money laundering put American business at risk

of becoming a victim of unscrupulous victims.

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimate that

fraud and abuse costs U.S. organizations more than $400 billion

annually, with the average organization losing more than $9 per

day per employee. The association says the average organization

loses about 6 percent of its total annual revenue to fraud and abuse

committed by its own employees. This is an enormous cost for

American business as a price to pay.

Sharing information and maintaining a reasonable and effective

relationship between the public and private sectors through OSAC

will enable American businesses to overcome these difficulties. It

will give American industry a chance to conduct an efficient and

profitable business, not only in the established overseas markets,

but also in the new emerging economies, full of promise and hope

for the future.

Thank you very much.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCarthy follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr.

Littlejohn. Mr. Littlejohn is the first vice president of the International Security Management Association.

Welcome to the subcommittee.

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased that

the subcommittee chose to draw on the expertise of the International Security Management Association in reviewing the safety

of Americans working and traveling abroad.

By way of background, ISMA represents private sector senior security executives worldwide. Some 80 percent of our membership

works for U.S. companies that compete internationally, representing an aggregate employee base of 10.5 million and aggregate revenues in excess of $3 trillion.

I am the vice president of global security of Avon Products, responsible for security operations in 140 countries. However, today,

I testify on behalf of ISMA as the first vice president and a member of the board of directors.

Let me, at the outset, thank both the Overseas Security Advisory

Council and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the assistance

that they have provided U.S. business abroad. Although the U.S.

business community, as Mr. McCarthy mentioned, is confronted

with many issues abroad, we will focus our testimony on the personal safety issues, as the lives of U.S. citizens are by far our most

important priority.

We’ll look at the risks affecting our employees abroad. We feel

that they fall into four general categories: travel, global crime in

general, and then, more specifically, kidnapping and terrorism.

Travel: American travelers today face a number of security risks,

and we anticipate that these risks will grow as business personnel

become more and more mobile. Increased threats have a chilling effect on global commerce. In countries with high levels of street

crime, concern for the safety of business travelers will discourage

entry into new markets. Moreover, U.S. business concerns are only

magnified when coupled with language barriers, cultural issues,

and more importantly, uncooperative and corrupt law enforcement

personnel.

Global crime issues, with the exception of kidnapping and terrorism: The most significant security problem faced by private enterprise is global criminal activity. This is a nearly ubiquitous problem which, in its most extreme forms, poses a serious threat to foreign commerce. Such crimes threaten, not only the staff and physical assets, but also increase costs, because security provisions,

high-risk compensation, and the difficulty in attracting skilled

workers and other accommodations are quite expensive.

Kidnapping: Kidnapping for ransom is on the rise worldwide.

Perpetrators use kidnapping for a variety of reasons. In Mexico,

criminal gangs kidnap for cash. While, in Colombia, guerilla groups

use kidnapping to fund their armed struggle against the state.

Terrorism: The U.S. Department of State reported 169 international terrorist attacks in 1999 that targeted U.S. interests specifically. Long-running terrorist campaigns have had an effect of

rising insurance premiums and other operating costs for U.S. companies working in certain high-risk countries.

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ISMA recommendations: With these issues in mind, our government can and should implement a dozen actions to enhance the

protection of U.S. businesses and their people abroad.

First, U.S. Government should expand training programs to enhance the effectiveness of the global law enforcement community.

It should work with other nations in providing targeted financial

assistance to law enforcement agencies in high-risk countries that

are currently unable to provide adequate protection to U.S. business.

The government should require the FBI to send observers to advise U.S. companies when an employee has been kidnapped abroad.

The U.S. Government should establish agreements with other companies—countries to expand territorial jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies. The government should use contacts, existing contacts, to facilitate relationships between private companies operating abroad and local law enforcement agencies. And we must create

a closer working relationship with Interpol and its member nations.

We must encourage other nations to enact wars against ‘‘air

rage.’’ The government should create programs that help the private sector companies to adapt crisis management planning and

training designed to address threats in high-risk countries.

We must encourage greater cooperation and communication between the security and the commercial branches of government.

The Department of State’s political branch should provide more

timely and accurate reports of global criminal activity, irrespective

of political concerns.

The government should require Federal agencies immediately to

disclose information with any appropriate security classification

that would protect U.S. business abroad.

And, finally, OSAC is the appropriate agency to disseminate information; and we should consider increasing the OSAC funding to

expand both its personnel and educational programs.

In conclusion, much more can and should be done to protect

Americans working abroad. We believe the recommendations, if

adopted, will have a significant impact on improving individual security and also enhancing global opportunities for U.S. business

today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Littlejohn.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Littlejohn follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. Let the record note that Mr. Platts of Pennsylvania

and Mr. Tierney of Massachusetts have joined the subcommittee.

At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Bishop. Mr. Bishop is the

director of disaster response and resource committee, InterAction.

Welcome to the subcommittee.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to participate in this morning’s

hearing.

Security for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those

NGO’s on the front lines of disaster relief and refugee protection

and assistance, has become a vital concern among our members.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Bishop, could you move the mic closer, please.

Mr. BISHOP. We greatly appreciate your interest and concern.

Where NGO’s were once the victims of random violence, they increasingly have become the specific targets of violence by governments, nonstate actors, as well as individuals. Motives include resentment at perceived NGO preference for one of the belligerent

parties; a desire to force foreigners out of an area so that there will

be no credible witnesses to war crimes and other human rights violations; and the desire of thugs or belligerents to seize the assets

NGO’s, U.N. agencies, and the Red Cross movement bring to disaster sites.

Death and severe injuries, hostage-taking, rape, and theft have

taken an increasing toll among United Nations, NGO, and Red

Cross movement field workers during the 1990’s. The United Nations keeps the best records, and they report that between January

1992 and the year 2000, a total of 189 field personnel lost their

lives on overseas assignments, with 98 murdered.

Our members are dealing each year with incidents in which their

personnel are robbed, incarcerated under one pretext or another,

and taken hostage by criminals or belligerents. Offices are invaded

by loot-seeking soldiers, guerilla bands, crooks, etc. There are near

escapes as bullets and grenades strike nearby. Land mines blow off

limbs. NGO vehicles slip off back roads taken to avoid mines, and

their occupants die.

As security threats have become more lethal and common, NGO’s

have taken greater care to look after their employees overseas. The

process has been encouraged by the sympathetic response of

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA]. It has provided InterAction with over $800,000 to design and field-test two

courses, one on provision of health services and complex emergencies and the other on security for field workers.

The further we looked into the subject of security, the more

sharply our members appreciated that the government and corporate approaches to overseas security are not appropriate for

NGO’s.

CARE and Catholic Relief Services cannot retreat to walled and

barred compounds or ride through the city in armored cars accompanied by armed bodyguards. The mission of most NGO’s is to live

among and serve the local poor and disaster stricken. They must

remain accessible to their clientele, forgo sidearms, and depend

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proach cannot be one of physical deterrence or retaliation; it has

to be acceptance by the population they are serving.

Thus, the InterAction security course relies more on the Mennonites than the U.S. Marines for content. It stresses personal conduct

and cultural sensitivity as well as roadblock negotiations, mines

avoidance, communications security, vehicle movement controls,

and evacuation planning.

The next stage in our collaborative relationship with OFDA on

security was approval of a proposal to persuade CEOs of disaster

response agencies that security could and should be incorporated

into their organizational culture and operations. Twenty-four CEOs

and senior managers of leading American and Canadian NGO’s

spent 2 days last September in a very participatory program. CEO

accounts of their successes and problems in trying to promote security awareness and training within their own agencies were very

credible to their peers.

The InterAction is pleased with the support it continues to receive from OFDA in addressing its security vulnerabilities.

With respect to the State Department, the help on security has

not been financial, but diplomatic. Senior officials of the Bureau of

Population, Refugees and Migration have been very accessible and

ready to bring—see pressure put on foreign governments impeding

access to refugees and internally displaced persons, or refusing

visas to relief workers.

There are several security issues which remain unresolved between the U.S. Government and most of our members. I must note

at this point that I am not speaking for all of our members in identifying additional help. Most would appreciate receiving funds from

the government. As a matter of principle, some of our members do

not solicit or accept any U.S. Government funds. And one member

which does solicit U.S. funding for the operations of its overseas

partners recently informed us that it opposes any U.S. Government

funding for NGO security initiatives.

The unmet needs most of our members would like to see the government resolve include coverage of the costs NGO’s incur in upgrading their security awareness and procedures. These include the

cost of employees hired to supervise security operations, training

costs, equipment costs, particularly communications equipment, additional insurance, better protective vehicles and so forth.

Another key issue for our community is eligibility for evacuation

by the U.S. Government. I was surprised by reports that members

of our agencies had been told by Embassy officers in some evacuations that their foreign citizen spouses and children were ineligible to accompany them. More frequently, American NGO’s reported that their third-country employees had been told that there

was no room for them in the helicopter or naval vessel conducting

the evacuation.

In fairness to Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs,

Mary Ryan, and Embassy officers who conduct these hazardous operations, I must admit that we have not sat down with them to

seek greater clarity and consistency on this issue. We will seek

such a discussion.

Another of our concerns is the growing unwillingness of the U.S.

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ernment employees assigned to work with NGO’s and instructed

not to go outside their hotel, to be back across the border by nightfall, are withdrawn under the pretext of a voluntary departure, it

is hard for NGO’s to provide the humanitarian services the Congress and U.S. people want undertaken.

As our members frequently find themselves involved working

alongside U.S. military forces engaged in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, we have long had a program which involves our

staff and members’ giving presentations on the respective roles of

NGO’s and the military at disaster sites. We have helped prepare

relevant military manuals and participated in both command post

and field exercises. Unfortunately, the information shared often

does not reach those assigned to the next intervention. We’re trying

to identify funding which would give our input greater reach and

timeliness.

A 30-minute video placed aboard each assault ship and in pilot

ready-rooms, defining the roles of NGO’s, would be one approach

if we can mobilize the funding. If members of this subcommittee

find the concept meritorious, your assistance in providing the funds

or directing their use would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you this morning

and for your attention. I look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bishop follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Cilluffo and Dr. Hoffman testified last week as

well. Their expertise spans terrorism issues from broad strategy to

protection of individuals. We appreciate your willingness to participate with us again today.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Cilluffo, senior policy analyst, Center

for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, it is a privilege to appear

before you today on this important matter. Threats, particularly

terrorist threats facing nonofficial American interests overseas, are

an underexamined and often underappreciated aspect of the emerging threat environment. Given the breadth and depth of the subject, to run through this in approximately 5 minutes is a tall order,

especially for me, as I’ve rarely had an unspoken thought.

One can hardly turn on the news without coming across a reference to terrorism, kidnapping, or piracy. Just to provide you with

a brief snapshot, yesterday, Philippine President Arroyo declared

an all-out war against the Abu Sayyaf in response to threats that

they would decapitate American hostage, Jeffrey Schilling.

Over the weekend, the Basque separatist group, ETA, threatened

Spanish tourist resorts and warned of ‘‘undesirable consequences’’ to Spanish tourism and economic interests.

During the past month, there were high-profile kidnappings in

Mogadishu, Somalia, in Nepal, in Bangladesh, and Egypt.

At the beginning of March, four of five American oil workers returned home after 5 months in captivity in the Ecuadorian jungle.

The fifth had been killed, presumably to hasten ransom payments.

U.S. citizens and facilities have long served as a lightning rod for

terrorist activity abroad. Official U.S. Government facilities are our

most visible international symbols of power and culture. Because of

past terrorist actions, the U.S. Government has been hardening

diplomatic and military facilities, making them less susceptible to

attack. I would like to note the efforts that Mr. Gilman has put forward in this area. These efforts have been ratcheted up in the

wake of the twin bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania in 1998.

While these efforts are a good beginning, we need to examine the

issue more holistically. These efforts encourage the terrorist, who

often takes the path of least resistance, to select from soft targets;

it displaces risk.

In addition, business now increasingly symbolizes the United

States. U.S. companies overseas, particularly those with strong

brand recognition, are equated with American power and culture.

Unfortunately, not everyone views these favorably. A Hamas training manual expounds that it is foolish to hunt a tiger when there

are plenty of sheep to be had.

Terrorism is a multifaceted problem. The intent differs from

group to group and incident to incident. But the means, violence

and intimidation, remain the same. Government is not in a position

to be the sole protector. The private sector must better understand

the risks and take greater responsibility for its own security.

Terrorism is nothing new. It has always been the weapon of the

weak to target the strong. It is also dynamic. While it may be possible to lessen our vulnerability to the terrorist threat, prophylaxis

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and protection efforts alone will not be sufficient since the terrorist

will simply shift their modus operandi and target selection.

For example, following the two successful counterterrorism operations by the Israelis in Entebbe in 1976 and the German GSG– 9 operation in Somalia in 1977 against hijacked aircraft, terrorists

changed their tactics almost overnight, moving away from hijacking to bombing aircraft. This illustrates the back-and-forth nature

of the struggle: measure, countermeasure, counter-countermeasure,

and on it goes.

Terrorists are no longer content with the land and the air. They

have also taken to the sea. The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, the

aquatic Hamas suicide bomber, and the LTTE Sea Tiger attack on

Trincomalee Harbor all point to a growing maritime terrorist trend.

Cruise ships present ripe targets. One should consider terrorist or

pirate attacks as a possible next step, whether they are politically

or economically motivated.

Throughout the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s, groups chose their actions with an ear cocked for popular support and an eye trained on

State funds. Of late, however, there has been a shift toward radical

religious views and extreme nationalism. Neither of these necessarily places the same constraints on violence as before. In fact,

radical and violent actions could bolster rather than undermine

support for the cause.

These terrorists no longer seek a seat at the negotiating table.

Rather, they want to blow up the table altogether and build their

own table in its place.

Usama bin Laden’s fatwah makes clear that civilians, not just

American officials are targets on al-Qaeda’s radar screen.

Funds from States that support terrorism are dwindling, but by

no means depleted entirely. Terrorist organizations have had to

search for a new source of funding for their wars. Organizations intensified their moneymaking operations, drugs, kidnapping, extortion, and a whole host of other illicit activity.

Kidnapping, of course, is nothing new to terrorists either, but

there is a new twist. More and more terrorists take hostages for

money, not for publicity. The $64,000 question is how much is

going into their coffers to further their terrorist campaigns and/or

how many of these enterprises are transforming into outright

criminal enterprises, Kidnapping, Inc., if you will.

Kidnapping abroad has evolved into a highly lucrative crime. The

perpetrators are more sophisticated and savvy than ever before.

Moreover, indigenous law enforcement may be outgunned,

outmanned, and outskilled. Worse still, in some countries, the local

law enforcement is part of the problem with high levels of corruption making protector and predator almost synonymous.

Though accurate statistics are notoriously difficult to obtain, the

majority of global abductions occur in Latin America. In the previous decade, business people accounted for roughly 40 percent of

the victims. International companies, particularly those with strong

corporate images, may be more likely targets, owing to their deep

pockets.

While South America is the global kidnapping center, Southeast

Asia is the global piracy hub. What kidnapping is to land, piracy

is to seas. There has been a dramatic increase in the frequency and

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severity of piracy. The International Maritime Bureau reports that

attacks by pirates increased by 57 percent from 1999 to 2000. This

is a total of 469 reported attacks on ships, leaving 72 people dead.

Business leaders must also expand their concept of security to include not only the physical, bricks and mortar, but also the cyber.

We are aware of our cyber vulnerabilities due to major government

exercises that we have conducted on our own systems. We have

also seen what can be done. Luckily, at this point, most of the perpetrators have been young adults, but someone was able to disable

the emergency 911 systems in south Florida.

There is certainly no shortage of bad actors with views inimical

to the United States. What we have not yet seen is the convergence

of intent and capabilities where the real bad guys exploit the real

good stuff. Admittedly, the global good guys are at a disadvantage

in the cyber realm. In essence, we’ve created this global village

without a police department.

In addition, U.S. businesses are at risk from foreign intelligence

services in foreign companies, be they friend or foe, for losses from

economic industrial espionage are enormous but almost impossible

to quantify exactly.

While information relating to product design and trade secrets

are the most obvious targets, information such as marketing plans,

bid proposals, pricing structures and customer lists also rank very

high on a competitor’s wish list.

In conclusion, as government targets become more difficult to attack and U.S. corporations and businesses expand overseas, terrorists and kidnappers have indicated they will likely continue to expand their focus to include nonofficial Americans, be they U.S. corporations, humanitarian workers, or international tourists.

The private sector needs to be part of the solution. We need to

expand the national security planning table to include them. We

have the opportunity to integrate the private sector into the overall

antiterrorism-counterterrorism framework and to attempt to prevent threats and mitigate risk, not merely respond to events after

they have occurred.

The U.S. Government must also continue to sharpen its own

antiterrorism and counterterrorism capabilities. The first line of defense is good intelligence. Multidisciplinary intelligence collection is

crucial to provide indications and warning of possible attack, including insights into the culture and mindsets of terrorist organizations, and to illuminate key vulnerabilities that can be exploited

and leveraged to disrupt terrorist activities before they occur.

While a robust technical intelligence capability is crucial, our

human intelligence capability must be enhanced. In addition, we

must enhance intelligence-sharing between the public and private

sector.

We must also cultivate good relations and connections abroad.

Terrorism is a transnational problem that demands a transnational

solution. I just look to the preempted bombings in the millennium

and the support that we got from the Jordanians to give a clear

insight as to how important that can be.

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ernment ought to help facilitate these meetings and ensure that

small to medium-sized companies are included.

More and more, the public and private sectors have overlapping

duties. We must realize that we cannot protect everything everywhere all the time. But we do have the opportunity develop a comprehensive plan and strategy to combat terrorism in all its forms.

And I highlight and really do appreciate the work of this subcommittee on assuring that we get to that point. Once developed,

implementing and sustaining such efforts must be a high priority

for U.S. national security.

Mr. Chairman, I’m pleased that the Congress in general and

your subcommittee in particular have recognized these needs and

will reform our Nation’s policies and posture and guide it accordingly.

Thank you for your time.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. The record will note, the gentleman from Idaho,

Mr. Otter, has joined the subcommittee.

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Bruce Hoffman, director of the

Washington office for the RAND Corp.

Welcome.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

and distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify in this matter.

While the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to

year, one trend remains constant. Since 1968, the United States is

annually head of the list of countries targeted by terrorists. Indeed,

for more than 3 decades, terrorists have targeted the United States

and its citizens more than any other country. This phenomenon is

attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of

America’s overseas commercial interests and the number of our

military bases on foreign soil as to the U.S. stature as the lone remaining superpower.

Terrorists are attracted to American interests and citizens

abroad precisely because of the plethora of available targets, the

symbolic value inherent in any blow struck against perceived

American, quote-unquote, imperialism, expansionism, or economic

exploitation, and not the least because of the unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity from the world’s most extensive

news media that any attack on an American target assures.

The reason why the United States is so appealing to target to

terrorists suggests no immediate reversal of this trend. It is, as one

commentator has noted, the price that the West and, in particular,

the United States as leader of the free world, pays for its hegemony.

Moreover, regardless of what the United States actually does, we

are perhaps irrevocably perceived as a status quo power and, therefore, attacked for real or imagined grievances. Indeed, as the lone

remaining superpower, the acute feelings of anger and resentment

toward the United States was cited last week before this committee

by Senator Rudman and General Boyd, in short, the world’s continued enmity.

The main problem that we face in protecting American citizens

and interests abroad from both current and future threats rubs up

against one of the fundamental axioms of terrorism. Hardening one

set of targets often displaces the threats onto other softer targets.

In other words, security measures may successfully thwart plans or

actual terrorist operations or even deter terrorists from attacking,

but they may not eliminate the threat entirely, which may mutate

into other, perhaps even more deadly forms.

Determined terrorists, accordingly, will simply identify

vulnerabilities and hence potential targets, adjusting or modifying

their means and method of attack to execute a completely different

kind of operation that still achieves their goal.

Therefore, in the current context of heightened threats to U.S.

diplomatic facilities and military forces overseas, as we harden the

range of American diplomatic and military targets long favored by

terrorists, we doubt this will eliminate the terrorist threat completely but risk displacing it onto softer, more vulnerable and more

accessible unofficial nongovernmental targets, that is, ordinary

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American tourists and travelers, business people, and otherwise

unwary citizens.

The implications involving a potential increase in maritime terrorist attacks following the successful assault on the U.S.S. Cole

are particularly chilling. It is horrifying to contemplate a U.S.S.

Cole suicide attack on a cruise ship steaming into a Caribbean,

Mediterranean or U.S. port, much less any other unprotected harbor.

The general pattern of terrorists attacking a wide variety of,

quote-unquote, soft American targets is, however, already well established. For example, according to the U.S. Department of State,

a total of 778 Americans have been killed by terrorists overseas between 1968 and 1999, the last year for which published Department of State statistics were available.

Let me pause for a second and say that in a country where murder rates hover around 16,000 persons per year and where the annual incidents of violent crime regularly exceeds a million, the

risks to U.S. citizens traveling and working abroad need to be put

in an admittedly discomforting perspective of just how safe we are

as Americans living and working in our own borders.

But, that aside, of the 778 fatalities, half were private citizens,

ordinary travelers, tourists and businessmen; 319 were U.S. Service personnel; and 63 were American diplomats. Accordingly, although the attacks on our two Embassies in East Africa in 1998

and the more recent assault on the U.S.S. Cole are seared into our

collective consciousness, they actually mask the threats that perhaps affect ordinary citizens far more than diplomats and soldiers

and sailors.

Equally significant is the fact that 83 percent of Americans killed

by terrorists between 1968 and 1999 died in attacks in which they

were specifically targets. Clearly, American citizens traveling, living and working overseas who have no ostensible or official connection with the U.S. Government are indeed already firmly in the terrorist cross hairs.

This should not conceal the fact that at times individuals are targeted not necessarily because they are U.S. citizens but because

they are westerners in general and hence opportunistically regarded by terrorists as desirable for their potential to bring large

cash ransom payments for their release.

These basic patterns of terrorism are evident in the key incidents

reported during 2000 that have continued into the present year. In

addition to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, four American climbers

were kidnapped by members of the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan last August. That same month, an American, Jeffrey

Schilling, was seized by the Abu Sayyaf organization in the Philippines, a group that had previously kidnapped two other American

citizens—a Protestant missionary and a Roman Catholic priest.

In November, an American who headed a program of the U.S.

Republican Institute in Azerbaijan, a nongovernmental organization, was found murdered in Baku, apparently the victim of a robbery. And in January 2001, a U.S. citizen in Chechnya, there as

a part of the humanitarian aid mission, Action Against Hunger,

was kidnapped.

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As the latter incidents evidence, threats to Americans working

for international humanitarian relief organizations and similar

nongovernmental organizations present a special problem. These

people are under increased threats for a number of reasons. According to Randolph Martin, senior director for operations at the

New York-based International Rescue Committee, there are at

least six reasons that NGO’s are targeted: The overall increase in

the number of conflicts in the past decade to which these organizations are being deployed; a general absence of the rules of war in

these conflicts and the proliferation of so called irregular fighters,

many of whom also include criminals and bandits interested as

much in plunder as in the realization of a political agenda; a prevailing perception of aid operations as especially soft targets; the

eroded acceptance of neutrality amongst these groups; and, within

the NGO’s themselves, a lack of security combined with the skeptical if not adversive altitude on the part of some for the need for

security and protective measures.

These views dovetail with those of another American citizen, in

fact a former student of mine, who works with a U.S.-based aid organization in a particularly conflict-ridden country in Africa. In a

recent e-mail she wrote to me: The first threat we face is basic—

and I am quoting—threats against expatriates by terrorists, guerrillas, paramilitaries and others to gain publicity or to enhance

panic and fear or to attempt to get the aid agencies to withdraw

altogether. The second threat is common banditry of theft that is

common anywhere but enhanced in a country of war facing severe

economic difficulties. The third threat that we face is being caught

in the cross fire, whether it be stray bullets hitting expatriate

houses, rebel ambushes on the roads, hitting mines, or being

caught in the field during a rebel attack. This third threat is often

the most difficult to predict.

Based on the observations of this aid worker, the help provided

by the local U.S. Embassy appears to be ingenuous but limited.

In general, therefore, the problem with NGO’s and the security

of NGO’s overseas appears to be twofold. On the one hand, the

NGO’s themselves may have in the past paid too little attention to

their own security and could have provided insufficient training before deployment. While, on the other hand, it often falls to the local

American Embassy to fill this void, whose efforts and activities in

this respect can be limited as much by insufficient resources as by

too few personnel.

In conclusion, it should be recognized that terrorism is not a

problem that can be solved, much less ever completely eradicated.

No country with the breadth and magnitude of the overseas interests and presence that the United States has can reasonably expect

to hermetically insulate or seal itself off completely from any and

every manifestation of this threat. In this respect, there are no

broad, sweeping policies or new approaches in the form of individual ‘‘magic bullets’’ that can hope to counter, much less defeat, a

threat that is at once omnipresent and ceaseless. By the same

token, we are neither powerless nor completely defenseless in the

face of terrorism; and there are a number of practical steps that

might usefully be taken that might effectively mitigate the threat.

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First, ensuring that our intelligence resources and capabilities,

especially with respect to human intelligence sources, are sufficiently funded, properly organized and continually oriented to actively identifying and countering the range of threats confronting

American citizens and interests overseas.

Second, making certain that the security in and around the principal transportation nodes, both for air as well as maritime travel,

most frequented by American tourists and business people overseas

are of a uniform, high standard. In this respect, Federal Aviation

Agency and Department of State inspection teams in the past have

identified lax security in airports throughout the world, particularly in some African, East Asian and Latin American countries.

Third, working in concert with NGO’s, further educate and inform the headquarters and staffs of these U.S.-based organizations

of the importance of security and predeployment proactive measures that can be adopted to enhance the safety of Americans working overseas.

Finally, perhaps seeking to achieve further consistency and clarity in the travel advisories and other warnings and public announcements emanating from U.S. official government sources.

Finally, the threat of terrorism itself needs to be kept in perspective. In this respect, a prerequisite to ensuring that our formidable

resources are focused where they can have the most effect is a

sober and empirical understanding of the threat. Only in this manner can our efforts achieve the greatest likelihood of success and

effectiveness.

Thank you very much.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffman follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. I thank all of our witnesses on the first panel.

Before we move into questions, I would say, pursuant to House

rules and committee rules, I note for the record that the subcommittee requested and all witnesses appearing at this hearing in

a nongovernmental capacity have provided a resume and disclosure

of Federal grants and contracts received.

At this time, I would call on the gentleman from New York, Mr.

Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank our

panelists again for focusing on the important aspects of what we’re

confronted with worldwide.

George Tenet, our agency head, CIA Director, stated, U.S. remains a No. 1 target of international terrorism. Close to one-third

of all incidents worldwide in the year 2000 were directed against

Americans.

I am going to address this to all of our panelists. Last week when

we conducted our hearing we found that there was a proliferation

of the responsibilities among 40 some agencies who had a little bit

of their responsibility directed to terrorism; and I think then we focused on the need for a centralized agency, some central control at

White House level. What I am going to ask all of our panelists,

from your knowledge and your experience, and you all are experienced in this area, what improvements can we make that would

have the greatest promise of improving the safety of Americans

traveling abroad and Americans in business abroad?

Let’s start with Mr. McCarthy.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I think that in order for people to protect themselves abroad, as they travel abroad they must have the information that exists in country at the time that they travel. The Office

of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of State certainly provides a lot of information concerning the current economic—well,

actually, the political situations in these areas. This information

should—is very difficult sometimes to get. Of course, now with the

Internet and several other means of mass communication, the public can get this information they need.

It’s very difficult—it’s very difficult for the U.S. Government to

control activities in foreign countries, obviously, for sovereignty

reasons. But I think some effort—much more effort must be made

in order to try and help these countries. It’s been my experience

that the U.S. Government and the Western powers have exported

democracy to some of these high-risk areas and emerging areas but

did not export the handbook as to how democracy should be implemented, and I think the U.S. Government and its allies in the

Western world should cooperate more with these countries to try

and show them how democracy must be implemented and, in that

way, possibly help safeguard not only the people within the country

themselves but also the people who travel into these countries.

In many of the high-risk areas we see poverty—as Mr. Kucinich

has pointed out, we see poverty and we see exploitation of the local

populations by these new governments. Particular examples, of

course, are Nigeria and Indonesia. And when you look at the way

the money that’s proliferating in these countries, the money that’s

available in these countries is unbelievable from the extraction—

actually, from the extractive industry, from the extraction of oil

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from these areas, and the tax dollars that the oil companies pay

to the governments fails to trickle down to the populations themselves.

Yet if you look at the Far East—not the Far East but the Middle

East and see the way the people in those countries live, they depend on the same source for their economy, namely the oil industry, but yet the governments treat them a lot better. Granted that

they’re not democratic governments, but here in the area of Nigeria

and Indonesia, where they have exploited a democracy and the

Presidents of those countries have more or less wrapped their arms

around the democratic principles and trying to enforce them, yet

the people remain fairly poor and poverty stricken.

The oil companies, of course, do take a beating in this regard;

and they’re blamed for everything. And the people in the communities look to the oil industry and the extractive industry and the

companies there to supply them with the infrastructure and—— Mr. GILMAN. Mr. McCarthy, I am sorry to interrupt you. We’ve

got four other panelists and my time is limited, if you could just

wrap up.

Mr. MCCARTHY. What I am trying to say is that when we export

democracy we have to export the handbook. We have to try and

train the police and train the military to be responsible for their

people there and for the people who come in there, and we have— and the U.S. Government I feel owes a responsibility to try and

proliferate the problems.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. I see our time is running, Mr. McCarthy.

Mr. Littlejohn.

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. Thank you very much.

I agree with Jack. I think the first thing we need is good information, good intelligence information. As I made a statement in my

opening remarks, often we get conflicting information. Presently,

most of our members in the private sector working abroad work

with OSAC, and we strongly believe that OSAC should be the organization that should be the clearinghouse. However, we question

whether or not OSAC is getting all the information from Central

Intelligence, etc., that could be sent out to U.S. companies to protect their people both traveling and living abroad.

Second, as Jack also mentioned, what goes on in a respective

country. Now the FBI working with State had an excellent operation in National Academy of Budapest, which was very, very successful in training law enforcement in east bloc countries, and I understand that the DEA is looking at something in Thailand. There

are also——

Mr. GILMAN. We have one in Thailand now. We’ve opened a similar one.

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. Is it open?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, it’s open and functioning. They’re now exploring South Africa, but I am going to ask you to please wrap up.

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. OK. Finally, we have to do something to assist

law enforcement communities in these communities who personally, A, are corrupt and, B, are not properly trained.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

And Mr. Bishop.

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Mr. BISHOP. Nongovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian response in conflict situations are required by international

humanitarian law to maintain their political independence. They

do not represent the U.S. Government, and they cannot. As long as

they’re able to maintain this independence, they are at less risk of

terrorist attack.

With great respect, Mr. Gilman, I do not think that, as their representative, it would be appropriate for me to comment on how the

U.S. Government should organize itself to deal with terrorism. I

have made several suggestions on what the U.S. Government

might do to assist NGO’s in enhancing their security overseas.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

Mr. Cilluffo.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

I personally don’t think that there’s a single fix, nor do I see this

as a one-time fix. This is something that requires perseverance and

continually reacting and keeping up with the state of the threat.

But on the macro side—and there are a number of micro issues

that we obviously don’t have time to discuss right now—but on the

macro side I personally believe the first line of defense is intelligence. We should always get there before the bomb goes off. To

date, signals intelligence and other technical means have provided

the lion’s share of actual counterterrorism operational intelligence,

but the truth is that only a human source is going to tell you when

and where a bomb is going to go off. So we need to enhance our

human capabilities, and we need to make sure that there are no

constraints prohibiting these capabilities from being able to flourish.

Obviously, we need oversight, and that’s a responsibility that the

Hill and others should take very seriously. But the point is that

terrorists don’t frequent the cocktail circuit, they are not Boy

Scouts, and we need to be willing to recruit these sorts of individuals.

Second, I think improving the signal-to-noise ratio of indications

in warning intelligence has been the biggest challenge. After a

major event we’re all at delta in terms of threatcon, but before

you—basically, Embassies, military bases and even U.S. companies

get bombarded with vague threat warnings. The challenge is going

to be, how do you improve that from a vague warning to a very specific warning where you can take very specific actions to prevent,

preempt or protect against a particular action?

Third, I think training, training cooperation. The ILEA is a good

example. It’s been a very successful model. We need to build on

that. I think companies also need to be working with the indigenous security services; and I would note the millennium bombing,

the Jordanians saved a lot of American lives during the millennium

in Jordan. So I think we need to be working toward enhancing

transnational cooperation.

Then, of course, there are a lot of prophylactic and antiterrorism

as opposed to counterterrorism measures that should be taken.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hoffman, our time has run, so we need——

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Mr. HOFFMAN. I’ll be very brief. I agree in improving intelligence,

but I think also improving the accuracy and timeliness of open

source information.

Mr. GILMAN. Could you put the mic a little closer, please? I can’t

hear you.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sure. Improving the accuracy and timeliness of

open source information as well as intelligence and its dissemination.

Second, increasing, I think, the overseas resources available to

Americans. It is my understanding—I may be incorrect—that

OSAC is oriented primarily toward the American business community, but increasing the resources available to ordinary American

citizens. Regional security officers, for example, at our Embassies

and consulates, already overworked, I think do a superb job. Their

responsibilities have increased as the number of surveillances reported against their Embassies has grown, but their focus is diplomatic security, not necessarily that of ordinary Americans.

And, finally, I think strength in programs such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program run by the Department of State, which

trains law enforcement personnel in other countries, that helps

them improve their own security and, in turn, affects the safety of

Americans but also fosters an atmosphere of invaluable cooperation

and liaison.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, sir.

At this time, I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich,

for 10 minutes as well, after which we’re going to try to go back

and hold firm on the 5-minute rule, alternating between sides. Mr.

Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman, and I again want to thank

the witnesses for their participation.

Mr. McCarthy, I have a detailed summary of questions that I

have for you as the director of corporate security for Texaco, and

rather than make this entire meeting the focus of Texaco, what I’d

like to do is to—I am going to submit these questions for the

record, but I’d like to give those questions to you and perhaps you

could respond in writing. That way we can facilitate this.

I am not here to embarrass anyone, but I do have some concerns

about Texaco’s practice in Ecuador. I know you’re working right

now on trying to settle a case for $500 million on the pollution in

Ecuador and the Amazon region, and I have questions that relate

to human rights abuses with Texaco and Chevron in Nigeria and

questions that relate to Texaco and Unocal in Burma and questions

that relate to Texaco in Indonesia.

But as I review all the questions, what it comes down to is this.

I think this hearing can help solve some real concerns that people

have in the world about business. Dr. Hoffman was the only panelist who had a—what I think is some degree of political analysis as

to what our dilemma is here, and I speak as someone who has had

some background in international business as a marketing director

for a software company. I had the chance to go around and visit

many countries and saw Fiumicino airport protected by people with

machine guns, understand the climate some of you are working in.

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These hearings have a way of communicating the fear that’s out

there. None of us wants to see any of our citizens hurt abroad,

that’s for sure. We want to be able to see American business go

abroad and be successful and help other countries grow as well. I

think all of us would agree with those principles.

But there’s another level here that we have an opportunity to get

to beyond this litany of questions which, Mr. McCarthy, I assume

you would be willing to respond to them, rather than us drag it out

here, but I want to go beyond that.

Do you see that there is a role for human rights principles, such

as we had with the Sullivan principles in Ireland, human rights

principles to guide the work of U.S. multinational corporations and

those principles incorporating workers’ rights, environmental quality principles? Mr. McCarthy, do you think that if Texaco had or

could enunciate principles of doing business that it would enable

Texaco not only to be less of a target but for Texaco to lead the

way in terms of a new era in global business? I’d like your response.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Texaco at the present time is part of an initiative which has been developed by the British Foreign Office and

the U.S. State Department where for the past year—actually began

in November 1999 and completed with a press release in December

2000, where it supported and welcomed a number of human rights

principles that were developed with the cooperation of the extractive industry and the NGO’s. It’s about a 10-page document and

has been released to the public. And just recently we came from a

meeting in London where we’re in the process of determining how

these human rights principles can be incorporated into the business plans of various industries, not only from the extractive industries but also from other American business industries, these principles.

Mr. KUCINICH. See, I think Texaco and your business partner

Chevron, because of your presence in so many countries, can help

to lead the way internationally for setting new standards for

human rights. I mean, it would be very easy, frankly, to spend this

time in this committee to go over the litany of human rights challenges which are faced, and I can also understand that in the extractive industry you enter into a climate which you’re going to receive resistance anyhow, and I can also understand in talking to

people in your industry the challenges that you face from people

who don’t want to be fair. I know that, too, but I think with the

tremendous financial power which Texaco has, with the scope and

the reach of your industry, that there might be an opportunity here

to create some new possibilities.

Now, we can—you know, again, I understand the past. I know

the record, believe me. I have spent a lot of time studying the

record of Texaco and Chevron and other people in your industry.

But we can’t change that past. We can change the future, and so

I would like you to submit to this committee, and I’d like to see

it personally, and I’d like to work with you in crafting some human

rights principles and principles that protect workers and the environment because we might be able to have an opportunity here for

a new dialog. Then, if we take that direction, it may be that some

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zens abroad would not take the shape that they have taken today.

And, again, that’s not to in any way soft pedal what I think is a

disturbing record of human rights violations, but we’re all accountable, not just you. I am accountable, too. We’re all accountable.

So to try to go above this debate, yes, we should do something

about making sure our citizens are safe abroad. Whether we want

to use the intelligence apparatus of the United States of America

to do that, I’ll let some of my other colleagues get into that, but

I would like to work with you to do something about creating new

possibilities in this new millennium for human rights. I think we

could do it, and I think Texaco has the understanding to do it. I

don’t think there’s any industry in this country that has the kind

of power and scope that your industry has, but we need to find a

way to go into a new millennium with some new possibilities.

So we have a short time for a response, but I just wanted to

refocus this a little bit. Mr. McCarthy.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I think I—for Texaco, Texaco’s always been

interested in human rights and as part of its values—and its vision

and values certainly has incorporated the basic human rights and

operates in a perfectly legitimate and ethical manner around the

world. That’s been our policy. And again, as I say, we are part of

the most recent initiative as far as developing human rights principles to be used not only in the extractive industry but all other

industries that happen to operate in high-risk areas.

Mr. KUCINICH. And I would like to again work with you to facilitate the delineation and enunciation of those principles. So it goes

beyond talking. I am just openly offering that. I mean, I could take

another position here at this committee table, as you well know,

but I am not doing that. I am submitting questions for the record,

but I am letting you know, let’s go beyond where we are at because

I don’t think where we’re at is satisfactory, to be charitable about

it.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, as I said, that Texaco with the Department

of State and the British Foreign Office is working very diligently

and has crafted over the past year and has worked very hard with

NGO’s, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and several

other NGO’s as well as the top companies from the extractive industry in formulating these principles that have already been promulgated. And we are working now in phase two to try and find

some way that we can implement these principles around the

world.

So we’re already doing that. In fact, we’ve taken a leadership

role. I was one of the first ones to sit on this board and take a leadership role in establishing these human rights principles. So Texaco and the extractive industry is certainly out in front when it

comes to trying to put together human rights principles that protect people and protect their property.

Mr. KUCINICH. I’d like to have some followup meeting with your

company about these things. I just see this as the opening of a dialog. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich. Gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Otter, you’re recognized for 5 minutes.

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Mr. OTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I think

this is probably a pretty timely hearing that we’re having.

I, like the previous member of the committee, have had a lot of

experience in the international marketplace. I was the president of

a company called Simplot International, which was a company that

sort of followed McDonalds, if you will, around the world; and we

supplied the French fries. I am from Idaho, if that surprises you.

Anyway, I found that in order to be successful internationally the

first two mistakes that most companies make when they go into a

foreign country, into a foreign value system is—No. 1 is failure to

recognize their traditions and to respect those traditions; and the

second thing is failure to recognize their practices and their beliefs

and then respect those.

And, you know, I can think of many, many cases where I would

no more put up with the way women are treated in certain areas

of the world, especially the Middle East, than I believe any person

in this room would, yet depending upon the value that we place on

those goods and/or services that we get from that area of the country we are willing to look beyond that. So I think part of our whole

attitude toward what we want to happen in the rest of the world

has got to conform to what the rest of the world wants as well. Because I know I was not going to be successful.

I have been to 82 foreign countries and, for the most part, everybody in those countries—and there isn’t a country I can believe or

that I was part of that I was in that didn’t have a little bit different value system than what I as a farm boy from Idaho had.

And so I had to respect that if I was going to be successful.

The second thing that I found out is that almost anyplace I went,

anyplace I went, not only my company but any other American

country had elevated the value of life, had elevated the style of living, had elevated the purpose of the individual in society. It was

maybe slow, and it may be, to some who wanted perhaps a little

more, a little faster response in human rights, in other areas, it

may well be slow, but I can tell you, from the time that I first arrived in a country until maybe I went back several times to view

how the operation was going, things had improved, understandings

had come together.

So laying that as a format for all the panelists, I want to ask you

a couple of things. It’s been my experience that the types of, quote,

unquote, terrorism basically came in two areas. One was economic

terrorism. They were after me or one of my people in order to hold

us for ransom so that they could get some money to advance some

more of their efforts which in many cases, believe it or not, the

world believed was an advancement of human rights, oddly enough.

The second thing was for philosophical purpose, and philosophical purpose is broke down into two veins. One is religious, and the

other was political. I never went to a U.S. office in a foreign area

without making sure that everybody, everybody that I knew knew

why I was going there. I did not want to be part of the information

gathering system of the U.S. Government because that immediately left me suspect in my community, in the business community, and it immediately left me vulnerable to some of these folks

who were, quote, unquote, working for democracy in their country.

133

I’d just like you to respond all but briefly, now that I’ve made

my speech, all but briefly as to whether or not I am right or wrong.

No. 1, do you believe that Texaco, any country you went into, are

those people worse off now that you’re there or better off? And with

the experiences that the rest of you have and including the humane

efforts of Mr. Bishop’s outfit. Mr. McCarthy first.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I think in many of the undeveloped areas

that the extractive industry has gone into that the people are better off than they were before. The reason that’s true is because,

just as we practice humanitarian and philanthropic aid here in the

United States, we also do it overseas in these poor areas. And so

we build roads for them, we build hospitals for them, we furnish

them with light sources and medical equipment and medical training and medical facilities that they normally would not have. This

has, in effect, lengthened their life and increased their standard of

living.

Mr. OTTER. Thank you.

Mr. Littlejohn.

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. First of all, I agree with the traditional belief.

Clearly, a business is not going to be successful unless it’s molded

around the local traditions and beliefs. But, second, the area of terrorism, I’ve experienced—I’ve had kidnappings in the Philippines,

Colombia, Russia and Mexico which I have managed.

Mr. PUTNAM. The gentleman’s time has expired. If we could finish out this panel with a yes or no, if people are better as a result

of these.

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. Yes.

Mr. OTTER. Thank you.

Mr. Bishop.

Mr. BISHOP. Sometimes. In Sierra Leone, there was a conflict. It

was ended. We needed, with the U.S. Government and other donors, to provide development assistance to consolidate that peace.

They walked away from it.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. We’ll put you down as a

sometimes.

Mr. Cilluffo.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Well, I sit here in the city of northern charm and

southern efficiency. I don’t have business interests abroad, so I

can’t answer the first question.

The second question, however, you are seeing a shift from—I

mean, terrorism has always been both political and economic, but

you are seeing a shift toward less political terrorism, toward more

nationalist and radical fundamentalist religious terrorism.

Mr. OTTER. Thank you.

Dr. Hoffman.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, with all due respect I would say that’s not

the right question because it’s not so much important what I think

but what they think. And I think a problem is what we regard as

benevolence and munificence they see as interference, as propping

up the establishment and as preserving the status quo, and that’s

the problem.

Mr. PUTNAM. I am sorry, we’re going to catch you the next round.

The chair recognizes Mr. Tierney for 5 minutes, plus a Washington version of a yes or no.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your

fair way of handling this hearing. Is there going to be another

round of questioning after the first panel?

Mr. PUTNAM. I have got time, if you’ve got time.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am hard pressed to let pass some of the comments that were made, because I am dying to find out just how

much mistreatment of women would equal the price of commodities

or what we get out of commodities in some of these countries. I

don’t think we should let that go unexplored at some point, and

perhaps we’ll ask all of you the question along that line.

But let me start with the question for perhaps Mr. Cilluffo initially. What is your opinion what the United States should do beyond providing information and communication networks and electronic data bases, newsletters and other publications in order to increase security for corporate interests worldwide?

Mr. CILLUFFO. I do think that when we do look at information

sharing and intelligence cooperation, that is absolutely crucial. And

we are not talking about a Kumbayah kind of fest where we sit at

the campfire——

Mr. TIERNEY. I understand. I am talking about beyond that.

Mr. CILLUFFO. I also think that we can be working toward common standards, common procedures to benchmark what is OK and

what is not. I am not saying—I don’t know if we want to go down

that path too far, because then you’re accountable based on certain

standards, but I think we can work toward that. And I also think

that working with our foreign counterparts is absolutely essential

and not just in terms of investigations and techniques and capabilities but also understanding the rule of law, the way we at least—

maybe it’s blinded, but the American version of the rule of law.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Littlejohn, what do you say to that? How much more should

the United States through its official agencies do to protect corporate interests beyond information and communications?

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. Well, I think we need help in the field. I think

when companies are starting a startup operation they should be

aware of what they’re getting into. And, as I pointed out in my initial recommendations, I believe that agencies, particularly FBI

leadouts in the country, should be introducing the security people

to the local law enforcement agencies, people that they can trust

that can help. But I do believe also that OSAC has been providing

us a lot and should continue on to provide both training and information; and the RSOs, of course, have to get into that.

Mr. TIERNEY. To the extent that the United States provides that

kind of assistance to corporations, do you believe that there’s any

right for the public, the tax-paying public, to expect backing and

quid pro quo from businesses such as a commitment to certain environmental standards and perhaps treatment of employees?

Mr. LITTLEJOHN. Oh, absolutely. How to define it, I couldn’t say,

but, yes, I believe that.

Mr. TIERNEY. How about you, Mr. McCarthy? Do you believe that

there’s a right for us to require some standard of environmental

standard and employee protection in return for what the U.S. taxpayers’ money does in security interests?

135

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I think that these companies in the extractive industry are already providing that to a certain extent. The division of values of American companies embody the American spirit

which incorporates environmental protection and human rights,

and most companies that I am aware of anyway have incorporated

that division of values.

Mr. TIERNEY. You don’t want to rely on what Texaco has done

for protection of environmental rights in making that statement, do

you?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, Texaco has done pretty good in protecting

environmental rights.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I have got to go there then.

I’ve got to ask you. You’ve been sued in New York, your company, for dumping tens of millions of gallons of toxic waste into the

Amazon over a period of 20 years. Is that your idea of a good environmental policy for indigenous people?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I am really not fully familiar with the problems

in Ecuador at this particular point in time. For me to answer these

questions would be pure speculation on my part.

Mr. TIERNEY. You’re basically answering my question. Without

the knowledge of what your company has been at least charged

with doing and which they settled at the cost of $500 million for

doing—you’re aware of the settlement?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I am aware of that—— Mr. TIERNEY. But you don’t rely on that for the statement that

your company has a great record of protecting environmental interests?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I don’t really represent Texaco at this particular

meeting. I represent OSAC, and I was under the impression that

my presence here was to deal with terrorism, not with the policies

and programs of Texaco. If we had—— Mr. TIERNEY. Well, you’re talking about security for our nationals, right?

Mr. MCCARTHY. If I knew that the questions would deal on

human rights and on problems in Ecuador certainly somebody

would be here to answer those questions for you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I just have to tell you that I hope all the witnesses are prepared to answer what responsibilities people that are

protected at the cost of taxpayers’ money owe back to the taxpayers

in terms of corporations. My question was really designed toward,

could we rely on some expectation that if we’re going to spend taxpayer money for security measures abroad, could we expect that

those corporations would be asked to adhere to certain environmental standards and labor standards?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, as I mentioned to you, Texaco, as well as

other companies in the extractive industry, are already engaged in

issues with foreign—with not only the U.S. Government but foreign

governments in trying to put together human rights policies and

other policies that will address those situations.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair would note that the role of human rights advocacy in

reducing resentments and easing the terrorist threat may indeed

be a very appropriate topic for a future hearing. The subject of toVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:29 Nov 26, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75955.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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day’s hearing is the potential—excuse me, the protection of the

U.S. interests against the immediate threat of terrorism.

Mr. TIERNEY. Point of order on that, please.

Mr. PUTNAM. You’re recognized.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is that to say that you’re limiting the hearing,

there will be no questions about what we might expect back in return for the provision of those security measures?

Mr. PUTNAM. No. The gentleman is incorrect. It was simply to remind all members and the audience that the topic of today’s hearing is protecting of U.S. interests against the immediate threat of

terrorism. You can direct your questions in whatever way you see

fit. You’re an elected Member of Congress.

We will do one more round for this panel and then bring in panel

two. Mr. Gilman, you are recognized.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I’ll be brief.

Mr. McCarthy, as co-chairman of the OSAC organization I note

that OSAC is supposed to be a clearinghouse for exchange of information among everyone in the private sector, businesses and executives and NGO’s, etc. The panelists have all highlighted the fact

that we need better intelligence, more accurate intelligence, better

exchange. Tell me what OSAC does to improve that intelligence

dissemination.

Mr. MCCARTHY. OSAC is a—they have a council of approximately 30 security professionals which actually operate the OSAC

facility—the OSAC organization. One of the major things that

OSAC has done is put together the electronic bulletin board, the

electronic data base; and this data base contains not only anecdotal

information but professional analyst information concerning political and criminal situations abroad.

Mr. GILMAN. And security threats as well?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Security threats abroad, and it’s available on a

Web site. A part of it is password protected because it’s—some of

it is very specific and would be considered proprietary, and a lot

of it is only of interest to the security professionals, but the

majority——

Mr. GILMAN. Let me interrupt a moment. How do you protect

your password security for OSAC information?

Mr. MCCARTHY. When you’re an American company and sign up

for OSAC, you are given a password. The senior security officer is

given a password which he can proliferate throughout the company

at his discretion.

Mr. GILMAN. Can NGO’s find that access?

Mr. MCCARTHY. There are some NGO’s that are included in

OSAC. The Church for Latter Day Saints, for instance, is a very,

very active member of OSAC.

Mr. GILMAN. And tell me about your country councils. I understand OSAC has country councils.

Mr. MCCARTHY. They have about 30 councils that have been

started around the world, and the purpose of these councils is to

try and give to the nonprofessional security-type information that

would help him fulfill his responsibilities. In many companies,

maybe a person who’s assigned to the human resources would also

have a security responsibility and he is not very proficient in many

137

of the best practices of security, and through the country council

these practices are passed down from the other companies to them.

Mr. GILMAN. And what’s your relationship with the government

agencies in providing the information you have available?

Mr. MCCARTHY. There are government agencies who are technical advisers as part of OSAC also, the FBI, for instance, and the

Department of Commerce and several other agencies.

Mr. GILMAN. Diplomatic Security Agency?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Diplomatic security actually runs those, yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Kucinich for 5 minutes.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, sir.

To Mr. Bishop, continuing the discussion I started with Mr.

McCarthy, what would be the value if major American corporations

or American corporations doing business in the—you know, generally anywhere around the world would have in advance of their

business activities fully enunciated human rights principles, including workers rights, environmental quality principles? And, of

course, that would also mean, you know, if we are talking human

rights we are talking about the rights of women, children. What if

that was the motif that was put out there for everyone to understand this is what we stand for and it was backed up by business

practices that were consistent with the enunciation of those principles? What would be the effect on improving America’s image

abroad and America’s position?

Mr. BISHOP. The organization that I represent hasn’t taken a position on that issue.

Mr. KUCINICH. I am asking you personally. What do you think?

Mr. BISHOP. I think that, speaking generally, that the adoption

of such a practice would improve the image of international business, many of these have lost their American identity abroad, and

be a calming influence.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Cilluffo, what do you think about that?

Mr. CILLUFFO. I believe that it actually does make bottom-line

sense. To win the hearts and the minds of any indigenous or local

population has been crucial in time of war, in time of crisis. So I

do think that it would be something valuable.

The devil’s in the details, and I have no idea—— Mr. KUCINICH. What you just said, though, impressed me, because you talked about the bottom line. Because it would occur to

me that business may actually lose money with practices that are

adverse to human rights. I mean, is that——

Mr. CILLUFFO. Initially, but the long-term benefits could outweigh the short-term costs and just in terms of support of a local

indigenous population. That is—it’s been—I mean, militarily, even

in traditional national security terms, I think that should be underscored, and it’s very important.

Mr. KUCINICH. Yeah, I think—and, Dr. Hoffman, would you respond to that? Because then I just want to make a comment on

this. Go ahead.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think it would be extremely useful. It would certainly, at minimum, deprive the terrorists of the propaganda that

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they generate and market against the United States to drill up

hostility to our country and also to increase their own recruits.

Mr. KUCINICH. It seems to me that human rights should be consistent with people making money. I mean, why not? Just as environmental quality principles—you know, we are in a new millennium where there’s new ways of dealing with environmental challenges that can also save money. Sometimes that smoke going up

the stack is profits lost, for example.

It seems to me that when we’re looking at the possibility of a

new millennium we could go one or two ways. We could end up

with more violence, which requires a greater presence and security

networks, etc., or we could take the world in a different direction.

And I think that our corporations are in the position where they

can help make it happen, even—may have even more influence

than U.S. Government itself when we’re talking about activities

abroad, which is why I raised this. Because, look, we’re all heirs

of traditions that we may not always agree with and sometimes

question, which is why I am a little bit uneasy about asking any

individual to be singularly accountable for what his organization or

corporation does, but we all have a role in where we go from here.

So, as you said, Mr. Cilluffo, you know, the devil is in the detail.

I think it would be useful to convene U.S. corporate leaders on this

issue and gather observations about what might be a common set

of human rights principles covering workers and environment. And,

you know, if you do that we might make some progress on some

of our trade issues because, as you know, one of the major sticking

points in a number of our trade agreements is the sense that corporations will not support human rights, workers rights, environment. If we can get corporations to do that voluntarily, then perhaps we can start a new era of human progress. That’s where I am

coming from.

So I thank the witnesses and look forward to further exchange

on these matters. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich.

The Chair and the subcommittee thanks the panel for their testimony and their thoughts on these issues.

At this time we will excuse the first panel, take about a 2-minute

recess and bring up the second panel. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. PUTNAM. The hearing will return to order.

Are all witnesses present?

The Committee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations is pleased to welcome our second panel of witnesses for the hearing on Protecting American Interests Abroad:

U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Nongovernmental Organizations.

As you are aware, you will be giving sworn testimony. At this

time, please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Note for record that the witnesses responded in the

affirmative.

At this time, we will take the witnesses’ opening statements. I

ask that you please adhere to our 5-minute rule.

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We will begin with Mr. Peter Bergin, Director of Diplomatic Security Service and Co-Chairman of Overseas Security Advisory

Council, U.S. Department of State. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF PETER BERGIN, DIRECTOR, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE, CO-CHAIRMAN, OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MICHAEL

WAGUESPACK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION SUPPORT, FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATIONS; DIANNE ANDRUCH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND LEONARD ROGERS, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. BERGIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased

to be with you today to address this important matter with you.

OSAC, which was created by Secretary of State George Shultz in

1985, is a partnership, a one-of-a-kind partnership between the private sector and the government to address the security concerns of

the U.S. private sector around the world. The Bureau of Diplomatic

Security is entrusted to carry out the U.S. Government responsibilities in this partnership.

This afternoon I will explain how the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, through OSAC, exchanges security information with U.S. companies, nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions

and private entities so they can make informed decisions about

how best to protect their people, their facilities and their investments overseas.

What makes the Council most effective is the breadth of its membership. The Council is comprised of 30 representatives from all

sectors of business—financial, airlines, pharmaceuticals,

consumables and high-tech, among others—as well as government

representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce and

Treasury and the Agency for International Development. In addition, there are seven government technical advisers from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the National Counterintelligence Center, the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Financial Crimes Enforcement

Network and U.S. Customs.

The Maritime Security Council, an organization of ocean carriers,

cruise lines, and related industries, also serves the Council as a

technical adviser.

Four committees serve as the engine for OSAC.

The Transnational Crime Committee provides information and

case studies on transnational criminals and organizations. The

Transnational Crime Committee is currently chaired by Motorola.

The Protection of Information and Technology Committee deals

with intellectual property issues. It is currently chaired by American International Group Inc.

The Security awareness and Education Committee reviews and

updates the OSAC Web site and publications. It is currently

chaired by Cargill.

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Our fourth committee is Country Council Support. This committee, which is chaired by Kellogg, promotes communications between

OSAC and Washington and the field.

Overseas, OSAC is represented by its country councils. They

serve in the front lines where private sector problems are addressed in cities around the globe. An American private sector representative and the Embassy regional security officer [RSO], chair

these councils. Currently, there are OSAC country councils in 35

cities around the world.

The exchange of information is the reason OSAC exists. OSAC

has an interactive Internet site of security information. This Web

site contains press reporting from around the world, unclassified

Embassy reporting, information on overseas contacts, groups prone

to violence, upcoming global events, cybercrimes and other special

topics. This user-friendly site, which is managed by Diplomatic Security, receives over 50,000 hits per week.

The operational element of OSAC is Diplomatic Security’s Research and Information Support Center [RISC]. RISC is staffed by

six analysts who are regional security experts. The RISC staff is

dedicated exclusively to the U.S. private sector with interests overseas. This staff is the person-to-person focal point for the exchange

of overseas security information with the private sector. RISC analysts do over 150 consultations per month. RISC has also supported

the U.S. private sector overseas at major events such as the Sydney Olympics, the World Bank/IMF meetings in Prague and the

World Economic Forum in Davos.

Every November OSAC holds its annual briefing. This event regularly attracts over 700 private sector executives to the State Department. At this session, OSAC presents a worldwide threat overview specifically tailored to the private sector.

OSAC publishes material on topics such as emergency planning

for American families and businesses abroad, protecting U.S. business information overseas and responding to a biological or chemical threat. These publications are all available on the OSAC Web

site or on hard copy.

All of our information services—the Web site, the consultation

with the RISC analyst, the annual briefing and the security publications—are free.

We have a number of initiatives designed to keep OSAC relevant

in today’s ever-changing security environment. OSAC, joined by the

State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, has formed the

University Working Group. This working group is developing safety

programs and establishing best practice guidelines to increase security awareness for students and faculties traveling and studying

abroad. The schools now represented on the University Working

Group are Pepperdine, Louisville, Ohio State, Arcadia, University

of Southern California and Michigan State.

Another initiative involves training. The State Department now

makes available to the private sector a 2-day personal security program to prepare their employees to live and work overseas. This

program offers much the same training that State Department and

other U.S. Government employees receive before they are assigned

abroad.

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In the last year we’ve done four sessions for over 100 private sector participants. The feedback has been positive. The Congress has

had a lot to do in legislating our authority to train the private sector, and we thank you.

The future holds many challenges for OSAC. As more American

companies travel and conduct business abroad, we are expanding— we are working to expand our constituent base. We also have an

effort under way to increase the number of country councils.

Just as U.S. Government officials represent American values and

interests around the world, every American abroad is a partner in

our diplomacy. Any threat to their security is a threat to U.S. national interests. OSAC is U.S. foreign policy at its best. OSAC provides security information to the U.S. private sector so that it can

travel, operate and invest safely in a world that is constantly

changing. OSAC is government that works.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergin follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Michael

Waguespack, Deputy Assistant Director of Counterterrorist Operation Support Section, Federal Bureau of Investigations. Did I pronounce your name correctly?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. You pronounced it correctly, Waguespack. Just

for the record, I am the Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Operation Support.

Mr. PUTNAM. The record will note the change. You’re recognized.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank members of the committee for inviting the FBI to testify about the

ANSIR program as the committee examines the topic of ‘‘Protecting

American Interests Abroad.’’

While other agencies in the government have primary responsibility for protecting U.S. interests overseas, the FBI participates

with them as appropriate and contributes to the overall government effort.

The acronym ANSIR stands for ‘‘Awareness of National Security

Issues and Response.’’ As part of its national security mission, the

FBI has been providing awareness information in order to reduce

the vulnerabilities of U.S. citizens, corporations, and institutions to

intelligence and terrorist activities since the early 1970’s. By knowing what intelligence services and terrorists do and how to frustrate their plans, American interests are better protected.

The initial focus of this program in the 1970’s was the protection

of classified government information, property and personnel. At

that time, the program was known as DECA, Developing Espionage

and Counterintelligence Awareness.

In the 1990’s, several challenges occurred which led the FBI to

decide that a larger audience should be receiving its national security message. First, foreign intelligence services expanded their targeting to include unclassified private sector proprietary economic

information.

Second, the threat of terrorist attack on American interests here

in the United States and abroad escalated. Additionally, the serious problem of computer intrusion and the costly menace of the

computer virus dictated the FBI awareness message should reach

a broader audience in a timely fashion to protect harm.

The FBI’s ANSIR program’s message is principally aimed at U.S.

corporations, although other government agencies and law enforcement also benefit from it. The principal method of disseminating

FBI information is through ANSIR e-mail which I will describe

later. The ease of replicating e-mail communication accounts for

the global nature of its dissemination.

American interests abroad receive ANSIR communications primarily from their headquarters in the United States, which relay

ANSIR e-mail to them, though on occasion the awareness message

is delivered directly to those overseas.

In addition to making potential targets of intelligence and terrorist activities less vulnerable through awareness, the FBI also has

a unique capability to respond when these activities are identified

in the United States. This response capability is a key part of the

awareness message. The FBI does more than simply identify problems, it does something about them.

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Let me just talk briefly to the organizational structure of ANSIR.

The ANSIR program is by any measurement of government programs a very small one. Currently, there is one supervisory special

agent assigned as the national ANSIR program manager in the National Security Division at FBI headquarters.

The ANSIR program also has at least one special agent in each

of its 56 field offices assigned as the ANSIR program coordinator.

This is actually a collateral duty assigned to take no more than 10

percent of the coordinator’s time. The coordinator acts as the point

of contact for request of assistance and inquiries generated by

ANSIR.

A special agent is assigned this duty because decades of experience with the ANSIR program has shown that the private sector

prefers discussing national security issues with an individual who

has operational experience.

The ANSIR program has no membership. Rather, individuals,

corporations, government agencies and organizations which request

FBI national security awareness information may receive unclassified awareness information via ANSIR e-mail or through presentations conducted by ANSIR coordinators and other knowledgeable

individuals that are arranged through the program. Presentations

are given both at the classified and unclassified level.

What is today the ANSIR e-mail program began as the ANSIR

fax program in 1995. After the private sector shifted its principal

means of communication to the Internet in 1996, ANSIR fax became ANSIR e-mail. The program uses the FBI’s Law Enforcement

On-Line [LEO], as its Internet service provider to ensure the security and integrity of ANSIR e-mail. This program was initiated to

greatly improve the efficiency of disseminating the FBI’s awareness

message.

While personal presentations, videotapes and mail all have their

value, nothing is as efficient as Internet e-mail for quickly distributing an advisory whose value diminishes with every passing hour.

Recently, the number of ANSIR e-mail subscribers was reported

to be over 30,000. Each ANSIR e-mail advisory eventually reaches

substantially well over this number depending on the content of its

message. Key messages which members of Fortune 500 and large

government agencies wish to pass on to their personnel have the

largest international dissemination.

The number of ANSIR e-mails disseminated annually vary depending upon the threat environment. In the calendar year 2000,

a total of 63 advisories were disseminated. Because the ANSIR email has asked its subscribers which advisories within 17 infrastructures they desire to receive, not all advisories are received by

every subscriber. However, the majority of subscribers ask to receive advisories from all 17 infrastructures.

Let me talk briefly about the ANSIR program with regard to the

counterterrorism effort. The role of the FBI’s ANSIR program in

the U.S. counterterrorism effort overseas is within the FBI’s primary mission of preventing, deterring, and defeating terrorism activities in the United States. To this end, the ANSIR program provides terrorism awareness information valuable to public and private sector organizations.

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ANSIR e-mail is a component of the government’s National

Threat Warning System. The National Threat Warning System has

established a protocol for the rapid dissemination of terrorism

threat and warning information throughout the Federal Government, law enforcement, and the private sector. The protocols established by the NTWS provide uniformity in defining what constitutes a threat advisory which should be disseminated and the

language used to describe it.

Mr. PUTNAM. Sir, if you could conclude your remarks.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Yes, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. We have a copy of your written testimony. We’ll be

able to derive our questions from that.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. In conclusion, then, I would just like to say

that you can talk about the cooperation that exists between government programs concerning the protection of American interests

abroad. The FBI’s ANSIR program coordinates all overseas activity

in which it is requested to engage with the Department of State.

In fact, the FBI Deputy Director Thomas Pickard is a member of

the Overseas Security Advisory Council Executive Board. As

noted—would be noted in the written testimony, we have also been

sponsored to present various programs through the Defense Security Service and other government agencies internationally.

We think that the ANSIR program is a ‘‘good news’’ program,

and I hope that this information is helpful. I look forward to answering any questions.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Waguespack follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. At this time, the Chair recognizes Ms. Diane

Andruch, Managing Director, Overseas Citizens Services, Bureau of

Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Welcome.

Ms. ANDRUCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. I have submitted my full statement for the record,

which I will now summarize.

The Bureau of Consular Affairs [CA], is charged with exercising

the Secretary of State’s responsibility to provide consular protection

and services to U.S. citizens abroad. The Department has no higher

priority.

I will be speaking today about the work of my office, Overseas

Citizens Services [OCS], to provide vital emergency and nonemergency assistance to U.S. citizens abroad on a daily basis. We

help Americans in dire circumstances, including deaths, arrests,

missing persons, medical evacuation and financial emergencies.

In times of crisis, such as natural disaster, civil unrest, political

instability or transportation disasters, OCS coordinates the consular response in Washington and at our posts abroad, and provides a vital point of contact for Americans in the United States

concerned about their relatives overseas.

We try to make it easy for Americans to reach us. Our phone

number is in every U.S. passport. Machine readable photo digitized

U.S. passports issued since November 16, 1998 also include our

Web site for our home page. We are available 24 hours a day, 7

days a week, worldwide throughout our Embassy duty officer program.

One of our primary objectives is to alert citizens to situations

that may adversely impact their safety and security. The cornerstone of this effort is our consular information program. OCS prepares a consular information sheet for every country in the world,

which includes basic information about local conditions. When the

Department determines that it is unsafe for Americans to travel to

a particular country, we issue a travel warning. We issue also public announcements which will cover short-term events, such as the

potential for violent demonstrations. In 2000, we prepared 40 travel warnings and 138 public announcements.

In addition, we issue worldwide caution public announcements

on terrorism and threats against American interests abroad, such

as the announcement issued on January 1st of this year which remains in effect.

American communities abroad are also alerted to threats through

our Embassies’ warning systems. These are through telephone,

multi-fax and e-mail trees designed to share information quickly

when there is imminent danger to Americans overseas.

We get the word out about our consular information sheets and

that program by disseminating them to our missions abroad, the

media, the travel industry and other U.S. Government agencies

and to e-mail list subscribers. We also place them on our Consular

Affairs home page at www.travel.state.gov. Our home page has

seen as many as 600,000 hits a day or 13 million hits in a month.

In the year 2000, our home page received 96 million hits. And we

anticipate our first million hit day won’t be too far in the future.

For those without computers, our materials are also readily

available by telephone recording, fax on demand, and by mail. Our

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home page also includes pamphlets and other detailed information

on a wide variety of topics.

Now I would like to talk a minute about the information contained in these documents that we’ve been discussing, how we obtain it; in particular, crime, safety and security information. For

the most part, the information is provided by our Embassies and

consulates abroad. Information on local crime, areas of instability

and the overall political climate are provided with the input of various offices within the Embassy. If a threat applies equally to private and official Americans alike, it must be shared with both. This

we referred to as our ‘‘no double standard’’ policy.

Information about terrorist threats is obtained from a variety of

sources: from the U.S. intelligence community, those of our allies,

friendly sources, open threats and other sources. No matter what

the source, though, all the information is taken seriously and put

through a comprehensive evaluation process.

Threats are evaluated based on evidence—on threat evidence

alone, not on political or policy issues. Before the information is

shared with the public, however, it must be specific, credible and

noncounterable. This threshold precludes us from publishing

unsubstantiating information and suffering the consequences of

‘‘crying wolf.’’ The Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security [DS], reviews

this information pertaining to private Americans. Information obtained and analyzed by DS, in concert with another office of the

Department, the Office of Counterterrorism, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and other sources in Washington is also

shared and evaluated by our missions in the affected country or region.

In addition to daily interaction among OCS in these offices, OCS

chairs a weekly meeting with representatives from DS, INR and S/

CT to review all outstanding threatening information. Our posts

abroad also evaluate the threat information through their emergency action committees. These are usually chaired by the Ambassador and made up of the deputy chief of mission, the security officer, consular and other representatives of U.S. agencies at the post

as necessary.

If a threat is determined to be specific, credible and

noncounterable, DS shares the information with our Bureau in

Washington, and we evaluate whether it is adequately addressed

in our consular information program or whether something else

needs to be done.

When the political situation in a country begins to deteriorate or

other threats to the security of American interests are evident, the

Department convenes the Washington Liaison Group [WLG], to

alert the interagency community to the situation and coordinate

interagency planning. This WLG typically includes representatives

of other agencies throughout Washington.

Mr. Chairman, the dangers that crime, security threats, kidnapping and terrorism pose for U.S. citizens abroad are of great concern to the Department of State. When an American citizen is

taken hostage, for example, the Department and the Embassy in

the host country work closely with the host government and with

other U.S. Government agencies and family members of the victim

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as well to develop a strategy for the expeditious resolution of the

hostage situation. Consular officers abroad serve as the key point

of contact for family members and remains in regular contact.

The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism works closely with law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and military, to develop resolution strategies and

may lead to an interagency foreign emergency support team known

as FEST to support the chief of mission at that Embassy concerned.

The FBI may dispatch hostage negotiation experts at the request

of the host country government, and the FBI has responsibility for

post-incident investigation and prosecution of those who kidnap

American citizens.

While the U.S. Government has a clear policy on the issue of hostage taking, we will make no concessions to terrorists holding

American citizens hostages. We will use every and all opportunities

and appropriate resources to gain the safe return of those American citizens being held hostage.

In June 2000—— Mr. PUTNAM. Ms. Andruch, I would also ask if you would summarize.

Ms. ANDRUCH. OK. If I may then just conclude by saying that I

believe that we in the Department, and specifically the Bureau of

Consular Affairs, are doing a good job in working with other agencies to recognize the needs—the needs of Americans traveling overseas. And I look forward to working with you and others to see if

we can do an even better job. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Andruch follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Leonard

Rogers, Acting Assistant Administrator, Humanitarian Response,

U.S. Agency for International Development. Welcome.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor to appear

before the subcommittee today.

At the beginning of this new century, there are many places in

the world where Americans are in constant danger, and there is no

place where we can consider ourselves completely safe.

Protection of Americans abroad is a challenge; however, it’s a

challenge we must meet. Our work overseas is important to our

own interests and values and to all those who seek peace, prosperity and security. We cannot allow ourselves to be thwarted by terrorism and random violence.

At this Agency for International Development, we are increasingly concerned about the risk to our own employees and to our private partners, the nongovernmental organizations which are so

critical to implementation of our development and humanitarian

assistance programs overseas, organizations like CARE, Catholic

Relief Services, Mercy Corps, and Samaritan’s Purse.

In 1970, there were 81 U.S. private voluntary organizations registered with AID. Now there are 446. Together, with the key U.N.

organizations, such as the World Food Program and UNHCR, they

are the backbone of our work in the field. We simply could not be

as effective without them.

Yet, the nature of our humanitarian assistance has changed radically. Once we concentrated on natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Now our work is heavily weighted toward

complex emergencies in places like Kosovo, Sudan, Afghanistan

and Somalia. So our challenge is to balance the need for field presence in dangerous places against the need to do everything we can

to assure our NGO partners are as secure as possible.

There are several steps we at USAID are taking to strike the

right balance. First, working with InterAction, we are developing

and funding security training programs for both NGO, staff and executives. This will help ensure our people in the field are as prepared as possible.

Second, we finance security equipment such as radios and appropriate security staff as part of all our grants. And in approving new

grants, we attempt to ensure that each NGO has fully considered

the security needs of all of its staff.

Third, we are reaching for consistency in security operations

across the entire community working in these dangerous countries,

including the U.N. and other donors. This helps ensure a common

approach and backstops support in an emergency. USAID and

State Department’s Refugee Bureau also directly fund U.N. security operations in select separation situations.

Fourth, we finance research and studies on current security

issues as they affect NGO’s. For example, we help determine how

best to provide appropriate insurance for NGO staff in dangerous

settings.

Finally, we provide our humanitarian assistance based on principles of neutrality and impartiality. This means our NGO’s are not

seen as favoring one side or another in a conflict, and there is no

basis for retaliation against them by partisans.

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Nevertheless, there are limits to what we can do. We must recognize there is an inherent risk in working in developing countries.

To illustrate the dangers of this environment, since 1992 the

United Nations has lost 189 civilian personnel to accidents and to

random targeted violence. U.S. and international NGO’s face this

same violence and suffer similar losses.

The countries our NGO and U.N. colleagues work in must be

held accountable for protecting humanitarian workers. We must insist that governments bring to justice those who commit crimes

against humanitarian workers. Otherwise, we can expect these

risks to continue to escalate.

Mr. Chairman, the American people give high priority to our development and humanitarian aid programs. U.S. NGO’s are critical

to our successful delivery of assistance in the field. We will continue to take their security needs seriously. We will continue to

work through the USAID security director with OSAC to improve

security for all Americans overseas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. At this time, the Chair recognizes the chairman,

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Given my not being present for all the testimony, I’m

happy to follow at the end. I thank the chairman and would yield

to Mr. Gilman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Gilman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank Chairman

Shays for yielding his time.

I would first like to especially welcome Peter Bergin, Director of

Diplomatic Security Service. Mr. Bergin’s agents around the world

have provided highly professional protection details for Members in

Congress whenever our colleagues are out traveling abroad. We

thank you for allowing one of your personnel to be assigned to our

International Relations Committee, Pat Durkin, who has done an

outstanding job. And your former members have been of great

asset and service to us. I hope you will continue in that direction.

I want to thank our panelists all for their instructive information. A number of—Peter Bergin, a number of the investigative personnel at-risk analysts provide good information to us. How many

do you have working in that area?

Mr. BERGIN. We have six.

Mr. GILMAN. Six in the whole world.

Mr. BERGIN. They cover all areas of the whole world.

Mr. GILMAN. I think you need a lot more.

Mr. BERGIN. Well, our budget for the OSAC program is about $1

million. If you look at the number of constituents that we have in

OSAC, a number close to 2,000, that’s really about $500 a constituent. And $500 goes a long way in terms—if we can provide people

information which will save someone’s life or save from being injured, I think it’s money well spent.

One of the problems that we have is that, for example, if we send

a risk analyst to South Africa to deal with an issue of the private

sector community there, there’s no backup. So we would be looking

to increase it probably by putting an additional analyst for each region of the world.

Mr. GILMAN. I hope you’ll let us know about your request for that

additional personnel.

Mr. BERGIN. We will, sir. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. You mentioned in November an annual briefing at

the U.N. for security purposes where you invite private organizations and security people. Is there any congressional involvement

in that meeting? If not, I would urge you to——

Mr. BERGIN. I don’t believe so.

Mr. GILMAN. I would urge you to expand it and include them,

and particularly in this committee. I think we would all be interested in some involvement.

Mr. BERGIN. We would be delighted, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Your publications, how available are they to the

public?

Mr. BERGIN. Well, sir, they are available on the Web site. They’re

available to all the public. They’re free. And if using the Web site,

they call into the OSAC office, we can send them hard copies. So

they’re readily available.

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Mr. GILMAN. I would hope that your bulletin—I don’t know how

regularly you put out an OSAC bulletin.

Mr. BERGIN. It’s every day.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you make that available to this committee?

Mr. BERGIN. We would be happy to, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much. Now, with regard to training, which it has been emphasized there’s need for greater training,

what do you do with regard to training? I know you have some

training sessions.

Mr. BERGIN. Yes. As I mentioned, sir, we have held four sessions

in the past year. These are actually provided by the State Department’s Overseas Briefing Center. The Overseas Briefing Center for

the State Department provides training to State Department employees and other agency employees who are assigned overseas.

This is an opportunity to provide employees of NGO’s, corporations,

universities, an opportunity to get the same training that U.S. Government employees get prior to their assignment overseas. And the

subjects are personal security, cultural security, awareness of those

kind of issues.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that done here at the UN?

Mr. BERGIN. No, sir. It is done here in Arlington at the National

Foreign Affairs Training Center.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Waguespack, we welcome the FBI being here.

How many ILEAs are there, the international training programs,

around the world today?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. I’m sorry, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. How many ILEAs are there in place today.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. One ILEA in place in Budapest.

Mr. GILMAN. What about the one in Thailand? I visited that

when they opened it.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Sorry, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. You’re not familiar with that one?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. I am not involved in that part of our program,

so I don’t have all the specifics on the numbers out there.

Mr. GILMAN. And I understand you’re exploring one for South Africa; is that correct.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Sir, again, that is not an area of my expertise.

I haven’t been involved in those. I can’t answer that question for

you.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, training has been emphasized in this hearing,

and it would seem to me that the FBI can provide a great service

by encouraging more ILEAs around the world. I know your Director, Mr. Freeh, has been very cooperative and very supportive of

doing that. And I would hope you could tell us of any others that

are being considered.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Yes, sir, I will be glad to take that for the

record.

Mr. GILMAN. Ms. Andruch, your Overseas Citizens Services, what

is the public’s access to your bulletins where you talk about a travel warning?

Ms. ANDRUCH. We have those. Those are published on our Web

site as well as being made available through travel agencies and

through the media. We also, for people who may not have access

to an Internet, we provide them by mail if they call us. We have

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an officer—someone available to the public 24 hours a day if they

should wish specific information about a country.

Mr. GILMAN. What about the media? Do your travel warnings go

out to the media?

Ms. ANDRUCH. Yes, sir, immediately. As soon as they are issued,

they go out. At the time they go on the Web, they go to the media,

and they go to the travel agencies.

Mr. GILMAN. How about to your Congress people?

Ms. ANDRUCH. Would you like to get special copies on them?

Mr. GILMAN. I think it would be important for you to circulate

that to all of the Members of the Congress and the Senate, since

we’re always in touch with our constituents. I know my office has

continual requests for is it safe for me to travel to this part of the

world.

Ms. ANDRUCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. So we would welcome if you could make those travel

warnings available to us.

Ms. ANDRUCH. We would be happy to. We might be able to—I’m

not very technical, but we might be able to look at something like

a hot link to our Web page if that would be helpful.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, whatever could help us in disseminating that

information.

And, Mr. Rogers, we welcome you from AID. What are you doing

about training the NGO’s about security? I notice you indicate

there are hundreds of NGO’s out there working with your agency.

What do you do to train them for security?

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we do two things, Mr. Chairman. First we

work with InterAction, which is the umbrella group for NGO’s, provide resources to them for their security training program. And

then in the field, we work with the international community onsite.

Normally, we have a disaster assistance response team that’s in

the field that will work with the NGO’s in the field, work with the

U.N. and their security officers, work with the Embassy and the regional security officer to provide information and alert the NGO’s

to current conditions in the country.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Rogers. I want to thank our

panelists. I know my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You’re welcome, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Otter, I apologize for having to cut you short on the last

panel, but feel free to fire away at this one.

Mr. OTTER. Does that mean I have a whole bunch of extra time

on this one?

Mr. PUTNAM. Sure. Why not?

Mr. OTTER. The victims. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In my previous life, prior to coming back here to D.C., Mr. Rogers, I was—1983, I guess it was, President Reagan then appointed

me to a task force. It was the Task Force on International Private

Enterprise. There were 17 of us, as I recall, and we traveled to different parts of the world.

As a result of that 18-month experience, I ended up on the World

Bank’s advisory committee for agricultural loans. You know, all the

testimony that I heard today, not only from this panel but the first

panel, never once in consideration of a loan to a foreign participant

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was the environment, was human rights, were any of those things

ever brought up.

Is it the practice of the IMF or the World Bank or any other

agency that AID has a participatory program with, is it their practice now to assess these environmental and human rights factors

in the international marketplace?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. Certainly. The—it’s actually the Treasury Department that has the representative that works with the World

Bank. But each one of the World Bank’s loans, in fact, the loans

of each one of the multilateral banks, is reviewed against a variety

of criteria. And certainly the U.S. Government’s view about the environmental practices of the recipient country, about the environmental impact of the loan itself, are all factors that are considered,

and the human rights performance of the country is also considered.

Now, we are one among many countries that sit on the executive

board of the World Bank. So there are other voices to be heard as

well. And occasionally there’s controversy over individual loans.

Mr. OTTER. Are these decisions made in a democratic process?

The 50 percent, the 51-plus—or 50 percent plus 1 wins?

Mr. ROGERS. I’m not sure what the voting rules are for the Bank

itself, but there is some process that people go through to assure

that the views of the executive directors are heard.

Mr. OTTER. Let’s just say for a moment, Mr. Rogers, that I’m

back in the international marketplace, and I’m trying to develop

products and plants overseas in order to develop markets, mostly

because of proximity. It’s closer to my market than my plant in

Idaho. Maybe it’s the natural resources. I can duplicate the quality

and the nature of the natural resources, renewable resources, farm

resources in that foreign country that I can in Idaho. And, you

know, maybe the energy is a little cheaper in this day and age because California is not stealing their electricity like they are from

Idaho. You know, maybe it’s any one of these factors.

When I make this decision, the thing that I do or did is, I would

go to one of these agencies that AID obviously has a working relationship with, and I say I want to invest $30 million—I want to invest $30 million in Ishmir, Turkey. We built a plant in Ishmir, Turkey to supply french fries for the McDonald’s in Europe.

I want to know what the process is now then that this agency,

whether it’s the World Bank or the IMF or whoever, would make

funds available to me now. Do I have to comply with OSHA in

Ishmir? Do I have to comply with EPA? Do I have to comply with

affirmative action? Do I have to comply with all the rules and regulations we have in the United States in order to put this site in

Ishmir, Turkey?

Mr. ROGERS. I believe that you would be obliged to comply with

the local regulations, and then the Bank would have its own standards if it were financing this program. But basically the local

standards would apply, plus whatever standards the multilateral

lending institution would have.

Mr. OTTER. So the rule of law, then, that Mr. Cilluffo talked

about in panel one, the rule of law certainly then entertains the

rule of law of the host country, right?

Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely.

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Mr. OTTER. Thank you. That’s all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Otter.

I have a couple of questions. First of all, to build on what Mr.

Otter’s point was with the first panel, in your opinion, are Americans, both governmental employees and American tourists abroad,

safer today overseas than they were 20 years ago?

We’ll start with Mr. Rogers and work on down. All right.

Mr. ROGERS. My opinion is definitely that they are not. I’m not

100 percent sure what the reason is, but since the end of the cold

war, we seem to have this proliferation of very vicious political and

ethnic conflicts, and they seem to be affecting our interests more

widely than they did in the past.

The United States is interested still in being engaged in those

countries. We provide humanitarian assistance to those countries.

Americans want sometimes to travel to those countries. So, all in

all, I would say we are at much greater risk, even setting aside the

apparent rise in terrorism. So I would say the answer is the environment is much more dangerous than it was 20 years ago.

Mr. PUTNAM. Ms. Andruch.

Ms. ANDRUCH. Yes. I think I would have to bow to the experts

on security as to actually if we’re safer now than we were 20 years

ago. But I think just the availability of travel and the increasing

number of Americans both residing and traveling overseas makes

it more likely that Americans would be the victims of some sort of

disaster overseas.

Having said that, however, I also think that technology being

what it is, and the availability of information to everyone, that we

do have the opportunity now to get out information so that the

travelers, if they avail themselves of that information, can make a

much better informed decision on where and when they travel.

Thank you.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. I think Americans abroad are at greater risk

today than they were 10 years ago, 20 years ago, primarily because

of the increased terrorism threat, but also because of the increased

risk to collection activities on the part of intelligence services for

proprietary economic information as well, and that’s something

that we should not lose sight of, as well as from a criminal element. So I think, across the board, Americans in various parts of

the world are at greater risk than previously.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Bergin.

Mr. BERGIN. Yes. Since the East African bombings, Mr. Chairman, I have never seen as much information about threats in my

28-year career in diplomatic security. There is considerable amount

of ground noise regarding threats. The specificity is certainly questionable. That’s one of our big jobs during the day is to—when that

threat window is opened, we’ve got to close it. We’ve got to make

sure that we’ve covered all the bases there.

I would second what Ms. Andruch said about information. I think

information today in terms of what we provide the public and to

our diplomats is much more accessible than it was 20 years ago.

I will recount for you, when I was in Cairo as the RSO, we spent

a considerable amount of time during the Gulf crisis briefing not

only diplomats and their families, but also engaging the private

sector.

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Our philosophy and that of the American ambassador was that

the American public in Cairo, in Egypt, needed to know what the

Embassy knew with respect to threats that entire community

faced. That’s basically what we’ve evolved to in OSAC, and with

the assistance of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, that the American

public know what we know in terms of American threats abroad.

Mr. PUTNAM. Well, addressing that point, and it was raised in

the first panel as well, separating the wheat from the chaff and determining what is noise and what is valuable information, are our

various information gathering agencies integrated and coordinated

enough to make those determinations, and are the bulletins that

are then posted or the information that is then passed on, is it as

accurate and valid as it should be or could be?

Ms. Andruch and then Mr. Bergin.

Ms. ANDRUCH. Yes, sir. I think our—the cooperation among the

various agencies in Washington and certainly the bureaus within

the Department is excellent. I think, you know, on a daily basis,

we talk to DS probably at least three or four times. And whenever

there is any information that they’ve heard, they’ve gotten from a

source, whether it be in Washington or at the post abroad, that information is shared. And we have contacts on—you know, in other

agencies, including the intelligence community. So I think, yes, it

is.

Mr. PUTNAM. Do you coordinate with ANSIR?

Ms. ANDRUCH. Yes, we do. We talk to FBI. We talk to the agency.

We talk to everyone, you know, who might have some input on it.

One of the—on the first panel, someone mentioned something

about the classification of information and sort of alluded that was

sometimes a problem. I, in fact, don’t think it is, because when

there is something that’s out there and it’s determined to be credible information, we find a way of working together to get that information to the public. And having the security officers and other

people, other agencies represented at Embassies abroad makes it— it’s so much easier in a way because there’s a little bit of built-in

redundancy. That same information that DS and other agencies

overseas are gathering for possible use by the Embassy and the official community overseas is always shared with the private community.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Bergin.

Mr. BERGIN. Yeah. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that one of the

most powerful lessons that we’ve learned out of the East African

bombings is that no agency can do it by itself in terms of protecting

Americans abroad. Diplomatic Security can’t do it by itself. The intelligence community can’t do it by itself. DOD can’t do it. But if

we work together—and I have seen an improvement, a terrific improvement in the last 2 years—if we work together, we stand a better chance at deterring and preventing terrorism against official

Americans as well as private American citizens. But you’ve got to

work together, and there has to be wise integration of all of our national assets to this end.

And I believe, for example, I can pick up the phone and call J34

over at DOD and get assistance, both logistical and people assistance, to augment what we’re trying to do overseas when a threat

is identified. So I’m comfortable that externally, you know, beyond

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the State Department, we’re working closely with the agency, the

FBI, DOD to protect all Americans abroad.

And I would say one of the things that was mentioned in the

first segment was that we needed to introduce the private sector

to the host country security police officials. We do that on a regular

daily basis. RSOs are doing that all the time so as to advance the

interests of the private sector abroad, because we feel we’re obligated to do that.

Mr. PUTNAM. Did anyone else want to answer that on the panel?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. I would just say from the perspective of the

FBI, certainly within the terrorism threat warning arena, our

focus—if I leave the committee with nothing else but this point, is

that our focus is, when we get a credible threat, our focus is to get

that information out as quickly as possible and to share it with the

community.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, let me

thank you for chairing this hearing. You were supposed to do a

good job, not a great job. And I appreciate that you are very capable, and thank you very much for doing that.

I also, before concluding this hearing, want to recognize Alex

Moore, career Foreign Service officer who is currently working with

the subcommittee under the auspices of the Pierson Fellowship

Program. At the State Department, Mr. Moore has served as a special agent in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security since 1985. As part

of his yearlong fellowship, Alex was responsible for all the research

and preparation for this hearing. We appreciate his help on previous hearings as well. We’re grateful for his very good work and

trust he will return to the State Department with a deeper understanding of the legislative oversight process. Alex, thank you very

much.

I also want to welcome our witnesses. I’m sorry I didn’t get to

personally greet you, but you have been in very good hands.

I would like to know, how does the U.S. Government differentiate

between terrorists and criminal incidents? Maybe we can just run

straight down.

Mr. BERGIN. I think that’s something that’s quite blurred. I think

when you—— Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to ask you to talk a little louder, too.

Mr. BERGIN. I would say that’s something that’s quite blurred in

terms of whether an incident is terrorism or whether it’s criminal.

For example, the incident down in Ecuador where these folks held

Americans and foreigners in the last—since November and released

them in March—is that crime? Is it terrorism? It’s a difficult thing

because perhaps some of them have relationships with known terrorist groups. But maybe they are—you know, they’ve separated. It

is a very, very difficult thing.

But one of the things that we try to do in, at least in the State

Department, is we provide antiterrorism assistance training to governments all over the world. In the last year, we’ve trained about

20,000 police and security officials. And the multiplier effect of that

is significant, because the Embassy—it’s difficult beyond the walls

of the Embassy to provide security. But if you can engage the host

government, if you can train them to standards of the United

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States, Americans who travel and invest abroad benefit significantly.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Again—— Mr. SHAYS. Do me a favor. I’m just curious. My ears must be— just tap your mic a second. It’s not picking up all that great. But

talk a little louder, if you would, sir.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Again, I would agree with Mr. Bergin. I think

there is very definitely a blurred line between pure terrorism and

criminal activity. The two go hand in hand. Terrorist groups commit criminal activity. They commit crimes. And certainly from the

FBI’s perspective, as we go after terrorist groups, much of what we

look at is what is their criminal activity as opposed to just, you

know, setting off bombs, whatever. Many of these groups are engaged in all sorts of criminal activity to further whatever their objectives and goals are. So the two are very much intertwined, and

you can’t really segregate counterterrorism or terrorism purely

from criminal activity.

Ms. ANDRUCH. Yes, I agree. And I would like to add, though, that

from the consular perspective, our concerns for and response to victims of crime or terrorism are the same. And one of the things that

we’ve been very fortunate in working with the Department of Justice, we now in the Office of Overseas Citizens Services, have a

crime victims specialist.

What we’re trying to do is ensure that victims of crime receive

the same sort of counseling and have the same sort of resources

available to them overseas that they would have if a similar thing

happened to them in the United States.

So we don’t make that distinction, although we recognize that

there is a difference from what we see. The effect on the person is

the same, and so we react to that in the same way. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. We would rely on the State Department to draw the

line in terms of a definition. But I would say that it seems somewhat more likely that Americans would be the victims of terrorists,

whereas common criminal activity would tend to be more random

and perhaps a bit easier to prepare for than terrorism.

Mr. SHAYS. You kind of answered this, so I’m not asking for a

redundant answer, but if you have something you want to amplify—how does the U.S. Government respond to terrorist threats

differently than criminal threats?

Mr. BERGIN. Well I think, given the political dimension of terrorism, I think there is a tendency in the U.S. Government to react

considerably to a terrorism threat. If it’s crime, I think that crime

is endemic. And having served in places where crime is a critical

problem for us, I mean, we spend—the Embassy, the RSO, spends

a lot of time with country councils and the private sector to ensure

that they have the commonsense general awareness of crime.

But in terms of a criminal threat, for example in Ecuador, the

United States engaged the FBI and a number of Defense Department assets to resolve that issue, which could be either viewed as

a criminal act against the United States or a terrorist act.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Again, from an FBI perspective, the terrorism

program is part of our tier one strategic program. And so much of

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our resources in the FBI are focused first and foremost on the national security aspects, the terrorism/counterterrorism part of what

we do.

In addition to that, obviously on the international criminal side,

international organized crime, those kinds of issues, while we

worked in the international scene, we’re looking primarily at what

the impact is in the United States, on the United States, but realizing that you can’t work solely within the United States; we do have

to work on the international scene.

But from a strategic standpoint in the FBI, terrorism and what

we’re looking at from a national security standpoint is our priority

tier one program along with the national foreign intelligence program.

Ms. ANDRUCH. Our consular information program, which I mentioned briefly in my testimony, has information. The consular information sheets that we have available on each country has specific

information devoted both to crimes, trends in crime, and in terrorism when that is known. The public announcement and travel

warnings that we will put out on an individual country are more

often for terrorism threats because those are the ones that we will

hear about through the intelligence community.

Mr. ROGERS. I don’t have anything to add.

Mr. SHAYS. I have another round of questions, but I’m happy to

defer to the gentleman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You can just continue.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask you, what countries do the best job

of protecting American interests overseas and which do the poorest

job? I don’t want to create a national incident here, but——

Mr. BERGIN. It is definitely uneven, sir. I mean, I don’t have a

list of the most prominent in terms of countries that provide us

protection, but certainly our aim is to ensure a baseline of service.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. I understand. But let’s try to get to the question, though, I mean with all due respect. There are some countries

that you have a better relationship than others, and who would

those be?

Ms. ANDRUCH. On an individual basis, I would have a hard time

answering that as well, but I think in countries where we have a

very small presence, I think our—we’re hampered then to the extent of, you know, having fewer people to get the information out.

And someone on the first panel also mentioned NGO’s, of course,

tend to go to the countries where there is perhaps a primitive infrastructure, if any at all. In those countries, then, our work will

then be that much more difficult.

Mr. SHAYS. See, I have a theory that the only one who tops the

State Department in terms of responding to a question as carefully

as Alan Greenspan, that he talks—he talked—in fact, I fear that

his training came from the State Department.

But maybe you could answer the question this way: What are the

factors that affect a foreign government’s responsiveness to American security concerns the most? What—when are they most—what

are the issues of the—the factors where they may be more responsive to our concerns? When they may get drawn in? When they

may be embarrassed? I mean, what would that be? Is it that we

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have worked out better relations with those countries or we’ve had

longer contacts? What tends to make a country more responsive?

Mr. BERGIN. I think it definitely comes down, sir, to the strength

of a relationship between the United States and a particular country. For example, in Egypt, there was definitely a concern about

their ability to provide security to Americans because of the number of incidents there stemming from the Achille Lauro. And what

we did was the Congress created the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. Basically what this did is it gave the State Department a

tool——

Mr. SHAYS. To reach out.

Mr. BERGIN [continuing]. To which they could engage the Egyptians and train them on how to protect. For example, in Luxor, we

had an incident in 1997 where you had a number of western tourists killed as a result of terrorist incidents. The security forces—— Mr. SHAYS. It wasn’t too good for the tourist trade, was it?

Mr. BERGIN. Absolutely not. And clearly that is something vital— it’s a $2 billion industry in Egypt. But clearly that’s not in the interest of Egypt to do that. Nor is it in the U.S.’ interest. So what

we did is flux the ATA program to provide training to police officers in upper Egypt, and we haven’t had an incident yet. And

they’re much more vigilant today than they were 2 years ago.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Anyone else want to respond?

Ms. ANDRUCH. I wish I—I would like to say that I wish I was

as good at predictions as Alan Greenspan, because then we

wouldn’t have as many problems as we do.

Mr. SHAYS. No, no, no. The thing with Alan Greenspan is that

when you’re done, everybody thinks that he agrees with them. So

both sides leave content. It’s quite a skill.

Ms. ANDRUCH. I’ll do my best. One of the things—I just—you

know, in individual countries with consular officers overseas, I

think one of their main responsibilities is to do the outreach and

sort of the public diplomacy with the law enforcement people in

that particular country.

So I think that responses from those people are generally good.

I think when they—when they are less good is if there’s something

in the political situation at the time that makes them sort of want

to use a particular case as a hammer.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Chairman, I just have three more questions.

I want to know these two. I’ll ask them the same. What is the

U.S. Government’s policy in kidnapping, and what is the FBI’s role

in cases of kidnapping overseas? Start with the FBI.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Normally, in kidnapping situations overseas

involving an American person, the normal procedure would be for

a coordinating subgroup at the NSC to——

Mr. SHAYS. I really am sorry. I’m having trouble hearing you.

Mr. WAGUESPACK [continuing]. A coordinating subgroup at the

NSC to bring together all the components of the U.S. Government

to look at the U.S. Government response. Depending on what

comes out of that interagency forum in terms of how we as the U.S.

Government should best respond to that particular situation, the

FBI may be brought in to provide advice, to provide assistance.

But, again, it depends. It’s on a case-by-case situation. And in

many cases, in most cases, we normally will send agents to assist.

214

But, again, it’s done on a case-by-case basis in an interagency

forum.

Mr. SHAYS. Does the FBI define the U.S. Government’s response

to kidnapping? Can the State Department provide me any difference or—— Mr. WAGUESPACK. Well, again, it’s an NSC-led forum. So it

brings together the various components of the government, and a

collective view of that forum decides what is the best government

response.

Mr. ROGERS. In the case of nongovernmental organizations, we

would consider strongly their preferences as well. There’s an incident now in Sudan where four ADRA staffer members, the Adventist Relief Agency, which is a U.S. private voluntary organization,

were kidnapped. The preference there was the United States not

step in, that they allow the U.N. and the NGO to see if we could

negotiate the release of these individuals.

Mr. SHAYS. When I was in the Peace Corps, I always felt that

I had kind of the government behind me. When I think of the volunteers who serve in nongovernment organizations, but in the

same capacities as teachers and so on, working in nursing care,

health care, would the response for someone in a nongovernment

agency be treated the same as a government—someone who is not

a government employee be treated the same way as a government

employee?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. To the best of my knowledge, there would be

no differentiation.

Mr. ROGERS. Except to the extent that the NGO wanted to express a preference. If they felt they could handle it better if the

U.S. Government was not involved, then normally we would stand

back and allow them to take that course.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being so generous

with the time, and I thank the panel.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Otter, do you have any further questions?

Mr. OTTER. No. No.

Mr. PUTNAM. I’m curious what the U.S. Government’s role, security role, will be in the upcoming Olympics in Athens in 2004.

Mr. BERGIN. Well, I know the Ambassador in Athens is engaged

with the Greeks on this matter. I know that, for example, we sent

a couple of agents to Athens in February to discuss with the

Greeks what sort of security arrangements they were planning for

the Olympics and how the Embassy would interface with the

Greeks in terms of providing security, not only for the teams and

the USOC, but also private American citizens who would be visiting Athens during that time period.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Again, I can only speak limited to that particular area, since I am not engaged in the counterterrorism division, but I know that our counterterrorism personnel were certainly engaged in looking at the issues and working with their

counterparts abroad on that issue. But in terms of the specific details, I’m not familiar with the specifics.

Ms. ANDRUCH. The Bureau of Consular Affairs will be sending

out additional consular staff for that, as they do with any time

there is a large gathering of Americans, hopefully there will not be

215

any large terrorism events or anything of a major crime, but just

for the usual kind of problems that arise with Americans traveling

in large numbers.

Mr. PUTNAM. Are there current bulletins on Greece as we speak?

Ms. ANDRUCH. No, sir, I don’t believe so.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. I’m not aware of any.

Mr. PUTNAM. The previous panel in written testimony had indicated that perhaps we are too quick to issue bulletins and travel

advisories, in essence getting back to this differentiation between

noise and sound or the difference between information and real

positive data.

I’m curious. If you were evaluating the United States, would you

issue a travel bulletin?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. It depends on what city.

Ms. ANDRUCH. I guess that’s me. I think there are countries, in

fact, who do warn their travelers, their tourists, against certain

areas in the United States. I know, for example, when there were—

people were being murdered after they rented cars in Miami because the cars were sort of—you know, pointed out tourists. That

became a problem for many countries. So I think the answer would

probably have to be yes.

Mr. PUTNAM. There’s a big problem in my State.

Ms. ANDRUCH. You know, one thing, though, if I could turn that

back not to your initial question about, you know, our sort of

issuing perhaps too many warnings or travel warnings or public

announcements. We take our responsibility concerning the safety

and welfare of Americans very seriously, and it is the State Department’s No. 1 priority.

Fortunately for us, that is our primary concern. So while it is unfortunate that in some—you know, there may be countries who suffer a loss of tourism, or travel agencies who aren’t selling quite

enough tickets or quite as many tickets as they had, and we’re

sorry for that. But at the end of the day, you know, if we have information that we believe is credible and there is a threat out

there, it’s our responsibility to get the word out.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you. Mr. Otter.

Mr. OTTER. Mr. Chairman, I do have a couple of questions that

I would like to ask.

First, of the FBI. Do you rate foreign law enforcement agencies?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Do we rate them?

Mr. OTTER. Do you rate them? The gentlemen was—geez, we

want to introduce these NGO’s to the foreign law enforcement

agency when we get in there, and we want them to know that

they’re there. How do I know whether they’re the good guys or the

bad guys if you don’t rate them? Would you know? Is there any

reason that you or the CIA would know?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Do you know in terms of rating like 1, 2, 3,

5, 5, A, B, C, D, E? Is that——

Mr. OTTER. No. Like these are good guys or these are bad guys.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Well, certainly. I mean, again, as we look at,

as we have expanded our ‘‘leg atts,’’ for example, around the world,

our legal attaches, our whole purpose in doing so is to be able to

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work with the local and national police authorities in those countries and to build relationships with those entities.

Another aspect of what we have done in terms of our National

Academy, we have brought more and more foreign nationals into

the National Academy for training as we normally train our U.S.

police officials. Director Freeh has taken this on as one of his priorities, is to bring foreign national police officers in for this training.

So from that perspective, absolutely. I mean, we would have a

much better sense of who we can work with because of the relationships that have been developed as a result of the National Academy training, as a result of our interaction through our legal attache program.

Certainly from that perspective, sure, we know that certain individuals, certain governments, certain organizations, are more inclined to work with us than others. So, in that sense, yes.

To be able to give you a rating, say this one is better than that

one, much better, less, I am not prepared to do that right now. But

certainly in our interaction with these individuals, with the organizations and these environments, absolutely.

Mr. OTTER. Let me give you an example, and maybe this—that’s

what I should have done in the first place. In the late 1970’s, we

had an operation down in Colombia in a little town called Tumaco.

And Tumaco is right out on the West Coast. It was a lumbering

operation. We actually bought it from another outfit, Potlatch Corp.

I don’t know if you can do commercials here or not. But, anyway,

we bought it from Potlach, and we were operating it for a while.

In fact, we were doing so well with it we decided to put in another

lathe. It was a plywood manufactory, so we decided to put in another lathe.

Fortunately for us, we went to the Colombian Government,

through the World Bank or IMF or some other agency. We got

about $300,000 to buy this lathe. We got it down to Tumaco, which

is tough to get to, and we had it on the dock. And one more $25,000

payment to the local police would have gotten it off the dock, but

my boss said no. He said, once you start that, that’s just a down

payment. He said, we got the money borrowed there. We ended up,

in fact, walking away from the entire asset, which is about an $18

million asset.

What could I have done? Now, admittedly, this is 30, almost—

well, 25 years ago. What could I do today to ensure my capital

sources that are willing to loan me the money for this capital, what

could I do today to ensure that—anybody—what could I do today

to ensure them that says my government agency, one of you folks,

tells me it’s going to be safe if we put it down there?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. In that particular environment, I don’t know

that anybody could assure you that your capital would be absolutely 100 percent safe.

Mr. OTTER. Well, let me just tell you that one of the first things

I always did, if I could not borrow the money in that country, I

didn’t go to it.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. It helps to have real-world experiences.

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This is a question that I would like to throw out. What is the

fundamental difference between the FBI’s awareness of National

Security Issues and Responses—is that called ANSIR.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. ANSIR.

Mr. SHAYS. The ANSIR program and OSAC, the Overseas Security Advisory Council Program. And I specifically am interested to

know, are we not duplicating efforts with these two programs?

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Let me just say from the ANSIR program, our

program, as I indicated in my opening statement, is a small program. We are focused with ANSIR to provide threat and warning

information through e-mail to—— Mr. SHAYS. I’m really sorry. I’m having trouble hearing you.

You’ve got to pull the mic closer to you. I really want to hear what

you’re saying here.

Mr. WAGUESPACK. Our main focus is to provide threat warning

information through e-mail, because we have found that is the

most efficient way of getting information that needs to be gotten

out in a timely manner to as many customers, subscribers, as possible. It is only a small part of the overall outreach program that

the U.S. Government has. Within the U.S. Government, there are

any number of outreach programs. OSAC is one of them. OSAC is

a much bigger program in terms of the outreach to the private sector, especially overseas.

Our primary constituency is in the United States with the

ANSIR e-mail. But it does get out internationally as we get this information out to the headquarters components of U.S. corporations

here in the United States. If they have a presence abroad and they

feel that the information is relevant to their international presence,

then they can get the information out through their headquarters.

On occasion, we will send it out directly if we have more specific

information that relates to an international component of a U.S.

corporation or U.S. entity.

So ANSIR e-mail is simply that, getting threat warning information out to as many subscribers who want the information and the

individuals who come into us indicating that they are interested in

getting this information. And we have about 30,000 subscribers

currently that we send this information out to.

In addition to the e-mail, we also provide threat briefings, both

classified and unclassified, to individuals, companies, corporations,

that are interested in more specific, more focused briefings relative

to their specific areas of concern.

So it really isn’t outreach for us specifically in the United States,

but it does have an international dimension as we work with these

corporations that have outlets internationally, as well as working

with OSAC and other entities of the U.S. Government such as the

Defense Security Service, working specifically with other private

sector entities like the American Society for Industrial Security. We

work with them. We’ve gone out at the request of specific corporations, for example, giving threat briefings to companies abroad as

well. So that’s really our focus of our program in ANSIR.

Mr. BERGIN. OSAC, sir, is—it’s international. It’s a council created by then-Secretary George Shultz who recognized that there

was a potential for displacing the risk back in 1985 when we had

the bombings in the Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait and the MaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:29 Nov 26, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00221 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75955.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
218

rine Barracks, that there was a potential for diverting that risk to

softer targets and the American business overseas.

So when it was created, the focus was the American business

abroad. And it has evolved over the years to include nongovernmental institutions, universities and educational institutions. But

the focus is clearly overseas. And it’s infrastructure, which consists

of two diplomatic security special agents, six regional security experts who provide threat assessments to the private sector, is— which has about a $1 million budget—is centered on how can we

as a government respond to the needs of the American private sector around the world?

And as a component of that is a membership which consists of

30 entities, and they range from AOL to Cargill to the Church of

Latter Day Saints. But 30 of these members really are the workers.

It’s their council. The government is basically the steward of a

council run by the American private sector, if you will. And its design is to make it safe for Americans to travel and invest abroad.

It’s that simple. There is no competition. It’s cooperation and collaboration. And in the 2 years that I’ve been the chairman of this

thing, it’s really—it’s unbelievable, I don’t like the word ‘‘synergy,’’ but there is a multiplier effect there where people are actually networking so—and transcending competition between them all to

make it safe for all of them to work overseas. But it’s an overseas

program, sir. It’s not domestic.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OTTER. You’re the chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I am the chairman. I had the gavel. See, if I had the

gavel, I would have asked you to speak louder, and I would have

gotten you to do that. I guess with the power invested in me, I can

adjourn. With the power invested in me, thank you all very much,

this is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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