SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0310-22 

C.D.V.D.,

1

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

B.K.T., 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

______________________ 

Submitted January 18, 2024 – Decided February 15, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, 

Docket No. FM-03-1185-20.

C.D.V.D., appellant pro se. 

Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC, 

attorneys for respondent (Rachel Elena Partyka and 

Wayne G. Perry, on the brief). 

1

 We utilize the initials of the parties involved in this matter to protect their 

privacy and their child. R. 1:38-3(d)(3) and (13). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0310-22

PER CURIAM 

 In this custody and parenting time dispute, plaintiff C.D.V.D. appeals 

from the Family Part's May 16, 2022 dual final judgment of divorce (FJOD) 

awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody of their son H.J., born in 

February 2018, designating defendant B.K.T. as the parent of primary residence 

(PPR), and designating plaintiff as the parent of alternate residence (PAR). The 

judge found plaintiff's request to relocate to Portugal with the parties' son was 

not in the child's best interest. Plaintiff also appeals the provisions of the FJOD 

ordering her to pay $189 per week in child support to defendant and the counsel 

fee award of $50,000 entered against plaintiff in favor of defendant. In addition, 

plaintiff appeals from the August 29, 2022 post-judgment order denying her 

motion for reconsideration of these issues. 

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision designating defendant 

as PPR, denying plaintiff's request to relocate to Portugal, and establishing the 

child support amount. However, we reverse and remand the award of counsel 

fees because the judge did not address the factors required by Rules 5:3-5(c), 

4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a). 
3 A-0310-22

I.

Factual Background 

 We summarize the facts developed in the record. The parties married in 

2015. Plaintiff was born in Portugal. Because plaintiff's father was a diplomat, 

she and her family moved every few years. At the age of eight, she moved to 

Maryland, then later to Brussels, and she returned to Portugal at the age of 

sixteen for two years. In 2003, plaintiff moved to the United Kingdom where 

she attended college, earned a master's degree, and began her career. Plaintiff 

maintains dual citizenship in Portugal and the United States. Defendant was 

born in Pennsylvania and moved to New Jersey when he was eight years old. 

He does not have dual citizenship. 

 In 2010, the parties met in London, where they were both living and 

working at the time. On May 25, 2015, the parties entered into a pre-nuptial 

agreement and were married in a civil ceremony in Lisbon, Portugal three days 

later.2 The pre-nuptial agreement does not address where the parties would live 

after they got married, but plaintiff contends that prior to their marriage, the 

parties agreed to move to the United States for a period of ten years before 

2

 The parties had a second religious wedding ceremony in May 2016, also in 

Portugal. 
4 A-0310-22

returning to Portugal where the couple would reside. Following the marriage, 

the parties moved to New Jersey and resided with defendant's parents while he 

was seeking employment. In January 2016, the parties moved to Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, where they resided until early 2018. They moved to Mount Laurel 

six months later after their son was born. H.J. is a dual citizen of the United 

States and Portugal and has lived his entire life in New Jersey. 

 After moving to the United States, plaintiff was unemployed for a year 

but claims she ultimately secured employment that paid less money than she 

earned in London. The parties agreed plaintiff would resign from her position 

after she became pregnant with H.J. After their son was born, defendant worked 

from home every day, and plaintiff cared for their infant. In June 2018, H.J. 

traveled to Portugal with the parties and stayed with his maternal grandparents 

for several weeks. 

 In April 2019, H.J. entered daycare. The following month, defendant 

changed jobs and began working for Iridium Technology, which provides 

business intelligence services for legal services providers. He works remotely, 

with ten to twenty days of travel per year. In June 2019, plaintiff co-founded 

Canopy Group, a virtual personal assistance firm, which provides clients with 

in-person and remote professional and executive assistant services. During the 
5 A-0310-22

COVID-19 pandemic, H.J.'s daycare shut down and defendant's business travel 

ended. Defendant's parents assisted with childcare when daycare was closed. 

When travel resumed post-pandemic, plaintiff and H.J. went to Portugal for 

three weeks in the summer of 2020, and H.J. has spent time there during the 

summer with plaintiff in subsequent years. 

 On May 12, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of 

irreconcilable differences. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim and later 

filed an amended counterclaim, which is not germane to this appeal. 

 On October 2, 2020, plaintiff contended defendant was using drugs and 

that drug residue was left on one of H.J.'s playroom items. A week later, plaintiff 

filed an order to show cause (OTSC) seeking to compel defendant to submit to 

a hair follicle drug screen, require defendant to have supervised parenting time 

with H.J., and award her sole custody if defendant's drug screen was positive. 

The OTSC was denied without prejudice as non-emergent and not meeting the 

standard for preliminary injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the same relief, which was returnable on 

December 11, 2020. Defendant countered that plaintiff planned to kidnap H.J. 

The judge ordered defendant to submit to a TASC3 evaluation. Plaintiff's 

3

 Treatment Assessment Services for the Courts. 
6 A-0310-22

application to restrict defendant to supervised parenting time was denied without 

prejudice, pending the results of the TASC evaluation. The TASC evaluation 

revealed defendant did not exhibit symptoms of a substance abuse disorder and 

treatment was not recommended. 

 On January 19, 2022, the parties entered into a marital settlement 

agreement (MSA), which resolved the majority of their equitable distribution 

and financial issues. On February 3, 2022, they entered into a custody and 

temporary parenting time agreement, which provided they "shall enjoy shared 

legal custody of the minor child born of the marriage" and "[t]here shall be no 

residential custody determination at this juncture, other than to memorialize that 

the parties continue to reside in the same home together with [H.J.] and neither 

has been designated as [H.J.'s] primary custodial parent. This determination is 

pending the [c]ourt's decision." 

The Trial 

 The judge conducted a non-consecutive seven-day trial in January and 

February 2022 via Zoom limited to the following issues: (1) custody and 

parenting time; (2) plaintiff's request to relocate with H.J. to Portugal; (3) child 

support; and (4) counsel fees. 
7 A-0310-22

 Eight lay witnesses and two experts testified during the trial. The judge 

determined both parties were "very fit, competent and capable parents" but noted 

they "are unwilling or unable to agree and cooperate in matters relating to the 

child, and therefore are unable to resolve conflicts." When plaintiff testified at 

trial, she reaffirmed that she wanted to relocate to Portugal with H.J., but she 

intended to relocate to Portugal even if she was not granted custody of the child. 

In fact, plaintiff relocated to Portugal on June 26, 2022, and has remained living 

there. H.J. spent the summer of 2022 with plaintiff in Portugal. Plaintiff travels 

back and forth from Portugal to New Jersey to exercise parenting time with H.J. 

She speaks to H.J. exclusively in Portuguese and extolled the benefits of a 

Portuguese education, explaining the linguistic and cultural benefits. 

Plaintiff asserted she needed to relocate to Portugal, in part, to be in a 

better time zone to service the European market after her company, Canopy 

Group, was unsuccessful in the United States, and her business partner and 

financial backer, S.C., "would not be inclined to invest in the business any 

further" if its financial condition did not improve. 

Canopy Group is based in the United Kingdom. S.C. testified the 

company's growth "has been much slower than anticipated," and the company 

was just "breaking even." Based on these circumstances, S.C. testified that 
8 A-0310-22

Canopy Group has been attempting to "develop[] its clientele in the European 

market," and may try to "re-establish itself in the U.S. at some point in the 

future." S.C. testified plaintiff could better service and develop clients if she 

relocated to Portugal, where she could "more effectively leverage her business 

and family's contacts." According to S.C., Canopy Group had three to six 

months of "runway" left, referring to his willingness to continue to finance the 

business for that period of time. 

 Plaintiff's custody expert, Harry Green, Psy.D., prepared an evaluation, 

interviewed the parties, administered psychological testing, observed each party 

interact with H.J., and conducted collateral interviews. At trial, Dr. Green 

assumed defendant would not move to Portugal and opined that it would be in 

H.J.'s best interest to remain in the United States with plaintiff designated as 

PPR. However, Dr. Green also testified that if plaintiff moved to Portugal and 

defendant remained in New Jersey, H.J.'s best interests would be served by 

relocating to Portugal because plaintiff is the child's "primary attachment 

figure," she has a better job opportunity in Portugal, it is more feasible for 

defendant to interact with H.J. in Portugal because of his remote work and prior 

employment history in Europe than for plaintiff to interact with H.J. in New 
9 A-0310-22

Jersey, and Portugal offers better access to both Portuguese and American 

culture and language than New Jersey. 

 Dr. Green opined the parties' "relationship was strained," and that they 

were "inflexible and unwilling to compromise" their parenting styles. Dr. Green 

testified that defendant resisted allowing H.J. to visit plaintiff's extended family 

in Portugal. Dr. Green stated, "any prior drug use on defendant's part has not 

impeded his ability to function" and that "he is capable of safe and effective 

parenting." Dr. Green testified he did not think it was necessary to subject 

defendant to drug screening. After observing H.J.'s interaction with both parties, 

Dr. Green opined that H.J. "was more interactive" with plaintiff but was 

"comfortable with both parents" and was "bonded" with both of them. 

 Plaintiff's younger sister, M.D., testified she lives in Lisbon and explained 

what the city has to offer in terms of culture, sports, and nearby beaches. M.D. 

stated plaintiff's family lives nearby, including H.J.'s maternal grandparents. 

M.D. testified both parties are good parents, but her sister "is a bit better" with 

being hands-on with H.J. On cross-examination, M.C. indicated she has 

FaceTime calls with H.J. daily. 

 Plaintiff's father, A.D., testified he resides in Portugal. He speaks to H.J. 

in Portuguese. A.D. stated the only way he can maintain a relationship with H.J. 
10 A-0310-22

is on FaceTime. Plaintiff also presented testimony from M.F., a family law 

attorney in Portugal, who testified about the status of Portuguese law, plaintiff's 

parental rights in Portugal, and Hague Convention concerns. 

 Defendant testified that he purchased a home in Moorestown, a short 

distance from the parties' former marital residence and close to H.J.'s daycare, 

paternal grandparents, and friends. Defendant is employed full-time in New 

Jersey, which gives him sufficient flexibility to serve as H.J.'s PPR. T.J., 

Iridium Technology's Chief Executive Officer and defendant's supervisor, 

testified defendant's job security was predicated on his remaining in the United 

States. Defendant testified he cannot relocate to Portugal.

 Defendant's custody expert, Gregory W. Joseph, Psy.D., also prepared an 

evaluation, interviewed the parties, administered psychological testimony, 

observed each party interact with H.J., and conducted collateral interviews. Dr. 

Joseph opined he opposed H.J.'s relocation to Portugal because H.J. would 

experience difficulties adjusting because of his young age, "late language 

development," and "some emotional dysregulation," such as tantrums and 

difficulty soothing himself, when frustrated. Dr. Joseph testified that relocation 

would not provide the stability and consistency H.J. needs in anticipation of 

starting kindergarten in September 2022. 
11 A-0310-22

 Dr. Joseph described plaintiff's parenting style as "democratic" and 

"emphasizing high nurturance, communication, and expectations, with moderate 

control" and noted she only speaks to H.J. in Portuguese. In contrast, Dr. Joseph 

described defendant's parenting style as "authoritative . . . with high nurturance, 

expectations and control and moderate communication," and noted he only 

speaks to H.J. in English. Dr. Joseph recommended H.J. be evaluated for his 

delayed language development and "over-reliance on gestures" through the 

school district or a facility, such as the Children's Hospital of Pennsylvania, to 

ensure he is prepared to enter elementary school. 

 M.F., defendant's mother, testified she is a retired schoolteacher. M.F. 

and her husband live fifteen minutes away from the parties. She testified that 

H.J. has a bedroom at her house. M.F. stated she picked up and dropped off H.J. 

at daycare and that she cared for him during the pandemic. 

The Judge's Decision 

 The judge rendered a thirty-three-page written opinion, which was 

incorporated into the FJOD, denying plaintiff's request to relocate to Portugal 

with H.J. The judge emphasized plaintiff's proposed relocation would "result in 

some positive developments for [H.J.], [but] that any such benefits do not come 

close to outweighing the substantial and irreparable harm that would result to 
12 A-0310-22

his relationship with [defendant] as a consequence of his relocating to a country 

over 3,000 miles away." The judge identified steps that could be taken to expose 

H.J. to a Portuguese community in the United States and stated, "[t]he ability to 

be immersed in Portuguese language and culture does not take precedence over 

[H.J.'s] relationship with [defendant,] . . . ."

In addition, the judge noted "such a relocation would also likely be 

detrimental to [H.J.]'s relationship with [defendant], due to the extended 

absences that any proposed parenting time schedule would involve." The judge 

highlighted that as H.J. grows older, the proposed international shared parenting 

time schedule "would only grow more complicated and result in further conflict 

as he matures and becomes a teenager with his own interests, activities, and 

scheduling obligations." The judge reasoned that plaintiff "had not explored

potential employment opportunities in the U.S.," and her testimony, 

corroborated by S.C., that Canopy Group's prospects for success would improve 

if plaintiff relocated to Portugal "were largely speculative" and not based on 

evidence. 

 In support of this conclusion, the judge considered the statutory factors 

identified in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), namely: 

the parents' ability to agree, communicate and 

cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents' 
13 A-0310-22

willingness to accept custody and any history of 

unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on 

substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of 

the child with its parents and siblings; the history of 

domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the 

safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other 

parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient 

age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent 

decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the 

home environment offered; the quality and continuity 

of the child's education; the fitness of the parents; the 

geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the 

extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior 

to or subsequent to the separation; the parents' 

employment responsibilities; and the age and number

of the children. 

[Ibid.] 

 The judge rejected plaintiff's contention that the parties reached an 

agreement regarding relocation and found her allegation was not supported by 

the parties' pre-nuptial agreement. Plaintiff testified the parties were supposed 

to live in the United States for ten years and then relocate to Portugal. The judge 

noted "even by her own understanding of the alleged agreement" plaintiff's 

request to locate "is [five] years premature." The judge awarded PPR status to 

defendant, entered a parenting time schedule, ordered H.J. to be evaluated for 

language development and emotional functioning, and directed that H.J. begin 

receiving any recommended services. The judge also ordered defendant to 

submit to quarterly urine drug tests. 
14 A-0310-22

The judge calculated the child support guidelines using a sole parenting 

worksheet, a weekly gross income of $1,058 for plaintiff, and $3,173 for 

defendant, and utilizing the parties' financial information provided at the time 

of trial. Although the judge awarded plaintiff up to two non-consecutive weeks 

of parenting time each month when she was within twenty-five miles of 

defendant, eight weeks of parenting time in the summer months in Portugal, and 

other parenting time, the judge found she should be allotted 16.16% of the 

overnights since the judge determined she would not exercise the parenting time 

of two non-consecutive weeks per month while residing in Portugal. The judge 

determined that plaintiff should pay $189 per week in child support directly to 

defendant. 

As for the parties' counsel fee requests, the judge noted "[t]he results 

obtained in this case would strongly support [defendant's] request for a fee 

award" and found the positions plaintiff advanced were not brought in bad faith. 

After reciting the factors in Rules 4:42-9(a) and 5:3-5, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and 

RPC 1.5(a), the judge made a "partial counsel fee award" in favor of defendant 

in the amount of $50,000. 

In her reconsideration motion, plaintiff argued the judge erred in denying 

her request to relocate to Portugal with H.J., and not designating her as PPR; the 
15 A-0310-22

judge erred in calculating the child support amount because he did not utilize 

the shared parenting worksheet, did not give her proper credits for overnight 

visitation, and did not impute income to defendant on the approximately 

$450,000 he received in exempt funds from his former employer. Plaintiff also 

requested that the judge reconsider and clarify plaintiff's parenting time, specify 

parameters for defendant's drug testing, and require H.J. to be evaluated by a 

mutually agreed upon expert for behavioral and emotional problems quarterly. 

The judge denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and issued an 

eleven-page written decision. Regarding plaintiff's request to impute "interest 

income at a reasonable rate of return to [d]efendant on the approximately 

$450,000 in exempt funds issued to him," the judge denied the request without 

prejudice as the transaction took place during or after the trial, and the record 

contained no evidence supporting plaintiff's allegations. Both parties' requests 

for an award of counsel fees incurred relative to the reconsideration motion was 

denied. This appeal followed. 

 On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred: 

(1) in denying her request to relocate with H.J. to

Portugal; 

(2) in calculating the child support amount; and

(3) in awarding counsel fees to defendant. 
16 A-0310-22

II.

Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding 

on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 

412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 

(1974)). 

The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding child custody "are 

entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v. 

DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan, 

51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because this court recognizes "the 

special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish v. Parish, 

412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will 

only disturb the Family Part's factual findings if "they are 'so wholly 

insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 

N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84). 

An appellate court, in consequence, will only reverse the family court's 

conclusions if those conclusions are so "'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" 

that they result in the denial of justice. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (quoting 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). The Family 
17 A-0310-22

Part's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010). 

"Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to 

discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 

448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 

(2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision "rested on 

an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors, failed to 

consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or 

unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 

(App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Challenges 

to legal conclusions, as well as the trial court's interpretation of the law, are 

subject to de novo review. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis, 

430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). 

Under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2, a parent who seeks to remove a child from this state 

when the other parent does not consent must demonstrate "cause" for the 

removal. The legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 was "'to preserve the rights of 

the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial 

relationship.'" Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 323 (2017) (quoting Holder v. 

Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 350 (1988)). 
18 A-0310-22

In Bisbing, the Court interpreted "cause" under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 as requiring 

the petitioning parent to satisfy the "best interests analysis . . . set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), supplemented by other factors as appropriate." 230 N.J. at 

338 (citing N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)). The Bisbing Court specifically overruled the 

two-part removal test in Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001), and replaced it 

with the best-interest standard embodied in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. 230 N.J. at 312-13. 

Further, the Bisbing Court instructed that in making "the sensitive 

determination of cause[, a court] must weigh the custodial parent's interest in 

freedom of movement as qualified by his or her custodial obligation, the State's 

interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and the competing interests 

of the noncustodial parent." Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Holder, 111 N.J. at 350).

Here, it is readily apparent the trial judge considered the principles 

enunciated in Bisbing and was cognizant of his charge to review the fourteen 

statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) when assessing plaintiff's application. 

The judge highlighted that both experts' hypothetical ideal scenario—for both 

parties to be actively involved with H.J. on a daily basis—was impossible 

because plaintiff intended to move to Portugal with or without H.J., and 

defendant was unwilling to relocate to Portugal. The judge noted defendant did 
19 A-0310-22

not have a visa or dual citizenship in Portugal, and his job and work travel were 

based in the United States. 

Moreover, the judge identified steps which could be taken to expose H.J. 

to a Portuguese community and immerse him in his cultural heritage in the 

United States. The judge stressed "[w]hile opportunities for [H.J.] to be exposed 

to Portuguese language and culture are greater in Portugal than in the [United 

States], there are means" to accomplish these goals and "[t]he ability for [H.J.] 

to be immersed in Portuguese language and culture do not take priority over the 

relationship with his [f]ather," however. 

Referring to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), the judge observed both custody experts 

indicated the parties "failed to demonstrate an ability to parent [H.J.] jointly," 

and "they are unable to resolve conflicts." Based on these findings, the judge 

found the statutory factor involving the parties' ability to agree, communicate, 

and cooperate was in equipoise. 

Regarding the parties' unwillingness to accept custody and any history of 

unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse, the 

judge concluded both parties have shown a willingness to accept custody and 

both of them "have some examples of being unwilling to allow parenting time 

for the other not based on substantiated abuse." The judge highlighted that 
20 A-0310-22

defendant's prior denials of plaintiff's requests to take H.J. to Portugal to see his 

extended family "were focused on the safety concerns relating to the COVID19 pandemic." 

 The judge also determined the next factor, the interaction and relationship 

of the child with his parents and any siblings, was supported by the experts' 

testimony that H.J. is bonded with both of his parents, but has a stronger 

attachment to plaintiff. The judge noted during Dr. Joseph's observation period, 

H.J. "was resistant to instructions" from both parents. 

 The judge found the factors regarding domestic violence and the safety of 

the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent 

were of no significance because there was no evidence either parent posed a 

threat to H.J. Further, because H.J. was only four years old when the hearing 

concluded, the judge determined he was unable to express a parental preference. 

 Turning to H.J.'s needs, the judge recognized both experts agreed that 

"maintaining frequent, consistent, if not daily contact with both parents is in 

[H.J.'s] best interest." The judge also noted both experts agreed it was not in 

H.J.'s best interest "for one parent to be living in the U.S. and the other in 

Portugal." The judge emphasized H.J. "is fortunate to have a good relationship 
21 A-0310-22

with both parties' extended families, and it is in his best interest to foster those 

relationships as well." 

 As to the stability of the home environment offered, and the geographic 

proximity of the parties' homes factors, the judge stated the parties resided 

together with H.J. during the pendency of the litigation. Based upon the parties' 

testimony, the judge determined both parties would be able to provide a stable 

home environment for H.J. if they separated and resided in different locations. 

The judge indicated plaintiff introduced evidence of a lease she entered into in 

Lisbon and that defendant was relocating to a new home in Moorestown, a short 

distance from the parties' existing residence. 

 Referencing the quality and continuity of H.J.'s education, the judge noted 

H.J. was transitioning from pre-school and daycare to kindergarten. The judge 

acknowledged plaintiff's "fears" that "the American educational system will not 

enable [H.J.] to develop his Portuguese language skills" and that defendant 

intended to enroll H.J. in the Moorestown school district. As to the fitness of 

the parents, this factor weighed equally in favor of both parents. 

 When assessing the extent and quality of time H.J. spent with his parents 

prior to and subsequent to the parties' separation, the judge found "both have 
22 A-0310-22

been actively involved in caregiving" and "[b]oth experts agreed that [H.J.] is 

closely bonded with both parents." 

 As to the statutory factory regarding the parents' employment 

responsibilities, the judge found plaintiff is self-employed and co-founded 

Canopy Group with S.C. in 2018 or 2019. The judge considered S.C.'s testimony 

that if plaintiff did not relocate to Portugal, it was unlikely the business would 

remain viable largely because the time difference between the United States and 

Europe made it difficult for her to service clients. Absent any changes, the judge 

noted S.C. testified that "he would not be inclined to invest in the business any 

further." 

 The judge stated plaintiff was previously employed by LexisNexis in 

London as a marketing coordinator and held other positions. She subsequently 

obtained employment in the Fintech—financial technology industry—which 

involves the use of technology to enhance financial services for businesses. The 

judge found plaintiff resigned from her position when she became pregnant with 

H.J., and looked for employment after he entered daycare, but ultimately cofounded Canopy Group with S.C. 

 The judge highlighted that defendant's employment provides him with 

"sufficient flexibility" that would enable him to be designated PPR. Although 
23 A-0310-22

defendant is expected to work in excess of fifty hours per week, the judge 

observed he could reschedule his business travel "in a way that is consistent with 

his child care responsibilities." Regarding the age and number of children 

factor, H.J. is an only child. 

 Here, the judge performed the required best interests analysis under 

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), and addressed all of the factors. Contrary to plaintiff's 

contention, the judge did not make an erroneous decision in denying her request 

to relocate to Portugal with H.J. The judge aptly concluded, based upon the 

substantial credible evidence in the record, it would be in the best interest of 

H.J. to have defendant designated as PPR so he could continue to reside in New 

Jersey. The record supports the judge's findings and conclusions, and we discern 

no basis to disturb the judge's decision on custody and parenting time. 

III.

 Plaintiff next argues the child support calculation was incorrect because 

the judge made factual errors in the gross annual income of both parties and 

awarding the number of overnights that the parties would exercise. She claims 

the judge accepted defendant's earned income was $165,000 but failed to include 

an additional $450,000 approximate amount he received in January 2022 from 

his former employer's payout and erred in using an inflated amount of $55,000 
24 A-0310-22

as her income. Plaintiff contends the judge awarded her eight weeks of 

parenting time each summer plus two weeks per calendar month outside the 

summer months, which equals 196 overnight each year, but only credited her 

with fifty-nine overnights per year without justification. We disagree. 

The child support guidelines are presumptive absent a showing of good 

cause. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, 

Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 2, www.gannlaw.com (2024). The guidelines 

recognize "child support is a continuous duty of both parents . . . [and] children 

are entitled to share in the current income of both parents . . . ." Id. at ¶ 1. 

For the purpose of these guidelines, gross income, is all 

earned and unearned income that is recurring or will 

increase the income available to the recipient over an 

extended period of time. When determining whether an 

income source should be included in the child support 

guidelines calculation, the court should consider if it 

would have been available to pay expenses related to 

the child if the family would have remained intact . . . 

and how long that source would have been available to 

pay those expenses. 

[Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, 

Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-B to R. 5:6A 

(2024).] 

"In determining the amount of income to be imputed [for child support 

purposes], the court must take into consideration the specific circumstances of 

the parent for whom income imputation is being considered, to the extent known, 
25 A-0310-22

including but not limited to . . . assets [and] residence . . . ." Child Support 

Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to 

R. 5:6A, ¶ 12, www.gannlaw.com (2024). 

"The trial court has substantial discretion in making a child support 

award." Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001) (citing 

Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 594 (1995)). "If consistent with the law, such 

an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." 

Id. at 315-16 (quoting Raynor v. Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 605 (App. Div. 

1999)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff argues the judge failed to substantiate his decision not to deviate 

from the child support guidelines. This argument lacks merit and is flawed 

because the guidelines establish a rebuttable presumption of support. "A 

rebuttable presumption means that an award based on the guidelines is assumed 

to be the correct amount of child support unless a party proves to the court that 

circumstances exist that make a guidelines-based award inappropriate in a 

specific case." Ordukaya v. Brown, 357 N.J. Super. 231, 239 (App. Div. 2003) 

(quoting Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 2). 
26 A-0310-22

There must be a showing of good cause to deviate from the guidelines. 

Rule 5:6A sets forth the elements of good cause: 

Good cause shall consist of (a) the considerations set 

forth in Appendix IX-A, or the presence of other 

relevant factors which may make the guidelines 

inapplicable or subject to modification, and (b) the fact 

that any injustice would result from the application of 

the guidelines. In all cases, the determination of good 

cause shall be within the sound discretion of the court. 

[Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, 

Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 

2, www.gannlaw.com (2024).] 

Here, plaintiff offered nothing to rebut the presumption to follow the guidelines. 

 The record shows the judge used the correct annual income for each party 

based upon the evidence and financial information presented at trial. Because 

there was no showing of good cause to deviate from the guidelines, the judge 

did not abuse his discretion and complied with the mandate required by Rule 

5:6A. 

 Moreover, the judge in his reconsideration decision denied plaintiff's 

motion to recalculate the child support amount to include the company payout 

defendant received without prejudice. Plaintiff can make an application to 

modify the child support award with this subsequently obtained information. 

We discern no reversible error. 
27 A-0310-22

IV. 

"[O]ur 'standard of review on a motion for reconsideration is deferential.'" 

Castano v. Augustine, 475 N.J. Super. 71, 78 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Hoover 

v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022)). Reconsideration is only 

appropriate in "that narrow corridor in which either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed 

its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is 

obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the 

significance of probative, competent evidence." Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC, 

466 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)). 

We consider whether the court acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable manner," which "is the least demanding form of judicial review." 

D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990); see, e.g., State v. 

Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966) ("If the trial judge 

misconceives the applicable law or misapplies it to the factual complex, in total 

effect the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an 

arbitrary act;" finding that the appellate court does not need to give the usual 

deference where the trial court's decision is arbitrary). 
28 A-0310-22

"Alternatively, if a litigant wishes to bring new or additional information 

to the [c]ourt's attention which it could not have provided on the first 

application, the [c]ourt should, in the interest of justice (and in the exercise of 

sound discretion), consider the evidence." Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384 

(quoting D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401 (cautioning against "repetitive bites at 

the apple")). 

The judge reviewed the arguments plaintiff presented on reconsideration. 

In his careful analysis, the judge considered plaintiff's arguments and denied 

relief, noting reconsideration is not "a vehicle to bring to the court's attention 

evidence that was available but not presented in connection with initial 

argument," citing Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 

(App. Div. 2002). The judge did not err or fail to appreciate the evidence. 

Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384. And, plaintiff may file a post-judgment 

motion to recalculate child support as stated. 

V.

 Finally, plaintiff argues the judge erred in awarding partial counsel fees 

to defendant. She asserts the judge paid short shrift to Rules 5:3-5(c), 4:42-9. 

and RPC 1.5(a). The judge acknowledged defendant was the breadwinner with 

his income being $165,000 annually and plaintiff's income being $55,000 
29 A-0310-22

annually. The judge found plaintiff did not proceed in bad faith. In his decision, 

the judge noted that plaintiff incurred $148,068.50 in attorney's fees in pursuing 

this action and defendant incurred $158,669.50 in legal fees and costs opposing 

her claim. 

Counsel fee determinations, "rest[] within the sound discretion of the trial 

judge." Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 314-15 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting 

Loro v. Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212, 227 (App. Div. 2002)). "We will disturb 

a trial court's determination on counsel fees only on the 'rarest occasion,' and 

then only because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. 

Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 

317 (1995)). 

Generally, "the party requesting the fee award must be in financial need 

and the party paying the fees must have the financial ability to pay, and if those 

two factors have been established, the party requesting the fees must have acted 

in good faith in the litigation." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 493 (App. 

Div. 2012) (citing Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 545 (App. Div. 

1992)). When both parties have a "sufficient ability to satisfy [their] attorney's 

fee obligation, and neither . . . proceeded in bad faith," the court may justifiably 
30 A-0310-22

deny the award of counsel fees. Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 586. The court also 

considers the following factors: 

(1) the financial circumstances of the parties; 

(2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to 

contribute to the fees of the other party; 

(3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions 

advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial; 

(4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; 

(5) any fees previously awarded; 

(6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by 

each party; 

(7) the results obtained; 

(8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce 

existing orders or to compel discovery; and 

(9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award. 

[R. 5:3-5(c).] 

 A trial court's failure to consider the appropriate factors, make the 

required findings, and state its conclusions of law, constitutes a clear abuse of 

discretion. See Saffos v. Avaya, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 244, 271 (App. Div. 

2011). Ordinarily, the purpose of a counsel fee award in a matrimonial action 
31 A-0310-22

is to equalize the relative financial resources of the parties. J.E.V., 426 N.J. 

Super. at 493 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303, 307 (Ch. Div. 1992)). 

"Simple omnibus references to the rules without sufficient findings to 

justify a counsel fee award makes meaningful review of such an award 

impossible . . . ." Loro, 354 N.J. Super. at 228. If the court performs its 

obligation under the statute and rules, and "there is satisfactory evidentiary 

support for the trial court's findings, 'its task is complete and [a reviewing court] 

should not disturb the result, even though it . . . might have reached a different 

conclusion were it the trial tribunal.'" Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568 (quoting 

Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981)). Conversely, a remand is appropriate if 

the trial court fails to adequately explain an award or denial of counsel fees. See

Giarusso v. Giarusso, 455 N.J. Super. 42, 54 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Loro, 354 

N.J. Super. at 227-28). 

Here, the judge awarded counsel fees without considering all relevant 

factors. In its written statement of reasons, the judge simply stated, "[t]he results 

obtained in this case would strongly support [defendant's] request for a fee 

award" and noted the discrepancies in the parties' incomes. The judge did not 

make detailed findings under the Rules 5:3-5(c), 4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a). Thus, 

we are constrained to reverse and remand for the judge to consider the requisite 
32 A-0310-22

factors and conduct the appropriate analysis. We have no opinion on the 

outcome of the counsel fee decision. 

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.