United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,

Committee on the Judiciary,

House of Representatives

For Release on

Delivery Expected

at 9:30 a.m., EDT

Thursday

June 18, 1998

OPERATION PROVIDE

COMFORT

Review of U.S. Air Force

Investigation of Black Hawk

Fratricide Incident

Statement of Eljay B. Bowron

Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations

Office of Special Investigations

GAO/T-OSI-98-13

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on our review of

the military investigations of what has become known as the Black Hawk

fratricide incident. My testimony this morning is a brief summary of the

work we reported on in November 1997, and I would ask that that report1

be inserted into the record. As you know, our work did not address victim

compensation issues. The Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House

Committee on National Security asked us to determine if the Air Force’s

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board investigation of the fratricide had

met its objectives and if the resulting Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ) investigations had followed established guidelines. We were also

asked to determine whether military officials had improperly or unlawfully

influenced these investigations.

Mr. Chairman, this morning I will briefly discuss some background

information on the incident and the subsequent military investigations and

then discuss the results of our review.

Background On April 14, 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and their crews

assigned to Operation Provide Comfort were transporting U.S., United

Kingdom, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish representatives;

and a U.S. political advisor in northern Iraq. Concurrently, a U.S. Air Force

Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft was flying over

Turkey to provide airborne threat warning and control for Operation

Provide Comfort aircraft, including the Black Hawk helicopters. The pilots

of two U.S. F-15 fighters patrolling the area misidentified the Black Hawks

as Iraqi Hind helicopters and shot them down, killing all 26 individuals

aboard.

Later that day, the U.S. Secretary of Defense ordered an investigation that

resulted in the convening of an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board,2

which made information more readily available to the public than would a

1

See Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide

Incident (GAO/OSI-98-4, Nov. 5, 1997).

2

A primary purpose of an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, in accordance with Air Force

Regulation 110-14 (since replaced by Air Force Instruction 51-503), is to gather and preserve evidence

for claims, litigations, and disciplinary and administrative needs.

Page 1 GAO/T-OSI-98-13
Safety Board Investigation.3

 The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

report and the required Board President’s opinion, issued May 27, 1994,

identified “a chain of events” as the incident’s cause: beginning with the

Combined Task Force’s failure to provide clear guidance to its component

organizations, the components’ misunderstanding of their responsibilities,

Operation Provide Comfort’s failure to integrate Army helicopter and Air

Force operations, AWACS crew mistakes, and ending with the F-15 lead

pilot’s misidentification of the helicopters and the wingman’s failure to

notify the lead pilot of his inability to positively identify the helicopters.

On the basis of the Board report, the Secretary of Defense directed

applicable military commands to determine if UCMJ4

 violations had

occurred. Subsequently, the commands appointed Inquiry Officers and

Investigating Officers to investigate 14 officers. The UCMJ process

resulted in the following: one officer was tried by court-martial, resulting

in an acquittal; one officer received nonjudicial punishment under Article

15,5

 consisting of a letter of reprimand; and nine others received

administrative letters of either reprimand, admonition, or counseling. No

adverse action was taken against the remaining three officers.

Results of GAO

Review of the Air

Force Investigation

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was properly convened and met

the objective as set forth in Air Force Regulation 110-14 of conducting an

extensive investigation that preserved evidence of the facts surrounding

the incident. We found that the Board report focused on, among other

matters, command and control problems, including individuals’ lack of

knowledge of specific procedures. The report, however, (1) did not

discuss the F-15 pilots’ responsibility, under the Airspace Control Order,6

to report to the Airborne Command Element7 when encountering an

3

Under a Safety Board Investigation, a promise of confidentiality is given to all witnesses; and

privileged information is protected from disclosure outside the Air Force Safety Board Investigation

community. Therefore, restrictions are placed on the dissemination of the information obtained and

the resulting report.

4

UCMJ, 10 USC § 801 et seq., governs the conduct of military personnel. It contains both substantive

and procedural law applicable to the military justice process and administration. It also describes the

system of military courts, defines offenses, authorizes punishment, and provides statutory due-process

safeguards.

5

Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is generally appropriate when administrative corrective

actions are inadequate and a trial by court-martial is not necessary.

6

The Airspace Control Order provided rules and procedures for all aircrews.

7

The Airborne Command Element on board the AWACS acted as the eyes and ears of the Combined

Forces Air Component Director of Operations and operated in a reactive mode.

Page 2 GAO/T-OSI-98-13
unknown aircraft in the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR),8

 which the

pilots did not do, and (2) cited a Combined Forces Air Component

Commander’s statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne

Command Element as not having authority to stop the incident, even

though evidence that the Airborne Command Element had the authority

was available to the Board. Further, the Board President erroneously

concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect electronic

identification code in the TAOR resulted in the F-15 pilots not receiving an

electronic response when they attempted to interrogate the helicopters.

Additionally, the Board report and opinion did not discuss a perceived

general lack of discipline in the F-15 pilot community in Operation Provide

Comfort and a perceived urgency by the F-15 pilots to engage during the

shootdown, both of which had been raised by family members and others.

While an examination of these issues was not required under Air Force

Regulation 110-14, the regulation did not preclude it; and we found the

issues relevant to our review.

In response to our inquiries, Operation Provide Comfort officials stated

that the pilots’ failure on April 14, 1994, to contact the Airborne Command

Element was the result of a lack of F-15 mission discipline in Operation

Provide Comfort at the time of the incident. In addition, Operation Provide

Comfort officials stated that, in their view, there was no reason for the

F-15 pilots’ urgency to engage. These issues are not inconsistent with the

Board President’s conclusion regarding the chain of events that led to the

misidentification and shootdown of the Black Hawks. Including them in

the Board’s report, however, may have raised additional questions about

the actions and inactions of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command

Element that could have been useful in subsequent administrative and

disciplinary actions.

During our review of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process,

we found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence. That

review included access to, among others, Board members, technical

advisers, and investigative staff as well as investigative documents.

Regarding the questions concerning the subsequent UCMJ process and

improper or unlawful command influence during that process, we

determined the following. UCMJ investigations complied with provisions

of the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Based on a review of the

8

The TAOR was the air space north of 36 degrees north latitude in Iraq from which Iraqi aircraft were

prohibited.

Page 3 GAO/T-OSI-98-13
summary reports of investigation, a statement by the AWACS Investigating

Officer, and stipulations by several of the officials involved in UCMJ

investigations, we found no evidence of improper or unlawful command

influence.

However, we were unable to obtain confirmation from applicable UCMJ

Convening Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers about

whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the

UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence. This

occurred because the Department of Defense, concerned about any

congressional intrusion into the deliberative process, denied our request

to interview these officials.

Finally, immediately following the accident and as the result of additional

reviews and analyses, the Department of Defense and the Air Force took

hundreds of corrective actions, including insertion of Black Hawk flight

times on the daily Air Tasking Order,9

 to help prevent a similar shootdown.

The Air Force Chief of Staff also took additional personnel actions,

including issuing letters of evaluation. He took these actions after finding

that a number of individuals’ performance evaluations had not reflected

previous administrative actions taken as a result of the individuals’ failure

to meet Air Force standards.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased

to respond to any questions that you and other members of the

Subcommittee may have.

600483

9

The Combined Task Force flying operations for all aircraft were scheduled on a daily Air Tasking

Order, which listed information pertinent to each day’s flight operations, or “mission package,” such as

flying times. In the case of the Black Hawk helicopters, the notation “as required” was included rather

than specific flying times due to the uncertainty of their schedules.

Page 4 GAO/T-OSI-98-13
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