No. 88-391 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

CITY OF BILLINGS, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsLESLIE LINDELL, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Russell Fillner, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert L. Stephens, Jr., Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

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r. Filed: 

Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Dgrothy McCarter, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

%ssell Fagg, City Attorney, Billings, Montana 

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Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 23, 1989 

Decided: _ .- March 31, 1989 I..) -: : :' $ 

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Clerk . 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This case comes on appeal from a judgment in the 

Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, the 

Honorable Russell Fillner presiding. The lower court found 

the appellant, Leslie Lindell, guilty of the offense of 

Speeding and Driving While License Suspended. We affirm. 

On May 21, 1987, Billings police officers stopped 

appellant's vehicle for exceeding the posted speed limit. 

Officer John Carpani requested that appellant produce his 

driver's license. Appellant could not do so, but assured the 

officer he indeed possessed a license. Officer Carpani 

radioed for a license check through the State bureau. 

However, because the system was not operating correctly, 

Officer Carpani received a "negative" response. Appellant 

was issued a speeding citation and released. Later, the 

dispatcher reported that appellant's license was suspended. 

The officers proceeded to appellant's residence where they 

issued a second citation for driving while license suspended. 

At trial, the City of Billings offered into evidence a 

certified abstract of driving history and a certified copy of 

a letter notifying appellant that his driver's license 

suspension had been extended through September 4, 1987. The 

extended suspension was due to a January 6, 1987 conviction 

for Driving While License Suspended. Appellant challenged 

the exhibits' admissibility, contending the documents 

violated hearsav prohibitions and the best evidence rule. 

The trial judge admitted the evidence over appellant's 

objections, and took the case under advisement pending 

receipt of briefs. Thereafter, appellant failed to file a 

brief in support of his arguments. On May 31, 1988, deeming 

the matter submitted pursuant to the evidence, the District 
Court found Leslie Lindell guilty of the offenses of Speeding 

and Driving While License Suspended. 

Appellant presents two issues for our review: 

1. Were the certified abstract of driving history and 

the certified copy of the suspension notification 

letter properly admitted as evidence? 

2. Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain a 

conviction? 

The Division of Motor Vehicles has the duty of 

maintaining records of license convictions. Section 

61-11-102 (2) , MCA; Lancaster v. Department of Justice (Mont . 1985), 706 P.2d 126, 42 St.Rep. 1425. However, we recognize 

the inherent difficulty in requiring the custodian to be 

present in court each time the records become necessary in a 

trial. To meet practical concerns, the Legislature developed 

a number of instances in which authenticity is taken as 

established for purposes of admissibility without extrinsic 

evidence. Section 61-11-102 (6) , MCA, is one such instance: 

A reproduction of the information placed 

on a computer storage devise is an 

original of the record for all purposes 

and is admissible - in evidence without 

further foundation in all courts or 

administrative asencies when the 

following certification by a custodian of 

the record appears on each page: 

The individual named below, being a 

duly designated custodian of the driver 

records of the department of justice, 

motor vehicle division, certifies this 

document as a true reproduction, in 

accordance with 61-11-102 (6) , of the 

information contained in a computer 

storage device of the department of 

justice, motor vehicle division. 

Signed : 

(Print Full Name) 

(Emphasis added) 
The statute is abundantly clear; once properly 

certified, the exhibit is admissible without additional 

foundation. In the instant case, the abstract of driving was 

certified by a duly appointed custodian of the records. We 

need not examine this point any further. 

The copy of the suspension notification letter, dated 

February 18, 1987, likewise included a certificate from the 

custodian of the files and records of the motor vehicle 

division, certifying that the information was a true and 

correct copy of the original. As a public document kept in 

accordance with the statutory mandate, the letter falls 

within the class of self-authenticating documents. Rule 

902 (4) , M.R.Evid. In addition, contents of an official 

document authorized to be filed may be proven by a copy 

" [clertified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 . . ." 

and meet the requirements of the best evidence rule. Rule 

1005, M.R.Evid. Finally, the exhibit falls within Rule 

803(8), the public document exception to the hearsay rule. 

We find the letter was properly admitted by the District 

Court. 

Appellant asserts that he did not receive the letter 

extending his suspension period and in fact, believed his 

driving privileges had been fully restored. However, we 

presume that "[a] letter duly directed and mailed was 

received in the regular course of the mail." Section 

26-1-602 (24) , MCA. Nor does positive testimony by the 

addressee of nonreceipt nullify the presumption. General 

Mills, Inc. v. Zerbe Bros., Inc. (1983), 207 Mont. 19, 672 

P.2d 1109. Instead, the determination of nonreceipt is left 

to the factfinder to give weight to the presumption he 

believes it is entitled. In the instant case, appellant 

presented no additional evidence, apart from his own 

testimony, to prove the letter was not received. On the 

other hand, the letter contained a certificate of mailing, 
dated and signed by an officer of the department, and sent to 

appellant's home address, the same address testified to as 

correct during the trial. 

Finally, appellant contends the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain the conviction. His argument, in 

large part, relies upon contentions already disposed of 

earlier in our opinion. 

Our review of the record, in the light most favorable 

to the City, indicates there exists substantial evidence upon 

which a reasonable mind could find appellant guilty. State 

v. Wilson (Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 1273, 38 St.Rep. 1040. 

Specifically, the abstract of driving history, letter of 

suspension, and Officer Carpani's testimony collectively 

constitute substantial evidence on which to base the verdict. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: A 

Justices