UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

HAIGHT, PENLAND, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist JAVARIOUS K. WHITE 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20131013 

Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood 

Rebecca K. Connally, Military Judge 

Colonel Richard W. Rousseau, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Ian G. Corey, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Lozano, JA; Major Aaron R. 

Inkenbrandt, JA; Captain Nicholas J. Larson, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major John K. Choike, JA; Captain 

Robyn M. Chatwood, JA (on brief). 

23 May 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

A special court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted 

appellant, contrary to his pleas, of three specifications of assault consummated by 

battery and one specification of aggravated assault, all in violation of Article 128, 

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The courtmartial sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for one year, 

forfeiture of $1010.00 pay per month for six months, and reduction to the grade of 

E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged. 

This case was referred to us for review pursuant to Article 66(b), UCMJ. 

Appellant raises one assignment of error, which merits both discussion and relief. 

Appellant asks this court to provide appropriate relief to remedy the dilatory posttrial processing of his case. We agree that relief is appropriate in this case and 

reduce the approved sentence in our decretal paragraph. 
WHITE—ARMY 20131013 

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LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The convening authority took action eleven and a half months after the 

conclusion of appellant’s court-martial. Broken into its constituent parts, some of 

this delay was reasonable, some was less than ideal, but one aspect is particularly 

concerning. The military judge authenticated the record on 18 June 2014. On 20 

October 2014, the staff judge advocate signed the recommendation (SJAR). That is, 

it took over four months—and longer than the time allotted for the entire post-trial 

processing of the case—to sign a routine legal memorandum. The SJAR, including 

the heading and signature bock, was less than one page in length. 

It should be made clear that this was not a case in which appellant was 

indifferent to the timeliness of the post-trial processing. Three weeks after 

authentication by the military judge, appellant’s defense counsel sent a memorandum 

to the staff judge advocate (the second such request) specifically requesting 

expedited processing. Nevertheless, no explanation was given for the delay. 

Appellant’s submission under Rule for Courts-Martial 1105 offered the final 

opportunity for the government to explain the excessive post-trial delay. In his 

submission, appellant again complained of the unnecessary delay and the violation 

of the time limits established by United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 

2006). In response, the staff judge advocate stated only that he “disagree[d]” that 

there was any legal error and advised the convening authority that no corrective 

action was required. 

 

 Although we find no due process violation in the post-trial processing of 

appellant’s case, we must still review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of 

the unjustified dilatory post-trial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. 

Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service 

courts are “required to determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ 

based on all the facts and circumstances reflected in the record, including the 

unexplained and unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. 

Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362-63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 

617 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2010); United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army 

Ct. Crim. App. 2000). 

Accordingly, we find ourselves at a familiar crossroads. The sentence as 

adjudged is entirely appropriate for appellant’s offenses. But, the failure to perform 

routine administrative paperwork, while not amounting to a due process violation, 

calls into question whether the sentence, as approved, after all the delay is 

appropriate. Thus, we must choose between reducing an entirely appropriate 

sentence or appearing to turn a blind eye to excessive delay. Preparing SJARs is—to 

quote then Chief Judge Pede—the “blocking and tackling” of military justice 

practice. United States v. Mack, ARMY 20120247, 2013 CCA LEXIS 1016, at *5 
WHITE—ARMY 20131013 

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(Army Ct. Crim. App. 9 Dec. 2013) (summ. disp.) (Pede, C.J., concurring). 

Accordingly, we choose, in this case, to provide relief. 

While reducing a sentence because of post-trial delay is an appropriate 

exercise of Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority, our need to do so frequently reflects 

poorly on “those principally responsible for the administration of justice.” Mack, 

2013 CCA LEXIS 1016, at *5 (Pede, C.J., concurring). 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. Given the dilatory post-trial processing, we affirm only so much of the 

sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge and confinement for nine months. 

All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been deprived by virtue 

of that portion of the sentence set aside by this decision, are ordered restored. See

UCMJ arts. 58a(b), 58b(c), and 75(a). 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: