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*********************************************** 
IN RE GABRIEL S., JR.*

(SC 20788)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Ecker and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminating

his parental rights with respect to his child, G. Shortly after G was

born, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed

a petition of neglect, was granted temporary custody of G, and placed

G in a foster home. Thereafter, using a preprinted form issued by the

Judicial Branch, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (E)), which

requires the petitioner to prove, inter alia, that the respondent’s parental

rights with respect to another child previously had been terminated

pursuant to a petition filed by the petitioner. At trial, the petitioner’s

counsel presented evidence that the respondent’s parental rights previously had been terminated in Rhode Island. At the end of the petitioner’s case, the respondent’s counsel argued that the petitioner had failed,

as a matter of law, to satisfy the requirements for termination set forth

in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E) because the petitioner did not present any evidence that the respondent’s parental rights previously had been terminated in Connecticut. The petitioner’s counsel indicated his belief that

the termination petition had been amended to include grounds for termination under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and, in the event it had not been

amended, he moved to do so. The trial court granted counsel’s oral

motion to amend the petition, as well as a six week continuance of the

trial to allow the respondent’s counsel an opportunity to reevaluate the

petitioner’s position. The petitioner then filed a written motion to amend

the petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights and, pursuant

to the relevant rules of practice (§ 33a-1 (b)), an amended summary of

the facts, both of which identified § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii) as the basis

for termination. Under that provision, the petitioner was required to

demonstrate, inter alia, that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate

and that G had been in the petitioner’s custody for at least fifteen months.

Although the court granted the petitioner’s written motion to amend,

the petitioner did not amend the preprinted, form petition to reflect that

the petitioner was seeking termination under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

When trial resumed after the continuance, the only additional evidence

the petitioner presented was the amended summary of the facts, which

repeated the original allegations and alleged that G had been in the

petitioner’s custody for more than fifteen months. The respondent testified about his attempts to comply with the steps that would facilitate

G’s return to his custody but never claimed that he did not receive

notice that termination was being sought under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

The trial court granted the petition to terminate the respondent’s parental

rights pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii), finding, inter alia, that the

respondent had failed to rehabilitate and that G had been in the petitioner’s custody for more than fifteen months. On appeal from the trial

court’s judgment, the respondent claimed that his due process right to

adequate notice of the grounds for terminating his parental rights was

violated insofar as the petitioner was allowed to amend the termination

petition after the close of evidence and insofar as his parental rights

were terminated pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii) when the petitioner

never amended the preprinted, form petition to indicate that the petition

was premised on that particular provision of the statute.

Held that the respondent’s due process right to adequate notice of the

grounds for terminating his parental rights was not violated, as the

petitioner’s amended summary of the facts, along with the trial court’s

granting of a continuance, afforded the respondent constitutionally adequate notice that the petitioner had elected to rely on § 17a-112 (j) (3)

(B) (ii) in seeking to terminate his parental rights as to G:

There was no merit to the respondent’s claim that principles of due
process required strict compliance with certain statutory (§ 45a-715 (b)

(6) and (c)) procedures and rules of practice (§ 33a-1 (a)) governing

petitions to terminate parental rights, as those provisions did not clearly

and unambiguously require the petitioner to amend the grounds for

termination in the preprinted, form petition, rather than in the summary

of the facts, in the event the trial court grants the petitioner permission

to amend the termination petition.

Even if this court assumed that the petitioner violated the statutory

notice provisions and the rules of practice, principles of due process

are not violated when the respondent parent has been provided adequate

notice of the amendment to the termination petition and a reasonable

opportunity to prepare a response, as the price of requiring strict compliance with those provisions in child dependency cases would be unacceptably high in light of the strong public interest in the prompt resolution

of such proceedings, in which the welfare of a child is at issue and delay

is inherently prejudicial.

In the present case, although the petitioner’s counsel initially indicated

that he would be adding § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) as a ground for termination when he orally moved to amend the termination petition, he clarified

in both the amended summary of the facts and the written motion to

amend the petition, which superseded the oral motion and was granted

by the trial court, that § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii) was the specific basis

for termination.

Moreover, in light of the amended summary of the facts and the written

motion to amend, the respondent could not reasonably have believed

that, when the trial resumed after the continuance, the petitioner would

seek to adjudicate the termination petition under either § 17a-112 (j) (3)

(B) (i) or (E), especially when the pursuit of termination under § 17a112 (j) (3) (E) already had been shown to be unviable and when the

respondent testified exclusively about his attempts to comply with the

specific steps that would facilitate the return of G to his custody, which

was relevant only to termination under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

Furthermore, the respondent expressed no surprise or confusion when,

at the recommencement of the trial after the continuance, the petitioner’s

counsel indicated that he was seeking termination pursuant to the

amended summary of the facts, which was premised on § 17a-112 (j) (3)

(B) (ii).

In addition, even if strict compliance with the statutory notice provisions

and rules of practice was required and the petitioner’s failure to strictly

comply violated due process, any such violation was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt because, to the extent the respondent claimed that

he did not receive adequate notice that the petitioner would proceed

under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii), the respondent did not claim that there

was additional evidence on the issue of his rehabilitation that he would

have presented if he had received adequate notice, the uncontroverted

evidence showed that G had been in the petitioner’s custody for at least

fifteen months at the time of trial, and the respondent did not claim that

he could produce evidence to the contrary.

Argued March 29—officially released July 14, 2023**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New London, Juvenile

Matters at Waterford, where the court, Hoffman, J.,

granted the petitioner’s motion to amend the petition;

thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Hoffman, J.;

judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights,

from which the respondent father appealed. Affirmed.

Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the

appellant (respondent father).

Elizabeth Bannon, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general,

and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for

the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. This appeal requires us to determine

whether the trial court violated the constitutional due

process right of the respondent father, Gabriel S., to

adequate notice of the grounds for terminating his

parental rights when, after the close of evidence, it

granted the motion of the petitioner, the Commissioner

of Children and Families, to amend the petition to allege

a different ground for the termination of his parental

rights pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3).1

The petitioner initially filed a petition to terminate the

parental rights of the respondent with respect to his

minor child, Gabriel S., Jr. (Gabriel), pursuant to § 17a112 (j) (3) (E) (ground (E)). After the conclusion of

evidence, the respondent requested that the court deny

the petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed

to present any evidence that would support a finding

that he previously had had his parental rights terminated with respect to another child pursuant to a petition filed by the petitioner, as is required under ground

(E). The trial court then granted the petitioner’s motion

to amend the petition to allege another ground for termination pursuant to Practice Book § 34a-1 (d).2 The trial

court also granted a continuance to allow the respondent to prepare a response to the amended petition.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed an amended summary

of the facts in support of the petition, alleging that

grounds for termination of the respondent’s parental

rights existed pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii)

(ground (B) (ii)). The petitioner did not, however,

amend the petition itself to reflect the new ground for

termination alleged in the amended summary of the

facts. At the conclusion of the continued trial, the trial

court granted the petition to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights as to Gabriel on ground (B) (ii). The

respondent now appeals3

from the judgment of the trial

court terminating his parental rights, claiming that the

court violated his due process right to adequate notice

of the grounds for the petition to terminate his parental

rights by (1) allowing the petitioner to amend the petition after the close of evidence, and (2) terminating the

respondent’s parental rights pursuant to ground (B) (ii)

when the petitioner never filed an amended petition

alleging that ground. We disagree, and, accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history. Gabriel, the son of Santasia

S. and the respondent, was born in January, 2020, at

Lawrence + Memorial Hospital in New London. Upon

learning of the respondent’s history as a sex offender,

hospital staff reported their concerns about the child’s

safety to the petitioner. On January 17, 2020, the petitioner filed a petition of neglect and an order of temporary custody on behalf of Gabriel. The trial court,

Driscoll, J., found Gabriel to be in immediate physical
danger from his surroundings and vested temporary

custody of Gabriel in the petitioner. The same day, the

petitioner filed a neglect petition on Gabriel’s behalf

and placed him in a nonrelative foster home, where he

currently remains.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate

the respondent’s parental rights pursuant to ground

(E).4 Under ground (E), the petitioner was required to

prove that (1) the respondent had failed or was unable

or unwilling to rehabilitate such that he could assume a

responsible position in Gabriel’s life within a reasonably

foreseeable time, and (2) the respondent’s parental

rights to another child previously had been terminated

pursuant to a petition filed by the petitioner. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E). In support of the

second adjudicatory ground, the petitioner alleged that,

in 2019, the respondent’s parental rights with respect

to two children had been terminated in Rhode Island.

Trial on the petition began on April 25, 2022. The

petitioner presented evidence, as relevant to this

appeal, in the form of an exhibit that the respondent’s

parental rights previously had been terminated in Rhode

Island, which the trial court, Hoffman, J.,

5 admitted

without objection by the respondent. The respondent

presented no evidence. At the conclusion of the petitioner’s case, counsel for the respondent argued that

the petitioner had failed, as a matter of law, to establish

under ground (E) that the respondent’s parental rights

previously had been terminated pursuant to a petition

filed by the petitioner because the evidence showed

that his parental rights to two children previously had

been terminated in Rhode Island, not Connecticut.

Counsel for the petitioner did not dispute that the petitioner was required to establish that the previous terminations of parental rights had occurred in Connecticut

but stated that he had been under the impression that

the petition had been ‘‘amended to allege [grounds for

termination of the respondent’s parent rights pursuant

to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) (ground (B) (i))]. But, [in]

the event it wasn’t amended, the [petitioner] would

move to amend the petition right now.’’ Counsel for the

petitioner argued that, under Practice Book § 34a-1 (d),

the trial court had the authority to allow an amendment

‘‘up until the point that the adjudication enters.’’

Counsel for the respondent then argued that principles of due process required the court to deny the petitioner’s eleventh hour motion to amend the petition.

Counsel for the respondent also requested that, if the

trial court were to grant the motion, it also grant a

continuance so that he could reevaluate the respondent’s position. The court granted the petitioner’s motion

to amend and the respondent’s request for a continuance.

The next day, the petitioner filed an amended summary of the facts6

that alleged substantially the same
facts that originally had been alleged in support of

ground (E), but also alleging that Gabriel had been

in the custody of the petitioner for more than fifteen

months, as is required under ground (B) (ii). See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii). On the day after he

filed the amended summary of the facts, the petitioner’s

counsel filed a written motion to amend the petition to

terminate the respondent’s parental rights by removing

ground (E) and adding ground (B) (ii). Ground (B) (ii)

required the petitioner to establish that (1) Gabriel was

neglected, abused or uncared for and had been in the

petitioner’s custody for at least fifteen months, and (2)

the respondent had been provided specific steps to take

to facilitate the return of Gabriel to him and had failed

to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as

would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable

time, he could assume a responsible position in Gabriel’s life. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

The trial court granted the written motion. The petitioner never amended the petition itself, which is a

preprinted form promulgated by the Judicial Branch,

to indicate that the petitioner was now seeking an adjudication pursuant to ground (B) (ii) instead of ground

(E).

Following the continuance, trial on the petition for

termination of the respondent’s parental rights resumed

on June 6, 2022. The only additional evidence offered

by the petitioner’s counsel was the amended summary

of the facts. The respondent testified on his own behalf

and asked the trial court to deny the petition to terminate his parental rights, but he made no claim that

the petitioner’s counsel had failed to provide adequate

notice that the petitioner was seeking termination of

his parental rights pursuant to ground (B) (ii).

The trial court ultimately found that the petitioner

had proven by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for termination under ground (B) (ii),

namely, that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate7

and that Gabriel had been in the custody of the petitioner for more than fifteen months. The court also

made the required written findings under § 17a-112 (k).

Finally, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the respondent’s parental rights

would be in the best interest of Gabriel pursuant to

§ 17a-112 (j) (2). Accordingly, the court granted the

petition for termination of the respondent’s parental

rights. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court

violated his right to adequate notice under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution by (1) allowing the petitioner to

amend the petition to terminate his parental rights after

the close of evidence, and (2) terminating his parental

rights pursuant to ground (B) (ii) when the petitioner

never filed an amended petition alleging that ground.8
Although the respondent has ostensibly presented two

distinct claims in support of his challenge to the trial

court’s ruling, the essence of both claims is that he was

deprived of adequate notice of the grounds for terminating his parental rights due to the petitioner’s failure to

complete the preprinted petition form in strict compliance with the governing statute and the rules of practice. See General Statutes § 45a-715 (b) and (c); Practice

Book § 33a-1 (a). We disagree and conclude that the

amended summary of the facts filed by the petitioner’s

counsel in this case, in conjunction with the trial court’s

granting of the respondent’s request for a continuance,

afforded the respondent constitutionally adequate

notice that the petitioner had elected to rely on ground

(B) (ii).

Our resolution of the respondent’s claims is guided

by familiar due process principles. It is well established

that a person in jeopardy of having his or her parental

rights terminated has a constitutional due process right

to adequate notice of the grounds for termination. See,

e.g., In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 295–96, 618 A.2d

1 (1992). ‘‘Notice is not a mere perfunctory act in order

to satisfy the technicalities of a statute, but has, as its

basis, constitutional dimensions. An elementary and

fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding [that] is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise

interested parties of the pendency of the action and

afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so

that [a] reasonable opportunity to prepare will be

afforded, and it must set forth the alleged misconduct

with particularity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Donna M., 33 Conn. App. 632, 638, 637 A.2d 795,

cert. denied, 229 Conn. 912, 642 A.2d 1207 (1994), and

cert. denied, 229 Conn. 912, 642 A.2d 1207 (1994).

‘‘[T]here is no violation of due process when a party in

interest is given the opportunity at a meaningful time

for a court hearing to litigate the question [at issue].’’

Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 196

Conn. 172, 176–77, 491 A.2d 1084, cert. denied, 474 U.S.

920, 106 S. Ct. 250, 88 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1985).

In support of his claim that his due process rights

were violated, the respondent claims that the statutory

procedures and rules of practice governing petitions to

terminate parental rights clearly require the petitioner

to amend the grounds elected on the preprinted petition

form, which is promulgated by the Judicial Branch,

when the petitioner has been granted permission to

amend a petition. Specifically, he relies on § 45a-715

(b) (6) (‘‘[the petition to terminate parental rights] shall

set forth with specificity . . . the facts upon which

termination is sought, [and] the legal grounds authorizing termination’’), § 45a-715 (c) (‘‘[i]f the information
required under subdivisions (2) and (6) of subsection

(b) of this section is not stated, the petition shall be

dismissed’’), and Practice Book § 33a-1 (a) (‘‘[t]he petitioner shall set forth with reasonable particularity,

including statutory references, the specific conditions

which have resulted in the situation which is the subject

of the petition’’). He effectively claims that principles

of due process require strict compliance with these

procedures. We disagree.

First, contrary to the respondent’s contention, these

provisions do not clearly and unambiguously require

the petitioner to amend the preprinted form petition to

terminate parental rights, rather than the summary of

the facts, when the trial court has granted a motion to

amend. We note that Practice Book § 33a-1 (b) provides

in relevant part that the ‘‘summary of the facts substantiating the allegations of the petition . . . shall be

attached thereto and shall be incorporated by reference.’’ Accordingly, it is arguable that an amendment

to the summary of the facts would be incorporated into,

and thereby amend, the petition itself. See In re T.C.,

307 Mont. 244, 250, 37 P.3d 70 (2001) (in determining

whether petition to terminate parental rights provided

adequate notice of ground for termination, court considered petitioner’s ‘‘claim as a whole and . . . the reason

and spirit of the allegations’’ (emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted)). Although we recognize that

this procedure would result in a potential internal inconsistency, with the preprinted form petition indicating

one ground for termination and the amended summary

of the facts another, it would be reasonable to conclude

that the later filing would supersede the earlier one,

particularly when it asserts in detail a specific new

ground for the termination of parental rights.9

Second, even if we were to assume that the petitioner

violated the statutory provisions and rules of practice,

we conclude that principles of due process are not

violated when the record establishes that the parent has

actually been provided adequate notice of an amendment

and a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response.

See In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 295–96; see

also Dennis v. Dejong, 557 Fed. Appx. 112, 118 (3d Cir.

2014) (although dependency petition ‘‘was not filed in

strict compliance with the time required by state law,

the question of what process is due for purposes of the

[d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause is a matter of federal constitutional law, not state law,’’ and due process was satisfied

because parents received adequate, actual notice of

proceeding (internal quotation marks omitted)); Giovanni v. Lynn, 48 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[When] a

liberty . . . interest is infringed, the process [that] is

due under the United States [c]onstitution is that measured by the due process clause, not that called for

by state regulations. . . . Mere failure to accord the

procedural protections called for by state law or regulation does not of itself amount to a denial of due pro-
cess.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied sub nom.

Giovanni v. Stalder, 516 U.S. 860, 116 S. Ct. 167, 133

L. Ed. 2d 109 (1995); In re Petition by Wayne County

Treasurer, 478 Mich. 1, 10 n.19, 732 N.W.2d 458 (2007)

(when government does not strictly comply with statutory notice provision, procedure ‘‘is sound as long as

there is constitutionally adequate notice’’);In re Consolidated Reports & Return by Tax Claims Bureau, 132

A.3d 637, 645 (Pa. Commw.) (strict compliance with

statutory notice requirement was not required when

government proved that party received actual notice),

appeal denied, 636 Pa. 653, 141 A.3d 482 (2016). A strict

compliance requirement would be particularly inappropriate in this context in light of the significant differences between child dependency proceedings, in which

the welfare of a child is at issue and delay is inherently

prejudicial, and other judicial proceedings. Cf. In re

Amias I., 343 Conn. 816, 840, 276 A.3d 955 (2022) (‘‘the

significant differences between child dependency proceedings and other judicial proceedings militate decisively against applying a per se reversible error rule in

dependency cases’’); id. (‘‘[w]e cannot agree . . . that

prejudice is irrelevant in a dependency proceeding

when the welfare of the child is at issue and delay in

resolution of the proceeding is inherently prejudicial to

the child’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed,

‘‘[t]he price that would be paid for [requiring strict compliance with statutory notice provisions and the rules

of practice in child dependency cases], in the form of

needless reversals of dependency judgments, is unacceptably high in light of the strong public interest in

prompt resolution of these cases so that the children

may receive loving and secure home environments as

soon as reasonably possible.’’10 (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 840–41.

We conclude, as a matter of law, that the respondent’s

due process rights were not violated because he received

actual notice of the grounds for the termination provision. The record reveals that, although counsel for the

petitioner indicated that he would be adding ground

(B) (i) as a ground for termination when he made the

oral motion, he clarified the specific basis for termination the next day when he filed the amended summary

of the facts, stating that he was relying on ground (B)

(ii). The petitioner’s counsel also expressly stated that

he was adding ground (B) (ii) in his written motion to

amend the petition, which superseded the oral motion,

and which the trial court also granted. In light of these

filings, we conclude that the respondent could not reasonably have believed that, after the trial court granted

the petitioner’s motion to file an amended petition, as

well as granting a six week continuance to allow the

respondent to prepare a response, there was any real

possibility that, when the trial resumed, the petitioner

would again proceed pursuant to ground (E), which

had already been shown to be unviable as a matter of
law. Nor could the respondent reasonably have been

unsure as to whether the petitioner intended to proceed

under ground (B) (i) or (B) (ii) when the petitioner’s

written filings, which followed and superseded the oral

motion, made it clear that the petitioner intended to

proceed under ground (B) (ii). Indeed, the respondent

expressed no surprise or confusion when, at the continuation of the trial on June 6, 2022, counsel for the

petitioner indicated that he was seeking termination of

the respondent’s parental rights pursuant to the amended

summary of the facts, which was premised on ground

(B) (ii). To the contrary, after the petitioner’s counsel

indicated that he did not intend to call any witnesses,

the respondent proceeded to testify on his own behalf

about his attempts to comply with the specific steps

that had been provided to him to facilitate the return

of Gabriel to his custody, which evidence was relevant

only to ground (B) (ii).11

Moreover, even if we were to assume that the statutory and Practice Book provisions governing petitions

to terminate parental rights require the petitioner to

amend the form petition and that the failure to comply

strictly with that requirement violates due process, any

such violation would be harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt in the present case. See, e.g., In re Amias I.,

supra, 343 Conn. 833–34, 840 (when party establishes

constitutional error in dependency proceeding, petitioner

must demonstrate harmlessness beyond reasonable

doubt). To the extent that the respondent claims that

he did not receive adequate notice that his failure to

rehabilitate would be one of the grounds for terminating

his parental rights when the trial continued because it

was possible that the petitioner would proceed under

ground (B) (i), any constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because he makes no

claim that there was additional evidence on that issue

that he would have presented if he had received adequate notice.12 Cf. In re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692, 732

n.26, 271 A.3d 633 (2022) (suggesting that, even if trial

court improperly denied motion for continuance in termination of parental rights proceeding, denial was harmless because ‘‘the respondent [mother never] explained

how the testimony that she would have given if the trial

court had granted her motion for a continuance would

have affected the outcome of the termination proceeding’’). Similarly, to the extent that the respondent claims

that he was not on notice that the petitioner would

claim under ground (B) (ii) that Gabriel had been in her

custody for at least fifteen months, the uncontroverted

evidence in the record shows that Gabriel had been in

the petitioner’s custody since January 17, 2020, and

the respondent makes no claim that he could produce

evidence to the contrary.13

In support of his claim to the contrary, the respondent

relies on the Appellate Court’s decisions in In re Donna

M., supra, 33 Conn. App. 632, and In re Christian P.,
98 Conn. App. 264, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006). Both of these

cases are distinguishable. In In re Donna M., supra,

634, an attorney for the minor child filed a petition

seeking a determination of neglect premised on an allegation by the child’s mother that the child’s father had

sexually abused her. Thereafter, the Department of Children and Youth Services (department) moved to amend

the petition to include allegations of neglect against the

mother. Id., 635. A hearing on the petition commenced

on April 21, 1992, at which the department withdrew its

motion to amend the petition, and the child’s attorney

requested permission to amend the petition, which the

trial court granted. Id. The child’s ‘‘mother objected to

the commencement of evidence prior to the filing of

the amended petition. The trial court overruled the

objection and commenced trial.’’ Id. On July 17, 1992,

while the hearing on the neglect petition was still pending, the child’s attorney filed an amended petition, alleging that, ‘‘in the event that the allegations of sexual

abuse by the father were not true . . . the mother was

abusing the child by . . . fabricating false claims of

sexual abuse . . . .’’ Id., 636. The mother again objected

on the ground that the trial was at an advanced stage,

and the trial court again overruled her objection. Id.

Thereafter, the trial court found that the mother had

intentionally made false reports of sexual abuse and

that these actions constituted neglect and abuse. Id.,

637. On the basis of those findings, the court ordered

that the child be committed to the custody of the department for a period of eighteen months. Id. On appeal, the

Appellate Court concluded that, because the amended

petition was filed after a significant amount of evidence

had been produced at trial, and because the amendment

changed the basic nature of the alleged misconduct,

allowing the amendment was fundamentally unfair and

violated the mother’s due process right. Id., 639. In

re Donna M. is distinguishable because, unlike in the

present case, the amended petition changed the basic

nature of the alleged misconduct, and the court did not

order a continuance of the neglect proceeding to afford

the mother an opportunity to prepare a response to the

new allegations. Here, the only new allegation contained in the amended petition was that the child had

been in the petitioner’s custody for fifteen months, and

the court allowed a six week continuance so that the

respondent could prepare a response.

In In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn. App. 266, the

petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent

mother’s parental rights with respect to one of her children under ground (E) on the basis of the mother’s

failure to rehabilitate. The petitioner did not allege the

lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant

to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D). Id. Nevertheless, the trial court

terminated the mother’s parental rights with respect to

the child on the ground that she had no ongoing parental

relationship with the child. Id. On appeal, the Appellate
Court concluded that, because the mother did not have

notice that her parental rights could be terminated on

that ground, termination on that ground was improper.

Id., 268. In re Christian P. is distinguishable because

the petitioner filed nothing in that case that would have

placed the mother on notice that termination of her

parental rights was being sought on the ground that

she had no ongoing parental relationship with the child.

In contrast, in the present case, the petitioner filed a

motion to amend the petition and an amended summary

of the facts, both of which expressly indicated that the

petitioner was seeking termination of the respondent’s

parental rights under ground (B) (ii). We further note

that, unlike both In re Christian P. and In re Donna

M., even if there had been a failure to provide adequate

notice of the ground for the petition in the present case,

any such failure was harmless because the respondent

has made no claim that, if he had received adequate

notice, he could have produced evidence to rebut the

petitioner’s claims under ground (B) (ii) that he had

failed to rehabilitate and that Gabriel had been in the

petitioner’s custody for at least fifteen months.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial

court did not violate the respondent’s constitutional

due process right to adequate notice when it granted

the petitioner’s motion to amend the petition to terminate his parental rights after the close of evidence and

terminated the respondent’s parental rights pursuant

to ground (B) (ii) when the petitioner never amended

the preprinted form petition to indicate that the petition

was premised on that ground. We therefore affirm the

judgment of the trial court terminating the respondent’s

parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** July 14, 2023, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior

Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear

and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families

has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child

with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless

the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required

if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or

determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2)

termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child

(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been

neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to

be neglected, abused or uncared for and has been in the custody of the

commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has

been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to

the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree

of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reason-
able time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could

assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . [or] (E) the parent

of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected, abused or uncared

for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal

rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period

of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could

assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent’s

parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a

petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families . . . .’’

2 Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) provides: ‘‘A petition may be amended at any

time by the judicial authority on its own motion or in response to a motion

prior to any final adjudication. When an amendment has been so ordered,

a continuance shall be granted whenever the judicial authority finds that

the new allegations in the petition justify the need for additional time to

permit the parties to respond adequately to the additional or changed facts

and circumstances.’’

3 The respondent appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the

Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

4 The petitioner also sought termination of the parental rights of Gabriel’s

mother, Santasia S. The trial court ultimately granted that petition on the

ground that she voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of

her parental rights. The court’s termination of the parental rights of Santasia

S. is not at issue in this appeal.

5 All subsequent references to the trial court are to Judge Hoffman.

6 Practice Book § 33a-1 (b) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] summary

of the facts substantiating the allegations of the petition . . . shall be

attached thereto and shall be incorporated by reference.’’

7 Because the respondent does not challenge on appeal the reasonableness

of the factual findings with respect to ground (B) (ii), we need not recite

the evidence that supported those conclusions.

8 To the extent that these claims were not raised at trial, the petitioner

concedes that they are reviewable under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,

239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,

781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

In addition to these claims, the respondent contends that (1) ‘‘the trial

court’s memorandum of decision does not clarify whether it terminated the

[respondent’s] parental rights based on ground [(B) (i)] or ground [(B) (ii)],’’

and (2) the petitioner never articulated good cause for her motion to amend

the petition. To the extent that the respondent suggests that reversal of the

judgment is warranted on these grounds, we disagree. The trial court noted

in its memorandum of decision that it was required to determine whether

the respondent had failed to rehabilitate pursuant to ‘‘§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The failure to rehabilitate language is

found in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii), not in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). In addition,

the trial court found that the evidence ‘‘clearly and convincingly establishes

that . . . [Gabriel] has been in the custody of [the petitioner] for at least

fifteen months,’’ which is a requirement found only in ground (B) (ii). It is

clear, therefore, that the court’s ruling was premised on ground (B) (ii).

With respect to the respondent’s claim that the petitioner did not show

good cause for the amendment of the petition, we note that, at oral argument

before this court, counsel for the petitioner represented that, if the trial

court had denied the oral motion to amend the petition, he would simply

have withdrawn the petition and filed a new one premised on ground (B)

(ii) the next day. The respondent made no claim that the petitioner would

have been barred from doing so. Accordingly, we find unpersuasive the

respondent’s argument that he was harmed by the trial court’s granting of

the motion to amend in the absence of a showing of good cause because,

if the motion had been denied, he would have prevailed as a matter of law

in his attempt not to have his parental rights terminated.

9 As we discuss more fully subsequently in this opinion, although it is not

entirely clear to us whether the rules of practice required the petitioner to

amend the petition itself, it is indisputable that principles of due process

require the petitioner to provide actual notice that clearly identifies the

ground for the petition.

10 We emphasize that we conclude only that principles of due process do

not require strict adherence with the rules of practice governing notice of

the grounds for a petition to terminate parental rights, but require only that

the petitioner provide actual notice. We express no opinion on the issue of

whether due process requires strict compliance with other procedural rules
and statutes governing termination proceedings.

11 We further note that Gabriel’s attorney stated during closing argument

that ‘‘the [petitioner] has amended the petition to include [ground (B) (i)]

failure to rehabilitate . . . .’’ Counsel for the petitioner stated that Gabriel’s

attorney had ‘‘misspoken’’ and that the petition actually had been amended

to include a claim under ground (B) (ii). Counsel for the respondent did

not respond to this remark.

12 As we previously explained, the respondent testified on his own behalf

on this issue upon continuation of the trial.

13 Indeed, at oral argument before this court, counsel for the respondent

was unable to articulate any prejudice that the respondent had suffered as

a result of the purported lack of adequate notice of ground (B) (ii) as a

basis for the petition to terminate his parental rights. Nevertheless, he

maintained that the respondent’s due process rights were violated, thereby

effectively contending that a failure to provide adequate notice is structural

error. As we already indicated, however, this court previously has held

that ‘‘the significant differences between child dependency proceedings

and other judicial proceedings militate decisively against applying a per se

reversible error rule in dependency cases.’’ In re Amias I., supra, 343 Conn.

840. We see no reason to depart from that rule in the present case.