UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Gregory Taborn, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-001378 (APM) ) Washington Metropolitan Area ) Transit Authority, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Gregory Ta born filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against his former employer, D efendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”). This case stems from an incident that occurred on October 5, 2013, when Plaintiff, a bus operator, became involved i n a verbal altercation with a number of WMATA managers and supervisors over his apparent failure to turn on the interior l ights of his assigned bus. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was terminated as a result of his conduct during that altercation, which violated a number of workplace rules. Plaintiff, on the other hand, con tends that he was fired for an entirely different reason: because months earlier, he had filed a compl aint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging th at WMATA had not promoted him because of his age, race, and gender. The court now considers Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgmen t. Having reviewed the parties’ briefing and the evidence, the court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that WMATA unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has p roduced no evidence showing that2 the official who fired him actua lly knew about his prior compla int; therefore, she could not have retaliated against him. The court therefore grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background Plaintiff Gregory Tabor n began working as a bus operator for WM ATA in December 1994. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.]; Def.’s Stmt. of Material Facts, ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Def.’s Stmt.], ¶ 1; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. ’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 15 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n]; Pl.’s Stmt. of Material Facts in Dis pute, ECF No. 15 [hereinafter Pl.’s Stmt.], ¶ 1. On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that WMATA had failed to promote h im because of his age, race, and gender (the “July EEOC Compla int”). Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl.’ s Stmt. ¶ 2. About two months later, on October 5, 2013, Plaintiff had a ve rbal confrontation with multiple WMATA managers and supervisors. The details of the co nfrontation are immaterial. It suffices to say for present purpos es that the confrontation aro se when WMATA employees accused Plaintiff of failing to turn on the interior lights of the bus that he was driving. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4. On October 22, 2013, WMATA Acting Bu s Superintendent, Jessica P itt, terminated Plaintiff’s employment because o f the October 5th incident. De f.’s Stmt. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 5. Pitt determined that Plaintiff’s conduct had violated numerous workp lace rules. Among other violations, she concluded that he had failed to “perform [his] duties as expected of a professional bus operator”; had “compromised safety”; and had “displayed unp rofessional conduct in the presence of customers as well as managers.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 , Memorandum of Dismissal from Acting Superintendent Jessica P itt to Gregory Taborn, ECF No. 1 4-2 [hereinafter Memo of3 Dismissal], at 7. Although Plaint iff defended himself by asser ting that the antagonism and “bullying tone” of the WMATA managers who were involved—rather than his own behavior— had instigated the confrontation, see Pl.’s Opp’n., Ex. 4, October 9, 2013, Letter from Gregory Taborn to Ted Harris, ECF No. 15- 4 [hereinafter T aborn Letter], Pitt nevertheless dismissed him. Memo of Dismissal at 7; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 7. Two days after his termination, Plaintiff filed a second complaint with the EEOC (the “October EEOC Complaint” ), this time claiming he was fired in retaliation for filing the July EEOC Complaint. D ef.’s Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 7. At some point, Plaintiff filed a grievance with his union repre sentative, which resulted in an arbitration proceeding. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 2, June 12, 2015 Opinion by Arbitrator Andrew M. Strongin, EC F No. 15-2 [hereinafter Arbitr ation Opinion]. The Arbitrator concluded that Plaintiff’s behavior constituted “serious insubo rdination” and was “unacceptable.” Arbitration Opinion at 15. He also found, however, that the WM ATA managers involved in the incident had “instigated and [ had] provoked” Plaintiff and had themselves failed to follow certain WMATA policies. Id . at 18. As a result, the Arbitrator reduced Plaintiff’s disci pline from termination to a 30-day suspension without pay. Id . at 20. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has yet to return to work at WMATA . Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 13. B. Procedural History On May 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in D.C. Superior Court. See Compl., ECF No. 1-4. The Complaint allege d a single claim: that Plain tiff “was terminated because he engaged in protected activity when he filed an EEOC Complaint a lleging age, gender, color and race discrimination on July 30.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Defendant then removed the case to this court on August 13, 2014. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.4 III. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [th e moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a)). A material fac t is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing suffic ient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, [ ] on which that pa rty will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the dis trict court of the basis for its motion” and identifying those portions of the record that it believes “ demonstrate the abse nce of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “set fo rth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose th e motion using “any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which [the Court has] referred.” Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 324. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable infe rences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted). However, “to defeat a motion for summary j udgment, the non-moving party must offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials.” Dormu v. District of Columbia , 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D .D.C. 2011) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324). In o ther words, if the non-5 movant’s evidence is “merely c olorable” or “not significantly p robative,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50. Summary judgment, then, is appropriate w hen the nonmoving party fails to offer “evid ence on which the jury could r easonably find for the [nonmovant].” Id. at 252.
IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s decision to terminate him con stituted unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pr oceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To show unlawful retalia tion under Title VII, “a plaintiff must show: (1) that he opposed a practice made unlawful by Tit le VII; (2) that the employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the emplo yer took the action ‘because’ the employee opposed the practice.” McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Once an employer comes forward with a legitimate, non-retaliatory re ason for the challenged employment action, as Defendant has done here, the court must d ecide whether or not the employee has proven intentional discrimination or retaliation. Morris v. McCarthy , 825 F.3d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). A plaintiff can surv ive summary judgment “by providing enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer ’s proffered explanation was a pretext for retaliation or discrimination.” Id . (citing Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fa ils for a simple reason: he ha s not offered any evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that either Jessica Pitt—t he person who fired him—or any6 other WMATA supervisor involved in the October 5th altercation had knowledge of his protected activity. Morris , 825 F.3d at 673 (“To establish . . . [a] retaliation claim, a n employee must have engaged in protected participation or opposition activity about which the employer knew.”), citing
Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We agree that Jones’s su pervisors could not have retaliated against him unless they had knowledge of hi s protected activity.”). Plaintiff admitted as much during his deposition. When asked how he knew that his supervisors were aware of his July EEOC Complaint, Plaintiff answered that “[t]here [w ere] people telling me ‘I heard you did this’” and he further pointed to “the overall treatment” at his workplace. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1, Deposition of Gregory Taborn, ECF No. 14-1 [hereinafter Taborn Dep.] at 107. Yet when asked if any of his supervisors mentioned that they were upset or wer e going to do something to him because he had filed the July EEOC Complaint, he responded “[t] hey didn’t mention it, no.” Id

. at 108. Notably, in a letter written to a different supervisor just days after the October 5 th incident, Plaintiff did not mention his July EEOC Complaint or that the W MATA employees with whom he argued were aware of his complaint. See Taborn Letter. In short, Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence—such as his own affidavit or deposition testi mony from Pitt—establishing that Pitt or any other WMATA supervisor involved in the altercation was aware of his initial EEOC complaint. The evidence that Plaintiff’s s upervisors knew about his protec ted activity consists of one vague allegation by Plaintiff that unnamed people at his workpl ace told him at an unspecified time that they were aware of his EEO C filing. There is no evidence whatsoever that Pitt was aware of Plaintiff’s July EEOC Complaint. Plaintiff has not offered nea rly enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer that Plaintiff was fired because of his protected activity. See McGrath , 666 F.3d at 1380.7 Plaintiff argues that the tempor al proximity—about three months —between his July EEOC Complaint and his termination is enough to infer retaliation an d allow his action to survive summary judgment. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8. On this point, Plaintif f is wrong. The case law in this circuit is clear that absent addi tional evidence, the fact that a few months passed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is insuffi cient to allow a complaint to survive summary judgment. See Taylor v. Solis , 571 F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that the passage of two and a half months between the protected activity and the adverse action was insufficient to support retaliation based on temporal proximityalone); see also Woodruff v. Peters , 482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[P]ositive evidence beyond mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption that the proffered explanations are genu ine.”). In any event, the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s pr otected activity and his firing cannot cure his failure, discussed above, to demonstrate that Pitt , or anyone else involved in the October 5 alterca tion, knew that he had filed the July EEOC complaint. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that Arbitrator’s findings enable him to defeat summary judgment, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, he is incorrect. The Arbitrator’s lengthy o pinion absolved Plaintiff of some workplace rules violations and reduced his di scipline from termination to a 30- day suspension without pay. See Arbitration Opinion. It did not, however, address the issue b efore the court— whether Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for f iling a complaint with the EEOC.
Id . The Arbitrator made no finding that Pitt, or any other WMATAsupervisor, was aware of his protected Title VII activity. Thus , the Arbitrator’s ruling pr ovides no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Defendant’s legitimate, non-d iscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff was pretex t for retaliation.8 V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate order accompanie s this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: September 19, 2016 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge