Panel 5 Panel 6

Strategic Forum

U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding

the Strategic Consensus

by Joseph McMillan

No. 186

November 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Israel’s principal sponsor and protector—and

as the starver of Iraqi children—it is easy for

opponents of American policies to portray the

Saudi regime as accomplices in an anti-Arab,

anti-Muslim conspiracy.

Ten years ago, fears about the attitudes of

the Saudi “street” could reasonably be disparaged. That is no longer the case. The information revolution has hit Saudi Arabia and the

rest of the Arab world with a vengeance. In the

1980s, the regime could exert almost total

control over information entering the country.

Foreign newspapers were carefully censored,

and the only television news available was the

dry recitation of the day’s royal appointments.

In 2001, Saudis get news of the world from 24-

hour satellite news channels, such as Qatar’s Al

Jazeera. They read online editions of Arabic

newspapers from London, Cairo, and Baghdad

and exchange political views by fax, cell phone,

and e-mail. When an Arab child is shot in

Nablus or suffers malnutrition in Basrah, the

images are instantly and repeatedly beamed to

the Kingdom and throughout the Arab world.

The flood of news has been matched by

an equal flood of political discourse. The power

of radical religious scholars is felt in the publication of manifestos and the preaching of

inflammatory sermons in mosques. Since the

outbreak of the Al Aqsa intifadah, the Kingdom’s cities have even witnessed street demonstrations, something unheard of in the past.

Meanwhile political reforms, such as national

charters and democratic elections in neighboring Kuwait, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, and

Jordan emphasize for Saudi citizens their lack

of a voice in the future of the country.

Against the background of this rapidly

evolving political landscape, U.S.-Saudi interaction at the personal, grassroots level seems to be

withering. Although the number of Saudi

students in American universities is still substantial, it is considerably smaller as a proportion of the university-age population than was

the case before the Kingdom’s own highereducation system was up and running. Furthermore, because of the narrow, Islamically oriented curriculum in the Saudi education

system, a progressively larger share of young

Saudis are reaching adulthood with only limited exposure to Western ideas, let alone to the

West itself. Meanwhile, the nationalization of

Aramco has meant fewer Americans living and

working with Saudis in the oil industry. Again,

the number of Americans living in the Kingdom

remains substantial; what has changed is the

nature and depth of person-to-person contact.

The same is true militarily. Restrictions on

accompanied tours for military personnel,

imposed in the wake of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, have shortened tour lengths and

hampered the development of personal relations between Saudi officers and American

advisory personnel. The consolidation of air

operations in the interest of force protection

has meant the loss of day-to-day contact between fighter pilots and ground crews of the

two air forces. Because of the oil price slump of

the 1990s, there have been no major Saudi

weapons procurements from the United States

for several years, further limiting opportunities

for interaction and familiarization.

The drift in ties has also been visible at

the policy level. Other than Secretary of Defense

William Cohen’s regular visits, cabinet level

officials in the Clinton administration visited

Saudi Arabia only when the United States had

demands to levy, whether lower oil prices or

pressure on the Palestinians. Even Cohen’s

visits, designed as routine consultations, were

often dominated by the need to enlist support

for particular actions against Iraq.

Rescuing the Relationship

For many reasons, Saudi Arabia must play

an important role if an international campaign

against global terrorism is to succeed. Its political stature in the Islamic world, the fact that its

regime is the ultimate target for many of the

terrorists, and indeed that the ideological,

financial, and personal roots of Al Qaeda may

be found within Saudi Arabia give the Kingdom

a special role to play. For it to play that role

well, the two countries must find a way to

revitalize their strategic relationship.

American military officers and defense

officials who have spent time with their Saudi

counterparts have heard the litany of grievances—some petty, some significant—that

have developed over 10 years of U.S. military

presence in Saudi Arabia. These run from how

America prices military training courses and

spare parts to the details of how the host nation

support program is utilized. Serious attention

to addressing these grievances would help in

daily dealings with the Saudi military. It will

have little effect on Saudi public opinion,

however, or on the ability or disposition of the

Saudi government to support the American

policy agenda. For that, the United States needs

to take serious action in six areas:

1. Prioritize what the United States

wants. It may well be that Riyadh’s most

important contributions to a war on terrorism

will be providing clear public condemnation of

Islamic extremism and quiet private intelligence on Islamic extremists. On the other

hand, the Bush administration may judge that

it is more important to have access to Saudi air

bases to fly offensive operations against the

Taliban or to have stable oil prices throughout

a crisis period. Nothing says that America

cannot seek help in all these areas, but the U.S.

must have a government-wide understanding

of what it is prepared to give up if necessary to

get the things needed most.

2. Undertake a genuine strategic dialogue. Ten years after the defeat of Iraq, there

is no shared understanding with the Saudi

leadership on the strategic underpinnings of

the bilateral relationship and the future of the

region. American and Saudi officials have

conflicting rationales for the presence of U.S.

forces in the Kingdom, conflicting understandings of the threat, and undoubtedly conflicting

conceptions over how to move forward. These

consultations need to be frank, strictly private,

regular, and inclusive of all aspects of the U.S.-

Saudi relationship, from security and oil to

agriculture and education.

3. Do not make cooperation harder

than it has to be. It will not always be possible

to avoid forcing the Saudis to choose between

the United States and the Arab and Islamic

causes that contend for their support, but

America often pushes them into these choices

needlessly. Moreover, U.S. public characterizations of what the Saudis have agreed to do, and

of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with that

support, often have unpredictable and unproductive consequences. Maintaining the kind of

secrecy that the Saudis would prefer is neither

practical nor appropriate, but what America

says must be better coordinated and better

controlled than it has been in the recent past.

4. Get better organized. On the diplomatic side, this means avoiding prolonged gaps

in ambassadorial representation, such as the

one that was just closed by the arrival of Ambassador Robert Jordan. Equally pressing is the

need to overhaul the way the United States

organizes its defense presence in the Kingdom.

For historic and bureaucratic reasons, the U.S.

military now has at least three general officers

in Saudi Arabia on a continuing basis. None of

the three works for either of the others. The

Department of Defense should elevate the

commander of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia

to three-star rank—equal to the senior naval

officer in Bahrain—and consolidate defense

activities in the Kingdom under his operational

control. At least the U.S. military would then be

able to speak with a single voice.

5. Give renewed attention to the IsraeliPalestinian dispute. It will be argued that

taking on this challenge now would be rewarding terrorism. Nothing could be further from

the truth. Osama bin Laden did not attack the

World Trade Center because the United States

was not working on the peace process. He does

not want movement toward a peaceful IsraeliPalestinian solution. The Palestinian issue is

not the root cause of radical Islamic terrorism

or the source of the Iraqi threat to the Gulf, but

it is much easier for the Saudis and other Gulf

Arabs to support America on terrorism and Iraq

when they see the United States working for a

just settlement in the Occupied Territories and

when they are seriously consulted on the direction of that process.

6. Articulate a positive vision for the

region. The United States cannot expect the

Saudi government to make a public case on its

behalf, not least because the American

vision—a world open to pluralism, freedom,

and participatory government—is not the

Saudi vision. Arabs in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere need to start hearing not only what the

United States is against (Iraq and Al Qaeda),

but what it is for, what kind of life it wants for

them. In précis form, this vision would call for

a region free from war, terrorism, and tyranny

where people are allowed to live their lives,

raise their children, and develop their political,

social, and economic institutions as they see fit.

The people of the Middle East need to

hear this message not second-hand but straight

through Arabic-language media, specifically

including the increasingly influential satellite

television networks like Al Jazeera. Moreover,

they need to hear it both from senior American

officials talking directly to them and from

Arab-Americans and American Muslims who

have found success and fulfillment in the

United States.

The most difficult part, of course, is how

to treat the question of political reform. Virtually every outside observer of the region recognizes that a way must be found to carry out

political changes corresponding to the social

changes that have been under way within

Saudi Arabia and all the other Gulf states.

Squaring a tangible and immediate national

interest in stability with a less tangible interest

in democracy is difficult everywhere, but

nowhere more than in the Arab Middle East.

Yet it is now clear that orderly change toward

greater political participation and finding a

way to reconcile deeply traditional social structures with the realities of the modern global

system are the only way to forestall serious

instability in the long run. Supporting the

necessary political evolution without triggering

an even greater anti-American backlash will be

a narrow path to walk, but one that cannot be

avoided. Obviously, it would be hazardous for

the United States to try to script the reform

process or provide the model for its outcome. As

in any country, reform must grow organically

out of the history and culture of the people if

the process is to be peaceful and its outcome

successful. America, however, can indicate

openness to such a process more clearly than it

has done in the past.

The United States must recognize that 

it cannot take Saudi Arabia for granted. Any

coalition to build security in the Gulf, let alone

one aimed at defeating global terrorism 

rooted in a radical interpretation of Islam,

cannot succeed without the full involvement 

of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. America needs 

to address the problems in the relationship

starting now.

Notes1 At his 1945 meeting with President Roosevelt aboard the

USS Quincy, Abdul Aziz said, “You and I want freedom and

prosperity for our people and their neighbors after the war. How

and by whose hand freedom and prosperity arrive concerns us but

little. The English also work and sacrifice to bring freedom and

prosperity to the world, but on the condition that it be brought by

them and marked ‘Made in Britain.’” Department of State,

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 8, Near East and

Africa (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 8. 2 Koran, Sura 3:103, trans. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The

Islamic Computing Centre, London, available at

http://info.uah.edu/

msa/quranYusufali.html. 3 Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10th ed. (London:

Macmillan, 1970), 738. 4 The Wahhabis destroyed the Shi’a shrines at Karbala,

Iraq, in 1801, then captured Mecca and Medina in 1803–1804,

where they cleansed the holy places of all traces of what they

considered idolatry. They then invaded Iraq and Syria and were

only driven out by a prolonged campaign led by Egyptian forces

at Istanbul’s behest (Hitti 740–41). In the early 20th century, the

British-brokered 1922 Treaty of Uqair, which defined the boundaries of Iraq and Kuwait, was aimed primarily at containing

Saudi expansion into territories ruled by Britain’s protegés, a fact

that is now often forgotten.

T

he United States inevitably will look to

Saudi Arabia to play a critical role in

any effective campaign against global

terrorism. For Saudi Arabia to fulfill expectations, the United States must revitalize a

strategic relationship that was under serious

strain before the attacks on September 11.

Managing this relationship has always

presented unusual challenges. In particular,

the Saudi Kingdom’s unique history and

status in the Islamic world create risks that

close military cooperation with the United

States could damage the House of Saud’s

political and religious legitimacy.

These challenges were met in 1990 by a

common understanding of the threat, shared

strategic objectives, and careful accommodation of each other’s sensitivities. However,

the factors that made the Desert Storm coalition work have deteriorated, while the political environment has evolved to make military

cooperation more difficult.

Restoring the relationship will require:

addressing grievances that have grown over

a decade of American presence in Saudi

Arabia; prioritizing what Washington needs

from Riyadh; reaching an understanding on

the strategic basis of the bilateral relationship and the future of the region; structuring

decisions to avoid forcing the Saudi regime

to take sides against America; overhauling

U.S. military presence in the Kingdom to

ensure improved coordination; renewing

diplomatic efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian

front; and articulating a positive American

vision for the region—one that is open to

political and economic change.

The preponderance of Saudi citizens

among the September 11 terrorists and President George Bush’s ensuing announcement of

a war against global terrorism have again

placed the spotlight on the U.S. relationship

with Saudi Arabia. Even before September 11,

U.S.-Saudi relations were approaching a crossroads. Despite long odds, America forged a

successful military and political coalition with

the Saudis during the Gulf war, but over the

last several years bilateral ties have been 

seriously strained. Both sides have been inclined—and for the most part able—to keep

these strains hidden from public view, but in

the process the United States seems to have lost

sight of the unique problems the Saudis face in

working with America.

As the United States comes to grips with

the aftermath of September 11, it is no longer

possible to sweep these issues under the rug, as

has been illustrated by the very public controversy over use of Prince Sultan Air Base by U.S.

forces for operations against the Al Qaeda

terrorist network.

At one level, the contretemps over 

the reported Saudi refusal to allow the United

States to operate out of Saudi Arabia arose

from a front-page story in The New York

Times, which stated that a senior Air Force

general had been dispatched to run the air war

from Prince Sultan Air Base. To judge from

subsequent reports, the steps reported in The

New York Times were taken without top-level

consultation with the Saudi government. No

government likes to learn from the press that

its territory is to be used by a foreign power 

to conduct offensive military operations

against a third country. Although Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld later denied that

Saudi Arabia had refused the use of its

bases—on the grounds that the United States

had not asked to use them—the fact that the

issue arose at all highlights the need to keep

three key points in mind:

■ Military cooperation with the United States

has always had the potential for damaging Saudi

sovereignty and political and religious legitimacy in

ways that have no parallel in most other countries,

including the other Gulf states.

■ Getting Saudi cooperation in the war against

Iraq and the continuing operations to secure Baghdad’s compliance with the postwar ceasefire was a

diplomatic feat of considerable complexity and skill.

■ Changes that have taken place since the

deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia for

Operation Desert Shield make such cooperation

even more delicate than it was before 1990.

Saudi Insularity

In structuring joint military action with

Saudi Arabia, American diplomacy must recognize that the basic underpinnings of the Saudi

polity create serious stresses in the system when

Saudi leaders try to work closely with non-Arab,

non-Muslim powers. Saudis are acutely conscious of the uniqueness of that system. The

Nejdi heartland of Saudi Arabia, the region

around which the modern Kingdom was built,

has an almost uninterrupted history of independence dating back centuries. It was never

colonized or taken under protection by

European powers; in fact, not even the

Ottoman writ ran in the steppes and

deserts of Nejd. As a consequence,

the Saudi political, social, and

legal institutions evolved

in virtual isolation

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

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and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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Director of Publications General Editor

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

No. 186, November 2001 Strategic Forum 5 No. 186, November 2001 Strategic Forum 6

Key Points because of the oil price

slump of the 1990s, there

have been no major Saudi

weapons procurements

from the United States

for several years

reform must grow

organically out of the

history and culture of the

people if the process is 

to be peaceful and its

outcome successful

Post-9/11 Critic

Issues Serie

No. 186, November 2001

Panel 1
Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4

circa 1745

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and

Muhammad ibn Saud form religiouspolitical alliance and establish

Wahhabi state in central Arabia

(Nejd).

1801–1804

Nejdi-Wahhabi forces sack Shi’a

shrines in Iraq; capture Mecca

and Medina, invade Syria. By

1804, the Nejdi-Wahhabi state

embraces most of Arabian

Peninsula.

1811–1818

Ottoman-Egyptian offensive

destroys Wahhabi state.

1820–1834

Al Saud family begins reconstituting Wahhabi power in Nejd;

by 1834 the revived NejdiWahhabi state includes most of

modern Saudi Arabia minus Red

Sea coast.

1836–1838

Ottoman-Egyptian force 

invades and occupies Nejd,

installs collateral branch of 

Al Saud as rulers.

1843

Imam Faisal ibn Saud returns

from exile, resumes throne, and

rebuilds domains.

1891

Al Rashid rulers of Hail (now in

northern Saudi Arabia) conquer

Riyadh, drive Al Saud into exile

in Kuwait, and recognize

Ottoman suzerainty.

1902

Abdul Aziz ibn Saud (later first

king of Saudi Arabia) retakes

Riyadh and founds modern Saudi

state as Sultan of Nejd.

1912

Abdul Aziz begins establishing

settlements of Ikhwan (“brotherhood”) of Wahhabi tribesmen in

an effort to harness religious

zeal on behalf of Saudi state.

1921–1922

British repeatedly repel Ikhwan

threats to Kuwait, Transjordan,

and Iraq, leading to Treaty of

Uqayr defining Nejd’s northern

borders. Ikhwan raids continue

as late as 1927.

1924–1927

Abdul Aziz conquers Hashemite

Kingdom of Hijaz, including holy

cities of Mecca and Medina;

drives Hashemite family off

Arabian Peninsula and becomes

King of Nejd and Hijaz.

1928–1929

Abdul Aziz puts down rebellion

of Ikhwan.

1932

Abdul Aziz proclaims Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia.

1933

Oil concession granted to

Standard Oil of California.

1938

Oil discovered in commercial

quantities near Dhahran.

1945

President Roosevelt and King

Abdul Aziz meet aboard USS

Quincy in Great Bitter Lake,

Egypt.

1947–1962

U.S. builds and uses Dhahran 

Air Base.

1951

U.S. Military Training Mission

established.

1962

U.S. deploys small force of

F–100s to Saudi Arabia in

reaction to Yemeni civil war.

1979–1989

U.S. deploys small force of

F–15s to Saudi Arabia in

reaction to Iranian revolution,

then deploys AWACS during

Iran-Iraq war.

1979

Radical Wahhabis seize and

occupy Grand Mosque in Mecca.

1989

Governor of Asir arrests

conservative preacher on morals

charges, provokes large

demonstrations.

1990–1991

Coalition forces invited to use

Saudi bases during Gulf war.

1993

Radical Islamic opposition group,

Committee for Defense of

Legitimate Rights, is formed;

later succeeded by Movement

for Islamic Reform in Arabia.

1994

Saudi security services arrest

leading radical cleric, provoking

protests and calls for violent

action against government and

foreign forces. Osama bin Laden

calls for holy war and is stripped

of Saudi citizenship.

1995

U.S. Army Saudi Arabian

National Guard program office 

in Riyadh destroyed by bomb.

1996

U.S. Air Force apartment

building in Khobar destroyed 

by bomb.

1991

Fundamentalist clerics issue

“Letter of Demands” to 

increase role of religion in

decisionmaking.

structure, the United States counted on personal relations between Schwarzkopf and

Khalid to ensure effective coordination.

The agreement on command structure

illustrates how far the U.S. administration went

to ensure that the Saudis could stay on board

in the common struggle. This careful approach

was visible in countless other ways as well,

from American efforts to keep Israel out of the

fight to Schwarzkopf’s prohibition of the consumption of alcohol by American troops and

restrictions on public disclosure about American use of Saudi bases. In return, the Saudis

agreed to a range of activities by U.S. forces

that would have been anathema a few weeks

earlier, such as non-Islamic religious services

and allowing American servicewomen to drive

on Saudi roads. It was this combination of

American sensitivity and Saudi flexibility that

enabled the coalition to work.

Postwar Changes

In contrast to the U.S. experience in Europe, where long-practiced habits of cooperation make joint action easier, operational military cooperation in Saudi Arabia has grown

more difficult since the victory over Iraq. There

are many reasons. Some problems stem from

the inevitable cross-cultural frictions, some

from the decade-long slump in oil prices that

altered the financial terms of both the security

assistance and host-nation support components

of the relationship. More fundamentally, however, U.S.-Saudi military ties have been affected

by transformations in three major areas that

overlap with and reinforce each other: the Saudi

leadership, the political consciousness of the

Arabs of the Gulf, and the American role and

image in the region and the world.

With King Fahd’s debilitating stroke in late

1995 and Crown Prince Abdullah’s subsequent

assumption of a de facto regency, the modalities

of U.S.-Saudi relations became significantly

more complicated. This is not because Abdullah

is anti-American, but because, as regent instead

of king, his freedom of action is constrained by

the requirement that he work within a collective

leadership. This constraint is magnified by

Abdullah’s lack of full brothers as natural allies

within family councils and his concomitant

need to reach out to other allies through compromise and negotiation. Abdullah is not in a

position to take risks or make bold decisions as

Fahd was in 1990.

Abdullah’s views, interests, and managerial style are also significantly different from

Fahd’s. Where the former focused on the strategic picture, the latter focuses on details. Where

Fahd’s attention was oriented toward the Gulf

and the West, family connections on his

mother’s side orient Abdullah’s attention more

to the Arab north—and the Israeli-Palestinian

dispute. Moreover, Abdullah is reputedly more

pious, which makes the Islamic dimension

even more germane to understanding his

decisionmaking. Finally, the crown prince is in

much closer touch with ordinary Saudis than

Fahd was, still conducting a weekly majlis, the

public council at which any subject can present

requests and grievances directly to the regent

for quick action.

What Abdullah undoubtedly hears

through his contacts with the Saudi people is

discontent with the fact that Western forces are

still in the Kingdom 10 years after the defeat of

Iraq. To the United States, the reason to remain

in Saudi Arabia is clear: Iraq has not implemented its ceasefire obligations, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and Iraqi forces still

threaten neighbors. Nevertheless, the Saudi

royal family is under steadily growing pressure

to explain how it can claim to defend the Holy

Places if it cannot even defend itself without

the aid of unbelievers. Its critics demand to

know how the leaders of Islam can allow the

sacred lands of Mecca and Medina to be used

as a military base by those who are making

war in Iraq and Afghanistan against believers.

These criticisms, which go to the fundamental

legitimacy of the regime, are the source of

Saudi refusals to allow offensive operations

against Iraq from its bases and of its anger

when the United States allows operations conducted from Saudi Arabia to be publicized.

In addition, the myth of American omnipotence (reinforced by its own frequent

pronouncements of its stature as the sole super

power) leads many Arabs to conclude that, if

Saddam is still in power, it must be because

America wants him to be. The seductive explanation is that the United States is obviously

plotting to dominate the Middle East and its

resources, particularly as the effectiveness of

the U.S. deterrent makes the Iraqi threat seem

misleadingly remote. Public receptivity to these

messages did not originate in dissatisfaction

with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but

attitudes toward the United States and the

governments that work with it have been substantially hardened by the collapse of that

process and the onset of the Al Aqsa intifadah.

To the extent that the United States is seen as

dynasty, first came to power in the 18th century.

So when bin Laden preaches a duty to overthrow and kill rulers who permit innovations

and foreign influence, the Saudi royal family is

hard pressed to dispute the point.

Islam is not only the basis of the internal

legitimacy of the House of Saud but also the

source of much of its international standing. It

is significant that King Fahd’s official title is not

“His Majesty” or “King of Saudi Arabia” but

“Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” This

designation, which traditionally conveys to

whoever holds sovereignty over the cities of

Mecca and Medina, crystallizes the claim of the

House of Saud to a position of leadership within

the Arab and broader Islamic worlds. From a

Western perspective, Saudi Arabian international standing may come from its possession of

more than a quarter of the world’s proven

petroleum reserves. The wealth that flowed from

those resources in the 1970s and 1980s surely

reinforced the strength of Riyadh’s voice, but

neither oil nor money alone could buy the

Saudis the stature that they enjoy in Arab and

Islamic councils; credibility in managing and

protecting the holy places does. However, close

military association with the United States, the

country that, more than any other, embodies

the modern globalist challenge to traditional

Islam, undermines that credibility.

Building a Coalition

For both religious and historical reasons,

allowing non-Arab (especially non-Muslim)

troops into the land of the Two Holy Mosques

was a momentous decision for Fahd to take in

August 1990. Secretary of Defense Richard

Cheney and the team he took to Jeddah to

secure agreement on U.S. deployments may not

have fully appreciated the historical basis of

these sensitivities, but the circumspection with

which they approached the task reflected a

clear recognition of how unprecedented and

difficult their proposal was.

Once King Fahd agreed to the deployments, General Norman Schwarzkopf and staffs

in Washington, Tampa, and Riyadh began

devising a structure for coalition forces that

threw aside the traditional U.S. insistence on

the indispensability of unity of command. The

coalition had no single supreme commander

but three separate chains: a NATO-style

arrangement by which Schwarzkopf exercised

command over U.S. forces and operational

control over British forces; a second chain in

which Saudi Arabian Lieutenant General

Prince Khalid bin Sultan Al Saud commanded

all Arab and Islamic forces; and a third, separate French chain of command. Instead of

insisting on a formal combined command

from the more cosmopolitan influences that

shaped the countries around it.

The House of Saud, which has ruled for

most of the last 200 years, has sought with

diminishing success to preserve this isolation.

One of the principal reasons King Adbul Aziz,

father of the current ruling generation, sought

American rather than British oil companies to

develop the oil resources of the Eastern

Province was his perception that U.S. involvement came with no political strings attached.

American companies were in it for the money,

not for strategic influence, and therefore would

be less likely to present challenges to the Saudi

political system.1 Until the 1970s, broad areas

of the country, including the capital, Riyadh,

were off-limits to Westerners. Foreign embassies

were restricted to Jiddah, a port city already

tainted by contact with the outside world. Even

today, all foreign embassies are corralled

within a secure, purpose-built diplomatic

quarter on the outskirts of Riyadh, where

interaction between foreigners and Saudis can

be controlled. Unlike the mercantile elites of

the smaller Gulf states, the dominant political

groups in Saudi Arabia rarely had to deal with

foreigners, especially non-Muslim foreigners.

One result of this history is an insularity that

sometimes borders on xenophobic arrogance.

Paradoxically, a second result is an uneasy

sense of fragility, a suspicion that institutions

that have not had to withstand the winds of

foreign influence may not be as sturdy as many

Saudis would have them.

Overshadowing this background of isolation is the pervasiveness of an especially strict

version of Islam as the framework within

which all of Saudi life and politics takes place.

An often quoted passage from the Koran likens

the Islamic faith to a rope:

And hold fast, all together, by the rope

which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not

divided among yourselves; and remember with

gratitude Allah’s favour on you; for ye were

enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so

that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye

were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He

saved you from it.2

This rope is made up of countless fibers

woven and intertwined—religious, legal,

social, cultural, economic, educational—and

disentangling them is almost impossible. But

two strands are of particular importance in

constraining the Saudi political system:

Mecca and Medina. First, geographically

and historically, Saudi Arabia holds the two

holiest sites of Islam. It is, as the definitive

history of the Arab peoples puts it, “the cradle of

Islam,” with “a halo of sacredness around it

[and] a unique place in the hearts and minds

of believers throughout the world.”3 Most Westerners living in a post-Enlightenment world

find it hard to understand the profound emotional attachment of Muslims to these places,

above all to Mecca, and the uneasiness with

which they hear reports (however untrue) that

infidel troops are occupying this sacred soil.

The Legacy of Abdul Wahhab and Al

Saud. Secondly, the House of Saud came to

power in the 18th century through an alliance

with the most puritanical movement yet to

arise within orthodox Islam. Founded by the

Nejdi teacher Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab

(d. 1792), the Wahhabis, as their opponents

called them, were viewed throughout the Muslim world as the quintessence of radicalism

and fanaticism for the first 200 years of their

history.4 Under Wahhabi political philosophy, Al

Saud rule is ideologically justifiable only to the

extent that the ruling family upholds the faith

in all its purity. Unlike King Abdullah of Jordan

or King Muhammad VI of Morocco, King Fahd

and his brothers do not rule by hereditary

descent from the Prophet but as part of a social

contract with the community of believers.

Osama bin Laden’s message derives much

of its appeal in Saudi Arabia from its reliance

on the very same Islamic teachers who provided the theoretical justification for the Saudi

state. Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taimiyah

(1263–1328), perhaps the most important

seminal influence on Wahhabi doctrine, taught

that subjects are not bound to obey a ruler who

fails to enforce the holy law, or Shariah. Ibn

Abdul Wahhab himself held that subjects have

a positive duty to disobey, depose, and, if need

be, kill a ruler who falls away from enforcing

the faith. That was the appeal on which

Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the

unlike the mercantile

elites of the smaller Gulf

states, the dominant

political groups in Saudi

Arabia rarely had to deal

with foreigners, especially

non-Muslim foreigners

Medina

Riyadh

Al Hufuf

Al Jawf

Ha'il

Mecca

Jizan

Captured from 

Ottomans, 1911 Kingdom of House

of Saud

Captured from Rashidis, 1911

Saudi protectorate,

1920 to 1933

Annexed in 1933

Captured from

Hashemites, 

1924–1925

Annexed in 1925

SHAMMAR

NAJD

AL-HASA

ASIR

An Nafud

Hejaz

Rub al-Khali

HADRAMAUT

ADEN

TRANS 

JORDAN

YEMEN

IRAQ

IRAN

OMAN

Arabian Sea

Gulf of Aden

Gulf of Oman

Persian Gulf 

Red Sea

250 KM

250 Miles

0

0

Expansion of the Modern Saudi Kingdom

the myth of American

omnipotence leads many

Arabs to conclude that, if

Saddam is still in power,

it must be because

America wants him to be

This Strategic Forum was prepared by Joseph McMillan, a distinguished research fellow in the Institute for

National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to

Dr. McMillan at (202) 685–3610 or forward them by e-mail to mcmillanj@ndu.edu.

No. 186, November 2001 Strategic Forum 2 No. 186, November 2001 Strategic Forum 3 No. 186, November 2001 Strategic Forum 4