### IN THE CO URT OF APPEALS OF TE NNE SS EE AT NASHVILL E Mar ch 6, 2 01 2 S es si on

RICHARD LAUDE v . STATE O F TENNESSE E

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, a n d D a w n J o r d a n , S e n i o r C o u n s e l
, f o r t h e a p p e l l e e , S t a t e o f T e n n e s s e e

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M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 1

On October 4, 2008, Richard L aude (“ M r. L au d e”) was driving his motorcy cle on the

Rule 10 o f t he Ru le s of

th e Cou rt of

Appe al s of

T enn ess ee pro vides : 1

T his Cour t, wit h the con cur re nce of al l j udges par ti ci pat ing in the cas e, m ay af fi rm, re verse

or m odi fy the act ion s of the tr ia l cou rt by m emorand um opi nio n when a for m al opi nio n woul d have no pre ced ent ia l value. Wh en a cas e is dec ide d by m emorand um opi nio n it sha ll be des ignat ed “M EMORANDUM OPI NI ON”, sha ll not be publ is hed
, and sha ll not be ci te d

or re li ed o n f

or any re aso n i n an y unrel at ed c ase

.interstate near Nashville, Tenne ssee. At the same time, T ennesse e Hig hway Patrol Offic er J immy

Knowles (“Tr ooper Knowles” ) was in pursuit of a g roup of motorcy cles that wer e speeding

. After alleg edly observing Mr. L aude drive onto the shoulder of the road to pass another vehicle, Trooper Knowles pulled Mr. L aude over. Trooper Knowles then order ed Mr. L au d e t o get off of his motorcy cle, and Mr. L au d e re s p onded by raising his hands to shoulder level. Trooper Knowles immediately put Mr. L aude in a straig ht arm bar lock, eventua lly remove d him from the motorcy cle
to the g round, and place d his knee on Mr. L aude’ s back to restra in him. Since Mr. L aude did not put his kick stand down on his motorcy cle befor e Trooper Knowles restra ined him, his motorcy cle fell
to the g round. Shortly there afte r, Trooper Knowles discovere d Mr. L aude was not a part of the g roup of motorcy cles he was initially pursuing

. Despite this discovery
, Trooper Knowles proce eded to write Mr. L aude three misdemeanor citations for not having a motorcy cle license, not having proper tag s on his motorcy cle, and rec kless driving

. Subsequently
, following a bench trial in the Davidson County Gene ral Sessions Court, all of the misdemeanor char g es ag ainst Mr. L aude wer e dismiss ed.

On October 2, 2009, Mr. L aude filed a claim ag ainst the State of Tenne ssee with the Division

o f C l aims Administration, alleg ing personal injuries and damag es t o persona l proper ty

. T h e ca s e was later transf

err ed to the Tennessee Claims Commi ssion on Dec ember 30, 2009. I n its answe r, the State conce ded that the Claims Commi ssion had subject matter jurisdiction, and also alleg ed the
compar ative fault of Mr. L aude. Aft er a t ri al wa s conducte d on October 26, 2010, both parties submitt ed proposed finding s of fact and conclusions of law. Ul t i m at ely
, the C laims Commi ssion adopted the State’s position and conclude d that, under Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 9-8- 307(a) (1)( E) and (F ) (1999 & Supp. 2009), the State was not neg lige nt, and that in the alterna tive, Mr. L aude was more than fifty perc ent (5 0 %) at fault, there by barr ing his rec overy

. Mr. L aude timely filed a notice of appe al to this Court.

Discussion

Although multipl e issues are prese nted to this Court for our revie w, the dispositi ve issue on appea l is whether the Claims Commi ssion had subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. L aude’ s claims
ag ainst the State. The State arg ues that the Claims Commissi on proper ly disposed of Mr. L aude’ s claims beca

use he pursued them under Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 9-8-307( a)( 1)(E)
, which authorizes claims ag ainst the State for the “[ne]glig ent car e, custody and control of persons,” and section 9-8-307( a)( 1)(F ), which authorizes claims ag ainst the State for the “[n] eg lige nt car e, custody and control of persona l proper ty .” On the other hand, Mr. L aude arg ues that the Claims Commi ssion lacke d subject matter jurisdiction be cause all of his c laims ag ainst the State wer e intentional torts.

Su b je c t ma tte r jurisdiction involves a tribunal’s lawful authority to a d ju d ic a te th e c o n tr o v e r s y broug ht befor e it

. Northland Ins. C o

. v. Stat e , 33 S.W .3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000); First Am. T rust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev

. Co.
, 59 S.W .3d 135, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The subjec t matter j u ri s d i ction of a tribunal in a particula r case depends on the nature of the cause of action and t h e relief soug ht, Landers v. Jone

s , 872 S.W .2d 674, 675 (Tenn.1994) ; SunTrust Bank v. Johnson
, 46 S.W .3d 216, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), and can only be confe rre d on a tribunal by the Constit ution of Tenne ssee or a leg islative act. Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co.
, 924 S.W .2d 632
, 639

-2-(Tenn. 1996); Kane v. Kane
, 547 S.W .2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 1977). Since the deter mination of whether subject matter jurisdiction ex i s t s i s a q u estion of law, our standard of revie w is de novo , with no presumption of corr ectne ss g iven to the deci sion below. Northland Ins. Co.
, 33 S.W .3d at 729 (citing Nelson v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999) ).

After thoroug hly revie wing the g rava men of Mr. L aude’ s cause s of action, we conclude that his claims ag ainst the State wer e intentional torts. I n Mr. L aude’ s complaint, he alleg ed that Trooper Knowles stopped him without probable cause , used excessive forc e, unlawfully detained him, a nd later subjected him to malicious prosec ution for the misdemeanor char g es. Fur ther, Mr. L aude filed

a motion entitled “Motion to Deter mine if t h e Actions of [Trooper Knowles] Were Commi tted Wit hin the Scope of Offic er’ s Offic e or Employ ment.” I n his motion, Mr. L aude arg ued that Trooper Knowles’ actions constituted “[a]ssault and battery (excessive forc e) and illega l arr est (fa lse arr est) [which] are intentional torts, not recog nized in Tennessee as being commit ted wit hin the s cope of

an office r’s authority .” I n response to Mr. L aude’ s motion, the State su gges t ed t hat “Troope r 2 Knowles’ actions are best analy zed pu rs u ant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307( a)( 1)(E)

. . . .” Thus, i t was the State, and not Mr. L aude, that raised the issue of the possible application of Tennes s ee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( a)( 1)(E) and (F ).

Although Mr. L aude ’s ar gu ment throug hout the proce eding s in the Claims Commi ssion clea rly appea rs to set forth cause s of action for intentional torts, the State emphasizes that we focus

on Mr. L aude’ s proposed finding s of fac t and co n cl u s i o n s of law that he submitt ed to the Claims Commi ssion afte r trial. I n M r. L au d e’ s proposed finding s, he states that “[a] police office r in Tenne ssee has a duty to evalua te a person being arr ested befor e using any ty pe of forc e ag ainst them,” and that “[the State] is l i able for damag es which are a proxi mate result of his neg lige nce towards the Claimant.” The State arg ues that these statements, followed by Mr. L aude’ s citation to Timmons v. Metro. Gov’ t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty
, 307 S.W .3d 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009), establish that he pursued his case in the Claims Commi ssion based on the “[n] eg lige nt car e, custody and control of persons,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307( a)( 1)(E)
, and the “[n] eg lige nt car e, custody and control of pe rsonal prope rty .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a) (1)( F)

.

We do not find the State’s arg ument persua sive. Mr. L aude made the statement that “[a] police off icer in Tennesse e has a duty to evaluate a per son being arr ested be fore using a ny ty pe of forc e ag ainst them,” in the context of his arg ument that Trooper Knowles used excessive fo rc e,

At tha t ti m e, Mr

. Laud e had a ci vil ri ghts act ion pen din g in fe der al cou rt agains t T roo per K nowl es, 2 and in ord er to pro cee d wit h tha t cas e, he asked the Cla ims Com m is si on to m ake thi s det er m ina ti on ear ly to avoid any pot ent ia l app li cat ion of the wai ver pro visio n unde r T enn ess ee Code Annot at ed sec ti on 9- 8- 307( b), whic h pr ovides :

(b) Cla ims agains t the st at e fi le d pur sua nt to sub sec ti on (a ) sha ll ope ra te as a wai ver of any

cau se of act ion
, bas ed on the same act or om is si on, whic h the cl ai m ant has agains t any st at e off ic er or employee. T he wai ver is void if the comm is si on det e r mi n es tha t the act or

om is si on wa s no t wi thi n t he s cop e of th e of fi cer ’s or employee’ s of

fi ce or employm ent

.

-3-despite his duty to deter mine if such forc e was n ece ssary

. As mentioned above, Mr. L aude specific ally asser

ted that Trooper Knowles’ use of excessive forc e amounted to the intentional torts of assault and battery

. Moreove r, the entire arg ument section of Mr. L aude’ s proposed find i n g s, from which the State finds these two examples, focuse s on the issues of probable cause , false arr est, excessive use of forc e, and malicious prosec ution. The State admitted in its proposed finding s that “[a]lt houg h it is not clea

rly stated, it is assumed that claimant is proce eding under [Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307( a)( 1)(E) and (F )].” I t is this a ssumption that the State continues to base its arg ument on appea l. Whil e Mr. L aude did inc lude the single sentenc e in his proposed finding s that “[the State] is liable for damag es which are a p ro x i m ate result of his neg lige nce towards the Claimant,” this
statemen t fa l l s short of overc oming Mr. L aude’ s numerous asser tions throug hout the rec ord that Trooper Knowles’ actions constituted intentional torts. There fore
, beca use the Claims Commi ssion does not have jurisdiction over any intentional torts, Shell v. State
, 8 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 16, 421 (Tenn. 1995), we hold that the Claims Commi ssion lacke d subject matter jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate Mr. L aude’ s claims.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing rea sons, we reve rse the judgme nt of the Claims Commi ssion and dismiss the ca se. Costs of this appeal ar e taxed to the Appellee , the State of Te nnessee

.

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. F A R M E R
, J U D G E

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