ML13142A437

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

August 23, 2013

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2013-15: WILLFUL MISCONDUCT/RECORD 

FALSIFICATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY 

CULTURE

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor or a 

non-power reactor under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” except those who have 

permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed 

from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard 

design certification, standard design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, 

“Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.”

All contractors and vendors that supply basic components to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) licensees under 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and 

Utilization Facilities” or 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear 

Power Plants.”

All holders of, or applicants for a fuel cycle facility license under 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic 

Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.”

All holders of and applicants for a specific source material license under Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 40, “Domestic Licensing of Source Material.” 

All holders of and applicants for a transportation package certificate of compliance or for a 

specific approval for transport of radioactive material shipping containers under 10 CFR Part 71, 

“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material.” 

All holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation license or a 

certificate of compliance under 10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent 

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste and Reactor-Related Greater 

Than Class C Waste.” 

All holders of and applicants for a gaseous diffusion plant certificate of compliance or an 

approved compliance plan under 10 CFR Part 76, “Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants.” 
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PURPOSE

The NRC is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of recent willful misconduct 

and record falsification incidents at U.S. nuclear sites and to emphasize the importance of 

establishing and maintaining an effective safety-culture by applicants, licensees and their 

contractors. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their 

facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained 

in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is 

required. 

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Described below are seven recent willful misconduct incidents including record falsification that 

took place at U.S. nuclear facilities. The NRC enforcement policy states: “Licensees are 

expected to take significant remedial action in responding to the willful violations commensurate 

with the circumstances, such that the action reflects the seriousness of the violation, thereby 

creating a deterrent effect within the licensee organization.” Therefore, licensees often take 

significant actions including the potential for employment termination for the individuals involved 

in willful misconduct or record falsification. The NRC may issue escalated enforcement actions

to the individuals involved. Licensees establishing and maintaining an effective safety-culture is 

essential in helping prevent willful misconduct by ensuring that expectations and consequences 

are clearly stated and understood by all their employees, contractors and agents.

Record Falsification – Travelers for Field versus Design Drawings - Shaw AREVA Mixed Oxide 

(MOX) Services Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Project - In 2009 a contract employee, a 

senior structural engineer, directed or allowed a junior engineer to sign his signature on 

travelers, contrary to an Engineering directive. Travelers are used as part of the process to 

signify that field drawings match design drawings. Thirty-seven travelers were identified in 

which the signature may not have been provided in accordance with requirements. The 

licensee completed an investigation which included an extent of condition review. Corrective 

actions included procedural revisions, several nuclear safety-culture initiatives and related 

training and communications to MOX Services personnel and contractors to preclude similar 

incidents. Additional information appears in the NRC confirmatory order available on the

agency’s public Web site in Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS Accession No. ML093280757).

Record Falsification - Work Order Packages - Tennessee Valley Authority, Watts Bar Nuclear 

(WBN) Unit 2 Construction Project - In 2010 two subcontractor employees, one craft and one 

craft foreman, at WBN Unit 2 deliberately falsified micrometer readings identified in work order 

(WO) packages for primary containment penetrations, and falsely annotated on the WOs that 

micrometer readings had been performed for cables in these penetrations, when they had not 

been completed. Additionally, the craft foreman falsely attested that a WO review, field 

walkdown, review of craft documentation, and the scope of work had all been completed. 

Corrective actions included a prompt cessation of all containment electrical penetration work 

activities, the initiation of an internal review of the incident, a root cause and extent of condition 

review, procedural revisions, training related to the importance of 10 CFR 50.9 ”Completeness 

and Accuracy of Information,” and procedural compliance, the addition of language in major 

contracts stressing the importance of procedural compliance and the consequences of 

noncompliance, as well as various site-specific and fleetwide communications. Additional 

information is available in Enforcement Action (EA-12-021), and the NRC Confirmatory Order

package (ADAMS Accession No. ML12202A260).
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Record Falsification - Fire Drill Forms - Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc, Kewaunee Plant - A 

fire brigade trainer deliberately failed to conduct announced fire drills in accordance with 

applicable procedures and license condition and falsified the Fire Drill Evaluation/Critique 

Forms required by the site Fire Protection Program Plan quarterly “announced” fire drills (from 

at least August 2009 through December 2011). The “announced” fire drills were performed as 

training sessions instead of actual fire drills. The NRC issued a final significance determination 

on April 30, 2013, determining this to be a white finding, along with a Severity Level-III willful 

violation of License Condition 2.C.(3), “Fire Protection” and a violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a), 

“Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Corrective actions by the licensee included

initiating an internal investigation into the fire brigade trainer’s activities, taking disciplinary 

actions for both the trainer and the individual’s supervisor and conducting fire drills correctly, 

with no major deficiencies noted. Additional information is available in EA-12-266 “Final 

Significance Determination of a White Finding with Assessment Followup, Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $70,000: NRC Inspection Report Number

05000305/2013008; Kewaunee Power Station” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13121A317).

Record Falsification - Shift Check Forms - Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle

Electric Generating Plant (Vogtle) Units 3 and 4 Construction Project - In 2012 a subcontracted 

employee falsified a concrete laboratory shift check form, at the Vogtle Units 3 & 4 construction 

project. Investigations substantiated that the subcontracted employee deliberately falsified the 

form and failed to identify to management or to correct equipment conditions adverse to quality. 

The employee listed the temperature recorder for safety-related concrete testing as operable 

and in range despite knowing the recorder was inoperable. The experimental safety-related 

concrete mix design in question was never used. Additional information appears in NRC 

Integrated Inspection Reports 05200025/2012-005 and 05200026/2012-005 section 4OA7

“Licensee Identified Violations,” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13030A390). 

 

Record Falsification - Hourly Fire Watch Patrols - Southern Nuclear Operating Company,

Farley Nuclear Power Plant (Farley) - Between September and December 2011, four contract 

employees willfully failed to complete fire watch rounds required to ensure that Farley remained 

in compliance with 10 CFR 50.48 “Fire Protection.” In addition, these same employees falsified 

fire watch logs by annotating that hourly fire watches were completed when in fact they had not 

been performed. These actions caused Farley to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 

50.9(a). Corrective actions included the prompt initiation of an investigation into the matter, an 

extent of condition review, the conduct of stand down meetings with the contractor to ensure 

that performance expectations were clearly understood, and other licensee fleet activities to 

strengthen oversight of supplemental personnel. Additional information is available in the NRC 

Notice of Violation; (ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A274). 

Record Falsification - Radiation Training Examinations - NRC Issues Confirmatory Order to 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Farley Nuclear Power Plant – On May 7, 2013, the NRC 

issued News Release No: II-13-031 to inform the public of an NRC confirmatory order to Farley 

nuclear power plant. The order addresses a violation that involved a Farley security officer 

helping other security officers during radiation worker training exams or actually taking the exam 

for them and falsifying the associated records. The licensee has agreed to a series of corrective 

actions related to the company’s failure to ensure that radiation worker training exams for 

security officers were not compromised. Corrective action steps include fleetwide actions such 

as evaluating the testing environment and compliance with applicable training procedures at 

corporate and operating sites and communicating messages throughout the fleet regarding 

willful misconduct and its incompatibility with safe nuclear construction and operations. The 

licensee also held fleetwide stand-down to address and discuss integrity and trustworthiness. 
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company has committed to conducting an effectiveness review of 

all actions taken under the confirmatory order, and to evaluating and implementing actions to 

reinforce communications involving willful misconduct, integrity and trustworthiness annually 

until 2015. Additional information is available in the NRC Confirmatory Order, EA-12-145,

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13127A144).

Misrepresentation – Display Serial Numbers - Pentas Controls, LLC (Pentas) - In 2010, the 

owner/president of Pentas directed one of his employees to switch a broken display on a Peach 

Bottom Atomic Power Station steam leak detector monitor with a working display unit from the 

Brunswick Nuclear Plant site. Before its shipment, the owner/ president also instructed an 

employee to file down the serial number on the substitute display to conceal its identity and to 

ship the working display to Peach Bottom without informing that site of the switch. On March 

15, 2011, the owner/president made false statements to NRC investigators by repeatedly 

denying that the unrepairable Peach Bottom display had been substituted with a working display 

from Brunswick site. 

Because of the egregiousness of the owner/president’s actions, the U. S. Department of Justice 

(DOJ) prosecuted the case in Federal district court in Phoenix, AZ. The president pled guilty to 

making false statements to NRC investigators, a felony, and was sentenced on February 11, 

2013. In exchange for his guilty plea, the president will serve a 5-year probation during which

time he will complete several conditions that the NRC developed and included in the DOJ’s 

global settlement agreement. The NRC will monitor these conditions. As part of the agreement, 

the owner/president was required to notify his employees of his violation and its consequences 

and Pentas was required to conduct training on safety-related activities and hire an outside 

contractor to conduct employee protection training. The owner/president was banned from 

safety-related decision making for 1 year and from quality-assurance oversight activities 

indefinitely. Additional information is available in Judgment in Department of Justice prosecution 

of President of Pentas Controls, Inc., including Terms of Probation (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13213A376) and in the NRC Enforcement Program Annual Report, Calendar Year 

2012, on page 16; (ADAMS Accession No. ML13079A446). 

BACKGROUND

10 CFR 50.9, 10 CFR 52.6, and 10 CFR 70.9, as applicable, all titled “Completeness and 

Accuracy of Information,” state that information required by statute or by the Commission's 

regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee, shall 

be complete and accurate in all material respects. Regulations in 10 CFR 50.5, 10 CFR 52.4

and 10 CFR 70.10, as applicable, all titled “Deliberate Misconduct,” have more detailed 

requirements and specifically prohibit deliberate misconduct. 

Related NRC Generic Communications and Website Information

The NRC has previously issued numerous generic communications related to safety-culture,

deliberate misconduct and issues involving proper oversight of contractors or subcontractors. 

The following represents some of the recent related NRC generic communications:

NRC Bulletin 2007-01, “Security Officer Attentiveness,” dated December 12, 2007. This bulletin

requested information on licensee administrative and managerial controls to deter and address 

inattentiveness and complicity among licensee security personnel including contractors and 

subcontractors; (ADAMS Accession No. ML073400150).
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NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-13, “Information on the Changes Made to the 

Reactor Oversight Process to More Fully Address Safety Culture,” dated July 31, 2006. This 

RIS documented changes made to the reactor oversight process (ROP) to more fully address 

safety-culture; (ADAMS Accession No. ML061880341).

NRC RIS 2005-18, “Guidance for Establishing and Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work 

Environment,” dated August 25, 2005. This RIS provided licensees, applicants for a license, 

holders of certificates of compliance, and their contractors guidance on establishing and 

maintaining a safety-conscious work environment; (ADAMS Accession No. ML052220239). 

NRC IN 2002-36, “Incomplete or Inaccurate Information Provided to the Licensee and/or NRC 

by Any Contractor or Subcontractor Employee,” dated December 27, 2002. This IN reminded 

addressees of the importance of diligently ascertaining the accuracy of educational background 

and professional qualifications of any contractor or subcontractor employees subject to such 

qualification requirements and alerted them about the potential penalties that could result from 

intentionally providing incomplete or inaccurate information to the NRC; (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML023650299).

NRC RIS 12-01, “Availability of Safety Culture Policy Statement,” dated January 17, 2012. This 

informs addressees of the availability of the Commission’s safety-culture policy statement;

(ADAMS Accession No. ML112940226).

The NRC Safety Culture Policy Statement was issued in the Federal Register on June 14, 2011 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML111650336). The NRC policy statement defines nuclear 

safety-culture as: “The core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment 

by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure 

protection of people and the environment.” Note: This policy statement applies to all 

licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, authorization holders, holders of quality assurance 

program approvals, vendors and suppliers of safety-related components, and applicants for a 

license, certificate, permit, authorization, or quality assurance program approval subject to NRC 

authority. Nuclear safety-culture program information is available (in both English and Spanish) 

at the NRC public Website link: 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/safety-culture.html#programs

DISCUSSION

As stated in the NRC Enforcement Policy (on page 9, section 2.2.1.d): “Willful violations are of 

particular concern because the NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees and their 

contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. The 

Commission cannot tolerate willful violations. Therefore, a violation may be considered more 

significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness.”

An effective safety-culture is essential to nuclear safety at all phases of design, construction and 

operation and can help prevent willful misconduct by ensuring expectations and consequences 

are clearly stated and understood. Construction activities present additional challenges as new 

employees join the nuclear workforce for the first time. Often, these new employees lack 

familiarity with the nuclear safety-culture expectations needed to conduct their work activities in 

accordance with regulatory requirements and may require extra guidance. For example, they 

may not understand and recognize the significance of their signatures as they relate to 

complying with the requirements (10 CFR 50.5, 10 CFR 50.9, 10 CFR 52.4, 10 CFR 52.6, 10

CFR 70.9, and 10 CFR 70.10, as applicable). In addition, employees new to the commercial 

nuclear industry may wrongly believe based on previous non-nuclear experience, that they can 
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interpret certain work procedure steps or have more latitude in deviating from procedural 

guidance. 

Key behaviors of a healthy safety-culture need to be continually reinforced. These behaviors

include personal accountability, including admitting mistakes, demonstrating a questioning 

attitude and a willingness to raise concerns and engaging with management in problem 

resolution. Trust and respect need to permeate each organization while communications

maintain a focus on nuclear safety and leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their 

decisions and behaviors. 

CONCLUSION

The above willful misconduct issues and discussion highlights the need for applicants, 

licensees, contractors and suppliers involved in construction, fabrication activities, and 

operations of nuclear facilities, to establish and implement an effective nuclear safety-culture. 

This includes training, adequate oversight, and frequent communications especially for workers 

new to the nuclear industry. Safety-culture weaknesses have been identified as one of the 

causes of major accidents and incidents such as the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 

2011, the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation near-miss incident discovered in 2002, 

the Chernobyl accident in the former Soviet Union in 1986, and the Three Mile Island Unit 2

accident in 1979. 

The NRC continually looks for signs of wrongdoing (willful misconduct, deliberate violations and 

careless disregard) when inspecting, evaluating inspection findings, reviewing licensee

corrective action programs, reviewing licensee employee concerns programs, and responding to 

allegations. Wrongdoing (e.g., falsification of records) may be referred to the U.S. Department of 

Justice for prosecution and may result in civil fines, criminal penalties, or Orders being issued to 

licensees, as well as to the individuals involved. 

The NRC expects that recipients will review the information in this information notice for 

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
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CONTACTS

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this 

matter to the appropriate technical contacts listed below or the appropriate project manager.

/RA/ /RA/

Laura A. Dudes, Director Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director

Division of Construction Inspection Division of Policy and Rulemaking

 and Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

Office of New Reactors (NRO)

/RA/ /RA/

Mark Lombard, Director Marissa G. Bailey, Director

Division of Spent Fuel Storage Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards

 and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

 and Safeguards 

Technical Contacts: Alfred Issa, NRO Mark King, NRR

301-415-5342 301-415-1150

E-mail: Alfred.Issa@nrc.gov E-mail: Mark.King@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web 

site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library/Document Collections.
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CONTACTS

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this 

matter to the appropriate technical contacts listed below or the appropriate project manager.

/RA/ /RA/

Laura A. Dudes, Director Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director

Division of Construction Inspection Division of Policy and Rulemaking

 and Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

Office of New Reactors (NRO)

/RA/ /RA/

Mark Lombard, Director Marissa G. Bailey, Director

Division of Spent Fuel Storage Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards

 and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

 and Safeguards 

Technical Contacts: Alfred Issa, NRO Mark King, NRR

301-415-5342 301-415-1150

E-mail: Alfred.Issa@nrc.gov E-mail: Mark.King@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web 

site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library/Document Collections.

ADAMS Accession No.: ML13142A437 *via e-mail TAC MF1836

OFFICE NRO/DCIP/CAEB Tech Editor NRO/DCIP/CAEB NRR/DLR/RAPB/BC

NAME AIssa QTE - CHSU RLukes SBloom (acting)

DATE 7/18/13 * 7/25/13 7/19/13 7/19/13

OFFICE OE/CRB OE/CRB/BC NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM

NAME DSieracki DSolorio CHawes MKing

DATE 7/23/13 7/23/13 8/2/13 7/25/13

OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC NRR/DPR/ DD

NAME DPelton SBahadur

DATE 8 / 6 /13 8 / 22 /13 

OFFICE NMSS/SFST/D NMSS/FCSS/D NRO/ DCIP/D NRR/DPR/ D

NAME MLombard MBailey LDudes LKokajko

DATE 8 / 13 /13 8 / 15 /13 8 / 19 /13 8 / 23 /13

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY