United States 

Strategy to 

Prevent Conflict 

and Promote 

Stability 
*** 

2020 

United States 

Strategy to 

Prevent Conflict 

and Promote 

Stability 

This Strategy was submitted to Congress in line with Section 504(a) 

of the Global Fragility Act of 2079, which requires development of a 

ten-year Global Fragility Strategy. 
Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUM MARY ............................................... l 

INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 3 

SECTION l: STRATEGIC CHALLENGE ................................ 4 

SECTION 2: STRATEGIC APPROACH AND GOALS ................... 6 

• Goals and Objectives of the Strategy ................................. 7 

Coal 7: Prevention .................................................. 7 

Coal 2: Stabilization ................................................ 8 

Coal 3: Partnership ................................................. 9 

Coal 4: Management ............................................... 9 

SECTION 3: ADVANCING THE STRATEGY ............................ 11 

• Department and Agency Roles and Responsibilities ........................ 11 

• Department and Agency Decision-Making and Coordination ............ 12 

• Country and Regional Prioritization and Planning ..................... 13 

• Compact-Style Country and Regional Partnerships .................... 14 

• International Cooperation and Public-Private Partnerships .............. 14 

• Authorities, Staffing, and Resources ................................ 75 

SECTION 4: STRATEGIC INTEGRATION OF 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TOOLS AND POLICY INITIATIVES .. 16 

• Tools ........................................................... 16 

Diplomacy ...................................................... 76 

Foreign Assistance ................................................ 76 

Defense Support and Security Cooperation ............................. 77 

Trade, Investment, and Commercial Diplomacy .......................... 78 

Sanctions and Other Financial Pressure Tools ............................ 78 

Intelligence and Analysis ........................................... 79 

Strategic Communications .......................................... 79 

• Laws and Initiatives ................................................ 79 

Women, Peace, and Security ......................................... 20 

Atrocity Early Warning ............................................. 20 

Stabilization Assistance Review ...................................... 20 

National Strategy for Counterterrorism ................................ 20 

SECTION 5: MEASURING SUCCESS ................................... 21 

• Monitoring and Evaluation .................................................. 21 

• Consultation, Learning, and Adaptation ............................... 22 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) affirms that the United States will work to strengthen 

fragile states ((where state weakness or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland" 

and "empower reform-minded governments, people, and civil society" in these places. The President 

affirmed this commitment when he signed the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title Vof Div.J, P.L.116-94) 

(GFA) into law in December 2019. This Strategy meets the law's requirement for a !(Global Fragility 

Strategy." 

The United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability seeks to break the costly cycle of 

fragility and promote peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. 

The United States will pursue a new approach that addresses the political drivers of fragility and supports 

locally driven solutions. The United States will engage selectively based on defined metrics, host country 

political will, respect for democracy and human rights, defined cost-sharing, and mechanisms that 

promote mutual accountability with national and local actors. 

This Strategy outlines four goals to guide United States efforts across priority countries and regions: 

Prevention: The United States will establish and support capabilities to engage in peacebuilding 

and anticipate and prevent violent conflict before it erupts; 

Stabilization: The United States will support inclusive political processes to resolve ongoing 

violent conflicts, emphasizing meaningful participation of youth, women, and members of 

faith-based communities and marginalized groups, respect for human rights and environmental 

sustainability; 

Partnerships: The United States will promote burden -sharing and encourage and work with 

partners to create conditions for long-term regional stability and foster private sector-led 

growth; and 

Management: The United States will maximize U.S. taxpayer dollars and realize more effective 

outcomes through better prioritization, integration, and focus on efficiency across the U.S. 

government and with partners. 

1 
The United States will achieve these goals by aligning U.S. Government operations, setting clear 

priorities, and integrating all tools of U.S. foreign policy: diplomacy; foreign assistance; defense 

support and security cooperation; trade and investment; sanctions and other financial pressure tools; 

intelligence and analysis; and strategic communications. The United States will recruit and train staff 

to work more effectively in fragile environments. The United States cannot and should not pursue 

these efforts alone. Accordingly, this Strategy outlines a commitment to forge new partnerships with 

civil society, the private sector, regional partners, and bilateral and multilateral contributors who can 

provide expertise and share the financial burden. 

This Strategy prioritizes learning, data-driven analysis, diplomacy, and information-sharing to 

understand local dynamics, target interventions, and hold actors accountable. Jt lays out a clear process 

to systematically monitor policy outcomes, not just program outputs. 1f changing dynamics require 

alterations in approach, if programs are not showing results, or if partners are not living up to their 

commitments, the United States will change course. The success of this Strategy will require discipline 

and commitment by the whole U.S. government and our partner governments, the creation of dynamic 

and forward-leaning country-level strategies, and flexibly and timely resources to power change. 

Through this new approach, the United States will seek to avoid past mistakes and better advance 

America's national security interests in fragile environments. 

2 
INTRODUCTION 

This Strategy aims to strengthen United States efforts to break the costly cycle of fragility' and promote 

peaceful, self-reliant nations that become U.S. economic and security partners. It advances the aims 

of the 2017 National Security Strategy, which affirms that the United States will work to strengthen 

fragile states "where state weakness or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland" and 

''empower reform-minded governments, people, and civil society" in these places. 

The President affirmed this commitment when he signed the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title V of 

Div. J, P.L. 116-94) (GFA) into law in December 2019. The GFA calls for the United States Government 

to create a unified U.S. strategy that is intentional, cross-cutting and measurable, and harnesses the 

full spectrum of United States diplomacy, assistance, and engagement over a 10-year horizon. The 

goal is to help countries move from fragility to stability and from conflict to peace. This Strategy 

builds upon reforms initiated by the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018 Elie Wiesel Genocide 

and Atrocities Prevention Act, 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and 2019 U.S. Strategy on 

Women, Peace, and Security. 

Through this Strategy, the United States will pursue a different approach from previous efforts. Rather 

than externally driven nation-building, the United States will support locally driven political solutions 

that align with United States' national security interests. Rather than fragmented and broad-based 

efforts, the United States will target the political factors that drive fragility. Rather than diffuse and 

open-ended efforts, the United States will engage selectively based on national interests, host-nation 

political progress, and defined metrics. Rather than implementing a disparate set of activities, the 

United States will strategically integrate its policy, diplomatic, and programmatic response. 

The United States government will pursue reforms to use taxpayer dollars judiciously and achieve 

measurable results. This Strategy prioritizes data-driven analysis, diplomacy, and information-sharing 

to understand local dynamics, target interventions, and hold actors accountable. It requires rigorous 

monitoring and evaluation and periodic reviews to assess policy outcomes, not just program outputs. 

The Strategy also requires greater insistence on host-nation political will, defining burden-sharing, 

leveraging a broader range of financing tools, and holding actors accountable. The United States will 

modify or end programs that are not producing sufficient results or where partners are not fulfilling 

their commitments. 

The United States should not address these challenges alone. The United States is committed to 

partnerships and burden-sharing with other nations and partners, including civil society and the 

private sector, to support local ownership and deliver cost-effective outcomes. In developing this 

Strategy, the United States Government has consulted with more than 200 civil society experts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and bilateral partners and multilateral organizations to date. 

The United States Government will continue to consult stakeholders, including the Congress, as it 

implements this Strategy. 

1 Fragility refers to a country's or region's vulnerability to armed conflict, large-scale violence, or other instability, including 

an inability to manage transnational threats or other significant shocks. Fragility results from ineffective or and unaccountable 

governance, weak social cohesion, and/or corrupt institutions or leaders who lack respect for human rights. 

3 
SECTION 1: 

STRATEGIC CHALLENGE 

The world faces growing risks from conflict, 

violence, and instability. International armed 

conflict and state instability, in particular, 

pose threats to the American people, United 

States interests at home and abroad, and United 

States allies and partners. Amid this instability, 

adversaries and malign actors can prey on weak 

governments, exploit their populations, build 

influence, and advance their own narrow interests 

or extremist ideologies. 

For decades, the United States has helped partner 

countries-ind ud ing those recovering from or at 

risk of conflict become more self-reliant and 

democratic. Many of those countries now rank 

among the most prosperous economies in the 

world and are important economic and security 

partners for the United States. They are essential 

in helping to address shared challenges. 

Many other countries experiencing high levels 

of fragility have not achieved these gains. Highly 

fragile countries and regions struggle with a 

combination of ineffective and unaccountable 

governance, weak social cohesion, and/or corrupt 

institutions or leaders who lack respect for 

human rights and fundamental freedoms, such 

as due process and freedom of religion or belief. 

Fragile countries and regions are vulnerable to 

armed conflicts, large-scale violence, or other 

instability, including an inability to manage 

transnational threats or other significant shocks. 

Fragility poses threats to the United States and 

U.S. interests, allies, and partners. Specifically: 

• Fragility provides fertile ground for violent 

extremists and criminal organizations that 

threaten the security of Americans and U.S. 

allies. Terrorists continue to operate and find 

safe havens in parts of Africa, the Middle 

East, and elsewhere, despite reductions in 

global deaths from terrorism. Transnational 

organized criminals use fragility to advance 

their operations, including illicit drug 

trading, environmental exploitation, and 

human and wildlife trafficking. 

4 
■ Fragility undermines economic prosperity 

and trade. Fragile countries and regions 

have the potential to become sizable future 

markets and future trading partners for the 

United States, but trade and investment are 

stymied by violence and corruption. In 2017, 

the estimated economic impact of violence 

was $14.76 trillion, the equivalent to 12.4 

percent of global gross domestic product 

( GDP) lost. Further, research shows that 

investment in highly corrupt countries is 

substantially less than in countries that are 

relatively corruption-free. 

■ Fragility erodes international peace and 

destabilizes partner countries and regions. A 

rising number of countries are experiencing 

protracted violent conflict and/or high levels 

of organized violence, including violence 

against civilians and civilian infrastructure. 

The average internal armed conflict now lasts 

more than 20 years. More than one-half of 

armed conflicts that achieve peace lapse back 

into violence within 7 years and too often 

result in costly long-term peacekeeping 

operations. Humanitarian needs, driven 

primarily by more complex and longerlasting conflicts, have reached historic levels, 

outpacing available resources by billions of 

dollars annually. At the same time, armed 

conflict obstructs humanitarian assistance 

and directly harms humanitarian personnel. 

In addition, the effects of the COVID-19 

pandemic are further stressing global 

humanitarian assistance. 

■ Fragility can enable authoritarianism, 

external exploitation, and increase the 

influence of the United States' competitors in 

both physical and digital realms. Weak states 

are much more susceptible to Russian and 

Chinese coercion. Through its Belt and Road 

Initiative, China has saddled many states 

with unsustainable debt, environmental 

degradation, increased long-term 

dependencies, and perpetuated fragility. 

China concertedly markets and promotes 

surveillance technology to client states and 

undermines democratic values of privacy, 

freedom, and equality. 

Fragile countries typically struggle to assure basic 

security, territorial sovereignty, and the rule of 

law, lacking a monopoly on the legitimate use 

of force. Fragility may manifest in the state's 

relative inability to control violence, and/or the 

illegitimate or excessive use of force against 

civilians. Weak institutions may instead serve 

the narrow political ends of elite coalitions and 

factions, whose interests are served by structural 

weaknesses in governance, oversight, and 

accountability. 

Fragility increases when citizen-responsive 

governance breaks down. It is exacerbated by 

institutions that are unable or unwilling to 

respond to periodic stresses or crises and protect 

their populations in a legitimate, inclusive, and 

effective manner. Over the long-run, fragile 

countries tend to see slower, uneven, and 

unsustainable development. They may become 

reliant on external actors to prop up governance 

systems, provide security, and deliver essential 

services to their population. 

The United States and other international 

contributors have allocated substantial assistance 

to conflict-affected and fragile countries and 

regions, achieving mixed results. Health, 

education, food security, humanitarian, and 

justice and security sector assistance save lives 

and disrupts threats. U.S. support, however, has 

not sufficiently addressed the political causes of 

fragility or ended costly cycles of recurrent crisis. 

Externally driven nation-building undermines 

local responsibility and distorts local economies. 

In some conflict areas, corrupt officials exploit 

external assistance to gain advantage and 

exacerbate conflicts. 

5 
u IJ,UJ�, 

U.S. Special Representative signs agreement for bringing peace in Afghanistan in 2020. 

Photo: Department of State 

j 

,, 

I . 

,' 

I ' ·,' ·, • ! �. 

greemenl for lri iiv 

Li.Ulil.:. .. , • 

09.U S-UW9� I 

, l..l&wwl 

t 

SECTION 2: 

STRATEGIC APPROACH 

AND GOALS 

This Strategy outlines a new framework for 

the United States' response to global 

fragility. It elevates prevention, addresses 

the political drivers of fragility, and supports 

locally-driven solutions. The United States, 

through this Strategy, will focus on the 

most vulnerable countries and regions that 

meet a clear set of conditions, consistent with 

the National Security Strategy. Namely, this 

Strategy applies to those states and regions in 

which fragility poses or magnifies a threat to 

the United States and U.S. interests, allies 

and partners. The United States will focus 

efforts and resources at a sufficient scale to 

achieve the Strategy's goals and avoid 

dissipating effort across too many countries. 

The Strategy emphasizes selective United States 

engagement based on defined outcomes, host 

country political will, respect for democratic 

norms and human rights, mutual accountability, 

and cost-sharing, including through compactstyle partnerships with key stakeholders. The 

United States will create windows of opportunity, 

where possible and if needed, and engage with 

credible local partners committed to inclusive 

political solutions, meaningful reforms, and 

lasting peace. 

To implement this new approach, the United 

States will recognize the complexity of each 

fragile environment, be nimble and adaptive, 

prioritize building resilience, 2 and ultimately 

build toward peace, across interventions. 

Patterns of conflict, large-scale violence, and 

instability are often cyclical; they fluctuate 

geographically and over time; and each has a 

unique context. 

2 Resilience is the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and wider systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover 

from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability, facilitates inclusive growth, and ends cycles of 

recurrent crisis. 

6 
Given this complexity, the United States 

will adopt a multi-pronged, multi-sectoral 

approach to strengthen the resilience of partner 

nations. Fragile countries face an array of often 

compounding shocks and stresses that can include 

civil unrest, complex humanitarian emergencies, 

natural disasters, and economic volatility. The 

United States will align diplomacy (including 

public engagement), assistance, investment, 

defense engagement, and other tools to help 

partners end protracted or recurrent crises and 

absorb, adapt to, and recover from such shocks 

and stresses. 

The United States will also incorporate 

peacebuilding approaches to address the drivers 

of conflict, violence, and instability, such as, inter 

alia, exclusionary politics, entrenched corruption, 

impunity, or capacity deficits. The United States 

will support partners to build durable mechanisms 

to resolve conflicts, undertake difficult reforms 

where needed, enhance social cohesion, build 

critical institutions, deliver crucial services such 

as energy, create inclusive political coalitions, 

and mobilize domestic resources that can 

enable lasting peace, stability, and ultimately 

prosperity. This support will include advancing 

women's leadership and participation in all 

aspects of conflict prevention, stabilization, and 

peacebuilding. 

Ultimately, U.S. intervention to address fragility 

will not be successful without the active 

engagement of critical local partners. Breaking 

the costly cycle of fragility and promoting 

peaceful self-reliant nations must be secured 

through the action and agency of host-country 

leaders, organizations, and communities. This 

effort cannot be imposed from the outside. The 

United States' role is to support those local 

partners committed to positive change. 

Goals and Objectives of the Strategy 

This Strategy has the following goals 

and subordinate objectives, which will 

inform subsequent country and regional 

implementation plans. 

Goal 1: Prevention3 -

Anticipate and Prevent Violent 

Con lict and Large-Scale Violence 

Strategic investments in prevention can save 

billions of U.S. dollars and achieve better 

outcomes over the long run. The United States' 

efforts will establish and support capabilities 

to anticipate and prevent instability and largescale violence before it erupts, and engage in 

peacebuilding. The United States will invest in 

both short-term efforts to mitigate escalating 

conflict risks and longer-term efforts to 

address underlying vulnerabilities of violent 

conflict and other large-scale violence. 

The United States will ensure its assistance is 

sensitive to conflict dynamics and reinforces 

inclusive, participatory, and legitimate 

governance. This may include critical efforts to 

improve the protection and promotion of 

human rights; mitigate health, education, 

economic, environmental, and food security 

dimensions of conflict; strengthen oversight, 

accountability, and administration in the 

security and justice sectors; and monitor and 

mitigate the impacts of disinformation, 

propaganda, and incitement to violence. 

Objectives: 

• Develop and/or reinforce local, national, 

and regional early warning systems and 

early action plans, backed by preventative 

diplomacy. 

• Address vulnerabilities and structural risk 

factors that fuel violence and conflict and 

undermine civilian security by enhancing 

partner nation prevention, peacebuilding, 

and related counterterrorism efforts. 

3 Prevention refers to deliberate efforts to reduce fragility, strengthen institutions, and increase cohesion in states and regions to 

disrupt likely pathways to violent conflict, instability, or political subversion. Strategic Prevention can include efforts related to 

atrocity early warning and prevention, conflict prevention, and countering violent extremism. 

7 
• Promote meaningful reforms of governance, 

essential services, natural resources 

management, and security and justice sector 

institutions to increase legitimacy and reduce 

corruption and meaningfully engage women 

and youth in decision-making. 

• Protect and promote the rights of members of 

marginalized groups, including women and 

girls, religious and ethnic minority groups, 

and other communities at risk, including by 

increasing their participation in public life 

and protection. 

• Strengthen local civil society and private 

sector networks, inclusive of women, 

youth and members of faith-based 

communities and marginalized groups, in 

order to meaningfully participate in conflict 

prevention, governmental reform, and peace 

building efforts. 

• Bolster the capacities of public and private 

organizations and institutions monitoring, 

countering, and mitigating the impact of 

disinformation and propaganda by actors 

who threaten peace and stability. 

Goal 2: Stabilization4 -

Achieve Locally-Driven Political 

Solutions to Violent Conflicts and 

Large-Scale Violence 

Stabilizing conflict-affected areas is an inherently 

political endeavor. The United States will support 

inclusive political processes to resolve ongoing 

violent conflicts, emphasizing meaningful 

participation of women, youth, and members of 

faith-based and marginalized groups; respect for 

democracy and human rights; compliance with 

international law, including humanitarian law 

and principles; institutional transparency and 

accountability; and environmental sustainability. 

The United States will integrate and sequence 

diplomatic, development, and military-related 

efforts, understanding their potential political 

impact. The United States will support efforts by 

legitimate local authorities to reduce violence, 

establish stability, and peaceably manage conflict. 

Objectives: 

• Assist national and local actors, including, 

inter alia, civil society and women leaders, to 

broker and implement durable and inclusive 

peace agreements or ceasefires and related 

transitional justice and accountability 

provisions. 

• Secure support from local, national, and 

regional partners to bolster peace processes 

and stabilize conflict-affected areas. 

• Expand civilian security in conflict- and 

violence-affected areas by building 

legitimate, rights-respecting justice and 

security institutions capable of countering 

the full range of threats to stability (e.g., 

terrorist groups). 

• Promote the meaningful inclusion of women 

and girls in brokering and implementing 

peace agreements. 

• Augment media, communications, and 

outreach efforts to engender public support 

for peace and stabilization processes. 

• Promote inclusive post-conflict economic 

recovery and reforms, including equitable 

management of natural resources, to 

reinforce stabilization and peace. 

• Reduce the destabilizing impact of non-state 

armed actors. 

4 Stabilization is a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally 

legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. 

8 
Goal 3: Partnership -

Promote Burden-Sharing, Coordination, 

and Mutual Accountability 

National and regional leadership are essential 

to achieve sustainable solutions to fragility and 

conflict. The United States will encourage and 

assist partners to create conditions for long-term 

regional stability and foster private sector-led 

growth. The United States can achieve better 

outcomes by marshalling contributions from 

other public and private donors. 

Objectives: 

• Establish compact-style partnerships with 

national and local partner governments that 

promote mutual accountability and advance 

agreed-upon reforms to reduce fragility. 

• Secure commitments from regional, bilateral, 

and multilateral partners to advance 

necessary governance, essential services, 

security, justice, humanitarian, and economic 

reforms and build resilience to shocks. 

• Mobilize private sector activity in high-risk 

areas to help improve the investment climate, 

advance transparency, build capacity to 

manage natural resources effectively, and 

combat corruption. 

• Enlist the international private sector 

to promote conflict-sensitive and 

environmentally sustainable investments 

in fragile states and increase the number of 

beneficial public-private partnerships. 

• Address cross-border security threats, 

disinformation, and propaganda efforts 

by malign actors, and regional challenges 

by developing and/or enhancing regional 

mechanisms for economic, security, 

information transparency, humanitarian, 

and/or justice cooperation. 

Goal 4: Management -

Enable an Effective, Integrated U.S. 

Government Response 

Creating alignment within and across United 

States departments and agencies to tackle global 

fragility is a difficult task, but one that will be 

crucial to the success of this Strategy. Working 

with Congress, the executive branch will achieve 

better results in fragile states and regions by 

improving how the United States Government 

conducts operations. The United States will 

improve prioritization, integration, and 

efficiency in all planning, diplomatic, foreign 

assistance, defense engagement, and other 

operations in fragile states and regions, both 

across the department and agencies, as well as 

with partners. The United States will pursue 

integrated civil-military resourcing and 

planning to advance shared objectives, 

collaboration, and information-sharing. 

The United States will create and pursue a 

learning agenda, capitalize on lessons learned in 

implementing adaptive management techniques, 

and assure that analysis and reporting are linked 

to desired policy outcomes. 

Objectives: 

• Institutionalize joint U.S. department 

and agency research, analysis, planning, 

messaging, prioritization of funding, and 

execution of activities toward prevention and 

stabilization. 

• Streamline and expedite funding processes 

to enable more adaptive, integrated, and 

agile implementation and informed risk 

management in fragile environments. 

• Recruit, train, and retain diverse staff, 

including U.S. military veterans, with relevant 

skills for fragile environments, and deploy 

diplomats and development professionals 

alongside U.S. military operational and 

tactical elements where needed and where 

security conditions permit. 

9 
• Improve field-level rigorous monitoring and 

evaluation, risk assessments, and feedback 

loops to assess progress, adapt strategic 

approaches, or shift diplomatic, security, 

and assistance efforts where appropriate and 

consistent with Secretary of State and Chief 

of Mission authorities and responsibilities. 

• Strengthen coherence among humanitarian, 

development, and peacebuilding activities to 

meet emergency needs while breaking cycles 

of crisis. 

• Mainstream conflict-sensitivity standards 

for all U.S. diplomatic engagement and 

foreign assistance to fragile areas to reinforce 

political and social cohesion, while upholding 

humanitarian principles. 

• Align and continuously adapt development, 

security, and justice sector assistance 

to stabilization and peace process 

implementation by using data driven analysis 

and adaptive strategic approaches. 

10 
State and USA D have supported commun ties in the wake of Colomb a's 

c on. 

Photo: Juan Carlos S

v l war to so id fy the peace process and promote reconciliat

er ra/USAID. 

SECTION 3: 

ADVANCING THE 

STRATEGY 

The United States will realize better outcomes 

by improving the ways in which departments 

and agencies address fragility, in line with the 

above management goal. This Strategy defines 

roles and responsibilities, department and agency 

integration and coordination mechanisms, and 

priority-setting processes. The United States will 

also review and pursue additional or different 

authorities, staff, and resources as needed to 

achieve this Strategy's goals and objectives. 

Department and Agency Roles 

and Responsibilities 

The executive branch has established clear roles 

and responsibilities for advancing this Strategy, 

specifically: 

• The Department of State (State) is the lead 

Federal agency for executing this Strategy 

and overseeing and implementing United 

States foreign po !icy under direction of the 

11 

President to advance diplomatic and political 

efforts with local partners, relevant bilateral 

parties, and multilateral bodies. State 

oversees the planning and implementation of 

targeted justice sector, law enforcement, and 

other security sector assistance to stabilize 

conflict-affected areas, and prevent violence 

and fragility globally 

• The U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) serves as the lead 

implementing agency for international 

development, disaster, and non-security 

prevention and stabilization assistance and 

program policy in support of United States 

policy objectives under this Strategy USAID 

works to strengthen coherence among 

development, humanitarian, and other 

non-security assistance in fragile countries 

and regions. 

• The Department of Defense (DoD) serves 

in a supporting role to manage and prevent 

conflict and address global fragility 

through specialized activities including 

civil Affairs, psychological operations, 
information operations engagements, 

institutional capacity-building, and security 

cooperation. DoD utilizes the defense support 

to stabilization (DSS) process to identify 

defense stabilization objectives in concert 

with other United States departments and 

agencies; convey them through strategic 

documents; organize to achieve them; 

and prioritize requisite defense resources. 

DoD also provides requisite security and 

reinforces civilian efforts, where appropriate 

and consistent with available authorities. 

Other Federal departments and agencies, 

including the Department of the Treasury 

(Treasury), Department of Justice, Department 

of Commerce (DOC), Department of Energy, 

and the U.S. International Development Finance 

Corporation (DFC), support United States efforts 

to prevent violence and fragility globally and 

stabilize conflict-affected areas, as appropriate 

and authorized, based on their unique mandates, 

capabilities, and relationships. 

Depa rtment a nd Agency 

Decision-Making and Coordination 

The GFA makes clear that prevention and 

stabilization requires a joint, integrated approach 

across State, USAID, DoD, and other federal 

departments and agencies. A senior-level GFA 

Steering Committee, convened by the National 

Security Council (NSC) or its designee, comprising 

State, USAID, DoD, Treasury, and the Office 

of Management and Budget (0MB), will meet 

quarterly to review GFA implementation progress 

and conduct oversight. Other departments and 

agencies will participate as relevant and as 

appropriate. 

State will chair a working-level secretariat,5 

inclusive of other departments and agencies, 

coordinate execution of the Strategy, and 

update the Steering Committee as needed. 

Departments and agencies will implement 

the strategy and secretariat's tasks through 

an inclusive, collaborative process with other 

vested stakeholders. USAID and DoD will lead 

aspects of the secretariat's work in line with 

their respective agency and department roles 

and responsibilities. The secretariat will work 

together to address inevitable challenges that will 

arise in implementing the new approach outlined 

in this Strategy. 

Chiefs of Mission in priority countries and regions 

will lead field-level planning, decision-making, 

and coordination. Chiefs of Mission, with input 

from the USAID Mission Directors as appropriate, 

will designate a representative to be responsible 

for coordinating and integrating the full spectrum 

of GFA activities across the Country Team and 

with the relevant Combatant Command and 

agency stakeholders. Chiefs of Mission or designee 

will lead bilateral engagement on security and 

justice sector reform to ensure United States 

support for such efforts is properly elevated to a 

central policy objective. They will be responsible 

for directing the planning and implementation of 

security and justice sector assistance resources to 

appropriately leverage political objectives. 

United States embassies and missions will 

establish coordination mechanisms for engaging 

regularly with national government counterparts, 

local civil society, and other stakeholders. They 

will review, align, and adapt plans and programs 

based on ongoing partner engagement and 

iterative conflict analysis, keeping other United 

States Government stakeholders periodically 

informed. As practical and appropriate, U.S. 

embassies and missions will incorporate plans 

to implement the Strategy into State Integrated 

Country Strategies (ICSs), USAID Country 

Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs), 

5 The Secretariat will provide administrative functions for department and agency activities to advance the Strategy, under 

the guidance of the GFA Steering Committee. Specific roles, actions, and outputs will be formalized in a Secretariat Terms of 

Reference, approved by the Steering Committee and updated as needed. 

12 
and DoD Campaign Plans, Operational Plans, and 

Regional Strategies. 

United States departments and agencies will 

develop internal communications plans and 

ensure this Strategy informs and is incorporated 

into other relevant strategies, plans, and 

initiatives in priority countries and regions. They 

will integrate this Strategy's goals and objectives 

with other United States policies to combat 

malign foreign influence, win the great power 

competition, counter authoritarianism, and 

promote a democratic, rules-based international 

order as the basis for global peace and security. 

Country and Regional 

Prioritization and Planning 

The United States will prioritize countries and/ 

or regions to implement this Strategy over a 

ten-year time horizon, starting with no less 

than five countries and regions. These countries 

and regions will be assessed, through the seniorlevel Steering Committee, based on objective 

criteria, consistent with the factors identified 

in Section 505 of the GFA. These factors 

include: assessed levels and risks of fragility, 

violent conflict and associated national 

resilience, political will and capacity for 

partnerships, opportunity for United States 

impact, other international commitments and 

resources, and United States national security 

and economic interests. 

As part of consultations, United States 

departments and agencies will weigh 

options for regional approaches to address 

identified challenges and maximize resources. 

Given the central importance of security and 

justice sectors to long-term stability, prospects 

for security and justice sector reform will be a 

primary criterion for selecting priority 

countries. 

Wherever feasible, United States departments 

and agencies will include third-party data 

sources and indicators to help inform 

selection of priority countries and/or regions 

and monitor overall progress. These will 

include the Armed Conflict and Location Event 

Data Project, Fragile States Index, Freedom 

House's Freedom in the World Index, Legatum 

Institute's Prosperity Index, U.S. Holocaust 

Memorial Museum's Early Warning Project, 

Varieties of Democracy Project, UNDP's 

Gender Inequality Index, World Bank's 

Worldwide Governance Indicators, and 

World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. 

Following consultation with Congress, the 

United States Government will finalize and 

transmit to the relevant congressional 

committees the list of priority countries and 

regions and update as needed. The Steering 

Committee will meet periodically, not less 

than once per year, to review the list of 

priority countries and regions, commitment of 

host countries, availability of resources, and 

status of burden-sharing efforts. The Steering 

Committee will assess whether new countries 

or regions meet the established criteria and 

should be added to the list. The Steering 

Committee will review implementation 

progress in priority countries and regions and 

will consult with other stakeholders as needed. 

Once priority countries and regions are 

selected, the United States will engage national 

and local government and civil society partners 

and develop and implement multi-year 

implementation plans. The United States will 

explore new mechanisms to solicit stakeholder 

input into those plans to ensure mutual 

accountability. The United States will align and 

sequence all relevant U.S. tools and resources 

to advance agreed objectives. Time horizons 

for each country/region implementation plan 

will be set based on the best available risk 

analysis, contextual information, and a 

reasonable estimate of when measurable 

outcomes can be achieved. 

13 
Compact-Style Country 

and Regional Partnerships 

Another innovative component of this Strategy 

is the development of new models for 

compact-style partnerships. The United States 

will promote mutual accountability in 

collaboration with national and local actors by 

applying international best practices and 

defining roles and responsibilities, resource 

contributions, and intended outcomes. 

These partnerships will be based on specific 

metrics that ensure adequate institutional 

progress and political commitment. Metrics 

will focus on demonstrated political progress 

to advance peace processes, inclusive and 

accountable governance, access to essential 

services, economic reforms, justice and security 

sector reforms, media independence, respect for 

democratic norms and human rights, and defined 

cost -sharing. 

The United States will reinforce these compactstyle partnerships by facilitating policy dialogue 

among national and local leaders and other 

international partners, planning for scenarios 

in which milestones are not met, and managing 

change. Through these partnerships, the United 

States will incentivize government partners to 

institute transparent and accountable governance 

systems and address corruption. If partners fail 

to meet their commitments, the United States 

will shift resources and increase diplomatic and 

economic pressure. 

International Cooperation and 

Public- Private Partnerships 

The United States will pursue bilateral and 

multilateral partnerships to implement this 

Strategy. The United States will work with 

other donors to share and track information 

on respective programs, avoid duplication, and 

optimize assistance toward shared objectives. This 

includes greater coordination within the Group 

of Seven, Group of Twenty, World Bank, United 

Nations, Development Assistance Committee of 

the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 

Development, and other bilateral and multilateral 

official contributors and private-sector partners. 

The United States will also coordinate with official 

bilateral and multilateral contributing partners 

to ensure consistent messaging to host-nation 

partners and efforts to confront malign actors 

and spoilers. 

The United States is also developing approaches 

for related multilateral pooled funding 

mechanisms, which could potentially include 

the Global Fragility Fund authorized by the GFA. 

Multilateral funds can be effective mechanisms 

for leveraging additional financial and technical 

support for activities from like minded official and 

private partners and achieving economies of scale. 

As these funds may have limited host-nation 

inclusion in decision-making, the United States is 

assessing ways to maximize success of such funds 

in fragile environments. Multilateral funding 

mechanisms must be structured appropriately 

to incentivize effectiveness and accountability 

and used in the context of a diplomatic and 

outreach strategy. 

The United States will work with the private 

sector to achieve greater scale, sustainability, and 

effectiveness of development and humanitarian 

outcomes. Domestic and international firms can 

prove powerful development partners where they 

share common cause, values, and development 

objectives. The United States can leverage its 

expertise and tools, including development 

finance, to promote such alignment, de-risk, 

and accelerate economic activity, and promote 

transparency and adherence to international 

standards. Strategic United States investmentif coordinated with broader United States and 

partner efforts and pursued in a conflict-sensitive 

manner-can unleash significantly greater 

and more sustainable resources to address 

challenges driving fragility and promote durable 

peace and recovery. The potential for such 

investments can also be leveraged to incentivize 

and build a domestic constituency for critical 

government reforms. 

14 
The United States will pursue new and more 

effective partnerships with private sector 

entities, including philanthropies and 

corporate social responsibility entities. The 

United States will seek to integrate those 

entities into planning efforts to better 

understand and incorporate the private 

sector's interests and capabilities and 

mobilize associated resources. The United 

States will employ novel financing 

arrangements such as open innovation or 

challenge models where appropriate. Publicprivate partnerships will employ conflictsensitive standards to ensure they contribute 

directly to this Strategy's goals and objectives. 

Authorities, Staffing, and Resources 

The United States Government will review 

authorities, staffing, and resources that enable 

the United States Government's ability to 

respond quickly to complex fragile and 

unstable environments. The United States 

Government will incorporate this Strategy into 

future budget requests to Congress and seek 

more flexible authorities and staffing as 

needed. 

While existing bilateral and regional funding 

accounts and activities can provide consistency 

over time, foreign assistance funding directives, 

earmarks, and other requirements can be 

constraints in dynamic, complex, and 

fragile contexts. The United States 

Government will work with Congress to 

advance the United States Government's 

ability to assess and respond to emergent 

stabilization requirements and the 

flexibility to align policy and programmatic 

interventions for implementing this Strategy 

across development, stabilization, and security 

sectors, consistent with the purposes described 

in section 509(a)(3) of the GFA regarding the 

Prevention and Stabilization Fund. 

The United States Government will also work 

with Congress to ensure DoD has authorities 

and funding to implement this Strategy in 

concert with United States national security 

objectives. Security conditions dictate that 

State and USA ID stabilization efforts are 

often constrained or delayed in lesspermissive operating 

environments, leading to a significant gap in 

the United States Government's ability to 

execute stabilization activities. 

During Strategy implementation, the executive 

branch will rigorously monitor, in real time, 

the bureaucratic, legislative, and other 

constraints facing Chiefs of Mission as they 

adapt. The executive branch will work with 

Congress to make any necessary reforms to 

existing statutory authorities and 

requirements. This effort will include a review 

of procurement processes, budget limitations, 

and programming authorities. 

The United States will review existing processes 

and make changes as needed to achieve this 

Strategy's goals and objectives. In line with 

their roles and responsibilities, United States 

departments and agencies will review their 

current staffing, skills, capabilities, research, 

and data analytics requirements to ensure they 

are positioned to implement this Strategy. 

United States embassies and missions have 

highlighted the need for additional diverse 

staff skilled in working on prevention and 

stabilization. The United States will develop 

short- and long-term staffing options to 

support U.S. embassies and missions in GFA 

priority countries and regions. 

The United States will continue to invest in the 

expeditionary capacity of its civilian workforce 

to advance this Strategy within priority 

countries and regions. In accordance with 

Secretary of State security responsibility and 

Chief of Mission authorities, the United States 

will assess options to deploy civilian -led teams 

into fragile and conflict-affected areas to assess 

local conditions, engage local authorities, and 

direct and monitor programs. Options include 

deploying civilians with DoD operational and 

tactical elements to achieve United States 

national security objectives. State, USAID, and 

DoD will seek to integrate and streamline 

relevant human resources, training, knowledge 

management, and operational support platforms 

where possible. 

15 
�' - : - ,-\, 

� 

- -

� 

" Jf . · · . . · ·- ·, -� �.�(../ '- ,,. ::..,. , 

. 

c

� �·::r1�:�J!!pr.�, . - . ,·:v,?� .,P. ·�· �t-" !t-1e't'_ , :·��<:-:·�_ >� • ,_, '•. J:''t} , ,}.

;. ,,, � ��I. '.• • 

l 

Sudanese woman leads peaceful protests in 2019 against President Omar a -Bashir. 

Photo, AFPvia Getty Images 

.i

� • C . ',,��

·'- . '" •1 '• 1� ' ��t; , -

-,.� Ji· ·� ·· l_( .�• - (.'.-�. 

"'•._

, 

_-.. _ -✓ ,llftl�- - . . • 

.·:f••.•.�• -

;rr

�

· 

-

... 

y:;t,,f \V .h'_, '#.!;...,: ._.,.• '•

. 1!'},\r 

,

._

• 

�,�.�rl" 

�j,o.-� �: 

-.-' f . i '/ -. r.-� �• n .('>r

, � �-

1 . :;Er: 

:.\.� .. , �-J/1,�· -.�t-�l�-

- ; > < • 

.

, . . '. 

·, P-1 . _. 

� . � -/����)� .... ·jt ;·��r�1

-)t'f ,6�,, :;i· :

·�:.:: . ,tt.·�1''\ :

,-: 11

fi_·- �"1[-i �,,· · 

_

,i\\ •. s, f I ..-. -%1 . ._-,;-: • .,.,.,.__t, , . ., .,, 

11;;9 

·, 

. ff .,

&1. 

• 

" i 

. . I 

·, 

SECTION 4: 

STRATEGIC 

INTEGRATION OF 

U.S. GOVERNMENT 

TOOLS AND POLICY 

INI TIATIVES 

Tools 

The executive branch will marshal all available

tools to advance this Strategy's goals and

objectives. Specifically: 

Diplomacy 

Diplomatic engagement fosters unity of purpose

and galvanizes collective action, which is essential

to help broker and support political solutions to

violent conflicts. State will invest in preventative

diplomatic efforts that promote dialogue,

mediation, reconciliation, respect for human 

rights, and conflict resolution. Embassies will 

target diplomatic efforts based on data-driven 

analytics, coordinate external messaging, and 

16 

provide a platform for collaboration across United 

States Government departments and agencies. 

This platform will help understand the complex, 

local, national, and regional political dynamics in 

fragile states and regions, including windows of 

opportunity and emerging risks. 

The United States will upgrade its diplomatic 

capabilities to address risks of violent conflict, 

violence, and fragility. This effort includes 

engaging proactively with partner nations, 

regional leaders, allies and partners to prevent 

violent conflict by strengthening early warning 

and response efforts. The United States will 

also work with like-minded partner nations 

to focus on common approaches and enhance 

burden-sharing, including by bolstering 

existing mechanisms such as the Stabilization 

Leaders Forum. The United States will expand 

training and tools for U.S. diplomats engaging 

in fragile countries and regions. 
Foreign Assistance other capabilities; employ data-driven decisionForeign assistance-including humanitarian, 

development, and security sector assistance-is 

a critical tool to address fragility, respond to and 

mitigate conflict and crises, and promote and 

protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

In fragile contexts, needs are often most acute, 

but so too are the impediments to effectively 

delivering assistance. 

The United States will enhance specific foreign 

assistance programs that address fragility 

directly, including those that seek to strengthen 

social cohesion, combat corruption, protect 

human rights, promote reconciliation, mobilize 

investment and engage private-sector actors in 

peace building, and reinforce critical governance 

reforms. More broadly, the United States will 

mainstream and implement guidelines to ensure 

the conflict-sensitivity of all foreign assistance 

programs in fragile areas. The United States will 

empower Country Teams to strategically use 

foreign assistance to address fragility, inclusive of 

both field- and Washington-managed activities. 

United States development professionals on 

the ground will use their convening power, 

strategic communications, technical expertise, 

and local relationships to support prevention 

and stabilization objectives. State and 

USA ID, including through the Humanitarian 

Assistance Steering Council, a senior-level 

mechanism launched by the Secretary of State, 

will continue to advance important reforms to 

strengthen coherence and collaboration to align 

with the "humanitarian-development-peace 

nexus, >' with a new focus on Relief, Response, 

and Resilience (R3). 

To ensure sustainable, impactful assistance 

programs in fragile contexts, State, USAID, DoD, 

and other assistance agencies, as relevant, will 

jointly establish planning, implementation, 

monitoring, and coordination mechanisms 

that deliberately layer, sequence, and integrate 

complementary types of assistance; promote close 

and constant coordination with diplomacy and 

making, adaptive management, and complexityaware monitoring; and implement a clear-eyed 

approach to partnership, placing a premium on 

engaging and empowering local government, 

civil-society, and private-sector actors who 

demonstrate agency and ownership, shared 

values, a commitment to mutual accountability, 

and who can affect meaningful change. 

Defense Support and 

Security Cooperation 

Basic security is essential for broader stabilization 

and strategic prevention gains. Defense support 

provides security for civilian, diplomatic, 

development, and humanitarian efforts, 

particularly in conflict-prone regions. In certain 

settings, the United States military can play a 

critical role in facilitating basic public order, 

responding to immediate needs of the population, 

and building the capacity of foreign security 

forces. These efforts contribute to longer-term 

stability in concert with United States national 

security objectives. 

The United States military will enhance its ability 

to support this Strategy through small-footprint, 

coordinated, partner-focused activities in line 

with DoD Policy Directive 3000.05 "Stabilization n 

and United States national security objectives. 

Section 121 0A of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA 

("Department of Defense Support for Stabilization 

Activities in National Security Interest of the 

United Statesn), as well as the SAR, has greatly 

increased department and agency communication 

and synchronization at relevant Combatant 

Commands and Embassies. 

State and DoD will develop security assistance 

and related programs and initiatives to improve 

governance of the security sector, build partners' 

institutional capacity, professionalize partnernation security forces, and build long-term 

relationships with key host nation security 

officials consistent with U.S. national security and 

economic interests. The United States will align 

17 
security sector assistance activities in priority 

countries and regions with political objectives 

and non-security assistance to address fragility 

and conflict where applicable. The United States 

will incorporate good governance and respect for 

democratic norms and human rights in security 

cooperation and capacity-building efforts, in line 

with the 2019-2020 Guidelines for Effective Justice 

and Security Sector Assistance in Conflict Affected 

Areas. The United States will continue to restrict 

assistance to foreign security forces that engage 

in gross violations of human rights, in accordance 

with United States law. 

Beyond traditional forms of defense capacity 

building (e.g., technical assistance, military 

education, training, and equipment), United 

States support for the security sector will include 

fostering relationships with reform champions 

within security institutions, empowering civil 

society to serve as a source of public oversight, 

and elevating security governance. 

Trade, Investment, and 

Commercial Diplomacy 

The United States promotes a development 

model based on free market principles, fair and 

reciprocal trade, private sector activity, and rule 

of law. A robust private sector and attractive 

investment climate help to: create jobs and 

economic opportunity, detracting from the need 

to turn to armed groups and illicit avenues or other 

malign actors for income; increase government 

resources and revenue available for service 

delivery, including through tax receipts; and 

improve stability and transparency by diffusing 

economic power and empowering individuals 

when conducted in a conflict-sensitive fashion. 

Additionally, broad-based private sector growth 

creates a virtuous circle by signaling stability to 

other firms and encouraging new investment. 

The United States will work with governments, 

multilateral development banks, and other 

organizations to improve economic policies 

and the investment climate and identify 

investment opportunities. The DFC aims to 

invest 60 percent of its portfolio in low income, 

lower-middle income, and fragile states. The DFC 

aims to invest more than $ 25 billion and mobilize 

an additional $50 billion by the end of 2025 across 

priority sectors. The DFC will catalyze investment 

through debt and equity financing, political risk 

insurance, blended finance approaches, technical 

assistance, and feasibility studies. DFC' s Portfolio 

for Impact and Innovation (P I2) will support 

early-stage firms who may operate in fragile 

contexts who lack the track record or scale of 

traditional finance partners. 

Additionally, the United States will implement 

export controls to prevent persons involved with 

or enabling human rights abuses from access 

to United States items to further such malign 

objectives. The DOC will support this Strategy, 

through for example, technology and entitybased controls, led by the Bureau of Industry and 

Security. 

Sanctions and Other 

Financial Pressure Tools 

The United States will use targeted sanctions 

and other financial measures to advance stability 

and impose costs on actors that fuel conflict and 

instability. Financial transparency and regulatory 

reform measures can increase accountability and 

adherence to the rule of law, and reduce the risks 

that human rights abusers and corrupt officials 

can exploit United States financial systems. 

Treasury engages with foreign counterparts to 

strengthen anti-money laundering and counter 

terrorist financing regimes, and to address 

corruption vulnerabilities through regulatory 

reform and financial transparency efforts. 

Treasury implements a range of authorities to 

impose financial consequences on those who 

pillage the wealth and resources of their people, 

generate ill-gotten profits from corruption, 

cronyism, and other criminal activity, and 

engage in human rights abuses. These tools 

include imposing sanctions on corrupt actors, 

serious human rights abusers around the world, 

and corrupt senior foreign political figures; and 

issuing related advisories to financial institutions. 

A number of United States sanctions programs 

18 
include criteria related to terrorism, human 

rights, and/or corruption, such as sanctions under 

Executive Order 1 381 8, which implements and 

builds upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accountability Act. These programs enable the 

United States Government to designate persons 

and entities and block their United States -

based property and interests or property in the 

possession or control of any United States 

person. Such designations bring human rights 

abuses to global attention, cut off the 

perpetrators from the United States' financial 

system, and often lead foreign financial 

institutions to stop processing transactions or 

offering financial services to the designated 

individuals or entities. The United States 

continues to enhance its use of such 

sanctions where appropriate to disrupt and 

deter the behavior of malign actors, including 

those who contribute to fragility. 

State will continue to implement visa 

restriction authorities to deny entry to 

foreign officials involved, directly or 

indirectly, in significant corruption or gross 

violations of human rights. 

Additionally, the United States will continue to 

ensure United States financial institutions meet 

related due diligence and reporting obligations 

under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), which 

underpins the United States Government's 

effective anti-money laundering/counterfinancing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework. 

Compliance with the BSA is essential to 

detecting, investigating, deterring, and 

disrupting criminal activity, including the 

designated categories of offenses: 

corruption; environmental crime; migrant 

smuggling; organized crime; and human rights 

abuses such as human trafficking. 

The United States will continue to restrict 

assistance to foreign security forces that engage 

in gross violations of human rights, in 

accordance with United States law. Gross 

violations of human rights by state security 

forces, including the recruitment and use of 

child soldiers, as well as violations of 

international humanitarian law and principles, 

erode legitimacy and contribute to fragility. 

Restrictions on assistance and other 

financial pressure tools will be accompanied by 

active United States diplomatic engagement, 

including on the UN Security Council where 

obligatory international sanctions regimes 

reinforce and advance United States foreign 

policy objectives. The United States will engage 

with government and civil society partners to 

promote full implementation of these sanctions 

and restrictions, investigate alleged violations, 

promote accountability, and incentivize respect 

for the rule of law and human rights by 

rights-respecting security forces. 

Intelligence and Analysis 

The United States Intelligence Community ( IC) 

will tailor intelligence collection and analysis 

to inform appropriate strategies to address 

fragility and political instability, in particular in 

the selected priority countries or regions. The IC 

will continue to assess conflict and mass atrocity 

trends and risks, drawing on quantitative and 

qualitative analytic methods. The United States 

will deepen partnerships with academic, think 

tank, private sector, and civil society experts who 

can contribute to these assessments. 

Strategic Communications 

The United States will partner with local media in 

fragile environments using media development 

and strategic communications tools. The United 

States will advance partner capacities to refute 

disinformation and mitigate incitement to 

violence and malign propaganda through digital 

and conventional media. The United States 

will highlight that the United States is a force 

for good, while reinforcing the voices of local, 

national, and global partners to promote peace, 

respect for human rights, and social cohesion. 

The United States will monitor and seek to 

counter transnational influence and messaging 

operations that promote violence or division or 

otherwise destabilize priority countries. 

Laws and I nitiatives 

This Strategy provides an overarching strategic 

prevention and stabilization approach that will 

19 
integrate with relevant existing State, USA ID, 

DoD, and Treasury department and agency 

strategies. This Strategy builds upon reforms 

initiated by the 2019 U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, 

and Security, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 

Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 1 the 2018 

Stabilization Assistance Review, and the 2018 

National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS} 

The United States Women, Peace, and Security 

Strategy, released in June 20191 focuses on 

improving the effectiveness of conflict prevention 

and peace building by proactively integrating the 

needs and perspectives of women and empowering 

women to contribute their talents and energies 

to international peace, security, and prosperity. 

It endeavors to rectify the disproportionate 

adverse impacts of armed conflict on women and 

girls. In line with the WPS Strategy, the United 

States will encourage partner governments to 

improve the meaningful participation of women 

in processes connected to peace and security and 

decision-making institutions. The United States 

will promote the protection of women and girls' 

human rights and safety from violence, abuse, 

and exploitation. The United States will continue 

to expand its capacity to use relevant analysis 

and indicators, including the collection of sexdisaggregated data, to identify and address 

barriers to women's meaningful participation 

in the prevention and resolution of conflict. The 

United States will institutionalize new standards 

for applying gender analysis of quantitative and 

qualitative information to identify, understand, 

and explain gaps between men and women to 

inform the design and targeting of United States 

interventions in conflict-affected areas, including 

defense support and security. WPS principles will 

be incorporated into all elements of this Strategy's 

country and regional planning processes. 

Atrocity Early Warning 

Preventing, mitigating, and responding to 

atrocities, as well as assisting in recovery efforts 

following mass atrocities, helps reduce fragility. 

The executive branch leads this effort through 

the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force ( the Task 

Force), a White House-led department and 

agency body established to help further the Elie 

Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act. 

The Task Force informs policymakers of 

countries at risk of or experiencing mass 

atrocities, and coordinates Administration 

response efforts. The Task Force regularly 

engages with civil society stakeholders to 

inform Administration analysis and policy 

development. The Task Force's work will be 

integrated into this Strategy's country and 

regional plans where appropriate. 

Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) 

The SAR framework, approved in 20181 

solidified a new framework for how State, 

USA ID, and DoD work together to advance 

stabilization efforts. State, USA ID, and DoD 

have developed new tools to operationalize 

SAR principles, including to craft political 

strategies, partner with other international 

donors, target and sequence stabilization 

assistance resources, and monitor and 

evaluate strategic outcomes. United States 

embassy teams in certain countries have, with 

assistance from relevant Combatant 

Commands, developed integrated stabilization 

plans and modalities to apply SAR principles. 

This Strategy will build upon and further these 

important efforts. 

National Strategy for Counterterrorism 

(NSCT} 

The 2018 NSCT emphasizes the importance of 

preventing and countering terrorist and 

violent extremist recruitment and 

radicalization. State, USA ID, and DoD are 

developing and institutionalizing the 

((prevention architecture" called for in the 

NSCT, in addition to other ongoing counterradicalization and recruitment efforts. This 

architecture includes efforts to promote 

disengagement and reintegration of former 

terrorist fighters and affiliated persons from 

violent extremist organizations. This 

Strategy will incorporate and amplify those 

targeted efforts 

20 
Women actvists in Kenya march in 2017 to promote a rap d response call center 

hot ine that responds to vio ence against women during e ections. Photo: Car a 

Chianese, IFES 

SECTIONS: 

MEASURING SUCCESS 

The United States will measure progress of 

this Strategy to demonstrate accountability 

to the American taxpayer and ensure impact. 

Departments and agencies will use a data-driven 

approach to rigorously assess the progress and 

impact of United States engagement and the 

demonstrated progress of regional national , , 

and local partners toward stated benchmarks 

and goals. Findings will inform decisionmaking and re-targeting as needed. 

Departments and agencies must make 

necessary adjustments and apply learning 

on a recurring basis to overcome inevitable 

challenges in implementing this Strategy. 

State, USAID, and DoD will jointly develop a 

Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) 

Implementation Plan for this Strategy. United 

States embassies and missions will also develop 

MEL plans for priority countries and regions. Plans 

will include a logic model that articulates what 

success looks like, maps clear pathways toward 

reducing risks and achieving policy objectives, 

and align actions and inputs accordingly. 

Stakeholders will identify relevant and specific 

commitments they will take to achieve the 

mid-term and long-term impact of the plans 

and propose appropriate metrics to measure 

progress accordingly. MEL plans will also assess 

effectiveness, capture learning on department and 

agency coordination, innovative structures and 

approaches, engage non-traditional partners, use 

other tools alongside assistance, and assess how 

departments and agencies are " doing business 

differently" in fragile contexts. The United States 

will regularly revisit the plans to ensure they are 

in sync with changing conditions on the ground. 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

The United States will monitor, assess, and 

evaluate progress toward reducing fragility in 

complex and rapidly changing environments. 

Initially, the United States will conduct baseline 

assessments for those priority countries and/ 

21 
or regions to enable subsequent measurement 

of changes. Embassies and relevant bureaus 

will gather data and routinely analyze progress 

towards defined strategic outcomes. The United 

States Government will structure monitoring 

around a framework that allows for systematic 

assessments of both quantitative and qualitative 

information, benchmarked against multiple 

levels of contextually- defined policy 

and programmatic progress. 

The GFA secretariat will conduct periodic 

department and agency reviews based on clear 

metrics to determine progress on country and 

regional plans toward the Strategy. The review 

process will systematically analyze comparable 

information across priority countries and regions, 

recognizing differences across contexts. Reviews 

will also monitor the potential risks that United 

States programs, policies, or resources could 

empower or abet repressive local actors or be 

exploited by malign actors. 

As part of the reviews, department and agency 

stakeholders will report on their actions and 

review collective strategic outcomes. Senior 

leaders will use review findings to inform policy 

considerations, determine course corrections, 

and identify areas for increased attention and 

staff resource allocations. 

Departments and agencies will streamline 

reviews and reporting efforts with other required 

reporting to reduce the burden on posts. To 

mainstream this Strategy and prevent duplicative 

MEL systems, departments and agencies will use 

existing indicators, where possible and feasible, 

and will create new indicators for tracking 

Strategy impacts as needed. 

The United States will provide sufficient expertise 

and training for embassies to conduct required 

monitoring and evaluation. 

Consultation, Learning, 

and Adaptation 

The United States will implement the 1 0-year 

Strategy on an iterative basis, building on a cycle 

of assessment, monitoring, evaluation, learning, 

and adaptation. As departments and agencies 

implement the Foundations for Evidence-Based 

Policymaking Act of 201 8 (The Evidence Act), 

the United States will institutionalize the use 

of data analytics, information-sharing, and 

rapid feedback loops. State and USAID will lead 

development and management of an integrated 

learning agenda on breaking the cycle of fragility 

and conflict. Ongoing learning will allow for 

course-correction and inform policy discussions 

and the use of adaptive management good 

practices. State, USAID, and DoD will 

incorporate lessons into department and 

agency training curricula and use 

information to address knowledge gaps. 

Headquarters will work with field-based 

partners, embassies, and missions to share 

information and learning across global fragility 

efforts. 

The United States will also develop a robust 

evidence base to address the long-term causes 

of conflict and fragility. This base will: examine 

external and internal long-term causes of 

fragility and violent conflict; determine the 

effectiveness of policies and interventions 

across contexts, conditions, and stakeholder 

groups; establish responsiveness to local 

systems and locally-defined priorities; 

examine multi-sectoral approaches to reduce 

fragility and the causes of violence; and ensure 

that approaches are conflict-sensitive and do 

no harm across multiple stakeholder and 

beneficiary groups. This evidence base will be 

hosted on a web-based application that will be 

available to United States departments and 

agencies. Departments and agencies will share 

best practices among each other and across 

multilateral partners to enhance a common 

and improved understanding of proven tactics 

and approaches. 

22 
United States departments and agencies 

will continue to engage the Congress, nongovernmental and private sector partners, 

international partner and donor nations, and 

host-nation and local partners throughout 

the implementation of this Strategy. Those 

partnerships are essential for successful learning 

and adaptation. United States departments 

and agencies will convene biannual "multistakeholder consultations" to provide updates on 

the progress of the Strategy, discuss challenges 

and lessons learned, and solicit new research and 

data-sharing on best practices. ■ 

23 
DESIGNED AND PRINTED BY 

Global Publishing Solutions (A/GI S/GPS)