alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 917.43 Terms and conditions of Sea Grant funding. No Sea Grant funding may be applied to: ( a ) ( 1 ) the purchase or rental of any land or
( 2 ) the purchase, rental, construction, preservation, or repair of any building, dock, or vessel, except that payment under any such grant or contract may (if approved by the Assistant Administrator for Administration of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or designee) be applied to the purchase, rental, construction, preservation, or repair of non-self-propelled habitats, buoys, platforms, and other similar devices or structures, or to the rental of any research vessel which is used in direct support of activities under any Sea Grant program or project.
( b ) In addition, Sea Grant funding under the Sea Grant Matched Funding Program will be subject to the limitation that the total amount which may be obligated within any one state to persons under the Sea Grant Matched Funding Program in any fiscal year shall not exceed an amount equal to 15 percent of the funds appropriated for the Sea Grant Matched Funding Program.
( c ) Any person who receives or utilizes Sea Grant funding shall keep the records required by OMB Circular A-110, “Grant and Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations,” and by NOAA General Provision, implementing OMB Circular A-110, by OMB Circular A-102, “Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments,” including records that fully disclose the amount and disposition by the recipient of such proceeds, the total cost of the program or project in which such proceeds were used, and the amount, if any, of such cost which was provided through other sources. Such records shall be maintained for three years after the completion of such a program or project. The Secretary and the Comptroller General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall have access, for the purpose of audit and evaluation, to any books, documents, papers, and records of receipt which, in the opinion of the Secretary or the Comptroller General, may be related or pertinent to such grants and contracts.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

IN RE: SIX BALLOTS IN THE 2024

GENERAL PRIMARY ELECTION

PETITION OF: JAMIE WALSH :

:

:

:

:

: No. 333 MAL 2024

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Commonwealth

Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 30th day of July, 2024

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

WILLIAM EVANS,

Petitioner

v.

THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA (HARRISBURG 

DIVISION),

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 55 EM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 5th day of July, 2017, the Application for Leave to File Original 

Process and the Application for Leave to File a Response are GRANTED, and the 

Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED.
### SUBCHAPTER V—COMPREHENSIVE CHILD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
#### § 762.4 Original records required.

The regulated person must maintain the original records in the form in which that person receives or creates them unless that person meets all of the conditions of § 762.5 of this part relating to reproduction of records. If the original record does not meet the standards of legibility and readability described in § 762.5 of this part and the regulated person intends to rely on that record to meet the recordkeeping requirements of the EAR, that person must retain the original record. With respect to documents that BIS issues to a party in SNAP-R, either an electronically stored copy in a format that makes the document readable with software possessed by that party or a paper print out of the complete document is deemed to be an original record for purposes of this section.

[61 FR 12900, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 75 FR 17055, Apr. 5, 2010]
§ 714.6 Deadlines for submission of Schedule 3 declarations, reports, and amendments. Declarations, reports, and amendments required under this part must be postmarked by the appropriate date identified in supplement no. 2 to this part 714 of the CWCR. Required declarations, reports, and amendments include: ( a ) Annual declaration on past activities (production of Schedule 3 chemicals during the previous calendar year);
( b ) Annual report on exports and imports of Schedule 3 chemicals from plant sites, trading companies, and other persons subject to the CWCR (during the previous calendar year);
( c ) Combined declaration and report (production of Schedule 3 chemicals, as well as exports or imports of the same or different Schedule 3 chemicals, by a declared plant site during the previous calendar year);
( d ) Annual declaration on anticipated activities (anticipated production of Schedule 3 chemicals during the next calendar year);
( e ) Declaration on Additionally Planned Activities (additionally planned production of Schedule 3 chemicals); and
( f ) Amended declaration and report, including combined declaration and report.
#### § 8a.605 Enforcement procedures.

The investigative, compliance, and enforcement procedural provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d) (“Title VI”) are hereby adopted and applied to these Title IX regulations. These procedures may be found at 15 CFR 8.7 through 8.15, and 13 CFR part 317.

[65 FR 52877, Aug. 30, 2000]
§ 845.206 Collection by administrative offset. ( a ) *Offset from retirement payments.* A debt may be collected in whole or in part from any lump-sum retirement payment or recurring annuity payments.
( b ) *Offset from other payments* — ( 1 ) *Administrative offset.* ( i ) A debt may be offset from other payments due the debtor from other agencies in accordance with 4 CFR 102.3 except that offset from back pay awarded under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 5596 (and 5 CFR 550.801 *et seq.*) will be made in accordance with § 550.805(e)(2) of this chapter.
( ii ) In determining whether to collect claims by means of administrative offset after the expiration of the 6-year limitation provided in 5 U.S.C. 2415, the Director or his or her designee will determine the cost effectiveness of leaving a claim unresolved for more than 6 years. This decision will be based on such factors as the amount of the debt, the cost of collection, and the likelihood of recovering the debt.
( 2 ) *Salary offset.* When the debtor is an employee, or a member of the Armed Forces, OPM may effect collection action by offset of the debtor's pay in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 5514 and 5 CFR 550.1101 *et seq.* Due process described in § 845.204 will apply. The questions of fact and liability, and entitlements to waiver or compromise determined through that process are deemed correct and will not be amended under salary offset procedures. When the debtor did not receive a hearing on the amount of the offset under § 845.204 and requests such a hearing, one will be conducted in accordance with subpart K of part 550 of this chapter.
NO. 07-02-0019-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL A

	FEBRUARY 13, 2002

	______________________________

	VICKIE DIANNE GRAY, APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY;

	NO. 57941; HONORABLE CHARLES D. CARVER, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

	ON ABATEMENT AND REMAND

	Appellant Vickie Dianne Gray challenges her conviction for the offense of securing execution of a document by deception and the resulting sentence of two years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Department of Criminal Justice.  Sentence was imposed on November 13, 2001, and the record was therefore due to be filed no later than January 14, 2002.  We have received the clerk’s record, but have not received the reporter’s record.  By letter dated January 15, 2002, we notified the court reporters that the record had not been filed and, in the event it could not be immediately filed, the reporters should request an extension of time by filing a reporter’s request form within ten days.  No response has been received to that letter.  Therefore, we abate this appeal and remand it to the Criminal  District Court of Jefferson County for a hearing.  See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(a)(2).  

	Upon remand, the judge of the trial court shall immediately cause notice to be given and conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant has abandoned her appeal or if she still desires to pursue her appeal.  In the event appellant still desires to prosecute her appeal, the court shall determine why the reporter’s record has not been filed and whether any further steps need to be taken to facilitate the provision of an appellate record and the completion of the record for appellate review.

	In support of its determination, the trial court shall prepare and file its findings and orders and cause them to be included in a supplemental clerk’s record.  The hearing proceedings shall be transcribed and included in a supplemental reporter’s record.  Those supplemental records shall be submitted to the clerk of this court no later than March 18, 2002.  

	It is so ordered. 

							Per Curiam
#### Stephens et al. v. City Of Russell et al.

February 27, 1948.

Jim Sowards, Judge.

L. D. Bruce for appellants.

John T. Diedrich and Chesley A. Lycan for appellees.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Latimer —

-Affirming.

Russell, a city of the fourth class, after ■ having passed a parking meter ordinance, entered into a contract with the M. H. Rhodes Company to install the meters. The installation work was commenced and possibly most, if not all, of the meters installed. The appellants brought this action to enjoin the further installation and operation of the meters. A temporary injunction was obtained. On motion to make the temporary injunction permanent, and after hearing oral testimony, the court dissolved the temporary injunction and dismissed the petition. Appellants prosecute this appeal.

Appellants attack the ordinance and urge a number of reasons why in their opinion the ordinance is bad. Appellees have summarized in a very concise form the points argued by appellants as follows:

> “1. The adjoining land owners own to the middle of the street and should be able to park there free and *728to charge a parking fee deprives them of their property without compensation.

> *“2.*Persons with vehicles over 20 feet long cannot conveniently park so they are discriminated against.

> “3. Some merchants think their business will suffer because customers might not want to pay the parking fee.

> “4. That the meter company is free of taxation.

> *“5.*The ordinance does not provide redress if the clock on the meter runs wrong.

> “6. The ordinance does not make provision for relief if persons are unavoidably prevented from moving their vehicles after their time is up.

> *“7.*The city cannot grant a private .privilege to use the streets.”

It is true that the ordinance is not as pointedly worded as it might be with reference to the operation of the meters and is somewhat awkwardly stated, yet we see no reason why any one should be misled thereby.

The points raised and the arguments made by appellants are not unlike those generally advanced in opposition to parking meters. The questions raised herein have been carefully resolved in the exhaustive opinion in the case of City of Louisville et al. v. Louisville Automobile Club, Inc., et al., 290 Ky. 241, 160 S. W. 2d 663. The above case was cited with approval in Graves County ex rel. v. City of Mayfield, 305 Ky. 374, 204 S. W. 2d 369.

We are not here concerned with the wisdom of placing in operation parking meters in the City of Russell. It may, and most likely will, work some hardships on some of the residents. The real and only question presented here is whether or not a city of the fourth class, in the exercise of its police power, may regulate traffic by the use of parking meters. We have held that the installation of parking meters constitutes a proper control of the public streets, and have upheld the validity of city ordinances providing for the establishment and installation of parking meters as assistant to that control. See cases above.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
§ 9.2 Definitions. ( a ) The term *Secretary* means the Secretary of Commerce.
( b ) The term *manufacturer* means any person engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of new appliances or equipment in the United States, or in the importing of such products for sale or resale, or any person whose brand or trademark appears on such products who owns such brand or trademark and has authorized its use on such products, if the brand or trademark of the person actually manufacturing or assembling the products does not appear on the products.
( c ) The term *energy consumption* means the energy resources used by appliances or equipment under conditions of use approximating actual operating conditions insofar as practical as determined through test procedures contained or identified in a final Voluntary Energy Conservation Specification published under § 9.4(e).
( d ) The term *energy efficiency* means the energy use of appliances or equipment relative to their output of services, as determined through test procedures contained or identified in a final Voluntary Energy Conservation Specification published under § 9.4(e).
( e ) The term *consumer* means the first person who purchases a new appliance or item of equipment for purposes other than resale.
( f ) The term *class of appliance or equipment* means a group of appliances or equipment whose functions or features are similar, and whose functional output covers a range that may be of interest to consumers.
( g ) The term *Specification* means a Voluntary Energy Conservation Specification developed under § 9.4.
( h ) The term *label* means printed matter affixed to or otherwise provided with appliances or equipment and meeting all the requirements called for in a Voluntary Energy Conservation Specification published under § 9.4(e).
[38 FR 29574, Oct. 26, 1973, as amended at 40 FR 33966, Aug. 13, 1975]
§ 325.14 Submitting reports. ( a ) Not later than each anniversary of a certificate's effective date, the Secretary shall notify the certificate holder of the information to be included in the annual report. This report shall contain any changes relevant to the matters specified in the certificate, an update of the information contained in the application brought current to the anniversary date, and any other information the Secretary considers appropriate, after consultation with the Attorney General.
( b ) Not later than forty-five days after each anniversary of a certificate's effective date, a certificate holder shall submit its annual report to the Secretary. The Secretary shall deliver a copy of the annual report to the Attorney General.
( c ) Failure to submit a complete annual report may be the basis for modification or revocation of a certificate.
#### **Exhibit31-1**

****

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Gerald E.Johnston,****certify that:

1.        I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of The CloroxCompany.

2         Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this ** **report;

3.        Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present inall material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;

4.        The registrant’s other certifying officers and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controlsand procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a‐15(e)and 15d‐15(e) for the registrant and have:

a)        designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;

b)        Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and

c)        Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

5.        The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and Ihave disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)        all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

b)        any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

Date:  September 19,2003

/s/ Gerald E.Johnston          

Gerald E.Johnston

President and ChiefExecutive Officer
§ 27.123 Early termination of research support: Evaluation of applications and proposals. ( a ) The department or agency head may require that Federal department or agency support for any project be terminated or suspended in the manner prescribed in applicable program requirements, when the department or agency head finds an institution has materially failed to comply with the terms of this policy.
( b ) In making decisions about supporting or approving applications or proposals covered by this policy the department or agency head may take into account, in addition to all other eligibility requirements and program criteria, factors such as whether the applicant has been subject to a termination or suspension under paragraph (a) of this section and whether the applicant or the person or persons who would direct or has/have directed the scientific and technical aspects of an activity has/have, in the judgment of the department or agency head, materially failed to discharge responsibility for the protection of the rights and welfare of human subjects (whether or not the research was subject to federal regulation).
§ 2006.5 Consultations with the Foreign Government. ( a ) If the Trade Representative determines to initiate an investigation on the basis of a petition he shall, on behalf of the United States, request consultations with the foreign country concerned regarding the issues involved in such an investigation. In preparing United States presentations for consultations and dispute settlement proceedings, the Trade Representative shall seek information and advice from the petitioner and any appropriate private sector representatives, including committees established pursuant to section 135 of the Trade Act.
( b ) To ensure an adequate basis for consultation, the Trade Representative may, after consulting with the petitioner, delay requests for consultations for up to 90 days in order to verify or improve the petition. If consultations are delayed, the time limits referred to in § 2006.12 below shall be extended for the period of such delay.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Leah Kleid, Respondent, against Carr Brothers et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Foster, P. J-., Brewster and Santry, JJ., concur; Bergan, J., dissents in the following memorandum in which Deyo, J., concurs: The presumption created by section 21 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law must rest on some fact tending to connect the accident with the employment. There is no such fact in this record. It is not enough to say the employee was on the station platform in the course of employment. He was not on the platform when injured. Where he was and what he was then doing are crucial and controlling facts, as an examination of the long line of authorities will demonstrate. Certainly there is substantial evidence here that he was not selling anything in his employer’s import-export business in the Brooklyn tunnel. Nothing he could be doing there would have any possible relationship to employment. To invoke the presumption here is to invoke it without evidence. I dissent and vote to reverse.
EXHIBIT 99.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, George Kadifa, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Corio, Inc. on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Corio, Inc.



Dated: March 28, 2003



/s/    GEORGE
KADIFAGeorge Kadifa President and Chief Executive Officer
#### The People *ex rel.*Jack Brady, Petitioner-Appellant, *v.*Hugh Campbell, Sheriff of Sangamon County, Respondent-Appellee.

(No. 12628;

Fourth District

September 5, 1974.

John F. McNichols and John L. Swartz, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP

delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner appeals from the order denying a writ of habeas corpus (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 65, par. 1 *et seq.).*

Petitioner was incarcerated in the Sangamon County Jail on July 5, 1973, on a 1-year sentence for a conviction entered pursuant to a negotiated plea of guilty to aggravated battery. On April 22, 1974, he was released from custody by the Sangamon County sheriff who had allowed credit for “good time” at the merit good behavior allowance rate pursuant to the Misdemeanant Good Behavior Allowance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 75, pars. 30 — 34). On April 23, 1974, a bench warrant was issued for petitioner’s arrest pursuant to motion of the State’s Attorney alleging that the terms of petitioner’s plea agreement required petitioner to actually serve 1 full year on the sentence and that he not be released prior to July 4, 1974. At the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus, the trial court determined that under the terms of petitioner’s plea agreement, he had waived, and was not entitled to any credit for “good time” against his 1-year sentence.

The State has failed to file a brief in this court and has made no request for extension of time for filing briefs. The State has taken no other action to support the order of the trial court. We have examined the record and have concluded that pro forma reversal would not result *1072in substantial injustice, and accordingly, the order of the trial court denying the petition for habeas corpus is reversed. *People v.*French, 9 Ill. App.3d 797, 293 N.E.2d 136.

Reversed.

SMITH, P. J., and SIMKINS, J., concur.
###### Editorial Note on Part 922

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 922 appear at 62 FR 3789, Jan. 27, 1997 and at 62 FR 67724, Dec. 30, 1997.

#### § 922.161 Boundary.

The sanctuary consists of an area of approximately 2,872 square nautical miles (nmi2) (3,803 sq. mi.) of coastal and ocean waters, and the submerged lands thereunder, surrounding the Florida Keys in Florida. Appendix I to this subpart sets forth the precise Sanctuary boundary.

[88 FR 969, Jan. 6, 2023]