United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1997 OPERATION PROVIDE

COMFORT

Review of U.S. Air

Force Investigation of

Black Hawk Fratricide

Incident

GAO/OSI-98-4

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Office of Special Investigations

B-266152.2 

November 5, 1997

The Honorable Steve Buyer

Chairman

The Honorable Gene Taylor

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mac Collins

House of Representatives

In response to written requests from the Subcommittee and subsequent discussions with your

offices, this report presents the results of our review of military investigations made subsequent

to the April 14, 1994, shootdown by U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters of two U.S. Army Black Hawk

helicopters over Iraq in which 26 individuals died. We were asked to determine if the Air Force’s

subsequent Aircraft Accident Investigation Board investigation of the fratricide had met its

objectives, if the resulting Uniform Code of Military Justice investigations had followed

established guidelines, and if military officials had improperly or unlawfully influenced these

investigations. We were also asked to, during our investigation, consider concerns voiced by

victims’ family members and others.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Air

Force and the Army, and interested congressional committees. Copies will also be made

available to other interested parties upon request.

If you have questions about this report, please call me or Deputy Director for Investigations,

Donald G. Fulwider, at (202) 512-7455. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix

III.

Eljay B. Bowron

Assistant Comptroller General

 for Special Investigations
Executive Summary

Purpose On April 14, 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and their crews

assigned to Operation Provide Comfort were transporting U.S., United

Kingdom, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish representatives;

and a U.S. political advisor in northern Iraq. Concurrently, a U.S. Air Force

Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft was flying over

Turkey to provide airborne threat warning and control for Operation

Provide Comfort aircraft, including the Black Hawk helicopters. The pilots

of two U.S. F-15 fighters patrolling the area misidentified the Black Hawks

as Iraqi Hind helicopters and shot them down, killing all 26 individuals

aboard.

As a result of questions raised by concerned individuals, including family

members of those killed in the fratricide, the House Committee on

National Security held a hearing in August 1995 to examine the causes of

the incident, the resulting investigation by an Air Force Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board, and the judicial actions under the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ) that followed. After the hearing, the Committee

asked GAO to determine if (1) the Board investigation of the shootdown

had met its objectives, (2) the subsequent UCMJ investigations had followed

established guidelines, and (3) Department of Defense and/or Air Force

officials had improperly or unlawfully influenced these investigations. The

Committee also requested that, during its investigation, GAO consider

concerns of victims’ family members and others, including corrective

actions taken to help prevent another accident.

To do so, GAO interviewed over 160 individuals throughout the United

States, Europe, and the Middle East. They included family members;

involved aircrews; Army and Air Force personnel who had served in

Operation Provide Comfort; Board members, legal staff, and technical

staff; and command personnel responsible for staff assigned to Operation

Provide Comfort. GAO reviewed its previous work concerning Operation

Provide Comfort and analyzed Board and UCMJ documentation, including

25 volumes and about 700 pieces of supporting evidence from the Board,

thousands of classified documents, hearing and court-martial transcripts,

and reports of corrective actions taken. However, the Department of

Defense prevented GAO from interviewing key officials in the process,

including the Convening Officials and the Inquiry and Investigating

Officers. The Department of Defense voiced the belief that “any

Congressional intrusion” into the UCMJ deliberative process would

compromise the independence of the military justice system. GAO did not

evaluate the appropriateness of the disciplinary or corrective actions

taken.

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Executive Summary

Background In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688

that demanded that Iraq stop repressing the Kurds in northern Iraq and

called on member nations to help meet the humanitarian needs of the

region. An emergency relief effort was initiated, named Operation Provide

Comfort. Military units from the United States and 12 other countries soon

joined the effort as a coalition. The air forces of four coalition members,

including the United States, began securing the area of northern Iraq

above the 36th parallel, prohibiting Iraqi aircraft from flying north of that

parallel—the “no-fly zone.” The coalition also established a security zone

for the Kurds, inside the no-fly zone, into which no Iraqi military could

enter.

The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, directed the creation of a

Combined Task Force with all coalition members. By September 1991, the

Combined Task Force organization, headed by U.S. and Turkish

co-commanders, included a Combined Task Force staff; a Combined

Forces Air Component (CFAC); and a Military Coordination Center. The

CFAC Commander exercised daily control of the Operation Provide

Comfort flight mission through his Director of Operations (CFAC/DO), as

well as a ground-based Mission Director at the Combined Task Force

headquarters and an Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS. The

CFAC/DO was responsible for publishing guidance, including the Airspace

Control Order, for conduct of Operation Provide Comfort missions. (The

Airspace Control Order was a directive to all Operation Provide Comfort

aircrews that provided rules and procedures governing Operation Provide

Comfort flight operations.) The Military Coordination Center monitored

conditions in the security zone and was supported by a U.S. Army

helicopter detachment.

Planes and personnel assigned to Operation Provide Comfort on a

temporary duty basis conducted air operations. U.S. air assets included,

among others, AWACS aircraft, F-15 fighters, and Black Hawk helicopters.

Daily flight operations were referred to as “mission packages.” AWACS

aircraft were to (1) control aircraft enroute to and from the tactical area of

responsibility (TAOR), or no-fly zone; (2) coordinate air refueling;

(3) provide airborne threat warning and control in the TAOR; and

(4) provide surveillance, detection, and identification of all unknown

aircraft. F-15 fighters, as the first aircraft in the TAOR, were to

search—“sanitize”—the area with radar and electronic measures to ensure

that it was clear of hostile aircraft and then fly orbit to provide air cover

for the rest of the package. The Army’s Black Hawk helicopters flew

supply and transport missions for the Military Coordination Center. They

Page 3 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

also provided transport into the TAOR to visit Kurdish villages and maintain

a visual presence.

On the day of the incident, two Black Hawks and their crews were

transporting officials inside the TAOR. Although the AWACS crew flying

support for the day’s mission package were aware that the Black Hawks

were in the area, the two F-15 pilots sanitizing the area were not aware of

their presence. The F-15 pilots received two radar contacts (helicopters)

and stated that they attempted unsuccessfully to identify them by

electronic means. They twice reported their unsuccessful attempts to the

AWACS but were not informed of the presence of the Black Hawks in the

contact area. As required, the F-15 pilots attempted a visual identification

of the helicopters. However, their attempt, involving a single pass each,

was at speeds, altitudes, and distances at which it was unlikely that they

would have detected the helicopters’ markings. This resulted in the lead

pilot’s misidentification of the helicopters as Iraqi Hinds and the

subsequent shootdown of the Black Hawks.

Later that day, the U.S. Secretary of Defense ordered an investigation that

resulted in the convening of an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board,

which made information more readily available to the public than would a

Safety Board Investigation. The Board report and the required Board

President’s opinion (see app. I)—issued May 27, 1994—identified “a chain

of events” as the incident’s cause: beginning with the Combined Task

Force’s failure to provide clear guidance to its component organizations,

the components’ misunderstanding of their responsibilities, Operation

Provide Comfort’s failure to integrate Army helicopter and Air Force

operations, AWACS crew mistakes, and ending with the F-15 lead pilot’s

misidentification of the helicopters and the wingman’s failure to notify the

lead pilot of his inability to positively identify the helicopters.

On the basis of the report, the Secretary of Defense directed applicable

military commands to determine if UCMJ violations had occurred.

Subsequently, the commands appointed Inquiry Officers and Investigating

Officers to investigate 14 officers. The UCMJ process resulted in the

following: one officer was tried by court-martial, resulting in an acquittal;

one officer received nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, consisting of

a letter of reprimand; and nine others received administrative letters of

either reprimand, admonition, or counseling. No adverse action was taken

against the remaining three officers.

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Executive Summary

Results in Brief The primary purpose of an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, in

accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-14 (since replaced by Air Force

Instruction 51-503), is to gather and preserve evidence for claims,

litigation, and disciplinary and administrative needs. Within a limited time

frame of 42 days, the Board conducted an extensive investigation that

complied with the regulation’s evidentiary requirements and guidelines in

collecting and preserving evidence. It also produced a “Summary of

Facts,” or report, that with a few exceptions provided an overview of the

factual circumstances relating to the accident.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report focused on, among other

matters, command and control problems, including individuals’ lack of

knowledge of specific procedures. The report, however, (1) did not

discuss the F-15 pilots’ responsibility, under the Airspace Control Order, to

report to the Airborne Command Element when encountering an unknown

aircraft in the TAOR and (2) cited a CFAC Commander statement that

inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having

authority to stop the incident, even though evidence that the Airborne

Command Element had the authority was available to the Board. Further,

the Board President erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of

an incorrect electronic identification code in the TAOR resulted in the F-15

pilots not receiving an electronic response.

Additionally, at the August 1995 hearing, family members and others raised

concerns about a perceived general lack of discipline in the F-15 pilot

community in Operation Provide Comfort and a perceived urgency by the

F-15 pilots to engage during the shootdown. The Board’s report and

opinion did not discuss these issues. While an examination of these issues

was not required under Air Force Regulation 110-14, the regulation did not

preclude it; and GAO found the issues relevant to its inquiry.

In response to GAO inquiries, Operation Provide Comfort officials stated

that the pilots’ failure on April 14, 1994, to contact the Airborne Command

Element was the result of a lack of F-15 mission discipline in Operation

Provide Comfort at the time of the incident. In addition, Operation Provide

Comfort officials stated that, in their view, there was no reason for the

F-15 pilots’ urgency to engage. These issues are not inconsistent with the

Board President’s conclusion regarding the chain of events that led to the

misidentification and shootdown of the Black Hawks. Including them in

the Board’s report, however, may have raised additional questions about

the actions of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command Element that

Page 5 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

could have been useful in subsequent administrative and disciplinary

actions.

During its review of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process, GAO

found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence. That

review included access to, among others, Board members, technical

advisers, and investigative staff as well as investigative documents.

Regarding the questions concerning the subsequent UCMJ process and

improper or unlawful command influence during that process, GAO

determined the following. UCMJ investigations complied with provisions of

the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Based on a review of the

summary reports of investigation, a statement by the AWACS Investigating

Officer, and stipulations by several of the officials involved in UCMJ

investigations, GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command

influence. However, GAO was unable to confirm whether the consideration

and disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of

improper or unlawful command influence because the Department of

Defense, concerned about any congressional intrusion into the

deliberative process, denied GAO’s request to interview the applicable UCMJ

Convening Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers.

Finally, immediately following the accident and as the result of additional

reviews and analyses, the Department of Defense and the Air Force took

hundreds of corrective actions, including insertion of Black Hawk flight

times on the daily Air Tasking Order, to help prevent a similar shootdown.

The Chief of Staff, Air Force, also took additional personnel actions,

including issuing letters of evaluation, after finding that a number of

individuals’ performance evaluations had not reflected previous

administrative actions taken as a result of the individuals’ failure to meet

Air Force standards.

Principal Findings

Aircraft Accident

Investigation Met Objective

but Report Was Not

Complete

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was properly convened and met

the objective as set forth in Air Force Regulation 110-14 of conducting an

extensive investigation that preserved evidence of the facts surrounding

the incident. The required report, which included the Board President’s

opinion, focused on Combined Task Force command and control

Page 6 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

problems, among other matters, citing lack of knowledge of command and

control guidance as one reason for the deficiencies of the AWACS crew and

activity by the incident Black Hawk pilots. However, the Board report did

not discuss or did not properly assess relevant information available to it

regarding three aspects involving the F-15 pilots and the Airborne

Command Element. Further, concerning F-15 pilot discipline, Operation

Provide Comfort officials told GAO that mission discipline problems with

F-15 pilots did exist at the time of the incident and they saw no reason for

the incident F-15 pilots’ urgency to shoot.

F-15 Pilots’ Requirement to

Contact Airborne Command

Element

The Board’s report did not discuss the F-15 pilots’ responsibility, under the

Airspace Control Order, to report any unusual circumstance or

occurrence, such as an unidentified aircraft in the TAOR, to the Airborne

Command Element aboard the AWACS. The Board had reviewed this

provision of the order and evidence that the pilots knew of the provision.

The Board report did not discuss the F-15 pilots’ failure to report to the

Airborne Command Element because the Board concluded that the

Airborne Command Element had been aware of the F-15s’ intercept of the

helicopters. Therefore, the Board did not consider the pilots’

nonadherence to be a significant cause of the accident. According to a

Board representative, the nonadherence was an example of a general

breakdown in command and control, and it “may not have been common

practice” for pilots to make this contact. While the Board conducted an

extensive investigation, it did not know of a CFAC/DO oral directive given

about a week before the shootdown, reemphasizing the requirement for

fighter pilots to report to the Airborne Command Element. That directive

was the result of an incident in which F-15 pilots had initially ignored

directions from an Airborne Command Element, concerned about a

possible trap, to “knock off,” or stop, an intercept with an Iraqi aircraft.

Airborne Command Element

Had Authority to Stop

Encounter

Also, the Board cited a CFAC Commander’s inaccurate testimony that the

Airborne Command Element had no decision-making authority with

regard to aircraft encounters in the TAOR. Other testimony—gathered

during the Board’s investigation—from more knowledgeable individuals,

including the CFAC/DO who used the Airborne Command Element as “his

eyes and ears” in the TAOR, contradicted that statement. Under the

Airspace Control Order, the Airborne Command Element had the authority

to stop fighters from engaging hostile or unknown aircraft in the TAOR.

Black Hawks’ Use of Wrong

Electronic Code Should Not

Have Prevented F-15 Pilots

From Receiving Response

The Board President erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of

an incorrect electronic code resulted in the F-15 pilots not receiving a

response when using their electronic Air-to-Air Interrogation/Identification

Page 7 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

Friend or Foe (AAI/IFF) systems. A subsequent Air Force analysis was

inconclusive as to why the F-15 pilots did not receive a response.

However, that analysis—based on the pilots’ testimony regarding their

system interrogation settings—indicated that during certain interrogation

sequences, the F-15 pilots should have received a response regardless of

the Black Hawks’ code. Although the Board reviewed the pilots’ testimony,

as well as other information about the IFF system settings and operation,

the Board President drew an erroneous conclusion from the information.

Operation Provide

Comfort—Perceived Discipline

Problem and Urgency to Fire

Family members and others raised concerns about perceived Operation

Provide Comfort discipline issues not described in the report or the

opinion: lack of mission discipline by F-15 pilots in general and the

incident pilots’ urgency to fire. Although these issues were not required to

be in the Board’s report or opinion, the Board was not precluded from

probing them; and GAO found the issues relevant to its review.

In response to GAO’s questions, Operation Provide Comfort officials stated

that they had experienced a number of mission discipline problems with

F-15 pilots. These included the knock-off incident a week before the

shootdown. Operation Provide Comfort officials also noted that the rivalry

between F-15 and F-16 pilots, normally perceived as leading to a positive

professional competition, had become more pronounced and intense at

the time of the shootdown. Further, one command official stated that this

rivalry may have led to the incident F-15 pilots’ perceived rush to shoot.

According to Operation Provide Comfort officials, the Airspace Control

Order was specifically designed to slow a situation, allowing CFAC time to

check it out. These officials said the F-15 pilots had no need for haste, as

the sighted helicopters had posed no threat to the F-15s or the mission

package.

Question of Command

Influence During the

Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board

Process

Based on GAO’s review of extensive information made available to it and

interviews of Board members and technical and legal advisors, GAO found

no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence exerted during

the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process.

Military Justice Process

and Administrative Actions

The Air Force UCMJ investigations that followed the Aircraft Accident

Investigation complied with provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for

Courts-Martial. In accordance with Department of Defense guidelines,

charges are ordinarily forwarded to the accuseds’ immediate commander

Page 8 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

for initial consideration as to disposition. Thus, individuals were

considered under UCMJ by two separate commands.

A command under the U.S. Air Combat Command investigated seven

officers; one—the AWACS Senior Director—was court-martialed. He was

found not guilty. Another—the Commander, 963d Air Control

Squadron—retired. Four others received letters of reprimand: one letter

was the result of nonjudicial punishment; the others were administrative

actions. No action was taken against the CFAC Mission Director because he

was judged blameless in the incident.

A command under the U.S. Air Forces in Europe investigated the other

seven officers—five Operation Provide Comfort officials and the two F-15

pilots. The pilots received letters of reprimand; two other officers received

less severe letters of admonition, with one—the Commander, Operation

Provide Comfort Combined Task Force—also being reassigned to a

noncommand position; the Director of Operations for Plans and Policy

received a letter of counseling and revocation of a medal for meritorious

service. No action was taken against the two remaining officers.

Question of Command

Influence During the UCMJ

Process

GAO found no evidence of command influence, based on a review of

information made available to it—including (1) summary reports of

investigation during the UCMJ process that included the suspected

violations, facts considered, and analysis involved in the decisions

reached; (2) a statement by the Investigating Officer in the AWACS

investigation denying outside influence; and (3) statements by six

cognizant officials denying any improper influence. In GAO’s attempt to

confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses

under the UCMJ process were the result of improper or unlawful command

influence, GAO requested access to the Convening Authorities, Inquiry

Officers, and Investigating Officers. However, the Department of

Defense—saying “any Congressional intrusion into the deliberative

process . . . endangers the actual and perceived independence of the

military justice system”—refused to allow GAO to interview these military

officers, thus limiting GAO’s investigation in this area.

Air Force Corrective

Actions and Task Force

Findings

Within 24 hours of the shootdown, European Command and Combined

Task Force Commanders instituted corrective actions, including

modifications of the Rules of Engagement, addition of helicopter flight

Page 9 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

times on the daily Air Tasking Order, and further definition of AWACS

responsibilities.

When the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted the Board report to

the Secretary of Defense, he noted that the tragic deaths of 26 men and

women on the Black Hawk helicopters were attributable to a series of

avoidable errors and the failure of safeguards in place at the time of the

shootdown. In July 1994, he ordered a review of Joint Task Force

operations with the objectives of strengthening operational oversight,

implementing change, and reviewing AWACS training and certification

procedures.

An Air Combat Command “Tiger Team” studied AWACS/Airborne command

and control, visual identification, and ground command and control and

made about 140 recommendations in its September 14, 1994, report.

Concurrently, a special Air Force task force composed of more than 120

people in 6 commands concluded that 2 breakdowns in individual

performance contributed to the shootdown: (1) The AWACS mission crew

did not provide the F-15 pilots an accurate picture of the situation and

(2) the F-15 pilots misidentified the target.

Actions by the Flying

Evaluation Boards and the

Air Force Chief of Staff

Flying Evaluation Boards were convened by the Air Force as a result of

the shootdown. Upon review of the Boards’ findings and

recommendations, the Commander, 17th Air Force concluded that the lead

F-15 pilot and the F-15 wingman should remain qualified for noncombat

aviation service. In a subsequent review, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces

in Europe (1) concurred with the decisions relating to the lead pilot and

(2) determined that the wingman remain qualified for aviation service but

directed that he be reassigned to a staff position not involved in flying

duties.

At the request of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief of

Staff reviewed the administrative actions taken in regard to the Air Force

personnel involved in the shootdown. While the Chief of Staff determined

that a proper balance had been maintained between command

involvement and individual rights, he noted that a number of performance

evaluations were inadequate, as they were inconsistent with

administrative actions taken by higher level commanders. Accordingly, he

prepared letters of evaluation for seven Air Force personnel, noting their

failure to meet certain Air Force standards, and took additional action

against five of the personnel. The two F-15 pilots were disqualified from

Page 10 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Executive Summary

aviation service for 3 years and three members of the AWACS crew were

disqualified from assignment to duties involving control of aircraft in air

operations for at least 3 years.

Recommendations GAO is making no recommendations.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense

concurred in GAO’s conclusions that (1) the Board was properly convened,

complied with the law, and met its objectives; (2) the military justice

investigations that followed the accident investigation also complied with

applicable law; and (3) no evidence of unlawful or improper command

influence existed with respect to the accident investigation or military

justice processes. Defense agreed that the few differences between GAO’s

report and the accident investigation report would not have affected the

Board President’s conclusions. These comments are reprinted in appendix

II.

Page 11 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Background 14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Chapter 2 

Aircraft Accident

Investigation

22

Investigation Met Objective but the Report Contained Three

Deficiencies

23

No Improper/Unlawful Command Influence Found 25

No Discussion of F-15 Pilots’ Requirement to Report to Airborne

Command Element Who Had Authority to Stop Encounter

25

Board President’s Erroneous Conclusion That Black Hawks’ Use

of Wrong Code Prevented F-15 Pilots From Receiving Response

29

A Perceived Discipline Problem and a Perceived Rush to Engage 32

Conclusions 35

Chapter 3 

The Military Justice

Process and

Administrative

Actions

36

UCMJ Process 37

Air Combat Command’s UCMJ Actions Against AWACS and

Related Officers

39

U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s UCMJ Actions Against Operation

Provide Comfort Officials and F-15 Pilots

40

UCMJ Activities Concerning Combined Task Force Chief of Staff 42

Actions by Flying Evaluation Boards and Air Force Chief of Staff 42

The Question of Command Influence 45

Chapter 4 

Corrective and Other

Actions by the

Department of

Defense and the Air

Force After the

Shootdown

47

Immediate Corrective Actions 47

European Command’s Operations Assessments and Corrective

Actions

48

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Corrective Actions 48

Air Combat Command’s—Tiger Team’s—Corrective Actions 49

Air Force Special Task Force 49

Appendixes Appendix I: Aircraft Accident Investigation Board President’s

Opinion

52

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Contents

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 55

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 56

Figure Figure 1.1: Operation Provide Comfort Operations Area 15

Abbreviations

AAI/IFF Air-to-Air Interrogation/Identification Friend or Foe system

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft

CFAC Combined Forces Air Component

CFAC/DO Combined Forces Air Component Director of Operations

GAO U.S. General Accounting Office

OSI Office of Special Investigations

RCM Rules for Court-Martial

TAOR tactical area of responsibility

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAF U.S. Air Force

Page 13 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Background

Operation Provide Comfort

Mission

In April 1991, and in concert with United Nations Security Council

Resolution 688, military units from a coalition of the United States and 12

other countries began providing direct emergency care and assistance to

Kurds and other ethnic groups in northern Iraq following a revolt against

the Iraqi government.1

 This emergency relief effort was named Operation

Provide Comfort.

Coalition forces secured an area of northern Iraq that excluded Iraqi

aircraft above the 36th parallel—the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR),2

or no-fly zone—and prepared transit camps within Iraq for the return of

the people who had fled from the advancing Iraqi army. To provide a

secure environment for the returnees, the coalition established a security

zone within the TAOR into which Iraqi forces could not enter. Coalition air

forces from France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States

were assembled to conduct frequent air operations in the TAOR. A Military

Coordination Center was established in Zakhu, Iraq, located inside the

security zone, to provide a direct communications link with the Iraqi

military, humanitarian relief agencies, and Kurdish leaders. Figure 1.1

illustrates the location of pertinent points in and around the TAOR.

1

The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, directed the creation of a Combined Task Force with all

coalition members. Members at that time were the United States, Australia, Belgium, Italy, Canada,

Turkey, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Luxembourg.

2

The TAOR was the airspace north of 36 degrees north latitude in Iraq from which Iraqi aircraft were

prohibited.

Page 14 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: Operation Provide Comfort Operations Area

IRAN

SYRIA

Incirlik

IRAQ 36 TH PARALLEL

TURKEY

Diyarbakir

Zakhu

TAOR = tactical area of responsibility

N

S

W E

IRAQ

Security

Zone

Irbil

Crash

Sites TAOR

Command Structure The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, delegated operational control of

assigned U.S. Army and Air Force units to the Combined Task Force

Commander located at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The Combined Task

Force Commander also had tactical control of participating Turkish,

French, and British forces; but operational control of those forces was

retained by their parent commands.3

On July 20, 1991, the Combined Task Force Commander issued an

operations plan governing the conduct of the Operation Provide Comfort.

The plan delineated the command relationships and organizational

responsibilities within Combined Task Force Operation Provide Comfort.

The Combined Task Force was headed by U.S. and Turkish

co-commanders and included a Combined Task Force staff; a Combined

Forces Air Component (CFAC); and the Army component, including the

Military Coordination Center.

3

Tactical control is the detailed, and usually local, direction and control of movements and maneuvers

necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Operational control is the authority to command

subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction necessary to

accomplish the mission.

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

Operation Provide Comfort

Air Operations

CFAC coordinated air operations for Operation Provide Comfort. It had

operational control of air assets—such as Airborne Warning and Control

System aircraft (AWACS) and F-15 and F-16 fighters—and tactical control of

Army helicopters. The Military Coordination Center at Zakhu was

supported by a Black Hawk helicopter detachment at Diyarbakir, Turkey.

(See fig. 1.1.) Air operations were conducted by planes and personnel

assigned to Operation Provide Comfort on a temporary duty basis.

Fighter Aircraft Fighter aircraft performed the bulk of the Operation Provide Comfort

flying mission. A typical “mission package” contained as many as 30 to 40

fighter aircraft and a variety of aircraft with specific mission capabilities.

The fighters flew two- and four-ship formations and provided the following

capabilities: visual and sensor reconnaissance of military targets,

defensive counter air operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, and

on-call precision-guided munitions delivery. At the beginning of each

mission, no other aircraft was supposed to enter the TAOR until fighters

with airborne intercept radars had searched, or “sanitized,” the area.

AWACS During the daily operations, the AWACS was responsible for (1) controlling

aircraft enroute to and from the TAOR; (2) coordinating air refueling;

(3) providing airborne threat warning and control for Operation Provide

Comfort aircraft operating in the TAOR; and (4) providing surveillance,

detection, and identification of all unknown aircraft. The AWACS took off

about 2 hours before the rest of the fixed-wing package and eventually

entered an orbit in Turkish air space slightly north of the TAOR. (See fig.

1.1.)

The AWACS mission crew was headed by a Mission Crew Commander who

had overall responsibility for the AWACS mission. The Mission Crew

Commander directly supervised an Air Surveillance Officer; Senior

Director; and various communications, radar, and data processing

technicians. The Air Surveillance Officer supervised air surveillance

technicians who were responsible for identifying and monitoring

non-Operation Provide Comfort aircraft. The Senior Director supervised

and directed the activity of the controllers. The Enroute Controller was

responsible for Operation Provide Comfort aircraft going to and from the

TAOR. The Tanker Controller was responsible for coordinating the refueling

of Operation Provide Comfort aircraft. The TAOR Controller was

responsible for Operation Provide Comfort aircraft in the TAOR. In

addition, a Turkish controller was present on each AWACS mission flight.

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Introduction

Military Coordination Center

Helicopters

Military Coordination Center Black Hawk helicopters stationed at

Diyarbakir provided air transportation for the Military Coordination

Center liaison team and conducted resupply missions at Zakhu, as

required. The Black Hawks also used Zakhu as a stage for flying missions

further in the TAOR to visit Kurdish villages, monitored conditions in the

security zone, and conducted search and rescue missions.

The Shootdown On April 14, 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and their crew

assigned to the Military Coordination Center were transporting U.S.,

United Kingdom, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish

representatives; and a U.S. political advisor in the TAOR. The Black Hawks

had departed Zakhu enroute to Irbil, Iraq. (See fig. 1.1.) At the same time,

two F-15s were sanitizing the area that the Black Hawks were in; and the

AWACS was over Turkey providing airborne threat warning and control. The

AWACS was aware that the Army Black Hawk helicopters had departed

Zakhu and were proceeding east into the TAOR. However, the F-15 pilots

were unaware that Black Hawk helicopters were already in the area and

were not advised of the presence of friendly aircraft. The fighters twice

informed the AWACS that they had unknown radar contacts in the TAOR, and

the AWACS had access to electronic information regarding the presence of

friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the F-15s’ reported radar contacts.

Throughout the incident, the helicopters were unable to hear the radio

transmissions between the F-15 pilots and the AWACS because they were on

a different radio frequency.

According to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board President’s

opinion, when the F-15 pilots were unable to get positive/consistent

electronic responses, they performed a visual intercept with each making

a single identification pass over the Black Hawks to identify the

“unknown” aircraft. However, the Board President concluded that the

identification passes were carried out at speeds, altitudes, and distances at

which it was unlikely that the pilots would have been able to detect the

Black Hawks’ markings. The pilots said that they did not recognize the

differences between the U.S. Black Hawk helicopters with wing-mounted

fuel tanks and Hind helicopters with wing-mounted weapons. The Board

President determined that the pilot in the lead F-15 aircraft had

misidentified the U.S. Black Hawks as Iraqi Hind helicopters and the

wingman did not confirm, when asked by the lead pilot, that he had been

unable to make a positive identification. The flight lead fired a single

missile and shot down the trailing Black Hawk helicopter. At the lead

pilot’s direction, the F-15 wingman fired a single missile and shot down the

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Introduction

lead helicopter. All 26 individuals aboard the two helicopters were killed

in the fratricide.

Aircraft Accident

Investigation

When the Combined Task Force Commander learned that the Black

Hawks had been shot down on April 14, 1994, he appointed the former

CFAC Commander to conduct a Safety Board Investigation.4 The appointee

assembled a staff and began to collect relevant information. Later on

April 14, the Secretary of Defense ordered an Aircraft Accident

Investigation, which provides more disclosure to the public than does a

safety investigation. As a result, the safety investigation was discontinued;

and an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was convened under Air

Force Regulation 110-14, since replaced by Air Force Instruction 51-503.

The investigation’s main objectives were (1) to gather and preserve

evidence for further investigations and inquiries by conducting a thorough

investigation and preparing an accident report and (2) to determine if

possible, through the Board President’s opinion, the accident’s main

causes.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The House Committee on National Security held a hearing in August 1995

related to the April 14, 1994, incident. Subsequently, the Chairman and

Ranking Minority Member of the Committee’s Subcommittee on Military

Personnel and Representative Mac Collins asked us, not to reinvestigate

the shootdown but, to determine whether (1) the Board investigation of

the Black Hawk shootdown had met its objectives and goals,

(2) subsequent Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) investigations had

followed established guidelines, and (3) any Department of Defense and/or

Air Force officials had improperly or unlawfully influenced these

investigations. The Subcommittee also requested that we consider

concerns raised by victims’ families and others. We did not evaluate the

appropriateness of resultant disciplinary or corrective actions.

We interviewed family members of the U.S. victims and others with

concerns about how the military had handled the incident. In general, they

had questions about the process and results of the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board and the UCMJ investigations. We examined thousands

4

Air Force Regulation 127-4 (Safety), since replaced by Air Force Instruction 91-204, establishes the

general program for investigating and reporting all U.S. Air Force mishaps. Safety investigations are

conducted to find the cause(s) and take preventive actions. Since much of that information is available

only from the person(s) directly involved, a promise of confidentiality is given to all witnesses; and

privileged information is protected from disclosure outside the Air Force safety community. Therefore,

restrictions are placed on the dissemination of the information obtained and the resulting report.

Page 18 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
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Introduction

of documents, including over 2,000 classified documents; interviewed over

160 individuals; and visited localities in the United States, Europe, and the

Middle East.

To assess compliance with regulations, we reviewed the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board’s report, its exhibits, and applicable regulations. We

interviewed Board members, both legal and technical advisors to the

Board, accident recovery team members, and many of those interviewed

by the Board concerning their role in the incident. In particular, we

examined how the Board investigated the incident, conducted its analyses,

and produced its report and the Board President’s opinion. We also

reviewed information developed by the Inquiry and Investigating Officers

under UCMJ and the court-martial trial transcripts and exhibits.

To address questions raised by victims’ family members and others

regarding the actions of the two F-15 pilots, the AWACS crew, and command

officials, we reviewed the then existing rules of engagement, operations

plan, pertinent orders (Airspace Control Order, Air Tasking Order, and

Aircrew Read Files), and guidance. We interviewed F-15 pilots and Air

Force officials to determine their understanding of the existing orders and

guidance for fighters in Operation Provide Comfort. We questioned these

individuals regarding the two F-15 pilots’ actions during, and statements

concerning, the April 14, 1994, incident. We also interviewed the F-15

pilots involved in the shootdown. Further, we interviewed senior board

members of the Flying Evaluation Boards that were convened. We

reviewed the two F-15 pilots’ flight and military records and interviewed

former instructors and fellow pilots to gain additional insight into their

qualifications and abilities.

Regarding the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system and its operation

on April 14, 1994, we reviewed the (1) Airspace Control Order and the Air

Tasking Order authority by which the IFF system was to be employed;

(2) statements of the two F-15 pilots regarding their operation and

responses received from the systems on April 14, 1994; and (3) subsequent

Air Force task force studies. We also interviewed other pilots, IFF

technicians, and other technical experts to better understand the

limitations and performance of the incident F-15 IFF systems.

With regard to AWACS operations, we reviewed the applicable procedures

for AWACS operations on the date of the incident. We interviewed crew

members aboard the AWACS during the shootdown to determine their

knowledge of the events and their understanding of the roles and

Page 19 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
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Introduction

responsibilities of the crew members. We also interviewed other AWACS

crew members who had served in Operation Provide Comfort to

determine the general understanding among AWACS crew members of their

roles and responsibilities; the commanders and other command personnel

of the 552d Air Control Wing, which operated the AWACS in Operation

Provide Comfort; and Air Combat Command personnel responsible for

identifying and instituting changes in AWACS operations following the

investigations. To gain an understanding of command and control issues at

the Combined Task Force, we interviewed personnel who were stationed

at Operation Provide Comfort both before and after the incident.

With respect to Black Hawk operations, we examined the procedures used

by Military Coordination Center personnel in scheduling helicopter

activities and the Center’s integration with the other Operation Provide

Comfort mission components. In addition, we interviewed individuals

responsible for developing the procedures for Black Hawk flights; those

who prepared the helicopters for their mission on April 14, 1994; and

responsible Combined Task Force officials. We also reviewed documents

concerning the Combined Task Force and the Black Hawk helicopters at

the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Further, we interviewed Combined Task Force and European Command

officials and reviewed directives and files at Incirlik, Turkey, and Stuttgart,

Germany.

Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the Board’s

investigation process, we interviewed the Board President and Deputy,

members, and advisors. We also contacted the Commander, U.S. Air

Forces in Europe, who had convened the Aircraft Accident Board

Investigation. In addition, we reviewed records that cautioned against

unlawful influence.

Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the UCMJ

investigations process, we reviewed the record of decisions made by the

Inquiry Officers and Investigating Officers in the UCMJ investigations to

determine whether they were in compliance with provisions in the UCMJ

and the Manual for Courts-Martial. These records of decisions included the

suspected violations, the facts considered, and the analyses used to arrive

at the conclusions and recommendations reached. The Department of

Defense would not allow us to interview the Convening Authorities or the

Inquiry and Investigating Officers.

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Introduction

The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this

report. Those comments concur with our primary conclusions and agreed

that the few differences between our report and the Board report would

not have affected the Board President’s conclusions.

The following chapters discuss the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

report and subsequent findings, subsequent investigations under the UCMJ,

the results of Flying Evaluation Boards, and corrective actions taken.

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Aircraft Accident Investigation

The congressional requesters asked us, among other points, to

(1) determine if the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board’s investigation

had met its objectives, (2) determine whether improper or unlawful

command influence had occurred during the investigation, and

(3) consider concerns raised by victims’ family members and others.

We found that the Board, in a limited time frame, conducted an extensive

investigation that fulfilled the requirements of Air Force Regulation 110-14

to obtain and preserve evidence and, with a few exceptions, to report the

factual circumstances relating to the accident. Also consistent with the

regulation, the Board President stated his opinion of the accident’s causes.

In addition, our interviews of the Board President and other Board

members, as well as technical and legal advisors, disclosed no evidence of

improper or unlawful command influence during the Board process.

During our review of the Board’s investigation/report and subsequent

Department of Defense reviews, plus our interviews of Operation Provide

Comfort officials and participants, we noted that the Board report and/or

opinion (1) did not discuss the incident F-15 pilots’ responsibility, under

the Airspace Control Order, to report to the Airborne Command Element

aboard the AWACS about the unidentified helicopters; (2) cited a CFAC

Commander statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command

Element as not having authority to stop the incident; and (3) erroneously

concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect electronic code

prevented the F-15 pilots from receiving electronic responses from the

helicopters.

Last, victims’ family members and others at the August 1995 congressional

hearing raised concerns that included possible discipline problems in the

F-15 community in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the

shootdown and the incident F-15 pilots’ perceived urgency to engage

during the shootdown. While Air Force Regulation 110-14 did not require

the Board to examine these issues, it did not preclude the examination;

and we determined that the issues were pertinent to our review. Indeed,

discipline problems did exist in the F-15 community in Operation Provide

Comfort, and some Operation Provide Comfort officials questioned the

incident F-15 pilots’ haste to engage the unknown helicopters.

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Aircraft Accident Investigation

Investigation Met

Objective but the

Report Contained

Three Deficiencies

Board Investigation/Report

and President’s Opinion

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense on the day of the shootdown,

the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, ordered the Commander, U.S. Air

Forces in Europe, to conduct an Aircraft Accident Investigation. The

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was properly convened under Air

Force Regulation 110-14. The Board’s investigation met its goal to obtain

and preserve documentary, testimonial, and physical evidence for possible

claims, litigation, and disciplinary and administrative needs.

On May 27, 1994, also in accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-14, the

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board issued a 60-page summary report

including the Board President’s opinion that, with three exceptions,

provided a summary of the most important facts and circumstances of the

incident. Those deficiencies—involving the incident F-15 pilots, the

incident Airborne Command Element, and the Black Hawks’ use of an

incorrect electronic identification code—are discussed later in this

chapter.

The Board President’s opinion, which was also required by the regulation

and was included in the summary, identified the accident’s causes as a

chain of events that began with the lack of a clear understanding among

the Operation Provide Comfort organizations about their respective

responsibilities and culminated with the F-15 lead pilot’s misidentification

of the Black Hawks as Iraqi Hinds and the F-15 wingman’s failure to notify

the lead pilot that he had not positively identified the helicopters. (The

Board President’s opinion appears as app. I.1

) The Board report was

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the

Secretary of Defense.

Composition of the Board On April 15, 1994, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, appointed

the Commander, 3d Air Force (a major general), as President of the

1

A supplement to the Board’s report was prepared at the request of the U.S. Commander in Chief,

Europe. It was a synopsis of interviews of individuals who had been AWACS mission crew members in

Operation Provide Comfort before the incident. The Board President reviewed the interviews and

related documents but did not change his opinion.

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Aircraft Accident Investigation

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board. The other Board members included

a Deputy Board President (an Army colonel), a Chief Investigator who was

an F-15 pilot, an AWACS expert, a Black Hawk pilot, a Black Hawk

maintenance officer, a flight surgeon, a Board recorder, and a public

affairs officer.2

 The Board also included 13 technical advisors and 4 legal

advisors (3 Air Force and 1 Army).

Scope of Board’s

Investigation

The Board conducted its investigation from April 15 to May 27, 1994,3

when it issued its report, including 25 volumes of evidence containing

testimony from 137 witnesses.4

 The Board reviewed directives on

command and control; rules of engagement, pertinent orders (Airspace

Control Order, Air Tasking Order, and Aircrew Read Files5

), aircrew

preparation, and scheduling; aircraft maintenance documentation on the

involved aircraft; aircrew qualification and training records and materials;

physical and medical examinations; data on the sequence of events for

each of the aircraft, such as flight plans, communications tapes, and

briefing and preflight preparations; search and rescue activities; and

integration of Army and Air Force operations. The Board also reviewed

classified documents, video tapes, and magnetic tapes relating to the

accident. To assess the possible malfunction of the Air-to-Air Interrogation

(AAI) and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system components,6

 the

Board commissioned testing of the incident fighters’ AAI systems and the

helicopters’ transponders. It also commissioned a filmed re-creation of the

incident with an F-15 fighter approaching a Black Hawk helicopter at

various elevations, distances, and approaches.

2

The Board President and the Chief Investigator had previous accident investigation experience.

3

Accident investigations are normally completed within 30 days unless, as in this case, the appointing

authority grants an extension.

4

The Deputy Board President (Army), a former Black Hawk commander, was present at the interviews

of the two F-15 pilots. Although a second Army Board member and the Army legal advisor were not

invited to be present during these interviews, they were advised that, if they had questions, they would

be asked. The Black Hawk Board member recalled reviewing the transcript of the interviews and

stated that all the questions that he would have asked had been addressed.

5

(1) The Airspace Control Order provided rules and procedures for aircrews. (2) Combined Task Force

flying operations for all aircraft were scheduled in a daily Air Tasking Order, which listed information

pertinent to each day’s flight operations, or “mission package,” such as flying times and IFF codes. In

the case of the Black Hawk helicopters, the notation “as required” was included rather than specific

flying times due to the uncertainty of their schedules. (3) Aircrew Read Files, prepared by the CFAC/DO,

contained Operation Provide Comfort policy and guidance information.

6

In the AAI/IFF system, the AAI component interrogates an airborne aircraft to determine its identity;

and the IFF component answers. A challenging aircraft transmits an interrogation signal via the AAI

component to a target aircraft. The target aircraft’s transponder system, part of the IFF component,

sends back a coded signal. The challenging aircraft receives the return signal and processes it

internally. If the return signal is valid, it appears on the challenging aircraft’s visual display.

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Aircraft Accident Investigation

No

Improper/Unlawful

Command Influence

Found

Section 104 (a)(2) of the Rules for Court-Martial (RCM), Manual for

Courts-Martial, defines unlawful command influence as an attempt to

coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a

court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof, in

reaching the findings or sentence in any case or the action of any

convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to such

authority’s judicial acts.

We found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence

exerted during the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process. The

Board members and technical and legal advisors we interviewed stated

that they had had free rein to examine all facets during the investigation.

According to the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, when the U.S.

Commander in Chief, Europe, tasked him to convene the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board, he was told to uncover the facts and get all the

details. Also according to the Commander, when he assigned the Board

President, he told the president to leave no rock unturned and bring up

every fact during the investigation. According to the Board President, his

directions to the Board members were to let the “chips fall” where they

may and to hold back nothing. He stated that there was “absolutely no

command influence” and that the Board was extremely careful to avoid

even the appearance of any influence.

No Discussion of F-15

Pilots’ Requirement to

Report to Airborne

Command Element

Who Had Authority to

Stop Encounter

Although the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reported that incident

participants, including the Black Hawk pilots, lacked knowledge of

command and control guidance, such as portions of the Airspace Control

Order, it did not discuss the F-15 pilots’ responsibility under the Airspace

Control Order to report to the Airborne Command Element when

encountering an unknown aircraft during Operation Provide Comfort

missions.7

 Further, although it had evidence to the contrary, the Board,

through its report, cited a CFAC Commander’s inaccurate testimony that the

Airborne Command Element had no decision-making authority regarding

aircraft encounters in the TAOR.

According to the Board’s Senior Legal Advisor, the Board did not report

the F-15 pilots’ nonadherence to that aspect of the order because the

Airborne Command Element was aware of the intercept; thus the Board

did not consider the pilots’ nonadherence to be a significant cause of the

7

The report did state that the F-15 pilots had adhered to the order’s requirement to contact the

Airborne Command Element before entering the TAOR.

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Aircraft Accident Investigation

shootdown. The Senior Legal Advisor stated that, in the Board’s opinion,

Operation Provide Comfort management had allowed operations to

degrade to such a point that the Board report, partly for this reason,

focused on command and control problems.

Command and Control of

Airspace Operations in

Operation Provide Comfort

Combined Task Force flying operations were conducted according to an

Airspace Control Order published by the CFAC Director of Operations

(CFAC/DO).8

 The two-volume Airspace Control Order, which provided the

rules and procedures governing all Operation Provide Comfort aircrews,

was required reading for those aircrews. Volume II augmented volume I by

providing detailed and specific guidance and procedures for conducting

Operation Provide Comfort air operations.

The CFAC/DO directed the Operation Provide Comfort flight operations

through a ground-based Mission Director at Incirlik Air Base and an

Airborne Command Element9

 aboard the AWACS. The Airborne Command

Element, according to the Board report, was to act as the “’eyes and ears’

of the CFAC/DO” aboard the AWACS. In support of this, as excerpted from the

Airspace Control Order, “[the Airborne Command Element] will contact

[the Mission Director] who will then pass the information to the CFAC/DO”

concerning any unusual circumstances, such as an unidentified aircraft in

the TAOR.

Requirement to Report to

Airborne Command

Element

The Board report and Board President’s opinion did not address that the

pilots were required to report to the Airborne Command Element in an

“unusual circumstance” as specified by the following excerpt from volume

II of the Airspace Control Order.10 (For the sake of clarity, we have used

titles in place of code names.)

8

The CFAC/DO was responsible for updating the Airspace Control Order; briefing incoming aircrews on

its application; and holding Detachment Commander meetings twice a week to discuss air-operation

problems and corrective actions.

9

In Operation Provide Comfort, the Airborne Command Element was called the “Duke.” During

wartime situations, such as Desert Storm, the Airborne Command Element was a colonel or a general

and operated as the air battle manager. In Operation Provide Comfort, the Airborne Command

Element was a lieutenant colonel or major and operated in a reactive mode.

10Volume I of the Airspace Control Order states, “Aircrews experiencing unusual

circumstances/occurrences will pass details to [the Airborne Command Element] or AWACS.” Volume

II clarifies the statement by (1) directing aircrews to first contact the Airborne Command Element and,

if that individual is unavailable, to then contact AWACS and (2) defining “unusual

circumstances/occurrences.”

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“Aircrews experiencing any unusual circumstances/occurrences while flying [Operation

Provide Comfort] missions will report the incident [as soon as possible] to [the Airborne

Command Element] or [the AWACS crew] if [the Airborne Command Element] is

unavailable.”

The list of six such unusual circumstances/occurrences contained in the

Airspace Control Order included “[a]ny intercept run on an ’Unidentified

aircraft.’” According to Operation Provide Comfort officials, the Airspace

Control Order was specifically designed to slow down a potential

engagement to allow CFAC time to check things out.

In response to questions we raised, the Board’s Senior Legal Advisor said

that the Board had reviewed that provision and evidence showing that the

F-15 pilots had read both volumes of the Airspace Control Order

containing the requirement to contact the Airborne Command Element for

guidance. He added that the contact-requirement issue was not significant

to the Board because the Airborne Command Element was aware of the

discussion between the F-15 pilots and the TAOR controller about the

intercept. He also said that the Board concluded that the F-15 pilots had

reason to believe that the Airborne Command Element was monitoring the

conversation and that the Airborne Command Element was, in fact, aware

of the intercept and did not intervene.11 Further, the Operation Provide

Comfort management, in the Board’s opinion, had allowed operations to

degrade to such a degree that it “may not have been common practice” at

the time for F-15 pilots to contact the Airborne Command Element. He

said that partly because of this degradation, the Board’s focus turned to

the command and control failures that had created an environment that

allowed the incident to occur.

However, this duty to contact the Airborne Command Element for

directions concerning unusual circumstances had been reemphasized by

an oral directive issued because of an incident about a week before the

shootdown.12 In that incident, F-15 pilots had initially ignored an Airborne

Command Element’s directions to “knock off,” or stop, an engagement

with a hostile fighter aircraft they thought was in the no-fly zone. The

Airborne Command Element overheard the pilots preparing to engage the

11The Airborne Command Element testified to the Board that once he heard the visual identification

call, he was trying to put together a plan because he was considering the threat of an Iraqi trap. He

testified that he did not intervene because, in his view, the F-15 pilots were not committed to “anything

[engaging the targets]” at the visual identification point and he had no idea they were going to react so

quickly.

12According to Operation Provide Comfort documents and statements from Operation Provide

Comfort officials, it appears that this incident occurred on April 7, 1994.

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aircraft and contacted them, telling them to stop the engagement because

he had determined that the hostile aircraft was outside the no-fly zone and

that he was also leery of a “bait and trap” situation.13 After several

unsuccessful attempts to call off the engagement during which the F-15

pilots did not respond to him, he ordered the pilots to return either to their

assigned patrol point or to base. The F-15s returned to their assigned

patrol point.

The CFAC/DO issued the resultant oral directive to the F-15 detachment

representative at the next Detachment Commander meeting14 following

the incident. At the meeting, the CFAC/DO listened to the complaints of the

F-15 representative and then told him that the word of the Airborne

Command Element was final.15 He also told the F-15 representative that

the Airspace Control Order was very clear and must be followed.16 While

the Board did an extensive investigation, it was unaware of this oral

directive.

Discussion of Airborne

Command Element’s

Authority

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report cited as fact the former

CFAC Commander’s testimony17 that the Airborne Command Element “had

no decision-making authority.” The Board justified citing the statement as

fact in its report because it was made by the Commander, from whom the

Board believed all authority for CFAC operations stemmed. The Board did

not include in its report, testimony from the CFAC Commander at the time

of the shootdown, the CFAC/DO,

18 a Mission Director, and others with more

13In such a strategy, a fighter aircraft is lured into an area by one or more enemy targets and then

attacked by other fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.

14The twice-weekly Detachment Commander meetings were attended by Detachment Commanders

(including fighter squadron Commanders) or their representatives to discuss operational issues and

problems.

15The Dec. 1993 Airspace Control Order, Vol. I, stated “Direction from [Mission Director]/[Airborne

Command Element] is final.”

16We were unable to substantiate that the F-15 wingman (who was also the Squadron Commander)

involved in the shootdown was at the Detachment Commander meeting. At that time, he was the

Squadron Commander/Detachment Commander. Operation Provide Comfort officials told us, on the

other hand, that the knock-off incident and subsequent guidance by the CFAC/DO were well known

throughout the Operation Provide Comfort fighter community.

17The testimony cited was that of the CFAC Commander who had been reassigned several days before

the shootdown. The testimony of the CFAC Commander at the time of the shootdown was that the

CFAC/DO supervised day-to-day Operation Provide Comfort flight operations and monitored these

operations through the Mission Director and Airborne Command Element, which he characterized as

command and control positions.

18Because the CFAC Commander also served as the 39th Wing Commander and the 7440th Composite

Wing (Provisional) Commander, the CFAC/DO was, in fact, acting as the CFAC Commander according to

the Combined Task Force Commander.

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knowledge of actual Operation Provide Comfort air operations that

contradicted the former CFAC Commander’s reported testimony concerning

Airborne Command Element authority.

The CFAC/DO told the Board and us that he had delegated time-sensitive

decision-making authority to his Mission Directors and Airborne

Command Elements.19 He testified to the Board that he had given the

authority to the Airborne Command Element to terminate the mission

package “and bring the entire operation back.” He further told us that the

week before the shootdown he had supported the Airborne Command

Element’s decision to knock off the F-15 pilots’ intercept and had

commended the Airborne Command Element on his actions. The

Combined Task Force Commander also supported the Airborne Command

Element’s decision.

Board President’s

Erroneous Conclusion

That Black Hawks’

Use of Wrong Code

Prevented F-15 Pilots

From Receiving

Response

The Board President’s opinion erroneously concluded that the Black

Hawks’ use of a wrong code prevented the F-15s from receiving a response

in one of the electronic identification modes. We agree with an Air Force

analysis, using information that was also available to the Board, that

determined that the F-15 pilots should have received a response despite

the wrong code. The analysis based its finding on the manner in which the

pilots testified that they had interrogated the helicopters.

Background During their sanitization sweep, the F-15 pilots, using radar, located

unknown, slow-moving contacts in the TAOR that were subsequently

identified as helicopters. In an attempt to identify if the helicopters were

friendly, the F-15 pilots interrogated the aircraft with their AAI/IFF systems.

An F-15’s AAI/IFF system can interrogate using four identification signals, or

modes: I, II, III, and IV.20 In the TAOR, the transponders on Black Hawk

helicopters transmit Modes I, II, and IV. However, two Mode I codes were

designated for use in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the

incident: one inside, the other outside the TAOR. As stated in the Board

19A lieutenant colonel and three majors rotated between the Mission Director and Airborne Command

Element positions.

20Mode I was the general identification signal that permitted the selection of 32 codes. Mode II was an

aircraft-specific identification mode allowing the use of 4,096 possible codes. Mode III provided a

nonsecure friendly identification of both military and civilian aircraft and was not used in the TAOR.

Mode IV was secure and provided high-confidence identification of friendly targets. A compatible code

had to be loaded into the cryptographic system of both the challenging and the responding aircraft to

produce a friendly response.

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report, the Black Hawk pilots were using the Mode I code for outside the

TAOR,

21 and the F-15 pilots’ systems were set to the Mode I code for inside

the TAOR. The Board report and its President’s opinion noted that the Black

Hawks’ use of the wrong Mode I code had resulted in the F-15 pilots’

failure to receive a Mode I response.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board took testimony from the pilots

who had flown the same F-15s on flights immediately before and after the

shootdown, in addition to testimony from the incident lead pilot and

wingman, to determine whether they had experienced any problems with

the IFF systems. All said that they had had no problems and had

successfully interrogated other aircraft using Modes I and IV.22

The Board also had operational tests performed on the F-15s’ AAI/IFF

components a few days after the incident. The tests revealed no problem

that would have prevented the lead aircraft from interrogating and

displaying Modes I, II, and IV. The wingman’s AAI system was found to be

capable of interrogating Modes I, II, and IV and of displaying Mode I and II

signals. However, it could not display Mode IV signals generated by the

test set. After the operational testing, the Board removed the AAI

components from the F-15s and sent them to two Air Force laboratories

for teardown analysis. The laboratory tests were performed without

recalibrating the components, and the reports showed no problems that

would have affected the performance of the equipment.

Because of weapons impact, the resulting crash, and/or the subsequent

fire, the transponder on one helicopter was completely destroyed. The

transponder in the other helicopter was partly destroyed and was sent to a

21Other Black Hawk pilots told us, as was also mentioned in the Board report, that they routinely used

the Mode I code for outside the TAOR while operating in the TAOR and no one had advised them that

it was incorrect to do so.

22The lead pilot stated on April 14, 1994, that the initial AAI contact on the unknown helicopters in the

TAOR was a negative Mode I and a positive Mode IV. When he testified before the Board, on April 23,

1994, he described the initial positive Mode IV contact as lasting only a second and attributed it to an

AAI system “anomaly.” The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was unable to determine why the

F-15s reportedly did not receive a Mode IV response from the Black Hawks based on the AAI

interrogation of the helicopters that the F-15 pilots said they made. We were also unable to make this

determination.

The Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, after reviewing the Board report and its president’s opinion,

objected to one sentence in the opinion that attributed the unsuccessful Mode IV interrogation to one

or more things, including “both helicopter IFF transponder codes may have been loaded incorrectly.”

He added that nothing in the Board report supported the possibility that the codes had been loaded

improperly and that it was clear the Army crews were not at fault in this matter. The U.S. Commander

in Chief, Europe, agreed with his view. Although the language in the opinion was not changed, the

Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, said his concerns were addressed because his complaint had been

included as an attachment to the Board report.

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Department of Defense laboratory. The report of the teardown analysis of

this transponder concluded that it had been on at the time of the incident

but that the testing could not determine conclusively whether the system

had been fully operational at the time.

F-15 Pilots Should Have

Received Mode I Response

The Board President’s opinion concluded that the Black Hawks had been

using the wrong Mode I code inside the TAOR after they departed Zakhu for

Irbil, Iraq, and that the incorrect code was responsible for the F-15 pilots’

failure to receive a Mode I response when they interrogated the

helicopters. However, the Air Force special task force’s23 subsequent

review of the IFF component revealed that, based on the descriptions of

the system settings that the pilots testified they had used on several

interrogation attempts, the F-15s should have received and displayed any

Mode I or II24 response, regardless of code. Thus, the helicopters’ use of

the wrong Mode I code should not have prevented the F-15s from

receiving a response.

In reaching his conclusion, the Board President relied on the evidence

collected by the Board, which included the pilots’ testimony as well as

other information about the IFF system settings and how the system

should perform. In its report, the Board cited three of four interrogation

attempts about which the lead pilot had testified on April 23, 1994. One of

the three was performed in a way that should have displayed any Mode I

or II response,25 as later noted by the Air Force special task force. The task

force also found that the additional interrogation attempt described on

April 23 was identical to the one that should have displayed any Mode I or

II response. The additional interrogation, not reported by the Board, took

place during the period in which the AWACS was receiving friendly Mode I

and II returns from the helicopters at an increasingly frequent rate26 and

23The Air Force Air Combat Command assembled a task force to review, among other issues, visual

and electronic identification systems and procedures.

24According to the Airspace Control Order, the primary means of identifying friendly aircraft in the

TAOR were through Modes II and IV in the IFF interrogation process. According to the Board report,

the F-15 lead pilot, in his preflight briefing, specified that the fighter pilots would use Modes I and IV.

25The Board report found that the Black Hawks’ transponders were transmitting the correct Mode II

codes specified in the day’s Air Tasking Order.

26According to the AWACS magnetic tape replay of the shootdown, the AWACS received IFF returns

(Modes I and II) from the helicopters at the same time that the F-15s received no response. The Board

report stated that beginning approximately 7 minutes before the shootdown, the AWACS was receiving

intermittent IFF returns that increased in frequency for the next 3 minutes. The returns then continued

uninterrupted for 2 minutes. During the final 2 minutes before the shootdown, according to the Board

report, the F-15 and Black Hawk returns appeared too close together on the AWACS consoles for the

crew to identify the helicopters.

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when the lead pilot was closer to the helicopters than during his initial

interrogation attempt at the same settings.

The Board President recalled discussions about the F-15 IFF-system

settings and said the Board report had included the interrogation attempts

about which the Board was certain. He told us that because of the

difference between the lead pilot’s incident-day statement and his

testimony, it was difficult to determine the number of times that the lead

pilot had interrogated the helicopters.

A Perceived

Discipline Problem

and a Perceived Rush

to Engage

Victims’ family members and others raised concerns about the lack of

discussion in the Board report concerning the discipline of F-15 pilots in

general in Operation Provide Comfort and the F-15 pilots’ perceived

urgency to engage during the shootdown. Although Air Force Regulation

110-14, under which the Board’s investigation was conducted, did not

require the Board to examine such environment issues, neither did the

regulation rule out an examination. However, the two issues were relevant

to our review.

According to Operation Provide Comfort officials, the pilots’ failure on

April 14, 1994, to contact the Airborne Command Element was a product

of a lack of F-15 mission discipline, as demonstrated by the incident a

week before the shootdown when F-15 pilots initially ignored Airborne

Command Element instructions to “knock off” an engagement with an

Iraqi aircraft. According to the Combined Task Force Commander, the

pilots’ failure was also related to a rivalry-induced urgency to engage

“hostile” aircraft.

F-15 Pilots’ Previous

Problems With Mission

Discipline Issues

The Mission Director during the shootdown and the Airborne Command

Element involved in the knock-off incident told us that they had had

problems with mission discipline issues involving F-15 pilots assigned to

Operation Provide Comfort during the time period leading up to the

shootdown. The Airborne Command Element stated that on the evening of

the knock-off incident, several F-15 pilots, including the pilots whom he

had ordered to cease their proposed engagement, approached him and

questioned whether he was a “combat player” and whether Airborne

Command Elements were perhaps too conservative.

According to CFAC officials, the F-15 pilot community was “very upset”

about the intervention of the Airborne Command Element during the

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knock-off incident and felt he had interfered with the carrying out of the

F-15 pilots’ duties.

The Airborne Command Element from the knock-off incident also told us

that so many flight discipline incidents had occurred that CFAC held a

group safety meeting in late February or early March 1994 to discuss the

need for more discipline. The flight discipline issues included midair close

calls, unsafe incidents when refueling, and unsafe takeoffs. The Combined

Task Force Commander said that he had recognized a potential

supervisory problem with the F-15 Detachment because no F-15 pilots

were on the Combined Task Force staff.27 He had made several

unsuccessful requests to the Commander, 17th Air Force, to have an

experienced F-15 pilot—on flying status—assigned to the Combined Task

Force staff. According to the Combined Task Force Commander, the 17th

Air Force Commander told him that the available number of F-15 slots was

limited and one could not be spared for Operation Provide Comfort. We

noted, however, that as part of the corrective actions taken following the

shootdown, an F-15 pilot was assigned to the Combined Task Force staff.

Further, the shootdown occurred, according to the CFAC/DO’s statement to

us, because of a lack of training and aircrew discipline in following

established guidelines on the part of the two F-15 pilots involved in the

incident. He stated, “[t]he pilots made a terrible mistake” and with greater

discipline—coupled with the multiple safeguards designed to prevent such

an incident—this fratricide may have been avoided.

Pilots’ Perceived Urgency

to Engage

The Combined Task Force Commander and other Operation Provide

Comfort officials acknowledged that a rivalry existed between the F-15

and F-16 communities, including those in Operation Provide Comfort

detachments. Operation Provide Comfort officials told us that while such

rivalry was normally perceived as healthy and leading to positive

professional competition, at the time of the shootdown the rivalry had

become more pronounced and intense. The Combined Task Force

Commander attributed this atmosphere to the F-16 community’s having

executed the only fighter shootdown in Operation Provide Comfort and all

shootdowns in Bosnia.

27The CFAC Assistant Director of Operations told us there was very little F-15 oversight in Operation

Provide Comfort at the time of the shootdown. He explained that an F-15 pilot was needed on the

Combined Task Force staff to help communicate with the F-15 group because contentious issues

involving F-15 actions had become common topics of discussion at Detachment Commander meetings.

He said that CFAC tried to have a certified F-15 pilot assigned to the Combined Task Force staff, but

U.S. Air Forces in Europe did not support such an assignment. He also said that an F-15 pilot was

assigned to the staff after the shootdown, which “paid big dividends.”

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In the opinion of the Combined Task Force Commander, the shootdown

pilots’ haste was due in part to the planned entry of two F-16s into the

TAOR 10 to 15 minutes after the F-15s. He said that if the F-15 pilots had

involved the chain of command, the pace would have slowed down,

ruining the pilots’ chances for a shootdown.

Further, CFAC officials stated that the Airspace Control Order was

specifically designed to slow down a potential engagement to allow CFAC

time to check things out.28 They said that the presence of the helicopters,

which were flying southeast away from the security zone, posed no threat

to the mission and there was no need for haste. For example, the Mission

Director stated that, given the speed of the helicopters, the fighters had

time to return to Turkish airspace, refuel, and still return and engage the

helicopters before they could have crossed south of the 36th parallel.

According to the F-15 Squadron Operations Officer at the time of the

shootdown and the Board’s Senior Legal Advisor, the tactical environment

did not warrant a rush to judgment. The Operations Officer added that the

F-15 pilots had acted too hastily and should have asked more questions.

The Senior Legal Advisor said that, in his opinion, the pilots had an

unnecessarily aggressive attitude toward the intercept and shootdown.

The lead incident pilot told us that he was concerned about going low to

check out the unknown aircraft. His primary concerns at the time were

(1) being fired on from the ground, (2) flying into the ground, and (3) a

possible air threat. Because of these concerns, he remained high for as

long as possible and dropped down briefly for a visual identification that

lasted, according to the lead pilot, “between 3 and 4 seconds.” He told us

that he saw no Iraqi flag on the helicopters and that the helicopters were

not acting in a hostile manner. He assumed they were Iraqi Hinds because

they were in the middle of Iraq, although he acknowledged that they could

have been Syrian or Iranian Hinds.

The incident wingman told us that his visual identification was not as

close to the helicopters as was the lead pilot’s.29 His visual identification

28The Airborne Command Element at the time of the shootdown testified to the Board that he was

surprised at the speed of the engagement, noting that he thought the F-15 pilots would have at least

told the AWACS of their intentions or asked for guidance. This testimony was not included in the

Board report. Also, not included in the Board report was testimony from the former CFAC Commander

that decisions concerning “out of the ordinary” occurrences while on missions were to be pushed up

the chain of command, to the CFAC/DO level or higher.

29The Board report found that the F-15s’ identification passes had been accomplished at speeds,

altitudes, and distances where it was unlikely that the pilots would have been able to detect the Black

Hawks’ markings.

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lasted “between 2 and 3 seconds.” He said, in hindsight, “We should have

taken another pass; but at the time, I was comfortable with the decision.”

Conclusions The Board report and Board President’s opinion would have presented a

more complete record of the incident’s events had they discussed the

incident F-15 pilots’ requirement to report to the Airborne Command

Element, accurately assessed the Airborne Command Element’s authority,

not concluded that the Black Hawks’ use of an incorrect code had

prevented Mode I electronic responses from the helicopters, and

addressed F-15 pilot discipline issues. This more complete information, in

turn, may have raised additional questions about the actions and inaction

of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command Element and, therefore,

could have influenced subsequent disciplinary or corrective actions.

However, if the information had been included, it would not have affected

the Board President’s conclusion: that a chain of events, whose final

actions were the lead pilot’s incorrect identification and the wingman’s

failure to clarify his lack of identification, caused the fratricide. Further, it

is difficult to predict if the incident’s outcome would have differed had the

F-15 pilots contacted the Airborne Command Element directly.

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The Military Justice Process and

Administrative Actions

The congressional requesters also asked us to (1) determine whether

military justice investigations, conducted after the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board completed its work, had complied with provisions in

the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ);1

 (2) determine if improper or

unlawful command influence had been exerted during the UCMJ process;

and (3) answer general questions raised by family members and others

regarding actions taken following the investigations.

First, we found that the subsequent UCMJ investigations complied with

provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Preliminary

inquiries, under the Rules for Court-Martial (RCM), were conducted into the

actions of 14 officers. The Air Force used two separate investigative paths,

one for seven AWACS-related officers and the other for the two F-15 pilots

and five Operation Provide Comfort officials. The former were

investigated by a command separate from the one to which they were

assigned. This command developed evidence beyond the material

contained in the Board’s report. As a result of the preliminary inquiry,

charges were preferred against four AWACS crew members and the

Airborne Command Element. An Investigating Officer investigated these

charges under Article 32, UCMJ; one officer was determined to be

blameless; and the Commander, 963d Air Control Squadron retired as a

Lieutenant Colonel although he had been selected for promotion. After the

Article 32 investigation, one officer—the Senior Director of the AWACS

crew—was tried by general court-martial and acquitted, and one officer

received nonjudicial punishment in the form of a letter of reprimand. The

remaining three officers received administrative letters of reprimand.

On a separate path, the actions of the two F-15 pilots and five Operation

Provide Comfort officials were reviewed under RCM in a preliminary

inquiry conducted by the pilots’ Wing Commander. The Wing Commander

relied on the Board report and filed dereliction-of-duty and negligent

homicide charges against the F-15 wingman that were the focus of an

Article 32 investigative hearing.2

 Subsequently, charges against this pilot

were dropped; however, he later received a letter of reprimand.

Administrative action was taken against four other officers: the lead pilot

received a letter of reprimand, two other officers received letters of

1

UCMJ, 10 USC § 801 et seq., governs the conduct of military personnel. It contains both substantive

and procedural law applicable to the military justice process and administration. It also describes the

system of military courts, defines offenses, authorizes punishment, and provides statutory due-process

safeguards.

2

The Wing Commander also preferred charges against two of the five Operation Provide Comfort

officials. Following further analysis, these charges were not investigated at an Article 32 investigative

hearing.

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admonition, and one received a letter of counseling. No action was taken

against the remaining two officers.

The Air Force also convened Flying Evaluation Boards for the two F-15

pilots involved in the shootdown. In addition, 16 months after the incident

and 6 days after the House Committee on National Security hearing, the

Chief of Staff of the Air Force found that a number of performance

evaluations of personnel involved in the incident (1) were inconsistent

with administrative actions taken by higher-level commanders and

(2) failed to reflect that some officers had not met Air Force standards.

Accordingly, the Chief of Staff prepared negative letters of evaluation

regarding seven officers involved in the shootdown and implemented

additional actions against five of them.

Second, based on our review of the summary reports of investigation and

statements made by cognizant officials, we found no evidence of improper

or unlawful command influence in the investigative or judicial process.

However, we were unable to complete our investigation and determine

whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses under the

UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command influence.

Department of Defense officials would not allow us to interview the key

officials—Convening Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating

Officers—involved in the UCMJ investigations.

UCMJ Process On July 12, 1994, the Secretary of Defense approved the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board report. The Secretary of the Air Force thereafter

forwarded the report to the Commander, Air Combat Command, and the

Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, as well as to the Commander, U.S.

Army in Europe, for appropriate action under the UCMJ and any

administrative actions. Thus, the Air Force UCMJ investigations followed

two separate paths—through Air Combat Command (AWACS-related

personnel) and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (Combined Task Force

Operation Provide Comfort personnel and F-15 pilots).

The AWACS mission crew and 963d Squadron Commander involved in the

shootdown were assigned to the 552d Air Control Wing, which was under

the jurisdiction of the 12th Air Force. However, the Staff Judge Advocate

to the 12th Air Force had served as Legal Advisor to the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board. As a result, the Air Force considered him disqualified

from conducting an RCM investigation or serving as staff judge advocate to

the Convening Authority during the disciplinary review.

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Therefore, the Commander, Air Combat Command, designated the

Commander of the 8th Air Force as the court-martial Convening Authority.3

The Commander, 8th Air Force, appointed an Inquiry Officer to conduct an

RCM 3034 inquiry regarding the actions of seven officers under Air Combat

Command’s command. The seven officers were the CFAC Mission Director,

Airborne Command Element, 963d Squadron Commander, AWACS Mission

Crew Commander, AWACS Senior Director, AWACS Enroute Controller, and

AWACS TAOR Controller. On July 18, 1994, the Convening Authority

appointed an Inquiry Officer to conduct the RCM 303 investigation.

The Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, designated the Commander of

the 17th Air Force as the court-martial Convening Authority. On July 22,

1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Inquiry Officer to conduct a

preliminary inquiry under RCM 303 into the roles of the following seven

officers in the shootdown: Combined Task Force Commander, CFAC

Commander, CFAC/DO, Combined Task Force Director of Plans and Policy,

Combined Task Force Intelligence Officer, and the two F-15 pilots. The

F-15 pilots were assigned to the 53d Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air

Base, Germany. The Inquiry Officer was the Commander of the 52d Fighter

Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base to whom the F-15 pilots’ squadron

reported.

The Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, directed the Judge Advocate, U.S.

Army in Europe, to determine whether administrative or disciplinary

action was warranted against any Army personnel for their role in the

incident. The actions of one person—the Combined Task Force Chief of

Staff (an Army colonel)—were considered as possible for review.

3

The Convening Authority is a commissioned officer in command who is authorized to convene

courts-martial. A commander may administer nonjudicial punishment upon military personnel of that

command under Article 15, UCMJ. (Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is generally appropriate

when administrative corrective measures are inadequate and a trial by court-martial is not necessary.)

Charges are ordinarily forwarded to the accuseds’ immediate commander for initial consideration as to

disposition. However, a superior commander may withhold a subordinate commander’s disposition

authority. Unless the authority is withheld by a superior commander, each commander has

independent discretion to determine disposition under RCM 306.

4

An RCM 303 is a preliminary inquiry into suspected offenses to gather all reasonably available

evidence that bears on guilt or innocence and that relates to mitigating, extenuating, or aggravating

circumstances. The appropriate commander determines what, if any, adverse administrative or judicial

actions should be taken against personnel accused or suspected of committing offenses, triable by

court-martial, that are referred for consideration under RCM 306.

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Air Combat

Command’s UCMJ

Actions Against

AWACS and Related

Officers

On July 18, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed legal, F-15, and AWACS

advisors to assist the Inquiry Officer. The investigation was conducted

from July 18 to August 18, 1994. The inquiry team obtained testimony from

AWACS personnel, flew in an AWACS, observed simulated Operation Provide

Comfort missions, and interviewed senior directors and controllers not on

the incident flight.

The Inquiry Officer prepared a 77-page report, largely consisting of an

analysis of the charges against the officers, with 2 volumes of supporting

material. The report also reflected the Inquiry Officer’s logic for selecting

the appropriate articles of the UCMJ that might be applicable to the actions

of the AWACS-related personnel, including manslaughter, negligent

homicide, and dereliction of duty. The Inquiry Officer said that voluntary

or involuntary manslaughter charges would be inappropriate against the

AWACS-related officers for their involvement in the shootdown. The Inquiry

Officer concluded that negligent homicide charges could be made against

some of them for their involvement in this matter; but he recommended

against this course of action, because “the occurrence of an independent,

unforeseeable, intervening act, namely the incorrect identification of the

helicopters by the F-15 pilots . . .” would not support a conviction for

negligent homicide.

On August 30 and 31, 1994, the Inquiry Officer preferred

dereliction-of-duty charges against the following AWACS-related officers:

the Airborne Command Element, the Mission Crew Commander, the

Senior Director, the Enroute Controller, and the TAOR Controller. No

charges were preferred against the 963d Airborne Air Control Squadron

Commander or the Mission Director. The Inquiry Officer concluded that

no adverse action should be taken against the Mission Director because he

had not failed to take any required actions.

On September 7, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Article 32,

UCMJ, Investigating Officer, who was assigned to the U.S. Air Force Trial

Judiciary,5

 to examine the charges against the five charged officers, in

accordance with RCM 405. The Convening Authority directed the

Investigating Officer to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the

charges, secure information to determine what their disposition should be,

and issue a report and advisory recommendations. The Investigating

Officer held a joint Article 32 investigative hearing involving all five

officers from October 11 to October 26, 1994. Forty-eight witnesses

5

Investigating officers should be an officer in the grade of major, lieutenant commander, or higher, or

one with legal training. In this case, a military judge outside the chain of the Convening Authority’s

command was appointed.

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testified at the hearing; and the government and defense attorneys entered

271 exhibits, including 54 classified exhibits, into the hearing record. The

Investigating Officer issued his report on November 12, 1994, and

recommended that the dereliction-of-duty charge against the Senior

Director be referred to a general court-martial. He also recommended that

the Enroute Controller receive nonjudicial punishment under Article 15,

UCMJ, and that the charges against the remaining three officers be

dismissed.

U.S. Air Forces in

Europe’s UCMJ

Actions Against

Operation Provide

Comfort Officials and

F-15 Pilots

In his appointment letter, the Commander, 17th Air Force, directed the

RCM 303 Inquiry Officer to (1) determine if any of the seven officers

(Combined Task Force Commander and staff and two F-15 pilots) had

committed acts related to the shootdown that amounted to offenses

punishable under the UCMJ, (2) recommend disposition of any offense and

whether administrative actions were warranted, and (3) file charges if

warranted. He also appointed two legal advisors and a technical advisor to

assist the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Team reviewed the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board report and supporting documentation. It neither

obtained oral testimony nor collected any additional evidence; instead, it

relied on witness interviews conducted by the Board.

On August 29, 1994, the Inquiry Officer issued a 66-page report on his

investigation. The report identified the following as “possible” offenses:

dereliction of duty by all seven officers, involuntary manslaughter by the

F-15 pilots, and negligent homicide by all the officers except the

Intelligence Officer. After concluding that three officers had committed

violations under the UCMJ, the Inquiry Officer preferred dereliction-of-duty

charges against two Operation Provide Comfort senior officers and

dereliction-of-duty and negligent homicide charges against one F-15 pilot,

the wingman.

On September 8, 1994, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe,

appointed an Article 32 Investigating Officer,6

 who was assigned to the

U.S. Air Force Trial Judiciary, European Circuit, to investigate the charges

against the F-15 wingman.7

 In accordance with RCM 405, Manual for

Courts-Martial, the Commander directed the Investigating Officer to

inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges by the Inquiry

6

In this case, a military judge outside the chain of the Convening Authority’s command was appointed

as Investigating Officer.

7

The charges against the two senior officers were dismissed; and, thus, Article 32 investigations were

not conducted.

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Officer, secure information to determine what disposition should be made

of the charges, and issue a report with advisory recommendations. The

Investigating Officer held an Article 32 hearing on November 7-9, 1994. The

government attorneys called one witness—the F-15 flight leader8

—and

entered 18 exhibits into the hearing record. The exhibits included (1) the

transcript of the F-15 wingman’s taped account of the shootdown made in

the cockpit approximately 45 minutes after the shootdown, (2) the

wingman’s testimony before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, and

(3) the flight leader’s testimony during the investigation of the aircraft

accident and the AWACS Article 32 hearing. The defense attorneys called no

witnesses and entered 116 exhibits into the hearing record, including a

prepared statement read by the wingman during the hearing and a

detailed, 102-page factual and legal presentation of his theory of the case.

The Investigating Officer issued his report on November 12, 1994, and

recommended dismissal of the charges against the wingman. His analysis

focused on whether the lead pilot had called the AWACS announcing the

engagement before or after the wingman responded to the lead pilot’s

directive to confirm whether the helicopters were Iraqi Hinds. He

concluded that if the call was made before the wingman’s response, the

lead pilot had relieved the wingman of the duty to independently identify

the helicopters. Based on his review of the pilots’ testimony9

 and the

wingman’s experience, he concluded that it was more likely that the lead

pilot’s engagement announcement had preceded the wingman’s alleged

“nonresponsive” confirmation.10

8

Captain Eric A. Wickson, the flight leader, was granted testimonial immunity for the purpose of

testifying at the wingman’s (Lieutenant Colonel Randy W. May) Article 32 investigative hearing.

Captain Wickson could still be charged, based on all evidence obtained from sources other than his

testimony at these proceedings.

9

The Investigating Officer found that the wingman consistently stated on three occasions (in the

cockpit 45 minutes after the incident, in his Aircraft Accident Investigation Board testimony, and in his

Article 32 hearing) that the lead pilot had overridden the confirmation directive. He also considered

that the lead pilot, during his Article 32 testimony, had begun to discount significantly his need for the

wingman’s confirmation.

10The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and the RCM Inquiry Officer concluded that the wingman’s

“Tally two” response led the lead pilot to believe reasonably that the wingman had independently seen

two Iraqi Hind helicopters. The wingman has stated that the “Tally two” response merely confirmed his

sighting of two helicopters, not identification of the helicopters.

Page 41 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 3 

The Military Justice Process and

Administrative Actions

UCMJ Activities

Concerning Combined

Task Force Chief of

Staff

On September 30, 1994, the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army in Europe, advised

the Commander, U.S. Army in Europe, that consideration was warranted

concerning whether the Combined Task Force Chief of Staff was

responsible for the breakdown in staff communication that had been cited

in the Board report. After reviewing the relevant Board testimony and

other evidence, however, he recommended that no adverse action be

taken against the officer because he had (1) focused his attention

according to the Combined Task Force Commander’s direction, (2) had

neither specific direction nor specific reason to inquire into the

transmission of information between his Director of Operations for Plans

and Policy and the CFAC, (3) been the most recent arrival and the only

senior Army member of a predominately Air Force staff and therefore

generally unfamiliar with air operations, and (4) relied on experienced

colonels under whom deficiencies had occurred.

Actions by Flying

Evaluation Boards

and Air Force Chief of

Staff

The Flying Evaluation Boards11convened as a result of the shootdown,

made findings concerning the proficiency, professionalism, care, and

judgment of the two pilots, and made recommendations concerning their

suitability for future aviation responsibilities. Upon review of the Boards’

findings and recommendations, the Commander, 17th Air Force

determined that both pilots should be reassigned to noncombat aircraft.

He further recommended that the F-15 lead pilot, Captain Eric A. Wickson,

should be assigned next as an instructor pilot in basic flight training. The

Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe concurred with this determination

and also concluded that the F-15 wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy W.

May12 should be reassigned to a nonflying aviator staff position.

On the basis of his review of administrative actions taken by higher-level

authorities regarding Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown, the

Air Force Chief of Staff determined that the personnel records of some

involved personnel did not reflect their failure to meet Air Force

standards. Accordingly, for seven of those involved in the incident, he

wrote letters of evaluation that addressed how each of the officers had

failed to meet these standards and took additional action against five

officers.

11If questions arise regarding a pilot’s fitness to continue flying, a commander may convene a Flying

Evaluation Board. That board conducts a hearing in which the pilot can present evidence and

cross-examine witnesses. After considering evidence concerning the pilot’s professional qualifications

and evaluating the pilot’s ability to perform future flying duties, the Flying Evaluation Board issues an

advisory recommendation to the convening commander. (Air Force Regulation 60-13)

12Lieutenant Colonel May retired as a Major, the last grade at which, as determined by the Secretary of

the Air Force, he had performed satisfactorily.

Page 42 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 3 

The Military Justice Process and

Administrative Actions

Flying Evaluation Boards On January 20 and 25, 1995, the Commander, 17th Air Force, appointed

separate Flying Evaluation Boards for Captain Wickson and Lieutenant

Colonel May. Each board consisted of a senior board member and two

board members, all of whom were pilots; a legal advisor; a recorder; and a

reporter. The Commander, 17th Air Force, directed the two senior board

members to make special findings on whether the pilots had shown lack of

judgment in performing their duties on April 14, 1994, and whether they

were unsuited for duty in a combat aircraft role. The Commander, 17th Air

Force, also directed the boards to make recommendations on whether the

pilots had potential to continue flying.

Evidence Captain Wickson’s Flying Evaluation Board was held on February 6, 1995;

and Lieutenant Colonel May’s, on February 9-10, 1995. The pilots were the

only witnesses in their Flying Evaluation Board hearings. The government

and defense attorneys submitted eight volumes of evidence in the Wickson

hearing and seven volumes of evidence in the May hearing, including the

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board summary of facts and executive

summary; the Operation Plan for Operation Provide Comfort; the Aircrew

Read File; each pilot’s testimonies before the Aircraft Accident

Investigation Board and Article 32 hearings; the transcript of Lieutenant

Colonel May’s aircraft videotape of the incident; a Kurdish citizen’s

videotape of the incident; and each pilot’s medical and training records,

ratings, and awards.

On April 5, 1995, the Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, concurred

with the boards’ recommendations that Lieutenant Colonel May and

Captain Wickson remain qualified for aviation service. He also directed

that Lieutenant Colonel May be reassigned to a staff position not involving

flying duties and that Captain Wickson be reassigned to flying duties (1) as

an instructor in basic flying training or (2) in other noncombat aircraft.

Air Force Chief of Staff

Actions

On July 25, 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force requested that the Air

Force Chief of Staff review the administrative actions taken in regard to

the Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown. On August 9, 1995, the

Air Force Chief of Staff advised the Secretary of the Air Force of the

actions he had taken.

The Chief of Staff said that the military justice process had worked as it

was supposed to after the incident and that he was comfortable with the

military justice actions taken. He concluded that a proper balance between

Page 43 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 3 

The Military Justice Process and

Administrative Actions

command involvement and individual rights had been maintained

throughout the military justice process. Further, the administrative actions

taken by commanders were within an appropriate range of options

available to them. However, he said that a number of performance

evaluations of involved personnel were inadequate because they were

inconsistent with administrative actions taken by higher-level

commanders and failed to reflect that the ratees had not met Air Force

standards. Accordingly, pursuant to authority granted him by the Secretary

of the Air Force, he prepared the following letters of evaluation regarding

seven of the Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown and

implemented additional actions against five.

• Combined Task Force Commander, Brigadier General Jeffrey S.

Pilkington. A letter of evaluation addressed his failure to meet Air Force

standards and became a permanent part of his record.

• CFAC Commander, Brigadier General Curtis H. Emery.13 A letter of

evaluation was placed in his permanent record to reflect his failure to

meet Air Force standards.

• F-15 Wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy W. May. A letter of evaluation

was placed in his officer selection record to reflect his failure to meet Air

Force standards. He was disqualified from aviation service for 3 years.

• F-15 Lead Pilot, Captain Eric A. Wickson. A letter of evaluation was placed

in his officer selection record to reflect his failure to meet Air Force

standards. He was disqualified from aviation service for 3 years based on

his demonstrated lack of judgment associated with flight activities.

• AWACS Senior Director, Captain Jim Wang. A letter of evaluation detailing

his failures to meet Air Force standards was included in his officer

selection record and disqualified him from assignment to duties involving

control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years.

• AWACS Enroute Controller, Captain Joseph M. Halcli.14 A letter of

evaluation reflecting his failure to meet Air Force standards was placed in

his officer selection record and disqualified him from assignment to duties

involving control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years.

• AWACS TAOR Controller, First Lieutenant Ricky L. Wilson.15 A letter of

evaluation reflecting his failure to meet Air Force standards was placed in

his officer selection record. It recommended that he not be assigned to

duties involving control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years.

13At the time of the incident, Brigadier General Emery was a Colonel.

14At the time of the incident, the AWACS Enroute Controller was a First Lieutenant.

15At the time of the incident, the AWACS TAOR Controller was a Second Lieutenant.

Page 44 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 3 

The Military Justice Process and

Administrative Actions

The Question of

Command Influence

Our review of the summary reports of investigation during the UCMJ

process and statements by officials knowledgeable of that process

revealed no evidence of command influence. However, we were unable to

confirm that the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses

under UCMJ had not been subject to unlawful command influence because

we were denied our request to interview applicable UCMJ Convening

Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers.

The Investigating Officer in the AWACS Article 32 hearing stated that he had

not been subject to command influence during the proceedings. The

counsel for the Senior Director, Captain Wang, had filed a motion to

dismiss the charges against the Senior Director based on an allegation of

unlawful command influence by the Secretary of Defense on the Secretary

of the Air Force. In response to that motion, six officials provided either a

Stipulation of Expected Testimony, a memorandum, or an affidavit stating

that they had neither been the subject of improper command influence nor

taken action to improperly influence military justice officials. These

officials were the Secretary of the Air Force; Air Force Chief of Staff;

Commander, Air Combat Command; Deputy Staff Judge Advocate,

Headquarters Air Combat Command (Legal Advisor to the RCM 303); the

RCM 303 Inquiry Officer; and the General Court-Martial Convening

Authority, the Commander, 8th Air Force.16 The convening judge denied

the motion, ruling that the defense had failed to meet its burden of

establishing at least the appearance of unlawful command influence.

Further, to address the question of command influence in the case of the

Senior Director, Captain Wang’s military attorney told us that he

interviewed the Secretary of the Air Force about whether she or the

Secretary of Defense had intervened in the court-martial. The attorney was

satisfied that neither of them had exercised command influence during the

UCMJ process.

However, our request to the Air Force and the Department of Defense to

interview military officials involved in the Black Hawk UCMJ proceedings

was denied. These officials included the Convening Authorities, RCM 303

Inquiry Officers, and Article 32 Investigating Officers for investigations by

both the Air Combat Command and the U.S Air Forces in Europe. The

Department of Defense voiced the belief that “any Congressional intrusion

into the deliberative process . . . endangers the actual and perceived

independence of the military justice system.” We assured the Air Force

that we would ask those officials only about the presence of unlawful

16Similar stipulations were not provided by the three officials involved in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe

UCMJ investigations of five Operation Provide Comfort officials and two F-15 pilots.

Page 45 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 3 

The Military Justice Process and

Administrative Actions

command influence and would not intrude into the deliberative processes

they had used in the proceedings, but we were denied access to those

decision-makers who might have knowledge of possible influence.

Consequently, we were unable to confirm whether the consideration and

disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of

improper or unlawful command influence.

Page 46 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 4 

Corrective and Other Actions by the

Department of Defense and the Air Force

After the Shootdown

In accord with concerns voiced by victims’ family members and others, we

also looked at the corrective and other actions taken after the shootdown.

Military officials took immediate actions to help ensure that the Black

Hawk accident was not repeated. Further, after the issuance of the

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report, the European Command; the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Air Combat Command; and the Air

Force instituted a large number of corrective actions. These actions

included modification of the Rules of Engagement; inclusion of Black

Hawk flight times on the Air Tasking Order; reviews of command structure

and operations, plus operating doctrines and procedures; revision of AWACS

training programs and certification procedures; and modifications of

visual and electronic identification training.

In transmitting the Board report to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following observation:

“For over 1,000 days, the pilots and crews assigned to Operation Provide

Comfort flew mission after mission, totalling over 50,000 hours of flight

operations, without a single major accident. Then, in one terrible moment

on the 14th of April, a series of avoidable errors led to the tragic deaths of

26 men and women of the American Armed Forces, United States Foreign

Service, and the Armed Forces of our coalition allies. In place were not

just one, but a series of safeguards—some human, some procedural, some

technical—that were supposed to ensure an accident of this nature could

never happen. Yet, quite clearly, these safeguards failed.”

According to an Air Combat Command official who was familiar with the

Board’s report and who participated in the Command’s UCMJ

investigations, over 130 separate mistakes were involved in the

shootdown. A discussion follows of some corrective actions spawned by

the shootdown and the Aircraft Accident Investigation report.

Immediate Corrective

Actions

Beginning April 15, 1994, the European Command and Combined Task

Force Commanders instituted immediate corrective actions designed to

prevent a recurrence of the shootdown. The actions included, among

others, modification of the Rules of Engagement, to restrict procedures for

engaging Iraqi helicopters; inclusion of Black Hawk flight times on the Air

Tasking Order; requirement for verbal confirmation of a positive IFF Mode

IV check on all Operation Provide Comfort aircraft prior to their entry into

the TAOR; reorganization of the Combined Task Force to designate one U.S.

Air Force Colonel exclusively as the Commander, CFAC; further definition

Page 47 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 4 

Corrective and Other Actions by the

Department of Defense and the Air Force

After the Shootdown

of AWACS responsibilities for coordination of air operations; placement of

radios on Black Hawk flights to enable communication with fighter

aircraft; and painting of white recognition stripes on the Black Hawk rotor

blades to enhance their identification from the air.

European Command’s

Operations

Assessments and

Corrective Actions

In response to a directive from the Deputy U.S. Commander in Chief,

Europe, an Air Force/Army team assessed Operation Provide Comfort’s

mission, organization, and operations. The assessment was conducted

from May 31 to June 8, 1994, and placed particular emphasis on the

adequacy of European Command guidance and oversight; the Combined

Task Force command structure and organization, manning, and support;

and operating doctrine and procedures. The assessment team flew

missions with F-15, Black Hawk, and AWACS units; interviewed key

personnel and random unit personnel; and reviewed organizational plans,

procedures, and directives. The team issued a 59-page classified report

that contained over 40 recommendations for operations improvements.

During October 14-22, 1995, a second team conducted another operational

assessment of Operation Provide Comfort and made 166 additional

recommendations in a classified report. A number of recommendations

made by both teams have been implemented.

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s

Corrective Actions

On July 7, 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the

approval of the Secretary of Defense, directed that (1) all Commanders in

Chief review their Joint Task Force operations to ensure that they were

conducted in accordance with published joint doctrine; (2) the

Commanders in Chief establish a program of regular oversight of all their

Joint Task Force operations; and (3) his staff review the curricula of all

appropriate professional military education institutions to ensure proper

emphasis on Joint Task Force organization, procedures, and operations.

The Chairman also recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the

Air Force Chief of Staff to review the adequacy of AWACS training programs

and certification procedures, develop a retraining program based on the

lessons learned from the shootdown, and ensure that all mission aircrews

underwent this training. The Chairman further convened a conference of

the Joint Chiefs and all Commanders in Chief on September 15, 1994, to

discuss actions being taken to prevent a recurrence of the shootdown.

On October 6, 1994, the Chairman advised the Secretary of Defense that all

Commanders in Chief had completed reviews of their joint operations,

aggressively implemented changes where required, and established

Page 48 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 4 

Corrective and Other Actions by the

Department of Defense and the Air Force

After the Shootdown

programs to ensure regular oversight of those operations. Further, the

Joint Staff found shortcomings in how Joint Task Force operations had

been addressed in professional military education systems. According to

the Chairman, each of the shortcomings was being addressed and

corrections implemented.

Air Combat

Command’s—Tiger

Team’s—Corrective

Actions

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force tasked the Air Combat

Command to investigate the specific operational issues identified in the

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report. The Air Combat Command

assembled a “Tiger Team” consisting primarily of Air Combat Command

headquarters staff augmented with representatives from the 8th Air Force,

Air Force Weapons Center, Air National Guard, and the 552d Air Control

Wing. The team divided into three groups: AWACS/Airborne command and

control, visual and electronic identification, and ground command and

control. The three groups used the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

report as a frame of reference and identified 90 issues, which they studied

in depth. The Air Combat Command Tiger Team issued its report on

September 14, 1994, making about 140 recommendations, most of which

had been completed or were underway when the report was issued. The

report also proposed six recommendations for consideration by the Air

Staff or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Air Force Special Task

Force

Concurrent with the Air Combat Command tasking, the Secretary of the

Air Force appointed an Air Force special task force to assist all Air Force

commands in identifying potential problem areas and implementing

appropriate corrections. The task force effort, which included the Air

Combat Command Tiger Team work, involved over 120 people and over

30,000 hours in 6 major Air Force commands and Air Force Headquarters.

The task force’s primary emphasis was to determine if the shootdown was

an isolated incident or indicative of a bigger problem. It issued its report to

the Secretary of Defense on September 30, 1994. The report concluded

that the incident was not indicative of a larger Air Force problem and that

the following two breakdowns in individual crew performance had

contributed to the incident: (1) the AWACS failed to build and provide an

accurate air picture and (2) the F-15 pilots misidentified the target.

The report also recommended a one-time retraining and recertification

program for all AWACS aircrews and a plan to reduce the temporary duty of

AWACS crews to 120 days per year. The report concluded that the Air Force

Page 49 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Chapter 4 

Corrective and Other Actions by the

Department of Defense and the Air Force

After the Shootdown

had corrected, or was in the process of correcting, training programs to

address the shortcomings noted.

Air Combat Command

Updates on Corrective

Actions

On July 27, 1995, the Commander, Air Combat Command, informed the Air

Force Chief of Staff that the Air Combat Command had completed a

majority of the Tiger Team recommendations and that efforts were on

target in achieving the desired results. He said that all AWACS crews had

been recertified by October 13, 1994, and that the certification process was

being applied to all AWACS crews deploying to any location. He further

stated that AWACS temporary duty rates had been decreased from 166 to

135 days per year from January 1995 to July 1995. He also said that Air

Combat Command planned to increase the number of AWACS crews.1

However, he noted that the Air Combat Command was continuing to work

on the following three areas: computer-based training devices, visual

identification, and electronic identification. For example, he stated that

the Air Combat Command had updated visual identification training

material, provided computer hardware for the Air Force-improved

computer-based training developed by an Air Force contractor, and

distributed the material to all Air Combat Command fighter units. The

Commander, Air Combat Command, noted that the new product was an

improvement over previous training materials (35MM slides and video) but

that it did not fully meet the Command’s needs. He said that the Air

Combat Command, in conjunction with the Air Education and Training

Command, was pursuing an enhanced visual training program that would

expand capabilities and allow aircrews to view three-dimensional or

animated images against a variety of backgrounds from multiple aspects in

all configurations and camouflage paint schemes. This new program was

distributed to all Air Combat Command units in January 1996.

1

By August 1996, the number of AWACS crews had been increased to 40 from the 28 available at the

time of the shootdown.

Page 50 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Page 51 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

President’s Opinion

Page 52 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

President’s Opinion

Page 53 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

President’s Opinion

Page 54 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Barbara W. Alsip; Neyla Arnas; Fred Chasnov; Richard E. Chervenak;

Barbara C. Coles; Donald G. Fulwider; Robert J. Gettings; Joan M.

Hollenbach; M. Jane Hunt; Woodrow H. Hunt, Jr.; Shelia A. James; Paul E.

Jordan; James M. Lager; William E. McDaniel, II; Richard C. Newbold; and

Carin M. Wyche.

(600392) Page 56 GAO/OSI-98-4 Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident
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