United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1998 JOINT TRAINING

Observations on the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Exercise

Program

GAO/NSIAD-98-189

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280041 

July 10, 1998

The Honorable James Inhofe

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

House of Representatives

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program is the

Department of Defense’s (DOD) primary vehicle to train its forces and staff

in joint operations. Recently, the Secretary of Defense and Congress

expressed concerns about the impact of this program on the high rate of

U.S. force deployments. At your request, we reviewed the CJCS Exercise

Program. Specifically, we determined the (1) number and type of CJCS

exercises conducted and planned from 1995 to 2002, (2) basis for DOD’s

estimates of exercise costs for the same time period, and (3) availability of

DOD data to estimate the impact of CJCS exercises on deployment rates.

Background U.S. national military strategy requires air, land, sea, and special

operations forces to be capable of working together as a joint force in

military operations. At the direction of the Chairman, the CJCS Exercise

Program began in the early 1960s to provide joint training opportunities.

According to CJCS policy,1

 the exercise program’s primary objective is to

achieve joint preparedness. Specifically, joint exercises are to be designed

to demonstrate that forces are proficient in wartime and other tasks

considered essential by the regional commanders in chief (CINC). CJCS

guidance allows the program to satisfy other national security objectives,

including overseas presence, coalition building, and support of U.S. allies.2

1

CJCS Instruction 3500.01A, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, July 1,

1997.

2

CJCS Manual 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, June 1, 1996.

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However, the guidance requires the CINCs to ensure that the program

accomplishes training essential to war-fighting missions first. The

guidance also allows the CINCs to train for lesser contingencies, such as

peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, while emphasizing training for

major contingencies.

The Joint Staff’s Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate

monitors and coordinates training activities under the CJCS Exercise

Program. However, the program is actually implemented by the CINCs, who

determine requirements, develop joint training plans, and conduct and

evaluate CJCS exercises for their respective areas of responsibility. The

military services provide forces to the CINCs and use service operation and

maintenance funds to absorb the costs stemming from the forces’

participation in the exercises. The Joint Staff allocates funds to cover

transportation-related costs among the CINCs. Congress makes an annual

appropriation for these transportation-related costs in the DOD-wide

operations and maintenance account.3

The Joint Staff and CINCs coordinate some CJCS exercises with the

Department of State and the National Security Council, including those

that (1) involve large-scale participation of U.S. and foreign forces,

(2) require granting rights or approval by another nation, (3) have

particular political significance or are planned to occur in politically

sensitive areas, or (4) are likely to receive prominent media attention. The

State Department’s role in the exercise program is primarily to review

exercise plans and consult with the Joint Staff and CINCs about the

implications of exercises to be held in politically sensitive regions.

CJCS exercises may be simulated, live, or a combination of the two and can

range from classroom seminars on a specific topic to the deployment of

thousands of forces to train for military operations. Examples of these

exercises include

• sending four senior military officials to a 3-day war game seminar to study

the interrelationships during peacekeeping operations among the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, international and

nongovernmental organizations, and the media;

• deploying about 1,350 land forces to a foreign country to conduct

combined force tactical military operations, such as infantry tasks,

reconnaissance, and combat medical operations;

3

Congress appropriated almost $364 million for these costs in fiscal year 1998.

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• involving about 20,000 air, land, sea, and special operations forces in a

training exercise to perform joint tasks, such as maneuvering to position,

identifying targets, and providing combat support; and

• sending 300 Marine Corps and Air Force personnel overseas to construct a

vehicle maintenance facility and renovate a community center and medical

clinic.

Over the past few years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, CINCs, and

military service commanders have expressed concerns to Congress about

the high level of personnel deployments by a downsized force. DOD and

Congress then considered the possibility that CJCS exercises were

impacting the high DOD-wide deployment rate. On the basis of this and

other concerns, the Secretary of Defense directed in May 1997 that the

number of CJCS exercise man-days be decreased by 15 percent between

fiscal year 1996 and 1998 to reduce the potential impact of the exercise

program on deployment rates.4

 Also, Congress, in its conference report for

DOD fiscal year 1998 appropriations, called for a reduction in funding for

the CJCS Exercise Program—including both DOD-wide and service

incremental funds—of about $118.5 million.

In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998

(P.L. 105-85) directed DOD to report on CJCS exercises conducted from

fiscal year 1995 to 1997 and those planned for fiscal years 1998 to 2000.

This one-time congressional reporting requirement was to include (1) the

percentage of mission-essential tasks performed or scheduled, (2) exercise

costs, (3) exercise priority, (4) an assessment of the training value of each

exercise, and (5) options to minimize the effect of CJCS exercises on

deployments. The Secretary of Defense submitted the required report to

Congress on February 16, 1998.

Results in Brief DOD cannot determine the impact of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Exercise Program on overall deployment rates because DOD does not have

a system that accurately and consistently measures overall deployment

rates across the services. Without such a system, DOD cannot objectively

assess the extent to which the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Exercise

Program contributes to deployment rate concerns.

From fiscal year 1995 to 2002, 1,405 exercises were or are planned to be

conducted as part of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program

at the 5 regional commands. The objectives of these exercises are to

4

Man-days is DOD’s term for the number of personnel participating in CJCS exercises.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
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(1) ensure that U.S. forces are trained to conduct their highest priority

mission contained in regional command contingency plans; (2) provide

joint training for commanders, staff, and forces; and (3) project a military

presence worldwide and support commitments to U.S. allies. Some

exercises focus on just one of these objectives, whereas others, such as

war-fighting training, focus on more than one objective (i.e., contingency

plans and joint training). About 37 percent of the exercises during fiscal

years 1995 through 2002 are directly related to executing contingency

plans, 60 percent are intended to provide joint training benefits, and about

44 percent are primarily directed toward engagement activities with

foreign nations’ military forces and U.S. allies.

The Joint Staff maintains data on transportation-related expenses but does

not monitor and track the complete costs of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff Exercise Program. Before the fiscal year 1998 National Defense

Authorization Act, DOD was not required to determine total program costs.

In DOD’s February 1998 mandated report to Congress, the Joint Staff used a

combination of actual and estimated costs to estimate that the total

program would cost between $400 million and $500 million annually from

fiscal year 1995 to 2000. This estimate could be understated because the

Joint Staff did not include some incremental operating costs, such as those

for pre-participation and recovery time, and other operating costs that the

services would normally incur in their operations, including flying hours,

steaming days, and tank miles.

DOD does not currently maintain the data that would enable it to determine

the extent to which military personnel deployments associated with the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program contribute to overall

DOD-wide personnel or unit deployment rates. The services use various

methods to track individual or unit deployments and collect some data on

the number of personnel or units that participate in the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff exercises and the length of personnel deployments

associated with the exercises. However, the services’ ability to measure

overall personnel or unit deployment rates is still evolving; as a result, the

impact of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program on

deployment rates remains unknown.

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Exercises Are

Conducted for Various

CINC Mission

Requirements

The regional CINCs use the CJCS Exercise Program largely to ensure that

their forces are trained to conduct missions contained in contingency

plans, provide joint training, and project a military presence worldwide to

shape the international environment. Some exercises focus on just one of

these objectives, whereas others, such as war-fighting training, focus on

more than one objective (i.e., contingency plans and joint training). CINC

exercise officials stated that deliberate decisions are made to determine

the number of exercises and their objectives necessary to meet the

commands’ regional security needs.

Our analysis showed that the five regional CINCs conducted or plan to

conduct 1,405 CJCS exercises during the period from fiscal year 1995 to

2002. On average, about 37 percent of these exercises have or will train

forces to implement the CINCs’ existing contingency plans; about

60 percent are designed to prepare U.S. forces for joint operations; and

approximately 44 percent are designed primarily for engagement

purposes, such as projecting U.S. military presence abroad or fostering

relations with foreign military forces.5

Exercises Directed to

Execute Contingency

Plans

CINCs develop contingency plans that cover a wide variety of wartime and

peacetime operations, such as major theater wars and evacuations. The

joint training system focuses on war-fighting or preparing forces to

perform the missions contained in these plans. Joint Staff guidance

requires that training should emphasize war-fighting missions and focus on

major regional contingencies before other less critical training is done. Of

the 1,405 CJCS exercises conducted or planned for fiscal years 1995-2002,

521, or about 37 percent, were directly tied to contingency plans. Figure 1

shows the number and percent of exercises that are linked to contingency

plans at each command. It also shows the current geographical areas of

responsibility for the five commands.

5

Since an exercise can satisfy multiple objectives, some exercises are counted in more than one

category.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
B-280041 

Figure 1: Exercises Designed to Provide Training Related to Contingency Plans, Fiscal Years 1995-2002

USPACOM

USCENTCOM

USEUCOM

USACOM

USSOUTHCOM

USPACOM

North 

Pacific 

Ocean

Arctic Ocean Arctic Ocean Arctic Ocean

North 

Pacific 

Ocean

South 

Pacific 

Ocean South

Atlantic 

Ocean

North 

Atlantic 

Ocean

Indian Ocean

Regional command

Atlantic (USACOM)

Central (USCENTCOM)

European (USEUCOM)

Pacific (USPACOM)

Southern (USSOUTHCOM)

Total

Number of actual and

planned exercises

166

262

618

236

123

1,405

Number

83

149

72

194

23

521

Percent

50

57

12

82

19

37

Exercises linked to contingency plans

(Figure notes on next page)

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
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Note: The number of exercises in this figure overlaps with the number of exercises in tables 1

and 2 to the extent that the exercises have more than one objective. By order of the Secretary of

Defense, on October 1, 1998, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the

Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov will be added to USEUCOM’s area of responsibility and on

October 1, 1999, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan will be

added to USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility.

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s data.

Exercises Directed to Joint

Training

The CJCS Exercise Program also provides the CINCs with opportunities to

train forces in a joint setting. Such training requires the application of joint

doctrine, which contains the fundamental principles that guide the

employment of forces of two or more services. Also, joint exercises are

either to respond to requirements established by a joint force commander

or train joint forces or staffs for missions. Thus, joint training under the

CJCS Exercise Program is primarily designed to train forces, commanders,

or staff of two or more services using joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, or

procedures to employ forces.

The percentage of exercises intended to provide joint training at the

regional CINCs has increased over the past 3 to 4 years. In 1995, we

reported that about 25 percent of CJCS exercises in fiscal years 1994-95

were designed to provide joint training.6

 Our current evaluation of 1,405

exercises conducted during fiscal years 1995-97 and planned to be

conducted during fiscal years 1998-2002 shows that 836, or about

60 percent, were or are intended to provide U.S. forces with joint training

experience. The percentage varied among the five regional commands,

ranging from 39 percent in the U.S. Central Command to 76 percent in the

U.S. Pacific Command. Table 1 shows the exercises directed toward joint

training.

6

Military Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance Joint Military Training

(GAO/NSIAD-95-109, July 6, 1995).

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
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Table 1: Total Number of Exercises

Directed Toward Joint Training, Fiscal

Years 1995-2002 Exercises linked to joint training

Regional command

Number of

actual and

planned

exercises Number Percent

Atlantic 166 90 54

Central 262 103 39

European 618 379 61

Pacific 236 180 76

Southern 123 84 68

Total 1,405 836 60

Note: The number of exercises in this table overlaps with the number of exercises in figure 1 and

table 2 to the extent that the exercises have more than one objective.

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s data.

In its February 1998 mandated report to Congress, DOD reported that

66 percent of CJCS exercises were for joint training purposes. Differences

between DOD’s and our figures can be attributed to methodological

differences in the evaluations. For example, DOD used planned exercises

for the period 1995-2000, and we used a combination of actual exercises

for 1995-97 and planned exercises for 1998-2002. Further, we considered

only those exercises that involved the participation of more than one

service component as joint; however, DOD officials included certain

exercises that did not involve more than one service if they believed that

the content of the exercises had some joint training value.

Exercises Directed to

Engagement Activities

The CJCS Exercise Program is also used by regional CINCs to meet other

responsibilities that are not directly focused on executing contingency

plans or providing joint training. For example, the CINCs may conduct

exercises or engagement activities to demonstrate U.S. forces’ ability to

project military presence within their geographic areas of responsibility.

According to military officials, gaining access to critical facilities,

maintaining presence, peacekeeping, providing humanitarian relief, and

fostering relations with foreign nations’ forces are engagement activities

that are essential to accomplishing the CINCs’ assigned missions.

Of the 1,405 CJCS exercises conducted or planned to be conducted during

fiscal years 1995-2002, 625, or about 44 percent, were directed toward

engagement activities. Some regional CINCs conduct more

engagement-related exercises than others. For example, in the U.S.

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Southern Command, 81 percent of all actual or planned CJCS exercises are

for engagement purposes compared with 24 percent in the U.S. Pacific

Command. Table 2 illustrates the number of CJCS exercises that each CINC

devoted to engagement-type activities.

Table 2: CJCS Exercises Directed

Toward Engagement, Fiscal Years

1995-2002 Linked to engagement

Regional command

Number of

actual and

planned

exercises Number Percent

Atlantic 166 76 46

Central 262 87 33

European 618 306 50

Pacific 236 56 24

Southern 123 100 81

Total 1,405 625 44

Note: The number of exercises in this table overlaps with the number of exercises in figure 1 and

table 1 to the extent that the exercises have more than one objective.

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s data.

Total CJCS Exercise

Program Costs

Cannot Be

Determined

The Joint Staff does not track total costs involved in conducting CJCS

exercises; it only compiles actual cost data for strategic lift, port handling,

and inland transportation—items covered by a specific congressional

appropriation. The Joint Staff, CINC staff, and military services do not have

systems to capture all exercise-related costs. Historically, there has been

no requirement that total CJCS Exercise Program costs be tracked or

reported. However, the Joint Staff estimated that the CJCS Exercise

Program would cost about $400 million to $500 million annually during

fiscal years 1995-2000. The Joint Staff’s estimate was derived from a

combination of actual and estimated costs; therefore, we were unable to

independently verify the estimate. However, we believe that the costs

reported by the Joint Staff may be understated, since certain incremental

costs and other related operating costs were not included in its estimate.

Costs Associated With

CJCS Exercises

A variety of costs are directly associated with conducting CJCS exercises.

These costs, shown in table 3, include strategic lift, port handling, inland

transportation, exercise-related construction, and service incremental. The

costs are funded by the DOD-wide and service operation and maintenance

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accounts except for exercise-related construction, which is funded by the

military construction accounts.

Table 3: Incremental Costs to Conduct CJCS Exercises

Cost category Paying agency Payee agency Costs paid

Strategic lift Joint Staff, Operational

Plans and Interoperability

Directorate

Air Mobility Command and

Military Sealift Command

Movement of unit personnel and

equipment to and from CJCS

exercises.

Port handling Joint Staff, Operational

Plans and Interoperability

Directorate

Services Commercial expenses to

receive and dispatch cargo at

ports of embarkation and

debarkation.

Inland transportation Joint Staff, Operational

Plans and Interoperability

Directorate

Services Surface transportation of

exercise participants and

equipment to and from an

exercise area or ports of

embarkation or debarkation.

Payment made for services of

commercial-for-hire firms when

organic transportation is not

available or cost-effective.

Exercise-related construction Joint Staff, Logistics

Directorate

Services Construction costs paid from

military construction accounts

related to service participation

in CJCS exercises and for

facilities expected to remain in

place after an exercise is

completed.

Service incremental Services Units participating in CJCS

exercises

Expenses for exercise peculiar

equipment, petroleum, oil,

lubricants, repair parts,

expendable supplies, and

contract support.

Tracking CJCS Exercise

Costs

Although the Joint Staff is responsible for program oversight, it only tracks

a portion of the total exercise program costs. The Joint Staff tracks actual

cost data for expenditures related to strategic lift, port handling, and

inland transportation expenses and reimburses the U.S. Air Mobility

Command, the Military Sealift Command, and service components for

these costs. It also maintains data on the amount of funding appropriated

for exercise-related military construction projects. The costs reported by

the Joint Staff for these categories for fiscal years 1995 through 1997 are

shown in table 4.

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Table 4: Strategic Lift, Port Handling,

Inland Transportation, and

Exercise-Related Construction Costs,

Fiscal Years 1995-97 Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Cost categorya 1995 1996 1997

Strategic lift, port handling, and

inland transportation $324.3 $388.5 $325.2

Exercise-related construction 6.3 6.5 6.3

Total $330.6 $395.0 $331.5

aThese figures represent actual expenditures in constant dollars from the DOD-wide operations

and maintenance accounts for strategic lift, port handing, and inland transportation and

appropriations from the military construction accounts for exercise-related construction.

Source: Joint Staff, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate and Logistics Directorate.

The Joint Staff estimated that the incremental cost to conduct the CJCS

Exercise Program annually between fiscal year 1995 and 2000 would be

between $400 million and $500 million. This cost included actual and

projected expenses related to strategic lift, port handling, and inland

transportation, as shown in table 4. The remainder of the cost estimate is

based on an estimate of exercise-related construction costs and service

incremental operations and maintenance costs. The estimate does not

include the items funded in the military service accounts, such as flying

hours, steaming days, or tank miles.

The CINCs do not compile, track, or report on total CJCS exercise costs,

although they have access to information on and track to some degree

strategic lift, port handling, inland transportation, and exercise-related

construction costs. CINC officials told us that maintaining total cost

information would be of no value to them because they are not

responsible for paying these costs. The Joint Staff does allocate each CINC

an annual strategic lift funding level, which is not to be exceeded, to

manage CJCS exercises. Consequently, CINC officials said total cost

information would have little bearing on their management

responsibilities.

Because individual military services provide forces for CJCS exercises, they

incur and pay for the incremental operations and maintenance costs

associated with the forces’ participation. These costs, which include

consumable supplies, repair parts, and non-aviation fuel, are tracked

differently by each service. Depending on the service, costs incurred by

units that are preparing to participate in an exercise, equipment

maintenance and repair expenses, and costs associated with recovering

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from participation in the exercises may or may not be tracked. To assist

the Joint Staff in developing the exercise program costs for the

February 1998 report, the services provided estimated cost data related to

such items as consumable supplies, repair parts, per diem, non-aviation

fuel, and communications.

No commonly accepted process among the service component commands

exists to capture CJCS exercise costs; therefore, the services’ cost estimates

will vary according to what costs they choose to include. The Army, the

Navy, and the Marine Corps maintained some cost data on the incremental

operations and maintenance costs associated with their participation in

CJCS exercises. In fiscal year 1997, for example, these services reported

costs of about $54 million, $11 million, and $12 million, respectively. They

developed these estimates using various systems and records of funding

targets to help the Joint Staff meet its congressional reporting

requirement. Navy components do not track operations and maintenance

funds for flying hours and steaming days used during CJCS exercises, and

Air Force components do not track flying hours used for the exercises. In

providing information to the Joint Staff to satisfy DOD’s reporting

requirement, the Navy and the Air Force estimated incremental operations

and maintenance costs, excluding flying hours and steaming days.

Service component officials cited two reasons for not accumulating cost

data at the level necessary to accurately determine total operations and

maintenance costs associated with participation in CJCS exercises. First,

such data would not enhance their management capabilities. Second, there

was no DOD-wide requirement for them to track and report these costs. The

officials said that any measure of the actual operations and maintenance

costs consumed by CJCS Exercise Program participation would require

individual unit commanders in the field (e.g., tank operators, pilots,

mechanics, or explosive ordnance specialists) to maintain such cost data

and report it through financial management channels. Service officials did

not believe that accumulating such data would be cost beneficial.

DOD Lacks the Data

to Assess the

Program’s Impact on

Service Deployment

Rates

The services use various methods to track the time individuals or units

spend engaged in operations and time deployed away from their home

stations because there is no DOD-wide requirement to collect and maintain

specific personnel deployment rate data. Service officials stated that they

maintain some personnel or unit deployment rate data to track their

forces’ participation in the exercise program. However, the services do not

regularly track the impact of participation in CJCS exercises on overall

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
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deployment rates. As a result, officials from the Joint Staff, CINCs, service

headquarters, and service components at the five regional commands

could not provide complete information on the total number of days

consumed by all deployments, including those associated with CJCS

exercises. Without this data, the program’s impact on personnel

deployment rates cannot be precisely determined.

The Joint Staff Has

Difficulty Measuring

Deployment Rates

The Joint Staff has generally had difficulty measuring personnel

deployments among the military services. We reported in April 1996 that it

is difficult to determine the actual time that either military personnel or

units are deployed.7

 Our report recommended that the Secretary of

Defense (1) establish a DOD-wide definition of deployment; (2) state

whether each service should have a goal, policy, or regulation stipulating

the maximum amount of time units and personnel may be deployed; and

(3) define the minimum data on deployments that each service must

collect and maintain. DOD agreed to further pursue initiatives—many

which were noted in our report—to enhance its ability to manage

deployments. Also, in January 1997, DOD forwarded a report to the

Chairman, House National Security Committee, on the impact of increased

deployments on training, retention, and readiness.8

 As part of that study,

the Joint Staff assessed the capabilities of service systems to track

personnel deployments. The report noted that, although all the services

had systems in place to monitor deployments, each service measured and

defined personnel deployment differently. For example, the Army tracks

personnel at both the unit and individual level, whereas the Marine Corps

and the Navy track personnel only at the unit level. The Air Force tracks

personnel by aircraft type and specialty type.

The difficulty with measuring either military personnel or unit deployment

rates stems in part from the differences in how each military service

defines and tracks personnel deployments. The services have different

definitions of deployed forces. For example, the Marine Corps considers a

servicemember deployed after that person has been away from his or her

home station for 10 days, but the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy

consider personnel to be deployed after only 1 day away from their home

station. Table 5 shows the variation in service measurement systems and

definitions that were in place as of March 1998. Military officials stated

7

Military Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide Management of Frequently Deployed Units

(GAO/NSIAD-96-105, Apr. 8, 1996).

8

Final Report of the PERSTEMPO Working Group, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 26, 1996.

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that systems that address the different personnel deployment rate

measurements are evolving.

Table 5: Service Personnel Deployment Standards and Tracking Capabilities as of March 1998

Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps

Definition of deployment 1 overnight away from

assigned quarters

1 day away from

homeport

1 day away from home

station

10 days or more away

from home station

Limit on deployment No policy, but goal is

maximum deployment of

120 days per year, with a

threshold of 180 days

per year

Policy exists that limits

deployments to 6 months

No policy, but goal is for

a maximum deployment

of 120 days per year

No policy, but goal is for

a maximum unit

deployment of 180 days

per year

System tracking

capabilities

Unit and individual levels Unit level Air Force specialty and

aircraft type

Unit level

The Joint Staff Does Not

Track the Impact of CJCS

Exercises on Overall

Personnel Deployment

Rates

The readiness staff at Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps headquarters,

which monitor data systems, currently do not track the impact of CJCS

exercise participation on overall personnel or unit deployment rates. The

services are developing systems to enhance their capability to measure

overall deployment rates. At the time of our visits, officials at the service

components at the regional commands had not been regularly maintaining

data on the participation of their personnel in CJCS exercises. Some CINCs

have tried to determine this relationship, but their data and methodologies

had flaws. For example, the U.S. Pacific Command performed an analysis

on the relationship between CJCS participation and personnel deployments.

The analysis showed that about 4 percent of the total deployed days spent

by service components in fiscal year 1996 were attributable to

participation in CJCS exercises. However, the analysis did not include data

from all of the units assigned to the command, the components

determined deployment days differently, and the information provided by

the components was not complete. For example, their personnel tracking

systems do not calculate the number of days used by deployments for CJCS

exercises.

The lack of such information is especially evident at the U.S. Atlantic

Command, which has responsibility for training and deploying nearly

80 percent of all U.S. forces. Officials from this command stated that, to

assess the impact of CJCS exercises on personnel deployment rates, the

command would need an adequate database with visibility into all

deployments, operations, exercises, and training events. Command

officials stated that they do not have historical personnel deployment data

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for all of their units; therefore, they could not determine the impact of

participation in CJCS exercises on personnel deployment rates. The

officials also stated that they do not have information on the extent of unit

deployments and therefore do not consider this factor when selecting

units for exercises.

Although many factors contribute to the pace of deployments, such as

routine training, peacekeeping efforts, and major deployments, the

military officials we met with believe that personnel deployments created

by participation in CJCS exercises have a minimal impact on the overall

DOD-wide deployment rate. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense directed

in the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review that CJCS exercise man-days

be reduced by 15 percent between fiscal year 1996 and 1998 to reduce the

stress on overall DOD-wide personnel deployments caused by these

exercises. The officials we met with believe that any reduction in CJCS

exercise participation would have virtually no impact on overall DOD-wide

deployment problems. Participation in CJCS exercises has a greater impact

on the personnel deployment of low-density, high-demand units rather

than military units in general, according to these officials. However, their

conclusion was based on professional military judgment, since no systems

exist to measure the impact of the exercise program on total deployment.

In its February 1998 report to Congress, DOD describes various actions

underway to reduce personnel deployments incurred as a result of the CJCS

Exercise Program. The report cited the Secretary’s directive to reduce the

man-days devoted to exercise programs and noted that the military

services had been asked to pursue further reductions. Actions to meet

these mandates are underway, according to the report.

Conclusions DOD officials use the CJCS Exercise Program to accomplish a wide range of

objectives. DOD policy directs that the exercises are to prepare forces for

their highest priorities—joint wartime operations. DOD policy also allows

these exercises to be focused on maintaining relationships with U.S. allies.

CINC exercise officials stated that the mix of exercises and their intended

focus are the result of deliberate decisions made to meet each command’s

security needs.

Total costs associated with conducting CJCS exercises cannot be

determined. DOD and its components are currently unprepared to report

accurate and complete cost data because they do not believe tracking such

costs would be cost beneficial. The cost data in DOD’s February 1998 report

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
B-280041 

to Congress is incomplete because some service participation costs are

not included. The reported costs generally represent some of the

incremental costs incurred in conducting these exercises.

DOD has no method to measure the impact of the CJCS Exercise Program on

overall individual and unit deployment rates. Although the Office of the

Secretary of Defense questions whether deployment problems exist,

concerns expressed by Joint Staff, CINCs, and service component officials

have led to actions by both DOD and Congress to reduce overall

deployment rates by reducing the CJCS program in terms of funding and the

number of exercises. Because DOD does not consistently track information

on deployments, the impact of the exercise program on overall

deployment rates cannot be precisely determined. Although DOD agreed to

consider the recommendations in our April 1996 report to address the

problem of managing personnel deployment rates, it has yet to fully

implement them. We continue to believe that our prior recommendations

to DOD are crucial to its ability to measure the impact that the CJCS

Exercise Program has on overall personnel deployment rates.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our

findings and made several observations about the CJCS Exercise Program

(see app. I). DOD also provided technical comments, which we

incorporated where appropriate.

DOD said that, even though the primary focus of an exercise may be joint

training, contingency operations, or engagement, it is not appropriate to

consider the value of this training for just one purpose, since all CJCS

exercises provide joint training value. In categorizing exercises according

to their purposes, we used established guidance published by the Joint

Staff to identify those exercises that provided an opportunity for joint

training. We did not assess the value of the training but did include

exercises with more than one purpose in all applicable categories.

With respect to program costs, DOD noted that the Joint Staff monitors

direct costs of the exercise program (e.g., strategic lift and port handling)

as well as service incremental costs. DOD acknowledged that the services

do not track flying hours, steaming days, and tank miles associated with

the exercises because, according to DOD, doing so would not necessarily

benefit the agency. As our report points out, without such cost

information, DOD cannot determine total program costs.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
B-280041 

DOD noted that the Joint Staff is now collecting data on the number of

man-days spent participating in the CJCS Exercise Program. According to

DOD, this data shows that the man-days associated with the exercise

program have been reduced and exceeded DOD’s 15-percent goal. DOD

acknowledged that the services’ ability to measure overall personnel and

unit deployment rates is still evolving and is not yet robust enough to

allow the agency to determine the share attributable to the CJCS Exercise

Program. Because the services use various methods to determine

deployment rates and do not regularly track the impact of participation in

CJCS exercises on these rates, we cannot verify DOD’s statement that it has

met its man-day reduction goal for the exercise program.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the number and type of CJCS exercises conducted or planned for

fiscal years 1995 to 2002, we obtained and analyzed quarterly schedules of

exercises conducted by the U.S. Atlantic, Central, European, Pacific, and

Southern Commands. These exercises represent approximately 88 percent

of the total exercises conducted or planned to be conducted during the

time period. We did not analyze the remaining exercises, which were

conducted by the U.S. Space, Strategic, Transportation, and North

American Aerospace Defense Commands and the Joint Staff.

To determine the scope of the joint training, we used the Joint Staff’s

published guidance to determine whether a particular exercise meets the

criteria for joint training. We reviewed the training objectives and tasks to

be performed for each of the 1,405 CJCS exercises conducted or planned to

be conducted during the 8-year period in our review. We provided the

Joint Staff and each CINC an opportunity to review our analyses and make

any necessary adjustments to account for additional exercises conducted

or planned and exercises that were canceled. Any discrepancies between

the information the Joint Staff and the CINCs provided about the exercises

were reconciled. To identify the CJCS exercises designed primarily to

accomplish contingency plans, we relied on the determinations of CINC

officials. To identify exercises conducted to address engagement-type

activities, we obtained and analyzed each CINCs’ joint training plans. We

discussed our analyses with officials from the Joint Staff’s Exercise and

Training Division. We visited each of the five U.S. regional commands and

discussed our analyses with CINC officials from each command. We also

interviewed officials from service components of the Atlantic, European,

and Pacific Commands. These officials generally agreed with our

categorization of the exercises.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
B-280041 

To determine the available cost data for the exercise program, we

interviewed officials and analyzed data obtained from the Joint Staff,

CINCs, service component commands, and service headquarters. We also

interviewed officials and obtained budget data from Headquarters, U.S.

Forces Command; Headquarters, Air Combat Command; the Commander

in Chief, Atlantic Fleet; the Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic; the

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; and Headquarters, Marine Forces

Pacific. We also discussed with the Joint Staff the methodology for

estimating the costs of the CJCS Exercise Program that were reported to

Congress.

To assess whether DOD maintains the data needed to estimate the impact

of CJCS exercises on overall deployment rates, we interviewed officials and

obtained documents from service headquarters; the Atlantic, Central,

European, Pacific, and Southern Commands; and service components of

the Atlantic, European, and Pacific Commands. We determined the

systems the Joint Staff, CINCs, services, and major commands use to track

military personnel and unit deployments by contacting the following

organizations: the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability

Directorate (J-7); the U.S. Atlantic, Central, European, Pacific, and

Southern Commands; the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; the

Air Force Operations Support Center, Training Division; the Office of the

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations; and

the Marine Corps Current Operations Branch Exercise Office, Deputy

Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations. We also contacted major

service component commands. Because these organizations were unable

to provide data on the amount of time units and personnel deployed for

CJCS exercises, service training, and operational deployments, we could

not evaluate the impact of the program on personnel or unit deployment

rates. Both the lack and inconsistency of the data that is maintained made

it difficult to determine the actual time personnel or units are deployed.

We conducted our work from September 1997 to July 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air

Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will also make copies available to others on

request.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
B-280041 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix II.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

22

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

23

Tables Table 1: Total Number of Exercises Directed Toward Joint

Training, Fiscal Years 1995-2002

8

Table 2: CJCS Exercises Directed Toward Engagement, Fiscal

Years 1995-2002

9

Table 3: Incremental Costs to Conduct CJCS Exercises 10

Table 4: Strategic Lift, Port Handling, Inland Transportation, and

Exercise-Related Construction Costs, Fiscal Years 1995-97

11

Table 5: Service Personnel Deployment Standards and Tracking

Capabilities as of March 1998

14

Figure Figure 1: Exercises Designed to Provide Training Related to

Contingency Plans, Fiscal Years 1995-2002

6

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

DOD Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol Schuster

Donald Patton

Penny Berrier

Rodney Ragan

Karen Blum

Norfolk Field Office Janine Cantin

Harry Taylor

(703209) Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-189 Joint Training
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