March 25, 1981

SECY-81-197

Fo)':

Cont.act:

N. A. Eisenberg, SO

443-5946

RULEMAKING ISSUE

(Atfirmationl

The Commissioners

Wil'liam J, Dircks

Exec:utive Director for Operations

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 10 CFR PART 71 TO RESTRICT AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

To obtaf n Commission approval of a proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 71 that would restrict the shipment of p.lutonium by air, implementing the Scheuer Amendment (PL 94-79) with a rule and acknowledging the development of a plutonium package certified· to be air-crash resistant.

This paper covers a minor policy question. Resource estimates, Category 1, preliminary (see Section 1.3.1, Enclosure 3).

The proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 71 are:

1. Replace, by a regulation, the existing order to licensees currently implementing the Scheuer Amendment.

2. In the regulation, permit air shipment of small quantities of plutonium in other than a container certified to be air- crash resistant (having decided that this is a reasonable interpretation of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as modified by the Scheuer Amendment).

3. Do not codify qualification criteria for an air-crash- resistant package in the NRC regulations. Instead refer to the criteria as published.

___1 • _
..

ThE' Commissioners

Discussion:

2

Repllacing the order to licensees by a regulation is desirable

because: (1) a regulation provides for a more uniform and efficient licensing process, (2) the rulemaking procedure provides

for public participation and (3) through rulemaking the NRC can

permit shipment of small quantities of plutonium in other than

an cdr crash-resistant package, as a reasonable interpretation

of the law and without seeking legislative change by Congress.

A rule that permits small quantities of plutonium (an A2 quantity

or less) to be shipped in other than crash-resistant packaging

is desirable, because it avoids the expense and inconvenience to

Licansees of mandatory use of an air-crash-resistant package for

small quantities of plutonium, while it prevents large pUblic

health consequences in the event that an aircraft carrying plutonium crashes--the 'goal of the Scheuer Amendment. Codification

of the package qualification criteria through the rulemaking and

public comment process is neither necessary ,nor desirable at this

timE!. The cri teri a have been made pub1i c in NUREG-0360 and were

givEm rigorous review by the AcRS and the National Academy of

scf ences. It is not expected that public comment would result

in alny significant changes. Further, it is desirable to obtain

experience with the use of such criteria before limiting flexibility by codification. Several procedural and technical alternatives were considered. These are discussed in the Value/Impact

Statement (Enclosure 3).

As a, follow up to this action, the staff will (1) consider whether

to r'ecommend that the Commission seek legislative relief to permit

shipments, that are larger than an A2 quantity, by air in other

than an air-crash-resistant package of safeguards samples and of

other small quantities of plutonium,for which rapid transport

is required and is of identifiable benefit to the public interest

and (2) evaluate' whether to encourage DOT to consider changes to its regulations that would reduce inconsistencies with NRC regulations, as amended by this proposed rule.

The following summarizes the detailed discussion of all the technical and administrative options considered in formulating this

action paper, which is presented in the Value/Impact Statement,

(Enclosure 3). A detailed evaluation of the pros and cons of

the alternatives is also presented in Enclosure 3.

The Scheuer Amendment

The Scheuer Amendment is part of Public Law 94-79 and appears as

a footnote to section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974. Enacted into law August 9, 1975, it provides:
The Commissioners 3

liThe Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall not license any

shipments by air transport of plutonium in any form, whether

exports, imports or domestic shipments: Provided, however,

that any plutonium in any form contained in a medical device

designed for individual human application is not subject to

this restriction. This restriction shall be in force until

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has certified to the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress that a safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture

under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and

explosion of a high-flying aircraft."

Ih!-NRC Certification Program

On August 15, 1975, NRC issued an order to its licensees, prohibiting the air transport of plutonium, except that contained in a

medical device for individual human use. Since then, the NRC

·staff has developed a plutonium package capable of surviving an

air crash' (Model PAT-I), published qualification criteria for

such a package (NUREG-0360), pUblished a Safety Analysis Report

for the package (NUREG-0361), and obtained the review of the

National Academy of Science (NUREG/CR-0928) and the ACRS for both

the certification criteria and the package. This effort culminated on August 4, 1978, when the NRC certified to Congress that

a package (Model PAT-I) that would fulfill the requirements of

public Law 94-79 had been designed and tested. A certificate of

compliance was issued by NRC (See NUREG-0383, Volume 2, Revision 2,

pp. 1-4) that authorizes use of the Model PAT-1 package for air

transport of plutonium.

On September 1, 1978, the NRC issued an order to NRC licensees

(superseding the August 15, 1975 order to licensees) which

states:

"Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in the NRC·s

regulations or in your license, shipments of plutonium by

air, other than plutonium contained in a medical device

designed for individual human application, may only be made

in packages the design of which the NRC has specifically

approved for transport of plutonium by air."

The iProposed Action

Now that the NRC plutonium air transport package certification

prog'ram has been completed, the staff proposes issuing a regulaticn implementing the mandate of Congress. The rule formulated

by the NRC staff to implement the law is a reasonable interpretation of the language of the law, permitting plutonium shipments
ThE~ Commi ss ioners 4

of small quantities and very low specific activities in packaging

othE!r than that certified by the NRC to be air-crash resistant.

The allowance to ship very low specific activities in other than

crash-resistant packaging is a practical interpretation of the

law" recognizing the definition of radioactive materials used in

transport regulations. Similarly, the rule drafted by the NRC

sta1·f would, as a reasonable interpretation of the legislation,

permit the air shipment of small quantities of plutonium in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash resistant. A

legcll analysis prepared by OELD, Appendix II to Enclosure 3 of

this paper, elaborates on this issue. An NRC staff analysis,

the Environmental Impact Appraisal, (Enclosure 4), shows that an

A2 quantity of plutonium released to the human environment as a

result of an air crash would generally be expected to produce no

more than minor public health consequences. This realistic, but

still conservative, assessment which takes into account the

environmental dispersion and population density exposed, shows

the health effects produced would be a small fraction of a latent

canc:er fatality. With that margin of safety, large public health

consequences would be essentially impossible, even if more than

one package was involved in a single air crash. In addition,

plut.onium shipments of an A2 quantity or less are currently exempt

from the proposed Department of Transportation and NRC requirement.s for accident-resistant packaging (which are based on internationally accepted standards), because such small quantities

pose small risk and hazard to the public, even if they were

entirely released. These exemptions, of course, have been

superseded by the NRC implementation of the Scheuer Amendment.

Petition to Ship Small Quantities

Related to this rulemaking, Eberline Instrument Corporation, in

a letter dated July 18, 1977, formally petitioned the Commission

(PRM-70-6) to allow air shipment of small quantities of plutonium

(less than 5 microcuries) contained in calibration sources. On

August 18, 1977, the NRC published a notice (42 FR 41675) of filing of that petition for rulemaking. Commission action on the

rule proposed herein will define NRC policy and constitute a

definitive response to this petition.

Inconsistencies with DOT and IAEA Regulations

Regardless of the particular manner chosen, any implementation

of the Scheuer Amendment will go beyond current DOT and IAEA

regulations, because those regulations do not require air shipment of plutonium in a crash-resistant package. If DOT or IAEA

should decide to consider changes in their regulations to reduce
The Commissioners

Recommendations:

5

or rumove the inconsistencies between those regulations and the

NRC l'egulations, some staff activity would be involved in working with those organizations. The NRC staff will evaluate whether

it should encourage consideration of such changes by DOT.

US/H~EA Safeguards Agreement

In the implementation of international safeguards in other countries,

the IAEA needs to be able to airship safeguards samples of plutonium rapidly to their laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria. Implementa- tion of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement may also require the

rapid shipment of safeguards samples of plutonium from U.S. nuclear

faciliities to Seibersdorf. The provision in this proposed rule

to allow shipments of an A quantity or less of plutonium in packaging other than that ~ertified to be air-crash resistant

will be consistent with the U.S. policy to support effective " tnternational safeguards by permitting"the shipment of-certain

safequards samples by air in packaging less expensive and less

cumbE!rsome than the air-crash-resistant package. This does not,

however, completely solve the problem because many shipments of safe~luards samples consist of quantities of plutonium that are

largE!r than an A quantity. OELD, NMSS, IP, OCA, and OGC will

coordinate an eV~luation of whether to recommend legislative chanqe to relax requirements for the shipment by air of safeguards samples and of other small quantities of plutonium, for which rapid transport is needed and of identifiable benefit to

the public interest.

The Commission:

(a) 1. Approve publication for comment of the no~ice of pro- posed rule makirig (Enclosure 1) which provides amend- " ments to 10 CFR Part 71 to restrict the shipment of

plutonium by air.

2. Approve the staff's conclusions set forth in Enclosure 6, which provides the analysis called for by the

Periodic and Systematic Review of the Regulations. The criteria used were derived from Executive Order

12044 which was rescinded on February 17, 1981 by Executive Order 12291 (see memorandum from Bickwit to

the Commission, February 27, 1981). This approach is

proposed as an interim procedure until the staff can

make recommendations and the Commission decides what

to do in response to Executive Order 12291.

(b) Note

1. Staff actions will be initiated to: (1) evaluate whether

to encourage DOT to consider changes to existing DOT
.r'

The Commissioners G

regulations that would reduce inconsistencies with the

NRC regulations, as amended, and (2) consider whether

there exist sufficient technical and policy bases for

a staff recommendation to the Commission that NRC seek

legislative relief for the air shipment of safeguards samples and other small quantities of plutonium, for which rapid transport is needed and is of identifiable

benefit to the public interest. (The motivation for

these considerations is discussed in detail in the Value/

Impact Statement, Enclosure 3).

2. The proposed amendment would be published in the Federal Register for GO-day public comment.

3. If after expiration of the comment period no significant adverse comments or significant questions have been

received and no substantial changes in the text of the

rule are indicated, the Executive Director for Opera- tions will arrange for publication of the amendment in

final form. If significant questions have been received

or substantial changes in the text of the rule are indicated, the revised amendment will be submitted to the

Commission for approval;

4. That in accordance with 10 CFR 51.7, 51.5 (c), and 51.5

(b)(G), a negative declaration is incorporated in the

notice of proposed rulemaking (Enclosure 1). A Draft

Environmental Impact Appraisal (Draft EIA, Enclosure 4),

supporting the negative declaration, will be made available in the Public Document Room. If substantive comments

are received, the staff will modify. the Draft EIA to

provide the Final EIA. If no substantive comments are

received the Draft EIA will be used as the Final EIA.

5. The preamble to the proposed rule contains the statement

that: lithe Commission hereby certifies that this rule

will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities. II A

copy of this certification and the accompanying succinct

statement explaining the reasons for it will be forwarded

by the Division of Rules and Records to the Chief Counsel

for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. A

summary of information to assist the Commission in making this certification is given in Enclosure 5.

6. The Value/Impact Statement supporting this proposed rule will be made available in the Public Document Room

for public inspection and comments.

7. The appropriate Congressional committees will be

informed.
The Commissioners 7

8. A public announcement, such as Enclosure 2, will be

issued when the proposed amendment is filed with the

Office of the Federal Register.

9. Copies of this proposed rule will be mailed to affected

licensees and known interested parties.

10. These amendments are considered to be matters of basic

compatibility between NRC and Agreement State regulations.

11. The basis for.the NRC resource estimate is given in

Section 1.3.1 of the Value/Impact Statement (Enclosure 3).

i~~~f..- Willia~J. Dircks

Executive Di~ector for Operations

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

2. Draft Public Announcement

3. ValuelImpact Statement

4. Draft Environmental Impact Appraisal 5. Information Summary for Regulation Determinations

6. Analysis with Respect to Periodic

Systematic Review of Regulation

Commissioners' comments or· consent should be.provided directly to the Office of the Secretary

by c.o.t. Friday, April 10, 1:981.

Commission Staff Office COmmE!nts, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT

April 3, 1981, with an infonlation copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such

a nature' that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners

and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

This paper is tantatlvely scheduled for affirmation at an Open Meeting during the Week of

April 20, 1981. Please refer' to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time..

DISTRIBUTION

Commissioners

Commission Staff Offices

Exec DiY' for Operations

ACRS

ASLBP

ASLAP

SecretaT'iat
.._-------

ENCLOSURE 1
[7590-01]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[10 CFR Part 71]

Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has under consideration proposed amendments to its regulations that would restrict the air transport

of plutonium. Pursuant to the Scheuer Amendment, the proposed rule will ,

require that. shipments of plutonium by air be contained in a package

specifically certified as air-crash resistant. However, plutonium may

be shipped b~ air in other packages if the plutonium is in a medical

device for individual human use or if the plutonium is shipped in quantities or concentrations small enough to present no significant hazard to

the public health and safety, even were the plutonium released in an

air crash. All NRC licensees authorized to transfer plutonium are subject to the provisions of this proposed' rule.

DATES: CClmments received after will be considered if it ----- is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given

except as tel comments recei ved on or before

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments

and suggestions on the proposed amendments, on the supporting Value/Impact

Statement, on the Environmental Impact Appraisal, and on the certification

criteria in NUREG-0360 to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear

1 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

Regulatory Cl)mmission t Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and :

Service Branch. Single copies of the Value/Impact Statement, the Environmental Impact Appraisal or NUREG-0360 may be obtained on request from

Norman A. Ei~;enberg (address below). Copies of the Value/Impact Statement,

the Env ircnaental Impact Appraisal, NUREG-0360 and other reports cited

under supplementary information below, and of comments received by the

Commi ssion miiY be exami ned in the Commission I s Pub1ic Document Room at

1717 HStreet NW., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Norman A. Eisenberg, Office of

Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

·20555 (Telephone: 301-443-5946).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background:

The Schl!uer Amendment, part of Public Law 94-79 and appearing as a

footnote to section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, was

",

enacted into law August 9, 1975, It provides that:

The Nuc"lear Regulatory Commission shall not license any shipments by air transport of plutonium in any form, whether exports, imports

or domestic shipments: Provided, however, that any plutonium in

any form contained in a medical device designed for individual human

application is not SUbject to this restriction. This restriction

shall bl! in force until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has certified to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress that a

safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture under cl~ash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.

On August 15" 1975, NRC issued an order to licensees, prohibiting the air

transport of plutonium, except that contained in a medical device for individual human use. Since then, the NRC staff has developed a plutonium

package capable of surviving an air crash (Model PAT-I), published qualification criteria for such a package (NUREG-0360), published a Safety

2 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

Analysis Report for the package (NUREG-036l), and obtained the review of

the National Academy of Sciences (NUREG/CR-0928) and the Advisory Committee

on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) for both the certification criteria and the

package. This effort culminated on August 4, 1978, when the NRC certified

to Congress that a package (Model PAT-l) that would fulfill the requirements of Public Law 94-79 had been designed and tested. A certificate

of conpl tance was issued by NRC (see NUREG-0383, Volume 2, Revision 2,

pp. 1-4) that authorizes use of the Model PAT-l package for air transport

of plutonium. The Commission will consider certifying other packaging

as air-crash resistant, if such packaging is demonstrated to satisfy the

criteria stated in NUREG"-0360. Comments on tt'lese criteria are invited,

although sell!ction of certification criteria is not part of this rulemaking

action.

On Septf!mber 1, 1978, the NRC issued an order to NRC licensees (superseding the August 15, 1975 order to licensees) which states that:

Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in the NRC's regula- tions 01' in ypur license, shipments of plutonium by air, other than

plutonium contained in a medical device designed for individual human

application, may only be made in packages the design of which the

NRC has specifically approved for transport of plutonium by air.

Now that the NRC plutonium air transport package certification program

has been completed, the NRC plans to issue a regulation implementing the

mandate of Congress.

The Proposed Rule:

This re~,ulation is a reasonable interpretation of the law. Reflecting

the specific language of the law, it will require the use of a package certified to be air-crash resistant for the air shipment of plutonium, unless

the plutonium is contained in a medical device for individual human use.

In addition t.he regulation permits air shipment of plutonium in packaging

3 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

other than that certified by the NRC to be air-crash resistant for low

specific activities (less than 0.002 microcurie per gram) or for small

quantities (Iess than an A2quantity*).

The allowance to ship very low specific activities in other than

ei r-cresh-restatent packaging is a practical interpretation of the law,

recognizing the definition of radioactive materials used in transport

regulations. Since the atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the 1950s

and 1960s, soil, animals, and virtually all terrestrial materials contain ·very smelll quantities of plutonium. Obviously the law was not

intended to apply to these materials in an absolute sense.

Similarly this proposed regulation, as a reasonable interpretation

of the legisllation, allows the air shipment of small quantities of plutonium in packaqinq other than that certified to be air-crash resistant.

An NRC staff analysis (The Environmental Impact Appraisal) shows that an

A2 quantity of plutonium released to the human environment as a result

of an air crash would generally be expected to produce no more than minor

public health consequences. This realistic, but still conservative assessment t ' taking into account the environmental di spers ton and population density exposed, shows the health effects produced would be a small fraction

of a latent c:ancer fatality. With that margin of safety, large public

health consequences would be essentially impossible, even if more than one

~2 quantity of plutonium is defined in Appendix C of the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 71 (44 FR 48234) published August 17, 1979 and

in Table VII of the International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations for the Safe Transport; of Radioactive Materials, IAEA Safety Series No.6

(1973 Revised Edition).

4 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

pack.age were involved in a single air crash. Furthermore the PAT-1 package certified to Congress by the NRC to be air-crash resistant allows

the release of an A2 quantity in a period of a week, after "crash and

blast testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft." Radioactive material shipments of an A2 quantity or less would

be exempt from the proposed Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements (44 FR 1852) and the proposed NRC requirements (44 FR 48234) for

shipping in accident-resistant (type B) packaging, because such small

quantities pose negligible risk and hazard to the public. For NRC

licensees thlese exemptions would, however, be superseded by the NRC regulations impl,ementing o.f the Scheuer Amendment. The allowance to ship as

much as an A:~ quantity of plutonium in packaging other than that certified

to be ai r- crash res istant wi 11 be consistent wi th the U. S. policy to

support effec:tive international safeguards by permitting the shipment of

certain safequards samples by air in packaging less expensive and less

cumbersome than air-crash-resistant packaging. On this basis the proposed rule would allow these small quantities of plutonium to be shipped

in other than.'air-crash-resistant packaging.

The A2 quantity is in the context of the 1973 IAEA regulations, the

same break point as 1 millicurie in the context of current NRC/DOT regulations. When the 1973 IAEA regulations are incorporated into the U.S.

system by making final the NRC and DOT proposed rules, the reference to

an A2 quantity in this proposed rule will be consistent with the new

regu"latory structure. (For long-lived alpha-emitting isotopes of plutonium, the ~12 quantity is 2 or 3 millicuries; for Pu-241, a beta emitter,

the A2 quantity is 0.1 curie, but Pu-241 is substantially less radiotoxic

than the other isotopes of plutonium.)

5 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

Petition to Ship Small Quantities:

Related to this rulemaking, Eberline Instrument Corporation, in a

letter dated July 18, 1977, formally petitioned the Commission (PRM-70-6)

to allow ail' shipment of small quantities of plutonium (less than 5 microcuries) contained in calibration sources. On August 18, 1977, the NRC

published a notice (42 FR 41675) of filing of a petition for rulemaking.

Commission action on the rule proposed herein will define NRC policy and

constitute a definitive response to this petition.

Envi ronmentcll Impact Statement:

The CORmission has determined under Council of Environmental Quality

guidelines (40 CFR Part 1500) and the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51 that an

environmentall impact statement for these proposed amendments to 10 CFR

Part 71 is not required, based on a finding of no significant impact on

the quality of the human environment. Concurrent with publication of

this notice of proposed rulemaking, the Commission is making available

for public inspection, in its Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW.,

Washington, DC, an IIEnvironmental Impact Appraisal for Proposed Amendments

'to 10 CFR Pa·rt 71 to' Restr-i ct the Air Transport of· Plutoni um, II to support

a Negative Declaration,** and copies of the Value/Impact Statement supporting the proposed rule. Single copies of either document may be obtained

on request from Dr. Norman A. Eisenberg, Office of Standards Development,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 (Telephone:

301-443-5946). Copies of any comments received on these proposed amendments may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H

Street NW., Washington, DC.

-;a---------- A copy of this appraisal is filed with the Office of the Federal Register.

6 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

Regulatory Flexibility Certification:

In accclrdance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, helve a significant economic impact on a substantial number of

small entities. The proposed regulation, if promulgated, will relieve

the restrictions on the air shipment of plutonium imposed by the current

NRC order tCl licensees by permitting the air shipment of small quantities

of plutonium in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash

resistant. Currently the schedules and work routines, principally of

SOlan orqarrizattons , are disrupted by the inability to acquire small

calibration sources containing plutonium in .a timely fashion by air

shipment. Because the proposed regulation reduces the regulatory

burden imposed by the NRC·s current order to licensees, the proposed rule

does not have a significant economic impact within the context of the

Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The Conwission has made this certification regarding compliance with

the requirements of the Regulatory Flexib1lity Act based on the analyses

contained in the Value/Impact Statement and the Environmental Impact

AppY'aisal. These analyses were based on the best estimates of costs and

number of entities affected that were available to the Commission staff

at the time these analyses were prepared. The Commission specifically

invites comments on aspects of these analyses that will either support

or dispute the determination made regarding compliance with the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Unless the Commission receives

comments on other information that causes the conclusions regarding these

determinaticlns to change, the Commission intends to repeat them at the

final rule stage.

7 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy

Reor'ganization Act of 1974, as amended, section 553 of title 5 of the

United States Code, and Public Law 94-79 (the Scheuer Amendment), notice

is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10,

Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71 is contemplated.

PART 71 - PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS

1. A new §7l.43 is added to read as follows:

§71.43 Air transport of plutonium.

(a) Notwi ths.tandi ng the provi sions of any general 1i censes and

notwithstanding any exemptions stated directly in this part or included

indirectly by citation of 49 CFR Chapter 1, as may be applicable, plutonium

in any form, whether for import, export, or domestic shipment, may not be

transported by air or delivered to a carrier for air transport unless:

(1) the plutonium is contained in a medical device designed for

individual human application; or

(2) the plutonium is contained in a material in which the· specific

activity is not greater than 0.002 microcuries per gram of material and

in which the radioactivity is essentially uniformly distributed; or

(3) the plutonium is shipped in a single package containing no more

than an A2 quantityl of plutonium in any isotope or form and is shipped

in accordance with §71.5; or

~A2 quantity of plutonium is defined in Appendix C of the proposed

amendments to 10 CFR Part 71 (44 FR 48234) pUblished August 17, 1979 and

in Table VII of the International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations for

the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, IAEA Safety Series No. 6

(1973 Revised Edition).

8 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]

(4) the plutonium is shipped in a package specifically authorized

for the shipment of plutonium by air in the Certificate of Compliance

for that packaqe issued by the Commission.

(b) Nothing in paragraph (a) of this section is to be interpreted

as removing or diminishing the requirements of §73.24.

(Sees. 53, 161b. and i., Pub. L. 83-703, as amended, 68 Stat. 930, 948,

as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201(b., i.»; Sec. 201, Pub. L. 93-438, as

amended, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, (42 u. S.C. 5841); Pub. L. 94-79.)

D,ated at Washington, D. C. this day 1981.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk

Secretary of the Commission

9 Enclosure 1
'-.

ENCLOSURE 2
DRAFT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

NRC PROPOSES AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS

TO RESTRICT AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

The Nuclear Hegulatory Commission is proposing to change its regulations

to implement by a regulation an existing law requiring most air shipments of

plutonium to be cclrried in packages certified as capable of withstanding the

crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.

NRC licensees were ordered in August 1975 to stop shipping most forms of

plutonium by air. The order reflected a statutory ban on NRC licensing of

shipments of plutonium by air--except plutonium contained in a medical device

intended f'or individual human use. The law also provided for resumption of

shipments by air when the NRC certified to the Congress that a safe container

had been developed and tested which would not rupture under conditions equivalent to an aircraft crash and explosion.

The NRC certified such a package (the Model PAT-I) to the Congress in

August 1978 and the fo11 owi ng month issued another order to its 1i censees

permitting the shipment of plutonium by air in these NRC-approved packages.

Under the proposed amendments--which would replace the 1978 order--the

certified-package restriction would not apply to air shipments of plutonium

contained in a medical device for individual human use (a heart pacemaker for

example). The proposed amendments also would permit air shipments of small

quantities of plutonium which would not present a significant hazard to the

pub1i c heal th and safety even if a package ruptured ina crash.

1 Enclosure 2
The NRC staff would also be authorized to review applications to use

crash-r-eslst.ant packages other than the Model PAT-I. New packages would have

to meet certain qualification criteria including certain individual and sequential tests that s'imulate the conditions produced in severe aircraft accidents.

The criteria also provide for operational controls which would have to be

observed during transport.

A copy of the IIQualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air Transport of Plutoniuml l' (NUREG-0360) is available for public inspection at the NRC

Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C., or for purchase

from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161,

at $5.25 for paper- copy and $3.00 for microfiche.

Written comme~nts on the proposed amendments, which are to Part 71 of the

Commision l s regulations, should be received by (60 days following publ lcatton of' the proposed rules in the Federal Register on _

Comments should be addressed to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.

2 Enclosure 2
ENCLOSURE 3
'.

VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT FOR

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR Part 71

TO RESTRICT AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

Prepared by

Norman A. Eisenberg

December 1980

1. THE PROPOSED ACTION

1.1 Description

Restrict the shipment of plutonium by air in accordance with the Scheuer

Amendment, part o'F Public Law 94-79 and appearing as a footnote to Section 201

of the Energy Reolrganization Act of 1974, as amended. Since the shipment of ,

plutonium by air 'is currently restricted by an order to NRC licensees, the

following value/irnpact analysis considers two types of regulatory change:

1) the imposition of restrictions on shipping plutonium by air as embodied in

the order to licensees and (2) the incremental change in restrictions effected

by implementing the proposed rule which is different from the existing order

to licensees. Since the proposed rule codifies the requirements of the existing order, it.is necessar.y to perform a regulatory analysis of those r-equirements, as well as the requiements of the proposed rule which are different

from the existing order to licensees.

In develeptnq this rule three main issues have arisen; they are:

Issu,U - Shoul d PL 94-79 (the Scheuer Amendment) be implemented by a

regulation restricting air transport of plutonium, or is an order to

NRC licensees sufficient?

1 Enclosure 3
Issue 2 - Can the NRC reasonably interpret the Energy Reorganization Act

of 1974. as amended by PL 94-79. as permitting air shipment of small

quantities of plutonium in other than an air-crash-resistant package; and.

if so. what amount is a small quantity and can be shipped this way?

Issue 3 - Should the package qualification criteria be codified in the

NRC regulations?

Issues 1 and 3 are procedural questions discussed in sections 3.1 through

3.3 and 3.4 through 3.6 respectively. Issue 2 is a technical question discussed in sections 2.1 through 2.3. Technical aspects of the qualification

criteria are discussed in sections 2.4 through 2.6. The decision criteria used

for the pro/con discussion of various alternatives under each issue are:

1. Prevention of large public health consequences resulting from plutonium dispersal in a severe air crash.

2, Compliance with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as modified

by the Scheuer Amendment (PL 94-79) and with other laws.

3. The degree to which the particular mechanism chosen by NRC to implement this legislative mandate is inconsistent with the practices of

other Federal agencies (primarily DOT) and international entities

(primarily IAEA).

2 Enclosure 3
4. The degree to which NRC regulatory action burdens licensees without

compensatory improvement in public health and safety.

5. The degree to which the public is permitted to participate in the

NRC regulatory process.

6. The degree to which the U.S. policy to support effective international

safeguards is accommodated.

1.2 Need for the Proposed Action

The primary reasons for the proposed action are: (1) policy direction

[f

mandated by the Congress through the Scheuer Amendment, (2) completfon by NRC

of the cE!rtification program for the air-crash-resistant package, (3) more

effective' and efficient use of the regulatory process for enforcement of the

restriction on plutonium shipments by air, (4) the need to provide some ability

to ship small samples of plutonium in support of effective international safeguards, and (5) disposition of a petition from a licensee requesting permission

. to ship .small quantities of plutonium by air ;'n other than an air-crashresistant package..

The Scheuer I~mendment, part of Public Law 94-79 and appearing as a footnote

to Section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, was enacted

into law August 9, 1975. It provides that:

liThe Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall not license any shipments

by air transport of plutonium in any form whether exports, imports

or domestic shipments: Provided, however, that any plutonium in any

form contatned in a medical device designed for individual human

application 'is not subject to this restriction. This restriction

shall be in 1'orce until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has certifi ed to the .loi nt Commi ttee on Atomi c Energy of the Congress that a

3 Enclosure 3
safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture

under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion

of a high-flying aircraft. 1I

On August 15, 1975, NRC issued an order to licensees, prohibiting the air

transport of plutonium, except that contained in a medical device for individual

human use. Since then, the NRC staff has developed a plutonium package capable

of surviving an air crash (Model PAT-I), published qualification criteria for

such a package (NUREG-0360), published a Safety Analysis Report for the package

(NUREG-0361), and obtained the review of the National Academy of Sciences

(NUREG/CR-0928) and the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) for

both the certification criteria and the package. This effort culminated on

August 4, 1978, when the NRC certt rted to Congress that a package (Model PAT-~)

that would fulfill the requirements of Public law 94-79 had been designed and

tested. A certificate of compliance was issued by NRC (see NUREG-0383, Volume 2,

Revision 2, pp. 1-4) that authorizes use of the Model PAT-l package for air

transport of plutonium.

On September 1, 1978, the NRC issued an order to NRC licensees (super-

".

seding the August 15, 1975 order to licensees) which states that:

.IINotwithstanc;ling any provisions to the 'contrary in the NRC· s regulations or in your license, shipments of plutonium by air, other than

plutonium contained in a medical device designed for individual human

application, may only be made in packages the design of which the

NRC has specifically approved for transport of plutonium by ai r".

Now that the NRC plutonium air transport package certification program

has been completed, it is time for the NRC to issue a rule implementing the

mandate of Congress.

The direction of the effort to develop this rule has changed considerably

since its initiation in August 1977, primarily by (1) inclusion of permission

to ship small quantities of plutonium by air in other than packaging certified

4 Enclosure 3
"

to be air-crash resistant, and (2) issuance of a proposed rather than an

effective rule. Because of this redirection, a copy of the Preliminary Value

Impact Appraisal prepared at the time of task initiation is appended to this

document (Appendi>( I).

1.3 Value/Impact of the Proposed Action

1.3.1 NRC Operations

Valu,e of the proposed action to the NRC regulatory function results both

from the restricti'ons already imposed by the order to NRC licensees and from the

additional provisions of the proposed rule. The impact on the NRC regulatory

function results primarily from the restrictions already imposed by the order

to licensees. ThE! value of this action to NRC regulatory functions is:

(1) Since over 8,000 licensees are potentially affected by this requirement, a rule, rather than an order to licensees, is a more effective and efficient means of implementation.

(2) Rulemaking on this subject allows an opportunity for public participation.

(3) Rulemaking is also a vehicle whereby the NRC can reaso~ably interpret

the Energy Reorganization Act, as amended by the Scheuer Amendment, to allow

the shtpnent of small quantities of plutonium by air in other than a container

certified to be air-crash resistant, thereby avoiding a burdensome regulation,

without needing to bring the issue to Congress for a decision.

(4l There were a number of ways to implement the Energy Reorganization

Act as aml!nded by the Scheuer Amendment; but, the preferred method of implementation by a regulatory agency, such as NRC, is by imposition of a substantive

requirement of general applicability, like this, through rulemaking in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.

5 Enclosure 3
Since the Scheuer Amendment already has been implemented by an order to

·'

licensees, the major regulatory impact of the proposed action, i.e., restricting

the air transport of plutonium, has already been effected. An additional impact

on NRC operations, produced by the proposed action, is the staff time required

to carry the proposed rule through to an effective rule. Resources required for

this rulemaking (including primary effort by OSD staff and review by ELD and

NMSS) , because of the technical and legal complexities involved, is estimated

to be 2000 man-hours (about 1 man-year effort) or $46,000. The allowance to

ship by air small quantities and low specific activities of plutonium in other

than air-crash-resistant packages is not expected to cause additional impacts

on NRC operations; in fact these provisions may forestall additional work required to approve air-crash-resistent packaging for small air shipments of plutonium. In the event that an applicant applies to license a package other than

PAT-l for the air shipment of plutonium, a fee of $69,200 would be charged for

license processing, through application ($7000) and approval ($62,200) (43 FR

7223). This represents 1 to 1~ man-years effort to license each additional

0.

package for air transport of plutonium. It is not expected that many of such

license applications would be received, but the staff. is .aware of at ieast one

such anticipated application.

1.3.2 Other Government Agencies

The value and impact of the proposed action on other government agencies

results from the provisions of the proposed action already implemented by the

order to NRC licensees and from the additional provisions in the proposed rule,

but not in the order to licensees. DOE is involved with this proposed action,

because it may choose to adopt a similar regulation for transportation under

its control, with differences to reflect the different legislation to which

6 Enclosure 3
DOE is subject. Coordination with DOE can be accomplished through the rulemaking pr'ocess, with minor effort for DOE. As part of its program to support

effectivE! international safeguards, DOE is developing a smaller, lighter aircrash-resistant package for shipments of safeguards samples, transported by

air. DOE has expressed some concern about the stringency of the packaging

criteria, especially for small quantities of plutonium. The DOE package will

undergo license review at NRC. Since prompt shipment of safeguards samples is

a necessary part of implementing the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, DOE. the

Department of State (having negotiated the agreement). and the Office of the

Pres i dent all have an interest in thismatter. Agreement States wi 11 adopt

the effective rule as part ·of their body of regulations. but this will involve

only a small effort. DOT is involved because this proposed rule extends NRC

control to quantities of plutonium, which without the Scheuer Amendment, would

be regulated by DOT under the division of authority embodied in the DOT/NRC

Memorandum of Undf~rstanding. Furthermore, the NRC requirements on the air shipment of plutonium are inconsistent with the current and proposed DOT regulations.

DOT will be able to coordinate with NRC through the ru1emaking process on these

issues.

1.3.3 Indust:!l

Air shipment of plutonium does not appear to be a significant concern for

most of the nuc Iear industry. because of the current national policy regarding

nonprol tfer-aticn, implemented in part by the deferral of recycling in the U.S.

fuel cycle. Furthermore. several companies and government agencies ship standard sourCI~S containing small amounts of plutonium. Because a large number of

entities are not c:urrently involved in shipping plutonium. no more than 50 respondents are expected to prepare comments on the proposed amendments to the

7 Enclosure 3
regulations. Most of the comments are expected to merely endorse the proposal

to permit shipment of small quantities in other than air-crash-resistant packaging, so a total of 14 man-weeks (40 x 1/2 day + 10 x 1 week) and $25,000 is

estimated as the impact on industry to comment on the proposed regulation.

There are several anticipated values to industry from implementation of

this proposed action. For the implementation of the requirements in the existing

order to licensees, the values are: (1) the ability to ship plutonium by air

in an air-crash-resistent package, and (2) a clearer definition, by issuing a

rule rather than an order to licensees, of the NRC restrictions on the air shipment of plutonium. For the implementation of provisions in the proposed rule

which are not currently in the existing order to licensees the value is removal

of the burdensome requirement, to use the high cost air-crash-resistant package,

on shippers of very small quantities of plutonium.

Since the proposed rule provides licensees with a less cumbersome means

to comply with the legislative mandate, as opposed to the more burdensome

requirements of the existing order to licensees, there is essentially no impact,

- just value, to the industry from the incremental differences between the proposed rule and the existing order to licensees. The impact to industry results

primarily from the implementation of the restriction on the air shipment of

plutonium as currently embodied in the existing order to licensees. This

impact is estimated to be a tenfold increase in cost for packaging of those

plutonium shipments required to be air-crash resistant and a substantial

increase in shipping costs due to the special procedures and arrangements

required for the deployment of an air-crash-resistant package. Prior to

passage of the Scheuer Amendment the packages used for plutonium air transport

cost in the region of $100 to $300 depending on quantity purchased, while the

8 Enclosure 3
air-crash-resistant container (PAT-I) has been estimated to cost $3500 in production (cost has been about $8000 for the small quantities required for package

development). The cost to ship a PAT-l package varies depending on a number

of factors including distance shipped t but carriers have estimated costs of

$900 to $7000; shipment in a 6M container prior to passage of the Scheuer Amendment typiically cost $200-$300. In addition to the added cost for shipping the

PAT-l package (costs attributable to the increased weight and added operational

requirements)t logistical difficulties resulting from the NRC imposed operational

constraints and air carrier response to those constraints have the potential

and have been reported to make shipments by air in the PAT-l package burdensome.

Usage by a lic~nsee of a package specifically approved for shipment of plutonium

by airt other than the Model PAT-It would be quite costly. In addition to the

$69t200 in licensing fees required for submission and approval of the application

for certification t the licensee would probably incur costs of $2-3 million for

design t developmentt and testing of the package.

1.3.4 Public

Value and impact to the public result from the provisions of the proposed

action already implemented by the order to licensees and from the provisions

added by the rule to those already implemented by the order. Value to the

public from the pl~ovisions of the proposed action already implemented by the

order to licensees is reduced risk from plutonium shipments involved in aircrashes and virtual prevention of large public health consequences resulting

from dispersal of plutonium in an air-crash. Impact to the public from these

provisions of the proposed action results from the increased cost of activities

requiring air shipments of plutonium t such as scientific research t laboratory

9 Enclosure 3
testing, and certain nuclear power instrumentation activities; these increased

costs of air shipment of plutonium will be passed through to consumers of these

services.

Provisions of the proposed rule differing from the existing order to

licensees very slightly reduces the overall value to the public, but significantly reduces public impacts at the same time. Permission~ included in the

proposed action, to ship small quantities in packaging other than a certified

air-crash-resistant package do not significantly add to the public risk from

air shipment of plutonium. The Environmental Impact Appraisal (Enclosure 4)

estimates these risks to be very small. It also shows that the consequences,

resulting from the environmental dispersal of plutonium in the event that such

shipments were involved in a severe air crash, are small. Furthermore, the

risks of making these shipments by other modes is not zero. However, the value

to the public resulting from the allowance to ship these small but quantities

of plutonium by air in other then an air-crash-resistent package is to eliminate

the unnecessary passed through cost of causing these small shipments to travel

by other modes or in an air-crash-resistant package.

1.4 Decision on the Proposed Action

The Commission should approve publication for comment of the notice of

proposed rulemaking which proposes amendments to 10 CFR Part 71 to establish

restrictions on the shipment of plutonium by air. Key facets of this proposed

action are: (1) the Scheuer Amendment is implemented by a rule; (2) a reasonable interpretation of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as modified by

the Scheuer Amendment, is for the NRC to permit air shipment of small quantities

of plutonium in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash resistant;

10 Enclosure 3
(3) the qualification criteria for the air-crash-resistant package are not

codified in the NRC regulations, but instead NUREG-0360 is referenced.

2. TECHNICAL APPROACH

Detl!rmination of the Quantity of Plutonium Permitted to be Shipped by Air

in Other than an Air-Crash-Resistant Package.

2.1 Technical Alternatives

The technical alternatives correspond to various quantity limits such that

packages containing amounts of plutonium equal to or less than the quantity

limit would be permitted to be shipped by air in an air-crash-resistant package.

The b~ic technical question~ given that a reasonable interpretation of the

, legislation permits shipment by air of small quantities of plutonium in other

than an clir-crash-resistant package (as discussed in the Legal Analysis, Appendix II to this Value/Impact Statement), is what size shipments of plutonium

should be! permitted to be shipped by air in other than air-crash-resistant

packaging? The following discussion evaluates various choices for the limits

on quantities of plutonium that can be so shipped. Although not as basic as

the quest~on of what quantities of plutonium ,may be shipped by air in other.

than an air-crash-resistant package, other provisions of the proposed rule are

also evaluated. The provision to ship plutonium by air in other than air-crashresistant packaging, if it is contained in a medical device intended for individual human use, and the provision to ship plutonium by air in a package certified

by the NRC to be air-crash resistant, are derived from the provisions in the

Scheuer Amendment.. The provision to ship low specific activity material by

air is a practica'i interpretation of the law recognizing the definition of a

radioactive material use~ in the transport regulations.

11 Enclosure 3
The alternatives listed in the order of decreasing strictness of interpretation are:

1. Issue a rule forbidding air transport of plutonium in any form, under

any conditions. (This alternative does not permit shipments that are allowed

by the Scheuer Amendment.)

2. Adopt a rule forbidding air shipment of plutonium except as: (1) contained in a medical device designed for individual human application, (2) contained in material with a specific activity not greater than 0.002 microcuries

per gram, or (3) shipped in a package authorized by the Commission for shipment

of plutonium by air. (This alternative does not allow shipment of small quantities of plutonium in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash resistant; it is a strict interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment.)

3. Issue a rule as in 2., above, but add the following provision: or

(4) shipped in accordance with 10 CFR §7l.5 for a single package containing no

more than 10 microcuries of any isotope or mixture of plutonium. (This alternative would allow some packages containing small quantities of plutonium to

be shipped by air in other than an air-crash-resistant package.)

4. Issue a rule as in 3., above, but in item (4) change the level from

10 microcuries to an A2* quantity. The A2 limit for shipments in other than

air-crash-resistant packaging would apply regardless of the form of the plutonium.

This is a less strict interpretation of the law than alternative 1. through 3. ,

above, but more strict than 5. below.

5. Issue a rule requiring shipment of plutonium, in a package certified

to be air-crash resistant, with exceptions for type A quantities of plutonium

as is consistent with IAEA regulations and the proposed DOT/NRC regulations. For

*An A2 quantity of plutonium is defined in Appendix C of the proposed amendments

to 10 CFR Part 71 (44 FR 48234) published August 17, 1979 and in Table VII of

the International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations for the Safe Transport of

Radioactive Materials, IAEA Safety Series No. 6 (1973 Revised Edition).

12 Enclosure 3
plutonium in normal form shipments in other than an air-crash-resistant package

would be limited to an A2 quantity; however, for plutonium in special form up to

an At quanti ty of plutonium (for a-emitting isotopes of plutonium an At quantity

= 1000 A~! quantity; for Pu-241 an At quantity = 1 Ci) could be shipped in other

than an air-crash-resistant package.

2.2 Discussion and Comparison of Technical Alternatives

Reasonable Interpretation to Permit Shipment of Small Quantities in Other

Than Air-Crash-Resistant Packaging

In preparing this rule, the question arose as to what, if any, classes of

shipments of plutonium by air should be permitted to be transported in other

than a container certified to bi air-crash resistant. , Some of the reasons this

question arose include: (1) a petition was received by NRC requesting that

certain small quantities by permitted to be shipped in other than air-crashresistant packaging, (2) the NRC staff did not consider it good regulatory

practice to restrict the air shipment of plutonium in an unsupportably absolute,

burdensome fashion, (3) the legislative history of the Scheuer Amendment indicated that an absolute guarantee of safety was not intended by the Congress,

and (4) the ability to ship small samples of plutonium by air in other'than

air-crash-resistant packaging would help to implement the U.S. policy to support

effective international safeguards. The Scheuer Amendment itself makes provision

for only one such class of shipments, a medical device designed for individual

human use, to be shipped in other than air-crash-resistant packaging. This legislated allowance to use other than air-crash-resistant packaging has the potential

(albeit with low probability) for permitting a release of plutonium in an aircrash, which could cause large public health consequences. For example, the

plutonium power SCturces for pacemakers are not tested against the qualification

criteria used to c:ertify that a package is air-crash resistant and there is no

13 Enclosure 3
"

guarantee that these devices would not rupture in an air-crash and possibly

disperse plutonium into the human environment. Furthermore, there is currently

no provision in the regulation to require any new medical devices containing

plutonium to survive an air crash or even be as air-crash resistant as the pacemaker. However, because of the rigid requirements placed on the sealed plutonium

source used in pacemakers, it is extremely unlikely that these devices would

rupture in the event of the crash and explosion of a high flying aircraft, itself

an unlikely occurrence. Using a very conservative analysis for the release

and dispersal, in a highly populated area, of the 4 curies of plutonium, typically

contained in a cardiac pacemaker, as the result of a very severe air-crash,

about 120 latent cancer fatalities are estimated (see Appendix III). Unlike

the NRC legislation that allows only a medical device for individual human use

to be shipped in other than air-crash-resistant packaging, similar legislation

passed for ERDA specifically cited additional types of shipments permitted less

stringent packaging requirements. Also, comments made by Congressman Scheuer

in the debate on this issue indicate his primary concern was to eliminate the

possibility of large public health consequences resulting from the dispersal

of plutonium in.an air-crash. Small quantities of plutonium (less than a few

millicuries) have been shown by staff analysis (The Environmental Impact

Appraisal) to be incapable of causing such large public health consequences.

Both the legislative history of this law and practical considerations would

lead one to conclude that that Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as modified

by the Scheuer Amendment, can be reasonably interpreted to permit air transport,

in other than a certified air-crash-resistant package, of small quantities of

plutonium, such as quantities currently exempt from the requirements to ship

in accident resistant packaging. A legal analysis prepared by the NRC Office

14 Enclosure 3
of the Executive Legal Director (Appendix II) substantiates this conclusion

and indicates that an A2 quantity would be an appropriate upper limit for shipments in other than air-crash-resistant packaging.

The current system of regulation divides shipments of any particular radionucl ide 'into three classes: (1) very small quantities (l imited quantities),

with neg"ligible potential for adverse health effects on an individual even though

special requirements are not placed on the packaging, (2) small quantities that

are shipped in Type A packages, with small potential for adverse health effects

to an individual even though the packaging is only required to survive normal

transport conditions~ but not required to survive certain hypothetical accident

conditions, and (3) large quantities that are shipped in type B packages for

which thE! strong packaging, that is required to survive certain hypothical accident conditions, as well as normal transport conditions, is relied upon to provide an adequate level of safety. Two quantity values, or breakpoints, are

used to separate shipments into these three categories. Each transport group

of radionuclides has different breakpoints depending on radiotoxicity. Larger

quantities may be shipped in a given packaging class if the material is in

special form or is j n- a manufactured article. Materials that are essentially

nonradioactive (i.e., materials in which the radioactivity is uniformly distributed and is If!sS than 0.002 ~Ci/g) are exempt from the NRC and DOT transport regulations.

The certification of the PAT-l package and the concurrent development of

a set of qualification criteria related to much more severe accident environments than the qualification criteria for the Type B package, introduces an

additional categor'y of shipments into the regulatory scheme. This new category

of shipments is comprised of plutonium shipments by air that are required to

be transported in packaging required to survive testing substantially in excess

15 Enclosure 3
of testing required for Type B packages. The structure, and therefore public

understanding, of the regulations would be simplified, if the new category for

air shipment of plutonium introduced in response to the Scheuer Amendment is

selected to correspond to one of the currently existing categories. That is,

the breakpoint defining those shipments required to be transported in an aircrash-resistant package would be convenient, if it were to correspond to the

existing levels used to require shipment in either a Type A package or a

Type B package.

Selection of an A2 quantity as the upper limit on the quantity of plutonium

permitted to be shipped in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash

resistant is based on the facts that: (1) shipment of an A2 quantity or -less

has been shown by staff analyses (see Reference 1, the Environmental Appraisal)

to be incapable of causing large public health consequences in the event of a

severe air crash, (2) an A2 quantity is consistent with the air-crash-resistant

package qualification criteria permitting the release of a small amount of plutonium in the event of a very severe air crash, and (3) an A2 quantity corresponds to the upper limit in size for shipments to be transported in type A

packaging (for normal form) in the IAEA regulations and the proposed DOT and

NRC regulations based on them. The legislative history of the Scheuer amendment indicates that the law was intended to prevent large public health consequences caused by the dispersal of plutonium in an air crash. The staff

analysis (Ref. 1) shows that an A2 quantity of plutonium released to the human

environment as a result of an air crash would generally be expected to produce

minor public health consequences. This realistic, but still conservative assessment, taking into account the environmental dispersion and population density

exposed (a hyper-urban population density is assumed), shows these health effects

would be a small fraction of a latent cancer fatality. With that margin of

16 Enclosure 3
safety, large public health consequences would be essentially impossible, even

if more than one package were involved in a single air crash. The qualification

criteria for an air-crash-resistant package permit the certified package to

release an A2 quantity in a period of a week, subsequent to the sequential tests

related to severe aircraft accident conditions. (For long lived alpha-emitting

isotopes of plutonium, the A2 quantity is 2 or 3 mi11icuries; for Pu-241, a

beta-emit.ter, the A2 quantity is 0.1 curie, but Pu-241 is substantially less

radiotoxic than the other isotopes of plutonium.) The qualification criteria

as approved by the Commission and reviewed by the ACRS (Advisory Committee on

Reactor Safeguards) and the NAS (National Academy of Science), permit the release

of an A2 quantity under very severe accident conditions. It is consistent to

permit shipment o'f an A2 quantity in other than an air-crash-resistant package,

since an air crash involving such small quantities, would not exceed the accepted

consequences of an air crash involving larger quantities shipped in the PAT-1

or other air-crash-resistant package, even if the entire contents were released

from the air-crash-resistant package. Furthermore, as shown in the Environmental

ImRact Appraisal (Ref. 1), the annual radiological risk estimated to result from

air crashes involving shipments of p1utonium.in other· than air-crash-resistant

packages is very small. Since both the consequences of any single air crash

and risk from all shipments for plutonium shipped in other than air-crashresistant packaging is small, the A2 level is a suitable choice to define what

quantities may be shipped in other than air-crash-resistant packaging.

A fur-thar consideration in permitting air shipment of plutonium in other

than air-crash-resistant packaging is the increased cost of air-crash-resistant

package acquisition and use, as discussed in Section 1.3.3. The PAT-1 package

is costly to purchase and use. Other air-crash-resistant package designs would

be costly to license. When the requirement to use an air-crash-resistant package

17 Enclosure 3
at its high cost is placed on shippers of very small quantities of plutonium,

the costs outwei.gh the benefits. ,

The Petition for an Exemption

In addition to the staff impetus to implement the Scheuer Amendment with

concern for effective integration into the body of existing regulations, and

fulfillment of the spirit of the law, the Commission has been petitioned to

permit shipments by air of small quantities of plutonium in other than a package

certified to be air-crash resistant. In a letter dated July 18, 1977 Eberline

Instrument Corporation formally petitioned the Commission (PRM-70-6) to allow

air shipment of small quantities of plutonium (less than 5 microcuries) con- l

tained in calibration sources. The NRC published a notice (42 FR 41675) of

filing of a petition for rule making on August 18, 1977.

Two comments, generally supportive of the petitioners view, have been received. The position taken by the staff with regard to the Eberline petition

is that no definitive action was possible until the NRC had certified to the

Congress that a package had been developed and tested to show it would not

rupture under testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high flying

aircraft, that consideration of the petition would be incorporated. in this

rule making proceeding, and that, until the rule was issued, the NRC order to

licensees restricting all air shipments of plutonium to packages specifically

approved for that purpose would be in effect. Commission action on this proposed rule will define NRC policy and permit disposition of the Eberline

petition.

Related Issues

1. Inconsistency with DOT and IAEA Regulations.

Regardless of the particular manner chosen, any implementation of the

Scheuer Amendment will be inconsistent with current DOT and IAEA regulations

18 Enclosure 3
and the proposed DOT/NRC regulations which incorporate in the U.S. transport

regulations provisions of the 1973 revision of the IAEA regulations. The

inconsistency occurs because the existing body of regulations: (1) does not

require air shipment of plutonium in a package as crash-resistant as the PAT-I,

and (2) permit exemptions for the shipment of small quantities of plutonium by

air in other than air-crash-resistant packaging. If DOT or IAEA should decide

at some point to consider changes in their regulations to reduce or remove the

inconsistencies between those regulations and the NRC regulations, some staff

activity would be involved in working with those organizations. The NRC staff

will evaluate whether it should encourage consideration of such changes by DOT.

2. Air Transport Restrictions for Other Long Lived Alpha Emitters.

Other long-lived alpha emitting isotopes (for example, americium) are

approximately as radiotoxic and pose a health hazard similar to that of plutonium. A Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Print, dated September 17, 1974,

entitled Transportation of Radioactive Material by Passenger Aircraft (Appendix IV), recommends that certain radioisotopes, in addition to plutonium, have

additiona.l restri,ctions pl aced on thei.r transport by air. Assuming that the

Scheuer Amendment establishes a level of air transport safety that is ~cceptable for a materi,al with a certain hazard potential, treatment of other

isotopes in the s.ame manner as plutonium would lmplement that policy level of

safety in a un i f'orn, logical fashion; this consistency could help to make the

NRC action more easily understood. The NRC staff in conjunction with DOT

and/or IAEA, could consider the appropriateness of extending air-transport

restraints to othl!r long-lived alpha emitters, thereby achieving a more consistent, logical regulatory structure. By restricting the air shipment of radionuclides with radiotoxicities similar to plutonium, the risk to public health

and safe~y would be reduced, although the NRC staff considers that adequate

19 Enclosure 3
safety is provided for by current practices (Ref. 6). Additional substantial

staff effort would be required to develop value/impact analyses on which to

base more restrictive regulations for other isotopes. which would add further

burdens to licensees. Since a staff evaluation (Ref. 6) has shown that an adequate level of safety is provided for by current regulations and since no other

compelling reason to promulgate regulations in this area has surfaced. the staff

will not consider further extention of the restrictions on air transport to

isotopes other than those of plutonium.

3. Shipment of Safeguards Samples.

As a result of the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the U.S. policy to

l

support effective international safeguards, rapid air shipment of quantities

of plutonium up to several hundred grams are necessary. The IAEA need was

defined in a letter dated February 2. 1979. from A. von Baeckmann. Director.

IAEA Safeguards Division of Development and Technical Support, to the U.S. IAEA

Mission in Vienna (Appendix V).

On April 25, 1979 representatives of NRC and DOE met with Maria Lopez-Otin.

a member of Senator Glenn's staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss

the interest of Senator Glenn and the Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation in the ability to ship safeguards samples of plutonium in packages other

than the PAT-I. Several options for addressing this problem were discussed

including:

(1) Design and development of a smaller package for safeguards samples

that would meet the current NRC criteria.

(2) Legislative relief (either granting authority to NRC to allow air

shipment of plutonium in other than air-crash-resistant packaging. when the

Commission decides such allowances should be made. or a specific provision to

20 Enclosure 3
allow shipments related to U.S. support of effective international safeguards

to be made in other than air-crash-resistant packaging.

(3) Modification of the criteria to make it easier to design smaller packages for smaller quantities.

The first and second options are being pursued to some extent. DOE is

pursuing the first option. NRC has not initiated action to pursue legislative

relief, the second option, although OELD has recommended such an action (memorandum dated January 7, 1980 from G. H. Cunningham, OELD, to A. DiPalo, OMPA,

Appendix VI). However, the permission to ship up to an A2 quantity of plutonium in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash resistant will assist

the U.S. policy to support effective international safeguards by permitting

the shipment of certain safeguards samples by air in packaging less expensive

and less cumbersome than the air-crash-resistant packaging. This does not,

however, completely solve the problem because there are shi~ments the IAEA will

need to make that are larger than an A2 quantity. The third option is not being

pursued, because the NRC staff is not aware of any new technical data which

would support dev.~lopment of less stringent criteria fnr plutonium package

certification under P.l. 94-79. On May 31,.1979 Senator Glenn followed up the

staff meeting with a letter to Chairman Hendrie (Appendix VII). The Chairman's

response (Appendi)( VIII) of July 6, 1979 restates the NRC position that besides

the development 01' a small ai r-crash-resistant package by DOE, "the other alternative is to initi:ate legislative action to provide an exemption to Public

Law 94-79 for the quantities of plutonium or types of shipments involved in

the IAEA sample shipment program." A more direct response to the IAEA request

for assistance was; provided by the June 6, 1979 letter from George Weisz, DOE,

to Professor Johannes J. Gruemm, IAEA (Appendi x IX); that 1etter rei terates

much of the above discussion.

21 Enclosure 3
Pros and Cons for Alternatives

For the purpose of brevity and claritYt the Commission Paper discussed only

three~lternatives under Issue 2. Here a more extensive discussion including

five alternatives is presented. Alternatives It 2t and 3 in the Commission Paper

correspond to Alternatives 2t 3t and 4 respectivelYt below.

Alternative l.

Issue a rule forbidding air transport of plutonium in any formt under any

conditions.

Because of the conditional wording of the Scheuer amendment t if the NRC

had not certified an air-crash-resistant package to Congress t then the ban on

air shipment of plutonium would continue. Since then t NRC has developed not

only criteria for air-crash resistance but also a package that meets the criteria. It is not reasonable to ignore that effort and ban air shipments of

plutonium. However t prior to these developments t such a ban was a viable alternative and is included here to complete the public record of regulatory decision

making. As discussed above, this rulemaking will codify features of the implementation of the Scheuer Amendment t as embodied in by the NRC orders to its

licensees; this regulatory analysis must include those previously implemented

features. Actually this alternative would include an item like (2) in Alternative 2t so that essentially nonradioactive material (e.g. t terrestrial materials containing at low levels by plutonium) would not be restricted from air

transport.

Pro: (1) Since the Scheuer Amendment allows plutonium contained in medical

devices for individual human application to be shipped in other than air-crashresistant packaging t these medical shipmentst that have the potential (albeit

with very low likelihod) for causing very large public health consequences by

the release of plutonium in an air crash t would be permitted by the Scheuer

22 Enclosure 3
Amendment to be shipped by air; this alternative would eliminate even that very

remote potential of large public consequences resulting from these medical

shipments.

(2) A regulation of this type is more direct and clear, because of

its simplicity.

(3) Since the plutonium in a medical device has essentially the same

potential for public harm as other forms, the apparent inconsistency of an exemption for medical use is eliminated.

(4) The Scheuer Amendment is complied with, even though this interpretation goes beyond the law and is more restrictive.

Can: (1) This interpretation is unduly burdensome to licensees. However, - . .

elimination of th,a allowance to ship plutonium for individual human medical

use in other than air-crash-resistant packaging affects a smaller part of the

public and is morIa significant in its effect on public health than the allowance to ship small quantities, as proposed in Alternative 3.

(2) This alternative is the most inconsistent with DOT and IAEA

regulations.

(3) There may be difficulty enforcing this alternative with regard

to foreign travel,!rs, entering the U.S., with implanted medical devices, e.g.,

a plutonium-powered pacemaker.

(4) No accommodation of the need to ship safeguards samples in connection with the U.S. support of effective international safeguards is provided.

Alternative ~~.

Adopt a rule forbidding air shipment of plutonium except as: (1) contained

in a medical devic:e designed for individual human application, (2) contained

in material with Cl specific activity not greater than 0.002 microcuries per

gram, or (3) shipped in a package specifically authorized by the Commission

23 Enclosure 3
for shipment of plutonium by air. This alternative does not allow shipment of

small quantities of plutonium in other than packaging certified to be air-crash

resistant. It is a strict interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment.

Pro: (1) This is a more direct, literal implementation of the Scheuer

Amendment than Alternatives 3 and 4, which do permit shipment of small quantities of plutonium in other than air-crash-resistant packages.

(2) Large public health consequences resulting from plutonium dispersal in a severe air crash would be prevented as in Alternatives 3 and 4; in

addition, the likelihood of lesser public health consequences would be reduced

below that of Alternative 1.

(3) Because it is simpler, this implementation is marginally easier

to comprehend and implement than Alternatives 3 and 4.

(4) Provides greater protection to the public health and safety than

all other alternatives but Alternative 1.

Con: (1) The impact of implementation is not commensurate with limited

decrease in risk to public health and safety, as discussed in the Environmental

Impact Appraisal (Ref. 1).

(2) This rule is more inconsistent with both DOT and IAEA regulations,

than all alternatives but Alternative 1, because inconsistent requirements apply

to a broader range of shipments.

(3) No accommodation of the need to ship small quantities, including

safeguards samples in connection with the U.S. policy to support effective international safeguards, is provided.

Alternative 3.

Issue a rule as in Alternative 2, above, but add the following provision:

... , or (4) shipped in accordance with § 71.5 for a single package containing

24 Enclosure 3
no more than 10 microcuries of any isotope or mixture of plutonium. Ten microcuries is the level current DOT regulations exempt from packaging, labelling,

and marking requirements.

Pro: (1) Same .as Alternative 4.

(2) Same as Alternative 4, except in this case Alternatives 1 and 2

are more restrictive and Alternatives 4 and 5 are more liberal.

(3) Same as Alternative 4, except a smaller set of shipments is permitted to be shiplPed in other than air-crash-resistant packaging.

(4) Less accommodation of the need to ship safeguards samples is

afforded by this 10 microcurie level exemption than by the A2 quantity level

of Alternative 4.

(5) Same as Alternative 4.

(6) Thl~ 10 microcurie level corresponds to the level in the current

DOT regulations b,~low which compliance with packaging, labelling, and marking

standards is not l"equired. Thus this Alternative is more consistent with the

DOT and I.AEA reguil atory structure than A1ternati ves 1 and 2, but 1ess consistent

than Alternatives 4 &5.

(7) ThE! 10 mi crocuri e 1evel is a more conservative quantity than

the A2 quantfty Ieval of Alternative 4.

Con: (1) Same as Alternative 4.

(2) Same as Alternative 4.

(3) This alternative is less consistent with IAEA and proposed DOT

regulations than Alternative 4, since an inconsistent requirement is applied

to a largl~r range of shipments.

Alter-natIve 4.

ISSUE! a rule as in Alternative 3, but in item (4) change the level from

10 microcuries to an A2 quantity. This is a less strict interpretation of the

25 Enclosure 3
law than Alternatives 1 through 3 above, but more strict than Alternative 5,

above. This rule would forbid air shipment of plutonium except as: (1) contained in a medical device designed for individual human application, (2) contained in material with a specific activity not greater than 0.002 microcuries

per gram, (3) shipped in a package specifically authorized by the Commission

for shipment of plutonium by air, or (4) shipped in accordance with § 71.5,

for single packages containing no more than an A2 quantity of plutonium.

Pro: (1) The public health and safety would be protected adequately, even

though not to the higher degree afforded by restricting all shipments to an aircrash-resistant package.

(2) The intent of the Scheuer Amendment is complied with, although

more restrictive (Alts. 1, 2, and 3) and more liberal (Alt. 5) interpretations

are possible. Since the atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the 1950's and

1960's, soil, animals, and virtually all terrestrial materials are contaminated

with small quantities of plutonium. The law was not intended to apply in such

an extreme sense and item (2) in the statement of this alternative recognizes

this fact.

(3) Licensees desiring to ship by air small quantities of plutonium

with essentially no potential for large public health consequences would be

permitted to do so without undergoing the expense and inconvenience of using

the PAT-l or other air-crash-resistant package.

(4) The allowance to ship an A2 quantity or less of plutonium in

other than air-crash-resistant packaging provides some accommodation for the

need to ship safeguards samples in connection with the U.S. policy to support

effective international safeguards and the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement pursuant

to that policy.

26 Enclosure 3
(5) Large pUblic health consequences, resulting from plutonium dispersal in an air crash, would be prevented, except for the remote possibility

of a relE!aSe from a medical device; however, medical devices for individual

human USE! are specifically permitted by the S~heuer Amendment to be shipped by

air in other than air-crash-resistant packaging and the risk from such devices

is minimcll.

(6) This alternative is more consistent with IAEA transport regulations and the proposed DOT/NRC transport regulations than Alternatives 1, 2,

and 3 which apply inconsistent requirements on a larger range of shipments.

Those shipments of an A2 quantity (or less) are defined by the I~EA and proposed DOT/NRC regulations to be equal to (or less than) a Type A quantity

(under current ~OT/NRC regulations a slightly different level is defined),

which shipments are exempt from the requirement to ship in a package able to

withstand hypothetical accident conditions. Although more consistent with the

IAEA and proposed DOT regulatory structure, this alternative is still inconsistent with IAEA and proposed DOT regulations, since they do not require use

of a package desiqned to be air-crash resistant for any shipments. As discussed

under "Re lated Issues, 1. Inconsist.ency with DOT and IAEA Regulations,1I above,

these IAEA and proposed DOT, regulations were developed prior to and without

taking into account the legislative mandate of the Scheuer Amendment. For this

reason any implemlantation of the Scheuer Amendment will be inconsistent with

the existing body of regulation.

Con: (1) OOlas not afford the higher degree of protection to the public

health and safety provided by restricting all shipments to the air-crashresistant packaging.

(2) An interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment in a less literal

manner (e.g., Altl!rnative 2), may give some persons the impression that the

Congressional mandate is not being followed.

27 Enc1osure 3
(3) This is a less conservative legal position than Alternative 3.

Although the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as modified by the Scheuer

Amendment, may be reasonably interpreted to permit shipment of an A2 quantity

or less in other than an air-crash-resistant package, a 10 microcurie level is

identified as a type of .de minimis (for purposes of transport) quantity and is

more defensible legally (even though the staff technical analysis shows no

compelling technical basis for the legally more conservative level), since

quantities of 10 microcuries or less are relieved of essentially all packaging,

labeling, and marking requirement in the current body of DOT regulations.

Alternative 5.

Issue a rule requiring shipment of plutonium, in a package certified to

be air-crash resistant, with exceptions for type A quantities or less of plutonium, consistent with IAEA regulations and the proposed DOT/NRC regulations.

Although similar to Alternative 1 in that type A quantities are not required

to be shipped in air-crash-resistant packaging, this alternative would allow

substantially larger shipments, up to an At quantity, for plutonium in special

form (for a-emitting isotopes of plutonium an At quantity =1000 A2 quantity;

for Pu-241 an At quantity =1000 Ci). Since the requirements for special form

encapsulation are less stringent than the air-crash-resistance criteria, these

larger quantity shipments would be permitted under this alternative without the

high degree of crash-resistance afforded by an air-crash-resistant package.

Pro: (1) By replacing the NRC requirements for Type B packaging by the

air-crash-resistant package qualification criteria, for air transport of type B

quantities of plutonium, inconsistency with DOT and IAEA regulations is minimized.

(2) This would be the alternative least burdensome to licensees.

(3) This would provide a greater degree of accommodation of the need

to ship safeguards samples.

28 Enclosure 3
Con: (1) The! risk of large public health consequences resulting from plutoni um dispersa1 ina severe ai r crash woul d be greater than wi th any other

alternative.

(2) Some might misunderstand this implementation and consider that

the Scheuer Amendment was not adhered to.

2.3 Decision on Technical Approach

Consider-inq t.he minor effect on public health and safety of shipping small

quantities of plut.onium in other than the PAT-1 package, the major cost of requiring such small quantf t ies to be shipped in the PAT-1 package; and the intent

of the Scheuer Ame!ndment, the recommended decision is to pub1i sh a proposed

regulation in which air shipment of plutonium is forbidden except as: (1) contained in a medica.l device designed for individual human application, (2) contained in material with a specific activity not greater than 0.002 microc~ries

per gram, (3) shipped in accordance with §71.5 for a single package containing

no more than an A2 quantity of any isotope or mixture of plutonium, or (4) shipped

in a package authorized by the Commission for shipment of plutonium by air.

The Environmental Impact.Appraisal (EIA, Ref.. 1) supports. this decision.

The EIA estimates an annual radiological risk of 3 x 10-4 latent cancer fatalities to resul t from potential air crashes and release of package contents.

This risk corresponds to the shipment by air of 5200 packages containing an

A2 quantity of plutonium in other than an air-crash-resistant package. A conservat.ively high estimate for the shipment of small quantities of plutonium by

air is $100 to $300 per shipment. The cost to ship in an air-crash-resistant

package is estimated to be $900-$7000. Using a conservative cost differential

of $1000 per shipment, the added cost of requiring 5200 packages containing

29 Enclosure 3
small quantities of plutonium to be shipped in air-crash-resistant packaging

is about $5 million. This does not include the cost of acquiring the aircrash-resistant packages. The reduction in risk corresponding to this increased

cost is about a factor of 250, but since the risk is so small to begin with, a

favorable cost/benefit ratio is not obtained. Since large public health consequences resulting from air crashes involving shipments of small quantities of

plutonium are not expected, regardless of whether these small quantities are

shipped in air-crash-resistant packaging, the potential for creating large

public health consequences is not a consideration in this decision, given that

the small quantities are ~hosen to be an A2 quantity or less.

Another consideration is that instead of eliminating the shipment of small

quantities of plutonium by air or requiring their shipment in air-crashresistant packaging, an alternative might be to transport such small quantities

by other modes. In most cases, use of other modes is logistically inconvenient

and in the case of international shipments inconvenient to the point of almost

precluding such shipments. Use of modes other than air for small plutonium

shipments, requires excessive time, possibly higher cost (in the case of transport by ship, this is certainly the case), and ~he potential for the loss or

misdelivery of a package in a transport system not designed for or used to

handling small, valuable packages. The reduction in risk effected by using

other modes is essentially zero, since other transport modes can cause very

severe accident environments and in some cases would produce releases at a

higher frequency than air transport. Thus, a favorable cost/benefit ratio is

not obtained.

30 Enclosure 3
Codification of the Qualification Criteria

2.4 Technical Alternatives

2.5 Discussion and Comparison of Technical Alternatives

The technica.l alternatives, i.e. various forms of the qualification criteria,

are enumerated, ·discussed, and compared in the following documents:

1. NUREG-0360, Qualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air Transport of Plutonium, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, u.S. Nuclear

Regulatol'y Commission, January 1978.

2. NUREG/CR-0428, Review of Criteria for Packaging Plutonium for Transport

by Air, National Academy of Sciences, 1978.

3. U.S. NRC Public Announcement No. 78-187, Letter from Stephen Lawroski,

Chai rmen, ACRS, to Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman, NRC.

No further discussion is required or presented here.

2.6 Decision on Technical Approach

- The Commission should approve the use of the qualification criteria stated

in NUREG-0360 in the licensing process.

3. PROCEDURAL APPROACH

Rule vs. Order

3.1 Procedural Alternatives

The procedur-al alternatives for restricting the air shipment of plutonium

are:

1. Adopt a rule restricting the air shipment of plutonium to specially

approved packages (at present only Model PAT-I), medical devices designed for

31 Enclosure 3
individual human use, or certain small quantities and concentrations.

2. Continue reliance on the existing order to licensees, rather than

issuance of a rule.

3.2 Discussion of Procedural Alternatives

Alternative 1.

Adopt a rule restricting the air shipment of plutonium to specially approved

packages (at present only Model PAT-I), medical devices designed for individual

human use, or certain small quantities and concentrations.

Pro: (1) Although there were a number of ways. to implement the Scheuer

Amendment, the preferred method of implementation by a regulatory agency, such as

NRC, is by imposition of a substantive requirement of general applicability, like

this, through rulemaking in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.

(2) Since over 8,000 licensees are potentially affected by this

requirement, a rule, rather than an order to licensees, is a more effective

and efficient means of implementation.

(3) Rulemaking permits public participation.

(4) Rulemaking is also a vehicle whereby the NRC can implement a

reasonable interpretation of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended

by the Scheuer Amendment, to allow shipment of small quantities in other than

air-crash-resistant packaging, thereby avoiding a burdensome regulation and

keeping Congress and the public informed.

Con: (1) Since there may be very little interest by the general public

in this rule and since the Scheuer Amendment has already been implemented by

the NRC order to licensees, a rulemaking proceeding could use a significant

amount of staff time for what amounts to a pro forma procedure.

32 Enclosure 3
--------------------

Alternative 2.

Continue reliance on the existing order to NRC licensees rather than

issuance of a rule.

Pro: No further staff activity would be required; the law could be implemented without incurring the cost of what may prove to be a pro forma administrative exercise.

Con: (1) Although this is a Congressionally mandated action, the preferred

implementation of' the law is through the normal rulemaking procedures in

accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.

(2) Implementation by the order currently standing is burdensome,

because no allowance to ship small quantities in other than air-crash-resistant

packaging is allowed. Granting such an allowance in an order to licensees,

without a rulemak"ing proceeding, is not considered feasible by the staff.

(3) It is less effective and efficient to implement a general condition such as this by separate orders to several thousand licensees.

(4) The U.S. policy to support effective international safeguards

is not we1l accommodated, because the existing - order to licensees contains no

provision to sh1p small safeguards samples in a package other than that certified to be air-crash resistant.

3.3 Decision on PI~ocedural Approach

Clearly rulemclking is desirable; the Commission should adopt that procedura 1 approach.

33 Enclosure 3
Codification of the Qualification Criteria

3.4 Procedural Alternatives

The procedural alternatives for making the qualification criteria known

are:

1. Take no further action on the qualification criteria, except reference

in the statement of considerations that they are published in NUREG-0360 and

request comments.

2. Issue a regulatory guide stating the current package qualification

criteria as one acceptable way of meeting the regulatory requirement to ship.

plutonium by ai~ only in an air-crash-resistant package.

3. Amend the NRC regulations to incorporate the package qualification

criteria, i.e. packaging standards for the air-crash-resistant package (test

conditions, acceptance criteria, and operating conditions).

3.5 Discussion of Procedural Alternatives

Alternative 1.

Take no further action on the qualification criteria, except reference in

the statement of considerations that they are published in NUREG-0360 and request

comments.

Pro: (1) This would require the least effort by the NRC staff.

(2) Because of limited interest in air shipment of plutonium, numerous

applications for approval of packages other than Model PAT-1 are not anticipated,

so the effort required to codify the qualification criteria in the NRC rules

is not warranted.

(3) This would provide for flexibility in applying the criteria until

sufficient experience had been gained to better define them.

34 Enclosure 3
(4) Request for public comment on the criteria in NUREG-0360 would

be included in the statement of consideration for the proposed amendments so

that the public would be provided the opportunity to comment without the need

for the staff time being spent in formal publication of a guide or rule for

comment.

Con: (1) This approach diminishes public input on the qualification

criteria.

(2) A NUREG report has no status as a regulation or acceptable

method of compliance.

(3) An opportunity to better accommodate the need to ship safeguards

samples in connection with the U.S. policy·to support effective international

safeguards by alt,ering the qualification criteria (to make smaller packages

easier to design, but not less crash-resistant) is not provided.

(4) The precedent for 1icens i ng Type B packagi ng is that the qual tfication criteria are codified in the regulations.

Alternative z.

Issue a regu'latory guide stating the current package qualification criteria

as· one acceptable way of meeting the reguJatory requirement to ship plutonium

by air only in a crash-reststant package.

Pro: (1) Thls allows public participation in the formulation of the qualification criteria without the time, expense, and effort required for a rulemaking proceeding. Providing this opportunity for public participation may

refine the criteriia to improve the protection of the public, make the criteria

more understandabl!e, and achieve a less burdensome requirement, while still

adequately protecting the public health and safety.

(2) Same as Alternative 1.

35 Enclosure 3
(3) If alternative qualification criteria were to be found acceptable

and if these criteria would make it easier to design smaller packages that are

no less air-crash-resistant, then this would better accommodate the need to ship

safeguards samples in connection with the U.S. policy to support effective

international safeguards.

Con: (1) A regulatory guide is an acceptable method of compliance with

the regulations, not a requirement. Public health and safety might be compromised by use of other criteria.

(2) This approach does not provide as great an opportunity for public

participation as involvement in the formulation of regulations, since a guide

defines an acceptable means of compliance, not a mandatory method of compliance.

(3) Staff time would be required to publish information already in

the public domain and subject to public comment.

(4) The precedent for licensing Type B packaging is that the qualification criteria are codified in the regulations.

Alternative 3.

Amend the NRC regulations such that the package qualification criteria,

i.e., packaging sta~dards for the air-crash-resistant package (test conditions,

acceptance criteria, and operating conditions), are incorporated.

Pro: (1) By obtaining public comment on the qualification criteria the

opportunity exists to refine the criteria to improve the protection of the

public, to make the criteria more understandable, and to achieve a possibly

less burdensome requirement, while still adequately protecting the public

health and safety.

(2) Codifying the qualification criteria through rulemaking in

accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act appears to be a preferred

method.

·36 Enclosure 3
-------------------

(3) Providing an opportunity for comment on the packaging criteria

could lE~ad to changes that would better accommodate the need to ship safeguards

samples in connection with U;S. policy to support effective international safeguards, by makinlg it easier to design smaller packages that are no less air-crash

resistant.

(4) Codifying the qualification criteria would clarify NRC policy.

(5) The precedent for licensing Type B packaging is that the qualification criteria are codified in the regulations.

Con:: (1) WClul d requi re staff resources for rul emaki ng that now can be

done on a case-by-case basis for the small number of cases anticipated.

l

(2) Would limit flexibility in applying the criteria until experience

had been gained from their use.

3.6 Decision on Procedural Approach

The Commission should take no further action on the qualification criteria,

except to referenc:e in the preamble to the proposed rule that they are published

NUREG-0360 and to request comments on them.

4. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS

4. 1 NRC Autbort ty

These amendments are proposed pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended (which 9ave the AEC the authority to regulate possession, use, and

transfer, includin~J transportation of certain radioactive material), the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (which transferred this AEC authority

to NRC), section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, (Rulemaking Requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act) and Public Law 94-79 (the Scheuer

Amendment f'equiring NRC to restrict air transport of plutonium).

37 Enclosure 3
4.2 Need for NEPA Statement

In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the

Commission has determined, under Council of Environmental Quality guidelines

(40 CFR 1500) and the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51 - Licensing and Regulatory

Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection, that an environmental impact

statement for these proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 71 is not required, based

on a finding that this action has no significant impact on the quality of the

human environment. An environmental impact appraisal supporting the finding

of no significant impact has been prepared.

5. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER EXISTING OR PROPOSED REGULATIONS OR POLICIES

The proposed rule is inconsistent with both IAEA transport regulations

and the current (and proposed) DOT regulations, since those regulations do not

restrict air shipments of plutonium to an air-crash-resistant package and since

those regulations allow shipment of plutonium by air in ordinary packaging.

This inconsistency appears unavoidable, since the requirements of the Scheuer

Amendment are basically at variance with the established body of transport

regulations. The Congress has not imposed a sjmilar requirement on DOT. A

similar requirement has been imposed on DOE.

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Commission can most effectively and efficiently implement the Scheuer

Amendment without undue risk to the pUblic health and safety and with minimum

expenditure of NRC and public resources by a rulemaking procedure which would

forbid air shipment of plutonium except as: (1) contained in a medical device

designed for individual human application, (2) contained in material with a

specific activity not greater than 0.002 microcuries per gram, (3) shipped in

38 Enclosure 3
,------------_.._----

a package speciiFically authorized by the Commission for shipment of plutonium

by air, or (4) shipped in accordance with §71.5 for single packages containing

no more than an A2 quantity of plutonium. The NRC staff would authorize packages

for air shipment using those criteria published in NUREG-0360.

In addition, staff will undertake actions directed toward: (1) evaluating

whether to encourage DOT to consider changes to existing DOT regulations that

would reduce inconsistencies with the NRC regulations, as amended, and (2) considering whether there exist sufficient technical and policy bases for a staff

recommendation to the Commission that NRC seek legislative relief for the air

shipment of safeguards samples and other small quantities of plutonium, for

which I

rapid transport is needed and is of identifiable benefit to the public

interest.

39 Enclosure 3
REFERENCES

1. Environmental Impact Appraisals for Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 71

To Restrict Air Transport of Plutonium t C. M. Mattsen and N. A. Eisenberg t

July 1979.

2. NUREG-0360 t Qualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air Transport

of Plutoniumt Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguardst U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commissiont January 1978.

3. NUREGICR-0428 t Review of Criteria for Packaging Plutonium for Transport

by Air t National Academy of Sciences t 1978.

4. U.S. NRC Public Announcement No. 78-187t Letter from Stephen Lawroski t

Chairman, ACRS, to Joseph M. Hendrie t Chairman t NRC.

5. Code of Federal Regulations, Title lOt Parts 0 to 199.

6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, "Final

Environmental Impact Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material

by Air and Other Modes t

ll Volume 1, December 1977t NUREG-OI70.

40 Enclosure 3
---------------------- • ' 7 7

APPENDIX I

PRELIMINARY VALUE/IMPACT APPRAISAL FOR A

RULE ON THE AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

January 1978
,

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PRELIMINARY VALUE IMPACT APPRAISAL FOR A RULE ON THE AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

Introduction and Summary

A rule is needed to implement the Scheuer Amendment because NRC implementation

of this Congressional edict has been accomplished, since August 15, 1975,

solely by issuance of an order to licensees. The Scheuer Amendment to S.1716,

enacted into law August 9, 1975 provides:

"The Nuclear Requlatory Commission shall not license any shipments

by air transport of plutonium in any form, whether exports, imports

or domestic shipments; provided, however, that any plutonium in any

form contained in a medical device desi9ned for individual human

application is not ~ubject to ~his restriction. This restriction shall

be in force until the Nuclear Requlatory Commission has certified to

the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Conqress that a safe

container has been developed and tested which will not rupture under

crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a

high-flying aircraft.~

Now that the NRC plutonium air transport package certification program is

nearing completion, it is timely to issue a rule implementing the wishes

of Congress.

The effective rule is planned for issuance in May 1978. This schedule

is based on greatly attenuated estimates of time reouired for various

reviews and concurrences, assuming action on this rule will be accelerated

by ,all involved parties. The schedule presumes: (ll that the rule will be

issued effective, without issuance of a proposed rule (i.e. the provisions

of 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart H do not apply, because a Con9ressional edict is

being implemented) and (2) that neither an environmental impact statement,

nor a negative declaration is reQuired (i.e. the provisions of 10 CFR Part

51, §51, §51.6(b)(6)'or §Sl.5(c){2) do-not apply, for the same reason given

above).

Alternatives to this task such as reliance solely on the order to licensees

or codification of the certification criteria are not viable. No contractual

effort is required for this task. An estimate of staff resources for this

task is 4 man-months in SO and 12 man-months for NRC.

Schedule for Task Completion

The proposed schedule for task completion is shown on the enclosed management

network diagram. This task, TP-7l4-1, is proposed to terminate with the

issuance of the effective rule in May 1978.

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- 2 -

Significant milestones for task completion are as follows:

Initial Draft of Rule Circulated for 1st Division Review ••• 02/17/78 Revised Draft of Rule Circulated for 2nd Division Review ••• 03/10/78 - Effective Rule Circulated for Office Concurrence •••••••••••• 03/31/78 Commission Review of Effective Rule and Office Concurrence Completion.n •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••• 05/12/78 Effective Rule Published in Federal Register•••••••••••••••• 05/31/78

The staff rcltionale in proposin9 this schedule presumes many of the normal regulatory procedures can be short cut, because this action is congressionally mandated. Specifically the schedule presumes: (1) that the rule will be issued effective, without issuance of a proposed rule (i.e. the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2, SUbpart H do not apply, because a Con9ressional edict is being imple~ented) and (2) that neither an environmental impact statement, nor a negative declaration is required (i.e. the provisions of 10 CFR Part 51, §5l.5(b)(6) or §51.5(c)(2) do not apply, for the same reason given above). The proposed schedule also makes greatly reduced allowances for the time required for various reviews and concurrences, and assumes the man loading required for task completion is less than that required for even simple rules. Thi s greatly accel era ted schedul e assumes top priority and rapi d processing by all invol ved parties, including the Commission and Aoreement States.

The Need for Task Completion

The Scheuer Amendment is a Conqressional mandate to which NRC must respond; an order to 'Ii censees is only a temporary means of response. Further, issuance of Ct rule would dovetail with the certification program of NMSS.

Al ternatf ves

Alternatives to issuance of this rule include:

1) Continued reliance on the order to licensees 2) Codification of the certification criteria 3) Banning of air shipment of plutonium 4) Issuance of a rule permittin9 exemptions consistent with DOT and IAEA regulations.

,j The order to licensees is an expedient temporary means of implementinq this ., legislation, but issuance of a rule is clearly a more aopropriate response.

ment

Codification of the certification criteria, in a manner similar to the state- of standards for type B packagino, is possible, but not advisable at this time because: (1) codification of the criteria would considerably lenqthen the time required for issuance of the rule, (2) only sli~ht domestic commerce in plutonium is expected, because of the Administration decision to reject the plutonium fuel cycle option, (however, administration nonproliferation . pol i c)' may grE~atly increase ,import/export shi pmerrts l e, (3) other modes of transpor-t are avai l abl e so only a very fe\·, shipment's wi l l necc ssari l..\'- co by " .:... .. '. ".'.:.: .. ,."a.1 r·d·lor. eX.arryJl] e·. cercain.·.e~port~) " ,.(4},.~h-e,;. c:~i..te..r..i.~ .a.r~::.~.9.t:.~.e.F~.~S~t~J.y,.>, -, .:. '" eAtt acbr-en t 2

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- 3 -

definitively established (until after· certification), and (5) a policy on.

whether to include the plutonium air transport package criteria in the

reoulations has not been established. Advantages of codifyinq the certi- fi~ation criteria include: (1) consistency with the manner in which other

NRC packaging standards are stated and (2) formal utilization of the output

from the certification program which, not only developed an air crash

resistant package, but also determined a set of certification criteria which

define air crash resistance. Bannin~ shipment of plutonium by air could

cause undue hardship to certain licensees and ele~~nts of the general public.

Furthermore the considerable effort to certify a packaqe meetinq the Scheuer

amendment criteria. would be wasted, if air shipment were banned. PL 94-79,

as ·drafted, allows an exemption from restricti"ons en shipments of plutonium

by air only for plutonium contained in a medical G~vice designed for indivd- o

ual human use. Futhermore corresp6ndence between ~~C and members of Conoress

indicates that an opportunity for some additional exemptions to be written

into the law was provided, but refused by NRC. Finally parallel leqislation

restricting ERDA from shipping plutonium by air contains additional exemptions

explicitly stated. Thus issuing a rule, permittin? other than the medical

device exemption and an exemption for de minimis Quantities, ~ppears impossible

without seeking legislative relief. Issuance of a rule permtt t ino no exemptions

for small Quantities of plutonium appears to be a burdensome reoulation and

not fully consistent with the intent of Congress. Ever since the atmospheric

weapons tests, virtually all terrestrial materials are contaminated with small

quantities of plutonium. Thus most soil, plants, animals, foods, and humans

contain small quantities of plutonium; it would be clearly inappropriate to

institute a blanket ban on transport of these materials. At somewhat higher

levels, but still small levels of plutonium content, a ban on air shipment

could compromise the public health and safety. For example, medical, bioloqical,

and environmental samples, that could contain small amounts of plutonium frOm

routine or accidental releases, need to be transported by air, for example, to

prevent decay of shortlived radionuclides, to prevent deterioration of bioloqical

samples, or·to provide an early determiRation of the radionuclide content of

the sample. Other shipments of plutonium by air could include· devices used

for the calibration of radiation detection equipment, wl1ich is required to

protect the public health and safety. Furthermore the le9islative history of

the Scheuer Amendment v/ould appear to indicate that no absolute standard of

safety was intended and that the air transport pro~ibition apply only to

"other than exempt quantities of plutonium. h

Mr. Scheuer expresses concern

over "deaths of hundreds of thousands of oeople"; such a disaster woul d c1 early

be impossible from a small exempt shipment. Finally the crash resistant

plutonium packa~e allows the release of s~all quantities (~. per week) for

the most severe crash environnent; allowin9 small :uantity exemptions from

the requirement of shipment in the crash resistant cackaoe ,is consistent

with this implementation of the Scheuer amendment. Implementation of the

Scheuer amendment with an allowance for small Quantity exemptions aopears

to be e re sponsi bl e requlat ory posi t i cn; ho\":ever,.:,i~·:0U.t. CI chan~e.i.n .the

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law that regulatory position cannot be taken. Thus the only viable alternative is to issue a rule following very closely the letter of PL 94-79.

Cost Effectiveness

An estimate of staff resources reauired for the effective rule is 4 manmonth'S'in SDan'd 12 man-months for all NRC·.·· A'lull in the demand for -Task ,.

Leader involvement in TP 610-2 (Urban Transport Generic Environmental Impact

Statement) is expected during the time period when the primary effort will

be preparation of the 1st Draft Assessment by Sandia; that period is expected to end late tn January or early in February, However, if unanticipated

problems do ar-ise in TP 610':'2 and Task Leader, involvement is recui red, this .. ',··task' (TP·114..l ) may be ~eraye'd:~,No cOf1.tractuai"·re~oLJrc·es·a·re'r€qul"red:' No'.: .',-,J

direct suppor-t is required; however, the const derabl e' research effort to ',' ... develop a certifiable package for air transport of plutonium is closely related

to this rule. Issuance of this rule could have a sianificant effect on the

licensing process in that: (1) it requires that licensees transport plutonium

by a'it in a certified package, without explf ct ttystattna f n the regulations' " what criteria a package must meet to be certified, (2) it may allow either

a monopoly on the de st cn of certifiable packaaes or lead to a multiplicity'

of certification criteria, (3) it establishes a precedent of implementing

Congressionally mandated recul atory acti ons, without foll 0111 nq normal recul atory procedures established by law. Impact on employment and labor interest

is e$timated to be minimal. Cost to licensees is estimated to be about

$3000 additional for each certified packaqe. The current oackaoes used for

plutonium transport cost in the region of"S100 t6 5300 dependinq on quantity

purchased, while the certifiable container (PAT) has been estimated to cost

$3500 in production (cost has been about $8000 per packa~e for the small

quantities required for package development). Durinp the air crash resistant

package development program, emphasis was placed on (1) development of appropriate certification criteria and (2) rapid development of a crash resistant

package; consequently the package desion developed may not have been optimized for low cost, so that other, newer designs may be cheaper •

. f . . . ' .

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APPENDIX II

LEGAL MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY THE

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR

November 10. 1980
\

LEGAL ANALYSIS: PROPOSED ~lENDMENTS TO NRC REGULATIONS

REGARDING AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUMIssues

1. Does the Scheuer Amendment pennit air transportation of A quantitiesY

or less of plutonium in containers meeting NRC or DOT packaging requirements,

,even though the containers may not be crash-proof?

2. Does the Scheuer Amendment pennit air transportation of plutonium

samples in larger than A2 quantities· to the IAEA in non-crash-proof

containers:' . __ .

Concl usions_

1. A reasonable tnterpretatfon of the Scheuer Amendment would pennit A

quantities or less of plutonium to be transported by air in containers 2

meeting NRC or DOT packaging requirements, even though the containers may

not be crash-proof.

2. A reasonable interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment would not pennit

air transportation of plutonium samples in larger than A2 quantities to the

IAEA in non-cresh-prcof containers.

The Scheuer Amendment

The so-called "Scheuer Amendment," part of Public Law 94-79 and appearing as

a footnote to sectf on 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, provides

that:

- The Nuclear R~,ulatory Commission shall not license any shipments

by air transport of plutonium in any fonn, whether exports, imports

or domestic shlpments i Provided, however, that any plutonium in

any fonn contaiined in a medical device designed for individual

human appl tca tton is not subject to this restriction. This restriction shall be iin force until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has

certified to the Joint Committee on Atanic Energy of the Congress

that a safe container has been developed and tested which will not

rupture under c:rash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and

explosion of a high-flying aircraft.

11 An A quantity of plutonium is defined in Table VII of the International

Atomic Energy Plgency I s IIRegulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive

Materials, IAEA Safety Series No.6 (1973 Revised Edition)." An A quantity of any radioactive isotope is the quantity of that. isotope in2nonnal

fonn permt tted in a Type A package under IAEA regulations (and proposed . DOT and NRC regulations). For Pu-238 or Pu-242, ·A2 is 3 mCi; for Pu-239

and Pu-240, A2 is 2 mCi; for Pu-241, A2 is 100 mCi.
- 2 -

The Legislative Histo~ of the Scheuer Amendment

NRC's 1976 authorizing legislation was considered and passed by the Senate

on June 17, 1975. This bill was then considered by the House of Representa- tives on June 20, 1975. It was during this debate in the House that Repre- sentative Scheuer's amendment was offered and agreed to by the House. (The

floor debate in the House is attached as Enclosure "AII• 121 Cong. Rec. H

5895-96 (daily ed. June 20, 1975)).

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of Congress requested the Commission's

views on Representatives Scheuer's amendment. Acting Chairman Marcus Rowden

transmitted these views in a June 24, 1975, letter to Mr. George Murphy, Executive Director of the Joint Committee. (Enclosure "BII ) . The letter to

the Committee stated, in par-e:

The NRC is opposed to this amendment for two basic reasons: ..... (2) the amendment would require an absolute guarantee of safety which is undesirable fram both a practical and social standpoint.

* * * * *

With respect to our second ground of objection to the amendment,

we strongly question the certification criterion which this

amendment would establish. As we read the amendment, it is

tantamount to a requirement that the agency vouch for absolute

container safety. Such an "absolute safety" criterion is not

desirable from either a practical or social standpoint. The

Congress itself has recognized that the peaceful development of

atomic energy carries with it an element of risk. We note, for

example, that section 57 c. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act prohibits licensing of special nuclear'material if the licensing

action would constitute an "unreascnable risk to ·the publ ic

health and safety.11

In response to this letter and the Commission's June 25, 1975, testimony before the Joint Committee on his amendment, Representative Scheuer asked,

and was given, pennission to extend his remarks for publication in the

Congressional Record. 121 Cong. Rec. H 7497-7501 (daily ed. July 25, 1975). (Enclosure IIC".) Representative Scheuerls response to the Commissionls

interpretation of his amendment is summarized by the following excerpts fram his extended remarks:

The second Commission argument against my amendment is that it

calls for absolute safety which the Commission feels is "undesirable fram both a practical and social standpoint. II , There is

not a shred of evidence on the record or elsewhere that anyone in

the House, least of all myself, wished to impose such a standard

on the NRC. Indeed, the word absolute appears nowhere on the

record. All my amendment requires is that the Nuclear Regulatory
- 3 -

Conmfssion tE!St and develop a container which they can certify as

befn!} safe while using the one restriction in the amendment--that

it will not rupture upon the crash of a high-flying aircraft•

••• Indeed, legislative drafting counsel, representatives of the

New 'fork State Attorney General's Office, and a Congressional

Reseilrch Service legislative attorney assure me that my amendment

leghlates flexibility and discretion on the part of the Joint

Comn'ittee and the NRC. The testimony before the Joint Committee

clealrly illustrates that members of that bodyalso interpret the

amendment in this way.

'.

* * * * *

-

••• No rational scrutiny of the record can show that absolute

safety was the criterion legislated by the House;••••

On July 31, 1975, the Senate -reconsidered the bill as amended by the House

and concurred in it.

Analysis•

Issue 1

The text cf the Scheuer Amendment is not clear and unambiguous. Nowhere in

the statute is there any provision that after NRC has certified the "crashproof" contatner to Congress, NRC licensees must use it for the air transport of plutonium. A reasonable interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment, in

light of the considerations which led to the amendment's passage, would,

however, impose such a restriction. Sim~larly, though the amendment does

not specify any qu,antfty or activity lfmits below which the air transport of

plutonium would be permitted in containers that are not "crash-proof" but do

meet NRC air DOT pa1ckaging requi rements, reliance on packaging criteria

developed by NRC under its health and safety authority or those developed by

DOT under its health and safety authority (see 49 CFR Parts 170-179) would

permit transportation in containers meeting NRC or DOT requirements. See,

for example, 10 CFR § n .5.

The Congress' posHion with respect to NRC's certification of the container

is also ambiguous. It is fair to say, in light of Representative Scheuer's

remarks, that his ilmendment does not requi re absolute safety for crash-proof

containers used fOlr air transport of plutonium. Thus, container acceptance

standards for qual'ification criteria were developed under subsections 53b.

and 57c.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to health and safety

- -

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risks, among other things.l1 These criteria, used in the development of the

crash-proof container and certified by the Commission to Congress as meeting the requirements of the Scheuer Amendment, all owed for leakage of not more

than an A quantity of plutonium fran the container "under crash and blasttesting e4uivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying ai rcraft;"

More specifically, the first of the three acceptance standards contained in the qualification criteria provides:

Containment - The containment vessel must not be ruptured in its

post-tested .condition and the. 'package must provide a suffic.ient . degree of containment to restrict accumulated loss of plutonium l/ co~tents to not more than an A2 quantity in a period of one week.

Although Congress was not ob!igated to approve or take any other affirmative

action after NRC certified to it the existence of a crash-proof container.

for the air transport of plutonium, Congress could have refused (by further

legislative act) to acquiesce in the certification if it believed that the , qualification criteria (contain~ in NUREG-0360) were inadequate. The

certification to Congress made on August 4, 1978, has been followed by subsequent Congressional inaction.

Using Congressional inaction as evidence 'for or against an interpretation of

a statute does not provide a solid foundation for legal analysis. Nonetheless, it does provide support for a reasonable interpretation, and a number

of decisions have held that the acquiesence of the legislature through inaction following a cant~l\1poraneous interpretation of the legislation and

its practical applicatio~ is that the legislature intends to adopt such an

" .

11 SUbsection 53b. provides that "the Canmission shall establ ish, by rule,

minimum criteria for th~ issuance of' specific or general licenses for

the distribution of special nuclear material depending upon the degree of importance to the canmon defense and security or to the health and safe~ of the public of (1) the physical characteristics of the special nuclear material to be distributed; (2) the quantities of special nuclear

material to be distributed; and (3) the intended use of the special

nuclear material to be distributed." Subsection 57c.(2) does not allow

issuance of any 1icense under section 53 which "would be inimical to the

common defense and security or would constitute an unreasonable risk to

the health and safety of the publ tc;"

, . NUREG-0360, IIQualification Criteria To Certify a Package for Air

Transport of Plutonium, II at p.8.

In this instance, the "contemporaneous tnterpretatf on'" and "practtcal

applicationll of the legislation is NRC's development of qualification criteria used for the design and construction of the crash-proof container certified by NRC to Congress as meeting the requirements of the

Scheuer Amendment.
. .

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'..

interpretation and application.~ Therefore, cons istent with the conta iner

acceptance standards in NRC's qualification criteria, a reasonable interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment would pennit air transportation of A, quantities or less of plutonium in containers which are not crash-proof but which

meet NRC's or DOT's packaging requirements pursuant to a health and safety

assessment of the ."isks involved. Thus, the Commission would detennilie

whether the potentlal maximum consequences that .could result from transportation of an A, quantf ty or less of plutonium in a non-crash-proof' container

are equal to or less than the potential maximum consequences that would

result .fran transportation-of a ful ly Ioeded crash-proof. contatner-;

. Issue 2 .

We' are aware that some NRC l icensees want to transport plutonium samples

(safeguard samples) by air to the IAEA. The samples would be in gram quantities, possibly 100 grams or more. Such quantities, canpared to A') quantities, would be extraordtnar-t ly large. A reasonable interpretation of the

Sc/'JeuerAmt!ndment and the heal th and safety assessments .made under the

Atomic Energy Act would not pennit such quantities of plutonium to be transproted by air in a package other than a crash-proof container, because such

quantf t ies far exceed the container acceptance standards in the qualification

criteria.

This interpretation is reinforced by the three exemptions for the a~y transport of plutonium contained in ERDA's 1976 authorizing legislaylon,- two of

which are not contained in NRC's 1976 authorizing legislation•u The Senate

1/

Canada Packers~. v. Atchison, T. &S.F. Ry., 385 U.S. 182 (1966);

United States v, Shreveport Grain & E,levator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).

Section 502 (1) through (3) of Public Law·94-187. The three exemptions

include:

11(1) Plutonium shipments in any form designed for medical

appl icati on;

(2) Plutonium shipments which pursuant to rules pranulgated by

the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration are detennined to be made for purposes of national security,

public health and safety, or emergency maintenance operations; and

(3) Shipnents of small amounts of plutonium'deemed by the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration to

requf re raptd shipment of air in order to preserve' the chemical,

physical, or isotopic properties of the transported item or material. II

Public Law 94-79. The one exemption similar to ERDA's (see exemption 1

in footnote 6) is: "plutonium in any form contained in a medical

device designed for individual human. appl ication."
. ".

" . ' .

- 6 -

considered NRC's authorizing legislation, which included the Scheuer Amendment, and ERDA's authorizing legislation on the same day. ~t could be

reasonably inferred that Congress intended the NRC legislation to be more

restrictive.

Sections 501 and 502 of the ERDA authorizing legislation contained provisions similar to the Scheuer Amendment and designed to achieve the same purpose with respect to ERDA shipments of plutonium. These sections are sjgnificant in interpreting the Scheuer Amendment, since they address the same subject.

In terms of legislative intent, it is usually assumed that whenever the

legislature enacts a" provision- it has in ,inind previous or contemporaneous legislation (in, this8yase, NRC's authorjz.ing legis,lation) relating .to the

same subject matter.-" Thus, it is generally held that, in the absence of

any express repeal or amendme~t contained in the new legislation, the new

provision was enaCg~d in accord with the legislative policy embodied in thI 01 prior legislation,1I and all the legislation should be construed together.~

There can be no aoubt that Congress was aware of the Scheuer Amendment when i~ approved ERDA's authorizing legislation. Section 501 and t£~ were added

to the bill during the Senate Floor debates on July 31, 1975,-- less than

one week after the extended remarks were inserted into the Congressional Record by Representative Scheuer. The Senate amendment was cosponsored by Senators Jackson and Pastore, and the same arguments used by Representative Scheuer to support his amendment were advanced in support of the Senate amendment. During the debate, Senator Ribicoff (in support of the amendment) remarked:

The House has already passed a similar amendment banning nonessential shipments of commercially owned plutonium by the

Nuclear Regulato~ Commission on any kind of air~laft, pending NR~'s certification of a crash-proof container.-- :

It is reasonable to assume from consideration of the ERDA legislation that

Congress was well aware of both how to grant exemptions and the particular exemptions it had granted to ERDA, because it gave contemporaneously to ERDA

more leeway than it gave NRC. Therefore, NRC's authority as modified by the

Scheuer Amendment should be considered strictly limited, and it would be

overreaching to go beyond the A2 quantity provided for in the NRC's container

acceptance standards in the qualification criteria.

Y Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft ce., 3~7 U.S. 535 (1954).

'}j M·

Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).

1!1 121 Congo Rec. 25414-15 (daily ed. July 31, 1975).

111 M. at 26415.

,
. . . .

- 7 -

In sum a reesonab le interpretation of the Scheuer Amendment would pennit A2 quantities or less of plutonium to be transported by air in containers

meeting NRC or DOT packaging requirements, even though the containers may

not be crash-proof. However, a reasonable interpretation of the Scheuer

Amendment would not pennit air transportation of plutonium safeguard samples

in larger than A2 quantities to the IAEA in non-crash-proof containers•

• '.' 0"

.. -

,
APPENDIX III

Estimate of Consequences of the Dispersal in an Air Crash of

the Plutonium in a Cardiac Pacemaker
Because of the rigid requirements placed on the sealed plutonium source used

in pacemakars, it is extremely unlikely that these devices would rupture in the

event of the crash and explosion of a high flying aircraft, itself an unlikely

occurrence. The Final Environmental Statement* on plutonium powered cardiac

pacemakers indicates that the plutonium fuel capsules ~ust survive, without

breaching, impact at SOm/sec on an essentially an yielding surface; furthermore

that Final Environmental Statement concludes that loss of plutonium from an

implanted pacemaker involved in a severe air crash is very unlikely. The

followin~J analysis is believed to be very conservative, because no credit is

taken foY' the'substantially stronger encapsulation of- plutonium fuel cells

used in pacemakers compared to the packaging proposed to be used for small

quanti t f es 'of plutonium, for which the analysis below was developed.

The consequences of the release in an air crash of the plutonium contained

in a plutonium-powered cardiac pacemaker is estimated using the information

developed in the Environmental Impact Appraisal. The release and dispersion

assumpti ens stated on page 15 are used; i. e. ,

Percent re leasad = 100%

Percent aero::;olized = 50%

Percent respl rab1e = 50%

Percent f nheled by

human population =

*Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Routine Use of Plutonium-Powered

Cardiac PacemakeY's, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1976, NUREG-0060.
The value obtained for latent cancer fatalities per curie inhaled for Pu-238

(the isotope commonly used in pacemakers), as stated in Table A-2 of the Environmental Impact Appraisal, is 1.2 x 104 LCF's/Ci inhaled. The consequences are

calculated as follows:

Consequences =4 Ci (typical Pu contents of a pacemaker) x 1.0 (fraction

released) x 0.5 (fraction aerosolized) x 0.5 (fraction respirable) x 0.01 (fraction inhaled by humans) x 1.2 x 104 LFC's/Ci inhaled =121 LFC·s.
"

APPENDIX IV

TranspoT'tation of Radioactive Material by Passenger Aircraft

September 17, 1979

A Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Print
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93d Congress }

2d Session .TOINT COMMITTEE PRL'i'r

JOINT COl\OIITTEE ON ATO~IIC ENERGY

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

NINETY·THIRDCOSGRESS .

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HOLD FOi-i h':LEASE

THU SEP 1S1874 AM

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE

?IATERIAL BY P.ASSEXGER AIRCRAFT

REl'ORT No. 1

OF THE

SPECIAL P.\~I-:L TO STl"DY TRA~SrORT.\TIO~ OF

. Nt;CLE.\R ){ATERI.\LS

-

SECOXD SESSIOS

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SEPTE)lBER rr, Ion

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Printed tor the use ot the Joint Committee OD •.\.tomieEnern

v.s. GOV£~"XEN1' PRINTING OFFICE

• WASHINGTON: ItT4

J'or ule bl lbe Su~erlnteQdenttit Documelltll. U.S. Goo:erll:Deat Prlatlr'l: Ol!h:. • Wasblalitoa. D.C. ::O~o~ • l'rlee .. c:eau

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" MEMORANDUM OF THE 

VICE CHAIRM

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On 1';,1 nnnonueed (11C' flC

flftulv the tl'IlIlSpOU(inn or IllU'IC'III' nmll

lll'llli,h and sllf.,ty uml the! snfl'l.!lIlIl'cliII

th",loltlllH1l'oillt nf IO;':/i uml T

whit'll ";;\"i.'rfj Ih,· tm iii!iiCii'1 ii I' iOii "r.'llIli'

;Jh'!""1 (t hus SlIhlllllh'

is 1I('I'rhy publislnvl, ,

This ."Tort. WIIR illi,in'.'11 to detorminc 

Intorv provisions :11111 to ltf'ul

))t'('\"(:lIt diversion. The 1.!l'('nt lv illrl'ensll

111 medicine IlIICI illdlJf;II'\' llI:;I.c'l'i RI",h I

imporlnnce. The of 1II1l'1e'

1\l'IlI ion will in II fl'w )'rUI'8 result in 1\ "i

of c'Ill'il,lll'll uruuium 111\11 plutonium ill 

.: , which will require J:pN'illl I"rot,ts to IlSS

, sion 1l1lc1 losses, Hnt

h the 1IS

of terrnrlat netivltlo

ut the ncqulsit inn of enricher] urnnium m

importunt thnt tho Jll'Oprl' snfl'l.!"nrdill

atteution, .

TIIlI .Ioint Committee WIlS most please

followilll! pllnel ml'lllh('J'S: 

MI', .Tohn '1', Conw,,\, (Chnit'lHnll of 

O1lt, to the CllI1it:lI\n1l of the BO

Comj)1I11}'. Ji'm'IIII'I'l\' Srw('iltl Al.!l

nil'llc'tOr' of thn ,foiilt. ('0111111hte(' 

wn,V is a III W,\'C'I'IlIlc1 rnl.!illt'I·I', ' 

MI'. ClIl'IlIinc S, Hel.Jino, foa'nll'I'I)' .\

lIoo\ ('I' IIl1d in dllll'l!l! of tlU

IlI-lIino is It l'c, ..tili."l pnhlie n(,(,O

RJll'cilll S\H"'C'Y of the 

J,,\Jt;C,

Dr, K, Z. 1\fol'l!lln. Profl'ssOl', NuC'1

O.'ol'l!i", JIIstitntc\ of Tel'hnnlol.!}

nitllIO Nntional LnluU'lltnt,)" I1ellf

n1l11 Cosmic UIl)' Physiciflt, 

)[1', .John G. Pl'MrSSOl' of 

])1'1111, CohulIhi" ColIl'l!l'. Atomic 

]\:I'/IIwdy of P()litil'llnt I

Advil>Ol')' COllllllittl'c Oil N

Dl', 'l'heocloro H, TllY101', Chait'mo

Ilnd 'l'ccJmology Corporation, }'on

tional Atomic Agency on 

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BncuL PARa. To STunT TR"N8POBTATIOl'l or NuCUCAS 11A'rQUIoa ,

T, CONWAY. e'lo'rlll." CARmi-I S. Ih:I.LUIO

Dr, K. 1.. )IOIIOAII

JOHl'I 0, l'AL""&\'

'Dr, 'l'HI:OPOIlr. U, TA¥LOa

WILLIA)! '

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CIlI\T Il11J.lvuu.n, ClIlIforula J,\C$IUlN, Wa..hla.i••·

JlIlIS \'Ul'="ci, '1''''''1t K'J'I!.\WI' Kr)Ill\(l1'1Il(. aUlIIIOIIrl

'£I.:SU IUlSI:AJ.IU. W)"A1l1h1lt AI• 111111.1':, )Jun: )lc('uU)I.\CIi. \\'....lIlni'o" JIIl'lI';I'1I )I. Nf'" )r...lce e:U,UU lllUUmlt, CIII"..rul" ,ClI-:tlIWI': II, ,','rlllunt '

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W.\1.1..\1'1': I·'. 1II':SSI·:1-r. u.ill I.l"bu l'I':T1m II. Culllr...lo

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Cui, RKnIO"1l CK,U' (lIo't.), 1',.1'1111/1,..1Co.,.,"••,

ALIIIO:-l W. Jr,. I·'·/I(..../Ul/l., 8'08 ."eHlII,r

)tANIlALL C, I\TtWlIl:SM, ",'o/co%II'" 1':'''11 Jle"'''.r

WILf,LIUI J. )IlS"I'Il, Jr., HIlI'C/o' eUllud

I,OUllt T, UhIlAl'IC70\'lC, C:OIIU/lOll ' CuaIIToPH£1I C. ".'1,,111111 ,.;,11101'

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nueh-nr 11Intm'iulR, J)c'lmty Dlreetor, 1>cfl'Ufi8 At.omic RI1JlP()I't

.\gt'nC'y, nml stl\IT nlC'lIIhC'I' of the Los AIIlllIWI Sd<lntific l.lllIlUl'I\-'

tOI'.V. '

"'imnill ])c'))\lty Director of Nnvnt Ut'ndOl'B slnn nf with spociul l'C'fipOIlHihilitiNI in regurd to nuelenr

muterjn1St

HI'ports 011 other I\rCnR of tho sturlv will be puhlifilw<l AS th.,y 1\1'0

(")III\lII'It'11. Till! .lnint Conuuittre tluurks tilt' plIIIC'l fclI' its ch!dicillt'll

C'tl'ortl' to IItlll Inol,s Iorwurd Io the l'('{'c'ipL nOll1'ir rindilll!s II,ul

"I'I'ClIIl"ll'llIllIl innsin thc' 1'C'lImilli,,:! 1l1'C'IIR or Htlii'ty, TIII'p"lllie'lItion of IhiH 1'('pol't ut this time dOl'li not fiil!niry the .loint

('UlIllllirh'I":; of the puncl's Jlndings 1\1111 recommendntiuns, The .J,)illl, ('Ollllllittl'O hali not h:1IIUI1 oppol'tllnily 10 sillily the

1'I"\I')I't nor l'xplut'l\ tho IU'I'IIN und lillllill;.!R, Althml:!h ihn connultteu 1.lall:; to review tho PlIIWl"s I'(,pOl't ill (h,tllil 111111 explore the vurione

fuctnrs involved in .Ioint Committe« hl'Ill'iIlJ,-rs, it rliduot wish to ell'llly

avnilnhle tho panel's findings. AccOI'dlll;.!ly, the report is bdng

1""J,lilih('d in advaneu of such 1\ review to assure thnt tho panel's indol'(.'lldcntstudy be made available without to all iuterested Mcm-'

LeI'S of Congt'CSS. Government, Industry, nuil the public, ., .

MELVIN PRICE. Ohairinan. ' I

,JouN o. PA6TOBB. v·ie, Ohaifortttm. "

. Cllairma

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LE1'TER OF TRA

Representnt lve

MF.I.\'I N 01/(1i,'II

HI'nntOl'.JIIIIN O. Vir-/' CI",i,..

.10i/lt. (/01mllilf."ll on

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U,S, f.!ollfJre,'1.", H"mtllillflfoll, /),0,

J>.:.\U Mil, CII.\IIl)(.\S 111111 VR'.

with is Ih-port. XIIl\Ihl'I' OliO Irom .t 

'I'runsportution of :\lult'I'illls 

R",li{)(lrliz,p, jlltt','r;(JIIII/I'"..,,'1Cllf/f·1' A

III }'CUII' MIt'I' of :\1), Iu 

.('ollln"itll'l\ wns plll'l leu1;11'1

Vnuxious to 

nt Ihl' lll'l'slmt, t nue 1\1111 nillt, )'011 wis

c,trOl'hl O!I Ill"t':I'l\Iillill:! what, if II11,r

1'('('lly. '\: nil pointer] out, Ihnt. tn he of 

dl,lillC'l'lltinllS should be nuulo uvuilnbl

liltivo action, if lIN'f'SSIII)", couhl he t

As tim PIIlIC'I Ih'h'l!t1 into tho C'III'I'Cl

fnillilll! to tho trnnsportuf ion of mdin

thnt IIUlIIY problems nre 1'III'Iil'II1111' to tion USC'11 nud trill' or muteriul lll·jlll

nil'l'l'nft (01' tmjlspOl,till1! nuliouctive 

tieulur nt this time silwo 

f!I'f'nt 1'00\1'IlI'n to ""1l1)', inchlllill·f! ni

c·II'O\'ls Wl'l'e Imilll{ IIInllt! 1J.r snml! l'Olll

Rlleh Rhipllll'lIts, As IlisClIf'Sell with th

t.ho pnl1l'l should illit.inll}' COlU:C'lItrnte 

of ni\'el'llft fOl' 

Tho l'l'pOl't, while it dot's 

, conel'I'n, primRl'By pC'l'tnills to the trn

terial by pnssenger niJ'l.'l'Rft. Flll'thC'l' r

other (U'CllS of tI'llllsporting rncU(,>Ilcth'

to YO\1 as completed. ,

Respectfully

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AI"IIIC1rtl":I",,, I..etft·r Clf Ir" '1/,11I111"1 IIr IItt' ('h"lrlll"" ""tl rh'f' {'ltulrlllnn 

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Intro/hlt~tlll" 

II. 1)e"el"l'uIl'1l1 IIf l,rt'sl'"1 r/'!:"I"tluIlH 

III. n"Hb. ,.t IllIIlI'l'H rl·I·III11II1I'u'I"/II1I1 

1\·; D!!'Cu!t.~hul :";t U:;.U;i~l'i it iiti j'I-,·UIIIIJI.'ucintiun"' 

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:.11111' IlIl<hllllll'''''' IIr rlldllllll'lh'" lIIuh'rlul 

n, n/',·lIl11l11t"IfIl..1 IIIl1/llIll'IIIlIl11 III rl·Jt"IIIIIt.u

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. AIIIIC'lItlix A. Ullt of h'dh'lduulll with whnm paillt'l hAN co

AWI'mllx Letter dated "la7 30, 1074 relatln to work 

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I. JNrrnODUCTJON· 

In 1117:1, An rstinlllt('(t (ol()().IlO() shipmr.nts o

\\'tH'U madl' in tIm of which

mmle nu nil'l"'llft, Tlltlll RhipmC'lIts o

nl't' to cC'lIrh 1 million (nl' thr. )'('IlI'lllj

rl'('IlRC Rll!nilil'nll( h' (I'll'h "('111' (0" Ihe foresceu111

II ircru fr tIll' 11 I'('llnilliUIIlit l'lll'l'il"'•

AIIh()l':rh :-:nllll' 0 f t IH' rndionctivo 11111 terlul 

indust riul 01' 1'..seureh IIR(·li. till' l\Il\jol'il,\'-lIlf1l

Nhil'lWll ".r nir, ll'I'l'IlSl'" ill Ilu'lIll'<1i('Il) pro

is(llo)lI'S 1111\'(\ llhlll'l hulf-lives uud 10 Ill' 

portvd n-Iutiv..I,\' fllst (I'nlll )l1I;\I'lIln(,1'1I1 il'lIlsIIP

Ollll'l'lclI'llt ions (01' 11\' 1III'llil'nliliwi OI'S, HI'I':II

lives, thev must It(' 1'(':r1Ilnl'h' replonlshed, IISlI

'flil! lise 

rWII(l':,\Rioll-llIlIl 1I1l' rOl'I'('Spol\(lilll! incrense il

nil'rl'"ft (nl' their t runaporlut inu IIIll; euuserl 

IU'lIlth 111111 snfl·t\, of IIIl! PllSS('lIg('I'S 1l1l1)I'I'I!\\' 

/Ill \\,1,11 liS fOl' flill lIil'lille 1ll'I'SOIlIlI'l who h:lIlIlI

A 111111111"1' of I\nown inl,jdl'lIts-lIlt \"l'IT 

flhiflllll'III:i-hnn' (W('III'I'I'd in whid. fill' 1I'I\I\!'li

I'in hl\s IU'I'(I(')lI'd its (,olllnint.>I' III' hus h('('n illlpr

shil'lll'I'. of whidl WI

nftl'l' \'l'(,l'ipt b,' thl' fOllsi;.rn('('. jllst ilinhl \' I'll ii'll' 

l'Jl\I\('Y of l'xistln#! OO\'('I'lIl1ll'nl. stal\lllll'c1s Illld l

t,ions fcU' paclm;.rillg nllil \IIonitol'illg l'lllliolll'th

Bllt. lIl'volul tile C'OIlI'('I'n on'l' th(' potentilllllll1

P;'I':;olll\('l {1'01Il Ilf(,jllt'lItlll n'h'lUil' nf 

liS it IlIn\' ur., Ihl'I'l' is ('OIlI'(,I'n ns to 

Ihis illcl'l'nsing- I\lIiollllt. of lIlah'l'iul 

nin'mlt. uncIl!I' nOl'1Il1l1 ('OI111ilioIlS. Ll',_ 

tions hn\'e tlot. hi'('n \'iolllh.'ll. This mil'll's th(' q

stlllullll'ds Si't, hr the J)('plIl'tmell( of TI'IIIlSluU

:\tolllic COlllllliRSioll (.\Ee) to l'I'g-ulllt

ill tl'llnRit 111'1' l'OIlS('I'\'lltin' ill li;!ht 

of SllI'h shiplIlenls 111\(1 tlw illel'l'lIsinl! Pl'lIll11ltil

pl.'l'!lOnlll-1 will bl! rxpo!il'd 10 low )c'n'ls o

shiplIll'lItS. In 01111'1' "'OI'lls, I\sslIminl! full l'O

1'1'1!"ll1tioll8-whidl ill lIl'tlllll )tl'lIcti('c th(" imll

'ISSlIme-nl'e IU'l'slmt 1'(!;!1I1nliolls 1l11l'111IIIt(' to 

t.I'IIIU'pOI'lllt iOIl wol'l.a'I's fl'om I'lldiuliOIl l'xll'I'llll 

III IIsS('!'lsillg th", )u'ohll'lIls IIss0('iUtl'll with h

mnt"'l'inl by p:lsselll!l'I'lIil'CI'nft, thl' p,,"(') thoug

hnnd illfol'mntion from (lCl'Sons and ol'l!Rnizntio

ess nllel to witness the \'flriOIlS sepnrntc nctivi

entil'O procl'SS, .Accol'dingly, the pnnel visitI'd f

..

"I

, . '.

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to II,'

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PH \ '.

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.,

I'

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II

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.. '.' ...

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t:, .

..... .

:/..... i '!' :: (,

, _. ,

, , at,:'

f' ...'.'t "._ 1 • • ;

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.... • .:•.•' .',' '." ... I' .' •• '.:' •••,

.,':. .i ..... ' -. i .: t .1; .', . , . , :.f f,'.' .,.: ;.·f '.'

.. .., ',;: .

.

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I;, '.',. ,t. •.•• ;•. .• :' ,': • ., '. ; . • &. • • ' •

. , '.1 ,., :.,"'"

......... .:•.., !.'," U' •. · ·:i :!. !; .. 'i I

.•,.:,.,it. •.••11 •• ••,. '. ' I •

:'.1' .1, .... 1·...I.i, 'f' j' : '. i .' ;•• ' .. :

•• ':, ..... " : .•1 . i. ; ••• :.:';.··•.•·'1·:· •..- ,. ," ..., ,.... ;.,.

• ':.J: .' : " ·1 t.. I' '" ". • • " I,;: -, I,

.,. .... -.1.... . .,.: t •• • ., .' • ::.I' .J:.:

.".

10 1 : i,,' ., I" 1-:' , . p' ::." , .,.' . '. :,1 ·..·: .' ." , t '''' ,i it /. ,.'.' ., ••: ',"i: fa •• ' , i ••"J.

• •.. 'J :" ,.... •• • ••• ".. ". • - ,••••:·,1 " . .:'1. '110"',.

•

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3

II. (W PJn·:SI·:

I 'I'!\I' .tl':\IlSli"I'(lltioll or I':Illioal'liw /IIllle'

l'llIdilll-t plll'SI!Il;.!I'I· IIi"1'1'11 rt. is l'I'I!"lllfc'IIII," 

nm is,'i,...cl 11\, I>OTUll 10 1'IIl'I,";.rill;.!' Illln·li

tu tlu\ /IIllxililll/ll 1lC'I'missihlc'Ie'wl or l'IUlil

pRc·lm;!I'. TIIl'sl' 11:1\'c' bl'c'lI IIC'\

c'oo"I'I'ntiun wil h.1I1111 II rte'I','c·\'il'\\'I.,.. tlll'.

PI'C'SC'llt l'I':!lIlntiulIs Ihllit, th.· IIInxillllllll 

n pRc'kn:!I' ill "ollliIlC' C'OIlIll\l'I"'C' to :!1I11 llIilli

of tho plu'lwl-!(' IIl1cl :11 illillil'C'1ll 1'1'1' hCllll' 

pnrlwA'c's. The le'n-I of l'Ilc!intioll illlllillit'I'll

8111'flU'l! of till' p:lI'lml!l' i!lI'lIJ1C'lI thc' JlIIl·lm;.!

h\' (,1ll·'·I'lIt.l·C':!ullllioll lllll\'llnt c·xI'I'I'IIIII. J

1'\c'I' 8111'11 lilt llil'l'l'llft. 01' mil ('111' ill 

sill;.dc' Jllll'lwl!(\ with 11 TI 1!"l'lIh'I' Ihllll J(I /

whllSt\ lolnl '1'1 will (,xc·l·c'lllill. 

mnilllllillNl IH'I\\'C'I'II plI('lm:!c'!I 1I11e1 nil'lilJp 

minillli1.C' 1'llIlintiClIl I'XpORlII'C' to 1)(,1'8011IIc'I 11

Tho l'I'(,sc'nt nOT I'C';!II1sttioIlS gowl'nill#

th'e by llil'C'I·Ilt't. ol'i:rilllllc>d ill sh

Oil llH7, hy the IlItl'l'Slnle CO

npon tho t"dmirn) I\pccifirllt.ions fOI·1ll1l1nte

Ucsclll'ch Council Committeo of CXpl'l'ts. A

exposure limits to personnel were the .M

AJthOIli!'h l'1ulinl",'h·C\ IlInl...·inl ill 

terinl tllIl'. hy HOT 111'(' 

1I1C'lIht Clf wh rl'h III'(l RlltlC'ific'lII1\- 1"'(·!'(·I'illC'rl. 

uIII\' tn 1'/ICIiUlwtin' IIIl1tC'I'illl'lIllcl thus cli

PlII:\'iC'\\' tu 1I11llw I'C'I'OllllllC'lulatioIlRrnl1l'

11111 IC'I·illI. 

Ilowovcr. silll'c' '1111/1

V uf rho lmllvirlunls 

with Iltc' uf nil I\"IC''i or h

flaiiiiiilihll's. III1l'ii c'ill'1IliC'a is. ilC'hls, II /II

obtnill SIIIIIIlIIl'I'HjJI'I'lin' 10 till' rl'llllin' 

1Il11 11'I,jIII II 1Ie1 \'11"WIIS (II IU'I' I"pc's

Ur hll1.a " Il

"'illlOllt (11111111.1111' pull'lililllllnll;!I'" 

8011111'1 fmlll 1111111." olhc·I·lm1.:nclulIs lIIale·l'i

:.....,. 1I1I'C·I·Uft. luela.\· i!;l (ai' :!I'I'1I11'I'lball rroll

111111 I 1IIIIItI W

(·um:itll·l·illl! till' l'I'I'UlIIlIu',,,lal illlll'l I'ullla illl'l

XIII wilJ.isl tl ... IlPI'Il/I'1l1 111'1'11 fu,' 

t lou IIl1cl c·ulltI·..1uf ClI hl'l' IIIIZllI·dnlll'l 111111 c'I

thuu fill' ,'n.tion'" i"Cl 11I:l11'I'illl-llw "IIIII'I h

lllltillllni Ilnlit,.\, uf ('XJillSill.!! iIllJidllul,ll'l I

lc·n·1 liS "low liS IlI'lll'lll'llhll'" "'hllulll hc' nlll

IIIwll'III' illliIll-ilI'" i'll'lclllilll! tIll' lI'lIlIsporla

Olluuc',ulaliUIIR ;IS (01'1 II ill th is "I'port 

I\nlll'l\ wif" Ihllt pulil'\' whic'h thc' plllwll.C'li

inllan' it is i/l thl! hc'st illlc'I'l'st o( nil l'1l1l

J.x.1ll'lic·inl'ic'lt of III1..tC·IIl· lIIal"I'illl n!l \\"l'III1S 

2

. .

f' ., '1'.' 1 ,. 1 '" • f ,m'm:: _JtC·I.1,lt·g W,IC'i'a i.\hiOjhiili'iiiiiC...·i1i ii'1\1 PI'O«ll1C'r" Rn' IIIRIIII RC'.

tlll'C'c11111l1 thn III1·th".lQ wh!+ ...:':

wC'm pIll·I';lI:!c·cl (.... shipnu-nt, illdiulin:! tho monltoring to IIf1SIlI'a thn

llllc'lwgc':; nl('c·t, '·'('(h'I·1l1 stmulurds,

"'Cl C':ll'go hllllcHillg UI'C'IIR lit thc\ uirpnrt to talk with C'I\I'#!'O

JlllllclIillg I'C'I':"Olllll\l :IIIC( ohserve tho pac'I';l\:!c's Ilc·ill#!' IOlulc·Il.lll1olll'cl

p);IIU'''. \\'C' IlllI\l'cl with l'elll'C'SC'1l11l1 ivos fl'l)lIIlllC' .J)c·p:II'llIIC'lit of

porlnl ion, ilwlutlilll! nlC' Fc·elc·ral

Avint ion nnd Ihl' Ollil'o

Clf lIay.llnlollS :\Ialt'l,illl uud with 1'l'llI'c'sc'lllnli\'c'!) of II,,· AI,:("! fmlll

llllih ihc HI';rlliniol'y und (Icm-rul ill'l':!. Also, WC· IIWI: with

1'C'Jln':'I'lItlllin's of Ill<' Pilols Assor-intion, .111\11 IIthc'I'H who

han' hC'c'n crit ieul of tllll situation lIH well liS I'C'JlI'C'"C'lltllli\'C'lI

(mill ill.lust I'Y nud till' uu-dienl profession who w:r. nnd

who wOIII.1 lWI'ioIlSI)' hlllll!'C'I·ll.l if t!", of t!Wh...• pl'nllIWI:; were scw('!"('l," curluiled.' In ndrlifinn, WI! Ill('t with I1\PI'NiC'llllltiwR

uf IIII' Elll,il'()lIl1wlltlll Protvct iou .\gc'IH'\' (Ell.\) who 111'1' l'OIlI'C'I'IlI'cl

till' #:IH1CW:1I PI'Ot.1c!IIlS of p0}llllnlioil exposure to iOllhdll;.! rndin11011.

0111' porsou,

n Willi of tho opillioll thut tlU' f;hi!IIIlNII of

nil l·u.liolu·1 ive mnn-rju], ilwlllClin:r 11ll'c1ic'nl ho

)lrohihill'cl {mil) nil'1illC' Ilns!'\I'III!('j· 1I1l1('ss 111(' IIlC'llil':11 pmrl's.

f;iull clC·1II0Ilst"l\lc,.1 pronf In his l;nlic;f:u'lill/l Ihllt wC"'C' ns

esscul iiiI ns Iltei I' inc'I'(,llsiIIg III ili1.ntinll wnll1c1 SIIl!;.!('sl••\ /lolh('r PI'I't!CIIl

illll'I'\'il'wc'd,

n l'ioln;"dst, thnt IhI' flllllltioll to thC' 111'01111'1\1

sholll.l ll'ft. to tllC' 1'1Ihlil': that 110 h'c'hllil'lll 0\' sl'iI'1I1 ilil' of

('xllC'l·ts h"s th(' tn I]C'lc'l'Illill(, whllt lc'whl of llllllllUlHl(' l'Illliatinll

is 1I1·1·"I"nl.l(' 10 tIll' pulllil·.•\II11thl"·s wilh whom wC' rOllfl'I'l'C'll,

llizl'Cl IhC' 1l1'1·('ssil.... to Il!;C' selll'lllllc'c1 J)nSSl'Il;:!I'I' ail'('/'llfl. nt Ie'nsf. {OJ'

SO'IlP slIIIl't eli "C'I1 I'll clioisotopc·s. CIt!t('I'Wisc' Wl' wCllIlll tlC'llI'in' flOIl\"

nl'('nA

of til(' I·..llnll·\, of all C'tTI'diw Ilia;:!lIoslil' nllll tlll'I':l!,l'lItit' nll'llil'lIl 1001

nncl Ihp 111'1·,1'10 adopl ('1I(o...·c·alll.. As mi!!hl he

PXIWrll'll. fhl'l'(, \\"1'1'1' Iliwr:!I'llt "iC'wpoillls ItS 10 whnt.• if nlly nl1l1i- .

I iOlla1 ....sll'ic·lions 01' Iilllitnticl/ll'l sholl 111 1m pIIIC'C'ci nil the- nncl

fllllllllllls of l'nllioltrlh'(' lllalc'l'i:t1 pt'I'lllitfNI 011 nil'rl':lft. Tn n

fl'\\' illslnlle('!!. ImowlC'llgl·al.ll· !'(,,,SOIlS \\,('1'1' of thl' opillion 110 rhnlllr('s

\\"(',.(' nN'('ssal'y to Iu'('sc'nl ..\RC nnd nOT l'C'#!'lIlllti(l1\ll. n" nnd tJlP 1'01l1lC'IlSlIS wt\s'Ihnt

n mom rOlls('I'\-nth·" np)ll'ol\('h

hr. nc1optl'Il fOI' th.. Jllhll'(, allcl thnt gl'C'ntC'l' 1·"c:tl'iC'fiolls thnn

h('J'{·tofol'(, 111111111111('11 h)' nOT lind AEC WI'I'e? 1IC·C'C1PIJ. Th"S(' rhnn:!I's

nrl' cnnsiclm,C'.1 lll'I'('SSlll'Y (111(' to th(' illl'l'C'llsillg 1I111ll1,('I' of shillnlC.'nts

nnd thC' 1II0llnt i C'\'icli'/U'" Ihnt poplllal ion FlIt'1IhI II('. I,l'l't

ns low fiS pl'lwtil'llhl" hC"'lIl1SI' or Ihll l'if:)';S o.f :!c'llC'lit' llIHI

sOlllatiC' Ilallla;!c' that )'c,JIIII' to thC' nl'rlllllll1:IINl

Tt shollld h(' Iwtpcl thllt whill' Ih(' »nl1l'l WflR in Ihl' !H'oC'('s,c; of ('onsidl·,'ill!! this lllllltC',·. 1\1111 flll'/lIlI1i1.illf! its 1·('rol\l/llI',ulntionR. thp

AEO

011 .TIII\' :\Il, 1!l;4, fOI'lIlHlh' suhmitted 10 Ihp. FAA ,'c'(,OIiHlwn<1ntions

fn:' ,·c·"isi/I)! 11I'I'sC'nt l'l':rlllll'tioIlS ;!o\'('I'ninl! tJl(' h'n ll!'pOl,tllt!ion (If 'l'II(lio- .

nl'lin' /lIlltl'rilll in pns,'wngcr nil·cI·nft. whil·h nl'(' mOJ'C' 1'('sfI'irtirc thHn'

1·('!:!1I1fitions. 'fhl' pnnel hns rcwiew('(1 nnd l'onsil1c'l'Nl tho"Ol'erOIllIIlC'wll1tions in nl'l'il-iug at Ihe rec!Jmmenoations contnined in, this

.' . '.. • '. "1 • _ •

-'-S-(YO-A-P.-'''-1ll1hi

A tor. lilt ot anel ora.nllatlonl :....·hh whom the

conr.rred, •... . • .••.• ,' • ..... ." I.'. I

'.

.\

.'

I

..'

,

I. 
,

, 5

It was nll\'iolls 10 tht' plllwl thnt 'With IIl1mhel's of I'}ulio· .

ncth'(\ 1H1Itt.>ri1l1 fihiJlIllt'llts, 200 millil'em 1'('1' h01l1' at. the amrflwc' too hiA'h lind should hI' s{'t' nt n 10w('1' limit. t.!LlI\'Of('rt..UIc...cllrltQ..

1'nlllll" ... who 10:1111\11(1111 Q!u1lhe "hipmellts, Hilllilarly'tlw pnne) COIIclllfl",l thnt, 10 1 -to millia'..lIl 1'1'1' hOlll' Ilt. :If(,.. not ns low n8

)))'n"ti.'lIhh· nllil should ho ]owel'c·t1 fc)J' th .. hcftl'l' Pl'OtNltion of pllSsellgt'1'3 lind ('I'!'\\,. It. waS ('l'(IIolly oll\'iolls thnt. whnt, mny hI' liS low ns

p"l\l'ti.'nhh' fIll' l'h'iJinll n\leIl'lll' PIlWCl' plllllts-I.hc £) millil'cm P('l!

)'{'nl'-is not 111'nctit'llllle fill' shipping I'nlliol\rth'e mntel'illl nnd tho

Rnml' !ruitIt· lilllit. 1II1l\' nut· he IIppl'opl'illll' in th.. t1'nnfip0l'tlltiull '. j 1IC1ust1'\',' I'

In nttt.>lIllll illl! to fOl'mlllllt(' its 1'I'('OIllIllI"lCll1tion. thei )lllnel was

l"'Iif11.'ll l)1'illllH'il" hv t\\'o lie\, ,il'1U'1'1I1 1ll'i!lt'hlll'S cOlltnhwcl in the

Nm'('llIll1'" 1 j'I'JlOI't of th ..'A,] ('ommittee on Ihe ni010lticn1

Effects of IOllizint,! Hll(lintions (Inan rl.'JlOl't) : , (,,) Xo (·XpOSIIl'l.' to ioni1.illj!I'Ilcliation shollld he )lermitttltl without "xllC'C'lntioll of 1\ COnll1l('nSIll'lIt(' hC'IIcfit.

(b) The plIhliC' mUfit hl\ prot..ctf'(l fl'om rndintion hut not. to t.be

extent that, the of protcction provided reslllts in th" Rubfilltntion

0 f Il won;l\ linl\I'll fOl' tho rnllintlon nvoic1"cl,

Ar1(lit ion-

nlly, thN'C' IlhCluM not, I", IIltt'lIIlltr(1 t

CW('I1 flll'II"'I' lit, tim o( InI'j!" NIIIIIH 

wiltt,. 'wulIIII c'l('nl'ly III'nlhlC't. J!I'c·nt..., 

It. WIIS' lIoh'cl Ihat, in 1'('I'('lIt, hl'llI'i

of 1hu

n ('unllllt'I'I'O CUll 1111 iUI·t·, l't'f'U

hun tho flhiJlllltmt, ur nil 1'llIliolll'li\'C. illntc

hlC'lluli"I! shlll't-Ii\'C,cI rillUO/lhlll'IIU\c'I'1Itil'lI 1

Olle witness nt,lIH1s(' IIC'II/'illj!s.

u 

71i pC'I'c"·III. IIf IlI1 III1'c1i('nl iso'ul't· IIst'cl \\'I

IIm\'(,,',.,\ II",clic'nl,lm'tol's, 

of nuvlvnr 1II1'IIit'illl·. poinl. In ,hc' 

('111'1)' c1inl:llosis of Hc·,'ioIlS elis"lIsc's with 

•\C"'fll'llillA' til Ihn Hoc·il·t)' of 1\JI

flnlil'lIl ont of every tlm'c! mhnitted In Iwsp

fillillj! from tht, IlKI' of IIlt'cli,'al isotol"'S, p

!t!('llIltltilllll.Unlll which has II hnlf-Ii fc' of fI 

IfI'odllt'!' of III0 I\,hd"11IIIII,IIII, The Inllt'" h

. Hospitnls Ihat n'l'e lIot ill tlH' illllllC'llinle ure

8l1pplil'I' /II1ISI, t"{'il' 0\\'11 tC'l'hllc'l iu

Oil I-!C'III'I'llIfll':'l,

Al'(,OI'IIiIlj! to lilt' .:\1';('.11 lIIujol'il')' of ull 

pu/'telI II}' 11 iI'l'l'lI ft is'tht· j'lIel ioplll

Ill) 111111 tilt' flllly 1)I'III'li.'al \\'11)' of ITll

to IlInllV 1I1'('IIS of Ihl' ('milltl)' IS st'lH'e

fiOI\ll'\\,lillt SilllHlII' l'illllliioll )WI'tllillR to sl

(1:1,2 hI',) 1111111-1:11 (H cllI,\'s)! ('OIllPOIll'lIts 

f(JI' hoth IIIt'l'lI p""1 IIl1d di:l;!'IIlI!'til' l"lI'pUS

111m thc shipllll'/It, of 1111 "II,liolll'tin' 

(,I'llft \\'ollld ill ('lI't'I't d"lwin' si;.!11 ilkll lit ;!I'flA

of thl' IIsn of t.lIl'!"! illlpOl'llIlIt 1II1dl'II

it \0111<1 fOl'l'o Iho 11I('(1i('lIl pl'o(,'s:lioll to s

topt's, liS f(U' exulJlplcl Iodille ]:n fcH' lodil

rlllltly rucliatiull I'XPOSIII'l'S to till! pl

h.. fl'Ol/I shi

hy ;IlI'('I'nft 1IIII'tll.'IIII1"'y [01' t1

)lllti..IIls bl·i/l;.t SI!I'\'ic('cl. Tlw qll..slioll is to \

fits 0 \\'iIh tht> \litelI'sil'lIIIIt· l'

1l1l!1 IJc'illg (·xJUlst'cI tu III I.litiU

SI'II)lIII'lItR

It, SIWlllf] he 1I0t('d tlmt ](,\'(·Is of l'IH1intioll 

I>ndmj!c,g ()( 1'111linllC'l in' Illn h'l'illl ill II'llliSit ('1

lihidiliIIj! is Jl111('('(1 Iwt\\'('1'11 IIIIl I'llIlilltion 

111111 lIil'lilw c'lIIplo)"C'I'S, Adllition:II shi,·ldil

nlld t""'11 ('Ii/llillllh'! fc)I' 1111 Jl"III'lil'lll plll'pOS

tioll ('xtc'I',ull to the l'ndiullC'l in· IIl/ltl'l"l1l pnl

shid,lill;! illl'n'lIsl's 1I1111l'II11S1'S In

with 1II000illA' 1I('n,',\' pllC'kllgl's.lInd 1'('SlIlIlI 

. )}J'odll('t. which ill the ill thl' 

will !Jo bOl'Il0 !Jy tho plltit'll" It !J('C'OIl f'" 

lit whnt l' . I es IIclc1l'c) ,'nsts nssol'intc·tl W

ing 1\1'0 C!xc'pssi"'Lnlld 1I0t. ('omm<'lISIIl'n

0 WIt 

tho HEIR rcport points alit"••• thcl'O 

, .

'.

4 .

lIT. n,\SlR 01"

IevelsfI' ton mlllhvm pm'elny or.IiOO milllrem i-cl' w('('k ",llic'"

l'Cwnlllllll'llClml h\'lht. Aeh'isctl'y ('U1l1lllilhlt· fill .x-UIlY "'ItI Itiulilllll, tho

1II'l'(h·('I·s,"OI' 10 ·tht· COIllu'i1 on HIlc1i"tic)n PI'otcw(.ion IUle1

..nt (NC It). Hil\l'uthen, the N('U P, tho Interuntiouu! Cum· .

mission em Hlulioluj!ie',,1 P,'ot"l,tion (ICUP). tho

AI';C, nnd th.. }··..cl·

('1'111 Hiulialillll ('eHlllc'il (It'I{C) huvo lowered those ]"\'llIH hy Il fl"'t.CII'

of 5 for m"'lIpal inunl WOdH'I'S, lind hy II Iurtor of lin for fIlClivic1l1u)

)I\I'IIII"'I':'Iur Ihl' puhlie,

_\i till, rim.. lhl' 1'1'j!lIll1lionR W('I'(l flrst

h

oill:.! fOI'1l\1I1I1h'c1 in tnn, pnsS('lIl-!l'I' uhlinc trnusportntinn wns 1I0t IlS ('UIllIIIOIIIlS it. is tuclay nml tho

priueipul C'OIW"I'n WIIS lint. rudiutiou "XpOSI11'C' to and crew

but pl'..vent ion of exposure to Hllclc\'l'lopl'lll'hotu;!l'IIphin film. to more

thun 1-1 lIlillil't'lll per hour nt, a distnuee of:lO fc,..t. in linch n8

'tit" ))('-:\UI' LII('ldll'c'.\ LlltI,!};IIII', '

:-;i,ll'" th,' Xut iounl HI's";I/'I'h Coulid I fil'l'it, 1II1111e ita l'I'('Ollllllt'lI,ln-'

tiflllS lIl'ill;! t h« Alh'isurv ('ulllll1iltc,t, Oil X-I'Il,l' IIIIII Hiulillli,'

J!lIilll•• 1l1C' FW' 111111 tho ,\ iiI mldition to fil'l Iillj! 1Il00'C' ennsorvutive

C'XpOSIIJ'(' 1..\'('ls ffll' Ol,'l'l\Ilnl iOllnl wO/'lwl's nllll tltc' plllllil', ItllV,. I\clopt(',l

thn "liS lo\\' IlS JlI'lwlif'nhlt,!1 pl'iall'iplt· to C'OIl(OI'1II wilh t.JlIl C"I11-

('ept Iltnt ""C'1l th(' flli:!lttf'NI' alllOlll\t or I'lulillliem ('lin lit' cX-,

IWI'It'" 'n .10 Ihllllll!!I' 111111 11C'1I1'0 Il ItU/IIlIll Iwilll! NlwlIllI not. he

to llll\' I'atlial iOll, Tllp. 1'1'I'C'lIt HI'Jlfll't. of lite A,l\,i:-;OI'Y ('ommillt:l' 011 tltc BioloJ!ic'lll Ett'l'ds of ]onbdlll-! H;H1intiolls ofthe

Xatiolllli 1:"::;I'III'I,1t CllIllwil Imll the Klltional .\"Il(ll'llI\' of Sci('/IC'''s I\lso

to lIlI,ll f;tI'OIIj!I,r SlIJlPOl'tS tilt' ('UlIl'I'pt of t!xpOSIII'es

ns low JlI'ndlC'ahlt·, .\ltholllrll hns pl'oposell Il of ti

millin'lII pl'l' ,rl'II" liS hpillj! lUI lo\\' I1S lu'al"til.'llhlo f()l'limitillA' l'Ildint.ion

to I!Ill gl'IIl'm1 Jlllhlir fOJ' ('1I111('1I!t, fl'om pl'C'ROIII civiliau nudelll' power

)l18I1tS. 110 SIlI'h hnsTi','clI ()I'lImlnted fol' ('ommon Cl\l'I'iCl' ship.

nWllts of 1':u1 iOlwth',! IIIllt('l'illl,
'tJ

!.lll· '·t>:!:wti:m nf RmAU rlsks even fiii'th,'" lit tho l'flSf. or iur".ra sumM of JlIUllt.V thnt: ~n"nt oth('I'wiAA , nul.1 ,.1•• 111· ..• ' n.I 1 11 •. " - .,_ " , - ,.. . . Thi. iliain ijj('I't'IlRC in (·u:>!. however wmil,l ()1:1'1lI' from •he need for the phlll'IIlIU'I'UI ieal SlIpplit'l' to 1III1k(~ major dUIIl""s in its production

]jll'~ 10 llt'C'1I11111l011Illt~' he IWII\'it'l: 1I11d 111I'gt'l' shipl:i'lIg '·lllikR. That IU'('II IIloll:! with ,h,· 1IC"t'~sity tn 11,'si~n uml numufueturu tho

lIC~\\' cnsks would {'utnil ill('I"'USt'tlc'olits 1lIlIllI'lIlhium. TIlt' pntwi 1"III'Ill'cl (1'011I its \'iliils IIlId ,lil"l·lls.o;ioIlH with till' nueleur phlll'llIl1(·tHltic·1I1 ialtlusll')', thnt 11('(':1111'1' tilt' illllll::,tl')' hI I"lIpilll.v dt'\'I~lopillg 11ll11Il"il'l, ,·llllllging', 1)1'0- .liii'tiiiii "iliiipiiIC'lIi iii lK'ill~ ch'pl',~c'illi(!(i ill shlll·l. Jll'l'i(l(is of tu r. )'eUI'H. .En'lI without new 11\01" SII'ill;!c~lIt n'gllial illlll".ll'I'llIlit·1l1 illll)J'0\'eilJ(~lIt8 Illhll'U1Ulll'Iilillll is l'lIllSin;! t"lu~ suppliers to Ii IIIit, tho l\l',c'{ullif'l of much (If ,I...ir )ll'Ocllletiol\ ('lilliplllt'llt 10 ll'~'i than 5 ~'l·ltrs. .

A 1"'1'1'111 :;tlld.\· h.\' I}j.• OClI'c11I1\ Hrownell, Pmfc's."IClI', P('plIl·tml,"t of !\Ill'it'll I' EII;!i1U'l'I·jII;!. :\1 I'I', I~U 1t'lIlUIt'H till' \'IU'.\· ill

g dollh I' ('Olit iJ1(~I"'nSl'lJ mNll'iail'cl wit 11

lowl!l'ill~ lilt' 1'('1'111 i~liillll' I'IU!i1ltion 1'11I111III t ill~ Irom pll"lw;!I'S of 1'lIlli()adin~ mutcrinl hy IIWIlIIS of IIddillg' increusiug numunts uf :ihit'ltlill;!.= TIlt' Brownell 1~J101·t

('Olll'llUll~ll thnt uno could, II,\' atlclill~ It':ul ~lIil'lclilll!. 100\'(w the '1'1 (Mil1il'l'lII~ )IN' hOlll'ut,:' fC'I't) frmu tlu- pl'es('ut.·I1111 xiIII11I11 of 10 down to 1 hilt. in thl~

l'Il~C of Ihn lal';!o !iUll IIli11iclII'il' U1o;,}'hth'IUIIII-!J!) ~t'IWl'I\tUl'S a .his would IIClll'1y (lUllhi"

•Ill' t'lI:-it of fihippillg. lIUWI'\'CI', shippin:! COS'H l'l'IH'I'Sl'Ut 11 VCI'Y slllnll JlOI·tion of the t.otal ('ost of this pl'llltnd to tllll plltiIllIIH-llPJll'oxillln'ely 1011 pat il'J1'S 01' 11I01'l~ Ilm tl'I'alt'll from olle !iOC) 1I1illielll'ic geuel'lltol·.

A I10II LJIi II;! of tho lilt ippi II~ cost wOll1l1 l'~JlI·I!SI·"t. upPl'oxillllltcly 25 ('c'II1 s to iii) Cl.'nts per paticnt whose Lilt is t1sllan~, UUOllt $100 per tre:ltllll'lIt.

IV. J>ISCUSS10X OF FIXJH~GSAxn

nl'~CO~E\II<~NDATI0NS

A. l)t:Ic')I1I't'IIII.F. R,\llIA'I'WN LE\'v.r. '1'0 Ann.na; PASSRSOV.ICS AND CREW Dn: TO SIIU')U:ST OJ!' n.\II1I1ACT1\·E M,\·!·t:mAJ; IX CAIIOO SPACI':S

OlJ.~(!I'I·atiOIl.·

Thl' l)J'esellt 6tllllthmts pm'mit pnsKl'ngl'l1J of U.S. cOIllIlll'!l'cil\1 nh'- cmft tu 1'1'1'I,inl 1\ IIl1lxilll\llll I'utlinliOIl IlflSlI 1'lItu uf ]1) lIIiUir(tlll PCI' hO\ll' itt. thc 'pnssl'n~c'l' l'UIII1)l1l'IIIICllt finO!' lC):d. This fitllllthll'd WIlS nl'l'in'ctnt m'l'I' l\Wlltj' ,"CUI'S ngo 011 th;;"lllISiH Ihnt it wOlllel hllllnlil,cly iOI' 1111\' olle iluli\'itlunl of the O\'lll'llll lUi. po)llllaition tn 1I11lJ,;e 1l10l'C than lillC (II' two !Ii;!hts plil' )""111'. 011 this Imsis the 10 millh'l'lIl pel' hOIlI' WIiS I'stllhlishl'(l JIlol'e Oil it1J p(lssihle ellh,t 011 phOtll~l':lphil~ IJlm whit," Illight IIc 011 the nil'('mft thall its pos:;;ilJhl ell'l~ct nn lll'ople. Tho pallcl 1'llIlSidc!l's that the 1Il1llillil'l'II1 ,lcl' hlllll' IlJlownhle mtc is tou hi::h IIl1d shollld be 1'l'Ihll'Cll. In c'sl ahlis cill;{ the Ill'\\' mtll it must' be IIS,,"I1I1'" Ihat. n. hU'go lind illcl'l~nsill;! sl'glllcnt of the pO}lulntion will lie lISill~ ('onullcl'eial nil'cl'llft fOI' puhlic tmnspol'tnl.lOn nnd thn.t a SII),st..III inl number of them will he mnldng l1lUOl~I'OUS flights pel' yelll',

• h""a"1 (I" II,,· ('IIMI "' l'lllllllllll~ 1III.IIIIIIII'lrlllllr'·IIIII·III" flll,il;III,," I"'\',·I~--.\ .., "lIr)'II'1: II... I'III'kllIll' 1':1I1I'rllnl I'h. r'· ....rl In tI", (J.~, A'"IIIII' 1':111"1:)' C~"IIlIllI""11I1I by 011,,111\1 I•. Ilro\\'IIt'Il, l.llhu"II"')·. II" ,'1'.." .....1'. 11"1'1, u, ~Il"I"lIr 1·:II;;III.·.·rllll:. :Ill'!', III1lI lIil"lI'lflr. I'h),..h·" 1l.....·lIrrh I·h. 11., 1I'·"·,lft·" :lI,IM".... hll",·Il.. e:"II"rlll """1'"111, willi Ihl! ,\ ....1..111111'" 0' John A, Curr,·lIn.

JIII~'

l··..llolv, !'h),..lell )t" ..,'n,e1, I.llborlllor)', :lIIIIIKllehIlHeUH Oellerlll IlOllJlllal-

,.. llli",

by•raoJl"l"h;arlllae,'ulIeal 'l'h., :11111 1II1111&'lIrlo genernlor toda, I. tho lar,ellt Mlled unit belD, produced and .blpped produeerll.

"

I'

I

7

COIIRU•1"I"hnn •. must 1\1 I • ItO tfI ~I\'t'" t •

n nit',.

"." !

who nl'l! 111111 will ('ontillll(' SI'I'IJ(lill~ III1lUy h

8('III-tCi' ('11mI'llI" 1I1t'lIt of CCllIIIIII'I'Cilll l\h't'I·.Rf

pilols 1I11c1 ,'I'l'W 1II('mUt'I'S Jllll·lIIl1J1y. ~llIll~

forwurd 1I1'I'a 1I1'~ much less 1111'('1'1 t'll Ill' mil 11

tht, 11lIl!gu;Il' ('U1l1plll'tllll'lIt" 'nurl thlls 'wollid 

IU·I·,'ptlllill· .In,.;., mIll ('slllhlisill'd ftll' the 1'1ISS

TIlt' 1':111..1 l'Ullfiilll'I"'tl lit

l('Il~lh

tlt~ 1!l'h

mdillti;::; do,",e nitc (Ul' Pll!'SC'II~!'I'S IIIHI /ligh

puuel 1I;.!I·C'I'cl flint. 10 IlIillin'lIl per hOIlI' \\'I

11I·('[·ptlll,II·. IIm\'('\'('I', on the otlu-r Iuuul, it W

Iishimr 1\ level u( tl,lmillil,t'1lI 111'1' hour woul

I · "" f I'" , I I 8 

IIJl!"dlt. () 1'111 IOlll'tt\:~ lIIutl'l'lll Iy !Il\S~t'

CiiilSi(lc,,'s, 1111' I'C'llSOIlS discussed 1'lsewht'I'c JIl 

nil nvorull 1I1'1l1'lit 1\11<1 l'ClllliI'('IIIl'lIt that l'IHl

)1I1'1j' fol' 1I1l'llil~1I1 }>lIl'pOHI'S be .permitted to 

nil'('I'nft IIl1d thllt tlll'I'O is 110 reasonahlo nlternn

Rr.r.ommemltltioll.·

'. With l'I';!III'(1 to t.he j'~~I'lllilisillle level of l

whllt. is "liS low liS l!I'ucd,(.'nhlc·' WIIS I"\'iewe,1 

('tmsi<!I'I'nt iOll8111'IWlollslr tIiSl·IIHSI'11. HlIsl'<! 0

COJllii&lc'l'S thllt. t II' IIpplit,illlle l'I';IIIJutioIlS 511011

l'luliu'ioll ('Xl'nSlIl'l\ ttl Ilil'(,l·nfl. Jlassenl!l'I's IIIU

houl' lit IhI' floll!, ·Jerel. This lillli. WIIS sl,I('('let

1.

H JS ill 1'(Il1flll'lIlalll't' with Ihe ('OW'I'pt of 

. 'If jl. i~ lIssulllI'd that lla" lIIaxilllllllllllllllllllt uf 

IIIt·IIIIIc·I' is tmlljl'l,t, In SllI'h I'u<!illt ion wOllld lll

frll' 50 wI'l'ks II )'l'lll", tht'll that Jll'l'son wOIII,1 I

em I'll! lo\n·I'c'xIl'clllith.~s.lf h'ulI!\lntt!lllo tlllllllO

of the bOil.\-' this dosage woulIl bo in Ihl' ol'l

)'('al'-1I li:,rI1l'l' gl'I\I'J:lllly 1I(,I'C'II"'" n~__ III~!ng:_I!

('IlUse II Ilelt'l·t:llcll~ 1~1l1'('t u'ii tlih1mWlllll bOlh'. 1

not lI!rpii;;t,;II;;;I:ui'rcfli1tiTii!iitSciirry-i:;'II)ioa

in those tllllt llo,n','\, flm' of the pa;;sl'llglll' S

the IU'{'II whc'I'" 1'llllioll;'1 inoIlIntl'rilll IS slowl'c!.

2, OntO Ilcillinl lll 1ll'1"1lI1I1' is in l'nllflH'IIII\ll('~ w

F(',lcl'Ill J:c'~lIluti()us (Titlt! 10. PUlt ~(I, .Alollli<

whh·h

d..lilll's,JlI'I'llIissil,lll I"\'els nf 1'lIdiatilllJ in 

(ft) J:lldi:,tioll 11'\'(,18 whirh. if lUI illdh'i

))I'1'5t'nt in the 1I1'l'U, conltl l'l!sillt in his I'e

of t\\'o l1IilliJ'I'llIs in llllV one hlllll" 01'

eb) J:nlliut iOIl 1,,\'el'8 "'hil'h, if Illl it1l1h'

)1I'(,51'lIt in the nl'en, n. dose in cxr('ss of 100 

l'onsl'l.'uth'c dn,}·s. •

'J'his 1'l'~il)ntioH flll·thl"· (11'Ones It "Rndiation 

C'l'ssi"lo to }>('I'SOnllct, in which thel'e exists rlu

wholt! 01' in Pll.l·t within licensed mntel'inIt nt sU

))Ol'tioll of tho body could receive ill any ono h

miJlil'ems. . li millit'l'ms, or in Ilny li consccutive days a 

, '

I
'8" Table 1,

I R.qulrel vehicl. plac.rdin,. crltl, l.b.1 m.ndatOl' for ••, Rilil. c

(173.389B),reilldlus 01 dose III. I.vel,,)

o

C, UF.DUC1X(1 'I'IIFo RIKltK OF n.\oI.\·I·lU

CU"'T.Ul

Obsel'/'aliol/, ..

UmlCl' 1>1'es£'nt DOl' Ilnc] l'('g'llintion

be tl·l\nspol·t.cd by common cRl'ricl', includ

tho shipll.ll'ntsconfol'm t!> spccific J!lIIitlltion

of mn.tcl'lll.l, and to speclficnUy dcslgned pn

TABLE 1.-ItADIOACTlVE MATERIAL CATEGORIE

II. MR/II/l

la_.1

R.diD.dlve-WhiC, I .. R.diolcli_y.llow II .. 111 1 .

ClI••or,

I

IIIII

O(·C·u )l1tiolUll l'('c·c·il'Nt hy fh(! rnl'g

• ClIIl JlIlC \11I (iililtlll'Rl' )'lu\icnuwlj,I('H. 'I'hiR 

thc' p('I·mittl·cL!!II\·r!'n'...!J.O

nc·tlm 1II1I1'\I'inl, 'I'hl' ('XPOSIII'C' rute 101' stcw

tho is uhout t he f:1I11l1' us thnt l'I'(,l

SI·Il:!C'I'S. TIm pilots lind the other' lIi:!ht. crow 

anllidc'lI11y rlistnnt [rmu the eompn

contr'ihutes ('ssl'lItinlly no rudintion to those 

Ilecom melltl,,1lo11,...

1, )II llI·tlC'!· to the muxiuuun rate 

ceived I"v 1"Il'lS('II:rl!I'S nud crew of plIl':'lC'I)l'!

proxirnute

Y J lIIilliJ'I'1II pel' hour thl' pn1lC'I 1

a, 'I'ho trausport index ('1'1) limit 

fl'wu.lUlo..L-

.b. 'I'h« trunsport indic'I's fll'l·ll1it.tl·t] 

uirern ft. 1'('II"c'('(1 fl'UlII rIo. The pnne

proximutely will' sot, hOWI"'I'I' it 1'1'('OI

AEC clc·h·.:lIIillc\ such level in to 

hour liuut to J)US!iI'III!('I'S,

(!, Tho nulionerivo padml!es.of ("nfl';!O

011 Ihl\ Iloor nf 11 eompurtmeut 

slIllU Itl uot Ill'stnckcd ),

.2. ]1\ (m\c'I' tu 1'('(11\('1' tho occupntionnl rm

Lv ah-line omployoos who hUllcll(' the plu'knl!

the pun,,1 1'('('OllllIWlIds tlUlt. Ihl' pl"'SI'nt mnx

20n millil·(·m pN' hO\ll' nt the SlIrfIU·t\ of Jllu

rNhll'('(l h\'. 2[1% to i)()%. The pllll('1 hl·)j"\·I's 

n limit h0l.\.!J'ihulIld 

nH·lIiIs. that the])01' lllUl AEC detl'l'Il1illc th

.within thosc limits, 

I

,

8 , .

, 'I, It is eonsidered fonsihlu and I'CItSOllllhlc to IlJ)ply this more 1'('!Ch·i,.-

tive level insofur us Ilia shipment of rndionetive

Tho panel ill\'l'H!i:!ah'd, (·'TI·,·t;.....9f l'c',hlC'in" tIll' "'1'lIml )o1·t.. lm,kL ..

achieve UIlR oven t I 1Il.1'I'l'aSl'tl sillclchn;.c ,

wOllIiTUe l'Ei'JlT1YcT\dl18111l fiil'lI onuses n wI'lght, JIll'reIIse IIIUI ultimutely results in lIi;.{hel· shipping costs, it. iN coiiclurlod thnt it eun he '

UOHC with 1\ relatively smull increase in cost to the ult imute COUSlIlIlm..

H, )[nIHI/IlW J'ION IX Ih:om,.\·I·WXH 1·'011 Tim RIIIl,:\(r.XT

,w 1:.\IIIOo\<:Tl\'!': :\[.\'I'.:IIIAI, 11\' ,'\11:1'11,\1''1' 'I'll Ib:- , 111'1'1·: I'll l\h::\llllmH OF 'I'Jm PUIU,W ANn Ttl OC('Ulwrum.\L

'VOIlI\.l·:mi

.\s previously indientod, lhu levels of rmlintiou permitted

hv 1)I'l'sent l'1':!nlut ions (01' Ihe sh iPI1H'lIt. C) r rudioucl ive muteriula hy

l'lIl'l'ying lIit·I:I'I\(t. IU'C hIlfIC'c1 on WI'.\' 1'"I'l,Y rmlintien PJ'Ot('ct.ion standards thnt. hnve 101lt! since been outrlnted, Thl'Y nre insufllcicurlv rouservative in tcWIIIS oI: IH'I'S"lIt rndiut.ion pl'oll·(·tion stuudnrds,

FlII'thl'l'IIIOI'C, U vnst umuunt. of l'NII'ul'rh rlutn hns nC'{'umlllntl'd over

tht' pnst three decndos whieh stromrly SIl:!:,!C'sts thnt, rOIlIl'IlI'Y to ('nl'ly

('011('1'1'11'1. there is no sllfu threshohl rndiution (losc' helow which there

no c'ollsc'C\llt'lltinlnltliation dllllla:!c: thnt.Iho risle of rnrlintion dum1I;!I' SIH'h liS l'IIIH't'I' incllll'fioll 01' IIInlflll'lIIl1tious illc'I'('ast's 11I1)1'0

01' h·i's HIll'al,l\' with H,c populatioll 'l'OClilY thel'e

11m fill' '1IH'lIIhl'I'S of pllll1ic' I'X posl'd to l'l\llilltion f 1:0111 the

shipIIlC'II1 of mdioIH·ti\'e \lInlN'inl thnll \\"hl'u t.hl' 1)J'C'f:('lIt

l'I';!1I1atiolls ,,"pre C'stahlislwd. This IIlIS ('01111' IIhont h(\('nllscthC'l'c hns

I,,'('n nn inc'l'C'asC' h.r cwclC'l's of holh in tlll' nUlIlhC'l' of pnc:klI,!!e'S of l'lHliO:ll'ti\'(' lIIalm'illl shippN) lay pnssclurel' nil'emit nuc] in the

Jllllllhc'I' of t.I'Il\·I'lin;.{ hy nit·el'nft.. .

pl·clsellt. praetic'l'S ill thl' shiJlJlwut of l'lu}ionrtiw lllnt(,l'inls hy

PlIl'iSI'II;!C'I' l,'al'loyin,!! nil'ernfl. pC'l'llIit. pnssC'nrf.'I'S to )'ereh'('

n maximum

.-XpOSIIJ'(\ of nhollt. 10 millil'I'1Il 1let· hOll\·. This is (I.('('omplisllC'd 1lrimadly hy lilllitill:! tIll' tJ'allSllCll't inl1ex of (III)' pllrkn,!!C! to no Ihnn

10 ('1'1=10), nn lIPlwl·)jmit. of trallsporl illclil'('f' 011 nil\' one pnsS('II:!I')' ail'c'l'lln:of no mOl'e thnh aO (total TT=i'iO) nnrl

that. tlll'l"l' he l'iIlIWill:! of tIll! pllC'knt?:t'B in th(' llll:,!un:,!l' C'nmjllll·tllwllt ill

IIc'c'OI'da1lC:n with minimulIl clistlllIC'l'R lislC'c] ill n tnllle publishC't} ill the !ihippin/,! )'C';!lIlatiollfl, Afl wOl1ld h('(·xpc·t'!£'d. hOWr.\·C'l·, this

nlC'lhod of C'on'Tolltils 11I'C'l1 It·ss 'hnn satisfn('IOI',r !IN'nIlSl' in the I'ush .

of lOllClil1:! paekllgt'S 011 nirC'l'lIft, too oftC'\1 littlc\ nttl'ntion is to

tllC' spac'ill:! niH) fll'pal'ation dist:\lIC'l'S of pllC'kn;!I\S of 1'llIlio:ldi\'t' mllterials ill thl' ,'al·1.!0 ltoldl1. Thl' tlllue1 hl'liC'\'C'i! tllllt. thl'l'l' is uC'(·d hoth to

l'c'clIlC'(' this (}nsC' I'lItC' 0(10 llIi1lil'C'm 1)('1' hOIl\' to nn 1Ii1'line

01' IIIC'lIIh"I' of thl' rl'cw nnd tllC' l'c'f(lIh'('(lloatliufY p1"O('cduro

h," whil'h this enn he nt:c'omp ishecl (i.e., l'lilllinntn ..1.(\ llSC the tnble

fOI' ..iif;ioi.thcpiiclm:r{'s), --

1'hB pl'C'Hl·llt. \'('!!;lIlntions tl'nd to limit O('c'upatiollo) C'xpos\'I'e to nirJiIlA who load nnd uuload the pnelwl!C's of mnteI,jllls on nit'emft by nn uppm'limit of 200 millil'em pel' hou1' nt

the surface of the pnclmgc, The panel believes thoro is need to fuduce
10 '11

• Ala, •• qu,plil, is d.'in.d .s anr qu.nlit, i1•••cnl 0' • "p. 8 qU.ltII"

"h(! t·.vP('S of IU'(\ iii thr- nOT mill "'lfllinUnnM to tll(\ t\'I)('8 nncl nuuut itics of

l'lail'pc'eI mul Ihr. of i ument. t

h.. is dotii;!llt'clln pl'(l\'il1c! unrlor nOl'II1ll1 nnd ueckleut COI1ClitlUllK ill

Hllclio:lC'li\'(lllllltl'l'i:lls 'lI'O cli\'iclNI into two hl'OIHI rl:U;"';I\s: (1)

('illI fon"" whieh is

n solid nuuerlul, 01' mnterlul (,c)llliIlC'll ill

n

hizh illll';!I'it,), cupsulo of hll'l,t mntcrjul, 01111 (:!) "Normul {OI'm"

which IIJ1plic's to 1111 nulionct.ive mntvriuls which Ill'n 1I0t. "sl'l!c'illl

funu." Iorrn nulionctlvo nmtorluls 111'0 clussilled into SI!\'Cln fir nulinuuclide» l.ased lJi·illllLriiy 011 rndintoxicity of tim rmliomu-lirh-s, PackaWl limits {Ol' the seven transport gl'OllpS and "special

fOI'III!'

n1'1\ shown ill Tuhle 2. .

Suml] quuntit.ies of nulionetive materials, certain conC'r.ntl·ntiolls1 small qunntit ies of radiouctive materials in manufactured rroods, I1nd

low specific activity materinls are exempt from paclmgnnd lnbeling,

TA8lE2.-TRANSPORTATION Of RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS-QUANTITY LIMITS AS RUATED TD PACKAGE

REQUIREMENTS

'1',)'1)('

A cl"lllltiti('s of IIl1\tm'.i111s must 00shipJlt'tJ in pncJ,-

";.!l'tl. idc'lItilinlllls 1)'pl1

A ll('signed to Iwe,'ellt. 10f:ls or elisor the 1'IllliollC'th'c t'olltl'nt.s nncl l'l,t1iin shinlcliur,r lUlll

elr,'c,t 1\'1'11I'8S of ot hl'l' Sit fClIt.m'l!s 1II1l1el' 1I0"n1l\ CUllchtlons o'f t1'l1l1!'1'0l't. . .

Qualltities ('XCl'ctliulC T.\'pc

A qnnntith's must shippl1f1 in Type

H I'lu'lilIging, Type

B lllllst hI' c1c!sigllcel tu withstund 11UI'-

lilaI t"llllSpOl't cOllllitiollS' without of C:OlltClltS 01' llhiolllin'J' elJi·

('icIIC'\' allli to SlIlrl'l'IlO mom thnllll. sl'ecili".lloSR or cOllh'nts 01' sti('ld-

(:UkiC'llcr if slIhjedl'd to It spcdliec1 SCII\WlIl'(\ of

tcst <:OIulit:ons. ll"nntitics, excccilillg 'F,)'po

n qllnntitil's,

1I0t \:crmittecl to sh'pl'l'lillholll'd pU8sl'lIt!el·ltll'c"I'Ilft.,

T llotl'S Ihnt tho I'isl,s of 1'l1l1iI\tion l'xposm'c lind its elTnds

unll of l'Il\'i"llIIlll('lltul contnminntion to 111\(1 I:I'OW

(1) with tIll' quantities «,Ill'il's) of shippc'lloll possc!IIget'

l.'lll"',rill;! nil'('I'n ft IlS flpedlil'ct in the shil'pin;.! l'c'glllatiUllll fOl' the "Il"iOilS Tram,pul't Ch'oIlPS ullel (2) ns tJm J'ltllionl'tive hnff life of the

l':\llill!llldic1e illl'l'c'nses fl'ol11 1\ fow clnys or weeks to months 01' )'eul's.

Crr.omm(,lIClatioll "

)',l'('uuse of the desimbility of nll J'nclilltion exposlII'o to

the lowest practicnble lcvel Bnd in considerntion of the cX}lanc1in

g

nllmbcr of nil' shipments of radionctive packages, tho pane recom-

''''('1\1114 thnt the Hhil'l)illl! 1'e;!1I1IltiOlllt lKl lIto

rilic'H (c'\II'ic'H) of l'nlliulIlU'illh'!4 ur '1'1'111114 ,o

1"111'11114 1,1' l'l'lhlC'('cI II\'

u 

thu

Ihl' tilIII'"Il'IIt· 01 CllllllltlfiNllll C'XC'('ss of 

lU'lIgl'l' nircmf't be prohihitr«] if 

tlu rud is lu-t\\'1'1'11 :lU cla,)'s und 

Thu exclusion of shipllWllhl of 

t..,."i;ll;i H nd Iv ! hnse uf 1;:

C'1I1"'Jill;.! ail'c'l'art wnlllcl;.!I'C·ntlr 

to till! IIUlI'l' l'llllilllllll'lillc's such 

IIl1d .\m211 nml. .\m:I] ! etr. .\Isu! it w

of IIC'"II'UII SUU"C'I'K slIl'h liS Ha-B('. PII-HI'

where i'li.lillliclIl risk» uro I-tl'c'ntl'" i hun t

l'lIdiUlllll'lic!c'tlllllll til(' pl'Clhlc'1lI8 nf shi,'ldil

euu be l'l'nlllll\\,hll' clillic-IIIt,

til till' 1'lISI' IIf Ic'alm;.!l' of til<' l'IUIiUlllIl

tulner, thl! risk ilr 

nml uf 1'('!c'lIfiillg qIlIlIlJitic'!i uf 

fumes into the. section uf the 

internnl exposure of t hu PlISSCII#!l'I'S nnd C

ol'clc,' of hy J'I'colllmelltllltiull (1 

of by l'CeClIllIll('lullltioll ('

of lUI yelll's is in ol'lJer liCIt to 

IlIl'lIt. of nuh"',,l thOl'itllll nnd of Jlllh,,',,1 

stllule isotopl'S whose hulf Ih'C's nJll'l'olll'1, i

D. R\l)Ju.,c.,'Tn

06861'1'(11;01/.,'

Unc1l'l' (,lU'I'C\Ut AEG nllcl.DOT 1'l'A"tllnti

fll)' "llIliollC'ti\'o 1I1111lH'illi I() bll mOllitclI'ecl h

thu is with l'IllJintioll 

h'II"l's Ihe f:lC'ilit-r ill whic'h th(l 

.1I11c1ll11ekIlI:Nl tlntil it.IlI'I'i\=I'S ill JIll' IUlIlels 

tlSC'l', Jilt hI! illlc'l'im pl'!'iocl, it. lIlll\' hnn! 1

Illld ni!'plulIl's nlld hunl uc'l'n loaih',lnllci 

11llllll'I'OllS lillie!;,

n 11lulollhI1'c1h' w,,"1l1 IU

)

w"iods of time ill illh'l'illl cUI,;.!(i Ftom;!., f:

ocation to ullothN', lI, thl' 1'llclioadin' ma

))11I'1Ul gc'c1, 01' if, f(U' 1111 r 1"'llflClIl, it Il to 

of Ihis witho;lt. SOIll(\ \·i... sign 

t.hu pu('lml!(', thl' dl'si:m of mos

1'lleJinl\C'tiri,\lIIull'l'ial ;.!OI'S I'JII'Oll;.dl

n 1'1'\'ii'\

nnc1 sullic'h'llt llh:;ul'lllmt '0 "I'l'wnt Jc." knl!C

: . oc'(':J!;ions Wlll'lllllllll!rilll thc' SOUI'C

, or wustl'llJlspol'tell inn posilion olltsicle the 

tiuns of l'llcliatillll pl'Oh'l'tion stnnc1I11'ds.

emll'erll iOl' this pl'qhlcm, l'C!(,l'nll,V ('lllIl

0110 Im'nl Pllul 

mission-ench to r.stllhlish its own pers

mntcrill.1 in transit. Delta Airl

violations in tho last thl'eo yenrs ill whic

T,'1'

A T".8' pack••• peck.,. (cu,ies) (curi.s)

IO-S 20 IXIO" 20 3 , 200

20 200

20 5,000 1,000 50,COO

1,000 50,000

20 5,000

10'1

10" .

10'1

10"

10" 10-1

IS

10-s

E....pl qU.lllilf Transporl,roup: Eump'" (curl..)

• .: Punt,C/:'I .. II: S, Po"' . Ill: .

IV:C", C .

V: ga'es •••••••••• _ .. VI: Noble2151$, ;;n'ollllll.'''01 .

VII: r,'I;ulII-II ••n tor in lun.lnous p.int . 1o,,,,; Co'" '0/ IIdio,lIph" Pu-8••••••••••••••••••••••••
,.

12

)IIWlmJ,.Fl'd nncl nR n. of n conIi/lllin:r fU·t'ic," of minot' lnels, is •f'll illin;.r en hnnc IIc'I'8 10 USI' I'llclilll inn mcmilm,j/ll: c'ClllipJI11'11 I, I.u WI-iry tIlilt, 1111 iI lic'll liS C'I\ 1'1'.\'iII;! I'UC IiCllJl'I i\'(' 11mIt'I'inl Jlll·l·t nt.lhl! lillll' of lu'c'('plIlIlC'C' IIy tllC' II irll 110.

This iuvulves IUlI'xh'llsi\'11 I ruillilll: 11I'U;!I'1l111 10 IIIIalif,V IIl'J'j;onJlI·1 ill Ihn use nrul ClIl'CI of sensitiv« ill:-;II'III11('llls 11l'l'l]lld 10 ucenmIII ish this tusk.Tt ruises It question ns 10 Ilw 1'f1Hl.lIlld duplieution of c.ffort irail ol!wl' ail'1illl'S SllhSl'IIIWlllly follow 0/' uuulo 10 follow tho

snme pruet il'c', TIIil 1I1fll'O '11l1!fil ion is whether Ol' nut,

he pl'lI\,ill!'cllllld mainlnilll'd fell' ull 01(' rndint ion llIollilol'S

that. will III' 1'1'lllIil'l!cl if 1111 nic'HIIl1R 1I11u}lt this IIlflllitol'ing l"'f1('I!lllll'O /lOW hl·ill;! l>1!lIn. '

011 .\pril Wi:!, tho Ii'.\.\ j)uhliHlll'd fl))' 1'0IHIl/I'llt iti the Federal

now inns, whic'h wOIIM IlIIIOIl;! ullu'I' I hillj.!H. roquirn

nh-linu C'UIlIPill/il'S to snrvey hy instl'lIIl11'lllnl ion. lin 1'1l11i1111l'1i\'l' mnterinl nt lillm ii, is l'c!l'l!ind from the shil'I'el' In the' nullo1l('1 ive IIH'nSIII'I'1l1l'1l1 s lire not :II'I'nll'I' Ihu

n whnt. thi' tdliPI'C'I"S clol'lIllwnts

'claim mul a1'1'. within the nOT stnndurds, '1'111\ III'\\' J'I';!1I111liuIlR wonld

also require till' airfiuos 10 S'II'\'C\Y IUlssellj.!(H' nnd c'al'lIo usin:r

I'lHlionC'lin' cll'll'I'Iioll iustrnmonts to 118SIll'(' C'OII1I'Ji'\IW(' with

rndint ion stuudurds, ))1111(\1 hns reviewed und tllk('n illto nC'C'Ollnt

this (l1'01'0sl'd IWW ill the l'c'eOllllll('lICluf iOIlR (,'ol\fnitll'c1 in this

..cpo,'t, .

HI·('c·1I1h,. thl' 'Pulll M(·t,'opolitnl\ Ail']lol't.. CC')lIl-' '.

lIlis"ioll (:HAC). n· 10('al tllIC'lll'y, IISS11Ill(!ll fhc\ I'C'spclllsihilit), fOl' t.ho

of the mc1iolwli\'l' lIlall'I'illl C'OI11illl! thl'lIll#!h nil'po"ts within

ils jlll'isl1il'iion, wl11'Illl'1' 01' olltlI(linlI, 1n pl'adil'l'. tho

is tho ('IIrJ'iI'I' to cln Ihl' tlPtllall11ollilol'illlI, 0111' C'C'Il11'lllmonislalion prC'slll1lahl" ('olllcl Si'I'\,ic(' nil llil'lilll'R withill the MillllC-

:i)lillis.St. Palll .\i!'pOI't, This ,,"ollM FiI'I'IlI Ill'('fl'l,tlhlc' to

hll\'ill;! I'llchnil'1illl' nlllinfllininlI I'Cdlllllll1nl. ('lIpahilit\' nl.

JIOWI'\'I'I', lIa ]0('111 Ill'Sllnw tlw 1'1'sponsl1lilit \' would 1I0t.

Ilppl'al' 10 II" Ihl\ most,lll'simll)(, tlJlpmach is l1onl"iu ('onfol'mil" ",illt Illltiollal 01'

-'rli'll!'llll' panld c'onsic1('I's Ihe IIction Tifl)i;'Jj II Ilncl M.\C to hn

IWOJlI'I'lIl1cl tillll'll'. IJICl IlIllll!1 hns (,OIII'I'I'n l'llll' if l'/\I'h 101'n I II()\' l'I'llII I<'nt.

or nil'lilll' WI'I'{' to Sl't,llp

n system, the 1II1l1titl1icity of l'II1es

uncl I'c';!lllntiollS nl\<1 8tll1111nrds. whiC'h IIIi;.!h t, ('\'l'ntllall)' in

ClifT('I'l'llt HI'l'tions of tIll' llllited Stall'S. wOlllc1 ('nU8C' COil fusion tlnd un-

)l1'(,I'!'!'lll'i)" hinc)('I' Iho illtl'l'statl' trnllsportllt'ion or mllterilll. "'hat is 1l1·1·t1I·cl ift.-ll11 l'fTc'I,th'l' 11111] HttllllllU'llizcd FC'I1C'I'nllll'ogl'llm of l'nfol'el'nhlc rCA'Ulntllllls,

RrroJ//m(!Ilt/"tionY: I

To 1II'I'\'onl the IHlllitiplidty of Stllte nnd Joc'nll'(';!1I1ntions nnd t.he

JlolPlltinl for stnndnl:lls tIS \\"(,11 liS l'I'lrlllntions, thI' Fl'dl'l'lI'l OO\'el'nlllcnt. ShOllld IIf1SnIllO tlll' II 1'('!olllOIlSillil.

it), 101' and tlw ineiclC'ut, to thn tmns- .

llol"tof rndio:lcth'c mntC'l'inl on It )f(,(,lnl'th'l' hasiA, No ]01':,1, St.ato, or .

independent should be porml ('(

0 Ni II ) IS I l'C';.!ulntions which

:\1'0 not in conformnncn with theso Fec1ernl regulntions.

A FedQrnl

llgcncy (some branch of the DOT Sitch as FAA, for example, or tho

::.. ':;,:

,

13

, A Rholllct lin Irh'c'n thn j;IIC'f·ifin rC'Rpo

llncll'C·,'li h' tlll'llI wicll' tn hl

IIlIMIIIIIl1iliiillv thc' 1"('( 1'1'11 .m'('I'nlll

fllllt'Iion pc·,'flll'nll:cl h,V tho Food IIml J>rllA

in;! 1,'c'III'I'1I1 I't:llICllll'cls on IIlI'lIt, RIIII olhc'I

1,'1,111'1'111 TIll' plllll'l 

)'c'I'nIlIIlIC"lllntion will C'lIlllil C'III'C'fll) study 

,tillll Clf a 

1'{'C'O;.!lIhl·S that. there 11m

n limited JllIlllhl

111111 ship I':lclinaC'1 ire isotoll('H, There is 1I

uf lIil'llCi,'ts Ihnt n'c'c'h'(' t l('!'(' 

F.!I;pn11'11 t, '

"I nil inII.\'. this IlI'

0III'lI l11 of F('lle'l'Ul 

". hy illl'lltif,rilllI Ill(' mnjor lIil'(llll'tK thl'OI

1'lllliCllldh'(' mutvrinl )lIlH!4 ("(l1Il tlu' "hil'I

"1'011 I'Xl'('I'il'IlI'(\ ollillilll·t! lint! 1I1C\ C'ulltil

)lllllc,,'illi 11\(\ 1·'c'clc'I'UIIIIClllitcwill#

mul C'\'l'llhlllllr 

thllt, 110 PIH')\lI:II' rndiouctive 11 li

qlllllltitic'!l. will Ill' t l'lIllspol'll'd II\' I'ClIlllllo

f'l'l'l ilic'al iOIl Ihnl it, has Ilc'c'lI 

Ic)l' Ill(' lllldsllfl·ty of thl' Jl"h1iI',

In ndclil'ion 10 iIlSpr.ctill;! 111111 1'('J'Iif,rill

the 11'I'III'I'n]IIlClIlitol's ShOllld, II,\'l;l1ot 

nlIl's III''' hC\in;! 10uIlc'll ahnlll'el indh'idllnl 

.Jm'sC'I'illl!d "III,'s to 

. 1.0 :I lid 1"'C'll:.

A1I1111'llU,'t. CIII'IIO I

11li\:l'IIISt:iIJI'c1 !':Ollll' ;!I'n8o'I (hilIh 11,\'1') i

n1l·1'I. C'1I1';:0 huncllilll-{ (ll'I'SOnll(') iC1'lItiion

idl'nl iIi1'1I is in tl\(\

n\'I'a,

.\s the slu\lc1ards fo\' tI'tlIlSJlo\'tin:r 1'lulio

I'('sll'idi',l', it. is impol'ttlnt. Ihllt. sOllie m(

nttl'llIpls to <'iI'CIIIll\'l'lIt. tho 1'1'IIullltiolls II)

lIot ))I'oJlC'I'ly illl'lIfif.rinlr thl'l/I ns contn

Slll','C'iIInn('(' of lind lo

iustl'lllllC'nls shonlc1 illso IIC\ the rcspollsihil

inl-{ ngl'nt. nt. thl' tlil'))()J't,. The ncllllinistmti

monitol'ing fiC\ITi('(\ ('olllcl be pnid fol' hy t

tho tl'l.lllsportnlion illllustl,y, I'ilhm' throlllIh

bCl' of pllC'lmgos ('C'!,tifiecl tl'nllsportnti

of the ('OlJ.IIllOII CIlI'l'Wl' or shlppc·r. 

.---- 

B. Tn.\N61·on'r.\,rION o}' PJ.U'fON

Ob&(lJ'l'ation: '

Fnclel' pl'C'sl'nt. pluto

thllll 20 gl'tllIlS JIlin' llot, be !>h ipprc1 on )lt

lilll'dnl limilnlion i,ln('C'cl npon plutoniulIl 

is ('onceJ'n('(l thnt. it. not be fol' ilIe

of nit'line "hiO'hjncldnO'tJ occurl'ecI in the en

concCl'ncc1 ono oftho pla

nbonrc1 find tho highjnckers knowmgly or 

1l1!lh'I'i'11 r:llt "r n,,-, ('/)Ilr,h'"
14 -15

Plutonium, in nd.1ition to lK'inlt 1IRC'.1 in nl1('l('nr l'xIJlnRh·('R. conn Itt' ' _1 ._.&..1 11!_' __ ' ...,!. ... ' 1 !.a. .. ! .1!_

• ,,:.:,·'''..'''.n ..." 1'1111'1\' ''''1\'1-11 III 111111, JI.'" 1111 '-111'" III&: 1"10110",

ntlC'lille of 101l:.r rudionctive hnlf-li f(\ nn.l ir (1\'('" in 11111,,11 .

11111011111 8-111

n 110 hurm, ·nll'rl'f(ll·.·. in lul.Jifiu"

In sa plutonlum from possibl« divorsion, it. is illll'OI'lnllt

that it h" snfr-lv ('olltl"O)I('ll so ns not to constitute

n risk to thr health

nnel f;a r.·ly of Ill" puhli», An tho other ndilli.l(· I'n.lioHlwli,),·::! ))J'('l'l'llt

similnr to those of PII U D wlu-n tuken into th.· h/),).\'. so 1)1'('.'11\1- Iionurv 1I\1':l!'UII'C'S 1IIIIIli(,:lhll'. to shouh] l,p. nuuller] 111M to PII::I11 uml •.\111 211 ... ... • •

1.i:rht wnn-r sliu-htl)' ('IU'idlt'll urnuium l"':ll'tOl'H in IIJlC'l':Itioll in the

Tuin-d IOlIn.,' nlntouium ns It h,\'I'I'll,hJ('t. "'h('I1 11U' fllel

1·1I·1II('lIt IH )'I'I'I'O(,l'ss(·c1. tllC' plutonium is H('plll'lIh'd Irom thl' IIJ'lHllIlIJl

Itr-lutivr-lv litrlo pliitoiihiiii hns from eivilinn HI;· .

, c'l"_l)' l'I'IIl'tOI' fl\('1 eleun-nts ill tho rllih'll todutc, sn l)J'oh- ;. I. lc'lII of plutouium currently is not. nil IU'I'ssin:! IlR it ift·

to in thl' rllllll'('. AR JUOI'r. l\I\1'lC'I\I' POW('I' plllllts ('Ollln

iutn 011l'I'lIt ion-Ii\' WHO .\EC ('slillllltl'!! O\'C'I' pInnts will Ian

ill nperut ion in lTllitl,et plutolliulIJ will 1M'

1I10\'ill,!!fl'Om rl'lu'or('ssilH! plnllt!! to f"lwi,'nlioll fndlitiC'!1 n)1(l ('llU'-

",hl'l'l' ill till' 11ll('lC'III' iJull1!ltq·. Thr. sh'il't ('onll'Ol of Ihi::! .1JI1l1l'I'illl

ill tl'llllsit will hc'n Jlllljm' Jll'Ohlem thnt. )'('Ct'lia'('R

nttl'1l1 iOIl lInll.will hI' Til th(' 1l11'1l1l- 1illlC', IICIWl'\'(·I'. il ill rssC'lllinl thnt. 1'\""11 till' n:JlItl\'l'T:v flll1all nmollntflor

nllltullillIll :Hill Othl'l' Iwtillid(' I'IUliOnlll'li,lC's in tIll' mlll'1iC't not

1)(' PNlIlilt(·c1 to constitule an hC'lllth nnd Rnf('t}" thJ'('nt .

IIII h(\IHlh1ic • . •

!:",'oIi111u'ml,,'inn: ,

Tn lulditiflll to thc J'€'C'\'nllllltion of mnxim\llll nlJlO1l1ltfl )lI'I'lIlitlNl hy .

1'C';!1I11l1 iOIl fill'

A anll

B plll'lml!('s! nJlll th.' 1:C'I'\'1I11lIltioll of tho·

1c'nls of ('xI'mpt ItJl101l1\tS lUI r('l'omml'lllll'll(,Isc'whr.m 1II fillS l'l·pOl·I;. thn

)llIlll'l J'I'('OI111lll'lllls t hnt, t.l1l1 .\EC nncl nOT )J'ohihit till' I'lhiJlIIICllt hv

IIil·.:.....n iI' "lfl'!!O IlS \\,(,11 l1S llIlSRC'Il;rl'I' It irt'1'llfI--o. Uflil'l' thnJJ r.xI'lIlpt

';;ii';ntitic·s of pllltOlliJlIlI :lIlc).ilhr.I' TI'nllRj2.ol't (h'.llIp I mntc'I'inll!lIlc's,'ll\

(h·tl'l'Illinnlion.is 1I1111lc' thllt thl' nJl' sTiiI>llli'nt .• " TIll' ,1ulIg(oi' of n!1 llil'l'l'nft lIe"lll.'·I!" una

1'Gk of cOlli IIIII IIIIIhOIl f,'olll pllllolll1l1l1. ol1lI'r nl'tlJllllt'!! nlld nlhc')' . C'afl';!lII'Y 1 11IllIl'I'illl is slIf1i('il'ntly ;rI'Il\'C' lUi to "'1\1'I'lll1t thl'iJ' totnl restrici imi tn I.!rOl1l1ll1l1ll1 wntC'I' tl'flnSpClI'tllticm.

Thl' 11nlll'1 t1ll1t slll'h n Ill'ohil:ilion will I'lInl'(, nn 1lU'I'('nsn

in tllC' tillll' f1\l'SC 1lll\tC'rinls will be in tl'llllRit nncl thllt nnet··,

Waf(,l' Wllr shipml'nts of 1I1\7.ll1'llolIs JI1ntl'l'in1:> 1'0llstitlltC' Rl'pn1'lltl'

hut. is of t111' opinioll these nrC' not. IlR na those lnt'nrr('d

II" nil' t\'aIlPOl't, III n fntnJ'c l'epOl't.the }lllnd will ho pl'C'plll'l'd to , ninlJll'llll imm'o\'C'm('nts in the contl'ol nnd llc1ministmtion of ,:rronnc1

F.hipllH'lIts ·fol' l'Il(lio:\ctive mntcrin.ls inc1udiu:.r plntoniuJIl Rnd other

Transport GI'OUt> I material from both n. snfcgnn.J·ds as well as health

and safety viowpoint. , ' ..' .' ..

,"

,. , . ,

'-' " . . I, to

... '. • ,I' I,

, . ., ,

,I, .. , , ,

:-'i!. I

......

.,..... !Ii

I I ,

F. UAlJln,u'J'I\'R M.\TY.JlI.\J, PAl!)(,\(lINO D'AmN 

()7Mt!/',·nf.itm:

In with th.'i!' )U('III()J'IIlUlI1J1l oC IJ

J'C'lllll'l·th·cI I'C·It"lutiOIlH, th(·

AEC reviews mul iH

uf mlt'.1 ill fl1Jtppin:: 

m-tive Illllle'l'inl fissile Illllt'·I·inlll wh

])O'L' fur uso hy 1IO\\'C'\'I

tniners 111111 Ii",..;ill· mUlc·I'iIlI'":-\J)l'I'lIic'lltiulI ('ullt

fill' shiH'('I's IISI' ('\"('11. Ihllll:rh' till',\' han: 

111'11\'1'<1 II" Ihl' .\10:(', 1.('.. tlu'.\' 11Il\·r. J'('I'C'I\'C,i! w

';rI'llllcl rathl'I' I'X"IIII/lilln", Tlu'SI' iIll'hllll' "(·I·tni

lay SIII'I'illl DOT J'C'rlllils prior tu ,'I1"·.·l

...... ... I... u I ....I.i;coluul ..I",. ..

"r II"'" ,.,••-••• '". I",.,... , ••,- .-,••1••' ••••,.... ,.,. 

111:111\' 1'(llIlniall'l'S \\'1'1'(' in 1I11I1c'I' Il so .·I1I1I·d 

)l('l'Iilitt('11 Ilu' lIf J1\rtnl-l'lwllsI·ll 11'1111 III' u

1inch'l' u Ilg"llllllfllllll'l' I)O

t(,III'I",liIllICII of thoslI "HpC'(' fj5·· contulner

Ihl\1Il1ll'.'rillI is ill SI'('dlll rOI'1Il uud no! IIICU'C' tha

Tlu\ IU7l DI·lln nil..'I'llft illl'ith·nt· illmh·c·<1 Ol

in cxisll'lI"(' prim' to .. H);:l1l1\l1 11

l'C'll1lia'('11 t.0 hi' nplH'm'('(l Ih(' .\ I':C••\lso tIll

- the .July ln7-1 1),,1111 nil'('1'llrt illl'ill<'lit in ",hil'll 

lIOt. IH'opC'l'ly I'oulnin('cl \\'Il!l II HOT Mi l'o

J'C'\' IImlnppl'o\"cd L)' the

AEO. 

!:(,C'OIll111 C1U/"tiOIl :

Tho palle) 1'(!COnUlll'mlR tlmt nil )(,,'illl 1C'),l

tn.iUN'S thnt othN'wis(' \\'HuM Ill'su IJ(·,·t to. '. 

)wio\' to 'IIS0 should h.· cnl1l'I'I('(1 nne! Iho UH' o

tmJ\RpOltinl[ )'uc1io:lrtlV(' IIllIh'I'illl in 

u!!!lt such tillle as the hilS 1

thClr IISC.

VI. stnDrAny ()lo' )(,\,JOn 

)AT10X

1. 1'htl .•i1Jl,! 1,weT OI"ITfli"fim

0'" JUWIt'Ilf/r.I' "iraCl.!' tI",. 10 If/ciPIllt!1I1 01 ,'mli

alm,,1'" ai,'(!,'nf/. x//olll" be Q'''' ",;11;1'('111 II"" 

'''/WI'P wit";,,, /l/t' ",,,1 (','r," ('fI/II IIIII'! 

':r P,:'i\-;I'nt. mllX IIIHlIll '(\\'('Ti'iOlI:'iH1intion PI'

mntl·l·inl in tl'llIlsit.lIhollJ'11 pllS,o;('IIt!l'I' nil'C'l"1I (I 

IllnXimUIll p('J'lIlis,'iil,11' 'l'J'nnspOl'1 InclC'x of 111 (

:1 f(,('t.) 8holll.l ho 10wl'l·.'ll to n 'J'I'/II1SU!1l:1 hlll

pl'I' ho\))'nt:l lind thr lll11xhiiiiiil)H'I'nj1;8i

PCI' hOlll' nt I.ho slIJ'f:tt'l'l'holll(lll(' lowN

lh (Mlto 100 mmh'I'1ll )('J' 1101\1' • Totnl mllxim

Ull'5 ))l'!: ..l?,o..l'kn!!C' s

Iaetorof at )ellstlO below iii'esCilf hllllt s.

.... t, ... • ,t
: I

,.

I

.,

.1

16

3. by c'nrl'yilll! ai"C'I'llftof l'l\cliol\ctiva ..jRl

in C'X('('SH or (,xl'IlIl,t (tlllmlitic'f! should b« lU'ohibitt'll ir l'IUliolu'tivl\ half

Ji(C' of Ih(' l'ndiulIlll'lith. ili between an CllL)'lo4 IIl1d yC'lll'$, 'fhis would

not II to 1'lI(tiOllc'l h'c' (hwic'c's illlphLllh'cl in t1.0 hlllllan bodies of I'nsSC'IlI!C'I'R, t":!,, pal'('lIlnk('l's,

-l. Thc! shil'lIlC,iiT'l'-vl'l\;st'lI:rt'I' IIIUI nOIl-l'l\SS('III!('I' nircrnft, of plutnniunt IIn.1 01 her 'J'1:allsJlol't. 01'0111' 1 1'lIh'l!lII'V nuuerinl in CXc'('RS of

('XI'IIII'I. qunurit it,s shollid 11(' IH'ohihitt'(llllllt.ss'tho nir shipHlcnt ls re- ,

(1IIil'c'c! (ol'llatiollll1!'iI'C'IlI'it.\' l'I'IlS0ns, .

n, hy ])()'l'rul' flhippinl! c'ollt.RinC'l'S

fill' mntorin] hused 1111011 u:rI'lIl1tHllthl'I' elnuses" should 1)(,\

l'c'\'ol,('11 1'1'\'il'W mul nPllI'U\'1\1 hv

li, 'rial' 1If;,· of radium, IIc'c't·I(·I'lIlm' ))I'oclw'ls Illlfl c'('I'lnill other nattII'all.\' OC'l'lIninl! rndioisotopos pl"'sl'lItl,\' not 11l'i:\1! 1'(,:!"ll1tcd by tho

A 10;(' !'!\fIlllcl III' III'OIl:!ht 111111"1'

A E0 l'el!lllation,

7, PaC'lml!c's 1'0111 a illiIll!melioncti\'t, IIIII n-riul for II lr shi PIIICIlt. should

hI' 1IIC1llilm'('cl fmhs('lJlwnt to 1(,Il\'iJlI! the Slll'p!i('I' 111111 pJ'im' tp

101llll'dablllll'l1 till' nirrraft to c'ollll'lialll'c, with npplienblo Ft'll-

('I'lIl 1'('I!lIlatilllls, This should 1m nRsil!lIl'll tCl

n

F,·cI"I'llI I'('gllintol',\' III!('IlI')' l'C'sponsihl" '(01' ('nfOI'C'I·lIl1mt. (jr UIl' 1'('l!lIlntiolls alld not. lIpon thll lIil'1ino {'nl'I'rill!: t.he t'III'l!0' TIll' J'(1f1J1ll11silllo

)<'C'IIl'l'a I ;1 sholllll nlso hI' 1'I'sl'oilsihl('rOl' )l('I'illCliCl iI\Hlwc,t.iollR to

n!'SIII'l\ 1111 )'('I!IIJatioIlS IWl'tllillill1! to nil' h'nllH!>OI'tntioll of I'llclio:JC'hh'(\

lIl11tl')'ials 1II'(·I,..ill:!C'OIllI'1i(·ll with,. '

Th(1 palll·llw1i('\'C's that with thC' l'xcl'plioll of Xo,

RnlJOvc. whic'h will

I'('/jll iI'e ('olll!I'c'f\sionlll nd iOIl-SJlI'ciIic'll 11

y OIl\I'IICh)!('IIt. to th"

Atomie

EIII·I':!.\' A(,t of l!I:i.J-nll of t!le nI>O\'C1 )'(l('OIllIllI'ndntIOI\S C'nn .lIn Rtlo))tl'Cl

thl'olll!h Atlmillistl'nti\'(· uctioll ns they ",olllcl I." within exist.inl!statuto 1'\' IIl1thOl'ilv, Hl'l'Omml'lUlntioll No:

7 ohov(·. if! ntloptl'o. wOllld illCI'l':,SC' till' 111'C'81'nt ]C'\'el of monitOl'in:r llnel cnfol'cing

]"C(lt'I'1l1 ),l' 4tlllntiOlifl, It mil!ht. be mOl'e nPl1l'olH'intl. if this wpre nccom';

plishC'o lI\ollc1llte mt)wr thall left to Adntinistm- 'tin tl..lel'llllllation, ---- -,-

VII, ADnlTIOXAIJ . .

1. It is RI1pnl'(lJ)t thRt in som(1 c.ll'gl'PC' hC'nv.v c1(!penclen('e on

)111R."I·nI!C'I' uil'(,1'Il ft. fOJ' tl'llnsp0l'tinl! rnclioisotopes for mec1icRl fllll'-

is hC'cullsC' of ('OIl\'pnil'IU'C'l'nthel' Rvpn l'eC'o:!nh..inl!

th(' IIC'I'(l to h'OIlSIIOl't, shol'l hn1f-Jifl' isotop(·g withollt. d"lny, thn nfle of

lund tl'lll\spCll'tation C'oll1.l 1)(\ lIlom efTC1diwl\' \lsed 110I'ticuh,,'h' for

l'l·lutin·h- l'ihol't halll tlistllnc('s, The PRlll'l thot Rhij1lll'l'S

of l'utlio;lrti\"(1 isotop('fI J1)l\lw IL I!I'ent('I' efTol't to chwclol) nncI usc lRnd tI'llnSllortat ion wllel'C'\'el' possibh\,

2, Rc'c'ogni;'.ing thl' 1ll'1'{1 to l.'ontinuc th" C'omlll'tit.i\'{\ nature of the

IIJ'ocltll'tioll lind of 1'I111iophlll'ml\('C'lItil'nls, tIll'! pnnr.l rcC'ommellll:J

thut IISI'r::; slIch ns hospitn)s nnll Ilortol's. nttcmpt to pUI'l'hm;e

shOl-t hnlf-life l'nllioisotop('S fl'om tho closest SlIpplil'r, This would

not only rcduce the 1\I1mber of nir shipments but wouM significnntly

't.ho nmount in curies of radioactive shipments by passenger

aircraft.

17

3. lnfol'llutt.lol1 lwovitll'cl to pnnl'l hu

prnctiee in the medical pl'of(,sOIion is 1.0 ImvC' th

1I11)e nt tho nl l,,·l.tillllinl! nn ('Rdl M(

UlI'oul!h 01(\ Frielll". This )))'()\'i,le

ill th(' hospital l",c'allso of· tht· short ]ml(·1ifo 

He"IIIISC\ IIC t his, most 1'I\{liClplllll'lIIlu;mll ienl 

their )ll'Olhll't on Thursrlny ClI' It'dclll\, lllitl flh

duy, In order t.o iusurn thilt. tho qnun

able OJI MOIlllay morning, IL flllllit-iJ'nt ('XI'I'flS 

fOl' the amount lost. It}' rndlonct ivo elC'l'o)' 

shippo«, Tn 1;01111\ ClISI'S 'Iho hospitu] will 1"·III

of Ihe radioisotope ill order to hnve

n (1111 slIp

l'lithl'I' thuu )(onc!ny, Tho pnuel Willi told, fuJ

to insure thut the hospitul IIIIA !ion millicm-ies 

on 1"J'iIII\Y moruinu, tho producer shipRII ppl'OX

011 Iho previous Friduv or Sntunlnv. The p

pl'olwl'1y revised the 1)lIl\litilic's (in 

sh by nircrn ft. run llR n't1I1l'l

6\'!l!I'IIC'C1 of I'fTOI't. Oil thI' pllrt of tho }1

t1111', 

,I. 'l'ho panel nofc·i\ thnt. in t.hl' 

fill' flhiplw'nt tlwl'c is 110 1'(1C)lIil'I'IIWllt. to plnl

plllstic ha#! herm'" insl'I'lion into thl\ shil'1l1N

IIwxlll'nsi\'o Idl'p I!t'lIl'I'nllr rollf)\\'('cl thl'oltl!llfl

tOlllL)< Rnet shollltl bo i!WOI'pUl'lIh'cl illto Iho 1

5, •\s 1111 Illlth',1 IU'l'Clllltion nl!llinst. 1!1'og,C\ m

, nll'lItR of )':JcJiolwth'C' mnte",inl. 11ll' pan('1 l'l

tioll o,f hil!h-l('\"('l ..u(linlion 111011 ilOI'S in c'llr

p('l'llllllA oth(·J' 1I1'l'1I8 of nmjcl!' nil'pMls. SlIc

JIIHlI('(liatl'lv c1c·tC'C'lp(l thC' n·ec·nt. ilJ('i.lent. im'

of on industrial isolope, 

fl, ThC' plHU'l ('onsiders thot. the Oil'JiIlNi sholl

mom lIl'th·o l'olc in lIlollitol'ing Iltl'i,' Opl'I'lltion 

J'lllliolll'ti\'O t11l1ft·I'illl. Then' 1I1lPl'Ol'S to hl\ n. 

thll II il'lino compollil's thnt. the 1'1'spnllsihiJit

I'llC!inndh'I' lIIull'I'ial I','sis with the shippel' li

lI11'l\t,

Althlmuh thl' lla111'1 ilt nnt. 

nir rnl'l'il'I's. it. doC's feel that. 11IC' nil'1inl's rnn 

netive I'olc,It would uot hI' lml'l'nsnnnh1" to l'x

onl' 01' t.WO pm'sons t.l'llitlC'd nI\(l ClllnliliC'd in 11

nit'!iul\ mnnnl!l'mC'nt. with soml' sm'\'l'ilIlluro C

itr wl1Illd thn nit'Hnl' A

pl'ol'p{1Il1"'s 1I':n beml! follO\wtl wIIhm tlH'lI' o

7, lTntil outl "nless cnl'l'it'I'S b('come lil'l'llsN

motel'in1, I'hinl1C'I'S must. hr. helel l'C'sponsihll' fo

materini Ullt 11 it l'C'.nf'1)(1s its elc-st inat ion. Tlu' 

that some flhippCl'S of rndioisolopl's to a lnl'

1'('.spom,i!)iJitv romnlcte onco they ha\'e pnc

nccol'dnnco 'Yit.h the requirements Rnd )\I\v

carrier, even though he is not trained' in the 

. I.. . ..., ... ' . •
of indlvlduala with whom the Pane

wit

h the problema discussed in this report, 

1>1'. Cnlvln Hrnntly, (.'1"';1'",,111, AlIt" Isot

. Cnnt. ""H1inm H. Brluer, Duke Univer

c:ielJof Xlll,lt'llf C

] >t'••re'IT.\· Hruno, It &. Ronll, 1,,4

:\h', Willi:llll ,J. Ih"'II!i. !Ji'·(!f't",· oll/aza

U1I'II1 of '1'1'1\ III ion•

1>1'. HIII'I'\' CUIllIiIlIIl"I" Itlrrrtor, ('(mtc'" 

W;lshill;..rlon Universlty, , 

:\h'••Iohn Y·". Derr, Products J\1Il1 

B. H, S: 111('.

Slim 1o:clI(\\\', g(lIl)\\' Intcrnntionnl Aes

1.>1'. :\Ic·,'il Eisenbud, XYU 

.•Jof"·ph A. FC'I'I'III'('SI'. (IMel. l'"li:,rht ()

8ta\luII1l'<!s ::-il'I'\'i("c', Ji'(·del'lll .\\'intion A,lmilH

)11'. I\('n ''::''1/;01' Ne"rnl'f''' Sricll

In('•.

'. Glos. H.-ret'lltil'e nil'tt'lol:

('IIll'•

fl·o

K1'\lI11'Ih .J. (J 1'('('11, .11aI/ngtW, nndi

tion,llllllin('I'odt, ' 

MI'. AI 0,'(,1111, O/li('o of HnzI\':clous }[ntl

'I'mnsp()l'tlll ion.

:\11'. RIHlllTI\l'I'is. Rnc\intion Dul't'

N','\\" rnl'kCit}... 

?\h·. ])('nn li. II01zgnf, .1/nJlngtr, NlIe1eon

Sons, Jnl'. .

Miss PILI. Kennell)" A"illtiol1 COlUlnmt'I' 

MI'. Pc'ter M, Kit'by, !>il'er.loI·, Feclel'Rl 

ASSOrilltioll of AmN,lcn.

eli/ford .T. Konnel·th, JIen1t

Sons, ' 

l\h'. Sam I"AngfO/'el, lc.\'illtioll Safety, F

trntion. .

.(1Cl'lllcl :M. Moyo, Esq., I..egal Division, D

D,·. Gel'ilM McDOlllllcl, Goo<l Snmnl'itan 

Ml'••Tamt's J. McGo,ocl'n, SU1,erinlendeJlt

Squibb

& Sons, Inc.

(10)

18

nC(H'O 11Illtel'iI\i. Ail hOl1l!b IlI\Ruhl:ltrmtil\h!cl, it,' "'liB to the ." 1· .1 _ _ 1.! . . __ . -; _. I • "I ••r • • .

. , '"'11''' 1'1 .. ·." 1111: nnlln' lUlU "(lnUlln" IInt'1I1 IU1111.IC'l"K .followc'ellJy some huul carriers UI\C'C their shillllumis hlLv" 1.""1\ turned

m'l'l' tn thnt· C'IlI'I'ir.I·, JlI)\\'('V('I', thu plllwl d icl 0 IS"I're one 11111 I" rrlld 111..'1'

whn, n:,rgl'(·s,o;in'ly SlIpl"'\'isell 1\11 plllll\(':'1 or thn trnnsportutlon cycle

11111 il tim product wus in the 111U1ds of the Iicensed user, punel WIlS

, 1I1111hll\ tn find UHV cwi<!('lIt'C where tIw (10\','1'1\111('1\1 (A EO)

illspl'('h'll 01' thl' operut ion of lund enrricrs who t\'llIlSPIH't

f"1)1II the shiuner' 10 I1Il' ILia'IICl!'ls {m' Ilit' I'he

1'11111'1 thut thi's'situutiou hI' ;'ol'I'c'('h'c\; thut t\w enforcemeut uf tl... !:'hi

p/lI'I"s license to luuulle mdiourt ive mnterial hI! extended to vover 1I 1 truck or auto movement of the radlouctive mute-

'ria 111111 i1 it.is l'I'('ch'ell hy nnot hur liceused lid ivity. '1'1 • • t ., , 1 1 l' I L ' _ 1.1

- .. !Ot'!lU!!t!'UH'Ht r-xists thut jil.nt.s "",oiRe" iii ,ri=iI 0, lun

)lJ'('l"I'III'I' flf rndionct ive 'shipllll'lIls 011 tlu-ir 'light:". The pnuel notes

that this requireiucut is not eonsistent ly Iwilll-! fullowed in thllt.('nl';.!o

iuuui rl'sls do not nlwnvs show the existence of suelr'shipments, The •p:1I11·1 recommends th:lt nirlillC'fi review their curreut procedures to

('111';1\1'1\ ('I)IlIJ1lilllll'e with this requirement.

!I. The puncl n-coumu-nds that nit'liJll"llllssllng'el'S, if thov usk, he told

.wlu-ther Ill' not rndiouctivo mutcriul is hl'illt! clll'l'ie(l olltlaeit· purticuJill' night. If. h"I'IlIlSI\ of this, they chose not to fly Oil thnt Ilight, tho

is Ilwirs, Th(, pnm-l does not. consider thut. 11It' 0 irl ilies should,

unrler such eircumsrunees, he required to provide tho pnsseuger' wit,h

so-culh«] hlJlllllpin;!rights." ,

W . .A11 hOIl;!h 1\0 \'('lllIIl'enwnt. t'XIStS, the panl'l it pl'lld,'nt

that n film h:\(lgl\ Ol' '1'1.0 he installed 011 tmll'd('clllil'cmft, pnssl'n;!l'l'

nllcl (·argo. This monilol' ('ollld be installed in nn itwollspicliOUS 10('ILtion in tho nl'en. and be read each thirt)' days.

A 1ll0nitol'

sholl1<ll\lso be placed in an nl')propl'illte Jo('ntion in the c:'\rgohandling

of major airports

w \(!re radioactive material is stored. Tho .in<1ividtin.l ail'lincs should conduct· and report. thei.r . I: 'Ii •. ":'11, '.1'. ;.: .: .; ..... , •.. ;:. ,,:'.:,"

.: ", . , .•F.I.;,· " ':!! 11a:, ·<'i.!, I'" f,o,' ." ../.:

\.. '. './1'.: ..: ",',:,:: :'.:'" :.: ". :""!;'''' : •• '':U;' ," ',I 'I I.' '., t"fI .·1 "h.:·.J· to'!".:!l. ,"I.,,, it

: ....... :"i":,:'

H.1:_.•• ,': ':'1' .iI, 'u.,. :"1,": ." • •i. .; . ',.ir.':·, .,i,;.

••.••• , i ".': •. ,"' •• :., ...". .• .... ! I.);, ·f ",': .•-, ',':I"U

...: .•..j .... :.( .IH ..••' ,.; t,_ :'1":" ..i!JJ t'l ••..• ' .•. , •. ':',. '; I 1'1 . .... I I' . I ' .• . 'I a .'0 ", .... .. '.' . 'I- ., '., • 'I ,", ':'.1 1•.,·,;,-;.." :·t •. .• .: ,,' , • I .. , 1 II - ,.' .'

..........:....'.i t .:,-,- ..•.• ;•. I •• - ••• "'II' •. :.

, ... ,,::.,- ,,'; ,.., ..1,·' ''''''';'j;i . ":"·'·'it •..•." :.••.•• '.,.'. ':'h"} •.

,! '., 't' .... ,'; i " .•" •• ··i .•., I.,.,.f ·.,1 \1." , ":', ': .i.::',.,,;. "

It•• i ..:.:· It.: " .i·f "':.' .•. "1' ".,: ... f. •• ,; .... ," .: i' t •. t:••·..

··i .1. ...•.• ,"i:', ", •.•••,!.. f.' :"':'1 "t'. ":":" ',':'" t, I. • • '" . i ,. ',' '.' ,.. . :: .""1. ..•.• It ," r•. h" '..1' , t' "'.) -, "!', .•••, "I·,..·,.l ,',.. "'It""'"

'.::. U. ',' .; .;. ·'·U , " Jol ': ·.l,' , ;. .;,' •

., , • t· , ••• " •• '.. "',"', ,.' '.

't.!..,·, ' •.• "':',II!' t' i.i·.··.' '.1: I .i· .,'. t ,I' : .4 .. , •'i" I. -, ". !,l i' ,.." • , •••• t • f' ' •• , ' • • •. •• • ,.,. .

•t

.,

.,' .

, ,

" ,

,', .'

'., .' ; 'I ,"

.i:

t

APPENDIX

A
..,;'"

.. . • ···.t .'.'!. ..... ..'

'1 ' .. : .•.. ,.' :"'!' ;:.,•..t1 •• •••\,•••,\.,.\,",..• • •• . : ••• ,', .,•. ;_ i. '.'! ". ,,'l , . I •

• . • '1. t ••• '.

__

..•• ' ••••.•.•

...a.t•.1 :•.....•,. ... ,'. 'I ,',; .• t. '::... "'. ,', ,"Il . •.. . . '-'f" , ; .,.;.,:. :.. ,/. ':;....:.. . .e:II!:'

:.. j ):.', ·,.. ·.t·.::;ij·••.•.! .;;" •t .·.11 , . ,('" I ..· .••11-:.. : I"

,,!!.I.,,·II ",,; "":'111'''.'',11 ."""'1":' /.".II:;lldl .';"\\'" i'('!i:':'1 :..,.. .. !II

'.• " • 'I ·f'· ',' .••.. I "1

. ...

•..•, I . '1 , .".,.. ,I ••'J' .\••.••• :.,.;.•I'';""1"'1I".,." .•' ...•.... " ' ,. ,I •• .... I',...,-,..··.I". I .. 1'/ \

MELVIN' PRICE, 

JOliN O. PASTOR

(21)

JOINT C03()(lTrEf'l ON A'I'O)(lO 

U:-lITF.D STAT

Wu.•/tiJ'gtoll, l

•

. .

..

APPENI>IX

D

Mr••TOIIN T. CoNW.W,

.Bf11cmtf.i"fI Altlli,.lfmt 10 fllf' CI",i,'mnn 01 the B

IMiM1J. 00. o]""f!'" ]"0..1.', .Y. l".

.TOIIN: \Yc want to thank )'1111 nnd )'ellll' c

on tho difllcult tusk of inln the proble

11IICImll' mnteriul tn nNS\1I'1! thnt it iii pl'opl'J'ly l'1

IltlNlllnll! Sll nnd PI'II('alltiuIIS nrc "':\I\t

The .loiut COllllllittN! looks fCII'wI\I'(l 10 the resu

tious, 'Ve nrc purt ieuhu'ly IIJlXimlS 10 know if any 

uctlvitiesnro necderlnt thepresent lime. 

1"'('l'iatPCl if wnuhl ('lIlll'CIlIt'1I11' efforts 0

If nnything, IS JlIIW hl'i.n;! done ,iJwol'I't'!'t!)'. "'c wo

"Oil infortn the l'UIlIUlIt"'I' of IllIpiIIHIIII/.! fll'llhll'I1I

. ns nur nuclenr netivitics increase ill order th

attention ill the future.

1'l"cH'dc'" fOI' "lilli' wOl'k tu hI' of 1!l'llntt'st ,'nllll

",nulll hClipJlI'(,cillll'cl if l'csulls nf \,our <le,libl'mti

IIhlo inlll.out two 01' tlll'l'C 1110111 hs. '\rt' thplI cOl1ld, 

tala' 1\11\' II';.!hillllh·o al'tiol1 that is I'(,l\"il'l'cl in thl' V

sl's."ioll: Ah;n, SiIlC'I! l!tp hanlllil1g 1\111 tl'llllsl'0l'tnt

OilS is siglli licll1ltly eli II'('rl'lIt {rolll tho l>J'ol'Nl!II'l

ll11cll'nl' matt'rial, it would appeal' nppl'opt'into t

hallelling nnd trllllsportntion of wenpOllS fl'om the 

Howcver, you are authorized to J'c,'icw the tl'lll

.dling of nuclear wcapons to whatc\'et· cxtent you 

helpful in arriving at your rccoJ1lJ1llmdntions. .

Sincerely,

-.

"

.. '.

: •• I

.:';'

.

n' •

'.

..

-

':i".i ' ,; i

.. 1. t: ..•.• i ., " " • ; " • • : 0' •••

.':, , "'. . • .'. • ....• J .

• 1° ',,-.')

, " ,', '.

p.", ·f.': .' I

'0 • '" I. ,

'. I ..... ,': .' ,., r •

I.'

" . , I ..' "1' .: . " ". .", ,I • •'. • I ,.. •• t." J. ., I... • .••.•• f "t • I .

"':1"1)' . I..' '1. , • . ; f: '\ ,! ., : : 1:. ! .'I,i

,.:..;, ,.:,,', '. I!I,' t" .. ".' .' .i I :.j .r. • ,', :,il.

.,:.-i.···.1··.·'··1; .t,' '.'.'I' . /: t .". " .'.: .... , ••••: ..•••••to ,

.:- :". t!.ti.'.:,,,.• "'1 .' .' 't,,··· .'-, :'. ," ..: ;

, • 1.1 ; .. • ." ' .. I., ; I : ..... , 1. "i:.·-.. ·, .:t ·,.I·:t.. .:i'\ ,",:' ...••........... .'•.. .. , .•..... •• ,.' I

Mr. Rohort n. Dt/lfJt'l Dh'Ct:lol', Ilircctornt.a of Rl'lZUlntory Stnndnrds, Atomic Commission.

O'Xeill, }·:SII.,

AttOl'1UW, Ail' 'J'I'nllRpm't Associntion of AIIIl'I·J('Il.

JJIlI'OId 1'. HnV('II, 1'1'f11l"1)(JI'f.(ltion. 411culflf/el', R. Squihb ..,

SOilS, Inc. .

M,'. Hurr

y Riehurdson, NSI, linton Rongn, 1..1'.

:'If,'. William Uohh, Quality Mnl- Iinerodt Nuclear Corp. .

Dr. Willium Rowe, BIl\'h'olltnent.nl Protection Administration. i,

Don Soldan, Radiution Slllot-y,M;l11incl'Odt Nuclear Corp. .

J. G. Speth, Esq., Natural Resources Defense Council, Ince .

.. Dr. Arthur Tamplin, National Resources Defense Council, Ine,

Dr. Robert Zimmerman, Consultant to Delta .&irlincs. ' .. 'I

• I . ,: " ', a·

••,;""" .;.1/ .......: •. ·••I:'·"!•••••• " ••ii.l: :1. ••.' ..:".=,1 . ,

a•••q '•. ;·:··I:/" .;'.. ..·1 f·:·,I';i.·,.·I.·.. .il. '!", ,"! .,,11

••...•. "il 1'/ .' :'1':" .. ,,:/ "". . .. ." '.. t. " ·.t·, I' '.' ,: .. ,.,·,f,,:,·'.'I·, ," ..... ,f. -,II I 1 .•. ,'1.' t ',i' .' •• . t '.- ••• • • " I., . . .. I r" . ••.• • .t .,. ·...

. . I " I I .•I •• " "'1, ., ..·.• :•. 1'. ttt.;•. I .i·r·•.•·•••• ..,' ...... ;"" " ..' .1 ..... ' .•.• ,.... .'1 i, ,

• '1' : .u- t

, I- .• ' :.1 . •..:I·.·I·.,··.:·.:·.. ·ti :';.01'.' ','. ;.. ;.: •...

\ . " . ,

•• '. ,.' :, •• ' • Ii i'J,·.;'l ':' If I:: I ••'.:' .1.. c1 ;'.. I

; ,',' J . • .1 ••• t":

,I't.
n ;,:". 1:·1':'1 •

I

\

I

I

", I • ·'11 .' •

..

•:' .... a:

. ,'1

,'

." to' .• , .....

.

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....

OTJOSSAUY

','

':

., .

(23)

!''''ff'. "·!!r!t h!uhdn:: 

"II"rtt.r IK Itllllllrlt..I'n 'hI' mutl..r. '1'11,. 1I111l111U

1I1t..l mnll'r'"1 I" .11Ih·d II". 111"'11I""',1 d'IlII', IIl

AI.tlI/iII.l ItrJ'k.,. '..h.. ""rlt'" ut ,'11'1111'11111 1"'1:'""111

.11111 1'0111'111111111: 'hl'Ullt:h h,wr,·III·hlllI. NIt'IIII'l

nil•• III.:dtlllll III 'hI' /"','i",II,.' 7·/fl,I.,. '1'hc' "

.... U2, 'iiini IIIi ii,t· iiIlUI"uluti\· ,·it·

tfllll' 'hI! ".\c·lIl1l1lt·it"•

AII"u, ,,,,,.'k/.·.

A 1II',l1lh,.·I)' .·hur!:I·,1 IlIIr,h·ll· 1'

, "'rillill. It. 114 IIII1c1c· 111.111' IWII 111'1111'1111" IlIItl 1

IK Itlc'lilll'lll wlth IIII' 1Il1l'1l'1I1' lit II 110-111111I "h

till' Ihr...• "1111I1111111 ')""'/4 lit n"lic,ti"H 'll'I'hll

Iwllvu 11111"'1'1111. 111'1111: "'II1"'t',1 hr " I'h,'," 

1'111111", 111111111I111 or 11I11" Ullh'lCll lIu' 1I11,hll-"

IUIII)·. 1',.", l",rtlGle, An l'h'lIu'"ll1ry \,111'11,'11' 1·I..llto..l 

Ih".! .h·'·II)', wllh II "llIl=h' "hot"rklllc'hllra:I' IIl

,'I',""n, .\ IIc'l:lllh"'I)' "hllrl:c'" '""n IN,,·lId.· II

r!:c'c1II1"" INI rile-h· '>1"1111,·" n 1"1,,1 I1'11

u",.,.·. 'rill' 1111 "It· IIIIIt I.. ,11'1«;'1'11••' tht' hlll'II"II)

IIIII'C,.·III', 'J'llI' (""'h' lit "111111 I III :17 101111,," .

,>lII....rux'lIIl1..·I)· IIII' rll'I'''C clc·(·I1)· ot 11=1'1111I 

'II)' fIr,11I)' 1Il...lhlt, h:&,·hu:1 (·II.'h·lIt rl\lIl":&I"I"

G.,III ,,1/1 rcc I'''. JlIa.:h-""'·I·l:r "h,,,'t-wlI\"1'1"111:'11 (,

l'ullIlIlI,," "'·('.......II11h·ll "'1,1111 IIl1d 

'"11lh',1 1\>1111,,", (;1111""8 rIl)'M IUt! "c'ry 1lt'llI

"hh'hh'd Ill:lIll1llt It" d"II"" 1I111"'rllll", Illlt'li 1111 

I'll)'" :lI:C' ('''''''l1l1l1l1y "i",'",,' to

X rllyll, ""t IIr

IIl1d"llI' III 01'11:111, a",,..'i,, ,·UI''''·'.''' 1'",11011'1/1. JhllUlItlOII C'fT"('1l1 

t·lIt. ,.. 1I1{>llll·'"t:, .\11)' 1'IIII1I1t1oll-'·III1>1l't1 \'111I11

(,,'111'•

/1",'''1'''; 011" or two OJ' 1II0re' III..ml' with th.. 

C'11l'''''''1I1 .·It'IIIt·1I1 11m' I\'lIh cllff"I"'lIt 11111I1111' 

IN 'hnt IIII' 11111''''1 ot "'nlnl"'" hlln' th" IU'IIIt

1I11111""rll ot Ill'lItrnlllf. 'l'h",.. ·;.l·, ",t.'. lIlltl 

(';11'111111, 'ht' ;'11"""1·11"" ,h·II".11I1: tlll'lr ('(1111 

.. "''I"I..tll dl'IIn'hll: 1111' cllff"I'IIII: I11OIl<It 11I1111"1'1'1

I"oflllll'" 11I'"1111)' IIl1n' '""r,' IIMrl)' the I"""1! (

.Uff,'rl'lIt Ilhrl'h'lIl Ill'III'C"'II,'l', 

. IIt'I'",I/(' ellrl.'I",u',,'• •\ 111'''('('>1:1 It)' whl('h 'II" rt

fit 1\ I;""I'U c'h'II11'1I1 "rc' "U ..I·I'I1, tllllII Ilrnchlc

hllN "c'c'n "IIrlchl'll III 11I11' Ilurtlculnr htoto

111·...1111I11 lu tile IIrlllllll",-2351"otolll'. 

loa(II"O. 'fit" IIIl1xllllum nlllllltl'r or 

'hnt. enn hI!' trllllllilortl111 In n cnrl:o compart

the total ot tile tranSllort Indeusllu tbo$e pac

JlilllcltrifJ (ice curle), %000 of a curle.

Jlllllrem (,eo rem). %000of II rem.

,.

I

"

"

. .'

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.....

:',tt":,':" ".11'1)'.1. i·" ·f.-:'1,"I'" • ' ..... 10

. ".'

,'.\\' :t;.'.', ':;:, ,:':: ',' .• ZI:"i"..".

I" .' . \ .... ,

... ... '.:.. r':; --: ' :', ,0 ". \ .. II ..•., .. ... " '.""':'."'" .0 . .:. ,',/:0.1,'.,':',' -'

\ ••\.\-,

'"

,_•.•;.,-'.""\'..,.\."\..\'\ ,.... 0".\",... \ :. 'o'l' t'"

"

to to ....

"

','. A',·· . 0".. '.of,

...

. . ,"; ,t: . t.: ••·.:I· •.,,' 1"'''' \ . .

..·••i·'· •.... f 1,,,•• .>. ',l, ..: "1&\' .• \ •• ! ··.·l·.· 1 :,f" t ." . • '.• 't. ..".. ..: 'f' 'f • • • : .. .' ."

.:.• ••••• d :t.,.."" -.,1, .:! •• , ". ",:, ': ...I· • It.t '.1'

• :.:.; ·: •••.t...ut,'.::..;.', ".')"'''!''''! ..,;. ;: -••,.!i· fl.: t' . -'0 -r-:'.

• t t .... :; .•, j··.1 t. 4 •

. • ".',," ·.ti ·d.···· .1 •.:1: n t i: ,,. /" .•... ·t ..,·...:·, '•. ,' ·i. : '.: .It , ..;'"

Ii; :•.. .. ·:! .• t.. •f ; i '6i:i: •••. ; .... ,. : I:' 'L •• ';' / 'I· ·t':

.,•..,: L,·.... ., ;<'''it·;·'·; 'I,l,.l ': .,: '" ; ·t :.' •., t· .1:"": ..

';'.... 'I •. u ••..•.( .. ... J I '. ";)"'-.: : ••..• : I J. ·i·d· ..... . r • . . . • .' .' '. 1

": I, J .,·:··.·i· t,&- .•"I I ••,••·.',.f· ., ,... • .·.·.:.. :1·' .' .. •., ;.""": •. i', I, .. ;. " ,'.. ..•.•..•.,'.\,,:' ,..,\. I" I··' ,... ••••

':' , '. • " •• I r·. .• . • '.i .' .'. " •• " • '.

'lli·i•• I ....: •..•' "I·.t .•. j .:,:'. ,.,t,· • • t ,lit ..... .'

. ,'-l",' .. 'il;' ::1'1. :•.•.••• • , . ,. .' f' . . 1! .':' '., ".j; .i ; .. I I't I l' •..••.• ".1 , ," I "!:.';" '.. .. ,.,.: , ." ' , . • "I . I .. J • . .'

.." .. " t.!.., ·4 ,'1 •.;!' ,••• ·lIa:/.1.· .:... ..• ..''''':, ,.: ... .•'·.

1'1:;•••.•• ••• •• ,·.:, •. ... .' ..... .. ,:"1"': '" \, ','

.; • "', I, : ••,.:.: ;:i '....I::r .. ;,: ':-:;:i· ':':' t. I:.':" .... ',. t' ',',,' ... ,'.•..: '11 ••, :: ,.,;, ••• t' t''': "! i ••:: ••• " .... " t." ..'

.. " '!!. ! ·•.•• f;,. :.1·.1 a".";"': .•••...: ,;.'1 :", _,'•. ...•.. :.•; .:

.'I'! .. ;·1· ' ,." .. •• ;tl."ti' ·li •. :I·. . "':'.' 'p;f,!.,":.

• /:;:" It: ' .. "1 'i'....:·•.. 'i·'.'.·.·; .... c.";·!'. "I

u•.1 ." .• ',. " ..... t ·.,!t •••. ',oi " , : .... :· •• ,: ;, ••• ; !. 0,;..•••.• ..' .. .. . .,. . . ' . " . . ", .

"I'''; •• IJ, ..:t,.• ,.",,-, I: '.1 '!" ",,1 I':· " .. I".:•.• I' .: " •.

• . .'••;·:I!": ',.'" •. .. Ii.' .... '0'; . . . .

:'. 'II:J-: ::'.-':

..
.TOINT COMMITTE

03d Congresa } 24 lad Session

.,

V••• GOVERNMENT PRINTINO 

WASHINGTON. I"'•

Printed for the 'lie ot the Joint CiJlIlIlIlttee 

REPORT NO.

01" TUB

aPEOIAI1 PANEl. TO STUll\" 

. NUef,liJAU I\IATlm

" .

."

•

"

NOLO F

TlIU SEP 

TRANSPORTATION OF 

MATERIAL BY PASSEN

SEPTEafDRR 11, 10

TO THB

JOINT COMl\fITTEE ON A

CONGRESS OF TIlE UN

NINETY-THIRD CON

SESSION

hrllIe III the 8upe.-tatelldellt.t

O•

• W••b1llltoll, D.e. 2IH02 - &"l1ce ". 

....1

"

"

,\

".". '..,' .. ' ·'t

•

.. ,- o

.. ,.. " "

,.

,',' -t .. , " ," •••• _. ." I.

,f r ... II ',., 1 '. I ,"

.. "

Yc,,'rnn. An U1lf'llIlrJtrll rll'IIlI'lItnr)' llArUrl/;' with 1\ IIlnMlC 'e1h;htly j;rellter thnn

Ihat lit till' 111'1111111, 111111 (unllel III the ot every ntum 1lI'lI\'lc'r thnn lIyelrll1:1'11.

A (rt'I' 111,,,1 ron 111 \l1Il'llllhlc' 1I11c1 (II'I'II)'H with

n of uhout 1:1 mlll\lteM .

111111 1111 1,11'1'1 run, 111'1111111, ullcllII'nlrlllfl.

Jlu,lilll;'JI/. '1'1 ... l,rllll:ll:lIl1l111 CIt rlll'rl:)' tllrolll:h mutter or simce III the tOl'lIlB

ut WII\'C'lIl1ll1l fIlSI·III11,'11I1: 1ll1l'IIl'1rH,

Ru,Ii,,,,r:tIc'o lnlll'l,•• Lubl'lli 1"'1I1'IIIl: IIII' uulqnc trl'fllll rll 111 IIIIon wllrlllnlf Il)'mbolll

whic'1I 111'1' I'C"IIII"'cl lu hc' Illnc'I,,1 111I IWII ClIIINI.dtl! /lltle'll CIt 1'111'11 IIIICIUll:1l ot

I'UCli"lIc'lIn' nurtvrtn], 1':11('11 I'luIlIlIlC'lh'c Iuhel IlIlCI\\'H Ihc' cOllle'nltc, tim lllllllimt

lit rolllllllld ivll)' In c'\lr"'l'l, IIl1cl CII\ I'luliCllWllvc )'1'1111\\'-11111111 rllcllCllwlh'e YI'lluw111 IIIIN'IIl, 1111' 1I111111,,'r CIt IrllllKllort lnrlexcs. LIlIII'IH lire 11I\'lcll'Il 11110:

(1) \\'flllc....I IIIIIC'I-tllr ('111'11 11l\l'IClIj;e 1I0t rxc'I'c'dlll" 0,5 ",1111-

rrm IM'r huur lit. 111I)' Ilulnt 1111 the external Hnrrnc'o ot thc Iluckllgr, not

nnllluI'l7.I'cl fur l"I":<lIe Clal'lll

n IllIl'IwJ:rll ;

(:.!) rlllilullcl\,'o )'1'1111\\,-11 IIIhl'l-flll" rnell.llnclml:p. rxrrecllll" IhultH ot

rCIlIIII:lC'llve whllc"-T IlIhc'l, hilt lillI, I'xcc'rcllll,;' 10 mlttlrems 1I0nr nt ICltr·

flll'C' lI11cllllll c'xc'c'c',lIl1Jr "1 lit OJi; IIl1d

(:lj 1'111110:11'11\'1' yC'llllw-llI IllllC'l-tClr cueh oxcl'rclln/; lhlliltc ot

rnlliu;\C'!I"1! )"1'1111\\,-·11 1111,,'1, C'lII'" 1"1Illol II I' C:IIlAA IT ( JlIIC'I'IIJrt!, eneh lIu'Jrl!

CII"IIIIII)' 111111 1'1\l'1I IJlldwJrr hl'illl: under u IIC.'rmlt,

'1'III1c' rc'c,"II'c',1 fur II taclilllllwlhlc' til IIINI! no llel'cent of UH nclh'lty

h)' ,Ic...a)', 1':nl'lI rllllill1l1lC'lich' hUHl\ 1I11111lle hlllf·litl',

/(",/i',I,"I"I;,lo. All unstuhle "'"1IIIie lit nn element I1..It clecn)'11 or dlHllltcl;rntell

I'm II I 11l1l17.llIlt rautn lion.

R,'m IAI'rllll)'1Jl tllr rlll'lIll:c'lI c11llh'nlc'nt mnn.] The untt of ot nny 101l1z1l1"

1'11,111111111\ wll..... l'I'mllle'('N the snme .-lIed ns n unIt of absorbrd

cllINC' lit u,'clillllr)' X'I'UrH"

liar-/lI!Jn, [Ah",'c','ialloll I')

A I1IIlt ot exposure to 10Tl17;llIg rnlllntlOil. It is tllnt

111111111111 o( 1:11111111:\ or X'I'U)'" requlred to produee 10UH c'nnyill/; 1 etectrostutte

111111 lIr ell'd .'kal c'lI:II'1:1' (dllwr IIIlldth'e or hi 1 cubic eeuthueter ot

clf)' nir stnntlurd cClllIlItioUN,

HCllllrrll;'jIJ. ,Ii,,1(//I"I'II, 'I'h.. In-tween Ihe IIlIHIlI'nger fllete of tbe floor or

loart 1111111 lIr Ihc! Jln",;colIll"'" compu rllllC'lIt mul thp nearest su rtllce of Il Ilucknge

CIt rmllnnet Ivo IIIIIlC'l'la I Hlnwc'llin (hI' curgn compartment,

HeJIIIllt/,: "fJcrl .•II! rn,lI"I;m., ot rudlntton Ilmlted to the expOlmd Incllvld\1ul,

lit' ...l1 trollll:l'lIl't1c C'fi'l'l'tll.

fi;"11";IIf/"IIIt,

A 1011 f'II' 111/111111" pnclml:l'1l ot l'ndillaclh'e materlnte 111 tile

rar;!C1 compurtrueut ot 111I IIh'cfnft whleh 1I11C1W8 nn ah'crllCt to corr)' lievernl

CIt "1111\11111111'1111111)'; thc HllIldllg·out conllgllrllt!oll limits the

IllllllhC'r CIt Jln,'kUI;I'1C In cllC'h J:rClIl(l nllli ICIIl'Cll1C'lC minimum IlC'JlIII'ntlop 11IHtnllCeS

IIl1cl 11I:<l;ll1l'etlht!tw(,l'n ot

7'1./1, Thrl'\I\ohulIlncscent dOI'IDlcter.

2','QII.•III;"";1II1 !lIclor. The (mrlloll ot rOlllntlon pnfl.'I11I1r -throllj;h the nlrcrntt

"trul'tnrcH hl'tw!!l'n the rnc1ll1t1on ,.OIlrce lind the clolle poillt of Intercllt,

llll/C'J1 ('1'1), 'fhe nlllllhrr lllllcl'd on the lnbel ot u pOt'kn"e ot raclloIIdh'p IIlllferlnl to clC'I;!:;lIl1te tile Ilrgrt'p. of contc'ol to bc exerclICed b)' the corrieI'

<lurllllt Irnnsportntlon, The trunsl'0rt index ill equul to the Illrger of the

,t4?llowlnl: : "

., the highest rudlutlon dose rllte, In mll1lrcm per hour ut three teet troDl AD7

, acccIll.lble uternalllurtace ot the puckage; or for fluile materiAl pAckages, '0:.11 the number 60 divided b7 the numbcr ot almUar packalel which DlDf be ' . trADsported together UDderAEO . '"." 1-.;I - '. 't. .1. ,t. • . .' Of. I ".l "."

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APPENDIX V

Letter, dated February 2, 1979, from A. Von Baeckmann,

Director, IAEA Safeguards, Division of Development and Technical Support,

to the U.S. IAEA Mission in Vienna
"Air shipments of small quantities of plutonium-containing materials" United

States Public Law 94/7 [sic] (Augustt 1975) restricted the U.S. air transport

of plutonium t except for small medical devices t until the approval of a crashworthy shipping container. Although the law directly affected only U.S.

licensees and contractors t it can have a major effect on air shipment of IAEA

samples from other countries. Some countries might set legal conditions for

air shipments of plutonium t using the U.S. law as an example.

The above restriction has been rescinded by the USNRC (August 4t 1978) based

on requiring the use of a new container for air shipments of Pu. This new

container is designed for up to 2 Kg of PU02 and the approved container weighs

500 lbs. I am unaware if the law or NRC regulation specifies an amount of Pu

below which the new package need not be used and lighter-weight t less expensive

(perhaps previously) approved containers could be used instead. If not t to

ship a 1.0g sample would require a 500 lb container. The law as written might

even apply to a resin bead bearing only milli- or micrograms of plutonium.

Tpe cost of containerst and especially air-freight charges t could be a large

burden to the IAEA if the US persists and several countries impose the same

conditions as the US for air shipments of plutonium.

The IAEA has need for rapid shipment of safeguard~ samples containing from

less than 0.1 to about 10 grams of plutonium. Under average conditionst the

number of samples to be transported at one time from one facility might be 12t

and the total plutonium for average shipments might be about 20 grams of

plutonium. There could be several such shipments each month t but from different

facilities scattered over the world. Under peak conditions t the number and

amount to be transported at one time from one facility might be 30 and 100 grams

respectively. These are only first order estimates. It would be highly

beneficial for international safeguards if the U.S. would provide a lead for

other nations to follow in facilitating such air shipments.

·C~uld you please find out whether U.S. law and regulations would permit air

shipments of piutonium without use of the approved crash-worthy container if

the amount of plutonium is less than a limited amount.

For example:

A. A resin bead bearing micrograms of Pu

B. An NBS standard of milligrams to 1 gram Pu

C. A standard sample of about 10 grams

O. Groups of samples totalling about 100 grams."

It would be highly desirable if the U.S. Mission could initiate steps to

facilitate such shipments. There can also be difficulties about inner containers to be used within the outer container discussed above. Thus t it would

also be highly beneficial if the U.S. could assist in establishing or maintaining an international agreement for air shipments which would be applicable
not only between nations but also within nations. This would minimize difficulties about one! type of inner container being required up to the airport,

another 'j nner container bei ng requi red by i nternati ona1 carders, and still

another tn the country of receipt. Inability e.g. to repack inner containers

at ai rpor-ts would otherwise prevent air shipments.

Attention to the problem of Pu transport was raised in the ISPO review meeting

1978 which resulted in the submission of two new tasks: A.59 - International

Air Shipment of Irradiated Plutonium on Resin Beads to Facilitate International

Safeguards, and A.GO - Air Shipment of Plutonium Samples to Facilitate Inter·

national Safeguards. We would be most grateful if the U.S. Mission could complement this ISPO effort by looking into the legal aspects of Pu air shipments. 1I
APPENDIX VI

Memorandum of January 7. 1980 from G. H. Cunningham. OELD

to A. D. Palo. OMPA

"
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In connection'with implementation of the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement,

currently before 1the.U.S. Senate for approval. rapid ail, shipment of quantities

of plutonium in sa.mples up to several hundred grams to thelAEA safeguards

laboratory will be necessary. The lAEA Deed was defined in a letter dated

February Z. 1979 from A. von Baeckmann. Director, lAEA Safeguards Division of

Development and 'reclmical Support to the U.S. lAEA Mission in Vienna.

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JAil 7 1980

MEMORANDUM FOIR: A. DiPalo

Office of Management and Program Analysis

FROM: Guy H. Cunningham. m

Chief Regulations Counsel

Office of the Executive Legal Director

SUBJECI": LEGISLATION PROPOSALS FOR 97l'H CONGRESS

In respollLse to Mr. Gossick'. memorandum of December 19. 1979. requesting proposals for possible inclusion in an NRC Omnibus Legislation Package, OELD ,

recommerlds that ~the Commbsion seek legislative authority to exempt shipment

of plutonium in IAEA safeguards samples from the requirement for shipment

in packages which have been certified by the Commission to be crash resistant •

pursuant to the p:rovisions in the ·Scheuer Amendmentlt contained in P .L. 94-79.

The Direl:tor of the OUice of International Programs has expressed his support

for this proposal. • ,

-Tbe IAEA has need for rapid shipment of safeguards samples

cOtl.taining f'rom less than 0.1 to about 10 grams of plutonium.

Uncier avera.ge conditions. the number of samples to be transported

at eae time from one fadUty might be 12, and the total plutonium

for average shipments might be about ZO grams of plutonium.

The=re could be several such ahipments each month, but from different

facUities scattered over the world. Under peak conditioDs,.the: '

. DWlilber and amount to be transported at one time from one facility

, .mlght be 30 to 100 grams respectively. These are only first order ':

.sellmates. h would be highly beneficial for international·safeaual"ds 1£ tb.e U.S. would prOVide a lead for. other nations to follow

til facilitatiJ:li auch air shipments•.
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Could you please find out wbether U.S. law and regulations would

.. permit air shipments of plutonium without use of the approved

crash-worthy container if the amoUDt of pIutonium is less than

a limited amoUDt•

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Por example:

A. A resiD bead bearing micrograms of Pu

B. AD NBS standard of mUUgrams to 1 gram Pu

c. A stazadard sample of about 10 grams

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D. Groups of samples totalUng about 100 grams.- l

.. - Original sig!'!ed by

Guy H. Cunningham, IU

Ouy H. Cunningham. 111

Chief Regulations Co\JD8el

Office of the Executive

ee: J. Becker

N. Eisenberg

The proposal has no budgetary implications for NRC •. though its implementation

would result lD cost savmgs for licensees.

OELJ) bas DO specific comments OD chenlne tentative. oac proposals•.

ID the oplDion of ELD the desired authority can only be obtained through legislatioD,

though developlDent of a regulation to exempt .very small shipments .of plutoi:li~m

is.underway • A 110n-statutory alternative is the development and certtfic"ation of a

_smaller package for safeguards samples that .would meet the NRC criteria used to

certify the one existing package design that has been approved. While DOE is

pursuing this option. we do Dot belleve tbat the smaller package will be avanable

mthe near term.

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APPENDIX VII'

Letter of May 31, 1979 from Senator John Glenn to Chairman Hendrie
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COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL A"AIRS

SUIICOMMITT££ ON ENERGY. NUc:uu.R

PROLII"DtATION ANI:) P'ECERAL SERVIc:£S

WASHINGTON. e.e, 20110

May 24, 1979

Honorable Joseph M.Hendrie

Chairman

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Hendrie:

It has· been brought to my attention that the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a need for rapid shipment

of safeguards samples containing less than 0.1 to about

10 grams of plutonium. Ordinarily, 10 samples containing'

some 20 grams of plutonium might be shipped from a single fac~lity in one shipment. However, under conditions of

maximum usage, shipment from an individual facility would

be only as high as 30 to 100 grams.

As you know, these quantities fall well below the amounts

envisioned for airshipment of radioactive materials

when the regulations governing the crash-worthiness of

containers were formulated. This means that shipments

must either be delayed or they must be sent in containers

the bulk and weight of which far exceed the necessity

of the amounts being transported.

'.

Given these circumstances and the exigencies of the

lAEA's safeguards program, I believe that a review of the crash~worthiness requirements for containers in which small

quantities of radioactive materials are shipped is in order.

To accomplish this, I would suggest the Department of

Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission meet

without delay to form an ad hoc group on the matter.

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May 24, 1979

Please notify me at your earliest convenience of the

steps you have taken to arrange this meeting. Additionally, please keep me advised on the progress of the group.

In this regard, it would be most useful if an individual

were designated to act as liaison with my staff. This

individual should be in touch with Dr. Leonard Weiss,

Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear

Proliferation and Federal Services or his' designee.

I am notifying the other involved agencies by means of

a similar letter.

Many thanks for your cooperation•.

.....S_i_nCerelY. I':? .

John Glenn

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APPENDIX VIII

Letter of July 6, 1979 from Chairman Hendrie to Senator John Glenn
UNITED STATES

. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, c. C. 20555

.

. .July 6, 1979

,

, ,

The Honlorable John Glenn, Chainnan

Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear .

Proliferation and Federal Services'

Conmittee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Washington,. D.C.. 20510

. Dear Mr. Chairn~n:

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This is in regard to your 'ett~r of May 31, 1979, suggesting the

fonnation of an inter-agency group to review the crash-worthiness

requir'ements fClr containers used to ship small quantities of

plutonium· by a;lr. .

On August 4, 1~~78, NRC certified to Congress that a sa.ofe shipping

container for cdr transport of plutonium had been developed and

tested and that the container would not rupture under crash and . blast-testing equtval ent to the crash and explosion Cl7 a high-flying

aircraft. Thts certification was made in accordance with Public

Law 94..79, enacted August·g, 1975, which prohibits the NRC from

1icens'ing any shipments of plutonium in any fonn other than within

certain merlical devices, .by air' transport whether exports, :imports,

or domestic shipments, except in certified containers. Before making

the ce'rtification, the NRC evaluated the conditions tr.at could be

produced tn aircraft accidents and developed qualification criteria

for p1uton"iurn packaqes. As a resul t, the cri teri a add~ess the

requirements of P.l. 94-79 that testing be equivalent to the crash

and explosion of a high-flying aircraft. The require~nt· of .. P·.L. 94-79 for the container not to rupture is addressed in

the criteria by specifying post-test acceptance standards equivalent

·to those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The criteria . also specify various engineering assessments to be made on plutonium

package designs and require that certain operational controls be

observed in tr-anspor-t, The operati ona1 controls are needed to prevent

or mitigate certain accident conditions. The criteria, as well as the

packaSle desigrl developed by the NRC· to meet the criteria, were endorsed.

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, by both the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor safeguards and the National Acad~y of Sciences.

On April 25. 1979. representatives of'the Department of Energy (DOE). the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) met with your staff to discuss the IAEA sample shipment problem. Our representative pointed out that we are not aware of any

new techncial data which would support development of less stringent criteria for plutonium package certification under P.l. 94":79•. Two ~lternatives were suggested at the meeting for solving the shipment problem. One alternative is to develop a small safeguards sample container that would meet the NRC qualification criteria for air .'

transport of plutonium. The other alternative is to initiate legislative action to provide an exemption to Public law 94-79 for the quantities of plutonium or types of shipments involved in the IAEA sample shipment

program. We understood that DOE has agreed to initiate a program. . to develop a small safeguards container that would meet the NRC'. . criteria. If this DOE program does not produce an appropriate container

on a schedule' consistent with the needs of the IAEA, 'we believe that

. the alternative ,involving legislative action should be pursued. Although we believe that certain very small quantities of plutonium could be exempted from the plutonium package requirements for air

transport. not all the safeguards samples (up to lOO grams per shipme~t) could be exempted while'still offering a level of public safety provided by Public law 94-79.

- I trust that this infonmation is responsive to your request. If

you have additional questions•. please feel free to contact me.'

Sincerely,

Or1g1Dal S,igned ty

~seph14. Bendr1e

Joseph M. Hendrie

,.

Cleared with all Cmrs. by SECY C/R

Retyped in SECY to incorporate Cmr. comment

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APPENDIX IX

Letter of June 4, 1979 from George Weisz , DOE to

Professor Johannes J. Gruemm, IAEA
ATTACHMENT II

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Dear Professor Grucmm:

As' you ~~1 recall, U.S. legislation requires a plutonium cc.ota~er

certified by the Nuclear I'..e:;ulatory Co.."':lI:I:ission (:mC) ::lCctins certa,1:l

safety perforcnnce requirements before any plutoniUQ, regardlesc of

qu:mtity, mr.y be shipped by rlr in the Lt:U.ted State:.. You arc :U.zo

'-"are that mlly one cOtltai.ller, elle l'AT-l, has to date been certified

by :a'XC.

I a= takiugthis opport~~ity to prov~de you ~~th a brief status report

C':1 the ste?s we have taken to address the plutonium sa.::li>le air tra..,.gporu.t1on proble!:l. you described during your visit hare in late ~..arcb.

At this point in tir.:c tbe general conaenaus ClU\!Jogst the various coneezaed U.S. p:lrties ~s that lc~1s1Ative rclia! is not f~sible.

Accordingly, lore have i.:rltiated C1 t.'4ree-pronged attack to provide the

needed flexibility.

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Prcfc.:o.sar Jo1u:mlC& J. GrucI:C

Deputy D~rector for Safeguards .

Inten:.4ticual AtOldc Lnllrgj' Agency

l\arntner Ung 11

P. C. Box 590

A-lOll Vienna, Austria

the fUst is to devGlop and obtain ccrtif1c~tiCll for -a 60&11 container

to acco==odate sh1pl:lents in the sue range of 30 to a few hundred zr.:1~.

PreJ1,=1na ry design of such n container. \1cighi:lg 70 pouads , is nov

cOII:.plete and Sancl1a is being tasked to pzoceed with n final desien to

be submitted to un.c for certification. Our ~stima.te is that final

ciesign and test .-:1.11 take approxi%C4tely 12 tlC:lI:tils and !ii.C certif;~~~gn

rill tal:e 2.nother four to six conths. . ...., ._ - .

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\tith respect ce plutonim:a nitrntG solution sa.oples using the resin bead

techciGue, weare in e~~cation ~ith ~TRC to e~lcre ~n intet'?rct~tion

th4t such 8~l.eS cIo not fall ~ith1n the statutory prchibitiO:l•. lie

believe such interpretation is possible vi:thin the intent and ::ze.a.nin8

of the U.S. Gtz1tutory refluirements in vie~ of the miniscule c:ounts of

pluto:1.iUZll 1nvolvcd.

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F:l:uUl)", \li~h respclct ee the u::e of PAT-1 cor.t~i1:.crs 1:1 carc:o aircr:tl:.

vc he-vc initic:tc:d co!:Cu::1ic::tiou ui:h the :C?C aad the t.S. lJcp~r:~nt of

'tr£nGportc.t:1.o:: lo:'itll a vic..'V toward ~:'riv4..t:.; at :l set of ::tutu::.lli·-"-;3rec~,

.; '.: 8~lificd :cc~u:irEm:lEl:::s. tJc· e':peet these to &:lir.::ln:ltc or reduce the OPe:1" .

. . .. 8~ce rCClu1:t:'c:.l.C:Ut a.ft: of the. Pl·.! co:tt<l1:c:r i:l the cl1rzo b~:-, of the: 41:-

.C17a!t. theriBOj' sign:1.f1cctly reduc1n~ tlU! sar.!!'le tracs~ort:ttion costs.

we arA &&:ressive1y pur::uine eaca of these steps a11Q vill, as 811pr0J:tria.te,

continue to keep you infonued of the prozras& :"1..1e.

S11<occrely.

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DP-311:UrBrtmner: amd: 353-5108: 5 /31/79

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Georr-e Weis.

Director

OffLea of ~:tfesuard3

Dr•. Adc)!f vou li'lecl-an--; •..IlL...

lieu. Rc)~r Kid;, u. s. Ui.GG1.on to

'tho J:AZA.

eel Securi~y

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ENCLOSURE 4
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL FOR

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 71

TO RESTRICT THE AIR TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM

Prepared by

Catherine R. Mattsen

and

Norman A. Eisenberg

December 1980

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has under consideration a proposed amendment to 10 CFR Par-t 71 that would restrict the air transport of plutonium in

any form" This almendment implements the Scheuer Amendment, which is part of

Publ ic LilW 94-79 and appears as a foonote to Section 201 of the Energy Reo'rganization Act of 1974. When effective, this amendment will replace orders to NRC

licensees which have until now restricted the air shipment of plutonium. The

proposed amendment differs from the currently effective order to licensees, in

part, by allowing shipments of an A2* quantity or less of plutonium to be shipped

by air in other than a package certified to be air-crash resistant.

This. environmental appraisal considers two..types of regulatory change:

1) the imposition of restrictions on shipping pluontium by air as embodied in

the currently effective order to licensees and 2) the incremental change in

restrictions effected by implementing those features of the proposed rule which

are diffe!rent from the existing order to licensees. Since the proposed rule

codifies the requirements of the existing order, it is necessary to perform an

*An A2 quantity of plutonium is defined in Table VII of the International Atomic

Energy A,gency Re,gul ations for the Safe Transport of Radi oacti ve Materi a1s , IAEA

Safety Series No.6. Table 8-4 in Appendix B lists the A2 quantities for various

plutonium isotopes and some common mixtures.

1 Enclosure 4
environmental analysis of those requirements, as well as the requirements of

the proposed rule which are different from the existing order to licensees.

The major impacts to the environment of restricting air transport of plutonium

is to reduce radiological risks to the population and to virtually eliminate

the possibility that a public catastrophe could result from the release of plutonium in a severe air crash. The impact appraisal examines the environmental

impacts associated with the transport of plutonium in air-crash-resistant packages and the impacts from allowing transport of an A2 quantity or lower quantities without special packaging requirements. The appraisal concludes that the

allowance of shipments of an A2 quantity or less in other than air-crashresistant packaging does not significantly affect the environment and that an

environmental impact statement need not be prepared, since the estimated

environmental impacts of the proposed action are negligible.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION

The proposed action would adopt amendments to the regulations for transport

".

of radioactive material (10 CFR Part 71) that would restrict the air transport

of plutonium in all. forms. P~rsuant to the Scheuer Amendment, the Commission

will require that shipments of plutonium by air be contained in a package specifically licensed as air-crash resistant. However, plutonium may be shipped in

other packages if the plutonium is in a medical device for individual human

use or if the plutonium is shipped in quantities or concentrations small enough

to present no significant hazard to the public health and safety, even were

the package containing the plutonium not to survive the crash and explosion of

a hi~h-flying aircraft.

2 Enclosure 4
PROBABLE IMPACTS OF PROPOSED ACTION

The amendment described above implements PL 94-79 (the Scheuer Amendment)

by replacing, with a rule, the order to licensees which has been a temporary

means of restricting air transport of plutonium in accordance with PL 94-79.

Although restricting the air shipment of plutonium enhances the public health

and safety, enforcing the restrictions by a rule instead of an order is primarily an administrative change and has no significant impact on the environment. However. the allowance to ship an A2 quantity or less of plutonium in

packaginn other than that certified to be air-crash resistant is a provision

not speci'fically set out in the Scheuer Amendment nor in the order to licensees

restricti'ng air transport of plutonium in the interim. This impact appraisal

then primarily addresses the impact of this provision and demonstrates that

the allo~,ance to ship small amounts in other than air-crash-resistant packages

would not cause a significant risk and that even the crash of a high-flying

aircraft containing such small quantities in packages that are not air crashresistant. would have only minor radiological consequences. The impacts of

requiring the shipment of plutonium in a package able to satisfy a set of qualification criteria, are also addressed, but in much less detail.

IMPACTS OF EXEMPT QUANTITIES

A. Health Consequences

The health cl)nsideration of transporting plutonium by air under incidentfree conditions is the external radiation dose to persons near the package from

gamma emissions. Since gamma rays represent only a small part of the disintegration energy of plutonium and since the gamma emissions are at low photon

energies, the extl~rnal radiation from packages of plutonium is at a low flux

3 Enclosure 4
level; thus, the doses associated with an A2 quantity, a relatively small quantity

of plutonium, would be very small. For most isotopes of plutonium, the A2 quantity

is 2 or 3 millicuries, but for Pu-241 the A2 quantity is 1 curie (see Table 8-4,

Appendix 8). Nevertheless, most of the energy from th~ disintegration of Pu-241

is in the form of a emission, which is stopped by the container. Thus, even

in that case the external radiation dose is expected to be small.

NUREG-0170 (Reference 1, p. 4-41) estimates the normal population dose

from all plutonium shipments, by all modes, for the 1975 base year and under

present regulations, to be 43.5 person-rem. This accounts for less than percent (about 0.45%) of the total population dose of 9790 person-rem resulting

from incident-free shipment of all radioactive material. Since the health effects

resulting from all incident-free radioactive shipping is estimated to be 1.7

genetic effects and 1.2 latent cancer fatalities (Reference 1, p. iv), the health

effects resulting from incident-free shipping of plutonium is proportionally

_3

less (about 5 x 10 latent cancer fatalities under present regulations) and

definitely negligible. The impact from the plutonium shipment of interest here,

".

shipments by air and shipments of quantities less than an A2 quantity, is only

a fraction of the impact from all plutonium snipments, which is negligible.

Another consideration in allowing small quantities of plutonium to be transported by air in other than an air-crash-resistant package is the possible release of the plutonium in the event of an air crash. Two aspects are of interest:

(1) that the risk from all air crashes is acceptably small, and (2) that the

consequences of a single, very severe air crash are not capable of causing large

public health consequences. For the lower severity accidents, even normal packaging would not be expected to permit release of any of the plutonium, since

that packaging is sufficiently strong to survive minor transport accidents (see

Chapter 5, Ref. 1), therefore low severity accidents do not contribute to the

4 Enclosure 4
radiological risk. For a severe accident, e.g., the crash and explosion of a

high-flying airp"lane, all of the plutonium in a package could be released.

However, only a part of the released plutonium will be taken in (inhaled or

ingested) by people and thus cause any health effects. Direct inhalation of

released plutonium is considered to be the most significant exposure pathway;

water and food chain routes and submersion doses are considered to be insignificant in comparison for releases like these that are not continuous or from a

fixed site. AlsCI, it can be shown (see Appendix A) that for a given amount of

plutonium re l aased, dispersed, and inhaled by a population at risk, more deaths

resul t f'rom dt strtbutton of small amounts of plutonium to many jndividuals,

thereby causing latent cancer fatalities, than result from the distribution of

larger amounts of plutonium to a lesser number of individuals, in quantities

sufficient to caLise prompt fatalities. To estimate what health effects would

result from release of plutonium in an air crash, one must estimate the factors

by which the activity reaching people's lungs would be reduced, namely: the

percent I'eleased, the percent aerosolized, the percent which is of respirable

particle size, and the percent actually deposited in the lungs of people (this

last factor depends on the.air dispersJon, popul~tiQn distribution, breathing.

rate, and pulmonary retention rate).

If one makes very conservative estimates for these factors, one would estimate that the release of an A2 quantity in a severe accident could result in

at most 0.105 latent cancer fatalities (this is an upper bound value obtained

by using the worst combination of radiotoxicity and A2 quantity, viz. Pu-242).

For purposes of comparison, if 10 ~Ci were used as the quantity limit instead

_4

of an A2 quantity, 3.5 x 10 latent cancer fatalities would result. It is of

course possible for a number of such packages to be on the same aircraft and

thus involved in an accident; however, the estimated radiological consequences

5 Enclosure 4
of a crash involving multiple shipments (say, a conservatively large number of

100 packages containing an A2 quantity potentially resulting in 10.5 latent

cancer fatalities) would be of concern, but would not generally be considered

to be an event involving large public health consequences. Taking some estimates from NUREG-0170 [1] for numbers of shipments, kilometers travelled, accident rates, etc., and using a conservative analysis, the number of latent cancer

fatalities expected to result from all severities of air accidents involving

transport of an A2 quantity or smaller quantities not in the air-crash-resistant

packaging, would be on the order of three ten thousandths annually; i.e., the

total annual shipping activity of small quantities of plutonium in other than

air-crash-resistant packages would be expected to cause .far less than a single

latent cancer fatality, as a result of release of plutonium in air crashes.

The calculations supporting these estimates are included in Appendix B. The

radiological risk from the plutonium permitted to be shipped in other than air-

_3

crash-resistant packaging is small, in comparison to the 6 x 10 latent cancer

fatalities estimated to result from vehicular accidents in all modes involving

all types of radioactive shipments under present regulations (Reference 1, pp. iv

and vii). This small radiological risk resulting from allGwing small quantities·

to be shipped in other than air-crash-resistant packages would not necessarily

be reduced to zero were this allowance not made, since it is likely that these

small quantities would be shipped by alternate transport modes. Since shipping

small quantities of plutonium by alternative transportation modes is not without

risk, the alternative of not permitting small quantities to be shipped by air

in other than crash-resistant packaging may actually produce no decrease in

radiological risk.

6 Enclosure 4
B. Economic Impacts

The primary economic impact of allowing an A2 quantity or less of plutonium

to be shipped in other than air-crash-resistant packaging is to reduce costs

of shipping items containing small quantities of plutonium. In most cases of

shipments equal to or below an A2 quantity, the high costs of air-crash-resistant

packages would make air transport too costly and thus impractical. Having to

use ocean freight in most cases would be burdensome. Because plutonium is in

a "speci al cl assl f tcat.tcn" the shipping companies must fill out special papers,

and present them in advance to each port authority where the ship plans to dock.

In each port the authorities can and very often do go aboard the ship to check

on these "special classified packages. II This causes delays of one day or more

at each por-t. These delays also cause extra changes at each dock, (Le., berth

charges, etc.).. In both land transport and ocean freight, the additional time

required for shipment can cause a significant economic impact to the businesses

involved. The ec:onomic impact of an airplane accident associated specifically

with the preSenCE! of plutonium would be the cost of decontaminating the area.

Assuming the complete release from a package containing an A2 quantity or from

several such packages ·as the result of an airplane crash, the ar~a that would

be contaminated to a level requiring cleanup probably would be confined to the

area containing the debris from the crash. Contamination to a high enough level

to requil"e cleanup would probably not occur more than 150 meters downwind from

the impact point. The additional costs of cleanup related to the presence of

plutoniu~~ (on the order of $1,OOO's - see Figure 5-13, Ref. 1) would be insignificant

compared to the cost of recovery from the air crash.

7 Enclosure 4
Impacts of Satisfying the Qualification Criteria

For the purpose of this appraisal, we assume that the test conditions listed

in NUREG-0360 are equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.

The acceptance criteria in NUREG-0360 allow for the release of up to an

A2 quantity* per week subsequent to testing to the conditions stated in that

report. Thus, the primary radiological impact of the transport of plutonium

in air-crash-resistant packaging would be the possible release in one week of

several millicuries of a emitting isotopes of plutonium or tens of millicuries

of Pu-241 or mixtures containing that isotope. The possible hazard associated

with this release is essentially the same as that from the A2 quantities allowed

. to be shipped in other than an air-crash-resistant package; in other words,

about a fraction of a latent cancer fatality.

To calculate the risk from these shipments, let us assume that the number

of such packages would be of the same order of magnitude as the number of packages not required to be air-crash resistant. The test conditions would simulate

primarily an accident of severity category VIII (see Reference 1 for the definition of accident severity categories) representing only 0.03% of all accidents;

thus, the probabi 1ity of such an occurrence is very small. Si nce the consequences are about the same, but the frequency of occurrence is so much smaller

(55.3% of air crashes are estimated to cause releases from packages that are

not air-crash resistant; 0.03% is about 1/1850 of that percent), the risk from

the shipment of plutonium in air-crash-resistant package would be expected to

be about three orders of magnitude less than the risk from the shipments of A2

quantities in other than air-crash-resistant packaging. This risk is of negligible significance (0.0003 x 10- 3 latent cancer fatalities per year 3 x 10- 7

LCF's per year).

8 Enclosure 4
The impact (If the action to restrict air transport of plutonium to the

air-crash-resistclnt package rather than allowing air transport of plutonium

without such packaging is to reduce radiological risks. The air-crash-resistant

packaging reduces only slightly the external population doses from the incident

free transport of plutonium; however, it has been shown above that these doses

are insignificant. The air-crash-resistant package greatly reduces the radiological risk from accidents during air transport of plutonium; it also virtually

eliminates the possibt l tty of large public health consequences under any circumstances. An additional impact of requiring use of the air-crash-resistant package

that has been considered is the use of nonrenewable resources. Since the primary

materials~used to construct the package are relatively small quantities of stainless steE~l and redwood, the use of nonrenewable resources is minimal.

CONCLUSION

The analysis above uses rudimentary methods to estimate the following categories 01' environmental impacts associated with shipment of plutonium in accordance with the proposed rule: public health consequences from incident-free

transport, public risk from air crashes, consequences of severe air crashes,

decontamination costs resulting from severe air crashes, and use of nonrenewable

resources;. The major impacts to the environment of restricting air transport

of plutonium is to reduce radiological risks to the population and to virtually

eliminate! the possibility that a public catastrophe could result from the release

of plutonium in a severe air crash. The analysis also estimates that permitting

the shipment of an A2 quantity or less of plutonium in other than air-crash-

_4

resistant packaging causes an increased risk of about 3 x 10 (about 1/3000)

latent cancer fati!lities per year resulting from air crashes and therefore does

not significantly affect the environment.

9 Enclosure 4
Above it is stated that the shipment of all plutonium by all modes of

_3

incident-free transport under present regulations results in a risk of 5 x 10

latent cancer fatalities. The risks as estimated here associated with accidents

involving plutonium shipped in accordance with the proposed rule is small in

comparison to that. Also, the total risk resulting from the proposed rule would

_3

then be smaller than the number above, 5 x 10 latent cancer fatalities. Other

impacts considered are also negligible. Thus it is concluded that the proposed

action produces no significant impact on the quality of the human environment;

therefore an environmental impact statement need not be prepared.

10 Enclosure 4
APPENDIX A

ACUTE VS. LONG TERM EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM INHALATION

This appendix considers acute health effects and concludes that calculating

long-term health effects is more conservative (produces the most deaths) than

calculat-ing some acute and some long-term effects. This ignores the difference

in public: perception between the occurrence of long-term statistical deaths

and the occurrence of short-term individual deaths.

Consideration of Acute Health Effects

From "An Estimate of Early Morl.ality and Morbidity Following Acute Inhalation of Plutonium" by Marvin Goldman (1976) [Reference 2] we have taken his

estimate of the dose ranges that cause first year mortality from inhalation of

Pu-239, in particular 67000 rem as the LD 50/365*. The effects of acute

plutonium inhalation leading to death are primarily fibrosis and pulmonary

insufficiiency. If a curie of plutonium-239 were inhaled by people so that

each recE!ived the estimated LO 50/365 of 67000 rem to the lung, 1791 people

. could· receive this dose from the one curie:

1. 2 X 108 rem/Ci 67000 rem/person =1791 people per curie

The rem/Ci value in the numerator is the one-year lung dose from inhalation of

Pu-239 as shown in Table A-I.

Presumably 50% or 896 of these would die from acute effects in the first

year and those that survive the first year would be subject to risks of cancer

fatal ity:

*The dOSE! level corresponding to 50% fatality among the exposed population

within one year from the time of exposure.

11 Enclosure 4
1791 eeople x 67000 rem = 1.2 x 108 person-rem/Ci curle

With a risk of 22.2 deaths per million person-rem (considering lung dose onlY)t

1.2 x 108 person-rem could result in 2664 deaths:

22.2 deaths x 1.2 x 108 person-rem =2664 deaths

10 person-rem

Of course t if only 896 people received this dose who had not succumbed to acute

effects t the maximum number of deaths from cancer could not exceed 896t and

from both effects the maximum number of deaths would be 1791 per curie.

TABLE A-I

One-year Lung Dose for Various Isotopes of Plutonium as Taken

from WASH-1400 (Appendix·VI)*[3]

I-Year Lung Dose

Isotope (rem/Ci)

Pu-238 1.2 x 108

Pu-239 1.2 x 108

Pu-240 1.2 x 108

Pu-241 6.4 x 104

Pu-242 1.9 x 108

*

Pu-242 I-year dose is taken from the 50-year dose in NUREG-0170 and

the proportionality of the 1- to 50-year doses for Pu-239 in WASH-1400 t

both being extremely long-lived nuclides of the same element.

If instead this curie were distributed such that each person received a

dose of 9500 rem (~ the LD100)t although approximately all would die in the

first year from acute lung effects t only 1263 could be affected:

1.2 X 108 rem/Ci = 1263 eo le/CI 95000 rem/person p p

As we lower the dose to each person more people would be involved t fewer acute

deaths would be caused t and long-term cancer fatalities would be increased.

12 Enclosure 4
The maximum canCE~r fatalities per curie of Pu-239 is 1.24 x 104/Ci inhaled by

a large population. So it can be seen that the most deaths would be caused if

a larger number of people received the same total activity and these deaths

would be a result of a cancer induction.

In Go1dman·s paper, it states that the reduction of dose in the first year

was not considerE~d in his calculations and this could change his estimate by a

factor of 2 or 3 or 22000 to 33000 rem for the LD 50/365. Also, it might be

argued that a qUcl1ity factor of 20 instead of 10 should have been used. It is

most likely that both these changes are valid but they would tend to cancel

each other out. The greatest potential change, however, cou1 d be a threefold

increase in the maximum acute deaths per curie but this would not change our

conclusion at all.

For Pu-240, and Pu-242, we can use the same estimate for LD 50/365. Since

they are all alpha emitters of very long half-life and similar a energy (and

similar LET) to Pu-239, the LD 50/365 would be very similar. These calculations were repeated for these nuclides with similar results and the same conclusion, as shown in Table A-2.

For Pu-241, a bet~ emitter, the LD 50/365 of 90Sr - 90y wou~d give a

better approximation: 43000 rem. In this case the number of acute fatalities

is extremely low.

Since all these nuclides of plutonium give lower numbers of deaths/curie

if distributed in doses high enough to give acute effects, the three mixtures

under consideration would behave the same. For these reasons we will consider

only latent cancer fatalities since the highest number of deaths could result

from a distribution of the plutonium to a greater number of people.

13 Enclosure 4
TABLE A-2

Comparison of Maximum Acute and Long-Term Fatalities

for Various Plutonium Isotopes

Isotope

Pu-238

Pu-239

Pu-240

Pu-241

Pu-242

Latent Cancer

Deaths*/Ci (Inhaled by a large Population)

1. 21 X 104

1. 24 X 104

1. 24 X 104

1. 30 X 102

1. 40 X 104

Maximum Acute Deaths/Ci

Inhaled at LD 50/365 to

Each Person

1790

1790

1790

2

2840

*From bone and lung doses.

14 Enclosure 4
APPENDIX B

BASIS FOR DETERMINING RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF AIR

TRANSPORT OF AN A2 QUANTITY OF PLUTONIUM WITHOUT SPECIAL PACKAGING

The fo11owi '1g shows the method of determi ni ng doses and 1atent cancer

fatalities that could possibly result from the release of the various plutonium

isotopes and some mi xtures.

Although reactor fuel would generally not be shipped by air in quantities

less than an A2 quantity, which are proposed to be allowed to be shipped in

other than air cl~ash-resistant packaging, there may be items containing mixtures of plutonium isotopes (e.g., assay samples) so plutonium mixtures Tesulting

from fuel reprocf~ssing are included here as examples of how such mixtures might

compare to the various isotopes of plutonium in regards to radiological impact.

Table B-1 df~scribes these mixtures in terms of weight percent of the various

nuclides and givf~s their specific activities. Table B-2 gives the rem per curie

inhaled. values u~;ed to calculate the doses; only bone and lung doses are calcula~

ted since these eire by far the most significant organ doses contributing to health

effects, i.e., lcltent cancer fatalities CLeF's). By using the risk factors 6.9

bone LCF's per 106 person:-rem to the bone and 22.2 lung LCF's per 106 person-rem

to the lung (which are BEIR coefficients for a 75-year lifetime of potential

cancer development as used in NUREG-0170), Table B-3 is obtained from Table B-2

and shows the latent cancer fatalities per curie inhaled by a large population.

From this table one can see that the maximum number of LCF's for any nuclide

or mixtu're of nuc:lides of plutonium is 1.4 x 104 LCF's per curie inhaled by a

large population for plutonium-242. This is an unrealistically high value

obtained by assuming that all the plutonium is retained in the lungs of the

exposed population. In order to determine in a more realistic fashion the number

15 Enclosure 4
of lCF's that could result from the release of an A2 quantity, one must estimate

what quantity of plutonium in the package will in fact be retained in the lungs

by members of the exposed population. Table 8-4 lists the At and A2 quantities

for various isotopes and common mixtures of plutonium. The largest product of

A2 quantity and LCF's/Ci (Tables 8-4 and 8-3) is obtained for Pu-242. Thus,

analysis of an accident involving an A2 quantity (3 mCi) of Pu-242 represents a

bounding case. Of the plutonium present in a package involved in an accident,

a fraction is released, a fraction of that is aerosolized, a fraction of that is

in respirable-sized particles, and a small fraction of that is actually inhaled

by members of the public. This last fraction depends on the dispersion in the ,

air and the population distribution. With some rough, conservative estimates

for these factors, it is easy to show that the consequences from the release of

an A2 quantity of Pu-242 is insignificant. If one assumes the following:

Percent Quantity

100 released

50 aerosolized

50 respirable

1 inhaled by a population

3 mCi

1. 5 mCi

0.75 mCi

7.5 IJCi

. For Pu-242 with the highest rem/curie inhaled value this amount inhaled would

cause an estimated 0.105 latent cancer fatalities from the involvement of

3 millicuries of Pu-242 in a severe accident. For Pu-238 the most common

isotope which would be involved, the number would be .091 latent cancer

fatalities. Thus even for an air crash obliterating multiple shipments, no

sizeable impact would occur, much less a catastrophe.

To estimate the radiological risk of allowing up to an A2 quantity of

plutonium to be shipped in other than air crash-resistant packaging, one needs to

estimate the likelihood of such an accident, as well as the consequences. In

order to do this we use some of the analysis in the Final Environmental Statement

16 Enclosure 4
-J>

,'~.~ '11,_

on the Transpor-tatton of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes NUREG"0170.

For the purposes of this appraisal, the release fractions for type A packages

of Model II (the more realistic, less conservative package release fraction

model) helve been assumed (p. 5-23, Table 5-8) and the fractional occurrences

per sevel"ity cateqory are taken from p. 5-8, Table 5-2. From these data one

calcul ates an aVE,rage release of 0.0717 or 7.17% of the contents of each package

involved in an accident (use of an average release fraction based on the fractional occurrence of the various release fraction values is equivalent to calculating consequences and determining average risk on the basis of fractional

occurrence of each accident severity). It was also assumed that as many as

5200 shipments are made annually, of one package each, of plutonium in A2 quantities or "less. Page A-22, Table A-8 of NUREG-0170 estimates approximately this

number 01: type A packages shipped by air in 1985 (based on an extrapolation of

1975 shipping activity); many of these would actually be special form material

in quanti'ties exceeding the A2 quantity for normal form, so the value of 5200

shipments is a conservative estimate. These shipments are assumed to average

594 km/shipment (ref. 1, p. A-13}: The overall accident rate of 1.44 x 10-

8

accidents/kilometer was also taken from NUREG-0170 (p. 5-8 and elsewhere).. If

one consElrvatively assumed the maximum contents of 3 mCi of Pu-242 for all packages, the result is as follows:

5200 x 1 shipment x 594 km x 1.44 X 10-8 accidents

yr pkg shipment km x

x 0.0717 of content~ released 3 mCi 0 105 latent cancer fatalities

accldent x x. 3 mCi release

_4

LCF or approx. 3 x 10 . LCF annually from allowing an A2

plutonium to be transported by air in other than crash-resistant

_4

=3.35 x 10

quantity of

packaging.

17 Enclosure 4
(For purposes of comparison, if 10 ~Ci instead of an A2 quantity were used as

the limit for shipments in packaging not certified to be air-crash resistant.

_6

the risk would be 1.12 x 10 lCF annually.)

18 Enclosure 4
..

TABLE B-1

Isotopic Content (Weight Percent) and Dosimetric Impact of Various Mixtures of Plutonium Associated with Light Water Reactors (ref. I, p. C-4)

High-burnup Predicted 1990 Predicted Isotope LWR fuel* industry avg. Equilibrium recycle

Pu-238 1.9 1.2 3.4

. Pu-239 . 63.0 53.0 41.7

Pu-240 19.0 25.8 27.1

Pu-241 12.0 13.5 15.4

Pu-242 3.8 6.0 11.7

Am-241 0.6 0.7 0.7

Specific Activity 12.3 13.68 15.93 (ci/gm)** (0.4) (0.32) (0.69)

*

35,000 MWD/tonne-Yankee fuel. **

Values for the alpha component of activity are shown in parentheses.
TABLE B-2

Specific Activity and Dose Commitment from Some Isotopes of Plutonium and Mixtures of Plut

(Plutonium doses from ref. 1. p. C-3)

Specific Type of 50-Year Bone Dose 

Isotope Activity (ci/gm) Radiation (rem/ci inhaled) 

Pu-238 17.1 a 7.6 x 108 

Pu-239 0.06 a 8.7 x 108 Pu-240 0.228 a 8.7 x 108 

Pu-241 98.98 P 1. 7 X 107 

Pu-242 0.00382 a 5.5 x 108 

High Burnup

LWR Fuel 12.3 a.p 3.47 x 107 

Predicted 1990

Industry Average 13.68 a.p 3.50 x 107 

Predicted

Equilibrium

Recycle 15.93 a.p 5.03 x 107 
TABLE B-3

Maximum Latent Cancer Fatalities Per Curie of Inhaled Material

for Various Plutonium Isotopes and Mixtures I

LCF1s (Latent Cancer Fatalities/Ci inhaled by a large population)

Isotope Bone Lung Total

Pu-238 5.24 x 103 6.88 X 103 1. 21 X 104

Pu-239 6.00 x 103 6.44 X 103 1. 24 X 104

Pu-240 6.00 x 103 6.44 X 103 1. 24 X 104

Pu-241 1.17 x 102 13.1 1. 30 x 102

Pu-242 3.80 x 103 1.02 X 104 1.40 X 104

High Burnup

LWR Fuel 2.39 x 102 2.35 X 102 4.75 X 102

Predicted 1990

Industry Average 2.42 x 102 1. 58 X 102 4.00 X 102

Predicted Equilibrium

Recycle 3.47 x 102 4.11 X 102 7.58 X 102

21 Enclosure 4
TABLE B-4

Al and A2 quantities for various plutonium isotopes and some

common mixtures

Specific Activity

Isotope Al (Ci) A2 (Ci) (Ci/g)

Pu-238 3 0.003 17

_2

Pu-239 2 0.002 6.2 x 10

_1

Pu-240 2 0.002 2.3 x 10

Pu-241 1000 0.1 1.1 x 102

_3

Pu-242 3 0.003 3.9 x 10

High Burnup

LWR Fuel 75.34 0.0455 12.3

Predicted 1990

Industry Average 105.1 0.0546 13.68

Predicted Equilibrium

Recycle 62.32 0.0406 15.93

22 Enclosure 4
REFERENCES

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development,

"Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive

Material by Air and Other Modes," Volume 1, December 1977, NUREG-0170.

2. M. Goldman, "An Estimate of Early Mortality and Morbidity Following Acute

Inhalation of Plutonium," University of California (Davis), October 1976.

3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," Appendix VI,

October 197!5, WASH-1400.

4. U.S. Nuclealr Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safegual"ds, "Qualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air

Transport of Plutonium," January 1978, NUREG-0360.

23 Enclosure 4
· ENCLOSURE

5
-------------------------

INFORMATION SUMMARY FOR REGULATION DETERMINATION

This summar-izes information to assist the Commission in making the determination required for compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The Reguirement:

The Regulatory Flexibility Act in § 605(b) indicates that the requirements

to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis do "not apply to any proposed or

fi na1 ru 1e if the head of the agency certifi es that the rul e wi 11 not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities.. If the! head of the agency makes a certification under the preceding

sentence, the agency shall publish such certificatlon in the Federal Register,

at the time of publication of general notice of proposed rulemaking for the

rule or at the time of publication of the final rule, along with a succinct

statement explaining the reasons for such certfication, and provide such certification and statement to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business

Administration. II

NRC Compliance:

The preamble to-the proposed rule (under the heading IIRegulatory Flexibility

Certificationll) states:

IIIn accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities. The proposed regulation, if promulgated, will relieve the restrictions on the air shipment of plutonium imposed by the current NRC order

to licensees by permitting the air shipment of small quantities of plutonium

in packaging other than that certified to be air-crash resistant. Currently

1 Enclosure 5
the schedules and work routine principally of small organizations, are disrupted by the inability to acquire small calibration sources containing

plutonium in a timely fashion by air shipment. Because the proposed regulation redUices the regulatory burden imposed by the NRC's current order

to licensees, the proposed rule does not have a significant economic

impact within the context of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. II

Since a certification and a succinct statement explaining the reasons for the

certification are included in the preamble to the proposed rule, a regulatory

flexibility anal.ysis need not be prepared. At the time the proposed rule is

sent forward to the Office of the Federal Register, the Division of Rules and

Records will provide a copy of the certification and accompanying statement to

the Chief Counse] for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. Thus,

the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act are fully met for this stage

of rulemaking.

The pr-tnc ipal reason for making the determination of "no significant impact

on a sub~tantial number of small entities,'1 is that the proposed regulation

reduces the regulatory burden imposed by the NRC's current order to licensees.

Based on the usagre Of the term lIimpactll in the Regulatory Flexibility Act andbased on the purpose of this Act as revealed by its legislative history, the

staff concludes that negative impacts, i.e., additional regulatory burdens,

were tntended to be subjected to the requirements of a regulatory analysis.

The ValuE!/Impact Statement (Enclosure 3 to the Commission paper) evaluates the

effect of this regulation on government agencies other than NRC (Section 1.3.2),

industry (Section 1.3.3), and the public (Section 1.3.4). This evaluation shows

that the regulati,:)n will reduce the current regulatory burden. It should also be

2 Enclosure 5
noted that the relief provided by the regulation will be disproportionately to

the advclntage of small entitiest since it is primarily small organizations whose

schedulE!S and work routines are disrupted by the inability to acquire small calibration sources (containing plutonium) in a timely fashion by air shipment.

Larger organizations have the logistic and financial resources to more readily

surmount such difficulties. For example t a large organization has the financial

resources to acquire and use an air-crash-resistant package for the air shipment

of small and large quantities of plutonium t while a small organization would

probably find it ill advised to acquire an air-crash-resistant package to ship

a limited number of small calibration sources.

3 Enclosure 5
ENCLOSURE 6
ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO PERIODIC SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF REGULATIONS

.(TMI ACTION PLAN TASK IV.G.2)

SUBJECT: 10 CFR Part 71

Criteria for Periodic and Systematic Review of Regulations

1. The proposed regulations are needed

2. The direct and indirect effects of the

regulations have been adequately considered.

......

3. Alternative approaches have been considered and the least burdensome of the acceptable alternatives has been chosen.

4. Public comments have been considered and an

adequate response has been prepared. .

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SUBJECT: 10 CFR Part,71

Criteria for Periodic and Systematic Review of Regulations

5. The regulation is written in plain English and is understandable to those who must comply with it.

6·. An estimate has been made of the new reporting burdens or recordkeeping requirements necessary for compliance with the regulation.

7. The name, address, and telephone number of a

N knowledgeable agency official is included in the publication.

8. A plan for evaluating the regulation after its issuance has been developed. .

NRC Compliance

The language of this regulation is co

currently used in 10 CFR Part 71. Th

ence to lIan A... quantity of plutoniuml

when the prop6sed changes to Part 71 

is anticipated to be before this prop

in final form (i.e., within a month o

In. general, no new reporting or recor

imposed by this regulation. Licensin

resistant packaging will involve com

application, recordkeeping, and repo

in place in Part 71.

The Federal Register notice for this 

OSD Task Leader as a contact for fur

Public comments on this proposed rule 

formulate the final rule. After issu

licensee and staff experience with th

used to evaluate the regulation. In 

tion will be reviewed in the second 

and systematic review process (1986-

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