Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part and Opinion Filed April 

20, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-20-00881-CV

OHIO GRAVY BISCUIT, INC. AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WOODHAVEN 

DRIVE 1401 LAND TRUST, Appellant

V.

NRZ PASS-THROUGH TRUST X, US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 

AS TRUSTEE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401-04848-2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Molberg, and Garcia

Opinion by Justice Myers

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee NRZ 

Pass-Through Trust X, U.S. Bank, National Association as Trustee. Appellant Ohio 

Gravy Biscuit, Inc., as trustee for the Woodhaven Drive 1401 Land Trust, argues the 

trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm in part and reverse and 

remand in part. 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 9, 2002, Daniel Budd and Diana Budd (the Budds) acquired an 

interest in property at 1401 Woodhaven Drive, McKinney, Texas 75070 (the 
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property) via a “Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien.” On April 4, 2007, they 

executed a “Texas Home Equity Note” (the note) in favor of Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., in the original principal sum of $400,000, and they executed a “Texas 

Home Equity Security Instrument” encumbering the property (the deed of trust) as 

security for payment of the note (collectively, the loan agreement). The deed of trust 

was recorded in the Collin County public records on April 11, 2007.

Appellee “NRZ Pass-Through Trust X, U.S. Bank Nation Association as 

Trustee” is the beneficiary of the deed of trust pursuant to a chain of assignments. 

On September 20, 2012, Countrywide, through its nominee Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), assigned the deed of trust to Bank of America, 

N.A., successor by merger with “BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide 

Home Loans Servicing, LP.” The assignment was recorded in the Collin County 

public records four days later, on September 24, 2012. On May 3, 2016, Bank of 

America assigned the deed of trust to “Citibank, N.A., Not in its Individual Capacity, 

but solely as Trustee of NRZ Pass-Through Trust, VI” (Citibank). This assignment 

was recorded in the Collin County public records on May 12, 2016. On April 6, 

2018, Citibank assigned the deed of trust to NRZ, and this assignment was recorded 

in the Collin County public records on April 23, 2018.

The property was also subject to a homeowner’s association (HOA) 

declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions—more precisely, the “Second 

Amended and Restated Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
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Restrictions for Stonebridge Ranch” (the HOA declaration). The declaration created 

an assessment lien securing the Budds’ obligation to pay their HOA dues to the 

association. 

It is undisputed that the Budds failed to make their contractually scheduled 

monthly payments. NRZ, or its predecessors, began foreclosure proceedings on the 

property on December 30, 2013, when Bank of America filed the first rule 736 

application for foreclosure under cause 429-05154-2013.1 A second rule 736 

application was filed by Bank of America on June 15, 2015, under cause 219-02390-

2015. Both applications included a notice of default to the Budds dated December 

13, 2012, informing them the loan was “in serious default” because the required 

monthly payments had not been made. On June 16, 2014, however, the previous 

accelerations were rescinded by Bank of America, and yet another rescission of 

acceleration was tendered by NRZ on May 3, 2019.

The Budds also failed to pay their dues to the HOA, and it foreclosed on its 

lien on January 5, 2016. Woodhaven Drive 1401 Land Trust (Woodhaven)

purchased the property at the HOA foreclosure sale for $12,000. On January 12, 

2016, a substitute trustee’s deed was recorded in the Collin County public records.

1 Section 21 of the deed of trust authorized the lender to accelerate the debt in the event of default and to 

“invoke the power of sale” if the default was not cured. Section 22 provided the terms governing a 

foreclosure sale of the property by the trustee. Under section 22, “Borrower authorize[d] Trustee to sell the 

Property to the highest bidder for cash in one or more parcels and in any order Trustee determines,” and 

required the trustee to deliver a trustee’s deed to the purchaser of the Property.
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On June 14, 2016, NRZ’s predecessor in interest, Bank of America, N.A.

(Bank of America), filed suit against Woodhaven in a Collin County district court 

(cause 416-02540-2016) seeking to quiet title to the property and for a declaratory 

judgment to establish that its deed of trust was valid; that it was superior to the HOA 

assessment lien; and that Bank of America held clear title to the property (the 2016 

lawsuit). In 2017, Citibank substituted in as plaintiff for Bank of America. 

On September 8, 2017, the trial court granted summary judgment, including 

declaratory relief, in Citibank’s favor. Woodhaven appealed the summary judgment, 

and on December 19, 2018, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Woodhaven 

Dr. 1401 Land Trust v. Citibank, N.A., No. 05-17-01393-CV, 2018 WL 6629586 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s 

summary judgment and declaratory judgment in favor of Citibank).

On March 11, 2019, NRZ filed a notice of substitute trustee’s sale, and the 

property was scheduled for an April 2, 2019, foreclosure sale. However, on March 

21, 2019, appellant Ohio Gravy Biscuit, Inc. (OGB), as trustee for the Woodhaven 

Drive 1401 Land Trust, filed suit against NRZ in a Collin County district court 

seeking to stop the foreclosure, alleging suit to quiet title (the March 2019 suit). The 

petition alleged that more than four years had passed since the acceleration of the 

note and that the deed of trust had terminated. The foreclosure sale was cancelled,

and foreclosure delayed, because of a temporary restraining order (TRO) obtained 

by OGB and signed by the trial court on March 27, 2019. The TRO indicates its 
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basis was that the exercise of the powers of sale under the deed of trust had 

terminated, based on the (alleged) expiration of the statute of limitations. 

New notices of default were mailed to the Budds on June 19, 2019. They

failed to cure the default, and as of May 14, 2020, the loan agreement payoff was 

approximately $703,779.31, which continues to accrue interest at a per diem rate of 

$65.04.2 NRZ has been paying property taxes on the property and has been paying 

and maintaining insurance for the property. 

On August 28, 2019, NRZ filed the instant original petition against the Budds 

and OGB in the 401st district court of Collin County seeking (among other relief) a

home equity judicial foreclosure and asserting claims against OGB for tortious 

interference with contract, quantum meruit, and money had and received. OGB filed

its answer and request for disclosure on September 30, 2019. On June 11, 2020, 

NRZ filed a combined motion for summary judgment as to OGB and motion for 

default judgment as to the Budds. On June 29, OGB filed a counter-petition

asserting a quiet title claim. OGB filed its summary judgment response on July 6, 

2020. NRZ filed a reply to the response three days later, on July 9, and the trial court 

signed the final judgment granting default and summary judgment for NRZ on July 

10. In addition to authorizing judicial foreclosure of the property, the judgment 

orders OGB to pay NRZ $21,139.06 for damages NRZ sustained because of the 

2

See TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.017(a)(5) (defining “Payoff statement” to include the unpaid balance of a

loan secured by a mortgage and per diem interest for the unpaid balance). 
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trust’s actions. On July 31, 2020, OGB filed a motion for new trial, which was 

overruled by operation of law, and on October 8, 2020, it filed the instant notice of 

appeal.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo. Trial v. Dragon, 593 S.W.3d 313, 

316 (Tex. 2019). A motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to 

show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 

84 (Tex. 2018). If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant 

to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84. We take evidence 

favorable to the nonmovant as true and indulge every reasonable inference and 

resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 

S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019). 

Appellant’s Issues

OGB argues the trial court erred in granting NRZ’s motion for summary 

judgment because the summary judgment record contained genuine issues of 

material fact. More specifically, OGB argues (1) the summary judgment record did 

not contain competent evidence to establish a prima facie case for tortious 

interference with contract; (2) a prima facie case for quantum meruit or unjust 

enrichment; (3) the record contains evidence establishing that NRZ’s lien was void 
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ab initio; and (4) the trial court erred in allowing a judicial foreclosure because NRZ

failed to establish any entitlement to judicial foreclosure.

Quantum Meruit 

We begin with OGB’s second issue, which argues the trial court erred in 

awarding judgment for NRZ because the summary judgment record does not contain 

competent evidence establishing a prima facie case for quantum meruit or unjust 

enrichment.3

“Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy which does not arise out of a 

contract, but is independent of it.” Vortt Expl. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 

S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990). Generally, a party may recover under quantum meruit 

only if no express contract covering the services or materials furnished exists. Id.; 

Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988). Quantum meruit “is based upon 

the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and knowingly 

accepted.” Campbell v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 573 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. 1978). 

A party can recover in quantum meruit when non-payment for the services rendered 

would result in an unjust enrichment to the party benefited by the work. Vortt Expl.

Co., 787 S.W.2d at 944. 

Recognizing that quantum meruit is founded on unjust enrichment, the 

essential elements of a quantum meruit claim are: (1) valuable services were 

3 During oral argument, counsel for NRZ abandoned the claims for tortious interference and money 

had and received, so we do not discuss OGB’s first issue, which concerns the tortious interference claim. 
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rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (2) which 

services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged, used and 

enjoyed by him or her; (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the 

person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was 

expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. Vortt Expl. Co., 787 S.W.2d 

at 944 (citing Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.

1985)); see also In Matter of Marriage of S.C., No. 05-14-00661-CV, 2015 WL 

4524191, at *7 n.7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Speck v. 

First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Houston, 235 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To recover in quantum meruit, the plaintiff must 

show it rendered valuable services or furnished materials for the defendant; it is not 

enough to show the plaintiff rendered valuable services or furnished materials that 

benefited the defendant. Truly, 744 S.W.2d at 944; 2001 Trinity Fund, LLC v. 

Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 393 S.W.3d 442, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2012, pet. denied); see Metroplexcore, L.L.C. v. Parsons Transp., Inc., 743 F.3d 964, 

975 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing Vortt). 

OGB attacks the fourth element of NRZ’s quantum meruit claim, arguing 

there is no summary judgment evidence it had any expectation it would be paid by 

OGB. OGB cites Balfour Beatty Rail, Inc. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 

173 F. Supp. 3d 363 (N.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d as modified and remanded, 725 F. 

App’x 256 (5th Cir. 2018), where the court explained the fourth element of a 
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quantum meruit claim as follows:

To satisfy this last requirement, the claimant must show that, before it 

provided services or furnished materials, it notified the person or entity 

sought to be charged that it anticipated payment for such services or 

materials or the person or entity sought to be charged had notice 

beforehand that the claimant anticipated payment for the services or 

materials being provided.

Id. at 403. NRZ tries to distinguish Balfour by arguing the above passage— which 

it claims was “cherry picked” out of the opinion—relates to “services or materials” 

furnished as part of a construction contract. See id. Additionally, argues NRZ, it 

provided a service or material to OGB by paying ad valorem taxes and hazard 

insurance on the property that benefitted OGB “while it continued its unfettered 

collection of rental income” on the property. 

However, other cases besides Balfour have explained that in order to recover 

under quantum meruit, the services rendered by a party must be accepted and used 

by another under circumstances which would reasonably notify the recipient that the 

performing party expected the recipient to pay him or her for the work; the basis for 

a claim in quantum meruit is either an express or implied agreement to pay for the 

work. See, e.g., Pearl Res. LLC v. Charger Servs., LLC, 622 S.W.3d 106, 121–22

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. denied); BP Automotive LP v. RML Waxahachie 

Dodge, LLC, 517 S.W.3d 186, 207 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.); Gen.

Capital Group Beteligungsberatung GMBH v. AT & T, 407 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied); Walker & Assoc. Surveying, Inc. v. Roberts, 306 

S.W.3d 839, 858 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.); Residential Dynamics, LLC 
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v. Loveless, 186 S.W.3d 192, 199 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Gen.

Homes, Inc. v. Denison, 625 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1981, no writ); see also Truly, 787 S.W.2d at 944.

The summary judgment evidence does not support the notice element. This

element focuses on what the recipient of the services knew or should have known 

before or at the time the services were accepted. Balfour, 173 F.Supp.3d at 403; 

Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 & n.4 (Tex. 

1992); Ellis v. Reliant Energy Retail Servs., L.L.C., 418 S.W.3d 235, 255 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Myrex Indus., Inc. v. Ortolon, 126 

S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). An essential 

element of any claim for recovery in quantum meruit is, of course, that the plaintiff 

must expect to be compensated for the services rendered. Vortt Expl. Co., 787 

S.W.2d at 944; Pearl Res. LLC, 622 S.W.3d at 121–22; Gen. Capital Group, 407 

S.W.3d at 512–13. But the defendant must have the same expectation. Vortt Expl.

Co., 787 S.W.2d at 944; General Capital Grp., 407 S.W.3d at 512. 

NRZ does not direct us to—and we have not found—any summary judgment 

evidence showing OGB accepted NRZ’s payment of the ad valorem taxes and 

insurance on the property under such circumstances as reasonably notified OGB that 

NRZ expected to be paid for the services rendered. Nor are we persuaded by NRZ’s 

citation of paragraph 9 of the deed of trust (titled “Protection of Lender’s Interest in 

the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument”), which, as NRZ explains, 
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entitled it to pay the taxes and insurance on the property to protect its interest, 

because, again, there is no evidence OGB had notice NRZ anticipated repayment.

NRZ has thus not met its burden of showing there is no genuine issue of 

material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its quantum 

meruit claim. See, e.g., Heldenfels Bros., 832 S.W.2d at 41 & n.4; Vortt Expl. Co., 

787 S.W.2d at 944–45; Ellis, 418 S.W.3d at 254; Gen. Capital Group , 407 S.W.3d 

at 512–13; Myrex Indus., 126 S.W.3d at 551. Therefore, we sustain OGB’s second 

issue and conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 

NRZ on its quantum meruit claim.4 

Quiet Title Counterclaim

In its third issue, OGB contends the trial court erred in awarding summary 

judgment for NRZ because the record contained evidence the lien was void ab initio

pursuant to the Texas Constitution. OGB’s argument is based on its suit to quiet title 

counterclaim and article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution, which provides 

that a home equity loan may not exceed 80 percent of the fair market value of the 

home. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(B). OGB argues the advance of 

$400,000 was more than the appraised value of the property, and that the trial court 

therefore erred in awarding a foreclosure judgment because the evidence established 

4

In a reply brief, OGB raises the argument that allowing NRZ to recover under a theory of quantum 

meruit or unjust enrichment and, at the same time, pursue judicial foreclosure amounts to a “double 

recovery,” which is prohibited. NRZ sur-replies that this argument was not raised in the trial court and that 

it is, thus, waived. Because of our conclusion above that the court erred in granting summary judgment for 

NRZ on its quantum meruit claim, we do not address this argument. 
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the lien was invalid in that it violated the 80 percent rule in article XVI, section 50. 

NRZ responds that OGB’s suit to quiet title counterclaim fails as a matter of 

law because (1) it is barred by res judicata and/or issue preclusion, which was tried 

by consent; and (2) OGB failed to prove the lien was invalid. We focus on NRZ’s 

first argument. 

“Res judicata is a generic term for the related concepts of claim preclusion 

(res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Barnes v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 165, 173 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). 

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of issues resolved in a 

prior suit. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992); New 

Talk, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 520 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, 

no pet.). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars relitigation of claims that have been 

finally adjudicated or that arise out of the same subject matter and could have been

litigated in the prior action. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 

1996); New Talk, Inc., 520 S.W.3d at 645. 

 Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that must be 

pleaded unless tried by consent. See TEX.R.CIV. P. 94; In re I.M., No. 06-21-00002-

CV, 2021 WL 1991271, at *13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 19, 2021, pet. denied) 

(mem. op.); In re D.L.W., No. 07-15-00243-CV, 2015 WL 8225213, at *4 n.9 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo Dec. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re R.J.P., 179 S.W.3d 181, 

183 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (plurality op.). Unpleaded 
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claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of the parties are 

treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings. Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, 

Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991). Trial by consent may be appropriate in some 

summary judgment situations. Id.; see Basic Capital Mgmt. v. Dynex Comm., Inc., 

348 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. 2011); Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 

(Tex. 2006).

For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) a prior 

final determination on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of 

parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same 

claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Travelers Ins. 

Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010); Hill v. Tx–An Anesthesia Mgmt., 

LLP, 443 S.W.3d 416, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). The doctrine seeks 

to bring an end to litigation, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court 

decisions, promote judicial economy, and prevent double recovery. Barr, 837 

S.W.2d at 629.

Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel were pleaded. But the record 

shows that, in its August 2019 original petition, NRZ asserted that OGB’s quiet title 

claim from the March 2019 suit was “the exact claim” adjudicated in the 2016 suit 

between Citibank and Woodhaven. NRZ’s petition and summary judgment motion 

included as an exhibit our prior opinion from the 2016 case, where we stated in part 

that “the summary judgment evidence conclusively established Citibank’s lien was 
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valid and superior to Woodhaven’s lien.” Woodhaven, 2018 WL 6629586, at *4

(emphasis added). In its counter-petition filed on June 29, 2020, eighteen days after 

NRZ’s summary judgment motion, OGB asserted a quiet title claim that the deed of 

trust was void ab initio based on the loan allegedly violating article XVI, section 50. 

Six days later, on July 6, OGB filed its response to NRZ’s summary judgment, 

arguing again the lien was void ab initio based on article XVI, section 50. In its 

summary judgment reply filed three days after that, at 1:43 p.m. on July 9, the day 

before the court signed the final judgment, NRZ asserted that, to the extent OGB

was stating a new argument that the lien was invalid “based on some type of 

constitutional challenge,” OGB was barred from doing so by res judicata or issue 

preclusion. The court’s final judgment states that it considered the summary 

judgment motion along with the pleadings, legal arguments, affidavits on file with 

the court, and all other pertinent evidence.

Given the record here, we conclude the issue of res judicata was tried by 

consent, and that the summary judgment record establishes res judicata. First, the 

previous judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, it is 

undisputed that the parties here are in privity with those in the previous case. Third, 

OGB’s quiet title counterclaim against NRZ arises out of the same transaction that 

was the subject of the 2016 suit, where the deed of trust’s validity was at issue, and 

it could have been brought in the previous suit. See Woodhaven, 2018 WL 6629586, 

at *1 (“BOA filed suit against Woodhaven on June 14, 2016, seeking to quiet title 
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to the Property and for declaratory judgment that its First Lien Deed of Trust was 

valid, the First Lien Deed of Trust was superior to the assessment lien, and BOA 

held clear title to the Property.”). OGB argues the prior case dealt only with lien 

priority, but the parties in that case litigated the validity of the deed of trust and we

held that Citibank’s lien was valid and superior to Woodhaven’s. See id. at *4. 

Accordingly, OGB’s suit to quiet title counterclaim is barred by res judicata. 

We overrule OGB’s third issue. 

Judicial Foreclosure

In its fourth issue, OGB argues the trial court erred in allowing judicial 

foreclosure because NRZ failed to establish its entitlement to a judicial foreclosure. 

More precisely, OGB contends NRZ did not establish all the elements of a judicial 

foreclosure. 

“‘To foreclose under a security instrument in Texas with a power of sale, the 

lender must demonstrate that: (1) a debt exists; (2) the debt is secured by a lien 

created under Art. 16, § 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution; (3) plaintiffs are in 

default under the note and security instrument; and (4) plaintiffs received notice of 

default and acceleration.’” Bracken v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 05-16-01334-

CV, 2018 WL 1026268, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. 

op.) (quoting Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D. Tex. 

2013), aff’d, 583 Fed. Appx. 306 (5th Cir. 2014)). 

OGB focuses on the fourth element, arguing NRZ did not establish its 
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entitlement to summary judgment on judicial foreclosure because it failed to show 

it accelerated the note before filing suit. The record, however, includes the prior 

notices of acceleration that were rescinded in 2014, when the lender’s attorney sent 

a notice of rescission, and, later, the notice of default to the borrowers dated June 

19, 2019. OGB does not dispute that notice of default was mailed in June 2019, 

which provided an opportunity to cure the default.

Moreover, NRZ’s petition included the following acceleration language in 

paragraph 13—bolded and underlined: “Payment of the past due balance on the 

debt has not been received by Plaintiff. Because of this default, Plaintiff has 

elected to ACCELERATE the maturity of the debt.” The filing of suit itself may 

constitute notice of acceleration. Joy Corp. v. Nob Hill N. Props., Ltd., 543 S.W.2d 

691, 694 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1976, no writ) (stating that to accelerate, a 

lienholder must make a formal demand for the payment of the past due amount, give 

an opportunity to make the payment, and “[d]eclare that the entire debt is due, or 

take some unequivocal action, such as filing suit, which indicates that the entire debt 

is due”); Emmert v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB, No. 02-17-00119-CV, 2018 

WL 1005002, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(declining to address whether lender may unilaterally waive acceleration over 

objection of debtor “because the filing of suit itself may constitute notice of 

acceleration”); see Florey v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Tr. for RMAC Tr., Series 2016-

CCT, No. 05-20-00306-CV, 2021 WL 2525457, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 
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2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The applications for expedited foreclosure by 

themselves constituted notices of acceleration.”); Burney v. Citigroup Glob. Markets 

Realty Corp., 244 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“[N]otice of 

filing an expedited application for foreclosure after the requisite notice of intent to 

accelerate is sufficient to constitute notice of acceleration.”); see also Smither v. 

Ditech Fin., L.L.C., 681 Fed. Appx. 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Burney, 244 

S.W.3d at 903–04). 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for NRZ 

on its claim for judicial foreclosure. We overrule OGB’s fourth issue. 

CONCLUSION

We sustain OGB’s first and second issues. The trial court’s July 10, 2020

final judgment is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The portion

of the judgment ordering OGB to pay NRZ $21,139.06 in damages based on NRZ’s 

claims against OGB for tortious interference, quantum meruit, and money had and 

received is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. The remainder 

of the judgment is affirmed. 

200881f.p05

/Lana Myers//

LANA MYERS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

OHIO GRAVY BISCUIT, INC. AS 

TRUSTEE FOR THE 

WOODHAVEN DRIVE 1401 

LAND TRUST, Appellant

No. 05-20-00881-CV V.

NRZ PASS-THROUGH TRUST X, 

US BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401-04848-

2019.

Opinion delivered by Justice Myers. 

Justices Molberg and Garcia 

participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED and REMANDED in part. We 

REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s judgment ordering appellant OHIO 

GRAVY BISCUIT, INC., AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WOODHAVEN DRIVE 1401 

LAND TRUST, to pay appellee NRZ PASS-THROUGH TRUST X, US BANK 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE, $21,139.06 in damages. In all other 

respects, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to 

the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is ORDERED

that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
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Judgment entered this 20th day of April, 2022.