Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in

the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective

knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of

military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation

of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any

other, united us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not

only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S.

Army will participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that

war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn

about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in

what has been called “the mighty endeavor.”

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over

several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years.

The following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions

for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the

Army’s significant military feats from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Clayton D. Laurie. I hope this absorbing account of

that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War II.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff
Anzio

22 January–24 May 1944

During the early morning hours of 22 January 1944, troops of the

Fifth Army swarmed ashore on a fifteen-mile stretch of Italian

beach near the prewar resort towns of Anzio and Nettuno. The

landings were carried out so flawlessly and German resistance was

so light that British and American units gained their first day’s objectives by noon, moving three to four miles inland by nightfall.

The ease of the landing and the swift advance were noted by one

paratrooper of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, who recalled that D-day at Anzio was sunny and

warm, making it very hard to believe that a war was going on and

that he was in the middle of it. 

The location of the Allied landings, thirty miles south of Rome

and fifty-five miles northwest of the main line of resistance running

from Minturno on the Tyrrhenian Sea to Ortona on the Adriatic,

surprised local German commanders, who had been assured by

their superiors that an amphibious assault would not take place

during January or February. Thus when the landing occurred the

Germans were unprepared to react offensively. Within a week,

however, as Allied troops consolidated their positions and prepared to break out of the beachhead, the Germans gathered troops

to eliminate what Adolf Hitler called the “Anzio abscess.” The

next four months would see some of the most savage fighting of

World War II. 

Strategic Setting

Following the successful Allied landings at Calabria, Taranto,

and Salerno in early September 1943 and the unconditional surrender of Italy that same month, German forces had quickly disarmed their former allies and begun a slow, fighting withdrawal to

the north. Defending two hastily prepared, fortified belts stretching from coast to coast, the Germans significantly slowed the Allied advance before settling into the Gustav Line, a third, more

formidable and sophisticated defensive belt of interlocking positions on the high ground along the peninsula’s narrowest point.

The Germans intended to fight for every portion of this line, set in
the rugged Apennine Mountains overlooking scores of rain-soaked

valleys, marshes, and rivers. The terrain favored the defense and,

as elsewhere in Italy, was not conducive to armored warfare. Luftwaffe Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, whom Hitler had appointed

as commander of all German forces in Italy on 6 November 1943,

promised to hold the Gustav Line for at least six months. As long

as the line was maintained it prevented the Fifth Army from advancing into the Liri valley, the most logical and direct route to the

major Allied objective of Rome. The validity of Kesselring’s strategy was demonstrated repeatedly between October 1943 and January 1944 as the Allies launched numerous costly attacks against

well-entrenched enemy forces. 

The idea for an amphibious operation near Rome had originated in late October 1943 when it became obvious that the Germans were going to fight for the entire peninsula rather than withdraw to northern Italy. The Allied advance following the Salerno

invasion was proving so arduous, due to poor weather, rough terrain, and stiffening resistance, that General Dwight D. Eisenhower pessimistically told the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs

of Staff that there would be very hard and bitter fighting before

the Allies could hope to reach Rome. As a result, Allied planners

were looking for ways to break out of the costly struggle for each

ridge and valley, which was consuming enormous numbers of men

and scarce supplies. 

When the British conducted a successful amphibious operation

at Termoli on 2–3 October, landing behind German positions on

the Adriatic front, hopes were raised that a similar, larger assault

south of Rome could outflank the Gustav Line. Such an operation

could facilitate a breakthrough along the main line of resistance in

the south and cut German lines of retreat, supply, and communications. On 8 November British General Sir Harold R. L. G.

Alexander, commander of the 15th Army Group (consisting of the

Fifth and Eighth Armies under Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark and General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, respectively), passed down orders

to Clark from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They directed him to

formulate a plan for landing a single division at Anzio (codenamed Operation SHINGLE) on 20 December 1943 as part of a projected three-pronged Allied offensive. The subsequent lack of

progress, however, and a chronic shortage of troops and shipping

due to the ongoing buildup for the cross-Channel invasion of

France (OVERLORD), soon made the initial landing date impractical.

4
5

The entire Anzio operation was shelved on 18 December. But

changes in the Mediterranean theater command structure would

soon lead to its resuscitation. 

General Eisenhower formally relinquished command of Allied

forces in the Mediterranean to General Sir Henry M. Wilson in

early January 1944. Previously, Mediterranean strategy had been

driven largely by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, the

leading spokesman in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who had frequently communicated directly with his American subordinate.

When Eisenhower left to prepare for Operation OVERLORD, however, Marshall lost this ability to influence Mediterranean events as

planning responsibility passed to Britain’s Sir Alan Brooke and

the British Chiefs of Staff. General Wilson’s largely British command resurrected the Anzio plan with his superior’s approval.

Heavily influenced by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the

British Chiefs of Staff continued to advocate a large Mediterranean effort as part of the “soft underbelly” or “peripheral” approach to defeating Nazi Germany. To Churchill the quick liberation of Rome offered the key to the success of this strategy and the

rapid capture of Rome implicitly required a landing at Anzio.

Churchill prevailed upon the Americans in early January 1944 to

delay further transfers of amphibious shipping from the Mediterranean to England so that a landing could take place in Italy by the

end of the month. 

The landing was scheduled tentatively for late January 1944.

Anzio was selected because it was considered the best site within

striking distance of Rome but still within range of Allied aircraft

operating from Naples. The initial beachhead was to be fifteen

miles wide by seven miles deep. The terrain at Anzio consisted of

rolling, often wooded farm country on a narrow coastal plain extending north from the town of Terracina to across the Tiber River.

The entire region was part of an elaborate reclamation and resettlement project that had been undertaken by Mussolini to showcase Fascist agricultural improvements and was studded with 

pumping stations and farmhouses and crisscrossed by irrigation

ditches and canals. 

Twenty miles inland from Anzio on the approach to Rome were

the Alban Hills, around whose southwest side ran Highway 7, a

major north-south route. To the southeast of the Alban Hills was the

Velletri Gap leading inland to another main north-south route,

Highway 6, at Valmontone. East of the Velletri Gap were the Lepini
Mountains along whose southeastern edge ran the Pontine Marshes

extending to Terracina. The proposed beachhead was bounded in

the north by the Moletta and Incastro Rivers, in the center by open

fields leading to the villages of Padiglione and Aprilia along the

Anzio-Albano Road, and in the south by the villages of Cisterna and

Littoria, a provincial capital, and the Mussolini Canal. 

The operations at Anzio were to be supported by a general

15th Army Group offensive. One week before the Anzio assault,

the Fifth Army, consisting of the U.S. II Corps, the British 10

Corps, and the French Expeditionary Corps, would launch a massive offensive on the Gustav Line, cross the Garigliano and Rapido

Rivers, strike the German Tenth Army under Lt. Gen. Heinrich

von Vietinghoff in the area of Cassino, breach the enemy line

there, push up the Liri valley, and link up with the forces at Anzio

for the drive on Rome. Meanwhile, Allied, British, and Commonwealth forces of the Eighth Army were ordered to break through

on the Adriatic front or at least tie down German forces to prevent

their transfer to the Anzio area. 

General Clark designated Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, U.S. Army,

commander of the Fifth Army’s VI Corps, to lead the invasion and

gave him two missions. First, Lucas was to divert enemy strength

from the south and, in anticipation of a swift and violent enemy reaction, to prepare defensive positions. The vague second portion of

his orders directed him to move toward the Alban Hills and points

east for the link-up with the remainder of the Fifth Army on D-day

plus 7. In what became a source of continued controversy, neither

American interpreted these orders as specifically charging VI Corps

with the immediate capture of the Alban Hills. That attitude reflected Clark’s and Lucas’ skepticism regarding the largely British

plan and the feasibility of the overall Anzio operation. Clark in

particular had been enthusiastic about the Anzio plan in its early

stages, but he became increasingly pessimistic after learning that

only two divisions were available for the operation. Both men expected that the assault troops would have to fight their way ashore

against fierce resistance. They strongly doubted whether the small

force could survive even the initial German counterattacks anticipated on D-day, let alone establish a viable beachhead. The notion

that these troops could also take and hold the Alban Hills soon

after landing, as implied by the British, seemed overly optimistic.

Under the circumstances Clark wanted to remain flexible, and he

6
7

encouraged Lucas to do the same, leaving the decision about how

far and how fast to advance to the VI Corps commander. 

By the time the plans for Operation SHINGLE were finalized on 8

January, with D-day scheduled for 22 January 1944, the landing had

evolved from a small, subsidiary attack into a major offensive operation behind enemy lines. For the initial assault Clark selected a

combined Anglo-American force then gathering in Naples. Since the

Allies wanted to land the largest possible contingent that available

amphibious assault shipping allowed, the invasion force consisted of

the U.S. 3d Infantry Division; the British 1st Infantry Division and

46th Royal Tank Regiment; the U.S. 751st Tank Battalion, the 504th

Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne Division, and the

509th Parachute Infantry Battalion; two British Commando battalions; and three battalions of U.S. Army Rangers. The U.S. 45th Infantry Division and Combat Command A (CCA), a regimental-size

unit of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, were directed to land as reinforcements once the beachhead was established.

The XII Tactical Air Command, the British Desert Air Force,

the Coastal Air Force, and the Tactical Bomber Force, units which

were supporting Allied operations throughout the entire Mediterranean theater, were directed to conduct major air assaults in support of the Anzio landings. The approximately 2,600 available Allied aircraft were to gain air superiority over the beach, provide

close air support for the invading forces, and destroy enemy airfields and hinder communications. The 64th Fighter Wing was

charged with protecting the battle area during the actual landings

from some 2,000 German aircraft believed to be stationed in Italy

and the Balkans. 

To move, protect, and assist the assault forces, the Allies assembled a naval flotilla comprising vessels from six nations. Task

Force 81, commanded by U.S. Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry, contained over 250 combat-loaded vessels and amphibious assault

craft of all sizes and descriptions. Admiral Lowry also commanded

the 74 vessels of Task Force X-Ray, assigned to see American

forces safely ashore and to support their beachhead operations,

while Admiral Thomas H. Troubridge, Royal Navy, commanded

the 52 ships of Task Force Peter, which was to carry, land, and support the British contingents. To obtain surprise, the Allies decided

to dispense with a long preliminary naval bombardment, planning

instead on a short and intense ten-minute barrage by two British

assault vessels equipped with 1,500 5-inch rockets. As a diversion-
8

The Anzio-Nettuno area. (National Archives)

ary move, other naval units were ordered to shell the coastal town of

Civitavecchia, forty miles to the north. 

The Allies launched their offensive in the south on 12 January

1944, with the French Expeditionary Corps assaulting Cassino and

the British 10 Corps attempting to exploit previous gains on the

Garigliano River. Neither attack succeeded in breaking through the

Gustav Line, although limited progress was made. One week later,

on 20 January, the U.S. II Corps attacked in the center of the Fifth

Army front, attempting to cross the Rapido River. After two days of

bitter fighting and heavy losses, the II Corps’ 36th Infantry Division

was forced to break off its attack. The assault on the Gustav Line,

the lynch-pin of the Allied plan of which Anzio was a part, had

bogged down. In the meantime, farther south, the elaborate air and

sea precautions taken to mask and protect the Anzio landing force

were completed. The armada set sail from Naples on 21 January. 

Operations

The Anzio invasion began at 0200 on 22 January 1944 and

achieved, General Lucas recalled, one of the most complete surprises in history. The Germans had already sent their regional re-
9

serves south to counter the Allied attacks on the Garigliano on 18

January, leaving one nine-mile stretch of beach at Anzio defended

by a single company. The first Allied waves landed unopposed and

moved rapidly inland. On the southern flank of the beachhead the

3d Division quickly seized its initial objectives, brushing aside a few

dazed patrols, while unopposed British units achieved equal success in the center and north. Simultaneously, Rangers occupied

Anzio, and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion seized Nettuno.

All VI Corps objectives were taken by noon as the Allied air forces

completed 1,200 sorties against targets in and around the beachhead. On the beach itself, the U.S. 36th Engineer Combat Regiment bulldozed exits, laid corduroy roads, cleared mines, and readied the port of Anzio to receive its first landing ship, tank (LST), an

amphibious assault and supply ship, by the afternoon of D-day.

By midnight over 36,000 men and 3,200 vehicles, 90 percent of the

invasion force, were ashore with casualties of 13 killed, 97

wounded, and 44 missing. During D-day Allied troops captured

227 German defenders. 

Allied units continued to push inland over the next few days to

a depth of seven miles against scattered but increasing German resistance. In the center of the beachhead, on 24 January, the British

1st Division began to move up the Anzio-Albano Road toward

Campoleone and, with help from the 179th Infantry Regiment of

the 45th Infantry Division, captured the town of Aprilia, known as

“the Factory” because of its cluster of brick buildings, on 25 January. Within three days the continuing Anglo-American drive

pushed the Germans a further 1.5 miles north of the Factory, created a huge bulge in enemy lines, but failed to break out of the

beachhead. Probes by the 3d Division toward Cisterna and by the

504th Parachute Infantry Regiment toward Littoria on 24–25 January made some progress but were also halted short of their goals

by stubborn resistance. Renewed attacks on the next day brought

the Americans within three miles of Cisterna and two miles beyond the west branch of the Mussolini Canal. But the 3d Division

commander, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., on orders of the

corps commander, called a halt to the offensive, a pause that later

lengthened into a general consolidation and reorganization of

beachhead forces between 26 and 29 January. 

Meanwhile, the Allied troop and materiel buildup had proceeded at a breakneck pace. Despite continuous German artillery

and air harassment, a constant fact of life throughout the campaign,
the Allies off-loaded twenty-one cargo ships and landed 6,350 tons

of materiel on 29 January alone, and on 1 February the port of

Anzio went into full operation. Improving air defenses downed

ninety-seven attacking Luftwaffe aircraft prior to 1 February, but the

Germans did succeed in sinking one destroyer and a hospital ship, as

well as destroying significant stocks of supplies piled on the crowded

beaches. Mindful of the need for reinforcements, Lucas ordered

ashore the rest of the 45th Infantry Division and remaining portions

of the 1st Armored Division allotted to the Anzio operation, raising

the total number of Allied soldiers in the beachhead to 61,332. 

10

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Velletri

Campoleone

Ardea

Aprilia

(the Factory)

Padiglione

Cisterna

Cori

River

HIGHWAY 7 Mussolini

Canal

Moletta River

Conca

Nettuno

ANZIO

Littoria

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Incastro

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Rangers

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THE LANDING

22 January 1944

Initial Beachhead Line

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ELEVATION IN METERS

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The Germans had not been idle during the week after the

Anzio landing. The German Armed Forces High Command

(OKW) in Berlin was surprised at the location of the landing and

the efficiency with which it was carried out. Although they had

considered such an attack probable for some time and had made

preliminary plans for meeting it, Kesselring and his local commanders were powerless to repel the invasion immediately because of the lack of adequate reserves. Nevertheless, German reaction to the Anzio landing was swift and ultimately would prove

far more powerful than anything the Allies had anticipated. 

Upon receiving word of the landings, Kesselring immediately

dispatched elements of the 4th Parachute and Hermann Goering

Divisions south from the Rome area to defend the roads leading

north from the Alban Hills. Within the next twenty-four hours

Hitler dispatched other units to Italy from Yugoslavia, France, and

Germany to reinforce elements of the 3d Panzer Grenadier and

71st Infantry Divisions that were already moving into the Anzio

area. By the end of D-day, thousands of German troops were converging on Anzio, despite delays caused by Allied air attacks. 

11

Preloaded supply trucks and DUKWs at Naples. (National

Archives)
12

OKW, Kesselring, and Brig. Gen. Siegfried Westphal, Kesselring’s chief of staff, were astonished that the Anzio forces had not

exploited their unopposed landing with an immediate thrust into

the virtually undefended Alban Hills on 23–24 January. As Westphal later recounted, there were no significant German units between Anzio and Rome, and he speculated that an imaginative,

bold strike by enterprising forces could easily have penetrated into

the interior or sped straight up Highways 6 and 7 to Rome. Instead,

Westphal recalled, the enemy forces lost time and hesitated. As the

Germans later discovered, General Lucas was neither bold nor

imaginative, and he erred repeatedly on the side of caution, to the

increasing chagrin of both Alexander and Clark. 

By 24 January Kesselring, confident that he had gathered sufficient forces to contain the beachhead, transferred the Fourteenth

Army headquarters under General Eberhard von Mackensen from

Verona in northern Italy to Anzio. Mackensen soon controlled elements of 8 divisions, totaling 40,000 troops, with 5 more divisions 

on the way. Seeking to prevent a permanent Allied foothold at

Anzio, Kesselring ordered a counterattack for 28 January, but

Mackensen requested and received a postponement until 1 February to await further reinforcements, especially armored units that

were being held up by Allied air attacks. Two days before the

scheduled offensive, the Fourteenth Army numbered about 70,000

Men and equipment move

ashore south of Anzio on Dday. (National Archives)
13

combat troops, most already deployed in forward staging areas,

with several thousand more on the way. 

Racing against the expected German counterattack, both the

Fifth and Eighth Armies prepared to renew their stalled offensives in the south. Lucas meanwhile planned a two-pronged attack for 30 January. While one force cut Highway 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Alban Hills, a second was to advance

northeast up the Albano Road, break through the Campoleone

salient, and exploit the gap by moving to the west and southwest. A

quick link-up with Fifth Army forces in the south was believed 

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Velletri

Campoleone

Ardea

Aprilia

(the Factory)

Padiglione

Cisterna

Cori

River

HIGHWAY 7

Mussolini

Canal

Moletta River

Conca

Nettuno

ANZIO

Littoria

Borgo

Grappa

Incastro

1st Inf

Br

3d Inf

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45th

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EXPANDING THE BEACHHEAD

1 February 1944

Front Line, Morning

Front Line, Evening

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ELEVATION IN METERS
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still possible even though German resistance all along the perimeter of the beachhead was becoming stronger. 

The 3d Division and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions

under Col. William O. Darby were responsible for the initial attack

on Cisterna. The 1st and 3d Rangers were to spearhead the assault

by infiltrating the German lines and seizing and holding Cisterna

until the 4th Rangers and 15th Infantry, 3d Division, arrived via the

Conca-Cisterna Road. Meanwhile, at 0200, 30 January, the 7th Infantry, 3d Division, was to push on the left to a point above Cisterna and cut Highway 7, while the 15th Infantry passed to the

right of Cisterna and cut the highway south of town. As a diversion

the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment would attack along the

Mussolini Canal. Unknown to the Americans, their assault was

aimed directly at the center of the area where thirty-six enemy 

battalions were massing for their 1 February counterattack. 

The Rangers moved out at 0130 to the right of the Conca-Cisterna Road and by dawn were within 800 yards of Cisterna. But

German soldiers of the 715th Motorized Infantry Division discovered the lightly armed Ranger force during the night and sprang a

devastating ambush at first light. Heavy fighting broke out and the

Rangers were pinned down quickly by an enemy superior in arms

Isola Bella and Cisterna. (National Archives)
15

and numbers. Efforts by the 4th Rangers and 15th Infantry to rescue the beleaguered units failed, and by noon armored units of the

Hermann Goering Division had forced the Rangers into the open.

The Americans had only grenades and bazookas for antitank

weapons, and as they attempted a fighting withdrawal in small and

scattered groups they were cut down mercilessly. Of the 767 men in

the two battalions, only 6 eventually returned to Allied lines. 

In spite of the disaster that befell the Rangers, the 7th and 15th

Infantry regiments continued their attacks toward Cisterna, one

soldier recalling that the defenders clung stubbornly to their entrenched positions while launching locally heavy counterattacks.

Sgt. Truman O. Olson, a light machine gunner with Company B,

7th Infantry, took part in one sixteen-hour assault on entrenched

enemy positions in which one-third of his company became casualties. Having seized a toehold, the survivors dug in while Sergeant

Olson and his crew took their one available machine gun and

placed it forward of the line to bear the brunt of an expected

enemy counterattack. Although he had been firing without respite

all day, Olson stuck grimly to his post throughout the night while

his gun crew was killed, one by one, by accurate and overwhelming

enemy fire. Weary from over twenty-four hours of continuous battle and suffering from an arm wound, Olson manned his gun alone,

meeting the full force of a 200-man enemy dawn assault supported

by mortars and machine guns. After thirty minutes of fighting,

Olson was severely wounded, but he refused evacuation. For an

hour and a half after receiving a second and subsequently fatal

wound, he continued to fire his machine gun, killing at least twenty

of the enemy, wounding many more, and ultimately forcing the attackers to withdraw. For his actions Sergeant Olson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. 

While some progress was made by 3d Division units in the face

of noticeably stronger enemy resistance, by nightfall on 31 January

the Americans were still one mile from the village, battling stubbornly forward but unable to break through. On the following day

fighting was equally inconclusive, and by noon it had become obvious, after three days of costly attacks and counterattacks, that the

Americans could not capture Cisterna, still 1,500 yards away.

Heeding intelligence reports delivered on 2 February, which indicated the arrival of new German units in the Anzio area and an imminent enemy counterattack, Truscott, on the orders of Clark and

Lucas, again told his command to dig in. 
The other prong of the Allied attack launched by the British 1st

Division and CCA, 1st Armored Division, toward Campoleone

and the Alban Hills initially fared little better. Rain-soaked terrain,

fierce enemy fire, and ubiquitous minefields slowed CCA’s advance, and by nightfall on 30 January the unit was still struggling to

reach its line of departure. The British succeeded in advancing two

miles the first day, but they also failed to breach the German defenses. General Lucas changed plans for the second day of the attack and ordered the British to breach the enemy line along the Albano Road at Campoleone for exploitation by CCA. During the 

next two days the Allies reached Campoleone, penetrated the German main line, and opened a two-mile-wide gap. But the exhausted Allied troops were unable to exploit their success, and 

the drive ground to a halt. 

The failure of the Allied breakout attempt, stymied by stiff resistance, convinced Alexander, Clark, and Lucas that an enemy

counterattack must be in the offing. Reinforcements were rushed

to Anzio, including 1,800 men of the American-Canadian 1st Special Service Force, elements of the British 56th Division, and additional antiaircraft and artillery units, raising the total number of

Allied soldiers in the beachhead to 100,000. 

Despite these additions, the Fourteenth Army outnumbered

the Allies at Anzio by 4 February. But the German force was a

hodgepodge of rapidly thrown together units. All were critically

short of ammunition, training, qualified leaders, and reserves. Allied air attacks had disrupted communications, hampered troop

and supply movements, and caused morale problems. From the

outset Mackensen had doubted the available force could eliminate the Anzio beachhead, but he prepared a forceful counterattack nonetheless. The 4th Parachute and 65th infantry Divisions of

the I Parachute Corps were to pinch off the Campoleone salient

and recapture the Factory at Aprilia. The same units would then

break through to the sea along the Albano Road. Elsewhere the

LXXVI Panzer Corps, consisting of the 3d Panzer Grenadier,

715th Motorized Infantry, 71st Infantry, Hermann Goering, and

26th Panzer Divisions would attack south of Cisterna along the

Mussolini Canal and attempt to breach the Allied perimeter and

advance on Nettuno and Anzio. 

The counterattack opened with an artillery barrage on 3–4

February, followed by armored and infantry assaults which 

smashed into the partially prepared British 1st Division defenses in 

16
the Campoleone salient. The British held, despite suffering 1,400

casualties, but their dangerously exposed position prompted Lucas

to order their withdrawal to one mile north of the Factory and

Carroceto on the night of 4–5 February, a retreat of about 2.5

miles. Although the salient was eliminated, the Germans failed to

break the Allied line or retake the Factory. The undulating and

soggy Albano Road area was just as inhospitable to German armor

and infantry as it had been to Allied forces the week before. However, the critical situation the Germans created in the Allied center

convinced Lucas to form a beachhead defense line running from

the Moletta River in the north, through the fields of the central

sector, to the Mussolini Canal in the south. He issued orders to all

Allied troops that this was the final line of resistance to be held at

all costs—the shallow beachhead precluded any further retreat. 

The Germans renewed their attacks on 7 February in the weakened British 1st Division sector and, in two days of bitter fighting,

pushed the British troops from the Factory and Carroceto. Although battered and exhausted, they managed to maintain a coherent line and were reinforced on 10 February by the 1st Armored

Regiment, CCA, 1st Armored Division (itself at 50 percent

strength), the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 504th

Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 179th and 157th regiments of

17

“The Factory.” (National

Archives)
the U.S. 45th Infantry Division. Ordered to counterattack and retake Aprilia on 11 February, the 179th Infantry and 191st Tank

Battalion began a two-pronged attack seeking to outflank the Germans holding the Factory. In two days of costly, hand-to-hand fighting, the Americans failed to retake the lost ground, but inflicted

heavy losses on the enemy. Lucas still expected further attacks in

the weakened central sector and removed the British 1st Division

from the line, replacing it with the British 56th and U.S. 45th Infantry Divisions. As an added precaution, VI Corps artillery was

strengthened and Allied tactical air attacks were stepped up. 

Spurred by the elimination of the Campoleone salient, the Germans continued their counterattack on 16 February by moving

down the Anzio-Albano Road on a four-mile front. The brunt of

the assault hit the 45th Division sectors held by the 157th and 179th

Infantry regiments. The initial attacks by the 3d Panzer Grenadier

and 715th Motorized Infantry Divisions were beaten back with

heavy losses, allowing only minor penetrations, while the 180th Infantry rebuffed lighter attacks. Just before midnight, however,

enemy persistence paid off. A gap was created between the 179th

and 157th Infantry, which was promptly exploited by three German

regiments supported by sixty tanks. By dawn the Germans had 

driven a two-by-one-mile wedge in the center of the 45th Division

and were poised to break the Allied line, threatening the entire

beachhead. Compounding the already critical situation, the 179th

Infantry attempted to withdraw in full view of the enemy the following afternoon and suffered heavy casualties. All through 16–17

February the Allies scrambled to plug the gap with hastily redeployed 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, naval gunfire, and units of the 1st

Armored Division. The XII Tactical Air Command flew 730 ground

support sorties and later claimed that the total weight of bombs

dropped and the number of bombers employed was the greatest

ever allotted up to that date in direct support of ground forces. 

The Germans launched a more intense assault against the 45th

Division at dawn on 18 February and destroyed one battalion of

the 179th Infantry before pushing the remainder of the unit back a

half mile farther to Lucas’ final defensive line by midmorning.

Fearing that the 179th Infantry was in danger of giving way, Lucas

ordered Col. William O. Darby to take command of the unit and

allow no further retreat. The regiment held, later counting 500

dead Germans in front of its positions. Elsewhere, the 180th and

157th regiments also held their positions in spite of heavy losses

18
during three days of German attacks. By midday, Allied air and artillery superiority had turned the tide. When the Germans

launched a final afternoon assault against the 180th and 179th regiments, it was halted by air strikes and massed mortar, machine

gun, artillery, and tank fire. Subsequent enemy attacks on 19 and

20 February were noticeably weaker and were broken up by the

same combination of Allied arms before ground contact was made

The crisis had passed, and while harassing attacks continued until

22 February, VI Corps went over to the offensive locally and succeeded in retaking some lost ground.

19

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Velletri

Campoleone

Ardea

Cisterna

Cori

River

HIGHWAY 7

Mussolini

Canal

Moletta River

Conca

Nettuno

ANZIO

Littoria

Borgo

Grappa

Incastro

1st Inf

Br

3d Inf

XX

45th

XX

 Inf

XX

56th Inf

Br

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LXXVI Panzer Corps

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Aprilia

(the Factory)

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HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD

28 February – 3 March 1944

Front Line

German Attacks

0

Miles

4

0 200 600 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS
20

The Germans could ill afford the loss of the 5,389 men killed,

wounded, and missing during their five-day counterattack. Enemy

troop morale plummeted, and many units lost their offensive capability. The 65th Infantry Division’s combat strength had dropped

to 673 effectives by 23 February, and one regiment of the 715th

Motorized Infantry Division numbered fewer than 185 men. Allied

casualties numbered some 3,496 killed, wounded, or missing in addition to 1,637 nonbattle casualties from trench foot, exposure, 

and combat exhaustion. Allied commanders at Anzio often

claimed that losses would have been lower if soldiers were periodically rotated away from the lines, but replacements simply were

not available. All 96,401 Allied soldiers were required to hold the

35-mile perimeter against an estimated ten German divisions in the

Fourteenth Army, totaling 120,000 men by 12 February. 

Despite the fact that their drive to eliminate the Anzio beachhead with an attack down the Albano Road had failed, the Germans resumed the offensive on 29 February. This time their main

effort was directed against the U.S. 3d Division holding the Cisterna sector of the Allied beachhead. The LXXVI Panzer Corps,

consisting of the 114th Light Infantry, 362d Infantry, 26th Panzer,

and Hermann Goering Divisions began a drive to breach the outer

beachhead defenses from Carano to Isola Bella, which, if successful, would be exploited by the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division all

the way to Nettuno and Anzio. The Americans, however, had anticipated this move. General Truscott, who had replaced Lucas as

VI Corps commander on 23 February, had reinforced the line with

additional artillery. Further, he made certain that each unit had at

least one battalion in reserve with additional reinforcements available at the corps level. 

At midnight, 28 February, German artillery signaled the commencement of the new attack. But VI Corps and 3d Division artillery responded in mass, returning twenty shells for each one

fired by the Germans, expending 66,000 rounds on 29 February

alone. When the enemy infantry advanced at dawn at a half-dozen

points along the 3d Division front, only one attack made any

progress, penetrating 800 yards northeast of Carano before being

halted with heavy losses. The other attacks fared less well amid a

hail of American artillery and mortar fire. Attacking on too broad

a front, the Germans lacked the overwhelming strength needed to

break through anywhere, and by the end of the day they had barely

dented the American line. Over the next several days, the well-en-
trenched Americans, supported by closely coordinated artillery,

armor, and air support, shattered subsequent German attacks. Even

though the 7th and 15th Infantry regiments and the 509th

Parachute Infantry Battalion often were hard pressed and suffered

heavy losses between 1 and 4 March at the hands of the 715th and

the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions, all three units held their

positions and beat back successive enemy assaults. The Germans

continued to seek a breakthrough, but their efforts gradually weakened. Mackensen realized that the Fourteenth Army had spent itself in a costly and futile offensive after a last German assault

failed on 4 March. 

The final five-day German counterattack cost 3,500 men killed,

wounded, and missing, plus thirty tanks destroyed. It had failed to

eliminate the beachhead, and 3d Division counterattacks quickly

reclaimed all territory. From then, the Germans went over to the

defensive, clearly incapable of mounting any further serious offensive action.

After six weeks of continuous bombing, shelling, and fighting,

the men of the VI Corps were as exhausted as their German adversaries. Following the collapse of the final enemy drive on 4

March, a three-month lull began. During this time both armies

limited their operations to defending the positions they held at the

beginning of March, while they conducted limited counterattacks

and raids and marked time until the renewal of offensive operations on the southern front. Although the reinforced Fourteenth

Army, totaling 135,698 troops by 15 March, considered another

offensive, plans were shelved in early April in favor of conserving

troop strength to counter an expected Allied spring offensive. 

The VI Corps spent this time reorganizing and regrouping as

well. The British 56th Division was relieved by the British 5th Division while Commando, Ranger, and parachute units were sent to

England to begin preparations for OVERLORD. The U.S. 34th Infantry Division took up positions before Cisterna on 28 March, replacing the 3d Division, which had seen sixty-seven days of continuous front-line action and now reverted to corps reserve. Over

14,000 replacements arrived to fill other depleted Allied units, 

bringing VI Corps to its full combat strength of 90,000 men in six divisions. In preparation for its role in the spring offensive, VI Corps

received Combat Command B (CCB) of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, giving the beachhead forces a complete armored division. 

21
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Valmontone

Frascati

HIGHWAY 7

ROME

Albano

Genzano

Velletri

Campoleone

Ardea Aprilia

(the Factory)

Padiglione

Cori

River

HIGHWAY 7

Mussolini

Canal

Moletta River

Conca

Nettuno

ANZIO

Littoria

Borgo

Grappa

Incastro

l l l l l l l l ll l lll l l l l l l

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1st SSF

Contact with

 II Corps 

 25 May

TF Brett

3d Inf

45th Inf

34th Inf

CCA

1st Inf Br

5th Inf 25 May

CCB

26 May

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Cisterna

THE BREAKTHROUGH

25 – 26 May 1944

Route of Allied Advance

Front Line, Date

0 200 600 1200 and Above

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 4

Miles
23

On 22 May the entire U.S. 36th Infantry Division landed, bringing 

the total number of Allied troops at Anzio to seven full divisions. 

During March, all of April, and the first part of May 1944, recalled one veteran, the Anzio beachhead resembled the Western

Front during World War I. The vast majority of Allied casualties

during this period were from air and artillery attacks, including

fire from “Anzio Annie,” a 280-mm. German railway gun which

fired from the Alban Hills. During March, shrapnel caused 83 percent of all 3d Division casualties, and other units experienced similar rates. The Anzio beachhead became a honeycomb of wet and

muddy trenches, foxholes, and dugouts. Yet the Allied troops

made the best of a bad situation, and one soldier recalled that during these months the fighting was light and living was leisurely. 

Supply problems at Anzio, originally one of the main concerns

of Allied planners, never reached a crisis stage. Beginning on 28

January, six LSTs left Naples daily for Anzio, each carrying 1,500

tons of cargo distributed among fifty combat-loaded trucks. Driving off the ships at Anzio, the trucks moved directly to front-line

positions with ammunition, fuel, and rations and were replaced on

the LSTs by the fifty empty trucks that had made the voyage the

previous day. In addition to LSTs, fifteen smaller vessels arrived

each week, and every ten days four massive Liberty ships delivered

heavier equipment. Between 22 January and 1 June over 531,511

long tons of supplies were unloaded at Anzio, a daily average of

3,920 tons. 

On the night of 11–12 May, the Fifth and Eighth Armies

launched their long-awaited spring offensive against the Gustav

Line. Stymied in attempts to break through at Cassino in February,

March, and April, the Allies initially encountered little success in

their new drive. Nonetheless, the Germans abandoned Monte

Cassino after a week of heavy fighting by Polish forces, and the

French Expeditionary Corps and U.S. II Corps succeeded in breaking the Gustav Line by 15 May. The II Corps continued its drive

north toward Terracina, which fell on 23–24 May, and raced toward

the Anzio beachhead against rapidly crumbling German resistance

as enemy troops began withdrawing northeast toward Rome. 

On 5 May General Clark gave General Truscott orders for a

new Allied offensive code-named BUFFALO. The VI Corps was to

break out of the beachhead on the Cisterna front at Cori, at the

base of the Lepini Mountains, and at Velletri near the base of the

Alban Hills. Once the breakout occurred, the Anzio units were to
24

Patrol moving through Cisterna. (National Archives)

drive east through the Velletri Gap to Valmontone, cut Highway 6,

the main German route of retreat, and trap the bulk of the enemy

forces withdrawing north through the Liri valley. The basic operational concept had been dictated to Clark by Alexander, who was

acting on Churchill’s desire to destroy the entire Tenth Army south

of Rome at Valmontone. Clark, however, had little faith in the feasibility of the plan. Furthermore, he believed that most of the 

recognition for Allied gains thus far obtained in Italy had been attributed unjustly to British forces, and he wanted the Fifth Army to

have the singular honor of liberating Rome. He therefore informed

Truscott that the VI Corps was to be prepared at any moment during the breakout to swing north for a rapid advance on the Italian

capital, especially if stiff enemy resistance was encountered on the

route to Valmontone or if the British advance up the Liri valley 

was slower than planned. 

The U.S. 1st Armored Division was to make the initial assault

out of the beachhead, supported by the 3d Division and 1st Special

Service Force. The 45th Division was to move beyond Carano on

the left as far as the Campoleone-Cisterna railroad, while the 36th

Infantry Division exploited the expected breakthrough. 
25

At 0545, 23 May, a 45-minute Allied artillery barrage opened on

the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry attacks along the

entire line from Carano to the Mussolini Canal. Although resistance was very stiff, by evening the 1st Special Service Force and 1st

Armored Division had breached the enemy main line of resistance,

while the XII Tactical Air Command completed the last of 722 sorties. The following day VI Corps forces cut Highway 7 above Cisterna and encircled the town, the scene of continued heavy fighting 

by desperate enemy forces. The town finally fell on 25 May at the 

cost of 476 Americans killed, 2,321 wounded, and 75 missing. 

Earlier on 25 May, at 0730, troops of the 91st Reconnaissance

Squadron, 85th Infantry Division, U.S. II Corps, racing north from

Terracina across the Pontine Marshes, met soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 36th Engineer Combat Regiment, from the Anzio beachhead, effecting the long-planned and longer-awaited link-up between Fifth Army forces. With the physical juncture of the II and 

VI Corps, the beachhead ceased to exist and the formerly isolated 

soldiers became the left flank of the Fifth Army. Clark personally

greeted the II Corps troops three hours later.

Meanwhile, the breakout west was proving costly to the VI

Corps. The 1st Armored Division lost 100 armored vehicles in the

first day alone, while the entire corps took over 4,000 casualties in

the first five days of the offensive. Allied troops, however, counted

4,838 enemy prisoners, including 1,000 in Cisterna, and destroyed

or damaged 2,700 enemy vehicles. 

On the same day that the Fifth Army front merged with the

Anzio beachhead, General Clark also split Truscott’s forces into two

parts, sending the 3d Division, the 1st Special Service Force, and elements of the 1st Armored Division toward Valmontone. This

thrust, however, proved insufficient, and most of the Tenth Army escaped north to fight again. In the meantime the 45th and 34th Infantry Divisions, along with the rest of the Fifth Army, joined in the

hot pursuit of German forces falling back on Rome, a scarce thirty

miles distant. Americans liberated the Italian capital on 4 June 1944. 

Analysis

During the four months of the Anzio Campaign the Allied VI

Corps suffered over 29,200 combat casualties (4,400 killed, 18,000

wounded, 6,800 prisoners or missing) and 37,000 noncombat casualties. Two-thirds of these losses, amounting to 17 percent of VI Corps’
26

effective strength, were inflicted between the initial landings and

the end of the German counteroffensive on 4 March. Of the combat

casualties, 16,200 were Americans (2,800 killed, 11,000 wounded,

2,400 prisoners or missing) as were 26,000 of the Allied noncombat

casualties. German combat losses, suffered wholly by the Fourteenth

Army, were estimated at 27,500 (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, and

4,500 prisoners or missing)—figures very similar to Allied losses. 

The Anzio Campaign continues to be controversial, just as it

was during its planning and implementation stages. The operation

clearly failed in its immediate objectives of outflanking the Gustav

Line, restoring mobility to the Italian campaign, and speeding the

capture of Rome. Allied forces were quickly pinned down and contained within a small beachhead, and they were effectively rendered incapable of conducting any sort of major offensive action for

four months pending the advance of Fifth Army forces to the south.

Anzio failed to be the panacea the Allies sought. As General Lucas

repeatedly stated before the landing, which he always considered a

gamble, the paltry allotments of men and supplies were not commensurate with the high goals sought by British planners. He steadfastly maintained that under the circumstances the small Anzio

“Anzio Harbor Under German Bombardment” by Edward A. Reep.

(Army Art Collection)
27

force accomplished all that could have been realistically expected.

Lucas’ critics charge, however, that a more aggressive and imaginative commander, such as a Patton or Truscott, could have obtained

the desired goals by an immediate, bold offensive from the beachhead. Lucas was overly cautious, spent valuable time digging in, and

allowed the Germans to prepare countermeasures to ensure that an

operation conceived as a daring Allied offensive behind enemy

lines became a long, costly campaign of attrition. 

Yet the campaign did accomplish several goals. The presence of

a significant Allied force behind the German main line of resistance, uncomfortably close to Rome, represented a constant

threat. The Germans could not ignore Anzio and were forced into

a response, thereby surrendering the initiative in Italy to the Allies.

The 135,000 troops of the Fourteenth Army surrounding Anzio

could not be moved elsewhere, nor could they be used to make the

already formidable Gustav Line virtually impregnable. The Anzio

beachhead thus guaranteed that the already steady drain of scarce

German troop reserves, equipment, and materiel would continue

unabated, ultimately enabling the 15th Army Group to break

through in the south. But the success was costly. 
Further Readings

For additional reading see William L. Allen, Anzio: Edge of

Disaster (1978); Fred Sheehan, Anzio: Epic of Bravery (1964); and

Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (1963). For a

British perspective, see Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio (1961). 

The official U.S. Army histories, which include Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (1969); Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the

Alps (1977); and the War Department Historical Division, Anzio

Beachhead, 22 January–25 May 1944 (1948), remain the most comprehensive histories available on the overall operational and tactical aspects of the Anzio Campaign. 

CMH Pub 72–19

Cover: Men come ashore from LCIs at Anzio on D-day. 

(National Archives) 

PIN : 071806–000