Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,

Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, and

the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and

International Relations, Committee on Governmental Reform,

House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m.

Wednesday, July 18, 2001 CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Observations on GAO

Access to Information on

CIA Programs and

Activities

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-01-975T
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Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

We are pleased to be here to discuss the subject of access by the General

Accounting Office (GAO) to information from the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA). Specifically, our statement will provide some background

on CIA and its oversight mechanisms, our authority to review CIA

programs, and the history and status of GAO access to CIA information. As

requested, our remarks will focus on our relationship with the CIA and not

with other intelligence agencies. Our comments are based upon our review

of historic files, our legal analysis, and our experiences dealing with the

CIA over the years.

Oversight of the CIA generally comes from two select committees of

Congress and the CIA’s Inspector General. We have broad authority to

evaluate CIA programs. In reality, however, we face both legal and

practical limitations on our ability to review these programs. For example,

we have no access to certain CIA “unvouchered” accounts and cannot

compel our access to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence

information. In addition, as a practical matter, we are limited by the CIA’s

level of cooperation, which has varied through the years. We have not

actively audited the CIA since the early 1960s, when we discontinued such

work because the CIA was not providing us with sufficient access to

information to perform our mission. The issue has arisen since then from

time to time as our work has required some level of access to CIA

programs and information. However, given a lack of requests from the

Congress for us to do specific work at the CIA and our limited resources,

we have made a conscious decision not to further pursue the issue.

Today, our dealings with the CIA are mostly limited to requesting

information that relates either to governmentwide reviews or analyses of

threats to U.S. national security on which the CIA might have some

information. The CIA either provides us with the requested information,

provides the information with some restrictions, or does not provide the

information at all. In general, we are most successful at getting access to

CIA information when we request threat assessments and the CIA does not

perceive our audits as oversight of its activities.

As you know, the General Accounting Office is the investigative arm of the

Congress and is headed by the Comptroller General of the United States—

currently David M. Walker. We support the Congress in meeting its

constitutional responsibilities and help improve the performance and

Summary

Background
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accountability of the federal government for the American people. We

examine the use of public funds, evaluate federal programs and activities,

and provide analyses, options, recommendations, and other assistance to

help the Congress make effective oversight, policy, and funding decisions.

Almost 90 percent of our staff days are in direct support of Congressional

requestors, generally on the behalf of committee chairmen or ranking

members.

The U.S. Intelligence Community consists of those Executive Branch

agencies and organizations that work in concert to carry out our nation’s

intelligence activities.1

 The CIA is an Intelligence Community agency

established under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate the

intelligence activities of several U.S. departments and agencies in the

interest of national security. Among other functions, the CIA collects,

produces, and disseminates foreign intelligence and counterintelligence;

conducts counterintelligence activities abroad; collects, produces, and

disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and

trafficking; conducts special activities approved by the President; and

conducts research, development, and procurement of technical systems

and devices.

Currently, two congressional select committees and the CIA’s Inspector

General oversee the CIA’s activities. The Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence was established on May 19, 1976, to oversee the activities of

the Intelligence Community. Its counterpart in the House of

Representatives is the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

established on July 14, 1977. The CIA’s Inspector General is nominated by

the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Office of the Inspector

General was established by statute in 1989 and conducts inspections,

investigations, and audits at headquarters and in the field. The Inspector

General reports directly to the CIA Director. In addition, the President’s

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board assesses the quality, quantity, and

adequacy of intelligence activities. Within the Board, there is an

intelligence oversight committee that prepares reports on intelligence

activities that may be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. Finally, the

Congress can charter commissions to evaluate intelligence agencies such

 1

 The Intelligence Community includes the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the

CIA, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National

Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other offices and services

within the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, and Energy.

Oversight of CIA Activities
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as CIA. One such commission was the Commission on the Roles and

Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, which issued a

report in 1996.

Generally, we have broad authority to evaluate agency programs and

investigate matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public

money. To carry out our audit responsibilities, we have a statutory right of

access to agency records. Federal agencies are required to provide us

information about their duties, powers, activities, organization, and

financial transactions. This requirement applies to all federal agencies,

including the CIA. Our access rights include the authority to file a civil

action to compel production of records, unless (a) the records relate to

activities the President has designated as foreign intelligence or

counterintelligence activities, (b) the records are specifically exempt from

disclosure by statute, or (c) the records would be exempt from release

under the Freedom of Information Act because they are predecisional

memoranda or law enforcement records and the President or Director of

the Office of Management and Budget certifies that disclosure of the

record could be expected to impair substantially the operations of the

government.

The National Security Act of 1947 charges the CIA Director with protecting

intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In terms

of our statutory access authority, however, the law creates only one

specific exemption: the so-called “unvouchered” accounts. The exemption

pertains to expenditures of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency

nature that are accounted for solely on the certification of the Director.

These transactions are subject to review by the intelligence committees.

Amendments to the law require the President to keep the intelligence

committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the

United States. The CIA has maintained that the Congress intended the

intelligence committees to be the exclusive means of oversight of the CIA,

effectively precluding oversight by us.

While we understand the role of the intelligence committees and the need

to protect intelligence sources and methods, we also believe that our

authorities are broad enough to cover the management and administrative

functions that the CIA shares with all federal agencies.

We have summarized the statutes relevant to our relationship with the CIA

in an appendix attached to this testimony.

GAO’s Authority to

Review CIA Programs
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We have not done audit work at the CIA for almost 40 years. Currently, our

access to the CIA is limited to requests for information that relates either

to governmentwide reviews or programs for which the CIA might have

relevant information. In general, we have the most success obtaining

access to CIA information when we request threat assessments, and the

CIA does not perceive our audits as oversight of its activities.

After the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, we began

conducting financial transaction audits of vouchered expenditures of the

CIA. This effort continued into the early 1960s. In the late 1950s, we

proposed to broaden its work at the CIA to include an examination of the

efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of CIA programs. Although the CIA

Director agreed to our proposal to expand the scope of our work, he

placed a number of conditions on our access to information. Nonetheless,

in October 1959, we agreed to conduct program review work with CIAimposed restrictions on access.

Our attempt to conduct comprehensive program review work continued

until May 1961, when the Comptroller General concluded that the CIA was

not providing us with sufficient access to the information necessary to

conduct comprehensive reviews of the CIA’s programs and announced

plans to discontinue audit work there. After much discussion and several

exchanges of correspondence between GAO, the CIA, and the cognizant

congressional committees, the Chairman of the House Armed Services

Committee wrote to the Comptroller General in July 1962 agreeing that,

absent sufficient GAO access to CIA information, GAO should withdraw

from further audit activities at the CIA.2

 Thus, in 1962, we withdrew from

all audits of CIA activities.

The issue of our access has arisen periodically in the intervening years as

our work has required some level of access to CIA programs and activities.

In July 1975, Comptroller General Elmer Staats testified on our

relationship with the intelligence community and cited several cases

where CIA had not provided us with the requested information. In July

1987, Senator John Glenn introduced a bill (S. 1458) in the 100th Congress

to clarify our audit authority to audit CIA programs and activities. In 1994,

the CIA Director sought to further limit our audit work of intelligence

 2

 Separate Congressional committees on intelligence were not formally established in the

Senate until 1976 and in the House until 1977.

GAO’s Access to the

CIA Has Been Limited

GAO Access to CIA Has

Varied Through the Years
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programs, including those at the Department of Defense. We responded by

writing to several key members of the Congress, citing our concerns and

seeking assistance. As a result, we and the CIA began negotiations on a

written agreement to clarify our access and relationship. Unfortunately,

we were unable to reach any agreement with CIA on this matter. Since

then, GAO has limited its pursuit of greater access because of limited

demand for this work from Congress, particularly from the intelligence

committees. Given a lack of Congressional requests and our limited

resources, we have made a conscious decision to deal with the CIA on a

case-by-case basis.

Currently, the CIA responds to our requests for information in three ways:

it provides the information, it provides the information or a part of it with

some restriction, or it does not provide the information at all. Examples of

each of these three situations, based on the experiences of our audit staff

in selected reviews in recent years, are listed below.

Sometimes the CIA straightforwardly fulfills our requests for briefings or

reports related to threat assessments. This is especially true when we ask

for threat briefings or the CIA’s assessments or opinions on an issue not

involving CIA operations.

• For our review of the State Department’s Anthrax Vaccination Program for

the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations

Committees, we requested a meeting to discuss the CIA’s perspective on a

recent threat assessment of chemical and biological threats to U.S.

interests overseas. The CIA agreed with our request, provided a meeting

within 2 weeks, and followed up with a written statement.

• While we were reviewing U.S. assistance to the Haitian justice system and

national police on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations and House

International Relations Committees, we requested a meeting to discuss the

Haitian justice system. The CIA agreed with our request and met with our

audit team within 3 weeks of our request.

• For our review of chemical and biological terrorist threats for the House

Armed Services Committee, and subcommittees of the House Government

Reform Committee and the House Veterans Affairs Committee, we

requested meetings with CIA analysts on their threat assessments on

chemical and biological weapons. The CIA cooperated and gave us access

to documents and analysts.

Current Access Falls Into

Three Categories
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• On several of our reviews of counterdrug programs for the House

Government Reform Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee we requested CIA assessments on the drug threat and

international activities. The CIA has provided us with detailed briefings on

drug cultivation, production, and trafficking activities in advance of our

field work overseas.

• During our reviews of Balkan security issues and the Dayton Peace

Accords for the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, we asked the CIA for threat assessments relevant to

our review objectives. The CIA provided us with appropriate briefings and

agreed to provide one of our staff members with access to regular

intelligence reports.

In some instances, the CIA provides information with certain access

restrictions or discusses an issue with us without providing detailed data

or documentation.

• During our evaluation of equal employment opportunity and disciplinary

actions for a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Post Office

and Civil Service, the CIA provided us with limited access to information.

CIA officials allowed us to review their personnel regulations and take

notes, but they did not allow us to review personnel folders on individual

disciplinary actions. This was in contrast to the National Security Agency

and Defense Intelligence Agency, which gave us full access to personnel

folders on individual terminations and disciplinary actions.

• For our review of the Department of Defense’s efforts to address the

growing risk to U.S. electronic systems from high-powered radio

frequency weapons for the Joint Economic Committee, the CIA limited our

access to one meeting. Although the technology associated with such

systems was discussed at the meeting, the CIA did not provide any

documentation on research being conducted by foreign nations.

• On some of our audits related to national security issues, the CIA provides

us with limited access to its written threat assessments and analyses, such

as National Intelligence Estimates. However, the CIA restricts our access

to reading the documents and taking notes at the CIA or other locations.

Examples include our readings of National Intelligence Estimates related

to our ongoing work evaluating federal programs to combat terrorism.

In other cases, the CIA simply denies us access to the information we

requested. The CIA’s refusals are not related to the classification level of
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the material. Many of our staff have the high-level security clearances and

accesses needed to review intelligence information. But the CIA considers

our requests as having some implication of oversight and denies us access.

• For our evaluation of national intelligence estimates regarding missile

threats for the House National Security Committee, the CIA refused to

meet with us to discuss the general process and criteria for producing

such estimates or the specific estimates we were reviewing. In addition,

officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy told us that

CIA had asked them not to cooperate with us.

• During our examination of overseas arrests of terrorists for the House

Armed Services Committee and a subcommittee of the House Government

Reform Committee, the CIA refused to meet with us to discuss intelligence

issues related to such arrests. The CIA’s actions were in contrast to those

of two other departments that provided us full access to their staff and

files.

• On our review of classified computer systems in the federal government

for a subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, we

requested basic information on the number and nature of such systems.

The CIA did not provide us with the information, claiming that they would

not be able to participate in the review because the type of information is

under the purview of congressional entities charged with overseeing the

Intelligence Community.

• For our review of the policies and procedures used by the Executive

Office of the President to acquire and safeguard classified intelligence

information, done for the House Rules Committee, we asked to review CIA

forms documenting that personnel had been granted appropriate

clearances. The CIA declined our request, advising us that type of

information we were seeking came under the purview of congressional

entities charged with overseeing the intelligence community.

Our access to CIA information and programs has been limited by both

legal and practical factors. Through the years our access has varied and

we have not done detailed audit work at CIA since the early 1960s. Today,

our access is generally limited to obtaining information on threat

assessments when the CIA does not perceives our audits as oversight of its

activities. We foresee no major change in our current access without

substantial support from Congress—the requestor of the vast majority of

our work. Congressional impetus for change would have to include the

Conclusion
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support of the intelligence committees, who have generally not requested

GAO reviews or evaluations of CIA activities. With such support, we could

evaluate some of the basic management functions at CIA that we now

evaluate throughout the federal government.

This concludes our testimony. We would be happy to answer any

questions you may have.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment

For future questions about this testimony, please contact Henry L. Hinton,

Jr., Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at

(202) 512-4300. Individuals making key contributions to this statement

include Stephen L. Caldwell, James Reid, and David Hancock.
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The following statutory provisions give GAO broad authority to review

agency programs and activities:

• 31 U.S.C. 712: GAO has the responsibility and authority for investigating

matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money, and

for investigating and reporting to either House of Congress or appropriate

congressional committees.

• 31 U.S.C. 717: GAO is authorized to evaluate the results of programs and

activities of federal agencies. Reviews are based upon the initiative of the

Comptroller General, an order from either House of Congress, or a request

from a committee with jurisdiction.

• 31 U.S.C. 3523: This provision authorizes GAO to audit financial

transactions of each agency, except as specifically provided by law.

• 31 U.S.C. 3524: This section authorizes GAO to audit unvouchered

accounts (i.e., those accounted for solely on the certificate of an executive

branch official). The President may exempt sensitive foreign intelligence

and counterintelligence transactions. CIA expenditures on objects of a

confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature under 50 U.S.C. 403j(b)

are also exempt. Transactions in these categories may be reviewed by the

intelligence committees.

• 31 U.S.C. 716: GAO has a broad right of access to agency records.

Subsection 716(a) requires agencies to give GAO information it requires

about the “duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial

transactions of the agency.” This provision gives GAO a generally

unrestricted right of access to agency records. GAO in turn is required to

maintain the same level of confidentiality for the information as is required

of the head of the agency from which it is obtained.

• Section 716 also gives GAO the authority to enforce its requests for

records by filing a civil action in federal district court. Under the

enforcement provisions in 31 U.S.C. 716(d)(1), GAO is precluded from

bringing a civil action to compel the production of a record if:

1. the record relates to activities the President designates as foreign

intelligence or counterintelligence (see Executive Order No. 12333,

defining these terms);

Appendix I: Legal Framework for GAO and

CIA

GAO’s Audit Authority

GAO’s Access-toRecords Authority
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2. the record is specifically exempted from disclosure to GAO by statute;

or

3. the President or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

certifies to the Comptroller General and Congress that a record could

be withheld under the Freedom of Information Act exemptions in 5

U.S.C. 552(b)(5) or (7) (relating to deliberative process and law

enforcement information, respectively), and that disclosure of the

information reasonably could be expected to impair substantially the

operations of the government.

• Although these exceptions do not restrict GAO’s basic rights of access

under 31 U.S.C. 716(a), they do limit GAO’s ability to compel the

production of particular records through a court action.

The CIA has broad authority to protect intelligence-related information but

must keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the

intelligence activities of the United States.

• 50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6) and 403g: Section 403-3 requires the Director of the

CIA to protect “intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized

disclosure....” Section 403g exempts the CIA from laws “which require the

publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official

titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. With the

exception of unvouchered expenditures, CIA’s disclosure of information to

GAO would be an authorized and proper disclosure under 31 U.S.C. 716(a).

• 50 U.S.C. 403j: The CIA has broad discretion to use appropriated funds for

various purposes (e.g., personal services, transportation, printing and

binding, and purchases of firearms) without regard to laws and regulations

relating to the expenditure of government funds. The statute also

authorizes the Director to establish an unvouchered account for objects of

a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature. We recognize that the

CIA’s unvouchered account authority constitutes an exception to GAO’s

audit and access authority, but this account deals with only a portion of

CIA’s funding activities.

• 50 U.S.C. 413: This section provides a method for maintaining

congressional oversight over intelligence activities within the executive

branch. The statute requires the President to ensure that the intelligence

committees (the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House

Relevant CIA

Legislation
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Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) are kept fully and currently

informed of U.S. intelligence activities.

(350098)