NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT ERIC MARTIN, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D16-1421 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed November 16, 2016. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Wayne M. Durden, Judge. Eric Martin, pro se.

PER CURIAM.
Eric Martin appeals the summary denial of his amended motion f or postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Proc edure 3.850. Mr. Martin alleges five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and w hile we affirm the postconviction court's denial of four of those claims, we rever se the denial of claim three and remand for further consideration of that claim. Mr. Martin has been incarcerated since 2006, serving a life sen tence for armed burglary. During his imprisonment, in July 2011, he was charged with one count of possession of contraband in a c ounty detention facility. § 951.22, Fla. Stat. (2011).-2- The State alleged that Mr. Martin broke off a piece of metal fr om his bed and sharpened it into a weapon. Officers testified at trial that they found the piece of contraband on Mr. Martin's person during a search of his cell, which he shared wi th several other inmates. Following a second jury trial after the first trial ended with a hung jury, he was convicted and sentenced to an additional ten years' imprisonment. When reviewing the summary denial of a motion for postconvicti on relief, this court applies de novo review and "must accept the movant's factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the record." J ennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1121 (Fla. 2013). Since there was no evidentiary hearing , the court "must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, an d, if so, whether the record refutes it." Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 2003) . To state a legally sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Mart in is required to show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient p erformance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984 ). To establish that counsel was deficient, Mr. Marti n must overcome the "strong pre sumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 690. In his third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Ma rtin alleges that counsel was deficient for not investigating the existence of a surveillance video that he contends must have existed. He maintains that there were ca meras pointed at his cell that would have shown that the officers who conducted the search had in fact found the weapon inside the shared cell and not on his person as they had claimed. Further, he asserts that he informed counsel prior to trial that there s hould have been a video of the search. The State, in its response to the motion, counters that counsel intentionally-3- did not seek the video as a trial tactic to create reasonable d oubt by having Mr. Martin testify that there were cameras and then pointing to the fact t hat the State did not introduce any video at trial. The postconviction court provided very little explanation in i ts order as to why it denied this claim, but because it agreed with the State' s response to Mr. Martin's motion we can presume that it deemed counsel's failure to obtai n the video to be a reasonable tactical decision. The court erred in drawing such a conclusion from the very limited record in this case and without having held an evi dentiary hearing. The Supreme Court has explained that when determining whether a decision was a reasonable professional judgment and therefore " virtually unchallengeable" under Strickland, the "principal concern" is w hether the investigation supporting counsel's decision no t to introduce certain evidence " was itself reasonable ." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (emphasis in origina l). For that reason , a determination of whether or not a decision is a reasonable tact ic should not be made without an evidentiary hearing. Hamilton v. State, 915 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[T]o conclude that an action or inaction taken by a tri al attorney was a strategic decision generally requires an evidentiary hearing."); see Cham bers v. State, 613 So. 2d 118, 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine if counsel's failure to introduce an allegedly exculp atory tape recording was a reasonable tactical decision). Here, Mr. Martin alleges that c ounsel failed to investigate th e existence of a video that he contends would be, at best, exculpatory and, at worst, corroborative of his trial testimony. If the video did in fact exist and would have shown what Mr. Martin-4- claims, then the failure to investigate and obtain that video w ould likely be prejudicial. It is therefore necessary for the postconviction court to know the extent of counsel's investigation into the video's existence before it can determin e whether or not her conduct was reasonable and therefore not deficient. Because the record attachments to the postconviction court's or der do not conclusively refute Mr. Martin's allegation, we reverse the pos tconviction court's denial of this claim and remand for the postconviction court to recons ider the claim and to conduct an evidentiary hearing if necessary. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D) ("On appeal from the denial of relief, unless the record shows concl usively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be reversed and the c ause remanded for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief."). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CASANUEVA, MORRIS, and ROTHST EIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.