ANZIO 

BEACHHEAD 

22 JANUARY - 25 MAY 1944 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990 
First printed by the Historical Division, War Department, 

for the American Forces in Action series, 1948 

CMH Pub 100-10 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Foreword to CMH Edition 

Anzio Beachhead (22 January-25 May 1944) is one of a series of 

fourteen studies of World War II operations originally published by 

the War Department's Historical Division and now returned to print 

as part of the Army's commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of 

that momentous clash of arms. These volumes, prepared by professional historians shortly after the events described, provide a concise 

summary of some of the major campaigns and battles fought by 

American soldiers. The skillful combination of combat interviews 

with primary sources, many of which are now lost, gives these unassuming narratives a special importance to military historians. The careful analysis of key operations provides numerous lessons for today's 

military students. 

I am pleased that this entire group of studies will once again be 

available. I urge all military students and teachers to use them to 

enhance our collective awareness of the skill, leadership, daring, and 

professionalism exhibited by our military forebears. 

Washington, nc. 

15 September 1989 

III 

HAROLD W. NELSON 

Colonel, FA 

Chief of Military History 

FOREWORD 

In a nation at war, teamwork by the whole people is necessary for victory. Bttt 

the issue is decided on the battlefield, toward which all national effort leads. 

The country's fate lies in the hands of its soldier citizens; in the clash of 

battle is found the final test of plans, training, equipment, and-above allthe fighting spirit of units and individuals. 

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES presents detailed accollnts of 

partimlar combat operations of United States forces. To the American public, this record of high achievement by men who served their Nation well is 

presented as a preface to the full military history of World JVctr II. To the 

soldien who took part in the operations concerned, these narratives will give 

the opportunity to see more clearly the results of orders which they obeyed 

and of sacrifices which they and their comrades made, in perfot"fl2ance of 

missions that find their meaning in the otttcome of a larger plan of battle . 

.,tJ 7# ~~ ...... '-

v 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

Chief of Staff 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Historical Division 

Washington 25, D. C. 

I October I947 

Allzio Beachhead, fourteenth in the series of studies of particular combat operations, is the 

story of how VI Corps of the American Fifth Army seized and held a strategic position far to 

the rear of the main fighting front, in the Italian campaign of 1944. Since VI Corps included 

British as well as American units, and the high command in Italy was in British rather than 

in American hands, the pattIe to maintain the Anzio beachhead was an Allied rather than an ex· 

elusively American operation. Essentially, this narrative of Anzio is confined to the first six 

weeks of bitter struggle to hold the beachhead against German attacks designed to drive the 

Allied forces from their foothold, a period which ended on 3 March. Thereafter, until the 

Allied offensive of May, the Anzio beachhead was a static and relatively quiet front. Then the 

beachhead forces spearheaded the drive that led to the capture of Rome. Only a sketch of this 

final and decisive phase of the Anzio operation is included in this narrative. 

This study is based upon a first narrative by Capt. John Bowditch, Ill, prepared in the field 

from military records and from notes and interviews recorded during and after the operation 

by Captain Bowditch and by 1st Lt. Robert W. Komer. Although as published this book con· 

tains no documentation, the original narrative, fully documented, is on file in the War Depart. 

ment. Captain Bowditch's manuscript has been revised and extended with the help of addi· 

tional information, including that obtained from enemy records, in the Historical Division, 

War Department Special Staff, by Maj. Roy Lamson, Jr., and by Dr. Stetson Conn. The maps 

were planned by Col. Allison R. Hartman of the Historical Division, and they were designed 

and drafted by the World War I Branch of the Division. The photographs were selected by 

Capt. Robert L. Boden of the Historical Division. In order that the more definitive history of 

this operation may be as complete and cOrrect as possible, readers are urged to send all com· 

ments, criticisms, and additional data to the Historical Division, Department of the Army, 

Washington 25, D. C. 

Photographs in this book were obtained from the following sources: U.S. Air Forces, 

U.S. Navy, British War Office, Acme Newspholos, Inc., International News Photos, Inc., 

Time, Inc., and special War Department files. All other photographs are from the U.S. Army 

Signal Corps. No photographs published herein, except official Wac Depanment pictures, may 

be reproduced in whole or in part without permission from the copyright owners. 

VI 
CONTENTS 

THE ANZIO LANDING (22-29 January) 

Plan for a New 0ffemi've 

The Assallil ............. . 

Expanding the Beachhead 

THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE (30 January-I February) 

Attack on Cislema, 30 Jamlary ..................................... . 

AUack 011 Cisternal 31 /anllal'y-l february .............................. . 

Advance 10 Cam pol cone .......................... . ........................ . 

THE ENEMY ATTACKS (3-12 February) ........................................................ . 

Battle of the Campoleo"e S.Iiellt ..... .. . ........................................................... . 

The Beachhead Defeme .... .. .............. . ............. . 

The Factory and Carroceto .................. . ............................ . 

Allied COllnterattacks ........................ . 

THE MAJOR GERMAN OFFENSIVE (1 6-20 February) 

Preparing for tbe Attack .............. ............... .............. . ........... . 

The First DaYJ 16 Febl'1lary ................ . ........................... ................. . 

'fhe Second Day, 17 Febl'llary .. . 

The Crisis, 18-19 February ........... . 

The Battle is 117011, 19- 20 Febmary 

VI CORPS HOLDS THE BEACHHEAD (20 February-3 March) 

The Battle of the C.ves .... 

The 3d Division Repulses the Enem)' 

THE BREAKTHROUGH .... . 

The Problem of S1Ipply ... . 

Life at the Beachhead ..... . 

Casl/alties . ........................... . ............... .. 

The Breakthr01lgh, 23 J1.lay-4 Jlllle . 

VII 

Page 

I 

3 

11 

18 

27 

28 

33 

36 

43 

44 

47 

53 

62 

67 

67 

70 

75 

80 

85 

91 

92 

97 

105 

107 

112 

116 

116 
Illustrations 

Frontispiece - Afler the Bailie 

The Anzio Beachhead Terrain 

Lilloria and Ihe Righi Flank . 

Maj. Gen. John P. LllcaJ . _ 

Preloaded SlIpply Trtlck! and DUKWS 

Troop! Filing Aboard 01 NapleI 

The AI1Zio Landing 

Enemy Coastat Defenses. . . . 

Lt. Gen. Mark II". Clark. . . . 

A Del/royed MUSJo/ini Canal Bridge. 

Engineers Clearing Demolition Charge.! ill Allzio 

An Air Attack 011 Cisterna. . 

Plliting Down Road Matting .. . . . . 

Unloading at Anzio'; Dodu. . . . . 

Advancing Toward the MflJJo/ini Canal 

The Righi Flank 01 Ihe MUJJolini Canal 

Enemy Shellfire Hilling Ihe BeacheI. . 

Al1liaircraft GUllS and Barrage Bal/oonJ 

Iso/a Bella and CiJlerna. . . . 

Each Building Became a For/reu 

T dllkl Take Momentary Cover . 

An Artillery Observer's View. . 

Z one of Armored Allack on the Lett Flank 

Campo/eone Slation . . . . . . . . 

FarmhollJe Attacked in the British Zone 

Forward Observation POll!. . . 

If/ire.Laying Crews . . . . 

Camouflaged Ar/il/ery Positiom . 

D eS/file/ion of Equipment in Nellllllo 

The Bllllerfiy Bomb 

"Hell'J Half Acre" 

The Fac/ory. . . . 

No Man'J Land . . 

COfmterballery Fire by Antiaircraft UnitJ 

The Over palS at Carrocelo. . . 

German Artillery in the Factory. . . . 

The Alballo Road Sector. . . . . . . 

Bombardment of the Anzio and NellfOJO AreaJ . 

DllgoutJ Along the MfIlsolini Cal1a/. . . . 

Bomb ConcentrationJ on Campoleone Statiml 

The First OverpaJJ Above Anzio 

Tallk! Move Up Ihe Alballo Road. . . . . 

Vllt 

Page 

x 

2 

4 

5 

7 

8 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

19 

20 

22 

23 

25 

29 

31 

32 

35 

39 

41 

45 

48 

49 

51 

52 

53 

55 

56 

58 

59 

63 

64 

69 

71 

73 

76 

78 

83 
Engineers Bridge a Stream. 

Prisoners Formed Long Co/umlls 

The German "Goliath" Tank. 

The Caves 

Maj. Gen. Lucien K . Tfflscott 

Smoke Over the Front Lines . 

Enemy Losses . 

A Destroyed Ammunition Dllmp 

A I&.id on an Enemy Position . 

Rushing the Farmhouse 

A Supply Dump. 

Anzio Annie 

VI Corps Headquarters at Nettllno . 

Revetting the Hospital Tents. 

Living Conditions at the Front 

The Captllre of Cistema 

The Fall of the Factory 

The Entry into Rome . 

Maps 

No. 

1 Ita/ian Front, 15 Janllary 

2 Allied Strategy ill /laly, 'alluary 1944 

3 The [.allding, 22-23 ' anuary 

4 Expanding the Beachhead, 24-28 Janf/ary 

5 Expanding the Beachhead, 29 January 

6 Expanding the Beachhead, 30 ,amlar, 

7 Expanding the Beachhead, 31 January 

8 Expanding the Beachhead, 1 Febmary 

9 Campoleone Salient, 3-5 February 

10 Plan for Beachhead Defeme, 5 Febmary 

11 The Factory and Carroceto, 7-8 February 

12 The Factory and Carroceto, 9 February 

13 The Factory and Carroce/o, 10 Febmary 

14 Allied CounterallackJ, 11-12 Febmary 

15 Enemy Offensive, 16 Febmary 

16 Enemy Offemive, 17 Febmary 

17 Enemy 0 fJemive, 18 Febmary 

18 Enemy OfJemi1Je, 19-20 Febmary 

19 Regrollping of Forces 

20 Holding the Beachhead, 28 Febmary-3 l\-Iarch 

21 The Breakthrough, 23- 24 May 

22 The Breakthrough, 25-26 May 

23 The Breakthrough, 27-28 May 

24 The Breakthrough, 29-30 May 

25 The Breakthrough, 31 May-4 1une 

IX 

84 

85 

88 

93 

97 

98 

103 

]06 

108 

]09 

110 

111 

112 

114 

115 

118 

120 

121 
AFTER THE BATTLE. The (eIllraJ square of Cislema, 26 May 1944. 
THE ANZIO LANDING 

(22-29 January) 

In the early morning hours of 22 January 1944, 

VI Corps of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army 

landed on the Italian coast below Rome and 

established a beachhead far behind the enemy lines. 

In the four months between this landing and Fifth 

Army's May offensive, the short stretch of coast 

known as the Anzio beachhead was the scene of 

one of the most courageous and bloody dramas of 

the war. The Germans threw attack after attack 

against the beachhead in an effort to drive the 

landing force into the sea. Fifth Army troops, put 

fully on the defensive for tbe first time, rose to 

the test. Hemmed in by numerically superior enemy 

forces, they held their beachhead, fought off every 

enemy attack, and then built up a powerful striking 

force which spearheaded Fifth Army's triumphant 

entry into Rome in June. 

The story of Anzio must be read against the 

background of the preceding phase of the Italian 

campaign. The winter months of 1943-44 found 

the Allied forces in Italy slowly battering their way 

through the rugged mountain barriers blocking 

the roads to Rome. After the Allied landings in 

southern Italy, German forces had fought a delaying action while preparing defensive lines to their 

rear. The main defensive barrier guarding the approaches to Rome was the Gustav Line, extending 

I 

across the Italian peninsula from Minturno to 

Ortona. Enemy engineers had reinforced the natural mountain defenses with an elaborate network 

of pillboxes, bunkers, and mine fields. The Germans had also reorganized their forces to resist the 

Allied advance. On 21 November 1943, Field 

Marshal Albert Kesselring took over the command 

of the entire Italian theater; Army Group C, under 

his command, was divided into two armies, the 

Tenth facing the southern front and also holding 

the Rome area, and the Fourteenth guarding central and northern Italy. In a year otherwise filled 

with defeat, Hitler was determined to gain the 

prestige of holding the Allies south of Rome. 

(Map No. 1.) 

Opposing the German forces was the All ied 

15th Army Group, commanded by Gen. Sir Harold 

R. L. G. Alexander, with the U.S. Fifth Army 

attacking on the western and the British Eighth 

Army on the eastern sectors of the front. In midDecember, men of the Fifth Army were lighting 

their way through the forward enemy defensive 

positions, which became known as the Winter 

Line. 1 

t An account of this operation is given in Fiflh Army al Ihe 

WinJer Line (American Forces in Action Series, Military Intelli· 

gence Division, U.S. War Department) , Washington, 1945. 
THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD TERRAIN, looking lIorthea5t over the 

~at plain toward Vellelri Gap. III the foreground is the toum of Anzio. 

Nellflllo is on the right. (Photo tak", ill September 1944.) 

Braving the mud, rain, and cold of an unusually 

bad Italian winter, scrambling up precipitous 

mountain slopes where only mules or human packtrains could follow, the Allied forces struggled to 

penetrate the German defenses. By early January, 

Fifth Army troops had broken through the Winter 

Line and had occupied the heights above the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, from which they could 

look across to Mount Cassino, with Highway No. 

6 curving around its base into the Liri Valley. 

2 

Before them were the main ramparts'of the Gustav 

Line, guarding this natural corridor to the Italian 

capital. Buttressed by snow-capped peaks flanking 

the Liri Valley, and protected by the rain-swollen 

Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, the Gustav Line 

was an even more formidable barrier than the 

Winter Line. Unless some strategy could be devised to turn the defenses of the Gustav Line, Fifth 

Army faced another long and arduous mountain 

campaIgn. 
ITALIAN FRONT 

15 January 1944 

ill111111l. AuIEO fRONT LINE 

ElEVAT/OH IN fEET 

TYRRHENIAN 

SEA 

MAP NO. 1 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN ITALY 

January 1944 

J1WWJ.lWW. ALliED fRONT LINE 15 JANUARY 

- GUSTAV LINE 

10 

Unils os of J5 Jonuory 

ELEVATIONS IN IIETERS 

:::~;::::~ l:~:$N4:¥:*-· 

o 200 600 1000 1600 and above 

o " 20 

IIILES 

ADRIATIC 

SEA 

MAP NO. 2 
Plan for a New Offensive 

The strategy decided upon by the Allied leaders, 

an amphibious landing behind the Gustav Line, 

had been under consideration from the time when 

German intentions in Italy became clear. By late 

October 1943 it was evident that the Germans intended to compel the Allied forces to light a slow, 

costly battle up the peninsula. To meet this situation, Allied staffs began to consider a plan for 

landing behind the enemy lines, with the purpose 

of turning the German Bank, gaining a passage 

to the routes to Rome, and threatening the enemy 

lines of communication and supply. On the Eighth 

Army front, a small-scale amphibious landing at 

Termoli on 2-3 October 1943 furnished a pattern 

for such an attack. 

On 8 November 1943 General Alexander 

ordered the Fifth Army to plan an amphibious 

landing on the west coast. The target date was set 

at 20 December. The landing, to be made by a 

single division, was to be the third phase of an 

over-all operation in Italy. 10 the lirst phase the 

Eighth Army was to carry out an offensive which 

would put it astride Highway No.5, running from 

Pescara on the Adriatic coast through Popoli and 

Collarmele toward Rome. The second pbase would 

be a Fifth Army drive up the Liri and Sacco Valleys to capture F rosinone. Dependent on the progress of the lirst two phases, a landing south of 

Rome directed toward Colli Laziali (the Albanese 

Mountains) would be made, to link up with the 

forces from the south. Because of tenacious German opposition and difficult terrain, the Eighth 

and Fifth Armies in the Winter Line campaign 

could not reach their assigned objectives. This situation, together with the lack of available landing 

craft, made the plan for an immediate amphibious 

end-run impracticable, and the project was abandoned on 20 December 1943. 

The slow progress of the Allied advance led to 

the revival of the plan for an amphibious operation south of Rome along the lines previously 

contemplated. At Tunis on Christmas Day the 

chief Allied military leaders drafted new plans 

3 

for an amphibious landing below Rome with increased forces and the necessary shipping. Two 

divisions, plus airborne troops and some armorover twice the force originally planned-were to 

make the initial assault between 20 and 31 January, 

but as near 20 January as possible to allow a few 

days latitude if bad weather should force postponement. The amphibious operation was again to be 

coordinated with a drive from the south , which 

would begin earlier. (Map No.2.) 

Main Fifth Army, reinforced by two fresh divisions from the quiescent Eighth Army front, was 

to strike at the German Te1lth Army across the 

Garigljano and Rapido llivers, breach the Gustav 

Line, and drive up the Liri Valley. This offensive 

was planned in sufficient strength to draw in most 

of the available German reserves. While the enemy 

was fully occupied in defending the Gustav Line, 

the surprise landing would be made in his rear at 

the twin resort towns of Anzio and Nettuno , about 

thirty miles south of Rome. Once established, the 

assault force was to thrust inland toward the volcanic heights of Colli Laziali. The capture of Colli 

Laziali would block vital enemy supply routes and 

threaten to cut off the German troops holding the 

Gustav Line. The Allied leaders believed that the 

Germans lacked sufficient strength to meet attacks 

on two fronts and that they would be forced to 

rush troops northward to meet the grave threat 

to their rear. Thus weakened, the Germans could 

be forced to withdraw up the Liri Valley from 

their Gustav Line positions. Eighth Army, though 

depleted of two divisions willch were to go to the 

Fifth Army front, was to make a show of force 

along its front in order to contain the maximum 

number of enemy forces. If possible, Eighth Army 

would reach Highway No.5 and develop a threat 

toward Rome through Popoli by 20 January. Main 

Fifth Army was to follow up the anticipated enemy 

withdrawal as quickly as possible, link up with the 

beachhead force, and drive on Rome. 

The area chosen for the amphibious landjng was 

a stretch of the narrow Roman coastal plain extending north from Terracina across the Tiber 

lliver. (Map NO.3.) Southeast of Anzio this plain 
is covered by the famous Pontine Marshes; northwest toward the Tiber it is a region of rolling, 

often wooded, farm country. The 3,100-foot hill 

mass of Colli Laziali lies about twenty miles inland 

from Anzio and guards the southern approaches to 

Rome. (Map No. 21.) Highway No.7 skirts the 

west side of Colli Laziali; on the southeast the 

mountains fall away into the low Velletri Gap 

leading inland toward Highway No.6 at Valmontone. The main west-coast railways parallel these 

highways. On the east side of the Velletri Gap rise 

the peaks of the Lepini Mountains which stretch 

along the inner edge of the Pontine Marshes toward Terracina. 

An area roughly seven miles deep by fifteen 

miles wide around Anzio was to form the initial 

Allied beachhead. (Map NO.3.) Its 26-mile perimeter was considered the maximum which could 

be held by the initial assault force and yet include 

the best natural features for defense. In the sector 

northwest of Anzio the beachhead was bounded 

by the Maletta River. Here the low coastal plain 

was cut up by a series of rough-hewn strean, gullies, the largest of them formed by the Maletta and 

the Incastro Rivers running southwest from the 

higher ground inland toward the sea. These gullies, though their small streams were easily fordable, were often fifty feet deep and offered difficult 

obstacles to armor. In the central beachhead sector, 

east of the first overpass on the Anzio-Albano road, 

the line ran 6,000 yards across a broad stretch of 

almost level open fields to meet the west branch 

LITIORIA AND THE RIGHT FLANK of the beachhead, vietved 

trom the air. The MIIJJOli11i Canal /loUJ! from right to left aaoS! the ler· 

rain shown in tbis photo, about olle·third of the distance be/ween Litlaria and A71Zio. The Fac/or)' (Aprilia) was very similar in structure, and 

bllilt about the same lime as LitJaria. 

r TORRE ASTURA ANZIO I 

4 
THE 

LANDING 

22 JANUARY 1944 

1fff!fff. 1",1;01 Beodtheod Line 

CoTtoI.r ;"IMIOI 20 mete's 

9 1 .,"" 1 

MAP NO.3 
of the Mussolini Canal below the village of Padiglione. This stretch of open country leading inland 

along the Albano road formed the best avenue of 

approach into or out of the beachhead and was to 

be the scene of major Allied and German attacks. 

Between Cisterna and Littoria the plain merged 

with the northern edge of the Pontine Marshes, a 

low, flat region of irrigated fields interlaced with 

an intricate network of drainage ditches. The treeless, level expanse offered scant cover for troops, 

and during the rainy season the fields were impassable to most heavy equipment. From Padiglione east the entire right flank of the initial beachhead line was protected by the Mussolini Canal, 

which drains the northern edge of the Pontine 

Marshes. The line ran east along the west branch 

of the canal to its intersection with the main branch 

and from there down the main branch to the sea. 

The canal and the Pontine Marshes made the 

beachhead right flank facing Littoria a poor avenue 

of attack; this flank could be held with a minimum 

of forces. 

Most of the beachhead area was within an elaborate reclamation and resettlement project. The 

low, swampy, malarial bogland of the Pontine 

Marshes had been converted into an area of cultivated fields, carefully drained and irrigated by an 

extensive series of canals and pumping stations. 

Only in the area immediately north of Anzio and 

Nettuno had the scrub timber, bog, and rolling 

grazing land been left untouched. At regular intervals along the network of paved and gravel roads 

crisscrossing the farmlands were the standardized 

2-story pode,.e, or farmhouses, built for the new 

settlers. Such places as the new community center 

of Aprilia, called the "Factory" by Allied troops, 

and the provincial capital of Littoria, were modernistic model towns. The twin towns of Anzio (ancient Antium) and Nettuno in the center of the 

beachhead were popular seaside resorts before the 

war. 

The plan for the landing was called SHINGLE. 

Originally conceived as a subsidiary operation on 

the left flank of an advancing Fifth Army, it developed, when main Fifth Army failed to break the 

5 

MAJ. GEN. JOHN P. LUCAS 

Commanding General, VI CorpI 

mountain defenses in the south, into a major operation far in the enemy rear. U.S. VI Corps, selected 

by General Clark to make the amphibious landing, 

employed British as well as American forces lInder 

the command of Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas. The 

assault force was to be dispatched from Naples, 

and was to consist of the U.S. 3d Division, veteran 

of landings in Sicily and North Africa, the British 

1 Division from the Eighth Army front, the 46 

Royal Tank Regiment, the 751st Tank Battalion, 

the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 504th 

Parachute Infantry Regiment, Commandos, Rangers, and other supporting troops. This force was 

the largest that could be lifted by the limited number of landing craft available. It was estimated 

that the turnaround would require three days. As 

soon as the convoy returned to Naples, the U.s. 

45th Division and the U. S. 1st Armored Division 

(less Combat Command B), were sent as reinforcements. 

The final plans for SHINGLE were completed 

and approved on 12 January. D Day was set for 
22 January; at H Hour (0200), VI Corps was to 

land over the beaches near Anzio and Nettuno in 

three simultaneous assaults. On the right, the 3d 

Division, under Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., 

would land three regiments in assault over X-Ray 

Red and Green Beaches, two miles below Nettuno' In the center, the 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional) of three battalions, the 83d Chemical 

Battalion, and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion would come in over Yellow Beach, a small 

beach adjacent to Anzio harbor, with the mission 

of seizing the port and clearing out any coastal 

defense batteries there. On Peter Beach, six miles 

northwest of Anzio, the 2 Brigade Group of the 

British 1 Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. 

W. R. C. Penney, would make the assault; the 2 

Special Service Brigade of 9 and 43 Commandos 

would land with it and strike east to establish a 

road block on the main road leading from Anzio 

to Campoleone and Albano. All these forces would 

link up to seize and consolidate a beachhead centering on the port of Anzio. (Map NO.3.) 

The assault plan assumed the possibility of initial heavy resistance on the beaches, and the certainty of heavy counterattacks once the enemy was 

fully aware of the extent of the landing. Consequently, VI Corps held out a strong reserve and 

placed great emphasis on digging in early at initial 

objectives to repel armored counterattacks. The 

bulk of the 1 Division, with the 46 Royal Tank 

Regiment, the 24 Field Regiment, and the 80 

Medium Regiment attached, was to remain on 

shipboard as a lIoating reserve. The 504th Parachute Infantry would land behind the 3d Division 

and also assemble in Corps reserve. Up to a few 

days before the landing, it had been intended to 

drop the paratroopers behind the beaches. This 

drop was called off because its objective was about 

the same as that of the 1 Division, and because 

dropping before H Hour might prematurely reveal 

the main assault. A drop at H Hour itself might 

I Allached .. 60 I st Tank Destroyer Battalion; 75 1 st Tank Bat· 

talion; 4415t AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion; Battery B, 

36th Field Artillery Regiment (1)5·mm. gun); 69th Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion (IOS-mm. self-propelled howitzer); and 

84th Chemical Battalion (motorized) , 

6 

incur the danger of being fired on by Allied artillery if enemy planes should attack at the same 

time. 

The Allied High Command expected that a 

landing in strength to the rear of XlV Pallzer 

Corps, opposing main Fifth Army on the Cassino 

front, would be considered an emergency to be 

met by all the resources of the German High Com· 

mand in Italy. From the latest intelligence available on enemy troops in the Rome area, Army G--2 

estimated that VI Corps could expect an initial D 

Day resistance from one division assigned to coast 

watching, four parachute battalions from Rome, 

a tank and an antitank battalion, and miscellanenus 

coast defense personnel, totaling 14,300 men. By 

D plus 1, another division, an SS infantry regiment 

from north of Rome, a regimental combat team 

from XlV Pallzer Corps reserve, and perhaps elements of the H ermalln Goerillg Panzer Divisioll 

could arrive. By D plus 2 or 3 the enemy might 

have appreciated that the Allies had weakened 

the Eighth Army front ; if so, he could bring the 

26th Pallzer Division from that sector to produce 

a total build-up of 31,000 men. If the Fifth Army 

attack in the south were sufficiently powerful and 

sustained, it should pin down all enemy reserves 

in that area. G--2 did not believe that the Germans 

could bring down reinforcements quickly from 

northern Italy, especially in the face of overwhelming Allied air superiority. Probable build-up from 

north of Florence was estimated to be not more 

than two divisions by D plus 16. The final summary by G--2, Fifth Army, on 16 January pointed 

out the increasing attrition of enemy troops: 

Within the last few days there have been increasing 

indications that enemy strength on the Fifth Army front 

is ebbing, due to casualties, exhaustion, and possibly lowering of morale. One of the causes of this condition, no 

doubt, has been the recent, continuous Allied attacks. 

From this it can be deduced that he has no fresh reserves 

and very few tired ones. His entire strength will probably be needed to defend his organized defensive positions. 

In view of the weakening of enemy strength on the 

front as indicated above, it would appear doubtful if the 

enemy can hold the organized defensive line through 
PRELOAD ED SUPPLY TRUCKS AND DUKW's a/ Naples 011 18 

Janllary are loaded aboard LST's. This novel Jllpply method fila! gelting 

il! first A(edilerraneal1 bailie test ;11 the Anzio beachhead opera/ion. 

Cassino against a co-ordinated army attack. Since this 

attack is to be launched before Shingle. it is considered 

likely that this additional threat will cause him to withdraw from his defensive position once he has appreciated 

the magnitude of that operation. 

Whatever the enemy resistance and coast defenses might be, two natural obstacles, bad 

weather and poor beaches, made a landing at 

Anzio in January extremely hazardous. The winter 

7 

rainy season was the worst time of year to launch 

an amphibious assault. Rain, low clouds, and high 

seas promised to complicate the problem of supply 

over the beaches and to hamper air support. The 

beaches themselves, much shallower than those 

at Salerno, had the added disadvantage of two 

offshore sandbars. The Navy estimated that only 

smaller craft such as LCVP's, LCA's, and 

DUKW's could be landed with any reasonable 
TROOPS FILING ABOARD AT NAPLES for the invaJion were in a 

happy frame of mind whell this pictllre waJ taken. A part of the 6615th 

Ranger Force (Provisional) 1 they were tram ported to Al1Zio aboard the 

stubby LeI's shown ill the background. 

hope of success 3 These risks had to be accepted, 

although special precautions could be taken to 

minimize their effect. Since the weather promised 

only two good days out of seven, the assault convoy was to be combat-loaded for complete discharge within two days; to permit larger craft to 

unload over the shallow beaches, pontons were 

to be carried to serve as mobile piers; and to decrease the turnaround time of craft, the novel 

method of loading LST's with preloaded supply 

trucks was to be used for the first time in the 

~The naval craft referred to by abbreviations in this and subse· 

quent chapters are identified as follows: 

DUKW -Amphibious Truck 

LeA -Landing Craft, Assault 

LO - Landing -Craft, Infantry 

LCT -Landing Craft, Tank 

LCT (R) - Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) 

LCVP -Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel 

LSI -Landing Ship, Infantry 

LST -Landing Ship, Tank 

8 

Mediterranean Theater. The trucks were to load 

at Naples, drive onto the LST's, and drive off 

again at Anzio. It was hoped that the small port 

of Anzio could be captured before the enemy had 

time to demolish it. Its capture intact would help 

to ease the grave problem of supply over open 

and exposed beaches. 

To protect the establishment of the beachhead 

an elaborate air program in two phases was projected. Prior to D Day the Tactical Air Force 

would bomb enemy airfields to knock out the 

German Air Force, and would seek to cut communications between Rome and the north which 

enemy reinforcements might use. The Strategic Air 

Force would assist in these tasks. Then, from D 

Day on, every effort would be made to isolate the 

beachhead from enemy forces by maintaining air 

superiority over the beachhead, bombing bridges 

and road transport, and attacking enemy columns 

or troop concentrations within striking distance. 
For this program much of the strength of the 

Tactical Air Force would be available, and assistance from other Allied air power in the Mediterranean Theater would be on call. Support would 

be drawn from some 2,600 Allied aircraft in Italy, 

Corsica, and Sardinia, representing an overwhelming superiority over available German air power. 

XII Air Support Command, under Maj. Gen. E. J. 

House, reinforced by two groups from the Desert 

Air Force, would provide direct air su pport, while 

the Tactical Bomber Force flew heavier missions. 

The Coastal Air Force would give day and night 

fighter cover to the mounting area at Naples and 

halfway up the convoy route. From here on the 

64th Fighter Wing would cover the battle area. 

A total of 60 squadrons (231f2 fighter, 6 fighterbomber, 4 light bomber, 24 medium bomber, and 

21/2 reconnaissance) would directly support the 

ground effort. Enemy air power was not considered 

a major threat. By early January almost the entire 

long-range bomber force of the Second Germall 

Air Force, under General Baron von Richthofen, 

had disappeared from Italian fields. It was believed 

that Allied attacks on enemy bases would reduce 

the remaining German air strength by 60 percent. 

It was not considered likely that the German Air 

Force would reinforce its units in Italy to meet 

SHINGLE, so the enemy air effort, never strong, 

should gradually diminish. 

Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry, USN, commander 

of Task Force 81, was charged with the responsibility of mounting, embarking, and landing the 

ground forces and with the subsequent support of 

this force until it was firmly established ashore. 

His assault convoy numbered 2 command ships, 

'The naval craft were assigned as follows: 

Task Porce "Peter" (British) 

1 Hq ship 

4 cruisers 

8 Fleet destroyers 

6 Hunt destroyers 

2 antiaircraft ships 

2 Dutch gunboats 

11 fleet mi oe sweepers 

6 small mine sweepers 

4 landing craft, gun 

9 

4 Liberties, 8 LSI's, 84 LST's, 96 LCI's, and 50 

LCT's, escorted by cruisers, destroyers, and a host 

of lesser craft. It was divided into two groups, 

Task Force X-Ray under Admiral Lowry to lift 

the American troops, and Task Force Peter under 

Adm. T. H. Troubridge, RN, for British troops.4 

Since only sixteen 6-davit LST's were available, 

the eight LSI's had been assigned to provide additional assault craft. Even with this addition, LCI's 

would have to be used for follow-up waves over 

X-Ray Beach. Peter Beach was so shallow that 

onl y light assault craft could be used. 

Task Force X-Ray was further divided into 

several functional groups: a control group of two 

flagships; a sweeper group to clear a mine-free 

channel; and an escort group for antiaircraft and 

submarine protection. A beach identification group 

was designated to precede the assault craft, to 

locate the beaches accurately, and mark them with 

colored lights. Then three craft groups would land 

the assault waves. Following the first wave, the 

1st Naval Beach Battalion would improve the 

marking of beach approaches and control boat 

traffic. A salvage group was assigned to lay ponton causeways after daylight for unloading heavier 

craft. Back at Naples a loading control group 

would handle berthing and loading of craft. 

To gain surprise no preliminary naval bombardment of the beaches was ordered, except a short 

intense rocket barrage at H minus 10 to H minus 

5 minutes by three LCT (R) 's. An important assignment, however, was given to a naval task force 

which was to deliver a feint at H Hour of D Day 

by bombarding Gvitavecchia, north of Rome, and 

by carrying out dummy landings. 

4 landing craft, flak 

4 landing craft tank (rocket) 

1 Hq ship 

1 cruiser 

8 destroyers 

Task Force "X-RPi' (American) 

2 destroyer escorts 

6 mine sweepers 

12 submarine chasers (l73') 

20 submarine chasers (110') 

18 motor mine sweepers 

6 repair ships 
The Germans foresaw the possibility of an Allied landing behind the Gustav Line, and strengthened the coastal positions that were in the most 

likely invasion areas as best they could with the 

limited number of troops at their disposal. Since 

it considered the number of German troops in Italy 

barely sufficient to hold the southern front and 

strengthen the rear areas, the German High Command in December 1943 worked out an elaborate 

plan to reinforce German troops in Italy with units 

from France, Germany, and Yugoslavia in the 

event of an Allied landing. Thus it was that while 

the Germans realized that they did not have available sufficient forces to prevent an Allied landing 

10 

behind the Gustav Line, they believed that they 

could contain and then destroy it by hurrying reinforcements into Ital y to meet the emergency. Their 

plans did not contemplate the withdrawal of any 

substantial number of troops from the southern 

front to meet such a threat to their rear. 

The bitter and continuous struggle along the 

southern front from November 1943 into January 

1944 forced the enemy to commit all of his divisions that were fit for combat to stop the Allied 

offensive at the Gustav Line. A lull in the fighting 

in early January permitted the strengthening of 

forces in the Rome area to resist an invasion. Under 

the command of I Parachute Corps, the 29th and 
90th Panzer Grenadier DivisiolZS were assigned to 

the Rome coastal sector; the Herman Goering 

Panzer DivisiOl' was held as a mobile reserve between Rome and the southern front. But when 

the American Fifth Army attacked across the 

Garigliano on 18 January, the Germans rushed the 

29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier DivisiolZS southward. On the eve of the Anzio landing, the Germans had almost denuded the Rome area of combat troops in order to stem the Allied drive in the 

south. They had observed the regrouping of Allied 

troops and Allied naval preparations in the Naples 

area; and they believed that the Allies had sufficient strength both to maintain the offensive along 

the main fighting front and to attempt a landing 

in the Rome area. But they hoped to delay such an 

invasion by counterattacking in the south; then, 

after stopping the Allies on the Garigliano, they 

would draw back enough troops to check a landing. 

The Assault 

In early January, VI Corps troops assembled in 

the Naples area to embark on a short but strenuous 

amphibious training program. Night operations 

and physical conditioning through speed marches 

were stressed. Infantry battalions practiced special 

beach assault tactics, landings under simulated 

THE ANZIO LANDING was virt1laily 1IlIopposed. T hese scenes, pho. 

tographed at Yellow Beach soon after dawn 011 22 Janllary, show troops 

of the 3d Divisioll (left) as Ihey waded the last few yards to shore and 

( below) a lille of vehicles moving inland. W hite lape indicales boundary of the path 10 which vehicles were cOllfilled by soft grolmd ill the area. 

II 
ENEMY COASTAL DEFENSES tvere JparJe and mOJlly unmanned. 

TheJe fOllr photos, all taken ill the Neltlmo area, show Ihe type of dejellies the Germans had set "p. The (a1111011 is al1 obsolete model, 

lire, removing mine lields and barbed Wife, and 

knocking out pillboxes on the beach. Artillerymen learned the knack of loading and unloading 

DUKW-borne 105-rnm. howitzers. Assault landings were practiced and repradiced, lirst from 

mock-ups on dry land and then in battalion and 

regimental landing exercises with craft provided 

by the Navy. The program culminated in WEBFOOT, a Corps landing exercise lasting from 17 

12 

to 19 January on the beaches south of Salerno' 

As D Day approached, massed squadrons of 

medium and heavy bombers roared out toward 

5During the WEBFOOT exercise the 3d Division lost one battalion of field artilJery due to DUKW's swamping when put into 

the sea too far off shore during bad weather. This illustrates the 

absolute necessity for proper loading and trained crews in the use 

of this type of equipment. Very few men were drowned, but the 

DUKW's and all equipment went to the bottom. This battalion 

was replaced by a battalion of the 4'th Division before the 3d 

Division sailed for Anzio. 
northern Italy to strike the first blow in the new 

offensive. Their role was to choke off the vulnerable Italian rail and highway routes down which 

enemy supplies and reinforcements could flow 

toward the beachhead and the southern front. 

Shifting their weight from one main line to 

another, Fortresses, Liberators, Mitchells, Marauders, and Wellingtons hammered at key bridges 

and railroad yards from Rome north to the Brenner 

Pass. Closer to the front, fighters and light bombers strafed and bombed transport on the rail and 

highway nets. Finally, a few days before the landing, heavy bombers flew missions against key airfields in Italy and southern France to forestall any 

interference from the Luftwaffe with the Anzio 

assault. 

While the Anzio landing was still in preparation, main Fifth Army began its southern drive. 

At dawn on 12 January, troops of the French Expeditionary Corps surged forward in the mountains above Cassino. While the French sought to 

turn the German left flank above Cassino, the 

British 10 Corps struck across the lower Garigliano 

to pierce the other flank of the Gustav Line. In 

spite of successive assaults neither the British nor 

the French were able to break through the rockribbed wall of German mountain defenses. In the 

center, on 20 January, the U.S. II Corps attacked 

in an effort to cross the Rapido and secure a 

bridgehead. After gaining a precarious foothold 

in two days of bitter fighting, heavy losses forced 

it to withdraw. By 22 January, D Day for the 

Anzio landing, the attack on the Gustav Line had 

bogged down in the midst of savage German 

counterattacks. Although Fifth Army had not succeeded in driving up the Liri Valley, the battle 

for Cassino continued and the Germans had been 

forced to commit most of Tenth Army's reserves. 

High hopes were still held that the Anzio landing 

would break the stalemate in the Liri Valley. 

During the third week in January, Naples and 

its satellite ports were the scene of feverish activity 

as troops and su pplies were loaded on a convoy of 

more than 250 ships and craft. Long lines of waterproofed vehicles rolled down to the docks and 

troops filed aboard the waiting ships. As dawn colored the hills above the Bay of Naples on 21 January, the first ships slipped their hawsers and the 

convoy sailed. 

It had been impossible to conceal craft concentrations in the Naples area, but elaborate efforts 

were made to deceive the enemy as to the time and 

place of the assault, which might fall anywhere 

from Gaeta to Leghorn. The convoy plowed north 

from Naples at a steady 5-knot pace, swinging 

wide on a roundabout course to deceive the enemy 

as to its destination and to avoid mine fields. 

Allied air raids, however, had temporarily knocked 

out the German reconnaissance base at Perugia, 

and not an enemy plane was sighted in the sunlit sky. Mine sweepers cleared a channel ahead, 

destroyers and cruisers clung to the flanks to ward 

LT. GEN. MARK W. CLARK, Commanding Gelleral 

of the Fifth Army, arriving at the beachhead 011 D Day 

morning ;11 a Nrwy PT boat. He ;J shown readi11g radio 

diJpatches 011 the battle's progress with a Fifth Army 

Staff officer. 
A DESTROYED MUSSOLINI CANAL BRIDGE lIear 

Borgo Sabotino, part of the recol1naissance effort 011 the 

right flank 'on D Day. Photo, taken later, JhoWJ a tread· 

way bridge over the c4l1a/, concrete road block! (GerIhan) 011 the far side, and a trench system dug by American jorces. 

off V-boats, and an air umbrella of lighters crisscrossed constantly. Actually, these elaborate precautions were hardly necessary, for the enemy air 

reconnaissance failed to observe either the embarkation at Naples or the approach of VI Corps 

to Anzio. Aboard the convoy men lolled about the 

decks, sleeping or sunbathing, checking equipment, 

or excitedly discussing what they would lind. As 

night fell and darkness cloaked the convoy's movements, it swung sharply in toward Anzio. 

At live minutes past midnight on 22 January, 

in the murky blackness off Cape Anzio, the assault 

convoy dropped anchor and rode easily on a calm 

Mediterranean Sea. There was a murmur of subdued activity as officers gave last-minute instructions, men clambered into stubby assault craft, 

and davits swung out and lowered them to the 

sea. Patrol boats wove in and out of the milling 

craft herding them into formation, and then led 

the first waves away into the moonless night. 

To gain surprise the guns of the escorting warships kept silent. Then, just ten minutes before 

H Hour (0200), a short, terrilic rocket bombardment from two British LCT (R) 's burst with a 

deafening roar along the beach. These newly developed rocket craft, each carrying 798 5-inch 

rockets, were employed to disorganize any possible 

enemy ambush, explode mine lields along the 

beach, and destroy enemy beach defenses. But the 

attackers saw no burst of answering lire; when 

the rocket ships ceased firing, the shore again 

loomed dark and silent ahead. 

As the first wave of craft hit the beach and men 

rushed for the cover of the dunes behind, there 

was no enemy to greet them. Pushing rapidly inland the astonished troops soon realized that the 

highly unexpected had happened. They had caught 

the enemy completely off guard. Although the 

Germans knew an amphibious landing was impending, they believed that it would not Occur 

until somewhat later. The two divisions that had 

been assigned to guard this coast had been sent 

to the southern front only three days before, and 

the coastal sector and area south of Rome were 

held by only skeleton forces. Consequently, except 

for a few small coast artillery and antiaircraft 

detachments, the only immediate resistance to the 

Anzio landing came from scattered elements of 

the 291h Pallzer Grelladier DiviJioll. Only three 

engineer companies and the 2d Ballalioll, 7I JI 

Panzer Grenadier Regimellt, had been left to guard 

the coast from the mouth of the Tiber River 

through Anzio to the Mussolini Canal; one 9-mile 

stretch of the coast was occupied by a single company. Furthermore, the troops in the Anzio area 

had not been warned that an Allied landing was 

imminent. The coastal defenses were limited to 

scattered mine lields along Peter Beach used by 

the British 1 Division; some pillboxes, most of 

which were not even manned; and scattered artillery pieces-a few 88's and several old Italian, 
French, and Yugoslav pieces--most of which were 

not even /ired against the attackers. 

Aided by a calm sea and the virtual absence of 

opposition, the invaders quickly established themselves on shore. (Map NO. 3.) On the right, the 

3d Division swept in over the beaches east of 

Nettuno. Brushing aside a few dazed enemy 

patrols, they pushed rapidly inland, established 

themselves on the initial phase line, and dug in 

to repel any counterattack. General Clark, accompanied by Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann and other 

members of the Fifth Army Staff, arrived at the 

beadlhead in a Navy PT boat, transferred to a 

DUKW, and landed at 1000. Motorized patrols 

nf the 3d Reconnaissance and Provisional Reconnaissance Troops forged ahead to seize and blow 

the bridges over the Mussolini Canal which ran 

along the right flank. Only at the southernmost 

bridge did they meet any Germans. Here they 

knocked out three armored cars with bazookas, 

ENGINEERS CLEARING DEMOLITION CHARGES IN ANZIO 

OIl D Day. The GermanI {ailed to carry Ollt their plans to des/roy the 

port. Explosives, stich as these men of the 36th Engineers are seen re· 

movil1g had been set so that bllildings flJould topple ;1110 the JtreelJ, and 

thlls hi11der flie of port facilities. 

IS 
AN AIR ArrACK ON CISTERNA by medium bombers shows smoke 

and dWI rising from bomb hils 011 enemy instal/alions and the ,-ail road 

jllsI south of the town. Note the narrow, winding CiJterna Creek directly 

below plane. 
killing or capturing eleven of the enemy patrol. 

The Ranger Force landed over the small beach 

just to the right of Anzio harbor and swiftly seized 

the port. The Rangers scrambled up the steep bluff, 

topped with pink and white villas overlonking the 

beach, and spread through the streets of the town, 

rounding up a few bewildered defenders. The 

Germans had had no time to demolish the port 

facilities. Except for a gap in the mole and some 

battered buildings along the waterfront (damage 

caused by Allied bombers), the only obstacles were 

a few small vessels sunk in the harbor. Later in 

the morning the ~09th Parachute Infantry Battalion advanced east along the shore road and by 

1015 occupied Nettuno. Northwest of Anzio the 

landing of the British 1 Division was equally unopposed, although delayed by poor beach conditions. By noon of D Day VI Corps had reached 

all its preliminary objectives ashore. 

In support of the lancling, Allied lighter and 

bomber squadrons Hew more than 1,200 sorties 

on D Day. Medium and heavy bombers blasted 

key bridges and such road junctions as Cisterna 

and Velletri in an attempt to block the main roads 

leading toward the Anzio area. Fighter-bombers, 

lighters, and night intruders ranged these highways, bombing and strafing the enemy traffic beginning to surge toward the beachhead. Other 

fighters gave continuous air cover to the landing 

force. Enemy air attacks were comparatively slight 

on D Day, totaling 140 sorties, but increased in 

intensity on 23 January. 

PUTIING DOWN ROAD MATIING at the beach exits was one of 

the problems confronting the engineers ailer the landings. Many heavy 

vehicles and the rapid !IIpply build-lip mad, the C011sImcti011 of a 11I1mbel' of filCh roadways 11eceuar,l. 
Behind the assault troops pushing inland, unloading of the initial convoy proceeded at a rapid 

pace. Engineers swiftly cleared the scattered mine 

fields and bulldozed exit roads across the dunes; 

but the clay soil between the beaches and the main 

road soon became so badly rutted that matting, 

corduroy, and rock had to be laid down to make 

the area passable. DUKW's and small craft scurried back and forth across the calm waters of Nettuno Bay, busily unloading the larger craft which 

were unable to approach the shallow beach. In 

spite of sporadic shelling after daylight from a 

few long-range German batteries inland and three 

small hit-and-run raids by Luftwaffe fighter-bombers, the 540th Engineers quickly moved streams of 

men and supplies across the beach. A mine sweeper 

hit a mine and one LCI was sunk by the bombs, 

but this was the only major damage. The 36th 

Engineers began clearing the debris from the port 

of Amio; the Navy hauled away the sunken vessels. By early afternoon the port was ready to 

handle LST's and other craft. When the British 

beach northwest of Anzio proved to be too shallow 

for effective use, it was closed and British unloading switched to the newly opened port. By midnight of D Day some 36,000 men, 3,200 vehicles, 

and large quantities of supplies were ashore, 

roughly 90 percent of the equipment and personnel of the assault convoy. 

Casualties for D Day were light. Thirteen killed, 

ninety-seven wounded, and forty-four captured or 

missing were reported to VI Corps. Two hundred 

and twenty-seven prisoners were taken. Against 

negligible opposition VI Corps had reached its 

preliminary objectives and captured almost intact 

the port of Anzio, which was to be the key channel for supplies. 

Expmlding the Beachhead 

Having reached its preliminary objectives by 

noon of D Day, VI Corps moved forward to 

occupy the ground within the planned initial 

beachhead line. The British 1 Division advanced 

from its beaches on the left toward the Moletta 

River and gained control of seven miles of the 

Albano road. In the 3d Division sector the advance 

resolved itself into a series of actions to gain the 

bridges over the Mussolini Canal, vital to the 

defense of the right side of the beachhead. 

By the evening of D Day, advance guards of 

the 30th Infantry and the 3d Reconnaissance Troop 
UNLOADING AT ANZIO'S DOCKS began D Day afternooll whell 

the engineers cleared the harbor. LST's (left) were able to Hose directly 

inlo the docks and soon aflerward British troops (above) were moving 

thro1lgh the battered port illstead of over the shalloll' lIor/hem beaches. 

had seized all of the bridges across the canal. The 

enemy regained most of the bridges that night 

in attacks by aggressive, tank-supported attacks 

launched by elements of the Hefmam1 Goering 

Panzer Division. The next morning Lt. Col. Lionel 

C. McGarr, commander of the 30th Infantry, 

brought up the remainder of his regiment, supported by tanks and tank destroyers; in sharp fighting it drove the enemy back across the bridges 

along the west branch. The Germans counterattacked with three tanks and a half-track to regain 

the bridge on the Cisterna road north of Conca, 

but the 30th Infantry's supporting armor drove 

them off. On the right of the 30th Infantry, the 

504th Parachute Infantry, which had come ashore 

in Corps reserve, on 24 January relieved the 3d 

Reconnaissance Troop along the main canal and 

retook the other lost bridges. 
By 24 January the 3d Division had occupied the 

right sector of the initial beachhead along the 

Mussolini Canal. The 504th Parachute Infantry 

held the right lIank along the main canal; in the 

center the 15th Infantry, and on its left the 30th 

Infantry, faced Cisterna along the west branch. 

Ranger Force relieved all but the 3d Battalion, 

7th Infantry, on the division left in the quiet central beachhead sector. Meanwhile the 2 Brigade 

of the 1 Division, under the command of Brig. 

E. E. J. Moore, rounded out its sector of the beachhead by advancing to the Moletta River line. The 

remainder of the division was held in Corps reserve in anticipation of an enemy counterattack. 

In two days VI Corps had secured a beachhead 

seven miles deep against only scattered opposition. 

Although the Anzio landing and initial Allied 

build-up were virtually unopposed by German land 

forces, the enemy reacted swiftly to meet the emergency. Headquarters of Army Group C immediately alerted elements of the 4th Parachute and 

Hermallll Goering Panzer Divisions south of Rome 

and ordered them to defend the roads leading from 

Anzio toward Colli Laziali. At 0600 on 22 January 

it set in motion the prearranged plan to rush troops 

from outside of Italy to stem the Allied invasion. 

Two divisions and many lesser units started at once 

from France, Yugoslavia, and Germany itself. 

Three divisions of the Fourteenth Army in northern Italy were alerted and left for the Rome area 

on 22-23 January. To command the defense, I 

Parachute Corps reestablished its headquarters in 

the area below Rome at 1700 on 22 January. All 

available reserves from the southern front or on 

their way to it were rushed toward Anzio; these 

included the 3d Panzer Grelladier and 71 st Infantry Divisiolls, and the bulk of the Hermann 

Goering Pal/zer Division. While these forces were 

assembling, the German Air Force bombed the 

beachhead area and its supporting naval craft in 

order to delay an Allied advance inland. For the 

first two days, the German defenders believed that 

ADVANCING TOWARD THE MUSSOLINI CANAL, elemel/I! of 

the ) 04th Parach"te hl/anlry 011 D plus 2 moved in small grollps and 

tben only when proteeled by smoke scree11S. The canal is jllIt beyond the 

smoke 0 11 the horizon, about 1/000 )'ards from the blli/ding in the foregrolmd. 
EXPANDING 

THE BEACHHEAD 

24-28 JANUARY 1944 

~ DirecTion of Mal" ElforT 

;n;r!r;mr Enemy OuTposls 

Allied ul'IlIs os of 24 Jon 

Enemy un!ls ond disposillons os of 28 Jan 

o 1 

"'''' 

Sobotlno 

MAP NO.4 
they were too weak to stop an Allied advance 

against Colli Laziali; but from the evening of 

24 January they were confident that they could 

contain the beachhead forces and, as soon as they 

had substantially completed their concentration, 

launch a counterattack that would wipe out the 

Allied beachhead. 

Army Group Can 24 January ordered the Fourteenth Army to take over the command of the 

German operations before Anzio. When the Fourtemth Army, commanded by Gen. Eberhard von 

Mackensen, assumed control on 25 January, elements of eight German divisions were employed 

in the defense line around the beachhead, and five 

more divisions with many supporting units were 

on their way to the Anzio area. By 28 January, 

Fourteenth Army had assigned command of the 

forces defending the eastern sector of the beachhead perimeter (before Cisterna) to the H er",aml 

Goerillg Panzer Division; of the central sector 

(before Campoleone) to the 3d Pallzer Grenadier 

Division; and of the western sector (behind the 

Maletta River) to the 65th bzfantry Divisioll. 

Behind this perimeter other units were grouped 

for counterattack. A gap of four or five miles 

separated the German main line of resistance from 

the main beachhead line occupied by the Allied 

VI Corps by 24 January. 

The reaction of enemy forces gave no impetus 

to main Fifth Army's drive and made the prospect 

of linking the southern force with the beachhead 

remote. Also, if VI Corps extended itself too far 

inland toward Colli Laziali, its main objective, it 

would risk being cut off by a sudden German 

counterthrust. Before the end of D Day the Germans were estimated to have 20,000 troops in areas 

from which they could drive rapidly toward the 

beachhead. With the advantage of good communications, roads, and railroads, and in spite of 

Allied air interdiction, they had doubled that figure 

by D plus 2, and continued to increase it to more 

than 70,000 by D plus 7. This growing strength 

indicated that VI Corps would have to prepare to 

meet an enemy thrust calculated to drive the Allied 

forces back into the sea. 

21 

VI Corps consequently consolidated its positions 

during the period 24-29 January. While awaiting 

reinforcements, Allied troops probed along the 

two main axes of advance toward the intermediate 

objectives of Cisterna and Campoleone, which 

would serve as strategic jump-off points for tl,e 

advance on Colli Laziali. On the right the 3d 

Division moved up the roads leading across the 

Mussolini Canal toward Cisterna; on the left the 

British pushed up the Albano road toward Campoleonen (Map No.4.) 

On the afternoon of 24 January, four companies 

of the 15th and 30th Infantry made a preliminary 

reconnaissance in force toward Cisterna, but they 

were unable to make much headway against strong 

enemy mobile elements. General Truscott then 

ordered an advance in greater force at dawn on 25 

January up the two main roads leading across the 

muddy fields toward the town. The 1st Battalion, 

30th Infantry, advanced up the left-hand or Campomorto-Cisterna road, while the 2d Battalion, 

15th Infantry, took the right up the Conca-Cisterna 

road. 

About two miles beyond the canal the 30th Infantry was halted by a company of the Hennalln 

Goerillg Pallzer Division, intrenched around the 

road junction hal fway to Ponte Rotto. On the 

right of the 30th Infantry, the 2d Battalion, 15th 

Infantry, gained one and one-half miles up the 

Conca-Cisterna road before it was stopped by German machine gunners concealed within the farmhouses along the route. Tanks and tank destroyers 

of the 751st Tank Battalion and the 601st Tank 

Destroyer Battalion were brought up to reduce 

these strong points. Before the armor could go 

into action German units infiltrated down a stream 

bed forcing the outposts along the 2d Battalion's 

right flank to withdraw. Company C, which was 

making a diversionary attack up a parallel road to 

the right of the Conca-Cisterna road, bogged 

down before similar resistance and four of its 

accompanying tanks were lost to an enemy self-

'Campoleone Station. The town of Campoleone is about a mile 

and a quarter north. References to Campoleone throughout this 

study are to the railroad station, not to the town proper. 
propelled gun. With unexpected strength the 

veteran Herllltlllll Goeril1g Pal1zer Divisiol1 had 

blunted the spearheads of the 3d Division attack. 

Not having time to prepare fixed defenses, the 

Germans had emplaced machine guns and antitank guns in every farmhouse along the roads. 

These strong points had excellent interlocking 

fields of fire across the gently rolling fields and 

were supported by roving tanks and self-propelled 

guns. They had to be knocked out one by one by 

American tanks and tank destroyers before the 

infantry could advance. 

To assist the main effort, paratroopers of the 

504th Parachute Infantry made a diversionary attack across the main canal toward Littoria. Advancing behind a heavy curtain of supporting fires, 

augmented by the guns of the cruiser BrooklYI1 

and two destroyers, they captured the villages of 

Bargo Sabotino, Bargo Piave, and Sessano on the 

east side of the canal. Company D, however; was 

cut off beyond Borgo Piave by a surprise counterthrust of five tanks and eight f/akwagom (selfpropelled antiaircraft guns) of the Hermalll1 Goerillg Panzer Division. Company D lost heavily, 

though many of the men managed to infiltrate 

back. That night the 504th Parachute Infantry, 

leaving behind strong combat patrols, withdrew 

from its exposed positions. 

Tbe 3d Division resumed its push toward Cisterna the next morning, 26 January. In the 30th 

Infantry zone the 1st Battalion inliltrated around 

the road junction below Ponto Ratto where it had 

been held up, and forced the enemy to withdraw. 

That afternoon the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantr)' 

thrust northeast up the right-hand road across the 

west branch of the canal to establisb a road block 

on the Cisterna-Littoria road. In spite of seventy 

minutes of massed supporting lire from the 9th, 

10th, and 39th Field Artillery Battalions, and neutralizing lire by heavier guns, the Germans clung 

tenaciousl y to their positions. Behind a similar 

elaborate artillery preparation, the 2d Battalion, 

15th Infantry, on 27 January pushed up the ConcaCisterna road. At the same time the 1st Battalion, 

15th Infantry, continued its attack on the right. 

It gained some ground but was unable to break 

THE RIGHT FLANK AT THE MUSSOLINI CANAL tvas covered 

by the 504th Parachute Infantry, dug hI all the eaIl bank. This position 

was west of Lilloria, toward which a diversionary attack was launched 

in support of the 3d Division on 25 Jannary. 

22 
ENEMY SHELLFIRE HITTING THE BEACHES did 'lOt halt the 

work of DUKW'! which carried !upplieJ from Liberty!hip! o!f!hore. 

This sporadic shelling UJas considered a 11Uisance, hut callIed only limited damage. 

through to its objective. Rushing new units into 

the line piecemeal as fast as they arrived, the 

Germans were making every effort to keep the 

Americans from reaching Highway No.7. In the 

attacks of 25-27 January the 3d Division reached 

positions one to two miles beyond the west branch 

of the Mussolini Canal; it was still three miles 

from Cisterna. It became evident that an effort 

greater than was immediately possible would be 

necessary to reach the division's objective. General 

Truscott therefore called a halt in the advance to 

regroup for a more concentrated drive. 

To parallel the drive of the 3d Division, the 

British 1 Division had been ordered to move up 

the Albano road to Campoleone, to secure this important road and railway junction as a jump-off 

point for a further advance. With the arrival of the 

179th Regimental Combat Team (45th Division) , 

VI Corps released from Corps reserve the 24 

Guards Brigade for this move. A strong mobile 

patrol up the road on 24 January surprised an ememy outpost at Carroceto and continued four miles 

farther inland to a point north of Campoleone. To 

exploit this apparent enemy weakness, General 

Penney on 25 January dispatched the 24 Guards 

Brigade, with one squadron of the 46 Royal Tanks 

and one medium and two field regiments of artillery in support, to take the Factory (Aprilia) near 

Carroceto. The 3d Bat/alion, 29th Panzer Grmadier Regirnml (3d Panzer Grenadier Division), 
however, had occupied the Factory the night before. The 1 Scots Guards and 1 Irish Guards pushed 

through a hasty mine field across the road, and 

the 5 Grenadier Guards then drove the enemy from 

the Factory, capturing 111 prisoners. (Map No.4) 

The enemy, sensitive to the loss of this strong 

point, counterattacked strongly the next morning. 

Twenty tanks and a battalion of the 29th Pallzer 

Grmadier Regimellt thrust at the 5 Grenadier 

Guards in the Factory. Their main assault was repulsed, but they continued to feel around the flanks 

until they were finally driven off that afternoon. 

The Germans left behind four burning tanks, one 

self-propelled gun, and forty-six more prisoners. 

By the morning of 28 January the 24 Guards Brigade had advanced one and one-half miles north 

of the Factory. The 1 Division then paused to regroup for an attack on Campoleone. 

By 29 January, VI Corps had expanded its beachhead by the advances of the 1 and 3d Division, but 

was still from two to four miles short of its two 

intermediate objectives. It was clear that an attack 

in greater strength would be necessary to continue 

the drive. The Corps paused to regroup. (Map 

No.5.) 

Behind the assault troops pushing inland, engineers and service troops worked day and night 

to organize the beachhead and prepare a firm base 

for the main attack. Roads were repaired, dumps 

established, and a beginning made on defenses to 

meet any future German counterthrusts. The port. 

vital to the supply build-up and troop reinforcement, was placed in such effective operation that by 

1 February it could handle 8 LSTs, 8 LCTs, and 5 

LCI's simultaneously. Liberty ships, however, were 

unable to enter the shallow harbor and continued 

to be unloaded by DUKW's and LCTs over X-Ray 

and Yellow Beaches. The weather during the first 

week at Anzio turned out much better than anticipated and greatly facilitated the stockage of supplies. The port was usable in all but the worst 

weather, and only on two days during the first 

week, 24 and 26 January, was unloading over the 

beaches halted by high winds and surf. A gale during the night of 26 January blew ashore all ponton 

causeways and beached 12 LCT's, 1 LST, and 1 

LCI. In spite of these interruptions and enemy interference, 201 LSTs and 7 Liberty ships had been 

completely unloaded by 31 January. On the peak 

day of 29 January 6,350 tons were unloaded: 3,155 

tons through the port, 1,935 over X-Ray Beach, 

and 1,260 over Yellow Beach. 

The beach and port areas, still within range of 

German artillery, were vulnerable targets for increasing shelling. Long-range 88-mm. and 170-mm. 

batteries dropped their shells sporadically on ships 

off shore and among troops working along the 

beach. Although this fire was a nuisance to the 

troops and interfered with work, it caused only 

limited damage in the early days. Floating mines 

continued to be a menace, damaging a destroyer 

and a mine sweeper. On 24 January an LST carrying Companies C and D, 83d Chemical Battalion, 

struck a mine. Most of the men were transferred to 

an LCI alongside, which also hit a mine and sank. 

Total casualties were 5 officers and 289 men. 

Far more dangerous to beach and shipping were 

the constant Luftwaffe raids. The German Air 

Force put up its biggest air effort since Sicily in an 

attempt to cut off Allied supplies. Small flights of 

fighter-bombers strafed and bombed the beach and 

port areas every few hours. The most serious threat, 

however, was the raiding by medium bomber 

squadrons hastily brought back from Greece and 

the torpedo and glider bombers from airfields in 

southern France. Skimming in low at dusk from 

the sea through the smoke and hail of ack-ack fire, 

they released bombs, torpedoes, and radio-controlled glider bombs on the crowded shipping in 

the harbor. In three major raids, on 23, 24, and 26 

January, they sank a British destroyer and a hospital ship, damaged another hospital ship, and 

beached a Liberty ship. The two heaviest raids 

came at dusk and midnight on 29 January, when 

110 Dornier 217's, Junkers 88's, and Messerschmitt 

21O's sank a Liberty ship and the British antiaircraft cruiser Spartan. 

Stiffening air defenses took a heavy toll of the 

Luftwaffe raiders, downing ninety-seven of them 

before 1 February. Initially Col. Edgar W. King 
ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS AND BARRAGE BALLOONS appeared ;11 

increasing 11/1mbers as the German air raiders stepped "p their attack!. 

The crew above mailS a 40-mm. Boim'J gll1z. Shown below is one of 'he 

low-level type bal/oonI designed to COlmlet' strafing attacks. 

25 
of the 68th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) and later Brig. Gen. Aaron A. Bradshaw, Jr., 

supervised the installation of increasing numbers 

of 40-mm. and 90-mm. antiaircraft guns and established a 12,000-yard inner artillery zone around 

the vital beach and port areas. Barrage balloons 

were raised to halt low-level bombing and smoke 

screens blanketed the port at dusk and on every 

red alert. The enemy's favorite tactic was to sneak 

over at dusk, when Allied planes. which needed 

daylight to take off, were returning to their 100-

mile distant bases. To combat these sneak raids the 

engineers renovated the old Italian artillery school 

air strip at Nettuno. P-40's of the 307th Fighter 

Squadron moved up to the beachhead to furnish 

"on the spot" cover, and the Air Force increased 

its use of Beaufighter night patrols and Spitfires 

trained for night fighting. 

Good weather during most of the first week at 

Anzio and the aid rendered by use of the port enabled the assault convoy to be unloaded rapidly and 

turned around to hring up the follow-up force. The 

45th Division and the 1st Armored Division (less 

Combat Command B, which was retained for possible employment at Cassino) had reached the 

beachhead by 1 February. Essential Corps artillery, 

engineers, and signal troops had also arrived. 

Although the Germans in the Anzio area outnumbered VI Corps by 30 January, it was believed 

that their defenses had not progressed beyond road 

blocks, hasty field fortifications, and mine fields 

along likely avenues of approach. Allied patrols 

could still operate freely to Highway No. 7 and 

Campoleone. The positions the enemy was constructing along the railroad between Campoleone 

and Cisterna were believed to be intended for delaying action. It was anticipated that his main stand 

against an Allied advance would more likely be 

along the high ground around Cori and Velletri. 

In view of the rapidly increasing enemy build-up, 

General Lucas decided to launch his drive toward 

Colli Laziali before his forces might be too far 

26 

outnumbered. On 30 January the enemy forces in 

the beachhead area were estimated to number 

71,500; VI Corps had 61,332 troops ashore on the 

same date. It was planned to resume the 3d Division push on Cisterna on 29 January, but the attack 

was delayed one day to permit the 1 Division and 

the 1st Armored Division to complete preparations 

for a coordinated offensive. On 30 January all three 

divisions were to attack. 

The drive of VI Corps out of the Anzio beachhead was designed to coincide with a renewed 

offensive on the southern front. On main Fifth 

Army's front, II Corps was preparing to open its 

drive on Cassino on 1 February, with the 34th Division carrying the attack. The 10 Corps in the Garigliano sector continued the consolidation of the 

bridgehead which it had successfully established 

in an attack on 17-20 January. On the Eighth Army 

front the Canadian 1 Division was to attack in the 

coastal sector on 30 January. 

The Germans originally planned to counterattack the Allied beachhead in force on 28 January. 

But Allied bombings of roads and railways, and a 

desire to await the arrival of reinforcements from 

Germany, led to a decision on 26 January to postpone the attack until 1 February. In preparation, 

the enemy proceeded to arrange his infantry and 

artillery into three combat groups. The principal 

assault was to be launched southward along the 

Albano-Anzio road (with the main concentration 

on either side of the Factory) by Combat Group 

Graeser, which would consist of seventeen infantry 

battalions heavily supported by artillery. While the 

main effort was to be made in the center, the Germans planned to launch simultaneous attacks all 

along the front on the morning of D Day, 1 February; these were to be preceded by a coordinated 

10-minute artillery barrage. While the necessary 

regroupings were under way, Allied VI Corps 

launched its offensive on 30 January forcing the 

Germans to postpone their attack until after the 

Allied drive had been stopped. 
EXPANDING 

TH E BEACH HEAD 

29 JANUARY 1944 

"""", Fronl Line, mornin9 29 Jon 

- --- LIne, evenil'l9 2'3 Jon 

Ccdour Inltrval 20 mtlttrs , ." .. 

MAP NO. 5 
THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE 

(30 January-l February) 

The VI Corps plan for the attack in the direction of Colli Laziali on 30 January called for a 

two-pronged advance, with the main blow to be 

delivered on the left. On the right the 3d Division, 

reinforced by the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and Ranger Force, was to attack at dawn to 

cut Highway No.7 at Cisterna. The capture of this 

key road junction would dislocate the German left 

flank and pave tbe way for a 3d Division thrust up 

Highway No. 7 to assault Colli Laziali from the 

east. On the left, the British 1 Division and the 1st 

Armored Division were to follow the Albano road 

axis, the best and most direct route inland. The 1 

Division was to drive up the road toward the high 

ground above Albano and Genzano on the southwest slope of Colli Laziali, while the 1st Armored 

Division swung wide around the left of the 1 Division to come in on Colli Laziali from the west. 

(Map No. 21.) A preliminary artillery preparation 

was not considered necessary, but extensive supporting fires, a smoke screen laid by air at daylight, 

and naval gunfire support were planned. The air 

force prepared an elaborate air program, including 

special air cover for the advance of armor. Once 

VI Corps attained the commanding heights of Colli 

Laziali, it would be astride vital enemy communications routes and so threaten to cut off the German 

forces in the south. The need for careful control 

and coordination of the advance was recognized by 

General Lucas, for the missions of the right and of 

the left were initially divergent in direction; should 

27 

VI Corps be overextended, the enemy might take 

the opportunity of splitting the Allied forces. 

In order to concentrate on a narrower front for 

the offensive, the 1 and 3d Divisions regrou ped on 

28-29 January. These divisions were relieved along 

the beachhead flanks by the 45th Division SO that 

they could employ their full strength in the advance. Elements of the 45th Division and Corps 

engineers took over the positions of the 2 Brigade 

along the Moletta River and of the 504th Parachute Infantry on the opposite flank along the Mussolini Canal. At the same time Ranger Force and 

the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, were relieved by the 

1 Reconnaissance Regiment in the quiet central 

beachhead sector. 

As VI Corps prepared to launch its offensive 

toward Cisterna and Campoleone on 30 January, 

the German forces were being regrouped for a 

major counteroffensive. Thirty infantry battalions, 

supported by armor and artillery, were being organized into combat groups for this offensive, and six 

more infantry battalions were to be held in reserve. 

The German main line of resistance was established in front of Cisterna and Campoleone, and 

forward positions were strongly held. Fourteenth 

Army was completing its preparations for the execution of its main mission, the annihil ation of the 

beachhead. 

A message from Berlin to Fourteenth Army on 

28 January reported that, according to reliable 

sources, the Allies were planning a second landing 
at Civitavecchia, north of the Tiber. The Germans 

drew some troops from the Anzio area to meet this 

threat, and on 31 January ordered a thorough 

demolition of the harbor installations at Civitavecchiao On 2 February, headquarters of Army Group 

C declared that such an invasion was probable; 

some additional forces were diverted to the Civitavecchia area. The effect of these diversions was 

to weaken somewhat the German defense forces 

around Anzio. 

Attack on Cisterna, 30 January 

On 30 January the 3d Division launched its drive 

to cut Highway No.7 at Cisterna. (Map No.6.) 

To spearhead the attack, General Truscott picked 

Col. William O. Darby's Rangers, veterans of 

Tunisia, Sicily, and Salerno. The 1st and 3d Ranger 

Battalions were to jump off one hour before the 

main attack and infiltrate under cover of darkness 

four miles across the fields to seize Cisterna by surprise and hold it until the main attack came up. 

The 4th Rangers and the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, were to follow an huur later up the ConcaCisterna road. Patrol reports and a careful reconnaissance of approach routes indicated that the 

enemy had not yet been able to consolidate his defenses in front of Cisterna; Colonel Darby believed 

his men could sift through. Then at H Hour, 0200, 

the 7th and 15th Infantry would launch the main 

attack. On the left, the 7th Infantry was to pass 

through the 30th Infantry and drive northeast to 

get astride Highway No. 7 above Cisterna, while 

the 15th Infantry would thrust north behind the 

Rangers to cut Highway No.7 below the town. At 

the same time the 504th Parachute Infantry was 

to make a diversionary attack along the Mussolini 

Canal to protect the division's right flank. 

Men of the 1st and 3d Rangers, each with two 

bandoleers of ammunition slung over his shoulders 

and with pockets stuffed with grenades, slipped 

across the west branch of the Mussolini Canal at 

0130 on their mission to Cisterna. In column of 

battalions they crept silently forward along the narrow Pantano ditch, which runs northwest across the 

28 

fields to the right of the Conca-Cisterna road. Concealed beneath a moonless cloudy sky, the long 

snake-like column moved past numerous German 

positions which they could see and hear on all 

sides. Several times Rangers hugged the sides of 

the ditch as German sentries walked by on its bank. 

By dawn the head of the leading battalion had 

come out of the ditch where it crossed the road and 

was within 800 yards of Cisterna. The 3d followed 

directly behind, the tail of the column just clearing 

the road running east from Isola Bella. 

When dawn revealed the head of the column 

moving down the road to Cisterna, a strong German force led by three self-propelled guns suddenly 

opened fire. The Rangers deployed quickly and 

knocked out the three guns. But as the light improved, German machine guns, mortars, and snipers, concealed in houses and haystacks or dug in 

all around them, trapped the Rangers in a hail of 

fire. Caught without cover in the open treeless 

fields, and with their chance for surprise completely 

lost, the Rangers scrambled for the ditches and 

houses, firing back at a hidden enemy. The Germans, anticipating a renewal of the attack on Cisterna, had brought in veteran troops the night before to stiffen the defense. Evidently the enemy had 

also detected the Rangers' approach through their 

lines and had had time to prepare an ambush. 

The Rangers fought desperately all through the 

morning against intrenched Germans all about 

them. At 0730 the 1st Battalion broke radio silence 

to report the situation in its struggle to get a foothold in Cisterna. An hour later a handful of Rangers had inched forward to take a few buildings 

near the railroad station at the edge of the town, 

but most of the men were still pinned down in the 

open fields. 

The 4th Rangers and 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, jumping off an hour later than the 1st and 3d 

Rangers, made every effort to respond to their 

appeals for help. The 4th Rangers advanced up the 

Conca-Cisterna road but were stopped by heavy 

enemy machine-gun fire from a group of farm 

houses below Isola Bella. Lt. Col. Roy A. Murray, 

battalion commander, sought to outflank this island 
EXPANDING 

TH E BEACH HEAD 

30 JAN UARY 1944 

"""", Front Line, 2<3 - 30 Jan 

--- Line, evenlnq 30 Jon 

o ! 

, 

1 

MAP NO. 6 
of resistance and pushed to within a mile of Isola 

Bella before dawn broke. As soon as the Germans 

could locate the attackers accurately, they kept the 

battalion under well-aimed fire in the open fields. 

Stopped in their first effort to relieve the trapped 

battalions, the 4th Rangers attempted a breakthrough with two tank destroyers and two halftracks, but two of the vehicles ran afoul of a mine 

field below Isola Bella. A second attempt also 

failed. All day the Germans held the 4th Rangers, 

who suffered heavy casualties in exchanging fire 

with an enemy only 200 yards away. 

Meanwhile along the road below Cisterna the 

1st and 3d Rangers were almost at the end of their 

strength. About noon enemy tanks came down 

from Highway No. 7 and raced back and forth 

through the Ranger positions. Firing up and down 

the ditches, they forced the Rangers into the open 

ISOLA BELLA AND CISTERNA, the focal poillts of the ..ight [lallk 

aJ/ack to Cflt Highway No.7, were connerted by the Concd-Cisterna road 

aeroS! flat, open grollnd. The 11/ and 3d RangerJ adlJtJl1ced liP Pantano 

ditch; the 4th fumgers allacked tOlpard Isola Bella (foregrofllld) to clear 

the way for the 15th Illfalltry. 

CISTERNA STATION 
and split them into small groups. Lacking antitank 

guns or heavy weapons, the Rangers fought back 

with bazookas and sticky grenades. One enemy tank 

was quickly set aflame. As a second tank rumbled 

down on a squad commanded by Sgt. Thomas B. 

Fergen, he hit it with a sticky grenade. One of his 

men blasted it with a bazooka and another finished 

the tank off by climbing up on it and dropping a 

grenade down the turret. 

As the tanks closed in, the shattered companies 

attempted to withdraw. It was too late. The Germans had surrounded them and they were unable 

to break through. As a last resort the few remaining officers ordered the troops to scatter through 

the fields and escape. At 1230, 1st Sgt. Robert E. 

Ehalt of the 3d Battalion sent a final message from 

the battalion command post. Only ten men were 

left around him, he was out of contact with all the 

companies, and he was destroying his radio as the 

tanks approached. Of 767 men in the Ranger attack only six escaped. Most of the men were captured by the Germans. 

A platoon of forty-three men of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop, which had followed the road behind the Rangers to outpost their line, also was 

trapped. The men tried to escape down the road in 

their jeeps but piled up on a German road block. 

Onl y one man got back. 

The American troops that advanced toward Cisterna on the morning of 30 January ran into a heavy 

concentration of German forces--elements of the 

Hermal1ll Goering Pal1zer Divisiol1 and supporting 

units-instead of the thinly held outpost positions 

which they expected. The German main line of resistance was in front of Cisterna, not behind it. 

Thus the Germans were able to destroy or capture 

the advanced elements that approached Cisterna, 

and to slow the American drive all along the front. 

When the 4th Rangers were stopped along the 

road below Isola Bella, the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, which was to push up behind them, was 

unable to launch its planned attack. On General 

Truscott's order, Lt. Col. Ashton H. Manhart, commander of the 15th Infantry, directed the 3d Battalion to swing off the road to the east and follow 

the route of the 1st and 3d Rangers, in an effort to 

reinforce them. After the Rangers surrendered, this 

battalion was ordered to turn toward Isola Bella 

and attack it from the right rear. Under cover of a 

heavy concentration of smoke and shells laid down 

on the village, the battalion found a gap in the 

enemy defenses and filtered across the soggy fields. 

Behind their tanks and tank destroyers they drove 

in on the battered, rubble-filled cluster of buildings, firing at point-blank range to clear each house 

of its defenders. By noon they had overcome all 

organized resistance, although they were kept busy 

all afternoon hunting down snipers and small 

groups of Germans who infiltrated through the 

lines. Too late to save the 1st and 3d Rangers, Maj. 

Frederick W. Boye, Jr., swung his 3d Battalion 

south from Isola Bella to clear out enemy pockets 

holding up the 4th Rangers along the road. 

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 

drove up the parallel road about two miles to the 

right of the 3d Battalion to clear the regiment's 

right flank. Against strong opposition the battalion 

pushed forward a mile and a half to reach its objective. Tanks of Company B, 751st Tank Battalion, 

spearheading the infantry's advance, knocked 

out a Mark IV tank, overran three 75-mm. antitank guns, and rounded up remnants of two shattered companies of the Herma1l11 Goeriflg Pal1zer 

Division. 

In a diversionary attack on the 3d Division's 

right flank, the 504th Parachute Infantry thrust 

north along the main Mussolini Canal. The paratroopers' mission was to seize and blow two bridges 

north of the canal junction and to cut Highway No. 

7 in order to block these possible avenues of counterattack. After a stiff fight the 1st Battalion 

reached both bridges, but before it could seize 

them, the Germans blew them up. While the 1st 

Battalion mopped up the Germans on the near side 

of the canal, capturing large numbers of prisoners 

from the H ermalZll Goerillg Pal1zer Divisioll and 

the 356th Reconl1aissallce Battaliofl, the 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Daniel W. Danielson, attacked through the 1st Battalion toward Highway 

No.7. Their advance was held up, however, along 
EXPANDING 

THE BEACHHEAD 

31 JANUARY 1944 

Front Line, e~enlng 30 Jan 

1ff'I'ff?1'; ___Line, .... tnlllQ 31 Jon 

l 

MAP NO.7 
EACH BUILDING BECAME A FORTRESS as Ihe opposing forces 

battled for prolection al1d cover afforded by scattered farmhouse! 011 the 

tea/lire/en right-flank terra;'1. Here a German artillery shell bllrsts all a 

bllilding Ilear Cistel'11d occllpied by Am.ericdl1 Iroops. 

the ravine formed by Cisterna Creek, because the 

Germans had blown the bridges, making it impossible to put supporting armor across the stream 

gully. In the afternoon, the newly arrived 7th 

Luftwaffe Jaeger Balla/ion attacked across the 

main canal, striking the paratroopers in the rear. 

This enemy shock battalion was made up of 

hardened disciplinary offenders of the German Air 

Force who had chosen combat service and a clean 

slate to military prison. The thrust was stopped by 

the 69th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in a 

hot hour of rapid firing. 

Forming the left prong of the 3d Division attack, the 7th Infantry, under the command of Col. 

Harry B. Sherman, was to cut Highway No. 7 

above Cisterna. The 1st Battalion made a long 

night march to the line of departure and then at 

0200, 30 January, launched its attack north along 

Le Mole Creek to cut the highway before daylight; 

the 2d Battalion's attack up the Crocetta-Cisterna 

road did not get started until 1115. The day before 

the attack the 30th Infantry had still been fighting 

for the area designated as the 1st Battalion's line of 

departure. Consequently, Lt. Col. Frank M. Izenour, the 1st Battalion commander, had been unable 

to make a detailed reconnaissance of the route of 

advance and was forced to rely mainly on air photographs. Before the 1st Battalion had advanced 

very far, the troops found that what had appeared 

to be evenly spaced hedgerows in the aerial photographs were actually 20-foot drainage ditches overgrown with briars. These barriers greatly hampered 

the night movement and the tanks, which were unable to cross them in the dark, had to be left behind. 

The infantry had pressed forward a mile and a half 

across the fields on both sides of the creek when 

suddenly a burst of German flares starkly outlined 

the troops against the dark ground. All around 

them the enemy opened fire. Daylight revealed the 

battalion caught in a small pocket formed by low 

knolls to the front, left, and right rear. From his 

positions on the three knolls the enemy poured 

down automatic fire. The men dived for cover of 

the ditches, but each ditch seemed enfiladed by German machine guns. The battalion suffered heavy 

losses; Colonel Izenour and about 150 others, men 
TANKS TAKE MOMENTARY COVER behind a farm blli/ding while 

smoke is put down to cover their advance. TheJe tanks were part of 'he 

armor accompal1ying the 7th and 15th Infantry in the attack 011 31 lamla,.y which carried them to flJithin a mile of Cistema. 

and officers, were hit. Capt. William P. Athas of 

the heavy weapons company hastily set up four 

machine guns, and under their protecting fire the 

riflemen deployed and drove the Germans from 

the hill to the right rear. During the day, 246 men 

of the scattered battalion filtered through to rally 

on this knoll. Maj. Frank Sinsel was sent forward 

to take command of the battalion and, after daylight, tanks managed to negotiate the ditches and 

came up in support. All day the 1st Battalion, too 

weak to attack, held its ground under the battering 

of enemy artillery and mortar fire. Reinforcements 

were sent up through the ditches that night, but the 

enemy, with guns sited accurately on the ditches, 

subjected the troops moving up to heavy shell fire. 

The 2d Battalion attack up the road toward Cisterna was also delayed. Its tanks were unable to 

move up through the smoke and artillery fire laid 

down by supporting units. When the troops finally 

crossed the line of departure they were thrown back 

almost immediately by a unit of the 1 st Pm'dehute 

DifJisioll, which had moved in the night before 

and dug in around the road junction south of Ponte 

Rotto. To renew the attack that afternoon, Colonel 

Sherman added his reserve 3d Battalion. He ordered Maj. William B. Rosson, the battalion commander, to clean up the road junction from the 

south and go on to the high ground overlooking 

Ponte Rotto. The Sherman tanks and M-lO tank 

destroyers operating with the battalion rumbled 

up over the gravel road, systematically demolishing each German-held farmhouse and haystack 

barring the way. Behind the screen of armor and 

intensive artillery and mortar concentrations, the 

infantry cleared the road junction from the south 

and pushed on to seize their objective, the knoll 

above Ponte Rotto, by daylight on 31 January. In 

the first day's assault the 7th Infantry had gained 

about half the distance to Cisterna. 

In view of the unexpectedly strong German resistance against the 3d Division and the failure of 

the Ranger infiltration, General Truscott ordered 

his division to reorganize along the Ponte RottoIsola Bella-Cisterna Creek phase line before resuming the attack. Instead of the incomplete defenses and limited forces it had expected to find 
before Cisterna, the 3d Division had run into 

strongly manned and well-prepared positions. Anticipating a renewal of the drive on Highway No. 

7, the enemy moved in fresh troops to reinforce 

the depleted Hermann Goering Panzer Division. 

Against such resistance the 7th and 15th Infantry 

had gained over a mile and a half in the first day's 

attack but were still almost two miles from tbeir 

goal. During tbe afternoon and evening of 30 

January the 3d Division cleaned up remaining 

pockets of German resistance behind the forward 

line, brought up reinforcements and ammunition, 

and prepared to renew the drive toward Cisterna 

the next day. 

Attack 011 Cisterna, 31 January-1 February 

With less than two miles separating them from. 

their goal, the 7th and 15th Infantry resumed their 

attack on the afternoon of 31 January. (Map No. 

7.) Instead of driving toward Highway No.7 north 

and south of Cisterna they were to advance up tbe 

Ponte Ratto and Isola Bella roads to converge on 

the town itself. This time General Truscott employed the full weight of all his supporting weapons to beat down the German defenses which had 

held up the previous day's attack. The infantry advance was preceded by successive artillery concentrations. Division and attached artillery fired 1,216 

missions (630 of them observed) during 31 January. The Air Force laid a smoke screen behind Cisterna at daylight to conceal the attack, and the 84th 

Chemical Battalion put down screening white phosphorus fire. Assault guns, tanks, and tank destroyers accompanied the infantry. Although extremely 

heavy ail' cooperation was planned, including an 

attack on Cisterna at H Hour by 70 B-26's, most of 

the program was canceled because of low clouds. 

Prior to the attack, on the morning of 31 January, the 4th Rangers cleared out the remaining 

pockets of German resistance on the road below 

Isola Bella. They crept forward through the muddy 

ditches and, aided by two tanks and two assault 

guns, stormed the last houses blocking the road. 

By noon the Rangers had forced their way through 

33 

to link up with the 15th Infantry, which had taken 

Isola Bella the previous day. In the afternoon, light 

tanks of Company D, 751st Tank Battalion, assisted the Rangers in rounding up 150 Germans 

cut off and left isolated in the fields on both sides of 

the road. 

On the division right, the 15th Infantry, its line 

of communication now cleared behind it, attacked 

on the afternoon of 31 January from Isola Bella. 

The fresh 2d Battalion passed through the 3d and 

drove northeast up the Cisterna road. The advallce 

was preceded by massed fi res of the 39th and 69th 

Field Artillery Battalions and the 1st Battalion, 

77th Field Artillery Regiment. Knocking out three 

German tanks and an assault gun, the troops fought 

their way across the fields toward the white buildings less than two miles away. German resistance 

was solid. The German defenders clung stubbornly 

to their intrenched positions before Cisterna. By 

nightfall the 2d Battalion had gained a mile of the 

remaining distance to Cisterna, but it was still only 

half way to its goal. 

Behind the 2d Battalion the other two battalions 

of the 15th Infantry cleaned out the German pockets in the fields between Isola Bella and the Cisterna-Littoria road. The 3d Battalion, advancing 

east along the lateral road from Isola Bella, was 

strongly counterattacked by seven German tanks 

driving across the fields from Cisterna. The situation became critical. Three of tbe four accompanying tank destroyers of Company B, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, had been disabled previously, 

but Sgt. W . E. Nesmith's M-lO, last one of the 

platoon, halted the threatened enemy breakthrough 

with well-aimed fire. During the fight he drilled 

one enemy tank with three shots and the others 

withdrew. Meanwhile, on the right of the 3d Battalion, the 1st Battalion continued its pusb northeast to reach the Cisterna-Littoria road. The Germans reacted swiftly. Infantry supported by tanks 

struck the 1st Battalion in the right flank, knocked 

out two supporting tank destroyers and a tank, and 

forced the battalion back 1,000 yards. At the close 

of 31 January, the 15th Infantry had dug in for 

the night on its newly established positions. 
To lead the renewal of the 7th Infantry attack 

up the Ponte Rotto-Cisterna road, the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, was brought up from division 

reserve. Before it could reach the line of departure at Ponte Rotto, fourteen German tanks, some 

of them Tigers, attacked down the road from Cisterna. The Sherman tanks and M-lO tank destroyers swung forward to meet the attackers. They 

caught the enemy tanks in an exposed position 

along the road, unable to deploy because of the 

soggy fields and ditches on both sides. In the ensuing tank battle, Shermans of the 751st Tank Battalion knocked out three of the enemy tanks; a 

platoon of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion shot 

up two more. The infantry called for artillery fire 

from the 9th Field Artillery Battalion. The Germans hurriedly withdrew. Then, behind massed 

fires laid down by the 9th, 10th, and 41st Field 

Artillery Battalions, the 1st Battalion, led by Maj. 

Oliver G. Kenny, attacked up the road at 1620 and 

advanced a quarter of a mile beyond the creek before darkness forced it to dig in 

On the extreme left of the 3d Division attack, 

the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, which had reorganized during 30 January, again tried to cross the 

railroad northwest of Cisterna and cut Highway 

No.7. Major Sinsel employed his armor and heavy 

mortars to clean out the farmhouses and haystacks 

from which enemy machine guns were holding up 

the battalion. Against slight opposition he then 

pushed forward toward the railroad line. En route, 

the battalion surprised and overran a group of 150 

Germans, who evidently had no idea American 

troops had penetrated so far, for they were not 

even dug in to meet the attack. When the battalion 

reached the railroad line, the situation changed. 

Here they were halted by dense, interlocking bands 

of fire from what was evidently the enemy's main 

line of resistance. The bridge over the railroad had 

been blown, preventing tanks from getting across 

to clean out the enemy. Under cover of the accompanying tanks and tank destroyers, whose fire drove 

the Germans to shelter, Major Sinsel withdrew his 

battalion south about 400 yards to a reverse slope 

and dug in for all-around defense. All night and 

34 

the next day (1 February) the Germans showered 

the exposed salient with artillery and mortar fire 

and tried to infiltrate machine guns to the battalion's flanks. Each time they heard the Germans 

moving in, four or five men would sneak up and 

knock out the enemy machine-gun crew. At 1930 

the battalion drove off a counterattack on the left 

rear and captured two enemy machine guns. Although tbey had almost exhausted their ammunition and were out of contact witb tbe other rifle 

companies, Major Sinsel and one hundred of his 

men held their positions. A strong patrol from the 

2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was hastily moved up 

that night to plug the gap between the 1st Battalion and Company G, 30th Infantry, and to mop up 

enemy snipers to their rear; it returned without 

having made contact with Company G. 

The night of 31 January, ending the second day 

of the attack on Cistema, found the 3d Division 

battling stubbornly forward but still unable to 

break through. Many fresh German units, especially mobile reconnaissance battalions, which were 

usually the !irst elements of a new division to arrive, had been committed on 31 January to reinforce the Hennam, Goering Pallzer DivisiOlI. The 

enemy's sharpl y increased use of massed armor was 

made possible by the arrival of the bulk of the 26th 

Pallzer Divisioll from the Adriatic front. 

On the morning of 1 February the 3d Division 

renewed its effort to reach Cisterna. (Map No.8.) 

Jumping off at dawn, the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, fought its way 1,000 yards farther up the Ponte 

Rotto-Cisterna road. The battalion reached Pantano ditch, less than a mile west of Cisterna, placing it about the same distance away from the town 

as the 15th Infantry on the south, when a well-laid 

10-minute German artillery concentration forced it 

to halt and dig in. A German battalion, reinforced 

by tanks and artillery, promptly counterattacked 

before American troops could organize for defense. 

This dangerous assault was staved off largely by 

the heroic action of Pfc. Alton W. Knappenberger 

of Company C, 30th Infantry. Crawling forward 

with his Browning automatic rifle to an exposed 

knoll ahead of his unit, Private Knappenberger 
EXPANDING 

THE BEACHHEAD 

FEBUARY 1944 

"""" Fron! Line, mornin!} I Feb 

_ _ Line, evening I Feb 

CMour inlefllOf 20 melers 

o 

MILES 

1 

MAP NO.8 
AN ARTILLERY OBSERVER'S VIEW of the bailie 

toward Cisterna shows the extreme difficulties enCOI/f1· 

tered by VI Corps as it inched over the Pontine Marshes. 

Cover was scarce and, even though the ever.present smoke 

screens, the enemy had excellent observation from his 

mountain posls behind the balliefield. 

held back the Germans long enough for the two 

advance companies of the battalion to withdraw 

and reorganize. With machine-gun bullets, grenades, and 20-mm. flakwagon shells bursting around 

him, he first knocked out a German machine gun, 

killing two and wounding another of the crew. As 

he did so, two Germans crept up and threw grenades within ten feet of him. Private Knappenberger 

killed both Germans with a burst of fire. Remaining in an exposed position throughout the action, 

he dispersed an entire enemy platoon. Only when 

his ammunition was gone did he rejoin his company 300 yards to the rear. The 1st Battalion remained near Pantano ditch where it had been 

stopped in its drive. 

General Truscott considered it essential to protect the division right flank before any resumption 

of the attack on Cisterna. Accordingly, he ordered 

the 15th Infantry to continue its advance toward 

the Cisterna-Littoria road in order to block any 

possible enemy counterattack across Cisterna Creek. 

On the morning of 1 February the 1st Battalion 

attacked for the third time in an effort to reach 

the road. For the third time it failed. The troops 

were unable to break through the H erma/Ill Goe/"-

illg Panzer Division barricaded in the houses barring the way. 

By noon it was clear that the 3d Division, holding a wide front and exhausted by three days of 

bitter fighting, could not hope to take Cisterna in 

the face of the ever increasing build-up of enemy 

troops. In fact, the German concentration opposite 

the 3d Division, and, in particular, the appearance 

of the 26th Panzer DilJisioll, the enemy's chief 

mobile reserve, forecast an early German counterattack. General Truscott pulled back the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, from its exposed position to 

the stream line at Ponle Rotto and ordered all 

35 

troops to dig in immediately to meet the expected 

attack. 

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, harassed by enemy snipers, antitank guns, and constant 

infiltration attempts, held on precariously in its exposed salient along the railroad northwest of Cisterna. The Germans considered this wedge thrust 

deep into their defenses a serious threat to their 

position and counterattacked strongly with elements of the newly arrived lIst Infantry Divisioll. 

By the afternoon of 1 February Major Sinsel reported his battered force had to be relieved or 

would be forced to withdraw. When the 2d Battalion relieved the 1st that night, Company C was 

down to sixteen men and Company A to eighteen, 

though many other men had filtered back separately. The relieving battalion was scarcely in position when it was attacked at dawn on 2 February 

by a fresh battalion of the 26th Panzer Divisio1l. 

Supporting tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery 

hel ped repulse this thrust in three hours of bitter 

fighting. The same enemy unit attacked again that 

afternoon and was again thrown back. In repelling 

these two attacks the Americans had smashed the 
entire German battalion, capturing 131 prisoners 

in the subsequent mop-up_ The 7th Infantry still 

held firm_ 

On the afternoon of 1 February the 3d Division 

attack toward Cisterna had lost its momentum. In 

three days the division had gained two to three 

miles up the roads leading to Cisterna, but had 

been unable to break through the last 1,500 yards 

to seize the town. The division had fought on 

approximately a 7-mile front toward an objective 

three to four miles away. An attack on such a wide 

front by a limited force could be expected to succeed only against relatively weak enemy opposition. 

But the opposition was not weak. The Germans 

succeeded in building up their strength and establishing a defensive system around Cisterna in time 

to stem the attack. Instead of meeting mobile covering forces, 3d Division troops struck well-organized and strongly dug-in positions amply supported 

by artillery and armor. In spite of these obstacles, 

the division almost reached Cisterna, and, although 

it suffered heavy losses, it had also inflicted heavy 

losses on the Germans. By the evening of 1 February, however, the tide had turned; the enemy now 

had numerical superiority. Forced to assume the 

defensive, the 3d Division began hastily digging in 

behind a barrier of mines, wire, and antitank guns 

to hold its gains and meet the expected enemy counterthrust. An uneasy lull settled over the division 

front as Americans and Germans prepared for the 

fight to come. 

Advance to Campoleone 

While General Truscott on the right drove on 

Cisterna, VI Corps made its main effort toward 

Colli Laziali along the Albano road. From the British positions above Carroceto this dominating hill 

mass was clearly visible. General Lucas' plan called 

for the British 1 Division to breach the enemy's 

main line of resistance along the railroad by seizing 

the crossing at Campoleone. The 1st Armored Division was to swing wide around to the left of the 

Albano road to assault Colli Laziali from the west 

while the British continued their attack up the 

main road to seize the high ground on the south 

slope. 

The plan of General Penney, commanding the 1 

Division, was to pass the fresh 3 Brigade through 

the 24 Guards Brigade to seize Campoleone. At 

2300,29 January, the 1 Scots Guards and the 1 Irish 

Guards attacked to secure the crossroads 2,000 

yards south of the Campoleone overpass as a line of 

departure for the main attack. (Map No.5.) The 

1 Scots Guards on the right struck a mined and 

wired-in road block south of its objective but 

pushed through with heavy losses. On the left of 

the road, however, the 1 Irish Guards were forced 

back at dawn by enemy tanks and self-propelled 

guns. To meet the threat of enemy armor the 3d 

Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, was hastily withdrawn from the 1st Armored Division attack and 

sent to assist the British. American and British 

tanks and tank destroyers drove off the enemy armor, and the infantry was able to restore its forward positions. The defending 29th Pallzer Grenadier Regiment was severely handled in this action. 

The sharp fighting for the line of departure delayed the 3 Brigade attack until 1510, 30 January. 

(Map No.6.) At this time the 1 Battalion, King's 

Shropshire Light Infantry (1 KSLI) , and 1 Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment (1 DWR), 

drove forward against scattered opposition and 

seized their objective on the high ground just south 

of the overpass at Campoleone. Tanks of the 46 

Royal Tanks hotly engaged enemy antitank guns 

beyond the railway embankment but were unable 

to cross. Since it was now too dark to continue the 

attack across the railroad, further advance by the 

1 Division was postponed until the next day. 

The area west of the Albano road, chosen for the 

armored assault, is cut up by a series of rough 

stream gullies, often fifty feet deep, which run in a 

southwesterly direction down from the high ground 

to the sea. Instead of attacking across the ravines, 

which would offer difficult barriers to armored 

vehicles, Maj. Gen. Ernest R. Harmon, commander 

of the 1st Armored Division, planned first to seize 

the old railroad bed running northwest from Carroceto. The railroad bed offered a built-up route of 
advance across the gullies and, once gained, it 

could be used as a line of departure for a drive 

northeast along the more favorable ground of the 

ridges lying between the gullies. 

General Harmon assigned the task of clearing 

the area along the old railroad bed to Col. Kent C. 

Lambert, commander of Combat Command A. 

Colonel Lambert prepared to make a reconnaissance in force, employmg Company B, 81st Reconnaissance Battalion, Companies A and I, 1st Armored Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, and the 91st Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion. 

This force was dispatched on the afternoon of 

29 January. (Map NO.5.) In order not to interfere with priority traffic on the main Albano road, 

the column turned off at the first overpass and followed a track leading north to Buonriposo Ridge. 

The Germans were not believed to have more than 

small delaying forces in this area. As t1,e leading 

armored cars nosed onto the ridge, they were met 

by sniper and machine-gun fire from enemy positions on the upper side of the Moletta River gully. 

Unable to cross the deep ravine, the tanks and armored cars skirted the south bank up to the railway 

bed, where they were halted by a mine field and by 

intense enemy fire. Colonel Lambert withdrew his 

force out of range to regroup. No sooner had the 

tanks halted than they bogged down in the muddy 

ground. Colonel Lambert decided to hold up for 

the night short of the railroad bed and secure the 

line of departure in the morning after his tanks 

had been dug out and suitable reconnaissance had 

been made. 

The remainder of the 1st Armored Regiment 

and the 6th Armored Infantry (less the 2d 

Battalion, still on the southern front) moved up 

under cover of night to reinforce Combat Command A. (Map No.6.) The 3d Battalion, 504th 

Parachute Infantry, and the 894th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion were attached as division reserve. Once 

the tanks were freed the following morning, five 

tank companies moved out across the upper Moletta gully and engaged the enemy along the next 

ridge. Many of the tanks, however, bogged down 

37 

again, and the heavy smoke and artillery fire on a 

cold, cloudy day made it difficult for the tankers 

to see. Since the armor was unable to get beyond 

the gravel road along the ridge, General Harmon 

ordered the 6th Armored Infantry under Col. Paul 

Steele to attack with the tanks astride the railway 

bed and clear out enemy resistance to the next 

stream line. Careful plans were worked out for 

tank-infantry cooperation to reduce earn enemy 

strong point. These plans had to be partly canceled 

when a tank battalion (3d Battalion, 1st Armored 

Regiment) was withdrawn just before the attack 

and sent north to assist the British. Lack of this 

tank support hampered the assault of the 6th Armored Infantry. The infantry pushed forward that 

afternoon through a wall of mortar and marninegun fire and reached the gravel road along the 

ridge. Here they were held until dark by a 400-yard 

hasty mine field, well covered by antitank guns, 

laid at the intersection of road and railway bed. 

By the end of the first day of the attack along the 

Albano road the 1st Armored Division was still 

struggling for its line of departure, and the British, 

while scoring a 2-mile advance, had still to breach 

the enemy defenses at Campoleone. 

In General Lucas' original plan of attack, the 

British 1 Division was to drive up the Albano road 

to reach the south slope of Colli Laziali, while the 

1st Armored Division swung around the left of 

the 1 Division to seize the high ground on the west 

slope. In view of the difficulty met by the 1st Armored Division in the muddy country and rough 

stream gullies west of the Albano road, General 

Lucas changed his plan. Instead of attacking northeast up the ridges from the railway bed, the armor 

was to wait until the British had taken the road 

junction at Osteriaccia, 1,000 yards north of Campoleone. When the crossroads had been taken, a 

column of the 1st Armored Regiment' was to pass 

through the British and attack up the Albano road. 

The 1 Division would follow as quickly as possible. 

Meanwhile, the 6th Armored Infantry, once more 

I Minus the 3d Battalion but with the 3d Battalion, ~04th Para· 

chute Infantry, and 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion at· 

tached. 
with a tank battalion in support (3d Battalion, 1st 

Armored Regiment), was to continue its attack at 

dawn to seize the two and one-half miles along the 

railway bed designated as the line of departure 

in the original order, and then prepare to attack 

north. 

At 1030, 31 January, the 2 Battalion, Sherwood 

Foresters (2 Foresters), and tanks of the 46 Royal 

Tanks attacked from their positions south of the 

overpass at Campoleone with the objective of seizing the crossroads at Osteriaccia and breaching the 

enemy line of resistance along the railroad embankment at Campoleone to allow the armor to pass 

through. (Map No.7.) They fought their way 

across the embankment but then ran into a hornet's 

nest of resistance from part of the 29th Pallzef 

Gfmadier Regiment firmly intrenched in the 

houses lining the road from Campoleone to Osteri-
accia. Tanks and self-propelled guns covered every 

avenue of approach. Some of them had been driven 

through the backs of buildings and were firing out 

the windows. A mine field barred progress up the 

road. Brig. J. R. James, commanding the 3 Brigade, 

withdrew his infantry in order to allow tanks and 

artillery to soften up German defenses. 

In preparation for the armored assault, General 

Harmon had ordered Maj. William R. Tuck to 

employ his 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, 

to reconnoiter the more level ground west of the 

Albano road near Campoleone for suitable stream 

crossings and routes across the railroad embankment. On the morning of 31 January, the tank column had swung up the road behind the British 

positions, and then had turned off and fanned out 

over the rise south of Campo del Fico Creek. Overrunning enemy machine gunners, they drove the 

Germans from the ridge. Enemy infantry counterattacked but were shot down by the tanks' machine 

guns. The estimated killed numbered 175. 1st Lt. 

Olin Dyer's platoon of Company C skirted the next 

gully until it found a crossing and then charged 

up the ridge on the far side while the Germans 

broke and fled. The platoon overran three mortar 

positions and a 75-mm. antitank gun. An enemy 

self-propelled gun set fire to Lieutenant Dyer's 

tank, but was in turn set aflame by another of his 

platoon. Two Mark IV's were put out of action by 

gunner Everett B. Perrien, using a 37-mm. gun. 

Having driven off the enemy tanks, the light tanks 

moved forward to the railroad, but were stopped 

by enemy antitank guns and heavy weapons along 

the railroad embankment. Intense enemy artillery 

fire throughout the action was largely ineffective 

because of the high percentage of air burst, which 

rattled off the buttoned-up tanks. Unable to force 

their way across the embankment before dark, the 

American tanks withdrew. 

As a prelude to a renewed British attack on the 

afternoon of 31 January, the 2d Battalion, 1st 

Armored Regiment, launched a raid up the Albano road toward Campoleone. The medium tanks 

reached the railroad embankment and fired heavily 

on the fortified houses beyond at about a 700-yard 

range but were unable to cross because of severe 

enemy fire. After a massed artilley preparation by 

the 1 Division artillery, the 2 Foresters attacked 

again, but were turned back by heavy small-arms, 

mortar, and self-propelled gun fire from enemy 

positions some 300 yards beyond the railway. The 

effort of the 1st Armored and 1 Divisions to break 

through along the Albano road bad not succeeded. 

While the drive on Campoleone was in progress, 

the 6th Armored Infantry had resumed its attack 

along the old railroad bed northwest of Carroceto 

at dawn on 31 January. The battalion met heavy 

machine-gun fire from Germans intrenched in 

farmhouses across its line of advance. Essential 

tank support to knock out these German strong 

points was delayed in coming up; and the mine 

fields, barring the way up the railroad bed, proved 

to be well covered by German antitank guns which 

Allied artillery was unable to knock out. Against 

strong opposition and w1Usually heavy German artillery fire, the troops were able to gain only 500 

yards. By evening, Colonel Steele reported that a 

further advance would be extremely difficult. His 

flanks were unprotected and his center was held up 

where the mine field had not been cleared. General 

Harmon halted the attack and the 6th Armored 

Infantry and its supporting tanks were relieved by 

the 24 Brigade that night. VI Corps withdrew the 

1st Armored Division back into Corps reserve. 

The Allied attack (British 1 Division supported 

by British and American armor) toward Campoleone had made better progress than the 3d Division drive on Cisterna. It had reached Campoleone, 

ZONE OF ARMORED ATTACK ON THE LEFT FLANK waI over 

'he ridges and gullies of the Moletta River, Vallelelo Creek, and their 

tribNlar;es. Photographed from a high-level bomber dllring a mission 

agams/ German positions ill the ridges, the gr(we! road where the tanks 

were halted and the railroad bed arr! seell clearly. 

39 
and penetrated the German main line of resistance 

west of the Albano road, where a 2-mile gap was 

opened between the 65th lllfalltry DiviJioll on the 

west and the 3d Pallzer Grenadier DiviJioll holding 

the center of the German line east of Campoleone. 

Despite this Allied penetration along the Albano 

road, which became known as the Campoleone 

salient, by 1 February the VI Corps attack to secure 

Cisterna and Campoleone had spent itself against 

unexpectedly strong German defenses. Reconnaissance reports before the offensive had indicated that 

the Germans held only delaying positions before 

Cisterna and Campoleone, and that their main line 

of resistance lay back on the high ground of Colli 

Laziali and the Lepini Mountains. Instead, the Germans determined to make their stand before Cisterna and Campoleone, key points on the two main 

axes of attack inland. 

The enemy had not only succeeded in rushing up 

reinforcements in wholly unexpected strength, but 

had also built up a strong system of defenses barring the approaches to Cisterna and Campoleone. 

Every house and village was converted into a strong 

point and these were connected by well-camouflaged machine-gun nests and rifle pits. Tanks and 

roving self-propelled guns and massed artillery and 

lIebe/werfe,. fire supported these positions. Allied 

troops again found, as they had all through the 

Italian campaign, the excellent fortification value 

of the heavy stone construction of Italian farmhouses. Reducing each house was in fact a small 

separate operation, requiring tanks and tank destroyers to demolish the building before the infantry could move in. Sniping and infiltration by small 

enemy groups continued long after key defense 

points were seized, and the infantry continually 

had to mop up bypassed pockets of Germans who 

fired on them from the rear. 

Every advantage of terrain, too, lay with the 

enemy. On the left flank the armor found it difficult to penetrate the natural obstacles presented by 

rough stream gullies and ground made soggy by 

repeated rains. On the right flank the route of advance layover open, muddy fields offering scant 

cover for the attacker while providing excellent 

fields of fire for defending troops. January rains 

made ground movement difficult, and low clouds 

during the crucial period of the attack severely 

hampered the air effort. In the face of such a combination of obstacles, Allied troops had driven fourteen miles inland from Anzio to within five miles 

of Colli Laziali, but they lacked the strength to 

break through at Cisterna and Campoleone. 

After a conference with General Clark on 1 February, General Alexander ordered VI Corps to continue the attack to extend the beachhead to the Incastro River-Campoleone-Cisterna line, and then 

organize for defense. The initial beachhead had 

been the largest that could be held with the limited number of troops originally landed, but it was 

so small that any part could be reached by enemy 

artillery and there was little room for maneuver 

or defense in depth. A breakthrough at any point 

would bring the Germans almost to the sea. Consequentl y General Alexander desired to extend the 

beachhead farther inland and anchor it on the key 

points of Cisterna and Campoleone. By the afternoon of 1 February, however, it was evident that 

these objectives could not immediately be attained. 

The enemy build·up had become so threatening 

that VI Corps ordered all divisions to organize to 

repel a counterattack. On 2 February, General 

Clark radioed General Lucas to consolidate the 

beachhead and prepare for defense. General Lucas 

on 3 February gave verbal orders to the units of VI 

Corps to assume the defensive. All units began immediate preparations of defensive positions to meet 

the expected German assault. 

In anticipation of the enemy offensive, Allied 

reinforcements were sped to the beachhead to offset 

the growing German superiority of force. The 1st 

Special Service Force, a mixed brigade of 1,800 

picked Canadians and Americans, arrived on 2 

February and took over the right flank along the 

main Mussolini Canal. The 168 Brigade of the 

British 56 Division landed at the beachhead on 3 

February to reinforce the British. Antiaircraft and 

heavy artillery were strongly reinforced to meet the 

constant Luftwaffe raids and the growing menace 

of long-range guns. By 4 February, the strength of 
VI Corps had increased to nearly 100,000, including service troops. Although inferior to the enemy 

in numbers of troops,' it was better equipped and 

supplied-particularly in guns and ammunitionthan the opposing German forces. 

While the Allied offensive of 30 January-1 February made only one important penetration, the 

German Fourleellih Army was forced to commit 

the bulk of its combat forces to stem the VI Corps 

advance. In fact, Allied armor came very close to 

effecting a breakthrough at Campoleone Station 

on 31 January. For the time being, Fourteenth 

Army had to postpone a large-scale counterattack 

designed to wipe out the Allied beachhead. and to 

'It is estimated that Fourltelllh Army numbered about 110,000 

at this time. 

limit its immediate mission to defense--preventing 

the Allied troops from expanding their beachhead 

and inllicting on them as heavy losses as possible. 

On 1 February FOt/rleelZth Army for the first time 

expressed doubt that it had sufficient strength to 

eliminate the Anzio beachhead. The German losses 

in the fighting of 30--31 January were heavy. Allied 

bombings of railroad lines were delaying the arrival 

of reserves; more importantly, they were preventing the Germans from receiving an adequate supply 

of ammunition. Nevertheless, FOt/rleenth Army 

was ordered to hold assault troops in readiness to 

launch a counteroffensive at the first opportune 

moment. 

The Germans expected that VI Corps would 

continue its offensive on 1 February, with the main 

CAMPO LEONE STATION tual the farlhest point of advance in the 

initial drive Ollt of the beachhead. Looking south over the open, mllddy 

flatlands, the only promil1ent feature in the plain is the Factory. 
effort in the bulge north of the Factory, but this 

did not materialize. The Germans themselves counterattacked strongly west of Cisterna at dawn on 

1 February with the 71 st bl/antry Division and the 

Hermann Goerillg Panzer Division. But German 

attempts on 1-2 February to recover their former 

forward positions in front of their main line of resistance were repulsed. In effect, VI Corps in its 

offensive had advanced its positions up to the German main line of resistance along the whole beachhead perimeter, and penetrated it in the bulge up 

the Anzio-Albano road. On 2 February the Germans were also forced to draw back their main line 

of resistance in the 71 st hl/antry Divis;oll sector 

north of Carano; this division had suffered heavy 

losses and had to shorten its front in order to 

strengthen its position. 

As soon as VI Corps halted its offensive after 

three days of heavy fighting, Fourteenth Army renewed preparations for a major counterattack. The 

weight and accuracy of Allied artillery fire delayed 

this attack. The Germans attributed the partial 

failure of the counterattack launched by the Hermalin Goer;llg Pallzer Divis;oll on 1-2 February 

to the demoralizing effect of Allied artillery fire. 

On 2 February, the artillery communications net 

of Combat Group Graeser was totally destroyed; 

the loss of fire direction charts forced a 24-hour 

postponement of the counterattack nn the bulge 

north of the Factory. On 2 February also, Army 

Grall p C ordered the transfer of troops to meet 

the threatened invasion at Civitavecchia, and announced its intention of transferring some troops 

from FOllftee1lth Army to bolster the Cassino front. 

Such factors were to limit the German counterattack on 3 February to a preliminary drive against 

the bulge north of the Factory, and require a postponement of the major German counteroffensive 

to 16 February. 

The projected main Fifth Army drive against 

Cassino and the strongly defended mountain mass 

to its rear was launched on 1 February. During the 

first week of February the troops of II Corps penetrated the mountain defenses of the Gustav Line 

and fought into Cassino itself. But they could not 

break through the final German positions and reach 

the Liri Valley. After 7 February, despite successive 

assaults during the remainder of the month by 

American, New Zealand, and Indian troops, there 

was but slight forward progress in the Cassino 

drive; at the end of the month, a virtual stalemate 

had developed. Elsewhere on the Fifth and Eighth 

Army fronts, bad weather, and a decision to await 

the outcome of the critical action at Cassino, led to 

a postponement of all large-scale offensive operations after the beginning of February. Thus the 

projected plan to coordinate a drive out of the 

Anzio beachhead with an advance on the southern 

front came to naught. During the critical days of 

the Anzio campaign in mid-February, operations 

on the southern front, except at Cassino, were at a 

standstill. Because of this stalemate in the south, 

the enemy was able to hold the Fifth and Eighth 

Armies at bay with fewer troops than he assembled 

before Anzio in an all-out effort to drive VI Corps 

from its beachhead. 
THE ENEMY ATTACKS 

(3-12 February) 

At the beginning of February General Mackensen's Fourteenth Ar/ll)' was preparing to strike. 

Hitler had personally ordered that the "abscess" 

below Rome be removed, whatever the cost. Having stopped the Allied drive toward Cisterna and 

Campoleone, the Germans renewed their preparations for an all-out offensive against the Amio 

beachhead. For the lirst two weeks of February, 

while these preparations were under way, the Germans believed that VI Corps migbt again attack 

toward Cisterna and Campoleone in an effort to 

break out of the beacbbead. They also thought that 

the Allies might attempt another amphibious landing northwest of Anzio, and coordinate it with a 

drive from the beachhead area across the Moletta 

River to the northwest. The German attacks of 

early February were designed not only to pave the 

way for the enemy's main offensive but also, by 

maintaining constant pressure on VI Corps, to 

prevent the Allies from reorganizing for a new 

drive out of the beachhead. 

The situation and mission of Fotlrteel1th Arm)' 

was summarized on 3 February in its Journal as 

follows: 

F01lrlee111h Army intends to prevent the enlarging of 

the beachhead, and to prepare an attack to eliminate this 

area. A number of army units arc remnants from various 

organizations and are not able to mount an attack at this 

time; during the last days, they had to be used in the 

front lines to prevent any enemy breakthrough. With 

these forces a strong assault group to conduct the attack 

on the beachhead cannot be organized. Therefore, F OllY· 

leenlh Army has planned attacks with limited objectives, 

43 

to suit various situations as they arise. When the enemy 

is weakened by these attacks, an all-out counteroffensive 

will be launched. 

At the same time, Fourteel1th Army headquarters 

again expressed doubt that the Anzio beachhead 

could be eliminated with the forces then available 

to it, and requested Army Group C to attach additional troops in order that the ultimate mission of 

eliminating the beachhead might be accomplished. 

On the eve of their lirst large-scale offensive, the 

Germans reorganized their forces. I Parachtlte 

CorpJ, which had previously commanded the entire 

Anzio front under FOtlrteenth Army, was assigned 

the western sector from a point west of the Albano 

road to the sea behind the Moletta River. It had 

two divisions under its command, the 4th Parachtlte on the west and the 65th Infantry on the 

east. The staff of LXXVI Panzer CorpJ was transferred from Tenth Army in the south, where it had 

commanded the enemy forces opposing the British 

Eighth Army, to Fourteellth Army, and given control over the central and eastern sectors of the 

beachhead perimeter. It took over its new command at 1200, 4 February. Five divisions were 

placed under it; in order, from the Albano road 

eastward, they were the 3d Panzer Grenadie,', the 

715th Illfamr), (motorized) , the TUI b'famr),. and 

the H ermallll Goerillg Panzer DiviJionJ, together 

with the 26th Panzer DiviJion , most of which was 

held in Corps reserve. In practice, German attacks 

were usually launched by combat groups that were 

formed by varying combinations of units. The most 
important of these, Combat Group Graeser, was to 

spearhead the enemy attacks against the center of 

the beachhead line. 

The VI Corps offensive at the end of January 

had concentrated on two areas: the roads leading 

northeast from Anzio to Cisterna and the paved 

highway running north from Anzio toward Albano. 

These avenues, which traversed the only terrain 

suitable to the employment of tanks and heavy 

equipment, were likewise the most favorable routes 

for an enemy attack to drive VI Corps into the sea. 

The German offensive against the Anzio beachhead launched in February had three principal 

phases: first, preparatory attacks to pinch off the 

deep British salient up the Albano road and capture 

the important Factory area (3-10 February) ; second, a major drive to break through to the sea 

along the axis of the Albano road (16-20 February); and third, an attack on the Cisterna front 

aimed at the main Allied beachhead defense line 

along the Mussolini Canal (28 February-2 March). 

The first of these attacks was to succeed; the second 

and third were to be repulsed by Allied forces that 

held grimly to the beachhead area and preserved 

it as a springboard for the subsequent offensive 

that led to the capture of Rome. 

Battle of the Carnpoleone SalimI 

On the night of 3-4 February the Germans 

began their Anzio offensive by launching a twopronged assault from the west and east against 

the center of the deep Allied salient extending up 

the Albano road from Carroceto to Campoleone. 

This attack was the first step in a preliminary offensive to capture the Factory-Carroceto area, 

which commanded the road network leading to 

Anzio and Nettuno; this area was to be the position for a jump-off in the major German drive that 

was to follow. (Map No.9.) 

The drive launched on 30 January by the Allied 

1st Armored and 1 Divisions up the Albano road 

had created a narrow salient approximately three 

miles deep and from one to one and one-half miles 

wide. If the Germans could pinch off the British 

44 

units holding this salient, they would achieve the 

destruction of a sizable portion of the beachhead 

forces and at the same time open the way for 

further attacks down the Albano road. Quick to 

seize the opportunity, the enemy rushed troops into position for the attack. 

After the Allied advance was stopped on 1 February, the 1st Armored Division was withdrawn 

into Corps reserve, leaving the British 1 Division 

occupying the ground which had been won. The 

apex of the salient just south of the railroad at 

Campoleone was held by the entire 3 Infantry 

Brigade consisting of the 1 DWR, the 2 Foresters, 

and the 1 KSLI. On the left flank of the salient 

and echeloned to the southwest was the 24 Guards 

Brigade consisting, in order of position, of the 1 

Battalion, Irish Guards, the 1 Scots Guards, and 

the 5 Grenadier Guards, with the 2 North Staffordshire Regiment (2 North Staffs) attached. The 2 

North Staffs were in contact with the 157th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division, defending the 

Moletta River line on the left flank of the beachhead. On the right flank of the salient, and echeloned to the southeast, was the 2 Infantry Brigade 

(less the 2 North Staffs) , consisting of the 6 Battalion, Gordon Highlanders (6 Gordons), and the 

1 Battalion, Loyal Regiment (1 Loyals) reinforced 

in the center by elements of the 1 Reconnaissance 

Regiment (1 Recce Regiment). The 1 Loyals on 

the right were in contact with the 509th Parachute 

Infantry Battalion, near the village of Carano. The 

1 Division, holding a front of approximately ten 

miles, had had little time to prepare for the impending attack. 

To add to the difficulties of this extremely long 

front and an exposed salient, the terrain generally 

favored the enemy. West of the Albano road the 

maze of deep, brush-covered ravines, which had 

proved such an obstacle to the tanks of the 1st 

Armored Division, offered the enemy concealed 

assembly areas from which they could infiltrate 

between the isolated strong points held by the 

British troops. East of the Albano road the country 

is more open, but the road leading southeast from 

Osteriaccia toward Carano offered enemy tanks 
CAMPOLEONE 

SALIENT 

3 - 5 FEBRUARY 1944 

""'" Front Line, morning 3 Feb __ _ Final Line, noon 5 Feb 

n:zz~ .• Regroopirog 10 shorten Line 

:;':":: location 051200A Feb 

ConIour inJerwl 20 meters 

.'CES 

ilr",;;~~' 'Sabatino 

l 

MAP NO.9 
an avenue of approach from concealed assembly 

points behind the railroad embankment east of 

Campoleone. 

Late in the afternoon of 3 February the enemy 

laid an artillery concentration on the positions of 

the 1 DWR southwest of the railroad and followed 

it with a small infantry attack. This proved to be 

only a diversion involving not more than a company. Artillery fue broke up the attack and by dark 

the slight enemy penetration had been wiped out. 

Then, shortly before midnight, the enemy artillery 

opened up again. This time the fire was concentrated near the base of the salient with the heaviest 

fire falling in the sector east of the Albano road. 

At 2300 the 1 Irish Guards west of the highway 

reported enemy troops infiltrating between their 

positions and those of the 1 Scots Guards on their 

left. At 2330 the 6 Gordons on the east side of 

the salient also were under attack. Enemy units also 

struck at the 1 KSLI and 1 DWR at the nose of 

the salient. In the confusion of night fighting it 

was difficult to measure the strength of the attacks, 

but by dawn the enemy's intention was clear. By 

driving deep wedges into both sides of the salient 

near its base, he aimed to cut off the whole of the 

3 Brigade. 

At daybreak on 4 February the attack on the 

west appeared to be the more threatening. An 

enemy battalion of the 65th [njantry DiviJioll, sup' 

ported by a few tanks and self-propelled guns, 

broke through the left flank of the 1 Irish Guards 

to reach the Campoleone-Nettuno railroad paral· 

leling the Albano road. Later it became evident 

that the more serious threat was to the east flank 

of the salient. At 072 5 at least six enemy tanks 

were spotted near a farmhouse to the east of the 

6 Gordons. Swinging west along a dirt road, the 

tanks overran one company of the 6 Gordons and 

established themselves on a small ridge just east 

of the Albano road. Infantry poured in behind the 

tanks, antitank guns were brought up, and additional tanks moved in to complete the isolation of 

the 3 Brigade. This attack was launched by Combal 

GfOflP Graeser, and spearheaded by the l04th 

Pallzer Gre1ladier Regimellt reinforced by three additional infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, 

two combat engineer companies, and armor, tn· 

cluding Mark V (Panther) tanks. 

FARMHOUSE ATIACKED IN THE BRITISH ZONE. British troops 

holding the line west of the Albano road were operating over terrain 

u,here observation tua! difficult. This farmhollIe 011 a ridge was photo. 

graphed earty ill the A'1Zio campaign aud was ;11 IIIe tiS tin obse,'valioll 

post. Cons/ani shelling reduced most stich slructflres. 
As the morning wore on the situation became 

increasingly difficult for the 1 Irish Guards and 

the 6 Gordons. Sherman tanks of the 46 Royal 

Tank Regiment, counterattacking to support the 

1 Irish Guards, were outranged by the enemy's 

tanks and heavy antitank guns which had been 

emplaced to cover the Nbano road. The 1 Irish 

Guards fell back to the southeast taking up a 

hedgehog position for all-around defense. Isolated 

by the enemy penetration, the 3 Brigade in the 

apex of the salient was under constant attack. 

Fighting under leaden skies and drizzling rain, it 

could not count on air support. By noon the situation seemed critical. General Penney, commander 

of the 1 Division, ordered the 168 Infantry Brigade 

(British 56 Division) to alert one battalion for a 

possible counterattack. 

During the afternoon of 4 February the force of 

the enemy attacks gradually weakened against the 

stubborn defense put up by the 24 Guards Brigade 

and the 6 Gordons. By 1500 the 1 Irish Guards 

had fought its way out of the trap created by the 

penetration on the left flank; the 6 Gordons continued to hold the ground south of the ridge line; 

and in the beleaguered 3 Brigade area the 1 KSLI 

successfully intercepted a party of Germans escorting 100 British prisoners. Enemy tanks and infantry suffered from accurate artillery and tankdestroyer fire. Company C, 894th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion, knocked out four enemy tanks and an 

antitank gun which the German crew was manhandling into position ; Company B picked off one 

Mark IV tank. At 1600, when the force of the 

enemy attacks showed signs of weakening, the 1 

London Scottish (168 Brigade), supported by 

tanks of the 46 Royal Tanks, launched a counterattack. Suffering heavy losses, the enemy was 

forced to fall back, and by 1700 the gap between 

the 6 Gordons and the 3 Brigade had been wiped 

out. 

Although the initial German attack had been 

checked, General Lucas considered that the forward units of the 1 Division were dangerously 

exposed, and he ordered them withdrawn to a new 

and more defensible line. The 1 KSLI and the 2 

Foresters drew back quickly with only slight losses_ 

The 1 DWR, which was under direct fire from 

enemy tanks, was unable to extricate itself until 

after dark; one company had been cut off, and 

the remainder of the battalion had to leave behind 

most of its antitank guns and heavy equipment. 

During the night of 4-5 February the 1 Division 

continued the withdrawal of its forward units to 

a line approximately a mile north of Carroceto 

and the Factory. The fresh 168 Brigade was moved 

forward to take over the center of the line and 

the 3 Brigade moved into division reserve. Although the readjustment of the 1 Division positions represented a loss of two and one-half miles 

of hard-won ground, the new line was considerably 

shorter and more defensible. Of the 3 Brigade units 

at the apex of the salient only the 1 DWR suffered 

heavily, the chief losses being sustained by the 1 

Irish Guards, 24 Brigade, and the 6 Gordons, 2 

Brigade, who had horne the brunt of the enemy's 

attacks at the base of the salient. Total British 

casualties in this action were more than 1,400 

killed, wounded, and missing; the enemy claimed 

the capture of more than 900 prisoners. 

The enemy's objective of wiping nut the Campoleone salient had been achieved; his effort to 

isolate and destroy the 3 Brigade had largely 

failed. Bad weather had hampered the movement 

of tanks and other heavy equipment and stubborn 

Allied resistance had slowed down the enemy infantry attacks. The enemy had suffered heavy casualties-nearly five hundred killed-and during 

the operation the British took more than three 

hundred prisoners, most of them captured during 

the counterattack launched by the 1 London Scottish and the 46 Royal Tank Regiment. Prisoners 

reported that their units had been hit hard. One 

battalion was practically wiped out, and the 104th 

Pm/zer Grenadier Regiment, which had led the 

attack against the 6 Gordons, was seriousl V depleted. Prisoners complained that the attack had 

been hurriedly organized without adequate reconnaissance of the ground and that some units had 

been moved up by forced night marches and 

thrown directly into the battle. 
PLAN FOR 

BEACHHEAD 

DEFENSE 

5 FEBRUARY 1944 

""'" 11'111101 Line 

•••• • lolfHnedlQle Line 

_ _ Final Beachheocl Une 

Con/ouf Itl/~ 20 me/~rs 

9 , .,'" l 

MAP NO. 10 
The Beachhead Defense 

On the morning of 4 February, when the fighting in the Campoleone salient was at its height, 

VI Corps issued written orders outlining the Corps 

plan of defense for the beachhead and confirming 

oral orders given the previous day. The initial 

beachhead line, which ran from the Moletta River 

on the left flank across the open fields of the 

central sector to the west branch of the Mussolini 

Canal and south along the main canal to the sea, 

was to be fortified as the final beachhead line of 

resistance. During the period of the expansion of 

the beachhead VI Corps had pushed out in the 

central sector an average of from two to four miles, 

with the Campoleone salient extending six miles 

north up the Albano road. It was the intention of 

VI Corps to hold the ground which had been won, 

falling back to the final beachhead line only as a 

last resort. (Map No. 10.) 

The flanks of the beachhead, the Moletta River 

on the left and the main Mussolini Canal on the 

right, were considered easily defensible. The 45th 

Division was assigned the task of preparing defenses along the Moletta River and of holding it 

with one regimental combat team; responsibility 

for the right lIank went to the 1st Special Service 

Force.' The critical central sector north of the final 

beachhead line was to be prepared for defense and 

held by the 1 Division and the 3d Division. The 

1 Division (reinforced) was to be responsible for 

the area extending from west of the Albano road 

to the village of Carano.' The 3d Division (reinforced) would hold the area from Carano to the 

junction of the west branch with the main Mussolini Canal.' The 1st Armored Division' (less ComI Attached: 456th Parachute 'Field Artill ery Battalion (less 

Batteries C and D). 

IAttached : 2 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery : 3d Battalion, 

504th Parachute Infantry; 168 Brigade; 46 Royal Tanks; Compani es Band C, 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion. 

3Attached: 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion; 751st Tank Bat· 

talion; 191 st Tank Battalion; 44 1st AAA Automatic Weapons 

Battalion; 84th Chemical Battalion; 69th Armored Fi eld Artillery Battalion; ~04th Parachute Infantry (minus 3d Bn) ; 661 5th 

Ranger Force (Provisional); 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. 

• Attached: 434th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion. 

47 

bat Command B) and the bulk of the 45th Division' were to be held in Corps reserve prepared to 

counterattack on Corps order. The 1st Armored 

Division was located east of the Albano road in 

the extensive area of tangled undergrowth, scrub 

trees, and bogland known as Padiglione Woods; 

in addition to its counterattack role it was to organize defenses south of the final defense line behind 

the 1 Division. The bulk of the 45th Division, 

located northeast of Nettuno along the road to Cisterna, was to organize the area south of the west 

branch of the Mussolini Canal behind the 3d Division. The 36th and 39th Engineer Combat Regiments, in addition to their engineer functions, were 

to assist in defending the coastline against airborne 

and seaborne raids and were to be prepared to 

assemble on four hours' notice as Corps reserve. 

At the port, the 540th Engineers, which passed to 

Army control on 6 February when Fifth Army 

took over control of supply at the beachhead, was 

to defend X-Ray and Nettuno beaches. During the 

critical days of February the task of improving the 

defenses absorbed the energies of every available 

man on the beachhead. 

The enemy attack on the Campoleone salient 

required some changes in the plan of defense. The 

168 Brigade, originally designated as Corps reserve, was committed to the support of the 1 

Division, and the forward line to be consolidated 

was drawn back to form an arc covering the Factory area. On 5 February VI Corps designated an 

intermediate line approximately halfway between 

the initial outpost and final beachhead lines. During the month of February, although powerful 

enemy attacks tore deep rents in the forward lines 

of defense, necessitating frequent shifts in the positions of the defending troops, the general outline 

of tbe VI Corps plan of defense remained intact. 

The work of preparing the defenses was performed under the most trying conditions. All operations had to be conducted at night and sometimes 

in the midst of battle. In the forward areas the 

extent of the outpost line and the relatively small 

I Attached: 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion; 894th Tank De· 

stroyer Battalion (less Companies B and C). 
FORWARD OBSERVATIONS POSTS 011 the right flank uSllally w/-

lered hi a blli/ding stich as thisl where tanks could find cover. The lanks 

110t only provided armored protectioll bllt also contained powerful radio 

eqllipment, and carried enough supplies to permit the observers 10 remain 

away from the rear areas for several days. 

size of the defending force made it necessary to 

depend almost entirely on a system of mutually 

supporting strong points. The stone farmhouses 

that dotted the countryside played an important 

role in the defense. Upper floors provided sniper 

positions and observation posts over the relatively 

level and almost featureless terrain; ground floors, 

strengthened with sandbags and timbers, provided 

protection for dug-in machine guns and antitank 

guns. Positions were wired in and protected by antitank and antipersonnel mine fields, roads were cratered, and key bridges were prepared for demolition. Engineers of the 10th Engineer Battalion 

strung barbed wire in the bed of the west branch of 

the Mussolini Canal and then, to increase its effectiveness as a tank obstacle, built earth dams to raise 

the water level. Tank destroyers and supporting 

tanks, moving into prepared positions after dark, 

helped to bolster the thinly held forward positions 

against the enemy's favorite tactic of night infiltration. Rudimentary in the early days of February, 

the defenses became increasingly effective as the 

weeks went by. 

General Clark inspected the entire beachhead 

front on 6 February, visiting each of the major 

units of VI Corps. He found the situation quiet 

and fairly well in hand. There appeared to be a 

weak spot at the boundary between the 1 Division 

and the 3d Division. To strengthen this point, 

where the enemy line was barely two miles from 

the final beachhead line of defense, two battalions 

of the 180th Infantry (45th Division) were sent to 

the villages of Carano and Padiglione to prepare 

defenses. The 1 Division had lost a large number 

of antitank guns in the fighting at Campoleone, 

and both the 1 Division and the 3d Division were 
badly in need of replacements. The 3d Division 

alone needed 2,400 men. Every effort was made to 

expedite the shi pment of replacements and to keep 

VI Corps units up to strength, but the problem 

remained a chronic one throughout the month of 

February. The absorption of large numbers of 

troops who had had no combat experience was 

difficult for units which were almost constantly in 

the line and often lighting desperately to hold their 

positions. General Clark was convinced that in 

order to build up an adequate force to defend the 

beachhead and to give it the strength necessary for 

future offensive operations an additional British 

brigade group or American regimental combat 

team and another 155-mm. gun battalion were 

needed. Although VI Corps was now committed 

to a defensive role, the possibility that it would 

SOOn be in position to resume the offensive was not 

neglected. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 

15, dated 7 February, which conlirmed previous 

oral orders that VI Corps was to hold its present 

position, included the provision that plans were to 

be drawn up for a possible attack out of the beachhead toward Velletri or Albano. 

After the 1 Division had successfully extricated 

itself from the Campoleone salient on the night of 

4 February, the enemy made no large-scale attacks 

for three days. It was not, however, a period of 

inactivity. Every part of the beachhead was subject 

to shelling from enemy long-range guns as well 

WIRE-LAYING CREWS seldom had an opporltlnily 10 work in daylight lin/eli Jmoke Jcreens were tlsedJ as shown in this photo. Here men 

of Ihe 2d Ballalion, 391h Engineer Regimenl, slrelch accordian wire paraUel to Iwo barriers of fuire on PostI. MineI also were placed in the area. 

49 
as to air attack, and while reorganizing his forces 

to continue the offensive the enemy made repeated 

efforts to feel out the new beachhead defenses. 

The most important of these probing attacks was 

launched against the 3d Division on the night of 

5 February. 

While the British troops in the Campoleone 

salient were bearing the brunt of the first German 

attack, the 3d Division had been reorganizing its 

units and preparing its defenses in depth along 

the initial outpost line, intermediate line, and final 

beachhead line based on the Mussolini Canal. The 

division sector was divided between the 30th Infantry on the left, the 15th Infantry in the center, 

and the 504th Parachute Infantry on the right, 

with the 7th Infantry in division reserve. The bulk 

of the division strength had been withdrawn to 

rush work on the intermediate and final defense 

lines, leaving only mixed holding forces along the 

initial outpost line. 

In the sector held by the 30th Infantry the outpost line extended in an arc from the village of 

Carano across the open fields and deep ditches of 

the rolling farmland west of Cisterna to the stream 

crossing at Ponte Ratto. It was lightly manned by 

platoon-sized units of the 509th Parachute Infantry 

Battalion on the left; a platoon each of Companies 

G and F, 30th Infantry, in the center; and platoons 

of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Infantry, and the 

1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, on the right. The defenses of these positions were not yet completed. 

Company F, 30th Infantry, had planned to wire 

in its position the previous night but had been 

pinned down by enemy machine-gun fire. Wire 

communication between units was still being laid, 

and the troops were being reorganized. 

Just at dark on the evening of 5 February the 

enemy put down a short, intense concentration of 

artillery, mortar, and tank fire on a front of two 

and one-half miles extending from Formal del 

Bove Creek to Ponte Ratto. Tanks moved up on 

the Banks and poured direct fire into the positions 

of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, to the north of 

Ponte Ratto. Then, making liberal use of flares 

and machine-pistol fire, the enemy attacked. At 

50 

2125 the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, reported it 

could not hold out much longer. The platoons of 

Companies F and G drew back; the platoon of 

Company E became disorganized; and the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, also withdrew from its positions near Ponte Ratto. The platoons of Companies 

F and G, 30th Infantry, finding their right flank 

exposed, fell back 1,500 yards to the intermediate 

line. The result of this wholesale withdrawal was 

to produce a gap extending over nearly the whole 

length of the 30th Infantry sector of the outpost 

line. To restore the situation Company K, 30th 

Infantry, was ordered forward to counterattack. 

Supported by tanks and tank destroyers, Company 

K moved up the road toward Ponte Ratto. It met 

only light artillery and mortar fire and, with other 

units, regained the former forward positions of 

the 30th Infantry by 0230. The 3d Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, also counterattacked and regained its 

former position by 0435. The 2d Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, moved to the rear to reorganize; its positions were taken over by the 3d Battalion, 30th 

Infantry. By morning, with the exception of Ponte 

Ratto, the original outpost line had been restored. 

The exact size of the enemy force making the 

attack is not known. It is probable that it represented not more than a reinforced infantry battalion supported by tanks. By clever psychological 

use of concentrated machine-pistol fire and flares 

the enemy had created the illusion of an attack in 

greater force. Two hours after the attack had been 

launched, the enemy had withdrawn. Except for 

heavy losses sustained by the 2d Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, little damage had been done. 

Although American troops had lost Ponte Ratto, 

they profited by the lesson. The transition from 

offensive to defensive fighting was not easy for 

troops accustomed to doing the attacking; in the 

early days of February, officers and men had to 

learn many lessons the hard way. To strengthen 

the thinly held forward lines, General Truscott 

ordered tank destroyers and tanks to be placed well 

forward where they could provide direct support. 

The positions of the units on the outpost line were 

further improved when, on the night of 7-8 Feb-
ruary, the division relieved the units constructing 

defenses along the Mussolini Canal and returned 

them to regimental control. This permitted the 

15th and 30th Infantry and 504th Parachute Infantry to defend their respective forward areas 

with two battalions, keeping one in reserve. The 

7th Infantry, in division reserve, continued the 

work of improving the defenses along the canal 

with the assistance of the lOth Engineer Battalion 

and the 39th Engineers. 

In addition to probing attacks the Germans built 

up their artillery and increased the tempo of their 

shelling throughout the first two weeks of February. On 5 February, the enemy had 372 artillery 

pieces, with 152 of calibers exceeding lO5-mm., 

concentrated around the Anzio beachhead. Directed by observers on the dominating heights of Colli 

Laziali, the Lepini Mountains, and a water tower 

at Littoria, the enemy's long-range artillery weapons and 210-mm. and 240-mm. railroad guns 

could drop shells into any part of the limited 

beachhead area. 

Air photos taken on 6 February, the first clear 

day in a week of bad weather, revealed the increase 

in enemy artillery strength. The main concentration was in the center, below Colli Laziali, where 

the guns could support an attack either down the 

Albano road or from Cisterna. A large build-up 

was also noted on the left flank. On the afternoon 

of 5 February the air strip at Nettuno was heavily 

shelled. Five Spitfires were destroyed, and the field 

had to be abandoned as a permanent base. Thereafter planes used the field only during the day, 

returning each night to bases near Naples. On 7 

February a heavy-caliber railroad gun was reported 

emplaced near Campoleone. Reconnaissance planes 

discovered additional heavy guns on the slopes of 

Colli Laziali : l70-mm. guns were located on the 

CAMOUFLAGED ARTILLERY POSITIONS were improved along 

the MIIJJo/ini CanaL as the 3d Division turned to the defemive early i11 

Febmary. Using the sloping west bank of the cal1al, the tl'OOPS dllg ill 

everything they had, inc/llding weapo11I J slIpplies, and eq1lipment. 
edge of a cliff near Lake Nemi, and a railroad gun 

was spotted near the mouth of a tunnel at Albano. 

Although the shelling from these long-range weapons was seldom accurate, the rear areas of the 

beachhead were so congested that material damage 

and casualties were inevitable. The shelling seriously delayed the work of unloading supplies in 

the port during this period. 

As many of the enemy's heavy guns were out 

of range of the 155-mm. guns in Corps artillery, 

the Navy and Air Force were called upon to assist 

in knocking them out. On 5 February the cruiser 

U.S.S. Brooklyn and three destroyers were employed against guns and enemy positions on the 

left flank of the beachhead. Two P-51 Mustangs 

of the Illth Reconnaissance Squadron directed the 

fire of naval guns with good results. The program 

was repeated on the left and right flanks of the 

beachhead whenever the weather was favorable. 

In order to hamper enemy observation of the right 

side of the beachhead, XII Air Support Command 

sent P-40's and A-36's to attack the water tower 

at Littoria on 7 February. The next day railroad 

guns west of Albano were bombed. Hits on the 

track and a burst of yellow flame and smoke from 

the target area indicated that some damage had 

been done. 

Damage from enemy bombing was much more 

serious than the long-range artillery fire. Day or 

night, the beachhead was never safe from enemy 

planes, which came in to bomb and strafe shi pping 

in the harbor, the dock areas, ammunition dumps, 

and troop assembly areas. The enemy used an increasingly larger percentage of antipersonnel "butterfly" bombs in his night attacks, which caused 

casualties throughout the beachhead. 

DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT IN NETIlJNO as well as elsefllhere;11 the c011gested beachhead area was inevitable. TheJe are two of 

five vehicles hit by Germall bombs dllrillg a daylight raid 011 7 Febmary. 
THE BUTTERFLY BOMB. When this German antipersonnel weapoll is dropped, it falls a distance alld the 

eMe is bJoum open, reiealillg a mlfnber of small delayed. 

action bomb! which, bef ore exploding, often lie 011 the 

grollnd for a day or two. Photo taken il1 the Peter Beach 

area on 15 Febmary 1944. 

Along the front, 7 February was a quiet day; in 

the rear, bombing raids covered the port area with 

high explosives and antipersonnel bombs. At 0810 

twenty Focke-Wulf 190's and Messerschmitt 109's 

dove out of the sun to attack Anzio and Nettuno. 

Bombs landing near VI Corps headquarters at 

Nettuno blew up three ammunition trucks, destroyed a number of buildings, and caused heavy 

casualties. At 1135 fifteen Focke-Wulf 190's and 

Messerschmitt 109's bombed and strafed the harbor area. An LCI and an LCT were damaged, 

thirty men were killed, and forty were wounded. 

At 1525 the enemy lighter-bombers were over 

again. One plane, under attack by a British Spit53 

fire, jettisoned its load of antipersonnel bombs in 

an effort to gain altitude. The bombs fell in the 

area of the 95th Evacuation Hospital, riddling the 

administration and operating tents. Chief Nurse 

1st Lt. Blanche F. Sigman and two other nurses 

were standing by tbe bedside of a patient to whom 

they had just given blood plasma. All three were 

killed. A litter bearer carrying a patient into an 

operating tent sacrificed his life when he shielded 

the wounded soldier with his own body. In all, 

twenty-eight hospital personnel and patients were 

killed and sixty-four wounded, including the commanding officer. X-ray and surgical equipment was 

damaged. Medical installations continued to be 

bombed and shelled throughout the period of the 

beachhead; the hospital area came to be known 

to front-line troops as "Hell's Half Acre." It is 

doubtful, aside from the sinking of the bospital 

ship H.M.S. David on 24 January, that the enemy 

deliberately bombed or shelled medical installations. It was impossible to locate the hospitals in 

areas coml.1letely apart from military installations, 

and they were never more than six to eight miles 

from the front lines. During the rainy winter season, also, the ground was too wet to permit the 

tents to be dug in deeply. There were no safe areas 

at Anzio. Nurses and quartermaster depot men, as 

well as the men in the front lines, were subject to 

shelling and bombing. Nevertheless, the enemy 

paid dearly for the air attacks. On 7 February antiaircraft guns accounted for 7 planes destroyed, 6 

probables, and 9 damaged; defending fighters destroyed 17 with 12 probables. 

The Factory and Ca,.,.oceto 

The swift and thorough measures of VI Corps 

to prepare a strongly organized and coordinated 

system of defenses were based on the certain 

knowledge that the enemy would resume the offensive as soon as he had grou ped his forces. On 

the night of 6 February orders were sent out to 

all front-line units to be alert for a possible attack 

the next morning. Intelligence sources in Rome 

had reported that the enemy was planning a major 
attack to be launched at 0400, 7 February. It was 

anticipated that the attack would be directed 

against the 3d Division, and General Clark arranged for strong air support to be ready on call, 

with strategic bombers prepared to attack Cisterna 

and Velletri. The expected offensive failed to develop at the reported time. Just before midnight on 

6 February the enemy laid down a concentration of 

800 rounds of medium artillery fire on the positions of the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, along the 

Moletta River line. At 2400 an enemy force of approximately one company launched an attack. By 

0110 the enemy had been thrown back with heavy 

losses, and there was no further action during the 

night. Indications of the impending offensive, how54 

ever, continued to accumulate during 7 February. 

There was an increase in artillery fire on the 1 

Division front, the Factory (Aprilia) area was 

bombed and strafed, and prisoners were picked up 

who had deserted to avoid participation in the 

attack. The evidence pointed to a resumption of 

the enemy's drive in the British sector with the 

Factory area as the first objective. (Map No. 11.) 

Capture of the Factory was the next logical 

move if the enemy planned to make his all-out 

effort along the axis of the Albano road. The Factory itself, before it was leveled by weeks of bombing and shelling, was a compact, geometrically 

laid out cluster of three- and four-story brick buildings designed in 1936 to be a model for Fascist 
THE FACTORY 

AND 

CARROCETO 

7 - 8 FEBRUARY 1944 

'!?????': Fron' Une, evenlnl} 7 Feb 

_ _ Finol Line, evening 8 Feb 

:~.:;~... Rec)rouping 10 shor.en Line 

9 

.,us 

Sobo!ino 

3 

MAP NO. 11 
"HELL'S HALF ACRE" waJ Ihe name by which Ihe beachhead hOJpilai 

area came 10 be knoum. Medical imlallaliol1s were Jubjected to bombing 

and shelling throughollt the campaign. Here a soldier clears away the 

dehriI of a shrapnel.torn col afler all aJlack. 

farm settlements. Located on a slight rise of 

ground, it stood like a fortress dominating the surrounding countryside. The hamlet of Carroceto, 

located 500 yards to the southwest of the Factory 

and just north of the overpass which crosses the 

Albano road and the parallel railway, was an 

equally important objective. Possession of the Factory and Carroceto would olIer the enemy strong 

defensive positions as well as assembly areas from 

which to launch further attacks, for they were the 

focal points of a network of roads leading south 

and southeast. As the wet boggy ground of the 

beachhead made employment of tanks 01I the roads 

virtually impossible, control of the road network 

was of great tactical value to the attacker. Once 

the enemy had won the Factory and Carroceto, he 

would be in position to strike at several different 

points along the final beachhead line of defense. 

To protect the Factory area the 1 Division had 

three brigades in the forward line. West of the 

Albano road the 24 Guards Brigade held Buonriposo Ridge with the 2 North Staffs, the 5 Grenadier Guards, and the 1 Scots Guards. The center 

was held by the 168 Brigade with the 3d Battalion, 

504th Parachute Infantry, astride the Albano road 

and the 1 London Irish Rilles and the 10 Battalion, 

Royal Berkshire Regiment, along the lateral road 

leading east from the Factory. The 2 Brigade 

held the right flank with a squadron of the 1 Recce 

Regiment and the 1 Loyals. Division reserve consisted of the whole of the 3 Brigade. After the 

losses sustained in the fighting at Campoleone the 

1 Division was considerably below strength, and 

the ttoops, fighting in rain, mud, and near-freezing 

weather, had had little rest since D Day. 

The enemy plan of attack called for a simultaneous assault on the night of 7-8 February by 

the 651h [n/alliry Divisioll from the west, and by 

Combat Group Graeser from the east, converging 

55 

on Carroceto and the Factory. The attack started 

at 2100, 7 February, with heavy artillery concentrations on both flanks of the 1 Division front. 

At 2115 the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, which 

was in contact with the 24 Guards Brigade along 

Buonriposo Ridge, reported its right flank under 

attack. The brunt of the blow, however, was borne 

by the adjoining 2 North Staffs. Infiltrating rapidly 

and in small groups, the I451h Illfantry Regi1IIel1l (65th Infantry Division) crossed the Moletta 

River and fought its way east toward the Albano 

road. Before midnight the attack had spread along 

the whole front of the 24 Guards Brigade. With 

the advantage of a dark night and the numerous 

deep gullies which cut up the rough country west 

of the Albano road, the 651h Illfalllry Division 

pushed deep into the positions of the British 

troops. The fighting along Buonriposo Ridge resolved itself into a series of confused hand-to-hand 

encounters as the strong points of the 2 North 

Staffs were isolated and overrun. In the earl y morning hours the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, discovered enemy tanks and infantry operating to its 

rear. At 0400 seventy men, all that was left of the 

company of the 2 North Staffs to its right, requested permission to attach themselves to the 3d 

Battalion; the British troops had used up all their 

ammunition and had to abandon their 'automatic 

weapons. In order to protect its right flank the 3d 

Battalion was ordered to withdraw to the stream 

line south of the ridge, and a company of the 179th 

Infantry was sent up to support it. By 0130 the 

reserve company of the 5 Grenadier Guards to the 

southwest of Carroceto was under pressure from 

German units attacking northeast along the Buonriposo Ridge line from the former positions of the 

2 North Staffs, and the forward companies of the 

5 Grenadier Guards and the 1 Scots Guards were 

under constant pressure from the north and west. 
Small enemy units penetrated all the way to the 

main road before being wiped out. Fighting continued all morning as the 65th ]nfal1try Division, 

having achieved its first objective of seizing Buonriposo Ridge, sought to continue its advance toward Carroceto and the Factory. 

The attack of Combat G,·oup Graeser on the 

British right flank started more slowly. Shortly 

after 2200, 7 February, two companies attacked 

C Squadron, 1 Recce Regiment, and the right flank 

company of the 10 Royal Berks near the crossroads 

where the lateral road from the Factory meets the 

road to Carano. This force appeared to be covering 

a mine-lifting party. An hour later it had withdrawn under cover of a mortar barrage. By midnight both forward companies of the 1 London 

Irish were under pressure, and one platoon was 

overrun. The attack, launched by the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier RegimetZt (3d Panzer G,·madier Division) followed the same tactics of rapid infiltration 

which were proving so successful on the west flank. 

Small groups armed with machine pistols and light 

machine guns would infiltrate behind the forward 

British units, cut communications, and organize 

THE FACTORY, focal point of the fighting 011 the beachhead right 

flank, was .sitllated at the iflnctio1l of a road network over which armor 

would be forced to operate ill the area. The lateral road behilld the Factory, the old railroad bed, alld the firJt overpaJJ north of A nzio became 

slIcceuive lines of baltle as the fight went on. 
small pockets of resistance deep within the lines. 

After the defending troops had exhausted their 

ammunition firing on an enemy who appeared to 

be striking from all directions, the main enemy 

force would overrun the position. The 29th Panz." 

Grenadie/' Regiment had only limited success with 

these tactics. This regiment had advanced too slowly, and accordingly all three battalions of the 725th 

lilt alltry Re gill/ent (715th II/tanhy DiviJioll) had 

to be committed. This attack also failed to make 

more than slight gains. One small group of the 

enemy got as far as the rear of the Factory, 

where the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion had 

three tank destroyers. 1st Lt. Bernard T. Schaefer, 

moving his destroyer into position to fire on a 

house occupied by the enemy, killed forty with 

his .50-caliber machine gun while he blasted the 

building with his 3-inch gun. The remainder of 

the enemy force--thirty in all-surrendered. Other 

groups were held at the lateral road. A company 

of the 1 London Scottish was sent up to plug a 

gap between the 1 London Irish and the 10 Royal 

Berks, and a local counterattack supported by three 

tanks drove back the enemy unit which had captured a bridge on the lateral road just to the east 

of the Factory. The only important success won 

by Combat Group Graner was on the right flank 

near the crossroads. Attacking at dawn on 8 February, a battalion of the 104th Panzer Grenadier 

Regimellt overran C Squadron, 1 Reece Regiment, 

and a platoon of the 6 Gordons which was supporting it. The Germans then dug in with two 

companies on each side of the road between the 

positions of the 10 Royal Berks and the 1 Loyals. 

Employing small groups of tanks in support of 

the infantry, the enemy kept up the pressure on the 

168 Brigade all day without succeeding in gaining 

control of the important lateral road. 

General Penney decided to deal first with the 

critical situation on the left flank. Orders were 

issued to the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, to move south of Carroceto where it could be 

employed as a counterattack force to support the 

24 Guards Brigade. Its former positions north of 

the overpass were filled by the 1 Scots Guards. 

57 

At 1400 General Penney committed his clivisional 

reserve, the 3 Brigade, to regain the positions of 

the 2 North Staffs along Buonriposo Ridge. The 

3 Brigade employed two battalions, the 2 Foresters 

and the 1 KSLI, attacking abreast with armored 

support by a squadron of the 46 Royal Tanks and 

a platoon of Company C, 894th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion. The 2 Foresters made good progress in 

clearing the lower end of the ridge; the 1 KSLI 

was held up on the upper end by machine-gun fire. 

The Germans had dug in well, and both battalions 

suffered heavy casualties during the attack. In the 

meantime Lt. Col. Leslie G. Freeman, commander 

of the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, was 

moving his battalion to positions south of Carroceto. The paratroopers of Company H were committed that night to assist the 5 Grenadier Guards 

west of the overpass. Although the counterattacks 

succeeded in retaking only a portion of the lost 

ground, they served to bolster the hard-pressed 

24 Guards Brigade. 

The enemy devoted the remainder of the afternoon to digging in and consolidating his positions 

along Buonriposo Ridge, while the 1 Division 

reorganized its forces. After the counterattack 

launched by the 3 Brigade, the 1 KSLI and the 

2 Foresters were left in position to strengthen the 

left flank. On the right the 6 Gordons was moved 

up from 2 Brigade reserve to help fill the gap 

between the 10 Royal Berks and the 1 Loyals. To 

strengthen the 6 Gordons, which had been reduced 

to two companies during the battle for the Campoleone salient, the 238 Field Company, Royal 

Engineers, and a company made up from 3 Beach 

Group personnel were added. The commitment of 

the 6 Gordons was balanced by moving the 1st 

Battalion, 180th Infantry, to previously prepared 

positions near Padiglione where it could be employed either as a reserve or counterattack force. 

Of the 2 North Staffs only 17 officers and 364 men 

were left at the end of the day. These were reorganized by their commanding officer into a rifle 

company. The 1 Division had been seriously weakened, but it had succeeded in checking the enemy's 

initial assault. 
NO MAN'S LAND on the right flank along the MtlHolilli Callal gave 

the appearance dtlring daylight of being deserted, as troops of both 

forces stayed in their foxholes. III this photo the road ill the foregrotilld 

js the AiJier front line, the enemy being Jome diIla'lce beyond the poim 

of the smoke btirI/. 

Ground action on the remainder of the VI Corps 

front was confined to small-scale company actions 

and patrolling, On the night of 7-8 February 

Company E, 15th Infantry, attacked north up the 

road paralle1ing Femminamorta Creek with the 

objective of capturing the farm east of Ponte Ratto; 

Company F, 30th Infantry, attacked from the west 

to secure the road junction just beyond Ponte Ratto 

bridge. Both attacks achieved limited results. At 

2100 enemy tanks and infantry pushed down the 

road from Cisterna toward Isola Bella. Tank fire 

collapsed some buildings in which Company G, 

15th Infantry, had organized positions. After losing some ground Company G fought its way back 

before daylight. A second company-strength attack, 

supported by tanks, struck Company G, 30th In· 

fantry. It was beaten back. 

On 8 February, while heavy fighting was in 

progress on the 1 Division front, only one attack, 

a raid aimed at the village of Carano, struck the 

3d Division. In beating off the attack the 509th 

Parachute Infantry Battalion captured ten prisoners and killed twenty-five of the enemy, most of 

whom were from the 1141h Light Division. 

Activity on the right Rank of the beachhead was 

carried on by the 1st Special Service Force under 

Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick. On the night of 

2-3 February, when the unit took over the right 
/lank of the beachhead, the enemy outpost line was 

along the Mussolini Canal. After a week of aggressive patrolling, the enemy had been forced back 

1,500 yards, leaving a broad no man's land between the opposing forces. During the day this 

area appeared to be a peaceful expanse of level 

farmland; at night the 1st Special Service Force 

kept it alive with hard-hitting patrols which gave 

the enemy no rest. Although the right flank of the 

beachhead with its soft ground and numerous 

drainage ditches was not favorable terrain for a 

major attack, the 1st Special Service Force never 

permitted it to remain a quiet sector of the front. 

During the night of 8-9 February the 2d Company, 2d Regiment, staged a successful raid on 

the village of Sessano. The German company 

which was holding Sessano was almost annihilated. After taking 7 prisoners, killing at least 40 

of the enemy, and holding the village for 3 hours, 

the Special Service troops withdrew. Accurate artillery fire adjusted on a reserve company organizing 

for a counterattack cost the enemy an additional 

20 dead, and the rear guard of the assault company 

accounted for 20 more. The 2d Company itself 

suffered only 15 casualties. 

During 8 February VI Corps artillery, in addition to su pporting the fire of the 1 Division guns, 

executed a coordinated program of counterbattery 

COUNTERBA TTERY FIRE BY ANTIAIRCRAFT UNITS was added 

to the coordinated program of VI CorpJ artillery agaimt known German 

pOlilioll1 and troop concentrations. Here the 68th COdl1 A,.tillery (AA) 

lower! the mllzzle of a 90-mm. rifle to add to the barrage. 
fire on all known enemy gun positions on the west 

Bank of the beachhead. In response to an emergency request, two British cruisers, the Orioll and 

Phoebe, and one American cruiser, the BrooklYll, 

moved up from Naples to add the fires of their 

5-inch and 6-inch guns. Good weather permitted 

accurate air spotting by the lluh Reconnaissance 

Squadron. Fighter-bombers of the XU Air Support 

Command and guns of the 68th Coast Artillery 

Regiment (Antiaircraft) , the 1st Armored and 45th 

Divisions, and the 976th Field Artillery Battalion, 

all joined in blasting the enemy gun positions and 

assembly areas. Dive-bombers also gave close support to the ground troops. They dropped smoke 

bombs and high explosives and strafed enemy 

troops, while forty-eight B-25 mediums bombed 

Cisterna. 

Following the same pattern of attack he had 

employed the previous day, the enemy renewed his 

efforts to take the Factory area during the early 

morning hours of 9 February. (Map No. 12.) 

Shortly after midnight, following a heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire, enemy units 

began infiltrating at various points all along the 

1 Division front. On the western flank, where the 

5 Grenadier Guards and the 1 Scots Guards were 

protecting Carroceto, elements of the 65th [njantry 

Division forced the 5 Grenadier Guards back to 

the railroad station and overpass. There they held. 

At the same time the enemy units dug in along 

Buonriposo Ridge drove south against the 1 KSLI 

and the 2 Foresters, pushing them back from their 

newly won positions to the stream line south of 

the ridge. 

The main attack was launched by Combat Group 

Graeser against the 168 Bngade, covering the 

Factory and the lateral road to the east. For the 

attack Maj. Gen. Fritz H. Graeser threw in his 

remaining reserve, the 735th II/jalltry Regiment, to 

reinforce the 725th bljalltry Regiment and the 

29th and l04th Pallzer Grenadier Regiments, 

which had been committed the previous day. During the night, small units penetrated at several 

points along the lateral road and in the Factory 

area. At daylight the major force, supported by 

a few tanks, drove through to capitalize on the 

gains made by the infiltrating groups. The fighting 

spread along the whole front of the 168 Brigade. 

To the east of the Factory, between the 1 London 

Irish and the 10 Royal Berks, elements of the 29th 

Pal/zer Grenadier Regiment pushed south as much 

as 2,000 yards. Farther to the east the 104th Panzer 

Grelladier Regimellt overran the right flank company of the 10 Royal Berks, clearing the way for 

enemy tanks and self-propelled guns to use the 

lateral road. Exploiting these gains, the 735th 

llifalmy Regiment fought its way into the Factory. 

By early afternoon the enemy controlled both the 

lateral road and the Factory. He lost no time in 

bringing up antitank gUlls and consolidating his 

gains. On the left the bard-pressed 5 Grenadier 

Guards and the 1 Scots Guards, aided by a counterattack launclled at 0630 by the 3d Battalion, 504th 

Parachute Infantry, held stubbornly to their positions covering Carroceto. 

60 

To give the 1 Division support against the 

enemy penetrations the 1st Armored Division employed two companies of medium and two companies of light tanks in counterattacks. At 0900, 

9 February, General Harmon ordered Major Tuck 

to alert his 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, 

to attack Buonriposo Ridge with light tanks. Company A moved up the Albano road to the first 

overpass, turned west on the lateral road which 

formed part of the final beachhead line of defense, 

and then swung north along a dirt road. Under 

artillery and antitank fire it made slow progress 

once it left the highway, and at the end of the 

morning it was only a mile north of the overpass. 

The tanks knocked out one Mark IV and assisted 

in breaking up the attack of an estimated battalion 

of infantry. At noon, Company B was ordered forward to attack the south side of the ridge. Following a dirt trail, it moved up to the stream line 

in the positions of the 1 KSLI and 2 Foresters. 

Here it encountered a hasty mine field, which 

caused the loss of two tanks; the company commander, 1st Lt. William W. Beckett, was wounded. 

The company attempted to get around the field 

and push on. As soon as the tanks left the road 
THE FACTORY 

AND 

CARROCETO 

9 FEBRUARY 1944· 

"""", Fronl Une, mornino 9 Feb _ _ • Finol Line, eveninQ 9 Feb 

o 

"'US 

MAP NO. 12 
they sank into deep mud and five tanks became 

mired. Accurate antitank fire and intense smallarms fire forced the company to withdraw with a 

loss of seven tanks. 

At noon the 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, was ordered to send one company of medium tanks up the Albano road to the Factory and 

a second company to the right of the Factory. 

Company H followed the main road to a point 

beyond the Factory where it was stopped by a mine 

field which the German engineers had laid across 

the road. The Factory itself was bristling with antitank guns. In the area of the 5 Grenadier Guards, 

Company H knocked out one tank and two antitank guns, and helped drive back two battalions 

of infantry; north of the Factory it destroyed two 

Mark IV tanks before withdrawing late in the 

afternoon. On the right, Company I followed the 

"bowling alley," a road leading northwest from 

Padiglione to the overpass below the Factory, and 

then turned north behind the 1 London Irish. 

Roadbound and under antitank-gun fire it was able 

to give the 1 London Irish only limited help in mopping up the enemy penetration east of the Factory. 

Continuing the program of the previous day, VI 

Corps artillery on 9 February carried out another 

coordinated air, artillery, and naval counterbattery 

shoot on the left lIank of the beachhead. The British destroyer Loyal while laying a smoke screen 

for the cruisers was hit and slightly damaged by 

a shell from a German shore battery. It had to be 

sent back to Naples for repairs. Trouble was also 

experienced in obtaining air observation. A wind 

of near-gale proportions held the P-51 observation 

planes on the ground and prevented all unloading 

from Liberty ships in the harbor. A cub plane from 

the 976th Field Artillery Battalion managed to get 

off the ground during the afternoon and so enabled 

the cruisers to do some observed firing. In the 

morning Fifth Army had requested that as much 

air support as possible be given to VI Corps. One 

hundred and four fighter-bombers, thirty-six light 

bombers, and eighty-four medium bombers were 

sent up. Medium bombers, briefed to bomb supply dumps between Valmontone and Palestrina, 

6, 

switched to assembly areas around Campoleone 

with excellent results. A more extensive program 

was prepared for the next day. 

Late in the afternoon on 9 February the fighting 

slackened. Both enemy and Allied units had suffered heavy losses; both sides were near the point 

of exhaustion. The enemy seized the opportunity 

to consolidate his positions while the 1 Division 

reorganized. To relieve some of the pressure on 

the seriously depleted British force, the 180th Infantry took over the positions of the 2 Brigade, 

which then passed into division reserve along the 

final beachhead line. This left the 1 Division three 

brigades with which to cover its reduced front. The 

168 Brigade held the right lIank east and south of 

the Factory, which was now firmly in enemy hands; 

the 24 Guards Brigade covered Carroceto, with the 

1 Scots Guards still holding a narrow salient north 

of the village astride the railroad; and the 3 

Brigade held the left sector along the ravine south 

of Buonriposo Ridge. The battered, tired troops 

worked feverishly through the night to wire in 

their positions and prepare for new attacks. General Brann, Army G-3, reported that the 1 Division was at not over 50 percent effective strength, 

and he concurred with General Lucas that another 

division was needed to hold the beachhead until 

main Fifth Army could break through the Gustav 

Line on the southern front. 

By early afternoon on 9 February, after twelve 

hours of heavy fighting, Combat Group Graeser 

had achieved the German's main objective, the 

capture of the Factory. (Map No. 13.) The 1 Division still held Carroceto and the overpass. Taking 

advantage of the observation provided by the Factory buildings, the enemy directed fire all afternoon 

on the 1 Scots Guards, the 5 Grenadier Guards, 

and the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry. 

Shortly after midnight approximately fifteen enemy 

tanks emerged from the Factory and together with 

a battalion of infantry struck the 1 Scots Guards. 

Tank destroyers of Company B, 8<)4th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and artillery fire broke up the 

armored attack and the infantry was driven off. 

At 0430, 10 February, the 5 Grenadier Guards and 
the paratroopers were under attack from three 

sides. With the hel p of a squadron of the 46 Royal 

Tank Regiment they held out. North of Carroceto 

the situation of the 1 Scots Guards gradually 

deteriorated during the bitter-cold, moonlit night. 

All contact was lost with the two forward companies, and the remainder of the battalion, in danger of being cut off, withdrew within the perimeter 

defense of the 5 Grenadier Guards protecting the 

overpass. Company B's tank destroyers, acting as 

a rearguard, covered the withdrawal with their 

.50-caliber machine guns. The "fighting tank busters," as the British troops called them, appeared 

to be all over the battlefield. In addition to their 

normal role, they operated as tanks, as mobile pillboxes, as assault artillery, and even as infantry. 

The British troops, fighting against odds, needed 

their support. At 0530 General Penney reported 

that his troops had been fighting all night, and that 

the division could not continue to hold out without 

the support of a counterattack by fresh troops prepared to take over the major part of the 1 Division 

front. 

Corps artillery and the Air Force gave all the aid 

they could muster to support the hard-pressed division. At 0900 two enemy attacks forming near the 

Carroceto railway station were broken up by a 

concentration of 200 guns representing both division and Corps artillery. At the same time, wave 

after wave of heavy, medium, and light bombers 

dropped their bombs on assembly areas along the 

Albano road from Campoleone to Albano. All the 

available resources of the Strategical, Tactical, and 

Desert Air Forces and XII Air Support Command 

were allotted to VI Corps. Unfortunately a heavy 

overcast began developing at 0945 and an hour 

later further bombing was out of the question, 

Many of the medium and heavy bombers were 

forced to turn back without unloading their bombs. 

The 65th Infalllry Division, attacking from the 

west, occupied Carroceto station during the morning of 10 February. An Allied counterattack during 

the day, supported by tanks, recaptured the station. 

But it was retaken in the evening by Combat Group 

Graeser, striking from the east. 

With the capture of the Factory and Carroceto, 

the German Fourteenth Army had won its initial 

objectives after three days of bitter fighting. 

Each day the Germans were forced to throw in 

more and more of their reserves until they had committed the equivalent of over six full regiments. 

Their tactics of night infiltration had proved very 

successful; but during the daylight hours, when 

Allied artillery could fire on observed targets, their 

troops suffered disproportionately heavy losses. Air 

bombardment and naval gunfire also aided in disorganizing the enemy attacks. The Germans had to 

pause to consolidate their gains and bring up additional fresh troops before renewing their offensive. 

Allied COllnterattacks 

The hard and protracted struggle to hold the 

Factory area had drained the fighting strength of 

the 1 Division. It was in no condition to launch 

a counterattack or even to hold the positions to 

which it had been forced back. On the afternoon 

of 10 February the 168 Brigade was estimated to 

be at less than one-third normal strength, and many 

other units were at no better than half-strength. In 

addition, the weather for the past three days had 

been cold, windy, and rainy. Fox holes dug in the 

wet, boggy ground quickly filled with water, and 

after a few days in the line troops suffered from 

trench foot and exposure. It was important for VI 

Corps not only to regain the Factory area but also 

to effect the relief of at least a major part of the 

1 Division. The first step had been taken on the 

night of 9-10 February when the 180th Infantry 

under Col. Robert L. Dulaney took over the positions of the 2 Brigade on the right flank of the 

division. The next night the 179th Infantry under 

Col. Malcolm R. Kammerer relieved the 168 Brigade with the 3d Battalion and prepared to launch 

a counterattack on the morning of 11 February to 

retake the Factory with the 1st Battalion. 

The commitment of two regiments of the 45th 

Division in the 1 Division sector resulted in a depletion of VI Corps reserves. To offset this loss the 

36th Engineer Combat Regiment took over a por-
, 

" 

" • 

"0$ 

l' 

1 <-

" j 

~ ,i! 

1~ 

'v" 

l 

THE FACTORY 

AND 

CARROCETO 

10 FEBRUARY 1944 

"""" Fronl Une, morning 10 Feb 

__ _ Final line, evening 10 Feb 

ConIour infert'Ol 20 meters 

2 .,'" 

'" 

.. , 

, 

'" • '" 

MAP NO. 13 
tion of the Moletta River line, relieving all but one 

battalion of the 157th Infantry. Although the engineers had had no experience as infantry and were 

badly needed for construction of defenses and road 

maintenance, by holding a relatively quiet portion 

of the front they released infantry troops needed 

to bolster the critical central sector. In the succeeding weeks while the regiment continued to maintain the Moletta River line the engineers were to 

prove themselves able to handle machine guns and 

mortars as capably as they handled bulldozers and 

road graders. 

The reliefs carried out by the 45th Division left 

the 1 Division holding less than half of its former 

front. It was then possible to move all of the 168 

Brigade to a rear bivouac area for rest and reorganization. Responsibility for the newly defined 

division sector passed to the 3 Brigade, reinforced 

by the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 1 Irish Guards, and the 1 Recce Regiment, less one squadron. The new front extended 

from the positions of the 2 Foresters and the 1 

KSLI south of Buonriposo Ridge to a point just 

east of the Albano road where the 1 DWR relieved 

THE OVERPASS AT CARROCETO, !Carred by both Allied and enemy 

jirel fUa! the jump. off poi11l for armor attacking toward the Fac/ofY 011 

11 February. This photo, laken a year afler Ihe action, shows Ihe rubble 

heap thai was Carrocelo. The overpass carried the old railroad bed over 

Ihe Anzio-Alballo road. 
GERMAN ARTILLERY IN THE FACTORY waf ill a well-collcealed 

position 10 hamper Allied armor atlackil1g the position. I1z the foreground is a modified German 150-mm. illfantry howitzer, and behind it 

a knocked-ollt American Sherman tank and all enemy medium armored 

personnel carrier. The photo waS trallsmilted 10 America dllring JjVorld 

IVa,. I I by l1ews JOl/rCel in a nelltral cOlmlry. 

the 1 Scots Guards and the 5 Grenadier Guards, 

which had been covering the overpass below Carroceto. Back along the final beachhead line the 2 Brigade was engaged in fortification. (Map No. 14.) 

For the counterattack to regain the Factory, Maj. 

Gen. William W. Eagles, commanding the 45th 

Division, committed the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, and two companies of the attached 191st 

Tank Battalion. One tank company was to attack 

through the overpass at Carroceto to strike the Factory from the west; the other company was to move 

up the north-south road just east of the Factory to 

strike it from the southeast. The infantry were to 

coordinate their advance with the tanks. On 11 

February at 0630, following a 15-minute artillery 

concentration on the Factory, the tanks and infantry jumped off. Company A, 191st Tank Battalion, 

drove up the Albano road. The first tank to pass 

through the overpass was knocked out by a direct 

hit; a second tank blew up 200 yards farther along 

the road. At 0830, after shelling the southwest corner of the Factory, the tanks of Company A withdrew under a smoke screen. Company A, 179th 

Infantry, attacking behind the protective fire of the 
ALLIED 

COUNTERATTACKS 

II -12 FEBRUARY 1944, 

"'"'" Front LIM, rnotnlnQ II Fl!b 

Final Line, evening 12 Feb 

9 

MIUS 

, 

MAP NO. 14 
tanks, was held up by machine guns located in the 

Factory and along the road to the south of it. The 

tanks of Company B, supporting Company B, 

179th Infantry, reached the road junction southeast of the Factory and poured shells into the buildings until forced to withdraw for ammunition. One 

tank was left forward to direct the fire of the 27th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion, which was supporting the attack. Company A sent six tanks up 

to the overpass at 1030 to continue the shelling. 

They were again driven back by accurate antitank 

fire. Nevertheless when American troops withdrew 

to reorganize at noon, tank and artillery fire had 

converted the enemy fortress into a mass of ruins. 

At 1300 the tanks and infantry returned to the 

attack. The concentrated lire on the Factory was 

having an effect. Enemy tanks .and self-propelled 

guns were forced to withdraw to the east along the 

lateral road and at least two Mark Ill's were 

knocked out. When the crews attempted to bail 

out, they were picked off by troops of the 3d Battalion, 179th Infantry, dug in south of the lateral 

road. Under cover of the smoke from the tanks and 

artillery fire, Company A, 179th Infantry, fought 

its way into the buildings on the southeast corner. 

The enemy reacted swiftly. Swarming up from the 

deep basement below the Factory where they found 

protection from artillery shells and tank fire, the 

enemy troops engaged Company A in bitter closein fighting. Outnumbered and scattered among the 

buildings, Company A became disorganized and 

was forced to withdraw. Company B, attacking 

from the southeast, also reached the Factory only 

to be driven back at 1630 by an enemy counterattack supported by artillery fire and tanks which 

moved down the lateral road. The tanks of Company B, 191st Tank Battalion, had already been 

forced to return for more ammunition. Before dark 

both infantry and tanks had been withdrawn for 

reorganization. The enemy still held the Factory. 

During the fighting the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, captured thirty-three prisoners from the 

10Ih and 121h Compallies, 7251h Illfalliry Regimet/I, from whom it was learned that only an intercepted radio message had saved the Germans 

from being caught completely by surprise. The 

enemy troops were alerted at 0430 and the 1 Sl 

CompallY was moved up immediately to strengthen 

them. After the attack started, the concentrated 

effect of tanks firing from the flanks and the artillery shelling caused heavy casualties to enemy units 

already depleted by the fighting with the 1 Division. One company was reduced to seventeen men. 

The counterattack of the 191st Tank Battalion 

and the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, had come 

close to retaking the Factory. 

At 0200 on 12 February, Lt. Col. Wayne L. Johnson, commanding the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, 

again sent his men forward in an effort to storm the 

Factory. Company B attacked from the south, Company C from the southwest, and Company I paralleled the advance farther to the east. Company C, 

191st Tank Battalion, moved up as far as the road 

junction southwest of the Factory. There it was 

stopped by a hasty mine field which the enemy had 

laid during the nigbt. One tank was immobilized. 

The others found what cover they could behind 

farm buildings and supported the infantry by shelling the Factory and directing artillery fire. By 0430 

both Companies Band C had fought their way into 

the Factory. Two hours later an enemy counterattack again forced the 1st Battalion to draw back. 

The enemy made no attempt to follow up the 

counterattack 'and the 1st Battalion was ·able to 

organize a line approximately 500 yards south of 

the Factory. During the day Company C, 191st 

Tank Battalion, was withdrawn. In the two days 

of fighting the battalion had lost eight tanks totally 

destroyed and several damaged. Company A, 179th 

Infantry, had been reduced to three officers and 

forty enlisted men. It appeared that a major effort 

would be required to retake the Factory. 

To back up the ground operations of 11-12 February, the Allied Air Force had agreed to furnish 

the heaviest program of air support ever allotted 

to a corps up to that date. Six groups of heavy and 

six groups of medium bombers were briefed to 

strike close support targets at the beachhead. Bad 

weather nullified or curtailed some of the program. 

Of the planned sorties, 34 B-17 Fortresses dropped 
100 tons and 19 B-24 Liberators dropped 45 tons 

of bombs on Campo leone Station and farther up 

the Albano road on the railroad crossing at 

Cecchina. A group of medium bombers also 

struck Campoleone and Cecchina, but most of 

the heavy and medium bombers were forced to 

return without completing their missions. Dive 

bombers and P-40's attempted to locate the 

long-range railroad guns and gave close support 

to the ground troops. Although the program 

had not been fully carried out, VI Corps reported 

excellent results. In the afternoon of 12 February 

three Germans of the 145th Infantry Regiment 

surrendered to the 1 DWR. They reported that 

they could not stand the bombing. That night 

the 1 DWR and the 1 st Battalion, 179th Infantry, 

were pulled back a few hundred yards to permit 

the bombing of Carroceto. At 1525 and 1530 on 

the afternoon of 13 February two waves of dive 

bombers struck the village. Clear weather permitted 

accurate bombing, and ground observers reported 

good results. The infantry then moved back to their 

former positions. 

66 

The failure of the second attempt by the 45th 

Division to retake the Factory on 12 February 

marked the end of the first phase of the battle to 

hold the beachhead. The enemy had achieved his 

initial objectives of wiping out the Campoleone 

salient and securing the Factory and Carroceto. 

Although the Germans had won the first round, VI 

Corps was far from beaten. The attempt to trap the 

3 Brigade in the Campoleone salient had failed, 

and the battle for the Factory and Carroceto had 

developed into a costly and exhausting struggle 

lasting five days. While the enemy consolidated 

his gains and rushed fresh troops to the beachhead 

to replace his heavy casualties, he was losing valuahle time. On the evening of 12 February the 6 

Gordons relieved the exhausted 1 Irish Guards, 

thereby strengthening the 3 Brigade line below 

Buonriposo Ridge, and the 1 DWR was tied in 

with the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry. With the 

fresh troops of the 45th Division in line, VI Corps 

was able to stabilize its beachhead defenses and 

prepare for the next blow. If the enemy had won 

the first round, he had not yet won the battle. 
ENEMY 

OFFENSIVE 

16 FEBRUARY 1944 

'?i!7??Ji Front Line, morning 16 Feb 

Finol Une, evenirlQ 16 Feb 

Contour inferwll 20 m~f~,s 

.9 2 

MILES 

MAP NO. 15 
THE MAJOR GERMAN 

OFFENSIVE 

(16-20 February) 

The capture of the Factory, Carroceto, and Buonriposo Ridge to the west provided the Germans 

with the key positions from which they could 

launch their all-out attack on the Anzio beachhead_ 

The network of roads leading south and southeast 

offered the opportunity for the employment of 

tanks; no natural obstacles would impede the advance_ Once the enemy crossed the three miles of 

open country lying between the Factory area and 

the final beachhead defense line, he could employ 

his favorite tactics of infiltration; the tangled underbrush and scrub forest of the Padiglione Woods 

stretched southward from the final beachhead line 

almost to Anzio. All ied air reconnaissance disclosed to VI Corps the regrouping of enemy forces, 

the forward movement of field artillery, and the 

movement of heavy traffic on the rail roads and 

roads leading from the area of Rome to the beachhead. The Allied command assumed that as soon as 

the Germans had completed the regrouping of their 

forces they would attack down the Albano road, 

and at the same time launch diversionary attacks 

along the whole Anzio front. 

Preparing for the Attack 

Fourteenth Army issued its preliminary order 

for the major German offensive on 9 February. The 

main effort was to be made along a 4-mile front 

astride the Anzio--Albano road, from Buonriposo 

Ridge on the west to Spaccasassi Creek on the east. 

After piercing the main beachhead defense line, 

the Germans planned to drive through to Anzio 

and Nettuno, splitting VI Corps and destroying its 

separated parts. The assault was to be commanded 

by I Parachute CorpJ to the west of the Anzio road, 

and by LXXVI Panzer CorpJ to the east. (Map No. 

15.) The first wave of the assault was to include six 

divisions-the 4th Parachute (elements only) and 

65th IlItamTy DiviJiollJ under I Parachute CorpJ, 

and the 3d PI/llzer Grenadier, 114th Light bIJaIltTY, 

715th Illfamry, and Hermallll Goerillg Pallzer 

(elements only) Div/JiollJ under LXXVI Pallzer 

CorPJ-supported by a variety of miscellaneous 

units. The 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier 

DiviJiollJ, and two battalions of Panther and Tiger 

tanks, were to be held in reserve, and thrown into 

the battle as soon as the first assault wave had 

pierced the main Allied defenses. This was a formidable force. Fourteenth Army on 12 February 

had at least 120,000 troops-including 70,000 combat troops-under its command. Although this 

number included forces guarding Rome and the 

coastal sector north of Anzio, the great bulk of the 

enemy troops were massed around the Anzio beachhead perimeter. The preliminary order of 9 February provided that the attack should be launched at 

H Hour on 15 February; subsequently (13 February), the time was fixed at 0630, 16 February. Essentially, the enemy tactical scheme was to break 

the main Allied defense line by massed infantry 

attacks backed by tanks, and then to follow through 

with the armored reserve. 

The enemy planned to hold the remainder of the 

beachhead perimeter with the bare minimum of 

forces during its all-out assault along the Albano 

road. To deceive the Allies, the Germans assembled 

their armored reserve behind Cisterna on the U.S. 

3d Division front, and planned to move it at the 

latest possible moment to the rear of the initial 

assault forces. Actually, by 12 February, the Germans realized that VI Corps was well informed 

(through aerial observation) about German movements and intentions; they also concluded that the 

Allies had given up any immediate intention of returning to the offensive themselves, and that they 

were concentrating on digging in to prepare for 

the German drive. 

General Mackensen seems to have entertained 

some doubt about the ability of his Fotlrteellth 

Army to push through to the sea and eliminate the 

Anzio beachhead, but the German High Command 

appears to have viewed the prospect with optimism. 

Hitler gave his personal approval to the plan of 

attack on 11 February. For success, the Germans 

counted on their superiority in numbers and in 

some forms of equipment. They had a greater number of heavy artillery weapons than VI Corps, and 

a more adequate supply of ammunition than they 

possessed on other fronts at this time. But the 

enemy did not underestimate the Allies' capacity to 

resist their assault. VI Corps had superior air support, and its artillery could be supplemented by 

naval gunfire. Despite Allied logistical difficulties, 

the Germans realized that VI Corps' ammunition 

supply, and therefore its artillery fire, would be 

superior to any which they could themselves deliver 

in support of their massed infantry attack. Enemy 

intelligence noted that, while Allied units, especially the British 1 Division and U.S. 3d Division, 

had suffered heavy losses, the morale of VI Corps 

was good and the Allies could be expected to defend their positions stubbornly. 

General Clark for some time had been aware of 

the necessity of reinforcing VI Corps if it was to 

hold the beachhead, and also maintain sufficient 

reserves to resume the offensive as soon as the force 

of the enemy counterattacks had been spent. As 

fast as shipping space could be made available, 

troops and equipment were rushed to Anzio. By 

clever use of camouflage the iilusion was created 

that the British 56 Division was moving into a rest 

area behind the southern front. Actually it was 

on its way to the beachhead. The 168 Brigade had 

arrived on 3 February and had been committed to 

support the 1 Division. The remainder of the division landed over a period of several days, with the 

167 Brigade coming in on 13 February and the 169 

Brigade on 18 February. 

The arrival of the 167 Brigade permitted VI 

Corps to complete the relief of the 1 Division, 

which then passed into Corps reserve. On the night 

of 14 February the 167 Brigade took over the short 

sector of the Moletta River line held by the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry. The following night, on the 

eve of the German attack, the sector held by the 

1 Division was divided between the 56 and the 

45th Divisions. The left position was taken over 

by the 56 Division, giving it a unified front extending from the positions of the 36th Engineers along 

the Moletta River to the point of contact with the 

45th Division west of the Albano road. All three 

battalions of the 167 Brigade were committed: the 

9 Royal Fusiliers on the left, the 8 Royal Fusiliers 

in the center, and the 7 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (7 Oxford Bucks) on the 

right. Two companies of Royal Engineers, fighting 

as infantry, were employed to bolster the line, and 

the 46 Royal Tanks and 1 Division artillery were 

left in support. The right portion of the former 1 

Division sector was taken over by the 157th Infantry under Col. John H. Church. The 179th Infantry 

THE ALBANO ROAD SECTOR is shown ill its entirety by this photomosaic compiled in February 1944. Approximate scale: 1 :50,000. 
held the center, and the 180th Infantry the right 

flank of the 45th Division line. When the Germans 

attacked on the morning of 16 February General 

Lucas had reasonably fresh troops holding the 

whole of the critical portion of the beachhead defense line lying astride the Albano road. 

Corps artillery was strengthened by the arrival 

of the 977th Field Artillery Battalion, and antiaircraft units were built up steadily to aid in combatting the enemy's raids on the harbor area. In air 

and medium and light artillery power VI Corps 

far smpassed the enemy. There were 432 artillery 

pieces on the Corps front, not including the weapons of the infantry cannon companies. The enemy 

had 452 guns available to support his attack, but 

his ammunition supply was far inferior to that of 

VI Corps. Even with limitations imposed on some 

types of ammunition, Allied artillery by 14 February was firing about 20,000 rounds per day, and 

Allied destroyers and cruisers thickened the artillery fire almost daily. The enemy artillery fire falling in the harbor and beachhead areas was estimated by the VI Corps /ire control center at not 

more than 1,500 rounds daily before 16 February. 

VI Corps took advantage of a period of good 

weather, 12-16 February, to request as much air 

support as possible against the enemis heavy-caliber guns. Locating and knocking out the guns was 

a difficult task. The enemy was adept at camouflaging his positions; the railroad guns in particular 

were moved frequently. On 13 February P-40's 

scored hits at the entrance to the railroad tunnel 

near Lake Albano and on a bridge along the railroad from Campoleone to Rome. The next day two 

railroad guns near the bombed bridge were attacked by P-40's and shelled by VI Corps artillery, 

adjusted by P-51 observers. This was one of the 

more successful aerial attacks on enemy railroad 

guns, for one gun car was derailed and the other 

destroyed. Other bombers concentrated on the 

Rome railway yards, on traffic moving south from 

Rome, and on assembly areas near the beachhead. 

The Germans also increased the tempo of their 

air effort and their artillery /ire on the eve of the 

big attack. On 15 February there were eight atr 

raids in the Anzio area; an LCT loaded with gasoline went up in flames and a Liberty ship was damaged. Heavy caliber shells whistled over the front 

lines toward the harbor where they threw up geysers of water or crashed into buildings, continuing 

the work of destroying the summer hotels and palatial villas along the waters edge. Defending antiaircraft guns filled the sky with high altitude 

90-mm. shells and with a crisscross pattern of 

40-mm. red tracer shells which shot up like balls 

of light from dozens of Roman candles. 

During the night of 15-16 February, Allied 

troops in the forward beachhead defense lines listened for the sounds of field artillery and nebelwerlerfire which would warn them of the expected 

attack. Few shells came in and patrols and outposts 

reported little activity along the front. The relief 

of the 1 Division was completed without incident. 

Before dawn there was no visible evidence of the 

impending attack, but the very silence was ominous. 

The Fint Day, 16 February 

On the morning of 16 February, at 0600, enemy 

guns opened up along the central beachhead front. 

For half an hour the forward areas were alive with 

bmsting shells and a pall of smoke gradualfy 

spread over the battlefield. Partly concealed by the 

smoke, assault waves of gray-green uniformed 

troops swept forward to strike at points along the 

outpost line of the beachhead defenses. 

The brunt of the enemy attack was borne by the 

U.S. 45th Division, which held a 6-mile sector of 

the front that coincided almost exactly with that 

upon which the Germans had determined to concentrate their assault. At approximately 0630 the 

troops of the 3d Pallzer G"elladier and 715!h h,-

lan!ry DiviJiollJ, supported by tanks, pushed forward against the 157th Infantry and the 179th Infantry holding the left and center of the 45th Division front. (Map No. 15.) 

The tactical importance of holding the Factory 

and the overpass at Carroceto became immediately 

apparent from the attacks launched against the 2d 

and 3d Battalions, 179th Infantry, located to the 
BOMBARDMENT OF THE ANZIO AND NETfUNO AREAS was 

J/epped liP as the enemy prepared for hiJ big offellIive. An air Ilrike 

deS/royed thiJ Liberty ship ( above) ill Anzio harbor. LOllg-rallge shelling of Nettllflo (below) conlj,11Ied the redllction of bllildings alollg the 

waler'! edge. 
south and southeast of the Factory, and against the 

2d Battalioo, 157th Infantry, astride the Albano 

road. From the Factory buildings the enemy could 

easily observe the positions of the 179th Infantry, 

and both the Factory and Carroceto provided concealed assembly areas for enemy infantry and 

tanks. Taking advantage of the network of roads 

in the area, groups of from four to eight tanks 

would issue forth from the Factory to pour fire at 

point-blank range into the fox holes of American 

troops. When out of ammunition they would withdraw to the Factory, replenish their supply, and return to the attack. Enemy infantry, coordinating 

their movements with the tanks, worked down 

La Ficoccia Creek against the 3d Battalion, 179th 

Infantry, and down Carroceto Creek against the 

2d Baltalion. 

During the morning all attacks on the 179th Infantry were beaten off with heavy losses to the 

enemy. 1st Lt. Donald E. Knowlton, observer for 

the 160th Field Artillery Battalion, had set up his 

radio in an oven next to a farmhouse southeast of 

the Factory. When the infantry outposts were 

forced back by enemy tanks and infantry attacking 

from the Factory, he refused to withdraw. While 

continuing to adjust the artillery fire he killed two 

of the enemy and possibly a third with his carbine 

before a slug from a machine pistol struck him in 

the head. Left for dead by his men he was captured 

by the enemy and then recaptured when the lire 

he had called down on his position forced the 

enemy to withdraw. The enemy seemed to pay no 

attention to casualties. As fast as one wave of the 

attackers was broken it was replaced by another. 

Companies F and G along the gully of Carroceto 

Creek were forced to pull back slightly and a platoon of Company L was sent forward to assist Company I in lighting its way out of an enemy encirclement. Company F, gathering together the remnants of its scattered force, reported that it was 

down to thirty men and that it had lost all its 

machine guns. Late in the afternoon the pressure 

on the 179th Infantry eased; the troops were given 

an opportunity to reorganize, and many of the men 

reported missing liltered back to their units. 

One enemy unit, the 309/h Pal1zer Grenadier 

Regiment (also called Infal1/fY Lehr Regiment), 

fell back in disorder, and without permission, from 

the 179th Infantry sector in the afternoon of 16 

February. This was an infantry demonstration regiment that had been rushed from Germany, and 

attached on the eve of the attack to the 3d Panzer 

Gm/adier Divisioll. Allied artillery lire produced 

heavy casualties among the troops of this regiment; 

after having lost a high percentage of their officers, 

the troops broke and fled. This incident helped to 

ease the pressure on the 179th Infantry and to rob 

the German assault of its momentum. 

Enemy tanks, as well as infantry, suffered heavy 

losses during these attacks. At noon, the 160th 

Field Artillery Battalion massed the lire of 144 

guns on a concentration of infantry near the Factory; at 1545, liring witl, observation by the 645th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion, it knocked out three 

tanks in the same area; and at 1725 it set fire to 

four tanks and damaged another near a water tower 

northeast of the Factory. When the attack started, 

Sgt. Charles W. Keyser, in charge of thsee tanks 

of Company A, 191st Tank Battalion, was located 

behind a farmhouse 600 yards from the Factory. 

His No.2 tank was knocked out in the morning by 

an artillery shell. At noon, enemy infantry worked 

down the ditch beside the road to the farmhouse. 

Turning the turret of his No. 1 tank he lired a 

75-mm. shell which grazed the house and exploded 

in the midst of the enemy. A second attempt to take 

the house was broken up with hand grenades. Two 

enemy tanks approached down the road. Concealed 

by the cloud of dust around the house Sergeant 

Keyser moved his No. 1 tank out, knocked out one 

enemy tank with three rounds, and with four 

rounds set the other on lire. Well-placed shells disposed of the crews as they attempted to escape. 

At 1430 No. 3 tank received a direct hit. Sergeant 

Keyser's radio, which he had been using to direct 

artillery lire, was damaged and he failed to receive the order from his platoon leader, 1st Lt. 

William E. Nangle, to withdraw. At 1615 six mOre 

enemy tanks appeared. Laying his own smoke 

screen the sergeant tried to make a run for it across 
DUGOUTS ALONG THE MUSSOLINI CANAL had been fairly weli 

prepared in every defilade. From positions such as these the 1st Special 

Service Force was able to stem enemy aJtempts to breach the right flank. 

country. Three hundred yards from the house his 

tank was hit and his driver killed. Badly burned, 

Sergeant Keyser hid in a ditch until after dark 

when he got back to his battalion. Altogether, for 

the loss of seven tanks, the 191st Tank Battalion 

destroyed Ii fteen of the enemy's. Seven others were 

knocked Ollt by antitank guns. 

The artillery fire preceding the enemy attacks 

reached its greatest intensity along the front of the 

2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, astride the Albano 

73 

,oad. At 0730 the fire lifted and enemy infantry 

and tanks struck the left flank of Company E, 

along the railroad, and Company G, which was in 

contact with the 167 Brigade in the rough country 

west of the Albano road. Four tanks supporting 

the enemy infantry attacking Company G were 

knocked out by artillery fire and, with the exception of the 3d Platoon which was nearly wiped out, 

the company beat off every attempt to infiltrate its 

positions. Along the highway and railroad three 
enemy tanks and infantry broke through Company 

E's left platoon. One of the company's supporting 

tank destroyers was knocked out immediately; the 

other destroyed two of the enemy tanks and forced 

the third to retreat. Then it stopped the enemy infantry with its. 50-caliber machine guns. All morning the company held. In the afternoon a squad of 

the right platoon was wiped out by tanks which 

destroyed the two supporting antitank guns and 

then moved directly into the platoon'S positions. 

The enemy failed to press his advantage and the 

fighting died away toward evening. 

Lighter blows fell upon the 180th Infantry, holding the right /lank of the 45th Division front along 

the Carano road. A force of approximately two 

companies, following the numerous stream beds 

and ditches which drain to the south, attempted to 

infiltrate between Companies E and F. The regiment called for prearranged artillery defensive 

fires, and the artillery together with the machine 

guns of the forward companies mowed down the 

attacking troops. At nightfall, when the remnants 

of the two enemy companies were pulled back, they 

appeared to be completely disorganized. No deep 

penetrations had been made anywhere along the 

45th Division front. 

At the same time that the main enemy assault 

was directed against the 45th Division, diversionary attacks were launched against the 3d and 56 

Divisions, holding the right and left Banks of the 

central beachhead defense line. In the 3d Division 

sector the enemy attacked at no less than six different points with forces ranging from single platoons 

to two companies. The principal attack came from 

the northwest of Ponte Ratto between the 2d 

Battalion, 7th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 30th 

Infantry. The first assault was launched by the 

Parachute Demol1Jtratioll Battalion, attached to the 

Hermanll Goerillg Pallzer Division, supported by 

nine Mark IV tanks. The men in the two companies of the Parachute Demollstration BattaliOlI were 

virtually all killed or captured; prisoners reported 

that men sick with dysentery had been forced into 

line for the attack. Accurate artillery fire drove 

back this first assault force in a state of disorder 

bordering on panic. Combat Group Berger, in command of the attack, then committed its second 

wave, the Hermanll Goerillg RecolI/Missance Batlalion. At one point the enemy penetrated 300 

yards between Company K, 30th Infantry, and 

Company E, 7th Infantry. Company K was fighting 

from its command post when, at 1145, it called for 

an emergency barrage. The advance was stopped. 

The enemy kept up the pressure until midafternoon 

when heavy losses forced him to call a halt. The 

751st Tank Battalion had knocked out five enemy 

tanks and a half-track; artillery and mortar fire 

accounted for Scores of the infantry. By evening a 

counterattack had restored the 30th Infantry's 

original line. 

74 

Platoon- and company-strength attacks launched 

against the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion on 

the 3d Division left Bank were also repulsed without difficulty. On the division right Bank the 504th 

Parachute Infantry was attacked by two companies 

which worked their way down Cisterna Creek from 

the north and another company which attacked 

from the soutbeast against the Mussolini Canal. 

The latter force was tied in with enemy units attacking the left Bank of the 1st Special Service 

Force at the bridges near the junction of the west 

branch with the main Mussolini Canal. Although 

two outposts beyond the canal were wiped out, the 

enemy failed to cross the canal or to penetrate any 

part of the line, and again his losses were heavy. 

Company C, 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, supporting the 1st Special Service Force, assisted the 

artillery in knocking out three tanks and a selfpropelled gun. In front of Company D, 504th Parachute Infantry, losses were .so heavy that in the 

afternoon the enemy requested an armistice to remove his casualties. An observer in Company D 

counted thirty-eight dead and estimated there were 

at least as many wounded. 

On the 56 Division front the enemy's initial attacks had more success. The 3d Baltalion, 12th 

(Sturm) Regimenl, attacked across the Moletta 

River against the 9 and 8 Royal Fusiliers. The 

enemy then shifted his emphasis farther to the 

east, striking from Buonriposo Ridge with ele-
\ 

ENEMY 

OFFENSIVE 

17 FEBRUARY 1944 

~ Front Line, morn1r'19 17 Feb 

- - - Final Line, evening 17 Feb 

......, Defensive Position, Compon~ 

_ ..L_ De :~~ :::i::: prior 10 

Contour inferlltJl 20 melers 

o .,'" 

Sabol1no 

1 

MAP NO. ]6 
ments of the 10th Parachute Regiment. Two companies penetrated all the way to the lateral road 

along the final beachhead line before they were 

mopped up by tanks of the 46 Royal Tanks and 

the penetration checked by local counterattacks of 

the 8 Royal Fusiliers. The forward companies of 

the 8 Royal Fusiliers and the 7 Oxford Bucks were 

overrun, leaving the enemy holding a wedge in the 

center of the 167 Brigade line. No effort was made 

to exploit the penetration, and the 56 Division was 

given time to move up a composite battalion of the 

168 Brigade for a counterattack. By noon it was 

apparent that the attack on the 56 Division wa's intended to do no more than support the major offensive down the Albano road. 

In addition to laying down preparatory fire for 

the infantry attacks, enemy artillery on 16 February delivered the heaviest counterbattery lire yet 

experienced at the beachhead. In the early morning 

hours the lire was concentrated on the 45th Division artillery; then it shifted to the positions of the 

Corps artillery. At the same time a concerted effort 

was made to keep the highly respected cub observation planes on the ground. German pursuit 

planes added to their task of straling Allied installations and forward troops the role of pursuing 

the vulnerable cubs. At 1000 the 3d Division reported that its observation plane had been shot 

down and that lighter protection was needed. VI 

Corps could guarantee no immediate aid. Enemy 

artillery had ranged in on the Nettuno air strip and 

destroyed four Spitfires as they were about to take 

off. The lield had to be abandoned for use even 

during the daylight hours, and all lighter protection provided from lields in the Naples area. 

Enemy planes and long-range guns concentrated 

on preventing supplies from entering the port. On 

16 February the enemy air effort reached its peak 

with 19 missions and approximately 172 sorties. 

The results achieved were not commensurate with 

the effort expended. An ammunition dump north 

of Anzio was hit, but otherwise damage was slight. 

In contrast, XII Air Support Command reported 34 

missions and 468 sorties flown in support of VI 

Corps. The main air effort, which had been planned 

75 

for the Cassino front, was shifted on short notice 

to the beachhead. From late morning to dark, wave 

after wave of fighter-bombers, light bombers, and 

medium bombers swept over the beachhead to attack assembly areas, troop concentrations, and 

tanks. The emphasis was placed on the 45th and 

56 Division fronts, with dive bombers and medium 

bombers striking both the Factory and Carroceto, 

while heavy bombers worked over the communication lines feeding into the Rome area. 

At the end of the first day of the big push the 

enemy had made only slight gains in the sectors 

of the 45th and 56 Divisions at considerable cost 

in tanks and personnel. It was evident that most of 

the attacks were intended onl y as diversions to wear 

down the strength of the defending troops and to 

pin reserves. The enemy had not yet committed his 

main force. 

The Second Day, 17 February 

Before midnight on 16 February the enemy resumed the attack in the critical Albano road sector. 

(Map No. 16.) One company of the 725th InfantfY Regiment (715th Illfalltfy Division) worked 

around both flanks of Company E, 157th Infantry, 

astride the road, while a second company inliltrated 

directly into Company E's positions. During the 

night the enemy slowly wiped out the forward positions from both the front and rear, forcing the 

remnants of the company into a small area around 

the command post. Here three tanks of the 191st 

Tank Battalion under the command of 1st Lt. 

Tommy L. Cobb, Jr., assisted them in holding out. 

The tanks lired their 75-mm. guns at pOint-blank 

range into the oncoming waves of troops and 

swept the surrounding lields with their .50-caliber 

machine guns. Before dawn Capt. Felix L. Sparks 

had only fourteen men left of his company and 

four men of Company H, his men were almost out 

of ammunition, and all supply routes were cut. 

Four enemy tanks were dosing in on the flanks 

when at 0500 he received permission to withdraw 

to the west of the Albano road. \1Vith the aid of 

Lieutenant Cobb's M-4 Shermans, which knocked 
BOMB CONCENTRATIONS ON CAMPOLEONE STATION alld 

olher targetJ aloug the railroad from Rome were jn direCl Jllpporl of the 

hard-preJsed VI Corps troops. The smoke and dust of direct hits blanket 

the stalio111 while at the right a lone bomb hit JlraddleJ the track!. 
out at least two of the enemy tanks, and a protec 

tive smoke screen laid down by the artillery, the 

handful of men fought its way out of the trap. The 

2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, also under pressure 

during the night, sent a platoon west to contact 

the 157th Infantry, without success. A dangerous 

gap was opening up between the two regiments. 

The enemy lost no time in exploiting the tactical 

advantage he had won by his successful night attack. Striking swiftly and in force he pressed 

through the gap he had opened along the Albano 

road. At 0740 an estimated thirty-five Focke-Wulf 

190's and Messerschmitt 109's bombed and strafed 

the 45th Division's front line. A few minutes later 

both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 179th Infantry, were 

under attack by a powerful force composed of the 

725th lll/antry Regillle11l (715th Infantry Division), two battalions of the 1451h ilT/antry Regiment (65th llTfalTtry Divisioll), and part of the 

741st Illfantry Regiment (114th Light Dit1ision), 

During the day approximately sixty tanks, employed in small groups, supported the infantry. 

One force of tanks and infantry moved southeast from the Factory to attack the 3d Battalion 

along the north-south road a mile to the east of 

the Albano road, while a second force, after dri'{-

ing south from Carroceto along the highway, 

swung east through the former positions of Company E, 157th Infantry, to strike the 2d Battalion, 

179th Infantry, in the flank. Company G, 179th 

Infantry, which had been under attack most of the 

night, was virtually isolated by this thrust. In order 

to protect his exposed left flank, the commander 

of the 179th Infantry, Colonel Kammerer, at 0855 

ordered the 2d and 3d Battalions to withdraw 1,000 

yards to the west branch of Carroceto Creek. Under 

cover of a smoke screen the 2d Battalion attempted 

to extricate itself from its untenable position. Company G was virtually destroyed; Companies E and 

F supported by Company A were unable to form a 

line until they had fallen back to the dead-end 

road less than a mile north of the final beachhead 

line. Again at 1040 thirty-five Focke-Wulf 190's 

and eight Messerschmitt 109's were over bombing 

and strafing. One bomb struck the 3d Battalion 

77 

command post, knocking out all communication 

lines. Tank destroyers and infantry fought desperately to hold off the enemy tanks, and the 4.2-inch 

mortars of the 83d Chemical Battalion grew hot 

as the sweating crews poured round after round 

into the seemingly unending waves of enemy infantry. At 0855, when the 3d Battalion had completed 

its move back to tie in with the 2d Battalion north 

of the dead-end road, the enemy had succeeded in 

driving a wedge two miles wide and over a mile 

deep into the center of the 45th Division front. 

To aid the hard-pressed infantry, VI Corps 

brought to bear all the resources of its greatly 

superior artillery and air power. In addition to the 

432 guns of Corps and division artillery, three companies of tanks from the 1st Armored Division and 

four batteries of 90-mm. antiaircraft guns were employed on ground targets, and two cruisers assisted 

with the fire of their naval guns on the flanks of 

the beachhead. All the resources of XII Air Support Command were put at the disposal of VI 

Corps. Counting only bombers, 198 fighter-bomber, 

69 light-bomber, 176 medium-bomber, and 288 

heavy-bomber sorties were flown in direct support 

of VI Corps. The heavy B-17 Flying Fortresses and 

B-24 Liberators and the Mitchell and Marauder 

medium bombers concentrated on Campoleone and 

targets up the Albano road; striking closer to the 

front lines, fighter-bombers blasted the already 

battered Factory, Carroceto, and the overpass; and 

during the hours of darkness armed reconnaissance 

planes and Wellington bombers patrolled all roads 

leading into the beachhead. The total weight of 

bombs dropped and the number of heavy bombers 

employed was the greatest up to that date ever 

allotted in direct support of an army. The term 

"direct support" was no misnomer for many of the 

big planes swinging in from the direction of Rome 

overshot their target at Campoleone and dropped 

their loads on the Factory, only a few hundred 

yards from the front lines. To the weary troops, 

looking up from the muddy blood-stained battlefield, the view of formation after formation of giant 

bombers sweeping majestically over the beachhead 

was a cheering sight. 
During the afternoon the enemy attempted to 

broaden and deepen the sal ient he had won. Fresh 

troops were committed on the 3d Pallzer Grmadier Divisioll front to bring the total enemy force 

involved to approximately fourteen infantry battalions. In most instances the attacks were made by 

small battle groups of battalion strength which 

were rotated frequently to keep fresh troops in the 

attack while units battered by the intense artillery 

fire and bombing were withdrawn to be reorganized. The main pressure continued to be exerted 

down the Albano road and to the east of it against 

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 179th Infantry. Tanks 

and infantry penetrated as far as the junction with 

the dead-end road where the tanks found concealment behind a group of farmhouses and the infantry proceeded to dig in. Two tanks broke through 

to the first overpass along the Albano road before 

they were stopped. On the west side of the highway 

the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, was almost surrounded by small groups of enemy infantry infiltrating through the deep ravines lying between the 

battalion and the 167 Brigade to the left. In 

the afternoon the regimental command post was 

bombed and communications broke down. When 

the lines were restored, the battalion reported that 

it was still intact. On the right shoulder of the 

salient, Company G, 180th Infantry, extended its 

left flank to maintain contact with Company K, 

179th Infantry. Although it was in an exposed 

THE FIRST OVERPASS ABOVE ANZIO, wh"'e the east-west road 

crosses the main highu'ay 10 Alballo, 1I..'a1 the Helle of enemy artillery 

("ollce11lrati011 as Allied lank! adl,'(ll1Ced "orthward to meet the COlmleraI/ark 0 11 17 Febmary. A German lank (circled) Ctlll be ,Seen a/ left 

cell/er. 
position and under constant pressure, Company G 

held its ground. The enemy's efforts to widen the 

salient so far had failed. 

Late in the morning of 17 February General 

Harmon was ordered to employ one battalion of 

medium tanks in a counterattack to support the 

179th Infantry. Moving out shortly after noon 

Company H, 1st Armored Regiment, at 1410 

reached the first overpass where the east-west road 

crosses the main highway. One platoon advanced 

500 yards farther up the road and assisted in holding off the enemy tanks attacking toward the overpass. Company I followed the "bowling alley" 

across the open fields southeast of the Factory to 

support the 3d Battalion, 179th Infantry. Roadbound and under fire from enemy tank guns, it 

made little progress. At dusk both companies were 

withdrawn. They had assisted in holding off thE 

enemy armor, but, unable to maneuver off the roads 

and lacking infantry support, the tanks were able 

to do little toward regaining the lost grou nd. 

The enemy penetration down the Albano road 

had brought him dangerously near the final beachhead line of defense. In order to relieve some of 

the pressure on the 45th Division and to add depth 

to the defense, General Lucas assigned to the 1 

Division, less the 3 Brigade which remained in 

Corps reserve, the task of holding a 2-mile sector 

of the final beachhead line of defense extending 

east and west from the first overpass on the Albano 

road. The 1 Division was tied in with the 56 Division on its left and the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, on its right. Corps also attached the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, to the 45th Division. 

The battalion was placed under the control of the 

157th Infantry and moved up to the first overpass, 

in position to relieve the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry. The 56 Division strengthened its 167 Brigade 

with elements of the 168 Brigade which had been 

employed successfully that morning to wipe out 

the wedge the enemy had driven in the division's 

line the previous day. These shifts of units were accompanied by changes in personnel: Maj. Gen. G. 

W. R. Templer took command of both 56 and 1 

Divisions when General Penney was wounded by a 

79 

shell fragment, and General Truscott left the 3d 

Division to become Deputy Commander of VI 

Corps, his former position being filled by Brig. 

Gen. John W. O'Daniel. 

In an effort to lessen the depth of the enemy 

penetration and to obtain a more defensible line, 

General Eagles ordered the 2d and 3d Battalions, 

179th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, to launch a counterattack on the night of 17-18 

February. The 179th Infantry was to reach the west 

branch of the Carroceto Creek, an advance of 1,000 

yards, while the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, was 

to reach a parallel position on the Albano road 

where it would be in position to tie in with the beleaguered 2d Battalion west of the highway. Maj. 

Asbury W. Lee's 191st Tank Battalion was to support the attack. At that time the 3d Battalion, 

179th Infantry, had been reduced to 274 men and 

the 2d Battalion, even with Company A attached, 

was in little better condition. The two depleted 

battalions jumped off on schedule at 2300; the 3d 

Battalion, 157th Infantry, was delayed. Capt. Merle 

M. Mitchell, the battalion commander, had been 

wounded in the stomach and shoulder by enemy 

tank lire. Refusing to be evacuated he personally 

reconnoitered the route of advance and led his 

troops forward beyond the line of departure. Hampered by the necessity of using runners to maintain 

communications with his units and by pressure 

from the enemy, Captain Mitchell's attack did not 

get under way until 0030. The enemy had already 

succeeded in bringing up machine guns and consolidating his gains along the Albano road. The 

battalion encountered such heavy lire that it got 

no farther up the road than the junction with the 

dead-end road, almost 1,000 yards short of its objective. Lt. Col. Charles D. Wiegand, commanding 

the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, found his left 

flank exposed to attack from the west. Momentarily 

on the defensive, the enemy returned to the attack. 

Company E was partly cut off by enemy tanks and 

enemy infantry who came down the Albano road 

in half-tracks and unloaded at the corner of the 

dead-end road. Colonel Wiegand was forced to 

order a withdrawal. To the right, Companies K 
and L reached their objectives only to find that 

Company K was in a trap. The situation became 

confused. Enemy artillery fire knocked out all communications between the 2d Battalion and regimental headquarters making it difficult for Colonel Kammerer to keep abreast of the situation. 

The counterattack had failed. It lacked sufficient 

strength to throw the enemy off balance and it left 

the troops of the 179th Infantry in an exposed 

position. 

The Crisis, 18-19 February 

All through the stormy night of 17-18 February the enemy moved up fresh units in preparation 

for a knockout blow, and even the counterattack 

launched by the 179th Infantry had not prevented 

him from continuing his customary tactics of infiltrating small groups under cover of darkness. 

During the night hours he paid special attention 

to the shoulders of the salient. On the left, enemy 

units, infiltrating along the ravines which drain 

into the Moletta River, got between the 167 Brigade and the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, cutting 

the battalion's supply route. On the right, Companies G and F of the 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry, 

holding the left flank along La Ficoccia Creek, 

were harassed by enemy tanks operating along the 

north-south road and enemy infantry infiltrating 

into their positions. Artillery fire worked over the 

units holding the final beachhead line. Behind this 

screen of activity the enemy completed preparations for what was to be his supreme effort to effect 

a breakthrough. During the day he was to employ 

all of the 721Jt, 741Jt, and 735th b'fa1ltry RegilIIelltS, and the 309th and 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Regiments. Armor continued to be used in small 

groups but on a more extensive scale than on any 

previous day. Each infantry unit had tank support; 

in the afternoon, when elements of the enemy reserve-the 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Divisions-were committed, tanks were employed 

with as many as twelve in a group. (Map No. 17.) 

The enemy launched his first thrust at dawn. 

Capitalizing on the confusion resulting from the 

80 

night infiltration and the unsuccessful Allied counterattack, he thrust deep into the positions of the 

179th Infantry. Company K was virtually destroyed 

and only remnants of the 3d Battalion filtered back 

to the final beachhead line. Enemy tanks moved 

down the "bowling alley" until stopped by a blown 

bridge; enemy infantry infiltrating to the south and 

southeast reached the positions along the final 

beachhead line held by the 1 Loyals, east of the first 

overpass, and to its right by the 1st Battalion, 179th 

Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry. These 

initial attacks, which were not in great strength, 

were beaten off. For Company I of the 2d Battalion, 

157th Infantry, which was holding a small area 

directly in front of the overpass, this was the second 

day of such attacks. The ring of barbed wire surrounding the company was littered with bodies of 

dead and moaning Germans who only a few 

moments before had been shouting confidently, "At 

ease, Company I," "Watch out, Company I, here 

we come!" Company I was also suffering terrific 

losses. Enemy 170-mm. and 21O-mm. guns, registered on the overpass, blasted huge craters out of 

the swampy ground into which oozed muddy water 

to cover the torn remnants of what had been a 

rifleman or a machine-gun crew. One by one, five of 

Capt. James G. Evans' company officers were killed 

by the artillery fire and he was hard-pressed to find 

men to mend the breaks in the wire and man the 

machine guns covering the Albano road. Some ammunition reached the company during the night, 

but no food or water had been brought up for two 

days. The wounded had to be left in water-logged 

slit trenches where aid men gave them what help 

they could offer. Although the infantry attacks 

could be and were repulsed there was no relief 

from the cold, sleepless nights nor from the constant pounding the men were taking from artillery fire. 

The 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, almost cut off 

by the tank penetrations on its left and the collapse 

of the 3d Battalion on its right, withdrew under 

covering fire of Company A. By the middle of the 

morning the 179th Infantry had been driven back 

to the positions covering the final beachhead line. 
ENEMY 

OFFENSIVE "THE CRISIS" 

18 FEBRUARY 1944 

~ Front line, morf'll"9 16 Feb 

....... Defense PosIIIOflS d Cornporues eV!l'IlnQ- , 

ConIoor mlelWl 20 meters 

3 1 ! "ilLES 

l 

MAP NO. 17 
To its right the 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry, was 

under attack from three sides by enemy tanks operating along the roads east of the Factory. Companies F and G at 0625 were ordered to withdraw a 

half mile to the east. Company F, led by Capt. Robert A. Guenthner, and a platoon of Company G extricated themselves; 1st Lt. Benjamin A. Blackmer 

who had taken over command of Company G never 

received the order. Completely surrounded, the 

company fought off every enemy effort to overrun 

it. On the other shoulder of the salient the beleaguered 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, virtually 

cut off from all support, likewise held. Although 

the enemy had widened his penetration and driven 

it a half mile deeper into the positions of the 45th 

Division, the courage and staying power of the 

American infantrymen still stood in the way of a 

breakthrough. 

The bloody struggle continued all morning under 

an overcast sky which prevented a repetition of the 

previous day's tremendous program of air support. 

Fighter-bombers, which /lew 120 sorties, gave effective close support against enemy tanks and infantry, and twenty-four light bombers covered the 

Factory area with fragmentation bombs. Medium 

and heavy bombers were unable to get off the 

ground. However, there was no reduction in the 

amount of artillery fire which fell on the attacking 

troops. Many of the Allied artillery ground observers became casualties or had their radios and telephones shot out, but the enemy's efforts to keep 

down the cub observation planes failed. At 1110 

Capt. William H. McKay, a cub pilot observing for 

the 45th Division artillery, spotted a force of tanks 

and about 2,500 Germans moving south from Carroceto along the Albano road, and radioed the news 

to the artillery. Within twelve minutes the Corps 

Fire Control Center had massed the fire of 224 

British and American guns on the target. The 

ground over which the Germans were marching 

seemed to blow up and when the smoke cleared 

the enemy force had disintegrated. In the next fifty 

minutes, under the direction of Captain McKay, the 

concentrated fire of these guns was shifted to four 

other locations. Many enemy units were disorgan81 

ized and decimated before they were even in position to attack, yet there appeared to be no end to 

the waves of enemy infantry thrown against the 

45th Division. 

At 1400, when Col. William O. Darby took 

command of the 179th Infantry, the situation appeared desperate. The shattered 3d Battalion had 

been withdrawn for reorganization, the 2d Battalion was at less than half strength and nearly exhausted. Only the 1st Battalion was capable of organized resistance. All communication lines between the regiment and its battalions were out, further complicating the task of creating a coordinated 

defense. Calling together his battalion commanders 

Colonel Darby ordered Colonel Johnson to hold 

the left sector with his 1st Battalion, reinforced 

with Company I; Colonel Wiegand, commander 

of the 2d Battalion, was to take over the right sector "with whatever troops he could find," and Maj. 

Merlin O. Tyron, commander of the 3d Battalion, 

was to "endeavor to get all stragglers and pick all 

men physically fit in the rear echelon." Colonel 

Darby favored falling back to the woods to reorganize. General Eagles replied to the request with 

an order to hold the final beachhead line at all 

costs and he promised the support of the 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry. 

The 180th Infantry, on the right flank, was still 

largely intact, but its nnits were holding a long 

front exposed to enemy tank attacks and Company 

G was completely cut off. The enemy's tanks could 

operate almost at will down the Albano road and 

the "bowling alley." A large percentage of the 

division's antitank guns had been knocked out or 

overrun during the fighting of the past three days; 

the tanks of the 191st Tank Battalion and the tank 

destroyers of the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion 

had suffered heavy losses while beating off the 

seemingly endless succession of enemy attacks. The 

645th Tank Destroyer Battalion alone lost fourteen 

M-I0's on 17 February. In order to obtain full 

defilade it was often necesssary to dig the tank 

destroyers into the marshy ground. Once in place 

they were difficult to move and in some cases they 

had to be abandoned when the infantry withdrew. 
In the late afternoon of 18 February, as the enemy 

prepared to make his heaviest attack of the day, 

the Allied defenders of the Amio beacbhead faced 

their most critical test. 

The renewed enemy attack started with a thrust 

by twelve tanks down the "bnwling alley." Only 

the blown bridge where the road crosses Carroceto 

Creek kept them from breaking through. Strung 

out along the road the tanks were able to fire directly into the fox holes of Company A, 180th 

Infantry. Under the cover of this fire the enemy 

infantry attacked. By 1750 the fighting was general 

along the whole front of the salient as far west as 

the overpass. Both Company A, 180th Infantry, 

and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 179th Infantry, held 

their ground. Small enemy units managed to infiltrate through the area of heavy brush growing 

along the regimental bnundary north of the road 

where the line of defending troops was thin. The 

enemy force had been whittled down until it was 

too weak to exploit its penetration and the infiltrating units were wiped out during the night. Farther 

to the west the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, and 

the 1 Loyals were attacked by enemy troops who 

came in across the open fields south of the dead-end 

road. For four hours the enemy troops fought to 

break through east of the overpass. At one time 

they penetrated all the way to the lateral road before they were driven back in hand-to-hand fighting. Tanks of the 1st Armored Division, patrolling 

the lateral road, helped the infantry hold off the 

enemy until the force of the attacks was spent. 

Compelled to advance across open country, the 

enemy was taking terrific casualties from artillery, 

mortar, and machine-gun fire. At 2130 there was 

evidence that the enemy was pulling back to reorganize. Never again was he to come so close to 

rolling up the final beachhead line. 

During the night of 18-19 February, the 45th 

Division took advantage of a temporary lull in the 

enemy attacks to strengthen its positions while VI 

Corps assembled a counterattack force. (Map No. 

18.) West of the Albano road the 2d Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry, under the command of Lt. Col. 

Wilhelm P. Johnson, managed to break through 

82 

to the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, making it possible to send supplies and ammunition forward to 

the beleaguered troops. General Eagles released 

the 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry, from division 

reserve and attached it to the 179th Infantry. The 

fresh troops were employed to relieve the decimated 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, along the lateral road, thereby strengthening the final beachhead line at a critical point. Behind the line Major 

Tyron reorganized the remnants of the 3d Battalion, 179th Infantry, and reinforced them with 250 

men who were brought up from rear areas. Combat 

groups organized within the 2d and 3d Battalions 

were prepared for use in bnlstering the 1st Battalion. On the left of the 179th Infantry the 1 Loyals 

adopted the same policy of pressing rear-echelon 

troops into service to replace casualties. To give 

more armored support Company F, 1st Armored 

Regiment, moved into position along the lateral 

road where it could support the infantry. 

The 180th Infantry, holding' the right shoulder 

of the salient, also took advantage of the night 

hours to readjust its line. The forward companies 

were drawn back from the north and west to a 

shorter line extending from just north of the lateral road to the village of Carano. Although the 

regiment had been under constant artillery fire and 

local tank and infantry attacks, its losses had been 

comparatively light. Even the troops of Company 

G fought their way out of the trap where they 

had been held throughout the daylight hours of 

18 February. Lieutenant Blackmer's company had 

been reduced by the withdrawal of the 3d Platoon 

and by casualties until there were barely fifty men 

left. Communication lines to the rear had been cut, 

the radio was damaged, and there were no supplies; 

there were no grenades, no mortar shells, and only 

a few rounds left for the rifles and machine guns. 

Four of the company officers had been evacuated 

on the first night of the attack and many of the 

men were beginning to suffer from trench foot. 

Exposed in no man's land, the tiny force was subject to friendly artillery fire as well as to enemy 

attacks. At 1430 Lieutenant Blackmer ordered his 

men to pull back 300 yards farther down La Ficoc-
ENEMY 

OFFENSIVE 

"THE DAmE IS WON" 

19 - 20 FEBRUARY 1944 

"""" Fr'O"It Ltne, fTIOI'I'I1OQ 19 Feb 

___ Finol LIM, evening 20 Feb 0""- Enemy for'llOf'Cl Position, 

19 Feb 

CotWJur in~ 20 melers 

o ., .... 

lJ 

1 

MAP NO. 18 
cia Creek; but Allied artillery spotted his position 

and began firing on the company. Pfc. William J. 

Johnston, a machine gunner, was left for dead by 

his comrades. Though seriously wounded Johnston 

attempted to crawl back up the stream bank to his 

gun. A passing soldier assisted him and he resumed 

firing in an effort to hold off the enemy while his 

company organized its new position. At 1600 Pfc. 

Robert Keefe, a company runner, reached battalion 

headquarters and then crawled back through the 

enemy lines with orders for Lieutenant Blackmer 

to withdraw. After dark the company fought its 

way through the enemy units dug in to its rear 

and waded over a mile through the waist-deep 

water of the creek to reach the regiment's new line 

of defense. By some miracle Johnston also managed to crawl back to safety the next morning. 

The spirit of these men could not be broken. When 

Colonel Dulaney called 2d Battalion headquarters 

to find out about Company G, he was told that 

"Blackmer came out grinning." The atmosphere 

of confusion and desperation which had marked 

the fighting during the late afternoon hours of 

18 February was changing to a spirit of confidence 

as the 45th Division reestablished an integrated 

line of defense, and communication between units 

was restored. 

In view of the possibility that the enemy might 

employ airborne troops in conjunction with a continuation of his infantry and tank attacks, VI 

TANKS MOVE UP THE ALBANO Road 011 19 February from Padiglione lV oods I01lNlfd the front lines where smoke ObSCtlfeJ the lateral 

,·oad. These U11ils of the 1st Armored Division were gOil1g forward ;11 

JlIPPO,.t of the 45th Division's Jla11d to halt the German drive in that 

scctor, 
ENGINEERS BRIDGE A STREAM Oil a road from NellllllO /0 the 

frol1t. Frequent rains and enemy .rhel1-fire damage made thiJ a difficult 

laJk, bill the roads had to be kept open 10 move armor against the 

Germam, 

Corps, on the afternoon of 18 February, issued an 

order dividing the beachhead area into zones of 

defense against airborne attacks. Forward zones 

were made the responsibility of the units holding 

the beachhead line of defense; responsibility for 

the rear areas was divided among the 35th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, the 18th Field Artillery 

Brigade, the 39th Engineers, and the 1st Special 

Service Force. Within each zone a mobile force of 

at least one company was to be held on the alert, 

and all roads were to be patrolled constantly during the hours of darkness. By employing reconnaissance units and rear-echelon troops for the antiparachutist patrols, the drain on the criticall y short 

supply of infantry units was kept to a minimum. 

The enemy devoted the night hours of 18-19 

February to assembling his forces for what was to 

be his last serious effort to break through the linal 

beachhead line of defense. (Map No. 18.) At 

0400 on the morning of 19 February enemy medium- and heavy-caliber artillery lire was laid down 

along the forward edge of the salient, followed 

ten minutes later by an infantry attack. The 45th 

Division artillery replied with prepared defensive 

fires, concentrating on the front of the 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, and the 1 Loyals. Two battalions of the enemy's reserve 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (29th Pallzer Grenadier DiviJion), 

supported by three tanks, overran the right Bank 

company of the 1 Loyals and penetrated to the 

lateral road. The remainder of the 1 Loyals and 

the 179th Infantry stood firm. By 0800, pounded 

by shells from the tank guns of Company F, 1st 

Armored Regiment, and by a tremendous concentration of artillery fire, the enemy was forced to 

withdraw, leaving only a pocket of resistance 

around a group of houses on the lateral road. During the morning, enemy tanks tried repeatedly and 

unsuccessfully to operate down the Albano road. 

Destroyers of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion 

knocked out two Mark VI Tigers and five Mark 

IV's. At noon when the enemy tried a final infantry 

attack down the same axis it was effectively broken 

up by artillery fire before any contact had been 

made. Although there was an increase in the enemy 

air effort over the previous day, marked by repeated 

bombing and strafing raids over the forward lines, 

the peak of the enemy offensive had been passed. 
The Battle is W01l, 19-20 February 

While the enemy was regrouping for his last 

effort to crack the final beachhead line of defense, 

VI Corps completed preparations for a counterattack. The plan called for an attack to drive the 

enemy back to a line extending in an arc from the 

stream crossing just north of the junction of the 

dead-end and Albano roads eastward and slightly 

northward toward the village of Carano. Two 

forces were to be employed: Force T, under 

General Templer, consisting of the 169 Brigade, 

was to attack on Corps order from the vicinity of 

the overpass to seize the ground north of the deadend road; Force H, under General Harmon, consisting of the 6th Armored Infantry (less the 2d 

PRISONERS FORMED LONG COLUMNS aJ they were marched 

single file from the bailie area. Pauil1g a grollp of cllriollS American h,· 

fantrymell 011 19 Febrllary, Ihese German captitlel, inclllding men from 

the 114 Light Division, displayed lillie illterest ill their caplors. 

85 
Battalion) , a battalion of medium tanks, and the 

30th Infantry, which was moved over from the less 

active 3d Division front, was to attack at 0630 on 

19 February up the "bowling alley" to the junction 

with the first north-south road. The original intention was to have the two forces attack simultaneously to pinch off the enemy troops in the 

nose of the salient. Inability on the part of Force 

T to assemble its equipment before the time scheduled necessitated a modification of the plan to a 

limited objective attack by Task Force H. (Map 

No. 18.) On the night of 17-18 February enemy 

planes dropped naval mines in the harbor of Anzio. 

The port was closed until the mines were cleared 

and the newly arrived 169 Brigade was delayed 

in unloading its equipment. Thus on February 19 

only Task Force H was prepared to jump off when 

dawn broke on what promised to be a clear, 

warm day. 

The artillery carried out an elaborate fire plan 

to support the attack. Eight British field artillery 

regiments were coordinated to fire a supporting 

barrage which was laid down in front of the line 

of departure at 0600 and then lifted on call. In 

addition, eight battalions of Corps artillery fired 

prepared concentrations for forty-five minutes on 

enemy assembly areas north and east of the Factory. Naval and 90-mm. antiaircraft guns fired on 

the Factory and Carroceto, while fighter-bombers 

and medium bombers, part of a large air support 

program, likewise blasted assembly areas. One 

wooded area northeast of the Factory was struck 

by 132 fighter-bombers and 48 medium bombers, 

and another 48 mediums scattered fragmentation 

bombs on an assembly area along the stream to the 

north of the woods. 

Force H attacked on schedule at 0630. Colonel 

Steele's 6th Armored Infantry and Colonel McGarr's 30th Infantry advanced abreast along the 

axis of the "bowling alley" with the 6th Armored 

Infantry south of the road and the 30th Infantry, 

in column of battalions, astride and north of the 

road. 

Col. Louis V. Hightower, commander of the 1st 

Armored Regiment, employed two medium tank 

86 

companies: Company G in direct support of the 

infantry and Company H assisting on the right 

flank. The attack started well. At 0820 the 30th 

Infantry had advanced a mile beyond the line of 

departure, and the armored infantry on its left 

was meeting only slight resistance. Then the advance slowed. The 2d Battalion, leading the 30th 

Infantry, was under fire from enemy Mark VI 

tanks as well as from troops concealed along the 

banks of La Ficoccia Creek and in the brush on the 

north side of the road. Lt. Col. Lyle W . Bernard 

was wounded and Lt. Col. Woodrow W . Stromberg took over the 2d Battalion. Company E was 

reduced to one officer and fifty men and Company 

F also was badly chewed up. The tanks of Company G, 1st Armored Regiment, could offer little 

assistance as they were held up until the engineers 

completed work on a bridge. At 1330 the attack 

was resumed. Company G's tanks crossed the repaired bridge and drove up the diagonal road 

spreading panic among the already disorganized 

enemy troops. The tanks of Company H also were 

successful. After advancing over a mile up the road 

leading north from Padiglione, they turned west 

to cover the bridge across Spaccasassi Creek. Blasting the enemy infantry from the stream bed and 

from houses along the road, they took so many 

prisoners that they had to call on the 180th Infantry to dispose of them. At 1620, 19 February, when 

General Harmon called a halt to the advance, the 

infantry had reached the objective called for in 

VI Corps' order. The main assault force was withdrawn during the night. Two battalions, left as 

a covering force, engaged in aggressive patrolling 

throughout 20 February and then were withdrawn. 

In its attack, Force H captured two hundred 

prisoners representing elements of the 741 SI, 721 SI, 

and 7351h Infanlry Regime/lls and a company of 

the /l41h ElIgineer Ballalioll. 

During the afternoon of 19 February the 1 

Loyals and a company of the 2 North Staffs, supported by tanks of the 46 Royal Tank Regiment, 

attacked to wipe out the pocket of resistance along 

the lateral road left by the enemy's penetration in 

the morning. At 1600 the houses in which the 
enemy troops had barricaded themselves were retaken. An hour earlier a platoon of Company D, 

1st Armored Regiment, drove up the Albano road 

almost to the junction with the dead-end road. Its 

mission was to cause as much confusion and damage as possible. Three of the tanks were knocked 

out by enemy antitank guns, and the remaining 

tanks were focced to withdraw under cover of a 

smoke screen. Before pulling back, the platoon 

assisted the British counterattack by driving a large 

force of the enemy from cover. The British took 

over 200 prisoners, who together with the prisoners 

taken by Force H, brought the total for the day 

to 413. General Lucas signalized the victory with 

a message to his troops: "Swell work today. Keep 

after them." 

The decline in the size of the forces, both in 

infantry and in tanks, which the enemy employed 

in his attacks on the morning of 19 February, the 

large number and the variety of units represented 

by the prisoners taken during the counterattacks, 

and above all the picture of disorganization within 

units and the spirit of disillusionment exhibited by 

the enemy prisoners indicated that VI Corps by 

the evening of 19 February had won its battle. 

It was anticipated that the enemy would keep up 

the pressure, for the prestige of the German Army 

was at stake. It was considered possible that 

General Mackensen would attempt another major 

effort to break through to the sea. Still, all the 

evidence on 19 February pointed to the conclusion 

that the German Fourtee1/th A'I'my was too near 

the point of exhaustion to continue the battle on 

the scale of the past three days without either 

bringing up additional fresh troops or pausing 

for a period of rest and reorganization. Since the 

enemy had already committed elements of the 

26th Pallzer and 29th Pallzer Grenadier Divisions, 

which he had intended to hold in reserve to exploit a breakthrough, it was believed unlikely that 

he had many fresh troops left. 

The fighting on 20 February only served to buttress the conclusion that VI Corps had broken the 

back of the enemy offensive. At 0430 an enemy 

force estimated at company strength attacked the 

1 Loyals east of the overpass. The attack was easily 

repulsed. Prisoners taken from the 67th Panzer 

Grenadier Regimmt ( 26th Pmlzer Division) reported that the attack had started with a battalion 

but that artillery fire had broken it up and only a 

company had reached the Allied lines. Prisoners 

taken later in the morning by the 179th Infantry 

revealed a condition of even greater confusion in 

the ranks of the 29th Panzer Gre1/adier Divisioll. 

According to the prisoners from the 71 st Pallzer 

Gl'e1Iadiel' Regime1/t, both the 71 st and 45th Pallzel' Gl'e1Iadier Regimellls were to have attacked 

at 0400, 19 February. Disrupted communications 

had caused such confusion in the transmission of 

orders that the 71st Pallzer Grel/aditl' Regiment 

failed to attack until the morning of 20 February. 

Leaving its assembly area north of the Factory in 

the early morning hours, the 1 st Battalion of the 

regiment had advanced into the no man's land 

in the center of the salient. Under fire from all 

directions, the companies became confused, lost 

their bearings, and became hopelessly mixed up. 

The battalion commander called a halt to reconnoiter. He found that the 15th Pallzer Gre1ladiel' 

Regiment, which was supposed to be on his right, 

was to his rear; the two connecting companies had 

been destroyed, and the 3d Battalion of his own 

regiment had failed to follow up. Left isolated and 

under terrific artillery fire, the battalion disintegrated. Although the enemy continued his attacks 

on the shoulders of the salient, the debacle on the 

morning of 20 February marked a bloody end to 

his efforts to achieve a breakthrough. 

The German focces lost heavily both in personnel and equipment during their drive to wipe out 

the Anzio beachhead. In their 5-day attack, 16-20 

February, the enemy suffered at least 5,389 battle 

casualties in killed, wounded, and missing. Enemy 

prisoners taken by VI Corps numbered 609. The 

German High Command never hesitated to sacrifice troops to achieve an important objective, and 

the elimination of the beachhead had become as 

much a question of prestige as of military strategy. 

On 21 February the 179th Infantry counted about 

500 bodies lying in front of its sector. An escaped 
THE GERMAN "GOLIATH" TANK, the enemy's Jecret weapon 

which proved a failure, tva! nothing more than a miniature mobile expJo. 

Jives (on/ainer. On the side of this trGolia/hl) can be see11 the baUery 

/r01l1 which power was drawn 10 ope,.ate the moto,. at the right. 

American prisoner reported that while being 

marched up the Albano road he had seen enemy 

dead stacked up like cord wood in piles of 150 

each. Bulldozers were being employed to dig mass 

graves for what he estimated to be over 1,500 

bodie"s. Most of the German units which entered 

the bitterly contested corridor along the Albano 

road had to be withdrawn for a period of rest and 

rehabilitation. 

88 

The successful battle fought by the Allied troops 

to hold their beachhead was won at a price lower 

than that paid by the enemy, but still high enough 

to cause concern to the already depleted units of 

VI Corps. Although the landing of new units 

in the period 16-20 February increased the effective strength of VI Corps from 86,915 to 96,401, 

the beachhead forces still numbered 21 ,268 less 

than their authorized strength. During this period, 
battle casualties totaled 3,496 in killed, wounded, 

and missing. The Germans reported the capture 

of 1,304 Allied prisoners. Exposure, exhaustion, 

and particularly trench foot resulting from days 

spent in fox holes half-filled with water resulted 

in a total of 1,637 nonbattle casualties. Although 

high, the losses suffered by VI Corps would not 

have been serious had it been possible to draw the 

troops out of the line for a period of recuperation. 

During February there were no quiet periods at 

the beachhead. Every man was needed and the 

steady drain on the I ives and energy of the defending troops never ceased. 

The enemy had started his all-out drive to destroy the beachhead with many advantages. VI 

Corps was forced to defend a front of nearly thirtyfive miles with less than five divisions of troops, 

many of whom had been in the line continuously 

for nearly a month; at the same time it had to 

maintain an adequate reserve. General Mackensen, 

with nearly ten divisions under his command, had 

the larger force, and many of his troops were 

fresher. Nor were the enemy's artillery and air 

power negligible factors. By concentrating his artillery fire on the area around the salient on either 

side of the Albano road he was able to subject the 

troops under attack to a merciless pounding, and 

the congested area of the beachhead offered an 

excellent target for his bombers. In spite of these 

advantages he had failed, because of the Allied 

superiority in artillery and air power, the inability 

of the enemy to employ his tanks in masses, the 

failure of his secret weapon (the "Goliath" remotecontrolled tank), the breakdown of enemy morale, 

and, finally, the stubborn resistance of the Allied 

troops holding the beachhead. 

Prisoners taken during the battle almost invariably commented on the "terrific" and "continuous" 

artillery fire, which caused heavy casualties, shattered nerves, destroyed morale, and brought some 

units to the verge of panic. In a report to Field 

Marshal Kesselring of 28 February, General Mackensen stated that artillery fire was responsible for 

the bulk of enemy casualties, and that 75 percent 

of all wounds had been inflicted by shell fragments. In many cases attacking troops were completely cut off from any support; communication 

between units was dependent almost entirely on 

radio and on runners, many of whom never lived 

to deliver their messages. In some cases, as a result 

of the breakdown of supply services, units went 

for days without food. At the peak of the attack, 

for every shell the enemy artillery fired, VI Corps 

threw back from fifteen to twenty. The salient the 

enemy had driven into the 45th Division front 

became a veritable death trap for his tanks and 

infantry. 

The Allied air bombing and artillery fire served 

to complement each other. An appreciahle share 

of the responsibility for the breakdown of communications and the failure of supplies to reach 

forward units was due to the weight of bombs 

dropped along the axis of the Albano road from 

the Factory and Carroceto back to th" Albano hills. 

Straining his reserves to the utmost, the enemy was 

ahle to fly an estimated total of 172 sorties on 16 

February, the peak day of his performance. The 

next day 288 Allied heavy bombers alone were 

over the beachhead. Whereas the number of enemy 

sorties steadily declined the Allied air effort was 

curtailed only by bad weather and lack of targets. 

Many enemy prisoners attributed their failure 

to lack of adequate tank support. This was due 

partly to losses suffered during the fighting, but 

largely to unfavorable tank terrain. Both enemy 

and All ied tanks were roadbound and consequently could be employed only in small groups. In 

some cases the lead tank and rear tank of a column 

were knocked out, blocking the escape of the 

remainder; wherever tanks were used in groups 

of more than two or three they made excellent 

targets for artillery. At no time did tanks prove 

a crucial factor in the final result of the battIe, 

although the prisoners paid tribute to the effectiveness with which the 1st Armored Division tanks 

were employed in the counterattacks on 19 February. 

The enemy's touted secret weapon, the Goliath 

tank, proved to be a dud. This was a squat miniature tank loaded with explosive and designed to 
breach obstacles such as mine fields, barbed wire, 

and concrete walls. The tanks were controlled 

and exploded by electrical impulses transmitted 

through a long cable. But for the capture of 

prisoners, VI Corps troops during the period of 

the offensive would not have been aware of the 

midget tank's presence at the beachhead. According to an engineer of the S13th Engineer Company. 

which was sent to the beachhead expressly for the 

offensive, the Goliaths were employed only on 

the first day of the attack, when thirteen of them 

bogged down; of these, three were blown up by 

Allied artillery fire and the other ten were dragged 

away. 

The morale of the enemy troops declined rapidly 

as the attack bogged down. They had been promised an easy victory. The 29th Pal1zer Gre1ladie,' 

Division went into the battle in high spirits. The 

troops had heard rumors that large numbers of 

Allied prisoners had been taken, that the attack 

was progressing favorably, that for once the German Air Force would not be busy on another front, 

and that they would be able to fight with tanks 

again. When they were subjected to Allied bombing and arrived on the front in the midst of what 

a prisoner called "carnage," they lost all desire to 

continue the attack. They felt they had been deceived and their morale suffered accordingly. 

The fighting spirit of the individual Allied 

soldier played an important part in the successful 

defense of the beachhead. During the dark hours 

of 18 February when the enemy infantry seemed 

to be infiltrating everywhere, when communications broke down, and when whole companies and 

battalions were cut off, it was the will to win of 

the Allied troops which gave them the strength 

to hold. With this spirit, the men of VI Corps had 

won the major battle in defense of the beachhead. 
VI CORPS HOLDS THE 

BEACHHEAD 

(20 FebruarY-3 March) 

Although the major enemy offensive to drive 

VI Corps into the sea had been repulsed, the Germans had no intention of abandoning their ultimate objective of annihilating the Anzio beachhead. Convinced that an immediate continuation 

of the frontal attack down the Albano road would 

be futile, the enemy turned his attention to the 

shoulders of the salient he had driven into the 

center of the beachhead defenses. At first, the 

Germans planned to mass their available forces 

against the eastern flank of the salient, along Spaccassasi Creek above Padiglione; but on 20 February they decided to concentrate on the western 

shoulder below Buonriposo Ridge. The Germans 

hoped that, by wearing down the shoulders of the 

salient, they would weaken the Allied forces holding the central beachhead defense sector so that 

the frontal attack down the Albano road could be 

successfully renewed. 

Many German units suffered such heavy losses 

in the assaults of 16-20 February that they had 

lost their offensive punch. By 19 February, the 

combat strength of the 65th blfantry Divisioll was 

only 901 officers and men, and 4 days later this 

figure had been reduced to 673. The 735th Infalltry Regi111e11t of the 715th Infantry Division had 

only 185 officers and men on 20 February; this 

remnant was assigned to the 725th Infalllry Regiment, which was itself severely depleted and had 

to be withdrawn from the front on 23 February. 

Under such circumstances, the Germans had to 

91 

pause to regroup and replenish their forces before 

they could again launch a large-scale attack. 

In view of the apparent German intention to 

continue the offensive, General Clark sent a message to General Lucas on 20 February urging him 

to make every effort to strengthen the weakened 

beachhead defenses. General Clark was particularly concerned about the shoulders of the salient, 

where the 157th and 180th Infantry's stubborn 

refusal to give ground had been a major factor in 

containing the enemy's drive. Steps were taken to 

reduce the front held by the exhausted regiments 

of the 45th Division and to organize effective reserve positions. 

In the two days after the successful counterattack launched by Force H on the morning of 19 

February, the 6th Armored Infantry (less the 2d 

Battalion) and the 30th Infantry were withdrawn 

to positions near Padiglione and Campomorto and 

placed in Corps reserve. Here they were in position to support the 180th Infantry on the right 

shoulder of the salient. On 22 February one battalion of the 30th Infantry reverted to the 3d Division, the boundary between the 45th and 3d Divisions was moved 1,500 yards west from Carano, 

and the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, took over this 

new sector, thereby shortening the front of the 

180th Infantry and adding strength to the critical 

shoulder. 

Responsibility for the left shoulder of the salient 

passed to the 1 and 56 Divisions. The 1 Division 
relieved the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, and the 

2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, in position 

north of the overpass and west of the Albano road. 

The 56 Division was given responsibility for relieving the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, which had 

succeeded in beating off every enemy attempt to 

destroy its hold on the anchor position of the left 

shoulder. 

The effect of the shift of boundaries was to reduce the front of the 45th Division by nearly 

one-half. The division took steps immediately to 

reorganize its units and strengthen the final beachhead line by assisting in the construction of a new 

Corps reserve line, 2,000 yards south of the lateral 

road. A series of battalion positions was laid out 

and the work of preparing them for defense divided among the units in reserve. On 19 February 

VI Corps ordered the 35th Antiaircraft Artillery 

Brigade to assemble a force of 30 officers and 650 

enlisted men to work on defenses and to be on 

2·hour alert for use as Corps reserve. Under the 

direction of the 120th Engineer Combat Battalion 

the antiaircraft troops assisted the 45th Division 

in constructing new reserve positions in the wooded 

areas a mile to the south of the final beachhead 

line. At the same time, by rotating the units in 

the line, the 45th Division was able to rehabilitate 

its depleted and tired troops, absorb new replacements, and rebuild its efficiency as a fighting unit. 

The 1 and 56 Divisions, which were now responsible for the left shoulder of the salient, also 

adopted a policy of rotating the forward troops 

in line. Lack of adequate replacements made it 

difficult to build up units depleted during the 

fighting for Campoleone and the Factory area as 

well as by the big attack. The brigades of the 1 

Division were far below strength, and the 56 Division had only one brigade, the 169, which was 

fresh. Heavy fighting during the period 2(}-25 

February further reduced the effective strength of 

the two divisions, and only the arrival of the 18 

Brigade on 25 February, which was attached to 

the 1 Division, prevented the situation from becoming critical. With the aid of the additional 

troops, work was rushed on new defenses to tie in 

with the 45th Division, while every effort was 

made to improve the old positions in the forward 

areas. The latter task was complicated by almost 

continuous pressure from the enemy against the 

shoulders of the salient. 

The Battle of the Caves 

The left shoulder of the salient was held 

throughout the period of the big offensive by the 

157th Infantry (less the 1st Battalion), assisted 

by the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry. (Map 

No. 18.) The troops were under almost constant 

fire for six days and it was imperative that they 

be relieved if the hold on the left shoulder was to 

be maintained. On the night of 21-22 February, 

1 Division troops moved up to effect the relief 

of the 3d Battalion, 157th Infantry, and the 2d 

Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, in position north 

of the first overpass and west of the Albano road. 

Not much remained of Company I, 157th Infantry. 

Of the 8 officers and 159 enlisted men with which 

he had entered the battle Captain Evans could find 

only 3 officers and 68 men to lead out of his small 

area of sheIl·cratered ground north of the overpass. 

The rest of his men had either been captured, 

blown to bits by artillery fire, or had died fighting 

to prevent the enemy infantry from crawling 

through the barbed wire protecting the company 

area. The 1 Division occupied its new positions 

without any immediate reaction from the enemy; 

the 56 Division which was assigned the task of 

relieving the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, was less 

fortunate. It became involved in what came to be 

known as the battle of the caves. 

At the beginning of the German offensive on 

16 February, the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, 

under the command of Lt. Col. Laurence C. Brown, 

was covering a front of over 2,000 yards extending 

from a point 500 yards east of the Albano road 

into a maze of deep ravines from which flow the 

headwaters of the Moletta River west of the highway. (Maps No. 15 and 16.) Enemy tanks, driving down the Albano road, rolled up the battalion 

right flank; enemy infantry, infiltrating up the 
THE CAVES, scene of biller fighting on the left of the beachhead, 

are graphically depicted ill Ihis sketch by soldier-artist Mitchell Siporhl. 

ravines, overran the left flank and repeatedly cut 

the battalion's supply route to the south. As squads 

and platoons were cut off one by one, the battalion 

was finally reduced to a small area 600 yards west 

of the highway where a series of caves provided 

a natural fortress. On the night of 18-19 February 

the enemy got close enough to throw hand grenades 

into the battalion command post. Friendly artillery 

fire was called down on the caves and the draws 

around them, effectively breaking up the attack. 

That night, fo llowing the successful attack by the 

2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, supplies were 

brought up. The next night one hundred wounded 

were evacuated. From then on the battalion was 

virtually cut off. By preventing the enemy from 

widening the salient the battalion had aided materially in saving the beachhead, but fresh troops 

were needed if the position was to be held. 

93 

It was important that VI Corps retain control of 

the left shoulder and particularly of the nehvork 

of dirt roads leading south to the fina l beachhead 

line. Once the enemy broke through to the lateral 

road west of the overpass he would be in position 

to cut the main supply route for the troops holding 

the Moletta River line. 

Unfortunately the attempt of General Templer 

to relieve the trapped battalion coincided with the 

enemy's decision to continue the offensive in an 

area where rough terrain favored infiltration. On 

the night of 21 February the 2/7 Queens' (56 

Division) reached the caves. On the way up the 

column was bombed and shelled and the supply 

train was held up by enemy opposition. An effort 

IThe second battalion organized in the British Army which bore 

the designation: "7 Battalion, The Queen's Royal Regiment (West 

Surrey) ," 
to send tanks and antitank guns up the main highway also failed with the loss of three tanks and 

one gun. The British troops reached the caves without supplies, ammunition, or supporting weapons 

and they had suffered about seventy casualties. 

When they took over the positions guarding the 

approaches to the caves, they had to be equipped 

with American automatic weapons. Then the 

enemy attacked. Capt. George O. Hubbert, artillery 

liaison officer with the battalion, called for the 

artillery concentration which had been fired on 

the night of 18-19 February and again the draws 

around the caves were filled with exploding shells 

and the moans of wounded Germans. The enemy 

assault was broken up, but it was impossible for 

the 2d Battalion to lea'.'e the caves that night. 

Fighting continued all day on 22 February while 

the British completed the task of occupying their 

new positions and the 2d Battalion assembled its 

men in preparation for a break-out. One party of 

fifteen men, including headquarters personnel, a 

mortar section, and artillery observers, was trapped 

in a group of houses 300 yards south of the caves. 

After dark an attempt was made to relieve the 

men and to clear a path through the enemy troops 

blocking the route of escape. Only the latter objective was achieved. At 0130, shielded by a dark 

night, Colonel Brown and his battalion, in column 

of companies, slipped out of the caves and struck 

south along the supply route toward the black-top 

road which marked the final beachhead line. Capt. 

Peter Graffagnino and his aid men elected to remain with the wounded, who had to be left behind. 

The troops had covered almost half the distance 

to safety when suddenly machine-gun and rifle fire 

lashed out at them from a group of houses. The 

men hit the ground and crawled for cover. The 

column was split. Colonel Brown and the first half 

of the column got through safely; the rest became 

scattered. Smoke was laid down over the area and 

in the early morning hours Captain Sparks and 

Capt. George D. Kessler, the battalion 5--3, managed to bring out part of the column. Small groups 

continued to filter through during the day. Captain 

Sparks was left without a single man in his Com94 

pany E until two days later when Sgt. Leon Siehr 

appeared. He had spent the last two days fighting 

with the British. Of the original battalion only 225 

men escaped and of this number 90 were hospital 

cases. After a week of almost constant fighting 

and nerve-shattering mortar and artillery fire, some 

men had lost their hearing, others were barely 

able to walk. For seven days and nights the battalion had fought off defeat. That any man returned is a tribute to the courage and stamina of 

the American infantry soldiers who have made the 

battle of the caves an epic of defensive fighting. 

The relief of the 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry, 

left the 2/ 7 Queens holding the caves and rolling 

farmland immediately to the south. Efforts of the 

2/ 6 Queens to get supplies through had failed 

Even urgent requests for supply by air had to be 

refused when stormy weather kept planes on the 

ground. On 23 February enemy infantry supported 

by tanks completed the work of sealing off the 

already diminished battalion. Two companies were 

overrun and a third was forced to withdraw into 

the caves with the battalion headquarters. After 

dark that night the remaining troops were divided 

into groups of twelve to fifteen and an attempt 

was made to infiltrate back to the positions of the 

2/ 6 Queens. Few succeeded. The effort to hold 

the former positions of the 2d Battalion, 157th 

Infantry, had to be abandoned, and the enemy completed his occupation of the bulge in the western 

shoulder of the salient. 

The battle of the caves did not end the fighting 

on the left shoulder. It was merely the most important and most costl y action in a bloody war of 

attrition in which whole squads and platoons disappeared without leaving a trace. The deep ravines 

and rough nature of the country west of the Albano road made it impossible to develop a continuous line of defense or to employ artillery effectively against the enemy groups which infiltrated 

between and into the positions of the defending 

troops. All of the units of the 1 and 56 Divisions 

holding the forward areas were tired and understrength; the units which were sent up to relieve 

them were in the same condition. The 56 Division 
reported on 25 February that its 167 Brigade was 

at only 35 percent of effective strength, the 168 

Brigade at 50 percent, and the 169 Brigade, which 

had seen no action at the beachhead before 20 

February, was down to 45 percent, not counting 

the 2/ 7 Queens, which had been reduced to 15 

percent during the battle of the caves. Although 

the enemy's tactics of nibbling away at the left 

shoulder failed to carry him as far south as the 

vital lateral road, the drain on the strength of the 

British divisions was becoming more serious daily. 

At the same time that the bitter struggle on the 

left shoulder of the salient was in progress, the 

enemy launched attacks in lesser strength against 

the right shoulder. (Map No. 18.) Late in the 

afternoon of 20 February enemy infantry attempted to infiltrate the positions of Lt. Col. James M. 

Churchill's 3d Battalion, 180th Infantry, covering 

the road leading north from the village of Padiglione, and of Company F, 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, astride La Ficoccia Creek. Intense concentrations of enemy artillery !ire preceded and 

accompanied the attacks. At noon three tanks 

of Company H, 1st Armored Regiment, protecting the bridge across Spaccasassi Creek, were 

damaged by the shelling; in the afternoon the 

remainder of the company and a platoon of 

Company I engaged the enemy tanks and infantry 

attacking the 180th Infantry. A bitter tank 

battle ensued before the enemy armor was driven 

off, and the 1 st Armored Regiment suffered such 

heavy losses that the remaining tanks of Companies H and I were consolidated under the control 

of Company H . To guard the infantry against a 

possible armored breakthrough, that night engineers, protected by troops of Company L, 180th 

Infantry, destroyed the bridge over Spaccasassi 

Creek. Two Germans, captured by the infantry, 

reported that they had been sent forward with a 

similar order to blow the vital bridge. 

On the morning of 21 February and again late 

in the afternoon the enemy continued his attacks 

against the right shoulder of the salient. Dive 

bombers and a 30-minute concentration of airburst antiaircraft fire preceded the afternoon at95 

tack. As on the previous day the infantry action 

was on a minor scale compared to the bloody battles of 16-19 February, but the artillery fire was 

the heaviest yet experienced at the beachhead. 

Occupying an exposed position near the blown 

bridge, 2d Lt. Walter F. Russell used his M-4 tank 

as a forward observation post. Pounded by the 

tank guns and by the accurate artillery fire called 

for by Lieutenant Russell (who was given a battlefield promotion the next day), the enemy tanks 

and infantry withdrew at dusk. That night, in an 

effort to renew the attack on the morning of the 

22 February, the enemy assembled a force of 

approximately four hundred men, including elements of the lJt and 2d Battalio1lS, 1028th Pallzer Grenadier Regillle/1t, the 741 Jt lllfantry Regiment, and the 114th and the Hermann Goering 

RecolmaiJJallce Battalio1lS. The variety of units 

represented and the relatively small size of the 

total force was proof that the enemy was having 

trouble finding troops to throw into the battle. 

The 180th Infantry called for defensive fires which 

so effectively covered all stream beds and avenues 

of approach that the enemy withdrew without 

making contact. 

2d Lt. Jack C. Montgomery, a platoon leader 

of Company I, 180th Infantry, saw to it that not 

all of the enemy returned. Two hours before daylight he detected troops moving into the no man's 

land directly in front of his platoon. Armed with 

a rifle and several grenades Lieutenant Montgomery crawled up a ditch to within a few yards 

of the nearest enemy position where the Germans 

had set up four machine guns and a mortar. Then, 

climbing onto a little knob, he fired his rifle and 

pelted the surprised Germans with hand grenades 

until he had killed eight men, and the remaining 

four in the position had surrendered. After returning with his prisoners and reporting to the artillery 

the location of a house where he suspected the 

main enemy force was concentrated, Lieutenant 

Montgomery picked up a carbine and started back 

up the shallow ditch. Locating a second position 

he silenced 2 machine guns, killed at least 3 of 

the enemy, and took 7 more prisoners. Although 
it was now daylight and the open fields offered no 

concealment, Montgomery refused to relinquish 

his role of one-man army. As soon as the artillery 

had finished firing on the house he had spotted 

as a strong point, he rushed forward and rounded 

up 21 stunned Germans to bring his total for the 

morning to 11 dead, 32 prisoners, and an unknown 

number of wounded. Against resistance of this 

kind the enemy gained little ground on the sector 

of the front held by the 180th Infantry. The effort 

to gnaw away the right shoulder of the salient was 

gIven up. 

While the attacks on the shoulders of the salient 

were in progress, General Mackensen proceeded 

with the regrouping and reinforcement of Fourteenth Army units in preparation for a oew major 

drive against the beachhead. Before the attack in 

the Albano road sector had ground to a standstill, 

the enemy had committed his reserve divisions, the 

26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier, in the 

areas previously held by the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

and 715th b,jalltry Divisiom. In preparing for the 

new offensive, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division 

was withdrawn into Army reserve, and the 26th 

Panzer Divisiofl was shifted to the Cisterna front. 

By the time that the Germans launched their new 

attack on the 3d Division front on 29 February, 

the Albano road sector south and west of the Factory was again occupied by the 65th Iflfafltry and 

3d Panzer Grenadier DiviJiom, both of which had 

received replacements and new attachments; the 

command of I Parachute Corps was extended to 

include these divisions, and its boundary with 

LXXVI Panzer Corps was now situated near the 

shoulder of the salient southeast of the Factory. 

For the new assault, German divisions under 

the command of LXXVI Pal1zer Corps were arranged as follows, in order from Spaccasassi Creek 

eastward to the Mussolini Canal: the 114th Light 

Divisiofl, facing southeast toward Carano, and 

reinforced by the attachment of the 1028th Panzer 

Gre/1adier Regi"'e/1t (formerly with the 715th 

llljantry Division); the 362d hlfantry Divisiofl, 

a newly organized unit initially engaged in coastwatching near the mouth of the Tiber, which was 

filled out with new units transferred from the 

Adriatic front; the 26th Panzer DiviJion, in position west of Ponte Rotto; and the H ermallll Goering Panzer Division. before Cisterna. Units under 

the command of the 715th Infalltry Division were 

also located at the eastern end of the front. With 

the 4th Parachute Division, which commanded the 

Moletta River line, Fourteellth Army had 9 divisions facing the 5 divisions of VI Corps, and 5 of 

the German divisions had been concentrated for 

an assault on the U.S. 3d Division. (Map No. 

19.) The enemy divisions were considerably understrength, however, and there was no great disparity 

in numbers between the opposing Allied and German forces. 

The initial objective of the impending German 

drive was to penetrate the outer beachhead defense 

positions on a line running from Carano to Isola 

Bella. Depending on the success of the first day's 

attack, the enemy then planned to push toward the 

west branch of the Mussolini Canal-the Jinal 

Allied beachhead defense line. If the attack developed successfully, FOf/rtee/1th Army planned to 

commit the reserve 29th Panzer G"madier Divis;o" to bolster the assault of the advancing German 

forces, either on the west flank along Spaccasassi 

Creek or in a surprise attack against the 3d Division right flank to be launched from east of the 

main Mussolini Canal. 

On the eve of the German attack of 29 February, 

the forward positions of the 3d Division extended 

from a point one mile west of Carano to the junction of the west brandl with the main M ussolini 

Canal. The outer defense line was held by the 

following units, in order from west to east: the 

509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, with the attached 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, on the left, 

occupied the forward line on either side of Carano; 

the 7th Infantry, the line from Formal del Bove 

Creek to Ponte Rotto; the 15th Infantry, from 

Ponte Ratto through Isola Bella to a position just 

west of Cisterna Creek; and the 504th Parachute 

Infantry, with the attached 4th Ranger Battalion 

on the left, from Cisterna Creek to the Mussolini 

Canal and thence to its junction with the west 
REGROUPING 

OF 

FORCES 

21- 27 FEBRUARY 1944 

All positions ore approximate as of 

271200 Febrvory 1944 

General line for period '21- 27 Feb 

Contour mleflfUl 20 meters 

9 .,"" 

Sobolino 

'J 

1 

MAP NO. 19 
branch. Each regiment in the forward line had one 

or more battalions in reserve, and the bulk of the 

30th Infantry was also held in reserve. (Map No. 

19.) Because of the relaxation of enemy pressure 

against the western half of the beachhead front 

after 25 February, VI Corps had ample reserves 

to reinforce the 3d Division in case the enemy 

seriously threatened to break through its positions. 

The regrouping of Allied forces after the Germans had been stopped on 20 February was accompanied by a change in the command of VI Corps. 

The former commander of the 3d Division, General Truscott, who had been named Deputy Commander of VI Corps on 17 February, succeeded 

General Lucas as Commander of VI Corps on 

23 February. General Lucas returned to the United 

States, where he subsequently became Commanding General of the Fourth Army. 

The 3d Division Repulses the E,zemy 

On the afternoon of 28 February the enemy laid 

down a smoke screen on the front of the 3d Division to conceal last-minute troop movements. 

After midnight enemy artillery fire shifted from 

the British front to the 3d Division sector, paying 

special attention to the village of Carano. VI 

Corps, anticipating the attack on the 3d Division, 

had matched the shift of enemy guns to the east 

by moving the 27th and 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions to the vicinity of Conca where they 

could thicken the fire of the 3d Division artillery. 

At 0430, Corps and division artillery responded to 

the enemy fire with an hour-long counter preparation which blasted the enemy front-line positions 

and assembly areas. For every shell that cratered 

the muddy ground or struck a farmhouse within 

the American lines, VI Corps' massive array of 

guns threw back twenty. The Germans estimated 

that Allied artillery fired 66,000 rounds of ammunition on 29 February, more than double the number 

fired on any single day in the big offensive of 16-

20 February. Artillery alone could not stop the 

attack. Just as the first streaks of dawn glinted on 

the snow-covered peaks of the Lepini Mountains 

97 

, ~_./ ,6J' 

MAJ. GEN. LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT 

Commanding Genera/I VI CorpI 

(23 February 1944) 

smoke began rolling in on the 3d Division front. 

A few moments later 3d Division artillery observers were calling frantically for fire missions 

as one choice target after another presented itself. 

Striking at half a dozen points along the front, 

enemy infantry and armor surged forward against 

the 3d Division defenses. (Map No. 20.) 

Of the enemy's initial attacks only the one 

directed against the sector of the 509th Parachute 

Infantry Battalion achieved any appreciable success. For this attack the enemy assigned the 1028fh 

Pallzer GI'e/ladier Regiment the mission of taking 

the village of Carano, and elements of the 362d 

Infal1lry Division were to reach the road junction 

a mile and one-half southeast of Carano. Engineer 

troops were to assist the assault waves in opening 

gaps through the outer defenses. 

The principal attack struck Company B, 509th 

Parachute Infantry, which was dug in on a low 

hill a mile northeast of the village of Carano. 
When artillery fire began falling on the company 

area, 1st Lt. John R. Martin, the company commander, called for counterbattery and defensive 

fires from the supporting artillery and the 83d 

Chemical Battalion's 4.2-inch mortars. Enemy 

shells knocked out the telephone lines to the battalion and all firing had to be done without observation. Before dawn, company outposts spotted 

the first wave of gray-green troops advancing 

through the smoke screen. The little group on the 

hill held its fire, waiting for the enemy to come 

within range. The smoke was beginning to lift 

now and the defending troops could see more 

clearly. Suddenly, as enemy assault engineers, 

equipped with wire cutters and bangalore torpedoes, began cutting paths through the shell-torn 

barbed wire, the hill erupted in a sheet of flame. 

Rifle and machine-gun bullets tore gaps in the 

advance wave of the attackers. The Germans faltered, then pushed on. Singing and shouting they 

swarmed up the slope and rushed the positions of 

the greatly outnumbered paratroopers. When the 

enemy closed in on the company command post, 

the executive officer, in the absence of Lieutenant 

Martin, who was believed to have heen wounded, 

ordered the remnants of the company to withdraw. 

Only one officer and twenty-two men reached the 

battalion's main line of resistance some 700 yards 

to the rear. The rest of the company was listed as 

missing in action, though many men were killed 

in the final hand-to-hand struggle for possession 

of the hill. 

Having broken through the initial beachhead 

line of resistance the troops of the 1 st Battaliol/, 

1028th Panzer Gretzadier Regillletzt, who led the 

assault, swung southwest across the open fields 

I ying between Carano Creek and Formal del Bove 

Creek, which ran through deep ravines leading 

south toward the west branch of the Mussolini 

Canal. Advancing on a 1,000-yard skirmish line, 

the enemy closed in on the paratroopers of Company A who were dug in north of the road below 

Carano. At 0735, Lt. Col. William P. Yarborough, 

the battalion commander, tried to get a call 

through requesting air support. The line to the 

rear was out. When the 7th Infantry, on the right, 

scnt a platoon of its supporting tanks to assist, 

muddy fields held them up. It was left to the 

artillery, the mortars, and the ninety-six men comprising Company A to stop the attack. Division 

and Corps artillery were now zeroed in on the 

attacking troops, and the paratroopers 81-mm. 

mortar platoon and three 6o-mm. mortars located 

along the Carano road fired with deadly effect, 

SMOKE OVER THE FRONT LINES WaJ the prevalent (ondition 

d"ring the Auzio campaig11 as Olle force or the other prepared for all atlack. This pic/fire, taken from a !armhome observation posl, 'shoun the 

zOlle of a German allark aud obut/fn the Lepil1i MOlm/aim beyond. 
HOLDING 

THE BEACHHEAD 

ENEMY ATIACKS 

OF 

2B FEB 10 3 MAR 1944 

"-"'J; General Line 01 befjlOJlIng 

GOd end of period 

o 

.,w; 1 

MAP NO. 20 
until the enemy got so close that the mortar men 

had to reach for their riRes. Under lire from all 

sides the enemy force stopped short of the road 

and sought cover in the ditches. It had penetrated 

800 yards to the intermediate beachhead line, but 

the enemy needed to widen his narrow salient if 

he was to capitalize on his initial success. 

Simultaneous enemy attacks to gain ground on 

the Ranks of the salient failed. West of Carano 

the assault parties of the 2d Ballaliol/, 1028th 

Pal/zer Grmadier Regiment, attacking at 0530, became tangled in the wire in front of Company I, 

30th Infantry. Before they could cut their way 

through, machine-gun lire killed a German officer, 

and twenty-one of his men surrendered. At 0630 

the attack was repeated. Again a German officer 

was killed and eighteen more of the enemy Surrendered. Tank and infantry attacks against Company L, 30th Infantry, were broken up by artillery 

lire and a platoon of the 751st Tank Battalion. 

Sgt. William Bolich had concealed his tank in a 

house where he could cover the road into Carano. 

While he was observing from the turret, an enemy 

shell struck the house bringing down part of the 

stone and masonry wall. Sergeant Bolich was struck 

in the back by a piece of concrete and a second 

block damaged the elevating mechanism of the 

75-mm. gun so that the muzzle could not be raised. 

In spite of his injured back, Sergeant Bolich 

crawled out of the turret and propped up the barrel of the gun sufficiently to allow the gunner to 

lire. In the COurse of the day the damaged M-4 

knocked out three Mark IV tanks and effectively 

stopped the armored attack. 

East of Carano the troops of the 362d IIlfantry 

Division tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to 

deepen and widen the salient that had been won 

between Carano Creek and Formal del Bove Creek, 

directing their attacks against the 2d Battalion, 

7th Infantry. In each case massed Corps and division artillery lire broke up the infantry drives, while 

supporting tanks and tank destroyers held off the 

enemy armor. Mortar lire systematically searched 

the deep ditches which the enemy used as routes 

of approach and as protection against the artillery. 

99 

During the morning of 29 February the Allied 

air effort was nullilied by heavy clouds and squalls, 

but beginning at 1500 247 lighter-bombers and 24 

light bombers bombed and strafed enemy tanks and 

infantry close behind the lines. In the attacks on 

the west flank of the 3d Division front which had 

begun at daylight, the Germans had gained some 

ground but were unable to exploit their penetration. Although communication within American 

units was poor, individual positions remained secure. The danger of a breakthrough on the division left appeared to be over. At 1930 the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, and a platoon of Company 

C, 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, launched a 

counterattack to regain the lost ground. 

East of the Carano sector, other troops of the 

362d Infa1ltry Divisio1l attempted to penetrate between the positions of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 

7th Infantry, along the axis of Le Mole Creek. 

Making use of the dirt roads leading south through 

the rolling country between the ditches, enemy 

tanks in groups of three to six supported the infantry. One platoon of Company G was overrun 

by tanks and Colonel Sherman had to commit elements of the reserve 1st Battalion. Small-scale but 

bitter lighting raged all along the front as the opposing forces struggled to gain control of strategic 

farmhouses or knolls. Colonel Sherman's troops 

held their ground and at the end of the day the 

362d Infalll"y Division had little to show for its 

efforts. 

Farther to the east the 26th Pamer Divisioll had 

better success. Mark IV and Mark VI Tiger tanks 

attacked the 3d Battalion's right Rank west of 

Ponte Rotto. Striking at noon down the CisternaCampomorto road the tanks and armored infantry 

drove Company L back from a bridge 1,000 yards 

southwest of Ponte Rotto. Lt. Col. William A. 

Weitzel, the 3d Battalion commander, sent a platoon of Company I forward to assist Company L, 

and the advance was checked. Late in the afternoon Ilebelwerfer rockets screamed into the 3d 

Battalion's positions and smoke covered the area 

as the 26th Panzer Division attempted unsuccessfully to exploit its gains. General O'Daniel and 
Colonel Sherman immediately took steps to deal 

with the danger of an armored breakthrough. 

After dark, engineers were ordered forward to 

mine and crater the road, tank destroyers and 

antitank guns were sent up, and artillery and 

mortar lire was concentrated on the enemy tanks. 

The 81-mm. mortars, in addition to their role of 

holding off the enemy infantry, had already accounted for two of the tanks, but so long as the 

enemy retained control of the captured bridge the 

threat of renewed attacks remained. 

For his attack on the 15th Infantry, which held 

the ground on both sides of the Conca-Cisterna 

road, General Mackensen employed elements of 

the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. Before 

dawn a patrol of forty to lifty men infiltrated to 

the east of Isola Bella. It managed to get through 

the barbed wire and mine fields without being detected, and by daylight it was well within the outer 

beachhead defense line. There it was trapped and 

during the day the scattered enemy troops were 

mopped up before they could do any damage. The 

principal threat came from enemy tanks operating 

down tbe roads from Cisterna and Ponte Ratto. 

The tanks carried personnel for the purpose of 

clearing the roads of obstacles; otherwise, infantry played only a slight part in the attack. Company G, covering the battered village of Isola Bella, 

was under tank lire all day. Just before noon one 

platoon was driven out of its positions and at the 

end of the day tbe company was reduced to thirtyeight men with another twenty-five in the attached 

Company H, although others found their way 

back during the night. Company F was sent up to 

assist it and the key position of Isola Bella was 

held. The enemy's efforts to keep his tanks hidden 

in smoke only partly succeeded and the destroyers 

of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion had a field 

day. They knocked out at least seven of the attacking tanks and damaged nine others. 

Enemy units under the command of the 715th 

In/amry DivisiOlI also launched diversionary attacks against the right Rank of the 3d Division 

near the Mussolini Canal. In the sector of the 504th 

Parachute Infantry a composite company made up 

100 

of elements drawn from the 715th Engineer Battalion and the 16th SS-ReichsJuehrer Division attacked at dawn to capture a bridge across Cisterna 

Creek. The 4th Ranger Battalion broke up the 

attack. Farther to the south Combat Group Schilldler, made up of odds and ends of the 715th lIl/antry and Hef11la11l1 Goering Panzer Divisio1lS, attempted to gain a bridgehead across the Mussolini 

Canal south of the village of Borgo Sabatino. Engineers carrying light foot ladders for use as bridging equipment led the advance. A strong patrol 

from the 1st Special Service Force laid an ambush 

in the no man's land on the east side of the canal 

and when the surprised enemy troops, many of 

whom were young and inexperienced boys, took 

refuge in a group of houses, artillery lire was concentrated on them. Thrown into confusion by the 

shelling, the enemy troops scattered. By midafternoon General Frederick's patrols, whose raids into 

enemy territory had for days kept their opponents 

terrorized, rounded up 4 officers and 107 men. 

At the end of the first day of his offensive the 

enemy had hardly dented the 3d Division's outer 

line of defense. His tactic of attacking on a wide 

front with infantry units of company and battalion 

size, probably dictated by the open nature of the 

terrain and respect for VI Corps superiority in artillery, had broken down against the well-organized positions of the 3d Division troops. His armor, 

although more successful than the infantry, was 

hampered by mine fields and the ever-present mud 

which made it almost impossible to operate off the 

roads. Employed in small groups, the enemy tanks 

and self-propelled guns lacked the power necessary to achieve a breakthrough and they made good 

targets for VI Corps' emplaced tanks and tank destroyers. In the course of the day twenty-one enemy 

tanks were reported destroyed. 

In holding off the enemy attacks the forward battalions of the 3d Division suffered heavy losses. 

They were forced to commit their reserve companies to back up the line, and individual companies 

from regimental reserves were drawn upon for 

local counterattacks. Nevertheless, with the exception of the commitment of the 2d Battalion, 30th 
Infantry, to regain the ground lost northeast of 

Carano, the drain on division and Corps reserves 

was slight. Since it was estimated that the enemy 

still had available a considerable reserve of tanks, 

General Truscott attached to the 3d Division an 

additional company of tank destroyers and the 3d 

Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment. Orders also were 

issued that all roads leading into the beachhead 

should be cratered and new mine fields laid. With 

a large air support program promised, the 3d Division faced the second day of the enemy's offensive 

in a spirit of confidence. 

The pattern of the enemy attacks on 1 March 

followed closely that of the preceding day, but on 

a reduced scale; their effectiveness was lessened 

by the vigorous countermeasures which General 

O'Daniel had taken to strengthen his positions. 

The counterattack launched by the 2d Battalion, 

30th Infantry, late in the afternoon of 29 February, made good progress until the early morning 

hours of 1 March, when it was held up by enemy 

troops dug in around a house east of Carano. The 

battalion stopped to reorganize and then continued 

the attack at dawn, bypassing the point of resistance and pushing on to reach its objective, the former outpost line of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, by 0830. Seventy-six prisoners were 

taken and an enemy counterattack repulsed during 

the morning. Before the enemy could launch a 

large-scale attack early in the afternoon, the battalion had consolidated its positions. Eighteen battalions of artillery were concentrated on the counterattacking enemy troops and their attack broke 

down. By dawn of 2 March the 30th Infantry had 

relieved all elements of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, which then passed into division reserve. The enemy's hard-won gains on the 3d 

Division left flank had been erased. 

The principal action on 1 March centered around 

the captured bridge southwest of Ponte Ratto. Efforts made by the 7th Infantry during the night of 

29 February-l March to destroy the enemy tanks 

at the bridge failed. Bazooka squads were stopped 

by enemy infantry protecting the bogged-down 

tanks and when, at General O'Danie!'s suggestion, 

101 

an attempt was made to illuminate them with 

lIares so that the tank destroyers could fire, pouring rain ruined most of the flares. At 0345 Company K, astride a dirt road northwest of the bridge, 

was attacked by tanks and infantry. The tanks 

rolled right into the company lines and blasted the 

men from their fox holes, virtually annihilating 

one platoon_ As all of their bazookas were out of 

order the men fought back with Molotov cocktails 

and sticky grenades. Artillery came to their support 

and the attack was stopped. At dawn the enemy 

shifted the emphasis to Company L near the bridge. 

The steady rain, which kept Allied planes on the 

ground, likewise hampered the movement of the 

enemy armor, already hemmed in by road craters 

and mine fields, and the attacks against the 7th 

Infantry as well as similar armored and infantry 

attacks against the 15th Infantry near Isola Bella, 

failed to gain any ground. General Truscott expressed his satisfaction in the progress of the battle 

when he told General O'Daniei he was "delighted 

with the way you have stopped the Bache." 

Clear weather on 2 March permitted the Mediterranean Allied Air Force to carry out the extensive air program planned for the preceding day. It 

was an impressive display of Allied air power. Two 

hundred forty-one B-24 Liberators and 100 B-17 

Fortresses, with 113 P-38 Lightnings and 63 P-47 

Thunderbolts providing top cover, dropped thousands of fragmentation bombs on areas around 

Cisterna, Velletri, and Carroceto. The total of 351 

heavy bombers was even greater than that 1I0wn on 

17 February, the peak day in the air support given 

to VI Corps during General Mackensen's big drive. 

An equally impressive force of medium, light, and 

fighter-bombers concentrated on enemy tanks, gun 

positions, and assembly areas, particularly along 

the railroad running through Cisterna and Campoleone which served the enemy both as a final defense line and an assembly area from which to 

launch his attacks. The combined eflect of the tremendolls weight of bombs dropped during the daylight hours of 2 March and night bombing of the 

roads around Cisterna aided materially in dissuading the enemy from continuing the offensive. 
Ground action on 2 March was on a limited 

scale. West of the Albano road the enemy resumed 

his tactics of infiltration on the front of the 1 and 

56 Divisions and he launched one tank and infantry attack down the road to Isola Bella. In all cases 

the attacks were beaten off. At Ponte Ratto enemy 

engineers were busy constructing a bridge across 

Femminamorta Creek in an effort to salvage tanks 

which had been damaged or stuck in the mud and 

to open a way for a continuation of the attack on 

the 7th Infantry. Colonel Sherman's troops also 

were trying to get at the German tanks. A knocked 

out M-4 blocked the road making it impossible to 

get antitank guns forward. In the morning a 

bazooka squad managed to get close enough to 

throw Molotov cocktails at a tank. Three hits from 

a bazooka bounced off without damaging it and 

two Molotov cocktails were equally ineffective 

when they failed to catch fire. After dark the men 

tried again with more success. One tank was set 

afire and bazookas scored five hits on a Tiger tank. 

Artillery and tank destroyers had already disposed 

of at least four others. The stretch of road between 

the captured bridge and Ponte Ratto was becoming 

a graveyard of enemy armor. At Isola Bella enemy 

tank recovery crews tried to reach a damaged Ferdinand tank destroyer and a Tiger tank. Flares were 

shot over the area and the 601st Tank Destroyer 

Battalion saw to it that the damaged vehicles were 

still there the next morning. 

At dawn on 3 March the enemy renewed his attack on the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, southwest 

of Ponte Ratto. Tanks and armored infantry of the 

26th Panzer Division broke through Company L's 

positions astride the road, forcing a slight withdrawal. Then the battalion held, and in the afternoon the 3d Division switched to the offensive. 

Colonel Sherman sent Company A, under Captain 

Athas, and Company B, under Maj. Lloyd B. Ramsey, up the road toward Ponte Ratto to recapture 

the contested bridge and restore the 7th Infantry's 

former positions. The division artillery poured 

smoke shells into the area ahead of the troops before the attack was launched at 13 30. Some of the 

smoke drifted over beyond Ponte Ratto, giving the 

102 

15th Infantry the impression that it was the enemy 

who was preparing to attack. The 15th Infantry 

expended a lot of ammunition laying down defensive fires across its front until a call to 7th Infantry 

headquarters clarified the situation. The smoke 

was thin at first, then it improved and the two companies moved forward. Company B, attacking on 

the north side of the road, reached its objective 

northwest of the bridge without difficulty; two 

platoons of Company A, attacking along and to the 

south of the road, reached the crater where the engineers had created a road block. There they were 

met by tank fire and a terriEc concentration of artillery. Captain Athas was killed and when the two 

platoons withdrew to reorganize only thirty men 

were left. Although the enemy still held the contested bridge, the counterattack served its purpose 

of stopping the enemy attack. At Isola Bella the 

15th Infantry sent one company to regain the 

ground which had been lost on the first day of the 

enemy attack. No opposition was encountered and 

the former positions were reoccupied. 

The counterattacks launched by the 3d Division 

on the afternoon of 3 March marked the end of the 

enemy's third and last major assault against the 

Anzio beachhead. It was a costly failure for the 

Germans. Their losses were heavy, both in personnel and equipment; in five days of fighting, 29 

February-4 March, they suffered more than 3,500 

battle casualties, and at least 30 of their tanks were 

destroyed. In this final attack, the Germans had 

made no further progress in reducing the size of 

the beachhead; their penetrations in the 3d Division outpost line of defense were almost wiped out 

by Allied counterattacks. Their units had sustained 

heavy losses and the lack of adequate replacements 

rendered the Fourteenth Army for the time being 

incapable of further large-scale offensive action. 

The troops of VI Corps were also approaching 

the point of exhaustion. Six weeks of almost continuous bombing, shelling, and bitter fighting, first 

to extend the beachhead and then to hold off the 

enemy attacks, had taken a terrific toll in lives and 

energy. Fortunately the 3d Division, which bore the 

brunt of the last enemy offensive, had been given 
ENEMY LOSSES in eq"ipmenl alld perlollllel were high ill Ihe a/lacki 

of 29 Febrtlary-3 iUarch. Above: A mine-sweeping detail is clearing Ihe 

area arollnd deltroyed German Mark IV lanks. Below: Prisoners are 

loaded onto 411 Lei at Al1zioJ enrOIiJe 10 a P,.iJOIl camp. Some priJollerJ 

were RPuiallJ previollIly captllred by the enemy. 
an opportunity to prepare for the final German 

attack. The weeks when the enemy was concentrating his assaults along the axis of the Albano 

road had been used to absorb and train replacements and to strengthen defenses. As General 

Mackensen learned to his cost. the beachhead forward line of defense had been developed into a 

well-integrated and formidable barrier. When the 

enemy attack lost its momentum. the 3d Division. 

although weakened. was still capable of sustained 

fighting and its positions were almost intact. 

The situation in the British sector of the beachhead improved as the enemy weakened. The arrival 

on 2 March of the 9 and 40 Royal Marine Commandos with a total strength of 660 men provided 

a force of fresh and highly trained troops. Assigned to the 56 Division. the Commandos were 

employed in raids along the fluid front west of 

the Albano road. The tactics of guerilla warfare. 

which the enemy employed SO successfully while 

he retained the initiative. were now turned against 

him. The situation was further improved when the 

British 5 Division moved to the beachhead during 

the second week of March and relieved the weakened 56 Division. 

Field Marshal Kesselring sent a message to General Mackensen at 1840 on 1 March ordering that 

the assault against the 3d Division be halted. and 

that offensive operations be limited to local counterattacks. FotlYteenth Army relayed these orders 

to its subordinate units. and the last major enemy 

drive against the Anzio beachhead came to an end. 

The enemy attributed the failure of his final drive 

to bad weather and to the poor condition of the 

assaulting troops. Four days of intermittent rain 

(27 February-1 March) had bogged down enemy 

armor. and it seemed pointless to continue the 

costly infantry attacks without armored support. A 

more important explanation of the enemy failure. 

in the opinion of the commander of the Fourteenth 

Army. was the inadequate training of units received as reinforcements. the youth and inexperience of replacements. and the general depletion 

and exhaustion of the attacking forces after the 

previous weeks of heavy fighting. At a German 

High Command conference 011 3 March. the enemy 

decided to abandon. at least for the time being. all 

plans for further major offensive operations 011 the 

Anzio front. On 4 March. Fourtee1lth Army issued 

an order to its units instructing them to hold their 

present positions and to develop them defensively 

as quickly as possible. The German High Command had given official recognition to a situation 

already apparent to its troops: the enemy efforts 

to destroy the beachhead had failed. 

The enemy had started his offensive in a spirit 

of confidence and with the determination to make 

any sacrifice necessary to victory. He had drawn 

upon his dwindling reserves in northern Italy. 

France. Yugoslavia. and Germany to build up an 

effective striking force. Then he attacked. His first 

drive. designed to pave the way for the breakthrough. was launched with skill and aggressive· 

ness. and he won his objectives. In the period 3-10 

February the Campoleone salient was wiped out. 

and the Factory and Carroceto were taken. He had 

then massed his forces for the blow which he expected would carry his infantry and armor through 

to the sea. In the crucial struggle of 16-20 February. the beachhead line of defense bent. but did 

not break. Although the enemy attempted to continue his offensive and to pour more troops into 

the battle after 20 February. he was unable to make 

up his losses or restore the confidence of his troops. 

His attacks during the last drive launched on 29 

February showed both timidity and lack of coordination. The enemy's efforts to win a victory whkh 

would bolster flagging morale at home and restore 

the reputation of the German Army abroad had 

broken down against the stubborn resistance of the 

Allied troops holding the Anzio beachhead; they 

had brought him only a further depletion of his 

already strained resources in equipment and manpower. 
THE BREAKTHROUGH 

After the repulse of the German attack on the 

3d Division, the character of the fighting at Anzio 

underwent a radical change. For nearly three 

months, VI Corps and Fourteenth Army limited 

their operations to an active defense of the positions they held at the conclusion of the German 

offensive. The Allied and enemy forces in the 

Anzio area were marking time, awaiting the renewal of Allied offensive operations on the southern front. Both forces engaged in aggressive patrolling. The Allied Air Force and VI Corps artiltery 

constantly pounded enemy positions, and the enemy retaliated with medium and long-range artillery fire and air raids against Allied shipping and 

supply dumps. After drafting plans for renewing 

his offensive against the beachhead, the enemy 

decided to conserve his depleted combat strength 

for the big Allied drive to come. VI Corps built 

up its forces and accumulated a huge supply reserve 

in preparation for the great May offensive which 

was to carry the Fifth Army through to Rome. 

Adjusting itself to its new defensive role, the 

Fourteenth Army regrouped its forces by reducing 

the number of units occupying the perimeter of the 

beachhead front. During March, the Hermann 

Goering Panzer DiviJioll was sent north to Leghorn 

for rest and refitting; the 114th Light DiviJion was 

transferred to the Adriatic front; and Fourteenth 

Army' J two best divisions, the 26th Panzer and 

29th Panzer Grmadier, were withdrawn to the 

area south of Rome as Army reserves. These two 

divisions were subsequently designated as Army 

Group reserves, making them available for action 

against an Allied offensive in the south, a new attempt of VI Corps to break out of the beachhead, 

or a new Allied landing in the enemy rear above 

Anzio. Some replacement units arrived at the 

beachhead, including two battalions of Italian 

troops that were employed east of the main Mussolini Canal in the Littoria sector. The Germans displayed little confidence in their Axis partners, brigading them with German formations down to 

alternate platoons in the line and at night taking 

over the positions held by Italian troops. 

The enemy regroupings substantially reduced the 

combat strength of the forces holding the beachhead perimeter; in early April, only the reinforced 

3d Panzer G"madier DiviJioll was rated as having 

first-class combat quality. But the total number of 

F01lrtemth Army troops was greater in mid-March 

than during the February offensives. As of 14 

March, it reported a strength of 135,698, a total 

which included about 65,800 German combat 

troops; by 10 April, this combat strength had 

increased to 70,400. 

105 

The enemy seriously considered a renewal of 

offensive operations at Anzio. Tentative plans 

drafted on 13 March provided for a large-scale 

attack to be launched on 29 March either in the 

Albano road sector or from Cisterna. On 23 March 

the date of the projected attack was postponed, and 

it was abandoned altogether on 10 April. Field 

Marshal Kesselring was reluctant to commit his 

best reserves, the 26th Parlzer and 29th Panzer 

Grenadier DiviJiolls, in a renewed offensive at 

Anzio; without them, General Mackensen judged 

that a large-scale attack could not succeed. When 

the Allies finally launched their spring offensive 
along the southern front on 11 May, the enemy 

was forced to strip the FOllrteenth Army of its reserves in order to check the Allied advance. Thus, 

when VI Corps joined in the offensive on 23 May, 

the forces opposing it had been greatly weakened. 

Fifth Army also undertook an extensive program of regrouping and reinforcement of VI Corps 

units at Anzio. Among British units, the 56 Division, which had been rushed to Anzio in the criticals days of February, was relieved by the 5 Division in early March and left the beachhead. The 

British Commando units were also withdrawn. The 

1 Division remained at Anzio, except for the 24 

Guards Brigade which was sent to Naples to reorganize; it was replaced by the 18 Brigade. Of the 

American units, only the paratroopers and Ranger 

Force left the beachhead. The 504th Parachute 

Infantry, long overdue to rejoin the 82d Airborne 

Division, left for the United Kingdom late in 

March; on 1 April the 509th Parachute Infantry 

Battalion also departed. These losses were more 

than offset by the arrival of new units, notably the 

A DESTROYED AMMUNITION DUMP ill Ihe beachhead area, hil by 

German tong-range artillery. Allhough thiJ slack of abOIll 25 10m of 

J05 -mm. ammlllJiJioJl was destroyed, the explosion was kept from spreading by the earthen revetments which protected every stlpp/y pile. 
veteran 34th Division; this division, which began 

to disembark on 21 March, relieved the 3d Division 

on the Cisterna front on 28 March, after the latter 

had completed sixty-seven consecutive days of 

front-line duty. The arrival of 14,000 replacements 

in March brought Allied units up to full strength. 

By the end of the month the numerical strength 

of the combat units of VI Corps was equal to that 

of six full divisions-approximately 90,000 menand considerably exceeded that of the opposing 

Fourteenth Army. 

VI Corps, like the enemy, at least contemplated 

a resumption of the offensive during March. Preliminary plans for a large-scale operation in the 

Albano road sector were issued on 11 March. A 

definite plan was outlined in Field Order No. 18 

of 18 March. It proposed a frontal assault by the 

British 1 and 5 Divisions against the German salient astride the Albano road; meanwhile the American 45th Division was to attack from the southeast 

toward the Factory. The 5 Division was to continue 

its attack along the old railroad bed which ran 

northwest from Carroceto. The 45th Division, in 

cooperation with the 3d Division striking from the 

east, was to follow through by capturing the Factory and Carroceto. The 1st Armored Division 

would then pass through the 1 Division up the 

Albano road and exploit the advances of the infantry. Other projects for offensive operations were 

issued in April for planning purposes, but there 

seems to have been no serious intent of putting 

them into effect. VI Corps as well as the enemy 

awaited the renewal of the offensive in the south. 

In the meantime, it limited its operations to patrolling and local attacks designed to keep the enemy 

on the defensive. 

The description of some of a typical day's operations and events may serve to illustrate the weeks 

of relative inaction at Anzio. Before dawn on 15 

April, eight enemy aircraft dropped antipersonnel 

and high explosive bombs in the areas of the 1 

Division and 1st Armored Division. They struck 

an ammunition dump and a gasoline dump, and 

caused a few casualties at the 1st Armored Division 

command post. Antiaircraft shot down one of the 

107 

enemy planes and probably destroyed another. At 

0530, the 2d Regiment of the 1st Special Service 

Force, supported by twelve tanks of the 1st Armored Regiment, launched a raid on the village of 

Cerreto Alto, southwest of Littoria; after seizing 

this objective and other enemy positions in the 

vicinity, the raiding force withdrew at 1115. Sixtyone enemy prisoners, including seventeen Italians, 

were captured. The attacking force suffered only 

one casualty but lost two medium tanks. Elsewhere 

along the front the situation remained unchanged. 

Enemy artillery fire was somewhat lighter than on 

preceding days, and the usual long-range firing of 

heavy enemy guns did not occur. American artillery fires were directed against enemy tanks and 

self-propelled guns in front of Isola Bella; and in 

the afternoon the newly introduced 240-mm. howitzers destroyed several enemy-occupied buildings 

in the vicinity of Cisterna. On the British front, 

mortars were used to scatter enemy troops working 

on fixed defenses. During the day, Allied planes 

flew ninety-nine sorties in the VI Corps area, somewhat fewer than normal. Behind the lines, 3,513 

tons of supplies were unloaded, slightly above the 

average daily total of 3,191 for April. Total combat casualties of VI Corps on 15 April were 105 

(20 killed, 83 wounded, and 2 missing) , slightly 

below the daily average of 107.5 for April. 

The Problem of SuPplJI 

The Anzio landing of VI Corps as originally conceived was to be the prelude to a short-term operation that would lead to a quick junction with an 

advancing main Fifth Army. When that advance 

failed to materialize, the initial plans for supplying 

the beachhead had to be radically revised and expanded. Supplies were brought in by preloaded 

trucks on LST's, by LCT's, and on Liberty ships. 

Beginning on 28 January, a convoy of six LST's was 

dispatched daily from Naples, each vessel carrying 

fifty preloaded trucks. Each convoy brought in a 

1,500-ton load, 60 percent of which was ammuni~ 

tion, 20 percent fuel, and 20 percent rations. Fifteen LCT's also made a weekly turnaround from 
A RAID ON AN ENEMY POSITION, as seen in these tOllr pictllres, 

was typical of operations il1 Ihe weeks of relative quiet at Anzio. Above: 

A 1 s/ Special Service Force detachment at/acks the position. Below: Rifle 

fire keeps the enemy down as the team moves closer. 

r08 
RUSHING THE FARMHOUSE after the German defender! had been 

seen leaving the building! (above) dnd, finally, soldiers ;11 the home 

pOfJril1g f/13chi11e.gtm fire inlo a haystack ailer the last enemy had been 

either killed or forced to l'elreal aeroS! the field. 

109 
Naples with supplies. Every ten days four Liberty 

ships, loaded with supplies at Naples or at North 

African ports, were scheduled to arrive at the 

beachhead. The LST's and LCT's could dock in 

Anzio harbor, while the Liberty ships had to be 

unloaded off shore and their cargo brought into 

the harbor or over the beaches by LCT's or (in calm 

weather) directly by DUKW's. Since VI Corps 

was not equipped to handle supply functions, Fifth 

Army assumed control of the port and dump areas 

on 6 February. The 540th Engineers took over the 

operation of the port and beaches, and their commanding officer, Col. George W. Marvin, became 

port commandant. 

As the whole beachhead area was within range 

of observed enemy artillery fire and subjected to 

constant air raids, a difficult and unique supply 

situation prevailed at Anzio. Enemy artillery and 

aiI attacks endangered beach and dock personnel 

and reduced their efficiency by an estimated 10 percent. Since ammunition and gasoline dumps were 

of necessity concentrated in a small and highly 

vulnerable area, some material damage also occurred. Between 22 January and 10 March, 1,043.8 

tons of ammunition were destroyed by enemy 

bombing and 228.5 tons by aItillery fire, an average of 27.7 tons per day. But material losses were 

at no time critical. Supplies were dispersed in many 

separate dumps and protected by earthen bunkers 

erected by bulldozers and Italian laborers. To help 

in this work, the 16th AImored Engineer Battalion 

improvised an armored bulldozer by mounting a 

bulldozer blade on an M-4 tank. As time went on, 

VI Corps counterbattery fires, improved air delenses, and bombing attacks on enemy gun positions reduced the effectiveness of enemy bombing 

and shelling of supply areas. 

At the end of January the security 01 the beachhead was threatened by ammunitior, and labor 

shortages. For a time, the Corps' most valuable 

counterbattery weapon (the 155-mm. howitzer) 

had to be limited to twenty-live rounds per gun per 

day, but gradually the supplies 01 ammunition were 

replenished and reserves built up. The beachhead 

needed many civilian laborers to clean up debris 

and to dig in dump areas. Soon alter the landing, 

the bulk (about 22,000) of the civilian population 

was evacuated from the beadlhead, and only about 

A SUPPLY DUMP ill the Allzio area is screened from enemy observation 

by Jmoke laid dowlI by Ihe 1791h Chemical Smoke Co. A few of Ihe 

Ilack! have been revelled, and others are dispersed widely 10 minimize 

damage from enemy artillery and air bombardment. 
ANZIO ANNIE, a German 280·mm. railroad .-ifle of the type employed 

dllring the latter part of the A m io campaign. When the Allied break· 

throllgh occ"rredl the enemy moved this piece 10 Ci·vitavecchia/ where it 

ti'as knocked Oil' by American air attacks. 

750 able-bodied civilians were left available for 

work. To alleviate the labor shortage Italian workers were recruited in Naples and brought to Anzio. 

At first a port battalion was stationed at the beachhead to unload Liberty ships. About 1 March a new 

practice was adopted of placing a port company on 

board each Liberty ship at Naples, and having it 

return with the vessel to Naples. The opportunity 

for a quick departure from the dangerous Anzio 

area was an incentive to rapid unloading. 

A shortage of LeT's, needed to unload Liberty 

ships, developed at the beginning of February. 

Most of these craft had been in service for more 

than a year without overhaul and they frequently 

broke down. On 6 February only fifteen were availIII 

able, a number that was increased to twenty-two 

by 12 February. As a stop-gap, from ten to twenty 

LeI's were successfully employed in unloading 

supplies. An effort was made to persuade the 

Liberty ships to come in closer to shore so that 

they could be unloaded directly by DUKW's, but 

ship captains were reluctant to do so in the face 

of heavy shelling. Between 450 and 490 DUKW's 

were in use at Anzio. The craft situation greatly 

eased at the end of February, when sufficient LeT's 

again became available. 

By March, supply problems at the beachhead had 

been largely solved. With improving weather and 

adequate craft for unloading, it was possible to 

discllarge five or six Liberty ships at a time. The 
proportion of supplies unloaded from Liberty ships 

greatly increased; by May they were discharging 

six times as much cargo as the LSTs. The greatest 

volume of supplies came in during the month of 

March, when 157,274 tons were discharged; on 

the peak day, 29 March, 7,828 tons were unloaded. 

Large reserves were built up in anticipation of the 

Fifth Army's resumption of the offensive. By 23 

May the beachhead had, in addition to its normal 

la-day reserve, a month's additional reserve of supplies. Between 22 January and 1 June, 513,511 long 

tons of supplies were discharged at Amio, the 

over-all daily average being 3,920 tons. As a result of careful planning and efficient operation, 

supply never became a critical problem at Anzio. 

Life at the Beachhead 

From the beginning of March the forward positions at Amio beachhead were stabilized and remained practically unchanged until the breakthrough in May. Conditions at Anzio resembled 

the quiescent periods of trench warfare on the 

Western Front during World War 1. The great 

VI CORPS HEADQUARTERS AT NETIlJNO oCCllp;ed exlem;ve 

wine cellars finder the town. Carved 01lt of solid rock, the cel/ars were 

safe from et'ell the heavint enemy bombardment. 
bulk of VI Corps casualties were caused b} enemy 

air raids and especially by enemy artillery fire. The 

narrow confines of the beachhead made it peculiarly vulnerable to enemy artillery, which ranged 

from 88-mm. guns up to giant 280-mm. railroad 

guns. One of the latter was popular! y known as 

the "Anzio Express," also as "Anzio Annie." These 

big guns, not to be confused with the smaller 

railroad guns which the Germans had employed 

during February, were first reported in action 

on 24 March. During March, 83 percent of the 

combat casualties of the 3d Division were caused 

by shell fragments, although the division occupied 

a long sector of the forward line until the end of 

the month. VI Corps' highly centralized fire control center carried out a systematic program of 

counterbattery firing to combat enemy artillery. 

Its efforts became more effective in April with the 

arrival at the beachhead of heavier artillery weapons-8-inch guns and howitzers and 240-mrn. 

howitzers. 

Smoke generators, used to create an artificial fog 

behind the lines, helped to reduce the accuracy of 

enemy artillery and of bombing; but there was 

only one effective answer to the problem of security 

from the constant pounding of enemy shells and 

bombs: that was to go underground. The whole 

beachhead area became a honeycomb of trenches, 

fox holes, and dugouts as the men burrowed into 

the sandy ground. Bulldozers dug pits for guns and 

vehicles and pushed up tons of earth around the 

neatly stacked piles of gasoline cans and ammunition which were located in every open field in the 

rear areas. During the rainy winter months the process of digging in was hampered by the proximity 

of the ground water to the surface. Fox holes and 

dugouts quickly filled with water. With the arrival 

of spring, warm and sunny days dried up the 

ground and it became possible to construct a dugout without striking water. Viewed from the air 

the beachhead created the illusion that thousands 

of giant moles had been at work. 

In the American hospital area near Anzio, the 

36th Engineers set to work excavating foundations 

three and one-half feet deep for hospital tents; the 

" 3 

sides of each tent were further strengthened by 

sandbag walls. Even with these improvements, the 

hospital area remained one of the more dangerous 

spots on the beachhead. No soldier who was at 

Anzio will forget the work of the doctors, nurses, 

and aid men who served with them. When the 

shells were coming over or the air raid siren signalled a red alert others could seek shelter; the 

doctor performing an operation or the nurse tending a patient had no choice but to continue in the 

performance of his or her task. A measure of their 

courage and willingness to sacrifice themselves for 

their patients is indicated by the losses suffered 

by medical personnel at the beachhead. Ninety-two 

were reported killed in action (including 6 nurses), 

387 wounded, 19 captured, and 60 reported missing in action. 

VI Corps headquarters was initially located in 

the Hotel de Ville at Nettuno. After this building 

was struck by shells and bombs, the headquarters 

was eStablished in caverns which the inhabitants 

had used for wine cellars. This was a popular spot 

while the wine lasted, but men tied to desk jobs 

in the little cubbyholes off the narrow corridors 

soon felt that they were sealed for life in catacombs. After the Fifth Army Advanced Command 

Post was established at the beachhead, it was located in a tunnel beneath Villa Borghese on the 

hill above Anzio harbor. Other troops built their 

own shelters. Wooden beams, doors, scrap lumber, and huge wine barrels from destroyed farmhouses, together with hundreds of thousands of 

sandbags and ammunitions boxes, were consumed 

in the construction of tiny underground homes. 

The barrels, sunk deep in the ground, made good 

bedrooms if one could stand the odor of stale wine. 

In any event, protection was more important than 

comfort. 

To counteract the debilitating effects of static 

warfare, General Truscott not only conducted a 

vigorous training program but also endeavored to 

give his men as much rest and recreation as possible when they were out of the line. Owing to the 

open nature of most of the beachhead terrain, 

troops in forward areas usually stayed under-
ground during the day; at night combat patrols 

probed deep into the enemy lines, and occasionally 

a company or battalion launched an attack to take 

prisoners or capture or destroy a strategic group of 

buildings. Recreation and training facilities were 

limited by the lack of a safe rear area. The 1st Armored Division built two underground theaters, each 

capable of holding over two hundred men. Each 

division set up small recreation and bath units; at 

the latter, the men could obtain a complete change 

of clothing. On the coast below Nettuno the 3d 

Division established a large rest camp where men 

could combine training with opportunities for 

swimming, going to the movies, and writing letters. Every four days VI Corps sent 750 men by 

LST to the Fifth Army rest camp at Caserta. 

Troops at the beachhead were given priority on 

mail, Post Exchange supplies, and recreation e'luipment. The 'luality of their food also improved. 

During February rear-area as well as front-line 

troops lived almost exclusively on C and K rations; 

by March calmer seas and lessened enemy activity 

permitted Liberty ships to bring in fresh meat and 

a high percentage of B rations. 

Where organized recreation was impossible, men 

provided their own amusement. Horseshoes were 

in great demand, and volley ball and even baseball 

games were played close to the fighting front. 

When enemy shells started coming in, the men 

ducked for cover and then calmly returned to their 

games. A few troops had their own chicken pens; 

others, less fortunate, dickered with the few remaining Italian farmers for eggs. Patrols for 

chickens and livestock were as care full y planned as 

patrols against the enemy. To help pass the long 

hours in dugouts men improvised radio sets on 

REVETIING THE HOSPITAL TENTS al Ihe beachhead. T hi< photo 

shows three phases of conS/rile/ion. FirJI (far lefl) , a bflrlap retaining 

walla set liP; second (cenler), earlh is packed arolmd the olltside; 

third and, (right), a ward tent iJ erected over the rez'e/ment. A newsreel photographer records the construction of Ihis evacuation hospital. 

. I ~ '" 

• 
LIVING CONDITIONS AT THE FRONT during the latter part of 

the Anzio campaign were milch improved as the men protected their fox 

holes with sandbags, tarpa1llins, and camol/flaged roofs. Fighting was 

light and living was leisllrely, distllrbed 0111y by sporadic 1heUing and 

bombing. 

which they could listen to the Fifth Army Expeditionary Station and also to Axis propaganda broadcasts. "Sally," the German radio entertainer, was 

as well known to them as the "Anzio Express." 

They enjoyed her throaty voice and her selections 

of the latest American popular music; they laughed 

at her crude propaganda and that of her partner 

"George," just as they laughed at the German 

propaganda leaflets which they collected for souvenirs. German efforts to sow discontent among the 

Allied troops at the beachhead were singularly unsuccessful. They merely supplied an additional 

source of entertainment. 

"5 

It was easy for a replacement arnvmg at the 

beachhead on one of the beautiful spring days of 

April or early May to gain the impression that, 

despite all the evidence of destruction around the 

tiny harbor, Anzio was a relatively safe spot. Even 

the occasional white plume of water, rising as an 

enemy shell plunged into the calm bay, had an impersonal air about it. Men worked at the docks 

unloading LST's or LeI's, drivers of DUKW's 

churned their vehicles out across the bay toward the 

Liberty ships outside the harbor, antiaircraft crews 

lolled by their guns, and a few men swam along the 

shore below the battered villas. But the apparent 
unconcern of the men was deceptive. The terrific 

tension under which they had lived during the 

critical days of February had eased somewhat, but 

some measure of it was still there. The next shell to 

whistle over the beachhead might well land in the 

hold of a ship or obliterate a truck driving through 

the streets of Anzio Or Nettuno. At dusk the feeling of tension increased; men around the harbor 

kept an eye on the end of the jetty, where the raising of a flag gave warning of another air attack. 

Although the enemy abandoned daylight raids 

after the costly attacks of February, anywhere from 

one to half a dozen attacks were made every night, 

and the enemy sbelling, sporadic during daylight 

hours, substantially increased after dark. One night 

at Anzio dispelled all illusions of security. The 

battle of the beachhead remained a grim and 

deadly struggle to the end. 

Casualties 

Both VI Corps and the enemy suffered heavy 

losses in combat casualties during the four months 

between the Allied landing at Anzio on 22 January and the attack out of the beachhead on 23 May. 

In presenting casualty statistics, a note of caution 

is in order. Since it is impossible to compile an exact record of combat casualties for any large-scale 

operation, those presented here should be treated 

as an approximation. 

The combat casualties of VI Corps at Amio 

through 22 May numbered about 30,000, including 

at least 4,400 killed and 18,000 wounded in action. 

Of these totals, American units lost approximately 

17,000 men, including at least 2,800 killed and 

11,000 wounded in action. The enemy reported the 

capture of 6,800 Allied prisoners, including about 

2,400 American troops. About two-thirds of the 

combat casualties occurred during the period of 

heavy fighting that ended on 3 March. During the 

first thirty days of the Amio operation, the combat 

casualties of VI Corps amounted to about 17 percent of its effective strength. British combat losses 

were relatively heavier than American, in terms of 

the number of troops engaged; during the above 

30-day period, their units lost 27 percent of their 

II6 

effective strength. In addition to the combat losses, 

VI Corps reported over 37,000 noncombat casualties during the wbole period of the Anzio operation, more than 26,000 of whom were American. 

About 33,000 casualties, combat and noncombat, 

were evacuated by sea from Anzio--including 

24,000 Americans-without the loss of a single 

patient's life as a result of the process of moving 

men from sbore hospitals to the waiting ships. 

Fourteenth Army lost between 28,000 and 30,000 

men as combat casualties in its operations against 

the Anzio beachhead. This total included at least 

5,500 killed and 17,500 wounded in action. The 

Allies captured more than 4,500 enemy prisoners 

of war. The German combat losses during the 

period of relative inaction after 3 March were about 

10,000, almost exactly the same as those of the 

Allied forces. 

The total combat casualties of VI Corps and 

Fourteenth Army were thus roughly equal, although the enemy had a larger number of troops 

killed in action. Three factors made the enemy 

losses relatively more costly in terms of combat 

strength than those of the Allies. The Germans 

suffered higher losses among combat units, they 

received far fewer replacements than Allied units, 

and the replacements they did receive were of progressively poorer quality. 

The Breakthrough, 23 May-4 June 

On the night of 11-12 May, main Fifth Army 

launched its spring offensive against the Gustav 

Line in the south. (Map No. 2.) After the failure 

of the Cassino assaults in February, the Fifth Army 

boundary had been moved southwestward toward 

the coast, and the British Eighth Army took command on the Cassino front. In the new offensive, 

Fifth Army attacked from its bridgehead north of 

the Garigliano into the hill masses between the 

Lid Valley and the sea; while the Eighth Army, 

heavily reinforced, at the same time launched its 

attack on the Cassino front. Cassino and the dominant mountains to the north fell only after a week 

of heavy fighting, and the Eighth Army pushed 
THE BREAKTHROUGH 

23-24 MAY 1944 

! t /fIUI 

elm/our ,,,,,,-,,q/- 5OM",,, 

""" InItial LIII' 

--- LIn. [¥lnII'lQl 23 Moy rt44 

-- Un, [v,nlllll M Moy 1944 

, 

• o • 

<., ',. 0,,,, ". 

MAP NO. 21 
on slowly up the Liri Valley against strong German opposition. Meanwhile, after three days of 

stubborn lighting, Fifth Army's two corps-the 

French Expeditionary Corps on the right, and II 

Corps on the left along the coast-broke through 

the Gustav Line positions and started the rapid 

drive northward that was not to be halted until 

Rome was entered on 4 June. 

As late as 15 May, General Clark had under consideration a plan to shift the two divisions of II 

Corps (the 85th and 88th) by sea to Anzio after 

they had completed their initial breakthrough in 

the south. They were to have combined with VI 

Corps to conduct a powerful drive out of the beachhead. But the pace of the advance in the south 

promised to collapse the German coastal defenses 

and permit a quick juncture between II and VI 

Corps by land. On 20 May, therefore, General 

Clark directed II Corps to continue its attack toward Terracina, situated at the southern end of the 

coastal plain that extended northwestward to the 

Anzio beachhead. Terracina fell on the night of 

23-24 May. American troops then raced northward 

over the Bat land of the Pontine Marshes to meet 

the 1st Battalion, 36th Combat Engineers (Task 

Force Brett), which had advanced south from the 

beachhead. The junction was effected at 0731 on 

25 May, and General Clark (who had moved to 

Anzio to direct the offensive) personally greeted 

his men from the south at 1020. Anzio was a beachhead no longer; it was now the left Bank of the 

main lighting front. 

During the first eleven days of the spring offensive, the character of the Anzio front remained unchanged; but behind the forward lines, the forces 

of VI Corps were busily preparing for their part 

in the big Allied drive. To strengthen the beachhead forces, early in May Combat Command B 

had joined the 1st Armored Division, which was 

now at full strength. On 22 May, the day before the 

attack out of the beachhead, the 36th Division 

landed at Anzio; this brought the strength of the 

beachhead forces to seven full divisions together 

with a large number of auxiliary supporting units. 

VI Corps had prepared three different plans for an 

attack out of the beachhead; on 5 May, plan BUFFALO was adopted to govern the Anzio offensive. 

However, to deceive the enemy, preparations for 

all three plans were carried out. Essentially, plan 

BUFFALO projected a breakthrough on the Cisterna front toward Cori at the base of the Lepini 

Mountains and Velletri at the base of Colli Laziali; 

the attack would then continue through the Velletri Gap to Valmontone in order to cut Highway 

No. 6, the main supply route of the German Telllh 

Army. The initial assault was to be launched 

through the front held by the 34th Division, with 

the 1st Armored Division advancing on the left, 

the 3d Division in the center (directly toward Cisterna) , and the reinforced 1st Special Service Force 

on the right. On the left Bank the 45th Division 

was to penetrate beyond Carano as far as the Campoleone-Cisterna railroad. The 36th Division, after 

its arrival, was earmarked to exploit a breakthrough. The British 1 and 5 Divisions, holding 

the western end of the beachhead front, were to 

launch local attacks to deceive the enemy as to the 

main course of the beachhead offensive and to contain enemy forces that were opposing them. (Map 

No. 21.) The British divisions were detached from 

VI Corps and reverted to Fifth Army control on 22 

May, the day before the attack. 

Until the Fifth and Eighth Armies began their 

offensive on 11-12 May, the German Fourteenth 

Army had substantially maintained its strength. 

The 26th Panzer and 29th Pallzer Grmadier DiviJionJ had become Army Group reserves, but they 

were kept in the area south of Rome and were 

available for use against an attempted Allied thrust 

out of the beachhead. Then came the breakthrough 

in the south, and Field Marshal Kesselring was 

forced not only to commit his Army GI"OUp reserves 

but also to strip Fourteenth Army of its combat reserves to bolster the hard-pressed T mth Army. 

General Mackensen protested, but his protests were 

overruled until it was too late to stem the American advance out of the beachhead. In anticipating 

the Allied spring offensive, the enemy made two 

major miscalculations, revealed in an estimate of 

the Allied situation drafted on 30 April. The Ger-
THE CAPTURE OF CISTERNA came as Ihe beachhead forces lillked 

liP wilh American Iroops advancing from the !otJlh. Many prisoners were 

fOJlnd ill the battered ("illS (above) and hllJlled 10 the rear. From the air 

(below), Chlema appeared as 1I0lhi1lg bill a gUlled pile of rubble. 
mans believed (and continued to believe as late 

as 20 May) that Fifth Army would make a new 

seaborne landing, either between Anzio and the 

southern front at Gaeta or Terracina, or (less probably) to the northwest of Anzio near the mouth of 

the Tiber River. In view of this belief, Field Marshal Kesselring was reluctant to release his reserves 

or strengthen the German forces in the immediate 

vicinity of Anzio until the very eve of the Anzio 

offensive. The second German miscalculationnatural enough, in view of the preceding offensives 

-was that VI Corps would launch its main assault 

up the Albano road past the Factory. Thus the 

better German divisions-the 65th Infantry and 3d 

Panzer Grenadier--continued to occupy the Albano road sector; while the Cisterna and Mussolini 

Canal sectors were held by the weaker 362d and 

715th Infantry Divisions. When the attack came 

on 23 May, the enemy was unable to shift his 

strength to the Cisterna sector. 

At 0545 on 23 May, a tremendous Allied artillery barrage was directed against the enemy defenses along the Cisterna front. Forty-five minutes 

later, American tanks and infantry emerged from 

the smoke all along the front from Carano to the 

Mussolini Canal to launch the assault. At first, the 

enemy resistance was stiff, and German mine fields 

took a heavy toll of American tanks and tank destroyers; but before noon, the 1st Special Service 

Force had cut Highway No.7 below Cisterna, and 

all units had reached their initial objectives. Bad 

weather curtailed the planned air support, but before the day was over 722 missions had been flown; 

Cisterna and more distant objectives were heavily 

bombed. By evening, the 1st Armored Division had 

crossed the Cisterna-Campoleone railroad, and had 

smashed the enemy main line of resistance. 

The enemy estimated that, by the end of the first 

day's attack, the 362d Infantry Division had lost 50 

percent of its fighting power, and two regiments 

of the 715th Z"fantry Division had been badly 

mauled. The Hermann Goering Panzer Division 

was rushed southward from Leghorn; and Fourteenth Army planned to detach combat units from 

I Parachute Corps, holding the Moletta River-AIbano road sector, to bolster the shattered forces of 

LXXVI Panzer Corps on the Cisterna front. This 

step was frustrated by the holding attacks of the 

British 1 and 5 Divisions and the attack on the left 

flank by the 45th Division. General Mackensen 

realized his precarious position, but his request to 

withdraw his left flank to the base of the Lepini 

Mountains was refused. 

Resuming the attack on 24 May, VI Corps troops 

drove forward beyond the railroad to cut Highway 

No.7 above Cisterna, and virtually to encircle Cisterna itself. On 25 May the German defenses to the 

rear of Cisterna crumbled, and Cisterna itself fell 

to the troops of the 3d Division, who collected 

nearly a thousand enemy prisoners. By nightfall, 

3d Division and 1st Special Service Force units 

were at the base of the Lepini Mountains, before 

Cori; meanwhile, 1st Armored Division troops had 

reached a position halfway between Cori and Velletri, thus facing the entrance of the Velletri Gap 

leading toward Valmontone. On 26 May, the 1st 

Armored Division advanced to within two miles of 

Velletri; while the 3d Division raced through the 

Velletri Gap its reconnaissance units reached the 

outskirts of Artena, only three miles from the goal 

of Valmontone and Highway . No.6. Although 

Artena was captured on the following day, the VI 

Corps advance then came to a temporary halt. The 

plans for the continuation of the Fifth Army's attack were being recast, and the enemy had now 

somewhat recovered from his confusion. In particular, elements of the Hermallll Goering Panzer Division had reached the Valmontone area and were 

counterattacking the 3d DivisiOll. (Map No. 22.) 

VI Corps' highly successful offensive out of the 

Anzio beachhead was nevertheless costly in losses, 

both in men and material. In the first five days of 

the attack, combat casualties exceeded 4,000; they 

were almost twice as heavy in killed and wounded 

as during the five days of the big German attack 

of 16-20 February. The 1st Armored Division and 

other armored units supporting the infantry lost at 

least eighty-six tanks and tank destroyers in the 

first day's attack alone. Enemy losses were far heavier; no figures are available for the number of en-
emy troops that were killed and wounded, but in 

the first five days of the attack VI Corps captured 

4,838 prisoners and, among items of enemy material, destroyed or damaged more than 2,700 motor 

transperts. 

On 26 May General Clark issued new orders to 

VI Corps which reshaped the nature and direction 

of its attack. Hitherto, the main axis of advance 

had been toward Valmontone; now, the weight of 

the VI Corps drive was to be shifted to the west 

of Colli Laziali, to seize a line from the Factory 

through Campeleone to Lanuvio. (Map No. 23.) 

The 34th Division would advance northwest from 

below Velletri (which was stubbornly defended 

by the enemy) toward Lanuvio, while the 45th 

Division attacked toward Campeleone Station. Initially, the 1st Armored Division was allotted the 

task of attacking Velletri; subsequently (28 May) 

it was shifted to the left Rank to strengthen the 

attack of the 45th Division. In the Artena area, 

the 3d Division was to continue its advance on 

Valmontone, while the wide gap be~een the attacks to the west and east of Colli Laziali was to 

be plugged by the 36th Division. This general 

plan was carried out in the face of stiffening enemy 

resistance. The 45th Division drove to Campeleone 

village by 29 May, and the 34th Division reached 

the outskirts of Lanuvio on the same date. (Map 

THE FALL OF THE FAUORY came the momillg of 28 Mayas British troops pushed northward throtlgh ills/ill-b/lrning rllins. The JOldier 

at the right (rol/ches agaiml a watt, laking cove1' from a few enemy 

mipers stili remaining in the wreckage. 

I20 
THE BREAKTHROUGH 

2!5+26 MAY 1944 

, 

""' Inltlol Lin. 

LIne E".nln9 2S 110, 1944 

- Un. E".nlnq H Il10, 1944 

MAP NO. 22 
THE BREAKTHROUGH 

27-28 MAY 1944 

o 

"IUS 

Con'OIIf "".fWl/-50"'.'",s 

'"" Inlllol Lin. 

Un. EVln11l9 27 May 1944 

Un. Evening 28 Moy 1944 

MAP NO. 23 
THE ENTRY INTO ROME 011 3 Jlllle climaxed mOllth, of bitter fighting at AI1Zio. TroolJJ moving into the Eternal Cit}' found little lrace of 

the jast-retreatil1g el1emy, a11d fired at ol1ly a few sIIspected positiol1s. 

No_ 24.) The 36th Division moved in before 

Velletri, but initially its role was limited to aggressive reconnaissance. In the east, the 3d Division 

was held on the defensive by the counterattacking 

Hermann Goering Pallzer Division. On 30 May 

the 3d Division and 1st Special Service Force 

passed to the control of 1I Corps, which thereafter 

commanded the attack toward Valmontone and 

Highway No.6. 

The enemy had been hard pressed to round up 

sufficient troops to check the American advance. 

He had been forced to withdraw to a new defensive 

line, extending from Ardea near the coast through 

Lanuvio and Velletri to a position before Valmontone, and German units were ordered by Hitler 

to hold this line at all costs. In a change of Corps 

boundaries, Fourleellth Army assigned the sector 

west of Colli Laziali to I Parachute Corps, and 

the sector to the east to LXXVI Pallzer Corps. 

In the reshuffling of units and the Corps boun121 

daries, the mountainous region of Colli Laziali just 

east of Velletri was left temporarily almost denuded of enemy troops; the Germans had concentrated their depleted forces in defense of Lanuvio 

and Valmontone. 

At dusk on 30 May the Fifth Army drive appeared to have been stalled. (Map No. 24.) On 

the left flank west of Colli Laziali, the 1st Armored 

Division and 45th Division had fought bitterly 

but unsuccessfully along the Albano road above 

Campoleone all day; and the attack of the 34th 

Division before Lanuvio had been stopped on 29 

May. On the new II Corps front east of Colli 

Laziali, the 85th Division was just coming in to 

reinforce the 3d Division, which had remained on 

the defensive since 27 May. Actually, General 

Clark had been informed by General Truscott of 

the gap in the enemy defense line along the rugged 

base of Colli Laziali between the units of I Parachute Corps and LXXVI Pallzer Corps, and he 
moved quickly to exploit this weakness. Late in 

the eveniog of 30 May, troops of the 36th Division 

(142d Infantry, followed by 143d Infantry) 

started to climb the steep slopes of Colli Laziali 

east of Velletri, undetected by the enemy. By dawn 

on 31 May, American troops had made a deep 

penetration that flanked both enemy corps, and 

not a shot had been tired to herald their advance. 

When the Germans discovered this dangerous 

penetration of their defensive line, they counterattacked; but the 36th Division held to its key 

positions which outflanked the main enemy line 

of resistance and permitted the advance on Rome 

to continue. (Map No. 25.) 

Despite their now untenable positions, the separated corps of F01lrteellth Army fought hard for 

three days (31 May-2 June) to check the Fifth 

Army's advance. Enemy resistance was especially 

stiff on the VI Corps front to the west of Colli 

Laziali. But when II Corps swept around the north 

of the mountains and the 36th Division reached 

the central heights of Colli Laziali, the enemy 

decided that the time had come to pull out. On 

the night of 2-3 June the main enemy forces hurriedly withdrew northward, leaving only scattered 

rear guards to impede the Fifth Army's advance 

into Rome. On 3 June all units of the Fifth Army 

hastened after the retreating enemy, and at 0800 

on the morning of 4 June the first American troops 

reached the outskirts of Rome. Actual entry into 

the city was delayed until early afternoon when 

elements of the 1 st Armored and 36th Divisions 

moved in simultaneously to occupy the Italian 

122 

capital. By the end of the day, Fifth Army troops 

held the entire south bank of the Tiber from the 

sea to the junction of the Tiber and Aniene Rivers 

above Rome. By the next evening, the tide of 

battle had rolled far beyond Rome, as Fifth Army 

pursued the fleeing enemy to its next line of mountain defenses. 

With the capture of Rome, Fifth Army attained 

the ultimate goal toward which the Anzio landing 

had originally been directed. On the eve of the 

landing on 22 January, the Allied High Command 

had hoped that the surprise assault behind the 

German Tenth Army, combined with a strong 

offensive in the south, would collapse the enemy's 

resistance along the Gustav Line and lead to a 

rapid march on Rome. Actually, the Anzio assault 

did not become a phase in an over-all Allied offensive, for the attack in the south stalled on the 

very day that the men of VI Corps swarmed unopposed over the beaches near Anzio. What had been 

envisioned as a brief operation coordinated with 

an Allied drive from the south became an isolated 

and bitter struggle to preserve a strategic foothold 

far behind the main enemy line of defense. Reinforced, Allied VI Corps was able to hold the beachhead, and then to build up its forces to fulfill its 

role in the spectacular spring offensive. Operation 

SHINGLE was crowned with final success; the 

grim defense of the American and British troops 

who held the Anzio beachhead led to a victory 

that forecast the collapse of the German war 

machine and the triumphant conclusion of the 

Allied war effort. 

tr u.s. GOVERNMENT PAINTING OFFICE: 1990 249- 158 
THE BREAKTHROUGH 

29-30 MAY 1944 

o 

.UUI 

Contour Inf.rvol- $OM,f,,, 

_ Inll ial Un. 

Line E ... n1nv ~Moy 1944 U n. Eveni"'9 3OMoy 1944 

MAP NO. 24 
THE BREAKTHROUGH 

31 MAY-4JUNE 1944 , MILES 

COn/Oil' InI.r.oJ· ~Mftr.rs 

~ Iniliol Lin, 

Un. EvtninQ 31 Moy1944 

Lin. Ev,n1n; 2 Jun. 1944 

MAP NO. 25