ARMT HISTORICAL SERIES 

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE 

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

1944-1946 

by 

Earl F . .Ziemke 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARM}' 

WASH!NGTON, D.C., 2003 
Library of Congress Ca talog Card Nmnbct·: 75- 619027 

First Printed 1975-CMH Pub 30-6 

For ••I• bt• the U.S. G.,,·cmmcn\ Pnnuu~; Olltu 

~., •• IIIIICIIIIrm nl [}Q.;wncnLS, MJ.t ~t ll : s~or• 

W•,hulj\rvn. DC lQ-102-'UlM 
Foreword 

Long before thr <lust settled on Europea n lmttldiclds in '"'orld War II, the 

U.S. Army had to face the dillicuiL tasks of occupying and governing war-torn 

Germany. Its leaders a nd troops were <'ailed upon to deal with a series of complex 

challenges in political, economic. fina ncia l, social, and cultural affairs, tasks beyond tbe traditional com hat mles of soldiers. 

This volume provides an authoritative account of Lhe role of the U .S. Army 

in miLitary government and occupation nf German)' from the inception of planning until the relative separation of milita ry government and tactical troops in 

1946. I n the prorcs.c; it offers a n in-depth study of the first year, the formative 

period of the occupation, a most eventf11l phase in the sha ping of post-war Emope. The story range.'\ from Washington ;md theater headquarters down to milita ry government detachments in the field, and covers Uw varieu national and 

international civi li ~ and military ;tpparatus that evolved. Tllwarating the diverse 

approac:hes of the .\mcric·ans, British, and Russians, it analyzes efforts to combat 

hunger, disease, and rrimc, prc.»erve cultural <lrtifarts, c.~ tahli h industry and 

utilities, and resolve thorny problems involving currency, housing, education, 

newspapers, elections, and displaced pcrsonii. The account how~ 1 he pit[ulls and 

dirTicultie.<; in planning, organi'l.ing, and execnting such a complex undertaking. 

While th.is volume is part of the .·\rmy Historical Series, it continues in effect 

the history begun in the largely dontmentary volutm: of the U.S. Army in World 

War li series, Civil AJftlirs: Soldie1's become Govemors1 ac; well as in the narrative volumes on the European ron flirt. in the same series. Besidc.'l being of particular· interest to that large number of men, still surviving, who participated in 

the events depicted here, Dr. Ziemke's volume wDll constitute for the Army 

an important sou rce for lc.c;.<;ons lcamcd in planning, training, a nd organiz<Llion 

for civil affairs anti militar)' governmenl. For the scholar this book should provide 

a most valuable add ition to the literature of the occupation, and for the general 

reade.r an enlightening and intere.r;ting account of a renmrkahle episode in the 

history of the U.S. t\nny and of Germany. 

Washington, D.C. 

30 .June 1974 

Ill 

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR. 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Earl F . Ziemke received an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University 

of Wisconsin , where he did his unde.rgradua rc work. He ~erved in World \\1a r 

II with the U.S. Marine Corps in Lhe P acific theater. In 195 1 he became n 

member of the staff of the Bureau of .\pJ.lllcd Socia l Rcsearr h, Columbia U niversity. J n 1055 he joinetl the slafT of the Center of Milit:vy History, U.S. Army, 

where he hccitmt.: Deputy Chid of the General History Brand1. Since 1967 he 

has been Professor of History at the Univcrsil)' of Geo rgia. 

Dr. Ziemke is a ullwr qf The German Northern Th etJ/er of 0 peralious. 

1940- 1945, and of Stalill.f!Uld to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, 106fl). H e is a contributo r to Colllllltllltl Dedsimu (New York: Harcourt, 

Brace and Company, 195!1), to A Cmtrise 1/istory of World War II (New York: 

Fredcrirk t\. Praeger, I nc ., 1964) a nd 1.0 Soviet Pt~rli.wn.r in Wotld War 11 

(M adison: U niversity of Vlisronsin Prt.'>'li, 1965). 

iv 
Preface 

The post-'v\lorld War IJ uc:cupation of Germany was a huge and diverse 

undertaking spnnning almost eleven years, cond uned in conjuntli<m with three 

other mcmhe•·s of thr wartjme alliance and in volving in various degrees a numllc1 

or U.S. govrrnmental dep:ll'tmcms illld agcncit.'>. The orcupntion was, moreover, 

n major event in Gcrll\an hiswry and in the history of the postwar world; ami 

for the \rmy it was a mis.<;ion scn111d only in scope and sig11ificance to the war 

itself. The subject or the pre;.;ent \ olume is that :\rmy mission, its origin, the 

manner in which it was defined, ~1n d its e><e<'ution to June ~) 46 in the period 

of prima•·y .. \rm)' responsibility. 

The narrati vr begin~ in the I W~. l>dore the CHithreak of war in Europe, 

and concludes in mid- I ~J46, a lit Lie more than a yea r after the victor)'· Althoug h 

the l i kcljhood of U.S. n1 i l i ta ry fo•·c·cs or<'u pyi ng> Germany appenred in fin ite~mal 

in the late l ~l:~Os a nd only slightl y greater in the first twn years of the 1040s, 

the actions taken in those years were in some ways more signifiranl than the 

f;ubsequcnt mis.<;ion-orit:nted plans <tnd preparations. 1l w::t._, of course, most important thnt the .\rmy, albeit somcwhal rductantly, had recognized the ueed 

fot· civil alrair!>- milita ry govcntmenl doctrine and training before the requirement 

to administer occupied tct'l'itol')l waf; plaC'ed upon it. Thi~ recognition was a trur. 

innovation in the conduct of military afi'nirs. 

To concl ude the account in the middle of 1946 mny appea1· less defensible. 

The oc<:upntion went on, with the .\nny ns the executive agency for militat·y 

government until 1949, and the rmy continued to provide the occupation force 

until 9~5. . good reason for slopping short' o( either or those two years, certainly, 

is space. The whole star)' ('ould simply not he tnld in a single volume with an)'-

thing like the li'C<Hment it deserves . . \ better reason. the <ntthor believes, is 1 hat, 

being a pal'l of the Army Historic-al Series, the volume should concern itself 

with the .\nny ex perience. While rnilit<ll'}' gtwernment is not the sole subject 

of the volume, it is one of the main suiJjects, and after March 1946 rontrol 

of militnry government a~seci to thr OITirc of tvlililn•'}' Government in Berlin, 

which, althPugh it 'vas headed hy an • \nny general, regarded it::-elf as predominantl y a civilian agem')'· In the field, by the end uf J une 1946, the milill1ry 

government detachments were divorced from the tactical comm:,nds, mut h redu ced in strength, panially ci,·ilianizcd. nnd limited to observing and .tdvi.<;ing 

German governmenta l agencie.". tvlilitary govel'nment a.<; it was cnnccived during 

the war and installed in German y in I !l44 and 1 )15 had ended. The occupation 

forces had ~o r hanged. The troops that had [()ught the war and occupied Gerv 
many after the victot•y had gone home. They had been replaced by anO£her 

anny of occupation, and militaJ'Y government contiuued for three more years; 

but lhal is anothe1· story better told elsewhere since much of il lies outside the 

area of direct :\1·my concern. 

T n the text, references occur in several places to Departmen t of the Army 

Field Manual 27-5 , MilitMy Guvernme11t. first published in July 1940. O ver 

the: years, FM 27- 5 was revised several times and eventually ~uperseded by other 

volumes, the most recent of those being FM 41- 10, Civil Aflrd?·.r Operation, 

published in O ctober 1969. The pu rpose of those publications was ami is to 

provide a procedural and doctrinal framework withln which the Army could 

conduct civiJ affairs and military government should the need arise. FM 27- 10, 

The R ules of Land Wa-rfare, issued in O ctober 1939 and ahio subsequently revised, ptovided guidance concerning the ri ht~ and obligations of occupation 

force!!. Withoul att.empting io any way to shnpe history to fit the field manuals, 

the author has as.<>Uined that the most useful purpose his work could serve would 

be to present a true description in one instan ce of the manner in which th<: 

Army actually C'a rried out an occupation. 

Although the discussion of plans has been limited to those that determined 

or influenced what was tlone, Ol' in some instances not done, in the occupation. 

plans along with policy developmen t and otl1e1· preparations still figure heavily 

in the narrative. The chief reason why so much of the planning, more specifically 

the Army's involvement in it, is included is that it has not been covered elsewhere. 

T o make the account comprehensible it has been necessary to treat matters that 

in <.'ombat operational histories would be left to be dealt with separately in volumes on strategy, orga nization, or procurement and training. The range, therefore, has had to be broad and include, in particu lar, plans developed over a 

relatively long period Qf Lime at several levels in W'ash.ington, in London, and 

in Germany. 

At the risk of, perhaps, belaboring- the ob vious, it should be pointed out 

that geographically as well as chronologically, the volume docs not purport to 

be a history of the whole occupation. It is concerned with those parts of Germany 

U.S. forces held prior to July 1945, with the considerably less tha:n one third 

of the count ry that became the U.S. zone in J uly 1945, and with aspects of 

quadripartite <'ontrol pertinent u, an understanding of the A1'my's mission in 

Germany. The British share in the occupation has been dealt with in two volume.<; 

of the British official World War Il history: F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs 

and Milita-ry Government Central Otganization and Planning ( London: H. M. 

Stationery Office, 1966) and F. S. V. D onniwn, Civil Affairs and Military 

Governm.e11t North-West Emope, /944- 1[)46 (London: H . M. Stationery Office, 

1961 ). Official or, for that matter, any other kind of systematic histories of the 

occupation have been published neither in France nor in the Soviet Union. The 

reader interested in events in the French zone and the Soviet zone will need 

to consult two works, one 1\merican and one British: F. R oy Willis, The F1·ench 

in Germany. 1945- 1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) and J.P. 

Nett!, The Eastern Zo1te and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945-1950 (London: 

Vl 
Oxford University Pr~~. Hl5 1). ,\!though somewhat dacect. the best comparative 

trcntmcnt of the c..-arly occupation P''riod in all four zone.'\ is W. Friedmann, 

ThtJ Allied Mililn.ry Gouernmc111 nf Ce111wny (London: Stevenson and Sons 

Ltd., 1947). 

T he author is indebted to Oem:rnl Luci11s D. Clny and J>roft:s.'ior Oron J. ll c who read Lhe ma nusrript nnd nmtrihutcd insights from their personal 

knowlcdgr. of the occupation. Hr is likewise gnncful to his former colleagues 

at the Center of Military History, Dr. SteLo;on Conn, Dr. urirt~ lvlatloff, Col. 

John E. J essup, Jr., Dr. Robcl't W. Coakley, Mr. Charles 13. MacDonald, Mr. 

David Jaffe and Mrs. Christi11c 0 . Gr·uhhs, who gave 1 he benefit of their expertise 

in writing American '"'orld War I I military history. The author also wishes 

to express his appreciation to the staff of the former· National Archives World 

War l1 Records Branch in Alexa ndria, Virginia, who ma<.lr the months spent 

there both pleasant and profitable. 

Athens, Georgia 

30 June 1974 

vii 

EARL F. ZIEMKI:: 
Contents 

Chapter 

I. A DlfFICUL T IHRTH . 

A School of Military Govermnenl i s Established . 

The Arm)' Takes the Lead . 

11te Program Under Attack 

The Civil Affairs Division 

lvlilitary Govemment Trt1il1ing ExjHwds 

The Arm)l l s Given Control 

II. OVERSEAS 13ECH\NINGS 

A Jlilissiou Emerges , 

Theater Planning Begi11s 

A Civil Affairs Section, COSSAC 

Toward a Plan 

HI. WASHINGTON VS LONDON 

Tft e AT(E) Committee and CCAC . 

'J'Ite EAC anti CCAC(L ) 

I V. TilE SUPREME COMMAND . 

SH AEF Concentrates on Overlord 

Civil Affairs Becomes G- 5 

No AMGOT 

V. SH.r\EF'S NEW MISSIONS 

Di.rjJlaced f.Jersons . 

1\t/rmuments, Fine Arts, and Archives 

A D1reclive for Germany 

Vl. Sl TRIVENHA~I AND MANCHESTER 

The Civil Affair.r Center , 

EGAD 

The Ma11chester Phase, EGAD , 

VI L STN;'FS FOR GER~ lANY . 

The Gerrncm Country U nit . 

V III 

Page 

3 

3 

8 

12 

I+ 

J 7 

20 

23 

23 

24 

28 

31 

34 

34 

37 

42 

42 

42 

45 

52 

52 

53 

57 

62 

62 

68 

72 

80 

80 
Chn/Jler 

The Handbook Coni rovers·y . . . 

The U.S. Group Co11trol Council 

VIII. U.S. POLICY EMERGENT 

Fraternization 

JCS 1067 .... . . 

A Program for German,,? 

IX. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS 

The Surrender Instrument , 

Tlte Zones • ..... 

The Control M achinery 

Crosscurrents . . . . . 

X. THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN, 194-1- . 

.Militar)' GoVtlrnment in Artion 

The German.r 

Aachen . . . . . 

1\•f onsthau • . 

Battle of tlte Bulge 

XL OETTING READY FOR ·'TilE DAY" 

EGAD ..... 

Practice wul Poln·y , . . . • 

Eclipse Plans . . . . . . . . 

The CarfJet and Static Plans . 

1'/te DisjJ/(Iccd Persons Executive 

War Crimes . . ...... . 

Ps:yWar .. .. ... , .. . 

' . 

11 Place for the Control Cowtcil GrmtjJ 

X II. Tl IE RHI NELAND CAMPAIGN, 1945 

The Hard Winter ....... . 

O n tfte .Moue 

lvfouuments, Fin e Arts, mul Archives 

The DP Flood Begins . 

Tht> G-5 Field Survey . . . . . . . 

XITf. AFTER VAL TA ..... 

The Fate of }CS 1067 . 

War Crimes . . . .. 

A Mission for the U.S. Grm~p Control Council 

IX 

Page 

83 

91 

97 

97 

98 

106 

l09 

lO!.l 

I 15 

126 

129 

133 

133 

138 

14+ 

149 

!53 

158 

158 

160 

163 

164 

167 

169 

173 

175 

178 

178 

184 

197 

200 

206 

208 

208 

215 

22 1 
Chapter Pag~ 

XIV. ECLIPSE 225 

The Rultr Pocket . 225 

The Turn to the East 232 

Into the Redoubt . 21

16 

XV. THE VICTORY SEALED . 257 

Surrtmder at Rcims 257 

Flensburg I 111 erilule 260 

Mt•eting in Berlin . 263 

XVI. GERMANY IN DEFEAT 269 

The CarfJet 269 

The Couutry . 273 

The QueJtion of Policy 283 

The DPs 1/mnoward Bound 284 

The Wehrmarht 291 

xvn. ZONE AND SECTOR 297 

Access to Berlin 297 

Rolling the Carpet 306 

Settling in the Z(me . 308 

The S jJOils '. 314 

Exit SJIIJW<' . 317 

XVJIJ. THE OCCUPATION TROOPS 320 

Army-1-,,pe Occupation 320 

N on-Fratem i::otic>n 321 

Redeployment and Readjustment 326 

Currtmry Coutrol , 336 

Police-Type Oaupatio'l . . 339 

XIX. POTSDAM <:ERMt\NY 342 

Quadripartite r:o11trol 342 

Potsdam and Polit:y . ~5 

Tftt• Subjects of the Policy 347 

A Lesson in Dctrwcrar'' 360 

XX. THE FIRST FRI EDO~l . 367 

JCD Organi:atinn and Policy . 367 

PreJ.f Control . 368 

ICD Overt Oj)(trations 372 

Other lvf edia 37 1 

X 
Chapter 

XXI. RECKONINGS WITH T il E PAST 

Deunzification 

War Crimes Trials 

XXII. T HE TURNI TG POINT . . . 

Military Government in the Static Phase 

"Nat a Job for Soldi,.,r" . 

"Wa Don't Want tlte Low Level job" 

XXIII. WINTER • 

Th e St1<1so11 of Despatr . • 

DPs, The Ruurge11l Problem 

7 '/w A ml)l in Di array . 

XXIV. NElTJI ER AN END NOR A BECINNINC: 

OMCUS Takes Cont1ol 

Tht Roru/ Ahead . • • . . • 

XXV. CONCLUSION 

NOTE ON SOURCES 

GLOSSARY 

1NDEX . 

Nu . 

Charts 

Page 

380 

380 

390 

396 

396 

401 

404 

407 

407 

413 

421 

425 

426 

~33 

444 

~50 

457 

460 

1. U.S. Military Government Relationships (Mobile Pltnst>, September 19 H -

July 19+5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 

2. U.S. Milita ry Government Relationships {Sta tic Pha . August- Dcn•rubcr 

19+5 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 

3. U.S. Military (.;o,·ernmenl Relationships After l April 1946 . . . . . . 426 

Maps 

l. Zones of 0\C\lpntion, British and SO\·iet Proposal); 

2. Zones of O(·cuptllion, U.S. Propos•ll . . 

3. Germany, Zones of Occupation, W 16 . . . . . . 

XI 

120 

121 

.Inside back rouer 
Illustrations 

Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gltllion . . . . 

Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham 

Secretary of War Hent'Y L . Stimson 

Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring . . . . 

Lt. Gen. Waller Bedell Smith . . . 

Military Government Training at Shrivenllam 

Military Govcrn111cnt Officers Practice River Crossing . 

U.S. Troops and German Civilians . . . . . . . . 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Conrept of 0<'tupation Zones 

Posti.ng the Ordinances . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Civilians Turn In Weapons and Cameras . . . . 

Germans Read the Procla111ation and Ordinances 

Aachen Evacuees Arriving at Brand 

Aachen After the Battle . . . 

Building a Bridge in Monscltau . . 

CIC Check in Monschau . . . . . 

Collecting Bedsheets During l3:;mlc of the 13ulgr 

Trial in a Military Government Court . . . . 

U.S. Officer Swears In a Bue rgermcister and Fi"e Policen1en 

A Spearhead Detachment at Work . . . . . , . . . . . 

A German Woman Surveys the Wreckage of Her Property . 

Coblcnz, March 19..J.5 . . . . . . . . . 

Military Government Headquarters, Coblen7. . . . . . . . 

DP Being Dusted With DDT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MFA&A Posts Room in vVhich Museum Pieres Are Stored 

Russian DPs Prepare Meal in Camp at Trier . . , . . _ . 

U.S. T ank Crashes Through Ruins of a Gern1an Town . . . . . . . . . 

Soldiers Admire Manet Painting in Merkers Mine .. 

Troops Advanre Through Surrendered Town • . . . 

Germans Dig Gra\'es fol' Concentration Camp Victims . 

Entranc~ to Nordhausen V - 2 Plant . . . . 

Survivors of Buchenwald . . . . . . . . . 

Captured Cer111ans in an Improvised Stockade 

Scene of the Atrocity at Thekla 

Heidelb«'!rg, March 1945 . . . . . . . . . 

Nuremberg, April 1945 . . , . . . . • . • 

Mass Funeral for Concentration Ca111p Prisoners 

Germans and DPs Carrying Loot . . . . . 

Marienplat;r, Munich . . . . . . . . . 

Munich's Main Railroad Station, May 1945 

Germans Exchange Street Signs . . . 

XII 

Puge 

~ 

6 

12 

16 

~3 

67 

75 

!)9 

116 

134 

135 

138 

143 

145 

!50 

152 

156 

180 

187 

188 

190 

192 

193 

196 

199 

201 

227 

229 

233 

234 

235 

237 

242 

244 

247 

248 

250 

251 

254 

255 

261 
Page 

Marsha l Georgi K. Zhukov Pours at the 5 June 1945 Meeting in Berlin 267 

Uermans Q ueue Up for ln(ormation and Advice 27 1 

School Opens in Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . 278 

H ousing Was a Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 280 

Troops Distribute German-Language Newspaper!\ . 282 

Westbound DPs Board a Train . . . . . . . . 2B5 

Russian DPs Give Departing Cornratles a Send-on· . 287 

Prisone1· of War Column Marches Through .tvfunid1 . 292 

llerlin, tvlay !945 . . . . • . . . . 29!) 

Allies Meet in Berlin . . . . . . . . . 302 

Russians Leave the U.S. Sector of Berlin 304 

Sold iers Check Papers of a Civi lian 319 

Nonfraternization 323 

Fraternization . . . . . . . . . . 326 

Ice Cream Parlor . . . . . . . . 331 

Maj. Gen. E'rnest N. Harmon Inspects a Constabtdary Detachment . 340 

Session at Potsdam . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3 

Women Salvage Bri,·ks . . . . . . . . . . . 348 

Berliners Recei\·e Bread Ratio11 From a Trailer . 349 

Many Lived in Sltaeks and Ruins . . . . . . . 352 

Troops Sea rch Lugga~e for Black Market Coods . 353 

Tanks Move In . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 

Printers Assemble Denazif-Ied T extbooks 359 

First Licensed 1ewspaper Conres on· Press 369 

Author Submits Manuscript for TCI1 C leararwe 375 

Outdoor Concert in Heidelberg for Americans and C:ermans 377 

Concentration Camp Prisoner Identifies SS Guard 390 

Loading Veit Stoss Altar for R eturn to Poland . 399 

Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay at Laenderrat lvleeting 1105 

Gathering Firewood, February 19+6 '108 

Famil>' Meal . . . . . . . 411 

General J oseph T. McN<trnl"y 419 

Votets Cast Their Ballots tJ.29 

A Day's R ation . . . . . . 436 

Illustra tion~ a re from Department of Defcnsf' fi les, ... vith the exception of photographs on pages I 99 a nd 229 which are reproduced by courtesy of the National 

Archives. 

xiii 

THE U. S. ARMY IN THE 

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

1944-1946 

CHAPTER I 

A Difficult Birth 

A Schou/ of M ililfll y Gom:mmcnf I r 

Eslablifhcd 

"Till' \mcrica n illlll) of occupation 

larked hot h 1 raining and or~anization to 

guide thl' clt•-;tinies of lhc nearly m1c 11\illion 

dvilians whom the fortune:~ (>f w:.r hacl 

pht ccd c•nck•· its temporary sovereignty." 

:-io -;talCd Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in 

Ch;~rgc of Civil AIT:1irs, l"hinl .\ rmy, in 

hi'l r<'pmt on U.S. military goVl'1'11111Cnl in 

Ccr man)' ,,ftcr \Vol'lcl Wa•· I. ' Milil.lt')' 

g<•vc·tnmcm, the admini~tration h) 111ilit;u·y 

oOin:r"i o ( c h if government in w t upied 

cncm)' tl'l'l itory, i. a virtunlly itwvitnblr 

ronc omitant of modern warfare. Tilt U.S. 

,\r'lll)' conducted militaqr J~tlvt' tlm rll in 

Mexico iu ll'l4 7 and I fl40 ; in th<' Conkdcra(e stales dtu•ing and after thr Civil \1\'~rr ; 

in the Philippines, Porto ( Pucr·to) Rico, 

and Cuh;1 ahl-r the • panish .\ nwl'ican 

\\',,r; nnd in thr Cerm:m Rhineland .1fter 

Wmlcl War I. In eac·h instam·c, ncitlwr the 

. \I'm)' nw· tiH' go,·crnmenl ;H't't'J)t,•d it as a 

legitimate military fnnrtion. C:onscqtwntly, 

its impositio11 inv:1riahly ranw 11s a '\Oilt<·-

what di quictin~ cxprrirnr c• ror• l>oth, and 

lilt' nwans devised for Hrronlplishing it 

ranged from inadcqu:ue tn rH'ar· disastrous. 

The I hurt Report. <t~ it <tffertionately 

( ,unc to hr knmvn by tht· World War II 

~('tll'ration of ~~tilitary govcmmcnt ofTit cr'5, 

for the.- llt' l time in the \nlt{s c-.-

1 Col lr\\ lll 1., Hunt. Anwrit';tn l\lilitnry C':O\'-

I'flllllt'lll of OtTIIpiccJ nrrnHllly, IIJ ifl 1'120, I Mar 

20, p. 011. 

pcriencc looked (Ill administration of orwpied trrritOI')' n.>~ something more lhnu 

a minor incidental of war. Colonel Hunt 

realized that to cx<:I'C'ise governmental authority, cvrn ovrr a defeated enemy, rcq wrcd prcpnrat ion. The Am1y, he urged, 

should n·ut ag:tin wail until the rcsponsihility was thrust 11p0 11 it but should dcvcl()p 

c:ompctcncc in ci\'il administracion among 

its offi<'crs during pcarctime. 

ln the ilftt.·mtltlh of Wodd \V:u· I, \vhcr1 

almost nCIIhing nppc.m:d mot•c remote th;tn 

tiH: po);."ihility of the .\rmy's again m·rupying fon•ign l(' t ritnr )', The Hunt Report 

nearly- hut noL quitc- disappc:u·ed. 0(·-

causc it wa~; tilt only substantia l do< 11mcnt 

on the uilj ec , W:u· College rommittecl' 

working in dvil niTairs pcriodicnll)' lwought 

it out or l l•c files. But I he lendcnq' or the 

War College in the 1920:-: was to look <II 

ci,·il aiTairs ;u1d milit:try govcrnri1Ctll C't1· 

tirdy :1.'1 the) rt•lntcd to military law, the 

a~«umption being- that they wel'e not mt•r'l• 

more than thr funrtiuns of oh~ervin~ and 

enforcing lnw." :\ bronder interpretation 

hegan to cn1crgc only after the 19~4 9~5 

' In 1 he intcrw:~r puriod and e~pcciall y during 

World Wnr I I IIIIlCh thonghl was cxpcnd('d on 

;ntetnpl~ to to~t:ohli~oh a clenr distinctio11 ht•lwct•n 

military govcruiiH'nl and ci\•i l affahs. Militnry government :1ppc:1rC'd to imply more complete contrl)l 

thnn might l1c ~~wu<·tl in ;~II instancl's <~nd wa~ 

thought to ring rnllwr too harshly on c:ivili•ll\ ears: 011 tlw <Hiwt hnud, l'ivil ;1ffairs sounded too 

hhmd for u~r in l'llt'lllY t~rritory. As good a definition :os any would prohnhly he that civil affairr> 

was military govt.'rnuoc.•nt conducted on one's own 

or frirndly ll:rrliOI)', and military govcrnmtool wn~ 

civil nJTaio·s rom.lt~rtrcl in 1•nemy territory. 
4 THE U.S. ARi'vlY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GER}.lt\NY 

C:F.NERAJ. CuJ. L.ION 

G- 1 (personnel) committee at the War 

College prepared a drart milita ry government manua l, and a committee in the 

19:19- 194·0 class proJuced a manusc•·ipt on 

ndministnujon of Ot'cupied tcrritory.

3 

Over the years, War College committees 

had a lso recommended several times that 

the Arm)' prepare a field manual on milita ry government. Bec<IWiC of the presumed 

close relationshi p between this function and 

military law, tJ;c joiJ eemed to falllogicall)' 

to the Judge Ad vocate General (J AG). In 

OrLolu::r 1939, the .J udgc Ad vocate Genera l, 'Maj. Gen . . \ lien W. Gullion, rurned 

down one such recommend ation on the 

ground tha t his offi ce had recently published FJ\If 27- 10, The Rules of L and Warfare . which contajued a substantia l section 

a History or tlrc Civil Affa irs Division, Wa1· Dcpanment Specia l Staff. World War IT to lvfa rch 

I!HCi, p1. !, p. 4-. MS in CMH fil es. 

on civil administration. TI)' then, however, 

war had broken out jn Europe, and the 

work of the recent tr College committees 

had put military government in a new 

light. Earl y the nex t year, a t the u rging 

of G- 3 (operations and training) and G- 1 

nncl with the " ' ar College materials and 

The H un t Report to work from, Gullion's 

oiTk e began writing a manual. ' The result, 

pttl)lished on 30 July 1940, was FM 27- 5, 

;\tlilitary Govemmenl , a statement of purposes, policies, and procedures. The two 

field ma nuaJs, The Rules of Land Wfzrfare 

and M ilitary Govemmenl, would eventuall y be regarded as the Old and New 

T estaments of American miljuny government ; hut in the summer of 1940 the coun -

try was not a l war, and C> f everything it 

th en larked, the ,\ rm )' undoubtedly missed 

a military government ma nual least. 

Another year pa!'.sed, and the Axis 

~; had occupied all of Europe except 

Sweden. Spain, Portugal, a nd Swi tzerland 

and wer-e driving deep into the Soviet 

Unjon a nd across North :\ fri ra towa rd 

Egypt. In World War 1', militm·y government had not been needed 1tntil aSter the 

m mistic:c, because the war haJ heen fought 

ma inly in Fra nce, <lfld the French au t: horilie!> had handled civil niTairs for all lhe 

a rmies. \\'orld Wa r 11 was clearl y going 

lo he different; governm nt~ had disappeared, gone into exile, or become collaiJoraling pu ppets. Whenever the anti-:\X)s 

f or(·es cha llenged the Germans on land, 

they would almost ccn ainly have lo e~ll 

with civilian popllla tions from the outset. 

The British had already had some experience in late 1940 in lhe ltedian African 

colonies, E.ritrea, Cyrena ica, <mel Ita lian 

Somali land. 

T n <:a rl)• 194·1 the In telligence Training 

I ibid., (J)J. 66-60. 
A DIFFICULT BlRTH 

Ctllll'<" of the Brilish Wa1' OIT1cr innugurnted politko-military courses nt ~t. Johu '<; 

College, Caml>l'idgc. Their purpnst· was ''w 

t••n in utric:<'l'll in post war reconstrtl<:tion and 

other missions incident to 111ilita•·y opcrati<> ns in foreign countries: ·:· Two U.S . • \rmy 

ollln·rn, Ma j. Hcnrr H. Cu111ming and Lt. 

Chal'le~ :\. H. Tbomso11, attended the third 

Wlll'sc, '~hkh began in Ottobcr I <J4 1, nnd 

thereby lu .. ·<·amc the fi rst ,\mcric-an oiTkers 

to ••ccrivr militar)• gO\'Cl'tlmcnt u·nining. 

The politi<:o-military rou <;c~ dealt with hislory, gco~rHph y, ccnnomi<~'i, <~nd pulitirs 

nnd nimt~cl at givin.l{ the olliC<:t·-stJICknts 

hat kgrou nd k11owkdge rallwr lhan spcciri<: 

in tr tt< tion in military govc·mntrnt . 

Later, it became t:uslclm:tl')' and c•ven 

ra-.ltinnnhiC' during the pel i(l(l or C'lllllhined 

o1wrations in Jo:nrope- to !I'll( <' tlw otigins 

of \nlly milita ry go\'ernmcnt tnunmg 

tlu•ot•gh Cumming's and L'homson's rc-

~ sui m1ittctl on their rrttn·n in Jnnu-

:\1')' lfJ42- to the C:<rmbridgc <'()I II'SCS. Thr 

British program, n.~ with deepening 

U.S. involvemeut in th<~ war in the late 

S\ln1nler of I !J4 1, did in f:trt J)l'()h:tbly give 

tlw first impetus to proposa ls for iustrm·tion 

in llw :\nH)' ; hut he yond this l'onnct'tion 

the . \mcl'ican development was < oii.Hcral, 

ttnl dcrivativt•. The fmmdation ltatl :wlu ll~ hrrn laid earlier in FM 27 5 .. \ nny 

field manu.tls, even thosC' in as littk demand W\ Ftd 27 5 was iu I MO and I 94 I, 

havt: statlll'l', ror unlcs-; upt:r~qcckd, dccln•·cd oh~o cte, or rescinded tltt:y rcpt'C$Cnt 

thl' rm y·~ intent to do s<mwthing in a 

spl'( ified way. F1\l[ 27- 5. harking bark to 

Colond Hu•ll 's plea for militar'y governmetll trnining, r.stahlishcd in p.trZJ~raphs. 7 

anc\ II tW)uircmcnt.:; fo r timely prorurcnwnt 

allCI tr.tining ()[ miliwrr gcwct•nmcnt per-

, C: 'l 13rir f, Ill Sep 41, iJl PMG, 1\IC Div, cl!ts· 

1cd tlt'timnl files 008. 

5 

sonncl. On 5 September 1941, Gcncml 

Gullion, a~ j\ldgc Advocate Gcnentl, had 

called these paragraphs to G- 1 's attention 

and rcmmmcndcd that the training be 

g ivcn.u 

fl\if '2.7 5 had :wrmnplishetl something 

c:Lc;c :t!oi w<'ll ; nantrl), it had assigned rc.o;pcmsibilily fo r military go"crnment personnel, 

training, :utd plauniug to G- 1. G- 1, lhC' 

personnel Jivision of the General StafT, 

seemed ~ll the tilllC n logical choirc Thr 

work on milita ry govcmmenl in th<· interwar rears had been done by the G- 1 n un• 

mittccs in tlw War· College, and the 

primary General ~LaiT co11cern with milital')' 

go,·crnment :'lppcarcd to be the pi'C>Cttt'Cmcnt of spcf'ialized pcr~onnel. On 15 Scp· 

tcmhcr. G I proposed to begin training 

ofTirers r or as.-.iwllll~lll lo ta. k forre stnlTs 

and Lo nr:\lt' a 1111dcus of officer::; for militar} gcwcrnmcnt and reconstruction.' (~ 2 

(milita ry intdligcn<r), G- 3, and the War 

Phtns Di\'ision obje<"terl. Any pos.-;ihlc missions seemed to lhcm too remote and too 

,·ague LO jwaify clivrrting offirers who wen· 

needed to train tht! expanding t\rm)'. When 

G- l refused 10 :l!'!'C!)l the nonconruncnrcs 

and the Chid of StarT referred the propo:ml 

hack for fmther study, G- 3 conteued lh:ll 

the proposal was appropriate but wnntccl 

nothing more done than .;ome plartning fm 

roun>c:; whir h C'n11ld hr gi,•en on n 

notiC'e whrn a m·t·cl ill'osc:' Enthusiasm out~ 

side thr. j .\C offirc Hnd G-1 was obvious!)' 

slight. 

ln the fall of 194 1. General Gullion 

briefly acquired all additional assignmc:nt; 

• Memo, OP~rC fo r Gttllion, ~ub: School of 

~Jililnry Government, tO Jan 42. in PMC, MC 

Div, decim:~l filr 11. 7. 

' Memo, C- 1 for t\CoiS C- 3, suh : Politico-Military CourSe~, 15 Scp •11, in PMC, MG Div, cl:lssi· 

fied decimal file 0011. 'C-3 Brief, 18 Srp ·11, in PMG, MG Div, clnssilied decimal file 000. 
6 Tl IE U.S .. \lUI \' II\ THE OCC:UP.\'1 ION OF GER~l.\NY 

(,1 :'\I R\l \\'JCKI RSIIA~I 

beside.'$ hcing the J ucl~l' \ th o• at<: General, 

he hct:amc p, m u~t ,\ [.u..,h.tl General 

( , \\ hich \\a' shortlr to brcnme hi~ 

sole a-"signmcllt. One uf hi' fia-.-t tasks as 

Provost I arshal (;('nt'l al wao; to ncatc n 

militarr poli! c hra ntlt. The \ran) had 

never before had a milit.•r}' police corps. 

In the pas1, militarr police, like milit;u·y 

government, had llrcn m·ganizccl in the 

field when nrrd1·d. Fell' t ht· new lira nch, 

Genera l Gullion wus organizi n.l4 a military 

police school, ;,nd 011 1 () Novc·mbcr 194 1, 

he offered lo im ludc military govt•mmcnt 

in)ltrurtion. (; I, stri• tly a sta iT agcnq•, was 

pleased lO ha\ (' .1 plan• to put the training 

function; hut (; '{ ohjr1 tl•d. insio;ting- that 

military govcrnmrnt, :lc((lrding to F~l 

27- 5, was o;o dirTcH'lll from mi lit ar~ polic c 

that no ,Jdvantal:l' cuttld JC'lull faom t·omhining thr two t) pt.., t.C im.trunion. aj. 

Gen. yron C. C1.11llrl', who had MICceeded Gullion"" Jud~t· .\d\'m .ttc Gcnnal, 

agreed that, strittl) 'Pt·al..in{t, milit.u y government did not hclun~ in ;a'' hool fm military police lnH argued th.tt ' '' ong ohjt•c tionc; 

could be found ·'' \\(!II a~ilill't "'"i~ning it to l.llt) nthea ni,tin~ \rna) .t!!CI\l~. 

Gullion, Cramer ar~ucd, "'·"' \\ill in~ to du 

the job; morcovea, ~~~ a '·"' "< houl graduate, former l':ntional Rcnwta' .\ c 1 administrator in Hawaii, and Jmigr .\dvoratc 

General when F~ l 27 10 und F~ l 27 5 

were written, he wrts t~s qwdi!icd to -;upervise the tn.in ing as nny oflin·•· in thr Army.'' 

On 3 Dc!'cmhcr, nv<T th(' (; :i ol•j<·,·tion, 

Brig. Gen. \V:~dc fl. Haislip, (; I, asked 

the Chief of StarT, Ct•wral (;c·orgc C. 

J\ [arshall, to :llllhori;.r.c milit.tl'}' gm crnm('lll 

training in ol "< hool to he operated " for 

other purpo,cs'' ~~~ the Pamosl j\ lar..,hal 

General.'" Ccncr ,\I ~ l.u'Shall c nnn n~t·u on 

6 J anuary 1942." 

.\fter Pc.a 1l llarhm, '"' the J.tprtnC$C 

O\'Caran the Pacific i ... land,, militilr) government seemed lcxs cs.-,cnt i.ll th.tn rver to the 

.\1111)' nt an~c. On the other hand, the internment of t'IH'Ill} :llit•n,, tlw dcdar.~tion 

of martial Ia\\ in I law.tii, .tnd the pro jet ted 

resettlement C> f thr wc:-t toast J apane,<;c impooed signifirant civil arTaia, rc..,pnn,ihilitie.-, 

on the .\rmr, partit ularly un llae Provost 

.\Iarshal General's Orrin·. l1 1 .Ja11uary 

1942, having by then (ict·ided tla:tl milit;~ry 

govcmmcnt I raining- ought to l>t• given 

~cpara ely, Gullion nlndt• Jrs.~t· I. M illn his 

adviser on Lhr suhjtrl and askctl him to 

• 1\fcmo, JA(: for ACufS (; I, \lth : Traiuiu~ 

of Pcrsonnrl for i\t ilil;~ry <imr1 nmrnl, 2:1 De~ 

.J I, in Pi\IC, i\t(i Di". d!'rim:~l fil,. ·o 1.7. 

•• i\lt'mO, C: I fur CofS, ~uh · Tra111ing of Perron· 

nd in :\lilitarv C:mrrnmrn1 nnd I i.1i~nn, 1 Dl'c41. in Jl).IC:, ).IC: Dh. tlt•c-nn:tl file :111.1. 

":\£cmo, OP:\IG for Ciullinn, ,uh· School of 

i\lilitary r.o,•crnmeut, 10 J.tn 12, 111 PMG, l\f(; 

Di,•. dc.-cirnal file 31-1 .7. 
A DIFFICULT BIRT H 

cklCJillinc what end" l'nch \raining should 

:l('I'\'C.' ~ filler, later ( i\ovt·mhr• I ~J42 ) 

plai'CU on active duly ao; a ('olonl·l, wa-; 

kin ~ nt the time without pn)' as nn adviser ou the internment of Cllemr ali<• ns. 

He h;ld )lCI'vcd in World Wa r I in tlw j .\C 

bmn~ h .tlld had practiretl lnw in \\';1-;hington, D.C., in the years between the wars.'·' 

Nobody had given Lhought to thl' t em tent 

,,( militarr government cour-;cs, and all 

~!iller had :•va ilahlc to him wt•r·c F~ l '2.7 5 

:md the Cumming <md ThonNU1 reports 

whit h, origina lly submitted to (; 2, h,~d 

fo11nd their wny tn G- 1 and finallr to the 

I'M (;'s n!Ticc. Although Miller acquired 

fr·on1 the Cambridge rourscs t lu~ corwcpt 

of hroad nrca orientation, he ,,deled the 

idcu of a prugram d!rcl.lcd <ll dcwloping 

kills i11 hnndling praniral problem~ of ( ivil 

~ovemmcn . T he Ameriran prc1gram, 

thcrdorc, although to a lcs.'\cr dcgl('(' tha n 

somr l:ttc·r thought i! should have, undertool-. to lrail l om ~rs in tcrhniquc and prartit'C, a:- wdl ;~s to give thc1n a c'rl'tllin area 

cxpcnisc. 

Ill Cfll' ly Februar}'. c( ll d Gullinn was 

authorized lO set up a sq>aralt' st'hool. " 

Thr <:om bridge courses had gi' <' II rnilitar)' go\'crnmcnl in-:truction an .tt·ndtmic 

a~opcn , ;mel a uni\'CI"'iity !ot't:lllt'd tlu· 

nntur:.t site fw the Am1y ~< hnul. Hard)· C. 

Dillard (later a colonel ) . who like ~diller 

w:•~ wOI'J..i ng at the time for thl· P;vrG <I$ 

a c ivilin11, g~estcd the Uni\TI'hit)' of \'irtia i11 ( :harlotlcsvillc, Virginia, link 

" Conf, Col Dill:1rd with l.l C.:ol 1~on, !) M nr 

·I I, ~uh: Urginnin~s nf 1he School u( Military C,o,·-

('rlutlt'nl, C:harloucsvillc, Vn., in SII A£F C 5, 

22.0 I. 11 t.Jruto, P~ ('j (or CG. ASf, ,uh · Recommcndatiun !or Di•tin!(ni>hcd Scn•ice rdal, l ~fay .Jot, 

in r~IG, l\IC. Di', chl.ssificd dt•r nnul fate 200.6. 

"J\lt•oncl, AC: for P~JG , ~uh: Training o( Personnel (or ,\ lililal')' Govcrnmc111, !I F<'h t2, in Pr.IG, 

MC: Dlv, tk·donal fil e 008. 

7 

more th<111 lWu ur~ from '''ashinglon h) 

car or tr.dn.•·• Gullion acccpLcd Chnrlottt•-,. 

" ille as the :;it c after the universit y ofT,·rcd 

10 fumi.<~ h ;dl dw rl'c~sar)' fa li Li e.~ :H :1 

rent o( $75 p<•r 111011lh. It had many aLh·:tll• 

tagc.<:, he o;;1id, i111 ludi ~ economy.''' l·:ronomy was to ()(' a .;trong feature ol' tlw 

sd wol. The lar~l'!>. l item of c..x pcnsc, pr fr-.~ 

sional pcr~ouucl , \Vlh $1 1,000 iu I 1H2, .md 

the tot.d hutl~ct for I ~14:~ was $<>8,6£10.' · 

incrcw;nl X1m1cwhn1 by expansion clnring 

the )'Cllr . 

. \n order of tltr Secretary of War, on 

2 .\ pril 1<142, cstah li hcd the school " to be 

k110 wn w; the School of ~li li lar ' Guvcr·nmcnt'' at the Univc il y of Virgini:1, aucl 

Brig. Gen. Comditl'i 'vV. Wic-kersham w:ts 

appointed ib <'Uilllllamlant and din·nor·.'' 

General \Vick<'t'llh.tm, chosen for hi-: expcricnc c ac; ;1 lawyer. had been G- 2, Fit'll 

.\ rnw. fill er h:l(l dune much of th<' worJ.. 

in organizing the 'rhool, a nd when lw <IC· 

reptcd a civil scrvirc appointmen t in i\l:l> , 

Gullion n:•nwd him :ts.<;ocinte direct(H'. Col. 

Frank H . n~t ing:<, former executive ollia :r 

of the :\r'l11)' J11 du,.,t• ial College, hcc:n1w nsi'\tanl romnmndanl. R}' .\ pril, Wir kcr-;ham 

had visited variou-; univc1 itico; looking for 

fac·ult y .md hacl rn1was.<;cd other ~twe rn

mcnl dcpartrncnt,s for lecturer!\. 1 k had 

hired three 1·ivilinn ('xpcrt.;;. one cnc h for 

Ccrmnnv (.\ rnold \\'olfcrs, Yale ), ft a l} 

(H enry Powell, j tlhns Hopkins), and j :\1):'\11 

" Co nf, Col Dillnnt wirh l.t Col Ma.~o n, Y ?o.-l ar 

·H . suh : Bc,qinnings l1f rloc School of Mili t:Jrr C.ov- <'rnment, Cha rlo ttcwillc. Va., in SHAEF C- 5, 

22.01. 

' t'rno. AIR ~t CofS for CofS, suh: Tr;~ininu 

of Pf't'SOntwl ((It ~lilhttry Covemmcnt and Liaison, 

5 ~h1r 12. iu 1'~1(: . C Oh·, dtcimat file 0(){1, 

H l\lf'mO, A C. for r lvlG, mh; Establishllll'llt o( 

School of ~lili1111y Covt•rnment, 13 Mnr •12, in 

PMC , :O.IC Div, <kriuwl file 008. 

" ASF, OP~ C, O ocl<·r· No. 47, 2 Apr 42, in 

Pl\IC, l\!G Div, clccilnal nJc OOll. 
8 THE U.S. ARJ\lY lN THE OC:CUPJ\'1'10 OF GERM NY 

(Hugh 13orton, J l<Lrvanl). Col. Cuthl lert 

r. Stearn~ headc.d thr four-officer milit ary 

pnrt of the faculty.''' i\lltold, Lhe stafT numhcrcc.l t wdvc onicn and civilian in tru cto ~, 

twenty-five othe r civilinns, and one enlisted 

man. ~u 

With so modest a strucllii'C, the school 

could not hope to handle more tktu a hundred LUd nt~ at a time and , in fact, 

intended to rnroll only about half t hat number. The t<lurst:s wen: srlteJ uled to r un fom 

months. Because some students were commissioned direct!)' from civilian lire, .\rmy 

organization and regulations a lso had to 

be taught. The s pedali;tcd instruction w<•s 

given in three rm : b)' lcnure.<; and seminat'S, l>y the W a r College <'<>mmittce-synclicate systetlt of working on hrnacl problems, 

a nd hy the Comma 11d and Gen<,> t-al Staff 

Sc.:hool (Leavenworth ) S)'Stem under whil'h 

the students wot·kcd out speci fi t as.~ cl 

problems. Since man y of the students were 

senior fi eld-grade ofllcct'); ('l nd others possessed pertinent civilia n skills, the War College system in pa rticular enabled the school 

to resear ch and solve problems, as well as 

to instruct. The first course. with -fifty 

officers a ttending, opened on II May 1942. 

The .'Inn)' T nkes the Lend 

The Sl'l1ool of "Milit a ry Government !1 ad 

been conceived before P(':p·l H a rbor to 

remedy a potential defi ciency by provid ing 

the Army with a !l ud eus of trained milita J')' 

government o/ficcr!l. H owever, the country 

was then plunged iuto a global Wil l', and 

long before Lhc fi1':'l ('lass :~s.c;e ml d ill 

Churlotlesville, the .\rmy's eventua l en-

•• Cot~ , Col Dillard with l.t Col a~on, 9 Mar 

•H, $lib: Beginnings of the SchClol of Miliw ry Co,·-

eromcnt, :~r csvill c, Va., in SHA EF C- 5, 

22.01. 

"" Mt!mo, AG for PMG, suh: Establishment of 

School of Militnry GovcnUII!'IIl, 1:1 ]\li ar '13, in 

PMC, MG Di,·, decim~1 l file 008. 

gagcment in military government was inevitable. Wiml hud been a contingency was 

soon to ~t e a rca ljty and a ,·ita ! one. 

H ow large, though fa r from certa in, w:tS 

fru;t heroming awesomely apparent. Thereport~ on t hr Cambridge CQm ses had added 

another d intcnsion by raising a question of 

posl host iii ti e.~ reron);truction, the likelihood 

that the . \rmy would h<we to ~su c worldwide relief obligations a~ well as govcm orcupied enemy tcrri lOry. Su(·h <1 situation 

eoulcl mean that at some Lime all the forces 

in tlw field would have substa ntial r ivil 

;d-l'a irs {W milita ry government responsibilities. O ne of the first studies made a t Cha rloll es\'i lie lricd lt> determine how ni;t n )' 

ofTi('ers the i\rmy might need. The Rhinela nd ocrupation a fter \<\lorlu War L which 

only involved a population of about one 

million, required 21 ~ military government 

offi cers, nr . I pcrrcnt of thr ol'cupatioll 

for<'e. O n this basis, the study showt:d, a n 

/\rmy of fum million men, without any 

nllowance fo1· the larger l'ivilian population to he g-overned, would need 4·,000 offi cers, as many as the S<"hool of Military 

Governme nt could produce in Len Ctt ' 

Gullion's vent ure in lo milita ry governIIH:nt training had onl y ex posed the !\1·my's 

probl em, not solved it. lt rl tte.~v ill e I'Oll ld 

not tt·ain the qtti il e number of ofTirct-s, 

ancl even if it could, enoug-h candidates 

with the desired skill'S a nd talents could not 

l>c found within the .\rmy. O n the mher 

hand, the l\nny had either to fi nd and tra.in 

the offi cers and asserl its predomina nce, at 

Jca~ t as lo ng a~ hustilitie.-; lasted, or let some 

other agency J o sc>. J f another agency assumed t11e responsibility, theater com-

<:~ nd s woulrl find 1 hcmsch-es having lO 

"Memo, .Jesse T. M iller for Ccn Wickc , 

suh : Confc rc-nrc with Representa tives of the Board 

of Economic Warfa re, 2 1 May ~2. in PM C, M\. 

Div, dccim;d file 0 H·.l :1. 
A DfFFlC:ULT 13JRTH 

c:ontcnd not only with lhc enemy hut also 

with highly placed American civilians in a 

separate cha in of <·omn1ar1d. ln any ~;e, 

the Army wo11 ld have to uv r careful!)' 

among several important and n11rn cr·mlS 

lesser govcnlmental agencies already entitled to a voice in the administration of 

occupied or Jiberated terrill)!')'. 

The most powerful of these agencies, a nd 

for the incipient .\nny progr·am pmi>al>ly 

the rnosl important, was the Board of Eronomi<' \Varfa re. l t operated directly under 

the l'resident, ad vising hi111 on all economi c 

aA'air ' related ttl Llw war or to the postwar 

period, partin da rly in the international 

sphere. :\11 departments, including the War 

Depal'lmcnt, W<-rc required to <'omply 

with the hoard'l': polil'ics and to senu'C' the 

hoard's approvaJ for· an y <H'tiviLics with cronomir cffc1·ts or implications. No Army activity fell more nlm i)lctcly under the 

hoard's aegis tha n military g-overnment. 

Co ~equ ntl , Miller reported with considerable ati ac ri , after three Boa rd of 

Economic Wal'fa rc: representatives visited 

Charlotl esvillc on 20 May 194·2, t·ha t they 

had seemed to agree that the Wat· Department should control planni11g, administration. and training in milita ry govcrnmenl. 

Tile lmard representative., had ta lked a bout 

finding ~ of co-op('l'<!lion, a nd Miller 

had pr o~ed tha t they might help the 

. \rn1)' find cc <t li s who could he trained 

to 111:1ke 11p a personnel ese voir. "~ 

The time when military govcmment 

might he needed still appeared ver)' remote 

in th e early hair of 1942. The .\rmy f11 t 

had the 'var to fig ht :mrl win ; (his priorit)' 

w;a;;; the VC'l')' ~o n th at Gullion and his 

n~c;nc: es wen.· l>(:roming uncas)'· Ci vilian 

agencies, stwh a::; the Board of Economic 

V: <~ e, with nwndat<:s to look ahead to 

"' Ibid. 

the end of os ti iti e~ a nd with plenty of 

time to d tl :)0, could in the meantime develop pl ans that would infringe on ,\rmy 

t•ontrol. In June, Gullion dedared his intention to set up a division in his offi ce to 

assert Army leadership in military government and to enlist the services of other governmental agencies. Since the primary responsibility for military governmcnl rested 

with the /\1'11\)', he sla ted, it should logicall y 

tnke the initiati ve in preparing polides and 

pia ns. ~~ 

On ~8 J une, Gullion made the first move 

toward securing de<~r-c ut 1\ rmy predominan ce. He requested authority ro e11large 

the training program and to rel·onrile an y 

nmflictitlg views between the military and 

d vilia n eJ; <~ hm nt . T he latter anthor· 

it)\ he sla ted, would IJe used to c.~ laldi!l h 

the . \ nny's right to absolute control over 

occupied a reas during lhe period of military ncecs.o;; ity ancl w makr cen a in that adequate preparations were made to fulfill ocr u pat ion mis.'iions. ~ 1 

Shortl y l hereafter, Gullion received an 

unexpected, and not entirel y welcome, assist from a nother qu:11ter. On 17 J uly, Pr·esidcnt Franklin D. Roosevelt forwttrded to 

U ~td r Secretary of \Va r Robert P. Patterson a memornradum suilmilted by :\rthur 

C:. Rin land of 111<' Wat' Relief Control 

Board, a r10lher rivilia n agency with a builtin t'ont crn wil h orrupationnl qut~s ti s . 

Ringlan d ha d hea rd <t houL the Charlottec:;-

villc s<'hool and al•out n school Lhat the 

Navy WH:" opening in the umm r at Co-

:• to.1lomo, Gullion (or CC, SOS. 2:l jun •12. 

in PM(';, MC Dil·, clr.dmal file 32 1.1 Q, Partia l 

htxt in Harry 1.. Coles and Albe rt K . Weinberg, 

t i,•il AOail's: Soldiers !lu ome Coremors, U nited 

States Arm}· h1 World Wnr If ( ;~s hing on, D.C.., 

J 116·1), fl. II. 

: I M emo, C ulliou fo1· CoCS, sub: 1'1·aiJ1ing of 

Civil Ml'airs Oflk 1:rs, 13 St•p •13, in PMO, MC 

n;,., dccim:ll fi le 3:i:l. 
10 THE U.S .. \Ri\lY IN THE OC:C:UPt\ 'I'ION OF GER~I.\1'\Y 

huuhia Uni\'t'l'sily, b11l lu: did II<Jl l1dicvc 

Lhc two togc·thcr· could turn out enough 

trained nw11. Private groups and othn intcrcslcu ovtrnmcnL agcnc·ics, he suggt•stccl, 

could help, and he propo~ctl that tilt• Prcsicknt appoi11t a colllnlittcc· 10 cxplorr 

the~ pct~onncl prohlcm and make· suggt•<;-

tions on ad mini ·tmt n. -. The: Ringland 

mcmomndur11 irnmccliatcly .H't ornplished 

"'hat Gullion, working through o:;cvernl starr 

levels, rui hl have necdc'd nwnths to do; 

it mnck civilian involvement a W:-~r DeJ.mrtnH'nt concern. It <;C::C'u r <:d, rnorrowr, 

polcnt suppor·t for Gullion from Secretary 

Pallcro;on. ln his reply P<~ttcr-sO JI <~gr·c<; d 

with Ringland on nwst point~, inc htding 

the· nrfd for stlldics ()11 pcl'l\Olllll'l and :leiministration, but proposed tlwy h(~ C':tt'l'icd 

"informnlly and with no puhlidt)' whatsoever,'' in uth<•r words, wiLhout a nmunittcr 

nncl at lt-a~t without calling- on priv:-~tc 

grolt ps. ~ 

While Patterson did not nllcmpt In exclude Ringland's aml other gowrnmcnt 

ngrnrics, his ln1cki ng- madr s 111 ·h in I c:r•ft'rcnce c:1sier w avert than might lrnvc been 

l'XJ)t'<·tcd. On thl' night of 2<) July, Wit kcrshnm, nppart'tllly at Pi\ttcr~<m'~ hchc.-;t, mel 

informally with five U.S. sen a tot'~< and s('v~ 

rl':tl Bonrd of Economil' Wnrf~ll <' r<~prescntali\'Cs. He outlined the . \rmy program, 

inc·luding tltr projected War lkpnrtnwnt 

leadership of nil interested agendc.;, and 

n·por't('d tha[ <•II prC'>Clll W('l't~ '' highly 

pleased.'' Tlw next morning th<: Pre .;idcnt's 

cJITirt called Patterson's ollin: to rc:(J llCSl 1 he 

r·t:tul'l1 of the" Ringland memorandum. l'ht~ 

caller implied that the Prc·siclcnt w:ts s~tli

ficd with the War Departmrnt pr ognm1.~i 

Coles nnd Wf'inhrrg, StJitlinr lluomt: Got·-

emors, p. 1•1. 

"" I bid., I'· 15. 

"M('mo, PMG for Clti<>f, Adrnini,lr.uivc• Services, 3 1 J"t •12, iu PMC, i\IC Uiv, t.lccinlill ftle 

01'1.1:1. 

Two W<'l'k~ latc1, 011 I ll u~w;L, Gullion 

t'C<'eivc.d authority lo set up n milital') government division in the Pro,·ost M<~r hal 

General's Ollin~ " to engage in broad planning. ' '"' tvJ ilk1· or~ani~cd the division ;111d 

became its tlin·c·tor w.hcn he wa-; rcsiCH'C'<I 

to active dut y in November. The PMG 

proposal., had al-;o fC('()Il111lended giving thr 

dh;. ion tlw ~u pcr visiun of operations in tiH: 

field wiH·n they nMtcrialized; hut to haw 

done so wmtld lwvc ahl'idged the tlw;\lcr 

comm:,ndr.rs' :wl hority lo rondul-1 all oper· 

ations in their thealCrs, including militar y 

government, as till')' saw fit. "'' In fact , llw 

term ''hronci planning'' was me<lnl w be 

restrictiw, cxc lttding plllnning for st)('ci11c 

perati ~. 

In the nrc:uttin)(' the G- 1 section, with· 

cut heing ~prd fi tlly r•dicved of rhc rc-.sponsihilitics assigned uncl,•r 1'~1 27- 5, had '' " 

hut dis;tpp<'a r·cd frmll lhc s1 ('ne. C I h.1d 

considered military gnvcmment n somewltal in('()llgnwus a.-;.-;ignment from the fir:;l 

and found it an impo~-; ihlc one after th1: 

Genernl Stafl' reorg;tnization of l'vl "n; h 

194 2. In tlw torga niz~I Li n G- 1 had 

-;hrunk from -;cventy-three officer:'; to thirteen anu front OIH' hundred rivilialls (o 

twenty. Milil:tr)• ~ov nmcnt had pns.<iccl to 

the " i\fisccllancou.; Branch," where it was 

lumped together with six other vagurly related acliviti(.'S.'"' 

The .:\I ilit<ll')' Go\'ernmcnt Division. 

P!viG, crc:ivc~cl it ~ first and, in I hr end, 

most portentous mission before it ofTic'i;tll y 

" Memo, OPI-.lC:, ~1(: Div, for Col\rml J)h, 

suh: Monrhly l'ro l!~$ Report for ~tr. Div, 10 

Oct -1~ in Pl\tC., l\1\. 11iv, decimal fill' :HO. I. 

"' l\lcrno, Miller for Cnllion, suh: l nilial Or~;ani· 

zntion of n ~lili1nry Co\•c•mmcnt Divi~ion, 2!'1 Jul 

f2, in PMG, MG l)iv, decimal filt' :ltO.I. 

"' Edgar 1 •. l•!rick$on, 1\11 Introduction to l\filitary Govcrnon c rlt .111d Civil Affairs in World War 

II, pt. I, pp. ll 10. !viS in CMH files. 
\ DJ FFIC:ULT BfRT il 

op~ wtl for hlt"in es~:" On th~ llHH'ning of 

4 Sl·ptl'tlll wr, Sccretal')' Patt er:>:tlll lliCl with 

SNtt' t:u·y of the Treasury Il<:nl')' J. ~lor­

!{cndmu, .Jr., Secretary of the Navy Frank 

K11ox, :u1d ~cvcrnl State Deparlntcnl ;tl)d 

tlw llonr<l of Economic W:u·fnrr ollie ial<;. 

Pallt:rsuu had thmrght the suhjcr'l wa" to 

br ( lll'rcncy rn. liSe in Nonh .\ fril'a. H e 

w.ts "urpri-;cd to lea rn that .:-.lorgcnthau 

had itH lutlcd the entire qut.-stiort of on upatinn pl.lnning on the agenda, tha t lw !.new 

about what had been done S() far, nnd that 

ht· was :q>p:tt'('ntly h;n-ing :o;( li1H~ W<lrk don(' 

in his own ckpanment. Pall<'t'SWl wa.-1 also 

:~o ew n sl;ll'tlcd wlten Knox ccpmtcd 

hllving t:dkcd .dwut the suhj<'<'t with the 

President. who had lt>ld hi111 tltt~l be 

tiHntght nlilit ~ g-ovcrnntcnt mtg ht to he 

put undct thr Joint Chic·fs or Stan· (JC!-i ). 

\ftt·r· the· tlltcling. Patlet"SUII tnld Gullion 

that the time had c-ome w g£'! tlw \\'ar 11<:-

p:trtmtnt ew~' l'Ct down on IJ<\fJt!l' anti to 

h£'ad nff for ~ood frcewlwcling di. C't R'\ on~ 

lik<· the Olll' Morgcnth:tu lwei rnginccrcd 

1 hat 11\CH'Iling. Gullion llllllllOIICd Wi<'kcr-

,;hatll and ]\filler from Chnrlottcsvilk, and 

l1dol'<' tlw d i•)''x end they ltad dndtcd :t 

don1rncnt l'nlitlcd ··synopsis of the \\'nr 

Df'p:tt tnwn t Program for ;\lilitar~ 

Cm crnmc-n t ... 

The Synopsi" pmjct ted a nation.1l prog rnm within a framework of War D<·p:tl'lmcnt doctrine. The fil'sl parngt•:tph as.~e cd 

initi;d :\,•my prcdomina nn·. \ny orcupation of hostile or .\ xis-hdd tct•ritory, il 

xtatcd, ~tlcl he divided intu two phases: 

a p<'riod or milit ary nccc,-:it y aud a IH(CI' 

pc:riod wlwn military m'l<'S'\il)' wollld no 

lunge•· ·x ~t. D11ri11g the- lir"'l phiN' the 

arnwcl forrcs wollld be (lltligalrd to ll('l up 

and 111aint:tin militar>• KO\'Cnlmcnt. In the 

"Tin.· clivi~iQII went into opt•rati(')n 0 11 I:; Srr· 

lt'lllhC'r I !142. 

J I 

sl!mnd phnli<" .1 'i\ it ian au thority would 

probabl y o,upplant the Jttilitary, lmt 1111til 

the second pha!Se began, the govcl'nmt•nt 

of any Ot'1'11pit:d territ ory wonld he in .\1'111}' 

ha11ds. The s11hscqutnt parag raph!5 outlitH;d 

1 he pro~ 11n . H:1si<· pnlicie~ to he administered hy the .'\rnt)' in ocrupied tc rrilUI')' 

would he dc.:,·ci<>]Wd, when needed, hy tlw 

appropl'i:ttc govrmmcnt agcnrics, the Stale 

Department, the Board of Economk \\'urfa re, 1 h<.: Tt raxuc y Drrartmcot, and (Jthers. 

The ,\rmy, mea nwhile, would r<'l'fltit and 

train -;pc< i:tlists lo cxcc·ute its mis-;iou. Fot• 

the pre."cnl tlw Army parricula rl y m•<·<kcl 

the ro-u ~· rati n of other agencies in li•lding spc< ialists. It ;dso proposed to rail on 

r.crtain a~c cc; £or spcrittl studies nncl fl>l' 

material.; and IClllii'Crs for the St !Htol of 

!\ (ilitary Covcrnmrnt. 1

" Later, the Milit ary 

Government Di\'i.,ion gave the st of the 

S~ nopsis ax ht'ing " to a"o;crl Rnd nwintnin 

\\'ar Dcpartmrm leadership in mililar) 

g o\'CI'IIIl1Cnl a11d at the same tintc invit e 

n nd e111 plu~ :1 "'ide ,·o-npcrat ion wi tit 

other dcparltlH'Ilt" nnd agenricl' of the 

gm·crnnlCI tl. "~ 

The :Military Covcrnmcnt Division sent 

out I hitt y·fnltr copies or the Synopsi,, nine 

to tlw mrmht·r~ of the rahinet, with itll ac-

··ompanying lellcr sig ned h}' , cn cl<try of 

\\':u· Hl n, }' 1.. Stim~on , and twcnty-fiw tn 

a v;wict> t~ f nthcr g"O\'crnmcnt agenl ics ;~nd 

scmip11hlir nrgilni'l.:lliom; rang-ing ft'lllll thr 

Oflirc oi Stratcg'k Srrvicc'l ( OSS ) nnd 1 he 

Omcc of Price.: t\clministration ( 0 P. \ ) to 

the Rockl•(dkr Found::ttion and the Anwri-

(':\11 Lihrarr ssor iation.:<~ Tltt' rc<·ipicnt:. 

" Colt'S aud Wciulll.•rtt, !'\t>ltlicn Jkccunt (:m ,.,. 

IIQfJ , pp. 11\-20. 

.. :\lcmo, O PMC:, MG Div, for Control Oi,•, 

s11h: Monthly l)rogrcss R~>port for MG Div, 10 

Ort 42, in PI\•IC:, 1\IC: Di"• dcc.imnl file 310.1 

"~ cmo. i\ctinlt Chief, i\IG Di''• suh: Tren~11r)' 

Dr.pa rtmcnt, in PMG, ~l G Div, df'cim;1[ lilt· 

OH .lS. 
12 TilE U.S .. \R~ Y ll\ T HE OCC:U P \TIOX OF Cf.R~ i\NY 

were ~L.,kcd .. ltl dc:;ignatc sunw JWI'-

son .. to c;t;tJ,Jish and maintain liaison .. . with aj. Gen. ;\lien W . Gullion, 

tlw Provost I :u"S h;d General, who ~ 

dirC('I(y in ·gc or the military government pt·ogrnnt.'''',., 

The Progmm {' ntla A llnl'l. 

In World \\'..r II the ,\rmy ll'\.'ittmcd 

lllilny new anJ lltHL'l tl responsibilities. 

.\ moug thc.<;c d~tti cs, military governnH nl 

wns distinguished a ilpvc all othct'S hy its 

rap.trity for grncr<tting ea rly and durable 

<"ontroversy. The term alone smmded 

vaguely unconstitutional and seemed tu intply a tcrnncss thnt probably ought not to 

IJc visited even on U.S. enemies. :\llhough 

the Unircd States hnc.l c·onducted tnilit :t t')' 

" Coles and Weiulll'rg, f!oldicrs /Jecomt1 (JI)t'rr· 

no rJ, p. 20. 

govcrnmC'n( in tt carlr all or its past wars, it 

had nlwnrs done so ns a kind of reluctanl 

afterthoughl. Ddihcrate planning seemed 

to SUK~CSt 'oldhloodedn<:s'i, Ji. ~;u·d for 

the lratlit ion a I civil-military rd•ll ionshjp, 

and dil'dn in for 1 he prcsunwd n.et mal ~uperioril)' of d ,·ilians in the arl of govcrnmenl. The i\ rm y teamed this lcssu11 <;a rly 

and painfully. 'l'ht opening of the school in 

C:harlottcwillt• in ~ ay I ~J4 2 hrou,tthl a rn.<:h 

of new IJWI' stories dcc;crihing t Itt· . \ nny 's 

"school for Caulciterl'." When the \Var Department < l:etllped a light prohibition on 

news from Chnrlottcsvill c, the volume of 

pre.<;.-; disns!;sion subsided, hnt 1 he school 

became 11 more a llractivc target for spccttla tion and St'll!;ational journ:dislt1. Bom 

with a had public image, \vhi< h it would 

never quite overcome, the program was 

soon fi ghting for its life aga inst a nood of 

om rial cri tirism and suspicion. 

The tide began to roll on 29 October, 

when the ~ynops s was hro11ght before n 

full rahinC'l lllt't'ling. Se\'crallllC'tnl)(:rs, who 

a pparently would have likrd larger role.<; 

for them:-.c lv~.-. and their depa rtments, 

\'Oiccd suspicions; and Strrcta ry of the Interior Hnrold L. Jckcs cxpn:sscd outright 

alarm ill what he ~aw a~ a germ uf imperi-

:tlism. 'l'ltc J>rc..;idcnt srrmrd In think lhe 

school was a good idea hut had tlouht.s 

about tltc quality of the fa rulty . .-\ftcr the 

meeting, Srncwrr Stimson concluded that 

the m111positc picture his fellow <":thinct 

members had drawn was one of itv ipicnt 

an diosc W;-er Department pluns on the 

one h<md ami mediocre Army rffon on the 

utl1cr!" 

Later in the tla}', the President's opinion 

changed. In a memo lo Stim:,on he s:tid 

he understood that the Provost MarshHl 

"' Draft nwmo, Sc·c:retary o{ War for the President fuo d.11c, nut sent], iu Pl\IG, MO Div, cln<sificd dl'cimal fill• 333. 
.\ Dl Ff·l <: UJ; r BTRTif 

(,<·Jll'l.d \\ ·" I raining orTi1 ('I · "to a-.sunw 

th(' dtllk' of \ ·filitar)' Govrtnw· or civilian 

ndvi~ors 111 i\ lilit:try Gm-crtHH-.s," lit' a~kt•d 

for a c'otllJ)I<:tc cxplan:11 ion :llld lists ctf nil 

thr pc'l'l'CIIl tll'l, 111ilitary a nd 1 i\ ili:cn, nndcrgelint.: MH It 1 raining. The nt.tllrr, lw ~;a id, 

wa!'. ~omct in ~ ,,•hidl should h:t\1' lH'Cil 

tal.cn up with ltim in the r;,...,t iu~t;tnrc. 

(;u\t'ttlillg c i\ilian lcnitm·y was prt•doaniuauth a c i"ilian l:Lsk and rcquiawl "ah<:olutd) fit,! da'>s 111C'1t:·•; 

in a few .;entrn<'<'s the Prr~ittrnt \ nwnw 

c·omertcd :ut in!erdcp;lllllt('lll:tl ~C)t t:dtltk 

into n monttmcntnl misunderstanding and 

a dift· threat to the prinC'iplc of ltnil )' of 

t'nmmand. Ohviottsly he h:td as."unwd that 

lhr .\nny was attcmptin~ lo tntin a s1wric.s 

of pt•m on.<.ttl-. :11 Charlouesvilk and hr was 

1 011\'ittn•d that Sllf'h po~ts should go 

tu higlt-pmvnrd < i,·ilians and !lOt to the 

mil it .tr)' at all. The . \rm) dorl rint• I hat 

madr t I1C' l heater eommandct 1 hi' military 

Cl\ <·rn<w a t Jca<;t until w~ti iti<~~ t'tHlrd 11 01 

only was :tp)Jarcnlly unknown to him hut 

could not C\'Cn he fitted into his <'OJH'(• pt 

nf 111ilitary g"ll\Trnmenl. The Prn~ id t• nt , like 

tht• pttl1lic, wa~ thinking in trrms of domc.;-

ti, guvcmnwut; he considcrnl civi l adlllinistration, no maucr when· it was roncl w ted, 

:1 rivilian rcspon~i hility nnd wa" wtall)· llll· 

intprc.,-.:ctl hy the argument uf militar}' 

ll('(('""j( y. 

StitltSOII dictated tw<, ktt<'I"S l'Xplaining 

th<' \\':n· f)rp:trtnlent c-onC'<'rt. pal'tirnlarly 

till' nred to have military oprrations and 

l'ivil administration undct' a singk autiJm·ity in the war zone-. N<·i tl wr INter 

wa-; setH , ~fost likely Stitmun w:tntrd to 

avoid. if lw could, precipitating a derision 

that rould in one stroke fmrc tlw ,\ rmy 

0111 c•f milit ar)' government :utd C't t'atc· in-

" !\lt•mo, Prc;;ident for the Scrrt.'tnry of War, 

29 Ort 12, in f>MG. MG Div, dMsifi ed dccimnl 

fil(' :l:l3. 

II 

c;tl< 11l,th k 1 ttJillll:tlld pruhlcms for 1 lw Cutun:. Jn,tc·ad, It<· mnck .ttl oral report at 

I lte 1 ahi·ttcl meeting of (i 1\n\'etlllll'l, in 

whit h he d('~rr l>cd tlw ohjcniw:- of the 

sdtool :ct ( :11Ht'lottc\\'illr and tlisc !aimed 

any .\ rmy dn-in· tc1 'ontrol mntpi<'d Hr<':ts 

aftet the: w:u t'tHird. H e let this rcpm't 

-;tand "' the- ·"'""'Ct to the President's 

quc~tion . 

[n 1\ovcanhea, all.•• J...., ranw fro111 .ttl 

dire< lion,, Within thl· \\'ar Dcp:~rtnwtll tht• 

qnc·,tinns t.tbrd a )C'M ea rlier were hrcHI)4ht 

forth again. \V:r o; tlu' training worthwhile 

when the times and pl:Kc ~ of future orntpations were •tn knnwn? Shou ld the .\nll)' 

rrcalc a large pool of officers for whon• it 

had m> a<;..;ignmcuts?1

' ' Early in tlw month 

the nit ic i~;nts fmtn owsiclc ,·entered on tile 

alleged sc-t·ond-ratc quality of tht: f:u uh y 

al Charlollt~'" lk .111d on the content of the 

rc)urscs.'" Late1 the • hargt"' IJc<·anw ltHJrc 

diversified, fHtd C:nllion surmised that !>CV· 

ern! c·i,·ili.lll ckp.trtmcnt~ wert• her ollli11g 

jc tl ous of car It (llhn, althoug-h they w<.·rc 

still sonwwlt at nnit ed in their attack on th r 

Arm~ . The new nllarks e·onrcntratcd tn<Jstly 

on Gullion's suppo)>ircl pcrson:tl anthitinn, 

on the politit·al compnsllHill of the 

Charlellt<·willc- f.H·tdl\ and student!'., .md on 

tlw < alil1rr of til<' stltdcnts. Gullion, a 

DcnHHT<lt, wa.; <U"<'U'>l'd of ha,·ing pa< l..cd 

the sc huol with anti-Nc"' Dralcrs and Rt'-

pnlllie·an!'. Toward tlw C'nd or thr month, 

the Prc:sidrttl o;rn t \mi>a.;s;~ ot• \\'illiilm C:. 

Bullitt anci Jnnut h:tn Daniels to C:ltarlollt·svillc to invcstigatr scparattl~ the qualitr of 

th<' studrnts, the 1 nut..,cs, and the plan!' 

"C-olc•s .tcl(l Wr·iuh!'r~. Solrlius llrrol/lc Go•w1/on. p. 2•1. 

» Mrnm, (;ullion for CofS, $tch; Tr.~ining of 

Ci,-11 A(Tnir~ Offir(·•~. 13 Srp 43, in P~IC, ~tG 

Div, drrimat fill· :1)'1 

•• :vf<'rno, I'~I G fol' Sec W:tr, suh: SchCiol of 

Military (:uvt'runt('nt, 'I Nov 42, in PMG, MC 

o;,., r.lassi fit•d tlt!rim;ll file 333. 
II TilE ~. \R.\1\' J:'\ I H£ OC C t P\'JJU'\ or GER~l \:'\\' 

lwinl{ m.tck 1 ht·~t· ." The clislllill 1\HHHh 

l'IHkd "it h Mmlt' < hce1 when Hull ill .uJ\'h.nl 

till· Pn·,iclent to ''< l'<Llo.C wCJIT) ing- .thou! I he 

'>l hool" .uul 1 cpollcd that thr < h.trl{cs 

agaill'lt it wt•n· "itlmut found.uion.' 

Till' llHl"t ominou-. char~e levdc.:ll a~:dn'>l 

the prognuu, lwrausc it was thr mo'l valid, 

waJ> till' <!Ill' .tll<'gin~ the lnw quality of 

<otudcnts at C:h.trlott<''' illc. i'\o ou(• knt•w 

thi' better 1 han Gullion. who in i\m emlw• 

g1 iml) prcdit:tt.•d that unlc.~ the '>tuclent 

body impmvcd nuttc• iallr anti l.tpidl) iu 

qualit), there wac: a real dnn~er that the 

r.ommanding general in each tlu•t~tn wou ld 

have :t "<'0111111is.sar" hy his ick, or a rivil 

gownwr with pnwl'r deriving dire< tly r, om 

the Pn"'ide11t :mel autho1 it) to act indepcnd('nlh uf the wmn1.1ndin~ ~cncr.ll.' 

'I hl· 't huol 11\i~ht be ra pahle nf 1 .1 i,i ng 

'tm·u,, iu high pl.tt e~, Inti "ithin the \ttm 

tl11· p1 iCirit} of ih 1 l;1ill1 on offin'r talrnt 

,,~;~~, low. In m t•mhrr, (;ulliun "e< m<"d 

authorit) to mmmi sion 2,f'J()() "J>C< i.di-.ts 

from t i\·ili:111 life, l111t the-e pcopk would 

ltavt' to hr found fir..,l. 11 Ju tht• nw.mtiul<' 

all thr ),tudeuto; wc :uld haw to he ofTi<Tr" 

.dn·ady iu thr . \1111 }'. and in the long run 

tht·y wnttld «till m.tkc 11p tltt' mnjn1 it) nf 

tlw tt;lint't''· Th<' truuhle "':l" that tht• ''"dt•nt' h.l<l tn Ill' ,eJected from li'h submitted 

h\ thl' atmi<.." .111d '('I' in· romm.tntk and 

the\ \H~Ii' not lild' to \'ohtntcct to lrlinqui'h thri1· hc."t <,ffic·c'"'· \\'itkl'r"ham rumpluin<'d that of sollH' twn hundred and lift)' 

oiTin't'S on the lists fo1· the third romst· at 

( :harlottcs\'illr only thirtr-<·ight would 

":O.Ic·IIIO, C':nllion for Cors. 27 Nov 12, In r~IG , 

MG l>i' , dc-ficn:~l file 21 O.ti:l 

,. C:ulc•• unci Weinberg, Soldrnr llfflllllf' Cor·urw rr, 11 2.'1. ' Mr1uu. <.:oullion for C:ofS, 27 Nc1\' 12, in J>Me, 

M(; Div, dc•cimnl file 210.()'1 

"t-h•mu, A(:c,fS G 1 to J>:O.IC: , suh : Appointment 

of rr~ons Skilled in ;\lilll:try Govrrnmrnt, 23 

Nuv 1'1, 111 P:\1(;, ;\IG ))i,·, drcimnl file llOil 

mal-e \IIi I .thlc stndl'llh, .tnd thc-.t: \\('1'1' 

"mllhin~ to llr:tg almut."' · The '-CI\'i<'c 

cwnm.md,, in \\it t..c•1:,h,nn\ opinion, \\'rrc· 

J,tr~cl~ c·cu11pcN·d of t ull" an} wa), and 

Charlotte·.,, ilk wao; thu-; grtting tlw cull>< 

or the tulk Gullion II icd to ~et app10VIII 

for dircc l :tppliration b) individual o!Ticcro;, 

only to luwc hi;; propo<;al icl et ar.kcc.l :uHl 

then lluricd in C: I. •·· 

'/'Itt ( 11•il l flails Dins/Oil 

\\'hilc tlw \V:u Dcp.trtnH'nt w;Lo; engaged 

in defending ill> nt·dgling pmgram against 

atLaLks from th(' rahi 1H'l and White House, 

it hegan to di..,(()V<'f' that, far from having 

fallen vittim w .111 inordinate amhition, it 

had in f.ut 'lll d~ unclcrcc;timated the potential rule- uf c i\ il .tO.til" and milital") government in the w~11 . On 8 Nm'cmher 1942 

U.S. and B1 iti~h rmu~ l.tndcd in \lgic ~ 

and mon o. l'n•twh North Afric·a wn~ n~­

~umcd, in '>pit<' of ~nmc doul>l'>, to be 

friendly 1('11 itcH) in which civil administration rould he ldtl'ntircly toloc al :ntthoritic-;; 

the Pn·<;idc·11t a'l.o.,igned polit )' forlllulation and l'll.l'ntlion to tlw St<llc Dcp:trtmrnt 

and the pt ovi,iun of rclirf supplic.-; to the 

J.end-l.cw.(' \dmini!'tration. lie saw in 

Korth \(a ic ,, the hc~inning uf an cvcntualh wculd" idt· J>ICI~r:un tn fulfill thr 

promi'e' of tlw .\tlamir Charter and the 

Unitl·d N.Ltion-; Del laration. 

The \\'a1' Dcpanmenl nrccdcd to the: 

delcgalitHI of m ntrol O\'L'r ri,·il martel'S in 

North .\frica to tht Stale Drp.trtment, except when sue h m.lllC'I"i directly affected 

,.. :O.Irmo, Diu•ctor, C: Oh·, for Gcu Gulliou, 

<uh : (.,!•n Wcdcc,..h.un'~ 'l c·ntn1he Estimate of J.ists 

of Swc.lclll .. for Third Cou,..c, 23 No, 12, iu P~fr., 

;\lG Di,·, dn '"'·'' filr 2 10.li!l. •• ~lcmo, l>irN·tor, C: l)i,•, for r.cn r.ullion, 

'"h: l)if'\•('11\1' tu Si•n•irr C:ommnnd~ ::.nd Arulll.'' 

for Fourth C<nll"'• l 'l Fl•t1 !:l, in PMC, J.lr. l)j,, 

tlecim~ol fil1• 210.Ci:l. 
.\ DIFFICLJLI" BIRT!l 

nr wc·r<· alll't It'd by miliLtl)' operations." 

Tlw solution wm; logical n wugh except 

that i\, like the President's dceisicm [rom 

\viii< It it tkr•i,·cd, ignored the mair1 issue, 

naml'lr. thm for the time l1eing at least the 

\nwr (': \11 ~ had only- one ft~(I);() JI rm lwing 

in l\'c>rl h \I rira- to fight the war. T he 

tlwatt·r t'OIIllllarHlcr, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. 

Eiscnhowrr, protested that until !\'onh 

. \frira including Tunisia, then still in ,\xis 

hands, wa ~ set urc, cverythi .~t done 1 here 

dirrnl y afft•t•tcd the military llituation. Jiis 

r liicf civil admini trator, tvfinistcr Roiler'l 

n. urph) , Eisenhower aclclccl, <CH ild not 

be a r11<:mher of the thcat<'r 1'tnfT and at 

the !o\arllc tirttr he iudcpclltknt.lr l'c n ;il>lr 

to the Stntl· Department. The Chid of 

StafT, t:cncnli ~far ll , agn:cd and on 28 

N<w<·•nhn· informed Ei.-;cnhnwt•r t h:11 l\1 urphy would not function indt•prntkntlv and 

the State Dcpartmcllt would not as.o;untr 

t tlllt ml of civil matters until t l11· milit ~ 

.;ituatiorl pcrmiued. Thr Scrretnry of Stnle. 

L~r tll ~;1id, wns in complclr agreement , 

though Jw had proposed an earlier transition period in whirh Eisenhower would be 

al1lt· to di,·c-st hims<.'lf of somr rivil 

;mthority.•· 

.\hhough ~lar.;hall had t'f:.'>t ut' d the 

principle or militnry ncccs.sity, the North 

•\frica u n uupaig11, in its first weeks, had 

'f't :t p;t t(('tll for t iviJ r~ffai ~ anJ milit<H}' 

~ovcrnnu·nt thnt would pcr);ist throughout 

the w;11', The two nmrcpt:-; wen· t•:;lahlishet.l 

w; civilin11 fun rtinns in the thinking of the 

hiKhcsl civilian rirdc.<1 of government. The 

.\rmy might and in fact would throughout 

the war ac-tu:lll)' colllrol both, hut it would 

do so alway" a~ a stand-in. The role itself 

was a proper enough unc nut! wao; e scntiall~ what hnd hrrn propost•d in the 

01 t:otl'' und Wt•it~lw ~. Solrlins Df' comr C:ot•er11111 ' • ll· :Ill. " Ibid., p . •1!1. 

15 

'ivnopsis; hill wh.tl the .\rmy had rlainwd 

in the nop~i" as a lllilttcr of r·ighl, it rrcci,·cd a her· i\or·t h Africa only on 

sufferance. 

\Vhilc t•ivili:m boarcl<> and committl!t'!t 

proliferated in Washington, operations on 

the <;( <'Ill' in North \trim lin tpcd ;thr:rd. 

In early Dcrcnthr•·. scnhower ntllcd attemion tu tlw aci\'C'"<' politicnl cffcrLs that 

would rc.-.ult from :\ f<•i lurc to meet t·ivilian 

need;; after pnhli1· a~uram c.-; h.td bern 

gi,·en in tlw United Sttttcs. Thirt)' th <~nd 

wns of r iviliiln supplies were needed t'V<'l')' 

month, httl tht l.end-l.casc .'\clministrntion 

was hard pnt lfl 1-{ t Lhr111 together in tim<' 

to meet the l'C)llVII)'!; le:wing for North 

.\fl·ira. On arrival in the theater the supplies hnd to 1 1e unloaded and moved h)• 

the .\rmy, siur<" tht Nor(h .\frican l·:n,-

nomiC" Doard did not have lhe 1ltafT cvc•n 

to supnvil'c tht• work; and hoth 1 he Jllili-

\()ry and tile t•ivili;m agencies agreed that 

on the drive into Tnnisi<t the _\ rmy wonld 

litH'(' tO ()SSllll1C' mmplcle responsibility ror 

c-ivilian rrlicL 

Simp!) -;tated, the United Stnte:; conlcl 

not inmll;tnf'Oil l)' fight lhc war and 

launch into ~>~r ntiall r postwat· rrlicf a11d 

rehnhilitation prog rams. On the other· 

hand, tlw W.tr Department realit.ed that 

it had taken too narrow n ,·icw and in J an-

\t()ry c"pandcd it., policr on planning for 

futun· pl rati ~ lo ind11dc preparations 

for food, hc:~llh. hot~ in g-1 and ~ec ur it y of 

civilian pnp11lations. lt proposed in thr initial period to handle a ll aspect!> of rivil 

affairs as part of the rnilitar~· oper:llion and 

to indue!<' civilian supplies with the military 

<;tores. '" Colonel .JC"-C T. Miller had pointed 

out a mnr11 h t•ndkr that Lhe long-view 

" War Dt:tll, Stnrt•nwu l of Policy of War Dept, 

suh : Provisio11 fo r <.:.trl' of Ci1•ilians in Tt•rrilory 

Rccol'crud hy I vn~lon, 20 Jnn 43, irt PM<i, MC": 

Div, dcciaunl file 0 I 1.1 'I. 
lG TllE U.~ . • \Ri\1\" I~ THE O<:C: P.\'110~ OF GERI\1.\~Y 

policy ht tCI he lcfl w the dvilian dcpartmcrHs hut implementation in the periml of militar)• nccn.ity ' hould b(· in the 

band'\ of the military command ..... Some indirer! o;upport for the War Department was 

al-;o toming frOJll ('ivilians. In carl}' February, J ame.-; Wt:hh, Director of the Bureau 

of the 13udgct, warrH:d the Jlr•c.,idcnt tha t 

U.S. global opt' ra l ions were approaching 

a IJrcakdnwn on their first trial, in North 

Africa. Tlw Board of Economic Warfare. 

he stated, was plannin!(, hoped to direct, 

and mi ht ~agc in clcvcloprncnt; the 

Lcnd-Le:1se . \dmiui-;tr<Hion was planning, 

pun·hasing, finanring, and distributing; the 

State Department planned and attempted 

to direct; nnd the ,\rmy planned, administered, ;mtl directed- all with respect to the 

,. Coles nnd Wrinhrrg, Soldius nuom~ Co ~r· 

nors, p. 56. 

same area. ' ~layor Fiorello La Guardia, 

who had hcen con .. idered a possible coordinator or all ci' ilian activities in North 

Africa, had already pmpo.\cd that, in the 

future, civil aiTnirs he handled entirely hy 

the militarv <om mantis. But I he President 

had remar.kt•d that he \\fHald dcla} an) 

such det i~;iur1 " for a lo11g time. " '•: 

Although the Prc.-.itknt"s lkci. ion would 

in fact he a long time coming and never 

he entirclv definitive, the Arm)' was engaged in ·North :\fri<'a in rivil aiTairs on 

a scale it had rwt t ontcmplated. Derisions 

had to he made, prr>l>lcrns solved, and liaison maintained with the dvilinn agcuri<:.<;; 

the \Var Department di~cO 'C red that it had 

no organ iz.11ion rapahiC' nf doing all thrc( . 

Technically, rc'lponsihilit y for dvil aiTairs 

w:Ls . till vc~ted in G I, which had never 

exercised it. Th<· ~I ilitar}' CO\ crnnH'Ill 

Divisi(lll of the P~£G offi< e stood far down 

in the chain of rommand; in the I fJ42 reorganization the PMG had dropped nnl 

or' the General Sta rT and hcrome a subordinate otTice in the Scrvin·s of Supply. Be· 

side;, th e 1\ lilitan Government Division 

had no operationai authurity. onl)' a planning mi~ion, and onl y ht officers, most!) 

junior, and fourteen dvilians. Owing to the 

inferior iti n of the 1\filitary Government Divi. ion, mfl! t < ivil alTair" matlt'r"' 

were hcing routed th rough the Operntions 

Division of tire Genna! StarT and hcing decided in offires srnll<'red nil over the 

Pentagon. 

Eisenhower added a further rontpl ic:ltion when, on 9 Fcbnrar}' 1943, he ;,-;ked 

for guidance on poliC)' relating w Opera· 

tion H t:sKv, the projected invasion of 

irilv. 1t would he the first United States 

occ-upation of c n<'lll} territory and would 

set the palter n for suhscqucnt ope-ra tions 

" Ibid., p. 60. 

"' Ibid., p. 51!. 
\ DIH IC.l'l.l BIRTII 

in Lu1Upt·. \\ h.at «mtcrncd him mo,t \\Ctc 

the rcl,\li()nshi ps between t i"il and militar) 

.wthorilics, the hancllin~ or thr ( ivilian 

pnptdation, nnd the arrangements with re-

)o,pet t to hoth which would have to be made 

with IIH' Bt it .''~ 

B} mid-J.'chruary l'l•U it wa" dt'at that 

if tht• \\'.ar Department pmp<N:d tu tontrol 

< h il .lfT.til operntions in thr fullltC 111 rvrn 

if it de, it cd no more than to man.1~c the 

pmhkms that ine, itahl~ W(luld 1 urttl' its 

way, it would have to estahli'h an approPI iatc orga nization at a high level. The· ahSt'l11'<' of Sltr h an organization wns :1lrcady 

h<'ing it<'tttel}' fl'lt in the drp:trtnwnl. Gullion pointed mat that Gov. Herbert II. Lehm.an, dircc tor of the St:atr rp:~t tmrnt'll 

Offia e of Foreign Relief and Rchahilitatinn, h.acl trmarl..ecl on rhc l.u 1.. of am 

'in~tlc \\'.1r Department agrnn In dt·nl with 

;Ill ph.a~t·s of 1 j, il <1 ff i~. ~dar,hall di'>-

' US$Cd thr problem "ith the r:lltl.ing 

ollin•ts in l he Scrvi!'CS or Supply and l he 

Oprmt ions Division and with the SccTClat•y 

of Wnr. Before the end of the morllll, lite 

ronfc 'C H't' '~ t'c!mllcd in n Vl'rllal dirTrtivc 

to Lt. <:en. J ohn E. Hull, Chid or tlw 

Th1•.atc'r Group. Operation.., Oivi•don, 1(1 set 

up a ( ivil .tfTaiN ruvisiun in the Gl·ncral 

StarT. • 

1 'he ('j,•jl \(fa irs Di"i. ion ( C.\D ) wa-; 

cst;dlli'>hccl on I 1Iarrh 1()4:l, .1nd l\1aj. 

<:cu. John H. Hilldrin,g l>cr:amr it ~ dit•n tor 

a montlt later. In assig ninl{ the division's 

mi~s on, the \'\'ar Depm•lmcnt rcas.~c tc:d its 

tlaim to leadership in civil affairs and military 1-{0VCI'nlllCnl. The divi"ion wa« to report clirct·tly to the Secret:lr') of \\'nr on 

'':til lll:lliC't'\ except those of ol militnr~· 

' llcr•. P..TOUSA, I ncoming :\I s~~; from Algie", 

E•"·nho,,rr to ~f;ushall, 9 F'eh 11, "' USFET. 

AG, 'l ll.22. 

'~dj!.lt 1 .. Erickson, An lncrodurtion ((I Military r.t>vnnnll'nt :lnd Civil AfTain< in World War 

II, pt. I, p. II. MS in CMH lites. 

17 

nature" and lo ll'PI C\Cilt the Scrrct.ll \ or 

War to oul'iitk •tgnu ic:'>. On matter:. rrlat 

ing to milit:arr opc:r'.lLiom: it would arl fur 

the Chief or StarT, '""I it would co-ortlin;llc· 

for the W:rt' Jkp;1111 r1rnt all a ctions of civil· 

ian a~em it''\ in thco;llt'l'> of operation<\, For 

the future, War D<.•1mrlmCJ1l oflicials conrcmplat<'cl pi.H inl.: hall cspon<~ hil it' !111 

ci,·il :~ff. ti " in the ,t,tff of the theater 1ommandcr "until ''"II ti111c ~t'> rhe lit. 1r ~ 

situation will .1llow other rran~cmcn s, •• 

nnd the (:i,•il ,\(fair' [)i,·ision w:u; t: haa grcl 

with mnkiug n·rt:dn that all plnm to ot-

<·upy cnc 111 y or t'lll'll1)'-ron trolled 1 trri tor')' 

included t.lc-tnikd planning for c·ivil 

affnir~ .. , On 10 .\pril. the Joint Chief., (lf 

Staff confirnwtl tlw C:ivil .\ffair'i Division 

as "the logir.tl :-wiT to handle t h il aff,tir" 

in nearly illl <'lnupictl territory.' ''•'· 

,1/i/ittJry c:m•rlll/111'111 Tminin}! E\flmuls 

Nol the lt·:t ... l or the problem<; hC'it'tl iup, 

the military government program in its infnncr wert· till' tll'c·d lo develop n pool of 

officers to 1111 a clrmnnd that did nol yrt 

cxi.o;t a nd tlu· r'l'(JIIirt•ment to give tll<'sc 

officers hiqhl)' spt·c ialit.ctl training in duti1~"1 

which thcv mil{hl h;wc no opportunit) to 

perfom1 for 'r:\1',, The ~Iilit ry Government Dh jo;ion, rc\'ir;inl{ the Charlott l"\\ ilk 

~timatc~ upward. nmcludcd in Septcmhcr 

l f>42 that 6,000 ta.airwd offirers would he: 

needed WQt'ldwidc, nnother 6,000 britr.~ 

renuitcd fi'OIH l:t('lit·;tl units as arcns w<:n· 

occupied. ·• Sinre ( :lml'lot tcsville rould not 

then g radu:ttc 111 ore th an 4:>0 per yrnr, thr 

~lemo, War l>l'tll, AG, for Col J. H. T :~~­

kell, ~ub: Orl(:lnil;Hion of CAD I ~l:u 43 in 

SRAEF G ~. 26. ' ' 

"" Ltr, CofS to the Commander in Chief o( rhe 

Army and Na\ y to Srr W.tr, I 0 Apr ..J3, in CCS 

01+ P - 22 H). 

•

7 Draft, Final Rrpo• 1 o( tl.c Present Director 

MG Div, PMC:O, Mar 15, in PMG, MC. 111 v: decirnnl fil e :! 1'1.1. 
18 Ti l E U.S . . \Rl\ IY IN THE O C:CUPJ\TLON OF \ :y 

MWta ry Govcrnlllcnt Divisio11 proposed to 

establish a second srhool at Fort Ogk -

thr>rpc, Geo <~, to I ra in another I ,200 

junior o!Ticcrs nnu ll y. ·~ 

.\!though hit hy the storm of criticism 

in October <md NovcmiJtJ', Gullion and the 

1vlilitary Government Di vision remained 

convinced that their c;:;t im atc~ were valid. 

Thereafter, however, they knew that [he 

program would be uuder persistent, powerful, a nd hy no n1 eans l1enign scmtiny. 

Henccfnr•Lh, until. as Gullion put it, " the 

11 ced had hcromc mllrc a pparent to those 

conl'erned," seeing· the program through 

would require determination, circumspection, ::wd a touch of guile as '''ell.f'" In J a nuary I !J4:~ the 11red wns not apparent anywhere. Gullion h<1 d cight)•-flve Charlottesville gmduatcs IHIL no a.s.signmcnts for 

them. Sixt)' gratlu alc.o:; hat! been < hcdulcJ 

lO gu to North fri c<~, lmt the ~<pti iti s 

w<:n· rc lcd after the derision lt> leave 

('ivil lfT tirs Lherc to C'iviJjan agencies. 00 

The program, as G111lion and Wir ker-

.sham knew belter than lhei1· critics, was 

mosl vulncrt.ti1IC on the S< ore nf the quality 

of rhc offi cers nominated for training. The 

authority t() commis.•;ion 2,500 specialists 

frorn < ivilian lire received in November 

seemed to hr ll1c most prartit'al wa)' tu improve the C]uality, <U1d in early J anuary 

1943 on Gullion's ~·c Stimson rcquc.-; ted 

. \ssistan t Se('retary uf the In tcrior Oscar 

Chapman lo ltead a m rnmiltee, composed 

mainly of non- War Departmen t civilians, 

to select c.:n ndidaLr'l for commissions in mili-

" ?\fcmo. O PMG, MG Div, for Control Div, 

suiJ: Monthly Progres.• Report for MG Dh·, 10 

Oct •12, in PMG, MG Div, dccima.l file 3 10.1. 

•' Memo, Gulliou for CofS, sub: Trair1ing of 

Civil Aff:,ir;, OfficCJ"!!, I :l Scp 43, in r ;vJC, M G 

Div, decimal file :153. 

, Memo, G\dlion for Din:ctor of T ra ining, SOS, 

22 j a n 43, in PMC:. MG Div, dassificd decimal 

file 353. 

lat'y governtllent.'11 T he committee was a 

~cfu l dcvire for forestalling rriti c.:ism from 

the civilian agencies, bur through no fault 

of its l>Wn , it was less than an immediate 

l're~s aL locating talent. The rect'ttitment 

autlwrity rcstril·Lcu the commissions to he 

granted to ('Hptaim; a nd lieutenants onl y 

a nd set tile minimum age at thiny-fiYe. 

Practically all good r.andidntes over age 

thirty-five were well cs ,!Ji ~> d in civilian 

j11l>s and arr in~ more prestige and aLLthority tha n rapla ins in the i\rmy.''" 

While ;twaiting the Aow o [ hig h qua lity 

train<·es, ,,,hic·h in the winter of Hl42 I !14:~ 

seemed <dl but unattainable from among 

eithCJ' the military or dvilia n.'i, the tv1 il itary 

Government Division revised the school 

plan. ,\nothcr exclusive ly !\rmy-run school 

of the kind pl'ojcned at Forr th rpc 

might have drawn tlw same fire to which 

I he C:ha rlottcwillc ~c ool II au been ul>

jc<·tcd. F11rthermore, the un cert intic·~ of 

recruitment Hlld of the /\rmy's future in 

militat•y government romhincd wit h the 

certainty, as Gullion a nd his ffi ce :~ saw 

it, that before the war ended the t\rmy 

wm tlu need l.t•a ined ofTi cet-s l>y l11c t IHn ,_ 

sands, ne('C'"ilatcd a training system for lhe 

time llcing lhat W<l s tl nobrrusivr l1u1 pa

l>k of ra pid expansion. T he result was the 

Civil .\ n·;tirs Training Program (C.\'l'P l. 

The training program, whir h ·wa-; expected to draw its students mostly from 

civil ian life, wn.'i divided into two phases. 

T lte first d of a month's milit ary 

a nd ba:->ic military government training a t 

the Provost JVJarshal Genera l's School at 

Fort Custer. Mirhigan. In the !'Ccond phase 

the tudents wmtld rr.('eivc three months' 

training at one of a ll\Jillbcr or universi-

•·• Untitl ed, und:llc:d memo in PMG, iv!C: Div, 

dt~ci l fi lc: 000. 7. 

"'- l.tr, Oscar ClHJ pman to Gcu Culliuu, 10 Feb 

•1:!, in PMC:, MC Div, dccim:tl file 2 10.63. 
.'\ DlfFICUL'I' BJRTH 

tics."=• 'rllt· universiti es providnl llw mea ~ 

for rapid cxp:lll . Their faculties could 

provide r<:u -sc~ in many fi elds on short 

notice. and when training demands incrcasctl, atltlitionul universities ('<H dd l1e 

l>rought into tlw progr:m1. 

The C.\TP schools oCTen•d substantially 

different training from the kind given 

at Charlottc-:-,·illc . • \!though the tu cknts 

eventually nmgrd in ran k from scrotH.l lieuLen:mt to licull' tt:lllt !'oloncl, IIHJSt held 

juni<Jr gradco:: a nd a ll wc·n· expected to l1e 

given as-;ignn tent}; .ts ::;pl'!'ialisL.;; anti lcdlllirian.s in the licld instead of staff H!'isi~ttrncnts for which Charlottesville provided 

training. C:on:-;<.:qnrntl y, in the 1 raining program the cmp a~is was on information, not 

on pmiliC'm-snlving m; at Charlo\tcsvi lle. 

The stucknt spc•nt h;df his time tud in ~ 

a foreign langu<tgc and most of the other 

ha lf in fot•cig-n ;trca studies. The CATP 

graduate was expected to deal diJ•cr.tly wilit 

the people in on·upied <~rC<~s, the Charlottesville graduate primarily with his own 

and allied slaffs.'ll 

. \ 1 its inc·cpt ion, C:\TP's most attractive 

a:;pecl wa!'l it-, ultimate expandability, sitwc 

for the Lime being militat y government 

officers seemed to be both lll1W:lnt cd a nd 

ltnoi>ta i nal >ic.. ( :harloltc<;v il lc, mt'an w I 1 ile, 

had c:omplrlcd it ~ ::;eC"ond C:Olll'l\C at tilt• Clld 

of D<Tcmbcr 1942, hnving grachtat<:d H 

lOt:ll of 130 orTirc rs in the two c·c>u rse)\.'"' 

The school's r nrollntcttt capacit)' lwd been 

''The first tlltivcrsitic$ to ronducl courses \\'Cl'l! 

Yale, Hnr\'ard, PittsiHirgh, Chicago, ~ti higan, ilntl 

Stanford. 

"' ( I ) War' OC'pt, Bun·au of Public Relations, 

"Civil AIT:1irs Training Progntlll," ~ fell •H, in 

PMC, G Oi,·, decimal file 000.7. (2\ Mrmo. 

Gullion for CofS, suh: 'l'rainiug of Civil An'ait·s Offircr~, I :1 Scp ·f:i, in PMG, !vi(; !);,., dC'cimal 

file 35:l. 

'" l'd cmo. ickl'r~lwm for PMG, suh: Tn crco:~~C' 

in Stnmgth for the Srlwol of l\·lilitary Government, 

·I· Jo:~n 'l:l, in I'MC, ~rc: Div, clossificd decimal 

file 352.0 1. 

raised to 150 niTit'crs, hut the prospects of 

:;ccuring that many qualified c·andidate!i 

w~re ~; ht. Cot~scqucntly, Wirkcrsham 

t'cc·ommendcJ ~u rommis.<;ioning at least 

half tlw Charlottcsvill(' ~tude11ts front c·iviliatl life."" 

I 11 Mar't.lt I !)4·3 the ren·uitntcnt problem 

cn·H·d somewhat when the War Departmen! ;utthorizcd nmm s~ on in g some ci,·ilians in the lidd grades. Itt April, Gullio11 

again rcque.<;ted pcn11ission also to aCI'Cpt 

incli icltt<~l appli1 at ions from olliccrs already t'Oil llnissionccl."' The fit'$! 100 C. \TP 

trainees entered Fort. Custer at the beginning of June. B~ then the ntilitflr)' government tralning pmgram was ~ year old but 

h<td proJ ~t cccl fcw<:t' than three hundred 

trained nrTiccrs. 

T il(' in\'asion of Si C":il)' in July ~)4:~ and 

tJtc C'OliSC(j\IClll Oow Of requisitions for milil<JI')' g<JVc>rrnnen t oiTicers finally hrokc the 

rcnuiting jam. In .June, Hilldring had 

ordered lire training program to draw on 

a lready c·ommis~ioncd offi cers lo the maximum and only fill the deficit with civilians . 

Jn .J uly, he withdrew the order and instructed the .Milit ary .Government Division 

to ncrdcra tc its l'ivilian recruitment to the 

originally ;1uthorized limit, 100 per 

tnontlt.'1

' In Jul y, too, Gullion recei,·cd pcrnlission to sclcrt sludents within the :\rmy 

llnlh ft'OI11 unit lists and through individual 

appliC"a tions at a ratr S hil-{h "" 400 orTiret'i' 

pet' mu nth.'"' 

"'' I bi<l. 

"' Mmno, Cuillion for CofS, sub: Training of 

Civi l All'ni rs Officers, l :1 Scp 43, icl Pi'viC, MG 

Dh·, tleritnal file 353. '" ( I ) :V1 emo, PMC, MG Di,,, for ACofS G- 1, 

snh: Sc:ntriug AUS Officers for 'Milil;t ry Goverumc:nt Tr:~ining, I J cd ·I\ in PM C, MG Div, dcciuwl file 210,6:!. (2) i'vlen\o, ~JG Oiv for Col Gro:~y, 

0 .ful ·I!\, in PM G, l ... rc; Oi\', dc·r.im•d filr :1 10. 1. 

"' Memo, Oulllon for CofS, sub ; Tr:cining of 

Civil A(l'airs Officers, ~ Sep ·}:i, iu Pl\•10, MG 

Di,·, decimal file :~53. 
:.w TilE l l.S, \R~IY I'\ 'II IE OC.CUP \'1'101\ tH' (;J·:RJ\1.\:\Y 

I ht• \,dU\' u£ thl' rcadil> l'\(l:tnd:d1k pwg'l'alll "'''" pnl\'nl ~urmct th.ut anyone cxpt'I'IC'd. In .\ugwn, the inlpt·nding- Iudi;~n 

slltTcndrr lrruught n 101 c r•cquisitions, nntl 

I>~ Sl'pt('tllf)(T lht• planning for the invasion 

of Fr;uu.t• plu), the po,o;if,ilit}' that the Ocruwn dC'fl'.tt tllight 1 onw sooiH'r than pt<·-

viously anth ipatcd r.liscd the prospctl of 

\'HSt f)' itlt'l't'tiSCcJ dCill:\lld~ ill tht' 11\':tl' 

future . . \t Charlottcsvillt· th<· clas:;cs were 

increased to 175 sLttdcnl!> and the eour~c 

l'C'duc:rd to twdw· wc•cks. The C:.\TP tocJk 

in 4!i0 students per month, and the mnnh<:r 

of pnr•d<'ip:ll ing uni\'C:t'Sit ir~ w;ts int rcn d 

to ten .... I 11 tlw l.lRI rour momhs or I !>13, 

Charlott<·sville ,tnd the C. \TP st hoof.; together tur'nt•d nut more thart two lhous.uld 

graduates, thcn·hy nearly filli11g the estimated wartinw F.ul'OJ)t'rllt requirements. 

Rcnuilnrrnt for thl' uropcun tr:tinin~ 

pmgra111 cnckd in J)et'l'lllhcr. aud tltt· J,,st 

European rmtr""CS at the schools '''rrc t·omplctcd in • \pril 1 !14·L 

One pmlllcm, the :tl't'utmtlal ion of thous;lllds of llllaro;-; IICO lllifitat')' gO\'el'lll llelll 

omrr~ in the United Stntt·~. /1CV(:t' lll.llC· 

rializccl. 'I he tlcmnnd from Cl\'Crl'ic:t.'l alway~ 

more Lhan kept pan· with the output fmm 

the schools, tlw l:u·gest hipnw11t~ going to 

l·:nghmd in J anuary and February 1911 . 

The ?\.filitar~ Government Di,·ision !'ould 

also rlaim at lea"! to havt' made a monurncntnl dTmt to ovctn)ttlc the carl} deficiency in student qmdit y. T ltc 2,000 ofTiccrs 

scicC'lcJ for training in thr lal't qunncr· of 

1943 wcr•c clr•awn from 2~\000 nominl'(~s. 

Selectivit) \\'<lS even more stringent in 1hc 

dvilian t't't • uitrm'rll with onlr 960 h<wing 

hcen arrcplt•d o\11 of :HI,()()() applicantli up 

'''Memo, PMG, Director, MO Oiv, for Director, 

Control Dh•, Mth; 1\unu:.tl Rtll, ASF ~IC Div, 11 

j1d H, iu P~l(':, MG Div, decimal fil~ :HC) I. 

The univt•rsilics added wcr(' Northwestern, Do~lon 

University, Wi$COnsin, and w.· tcrn RcM~rve. 

lu tht• ttlllt' ri,ili.m prot urcmct\1 'topped 

itt Ottoht·r l~l·~ L:' 

'J'Ite llrtny Is G'il•cn Control 

Inc renting the Civil .\fTairs Divi'liorr, the 

\\"ar Dq>Minl<'ttt !tad gi' en itc;df the 

mc:tns for clirc<·ting ;,nd nl-ordinatiug U.S. 

milit:~ry government operations. Whether 

it would IJc able to nuTy out this mission 

-;till remained to ll<' ~ccn. North .\fri<.a, 

\\•hik iL hntl '< ll~ dcmoHslt'altd tltc 

sltp<·riorit)' uf civilian •·onLroJ, had ilt'D\Ig'ht 

puwl'l'flll ( ivilian agt't\t ics onto the scene. 

ln M .tn h 194J, tlw President g<l\ t~ (;Clvcrnor Lvhman 's OfJin· of Foreign Relief ami 

Rehnhilitaliun the mi~..;iorr of planning and 

administering U.!-i. rclil'f for victims nf war 

i11 lihct•atcd areas. :~ .\t the same tinl<', an 

intcrdt·pmtmcntal mmmillee of t·ivili an 

rcpn:s cnt<~tivcs urH..Ier .St:tlc Dcp:\l'tlllt'nt 

r hairmnnship unclcrwok ltl scnrrc pnsonrtcl for overseas service and provide for 

trainin.rr. 'l'hc President had dirct ted tltc 

<'Oillmiucc also to dr.terminc 1 ftc t•l'lal inn-

-;ftip between thl~ t'ivilian administration 

and milit.ll')' govt'l'lltll('l\1, wftirh it wotrkl 

supcr'l;cdc as soon :ts civil government cmtlcJ 

I ,c t'~to ccl. ::~ 

'I' he big question was how 1mwh 1 imc, 

if all}. would he alloucd to the militm: 

rommnndcr befo re he wa.<; required 10 rclinqui::o lt his suprcmncy. On the basi:; of the 

Pt t'~idrnt's directive, Governor Lehman altcm ptcd 10 S<'t ninct )' days CIS the fimi I of 

"Dmft, inal Rcporl of lhc Prl'scnt Oirenor, 

MG Div, I'MGO, Mar ·l !1, in PMC, MG Div, 

dcrinml file :1 14 .7. 

" l.tr, President to Co1• l.chmau, 19 Mnr ·1:1, 

i11 PMC, MG Dil·, d<'C'imnl lilr 011.1:-1. 

" M<·mo, Acting Direr\(,)r, C.:AD, ((,)r A~i.t;~m 

Secretary of Wa r. sul1: Mcc1i11g of httt•rdcpart· 

mcmoll Committee, t 7 Mar 4:1, in PMC, MG 

Oiv, decimal file 0 l4.1 :3. 
A l>lFFI<.L'L'J' BIRTH 

military l·ontrol.:' The dit·tum that there 

shol!ld 1101 he.: two imkpt·tHI<•I\1 tomJllfiiHlt:r:. on the amc l>nttldidcl had nt\CJ' 

carrkd muc h weight in civilian t·irdc-;, and 

in I <>4:! lh(• prevailing ,·icw, hotll c i\'ili:1n 

and milit:tl'), of ci,·il :1 f1 aia~ o1wr;ttions 

hardly xtcm<·d tu nccco;-:itatc an c·xtt·ndcd 

pc·riod c.( tight militaq coutt (>l. Ch il alTair); 

-.till "c:cmcd almcr;t cntirC'I) sqmral1lc from 

militat y (lpC'I'atious. (:i,·i liau populations, 

fricndlr or enemy, were.: l'tganlt-<1 .1-. \'ll tims 

uf th(' war, nol participants iu it, and their 

admini.stration was seen M a lna ntani tarian. 

not a punitive or even prccautionat')', obligation. lu \ rmy doctrine as wdl a~ tJ.S. 

r idlian thin kin~. the w :11' <'IH!t:d fm· < iviliau), alntost as xoon a.'i they pa~'ic d under 

\ me lira n on u pmion. f M '27 - 5 pl'csc rihed 

a milit;u )' government 1 hat was .. ju:.l, hum:uw, and a~ mild :L" pr:wtit'ahk," tlw oh· 

jet'! lll'ing Ill ohLHin an endurin!{ IH':Ic't· .1nd 

1 otwr a·t former cncmico; into frirnds.', Tl1<~ 

dircrtivt· fw Opera tion lL ~ ~v, i:-;.'iut'd in 

e:trl)' I !11 ~. cstnhli:shcd "bcncvolcnn:, ·· to 

tlw rxlcnl consisten t with stric ·t rnilitM)' t'C-

<ptirtllJCIIIS, as the wat< hword in 'idl 

.tlfair-s for tht· iawasion of Sirily. '" l l <'II('C, 

the wdfat'(· of the ci\ilian popnlatiun-; .lppc·n n·d to he the prcdollliiMill J>lll'f>O~<· of 

< ivil aff.ti ~ whether admini!>tC'rNI by l'ivili.nts or by the militilry. The one· point nt 

jo;o,ue hctwcTit them wm• :1-;idc fmm the 

lllilit :tl')' 1 onn:rn over a di\ ickd cC>mmand whn I'Ould do the: I ltllcr jPI>. 

The Prr<~ident remained touvirH·('d thai 

the juh war-; a rivilian otw, nnd in June 

J!I ~ lw undertook lo put (Jol r)·lllakiu~ 

nud dirt•c·tion dearly in civilian hand:-;. He 

propust·o to establish an intcrdqJartmem:ll 

" fl h toay vf the CAD, W"r Department Stwcial 

StnrT, World War If to M arc•h 19 1G, hk. II, C'h. 

I, v. 5. S j,. C~ IH files. 

" Fl\1 ~7 5 ( 19~0 1, pa r. 9. 

''' l\!cnao. Mililllry Con:rnnwu1 n1'f111C'It, CAD, 

110 dal(,, iu 26. C:Al)- War Depl. 

:! I 

policy 1 omntittt<', r haircd l>y an :t"-'~ ;;; ant 

"cnctary of stat(', to give c·rnt ral clirc1 Linn 

to all U.S. economic operations in lihca·-

atcd area.-.. For l' :wh lii'Cil, a director wou ld 

he :q1po i111 t d who would occupy a "i111il:tr 

central position in hi:- own area. He would 

be sulmnlinatc to tht• militarr c omman<.lc1'; 

hut he would ;alo;o 1 iH~ <Jrdcr» dircftl~ 

from the ''""i-;t;uH , <•crctary of state, woul<J 

han- wid~ lalilud<· and authorit) to mt on 

hi5 own rc ibilil~ , and wouJd funt tion 

as the ma jor< h:tnncl o f lOnliiCI for< ivilian 

agencies with the U.S. military and wit h 

1 he allie.o;. ;; Civil ;!{fairs seemed , afll'l' all, 

to ltavc .•dippc·d tHII of the War Ocparlmcnt's hand" in tlw wor-;t inmginaillc 11\:tll· 

ncr, namdy, wit h the C!->Lahlishmcnt of a 

second sqmr:tll· and complete t·ommand 

<'hanncl. Scrrt'!<lr)' Stim..-;on pr t~H d the 

danger ;utd " tiH' lf'alunwisdom" of nwving 

too quick lr from military to ci,·ilian authorit)' in O(I'IIJiicd artas; l>ut lhe most the Was 

Department managed to achieve s ,, redefinition that plan!d the area dircrtqr 

llCll11inallv 111 tltr tltt•atcr ccmlmand 

1 hannel. ;. 

B~· 1 he SIIJHIIICI' of 19·.U, however, politit''<d prdcrcn< ('<;, C'Vt' ll those or the Pn"<idcnl. 

eould not loug n•o,i'it the c·our.;e of tlw war. 

~filitar~ gm <·1 llllH' IIL" would hav<' tu h<' 

established. Tlwy would require men a nd 

rcsoun c.; ; 111d tlh' IIH'ans lo dcplo) thcan 

when and wht•rt· they were needed. Tht: 

.\rmy had this ;thility. T he civilian HJ.(i'nrirs 

did not, and as the sltmmcl' pro~ cs~cd the y 

lw('amc intTca-;illglr dmdnhrl nf thf'ir own 

abilit )' 10 nH'<'l llw nccck Moreover, in SC'ptcmber, wlwn the l'l'c-;idcnt rrcated the 

Foreign ~ronomi<· \ dministrntion to rn11 -

" Ltr, Prr,idt•nl 10 Scrrctary of Sta ir, 3 J un 

J:l, in P,\((;, ~IC: Di,·, cle;cimal file OH,I'l, 

'' Ltr, Stiamon 10 the Pr<' ~idenl, ll Jun ~, 

and Ltr, Mc•Cloy 1o ~c r or a he Budk1't, I 'i 

Jun 43, in .PM(;, MC Div, dt cima l file 01-1 ~. 
T l m U.S . . \R~ Y It'\ 'I HE O<:<.UP.\'t'IO\ OF CI·.R~I.\1\Y 

~o li d;tlt' tit<.: civiliau crr()rl, these agcnrks 

ohjcnct.l as much tu It unified t·ivilinn dirct·-

tion as they had to \\'ar DcparlmcrH lcat.lt'Nhip. ;,. J n ihc iutcn·al, the i\rmr had 

ill<~litntt•d milit:11 y gt)\'('1 nnrcnt in Sidly and 

p:tt ~ or Italy. 

It had not l>cC'n proved that in the lo ng 

l'tlll dvilians \VCHtld not perform hc~ltCr', but 

.tt til!' moment they rould not perform at 

all. On I 0 November the President a<-

kntMled~ed this Stalt' of affairs itt a letter 

l<l Stim-;on in whit:h he slated. "Although 

w llistory of rlw Ci\1), Wttr Dcpnrttncmt Spt!cinl 

Stflll', World WM II hl March 1!.146, hk. Jl , r h. 

I, p. 32.1\·IS in CMll files. 

othc1· :t!{Cnc i('.'l are pn·p.tt iu~ thrtnsc· vc~; fur 

the work lh:ll must he done i11 connection 

wirh relief and rchabiliL;rtion of liberated 

area~, ll ts quite apparr.nt dmi if prompt 

results arc to he obtained the .\ rmy will 

have to assume Lbc initial hurdrn.'' Continuing, he assigned le> the· Army the plnnning- ancl rxenrLion of r i,·il rdicf and 

rch~llili tation "until civilian agt· Ki~ arc 

prepared to !'arry out the longer range program ...... ,\ftt•r nearly a yc;rr or liiH't'rt:\inty, 

the .\rmy at l<l'>L had a d(•at•, iC temporary, 

manthttC. 

~ Ltr, President to 1hc Secrcwry uf War, 10 

NO\' ·l!;l, in Slli\F:F G-5, 10.0-J.. 
C:IIAPTER II 

Overseas Beginnings 

.I ,\/ issio11 Emt•tp,cs 

\t <:as.tblama in Jantlill')' Hl4'~. Pn:sicktll Roo:-.cvclt, somewhat to llw st~r prisc 

of his tr)nftr·ctwc partner, Pl'inH' Mittistcr 

\Vinstllll S. Churchill, pronmttrretl unconditional :->urn.:ndrr to be th<· ,goal nr .\ mcric·an :11 1d Br•il islt military opc•r:nimts Hgainst 

the . \xis Powers. :\I though the announ<"e11\Cnl il-;df wa~ apparent!) ma<k, as he ~aid 

lnlt't', on the spur of the mumtut, Roo<:cvd t 

h.td diM us.o.;,•d the idea of unnmdiliunal surr<·tHka with the Joint C:hid. nf !'>tafl' <'arly 

in .Janunq. \t the time, he h;td < o~rrdvcd 

it as I trittg primarily a W;t)' tu r<':L<:surc 

Soviet l\ larsh:tl Joscplt V. Stalin ah<)trt the 

Western ower~· determinalinn w carr y the 

wlrr ag-ainst Germany through ttl the finish. 

'ot thinking )' CI of a pultlit· anaHIIIIH'Cmcnt Rno:o-cvch had proposed !!ettding 

Cirnl'r':rl ~I arshall to ~[oM ow to infonn 

!-italin thnt "the United Nation~.: will wntillltc.' untiltlwy reach Berlin and thal their 

only te rms :tre unc-onditiOHal Slll't'C'ndcr ... , 

Quilt' oh\'iousl)'• although lw l.ttcr inl'lu<kd ltalr and J apan in the fmnnrla, 

C<·nnany w:L<> from the I'i~t 11ppt mo t in 

the Pre ident'~ mind. For the t110tllCnt, hi:-; 

'OPU, F.xecuth't" Fill', Item tO, Min of ~lceting 

ill llw White llonsc on Thursday, .]:'tllu:'try 7, 1943, 

:-.t I '00, lr1 OPD, ABC: 387, st•c. lA. On the 

tmtottditional ~urrcndl"r announc('mt•nt ~cc :'tlso 

Mirhnrl Howard, Grand StroUg)'. vol. l V (!.ondoll' II ~I. Stationery Office, 1972), pp. 281 - 35, 

and 1\lauricl' Mntloff, Strategic Pltumi•tJI for Ca{l/iJiou ll'ltt{t11~ 1 J.IN.'J 1')·11, United Statt·~ Army in 

World Wt11' II ( Wa,hington, 1%9), p. 37f, 

dtid nmu·rn was pt·ohahlr maintaining 

the E:L-.;t~Wc,t 1011lition through the lighting still .dwad; but he It ad also, whet hc1· 

intention:dl)' tJr nut. laid the groundwork 

for the eventual :\flied occupatio n of Gcr·· 

many. Very likely, since the f::tilure to bring 

home tn lh~ ner·mans the fu ll CXl<:nl of 

their defeat was <·on;;idcred a major mislakl· 

of \V orltl \V a I' I' sonw kind or Sll pervision 

would ha V<' l>c<·n i rn posed on G crm:tn y in 

<lilY case. The dcmaud for unconditional 

surrender madt thi:o- likelihood a ccrtninl}' ; 

morcovct', gin-n the character uf Hitler's 

go,·crnmcnt, the demand meant that the 

war anti. in its wnk<:, Allied military government would be rarricd intu tit<' heart 

of Grnn<lfl)'· 

·when tlw President and Prime Minisl't•r 

met at C::,sahlartr<~, however, the Nazi 

W elmnnrltt wn~ deep in the Soviet Union, 

nnd neither the Ru<:Sians nor the Wc..<~tcrn 

• \llic-; wn<' in ·' posit ion to t hrcatcn German)· dire( tl}' in the near ruturc. The 

• \meril'ans ami Lite British had <tgreed in 

prinriple in .\pril 194-2 on OpcratiOtl 

RouNDUP, a cross-Channel invasion to he 

CXCI' ll Led iII til\' Rpring of 19 ~3 j lllll 

RouNDUP had given wt~y lo Lhc Noa·th 

Afriran i nv:rl!i()n. t\1 Ca~niJ anca the l\l[ cditcrrancan ~tn\lc~y won ouL again, al knst 

as far as Sirily wa<; {'tmrerned. The march 

on Gcrme~ny would not begin in I D43. The 

sLaffs, hmvevcr, bt•rame <l ll the more clctcrmin<·d that it should then sta rt in l!H1, 

and the ronfrt'<'tH c r1~tecd lo e.~ tahli lr in 

England n romhincd planning ~taJT for a 
I I IE l",',, \R \ I \' ~ J'HE O< < t 1

1 \ I fO'\ OF GE R~I \ ''" 

l m,o;.( .h.11111d ;tll.ll ~ in I II II. Tlw r hi1•f uf 

-.t.df \\11111<1 he Btiti-.h; thr Sllf'll'llll tummamlct '' ould ht• -.ckt tnl l.ttrr. · 'l'lw dcd-

'ioll 111 tni\T the pl.lllnin~ fur arms-,-

( .h:nltll'l .111.11 ~ h.1tl thr growin~ \llll'tit an 

in fhrt'tlll' .1nd P"'' rr hd1ind it, .lllcl he• Core 

1 he ~ t\11 \\ .1-. out it would 1 unw 111 dmrtillal<' 

dw pl.lllnill ~ rm the \\ ar in "t."'tcrn 

Europe· ( ;t' Jill,\11\ would lll't llllll' dw ta rg('l 

or militar~ opcr.ttinfl<, ollltl, inc\ it .th ~ •. tl-.o 

nC militat y ~owrnmcnt. 

In prc\'ious wnrs U.S. nlilitar)' gm't'l'll1\\l'llt had al\, avs l1ccn a fil'ld 11prration carric•d 11111 with lllinimum diH·t tion from 

\um ht·adqu.llll't'!>. In \\'mid \\' .11 Tl , 

\\ ar lkpartnlt'nl .tml GC'IIt'l ;tl :-,t.tl! illtt'rr ... t ·1'-'-llrt'd H'llttal «lilt lUI; nt'\Trtlwlt•,-;, in 

thi-. W<tl too 1111· fit•ld 111 ganit.ltioll" t•mergcd 

and 111 .1 ,uiJ.,tilnti:d r·xtt·nt C'\ oln:d imkpcndeutl~ of til<' Wa-.hinglflll ltt•.tdqua rtc•'· 

The \r·my's fir-.t tart ira I r i' it .tll.lir~ srt·tinn 

in f.u I ,lflltdated all lllll the <l~lf(''l gJimtlH.'I'illf:('i or 10111 <'I'll fur milit.ll ~ g<l\'(.'fllllWJl l 

in tlu· .\11m St,lff. On :0 DN rmlwt I <HI, 

\' Corp' ( Rcinforred ) 11mkr l. 1j. Ccn. 

l:dmund L. D:tlc'. th('n ... t.ttirnwd .11 Cilmp 

llc.tut<'c;.trcl, Lnuisi:tll.l, rNCi\('U md<·r to 

prcpan· fot "hipnw11t O\'l't t•as. F~l '1.7 ~> 

I)('( ifit•d tlw nr.ttion or a I h il :dl.tirs section in n>rps anc.J hi _!!lwr slnf1'1' opct•ating 

ut irl ~· till' United States, ;111d on 4 Fdm•-

ary 1 C)<!2, C:ol. .\rthm B. \\':tdr wa' named 

C:i\'il .\(fait-.; Offitcr, \ ' Corp~. No similar 

tafr 'c< tion r,i-.tcd c11 had c·'<i'-tNI sinn· tltr 

early ICI2(b in the .\rm). \\'or~in~ from 

FM '!..i ·, .1nd The 1111111 Rt·pwl, Colonel 

~l 11loff, Strotrgu 1'1""""'1:· p. 2h. Scr al<o 

Mich:tcl IIO\\::Ird, (:rtllttl \troltJ!) , \Ol. IV ( l.cm· 

tlorl ll ~I. St.'"""('ry Offil~ . t•tn I, pp. 2S2 55, 

aud 1-'orrt••l C Pot.:ur, Tllr .'ittprrlllt (.'r>mllltllld 

( ;uhill~tiOII, I <t'j.l ) , pp 1111 I 0'1. 

\\'adc <kvdopt·d ,, \ ' Corps < i\ il .lfT.tiN 

plan " ·hit h l''-t.thli,hrd the ~c< tion· ... ntaill 

funnion a' la·ing to fo-,tcr and m.1int.dn 

harnwnicHt' rcl.ttinn.., llct\\CCn the r11ili1ar) 

fon c and 1 idli.111 populations in t•ithc•· 

friend!) ur otr upil·d <'ll<'nl) trrritor~. \ ' 

CorP" <>hippt·d out rrom Fort Dill., i'\t•w 

Jrn:c~. oil 'l.IJ .\ptil 111-12 and <llri\Cd i11 

Belfal'l, ~orth<·rn lrda11tl, em 12 ~f.t y. Tl11· 

,\rmy thtl'- h.ul ,, t i\'il a flair; -.ct tion in 

being in olll 1)\'( 'f'\('il' theater one da} a ht•J 

the fir~L C'ias.' as~tmblrd at Charloltc.o.;vilk. 

Ou R J unc, ll cadqmHLcn;, uropcitll 

Thcalcr of Operations, ( I.S. ,\r·rny 

( ETOU:-{,\ ), :t•.-.tunt'd ro1111nanJ of nil 

U.S . . \rm) forr<'" i11 Eurnpc. I·:TOUS \ 

hnd two collllll:tntkrs in it., f'ir<;t t)IOilllt : 

initi.tll~ \laj. (;t·n. J•IIIIC.., E. Ch.111t'\, tht'll 

General J),,.i!{IH 0 . Ei-.<•nlwwcr. 

f.TOU. \ "·" o;Ju\H'r to rcw~nit.r tlu· 

need for .1 'j, il .tiT.tir' "('t Linn th.tn \ 'Corp-. 

h.1cl IJt'Cil. \ ' Corp-. had been fotlltt'd in 

the Unitnl St.ltt·-. 111 per fnrnt an i11cldlnitt' 

mi.o;sion; :'I'Oll~ \ 1 a111c inw llcin~ in 

Londnn, and j f il'l mi .. sion " ':I'\ l'OI1looid{'t'il hi} 

IC"." than JHCt i,r, it ~new that it would he 

t•flgaged prim.u il\' in a ·,cmhling- . \mer ic an 

furrt' in tht• n. iti'h J ... le-., Fl hi, rni,,itlll did 

1101 '<'<'111 In t'<.tablio;Jt ol I'OillpCilin~ l<'{fllitt'• 

mem fc t ,, • i' il .1lfair-. st'c tion. 

\\' hen .1 Briti-.lt oup. the .\c.Jmini.,tration of 'J crritorirs ( Emopl') C:ommitH·t· 

began nwdin){ in ul~ to <kat with t ivil 

<tiT:tirs su l>jt'l'lo; rt•lating to the pbn11ing ftH 

Rot•NDII t', t·:TO liS.\ srnl the thr:t\1'1''-< 

jucl!{e aci\'ClC.t lt' ~t' lll'l .tl, Col. Edw:tl'cl C:. 

Bell'i. a.s LI,S, ol!)lt't'\ ,.,_ ( :otond fklls was 

irnprc. sed I" tlw ~crioll-. intcr(".l t h<" Rrili'h 

civilian<> .111d milit:u ~ on thl' . \ I 1 I. ) <:ornmiucc o;Jul\\ c·d in nt < upalion prohlem-., and 

.tt the cud Clf tlw mnrllh he rccommcmk<l 

appninllllcnt of .1 t i, il aOaiN of!ic t·r rn1 

' \' Arrn) Corp,, l'l.111 for CA Sl·c, SIIAF.F 

G- 5. :H .Il I. 
OVER:-iE:\S BEGJl'\ ' 11\:GS 

E rot·s.\. 011 5 .\ ugwn, Colonel \\';,de 

was tr tn~> fcrrcd from \ ' Corps to an 1~ thl· 

tcmporat'y ci,·il :lffnirs olfirtr for ETOUS.\ 

and UJ I>C'comc, a few <bys later, the first 

a nd, for the moment, only n1<'mber of a 

newly created ETOU:-i.\ ri,·il aOair-; sertion. By then the .\T( E) ComrnittC'f' had 

pro e~scd to the appointment of ~ De put)' 

( :hicf Civil . \flairs Officer ( DCC:.\0) to 

take thnrge of the ntilitary planlling for 

civil atTain;, and on 10 August in a letter Lo 

Wnshiugton, Eisenhower asked for a qualified colonel whom he ~·ou ld appoint as a 

<'Olllll<·rpart to the British DCC.\0.' 

Uy .\ugust, however, RouNDt.:P had 

n way to T oncH, the North :\fricnn 

invasion. and ETOUS.\ 's future mi."'iion, 

if "n y, w its IJt<"oming- more Jtclatlous. 

Colonels Betts nne! Wade continued to sit 

a" observers on the :\T( E) Committee, but 

a DCC. \0 \vas nut <tppointcd . . \s trained 

ci,·il afrairs offit"er;;; from the first course 

.tt Charloucsvil le began to ani,·c in the 

theater, they were a<;Signed to the British 

civil defense n;gi<llls, where they maintained 

li ai~on hel ween lite regional C(>mmis.<.;ioners 

and the U.S. troors. Scattered across England, tltr Ci,·il .\fTairs Sertion, ETOUS.\. 

roul<l 1101 beg-in to perform nny stnff func--

liom; at a ll until after mid-January 19 ~ 

when seven ofTic:crs, fnur of them recent 

Charlottesville g-rad nates, were fi·nally ;.L«.')embled <\I hcadqltarters. This gmup, however, 

after working 0 111 a sludy for " n1ilitary 

go,·eJ'IH11cnt operation in nn indeterminate area of nonltwestcrn Europe, found 

it had exhausted its resources and the staO''s 

interest w; well and su bsided into collecting 

library material;,;. fn early 194-3 the Civil 

. \ff;tirs :-;ection had no coherent organ iza-

' ( l l tori l Record, CA Sc.c, ETOUSA, in 

SIIAEF G !\, 10.0:). (21 ~1. A. StaniforLh, "The 

Administt·:!Ji<.~u of Tt•rrilorics (Europe ) Cornmittrc, op. (i,' ' i11 SHAEF G- 5, 60, Jackel 9. 

1 ion md no mi~s ion OIIH' l' th; t n gc1h:r:d instrurtions tn follow th<' principle~ <Jf F .\1 

'li- 5:'• 

fn tlu· :-prin.g of I ~. .tft<'r the 

C:asahlanc:1 ( :oHfcrellrc, ( j,·il all'air'> at 

E1 '0 US.\ l1ega n to show si!?:ns of renewed 

life and purpose. The emergence of the 

Civil .\(fairs Divisiou in W<L'>hinglon lent 

an incvit<tl1le prestige lo civil nfTairs J\rmywidr thnt it h:td not had before; and the 

hcg'inning of BriLi:;h War Offif'C negotiations 

wit h the Dutch nnd Belgian exile go,·-

crnments and the Free Frcnr h on the adnli n istra Lion of 1 iheratcd terri tory i ncrcascd 

the possibility of ETOUSA's opening negotiations too. ln the third week of ·March, 

civil affairs finally emerged, on paper at 

ka-;t, as a full-ncdgcd stafr sc('tion with a 

dticf ('i,·il nfTii ir-; ofl'i ccr Clnd more IH·anches 

in its tahle of organiv,a tion than it had 

qualified offlrer' to fill. " Lt. Gen. Frank H. 

.\ndrcws, then commanding- r:rous.\, 

asked for more officers and for a chief who 

had "suh!itan re," preferably General Wicker!lhamJ the rommand ant ~~ Ch;ulottesvillc, and declared that ETOUS. \ needed 

tltt .stnJnge.<;t pos.-;il>le ri,·il affairs section 

sine<' in the long run all the:ue1'S would be 

scr·ontlar) to the European Theater of 

Operations ( ETO )-~ ETOUS.\ would gel 

more and more offi c:e rs hut never the grand 

mi::;sion lit "vas beginning- to se<' in the 

making<. 

ln :\pril a new staff appcn rcd. Lt. Gen. 

Frederick E. J\lorga n, as Chief of Staff 

to the Supreme Allied Commander 

(COSS,\ C), iJ<'..gan forming- a combined 

British-.\mcrican staff to start the rross-

' Historical Record, CA Sec, ETOUSA, in 

SH A gp C- 5, I O.O~l. 

• !bid. 

• cable, USFOR, J.omlon lo WAR, No. 7992, 

18 Mar 13, in Pl\fC, M.C Oiv, cl:~s ified decimal 

fil e :112.1. 
2G '11m t .S. \R~l\' 1:'\ THE OCCUP.\ 1'10~ OF GE.R;\1 \ ~y 

C:h.mnd invn~irm planning provided £or at 

C;t~ahl;mm. G<'ttcral ;\!organ wao; H"-'>llllH:d 

to he );Cn ing as 1 hr stand-ill for a ~up ern~' 

1 Oll l lll:llltkr clln he appoitttcd, who would 

he British. 1\ raj. Gen. Ray \\'. Barker. as 

1 he first ill a sli'Cllll\ (lf ollie crs ft•om 

E'I'OtlS \ , mo\'cd over to the C:O. S,\(: 

staff to hccmnc ~lor!-{an's dcpttty. 

.\lthnugh General :\ or~·"' npp<•arcd at 

fiN 1t1 lw building primar) a Briti..;h stan· 

"it h :111 illt!'l'larding of . \me t iean officers 

on dt't.H·hcd duty from their mnin hcadqn:trlC•'-'· TOUS. , his appointmcm 

nutt•J..rd tlw true beginning of opct•ational 

rivil alTair-; military govenuncut preparations, \ mrriran as well nc;: Bl'iti . Unlit 

tht•n <"h'il .• rruit-s- military ~0\ crnnwnt had 

po~-.(·~~cd only :1 nebulous staff flllwtioll and 

pt·ru tit Hll~ no definable mis<;iun; COSS.\C 

"'"' .tblc !<1 'upply both. \\'hilt· he w:L'l m1t 

.u·tu;clly told l\o, organ could and did a'>-

~umc thnt hi<~ wns not jw;t a plnnning stnfT 

hut w:ts alxo the nudcuo; for the starT that 

wou ld cwntnall)' direct the a~sn.ult pn Ger11\ally. IIi ~ chief mission wa~ to dmft the 

plan, lin<t nurncJ Rot ~DHM•I ~11\1< and later 

On·Ht.OHO, for tl1c projected IIJ I •I invasitm of the Ctmtinent. IIi-. rC'lpom;iiJility 

dicl nOl rnd there. howe\'Ct' ; lw was ;~)so 

to plan for a po "ihll· German l oil apse or 

p11rtial collapse at any titnc before the 

"Pring of I 9+4.' The lattr•· <'Ontingency 

111<tc.k noc only the planning but also the 

eXI'('\11 ion or civil a ITa irs ami lllilit<try govCrlllliCil( nlHjo r concel'lls of COSS:\C. 

While the terms of Morgan's mission 

s11g~t''ltcd the need for militnry government, 

one of hi~-; carl)' rondu.;ions as CO!-> .\ C 

w;ts that nu Rudt 1 apahility existed . . \t the 

t•nd of \\ lay. uncertain even. whrrt: the ultinwtc • espo~tsibility hty, he reported an 

tu'g!'nl requirement for ·• civil affairs hc~d-

' I liMoril'ut Sttb~<·c , SGS, SHAEF, lli ~rory of 

C:OSSAt:, II\>' H, in USFF.T SCS :.lii.!J. 

quancrs and att operating org<udzation 

equipped wit II a \ohcrcnt botlr of policy 

procedure." The Tttm£NT Conrcr·r•H c·, 

held in Wa ing'ton cnrlier in the lliOillh, 

had given CO!->S.\ C a target date, 1 May 

194-4. <tntl some ptdfie figw·cs on forcc.s. 

l\lorgan apparently a-;sumcd tlw ch·il 

affairs or~au zation would he formrd st·p.tratcl)' frw11 t ht· milit;1ry ··ommand, whid1 

seemed to ht· in kc<·ping with :\merican <tncl 

British tlti~tkirag, hut. as was to happen rc· 

pentcdl)• in the fulnre, his rcqncst foun~ 

dcred in runnoil :tnd uncertainty at lhr 

higher wn••nand kvcl~. On Lltc :\mcl'irllll 

side the mgttmc·nt over 1 i\'ilian versus military control was st iII so far from set tltd t h<d 

the \ Vat• D <·p:ll'l mn11 could not h;we ventured a decision. Con.:;cqucntl!-', what was 

decided cml'rgccl piecemeal in LhC' wakr of 

event.;, tiH' pruduc 1 of nccc·;;it > more than 

of policy. 

In July. with no dtTision yet 0 11 : 1 srpara tc org-anization or on a lmlnC'h within 

COSS:\ C: which Cc•ncral .Morgnn proposed i11 .}tll\1' 1 ivil all'airs suddcnl)' 

moved intcl the' fortground of COSS:\C's 

pla11ning. Wi1hin da)"' of carh other, <'amc: 

the landing in Skil)' nnd the failure of the 

Gennan niTm-;ivc a~ainst the Kursk ~>a li en i 

in Rult<;ia. Hrn<·efurth the ,hjs would be 

on the dcfcn..,iw in the East and the \\'<' ~t. 

Germany'.., nmdition appeared strikingly 

like that of J ul)' 191 H when Lud<•nclnrfT'!>( 

Friedens.rlium halted nnd Germany went 

from nea•· vir tm·r to complete defcar in Jess 

than four months. 

Bdor<" t ill' end of j11ly, C:OSS.\ C had 

ordcn-; to giv<- first priority to the planning 

for a return to the Continent in th<.· cvmt 

of n partial m· 1 omplete Gcnnan rollapsc. 

Since he wall to nntit ipntc such ·• comingcnq • Hll)' time after I .\ugust, his staff 

• Memo, COSSAC ror SAC, snh: COSSAC ?lit 

Wc1•kly Report, :ll ~I:J)' ·11, i11 SHAEF C- 5, 11.01. 
OVERSEAS 13EG fN 1 ·cs 

would :also ha\'C' ln be prepared to art ns 

Lhe excn11 ive agency for nny operation that 

might ensue. Morgan now found himself 

with an mgcnr task and still no dvil ff ir~ 

staff. Meetings in June a nd Jul y between 

COSS:\ C and ETOUS.\ reprcsen\atives 

had produced agreement that he ought to 

h;we some sud1 staff to procmr uniformity 

in U.S. and British dealings with riviliatt 

populations; hut the final authority, w the 

C..'\ICnl that it existed, remained vested in 

and diYided hetween the Civil 1\ ffairs Seclion, ETOUSA, and the Civil Afrairs Directorate of the British War Office.''' 

On 28 Jul)', in lelters to the Under Secretary of Stale, War Offirc, nnd Headquarters, ETOUSA, Morgan prop()sed n 

combined c:ivil affa irs sec tio11 within the 

COSSAC st<tff and urged its early establishment. His mission, he e..'Xpl 1lined, required him to enter <t nd tak e r.omrol on 

short notice in any of a lmlfclo7.en countries, 

including Germany. Whctllcr he might 

have to assume such control next month 

or ne:xl year lte could not tell , hut at the 

momcnL he could not d (l it at a iL He asked 

for U.S. and British section <'hids to hr 

:1ppoinl<•d immedia td y. They would head 

a central executive, to he ('Onccrncd with 

high poliry, and a co-ordinating section, 

which would supervise grottps charged with 

plann ing for specific tountries.11 

The COSS:\ C sta ff, meanwhile, worked 

en th<' various o~s ibili es of a rctul'll to 

the Continent before the appointed <.l i-l te 

for O vERLORil. The s t a ff took its J~ uid e 

from a hig-h-level B1·itish intelligcn<·e c.~

mate which described the German situation 

at tht~ end of Jul y as "verging on the desperatr'' a nd predicted that in the roming 

winter Gcrm:'lny c:nuld suffer " an over-

'" C:a rl Cr11m, "Civi.l Affairs Section, ETOU SA,'' 

in SHA EF G- 5. 60, j acket I. 

' ' COSSAC His10ry, in Sf-fAEF C -5, l 1.0 11. 

27 

whelming defeal and irretrievable disaster 

on the Russia n fr nt.. ,,~ vVhoever W (L<; then 

in control in Germa ny, the estimate contimted, would have to decide between unconditional sutrender or abandonment of 

the occupied territol'ies in western and 

sourhern Europe in order lo concel1\rate 

forces ag<tinsl the Rus.'\ian r~cl va ce, postpone the: hour of (jnal defeat, and ensure 

the ultima te occupati011 of Germany 1>)1 

Anglo-.\merican rather than hr Russian 

forces.' " 

From th is !'ather blaranlly optimistic estimate, the COSS. \C pla nn ers ded11ced three 

so-ca lled rases to whidt they as.<>igneJ rhe 

t.ollcctive code name RAN t\ tN . Cn.ses • \ 

and B were concerned with the prospect 

of an invasion before I May 1944, the target date for O v tm t.ORt>, to exploit a drastic 

Germa n weakening in France and tlte Low 

Counr1·ic.o; ur a V(l)untarr German withdrnwal. 1\[orga n especia l! )' remembered 

how unprepared the Alli es haJ been in 

early 19 17 for the German withdrnwal to 

the Hindenl>urg Line. Ca.c;e C: dealt with 

the possibilit y of nn tm(•ondjtionrtl German 

surrcnc!cr. 11 

Were it not fc>r ('ase C:, the whole 

RA ~ plan could he djsmissed ~ only 

one more of the wave-; of wi:;hful thinking 

tha t had pet·iotlirally swept O\ 'CJ' the \Vestern :\llies l\ince the beginning of the war. 

Case C, ltowc,·cr. marked a new high in 

optimism and (herewith added another aspeer to the plnnning-. \Vl1ile the fir:-;l two 

c<.tse..') could be hnndled as variations of 

OVERLORD, RAl'KIN C W:t'$ conCCJ'ned 

with the end of the war, the beginning of 

"COSSAC (4:1) •10, Ope ratio11 RANK IN , in 

SHAEF C 5, 115.25. 

"' Ibid. 11 ( l l Sir Frrdl'rick E. :Vforgnn, Ot•erlllrc to 

Ol' lmL-OJW ( l.ondon : Hodder. 1950 ), p. l lH. 

( 2 ) T.tr, C:OSSAC to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 

Wnr Office, 13 Aug •13, in SHAEF C- 5, 11.02-
28 THE U.S. \R Y IN TH E OCCU JO~ OF GERM A Y 

the IH'<'upation, and t ht: 1 coric ut nlion of 

effort into directions whieh so far had nol 

even liccu defined, murh ks'i cxplos·cd. 

M orcoVCI't even if such a si tuntion did nol 

ht•<·omc a reality in the ncar future, it wa,<; 

likely to <srise sometime and pc:r·haps sudden ly. \\' h"n it did, C.:O~S. C pointed out, 

romb:H fon·cs might wcH he 1<:.-<-; m;cfulthan 

the ;~hi lit y w c:onLrol and dirt'ct civil affnirs. 

Morgan therefore requested that the British 

aml Un ited Stales govcrnm<'nts. "as a mtlltcs· of ur~c cy,'' lay down polic-y on military government in enemy l<'rritory and 

dvil afTnirs in liberated trl'l'itory ;111d provide resourc·ts with which to cxc:nttc: such 

policy. A~ of August J 943, he Jl<)intcd out, 

he had nothing from which even lQ improvise a civil aiTairs organization,, .. , 

A Ciuil Affairs Sectiou, COSSIIC 

ln RANKIN C, General Morgan had 

proposed nn operation for which be had 

no slllff to do the detailed planning, 11<> organi?.ation ro execute any plans that mig ht 

be mndc, and no poliq • dircnion on which 

to lwsc plan'i in the fir.>l plarc. The fust 

two anci a reasonable suhstilllt(' for the last 

would he found het."llusc the)' had to he 

found, hut, not without their appropriate 

measure.~ of administrative agony. Without 

waiting for actjon elsewhcn', Morgan, in 

August, took in hand Lhc or ni~ing of a 

dvil aiTairs section for COSSAC. Where 

um:c the European theater had no civil 

affairs planning staff, it wo11ld soon have 

two, which would prove to llc one too 

many. 

On 23 August, COSS.\C cst.tl>lishccl a 

rivil aiTairs scrtion undc:r Maj. Gen. Sir 

" ( I ) COSSAC {-13) -10, O lltmttiou R ANKIN, 

in SHA EF G - 5, 11 5.25. (2) C:OSSAC to Sec, 

Cltic:fJ of Swlf Commillcc, Offirc of tlw ;~r Cahinl'l, 17rh Rc)lort hy the CofS to SAC (Design a t!:) , 

9 Aug •l:l, in SH AEF G- 5, 11 .06. 

Rugc.r· Lutnll'y. '!lw C.:OSS:\ C l'ecticm ultlsisted of a < cntral organi?.ation which 

would he.: rouccrned with operational pl<snning for OvERLORn and the RANKIN o pCt'-

ations nud a planning board to tlirt•<'l the 

worh. of fout' "rousnry houses," OJIC cnrh 

for fr ctnrt:, Belgium, the Nerberla nch;, and 

Norway. The count!')' houses would provide the msdnss civil affairs staffs for tlwi1 

;:u igncd Hrcas. No staff was created for 

Gen11any hera usc COSS. \ C assumed that 

the United State..<; and Britain would lt audk 

the ocC'upation of Germany separately.''' 

ETOUS!\ s.<~ d twenty offi cers to the 

Civil /\tTairl! Scrtion, COSSAC, leaving 

twenty-t hr<'C Ofn<'CJ'l\ in its own civil lTair~ 

o;;ecLiOn. ;-:-

In Augu~ , Lt. Cen. J acob L. Devers, 

rommanding ETOUS.\ , named Col. 

CornclilL" E. Ryan the arting chief or tit<' 

U.S. C:i\'il AITairs Stall, COSS.\ C. " Ryan 

was at the same time chief of the ETOUS.\ 

Civil Afl'airs Sct•tion, having replaced 

Wade a month earlier. In July, after ncad y 

a year in limbo, lh<' Civil Affairs S1'Clion, 

ETOUSA, hatl finally found a firm billet 

in the spr.cial stall. :\ t the end of the tllonth 

it ltad established a tahle of organization 

consi.<;ting of four planning hran('hcs rivilian relief, military government, economic:s, 

and pe ·~ouncl and training-and a flfth 

branch- area rc..,carrh- which was conceived as having a n operating as well a!' 

a planning fun('tion since it would be concerned with ar(:as to I>C' occupied, including 

Germau y.•v The :-;ection's directive gnvc it 

•• Hqs, COSSAC, CA War Diary, in JTAT P 

C-5, 11 .01, " Histvrirnl Rl'l'ord, CA Sec, ETOUSA, in 

SHAEF C 5, 10.11'1. 

" Llr, CG. ~' 1'0 SA, to l.t Gen F. E. Morg;111, 

3 Aug 43, in SII AF.F C: 5, 11.01. 

~ E'TOUSA, CAS, Memo No. I, suh : Oirt!ctivl' 

to Bl'anch Chie ~, 211 Jul 43, in SHAF.F C !\, 

10.04. 
QVgRSEAS BEGI~~~~GS 

rcsponsihilit y for planning mil it at')' gowrnmcJ1t in all enemy and cnemy-orrupicd 

areas itl the European Lhcatcr, authority 

to ret.omtl1cnd general and specific polic.:ics 

(()I' militt\1')' government, ;"'d control or 

c:ivilian 1mpplics and civil affairs 

pcrscumel. ~u 

The C'JllC.'ltion then wa.;; on which of the 

t\vo ~cc ions would the mantlr of rc.-:ponsibility cvcutuall} fall. The Civil .\ffairs Section, E.TOUS:\, assumed th:lt COSSAC, 

when it hccamc an active command, would 

he predominant!)' British with a British 

c:omrrwndcr and t\ mcritans in the minority 

on the staff. ETOUS.\ wou ld th(•n ti ll 

hnvr to repn:scnt the War l)(•partntcnt in 

the European theater ;md at ca~t control 

t ht supplies, training, anJ transportation 

of .\mcrican orce.~ in thr theater. The 

ETOtJS.\ section wa~ partitularl)' emphatic on the score of prc-;enting the U.S. 

inlc• c~t in I he com hi ned pl:lnning. The 

Bdtish side of COSS,\C, tlw Civil t\ff" ir.s 

Scrtion 111ai11 taincd, wa!> alr·c·ad)' seeking lo 

clomim1t<! the planning hy drawing ou the 

rcsoutTCS of British governnwntal agencies, 

whit:h it had 'lose at hand , and hy prcscntiug the Americans with fails arrompli in 

the form of papers on impot'l:-tnt and complicated suhjccl:i on which Brit ish experts 

uutsidc the GOSS.\ C 'l'taff had obviously 

worked for months. The . \merirans were 

t'>qwrtcd either to come forward nn ort 

noticr with something better OJ' l(> acrcpt 

the 13ritish position. ETOUSA, the C:ivil 

A(Tail's Sc(' li(Jil urged, sho1tlcl thcrdorc he 

iuvitcd h)' the Brili:;h to oh:-t•rvc all fll'(•limiHlll')' confcrc11rrs and ('gotintion~; should 

he the dmnn<:l of communication (rom tlw 

Civil t\ffai~ Divisiou. War Dcp;u 1mcnt, to 

the U.S. clement in C:OSS.\ C ; and -;hnultl 

., CCI, RTOUSA, Draft Dirt•\'tlvt for CAS, 16 

Jul ·l3, i11 SHA I;;F ('; 5, 10.0•1. 

review all plan'), dire< lives, and ngrccmcnls 

put out hy C:OSSAC. 

The position of the Civil !\ffairs Seninn, 

ETOUS!\, however, seemed hound to he· 

come romplctdy prccr1rious if COSSAC 

became a full-fl edged coml>ined command. 

As Maj. g. R. Bnltzcll, who had hccn 

ETOUS. \ 's dvil affairs liaison officct' with 

COSS:\C:, prcdirtrd, once the Supreme 

Commandct• wa~ appointed he would have 

full authority in phmning as well as opera· 

Lions; cmt~(·qut·utl y. the Civil Affairs SeC'· 

tion, Kl'OUS,\ , W(>uld not have any 

fun elions ldt lo perform, except possibly 

minor n1 1t:s in COilltertion with lhc United 

Kingdom a11d k<' nct. ~' Sinre the decision 

on the Supreme Commander had tliH }'<'I 

been <IJIIH)UIWl'd, f-kadquaners, E.TOUSA, 

on t:3 Scptrmbcr, ten tatively confinned the 

Civil . \ffairs Scrtio11 as the fitlal clannn<'l 

of civil alfai1.' Jt nthotity in the theater with 

responsibility for all phases of pbtnni11g for 

civil d1 irs in ron1hined operations.~~ 

The whole <ptc~tion was reopened in 

October when COSSAC revised its ap· 

pronch to dvil ;t iT ir~. T he C<)untt')' lt ou~•· 

organization bnd been modeled on thr 

Allied Military Govcmmcnt of Orrupiccl 

T erritory ( /\MGOT) created for Italy, 

under \Vhirh the military go,·crnor wa-. ~uh· 

ordinate II) tht: Supreme Commander, hut 

AMGOT it.;rlf was otherwise completely 

scpandc front the romhnt force~. Unclct' the 

Ai\·1 GOT 1 otlct:pt 1 he rou1Hry ~c." 

would each hav<· ,.,·olvcd into civil affairs 

heaclquarlt•rs. pt'a<·ti c;dlr nation<\! milit:tr}' 

administrations for their as.signed rounlr t~o;; 

<• Memo, ETOUSA, CAS, MC Br, for Chief, 

CAS, ~ul. : Rt·lnci(ln hip BNwc~n CAS F.TOURA 

nnd CAS COSSAC, 7 Scp t:l, jn SHAEF ('; 5, 

11).02. 

:.: l.tr, If , ~' I'OUSA, to Chief, CAS, ~ Scp 

~. ~" : Cot~~h in~d Plnnning for CA, in SIIA[?.F 

C- :i, 10.02. 
30 '1'1 IE U.S. ARf\IY JN TilE OC:C:UP:'\'l'TON OF GEIU.lANY 

hut, ext c·pt £u1 G<"nuan>'• til(' t·ountl'ic~ of 

wcstem F.urnpc wot~ld bt· lihcratec.l, not 

OtC'upied, and according to a decision of the 

Quebec Conference in August, were lo l1e 

n:tumcd w their nativr governments :1s 

soon <L<; po..-.•;ihlc .. \~I GO l, morco\'cr, t~fler 

it wrnt into nnion in Italy in September·, 

rapidly brgiln to look like a prize exnmplr 

of 1 he fallat·y nf permitting two independent 

commands in the ~1mr thcntcr. J\tlditinnnlly, C:OSS.\ C soon rc<dizcd that the 

count!'}' housrs would impose a tremendous 

drnin on prl'sonnel. Ead1 would have a full 

stall' of experts in all rivil afTairs fields, 

virtual shadow gO\·crn nwnts for '' half 

dozen or mon: coutu rics.21 

• \lthou!{h iu. demise '"oulc.l not IJc a.; 

complete as ~IS then intended, the C'Ountl')' 

house era in C:OSS. \ C carne to an end itt 

lme Ortobtr. On the 13t h, (;c)l. l<al'l R. 

3cndct-;l'l1 htnune Chief ~tafr Ofli<'cr 

(U.S.) for Civil .\fTair-s, COS !\C. With 

this a~ignrncnt, the .\mcri<'an side or the 

Civil Affairs S\'('tion, CO!'>S. \C:, a11d the 

Civil :\!fair'S sc~ tion. E'I'OUSA, W('rt 

separiltcct. Until then C:oluncl Ryan had 

h<·aded both. En mutt to London, 

Bcndetscn had spent fi ve dll)'S in Washington. He snid later, hl' had spent the time 

rending ol'l~, and no particulnr form of 

dvil affairs organization had been rC('Otll· 

mended to him. ~• But it t·ould hardlv ha\'c 

been unknown to him that the Civil \O'a i~ 

Division, War Departmcut, was not IHtppy 

with the dl1al <'Oil111Htnd channels r\MGO'I' 

llad created, and within days after his 

nr rival in the theater, Bendctscn began dismantling tltc country house.<;. He gave n~ 

his reason the Supreme ( :onuwwder's need 

for a single compact starT that !'ould deal in 

broHd principles. He wa.; also c·onccrncd , 

" COSSAC 1-li<tory, in SHJ\ F. f.' G-5. I 1.0·1. 

:• lmerv, SHARF C- 5, lli toricnl Sec, with C:ol 

Karl R. Bc.ndctscu, iu SHARF C- 5, tO. 

he reported, about I·:'I'OUS!\ ·~ plarc in 

~ i,·il afTairs. If ETOUS.\ received .t c.ivil 

:tfTairs mission. he· maintained, part or 

COSS. \ C:'s a rca plauu ing would obviou~ly 

i>e use c.~'l.~ · 

Tlw proj(:cted abolition of tlw r·ountry 

llou'\cs hr·ou~hl with it tlte fir•st trul y signifi-

<·ant development in rivil Jfair~ dortrine 

of the war. Civil aiT<tirs and military govemmclll finally il<'hkvcd integ ration into 

the operating military force.'>. Within 

COSS,\C, the cha nge was described as 

being ( r'Ont a static, regional approarh to 

a mobile: plnn. Tn other words, riv.il affairs 

wot~ c.l ntovc with tlw combat lr'oups and 

be pal'l of the c·orHinuing operation, not 

just a su bst itule for native government in 

liberated and occupied urcas.~r. Until then, 

mnsidcrcd in lloLh l ivilian and mililaq• 

circles as primaril)' a rear area and post war 

artivitr, civil affairs would find a plnrr in 

the w;u· itself. 

The rcvi~cd CO. S.\C conrept nf civil 

affa.i ~ for a few days seemed :-~\so to 

IJreatlw new life into E'J'OUS.\ 's pn>spcct 

of arquiring an operational civil affairs 

mi ·sion .. ·\t the end uf the month General 

De\'ers proposed that C:OSS.\C assume responsibility for· all cvmlJincd planning and 

ETOUSt\ take rc ponsibilily ror planning 

ami the c·ondtwl of <'ivil a ffairs llv U.S. 

forccsY \.Vhm Wt'ls not yet known · in the 

theater was that at Quchec in . \ugust the 

President aud the Prime Minister had dcddc:d th:ll the Supreme Commander 

ou ld be an .'\ mcriran. Bv carlv ·ovl'mher, with the Tehran Cw;ferCJ1~ e in the 

offing, the naming uf the Supreme Commander w:L" becoming ur'gcnt, am! his ap-

"' Ltr, BeudctseJt to fl illdring, 27 Oct ·11, in 

SHAEF G -5, I 0.02. 

"' L1r, Mnj Cen R. W. Bnrker to L1 Ccn O .. vers, 

2fl Oct 4:1, in 511:\EF G - 5, I 0.02. 

" Memo, Dl'ven ror Ot•p COSSAG, 3 1 Ort 13, 

in SHA£r U 5, 10.03. 
OVERSEAS BEGINNI NGS 

pointmcnt would automatically finish off 

ETOUS:\ as an operational c·ommancl.u' 

On 12 :Now·mbr.r the Civil AO'airs Division 

t Ci\D ) advised Devers that S~AC 

henceforth wou ld speak with final au thority on nil civil affairs matters, and the U.S. 

side of COSSr\C woulrl be the \1\lar Department's channel of communjcarion. The 

Civil Affairs Sec·tion, ETOUSA, would be 

r1hsorhed into the lsi (later 12th) U.S. 

•\nny G1'01 p.~u 

Toward a 1'/an 

Although C:OSSAC <tchicved a ci,·il 

alTair'S planning capability late and a clear 

mandate to do such planning even later, it 

hnd, ncverLhclc.~s, by the end of lhe year 

I !.!43 laid the foundations for civil affairs 

in northwest Europe and for military govermncnL in Germany. One major step was 

Lhc decision already mentioned for a mobile 

civil affairs organization . .t\nother was the 

projerted division of the GCJ'tllan terri tory 

to he ocrupied by the Western Allies imo 

a 11 orthwestern (British ) zone and a soul hwcstern (. \meriran ) zone, which aroused 

'ittch prolonged rontroversy at so ltigll a 

level that it will have to be left for discussion elsewhere. The rest of COSSt\C's 

work for the most par·t took the form of 

single, often mnclom-seeming decisions, bu t 

ones nel essru·y Lo the construct ion of a 

<·oherCJlt organization and plan. l11 earh 

instance tbc C:OSSAC st<tO' was literally 

striking out into unexplorrd territory. 

'' Ltr, Sl!C.: of War lO Presidl'nt's Special AssistiHH, 

tO Nov •13, ln DcparllnCnl of Stale, The Cott· 

/~re11r.cs fit C11iro tmd Tchra11, 1943, irl "foreign 

Relations of thr. Unilc~d Stall'S" Wa~hin ton , D.C., 

l!l61 ). 

,. Memo, Hqs, ETOUSA, C:ofS for Maj Cen 

G. W. Bnr ker, Dcp COSSAC, 12 Nov 43, in 

SHAE.F G- 5, 11.01. 

31 

I n the last quarter of 1943 RAN I<JN C 

t'Ontinued to he COSS:\C's main concern. 

J ts object was conceived as he1ng to occupy 

areas on the Continent, particularly i11 Germnny, from which rhe British a nd Amcrit'an forces could enforce the terms of 

sutrender. Of the probable civil affairs 

tasks, the foremost seemed to he to maintain 

law aud order. .t\ German sunender was 

sc·arcely c()nceivable without also either a 

C"o llapse o r overthrow of the Nazi regime; 

ccnse(]uently, the co11ntry might be found 

to have very little in the way of a functioning govc;rnment or none at all. Addition all)' 

the defeat could be expected to set off a 

ma~ ive movement of people :t!\ the German 

troops still scattered anoss F.mopr from the 

N«·lrth Cape to Crete attempted to make 

their way home, as millions of prisoners of 

war and displaced persons took to the l'Oads 

out of Germany, and possil>ly as the Germans thetn!~elves Aed in panic from their 

most feared enemy, the Russians. The economy, on the OLher hatld, having survived 

four years of war, was expected to he able 

to provi<.le adequ<ttcly for the counlr)' after 

the surrender. ~o 

H;1vinR o~ tu ated tile conditions under 

which militnry government in Germany 

migltt expect to operate, the COSSAC staff 

also undertook to define its pmpose. FM 

2 7- 5 had rerum mended l;enevnlem·e. toward both fri endly and enemy populations. 

In the COSS.\ C thinking a sterner line 

rmergecl and \.Vith it the germ of what was 

to become a fundamental assumption in 

all laLcr planning for the ucnrpalion, 

namely. that for the Germans hostiliLies 

wou ld not necessarily end when the shooting slopped. Tlte purpose of militHry gnvernmenl in Germany would be lo assist Lhe 

""COS SAC:, CA, Pion 26/•t, Otttlinc of Opera· 

cions loa· Civil Affairs Pl::tnning R ,\:'IKIN Cosc 

C, 15 Nov 43, in SHAEF G- 5, 1 t5.25c. 
32 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GER~lANY 

mililn•·y c·c\mmander to impose hie; will on 

tlte t·ncmy, and the first concern would be 

to help maintain the striking power of the 

military forces by controlling movements 

of people ltnd by preventing disease and 

disordc•·· Relief, an impo•'llllll function in 

libt•ratcd Allied territor)•, would he restricted in Germany " to those measures 

which the Supreme Allied Commander 

mny l!pccincaiJy direct to prevent a general 

breakdown of civil life and the spread of 

disca.<~ e.' 31 

The most difficult prartiral CJUt!.<ltion 

RANKIN C raised was one of 111cans. A 

German surrender could rrcat1~ a suddCJl 

need fm· n full-blown civil affaits organization lo administer all of we>..<~ tcrn Europe. 

The first proposal, in October 1943, was 

to form u rombined U.S. Uri1ish rivil 

nffni~ military government force totaling 

5,000 officers and enlisted men. 1\ month 

latt , <•s lhe RANKIN plan began to take 

shape, the number was increased to 2,400 

U.S. officers, 5,000 U.S. culisted men, 

2,500 British officers, and 4,500 British of 

other· nks. ~ The choice General Morgan 

then fnc.:ed seemed to he citht·r· lo r•nll inro 

being so large a force and risk there bcing 

no assignments for it for months, possibly 

even yea ~, or to go ahead and draft plans 

which he knew be could not exe(ute. Fortunately, the choice was not quite as stark 

as iL appeared. The British cnnlingcnt 

co~lld he assembled at fairly short notice 

if RANmN C were to matcr·inlizc suddenly. 

1\ Hdti:;h rivil affairs school at Wimbledon 

had been training officers sinec February 

ID43 nnd •·ctuming them to their originttl 

units or to civilian life. They could be 

" .Memo, Chief, CAD, COSSAC, for llr:~n hes, 

sub: CA Adminislrative Apprcci:ltion, Nov 43. 

in SFIAEF C-5, 11.02. 

" Memo, COSSAC, CA, for COSSAC, Ill Nov 

43, SIIAEF G- 5, 11.03. 

quickly rccallcd:

1

' The Americans were a 

differem r:~sc. They and aJJ their equip· 

ment would have to be as..'iembled in tht~ 

United States and brought across the Atlantic. Morgan M\\V no alternative but to 

accept the risk that they might have lo be 

cckept ing about" for a long time a11 

the price fol' having them at hand if they 

were suddenly nccdcd. 3

• 

On 5 October. Gcne•·al Devers aler1<·d 

General l lilldring to the impending rcqu.ircmcnl to :;hiJ) the entire projected U.S. 

civil affairs contingent to England. ~n The 

first nival~ cnuld nor be expected hcfo,·c 

January 194-4-, just lHtrely in time if a disastrous winter in Russia forced a German 

surrender. H not, the U.S. civil affairs personnel would h:we 10 wait and go h:ark tn 

school in England. Jo:TOUSA would make 

pace available in the American Schools 

Cente1· a.t Shrivcnh<tlll, sixty miles due wCJ>t 

of Londo n, whirh ah·cady housed a vnl'icty 

of other ETOUSA schools ranging fro111 

cooking and l1aking to military intelligence. 

On 1 Decemhcr, Col. Cuthbert P. Stearns, 

a;; commandanl'

1 actjvated the Civil Aflairs 

Center at Shrivcnlwm. The Civil Affairs 

Center· would be responsible not only for 

training hut few the entire U.S. field organization for civil affnirs in the Europcnn 

theater.~~~ The firsr group of trainees, for1y 

,. Note 011 British School of Military Covurnmcnl 

(no dntcJ, iu PMC, MC: Div, classified decimal 

file 350.1. 

"Memo, COSSAC, CA, for COSSAO, lll Nov 

43, in SHAnF G- 5, 11 .03. 

n F. Van Wyck Masou, ed., "The EdtaetLtion 

and Training of Allied Officers for Duty with 

Civil AffrtiN, Mili1nry Government, E11ropcan 

Theater o{ o,,cr.Hic>m," ill SHAEF C- 5, GO, Jackel 

7. 

,., ( I ) Memo, CA Center, Amcric::m Schoot 

Cente.r, Cor Ch, Uist Sut.Jsec, COSSAC, 3 1 Dec 

43, in SH A F.F C: -!i, 17,02. {2) Memo, COS SAC 

for CC, F.TOUSI\, ~uu: Assign•11ent of U.S. Pe r-

~onnel to OA Duty Under RANKIN C, 29 Dec 

. Ln SHAEF G- 5, l t .03. 
OVERSEAS BEGINNINGS 

offi<·crs, arrived at Shrivenham on 13 J anuary 1944 .'10 

In Decemllet· 1943, with rhe announcement of General Eisenhower's appointment 

as Supren1e Commander, the COSSAC 

phase of combined planning drew to a 

dQse. On the 13th COSSAC published 

what was to be the most important document on civil affairs produc-ed during its 

~enure, the Standard Policy and Procedure 

for Combined Civil AITair!-i Operations in 

orthwest Europe. Di vided into three 

parts, one dealing with nomendalure and 

organization and two with operations in 

the field (on 1\llicd and on enemy territory), the Standm·d Policy ru1d Procedure 

was designed to J'Ceoncile American and 

British pt•acticcs and polides as far as they 

were then known. 1\ s such, it was mostly 

a routine compilation distinguishable only 

])y its !iuhject mat!er from dozens of similar 

., Ffist Sec, G- 5, SH A EF Rear, Chronology of 

Civil Affairs- Military Government, eTO, May 

<I I fi Jun 44, 24 IJec H, in SHAEF G- 5, 60, 

}:'lckct T. 

33 

stalT manuals. \Vhat made it a civil affairs 

milestone: was that it assig ned full control 

of and responsibilit y for civil affairs and 

military government co the military commanders, from the Supreme Commander 

on down. ln the European theater, civil 

af·f:tirs was to have no existcnn: separate 

from the romhat commands. l n u('cupied 

rncmy tenitory the Supt·eme CommandeJ' 

would be the military governor and would 

delegate appropriate authority to his subordinate c·ornrn<mders, who would then 

bear the responsibility in their own areas. 

The chief object would be to m~Lintajn condition~ among the civilian populatiou 

which would at least not hinder military 

operations and if possihle a'lSist them; and 

the task of the civil affairs stairs and detachments would be to relieve the combat 

troops or civil commitment~. ~~~ 

" ( 1) SHAEF, Standard Policy and Procedure 

Iot Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe, 1.3 Dec 43, in SHAEF, SGS, 01 4. 1. 

(~) Report on Standard Policy and Procedure 

(no date], in SH AEF 'G- 5, 32, 
CHAPTER Ill 

Washington Versus London 

Thr 1l T (£ ) Commillec twd CCJJC 

\ hat 'itratcgy is to military operations, 

poli< y is ru < ivil affairs and milit.~ry government. Poliry lends form and purpose to the 

g'CIWt'rtrncrtt (lr or.cu pied ttnd li bt•ratcd terrilory unu is nltimately as 11111 r.h conrcrncd 

with wiuning wars as the militnry stt·:ucgy 

itsclr. Ww;hington and London lwth were 

aware or thi~ fact, and neither C]lleSti()JlCd 

the <''l<'ll"i<)n of the parLnct:hip developed 

in the wnr tn the fomlltlatitm uf <'ivil affair~ 

and milit,ll} l{<wcrnment policy. The pannea"'hip "·'' not one witiiCltll dirTen·nce-, 

huwevcr .• tnd the partners w<~t r not without 

inclqwndl'nl am hi Lions; ri,·il :riTa in; and 

tllilit;11·y government gave .tmpk ~cope LO 

botlr. 

The fitosl organization, cit Iter British or· 

• \mcrir:m, to he concerned c;pcriftrally with 

tldinin ~ < ivil affairs polic~ wao, tlw \clmini'>tration of Tcuitories ( Eumpc ) Committee. The .\T(£ ) Committee lr:H"cd its 

origin' h.u I,. to the earlr planning for 

RO\JNt>UI' in the ' Pring of 1942. s:. IOtnmitl<'<' or rh1· Dritic;h War Offi ce, it held 

its fir st r1t ccting on 2 } 1dy 1942 11ndcr· the 

chnirmnnshir or Lhe Pcnmii1Clll Under Scrl('l:ll')' for War, Sir Frcdclir k g _ Bovt·nsthcn. Ar 1 hen Rou:-.:ou r, after a hrief 

per iud of rnmhincd planning, was t cvrrt ing 

to the Briti'h while the \mcrkano;; took up 

I he pl:uwin~ ror the North • \(tirn 0 1)('1.1-

tion. \lthoul!h the \T ( E) Cnmmilt<'<' wao; 

entin·l)' Br iti-.h, under its tcrmq or rcfr•cnrr 

it ao;.'ltJmrcl hrond authorit y ro dcvbc· policy 

1 h:\ t would " ensure efficient civil ad ministration of the territories liberated in Europe 

as the e.~u lt of oprra tions br forces of the 

United Nationo,.'' and to maintain c·ontart 

for this put po),c with the Allied exile govemmetlt'> aml with ETOUSA. 

RouNnur>, rwvcr· lllUdl in favor with the 

British Chiefs nf StniT, quickl.y fell inw 

abeyance, hu t the /\T( E) Committee nwt 

regularl y aft<·1 J ttly 1942, concerning itsclr 

t bieny with n•licf nncl with the negotiation 

of ci,·il afT;rir-. ~rcem<.'lll'> with the exile government'\. 'J'hc 01 cupation of Germany ao; 

yet <;ecmcd 100 rrmotc to he pertinrm. \t 

itc; fin;t meeting the t·ommittec agreed to 

:ll'l'allgC for .Ill t: I'QUS.\ reprCSCntatiV(' !O 

sit in on future IIH.·ctings; therefore, from 

the third m<:t·ting- on1 at least one liaisr11 1 

officer fn1111 ETOUSA attended fir«t 

Colonel lkrt ~. l,tln Colonel Wade, and for 

a time hath. Their in tructions were to nt· 

tent.l tlu• trtt t•ti ng' "without accepting the 

responsihilil\ of mnling fin.tl dt·t isiuns 

which have not a lt c.td)' received the approva l o ( thi' headquarters."• The 1\ mcricans' ta u-; wa' litH <·rtain from the beginning. The Briti>~ h apparently wanted to regard the 111r11 ; 1s fnll-ncdgcd members. 

ETOUSA !Wcms at rirst to have intcnckcl 

to ncgotiart with the committee tlli'Ouglt 

them hut, :L'i thr American concern with 

Rou:'lnt·t• dcdincd in the summer of 1912, 

came to ·~a t cl 1h1•m merely as ob. en rrc;.: 

• S1aniforth, ... , hr Administration of T rn itorir\ 

( F.urope) Cnm111ill~t .'' p. 5. 

: Memo, l'lll'all'r J ud,Rr Ad\'ocate for CofS, 

ETOUSA, ~~~~~: Aclu1iui~tra1ion of Tcrriwric~ 

(Europe) Ca111111illl'l' (Br), 3 1 Jul 42, in STIA ~F 

G-5, 10.0·1. 
WAS111t\GTON VERSUS LONDO ' 

The •·cvival of the cross-Channel attack 

in cn rly 1943 raised, more urgently than 

the 1942 approach to RouNDUP had, the 

question of combined r.ivil an'airs planning 

fw· llfll'lhwcstcrn Europe. In t\ pl'il, the: reprcscJltativcs of the Britio;h Chiefs of Staff 

ou the Combined ChieCs of Stn!i (GCS) 

propo~c<.l that civil affairs pr)lil'y-planning 

cludng the period of militnry control be 

ddcgatccl to the J\T( E) Committee and 

that spec ial \Var Depa rtment t'Cpt•cscnlati\'C!l be as:.if{ncd to sit on the committee. I• or 

t ht suhrwq ncnt period of ei vili;m t·on trol 

they pt·oposcrl the crenticm of n commince in Washington undet' State Department leadership l'Omposed of intct·cstcd 

Rritio;h and U.S. civilian agencies including 

W:u· Department and CCS r·cpresentativc'>.1 The U.S. Joint Chiefs ohjected that 

tlh' nJ'iti:.h propOs:\Js wou)cl CI'CnlC n du:l) 

chain of rommand and jcnpat·di?.l' the 

h:ml-fought principle o! military ncrc,._ity. 

They propo<;cd, instead , the ct•cati<m of a 

rombi nrd civil affairs commiucr to flltH'-

ti<m under the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

with authority boLh to fomHdalc <.lit•ccf'ives 

to rommanclcrs in the field and to c·o-ordinalc the a( tivities of U.S. and H1 it ish dvil- • • -1 

mn agenr1cs. 

Allhclugh the Joint Chief:; of Stan· 

(J C:S ) clid not commcnl pcrifin\lly on the 

, \T ( E) Colllmitt ee, Lhe Americans cle<~rly 

indicatt•d thnt they did not t•rg,u•d it as a 

suitable vchirlc for <:ombincd civil affairs 

planning. On 13 1\pril, at a meeting in the 

U.S. Emba<;.<;y in London, the Commanding General, ETOUSI\, :u the time Gcncr:d Andrews, expres5ed the r\nlCt'i!·an view 

• t.lrmo, R<'pt~entatives of Ur, CofS (CCS 

1!10/ 1 ), 11 Apr 13, in CAD 092 P -22 13) , sec. 

t. S~u Cok' an~l Weinberg, Solrlias IJreomtJ Co ~ 

nuor.r, p. 11!.1. 

'JCS '250/ 1, 1!) Apr ·I:J, in CAl') 0!)2 (1- 22- IJ:l), 

~cc. I. Sc!! Cole~ and Weinberg, Solrlius Become 

C:lll'llrl/01.1, p. 120. 

that COSSAC would handle all plans fot 

cross-Chann el operations and, thus, would 

supersede the AT (E) Committee. Two 

weeks later, Colonel Wade rep01'tcd that 

the committee had completed the estimate.~ 

for the tnilit:tr)' piHtse in cross-Channel 

ope1-ations and was moving on to lbngrange planning whit h did not concern 

ETOUSr\ ; he recommended, therdun:, 

that nctive ETO USt\ participation on th~ 

committCI' h~· withdrnwn. 5 

The 1\mcricans had, in fact. come to t'Cgard civil affain~ as a unilateral conccm 

and the AT( F.) Committee as a British 

committee with whid1 they mighl cxrhangc 

opinion hut t ould not. negotinte, since 

neither F.TOUS \ nor the War Department itself had hody authorized to do 

so at tht~ time. Con<~cqucnt l)' , whil<' in the 

British , ·icw tht· .\TtE) Committee pc•·-

formed a val11ahi<' nnd needed service for 

the allianC'c, the .\meric'ans AAW in it '111 

attempt lo prc-C'mpt Lhc civil affait'!; planning in tlw Bt·itisll interest, pnrtic11larly 

after th e n nnmitlce ;mel its mosl arLivc ff hoot , llw Shipping and Supply Sub· 

Commitu:c, began lo concemrale 0 11 rclit·f 

and seetncd ahotll tn assign the furnishing 

of relief supplic..'S to the United States and 

their distrihttlion to British agenrie~. The 

O\'CI'l • \ merit-an objections to the Kl' (E) 

Commit trt• wct'C 1h:11 it renewed rhe danger 

of civilian intcrfcrt<nre in the military phal'r 

;md thal dvil niTait'S ought to he in rxactly 

the sa111c n1tiH1HitHJ channel as the larti(·::t l 

troops, nan1d y, 1111dl'1' the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. o) 

T ownrd 111<' end ()r May. the Brili!!h Wnr 

Office agreed with two proviso.", to ac:ccpt 

a comhin<'d ,.i, il a I fair.; commillrc iu 

Washington undc~r the CCS. ln the first 

> Staniforth, "The Admiuislration of Territorica 

(Europe ) Cunt•llitte•·," p. 3 1. 

• History of the CAD, hk. rr, ch. fV, pp, 5 fl. 
36 THE U.S. ARMY IN TH£ O CCUl'!\'flON OF GERMANY 

pmviso the Wa r Office required ~xcmpli n 

from combined wnt rol for recovered tct•ritOrii'S whkh had originally been possessions 

of the Uojtecl Kingdom, the Dominions, 

or the United Sta e.<~. ln the second it inlli~tt~d on e-xpanding the 1\T(E) Corntn iuec 

inw a full y <'omiJincd committee ''with 

strong U.S. rcprcstmtation whi('h must IJc 

Cull y authorized to ~peak for the U.S. Go,·-

('J'IllllCnt."' Within ICliS than a week, the 

Civil .\IJain; Divisio11 of the U.S. War lkparllllCnt had rcr:tlll the JCS proposal to 

inr.rwporale the British provisos, but the 

a,grcement in princ·iplc thus easily reached 

wns to meet far rougher going when it 

came to writing a tharter for a comhincd 

dvil ffair~ committee. In a foretaste of 

similar arguments to t·ome, Lhc Ba·itish and 

t\anca icans fell to dchating hypot hetical aspects of the first British proviso, meanwhile 

ignCII'ing lhe immcdinlc and prnrticnl implirations of the second. 

On 3 July, nftcr nearly a month 's intensive discussion, the Combined Chiefs or 

StnfT approved :t tentative chartc1· for the 

Combined Civil ;\A'airs Conunill tc 

( C:Gt\C). Paa·ng-raph 6, concerned with 

CCAC authority in areas in wrud1 one or 

thr other of the partners claimed !'\Overl'i~nty, was still undergoing revision; hut 

sinrc the CCAC would not have to deal 

with any such prohlcmR Cor awhiJe, it could 

fun ti on adequately withoUl the paral{ raph.b On 7 Jul y, Gc·neral Ma rshall authOI'ized General Devers to appoint an 

offi('er from the ETOUSA sta ff to serve 

as U.S. member of the .'\T(E ) Commit· 

1 MKg, War Office to ri i~h Joint Staff Mission, 

211 Mll)' ~3, in CAD 0!12 (:1- 22-43) , sec. I. St•e 

Cotrs :lnd Weinbers, Soldiers Become (Jo,•emors, 

p. 121. 

'CCS 190/ 6/ D, Clo arlcr of the CCAC, :1 Jul 

-1 3, in CCS :131 (IJ 'i- 13), ~ec. I. Set• Co e~ :~ud 

Wl'iuherg, Soft/ius nuo11M Govemors, P• 123C. 

tee.t• In Washington, the CCAC held its 

first formul meeting on the 15th under the 

ai nnan~hip of Assistant Scr•·ctnry of War 

John J. M rCloy, but h y then the CCAC 

was a lready quickly lapsing imo a state of 

p<U't\ I) ~ is. 

Some week!! before, Lhc i\T ( E) Committee h ad sent lo Washington a draft civil 

affairs ag reement with Norway. According 

ro their undcr anding of the C:CAC charter, the British expected the U.S. Join t 

Chiefs to rcvirw the document and return 

iL to Lon don, where the combined n egolia. 

Lions would l1c completed by the U.S. representation 0 11 the AT ( E ) Committee. The 

Americans insisted on prior submission to 

the CCAC, which they maintained constituted the final authorit y in c ivil ~t O' rs derisions.''' Until then neither side had fully 

cnlight('ncd t hr other as to itl! inL('a pretalion 

of the charter. The British now revealed 

that thC)' ronsidered the :\'"r( E) Com ani ttee to be the principal combined planning 

agency for all t ivil affa irs operations based 

in the United Kingdom, hence for all of 

uorlhwcstcl'n Europe." The Amcrirans, on 

the ot hc a· hnnd, had never intended to 

rerogn izc t ~: i\ T ( E ) Committee as a combined agency. In recomrnt nding approval 

of U.S. membership on lhe committee General Hilldring had stated, "il does not ap· 

pear to be desirable lO have the War 

Departmcnl recognize and hen part of any 

agreements which are made by the Vlar 

Office Commillec AT(E)]."'~ 

Subsequently, through the summer, the 

• Cable, 1\CWI\R to ETOUSA, 7 jut 43, i11 

SHAEF C: 5, II.Ol, 

•·• Memo, Representatives of Ur, CofS, 10 J ul 

431 in CAD 014 (fi- 13- t\3). See Coles and Wein· 

berg, So/riirrl /ttJcome Gov<1r 11 ors, p. 125. 

" Histo11y of the CAD, hk. II, c:h. lV, p. 27. 

"Memo, llitldring for CofS, 1 J uu 43, in CAD 

092 (3 22 1 ), sec. I. Sec Cole~ :.nd Weinberg, 

Soldiers lJu:Qmc Got•tmors, p . I Z2 
WASHINGTON VERSUS LONDON 

combined planning degenera ted into a tug 

of war over the Norwegian agreement, with 

the .\mcric:ans in~isung that one :.~y or ano ther, no matter how ncetingly, the paper 

had to pass thro ug h the CCAC ami with 

the Brilish !>taunchly refusing to have the 

CCr\C Jay ·o much as a finge1· on it. Dy 

mid-Scptl'mhcr the frustra tion t'Cadwd 

such intc.nsity that Gener<ll Hilldring contemplat ed n direct assaull on the J\TCE) 

Commillce. T o General Darker, chief of 

tht U.S. clement in C O SS.\C, he exprCS!ccl 

the opinion tha t the :\T( E.) Committee no 

longer hntl "any real funclio n to pedol'lil " 

( because primary responsibility for combined plnn11i11g a~ vc·stc'd in the CCS nnd 

CC.\C) and, therefore, if Barker considered it polilically exp('d i('rH, the U.S. 

representative o n the committee ought lo 

he withdr<& wn. '" The s11ggcstion wn ~ not 

<l<'ted upon, though it almost certainly 

would evcnlllally have been had the r.ommillee not resolved on its own accord in 

Or to her to stt!;pcnd it,o;; meetings while 1 hr 

War Omrc rlncl Po reig n Omcc re sse.c;f'e d 

its relationship to lhc CC.\C.'' 

Th e EllC and CCAC( L ) 

Tn Moscow the Tripar•titc Conference of 

Fon•igu 1'vfinisters, uudcr· a secret pr•otocol 

signed o n I November 1943, neated the 

Euro pean . \dvisory C(}mmission ( E,\ C) 

:wd t h <u'p,cd it with tr.ipar·tite planning o n 

quc.c;tions pertaining to the occupation. l\t 

the con fc l'cncc, Secretary of State Cordell 

H ull, British Secretary of Sta te for For·cign 

\ffairs Sir i\ruhonr Eckn, and Soviet 

People's Commiss:u for Foreig n Afftlir~ 

" Meu1o, Wi1r Dept, Ch, CAD, for Gcn BDrkcr, 

Mlb: AT(Bl Cornmiucc, 13 Scp 43, in SHAF.F 

G- 5, 11.01. 

"Stnnlforth, ''l11c Admini~tr:tlion of Territories 

( guropc ) Uouunittcc," p. 33. 

37 

Vyacheslav M. M olotov had been mostly 

c:onremcd with the agenda for the forthcoming Big Three conference at Tehran. 

Hull nnd Eden, however, had also hoped 

to begin establis hing, for the last sta.gc of 

the war against Grnnany, something like 

the collnl>onHion that had e.xisted between 

the c~~; trrn J\llir.s . inrc 194 1 hut had so 

far no t been attained with the Soviet 

Unioo. Sin er 0\'eR t, ORn would meet the 

long-sta nding Soviet demand fm a full-

~ca e sec•ond front, rhc development of romma n approarhes and objectives not onl] 

for the war but ~;o for the period after 

the vi<'lory seemctl ho th possihlc and necessary. T he British and merit-an thinking 

on the R ANKfN pl<m. since it pre'>llpposed 

a Gerrnan su rrender before Western forces 

were on tlw Contint·llt, even lent ~ degree 

of ur!{CJ\ c:y to tripartilc agreement· on O(TUpation policy. 

The ,\mericans and British were pleased , 

and a trine surprised, to find the Rtr.ssians 

willing to discuss postwn1· CJUestions 1 but the 

.\ nteric:tns were mur h le.c;s pleasa nt ly surprist'd when Eden proposed tha t the European Atlvi.,.or }' Commi sion have its scat i:n 

London a nd hr the vehicle for tripartite 

decisions. The Amt~ricans saw in this proposa l nr1 ;1tlempt to replace the faltering 

.\ T ( E ) Committee with a more powerful 

body nnd raptun' for London the entire 

field of postw<lr ph10ning. The Russians, 

for thdr· p:~rt , wc:r·e quite willin~ to p:Hticipate in broad deci:;ion-making fo r areas of 

primary ron cern to the Western . \IIi c.<; but 

gave no indiration thnt they would rccipro-

("ate where areas of direct int t to them 

were concerned. 1\ s fina lly draftccl, the 

terms of reference of the E!\C were left 

suffiricnLiy indefinite to a ccommodate both 

the British C..'--pectations <~nd the American 

and Soviet r c.c;e r·vat ions. " The Commission,•· thr. 1\lfoscow proto<'ol statl:d , " will 
38 TilE U .S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

study and make joint recommendations to 

the three Govcr·nn1cnts upon European 

questions connected with tbe termuJation 

of hostililies which the three Governments 

may consider appropriate to refe r Lo it. '·•r. 

The European Advisory Commission was 

to meet ill L<Hldon. f. den, 011 his return 

from M oscow, named as United I<i11gdom 

delegate Assistant Unde1· Secrctnry of State 

in the F oreign Offi ce Sir 'William Strang, 

who was already thoroughly f11miliar with 

the British thinking on post war plans. As 

the seat for the rommission , the British govemment l'enovated and redecor;1ted the 

palatial Lancaster House to make it "a 

building where medium-sized international 

conferenrcs could he held in conditions 

worthy of a g reat capita l." 10 Strang's was 

a full-Lime a ppointment and the British 

were somewhat chagrined when the United 

States and the Soviet Union appointed as 

tl1eir delegates their ambassadors in London, J ohn G. Wina11t and f7edor T. Gousev, 

who would both rontinuC' to pel'form their 

<UJ1ba.••<;adorial duties. '

7 

In the W a r Department, the creation of 

the EAC aroused severe misgivings, particularly a ft er repol'ls from London derihed lhe prepatations to house it as being 

made on a scale extensive enough to ac;-

commodate ''a major imerallied organization."' ~ M oreover, no maller what the 

eventual scope of the Ei\C, it would inevitably lend a political aspect to civil affairs 

nnd military government. The SupTeme 

Commander, when he was appointed, 

would from the beginning not be guided 

•• Deparlmcnl of State, C1mernl, in "Foreign 

Rela tions or the United Stales, 194:!," vol. r 

(Washing ton, D .C., 1963), p. 756. 10 Willia m Strang, f/omt: nntl A broad (London : 

Andre Deutsch, 1956). p. 203. 

" Ibid. 

'" R~•dolph A. Winnackcr, The Office of the 

Secretary or War Under Humy L. Stimson, pt. 

I, p. 299. MS in Civll-1 filt:s. 

solely !)y military consider a tjons and interna tional law !Jut would be saddled with 

and con!'Lantly have to adjust his pl ans lo 

any developments in na tiona l or internationa l pol icy conveyed to him either by the 

governments or through the EAC. The 

Wnr Department, in turn,. would have to 

a<~cepl inrr eased State Department infi.uence in c-ivil a ffa irs and military government planning. •n 

In November, the tug of war l>ctvJ~en 

W hing1'on <tnd London brought civil 

affairs planning outside of COSSAC to a 

standstill. After General Ba rker reported 

tha t the AT(F.) Committee "unhappily," 

he said, was not «S defunct as the Americans had thought, F.TOUSA acted to 

hasten the committee's demise by withdrawing the U.S. epresentative. ~~~ The 

B1•itish , on the other hand, now wanted the 

CCAC transferred to London and, to emphasize their desi•·e, ordered lheir represenl<ttivcs on the committee to refuse to ta lk 

about anything having to do with Europe. 

F or• several weeks the CCAC r.eased meeting altogether. Caught between the withdrawa l o f U.S. recognition and its own 

government'~; pursuit of more importnnt 

prizes, thr t\T ( E ) Committee finally hecame a causally of the struggle. It he.ld its 

lasl meeting on 2 D ecember. 

/\fte1' H111l retmncd [rom M oscow, Stimson unde rtook to impre.<;,c; on the Pre.c;idcnt 

before h~s departure for T ehran the W ar 

Dep rtm nt'~ nntipathy toward a strong 

E/\C. 2 ' Later in the month, Assistant Secreta ry of ·war McCloy wenl along as a 

'" Memo, School of Military Government, Assl 

Dir of lustr, for A..: ling Comdt, sub: Stale Department l.i ~on, 2·1 Nov 43, in PMG, MG Div, 

drcirua l file 0 t 'U :3. 

-"' ( I) Staniforth, "The AdminisiTalion of Territorie$ ( Et~rope ) Committee,'' p. 33. ( 2) Coles 

antl Weinberg, Soldiers Buome Col•f/YIIOTJ, r. 128. 

" Winnacker, The Office or 1hc Secretary or 

War Unde r H enry 1.. Stimson, p. 300. 
WASHINGT ON VERSUS LONDON 

member of the Unit ed States delegation to 

preliminary talks wi th Lhc Brjtish in Caii'O 

lo argue the rase for the Washington 

CCAC. On the British side, the Prime 

Minister had been briefed to urge the 

CCAC's lra r to London.~2 

The President and the Prime l\IIJnistcr 

did not take up the atte ~ either of the 

Ei\C or the CCAC, but McCloy found 

Eden eager to t;:dk about hoth and, in the 

end, came away believing he had gotten 

what he needed. When l'vi cC:loy complained 

about the British CCAC representntives' 

tongues being tied, Eden replied that if the 

United Stales agreed to treat the EAC 

seriou!'lly he would see to it tbat the tongues 

were loosened. In return for support of the 

EAC, Eden proposed to have the commission's recommendations submitted to the 

CCAC for comment, give up the atlernpt 

to have the CCA(: shifted to London, and 

allow the British representatives in the 

CCAC: to parLicipate fully in decisions related to operations based in the United 

Kingdom.

23 

ln subsequent talk~ I>() I h with Eden and 

with the Vlal' Offic'C Director of Civil 

Affairs, Maj. Gen. S. W. Kirby, M cCloy 

explained the War Department's desire to 

keep the civil aiTairs control in Washington 

as a necessity of U.S. domestic policy. He 

asked Eden tn nvoicl playing up the Ei\C 

as the "grcal decider" of all postwar questions, and he told Gencml Kirby lh<at isola-

~i ni m and an1 i-British feelings were fa1· 

from dead in the United States and would 

increase if Lhr decisions were being made 

in London. He indicawd to both that the 

"' F. S. V. Dennison. (;it'i/ .AUair,r tmrf Miliuzr;• 

CvotJrtllltt!lll, Central Orgmzi.atio11 at1d Pllllwitlg 

( l.ondon: H . M. Saationcry Office, 1966), p. 7•1. 

" Dcpartrncn l of State, '/'II~ C:o nferen t<u ttl 

Cairo 011d Te/mm, I 94.1, in Foreign Relntions 

of a I.e United Statc5 (Washington, D.C., 1961 ), 

p, 352. 

39 

\Var Department was not as much interested in where t he decisions were actually 

matle as it was in preserving the appearance or having them emanate from Washington. H ence, lhe CCAC would have to 

stay in \'\l~ hin gto , even if most of the decisions were made in London and only funneled through W ashington. 2

" 

The spirit of Cairo, such as it was, did 

not outlast the meeting. On 14 December, 

the War Department, apparently not 

awa re that the AT(£ ) Committee was deftmrt, directed ETOUSA to make certain 

thal :111y U.S. personnel who might attend 

meetings of the committee did not take an 

arlive pa tt in the d~ ss. s; a week later 

th e U.S. civil affairs offlcers in COSSi\C 

received orde ~ not to attend t\T (E ) Con1-

mitt ee n1cetings at ll. 5 On 5 J anuary 

1944, ant icip;H ing Lbe first formal ses.'iion 

of the F.AC early in the new year, i\dm. 

William D. Leahy sent the J CS guidelines 

for the U.S. delegation of the EAC to Secretary Elull. "The EAC," Leahy wroLe, 

" from the U.S. point oi view is an important 

body, whose functioning and development 

should be guided and maintained in acc:or·d:Lncc with Lhe U.S. concept as to the 

scope of its activities and the manner of 

its operation. " The Sl'ope, fTom lhe .J CS 

point of view, was to be narrow, with a 

Light rein kept on I he manner of operation. 

''The EJ\C,'' Leahy continued, "should 

keep ::;L riclly wiLhin the letter and spirit of 

its directive and in so doing in particulnr 

avoid problems rei::Hing Lo the condu ct of 

milita ry operations and concerning civil 

affairs of li berated or enemy territory prior 

to the end of hostilities." The JCS strictUl'es 

further required tha.L i\mha~sador Winant 

" ( I ) Ibid. (2) Dennison, CA- MC, Centtnl 

Orglul izMi.OII and Pltal11 ing, p . 74. 

~ Staniforth, "The Admini~tration of Tt:rritorics 

(Ell rope) Committee," p. 34. 
40 TilE U .S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

submjt " all stuuies and proposed recommendations of the I•:AC'' fo1' approval by 

appropriate U.S. agenries before making 

commitments on lhcm and t hat all questions invoh·ing milit a ry matters ·'either 

directly ur indirertly" be passed on by Lhe 

JCS. the theater· rommander, or the Wa r 

or· Nav)' Departments as approprit1Le. ~<• The 

State Depnrtment had, in fact, in its instruLlion. 1.\') Winant a lready e..-xduded the 

period of hostilities from the EAC's area 

of discussion , and the President had earlier, 

according to H ull, w:nned against a llowing 

the E.-\C lO arrogate to itself the general 

field of pnst war organization. Consequently, in the U.S. concept as transmitted 

to Wimmt, the EAC could have a t tbe outset only two functions: to draft the surrender tloC\nncnts for Germany and her 

a llies and to devise the Allied control machinery to be imposed a fter the surrender. 7 

On his return to London, Genera l Kirby 

found understanding for the American attitude as expressed b y t\ssistt1n1 Secretary 

McCloy IJut no inclina tion to abandon th e 

struggle for control of civil aff:tirs. The 

most the War Offire would concede was 

the formation of a second CCAC in London posscssi11g the a uthority fonncdy 

claimed for Lhe :\ T ( E) Commit tel', 

namely, ronLrol of civil a ffairs and military 

gove•·nnwnt in opera tions based in the 

United Kingdom. f n January, Sir Frederick ovc ~c heo went to Vhshjngton to try 

to secure agreement on these terms. 8 Sir 

"' I.tr, Leahy to Hull, suh: Procedure for 1nstructiug the American Reprcscn[a til·c on the 

F.mopuan Advisory Commission, 5 Jan <H , in CAD 

334 ( 12- !1-4:!). •• Dcparllllcnl of State, General, in Fon ign 

Relations or the United St:lles, ~H4 " vol. J 

(W:lshington, D.C., l!l66), pp. 6- 14. 

,,. ( I ) AT(F.) Co•llmiltce, Minutes of Conferences, ?.7th- 30th, 2 Dec 1:~, in SHAEF G 5, 4. 

(2) Donnison, CA- AIG, Ce••lral Organization and 

Pla1111i•rg, p. 75f. 

frederick's mission wns, as the British 

offi c ia l historian sta ted, "on paper, entirely 

cce.'lsful. ""~ On 29 J anua ry, the CCS approved a new CCAC cha rter. Under it the 

vVashington commillee was to rec:ommend 

genera l c ivil affairs policies to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a nd be rcspousible 

for hmad civil aO'airs planning. A London comn1ittce- CC:AC( T.) - was created 

which was to give guidance and make 

rccomrnend<tt ions to tbe European a nd 

tvl editcrranean theater commanders 

( "within Lhe framework of CCS directive."" ), rc oi\'C questions ra ised by the 

theate r commande rs ("not requiring submi sion to the C:CS" ), and make recommendations to the C:Cs ~o T he new cha rter, 

like the old , skirted the main question: 

1

Nhcrc dud the ultimate authority really lie? 

The Gt~" t Et\C meeting, on 14 J anuary 

and the approval of the CCAC( L ) charter 

two weeks later completed the forma tive 

period o( the J\llied and combined planning agencies for the occu pauon of German y. In neither instance was there or 

would th·cre ever he a full consensus on the 

role of l he l wo hodies. I n the EAC, the 

Soviet interpretation of the commission's 

terms of reference soon proved to be more 

r•estrictivc even than tha t of the United 

States. The C:C/\C(L ), excl uded from 

broad planning hy the Washington committee and froni decisions irt the 1 heater 

by SHAEF (Supreme H eadquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Force), held only seven formal meetings, and these with its American 

1111.!111 Jc ~ under orders to see that the cornmillce ac:cmnplished as lillie as possihlc.a' 

The Washing t<)n CC.'\ C emerged ns the 

'"> Donnison, CA- l'vfG, Central Orgmricatio11 Planning. p. 76. 

., CCS 190/1 0/D, Char•ter of the CCAC, 24 

Jan •H,in CCS334 (G 4~),scc. I. 

" History of the CAD, bk. ll, ch. tV. 
Wi\SHJ 1GTON VERSUS LONDO 

principal combined civil affair-s and miJitnry government planning agency; hut the 

authority to decide major issues) the subject 

of the struggle hetween Washington and 

London, for the most part remained outside 

its grasp. The Norwegian agreemcnl never 

was sul.nnittecl to the CCAC nor were the 

civil affairs agreements with other ocrupicd 

countries. After the British failed to have 

the agreement') adopted in the E/\C, the 

11 

United Stales, the United Kingdom, and 

(for Notway) the Soviet Union negotiated 

identically worded but separate agreements 

with the countries ronc:erncd. ~ For the 

n'lilitary government of Germany the 

CC/\C would provitle the appearance but 

lillie substance of combined policy. 

"' Dcpnrtmcnt of State, Foreign Relations, 1944, 

vol. I, p. 38. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Supreme Command 

SJJJ1EF Concentrale.r 0 11 OVERLORD 

Genet·rd Eisenhower anived in London 

0 11 15 January IV44- to begin converting 

the COS!:iAC staff into the Supreme H ead-

<Luarters, Allied Expeditiona ry Force 

(SHAEF). Planning would continue for 

months yel, hut now with troops and a 

solid pttrposc. OvF.RLORn w<1s coming to 

the fore. The hope of a n early German collapse, strong in tlte fall, had dwindled with 

Lhc arriv<1l of winter. At the tur11 of the 

year COSSAC hat! put aside R.\NKJN C, 

and shifted to R ANKIN B, a projected 

lodgment on the Continettt in the event 

of a. German \Vithclrawal from France. 

COSSAC r.ompleted a directive for R t\ N KIN 

B on ~ .Jarwary. By Lhcn, however, the 

Germans were reinforci ng }'ranee, ar\cl n 

voluntary withdrawal to tbc West Wall 

was becoming very unlikely. SH AEF's conrern would be with 0VERI.ORD, the invasion 

and drive in lo Germ<U1)', although the 

RANKIN conditions, a sudden partial or 

romple1 e German rollapse, roulcl no1 he 

put entirely out of mind.' 

Jn the R ,\ N KJN operalions, civil affairs 

and military government would have been 

paramollnt from 1 he first. Under 0\"l':RLORD 

they would In: subsicti ary until the issue 

had hcen derided in the fi eld, hutultimnlcly 

no le.<>s cs.~enti l. RAN KIN would have resulted in an improvised orrupalion with 

1 Memo, Combined Planners (SHAEF), suh: 

Operalion RI\NKrN B, H Mar '1'1, in SHAEF 

G- .'l, 501 . 

limited forces prohal!ly not capable of 

reaching illlO Germany beyond the roastal 

cities and the line of lhe Rhine River. Even 

such a limited occupation, however, presupposed control with token forces and, 

hence, w o\tld have requ ired a complete 

absence of German resistance and Sovie1 

interference, espccia11 y the latter, since the 

Rus.c;ians would probably have the overwhelming preponderance of ~trength on 

the scene. OvE RLORD, on ~he <>Lher hand, 

would array fully operational U .S. and 

British forces on the Continent and, whether 

opposed or under so-called R ANKIN COlldiLions, wo uld very likely culminate in a deep 

!';WCcp int.o Germany. SHAEf would (0111-

1111tnd the assault on Hitler's " Fortress 

Ettrope" and be the executive organ for 

establishing the occupation. Therefore, 

O VERLORD would req uiTe a military government able to operate in the wake of baltle 

almost sid e by side with the frontline u·oops 

!IS well :o~s t·o govern :1 defeated Gern1any 

from top to bottom. Either was a massive 

enollglt undertaking i.n its own . righl. 

Doing horh req uired answers to questions 

rhat had so ft~r hardy been raised. 

Civil Affairs Becomes G- 5 

Under COSSAC, <.:iviJ :illair-s had found 

solid acceptance in principle bu t had remained a n anomaly in the staff structure. 

COSSAC hnd used the American "G' ' systcnl hut l1ad not assigned a G number to 

civil affairs. In O r.toher 1943, the country 
THE SU PRE~IE C:OM~l.\f\.:0 

houses had givrn w.l} to the Civil Affairs 

Division, COSS.\ C, whit h tonsio;ted of a 

small planuin~ stniT to work on the 

RAXKJ:--: lat~'> ,,net . ix advisory hranLhes. 

The hrand1c.s, made up of the former counIIY holl"C pr1 'onncl, were designated hy 

function : k~al, fisc-al, supplr, ~ovcmment l 

:"t(Liir<i, crnncunic afTai1 ·, and information. 

Their ~!>.~iKnnwnt had hccn lO produce instrurtion<; for :.uhordinate comnmnds and 

to rcco11c ik U.S. ;utd British livil ;tiT a irsmilitary ~ovct nmt·nl licic~. 1 hat is, to 

write a comlJincd tlHIIHI:1l- the Standard 

Policy :mel roced ure. ~ 

l n Nnvt·mhcr, tht• Wa1' cp~11 tmcnt had 

authorized two ~CIH'I l ollirn :.;, ninety 

other (lfliccr<;, five warr·ant officers, and sixteen cnlislecl mrn fnr the Civil .\ffa it'S Division, COSSAC; hu t in the thit·d week of 

the month onl)' fiftN'n oflkcrs and one warrant ollicer had hccn m:o;igned. In the 

hr:uwhcs, ''hit h numbered nearly two 

hundred offit crs, the ;\mcric:ms were only 

'>p:tr<;clv repa•,cmcd. La te in November, 

Brig. Gen. fran I. J. ~1< hrt r)', who had 

'erved in milit.W)' gnvc1 nmcnt in icily and 

h al}, became the 1 1nkin~ U.S. civil affairs 

officer in COSS \C ilnd coeq ual l hief of 

the Civil \ITair~ Division with General 

Lumley. 

;\!though COSS.\C harl, in the Stnndard Poliry nnd Pron·durc, '>lipulatcd a 

complete fusion llf rivil nfTair~-mi lit ary 

governmen t with the militmy mmmnnd, 

it hac.! in the Civil Mrair!i Division in fact 

maintained whnl amounted to a ~c parntc 

staff too diverse in it ~ functions to be integrated with the milital')' command. Eisenhower's r hicf of staff. Mnj. Gen. \Vatter 

: COSSAC, Civil AfTai~ War i:~ry, in SHAEF 

G -5, 11 .01. 

• Opn~ Br, lfi•t Src-, C: S S IJ AEF Rear, Chronol· 

ogr or Cinl AfTail"(-~ltt.IMy Covc-rnment, Euro· 

pean J'he:.ler of Orx-riltion•, :ly 11 - 6 Jun -14, 

in SIIAEI' C: 5, 60, J.nl.,•t I 

GE:-\ERAL SMrrll. tl'ltotflgmjJ/, tnkcu 

Ill 1946. ) 

43 

Bedell Smith, 1111 his .111 h ;1l in London 

earl)• in Jammr)' immediately recognized 

the latent simila1 it) w \~ COT, towc:1rd 

whjch he had not devdoprd the antipathy 

that prevailed in COSS.\ C: and to ~ome 

extent in the Washi11gton Ci' il Affairs 

Division. Alleild)' thoroughl y convinced hy 

his M edit errancan t· pcri ce of the value 

of civil affairs and in good pa rt rrsponlliblc 

himself for tht' 1\J\ICO'J' orgnniza ti(Jn, 

Smith objected oul y ln the '

1

pondcrow: and 

unwieldy" d11al Brilish-t\mcri cnn ea hip 

of the COSSi\C Civi l Affairs Division. He 

proposed to appoint a single head and, 

going e,·cn a step hryrmcl the AMGOT 

analogy, asked for a civilian of subcabinet 

rank to fill the post, •laming . \ tant Sccretarv o( War 1\kCio\ ;1s hi«rhoirc. General 

Hind.ring. while rcpl) ing that Secretary 

of " 'ar Stimson " ould not part with 
'1'111 ~ t i.S . . \lU\IY I:'\ T ilE OCCUP.\ T!O:-\ 01" GER~L ~\' 

l'vlt Cloy, at ~·ntptcd w di\'C.:rt Sntil It fl'om 

the idra of a civilian head I>)' suggesting 

that he \ISC the \\'a1· Dcp:11'tmcnt Civil 

:\A'ai1'S Division, which had a military 

chid, as his motkl . . \nxious, however, to 

avoid seeming to interfere with a theater 

comm<u1dcr·s right to organize his own 

stan·, Hilldring assured Smith th:at h<: 

(Smith ) and Eisenhower had a completely 

free hand in organizing civil a ffairs for 

SH. \ EF. He had a:<ked for a high-powered 

civilian, Smith then expla ined, in order not 

only to ha\'e a n expert administrator hut 

to acquire ;\ kind of lightning condu t:tor 

as well. T he idea of civil affairs entirely 

in proressional military hands ohviou$ly 

maclr ltim somewhat uncasr. The Civil 

Aff 1ir:; Division, he agt•eed, was military, 

hut it had the Scrretary of War behind il. 1 

No tlotlht, Smith was aware that the im

pk t soh1tion ior hi111 and fnr Eisenhower 

would have IJecn to turn c:ivil affairs over 

tl) ·M 1·C:Ioy or to HiJidring, whom he also 

invitrd to as~ume the joh. and thus drmv 

t·hc W<t r Department into a kind of partnership within the theater. 

By the end of the month, when Hill<.lring 

a lso dedined th<" position, citing Chief of 

Staff Marshall's "fotTihle" opposition to hifi 

trying to "hreak oul" of the nta.~o , 

Smith h:'td bcmmc immersed in fundamental ri\'il a ffai1"> problems !hal rould not 

wait until a rhid wns found.' Obviously 

I he whole COSS:\ C Civil ,\ffairs Di\'i. ion, 

a ronglomerate of tl1c former COSSA C 

civil affairs planning staff and the count!'}' 

house personnel to which a number of 

American offircrs were being added, could 

not he taken into the SH .\EF staiT. General 

McSherry aclvon1Led a virtually outright 

return to AM.GOT, then beginning to he 

1 Coles ;~uti Wt•iuiJcrg, So/dinrs lluoml' C:ol'l•rnors, p. on •. , fbi<)., p. ti74. 

rd('rrcd lo llHll'C lofLil)' as liar 1vlcditert•:mcan system, with rivil affairs suhordiHat<' to the Supreme: ( .om1n nndtr lmt 

1h crw c pra.etirallr autonomous." Smith 

:tl->o was still thinking in terms of Lhc ~lccli

tcrrancan approal'h. Colonel Bendctsen a~ 

a proponent of integrating dvil aiTait':' into 

the military command stood a lone among 

the :\merica.ns and would shortly be transJ crrctl out of S 1-L \ E F. 

On 5 February, Genet'ai Lumley, as the 

senior of the COSS.\C: Civil .\(fait"> Di vision's dual beads, sen t Smitb a 11 org;anization piau. Sinr.c SH.\EF woultl he drawn 

together at one location in London within 

lite xt few weeks, Lumley believed it was 

lime to fit ilaff:-~irs ciircctl)' into the stafT. 

To do this he proposed creating a G- 5 di,·ision at SH.\EF, initially with thirty-five or 

furty ffic ~;, later In l>c brought up to " 

. .:.trcngth of a bout sixty. C:- 5 would formlllat e policy and co-ordinRtc: the work of a 

rear ec he lon to he rc,mposed of the: existing 

Civil .\lfairs Di vision branches plus ;1 German planning unit. Tbc only completely 

separate 1'11ndion then would he training, 

which wonld he r arried out at the America n center in . hrivenbam and n L a Bl'itish 

centrr in f. <L~ ll> urne.; 

l n his plan, Lumley haJ sul\'cJ the pr·ohlcm of dual heRds <lnd that of civil a1Tairs' 

place in thr command slnu'llll'C, neither, 

however. to Smith's satisfaction. The nc.xt 

day Smith LolLI Hilldring that he had ser urcd Eisenhower's approvRl for a plan of 

his o•.vn. SH.\ EF would retain a small civil 

arrair.s set:Lion, ''po~sib y to he c.~ natecl 

G S." Lumley would head iL hut would 

have to he supported " by a deplll)' ... in 

whom both the Commander in Chief and 

• Pogtw, T/11~ Sr~pr; lll'' Command, p. Ill . 

' Memo, SHA£F CAD for CofS, sub : Organizaaion of CA at Sfi'AE"f, 5 Fch ·l·t, in SHAEF 

(; 1, :15.01l. 
THE SU PR£\\fE CO~H-1.'\f\0 

myself have complete confidence. " For this 

assignment, Smith asked for Brig. Gen. 

Julius C. Holmes, who was then in Italy. 

Civil nffairs training-, organization, Hnd detidied plnnning would be done under l\tfrShcrry outside the ,!{encral stalL' In hi::; 

reply to Lumley on the 7th, Smilh commcmed acidly tltaL the general staff di\'ision 

w,,ldd nol need sixty officers. Jt s hould be 

a small. poliry-making hod~. Lumky 

would be G 5, hut J\fcShcrrr would h:we 

to he '·c-onsiclcrahh· more rhnn a .'>upcrintcnden 1 of train in g."'' 

:\ con f<:rCIH'C in lhe Ci\'il ,\ITairs f)i,·ion three cl:~ys later predirtal>ly !'UIIllinalcd 

in a victoi')' for the advocates of the Mcditer·ranc;"Ln S)'SICm. Lumley and McSherr}' 

agreed that Lumley would hc:come Assisl:tnl Chid of Staff, C- 5, with Holmes a~ 

his deputy. hut G- 5 would have no mor(' 

than thirty-nv<' o(Ticers and would he 

limited to polirr-mnking, advisory, and review functions. McSherry would be appointed Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer 

(DCC. \0) ;md head a civil nffairs -;peci;\1 

staff removed or~anizationally and physit·ally fl'om SH.\EF G- 5, its sea t being at 

Shrivcnhnm. The DCCAO would dir•ert 

training and prepare detailed phm~ md inslruelinns. To accomplish the latter function, country mi~c; ns, a revival of the old 

c·o1ult ry houses in eluding a Germnn see I ion. 

woHld he estnhlishcd. After the- inv , 

1hc country missions would "sit a longside" 

restored governments in lihcrmcd co,Inrrics, 

wi1 h the German section eventually becoming the U.S. clement in the .\llied control 

organization for Germany. SH!\EF G-5 

wendel review the DCCAO's plnns and " ex-

'CalC's n11J Wriuhrrg, So/dicl'.< Become Co,·cr· nors, p. ti7·1. 

• Memo, C.:ofS, SHAEF, for Cc11 f.11mley, snb: 

gani~n liun of CA al S IIAEF, 7 Feb ·H·. in 

SHAEF C- 5, !15.01l. 

45 

crcisc get\CI'al !illpct'\·ision over their execution," hut onl y one of the G ~·s six sections 

wo11ld he concerned directl y with civil 

aA'airs operations. The rcs1 would handlefiscal, strpph·. lrgal, economic , anti St;llf 

dutie_, within SH.\£1". '' 

In Staff 'Memorand rm No. 2, 15 February 194+. Smith e.-;ta llishcd SHJ\1-:F G- 5 

and the Special Staff ef-fective on this date, 

.llld confirmed Lu1r lcr and M cShe rr)' in 

their· nppointmenlo;. ' Ironically, on this day 

the memher. of th•; Civil Affairs Di\'ision 

were drawn together in one place for the 

lir~l time . T he di, on had begun moving 

the day l>dorc from scattered locations in 

London, at C~!dogan SquMe and Norfolk 

House, to Prince's Gard('ns. By the 16th, 

when dw move was completed, 1 he rcorgnnization had also J,cen accomplished and 

the taff . though in physical proximity. 

were organization;-,lly separate. Even thili 

ronclition would not la t long. The Special 

Sta iT was to move to Shrivenham before 

lhe end of the momh and the G- 5 serti(m 

would go in early M a rch l<l the SH:\EI; 

headquarters c:ornpou nd, WmF.WINC , in 

Bushy Pa rk on the out~k irts of London. 12 

:vo !IMCOT 

Tn the ron\'er':':ion of Ci,·il Affairs Di\'in, COSS.\ C, into G-5 a nd lite Special 

St nn·, SH .\EF, the .Medilcn;-,nean concept 

seemed to have won out. G- 5 hnd been 

practk;dly ~hom of C1pera tional con trol, lhe 

means for exercisir1g it being concentrated 

1

" ( I I An :: ysi~ Sht:t•t, S IIAEF G- 5, !list Sec, 

Summary of Co11fcrc ncc> held a1 I 000, 10 Feb 

1•1, presickd o,·cr l•y ~vlaj G!'n Lttllllt:y, in SHAEF 

C 5, 16.02. (2) M!!nw, Sl-IAEF CAD for CofS, 

suh: Org"nizn!Iun of CA SH A r.r.·, 11 Fch ol'l, 

in SHAEF G- 5, :~5. UH. 

"SHAF.F, Scan· Memo No. 2, 15 fth 44, in 

SHi\EF C- 5, 15.02. 

'" N<Hr in SH i\ EF C 5, 15.111. 
•Hi I'HE l l.S. \R~I\' l X THE OC:C:UP \TlO:\ OF GERi\1 \ "'\Y 

in the Spc< ial St,,{T. The prupnrwn!s nf thc-

~leditCI r:\IIC:tn ~ystcm, however, had uol 

)'t'l snn'l'd a wmplele vietoq·. Slllff 1\{cmurandum No. 2 had in n<} way re~d ndcd 

the St o~ndat cl Poli cy and Pro<"cdurc, which 

had hC't'n dw fundamental 1-{uida••rr fw· the 

nrnt}' groups ami <lrmies since Occcmher 

1941. ln fatt, on 12 February Eisenhower 

had appruvc<.l 21 . \nny Group's ftt'!'t joint 

;1ir aml gro\tnd fon·e plan for the inv;,sion, 

and Crncral Sir Bernard L. M nntgomcry' · 

!\tafT, [olluwing the Standard Poliry and 

Pmc-cd11n:, had assumed <'ivil affairs to be 

ILII intcgr;ll fu nC'lion of the La ctical t·ommand~ from the army group 011 down.' :' 

On 19 Fcb•·uary, General Smith revealed 

that he h.1d in facl not n)adt· a definitive 

rhokc between the propo~;ed COSS.\C and 

th~· ~lcditca ranean S}~Stems; he approved 

a (; 5 directive to MeSbcny, confirming 

the nti~'\ions n.-~igned to the DCC. \0 four 

days earlier but only during the plnnning 

and pr•cpar•ation for OvF.ttt.ORO. Tlte real 

issue, how civil affair~ in northwestern 

F.urupc ( milit :tr)' government in Cc•·many ) 

would he ronductcd duri11g and a fter the 

inv;t-:ion, then. remained undccidccl .

1

'

1 

.\ftcr Holmes arrived in London, his and 

Lumley'~ views proved .so divergent n.s to 

impel them, on 10 arrh, to appeal jointly 

to Smith for a dcci~ion. ' On the surface, 

Lumlc'y nppt~arr.d to hnvc entered an unequal contcsL; he had la·cn a reluctant 

rl•oirr (m· G 5. Smith hnd asked for 

Holmes. Holmes had two proposals to 

•nrtkc : thr first, lo cancel the St<•ndard 

Policy and Procedure; the second, to issue 

"J\nnty$is Sheet, SHAEF C ..5, lf i~t Sec, ~;ub: 

AN'Xf', C.OC 2 1 AGp, CINC, AEAF, to SCAEF, 

I Feh ·II, in SHAEF G- 5, 15.01. 

"SHAEF 0 -5, DircctiH• to UCCAO, S[J<:ciat 

SwiT, SIIAEF', 19 Fch 4·~. io SIIAP.F C- 5, 16.01. 

u M<•mo, SHAEF C- 5 for Cors, sub: Organization of Civil AITnirs, 10 Mnr H, in SHAEF G- 5, 

:~22. 

a new di1 <:ll iw ln I rShcrry expanding his 

authorit) and r~tcnding it intn the period 

following thr invasion. Standard Policy 

and Pnxcdur·c, Hoh11cs arguetl, was inconsistent with St.tfT lt: morandum No.2. The 

mcmoramlunr pl:wcd rivil afTairs plnnning 

and opc•·ntiono.; em ,, r.ountrpvidc basis, 

while the Stnndnrd Policy and Proccdur·<· 

put all the autl101 ity in the hands of the 

individtt:ll military commanders. Furthc1· 

more, the Standar·d Policy and Prorcdurcmadc no provi~ion for· the so-c:allcd hiatus 

areas, p:trts of a liberated t'ountr)' whkh 

mighl not ;tl'lunll)' lw occupied hy Slt\EF 

troops. This omission and the statements 

suggesting thac Sl-1 .\EF and its subordinate 

<'ommands might not set up military governments t'\'CI')''vhcre they Wl'lll were, 

lm~ insisted, in violation of both intn·· 

national law and dec fa red Unjted Nntion<t 

objectives. X I orcovct', Holmes said, lu 

claim, al! ~orne were doing. that the Surndard Polir)' <1 nd P•·ncedure had to he C'On· 

tinucd in fon'<' because it constituted tlw 

only uide fo•· plnnning hy subordinate 

echelon'> was J'ullacious. FM 27- 5 and 1 he 

British Wnr Manual provid('cl adequate 

general polky stalrments. 10 

.\s his sc<·ond prC1posaJ, Holmes wanted 

ro delc~ah: tlu· Supreme Commander's 

legal authority tO ronduct military government to ~tc-Shrr Y ns DCC.\0, making 

him the c-ommander of all civil aJTairs organization:; in llnl'llm•l:[,)t Europe. He woultl 

nppoinL chkfs for each country, nne! the 

staffs at Army gronp and lower formations 

would ht special stafrs recei"ing their 

orders through civil affairs channels. not 

from the military commands. MC'Shcrry 

would c-ontrol all ~r the civil affaia detachments workiug din-ctly under SJJ,\El', 

'" M!!mo, Brig C.ru llolmes for CofS, $lib: St;uldard Potiry and Prc:H.:~ dnrc, Brig Gcn Holnw$' 

Views, ~1 M llr •t•1, in SH AEF G- 5. 322. 
issue tc"hnintl instt'1wtim1s to any other dcttwhments, and dispatch orders to I he arm)' 

group and lesser commands through the 

appropriate G sections of SHAEF. 17 

Lumley cldended 1 he Standnrd Policy 

and Pmcedu rc, not in its details but in 

what ltc ca lled ils h;lsi<' cmH'ept iun, namely, 

that the first purpose or civil afTairs was 

to further military operations. Full-scale 

militat·y govern lllcnt, ltc therefore maintained, ought to he confined to 1 he ;u·eas 

where military necessity was paramount, 

the zones of openuions and communi<'ations. In hiatUs areas of liberated countriec; 

the indigenous governments should be respons·ible, under just enough surv<·illan ce 

by SH:\EF missions to ll!nkc certain th;tt 

they did not pt·ejudice military operations 

by their actions or throug-h failure to establish their authority. Tn the agreements with 

the exile govern nt~, Lumley pointed out, 

promises had been given not to interfere 

in civil matters any more than was es.<;entia l 

to militar)' operations and to restotc authority to the national governments as soon 

as the military !'itualion permitted. Germany, be ronreded, w:-~s a somewhat special case since the whole counti'Y would he 

placed under military government, and a 

rou ntry headquarters would be requit'ed 

because SH,\EF would not relinquish rontrot to a Grrman government lmt r~Lthcr 

to an Allied age11ry of some kind. To these 

arguments Lumley added one other: callceling the: Standard Policy am! Procedure 

would reve1·se and reject COSSAC's policy 

after it had been in effect for several 

months. "The British Army particularly" 

would not be happy, and much g0od will 

built up for civiJ nfrairs in the military staffs 

might be lost by so complete a tum-

" Memo, Brig Gc:n Holmes for CofS, sub ; Organization of Civil AITairs, !l M::tr 4·1, in SHAEF 

G- 5, :.122. 

·1-7 

ahnut. The hcst <'nurse, he su,!{gC.<;trd, 

would he to keep the Standard Policy and 

Procedure: in force as a general guide, supplementing it :1s needed wilh additional 

plans ;tnd directives while holdi11g to the 

basic premise of civil affairs integration into 

the staffs at aJl levels." The Supreme Commander. Lumle)' insisted, should deleg::tte 

hi~ milit~U")' government authority not to 

a DCC.'\0 hul to the army group conllnanders, who <loultl redelegn te it as needed to 

their bordinate commanders. PlatiS 

drafted i1,1 rhc Special Sta(T would t.hen he 

approved i>y G- 5 and issued to th<: army 

groups fnr them to convert into operational 

directives. 

Smith's reply reatl like a death sentence 

for the Medilernmcan system. He ndmonishcd Lumley and Holme.c;, though Lumley 

scartcly needed it, to bear two points in 

trlind: fit~t, that the Mediterranean organization, a ltho11gh it tlid a good joh, had 

many defect~: and second, thal mnditions 

in northwest Europe were differclll from 

those in the Mediterranean. Therefore, he 

continued, c·ivil affairs taff:-; would Ia! 

C'lo:-;cly intl'grated with normal st;~rTs 

throughout the chain of commnnd; civil 

affairs headquarters would not he estahlishcd 11nrelatecl Lo mili tary headquarters; 

and the AM GOT approach wou.ld he 

avoided. Thal :\1\[GOT would not he duplicatec.l in nonhwe.c;l Emope, he stated, 

had been directed in ' 'the latest paper Jrom 

the U.S. Chiefs of StalJ.'"ll Continuing, he 

described Lhc StaJH.I:trd Policy <1nd ProC'cdure as a sou nd document in \-vhich reviions could be made as long as they did 

"'Memo, SHAEF G- !'i for CofS, sui• : Orgnni7.ation o( Civil Affa irs, Tah A, 10 Mar .J.I. in SHAEF 

G :i, '122. 

•• Smith was apparently referring to JCS 723, 

Administration of Ger ~ny in the Occupation 

Period, 22 Feb •H (in CCS :!8:!.2 1 [2- 22- 4·11, 

$CC. I ). 
TIJE U.S .. \R~JY J:'\ THE OC <:t:P.\'1'10:'\ OF CF.R~L.\'\Y 

uol t•ud in '><rapping- the hn~i1 prindpl~. 

l·k rcjt< ted Holmc.-;'s prnpos.ds on org;mization 1 omp'lctdr ex<·cpl for a ri"il <Lffa1r~ 

lt:l'l11tin tl l'tlll111lllllit'alie)I1S t'11HI11WI, lllll 

<'\'C'Il it would run thr h G 5 S I 1:\ EF 

to the appropriate sections in lower headC) u:u·tcr ... , not through the Spcria I StafT . . \1-

thou~h he had put opcr:t tin ~ prf'solliH'I in 

the Sp<·, ial StarT, Smith insi.'ltcd, hi' h.td not 

men Ill tht•rch) In cnhan<'t' the n< :( · \0''1 

mk. Tht· 1 umuwnd and M.tfl' < h:mucl 

would nm from SH.\F.F ami G 5. G 5 

lwuld add one or two orlit•t·r-s w its Operations Umnch f"r t<H"h of the natinnal arcns. 

In lht t>JWI'aliuns zone:, SI I'\ t·: F " 'otdd relit'\'<' the :11'111)' groups of civil .tll'airs duties 

out'lidt' ( 01nhat ar<·as as soon <1-; it n11tld, 

and wnulcl ~<~umr the rcspon~ibilil~ illoclf."'' 

In the reply to Lumlc)' and Holmes. 

Smith made the fundamcmal <lt:c ision on 

civil affairs organization for the SHL\EF 

period. tlr no"' acrcplco Standard Policy 

and Prot t·durc, whirh he had ttudcrrtll in 

StarT ~ rcmmandum No. 2, :dmost intact 

along with Lum ey·~ dcfcn!'e of it. Lumley's 

sur<T'i'\, however. unfortunatt'ly for him, 

wuct going lo shorter\ his tt'nurc HS G 5 

r•athcr tll<ln prolo11g it. 

[( Smith hnd nol changed hi<~ mind durin~ the month <sfter G- 5 .md the Spt·rial 

Staff Wf'l't: ('rca ted, he had c rttainly clc\'ci-

'>Pnl a 11111< h firmer attitude lOward the 

two !~}Stems thnn could hii\'C I1CCn dcdured 

fw111 Starr I cmorandunt 1\o. 2. 'l'lu: rcasons arr not hard to find. I lc had no 

dnuht l'nndudcd, a~ Ltlllllc}' also su~gcsted, 

lhat llw Standard Polir>· and Prot·r.durc, 

C\ 'CI1 1 hough it was ~ired by Colmwl 13cndcl'\Cn, .Ill • \mcl'ican, had hrtn r~ n agrrcd 

donum Ill. f•llC whirh could not hr disOII'dcd !'impl}' hrc·ausc :\nwriC'ans c·oming 

:o Memo, C!ofS for G(·n T.nmh-y, (;rn ll olm~s, 

Mi l t: Orwlllillllion or Cidl Afhlirs, H !\tar 4•1, 

in SIIAI~F C: 5. :1:12. 

from thf' ;\l<-ditrt rancnn liked the ~\s lt'lll 

they had uo.;t•d tlwrc hcucr. 11 [orcovcr. ht· 

had h.td ti11w In ht'c·omc aware. if ltc h:1d 

not J,ccn l>rforr, 11f the Quebec decision in 

_ \ ug-usl I ()4:1, not tn csta1Jii$h nnlion<tl military gm·crnmcnt;; in liberated c-ountries.~' 

H ost insp rtnntl~ . in the dnntm<·sll ltl 

whkh Smith h.t(l rdcrrcd i11 hi!> n·ph w 

Lu111lcy and ITolnu.''• the JCS, \\'hik cnu~­

nizing :ts I .umk~· h:1d in his mC'mor:-~ndnm 

the prohahlt• need for "OIIle kind of ro-ordimttcd milit:u)' government, had dc~c:rih('(\ 

a full) m mhincd U.S.- BriLish militat')' p;m·· 

ernmcnt on the pattern used in Italy as npparently not fefl-;iblc for Germany .~" 

.\ ftcr Smitls ns:ldt his decision, altltnugh 

the rontrov<'I"'Y by no mrans cnckd. tht: 

r.nse for ahc Standard PnliC'y and Pron:dlll'<' 

rapidlr hccanw c;trongrr. On I 3 l\hr<'h 

Smith had 11skcd how C- 5 could he rcor~anizcd to prrmit it to upcrvisc dr!ailrd 

planning and l:s tcr or1 to co-ordinate oprra· 

tion" on I he C:nnlirwnt witho~rt c·ountrv 

hcadqws rlcro;, I 11 ito; answer, C'r-5 ttnd<"I'IO(lk 

to cklincHI(· tlw rr pc1 tivc advftn ragcs nl 

a funrtion:d Of'l-{iltlization (for exan1plto. 

supply. ptlhlic lw.llth, l.tl10r, and law, with· 

oul regard tu national houndaric<>) and a 

regional (H~.s ni zation. The runftional lll'~.lnization ac; f'('<'Cll1111ll'ndcd in the Stilndnrcl 

Polity ancl Pt•oc rdut•c, G-!'1 mnintainrd, 

would JK'I'tnil the Supreme C:ommantl<-r to 

g-overn wi1 h an r' en h:lnd 1 hr·m,ghotll 

northwc."t Eumpe and neil h;wc to t·ontrnd 

with n tLI ion a I J;tn (f!; each de\'ising its own 

poliq•. lr1 any cvctH most civil ;t(fairt> proiJlcms would not fall within specific ttional 

houndarico; . . \ rc~ional organization, on the 

ether hand, would !'H-"C the way for 1 co:torn-

" SIIAEF C ~. Opu\ nr. Hist s\'~, Chtt~nuk'IJ)' 

of Ch·il /\!Tail' !\lilitar)' Govcrnmcllt, !\J:sy II fi 

Jnn +1, 2 Dc•c· II, Jl. 7, in SHAEF (: 1, 1;0, 

jacket I. 

"" Sec fn. I 'l, 11bovt•. 
llll·: ~U PRE:.\IE C.0:.\ 1:.\lA D 

tion of nationnl gnvcmmcnls ;;md would 

take acroum of cliiTrt<~tH CS in l:t\\li', lanag(~, and nt);l0111s. In general, the adv:llltagc-> of tlw nne \\'CtC the dis:tdvant:.ge.<> 

of the other. Nevertheless, the weight of 

ad":wtttgc Ia) on the functional ide because Eisenltow<•t·'s responsibility wo11ld be 

for the whole coni incnt and many pt•ohlt·lns 

t.'Ould be dealt with functionally without 

1 cfnence to l>ouud:u ics. but few cou ld ht· 

handled on a purely national ha~k In it.; 

pt'llpi>Sal, then, G 5 attempted to give predominance w the functional organization 

witl•out cnti•·cly ext lu<.ling the t•rgiunal. 

C- 5 would rcvio;c its f11nctional hrnn chcs 

to enable them a(<;o to cope with pmblrms 

which required a nationnl approach, and 

it W(lll(d SCI tap lllll Jei of a f~·w onil'('r!' 

arouud which nation.tl stnffs rould he built 

if they wen: t't·qttit•t•d after OJH't'ations 

bega n.~~ 

Sul,scClliCntl), the weight of ndvantagc 

shifted even more decisively to the~ functional organization when Smith slwwrd 

himself to be receptive. The Meditcrnmcnn 

system's ndv<watcli lost &'round when they 

rould not prove 1 hat because th<' syst<'m 

hnd been tcstn.l in a ct inn in Sicily and Jtal)1 

it would :-;uc-~ t•cd under different conditions 

in IHll'thwcstcrn Eumpc. The proponents 

of the Standard Polity and Proc<'d urc, on 

tlw Clthcr hand, who had argued, while 

they were on the defensive, mainl)' rm th(' 

hnsir. c·onccpt. n>ultl also rite prartiralmilitnry ndvanta!{($: the elimination of n s<·paratr. rivil aff:1irs rcunmand cha11ncl, thr 

direct il rin~ of thr civil aff:lir:; plan to 

the military platl, and tire integration of 

' ivil affairs and milit:tl"} c;upplie.s. This last 

poim was pat'lindal'l y telling. t\ frccpt~ nt 

t<M1pl:\int of the rivil affairs operation in 

u Memo, SHAEF C- 5 for Opns Br, suo : Rcorgallil.:llion o£ G-5 Div, 11 ~l:1r H, in SH,\P.F C. 5, 

15.01. 

tlw i\ltcditl'l'l':tlll'an hacl been that il had 

l::lst call on "hipping spare for relief supplies 

and c•n !n wht•tr it was nhlr to ohtnin ships 

rould not get them lo.ldcd and unloaded. LlndcJ' the Stund,rrd Policy :mel 

ProccdtnT tltr military commandrrs, being 

rcsponsibl<- for rivil arTair·, would have to 

combine civil affnirs suppli es with their 

militar~ supplies. One lwla ncc sheet 

draft ed in G 5, probahl)' in late March or 

earlr .\pril, enumerated eleven points in 

favor of th(' funct n<~! nq.~.111it,alion a~ 

oppost•d lt.> four for the ;\ lctlilcrranc;nl 

system."' 

Before the end of i\lnrr h the functional 

system r karlr predominated. On the 24th, 

G- 5 an noun red a fort romin~ rcor ganizarion c.~ it(tiCd to diminatc: the last serious 

doubts nn this sc()rc and at the same time 

st rik(' l ' lltlllj.tll oF H c·orllpi'Oilli!\(.' to (1\'()id :Hl 

:lhsohltc rejection of thC' Mt:ditrnniH~a n approach. n 5 would be divided into two 

part., Polit y and Opcrnticms. Policy, subdivided i nlo functional hra nc:hc.'>, would 

come directly uncler the . <:.si~t:m t Chief of 

, tafT, G 5. ~IrSherry would head Operations, bringing enough offircr!! with him 

from Shrivcnltam to establish r ounlr)' 

hrnnr hrs. Hr wou ld retain thr functions 

he had as DCC1\0 without the title, whir h 

in t ivil tl' :r ir ~ usage implied direct subordination to the Supreme Connnnnder who 

was also tlw Chief Civil \!Tnirs Officer. H e 

would ~u in ouc function, polity supervision 

of :muy gro11p plans and thcit• ('Xt'cution, 

hut without direct cotmn<llld authority. Hr 

would .tl!\o continue to control, 1 h1'0ugl1 :\ 

deputy, the Sp<:rinl Staff which, made up 

of the < ountt•y . en ions lc-l'~ the officers 

drawn i111 0 the Operations side of G-5, 

would stny .tl Shrivenham. !though l'vfcSherry if an ything seemed tn lwve ga ined 

" :\femo (Qf r('COrd [no ~0\tr'( cl, ·'"h; Points 

of Polic)• nt ll.Mtc [undated], in SHM f G-5, 15.01. 
!)() TilE U.S. MUJY lN THE OCCUPAT IO:'\ Of GEIUI.\ NY 

'unu·whal. hi' ,lfld the ~pee i.d Staff'l> lcK., 

of :wtonomy wa~ a 1 rippling blow for the 

Mcditcn:1ncan S)'Sl!'tn. and it was unclc·•-

.scorcd by a provision thnt hard-nnd-fnst 

lim·-; would not be dr<I\Vn l<l sepHratc the 

nnnpctcnc c<> of Oper:uionc: .tnd Poliq•. ~; 

The w.1h hword for SJ I \Ef rcorg.,uil<~­

lions in tll!),;;e cMiy dap1 wac; "no soom·r 

said th.tn clone,•· hut this one took over a 

month tu an ompli h. In p:Ht the delay can 

prohahl> he .1ttrihuted to the Medit,·rt'an(';ln f11111'' fighting :\ rear guard action, 

tht· n•-;t, no douht. to mith 's dctcrminr•t ion 

ll{)l lO h:t\'1' Lumley as c:hi<'f nf the reorganized C ;,, Smith had not hccn happy \vit h 

Lumlry in J.mu;Hy .mel did not want him 

at all as ho;istanl Chid llf Staff of ,, much 

enlarged G 5. E\·cn thou,r::h civil a ffairs 

would 11111 h:I\'C a separate role, lw still 

wanted :111 ollltcr ''ith more rnnk and 

military o;t;~t ure Lh<111 Lnmlc·r pel'-'"'"('< I. 

Lnmlc~, like• ome other ranking llriti'>h 

t'ivil nffairs offirct-s, war not a prufc-;..,ional 

~oldier but a fm·mct• <.oloninl nclminislr«tor, 

tuosl rcccntl)• 1-{0V<.'rnur of wnll :\y.~u Smith, 

who h }' no ntc.ms ohjc<·tcd in princ·iple to 

a 1111ifw nwcl 1 j, iliau, did nut ~cc the same 

potcntialc; in one from the upper reaches 

of the British tivil .scl\·irc that he snw in 

:t deft Pcnt.tgon «nd \Vac:hington hand like 

~lrC:luy. Wh~:thcr the 0 5 chief was a 

civilian in unifom1 or t arcer militnrr. 

. mith's ·IJ>prehension of the inhcrnll 

touchiness of civil affairs made him pt·cfcr 

i\ 11 i\tn et•in ll1. But the position in thf' t·11d 

fell to British Lt. Gen. Sic• A. E. Grasctlt 

until then 1 hid of SH.\ EF's Euwpca n 

\llied Cont.H'l Section .. \hhou~h Smith 

proposed o;cveral American offi cers, Eist'nhowcr preferred to leave the post to the 

Memo, SIIAEF G- 5 for nil Branche~, ~ub· 

Reorgani1ation of G-5, 2·1 r II, in SllARF 

G- 5, 35.06. "' Pogul', TlttJ Supremr Collllllnlltl, p. 110. 

Btiti<;h to cl\oid friction in an tlrC.I when· 

England lt,ul st1 ong traditional intere,tsY 

Gr:~scll tunk over ns .'\s<;istnnt Chief of 

SlaiT, G "i, in 111i<I April , rcrdving his 

offic i.d .1ppointmrnt on the 22d. Lumlry 

wa.; rt.'l ic' ctl, ami I Iohnes r~·r11aiunl ll'i 

tie put' . 

. muu~ Grt~o;ett .; ficl aetionc; ac; 0 5 wa~ 

an attt•mpt tu lay to e~l the Standard 

Poliry a nd Procedure l\Iediterrancan syc;-

tcm c ontrovcrc;v 'till c;molderin.l\ in the 

a<"k~roun . On 19 .\pril he issued a pnliq 

:-,i,•ltlll('ll\ fm· gcnna I cl ic;t ribut ion to c;erve 

"It') a gl1idc wall future planning- ami prrparati<ms." Itt the irllt mlurtory paragraph 

he ·t,,tccl: '·It h:t'i become apparent t() me 

that :>onw confu,ion of thought exi,ts on 

the method h)· whic-h rivil affair,., will he 

mndw·tc•d oncT oprr.11ion" tart. T ime is 

~hort and c·annut he wao:;ted on fruitlc"-o; dic;-

t'll<;Sion." li.\I F. lu• .;aid, '~ tld control 

rh il aff,,j,.._ Clpcr:uion ... directly. as would 

the subo rdinate commands. There wou ld 

be no intermed iate staffs between SH A r;F 

and the fon rs in the lirld. How the rountry 

-;cuion .. \~mtld be employed, if at all , had 

nnt h<'t'll dctcrmim.·tl; hut no mntlrr wha t 

the de< i ... ion, 1 hey would " or!.. under 

. H.\EF, not independently of it, in thr liberated \Oitrllrics and in German)' n' well.:' 

T he fi hl took its toll. Lt. C:ul. J am c.~ 

H . S hormal-c•, of the Provu;t ~[ -:;; al 

neral'~ Civil J\ffnirc; Di,·ision, in England 

a t the time on a two-week tour of duty, 

found morale g~in g. Most ri,•il affairs 

officer!;, HS far no; he could discover, t<·ndccl 

to fa\'or the Standnrd Policy and p, on:dure 

S\ tcm. General Holnu ...,, how<'' cr, <;till 

'~anted a substan tia l role for the nnmtr)' 

sections, ;mel many nfficers not familiar 

" I bit!., I'· R2. 

"' Memo, SHAEF G 5 (Graseltl fur IJi•lrihutiou, suh : CA Organizntion in 1hc Fil•h.l, 1~1 Apr 

'J.I , in OMC:US :1/35, dec. :i22 CA. 
T liE SUPRE!\lE COld t\1.1\ND 

with the whole picture saw only serious 

disorganization. ~r 

On the 20th, Grasett announced the 

fin d form o( the reorgaJ1iz ation , to he erTcrtivc on l May. G-5, Policy, would form 

six branches: lega l, fiscnl, supply, public 

health, disphtced persons, a nd conomic.~ . 

Operations w;as to have u plans branch and 

six country sections. Through the Speria l 

StnrT, it would st1pervise the old countl')' 

sertions a t Shrivenham ns units and the 

training sections nl Eastbourne nnd Shl'ivnh am.~•l Though this was not by any 

means to be the last reol'ganization, it did 

establish fin important principle: as long 

as SH.\EF existed, riviJ arTairs and 111ilitary 

government we.re to he a direct responsibilit y of the military commanders. The principle L<; undersrMcd on I f\ ray in the 

pulllkaticlll of n revised Standal'd Poliry a,n<J 

P1·ocedure in whir b a ll of COSS/\C Civil 

:\ffairs Division's h<~ c assumptions were 

retained. Two concessions I'O the Mediter-

"' Memo, PMG , MC Div, Liaison and Studies 

llr, Lt Col ] llmcs H. Shoemilkcr, for Oir, MG 

Div, s11 b: Report on ' 1\vo Weeks' To11r of Duty 

iu t;;To , 27 Apr ·1·1, in Pl\•lC, MC Div, classified 

drcimlll file :!00,7. 

"'' ( l ) Memo, SH A F.F C- 5 for a ll Branches> 

sub: Rcorg;mi zalion of C-5 l)iv, 2U Apr 41, in 

SHAEF' C- 5, ~5.013. ( 2) Memo> SJ-JAEF G- 5 for 

aU Branches. sub: Rcorga r\izati()ll of G- 5 Div, 

28 Apt• 44, in SHAEF G-5 15.01. 

51 

ran<:an concept were added in the form of 

a p1'ovision for a dircl·l t·ivil affru rs channel 

of communications :md an authori?.ation 

to establish civil arTairs in and undertake 

rehal>ilitation of a whole country even 

though SHAEF forces occupied onl y a part 

of it."' The second point was in part also 

n rcspouse to the President·s transfer of relief operation::: in Europe lo the Army in 

Noven-11bcr . 

The principle was established but the uncertainty did not diminish. Three weeks 

later, on 25 May, Brig. E. A. L. Gueterbock, M cSherry's deputy in charge of the 

Special Staff, atlempted to e>:plain the 

fitnlus of the German Countr·y Unit to its 

members. It was cu rious, he said. They 

were definitely not l'arl of SHAEF. They 

were a planning unit but not a control mission in emiH·yo, though they might someday 

in some fashion become one. He was sorry 

tha t it a ll sounded some'Nhat " woolly," but 

the decisions at the highest level had not 

yet been made. 2 

" ( I ) Pogue, Th ~ S11)1teme Commatllf, p. 83. 

(2) SHAEF, Standard Policy :~nd Proccdltrc for 

Colllllinet.l Civil Affa irs Operations in Northwest 

Europe, t May H, in Admir' Hi$t Collection, 

li:TOUSA, Nr. H6, G- 5 CA. 

An y~is Sheet, SHAEF G-5, Hist Sec, Ltr, 

Col C.:. E. D. Bridge, British Officer in C:crman 

Unit, lo Brig. E. A. 1... C ucterbock, suh : Wa r 

Establishment, 23 May H, in SHAEF G--5, 15.02. 
CHAPTER V 

SHAEF's New Missions 

One of the familiar human products of 

war i the rdu!{ee, the resident of a comlmt 

zouc <.eL adrift c.:itlter hr anticipated m· actua l dc.•ur·uctiun of hi~ home and lllCllllS of 

livelihood. An objet! of pit)' as a n individual, in the mas.<. he hec·unr c.-; a menace. clogs 

roa ~, impo·e..; potentially ruinous burden'! 

on alr eady l>t r•a incd <·ivilian services, nnd 

'P' {'ad-. panic. The Brilio;h a nd Fr·ench ha<l 

some experietH C witlr refugee<; in the 1910 

campa ign, and it hacl become at ceptcd 

,\llied doctrine th at the rm.m~ were C.'(· 

c:eptionally adept at exploiting t hcsc unfurtllllillt'-" for L;wl iral and cv<:ll strnlegi<· 

advant age. 

Tc1 the traditionnl pirt111 c (If the refugee, 

the wa r had by 1944 added ;mother figure, 

the displaced person ( D P). refugee w ao; 

a lmo't a lway, a c iLizen of the 1 Ollnlr)' in 

whirla he w ;t'\ cnt mmter<·d and uo;uall ~ no 

great disla nt·c from home. If he wns a polrntial threa t, lw \\ :l'i at lca'>t a transitory 

one. In liltcr.lled territory the lot al lllth

iti<·s <:ould bc r~pc< ted to take t·.trc of him, 

:md in cnel11 )' territor)' they would be compcllcd tn do '\0. The Dr wn-; a diffet•cnt 

:md more nuuple" spccic.s altogether. He 

and hi ~ fell ow~ had onl y two dtara rtcristir-; 

in common : tltt·y would .til lw citi.tcns uf 

one uf the Unitt' d Nation-; (h) defi nition. 

enrmy aliens rH> maucr where they wrr r 

found rould 110l qualify), and they would 

all hr outside their national bounda ries at 

the time of libemtion. They were certnin 

in l.u gr numhcN to he Russians :-r nd l<'"~ 

with some Yugo'>lavs and Greeks, and inside Germany would lw Frt'nr h, Belginns. 

and l)utch. They were the result of the vast 

lran.;fcr of popula tion that Germany had 

he.~ llll in 1 dy 1942 to provide labor fot• 

its war industry, fnrms, and lllililary w nstruc t ion . .-\11 \llied agency hnd estimated 

that a'l of O{' tnhcr I !1 ~ there were 21 million displaced pcr!\ons in Europe, mainl)• 

in Ccrrn.tm 0 1 in terr it()ry annexed by the 

R61' h.' T o tlte OP-; could be added an indctermirtate hut large number of what 

would later route lo he called RAMPs ( rcn>vcrcd . \llicd milittll')' personnel ) : prisoncr.> of war· of all na tiona lities, many or 

\Vhom had htt ll hdd in German)• sirwc t hl· 

early Lantpaigns of the war and, if thq• 

wrr•t· soldiers of defeated nations, used n' 

romrnon lnbor. 

~vc'll <ll a di,t.llltc nnd in the abstract, 

the DPs conl>til uted a towering problem for 

SH.\EF .. \llicd propnganda had pht}<·d 

heavil} on the plight of the so-rolled slnve 

lalmn.•r-.;, mak ing their lihcratio11 and rehabilitation major U l< d !\' :-.1 ions wnr 

in ~. Persuaded by thci1' own propaganda, 

which in fact prm·ed a ll too true, the military planncf't a sumed that the DPs' first 

desire at the moment they rcali1.cd they 

were free would he to get awar from their 

Genmm mastCI1i a nd, if po.~ihl e, get out 

of German)'. T he h t llllil ll flood thus unloosed would ' astl y overshadow the refugee 

onni~on, C1l MG, Cr11tral Orga11iLatio11 n11d 

1'/o utliiiJ:, p. 192 . 
SJ-IAEF'S ·Ew I\tTSS!Ol'\S 

pt•ohlcms of the British a nd French in 1940. 

Furthermore, the Drs could not he left for 

1 he Germans lo control. , \s victims of 

nazism and as United Nations citizens, they 

wou ld llccome SHAEF's responsibility. 

Initiall y, they would have to he prevented 

from hopelc.-;sly clo~ging the armies' routes 

of ndva nce and commtmic:aUons; secondly, 

Lhcy would have to be cared for with some 

soliC'itude; fina ll y, they would have to be 

•·rtu•·ned to tltcir homes. The interval between the first and the last stage might lJe 

a long one since it would he determined 

by tlte state of the war, the condition of 

the EUI'opean transportation systems, and 

in some instances by Lhe people themselves, 

nnt :til of wltont would he nblc OJ' willing 

to retut·n to their homr counLries. 

Thr DPs, moreo,·cr, could not br igtt orccl cvtn briefly or in the hen I of battle, 

for they might ha rbor among them a dangrr to hum:m life 1 both tnilit'lry and civilia n, that was potentially greater than the 

wn.t' itself- the virus-like micro-organism 

Rit:kellsin. A benign par:-~ le of the body 

louse, Rickettsia, when it passes from the 

feces Of ~I louse into it htmtan !JocJy through 

a uite or opening in the skin, causes typhus, 

Ute mO$t feared epidemir disease in Europe 

since the bubonil' pbgue. Napoleon's army 

in Rus.-;ia reportedly suJTercd more losses 

from typhus than from mmb:tt. During 

and after World War T, nn r.<;timated three 

111illion persons died from the disca~e in the 

.Balkans and the Ukr<•ine. fn World \•Va t• 

rr, a thousand ~.:ases had been registeretl 

in Naples by cady 1944 .. \)ways serious 

and frequent!)' fa tal, typhus is endemiC" in 

p::nts of eastern Europe. vVhen war bre ~ 

oul it begins to spread; humans carrying 

the louse, host oi the disease, provide its 

transportaLion. The Gem1an enc:ountered 

il in their e:1stcrn ra11tpaigns, and it was 

known lo have come into Germany with 

53 

foi'ccd laborers and transports to rom·cntration amps ~ 

T he U.S. gnvrrn ment had establ ishcd 

the U.S. T yphus Commission in December 

~14 2 to st udy the disease and devise methods of control. 9 By earl y 194-4, DDT had 

l1cen proven highly effective against the 

louse, hence indirectly also aga inst the disease : however, it had to be applied individuall y a nd more than once, since it killed 

tlte insert but did nol affect the eggs. In 

a reasonably static· population, DDT could 

in a shorl time practirall)' wipe out the disease; in a mass eruption and uncontrolled 

migration of people, rarriet•s might still 

spread it from one end of Europe t·o the 

other in a f~vJ weeks. 

"Displaced Pet-sons'' appeared for the 

fi t Linw as u separate l>rnnch of the G-f.l 

in the reorga nization of 1 M ay 1944. (ln 

tltc Standard Poliry and Procedu re vhe 

designation "DP" was still regarded a$ a 

synonrm for refugee, and pertinent duties 

were divided among lhe r.ivil affairs 4'lclac·hments in the llcld, t.he provost mnt-shal, 

nnd the loud police.) 1 .\ltll<Jugh nobod)' 

then knew whnt Lhc DPs' full impact on 

military government would be, the brandt 

from the beginning was one of two reserv'!d 

fur a senior U.S. offi cer (Supply being t'he 

oLI\er). On 13 1\IIay, General GuiUon hecame branc·h chief.;; 

Monuments, Fi1te llrt,\. and A l't:ftives 

Next lO simple ignoranc·e and neglect, 

war has always bee11 the greatest destroyer 

' H<JS, U.S. fir$\ Army. Office of Civil Affa irs, 

Sttll: Control of T)•phus Fc,·er, t2 May ~. in 

SHAEF G ..5, 17. 16. 

• EO 926.5, 2•1 Dt!c ~2. 

'

1 SHAEF, St:llldarJ Policy a nd Proced .. rc, par. 

11 5. 

' SHAEF G-5, Opus Br, Hist Sc:c, Chronology 

of Civil Affairs- Military Government, l\11ay 4 1- 6 

Jtm 'H, 2 Dec 44, p. 26, in SHAEF G- 5, 60, Jacket I. 
.11 Tiff.. U.S. \R~IY Il\ THE OC.C:UP<\TlO~ OF Gf'.JC\L\'\Y 

of lllilll·:r. nohlc<;t rdir of hi.; past, and \\hat 

fir<.' and pilhtgc onre had done, the bombers 

ancl :u·tillrry of World War fl could do 

a thousand timcos more cnmplc:lcl)'· ln its 

('Oil('Cpt ion :~ ne, Operntion Ovrmr.ww- a 

mas..,ivc nrmed sweep, with tnrtic~l and 

tr alCJ!k air support, ncros.-; northern 

Frnn<'c nnd the Low C<.tuntrics and into 

Gcn na n)' as deep as might he nec·cs.~:t y to 

bring down nazism- m<tdc a Mron~ hid to 

break all prt!vious ecord~ r or dcstruc·tive11CS.'I. Th<! war thus far had not been quite 

:ts devastating as anticipated. Thr art, parLiculnrly the architecture, of Italy was in 

great danger', but the wa r· thcrf' was on nowhere ncar the l'ca le rcJntcnrplatcd for 

nor•tltwcM Europe. I n t hc·ir early C<'lmprligns, the Gcnnans had won !'ather easily; 

ronscqrrcntly, they had hcrn careful to 

•c vnluahlc art and buildings even in 

the.· :tM . • \her nil, among their topmost 

lcndcl'l! w<!re ~everal admirer.., <1 nd collcclors 

of ar·t. T o the . \ mcriram; and the British 

th e pt'<tlertion of art and hisiCll'in tl monunw rl ~ had hetn :tn entit·rly pcripiH'rn l mnsidemtion until they landed in Sicily and 

Italy in the summer nf (') ~ 3. 

The I tnli.-u1 campaign, however, had revcakd lhr military commanders to he distim·tly unwilli11g to risk tactical advnntage 

m• thr lives or welfare of their• troops to 

protect cultural intangibles. Neilltct could 

rivilinns, in the mid::;t of a life-or-death 

ideological struggle, easily tlrgc: Roldiers in 

bntlle to respccl the shrines. Nevertheless, 

lwowlcdgenble individuals and groups ilolh 

in);idc and outside the government were 

dccplr roncem cd with at lcnst prev<·nting 

n<'cdlc"~ destruction. 1 n early I !'>43, the 

.\mcl'i,·an Defense-H arvard Grottp and the 

Commince on Protection of Cultural Treasures in Wa r Areas of the .'\mrricnn Council of Learned Societies ( ,\C:LS ) had 

brgun p!'cparing inventories of Eur·opean 

nahlllal rnonumcnts, mus<·ums, r~nd pr·ivntl' 

c:ollcc·t inns. Thl'Y received vnl1lalllc :l~'i stnncc from the l•'rirk i\rt Reference Library, where the slUff was already engngcd 

in p1•oducing t•trlttrr'fll maps and ll asc~. Dy 

spring JM4, the /\CLS committee w<1s able 

to f ur•ni ... h for· \ rmy publicttion dew ilc<.l 

maps showing the locations of rttllurnl 

monuments in mn1 incuta] Europe. information on looted art objects, and instructions fur !lalvagc and protection of att work 

lobe indudccl in rivil affairs handbooks. 0 

I nside tlw ~ovc rnmcnt , Justice Jlarla11 

f. Stone of tlw tJ .S. Supreme Cow·t h:1d 

asked tlw Pr·,~s dc , on 8 Dec.·rJ11bcr 2, 

to create un <wgani7.ation for the pi'Otcrtion 

and (lll~<'r ·vatiun of works of <HI, monuments, ami record<~ i11 Europe; and in the 

spri ~ of 1!143 1l1<: U.S. government had 

proposed ("';t:-tbl ishing an Allied agcaH y fot 

sud\ pllr pose'\ l o the British and the Russinll'{. f n . \ugust 1943 the President h:~d 

::rppointt·d Suprc111c Court J ustice Owc·n .J. Roberts chninnnn of an in terdep:u·tmcntll l 

comn1 Uc~ to br known as the Americnn 

Commission for the Protection and Salvngc 

of :\rti);tic- and Historic Monuments in 

Europe·. T lw Roberts Commission, M it 

quit·kly came lO he known, took in hand 

the va.<tl joh or ns.c:rssing in deta il the CX(('IIt 

of Gcrnmn tt nd other Axis appropri:ltion 

of ru lttrr:~l pi'Opct·ty and at'tcd ::.s the 

Army's chnnncl to museums and univcr!lilies for infotmation and for personneJ.T 

By early HH 3 the War Department, too, 

had I'CI'ogni'l.cd tire desirabili ty of pr·otccting P.ur·opt:an art and monuments from 

war darnagr. On I April General \Vitkersham, Director of the School of Milit:\1') 

• USl-'1 1. Gcncr:1l Board, Study No. 'lfi, Ci\'il 

AfT11in; .wd Millmry Cov•:rnmern Activiti('~ 111 Connection with MQti\HliCnt!l, Fine Arts, and Arrhiw~, 

1 I M:1y ·16, in lli ~t Div, Hqs, F.TO, 97 USF 

5-0:3.0. 

' Ibid. 
Sl l.\JW'S l\T.W ~llSSI :\$ 

Government, writing to the \ r ting Dire<.-

IOI', Civil AO'air.. Divic;ion, 1crommcndrd 

commis.o;iouing several art cxpertR ancl, after 

they had lakcn the course al Chndoucsvilk, nttnching one or two as uclvi::;crs to 

each theater commander's sta(J', In Jul)', 

Hilldri11g had reported to McCloy thnt the 

direnivc for the Sirilian landing tOt)t<tined 

a reference to the preservation of hh1toric 

monuments and that Eisenhower had hccn 

giv(·n I wo t:xperts as staff :ulvisrrll and had 

been ~;upp li d with all the material the 

t\ C:LS C:orntnittee on Protection of Cultural Trt•asurcs in War An:a'i had so far 

completed. By the fall of 1943, the protcrtion of an treasure~:. "to the fuiJ cc;t extent 

ronsistc:nl with military openllions'' had hecome ah li -; ed W<lr Depa rtment policy; 

and in Ap1 il 1944, Col. Henry C. N<'wton, 

,111 :HchitcC'l in civilian life, was brou~ht 

inw the Civil Affairs Division to ~ct up proc:cclurcs for putting the War Department 

polity aud the work for t he rivilinn groups 

intc1 cfTcct.' 

Ovcrsr ns, the Monumcms, Fine Arts, 

nnd t\n·hi vcs Sullro mmis.<~ n ( MFA&!\ ) 

d readily found a place in t'ivil aff<Lirs, 

first in \~fCOT and Inter, on the 

(!0$~ C staff. D etermining its functions, 

however, was a more diffinah mallcr, one 

whirh would never ne completely settled. 

Within rivil affairs, MFA&A was an 

anoma ly in that it was hasi<·rllly k.c;_s ronccrnc:d with thr affairs of C'ivilians than 

with the actions of its own troops. 

In Sid ly nnd Italy and as projcC'tcd in 

COSSAC's Standard Policy nnd Proccdtn'<:, the MFA&:\ mission was to protect 

historic buildings and arl work against 

wanton damage and looting hut to do so 

without encroaching on the troop romm:andrr·s nvcrriding concerns where rhc 

outcome of a battle or his troops' lives and 

' Ibid. 

55 

welf<•rc i11 or out of romh:u were at ake. 

.\ li ne IJctwccn avoidable ancl unnvoiuablc 

damage wns impo~..; il>l c to draw stncc cnch 

case could ul1im:11dy he judged only by one 

tmtn, the c:ommandcr on the spot. Consequently, l><')'OI\d wh;~ t r.ould be accomplished hy ndvic<' and persuasion, 11 f':\&:\ 

on its own authority could do litrle .in the 

way of attivc: pw tcction. Most oft en it 

<·ould not begin to function until after the 

most ( IIIC'ia I time: had ~u;sed. Although 

even then. no doubt, mu('h could oftrn till 

he done to prevent runher damage, the 

MFA&/\ role tended to become e~s that 

of a guardian than of an insurance adjustor 

as..')essing chr loss, looking fot what was salvagcnhle, and ttttcmpting to forestall unwarrant<·cl d :aims. Lntc in December I ~)IJ i. 

shortly before ht· left the Mediterranean, 

Eisenhower hnd undertakCJl to strengthen 

the preven tive and protective aspect of 

MFA&A by directing higher commanders 

to detcrm inc the local ions of historic monuments ahead of i'lnd hC:hind their lines and 

to keep in mind and impre.c;s on their S\lh· 

ordinates that the tc•·m ''military necessity" 

djd not cmhrnrr military or personal convenicnce.0 Although he required only compliance with the ·pirit of the directive, 

Ei')enhowcr ordered separately on the same 

day that 110 building li tcd as a work of 

art in the 1.onc handbooks on Italy was to 

he used for militru·y purposes without his 

or the 15 ,1\11ny Gre>up rommander

1

s permission in each case. '

0 

MFA&A in SH AEF, after a somrwhat 

uncertain start in C:OSSAC (the first 

American nl'l expert to arrive was sent 

down to Shrivcnham to be a librarian because he did not posscs.c; enough milita ry 

t·ank), hegan its c.xistencc with two modest 

• Coles :. nd Wcinucrg, S1>/cliers Buome Collltrnors. p. 4 17. 

'~ USFET, Gcrternl Board, Study No. 36. 
THE U.S. AR~fY Tl\ THE CC:UP \TIO~ OF GERJ\lAi\11' 

ndvnnt:~ ges : il was better situated within 

the military chain of command, at least 

theoretically, limn it had been in the MeditcrTanean whet'C, with the rest of <:ivil 

arra irs, it was completely sepa ra t·e; and it 

w uld <J.~s ume from the o utset that the tenor 

of Eisenhowe r's D ec:ember directive for 

Italy would a lso apply in northern E.uro pe. 

Tn J a nuary, Professor GeoiTrer WciJIJ, 

Slndc Professor of fine Arts :11 Cambridge 

U nivcrsil )', became the semiofficial 

M FA&!\ advisct· to the Supreme Com -

mander pending his <·onfirmation as civilian adviser nnd s11bsequent appointment a~ 

lieutCJ)a nt colonel a nd sect ion chief. The 

1\I[F.\&.\ functions that he proposed were 

to protect mo numents a nd a rt work from 

avoidable los.-; or damage, prevent their deterioration after' t omlmt, and collect evidence ( ll1 Germa n looting or desecr(ltion. 

The civil a ff(lirs instructions fo r OvERLORn, 

issued in Februa ry, ('Onfirmcd these duties 

and added requirements for protecting 

• \!lied governments from false claims and 

J\llicd troops from slanderous acc sation . 

To exerute its mis."ions, MFA&/\ was to 

have four officers :lttarhed to each army, 

one al ar111 y headquarters and three wilh 

the frontline troops. The chief would furrher mainta in a pool of e ig ht offi cers at 

SHAEF. Since experience had demonstrated that without some weight of r<~nk 

1vfF i\&:'\ offi cers wcJ'C helpless, the chief 

was to IJe a licntennnt colonel and the other 

offi cers m11 jors. To avoid immobility, which 

had long beset MFA&A in the Mediterrane:u:r, the section would have three jeeps 

and 11 truck of its own. 11 

Compnrecl with the setup in the Mediterranean, the i'VfF:\&A organization proposed fol' SH. \EF appeared a lmost ideal. 

" I bi1/. 

.\s such, tml'ol'tunatcly, it <~<; alsn to prov<' 

unattainable even within the elaborate 

SI-IAEF ti' LH' urc.. l\•lilitary organizatio11n 

do not easilv nssimilatc hig hly specialized. 

autonomous f u nrtions; consequent! y, for 

MFA&.\ within the military chain Ute 

quctstion was still not w ha t was dcsirablt' 

hnt rather wha t was feasible. This situation 

was true l>oth in personnel and in org-anization. The arg ument tha t MFA&A ffi er~ 

needed the pre<;tige of rank Ct)uld not prevail aga inst the J\rmy's relu ctance to grant 

n.eld grade C0 111Jl1i s to art spcrinlist:: 

with no military c:-;pcricncc ; therefore, 

what JvfF.\ &:\ received were cnptains and 

lieutenants. ·while Professor \Vrbh awaited 

his own confirmation a~ civilian adviser. 

which did not come tmLil I April, MFJ\&1\ 

led a s-hHdow xi tcn cc within G -5, 

SH.'\EF; Md the G erman <1nd Jlrench 

<·ountry units in the Specia l Stall nt Shrivcnham set up their own MFA&.\ sub:-ections which, as vVehh ac one point r.omplnined, scan·ely seemed :1ware tl1at a 

policy-ma king section e..xisted in C'.-5.'~ In 

the 1 ay 1944· G- .'> reorganization. 

Mf.\&:\ ~11ff rrd the ultimate indigni.tr : 

it did not nppear in the organization chart 

at nil. The omi!t<;ion was not 'remedied 11ntil 

nearly ,., month lnter when a place was 

made for it in the Operations Branch. 

For a time in ,\pril, i\ IF'A&A in northw est Ew·ope even seemed abO\Jt to he reduced to the impotence it had experienced 

during the early months in I taly. Wben Lhc 

Governmental Affairs Branch, Special 

Staff, recommended issuing a letter and a 

general order similar to those Eisenhower 

had put nul in Italy in De('cmher 1943, 

G- 5 Operations objected on the ground 

that existing ci"il afl'airs instructions pro-

"CoJ..,s a nd i~ g, SoldierJ /Jcrotlie CoPerllors, p. U61

1. 
SH •\EF'S 'EW I ISS IONS 

ddnl amp!<- pmtcttion foa arl .tnd 

ltiOIIIIlll('nt,,' 

. \lthou'-:11, :l~ 1 he (·nd of tlw planning 

period .tpproaC"hl·d, ~r I' \&. \ h,td c;till nor 

found " st·< 1nc· p<l'itiun iu thr commnnd 

strurturc. it clid at the hL"t minute find 

"tron~ .suppmt ;11 lc-.1-.( for it-. p111 pose. Over 

all ohjcnimb, Wd1h h.tcl in<.isted that an 

order Oil art and lliOI\lii\1C11lS f1 Om the 

Supreme ( :omm.~ndct, not merel y in ·trurtions to l'ivil affairs officrn1, was necessary 

in nort hwcst<:t'n l·:mopc where initially the 

British and J\nwric·nn troops would he 

lighting tl11 (d('IHII)' tcrrilm·y. In May, 

Colonel Newton of lhc Civil t\fT;l ir~ Division, nl tlw titm• the Wnr Department's 

candidate ultinwtclr to llccomc militar·y 

chid of SJ 1.\l•: l''.s I F1\ &:\ , vL'Iited the 

theater. J\lthou~h Newton did not get Lhe 

appointment, he took n strong and somewhat influential interest iu <1"-'\Uring 

.\IF.\&.\'s c!Trtti' rnc-.." and supported 

Webb's .;tand. ~Iorc ·er, on l5 February. 

U.S. bomlH:"' in fl alv lrad unloaded ix 

hundred tott'l of homl,., on the monastery 

at 1\(ontc Ca~i1111, ClllC of the,: oldest and 

mo.~t venerated hi~torir~ l '>lructurcs in 

Em-ope. Thr ,\llit:d c<llllll1and ron. idcred 

militnry ncr< ~ity proven beyond question, 

hut the prospcrl nf rllorc 'lll<'h instances in 

the future pointed 11p the need for a firm 

policy. Ou 26 }. (">'· Eisenhower audrcssed 

a letter to thr r11·my gro11p, naval, and air 

comnaantlcrll fnr Ov HI oaw. In it he made 

every t:ommandcr ·r~ ponsib e for protcrting 

and respecting- the ltiswriral monuments 

and cultural rente ~ "which ~ymholizc to 

the wol'ld all we arc fighting for." 

Where sm·c·c.;;.o; of the military operation 

would he prcjudkrcl, a<~ at Cac;..<;ino, military 

necessity would prevail even if it meant the 

u USFET, Gencml Board, Study No. 36. 

57 

dC<Uruction of MllllC honw cd .site. llut in 

tbe marn itht.liH "" "he a c d.ull >~~ .tlltl 

destruction 1 oulcl nol he ju~tifi(•d , 'omm:mders would he H'spon<iihl(• foa pr~erving ohjecLs of hi.,toriral and rultmal "iga1fir.uuc·." 

In the serond \\t't'~ of June, SJ I \EF dic::-

patched offil'ial list-. of tl101111111CIIts to~rthcr 

witJ1 at a~es to the army group-. for distribution down to the di' ion<;. 

A DireclirJfl fM GummiJ' 

Although plnnnin!-{ for C:ermany was excluded from the COSSi\C :'!-1 range of civil 

affair'S rompet<:nc<', Morga rt's st;dl had 

hcen aware that a sltar·p divi~ion lwtwt'<"n 

the end oJ the militar}' phase of 0\ t~l{LORDRAl':KIK and the hq,:inning of thr orrupation proper would not he po,,ihle. In 

December I CI·U. Lumlq h;td dcwiiNI l.t. 

Col. Sir T. St. \ 'intl'nt 'J' muhrid~e to \tucly 

the Gcnnan admini!.trati\e '\)stem ;rnd dctemline ho" it t 01lld lw .,d.aptcd w the initiation of militaq• ~O\ ernmcnt in Gcrm.tn'. 

Completed in January l944 anti thereafter 

referred to as Slash I 00, taken from its file 

number, the Troubr idgc study looked at 

the Lransjtion from war to occupation a<; 

a proce.: · rather than as a single event condjt.ional on tbc Grrmnn '\llrrrndrr.1

" From 

Slash I 00, SHI\.EF derived huth the requirement for :u)(l the limit'l of its pnrtiripation in the orrupation of G.:rmall)'· 

These aspcrls were expressed ill terms of 

three phases: a military phase of complete 

miJjtary government ciliH'I' ~r l up before 

"AC (SHAEF C 5, 751 ) 10 (;QC 2 1st AGp, 

CG U .S. 1st ACp, Allied N;n·.•t Commnm.ler, 

F.xped Force, Air CinC, Allic·d P.xpC'd Forres, sub: 

Preservation of Historic:.l OIIIIIOC>II $, 26 ll.lny 

H, in SHAEF G-5, 10. 

"SHAEF C 5, J-liH Div, Ili\toriC'al S1nccmtnt 

of tht Gcn nan Country Unit, Au!f •II, in SHAEF 

G-5, 60, jacket 10 
513 TliE U.S. ARMY lN '1'11£ OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

the Germ<m final collapse or necessitated 

by chaotic conditions in Germany after the 

surrender; a tJ:ansit ional middle phase in 

which the military command would pass 

its authority to a rontl'OI commission ; a11d 

a final phal;e in whirh the occu pntion 

woukl assume pcrmnnent form. '" On this 

basis the prenH~ Commander could as~ 

sume that he would hn ve a milita ry government 11l1SS!Oll in Germany before the 

surreudcr and for a n indeterminate pCI'i.ocl 

thereafter. 

The Supreme C:ommn ntler could assume 

that he bad a mi.;;sion lntt not m11r h more. 

Responsibility for launching the oc\upntion 

would proha.hly be his, hut its nature and 

purposes \verc almost totally unknown. T he 

second and third phases, as Slash I 00 

pointed oUL, depended on political decisions 

whir h had not yet been made. T his deficiency loomed large as soon as G-5 moved 

into the plnnning for the lirst phase. On 

10 February, Smith laid the problem before 

the CCt\ C (Combined Civil 1\ffairs Committee) . SHt\EF, he said, was beginning 

lo plan for military government in Germany, recognizjng that jts direct concern 

was only ~h the fir!;t phase, hut such 

SH AEI.' decisions could affect lhc whole 

occupation machinery. Therefore, the fir.)t 

phase poliries ought to be attuned from the 

start Lo those of the other two phases. T o 

accomplish this; SHAEF needed political 

and economic guidelines." 

Smith did not know it, but he had asked 

the impossible. There was no agency that 

could give him what he wanted nor would 

there he one fot· the duration of SHAEF's 

'"Memo, CCAC, Director to Civil Affairs Division, sub: Problems of 0CCII)Ja~ion of Germa ny, 

27 f'cb 44, in ASW 370.0. " Cable, SHA EF to CCAC. wh: The Administrative System o£ Gcnnany and So111e Problems 

of Occupation, 10 Fell H, In OPD, ABC :lll7, 

~ec. 7- A. 

existence. Thr first impulse in the CCi\G 

was to put Smith oCT with an assurance that 

the major policy decisions could he expected from the Ew·opean Advisory Commis!\ion (E•\ C) in dut time. 18 T o do so, 

howevc1·, would have amounted to CCAC's 

ahdil'aLi ng its f undion as the sour<'e of 

romhincd civil affairs policy as far as Germany W<IS concerned. Furthermore, the 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had independen tly arrivctl at an estimate of the way 

the occupation would be imposed on Germany that coincided with the SHi\EF view 

derived from Slash 100; consequently, as 

fa r as the U.S. tafT was concerned, Smith's 

requ est was highl y pertinent.'u The J CS, 

Lhcreforc, agreed that SH EF would most 

likely hlnve lo establish military govemment 

in Germany and llla intain it for what 

"could he considerable lengt h of time" 

after the capitulation. H illdring sent this 

infonmHion to Smith on 22 February.~0 

Howevcl', as Supreme Commander, 

Eisenhower wa.'S nnder the CCS not tlte 

.JCS, and his instructions would have to 

come thi'Ough the CCS in order to he valid. 

ln the C:C:I\C:, the Britil'h members proposed, not LI11Cxpcctcdly hut nevertheless 

disquietingly for the America ns, that the 

qnestions Smith had raised be referred to 

Lhe C:C:!\C(L ), which rould secure opinions directly from the EAC.u1 Thereafter, 

for both the British and the America ns the 

issue became one of supplying an adequate 

answer to Smith without prejudicing either 

Washing ton's or London's claim to be the 

fountainhead of ocC'upation policy. In a 

meeti11g on 9 March, Hilldring advanced 

"CCAC 69, Proposed Cable, CCS to SCAEF 

[no date], in O PD, ABC 387, sec-. 7- A. '~ l.tr, JCS 10 Sec: of State, JCS 62:1, Appendix 

B, Ill Dec 43, in OPD, ABC 367. st:c. l A. 

"' j CS 723, Administration of !viC in GermanyOccupation Period, 22 Feb H, in SHAEF C- 5, SO. 

" Histoty of the CAD, bk. Vt, p. 18. 
SHAEF'S NEW MISSIONS 

the th0t1ght that the EAC, a<; a negotiating 

body for the govemments, would not l>e 

much help as a source for informal judgments and advice; he stated that the Civil 

Affairs Division ( CI\D) was already we] I 

along in lr·a f~i g basic directive$ for German y which ought soon to be expanded 

into detailed directives. f our days later the 

British pr~ent ativr.s suggested issuing an 

interim directive to take effect before the 

EAC completed its work, the details being 

left to the CCAC(L). ~ 

In a meeung on 19 March, M cCloy asserted that the military could not wait for 

the EJ\C to ac:l. milit::~ ·y directive would 

have to be prepared l>eforchand antl the 

necessity for it would have to be made clear 

co the British and Soviet governments. HjJIdt·i11g added tha t, as a matLer of fact, the 

CAD had completed a draft of a basic 

direc:live which it would submit for British 

approval and for expansion in detail by the 

CCAC( L). Alarmed at rhe broad hint in 

!v[cCloy's remarks tha t the Americans were 

ready tn ignore lhc EAC entirely, the Brilish conced ed that since the Russians probably had their own prepared directives for 

fringe areas such as Estonia and East Prussia, the Amerirans and British could probably do t11e same, "having in mind the 

recommendations being put forward by the 

U .S. and U.K. representatives on !he 

AC.""~ H aving rcatheJ an agreement, 

which as nsual was open to dispa rate interpretation. the CC.'\ G finally sent a reply 

lo Smith telllng him a directive for Germany was bei ng p1 paretl. ' 

Another !lix weeks passed before Lhe directive reached Eisenhower by specja) air 

" lbr'd., p. 19. 

v Min, CCAC 26th Meeting, Ll) M~r ~4, in 

SHAEF G -5, :3- A. 

" Cable, Gov 15 (CGAC 69/2), I 9 Mar H, 

in OPD, ABC 31!7, ~er.. 7 A. 

59 

courier o.n 28 April as "CCS 551 /' because 

it first had to be Lransmitted to London 

fol' .British review and approval. At .British 

in~i ce the scope was limited speciGca lly 

to the periotl before Lhe German defeat or 

su rrendet· to avoid infringing on the competence of the London-based EAC. In the 

meantime, working parties in the CCAG 

:~d prepared supplemen tary poli Lical, 

financial, and economic and relief guides. 

The basic directive was Eisenhower's 

charter to establish military government in 

whatever parts of Germany his forces occupied. As Supreme Commander he would 

have t11e supreme executive, legislative, and 

Judicial a ut11ority which he could delegate 

as necessary to his subordinate commanders. Military government adminiAtration, 

however, would be idenuca l throughout the 

occupied pRrts of Germany. ~~ 

1\. political guide, sent with the directive, 

stated thnt military government was lo h e 

" firm . .. at the same time just a nd humane '-vith regard to the civilian population 

as far as con<:istenl with strict milita ry requirements." The purposes were to he to 

assist rontinuing military operations, to destroy nazism and fascism, to maintajn Jaw 

and (ll'der, and to r·eslore normal conditjons 

in the popubtion as soon as possible! 0 

Fin ial md economic and relief guides 

reached SH AF.F on 31 May. The first pxovided for Light control of German banking 

nnd r une ncy and for the introduction of 

i\llied mjlitary ma rks as occupation curretwy. The Allied military mar·ks were to 

he used in Germany by tl1e U.S., British, 

and Soviet forces, each country retlecmjng 

0$ Analysis Sheet, SHAEF G-5, Hist Sec, sub: 

Directive for MG in Germany Prior to Defeat 

or Surrende r, 6 May '(4, in SHAEf G- 5, 1- A. 

"'' CCAC ti!l/5 fCCS 551 f, Directive ror Military 

Government in Gc1'1113JIY Pr·ior to Defeat or Surrender, 2H Apr H, in CCS 383.21 (2- 22- H), 

~ec. t, 
60 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

them in its national currency for its own 

troops. The Germans would continue to use 

the Reichsmark a.nd would only be able 

to exchange Allied militaJ'Y marks for 

Reichsmarks. 

The U. . Bureau of Engraving and 

Printing in Washington had made plates 

for the Allied military mnrks ea rlier in the 

year and had begun printing (or all three 

governments when the Soviet Union demanded it be giveu duplicate plates from 

which to do its own printing. The Soviet 

government had explained, with almost 

disarming candor, that it wanted to do its 

own printing to be sure of having a constant supply of marl<s available. Neither the 

Americans uor the British had openly 

raised the obvious objection to putting 

duplicate plates in Soviet bands, namely, 

the lack of control over the amounts 

printed; but the British had argued against 

relinquishing the plates on the ground that 

the whole issue might be discredited because of the unlikelihood of the Russians' 

being able to produce identical notes even 

from duplicate plates, which in fact proved 

fortunately true. For both the British and 

the Americans, however, Lhe real dilemma 

was whether or not they wanted to see a 

separate Soviet occupaLion currency introduced into Germ ny~ a move which the 

Russians th1·e:w:ned to ma ke if they were 

not given the plates. To avoid such a development and jts implications for projected Allied unity in the occupation, the 

duplicate pla tes had been made and sent.~; 

The economic and relief guide combined 

t~vo marginall y related suhjects in one 

paper. The economic part gave Eisenhowet• 

full control over German industrial produc-

" Min, CCAC, 27th Meeting ( I Apr ~4) and 

28th Meeting ( 13 Apr -H), I and t5 Apr 44, 

in SHAEF G-5, 3- A. 

lion whi<: h he was insb·ucted to use to 

orienl German industry toward h elping the 

war agajnst Japan, to convert industry not 

needed against Japa n to peacetime production, to make goods available for restitution 

and r·epar•ations, and to integrate the German economy into the European and world 

economies. With regard to relief, the guide 

specified that c ritical Gcrnmn shortages 

were lo he alleviated only to the minimum 

extent necessary lo prevent disease Hnd unrest. Excess Germa n food and othel' commodities we re to he used for relief in 

liberated countries.zjj After he received the 

guide, Eisenhower pointed out that it assumed a surplus in Germany but made no 

provision in the event the assumption 

proved wrong. The OCAC then t•cvisetl the 

guide an d empowered hirn to plan for relief 

in Germany on the same scale as in lil.Jerated countries, exccpc that· if supplies 

proved inadequate, Gel'rnnny as the enemy 

country would rereivc lbe lesser shrtre.:w 

Although the directive and 1 he guides 

categorically disclaimed any purpose be· 

yond providing Eisenhower with a basis for 

conducting milita ry government in areas 

he rnigh t occupy before the surrender, they 

were obviously conceived as being readily 

convertible to final pollcy statements. They 

were firm, even severe, on specifics but on 

the whole rema rkably moderate. J'.lthough 

the elimination of nazism anti of the Gcr~ 

man abjlity to make war were assumed, 

Lhc mis.~ion would be lo restore normal con -

ditions and to re re te a peaceable Ger·-

many. The authors had learned Colonel 

Hunt's lessons well, but: The Hunt R eport 

" CCAC 69/ 8, Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or S1•rrender, 

3 t May 44, in CCS 383 .2 1 (2- 22- 44), sec. I. 

•• ( I ) Memo, Dir, CAD, st•h: Civilia n Relief 

in Germany, 19 Jut H, in SHAEF G- 5, 3- A. 

(2 ) Cable, CCS lo ~HAEf, 19 Aug 44, in CCS 

3B3.2l (2-22-44), sec. 2. 
SHAEF'S NEW J\lfTSSJO IS 

had been absOJ•bc·d only into Army doctrine, not into United States high policy. 

Elsewhere, specifirall y in the White H ouse, 

otJ1et· lessons were being drawn from the 

twn world wars. 

Eisenhowct• nnd Smith had been troubled since the inception of SH /\EF by Lhc 

unconditional sutTender formula. Tn April, 

when Under Scrrcta.ry of State Edward R. 

Stcttinius, Jr., visited London, they asked 

for a dnrification, an announcement of 

principles on which the treatment of defe<I Lcd Germany would be based, in order 

to ·'create a mood of acceptance of uncondition:.d wrrcndcr in the Gem1an Army." 

They proposed a political directive similar 

in tenor to CC:S 55 1 then being drafted 

in the CC.i\.C, one that would differentiate 

l>ctween the t-rimes of nnzism a nd militarism and the German people's desire for 

a tolerable f1ilure."" StettinitL') took the request to the Pt•csident who dcdared himsetr opeu-mindcd lmt inquit•cd how Ei!'\cnhowet• imagined he could hack up any 

promise to the Germans IIHt t they would 

llc treated humanely when he would have 

to he speaking also for the Russians, Lhc 

'" Cahle, Stettiui\tS to Sec of State, ~ Apr ~, 

iu USFET SGS 09 1.412. 

61 

N onvegians, and alJ the other peoples who 

had suffered in the war and would not he 

inclined " to be soft. " 3 ' Actually, the President. had a month before flat-ly rejected a 

similar proposal from the J CS.$2 He had 

said tlten: "The trouble is that the reasoning ... presupposes reconstituting a German stale which would give active co-operation apparenLiy al once to peace in 

Ettropc. A somewhat long study and personal experience in and out of Germany 

1ead'5 me to believe that the Germany philosophy ca nnot be changed by decree, law, 

or military order. The change in German 

philosoph y m~tst be evolutionary and may 

take two gcncl'alions. To assume otherwise 

is to assume, of necessity, a period of quiet 

followed by a third world war. ~' 

" l,tr, E. R. StetlinitL~ 10 Hon Wm. Phillit)s, 

11 ay 11 f, in USFET SGS 37 I. 

'"The .JCS had urged that because the Nazi 

propaganda intcrpretl\don of qncond itional sur. 

render wa& bolstering the Ge rman will to resist, 

Allied propaganda shoulrl "stress that ord inary 

Gcnnans wi ll he given a chance 10 live normal 

liv()s.'' ( I ) JCS 7 111, f:fl"ect of ''Uncondi tional 

Sli i"I"CIIdcr' ' Policy on German People, 19 reb ·1+, 

in CCS :187 (12 -- ), ~ec. 2. (2) Memo, JCS 

fo t· the President, 25 Mar •1•1, in OPD, ABC 387, 

sec. 3 . 

.., Memo, F. D. R. for lite J oinl C hiefs o( Staff, 

1 Apr H , i11 OPD, ABC 337, sec. 3. 
CHAPTER VI 

Shrivenham and Manchester 

The Civil Affairs CP.uter 

Shrivenlmm, situated a few miles north 

of tbe railro:1d from London to 13ath and 

Dristol, is not found on cvcr·y rnnp; a nd 

gaz.cttcers, when lhey do so a t rtll, give its 

locatiou in rela tion to Swindon , whkh lies 

tsix tnilcs to the southeast and Gears lhe clistinrtion of actually being on the railroad. 

•\ thcwnughly unremarkable Berkshire village of somewhat less than six hundred inhahit,aut<;. Shri\'enham wa.-;, ncverlhcle$5, 

lon!{ to remain in the metiHwic-.; of the 

Wo!'ld \Val' J1 generation of . mcl'ic:m civil 

affairs offi cers-e..'Xcepting po~<> ihl y the min<u·it y who experienced the elegance 

(mostly architectural) of the British center 

in the Grand H otel at Eastbourne. 

On the grounds of what had been a private srhool fnr girls nt Shrivcnham, 

ETOUSA had established Lhe AmeJ·ican 

School Center in the summer of 15142 to 

train officer candidates and various categories or 1111pply specialists. When Colonel 

Stearns visited there in Octobct 1943 looking ror space to billet Lhc \mcri<:~ n dvil 

affairs contingent, he found room for 1,000 

tllCII. U pou activating t11e Civil Affairs 

Center in D ecember, he planned lO l'Cceivc 

th<- hipmcnts of riviJ affairs officers and 

enlisted men a t Shrivenham tnd thet·c as-

:;;ign them to dctachmenlc; and givr them 

:~dditional training.' The program, as it de-

'SHAEF C - 51 Hist Sec, T lw Education nnd 

Trnining of Allied Officers for Duty with Civil 

AITairs, Milllnry Government, T-:uropc:1n Theater 

veloped, envisioned a r-egulated, synchronized now or officers and men and a course 

Of training and instl'lH Lion that would prO• 

duce fully organized nnd equipped dctarhments, eaeh thoroughly acq1tainted wllh it :-~ 

pinpoinl l"l!'signmcnl- the actual loc:nlity 

for which it would ue responsible in the 

occupation .t ' l'he detachment which had 

completed their tr~1ining would be sent tn 

Mancheste r, whct·e Stearns had !orated 

fl,QQQ billets, to await their move to til<' 

Continent. 

The ro~rnm looked good. hut ~<mlc 

early signs were ominous. On close jnspcction, Shri vcuham proved to be sorely wanting in the amenities expected by offi cers, 

particula rly field grade officers, of whom 

there would lw :\ snbstanti"l nnmhcr. All 

officers, lieutenant colonels and hclow, 

would have to he billeted sixteen to a room. 

They wo11ld do tlwir own cleaning and 

sweeping, and some moms would hnv<' to 

double ;~s classrooms in the daytime. The 

officers wottld ht rcqujn::d to carry knives, 

for·ks, :11Hl t·ups to the dining hall w lwrr 

they would cal orr compartmentecl ·m ctal 

trays which they would have to ::~s h 

t hemselv<:s. n 

of Operations, Sl!p II July •15 [no dnre], in S IIAf.F 

G-5, 60, J ;lC.kl't 7. 

• Rpt, t:CAD l"ra1ni11g Div, Admin Srr, to t )j. 

rector ()( Trnininl!' Oiv, sub; O rg:anizatinn :nul 

Activities 'rhr0111th ~7 May ·H, in fi A~F C: 5 , 

604. 

' Memo, SHAF.F CAD fo1· ACofS G- 5, "'h: 

Accommodation• :•t j oint CA Ccnt<:r, 19 Feu 4<1, 

iu SHA EF G- 5, 17.0:1. 
SIJRIVENHAU AND MANCHESTER 

On thr other side of the ;\tlanti<-, the 

Provost MarshaJ General's OITie!' ~HJ 

fou nd the morale of the officers who were 

slated for shipment to Shrivcnham <dready 

sagging. Orrc of its inspectors who observed 

the graduates of the Civil AIT~tir·s Tndning 

Pmgr'alll { C.\TP) a ... <~Scmhkcl at C:nmp 

Reynolds, Pcnns}•lvania, reponed that the)' 

were "fcelin~ pretty well kir.kcd aroun·d." 

Many had graduated from the roursc in 

unc uni\l r~ity and then been liCill to anotlwr to Utkc the same comse n second time. 

/\11 1)1(')' would nrcomplish nt Camp Reynolds would be to acqu ire c11ouglr familiarity with tiH' .45-caliher pistol to fire for 

record. The)' would then go to the staging 

~ll (·a at Cnmp Kilmer, New J ersey, whc1·c 

they would wait for a n undetermined time 

lldor<: bring shipped out. • 

Jn Dccclllher, when Steams set up the 

Civil 1\fTnirs Center Lhcre, Shrivrnhnm, in 

adtlitio11 to l)cing the reception :1nd training 

dcpor, lwrnmc the ndminisn·~ttivc headquarters f<> t' civil affairs--military government in thr. field. The Civil 1\fTnia-s Center 

proposed to continue as parent organizalinn ror• the detachmenL<~ a(tcr they were 

Conned nnd when they went into ;wrion on 

rhc ( :ontilll'nt. For tlw time hcing, however, two [unctions, assignment i\nd training, ovct~ .ulowed everything else. 

For the incoming officer. his encounter 

with 1 hr nssi,gnment divb;ion of till' Civil 

,\fl';tia-s Center could easily bt: the rnmil impcll'lnnt cvrnt in his mili tary cnrc·cr. Tts fonr 

IHmr·ch; would determine w here he was to 

~crvc, nnd th is placement in most instances 

proved permanent. The muncric:al designation o( c:tc h board, as new officers quickly 

learned, reflected the level and, hcnrc, desimhility of the l'L"-'<ignments it controlled. 

1 Mrmo, Col H arley L. Swift ror Col Ccorge 

C. nel'l')', >llh: C11mp Reynolds lns1wr.tion, 7 Jnn 

•1•1, in PMG, MG Div, classified dt:Cittlal fila ~33 . 

63 

The first uoard selected men for army 

group, a ,·my, rotps, and division staffs, the 

second for civil a ffairs detachments, and 

the lhird for ~rvke with the British. The 

fourth board, really the first in the order 

in whi<·lt inr()ming officers encountered 

them, screened a ll officers and sen t Lhcm 

on to Inc otlu:n; rcw final as.->ignmcnt. The 

vast majority of the officers would go to 

the dctadtmcuts. The early assumption was 

that British nnd U.S. personnel would be 

mixed about lift)'-fifty, hut, in fact, only 

250 U.S. offi< crs were sent to Easthomnc, 

and the>' lat<:r returned lo serve with American detachments. 

The uctac.:hrnc•H board additionr~ ll y 

selected officers Cor gpecifi c types of detach· 

mentl\.r. There wca·t• four types: A ( 17 

ofTi<:ern, ~ wnm111t officers, and ~ enlisted 

men ), B ( 9 offi<'ers, 2 warrant officers, and 

16 enlisted mrn ). C ( 5 officers and 9 enlisted men ), and D (4 officers and 6 enlisted men )." Tlw . \ deta hment~ were. 

designed ror ('fltployn tcnt in major ril ics, including national capitals such as Berlin and 

Paris, a nd wc·re regarded as elite dr.Larhmcnts. T he others would he stationed in 

smaflcr C'iti<''< or rural r.ommunjties. The A 

and B dct:whmcnts offered the most desirable heaths in term<; of probable IOI';)Iion 

and opporttanit y 10 spcciaJjze, not to mention ran 1: and pr<>$prcts for advant'Cillcnt. 

But the C ami D detachments, although 

iltdividttall y Slllnllcr and de..c;tined 11\0sl 

likely to operate in unglamorous and 01ltof-the-w ay places, would be needed in far 

greater numbers and wouJd absorh the 

larger n~tmhcr of officers. 

The training divit<ion had the mission of 

• Hqs, CA Center. Amcricnn School Ct·ntrr, to 

Chief, i~ • Suhscc, COSSAC, 31 Dec •II , in 

SHAEF G 5, I 7.02. 

• Memo, l.i:'li~ofl Officer at FUSJ\G for Col H. 

McE. Pcmllt'tun, ~uu; G- 5, Ils Evolution :-~nd 

FunctiMs, 17 Moy ·14, in USFET CAD 31'U . 
64 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERivlANY 

turning out es~e nt ia ll y finished de tachments, an estimated 70 of them for France 

and 273 for Germany! As originally 

planned, each class would be given two 

months of genera l <:ivil niTairs instruction 

and military training which would be f ollowed by an indefinite period of regional 

study and planning for pinpointed areas. 

In the later pari of the second stage the 

enlisted men would join the teams. Col. 

H a rdy C. Dilla rd, who had been associated 

witb civil affairs Lrainingsince its early da ys 

in the Provost M ars hal General's Office 

and at Charlottesville, was transJerred frorn 

Lhe Unite<.! Stales to b ead the division. On 

his a rrival in D ecember along with the 48-

oiTicer f<\.culty and stafT, most of them a lso 

from the United States, the division opened 

al Sbl'ivenlwm with no students. When the 

first forty students came in mid-January, 

they were outnumbered by the faculty. 

The regul ated flow of officers thal had 

been planned wns not going to ma terialize. 

At noon on 27 J anua i'Y the first large sh ipment, 4 I 6 o!T1cers, arrived a t Shriven barn 

with full field packs after' a twenty-hom 

trip by train from port. The center mustered enough trucks to u·ansport the lieutenant rolonels and majors; all the others 

marcht:d the two miles from lhe station 

in tain cnrrying their pac ks. Two days 

later, while Lbc IJon rds were immersed in 

interviews with the first group, another 308 

officers anived. 

At r.he end of the month the Civil Affairs 

Center, with none two weeks before, now 

had 770 officer trainees a lJoard and, if 

nothing else, a tatistic~ll sample of the men 

wh.o " 'Oldd ma ke up l11e civil affairs organization in the field. About 40 percent of the 

offi cers were rommis.c;ioned directly from 

c ivilian life. The rest had received their 

1 SHAEF G-5, Hist Sc<;, Ed11<:ation and Train- ing, in SHAEF G- 5, 60, .J acket 7. 

commissions in other branches of the Army 

or in the Na tiona l Guard. The youngest 

was 22 yc:u-s old, the oldest 60. The average age was a few months short of 40; and 

the largest single increments were from ages 

38 to 46, which tOgether constituted about 

40 percent of rhe tota l." (Subsequent shipments brought the proportion of commis-

!\ioncd civilians down to near 30 p ercent, 

but lhc average age rema ined constant.) 0 

Youth w<Js going to be in somewha t short 

supply, which was no surprise sinc-e few 

offi cers l)elow the d ra ft age limit, 38 years, 

and in first-rate physic:al condition bad 

l,een accepted for civil aHairs duty. 

Matmity was considered to be an asset 

in a l'ivil a ffa irs offi cer. It did not prove 

to be so fo1' ma ny, however, in their initial 

confronti1tion wiLIJ the English climate. On 

14 Februa ry, out of a thousand officers 

1 heu al Shrive.nham, 46 percent went on 

sick call, most with colds which had already 

put 10 percent in the hospital. 10 

On 7 Fel)l'ltmy, after the assignment 

hoHrds lmd processed the J anuary arrivals 

and dctaiJed at least an offi cer or two as 

a cadre to each of the 343 detachments, 

the tra ining division started its first course. 

lly then the center was on notice to expect 

another t housand officer'$ at the end of tbe 

111onth and lnrgc shipments of enli$tcd men 

in March. With these additiom, the civil 

affairs force for nortlnvest Europe would 

be pl'actically complete, and sometbil1g 

would h ave to he found for it to do, since 

RAN r<JN was d imming and OvERLORD not 

expected until late spring. In both opera-

' Hist R pl, Hqs, C.'\C, 1\SC, to Chief, Hi:;t Sub-

~cc, SHAE.F, suh : Activities of CAC, l8 j an- t 

Feb ++, in SHAEF G- 5, 17, 12. • Hist Rpt, Hqs, CAC, i\SG, to Chier, Hist Sec, 

SHAEF G- 5, 11 h: Aclivitics Rt CAC, 15 Fell- I 

Mar •1•1, in SHAEF G- 5, 17.02_ 

•• Hist Rpt, CAC, ASC, to Chid, Hist Sec, 

SHAEF' G- 5, sub: Ac1ivities of CAC, l F'eb- 15 

Fcl o H, io SHAF..F G-5, l7.ll. 
SfiR IVENI-1AM AT\TD MANCHESTER 

tions, civil affairs- military government had 

lhc !;ame Lwo, though not mutually <'omplementary, missions: to be teady and to wait. 

\Naiting would be Lhe more diffir ult. 

Before the first cow'Se began, the training 

division had revised its program. The first 

cou rse ran for nine weeks. The second 

began in late February for the officer'S arriving then and lasted six weeks. In the first 

week of April the l wo cla!ises were merged 

and given a composite course. To handle 

the whole student lm1d in two increments 

instead of four or five as had been planned 

at fu-st, the fac:ulLy had to be doubled. Since 

there was no oLher source, the additional 

faculty were retTuited from among the incoming officers even though doing so increased the risk of the whole program bei11g 

k)oked upon <lS busy work hy students and 

ran llly a like. 

Since the fit'Sl segments or both courses 

would be given before planning at SH AEF 

hnd progressed fat' enough to provide more 

perti11ent ~ul>ject matter, they rontained little that the sLUc.lents had not hea rd before 

at least once. T o compen~ate, the training 

d ivision decided to concentrate on the 

known weaknesses of the trainees, languages and military tra ining-the latter 

embracing bot·h formal military drill and 

physic-al conditioning. I ntensive cottrses 

were offered in Fren<'h, Ge•·man, and Ru!;-

sian; and the training sche<lule included 

two to four bours per day of military tt·aining in the form of calisthenics, games, and, 

spccjfically, two or three road marches oJ 

folll' to twelve miles each week- this last 

activity being less than universally popular 

with lhe stlld<"nts. 1 ~ 

Tl1e compo·ite course started on 6 April 

11 Rpt, ECAD Training Div, AdmiJl Sec, to Director of T raining Div, sub: Organization and 

Activitic$ Through ?.7 May H, in SHAEF C- 5, 

60•1. 

G5 

and ran for eight rather than six weeks1 

ending o n 27 May. During this time, the 

stndents, their theoretical training complete 

nnd pinpoinr nssignments in hand, were to 

have studied lhe towns and cities in which 

they would be posted. By April, a pinpoint 

location had been determined for each detachment, but by rhen, Loo, SI-Ji\EF had 

imposed severe sec:mity restrictions on 

any inlo ma~ on tltat might C'ompromise 

OvERLOJm . Con!<cquently, the locations 

<'ould not l>e re,·ealcd to the detachments. 

The disappointment was enormous, but the 

actuaJ loss was prohahly not much since 

the assig nments nil had to be changed later 

anyway. Ac; a substitute for the pinpoint 

training, all students took part in a fourweek exercise, an elaborate but obviously 

contrived military government war game 

va~ue ' la id out ·in the German Land 

(state) H esse. '"' hen the war game ended , 

the course reverted to lecturec; and con(erences sporadjcall y enlivened by guest leeLures 0 11 Gerlllnny, france, and the Low 

Co~tntries; langnage and military training 

also continued. Toward the end, in near 

dcspe,·ation, the fa culty rf'.sorted to demonstratious nncl dramatizations- a. detachment in action in n mythical German town, 

a military government court, bomb disposal -some useful, some not, an d a ll 

undisgnisablc t mr.-ki ll rrs. ~ Word that 

SHAEF would stock t he British Stella 

water purifier for use on the Con tinent set 

off a :;earch across southern England for 

a specimen around which, hopefully, mor e 

hours of instruction cottld be devised. One 

was found, hut then SH 1\ EF announced 

t hat it would retain the ab·eady familiar 

U.S. equ ipment after all. 

To the studen l officers the courses a t 

Shrivenh r-tm seemed most of lhe time to be 

ar1 elaborate effort to generate mass bore-

" Ibid. 
G6 1HE U.S. t\RMY IN THE OCCUPA110N OF GER~ A~Y 

dom while ntthe same Lime fls.<~:u tlting individual clf~r..s teem and possibly physical 

wcll-l1cing as well. Hastily devised wmscs 

led by instructors with no more knowledge 

than Ule students, and sometimes lec:;s, resulted irl disgruntlement that no amount of 

ingenuity in devising lectures, recitations, 

dcmonstt·ations, and similar activities could 

dispel. '·

1 The living conditions of rcC'ruits, 

unltratc·tl dassrooms, tlrill , ami crossl't>unu·y hikC'!'I during midwitHCl' nnd n cold, 

dnmp spring smacked almost of sadism to 

middlc-ngccl men who as.c;umcd, not illogic:ally, t.hal if Lhe Army needed them at all 

it ought to he ror something helt('r. They 

had (;0nlC cxpecti11g to be given important 

work h11t instead found themselves trudging ano-;s the English countryside or takin!{ 

cnnncd rourses and solving stereotype prohlcms. Wnr1it of all was the feeling of being 

cxrludcd from whnt appenrcd w he w~ry 

\v<Wthwhik and important a<·tivil)' going 

on around them. The SI-IAEF Special StafT 

and the rountry sections, which hnd moved 

lo Shrivcnhnrn in March, seemed Lo be immcr'Sed iu viu.J projects. From occasional 

appc,mmcC'I as lecturers by members of 

thc.~c groups, the student officers gathered 

thut the n·nlly important work w~s going 

on behind a curtain of security nnd that 

they wen: only maTk.ing time. 1\ morale 

stutly in the Civil Affairs Center in 1\pril 

reported the rommoncst con1plaint to be 

the feeling of working in a vacuum without 

knowing what was real!)' going on.' 4 

The truth was that most of the mor'e 

thnn two th ~a nd civil affairs bffir<'r'S in 

ttaining ll Shrivenham, barring n !Iudden 

dcvclopmcm of so-called R ANKIN <.:ollditions, were only getting a lnslc of the frus-

"SJIA~Jo' G- 5, llist Sec, F.ducnlion nncl Tr:~jn

ing, in SUAET•' 0-5, 60, Jncket 7. 

"Mt'JI\0 fol' Brig Cen McSherry, 19 Apr •H, 

in SJlAf:J! G- 5, t7.02. 

!ration they would experience before finding 

their place in the war. Sooner or later 

they would have to be so informed, hopcIull y in a manner that would raise their 

morale, or at lcust not destroy it completely. 

Consequently, 9 May 1944 was later re~ 

membered as the first day of spring in 

Shrivenh::.m by the students and as something akin to Resurrection Day by the Civil 

Affairs Center staff. Jn the morning, Eisenhower <u't'ivctl to inspect the school. Toward the end of the ceremony, which had 

included a more or less well-executed and 

enthusiastic parade, he invited the st-udents 

Lo break r<mks and gather around him, l'mying lhcy •'cminded him too much of a firing 

squad ''standing out there." Having implied that he IOO saw Lhc incongnrity or 

field g-rade offirers doing close-order drill, 

he went Otl ro ~ ... m·e them that they were 

not forgotten. Tht')' wcr'c as modern, he 

said, as 'ch , :u1d just as important to tlw 

command. !though humanitarian in its 

results, Llrcir joh wa!< to help win the war. 

If the)' failed, the nrmies would fail ; the: 

fighting rronl of 1 he modern army was 

"only the fringe of H tremendous organization." What Eisen hower said was less importnnt than th:u he said it, particularly 

his closing remarks; 

Now a word about what you are doing het·e. 

No commandt!r ('atl ever accumulate tht~ supplies, the organization, the men that he needs 

in exact liming with the existence of thnl 

need. In oth\ r wol'ds, he piles up rese1·vcs. 

for some: time you have been in reserve. You're probably getting bored, some of you. 

You are a little tired of idleness, particularly 

when some of you were extraordinarily busy 

men in civilian life, and you gave up mnnr 

things- made many sacrifices-and you nrc 

getting daltlncd tired of not being used u~t~­

fuUy in view of your sacrifices. Your time is 

coming, so don't worry. H• 

"Coles and Wcinhrrg, Softlicrs B e&Oiilt! Gouernors, p. 67!). 
SHRIVENHAM AND MANCHESTER 

Nothing substantive had changed, but 

the Supreme Commander had shown that 

he was aware of the student.«. They were 

at least not 1 he victims of wanton mismanagcmenl. To enhance the mood, the Civil 

Affairs Center sponsored nn all-da)t press 

t<mferencc at Slu-ivcnham on the 1 0Lb. 

Fifty correspondents attended. It gave tJ1e 

newsmen something to write about at a 

time when the security on all orhcr SHAEF 

activilies was a t its tightest, and the ensuing 

publicity made the continued waiting in 

the wings a little less onerous for the student officers. 

Although it c.ontinued in nominal exis67 

tence until the last week of J une, the Civil 

Affairs Center completed it'S essential work 

in May. By the end of the month, the whole 

anticipated U.S. rivil :-tffairs offi cer contingent for northwest Europe had bec11 assigned- and so met irnc.~, as plans changed, 

whic;h they often did, reassigned.

10 After 

Lhe training division completed the composite coui"Se at the end of May, there remained only a small course for warrant 

offi cers <md offi cers with no previous civiJ 

affairs training. Ever since the 6rst full de-

•• Hqs, ECAD, Extract from Hist Rpt, May 44, 

17 j un 4·•1, in USFET CAD 314.7. 
68 TJ !r. U.S. ARMY lN THE OCCUPATION OF' GERM NY 

lachmcnt, cl n detachment, was formed 

and -;ent to U.S. F1"l \1111y on 15 ~Jarch, 

the student officcm had been mo\ ing ou~ 

gradual!} in \p1 il :md in la rge numbc~ 

in ~lay, to join their detachments.' 7 On its 

closing iu jllrH', thr Civil .\ffairs Center 

left behind in St. ,\ndrcw' Pari~h Church 

in Shrivcnharn a pl.tC}uc and two bells to 

complete the churt h'., octave of chimes. 

~CA O 

One of 1 he fi 1111 lessons learned from 

AMCOT in Sicily nnd Italy was that mHitary govcmmcnt in lhc field oughl to be 

able to take c:nre of itself. The line troops 

there hat! frCl)trrrHiy hccri too busy and almost always too preoccupied with what 

they rega rded It<; rnort' important affairs to 

provide support ond services for· members 

of an t>r~anization who • acronym Lhey 

were indincd to read :L'l " . \ged Mmtary 

Gentlemen on Tour."1

" More often than 

not the AMGOT oflkcrs had gone into action with no more thau their personal gear, 

flags, proclnmntion'l, :-.orne stationery. and 

some lllone). The)' had counted them ·elves 

lucky when they had a jeep, a trailer, some 

spare g:tsolinc, a tent, and a typewriter. 

Their priority wns so nh~-s mally low that 

before the Sic·ily landing some tactical units 

hnd even rcf\lsed to ~mha k thr rivil affairs 

officers llt I~l SCivcs. tu 

Ci vi I alTai rs pin ns rc)t' IHWI h wcslcrn 

Europe ccog 11i~cd early the need for a 

housekeeping •gnni~at ion. The dctncbrnenl concept, developed under COSSAC, 

provided n bnsic unit ; hut 1 he dctarhmenls, 

although the}' wntdd he attached to the tac11 Rpt, ll ct~. F.CAD, (; 2, llistorian, 'ub: The 

Mancheste• Ph. se ur the ECAD, 20 Jan 15, in 

USFET CAl) 'HO. 

"C. R. S. ll:l rri~, Afll,.tf ,\fililtH)' Administration 

of Italy (Londow H. M Stalionery Office, 1957), 

p. 82. 

" I bid., Jl 21t 

tical commands, would not he part or thrm. 

Neither would the}' be elf-sustaining. The)' 

would, as . \MGOT hnd, exist in a kind 

of a.dministrati\'C void. T o corrccl this 

shortcoming, Civil Affairs, ETOUSA, had 

begun th inking in the fall of 1943 of creating a separate nclminhnrative cwg,tnizatioo 

for the detachments and in Nov1~mber had 

asked Washington to furnish ~cv~:n skeletonized military polilc (MP) battalions, 

that is, headCJuartcrs and rnrdirn l pcr':\onnel 

nl y.~0 T he dcrad1mcnts would be attached 

to the battalions which would go into the 

field with them prcwiding continuous administrative services n11d sttpptll'l and 

thereby integrating civil affair-s solicJiy into 

the Army. The Civil frail'S Center· would 

do the same al the top. 21 

Apparently because seven miliwry police 

battalion headquarters were not to he h~td 

in the United tates, General llilldrin ~ was 

obliged to in\'cnt the £uropt•an C:h il AfT ai r'S 

Oi,·ision ( EC:An ). \t the end of Dncmber he proposed th.1t in pl:tc·<' uf the 

)fP battalions, ETOUS srt up ,, divi ion 

with a nor mnl di' i'liOII hl·adqu.trttr;, 

twenty-eight wmpanifS (the equivalent or 

seven ba nations), and seven mc:diral detachments. The divL'Iion, he ~~~g~N~tc-d, 

ought to provide administr,,lion for nll ll. . 

civiJ afT~irs personnel in 1hc Curnpean 

theater except those :1ssi)<rwd to S III\ F. F 

and Headquarters, 1st U.S. 1\rmy Group. ~ 

Two weeks later the Civil Mfai111 Division 

approved a strength or 2,528 <liTiccrs, 124 

warrant officers, and 5, 147 nli cd men 

(total 7,799) fol' the division. or these 

numbers, 2,2HO n(JirCJ'S, 120 warr·ant 

officers, and 3,600 enlisted men would he 

'" ECAD G-3, Et:AO Or~eaniz:uion nnd Drvt-lop· 

mem 19H (no dntC'], tiSFF.T (;1\f') '122. 

~• Rp1, Hq$, CAC, ASC, lo Chid, ll ul Subsec, 

COSSAC, 3 1 Dec 4:J, in SIIAF.F C: ~. 17.1)2. 

:: ECt\0 G- 3, ECAD Ol'f(unit:llinn .ond Develop· 

ment 19H, USFET CAU 'J22. 
SHRlVENHAM AND .MANCH ESTER 

detachment pcrsmmel and the rc.'ll ~t dminisu·ativc, excepc for forty-eight instructors and 

several d 07.t.:ll enlisted men assigned to the 

Civil AO'airs Cente r. ~~ 

On 7 f ebruary 1944, by General Order 

No. 13, Headquarters, ETOUSA, established the European Civil Affairs Divisiou 

(U.S. Contingenr, SHAEF Prov ona ~' 

letter iKcompan)'ing the order nnmecl 

Coloud Stearn as division t·omrnnnder· and 

gave him a free hand in orgauizing the 

division within the War Depa rtment pcrlionncl allotment. On the 12th, Stearns, in 

the first EC1\D geueral on.Jcr, tiv<~L d 

the division at Shri venham and fMmally 

assutliCd C'Ommand. t the same lime he 

attnrhcd the Civil Affairs Ccntca· to the 

division, tlrerl'by E{iving dvil aO'airs out!)ide 

the higher staffs a single and :scpa r·:ue 

ad ministration. ~.-. 

Fr·om the fir:;; t, one thing cvcr·yonc associated with the division was nwarc of was 

that ~CAD was an unusual military organiUllion, unique in some respects, curiou11 in 

other-s. No unit Jjke il had ever C.'\istcd before in Amcl'ican history. Perhaps somewhat ovcr·cstimating the impm'tflnrc of Lhe 

distiuction, the division's historians extended it also to world hi y. ~ Among 

other firsts, tJlc djvision was the first known 

lO have been organized entirely out ide the 

coutincntal ho11ndarics of the U 11 itcd 

Stale.<;, <uttl it daimcd the rcrord i11 World 

War II ror achieving tombnt rcndincsstcn weeks, HS opposed to 1 hir·tccn months 

for the average infantry divi t1. 7 On the 

Ibid. 

••co 13, H qs, ETOUSA, 7 Frh •I I, in USFJtT 

CAD 31'1.7. 

" H ilct Rpt, Hqs, CAC, ASC, to Chief, i~t 

Sec, SllAEF C:- 5, s11b: Acti vitito~ ~t CAC, 1!1 Frh- 1 

Mnr <11, iu SllAEF G- 5, 17.02. 

'" Orafl ECAO H istory, Scp ·15, in USFET 

CAD, filM Doc fi le. 

"·ll q~, gcAD, Extract from !list Rpt, Mur <11 , 

1? j un Iii, In USFET CAD 314.7. 

69 

curious side) the ujvision had lhc overt 

characteristics of a tactical organization 

without heing one. In the field it would 

have no command fun ction. Its opetating 

personnel would receive their orders exclu· 

sively through the tactical units to which 

they would be attached. EGAD would in 

fact cease to he a unit in the usual sense 

once il left Engltmd. Some part of it would 

go whcrcvct· Sl-lAEF troops wCJlt. The sole 

function of the division headquarters would 

he to act as parent ~niz tion {or the civil 

affairs person11el, "keeping their records, 

promoting them as they deserve, disciplining 

them if ecc~;sa y, paying them, getting 

their mail lo thcnt, relieving them, Laking 

care of them if they arc ill, burying them 

if they die, and getting them help if lbcy 

need it. "::~ 

The division was formed inro t11rec rcgi· 

mente;, t.he 690 I st, 6902d, and 6903cl (all 

provisional} European Civil Affairs Regi· 

ments. The 6901st Regiment, with eight 

companies, wa:; car·marked for France and 

lhc Low Countr•icc; hut was to he tr·nincd 

also for Gcrm<my. The 6902d and 6903d 

Regiments, ten f'<)mpnnies each, were to be 

trained exclusively for Germany. Qll Earh 

company would have 80 civil affairs officers 

and 113 civil affairs enlisted men, plus an 

organic ('omponct)l of officers and enlisted 

men nol speriali;,o;ing in civil affairs, who 

would provide ~e ces and administration.ao The detachments were designated 

" Hisr Rpt, llq~. CAC, ASC, to Chid, Hin 

Sec, SHAEF G !l, sui>: Activities at CAC, 15 feb- I 

Mar II, ill SHAP.F C".-5, 17.02. 

" A fourth rosi•ut·•ll, brought into being briefly 

in the spring of 19•11, w.:1s to ha,·c had rcspousjhil· 

ity for ()Ricers servinq wilh British detachment.s., 

ru was also :\ fifth relgiu•cnt, which was planned 

hut not activ:~tcd . 

.., Risl Rpt, rt~. C:AC, ASC, to Chief, Hist 

S11hsec, SflAEF, sub: Activiti es of CAC, 18 :~n 1 

Fch H , in SHA F C:- 5, 17. 12, J acke t I. 
70 THE U.S. ,\RMY IN THE. OCCUPATION OF GER 1:\NY 

hy type, rompnny. and rq~i nt, hence 

D!:iB I was the fifth D detad1ment o{ B 

Company, 690 1st Rcgimenl. 1 n nc:Lion, the 

companies would move with the tactical 

c·ommattds lo whkb their· dct:t('hn1l~nt's 

wc•·c aunrhcd, and the regiments would 

station themselves as close as possible to 

their t·on1panics, 1hou!{h the) .md to an 

even '{renter degree the division headquarters- could scarcely avoid becoming remote cntitir'{ for most of the cletnchmcntc;. 

The outstanding peculiar·ity of E.CAD 

wa~ that only its smallest components, the 

dclachtnCnt-:, had an opr. '~lt i ng civi I 

finir~ ilit ary government role. ndcpt ndcntly of the division, they would be the 

in!ltmmr.tlts through which the combat 

troops would he relieved of civil commitment" nod the primary SHAEF civil affairs 

objective would be attained, narntly, " to 

en!-tUt'C that conditions exist among the civilian popuhHion which will nol in terfere 

with operations, but will pl'omote these 

operat ons."~' They would he small, selfcontaitwd and partially scl -suffic it ~nl ht~adqunrtcr~, which, although not de;;igncu lo 

govern , would have sufficient authority :-tncl 

po..'i.~<' ~ enough technical knowhow to revive, in~;trw:t, and supervise local govcmmcnts. In uoing so they would an·omplish 

the !irconcl S I 1.\ EF 1'ivil a ffairs ohjc<·ti,·c, 

whirh was to <Khicve the lirst with mnximnm eronomy of military manpower. 

In lihcralcd area~, the degree of milit at'y 

rontrol won ld depend on how well the indil{e tWll'! authorities functioned without 

n~~ist::\ncc. In enemy territory, however, military ROvcrnment, though indircrt, would 

he firm and C'Omprehensive, and each detachment in its own locn lit y would be 

11 Hqs, First U.S. Army, Offict• o( CA Officer, 

!tub: Guide to Jniti:tl Functio11~ v( CA Det:H:bmcnt.s Operating with Comlnlt tJniu, 27 May •H, 

in SHAEF G- !i, 17. t6. 

lOncemcd with tht: " 'hole spt•c lr'lllll of 

governmental niTairs. 'In the first stage of 

the occupation every deLarhmcn r would 

carry out the following essential actions: 

Covcrnrnl'ntaJ AO'airs 

I. Hold a confeJ·ence of local officials. 

Announce tlu.• military government proclamations and ordinances and make the necessary plans for f'nforcing them. 

2. Post the proclamations and ordinance•!>, 

noting time and date. 

3. Recon noiter the area. 

4. Mak(~ t1n·;wg1~11'tcnts for billetit1g military personnel in lhc art:a. 

Public Safety 

I. Hold :1 confe rence of local public 

sa fety officillls. 

2. Secure guards for supplies, important 

installations, C~ncl municipal recot·ds. 

3. Control circulation of the local population ( tq>erially displaced persons <llld 

refugees). 

4. lmpmmd all weapons. e...:plosives, narcotics, and rudio transmitters in civilian 

hands. 

5. ln JH~C l local prisons and clewntion 

camps. 

6. I nvcsti ~a c unexploded bombs, minefields, booby-trapped areas, and ammunition 

clumps. 

Public r lcalth 

1. t~s1ablish local public h~alth 

organi2ations. 

2. Secure care for ci\'ili<m sick and 

wounded. 

3. Repon inridoncc of communirablc 

diseases. 

'k Correct serious hazards in environmental sanitation, pa r•ticula rly i.n water supply and );<:'wage disposal systems. 

5. Es tn bli~h lltr·ict conh'OI over medicAl 

s11pplics. 

Public Welfare 

I. Re-establish local agencies fol' lumdling relief. 

2. Pr·ovidc adequate food distribution 

facilities. 

3. Establish information anu losl and 

found bureaus. 
SHRIVENHAM AND I "CHESTER 

Utilities and Communications 

I. Establish military con trol over all 

means of communications and all utilides. 

2. Restore civilian services, including 

water, sewage, power and gas, telephone and 

telegraph. and postal service as well as sltects 

and rof1ds. 

l.abor, Transportation, and Salvage 

I , Co-ordinate local labor exchanges. 

2. Establish control ovc1 all means of 

transr.ortation. 

3. Set up a system of salvage collectiou. 

Rnsources, Industry, Commerce, and 

.t\gric u It u re 

I . Prorure a nd provide materials a nd services for the military and food for civilians. 

2. Restore price a nd rationing controls: 

suprcss black markets; institute first aid for 

l'C!.toration of normal cjvilian reguircrnents. 

Legal 

I. Set up milita1·y government courts as 

necessary. 

2. See that proper proclamations, ordinances, regulations, a nd orders arc posted 

and published. 

3. Co-opera te with the public sa fety contin.!(ent and Co\mterintelligencc Corps on release of poliLicaJ prisoners. 

4. Make recommendations on local legislation to be suspended. 

Fiscal 

I. Guard banks and other depositories of 

funds. 

2. Require continuance of !oral ra.x 

collection. 

3. Assure proper custody of all enemy, 

abandoned, or absentee-owned property. 

Supply 

I . Contact local government officia ls in 

cha rge of food and clothing surplics and find 

location or storage poi nts and available 

srocks. ~ 

t\t SH AEF and in the higher staffs the 

main fu nctions would have speciali LS assigned to them. J n the detachment<; an 

officc·r rou ld be judge or prosecutor in a 

military governmrnt court one day, se,vage 

•• Ibid. 

71 

and walet works i11spector the next, and 

fim1ncinl, transpnrLatinn, raliouing, or 

polic<' expert as the situation might require. 

Sinrc E.Ct\D existed a lmost entirely to 

ena ble the < ivil affairs-milita ry government detachments to work, subsi ·t, and 

move independently of the ta<.:tiral uniL'i 

that they would serve, the division's table 

Of equipment WIL" its OUtstanding officerS 

who served with ECI\D might even say 

sole- as.'iet. ln the early planning, before 

exact civil affairs need<; could be known, 

Colonel Stearns had prepared a specia l list 

of equipment (SLOE) based on the stan· 

cJard table of C<Jllipmenl of a military police 

batta lion flltthiplied hy seven. T o the result 

he added for good measure enough jeep· 

and weapons carriers to bring the total 

number or vehides to just a few short of 

two thousnnd.33 In December 1943, Gencnli 1\lr 'herry took the special list of equipment to Washington. Al this lime the os.~; ible imminence or RAN I<lN assured its fast 

approval and secured for it an 1\- 2 priorit y with SHARF, <111 astounding))' high priority for civil a ffni.rs, whic·h would never 

a&tain hold any higher than A 6. Outfillcd 

with a gilt-edge hunting license, EGAD was 

emharras-;ed hy a lark of driver.~ until Frh· 

ruary, when Stearns recruited vohmtccrs 

r rom among the student offit·crs to begin 

driving the vehicles to Shriven ham from 

depots all over England.;

11 Later, when 

what was needed to make th e detachments 

scH-surTicienl was helter known , a revised 

special list of equipment added trailers, 

tenl'i, field de"ks, sa fes, drafting instrument , and electri c: and gasoline lanterns. 

ETOUSA's approval for this revi:;ion came 

., Rpt, Hq5, ECAO, G-2, Histori:~n, sub: The:: 

M:mchc<ter Pha~c of the ECAD, 20 j;m 15, in 

USF'ET CAD !\ 14.7. "Jli~t Rpt, IIqs, CAC, ASC, to Chicr, ll ist 

Set·, SHAEF G- 5, ~t 1h : Activities at CAC, 15 Fcb- 1 

M;ll' 44, in SHAEF G- 5, 17.02. 
72 THE U .S. ARMY TN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

much more slowly1 and Lhe division's G-4 

section spent most o! May, June, and J uly 

on the road scouring the depots Ior the new 

items. 

Allbough it was well outfitted- l>y 

AMGOT standards even lavishly- ECAD 

had a n early and persistent weakness; it 

was not n table of organization unit The 

grades o! jts personnel, from priva te to 

colonel, were a llotted to it, not determined 

by the organization al structure and needs 

of the division. This arrangement meant 

that throughout the division1 but particularly in the detachments, the grades of 

officers and enlisted men were those they 

brought with I hem ~mel not those a ppropriate to the positions to which they wete assigned, which were in fact usually higher. 

After £TOUSA made the alloca tion, the 

number of officers in the ranks of majm' 

and above was about half what the division 

thought it needed, and eight Limes as m any 

lieutenants were allotted as the division 

wanted. A~ SiJ1C:e the imba lance originated 

la rgely in the War Departmenl policy that 

virlun.lly reslricted direct commissions for 

civilians to the company grades, the rea l 

experts in civil administra tion as often as 

not were bracketed in the lower ranks. 

EC,\D reque'>ts fot· upgrarling were uniformly lurned down il'l ETOUSA, where 

Lhe reasoning prevailed th al by the lime 

a full-scale civil affairs organization was 

needed, the fighting would be over and an 

ample selection of higher ranks would hr 

avilable from lhe c(lmbal branches. Consequently, the prospects for promotion in 

EC:.\D were, and would remain, dismal. 

In comparison with the rest of the EUTopean civil affairs organization, ECAD was 

remarkably stable1 a condition fhal some 

of its members interprcled- with some rea-

$> ECAD G- 3, ECAD Organization and Developmenr 19+.J., USFET CAD 322. 

son- as a symptom of ~Lag ti on. The upheavals in SH ARF in the winter and spring 

of 1944 only barely reached down to the 

division. As a result of the G-5 reorganization in April, the country sections which 

had heen in the Special Staff were attached 

to EGAD for administration and assigned 

unit designations, the U.S. element of lhc 

German rountry section becoming the 

6911 th European Civ il Affairs (EC:A) 

Unit. 30 In M ay after wrestling for two 

months with the org::mizational peculiarities neeessitated by the grade a llotments, 

ECAD ~o ved part of the problem by eliminating one company each from the second 

and third regiment<;;. lso in M ay, when 

ETOUSA reacqnited an operating civil 

affairs missio11 ( in the:: Communications 

Zone), Colonel Stearns became Assistant 

Chief of Stuff, G-5, ETOUSJ\, and Colonel H enry McE. Pendleton assumed c:ommand of ECt\0. On 6 June ECAD applied 

a final organiza tional touch by converting 

Jrom provisional Lo penmmcnt ( l11ough still 

not tahlc of organ ization ) stHtus. T he 

690lst, fi902d, and 6903d ECA Regiments 

(Provisiona l) becnme the 1st, 2d, and 3d 

ECA Regiments, <tnd the 691llh EC,I\ 

UniL ( Provisional) became the 6th Civil 

Mf<1irs (C ) Unit.a• 

T h.e Manchester Phase, ECJlD 

In la te February, 12 ECAD officers and 

19 enlisted men went to M a nchester, where 

al the end of ·March they rer.eived am.l billeted 661 en listed men and 29 compa11y 

officers from the United Stales, the first 

large c-ivil affairs- military government en-

"' Ibid. 

" SHAEF G- 5, Opns Dr, Hist Sec, Chronology 

of Civi l Affairtr-Milita ry Government, ETO, May 

'1·1- 6 Jun 'f.4., 24 Dec 44, in SHAEF G- 5, 60, 

.fn(•ket 1. 
SrlRl\'F.:'\HAM i\ND -MANCHESTER 

IL-;tecl ccmlingent. 1\ day later, in a morning 

rog so thick that the rear ranks could not 

sec him stnuding fifty feet nway, Stearns 

c~.:wd the uew arrivals. He told tht:m they 

.. vould br speciali ts , hut for lhc time being 

th<'il' musdc..-.; were needed 10 ~et 11p " rC('cption rtnttr· for the several thou!!Hllcl men 

who would he coming after thctn. 

Mmwhe:;te.r was almosl the only lnt-ge 

cit)' in England not already s;tluratcd with 

American or British troop11. Thr British 

Army hnd a·cquis.itioncd some buildings and 

had established a system for billeting in priVFllC homes 1 hrough the loeul police hut 

hnd not ttscd them, except briefly for the 

Dunkirk survivors in 1910. In M arch, 

ECAD took over as its lornl headquarters 

I h<: i\irholls Hospital, a former orphanag"e 

built in the late njneteenth C'Ctllut·y, and 

:t cn Ji ed hilleLc;; the Denton h:\t factory 

plu.s thirty-two large dwellings iu Heaton 

MoM.~~ The buildings, vac;tnt fOI' several 

years, were dirty ; messing equipment and 

pluml1ing needed cleaning and repairs; and 

beds had to be ~e t np and mattres.c;es 

tllfT<·d. T he Lhr·ee m:~in locations were 

:'lho\tl four miles from ea<'h other nnd th('v 

did not h:~ vc a ll the ~pnre nc:cdccl fur 

offirc..c;, torct'ooms, cla...-.srooms, and the like. 

Thcsr facilities had to be sit11 ntcd elsewhere 

in the city wherever a vacant store, garage, 

meeting hall, or large dwelling rould be 

found . 

Ily cn rly pril, when nenf'ly lhr·cc tllOU-

!!nn<l enlisted men arrived within four days, 

1 hey con lei he taken otT the tr·ains ()If which 

they came, assigned quarter:-, ~iven a hot 

mcul, have their papers proc·c.'iScd and he 

classified during the night whil<' thcr slept, 

and the next mornjng be given their company and detachment as.c;ignmcms. When 

' ' Hi t Rp1, HQ$, EGAD, to Chief, !Jist Snbsec, 

SHABli', suli: Activities of EGAD, 1- 3 1 Mnr 4<1, 

in SHAEF G-5, 17.12. 

73 

the second and thi,·d shipmeuts al'l'ived. 

some men had 10 be billeted in private 

homes. At I he I 1cginning there was a Ourry 

of medi cal r.ct•tificat.N: presented by how;choldcrs seeking exemptions, but soon more 

space was being oO'ered than was needed. 

While Manchester, with its persistent 

smoke, rniu, and fog, was hardly a place 

.\meri<·nn soldict would have chosen to hr 

stationed, particularly in a gloomy wartime 

winter, rhr ~C. f) troops and Manchcstet· 

civilians struck it ofT from the start. Recreation was plentiful in every form from motion pictures and plays to dancing, boxing, 

and wrestling and motorcycle and greyhound racing at the Belle Vue Zoological 

Gardens, the :~rgcst nmusement park iu the 

British Isles. The ECAD soldiers met th<" 

people in tht pulls <~nd in their homes. and, 

inevitably, hcfor<' long some Manche.o;tcr 

gids wer•c lu~C'omi ng American wives. I n 

June a fonn<'r lord mayor of Mand1estcr 

publicly pmisr.d 1 he deportment of the 

EGAD troops in a newspaper article, and 

Inter Eisenhower commented that militarycivilian J'Cbt ions in M am· hester were the 

hesl nf any pl:Hc in the United Kingdom.3\) 

The enlisted ~\C n detailed to ECAD 

were not spcd;tlists in the sense of having 

been given prcvi<lus dviJ affairs training, 

and about a third were former Jjmited-scrvice men. These lwo c-ircumstances gave 

rise earl y to a rumor which was nevct' entirely laid lo re~;t, even within EGAD itself, 

that the dvil nffair~ enlisted personnel wen: 

mostly mental misfits. A few of the limitedsen·ire men had previous records of functional mental clisturhances-later !iomc 

were transferred in who l1ad broken down 

in combat- but the most common defect 

was impaired vision. T ile enljsted dassifica-

"' H ist Rpt, Aqs, ECAO, to Chief, Hi~t Sec, 

SHAEF G- 5, ~ub : 1\t:tivitics of ECAD, l- 30 J un 

~, in USFET CAD 3l<l.7. 
74 THE U.S. AR~ \' IN THE OCCUPATIO ' OF GERMANY 

lion sr.rtion found thr median ECt\D 

cnlistl·d nm11 to ha vl' an AGCT (t\r111y General ClassificMion Tc~t) score in g1•oup ll 

( 110 or higher) . He was between the ap;t.."i 

of twenty-three and twenty-nine, hnd at 

l<:ast a high school education, <Uld in civil· 

inn life bad ill'(:ll c·it hcr a student 01 a 

skilled white-collar worker. Of the total 

EC:t\D enlisted pcr~nnncl, 68 percent were 

in . \ GC:T groups I and I I <L~ ('omp:trcd 

with 37 percent of the :\1·my as a whole, 

and 61 percent wert• high school graduate:-> 

(t\t'll1)' average 41 petc-ent). About 20 percent had al least nne year o( college. The 

enlisted men were generally younger than 

the officers under whom they would scn ·c, 

only 2 percem h('ing over thirty-eight Cat~ 

o( .tgr, hut thcr lucl a substantiallcnwning 

uf mnturity. fort}·-si:< pt'rrent were hctwcf'u 

n~es twenty-thl·t•c nnd twenty-nine, and i 

J)CI'rCnl were o' cr· thirty .• \lLhough the) did 

not have .\ rnl)' <'ivil niTairs trainin~. many 

hal.l har kground experience superior lo th:-~t 

uf c;onll' ch·il aiT;.ir, oflkcr-:. Over firt }' were 

grntluntc cngim·<·r~ or .m·hitects. Four were 

rw lllCI' 11Hl~C.:ltrll dir<'rtors. Others ltad hc<·n 

lawycr·s, coll<.-gc in~truc ors, teariH ·s , polir c' lt\l'll, and .soc·ial inwstigators. i\l)()ul :30 

pen ent were . \ STP (. \rmy Spec ialil't 

Tr·airting Progrt11H) trainees, who in om· 

scn.;e constituted a potential <'ore of di~­

gnurtlcmcnt <S int·c they had cxprrtt•t.l t(J get 

C'Ommis.')ions. On tilt' ot iH·r hand, thei1· nine 

1\llllllhs or ('Oilc;gc training in foreign hmg'llrlgC''i and ot her nre~ ~ put them well 

ahc;~d in this rcsp('l't of manr of the olnrt•1')., 

under whom riH·y would serve. 10 

Ou 20 ard1, ~t:tj. D. I. GJo,.-;brenncr, 

thC' divi<.:ion's eM·< uti'c officer, rook rhnrgc 

of tlt(• ad\·atlcc cthclon headquartt'l"i at 

'''fit1s, ~CAI), Cln,,ifl<'ntion Sc1·, A(;, to II F 

C 'i, >uh: Clas>ifk:ttion or gnli~ted P1 r,o11tl1'l for 

ECAD, Ill Au~ 11, '" S!IAKF G- 5, 171 2, Jut kt!t 

-!. 

Nicholls lloi<pital and began the work of 

bringing EC. \D into cxistcnrc. The officers 

were nt Sill i\'cnham, a.nd the enlisted men 

were co111ing into Manchester. The task 

was to bring the two togethr.1· wilhin the 

next tCJ1 wt:cks, equip them, and have the 

three regiments ready to go into action any 

time they might be called after J J une. 

A~de from see-ing to details even down to 

road maps and .stationery, the ad\'ancc 

echelon 11:\Cl to make certai n that each 

officer and enlisted man had enough we<tpons training lO be able to ":shoot his way 

in and out" and that each kuew how to 

operate and maintain the vc:hiclcs he might 

be expcncd to usc. '

1 

The (jrsl r<)tllplcte rornpnny, Company 

n, 1-;t European Cidl .\(fair" Rc'giment 

( EC:.\R) . tno,·cd out on 14 1\p,·il to join 

First .\rill)'· The whole 1st EC.\It was put 

together by 1 t-. r ay and nHwccl t t) Shrivenham to await its call to join tacti cal units. 

The 2d anti :lcl EC. \Rs, with !'\omc vacnnl 

pen:onncl 'P·H (':<;, were ready at the end of 

the month. On 8 June, two days after the 

in\'ao;ion. t wu tlctadtnH.'nls, D5 B I and 

DTI31, lanclt'd on 0M;\tr,\ fk:1rh; and 

three: days later, D3B t was in operation 

at Trcvirl't• :1nu D5Bl at l sigtl y, the first 

-:i1.ablr t<l\\'ll' lihrr:ttccl. , .. ,\t tiH· l'lHI of the 

month fcmr romlx •ni<.."\ were on the Contint·nt. and the• divisit>JJ ht·adquartcrs had 

rlo~rd at Slu ivcn ham :111d niOV{'d tO the 

Kenilwot'lh Hotel in ~ [:nH·hc';;t rr to join Lhc 

1tndrploycd cl<·ments. 1

:

1 

But till' w:titing- was nol Q\ 'Ct' . Gcrm<lll)' 

did not lm·ak nndcr thr in\'asi(ln, and tht" 

'' Hi~t Rpl, llll"· EC:AD, In C'l11d, J i~t Sr(', 

Sll AEr (; •;, >lilt : Activitirs 11f C:A 1), I 11 :\lay 

II, in USFET Ci\D :l l-1 .7. 

" Drnft r.C:A I) llistor)', Sr·p 15, in USF~T 

CAD, ll i< t J)o1· 111r 

" Hq,., EC:J\l>, Jl i,tori:tn, to Chi1•r, lli•t Suhscr, 

SIIAEF (: 'i, ~11h: 1\cti\'itw~ ,,r !!CAl>, 1-:10 J•tu 

II, in S JIAEF G 5, 17.12. 
SHRIVE!\] 1.\ ~l \~D MA0:C:HESTER 75 

1ItLITARY GovF.RNl\lhN'r 0FPtCERS PRAC'rlCt.: Rtvr.R CRossrNc 

Frcncll showed themselves surprisingly 

t'.tp:thlc of running their own governmental 

a ffairs. The whole lsi EC.\R :;hipped oul 

c·a d)• in the second week of Jul)', and the 

J-fcadqunrters, 2d ECAR, with five of its 

c•ompanics followed late in the month.'' 

ln hc tcr in Jul y, the division 

hcadctuancr:o;, which after 0 -day had 

-.cc.·mcd not to have much ld1 to do except 

10 c·w11 inuc training anti wait for its call, 

suddenly found itself plunged into a rou nd 

of r( planniug. De,isions being made ou t11 Jl ist Rpt , Hqs, ECAD, to SHAEF, suh: Activitil•s ol EC:AD, 1- 30 ]111 ·H, in llAI F 0 5, 17. 12, 

J at•kt·l ·1. 

side SH .\EF, in Washingcon and London 

<tnd in the E.mopean dvisory C:ommissiou, 

added a new and important dimension w 

ECAD's role in Grrmany; besides providing civil affuirs support for the armies in 

combat, it would be required to establish 

territorial military government for n U.S. 

zone in Germany. The detachments, thus 

rar organized spcrifirally to a'ISist military 

operations, would nl11o have to become the 

executive iuc;trumcnls or u.s. purpoocs and 

polil'ies in the oc< up ti n. •~ 

The new rok rould not he ac('ommo-

"Sec mlso hclow, p. 77. 
7G l H£ U.S. \R~r\ LN rHg OC:C:UPXriOL': OF GER~l!\N\' 

dattd without rrvamping tbe dctachmcrlls. 

Organizc:d under the anti-,\MOOT principles of lite Stamltu·d Polk)' ~1nd Prorcdure, 

they Wt'r'C not c.npahlc of ndlllini~;tcl'ing 

ritory h<')'Ond the span of rontrol of a single 

dct;u lrrnrtn. Such ability as existed wa:; 

vested in the tnctical G-5s, ETOUSA, and 

SHr\EF ami, except for SHAEF, was to 

he <'xca·ciscd within w1it boundaric.'i, not 

politit·al hot~ndaries. Although they vmied 

somcwhnt in size, hence also in potential 

span of t•ontrol, the deuH·hmcnts (ormc:d 

only n compurtmentalized hol'izontal structure. For Germany they would have to be 

given a vertiral dimension as well. 

Zonal mililar)' governmc:nt nnd1' 1' the 

new s<:hemc, as far as it con<:erncd the 

ECAO dctn<'hments, would covet• nil govcrnancntnl levels ln Germnny except the national level. Common sense required thal 

it should also conform to existing German 

ndmini)(ll':ll ivc boundaries, which raised 

two problems. In the first place, the German inLcru;tl 11bdivi~ions vmiccl widely in 

area nnd popula1ion. For instance. one 

/,out! ( st:"'lc), Pna~sia, comprised tin~<' to 

twcHI•ir·cls of the total prewar arcn and 

population of the Rek h. However, cxc·cpt 

for Bavaria, whk h was substantially le'IS 

than hnlf the size of Prn."-'iia, 1 hr remaining 

Lacnrln (states) we1·e murh smnllcr, ~ome 

no larger than counties in the United 

Stale)!, and some amh~rrg :tnd Bremen were single cities. Several Prul'.<:ittn 

proviuc<·s, such as Hanover and the Rhine 

Province, were larger th<ln any of the uther 

J.acnrln cx~cpt Bavaria. I n fact t hr smnller 

L(lclldcr were more nearly comparable to 

the Pr·us.'>inn Regienmgsbezirkc (provincial 

di.<~tt ictc; ) . . \t the T< reis level the disparities, 

though still there, were less pronounred. 

The Lantlkreise (rural distrirts, roughly 

similar to small U.S. counties in size and 

fun<:licm) provided an element of uniiormity. The Stadtklldsc {equivalent to U.S. 

incorporated muni< ipalities) again varied 

depending QJl ropuln£ion, since every dty, 

whether larg1' nr ~;ma ll , c:onstitlltCd a single 

StadtkreiL Srwndly, while the division into 

three tmws t o11 ld be a· umed, whirh of the 

two western z<mco; would go to the United 

State.<: was not y<'t decided. The British nnd 

the .\merica ns hnth wanted the northwestern zone. Trring lO keep abreast of shirting 

argument'S hctwCl' ll the two governments, 

ECAD dt·nCtC'd v:u·imrs plans: the 14 1700 

North Plan" in mid-July, the" 1500 North 

Plan" in rndy .'\llgllst, Lbe "900 South" 

and "I I 00 South" plans also in August, 

and the " I I fiG So111h Plan" and " 1737 

North Plan" ;'It the end of August. (The 

numbers all rrfc:r•t•r<l to the numhrr or 

officers to he ao;.•;i~ncd ) The "1 186 South 

Plan," :1s mrnd~c·d in mid-September, wn!! 

the one finally adopted, but by th:u time 

the revamping of the detachments w~rs 

completed, hnving been based mo~tly 011 

the "North" plans."' 

Fi1-:;t ~s timatcs for twenty-four• nl'\v 

dctachrncnl 1ypcs boiled down fin:tlly 

to fi\'C 1 ypcs given the leller clc:-iglliltions E to 1. t: clct:\cbments ( 26 officers 

and 35 enlisted men ) wct-e originally conceived of as re~iunal detachments c-npahlc 

of admin istcri 11 g Lacnder and Prussian 

provin\'cs. They would supervise German 

authoritirs nt thtRC. lcveJ::; and the military 

government tlclarhttH:nts assigned to subordinate levels. ~ cktnchments were designed 

to fit in at the level of Lhe Regienmgsbozirke and smallc.t• Laender. When the 

soull1western zo11c became the American 

zone, E detachments were assigned to the 

Land and t•J~inullgsbezirk governments 

and F detachments to the larger nHmir.ipalitic'l. The G (9 officers and 15 enlisted 

•• ECAD C:- :l, :C AD Organization and Develop· 

mcnt 19H, USJOET CAD 322. 
HRTVENIL\~1 A'"'\D 1.\ . 'CIII ~S R 

men ), H ( 5 officers and 1 0 en listed men ), 

and 1 (4 officers and 6 enli!;tcd men ) detnr hmcuts were designed fot· Sladtkreise 

and l.nndloeise. The H and T d<·tnrhmcnts 

were always the most num ci'OllS, <tnt! in the 

i11itial di trilmtion constituted nhout (Clur-

(jfths of the planned 250 <kladHncnt ·." 

'J he ~ys tcm of designation C"otttinuc-d to he 

by d<·tachmcnt type, numhcr in company, 

and lCginwnt, for cxampk. I•: I n:i and 

1"21T3. The A- to D-trpc dctar hmenlS 

would not be used in Germany with one 

notable exception, Detachment AlA 1, the 

Bcl'lin detachment. 

Since regional detachments had not hren 

ttlrmpl ttcd in Lhe original S('hcmc for 

EC.\ D, their inclusion a t this time added 

some runrtions that in Grt·mnn )' were administered prinmriJy throu~li regional 

a~c cs, such as, tran!'portation ( pnrti<:nlarly railroads); os , telegraph, aud telephone ~rrviC"cs; public ulililiC'!I, education; 

ami religion. Furthermore, in all funcLions 

I he Gct•rn:m r•cgional agcnric.<; ('011C'Crncd 

themselves lc.~s with the puh.lic lhnn with 

management of the lower govcrntltcut;d 

kvcls, so f11nctional specinli7.ntion heramt! 

important. Whereas a t lhc !( reis level public hrnllh might he concerned mainly with 

rommunicahlc di'iea<>es ami sanitation, on 

th<· rcgionnl . C"a lc it would involv<· ndministcring health insuran<"e progl':rnJs ;tnd 

lir cnsing mcdiral prnrt itioncrs. In the 

Umtlkrcisr, tnmsportation meant finding 

enough conveyances to move food supplies 

il nd produr ts; at the regional level it could 

mean running a major scgrncnt of the naliun:d railroads. In ] ul}', ECAD hcgan ao 

ci~ht wccl.. regional progr:un to trnin 

offir·ct'S in twelve functional specialties: 

finanre; economics and puhlir utilities; 

C1\D, Rrgion(ll Stnlf Progr:nn, M<~mor:~ndum 

No. t, I Jut 44, in SHAEF C 5, 1?. 12, Jackel 

'1. 

77 

property control ; transportation: lallm ; 

postal, telephone, tlnd telegraph; food and 

agrintltur·c; legal; education and religion ; 

interior; public safety and public hcallh.•• 

The approximatrl)' 150 E dctnr hmcn t 

officers so trnincd were expected later to 

instruct the Rtf!,ierungJbczirk and ICiwcr 

level detuC'hmc-nt ofli c N s whom they would 

nd vise and <: uprr\'i~e in the occupation. 

The rcgio11al pt·ogram began on 3 July, 

and the detachments were recast and I'Ctld) 

to begin traini11g for Germany by the end 

of the month. Sin< c security reslr'irtions no 

longer prevented pinpoint trnining, tile 

plan was to familiarize each detarlmrcnl 

so thoroughly with rhe area in which it 

would opcr:'\lc that the members wotdd f<'cl 

at home th<'r<· ft·om the day ther arrived. 

even down to krmwin~ hy name the ~o c; 

with whom thry might have to do businco;s.tt• Eventually the detachments would 

get such lr'Hining. hut in August the war 

suddenly sc<·mcd to he moving too swifll) 

for it to l•t nrcomplished in J'l'lctndwsl<'l'. 

The i>c:lrlrhcHd phase o[ thr invnsicm 

ended in July. On l August, l2tlt AnliY 

Gronp hccnmc opt·• Htional. With first and 

Third 1\ rmics, it would make the driv(• 

northenst w:u <I inw Gem1an)'. The- Germans were in trouble in France and at 

home, whCfC' cli.sirlent GcneraJ StarT offi cer» 

had attempted to assassinate H itler on 20 

J uly. l mid -:\ug nsl, Montgomery trapped 

the German Seventh Army in the Mol'tainFa laisc porkcl, and the Germans began a 

retreat that they would have practicall y no 

cha nce of stopping ort of their own western hordel', if there. 

On I 8 J\ngust, Pendleton rcrci\'cd orclet'lii 

" Hist RJH, lltl'• ECAD, to SHAEF, suh : Acrivities of ECAO, I 31 Jul t•1, in SHAEF C- 5, t 7.12, 

J acket ~. 

., ECAD CA Trng Div, to CO, ECAO, snb : 

T raining Program Prol{rcss Report (No. 2 1 ), 2 

Aug ~-4, in SJJAEF G- !i, t7.1 2, Jackec •1. 
7H THE U.S. AR~ l\' lN THE OCCUPATIO~ OF GER~ Ar\Y 

10 ll1ovc ECAD to France in tile fir a two 

weeks of September and complctt' it~ reorganization and ttaining there while standing by fot' tluty in Germany. Th(' derision 

had been L:'llked over in SH/\IW 0 - 5 a 

week ami a baH earlier, the ronclusion then 

being that, if nothing else, the detachments 

would ucncfi t from living undct' fi eld ronditions:'0 l)UJ•ing the interval the war had 

moved ra!St, and by the time the orders 

rcaclwd ECAD, SHAEF had instructed 

12th Army Group to conrcnlrntc on preparing for military government in Gcrmnny, ''st<trving" France to r,·cc the ma.ximuttl number of detachmentll for training 

f0 1' GCt'lllany nnd being prepared if necessary to cUsmantlc the whole civil nffait'S 

tru c: tw c then in France and dispalt'll it 

to Ccnnany.t.~ 

The divi!lion had packed tsnd wrighcd, 

determined the cubage of its equipment, 

:~n d held a practice loading in J uly; a forward headquarters echelon had gone to 

Pt•nnr.c late in the month to take in charge 

1 he undcployed companies or the I st ancl 2d 

ECt\Rs and begin reorgani:ting Hncl retraining them for Germany. When the call 

('amc for the whole division to move, the 

forward echelon had its eadquat tc~ in the 

Chateau clu Mont Epinquc near Cherbourg. By then the front was moving fast 

nJHl 12th Army Group wanted the division 

to set up rnrther east. In Lhc fi t'St week of 

Sc·ptcrnhcr·, the forward echelon and the 

units untler it moved Lo Rorhfot·t-en-

.. Memo, SH AEF G-5, for Chief, Orns J.lr, C-5, 

ub : Atio1ln :md Deployment of MC Pcmonnel 

in German)•, 9 Aug 44, in SHAEF C:- 5, ll03. 

" Tht· one exception wrus Paris whkh, not yet 

lilu•r:ucu, was Lo be "given enough decnc:hmencs 

to do the joh ... [its) importance , • , in the 

cyt•s of chr world warrants." .Mt:mo, Bets, I 2th 

ACp, ACofS G-5, Opns and Pe"onncl Br, for 

ACofS C-5, $ub: Opns and Personr\Cl Meeting, 

17 Aug 44, in SHAEF G-5, 17. 16. 

Yvdines, thir Ly miles southwest of Paris. 

Unlit two weeks earlier the chateau had 

housed Gcl'll1an troops, and some were still 

there as prisoners of war put to work cleaning up for ECAD's arrival. 

On I September· the division moved to 

Dunham Park <I few miles outside Manchester. Simultaneously with this short 

move, the division assumed a new chatacter, painting out the "CA" markings on 

its truck and jeep bumpers and substituting 

"i\1G." Detachment commanders, previously called CAOs (civil affair'S offi cers) 

became ~tGOs (military govcrnmcnL 

officers). The tone of the tenn "military 

government," considered loo ha rsh for 

friendly ca~, lleemcd just right for the Germans; hence dvil affairs ceased to exist except in t hr dcsignntions of the divic;ion and 

the regiments, where the CA was retained 

apparently for the sake of euphony. 

During the several days spent at Dunham Park, U1e division completed gas mask 

and personal equipment inspections, and 

the officers and men drew ammunition, insect powder, t~nd K rations. On the 7th 

I he division began Lhe first serious Lest or 

its mobi lily as scri:\ls of about sixty vehicles 

each, carrying men and equipment, staned 

moving out of Dunham Park to H urslcy 

Camp outside Southampton. From here, 

as quickly as space became available, the 

division moved onto the Southern Ra ilway 

docks at Soul hnmpton to board ships. 

Nearly everyone spent several nights bivouacked on the docks waiting to go aboard 

the Libert y ships on the cross-Channel run • 

By thi..'l time, the ships were all thoroughly 

dirty and rat-infested from two months of 

such trips. 

WhiJe Lhe division was aboard ship, ofT 

UTAH Beach waiting to land its vehicles, 

word cante through on 15 September that 

the U.S. zone in Germany would be in the 
SliRIVEt\11 UJ ANO 1.1\ NC.:JIESTER 

!10\llhwc.o;t. Every detachment had to be reassigned ~nll fast; the first American troops 

had a lrcndy c:rossed the German border 

south of Aachen on the 11th. In another 

fout' dn y~ 12th Army Group was calling 

for four military government companies to 

move up to Verviers ( Belgium ) and 

Verdun behind First and Third Armies and 

he t·c:tdy to enter Germany as more terri· 

tory was taken. Because the detachments 

organized for Germany were stiJJ either 

bringing their vehicles ashore in landing 

C't'nft or making their way inbmd along side 

rm1d1> (to leave the main arteries open for 

pnMilY lralli< ) , I he forward echelon hnd 

to put together the companies from tl1e 2d 

ECAR detaduncnts that it had at Rochfort 

and send them off to the armies. 52 The last 

EGAD convoy pulled into Rochfort on 24 

September. Five days before, on the 19th, 

the first clct::tchmenl to operate in Germany, D8B 1, had gone into action a t 

Roetgen.r.• 

i~L Rpt, IIqs, 1-:CAU, to SHAEF, sub: Activities of ECAD, :~0 S('p 4~, in USFET CAD 

:~ 14.7. 

., Draft ECAD History, Scp •15, in USFET 

CAD, Hisl Doc lilc. 
CHAPTER VII 

Staffs for Germany 

Tltc Cermm1 Country Unit 

Jthough the COSSAC approach rcjcrt<·d the idea of national military govcrnt11Cttt headquarters separ:llc from the 

rombnt commands, the- C:OSSAC: phumerr-; 

lll clvc.~, before they were fi'nishr.cl, 

f<Jtmcl that they could not br t:ntircly con-

·"i'itCtH in applying the Standard Policy arid 

Pt•orcdtu·c to Germany. The o~row and 

Tehran Conferences had made the Allied 

ncfmini1\trntion of Germany aftrt tht: war 

a certainty. Furthermore, of the three 

phases Colonel Trouhridgc idcutificd in his 

report known ns Slash 100, the second 

phrtse, coming between the end of ltostilitics 

and the assumption of control hy nn Allied 

mmmission, entailed a period of central admihistt·ntion by SHAEF in the western 

1.Cli1C,$. H()w long the period would last 

could not he d etermined exactly, hut the 

fi rsl SHJ\EF estimate, according to Trouhridgt:, wns six months. Consequently, the 

Supreme Commander would have to be 

prepared to conduct military government 

in Gcl'tnany through the normal military 

command channels specified in lhc Standnl'<l Poliry and Procedure until thr fighting 

stopped, and through military govcnHnent 

tcc·hn knl ch;lnnels for some time thcrc·afte r.' 

In his first proposal concerning the SHAEF 

civil nn·airs organization, Lumley in(')uded 

1 lnt<·1v Sheet, SR AEF C-5, i~t Sec;, «uh : Interview with Sir T. St. V. Tro~tbridgc on t\cllievcnl('nls nnd Policy of British CC, 23 Ang 4•1·

1 in 

SHAEP 0-5, 30. 

a Germ:m rountt·y unit which would pt'C• 

pare plans and eventually form the agency 

through whic·h the Supreme Commander 

would control the lkitish and Amt•t•ir an 

zones uulil the coutrol commission wok 

ove .~ 

The SH/\EF l'eorganization of February 

1944, howev('t', influenced by the AMGOT 

philosop hy, disn:gnrdcd the COSSAC separation of thr two ph ses of military govern· 

mcm and gave the Ccm1an Country Unit 

responsibility fo1· exercising control in Ger· 

many "f I'Om the time: 1\ltied military forces 

enter Gcnmtn)' until such control passes to 

an Allied High Commission," that is, dttt'-

iug both the first and the second ph;tses.l 

U ndcr the rcorgnnization, the Gcrm;u1 

Countt·y Unit moved into the Spec:ial Staff 

under the DCCAO, McSherry, and on 16 

February, Col. C. E. D. Bridge (BI'itish ) 

and Colonel Tl'oubridge, assisted Jater by 

one other 13 iti h officer and Lhrec 1J.S. 

officers, Lt. Col. Bernard Bernstein anu 

1\Iajors Galen Snow and L. J. Chnwncr, 

began laying out the missions and structure 

of the unit. 1 TIH'Y identified its t<~ s aJ; 

being lo plan for ;~nd later constitute the 

ma in militat')' govcmment headquarters fot 

Germany, lO write a handbook whil'h 

would he a cm11prrhcnsive military gClvcrn-

• Mrmo, SHAEF CAD for CofS SHAEII, n 1b: 

Organization aC Gl\ nt SHAEF, 5 Fch •1'1, in 

S HAEF G-5, 35.06. 

• Cenn:1n Country Unit, Hist Div, i~tori<:nl 

Statement of thll German Country Unit, Aug •14, 

p. 1-3, in SHAEF cr-5, 60, Jacket 1. 

'Ibid., p. 1- 2. 
STAFFS FOR GER~L\t\Y 

mcnl tnanual for Germany, and w provide 

advi< c and direction to the milhar)' commands and to the other civil a fTairs echelons. l.umlc.:y, trying to prevrn l the unit and 

it" ambitions from expanding too rapidly, 

prupo~wd limiting it at first to a 20- or 30-

offitcr complement. The planning committee tcjcCLcd his idea, however, .md '>et the 

minimum initial so·ength al 102 officers 

with an anticipated progressive expansion 

of 400 to 600 officers. ~ t conferences in 

latt• Fd ru :~ry, General ~lLS rry approved 

1 ht: rommiuee's action, and on ~ Mnrch 

the 1 hit'ly-thrce officers then as.«igucd to the 

nnil bcgnn as.~em bling for wol'k in the Wat-

~on West lntilding al Shrivenham. On the 

!)th, Col. Edgar Lewis was nHmccl Chief 

PlannC'r ;uHI Head of the German Section 

with Colonel Bridge as his deputy. 

Colonel Lewis's appointment brought 

int(J the unit one of the few 1\meriran 

officers wlto had previou.ly done work on 

rnilitnt·y government organiznlion for Germany. lie wa:-; also apparcnlly nut :\11 ndvoc-atc of the AMGOT philosophy prevalent 

in the unit when he arrived. J\ s chairman 

uf a student committee at Charlottcwille 

in the l'pring of I 943, he had dir c'rtcd the 

drafting of a plan for Grrmany th.lt prcfigu•rd <>ome later CO .\C ami Sl I \EF 

<"Ontcpts. Lewis's commitrcc had cnvi,ioncd 

.t tntticnl military govcrnlltcnt 1<1 lw used 

as long <ts hostilities wntinut·cl; some 

months I.Her COSSAC planninJ;; inclmlcd 

lhis some idea. Looking farther ahead than 

COSSAC did, however, the commillcc had 

also proposed retaining territorial military 

govcrnmem, which would he instnllcd nrter 

rC'Sistance ended, under the comnwnding 

generals or the field armies as milit.try dis-

' M<'mo, SliAEF CAD. Actg Chit·(, German 

lJnat, for OCCAO :~nd F.xccutivr, ~ub: •'o rm:~tion 

t>f the German Unit, 22 Fch N, in SIIAP.F C- 5, 

lfi.O I. 

Ul 

trict cornmandc•"'· Such an arrangement 

wnuld limit the c;ropc of the national ron· 

lt'OI authorit)' in Berlin to matters lllWh 

as com nHin k01 1inn~, lr;:J.nspOI'lation, and 

money nnd banking, which absolutely required ccntr.d dia·nion. The commillt>C'J. 

report had f111 th("r projected a pool of 

trained militaq ~cl\'crnment teams i111il:ll 

to EC.\0." 

The hem or Lewis's previous thinkin~ 

was probably somewhat related to his assignment to the German Country Unit, 

since the J\MGOT-M cditernmcan approach 1,o the plnnning for Germa ny 1d 

run into trouble al higher levels even while 

it seemed tu lw havin.!{ a triumphant inception in the \ EF Special Staff. In February the Btiti h War Office had bc~un 

pressing for the early creation of a !>epnraw 

Allied <ontrol .1utho1 it)' lo take aU posth<Xtilities planning m'ay from SH AEF. The 

Director of Civil \fTai~, War Oflkc, pointedly asked tO h.1 vc explained the purpose· 

of the German C:ou111ry Un it as well as the 

"necc.'iSity ft)l' the institution" or such a 

group.; General !\[organ, the SJI F.F 

Deputy Chid of 'tafT, found reasons to 

jLL<Qify thr ,.,i,trm·r of a German unit in 

SH:\EF, but not WIC with as wide rangin~ 

a mil; ion ,,.., the pl:mner.- bad .~;et fot thrmselves. Morgan emphasized the need for a 

handbook on (;r1mnny; he furthcr·morr 

stressed both SI L\EF's responsibility to 

provide :1dvanrr.ci training for civil 1'1 fTairs 

officers nnd the belief that the "minor machinery" of .'\ J·:F ;md the Allied rontl'Cll 

authority should he the same in order to 

avoid duplic:-.,tion. orga 's explanations 

were not enough, however. to get prompt 

• Cerman (;ountry Unit, Historical St:urmrnl, 

p. I-7L 

' SHAEf SCS, Summary of Decisions, vol. 1, 

in SHAEJ1 SOS 016.1. 

• 1 bid. 
02 THE U.S. :\RMY IN THE OCCUP/\TlOI'i OF GERMANY 

War Ollkc approval concerning British 

officer nssignmcnts to the German Country 

Unit, and <-ls of mid-t\pdl, only eighteen 

officers out of the British guota of fifty-one 

wt c at work. By then, all the U.S. offi cers 

were pr<·-c;cnt plus twenty-four additional 

ruen temporaril y filling spaces nllmtcd to 

the Ul'itish. The shortage on the British side 

persisted throughout the unit's existence." 

In the SH:\EF G-5 rcorg;mizatjon in 

April the German Country Unit figured 

pl'imai'ily ns an embarrassment. The revise<.! SJIAEF thinking excluded it ft'om 

militnry government l>eforc the German 

surrender, and because of the British opposition, it!! ••ole after the end of hostilities 

was in clouhl. The handbook was ull that 

remained of the unit's original mission. As 

the plauning papers deJicatl'ly stated, it was 

"not o~iblc to foresee the exact requirements" for the unit.'" Morale hit a phenomcnnl low in 1\fay when for nearly the 

whole n'lonth nothing was announced cont' Ctnill~ the unit's place in the SHAEF 

sc:hcmc othc•· than that the U.S. personnel 

would hcnrcforth constitute the 6911 th 

EC1\ Unit in £CAD. When Brigadier 

Gucterhock on the 5th described the situation as "t'\ll'ious;· he was giving voice to 

a sentiment already widely held in the unit. 

l fc did m;~u age to decrease the curiousness 

somewhat by implying that, as SHAEF's 

organization ror governing Gcrnlany after 

the surrender, the unit existed for <Ul evcntu:dit y that was no longer expected to 

mat riali ~. ' J\l r<~le in the unit again im-

' Ccrrnan Country Unit, H istoric:tl St:ttf'lnent

1 

p. 1- 9. 

'' 1o, St"IAEF G-5 for Oi~t ilm ion, ub : CA 

0 1·gnnit.ntion in the Field, 19 Apr I I, in SIIAEF 

G-5, :15.011. 

'

1 nu y~is Sheet, SHAEF C- 5, Hist S('c', Ltr, 

C. E. n. Otl<lgc, British Officer in Ccrmnn Unit, 

to Brig 1·:. A. L. Cuctcrhock, $UU: War f.Hablishmt:nt, 23 M•t> H , in SHAH' Ci 5, 15.02. 

proved !<lightly after G-5, on the 29th, 

finally announced its dcsignaLion as the 

Gel'man Countr·y Unit, SHAEF, and its 

retention unclcr the Operations Branrh, 

G- 5, for· maucrs of policy, operations, hncl 

planniug. 1z 

On 7 Junr IQ44, the day after the Normandy lnnding, the German Country Unit, 

having 11 cvcr really fitted into EGAD, 

began moving from Shrivenham to Prince's 

Gardens, London. Its arrival in the city 

coincided with the start of the German 

V-bomb c:unpaign ~in t England, and 

in early J 1tly, 1 he 11nit's offices on Exhibition Row were wrccke'cl by a nea1' miss. 

The bomb hit cn•·ly in Lhe morning before 

anyone was in the offi ces, but five enlisted 

men were injured on the same day hy R 

bomb that struck the enlisted billets smtw 

distance away. Ncvcnheless in June ~tnd 

July, working in partially demolished 

rooms without panes in the wind ~ Ol' 

plaster on thr walls and ceilin&rs, the ~ 

man Country Unit ~ccmed at last lo IHIV<' 

found its purpr.>sc in the war. The handbook had to hr rini hed , not as an exercise 

but berau);c within weeks achm nt ~ 

might he in German)' and would need it. 

The unit ali\o bcrame involved in tlw 

ECAD reorganization, Lhe regional training pro~ra , the as.c;ignmem of detachment 

pinpoint !orations, <md the various "north" 

and " sm1th " plans for the British and U.S. 

ne .' ~ 

At the •mmc time, once the troops had 

landed iu Franrc and hegun moving, no 

one really experted SHAEF's Gcr111H11 

Country Unit to last out the summer. The 

British governmellt had never accepted the 

estimated !'ix-monlh period of SHt\Ef COiltroJ after the surrender and only very r<'hlt'-

11 Germall C(>llll lry Unit, HisLOriclll S1n1rment, 

p. 1- 14. 

,, Ibid., t>p. I 15- 19. 
STAFFS FOR GERMANY 

tantly contempla ted any liAEJ~ pcd od at 

all. o doubt, in considemblc pa rt the British attitude stemmed from un \lt1willingnes<; 

to see p.olicy-making author·ity vc:stcd in an 

agency of SHAEF, which in tum took its 

dit•cction fi'Om the Combined Civil !\ITairs 

Committee ( CCAC) in Washington. By 

late spring, however, hoth the lkili. h and 

the . \mcricans rea.lized tha t getting the 

Soviet Union to pa rticipate ill tripartite 

coni rol in Germany would be more difficult 

if the United Kingdom and the United 

States pursued a combined poliry in their 

zones. Brigadier Gueterbock had already 

strongly suggc'ited to the oiTicers of the' German Country Unit in May Lhal they might 

have a future as members of sepa ra te British and U .S. eountry missions but very 

likely did not have one as part of SHAEF. 

For the U.S. contir. ent in the unit, the 

dcnouernent began on 17 August when 

G 5 reassigned some offi cers to the training 

radre of £CAD and some to Headquarter-s, 

F..C:AD, leaving only slightly more than a 

third under Colonel Lewis LO await transfer 

lo the U.S. Group Conlrol Council Soon 

to he formed." 

The Handbook Cortlroversy 

The one task the German Country Unit 

had throughout its existence was the writing of a milita ry government handbook for 

Gel'many. T he job, though a large one, was 

C.'>Scntially routine, and the German handbook would have passed into oh~ urity 

a long with its linear ancestor, the AMGOT 

"Dihk" for Sicily and Ita ly, and the handook..<~ fot· the liberated countries of northwestern Eu rope had it gone :ts intended 

to thr. llliliLary govemmcm dctarluncnts 

and not made an unscheduled detour 

thtough the White House. Theoretically, 

" I bid., 1>· l- 23. 

£13 

the handbook wa<; tel he the only dot·umcnt 

a working militaf')' government offi cer 

would need ill the field , comp~wt enough 

to fit into a porkr.t but comprehensive 

enough lo i rrn>rporate "nil thr~ t . • . (hr.) 

requires in order to <'arry out his duty, and 

no morc."'n Dmi11g March, J\pril, ar1cl 

May, r<'gardkAA of its organizationa l ups 

and down<.;, the German Coun lry U nit 

worked on the h:-tndhook. It b ad completed 

the tJ1ird d rah hy 15 J une when tn editoria l boa rd took over to co-ordina t<' the 

work on wha t was assumed to be the fin a l 

drart. Scvct·nl hundred copies of the third 

draft were minreogr·aphed and disLributed 

within SHAEF and to civil agen cies in 

'"'ashington Hnd London. 

The handbook differed from the t•d a tcd 

comp ti ~. f?., ( 27- 5 and Stand<u·d 

Policy and Procedure, in that, while they 

were broad pro('cdmal guide<; u cd mainly 

by stafTs in plunning, the handbook dealt 

wilh n mt·r·ctc milita ry government problems antiripa ted in Germany. Its oulst·anding virtue was lhat it would save the fir.ld 

officer the work nnd protect him from the 

pitfa lls of having to adapt general procedures and poli<'ics lo German conditions. 

This adapta tion would be done for him 0 11 

every forcsceitlJie question in one or another 

of the three SC<'Iions of the handbook. Jn 

the first section he would find descriptions 

of the probable conditions in Germany and 

of the organizc:tlio11 and workings of military government. The second section, considered to he the heart of the handbook, 

containccl a chapter each on the twelve primary civil aCfajrs- military government 

functions, such as food , finance, and education and religion. For the functional specia lists each chapter was expanded and 

issued separa tely ns a manual. The third 

section contained sample report forms and 

u r bid., P· rr - t. 
84 THE U.S. ARMY II\ THE O CCUPATION 01,. GERMA ·y 

other basic in formation a nd the Supr eme 

C:mnmnndcr'!) proclamatiou, ordinan<.:Cl>, 

and law::; .~'1 

The proclamation, ordinances, and 

laws- a lso printed separately in t~rgc forlila! for posting- wou ld com;titute the lega l 

bond between the Germans and military 

govcl'llment. Although not strictly required 

in intern ation a l Jaw, the proclamation was 

assumed to bt' accepted United States prn rt ice. 11 Addressed to the people of Germany 

in the name of Genera l Eisenhower as S11-

preme Commander, Allied Expeditiona ry 

Forces, it declared his assumption of "supreme legislative, judi<:ial, and executiv<' 

power wit run the occupied lerritol'y''; suspended German courts and educational intituti s; and required a ll officials and 

puhlir employees to remain at their post:; 

until further· notice. The first of the three 

ordinances defined nineteen crimes against 

the A llied for't'C<; punjshable by death. The 

second ordinance established military government 1;ourt , ami the third made English 

the off1 c ial language of military governrf'lcnL. The law:-;, with gaps left in the numbering system to accommodate future 

legislation, fell into two classes: those necessa ry Lo establish and majnta itl milita ry governmet1l control and those dea ling with 

nationnl socia lism. Law No. J abrogated 

r\ine fundamentnl razi laws together with 

their· subsidia ry decrees and regula tions and 

prohibited any interpretation of German 

law in accordance with Nazi doctrine. OU1er 

laws aholished the National Socialist Party, 

its auxi liary organization , and the use of 

its emblems. 'q 

'" /bill., p. 11- 2. 

'' Departmanr or tlw Army, FM 27- 10, The 

Lnw O/ Land Warfntc, p. 140, par. 357. 

" USFE1', General Boa rd, Study No. 115, l.egal 

Pha$es of Civil Affairs a nd Military Government, 

15 May 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97- USF 

5- 03.0. 

On 15 . \ugusl the German Country Unit 

had a fourth dra ft of the h:mdbook ready 

for fina l npproval and publication. The 

forewnrd defined the scope as embracing 

"the objectives and policies to be pursued 

by commands and stalfs in planuing for 

nn operatJIIg military government. in German y wlH!Lhcr in the. mouile, lransitional, 

or static phase l t hal is, both before and 

afLc r the .')urrencJc,']. " 11

' :\t the time, CCS 

55 t , restricted to the presurrender period, 

was still the only direct ive SH /\EF hnd re~ 

ceivecl, hence the handbook overstepped 

SH:\ EF's authorit)' in some deg ree; but 

SHARF had directed the country units to 

keep the ll<.lfldbqok under constant examinalion and up to date with new policy if 

an)' came from the CCS. 2

') Until the Normandy landing and for some time thereaft er a German collapse or surrender be~ 

fore Allied troops had entered the Reich 

itself seemed likely; consequently, to develop e lab orate plans and exclude this contingency from them would not have made 

sense. 

Even though the CCAC had trouble 

composing agreed poli<:y papers, there had 

been no fundamental philosophical dis· 

agreemerll over the treatment of the Germans in e ither CCAC. in SHAEF , or in 

the other British and American agencies 

directly concerned. The 1\merican officers, 

considering the newness of their specialty, 

had a remarkably homogeneous outlook 

fostered by The Hunt Repo1·t. the militar·y 

government manua l (FM 27- 5), and the 

scbt1ols, C harlottesville in particula r. The)' 

a ll had read The Hunt Repott, at least in 

its abridged wa rtime edition ; many had 

'" US G1> CC, Hist Sec, sub: Handbook for 

MG in Germany, Comparison of Drllfts 15 Aug 

4-4 and I Sep •H, in SHAEF G- 5, I 7.05. 

~ t~mo, SHAEF G 5 for all Branches, sub: 

Role and Responsihilirics of Country Un its, 5 Jun 

H , in SHARF G- .1, 16.0~. 
ST AFFS FO R GERivlA J).' 

listened to leclUres by World Wat• I veterc\IISj and the belief tha t the U.S. administration in the Rhineland h ad been better 

than those of Lhe Brilish ;md French because it was the most ben evolent and enlig htened hnd heromc p ractically an a rtidc 

of faith. FM 27- 5 as revised in December 

1943 no longer sta ted the conversion of 

enemies into frie11ds as an objec:t of military 

governn1cnt, hut it predi cted that pl'Op ei'ly 

conducted mililal'y govcmment could 

''minimize belligerency, obtai11 co-operation, and achieve favorable influence on 

the present and ftllure atlitudc toward the 

U.S fi nd its lli es."~ 1 On 15 August 1944 

the Civil J\ff;1 irs Div ision had a proposed 

poslsurremler directive read y in whic:h it 

instructed Eisenhower to mainta in n " fit•m , 

just, and humane" administra tion. Under 

this directive, h e would be required to destroy nazism ::tnd fascism bu t also to preserve law an d <)rder and " restore norma l 

" Wa r Dcpa rttllcnt, l fnlly·Ni/11)' Ma r11wl of Atililary Govrmmc11t aud Cil,il AUnir.r, F?vf 27- 5, 22 

IJcc •13. La te r cri1 ics have somclimcs attrihutcd 

a dt> llbc.rate ha rdening or polit·y to the revised 

FM 27-5. (Sec Carl J. Friedri ch, eel., A meric11n 

£.,·perie••ces In Military Cooem mtml iu World War 

TT (New York : Rinehart and Compnny, In(;., 

l!J.I!l], pp. 37.) The manual dtlC!J. seem ro 

have stnlck a more severe tone by its emphasis 

on employment of civil affa irs 10 a id and promo te 

milita ry opera 1ions and its consecl'tenl appnrent 

<~banuo lle ll of the overt humanitarinnism of the 

I!HO edition. But hy I !!•13 thl' (OtiC '''as hound 

to ltnve clumgcd somewha t. In the interval be· 

lwccn 1l1e lwo edi tion$ the United Sta tes had 

become involved in :'1 wa r in which h umane consiclrr-.Jt iotls we re more thau usua lly d isregarded 

on hoth side~. Still, fo r its im<~, thr. I ~)<)3 FM 

27~5 \l' ots n rcm.1rkahlr mild documcnt. T he fl 

in approach was 111ostly toward recognizing civil 

aff;•i rs a nd military government ns having n place 

in tht tl.c tivc con ~tct of 1he war, he11 ce the concern 

wilh using them to promote t·muhat opera tion s-if 

n<:t:cssary at some expense to the welfare or comfori or c:ivilian popldnlions. O therwise, the Ul!lll U<l l 

contimted to insi~ t on ''j11st :~ d reasonable" treatment of civilian$ aHd prompt rehabilitation of 

cco11omies. 

!35 

conditions among the popula tion as soon 

as possible." T he econom ic g uide would 

have inst:ructed him to prevent infla tion , 

control prices, reduce unemployment, and 

provide emergency relief and housing. z

2 

'"' hile the Germa n Coun try Unit WRS 

strongly conscious of the deurth of romhined guidance for 1 he handbook, the basic 

lines of British and U .S. policy appeared 

ln he cle:tr enough. The CO SSAC pl mners 

had used both FM 27-5 and the Military 

M anual o f Civil Affairs (Br·itish ) in writing 

the Standa rd Polit y a nd Prclcedure and 

had not round any glaring conflicts. At the 

very highest level the President and Prime 

Jvlinister had m ade what appeared to be 

:l cleat· and public statement of combined 

pnli1·y in the Atlantic Charter ( 14 August 

1941 ) in which they promised the "final 

desl1'uction of Nazi tyranny" but did not 

exd ude l11e German people from the better 

world to be buill aft er the wa r. CCS 55 1, 

the pl'esurrendet' directive and the only 

conrrete piece of agreed p ollcy guidan ce 

tha t the German Country Unit had, except 

for its de tailed instructions on dealing with 

az , read mur h like a version of FM 

27- 5 ~l pl d specifica lly to Germany. In 

fac:t, except ~o ce rning nazism, militarism, 

repa rations, and wa r aimes, the German 

Country Unit assumed tha t the policy tow;mJ Germany would di£Ter in some e~ree 

from that for the other western Emopean 

tountrics but wonld have essentially the 

same tendency, n amdy, to provide as much 

supervisio n as necessary and as little as possible. T oward mid umm r 1944, p ostwar 

phmning p~tp s then beginning to circula te 

in the EJ\C took up the idea of German 

c:ollcrti vc responsibility : however, this concep t did not seem lo require changes in 

,. CCAC: 119, Directive for Militr.ry Cove rnment 

in Germany ( Post-Surreude.r ) . 15 Altg •1·4, ill CCS 

3k:l.2 1 {2- 22- 4<1), sec. 2. 
!J() THE U.S. ARl\IY H\ T il C OCCUP l'10 ~ OF GER MANY 

SHt\ EF's an~ IJt')lllld the stt ~Bl llti n of 

the tcrrn "rnilit<U')' government" for a ll 

rcfcrcncr'l itt the lta r1dhook to "c ivil 

afl'airs," which \V<~-" done by order on 28 

Jttl y.~:r FM 27- 5 had already prescribed the 

lel'm "milita ry government"' for use as the 

over-all dcsig11ation for civil a fl'a irs in 

cncnl )l territory bu l had not insisted on its 

heing ~ed excl usively. 

I n early August 1944, Secretar y of the 

T reasury 1\ ,l otgentha u, ose overt involvement in occupa tion planning had for 

two years l>cen limited to fin a ncial ma tters 

and the nomination of oc<-asional Treasury 

offi cia ls for rivil a ffairs appoiutments, made 

a tri p to Eu rop e. H e went to observe the 

effects of the ct~s ry's fina ncial a rra ngements for libera ted F rance; but, as he la ter 

said, on the flight over he cha nred to read 

a Sta te Depa rtment pa per dealing with 

postwa r policy for Germa ny, a nd he s 

filled with misgivings ~• I n London he 

talked with the U .S. representa tives in the 

E AC and discussed the SHL\EF pla ns for 

G erma ny with Colonel Bernstein, who had 

gone from the Treasury De pa rtment into 

civil a!Ta irs a nd had been associated with 

the Germa n Country U nit from its inception. W hen M o1·gcntha u returned to Wa.<;hington he brought with him a cop y of the 

German h andbook which, with a n accompanying list of his criticisms, he p assed on 

to the President and thus, not unwillingly, 

preciJ.)i taLed the opening thunde1·clap of a 

storm in U.S . policy tha t would be long 

in passing. 

"'See " Drafc Directive to the T hree Allied Comntaudcrs-in-Chicf, (;encral Directive for Germa ny" 

hy the Planning Commitlt:e, U.S. ~c s to Ambassador Winant, in Department of Sta te, Foreigu 

Rel11tirm.r, /944, vol. I, pp. 24-1-46. Sec also Ge rmlln ColUilry U nit, liistorieal Statement, p. 1- 17. 

" J ohn Morton Blum, Frum the Morgeu tlwu 

Din!ieJ1 voL II T (Boston: H ough tort rvtiAl in Company, 1967), p. :I:H. 

The errant hantlbook arrived in Stimson's office on lhe 26th accompanied by 

n pr·csidential memorandum w hich began, 

"This so-ca lled H andbook ~ pretty bad. 1 

shuultl like to know how it tame to be writlen and who approved it down the line. 

H it has not been sent out as approved , 

all copies should be withdn1wn and held 

until you get a t han<'C to go over it. " There 

followed p<lssagcs from the han dbook pertaining to economic re ha bilita tion Lhat 

MorgenLh:n.1 had singled out as particula rly 

objection a ble. " It g ives the impression," 

lhc memorandum continued, " tha t Germany is to be restored as much as the 

Netherlands or Belgium, and the people of 

Gcrmnny brought hack as quiekly to t heir 

prewa r esta te.'' T he President said he h ad 

no such inte nlion. It was of " the utmost 

importan ce" tiHll every person in Germany 

should rerognize tha t " this time" Germany 

was a defeated nation. H e did not want 

them to !\Larvc. If they needed food " to 

keep body and soul together," they could 

be fed "a bowl of soup'' lhrce times a day 

from Army soup kitchens. (The first vel'-

sion rcpon edly read, "a bowl of soup per 

day.") J-Ie saw no reason, h owever, for 

sta rting "a WP:\ , PW A, or CCC for Germa ny." The Germa n people had to have 

it driven home lo them that " the whole 

nation h as been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of m odern 

civilizatio n. " 2r' 

The J>re<>ident's idea of what the coming 

defeat would mean for G erma ny was not 

very d ear. A year hence most Germa ns 

=> ( I ) U.S. ScrHILc, Committee on the J udicia.ry, 

Suhcornmiilec to ln ve~tigate the Administra1ion 

of the l n tc rn:tl Securit y Act a nd Other Inte rnal 

Security Laws, Margentl11w Diary (Gumauy), 20 

Nov fi7, vol. I, pp. 1H 0- 45. (2) Cordell Hull, 

Jl·femoirs, vol. Tl ( New York : T he Macmillan 

Corn)lany, 19·1!1 ), p. 1602. (3) Notes on Conferr.nc.l: in Col Gunn's Office, 11 30 11 •1·5, 14 Nov 

·H, in SHAEF G-.5, 17.11 , J acket 3. 
s·l'.\ FFS FOR GER.t\1 \ :-\Y 

would have been happy to have three Jl)C<tls 

n day from . \rmy soup kitrhcns, had the 

,\rmy been able to provide them. In fact, 

his concept of the German poslwm· wndition wns probably no moJ't! austcrt• tht~ tt 

the authors of the handbook had as.<~umcd 

it would he and ''astly hrighl<'r than it nctuail}· was. Nevertheless, Roosevelt set the 

whole U.S. urcupation polky CliT on a 

<'OUJ'Sl' that would be difficull to steer and 

for too long impossible to ah:uulnu. 

On lhc :1ftcrnoon of the 23th, General 

liilldring telephoned Smil h, Eis<'nh<nvr.r·s 

rlticf of starr, and told hirn to "get to work 

right awal' suspending and wilhtlf•awing 

the ha11dhook and recalling :111 eopics of 

several draft postsurre11tll'r directives 

SH.\EF ltntl recentl y sent 0111 for review. 

fie s:~ id tha t "vcrr strcnuou,;'' objec-tions 

laad been raised "at the very high<.-st level 

on chc U.S. side:· Srnce neither the War 

Dcp<ll'tmcnt nor the Combined Chiefs of 

Stnff had iss11ed any postsul'l'cndcr in!ltructious, Itt added, it would be wc·ll "to h<:ac• 

in mind in C:cncral Eiscnho,vcr's own interest" that <Itt}' instructions SHAEI•' issued 

roulcl only npply to the preMtrrcnclcr 

period. ''It appears to us," rlilldring rondudcd, " tltat there may he st~mr considerable difference in what we do during the 

active opCrCitional period in tlu: tr-ea tment 

of those· \vho come under con trol of 

SII,\EF and those measures which we will 

ncl(>pt whkh ron1e through th<' dd<:at of 

the Cicr·rnnu J\rmy. Is that philosophy dear 

to yo ?"~" To Smith it w<~s nol at all dear. 

and he said so. The phii<!SOplty botltcrcd 

him IC'R'I thnn two pmctir.al m:utcrs whkh 

he hlunlly called to Hilldring's <lltCntion : 

ftrst, tlw tmops were npproarhing Germany 

and mighl I><· there in :t Cew days, and 

' l'l'lccuu, ~l<~j Gcn J. H. fiilldri11g, Col J. 

ll. Sh1'm1nn, 21l Aug '1-..J, in USFP.T Sr.S /2, 

vnl. II . 

ll7 

SR.\ EF c•otlltl -.:rarcely afford al this pCiinl 

to scr<1 p t lw hand hook; second, "on m<'lllcrs 

of such importanr.c:" SHAEF as n combined conHWUltl had to receive its orders 

through the Con11>ined Chids or Staff 

CCS ~' 

A day later I>>• urgent c:ahle the CCS lolci 

SHAEF to drkr hulh<'r anion on the German handbook pending instructions whi< h 

would he i!l'\ued " in the near future. "~· Th<: 

agreement of the British member-s in the 

CCAC to hold up thr handbook had hecn 

easily obtnin ecl. The)' were not bound to 

follow the Pt icl nl's wi:-;h es even if the 

memorandum had been shown to thtm, 

\vhich il pmbahl>• had not; but in the 

meantimr., the Wa r Office had cxprcs..;;cd 

its own trong dislike for the handbook 

which it dot umcmcd with a list of specific 

critici ms almmt as long as the handbook 

itself. W hilc 1 he British reaction ~:wed the 

CAD lhe trouble of having to engineer unilaterall)' ;111 niJOul·facc on a combined project, the rclid was mixed with disma)'. The 

BriLish cc\f11111CIIIS, on dose readi11,~, pmvtKI 

to he chicf1y c·om·crned with clemonstraling 

that the handhoClk ould not have: been 

assigned to the German Country Unit in 

the fi n;t plan· and now ought to br dom· 

over hy thr CC:\C ).~0 

The job of reworking the h andbook, 

however, did not go to the CCAC(L) httl 

to G-5, SH.\EF, the German Countr~· 

Unit having ceased to exist. SHAEF's w m· 

pelling intC'rc.<;t at thr moment was to get 

the handbook dc:nrcd in some form and 

issued before the lt'(}Ops made their way 

into CC'rmany. G 5 put out a hnst)' rcvic;inn 

dated I September in which it allcmpccd 

:r Ctth1<', Smith tu llilldring, 30 Au~ •11, itt 

SHAF.F r. 5, 25.:1 1, 

"' Cabh•, c:o" !00. CX.:S- CCAC, to SHAEF, 3 1 

Atrg 11, in SHARF C: !l, 25.3 1. 

,, llislor:y of tlw t:AD, bk. vr, ch. 1, p. 62. 
uu THE U.~~ . AlUdY IJ'\ T I-lE OC:C:U P,\TION OF UI \1 Y 

w disarm further nitit'ism h)' cmpha in~ 

tlw worJ.::-. im·wHiu-;h<·nr'" with a statement in thr prrfacc that "porlions sltould 

IH:come inapplknblc with r hanging d rcumstanccs" nnd by inserting a section of 

blank pagt-. ;1s a token of change. to 

comc.

3'1 \It hough the CCAC. after e.xamining the handbook closely, found it to be 

far fmrrl a had job and recognized 

SH .\EF':t url-{ent need for something to give 

to militar}' go\'ernnwnt onicers about lO 

enter Gt:rmany, the U.S. membership could 

not put its imp1;matur on a documenL that 

did not s.how some clear and serimr); effort 

to incorpotatc the re.~idcnt's thinking. The 

solution st' ltkd upon WH'I to allow Eisenhower to puhlish the handbook provided 

he affixed to the front of each copy :1 war·ning, like those on patent medicines, consisting- of three principles composed hy tlw 

CCAC, nnd had a number of specified r'evixions made in tlw text.:.' 

In the Jio; t of requited revisions, the 

CCAC tr·ird to tnilor tlw language of the 

handbook to the spirit of the J>re.<~ id nt 's 

rncmor:lndum :mel to the Btitish critkisms, 

which in many instances were not rompntihlc. :\t the :~n me time, the CC.\C tried to 

retain almost ~he entire ub~tancc or the 

ol'igina l cc::nt~c it came rlosr.r to the r ur· 

rent British and Amerit'an views than nn· 

other effort from srratrh evct• rould. Since 

the handbook had no chance of bring 

I'Crognized a!> definitive of either· British or 

United Stale.<; policy, most of the revisions 

had no actual significance; whatever national policy they embodied would be 

d more :lllthmitatively elsewhere. Only 

a few, therefore, arc of even moderate historical int crt::>l. Among· these few, OlH' 

'US Cp c:c;, His1 Stl, ~uiJ : Hnndhook for 

MC in Germnny, (.;ompari,on of Drarr~ 15 Aut:t 

·H nnd I S!!p H, in SH AEF C.- 5, 17.05. 

"Ltr, Brig C"~hn FosteT tn Charles Penkc•, !l 

Scr~ ti-t, in SHAin· C- 5, 25.31. 

~land s out hcc:lll!\C it !-lt:cmcd nt the time 

to get :ll the very lwart of the problem with 

the handlmok and hc,·nllsc· it stiJl illustrates 

the semantic pitfalls to be enrounlcrcd in 

this kiml of writing. 

In the original handbook version the fir-;t 

paragraph of the Supreme Commander's 

prorla ti on had rdrrrcd to Germany ns 

a " lihcmtcd" rountry and did not mention 

rnilitarisrn among the evils that the occupation for<'<...-... propo eel to eradicate in German ). This omission was easily rorrcrted 

by inserting a scntcnct: condemning militarism between one ·o rn d with lhc Nazi 

party and iLo; institutions and another pettnining to war ctimcs a nd atrocities. The 

usc of the word ' 'lihcra tcd'' in addressing 

the German people. howevct·. r a ised problems. The U.S. ami British planners were 

long accustomed to differentiating between 

" libcnuccl" frie.ndlr and "occupied" enemy 

territot•y, hut the .\tlantit Charter promised 

the Germans, too, a kind of liberation, and 

the wor·d "occupiers" was ruled out because it had come lo be S)•nonymous with 

"cxplniwrs.'' Furthermore, the military 

commands, a.lrea.t.ly feeling trapped by their 

governments' rhetoric in the unconditional 

surrendcJ· formula, wanted to avoid additional ~yc og ca l handicaps. The answer 

found W<lS the sentence, " \'\' c come as conquerors, hut not a~ nppr't'.'tc;ors"- -in Englic;h 

at once martial and pacific, forceful and 

vague. It had the 1\iml of lofty nmbivn l<'nre 

the Americans and British appreciated, but 

not so much lhe Germans. In German 

there is no way of muting the connota tions 

of plunder and <lllncxation of U't'dtory in 

the won t Hrollerer (conqueror), wh ich the 

Psy<·hologi<'al Warfa re Division, SHAEF, 

hurried to point out when the first copies 

of the ptorlamHtion ramc out in print. ~ 

u Cahlt•. PWD, SII AF.F, lO SHAEF Pnn,•ard. 

17 S(·p •1 'i, in USFF.T SGS !lUU.5/ I. 
STAFFS FOR GER1\ lAN"l' 

The search for a better word cvcr1tually 

weal ;dl the way to the Pentagon's top German transliiLOl' who substituted ein siegreic:hes 1-J eer (a victorious army), which to 

the Germans only emphasized the obvious.9~ ln Rngli!;h, "We come <ts conquerors" quickly found a place among the 

durable quotes of the war. 

The three principles, as drafted in the 

Civil :\ffnir-s Divisie>n, were r·eady to be sent 

to SHAEF along with the revisions in the 

lir.;t week of Se-ptember, but reconciling 

them with British views took almost another month. Point One in the CAD version read, "No steps looking toward the 

economic rehabilitation of Germany are to 

be lllldertaken except such as may be immedjn.tcly neressar·y in support of milit ar·y 

operations." Obviously meant to give effect 

to che President's strictures against any involvement hy mjlitary gove1·nment in restoring the German economy, it was a lso, 

in a more stringent form, something Eisenhower h:td nsked for earlier in another conte.xt (see below, p. 100). On British insistence a serond sentence was added in the 

final vet\'\ion which rend, " In accordance 

with this policy, the m;\intcnance of existing 

German economk c-ontrols and anti-inflationary measures should be mnndatory 

upon the German authorities and not permissh·e as in the present edition of the 

handbook." One of the strongest British 

objcniuns Lu (he handbook had heen to the 

use of the words "will be permitted to continue'' wiLh rcfct·cnce to rationing and price 

ami marketing controk Moreover, the 

13ritisil had not suppon ed Eisenhower's request to he relieved of economic responsibility and had ;trgucd that as mud1 of the 

German cconnm y should br saved as pos-

"Military Govcrnmellt·Cermany, Supreme Comm;md~r·s An~n of Con trol, Prurl;,m:~tion N<>. 1, ill 

SHAEF C- 5, 17.Q9. 

8!J 

Riillc.1

" !\ s :t :.~ ult , tlw f)rsl ~cn tence of 

Poim One ordered militnry government to 

do nothing to support the Gennan economy and dre second ordered it lo require 

the Gerrnan authorities to c-ontinue the 

controls that had susta ined the economy 

lhrough the war. 

Point Two went as it was written hy the 

CAD. It r~td "No relief supplies arc to 

he impot•ted or distributed beyond the minir nurn uet·es.,.ary to prevent disease and such 

disorder as might endanger or impede military operations." .\!though the disease and 

disorder (more often unre.~t) formul a was 

later frequently ritecl as the mosl inhumane 

feature o( the occupation policy, no objection to it was voiced in the CCAC because 

it had long ago been accepted by both the 

British a nd the Ameri cans. In its earliest 

relief planning the CAD had assumed, as 

the AT(E) Committee a lso had, that the 

Army would hold its relief activity to the 

minimum in liberated as well as enemy Lerritory, not out of in cnsitiviry or inhumanity but because winning the wa t' had to 

come first.=•s The COSSAC planners had 

proposed not to import relief supplies into 

enemy territot)", "except where military 

opemtions or the health of ow· forces would 

otherwise he jeopardized."·'" Standard 

Policy and Proceclmc established the n iteria for relief HS "a genera l breakdown of 

civil life and spre~d of disense" for enemy 

" ( I \ CC1\ C 122/5, Orntplllion and Control 

of Germar1y, ll andhook, 21 Sep ·H , In CCS :JH:!.2 1 

(2-22-1+ ), sec. :!. (2) F. S. V. Donniso11, Cil'il 

Affair( 1111d Mili/(lf)' r.()ltt!TIImenl, Northwest 

Erm>/111 (London : H. M. Staliorit:r)' Office, 19fi l ), 

p. 201. 

"' Memo, Wa r Dept, AC, for CG, ETOUSA, 

suh : Organi;mlion :111d Plans for <.:onduct of Civil 

AITnirs, 29 Jul 43, in Admin H lst Collection, 

ETO USA No. H G. 

'"' Memo, COSSAC, Chief, CA Uiv, for Branches, 

sub : CA Administra tive Appreciation, Nov 4:!, in 

SHAF.F 0 -!i, 11.02. 
~HJ TilE U.S. ARMY It\ --niL~ OCCUP.\TION Of' GEl\J\1 ~Y 

tc• ritory and ' 'the development of conditions whidt mi~ht interfere with milit:"tt')' 

upcraticm~·· feu· liiH r:tttd pop11lations. (;(:S 

55 1 used tht~ discaM' nncl llllt -:.~ l form11la 

in its text, llltt in the ct·ontHnir <111d relief 

gttidc. it mudc the o;t,mtlard of rdid for 

Ge-rman~ th\' s;u11l' ., ~ for liberated 

t'CJutttrics. ,, 

Thr first ~<·ntclHT uf Point Three, written 

in the C:.\1), read, "Lindt••· no c·ir·rum-

'\l;'ut<' e.'\ shall :\rlive 'azi-; or ardent sympathizers IH· r<•tnincd in nllk<· for purposes 

nf administrative rOJ1\'Cnicnce or expedi-

<' 11<')'." The handbook hnd t·ontemplatcd. 

us had anyortc who had given thought to 

the subjt:ct, tlw nec-essary usc of some Germans with unique technical skills even 

though th<')' were Nazis. Point Three closed 

the door on "active Nazis and ardent sympathizers" witho11t defining cilher one. The 

two conduding ·entem:cs, both Briti,;h in 

ori~in , added: "The Nazi Party and all 

subsidiar}' organizations shall be dissoh'cd. 

The .tdministrati\'e machinery of ccr•tain 

dissolved N:w,i organizations may he used 

when m·cc.ssary to provide t·crtain essential 

funrt ions as rclief, health, and sanitation:'25 Poim Three is notable a:-; the first 

Olltr·ight plunge into the semantic jungk 

of denazification. This point rejected expediency where inclividu<~ls were concerned 

but appeared to <.'ondonc it at lcnst in the 

rase of o;omc organizations. (_'\n allcmpt 

was made Inter to correct this apparent 

contradiction h}' estnhlitlhing the scconrl 

pnrl as a stparnte fomth point.) The third 

principle also aSSttmcd that the cntcgoricc; 

''active Nazi'' and ''ardent sympathizer" 

" (I) SIIAEF, Stru1dunl Poliry :~nd Proc·cdurc, 

Pll- 20 and 35. {2 l CCAC (l!l/ 6, Mt'nto hy Oir, 

CAD, suh: Ci\ili:m Rclit•f iu Gcrm:\11)'. t 'l Jul 

1-1, in SII AP.J.' (; ~. :l.a. 

"Gault, C<:S to SIIAEl: Maiu, 6 Oc-t I J, !11 

ASW 370.11. 

wouJd he as scl[-cvi<.knt on the ground in 

Gennan)' a~ they '""' ' e a<:rOS-<; tht• . \tl:tntitin Wa.;hington. 

When I he CCS tra11 111itt ed tltc three 

prindplc..-; to SH.\EF on 6 Octohet·, it pronuutw,•d the finn SH \£F revision of th(' 

hnndhnok "greatly improved but not yet 

-;atisfactot') ·· and <t1tll1ot ized a tlliuimum 

distrilmLion pt•ovidcd the principles were 

pmntincntly allarlted al the frout. "1

' !\ second revision was cmnplctcd in mid-Octoher, just iu time t<1 be put out of dalt' by 

E-\ C decisions on the zones and control 

machit1CI')' w!tit h 111adc another revision 

necessat•y in December. 10 Once it had been 

printctl and distributed in December, the 

handbo()k promptly fndcd from the higher 

cchclllns' ,·jew. ,\s an <JITicer in SH t\ EF 

stated <.luring the controversy, " . . . nobody ever reads handbooks anyhow, except 

\·cry junior offirers whose suhsccptt•nt actions t:an It ave very little effect.''" The 

three principles, on the other hand, had 

a life of their own. They constituted, presurnai,J y, an expression of War Department 

polity based on the- Prc.-;ident's dc.,'lircs, and 

as a CCS documcut they became agreed 

combined policy, of which Lhere was a nd 

would he very little. J\s such they had the 

force of a hasic dirct·ti ve in all mallet'S ll1 

which they applied. Viewed in this light, 

they appear sevrrc, cwn harsh. Studied 

iudividually, however, they reveal an ambiva lcure almolll too st r·iking to he accidental ; even aside fr<>m tht: British 

contri butions, the sc,·<·rity Wi'ls at least as 

11111( h rhetorical as real. 

'' Ibid. 

"'Aol:tly~i' Shr,.t, S I!AE.F G- 5, H ist Se<', 3 Dec 

H, in SHAr~f' G-5, 25.!11. 

"IM, 1 .. F. Field, SHARF G- 5, EconomiC'$ and 

Supply tlr>lnch, to F. ll oU''· Uritish Elcm~·oll, t:outrot Count il for Gctmnny, 2 Oct -1-1, in liAEI~ 

G- 5, 25.:11. 
ST. \I-I'S 1-'0R CER~! \ 

The C:.S. Grmtjl ( onlrol CtJuw il 

\\ ith tlw in"·''ion imrnim·nt in the l.ttc 

~pri ng of I tJ.H, no dcC'i.,inn had )'et. been 

reached m the E.\ C on the mechan1c.s of 

tripartite rcmu ul in Gt·• tn:llt) .tfter the 

-;urrcnder. Ind<'pcndcntly, the j{ 'Sin Washin"ton .md the Briti' h <tuthorit ic-; in London h:ul ttlllllllclt•d t•.uly in the year that, 

initially at lca-;t, the three commanding 

general.:; would hl'.td :1 n·ntr~d authority to 

which the JCS ~ave the name "Control 

Council" and till' Bl'iti , ''( :ontrol Cornmission. ~ Both had n.rccptccl the three 

phast:s used hy SJ(,\1•: 1' a military .~hase 

during attivc hostiliti<..-.;, a transJt•onal 

pha.~c after the Slll'l't·ndcr, nnd a phase o! 

permanent Allit:d C'ontrol hut they tended 

to disagree un the dwatitm and form of 

control appropriate to each phase. !he 

JCS saw the fi•,l twc1 pha!.c.:; as csse nt~a_ll> 

mililary and poo.,ihl)' extensive; the Bnttsh 

wanted them to he lu ief, even fleeting, and 

wished to mo\t' intu permanent direct 

control I>\ thr ~m cttllnt'llh almost immcdia telr. Tt{c worcl'i "rouncil" :1nd "commission., htt';unc :.)'11\holh cmhodimcnlS of 

these divergent views and adherence to 

them bcn 1111c, ht·nt <', almo~l a point of national honor. 

As D-day app• o:whccl and pas.<>cd, Eisenhower had a prohlcrn. As Supreme Comma nder IH' had n military government 

organi?:aticm that !'OI1~idcrcd iL<;clf ftllly capable of govc:l'lli•l!-t' as tl\ltl'h of CcmH1n.y as 

might fall to the Briti h and Amencan 

combined forces; however, :ls Commanding General, ETO USA, he had not. ~ven 

an cmbq•o <.li'J.:<llliz;ttion lo head m1lllary 

"' ( I ) JCS lllbtl I I, i\tlminiMt.tli?" nr ~filitary 

Go,·crumenl in Grrm;my O{tllfMliC>JI l'cn od, 22 

Feu II, in SIII\P..F C: 'i, 10. ( 2) F.AC (H ) 3, 

Mernornud11111 hy the Umlt·tl 'Ku11tdom ep e.~ n.tati'-c to tlu.• ~HrOJit'.lll i\dvhory Commiss•.on 

( Strnnlf , l'i j ,.,, 11 , 111 St.lh' l>l'llartml'nl, Fourgn 

Udotions, 1941. \ol I. I'll· I :.1 57. 

government in cl lJ.S. /.One or lO ~>rm th.<.• 

U.S. elcmem of ,, t<mtrol auth(lnt). Jia .. 

own prderence w." for ,, p<'• mancnt combined administration in the wc,tcm V Ille..,. 

but. in this opinion he was cn•t of tunc wilh 

both \\'a."hington and London.' 1hc .JC. 

and the Pr idenl were convinced of the 

neccssitr of sepa1 :He 1.oncs to prole< t the 

national interest. The Briti-;h had nlrrndy 

betrun planning tht•i t ckmrnl of thr ConLT~i Council / Commi<>'iion in late 1943 nne! 

hy early 1944 had set. t~p one mcnt of 

it the Control Conllntsston ( M dttary Sccti~Jn) (CCMS). 11 In the F.AO, tht~ British 

delegation proposed on 2 May 1!!44 that 

the Control Commission he prcpnrecl to 

take over in the " middle" (sc<'ond ) period 

"at. the earlie.'>l ihlc date" and that n 

British-. \merican-Soviel team for tht• pur· 

pose be formed iu London soon .• s 

The U.S. delegation in the E.\C bega n 

work in ~lar on il\ own pi'Opnsals for <'Cifl· 

trol madlinery and prc,C'nted ,\ pl.lll on a 

June in which it (',lllcd for the early Nnhli ·hmenl of Control Counril l'adrl"'i. ,~, The 

planning commillce of the U .. delegation 

als{) drafted principles rd .l tin ~ to the nature and functions of a l'CHUrol roum il. On 

19 June thr<ie prim iplcs began t~~~~ !'rm ~~.:; 

of clearance through the tklq~at•on s mllstary advisers, submission to ashin~l<lll, . R A(' I ' an•d eventual prcscntaticm in lhl' .n •· · 

~· LLr E. R. Stcuiuiu~ w lion Wm. Phillip . 

11 1\-la~ ·H, ami Ltr, F.iNcrthowcr lu Marshall, 

27 Mny H, in USFF.T SCS :n I. 11 Donnison, Cit MC:, Nvl'lhl,>rsl F.taiiJI(', p. 250. 

"f:.AC (H) 17, Memoramhnn hy lhc U~itcc.l 

Kingdom Rcprcsentntivc 10 tlw P.u.ropcrtn Ad v~5ory 

Coeumission (Strang ), <! 1\lay II, 111 SHill' Dcpnrl· 

ment, Foreign Relatious, /1)4·1, vol. I, pp. 21.' . t6. 

•• Ol\!CUS, Hist Div, ll t~ltt y, Offin· of 1\lllnnry 

Co·,·ernmcnt for Germany (U.S I (U.S. Croup 

Co1ntrol Counc.l). to No' l'i, 111 0 .\IC:l'S 12 1/ 'i, 

p. 2. I 

" (I ) fbitl. ( 2 ) No. lliK'ill, .\rnh.,<~:ador 111 t 11: 

United Kingdom to lhe Sccrt'IM) of St.llt',. II 

J ul ·PI, in Department of St;lll', F o ttlf!./1 Rt'/atro11s, 

/Q-,!4-, \'OL (, pp 246 18. 
TilE U.S. ART\JY t . THE OCCUPATION OF GERt\fAN\' 

SHAEF alway:~ £ollowcd what went on 

in the EAC C'loscly and especially so beginning in May when the British showed 

themselves determined to set up their Control Commis.«ion as the prinripal posthostilitics planning agenc-y for Germany. Jn 

May, Eisenhower brought General Wir·kcrsham into SrtAEF to assume the rolt· of 

deputy chief of the European Allied Contact Section in audition to his duties as War 

Department adviser to :\mba!>.c;ador 

Winant in !he E.\C. (Wickersham hnd 

he en transfcr•rcd to Winant's staff in J anuary. ) The Control Council/ Commission 

plans, •specially in the- British version. 

could e:t.'lily result in another AMGOT, 

which hy 1hcn was an anatherna in SHAP.f 

policy, though not necessarily to all of the 

individual:: in G- 5. t\s a pr:'lctical nl<ltler, 

lwwcv<'r', gi~c nhowcr had al·o to consider 

that om·c the inva.sion had succeeded, the 

t'tHl for GnmitO)' might come fast; furthcr·-

morc, as of June, his ow11 authority to plan 

Cot lhe titne ~t (ter swTt:ndcr as commander 

llf 1 he 13riti:~h and U.S. forces was at best 

doubtful. Worse, as the prospective chid 

U.S. rcprr;!;rntalivc in :'1 tripartite administration, he had no resoun·cs for planning 

;1nd none existed anywhere: else other than 

in the EAC:, which so far had produced 

VCI')' lillie. ~ 

General UeShcrry, chid of the newly 

crea ted Oprrn.tions Br:-~m , G- 5 , SHAEF, 

advocated immediate creation of a tripartite rontrol Ol'ganization, arg1.1ing lhat tinH: 

was short. ~k~hcrry. who h;tcl earlier ticfended the A~lGOT S)'StCrn, also believed 

that the military r.omm:mdcrl' ought to ht· 

relieved of all military gover•nmcnt responsibilities s soon as the lripnrtile body 

could he C"t<:d>lished iu Berlin. 11' /\s (:om-

"SHJ\ EF C .j, :\lin of lsi Weekly 01111~ Or, 

G- 5, Mtg, 7 Jun 44 , iu SJIAEF G-5, 15.05. 

•• Draft, fr0111 Urig Cen McSherry 10 •• , mh: 

manding Gcncml, E'i OUS.\, however, 

Eisc11howcr was k~ rcmcerned ,,·ith the 

need for· a tripartite plflnning agt•nr)' than 

with the possibility that the EA< : might 

bring one into being before he had anything to contrihutr to it. The Rw-.sians were 

unprcdict;tblc. Their clement might never 

appear- as in fact it did not--on the other 

hantl, it might show up one day full y organized anti n .:ilU)' for' work. The British 

had the Control Commis.o;iou ilitary Sc("-

tion J ( CC~ ) ~tnd ltnlf a dozen groups in 

the Furcign OITit c :md Cabinet Office wajting lO he c:onvertcc.J intu control sections. 

ETOUS,\ had nothing.n•• 

On 20 June, \-\1ickcrsham left by pl:mc 

on a :.pccial mi~ion to W ashington carrying with him n memorandum from Eisenhower to the JC:S. The mis.'iion was a 

delicate OtK I or<' was involved than just 

crcatin~ another planning staff. SH:\EF as 

yet had nu authority to plan for the period 

after sul'rcnder. The E. \C had sut h authotity, hut the surrender might very well come 

before the Ei\C completed its work; consequcntl)', SH.\EF was the logical and only 

body ntpable of instituting and condm;ting 

military government in Germany ~..lurin g 

the initial post~ur-r<'ndcr period. To fulfill 

this potential, SHA EF woulc.J have to havt" 

a hand in the post~w·rcnder pbnning and 

he tlw E.\C\ executive agcnq• then, as it 

already Wt\S the CCS <~gcncy for the prcsurrendcr· perirJd_ The tri c-k was to find a place 

for the Control Council, which would be 

both a ncrcs.c:ity and :111 innmvcnicnce and 

'"hkh would have to be hath fostered and 

restrained. How surh a task would lw :'ICcomplillh<'cl was, no doubt, what Wickersham went along to explain. Eisenhower 

Fonuation o( Trip:mlle Coulrol Commi~~ion for 

Gt•mmuy, 13 Jun H, in SHAEF G 5, !'!. 

"'' Ltr, Brig Hcymau 10 Cen l\tcShPrty, 2 Jun 

H, iu SITA£1~ G-!i, !i, 
STAFFS FOR GER~lANY 

implir.cl that it woultl be done through eonlrollt·d development. Jlc nsked lo have 

<1ppoi11ted under him as Commanding Gcuaal, F.TOUS:\ , a deputy chid for the 

Contml Council a nd a nucleus group to 

,·on!list mostly of a rountcrpmt of the British Contr·ol Coundl rlemcnt, the CCMS. 

~XC'(' pt rm· tl tokt:n lllilitt~ry government 

staff the U.S. cltmcn t of the Control Council would t:onrcrn it~clf exclu ively for the 

timr being with planning for German 

demobilization and disarmamen ~' 

In Washington, Wickersham successfully 

shepherded Eise nhower'~ memorandt~nt, 

whirh in the process a cquired a JCS number• nl2:~ I I ), Lhrough twtnl y-five olliccs including those of the President and General 

l'vt arshnll.''-z Aft~•· he returned to London 

in mid-July, Wirkc ~; am turned ove1• his 

d11tit·<~ in the E,\ C to Br·ig. Gen. Vincent 

Meyer and worked fltll time on organizing 

n military !-iection for the projected Control 

Council, modeled on rhe B1·itish CC'MS. 

When Brig. Gen. J ohn E. Lewis arrived 

nt thr end of the month, a cadre of U.S. 

.\rmy, Navy. and .\ir Forre office.rs w;scrnhlcd in Norfolk House, London, which also 

ho11scd the British C:C:!'v1S.~'1 The two 

groups, though cxpc<•ring to be merged, 

maimaincd a snupulouc; scparatencs.<; while 

'w ai ting a Soviet <'Olllingcnt. Later. how-

<·vcr, when, on \Vickc:r:<lham's urging, thC' 

Soviet delegate to the E/\C, AmbMsador 

Cmt.,.;cv, sent a d('S< ription of the org<tnization and its personnel requirements to Mos-

' Mrmo, Hqs, ~TO USA, for JCS, ~uh : Po:ct· 

H011tilities PlaiTuing, 20 Juu II , in SHAF.F G 5, 

115.05A. 

•• JCS Cl23/ t, o~t Ho~ti lit y Planning, 26 Jun 

•t•l,inCCS3:l4 (6- 20 •ll ),scc. l . 

., ( I ) M emo, Wickc ham for Smith, Kuh ; Rcpol'l of Visit to W:1 hin on, 17 J ul ·14, ill USFET 

~GS :S I9. 1/ -I. ( 2 ) q~. US ( :p CC, H ist U11il, 

Draft I'Hstorical Stntcmcnt, 'll Oct ·H, in SHAEF 

C-5, 'lO. 

93 

t'OW, the reply staled curtly tltat 1 he Soviet 

Union could not spar·e oiTiccrs from 

com hat:" 

f omtal JCS approval arrived on 5 

August. It authorized Eisenhower to set up 

a nucleus pl anning staff to he known as 

tl1c U.S. Group Control Cou ncil (Ger·-

many ) an d nalllcd Wickersh<trn as the acting deput y to the hid U .S. representative 

on the Coutrol Council ( 1101 yet appointed). The U.S. Group's mi~'lion would 

he to plan for posthostilitics control in Germany in at·c ordance with EAU directives 

or, in the absenc·e of such directives, in accordance with U.S. views on snhjerts pending before the EAC. The U.S. Group 

would hclcm~ tu ETOUS.\ not to SH:\EF, 

but in Germany, until the combined command terminated, it would he suhordinate to Sli.\Jo:F " in implementing on 

behalf of the U;S. and U.K. government~ 

polic ies agreed upon by the three 

governments.' '"" 

The JCS gave Eisenhowe r mo1•e Lhan he 

had as ked for, in effect a dircnivc to begin 

!ietting up a full Control Coundl clement, 

not just a counte rpart C:( ~fS. Group 

Memorandum No. I of I 0 August took this 

au thoriza tion restrainedly into account in 

creatiug three divisions within lhe U.S. 

Group Com m l CounciJ: the A•·mcd Forces 

Division, charged with planning for Germrul disnrntnm~:nt, disposition of the German armtd forces, demilitarization, care 

and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war, 

and intelligence with respec t to German resca.rch and inventions; Milit:\1')' Government Divi.•:ion 1\ , to deal with economics 

., OM GUS History, p . 6. 

"' ( 1 J (;a iJlc, 1\CWAR- JC:S tu SHAeF, s•tb: 

Post-Hostilities Planning, ~ Aug \ in SHAEF 

G-.5, :H . ( 2 ) llqs, ETOUSA , CO 1\0, Establish· 

mcnl of U.S. Croup Control Cu1mcil, 9 Aug 44, 

in SHAEF C .'i, 5. 
T HE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERJ\1ANY 

" in a hrond general sense"; and Militar y 

Government Division B. to handle political 

llcr~ in the sa nh~ Cashion.'"' The nuclclll! 

of rhc: :\rmed ForrC.<; Division already 

existed :n Nor folk House under Gcner;d 

Lewis. The military ~ovc rnrnent divisions 

did not c onw into being \rnlil later in tltc 

month when omcers from the disbanded 

(;l·r·m:tn C:ounlry Uuit were assigned and 

chiefs were appointed, Brig. Gen Eric F. 

Wood for Divillion 1\ ;mtl Br·ig. Gen. Bryan 

L. f.ifilhlll'n for Division B.r.; 

From the 111omcnt o( its inct>pli(m 1 he 

U.S. Group Control Council constituted 

the wave of the future for militar} government in Germany. T he United Stales 

()('repled the principll' of tr·ipartitc polit:ym.tking, and the JCS had assigned to the 

U.S. Group, along with the British and the 

supposed Soviet "roups, the mission of converting general policies drafted in the E.\ C 

into operational plans. Presumably, once 

the E:\ C hcg.m to produce and the Soviet 

clt-ment of lht! Control Council put in a n 

appearann~. tltt·r·c \V<m ld uot he much 

scope ldt for SH. \ EF. :\lrrady in midAugust the ll1·it ish Chids of Staff proposed 

rhnt the U.S. and llritish groups begin 

working togctht'l' at once with what guidance was availahlc and rcCer questions they 

could not resolve to the CC \C ).~~ The 

British pr<>posal would in one sweep have 

taken po~tsutTcnder planning and prohnhl)' prcsurrender planning as well, since 

the two hnd to conform to cn<·h othcrnw:w from hoth the CC,\C in \Va.<;hington 

and 'sH,\ ~ F. 1-l:ttl the Russi:ms come, s~mc 

111'11 development could rdl ~ have been 

;tvoicl<-d. The actu.tl events. howcYcr, 

.•. Ol\!GUS Tll\lor,·, p. 7. 

•• Hqs, US (:p CC, Hht Unit, Draft Historic:1f 

St:llcrnent, 3 1 Otr 4 I. in SHAP.F G- 5, 30. 

ll is.10ry of llw C1\D, hk. VI, . Xlll, 11. 

~1. 

prompted McCloy to move quickly in the 

CCAC to get an interim postsurrender 

directive for Eisenhower and thus affirm 

his and the CCAC's mandate for the duration of the wmbined command. (See 

below, p. I 0 1) ~'' 

H enceforth the going would not he easy 

either for· the CCi\C or for S.I-L\£F; but 

SHAEF had, no doubt, known from the 

start the r•isks a ... "-'Soci:ued with talli11g the 

Control C<l ttncil even inlo sltndow existence. Punhcrmorc, SHAEF was itself a 

potent orgHnization. It was the actor on 

the stage and the Control Connl'il the understudy in 1hc wings. Bollt were powers 

htll uot )'Cl equal powers. In an agreement 

on 23 August, later nicknamed " the Treaty 

of Portsmouth" by the Contml Council 

sta ffs, SH . \ .EF C.'ltablishcd it:; relationship 

with the Control Council Staffs. Before the 

Genn.tn -.urrcndcr 1he British (:on trot 

Comrnis.o:;ion Sian· wou ld be responsible to 

its own gm·ernrncm and the U.S. Group 

Control Council to Ei~cnhowcr as Commanding General, ETOUSA. After the 

surrender, until the romhincd command 

was terminated, both would fun C'tion under 

Eistnhowcr as Supreme ( :ommandcr. 

..-\llied Expcditionnry For·cc. Before the surrend<·•· the \'(mlrol staffs would have no 

cxcnrti\'C <lltlhority. SH. \EF, however, 

would adjnst its policic~ to conform with 

the loug-lcl'm plans made h)' t.ht: Cont 1'ol 

Cmrawil Commi !\ion in accord;U1cc with 

EAC dit'<'r.tiws."'' 

In September. when for a while tiH: oct•upation of rnost of German y, including 

Br1lirr. seemed likel y, SHAEF also undertook to c~;ul tc the posthostililic.o; rela!ion-

' Ibid., p. II 

o• Stnfr ,\ft•nfo No. I 04, Sll AEF, s11b : Rt!larion· 

ship hrt\\'N'u SHAEF nnd tltc Briti h and U.S. 

Elcou. of the Control Council/ Commission, in HAEl~ c._: 5, .iO. 
Cll 

c: 

c: 

0 

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u 

0 

0 

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.c: 

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I 

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SCAEF Deputy Mil itary 

SHAEF Governor (18 Apr45) 

G- 5 U.S. Group 

Control Council 

CG's, Army Groups 

Hqs, Army Groups 

G-5 

CG's, Armies 

Hqs, Armies 

G-5 

-----, ECAD 

Detachments Cll 

c: 

c: 

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.c: 

CG's, Corps 

u 

CIJ 

Hqs, Co ECARs rps .:: .,_ 

G-5 0 

... .... 

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c: 

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Detachments 1 

~------ --J ___ L ___ J 

CG's, Divisions 

1 Companies 

I 

Hqs, Divisions 

G-5 

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I 25--a=--a--a-----J 

C IIA1t'l' I U.-S. ~hUTAR\' GO\' Eit ' MI•NT R L I A'I'IONSHtl's r>lllll PIIAS J(, Sf Pn ~m R t9 H 

J l'l.'. 19·1-:il 
96 THE U.S. J\Rl1

vlY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

ship. ( Chml 1) Tltc British were known 

to wanl to turn over the administration tb 

the control bodjes immediately. "The U.S. 

Group Control Council," as SHAEF 

blandly stated, "it is believed .. , con~ 

siders thal both the miJitary gover'nment 

of Berlin and the provision of necessary 

machinery at ministeri<tl level nre the rc~ 

sponsihility of SCAEF during the initial 

period." SHAEF announced itself as sharing this opinion and added that the control 

starTs "must be integrated [incl uding the 

Soviet element if British and U.S. troops 

r·cac:hed Br.rlin first], must be al SC/\Ef's 

disposal, and must be under his com~ 

mand .... At no time," SHAEF added, 

"dnring the SCAEF period will any Control Connril or other commit tee be in 

Berlin Lhill is noL under his command. " 6 ' 

•• Mrono, SHAEF G- 5 for Chief, Control Commission for Germany (British f:.l em). Chief, U.S. 

British protests, if any, concerning th e 

Americans' blithe assumption of authority 

over a separate British staff have not been 

found. Perhaps there were none; September was il tumultuous month in Washington and London. Nevertheless, toward lhe 

end of the month SI-1/\EF relaxed its 

earlier stand to the extent of agreeing to 

pctmit a small minister·ial control learn of 

Control Council/ Commission officers to 

c nlet• Berlin with the SHAEF forces, provided it remained under Ei$enhower's command during his period of responsibility 

and its channel of communications passed 

through SHAEF.u~ 

Grottp Control Council, sub: Supreme Commander's ReCJuirements for MHit:try Government in 

lhe City of Berlin, 12 St•p 44, in SHAEF G- 5, 

I 15.05 . 

., SHAF.F G- 5, Ops Fwd/00~, sub: Agreements 

Reached al Meeting on tvlilitary Government of 

Berlin, 28 Scp 14, in SHAEF G-5, 3!. 
CHAPTER Vlll 

U.S. Policy Emergent 

Fr(llemization 

F1-atcrnization bctwrcn one's own troops 

mtd enemy civilian~ h:t.c; UCeil a l' Olllln<trtcJ 

pr•oblcm and n soldier's pastime as long as 

armies have existed. Od)rsscus knew it; the 

Chi11e.'>e reputedly frustrated succe ·sivc it1-

vasions by diligently ptact:ic:ing i(; U.S. 

General Headquartct-s in the Gcml<m 

Rhineland after Wodd War I forhade it 

hut quartered troops on civilians- with 

predictable results. J t was bound to be a 

pi'Ohlcm aga in in \Vol'ld War 11 , if only 

bc:cnuse the Army rcgnrded itself as lhe 

guardian of the health <1 nd momls of the 

young men pln<"cd in its hands. ThHl fraternization, or rather lhe prohibition of it, 

might become the bane of the occupation 

soldier's life and the figurative hairshirl of 

the wmmand, however, first became appmcnt in the spring nncl summct• of ~4. 

J 11 the politim l guide accompanying 

CCS 55 1, the Combined Chiefs of Sta fT 

directed Eisenhower to "strongly discfmr-

~~gc fraternizatiou between Allied tmops 

and German officials and the population." 

Exactly what sur h discouragement mighr 

enta il had not been thought out. At the 

ti111c, it seemed thnt dose contacts between 

troops and civilians both in liberated nnd 

in occupied territory fm· reasons of health 

nnd military security also needed di rouragcmcnt. Later, the Civil Affairs ])ivi!lion 

mulled over the question of troop behavior 

in Germany, at the S<lnte time considering 

it sufficiently significant to hermtle one of 

the few mnt.lcrs submiued fl'Om the U.S. 

side in the CCAC (L ). 

In June, General Hilldring sent the gist 

of the C!\ I) thinking tu General Holme-'>. 

In Hilldring's opinion, nnd th:n of the 

CAD, an order prohibiting fmtcrniza tion 

would lw cl iiTicult if not imiJOssiblc lo enforce; ncvet·thcless, the Germans needed to 

be made ronscious of their guilt nnd of the 

contempt in wbi<'h they wen~ held hy the 

pcopl<: of the world. They needed to sec 

the "ern))· of their ways" and were to be 

" held at m·m's lengtl1·· until they had done 

so. The most practicable means, he 

thought, was to rcstrir l public ~.:o ntarts. 

The trOOJY.I ought not to he hilkted in German households, eat in the same restaurants as the Germans, or allcnd their 

reli~iou:> services.' 

Since the statement in CCS 55 1 als(l 

logically implied a limit on private contacts, the C.\D had a booklet printed for 

U.S. troops entitled "Pocket Guide to Germany.'' It took a rigid stand ("There must 

be no fr'<Hcrnization! This is absolute!'') 

as well ns a fl exible one (''This warning 

against fraiernization docs not mean you 

arc to ad li ke a sourpu · or· lllilitary automaton." ). J\s if dubious of succ<'.ss either 

way, the hooklet also indudcd the regulations pertaining to maniagcs with foreigners and n section on venereal discnse.2 

' Llr, Dir, CAD, Hilldrl11g, to DACofS G-5, 

SHAEF, 2:i Jun •t-4, in SHAEF C- 1, 250.1 - :3. 

ruu :tt , CUAC, 13ehavior ol Allict.l Troof'l' iu 

Germany, 1'1 J ul 44, iJ1 OPD, ADC :~1)7, sec. 7-A. 
CJ8 THE t:.S. \ JUlY I~ THE OCCUP \ 'I 10 ~ OF GER~l \ '\ Y 

For Sli.\ EF. in Lbe :.umrncr of 1'14'1, 

lraternization seemed to be aulllliA tllr h·a l 

11rgrnt qucMions of the \V;tt', one_ hich 

roulcl wait unti l the fighting wa'i ftntslwd. 

lntlw S('cond week of .\ugust, S I!AI•: I•' C I 

dndtrd n rc1 o111mendation for a IHlltfr;~h rniz.ttion pulic )' along the lint'' I lilklring 

lt.teJ sug~~ trd and pointed out th.tl c.xtcm.i\<~ traiuim~, education, .md rrc H'iltiun 

pn1~1·1111s would have to he tkvi,c·tl hl oc-

< up) tht• troops' time. ~ Two wet•!-, latrr, 

when he .~ot .tround to it, the Drp11l) Chief 

of StniT, Ccncral l\forga u, railed .tllcnticm 

In u lack c1f rea lism in the (; I p•'clposal, 

n:u1H'I)'• with regard to women. " I ronsidcr 

it c·.;.~cntial. " he added, "that, if we arc 

11'.dly to follm., through with the hu-:inN 

ur noufratcrnization, we "hould import 

inw Gc·1 m.wr at the e;ulic. ... t po,.,ihlc mom<·m our own women in ao; large numhcf' 

a-. ma\ he."" 

Th ·c thr matter c~ted for anc)l her 

111onth, until 22 Septcmlwr whrn two 

rahlcs a t•rivcd, one from \Va<~ hiu~ltl ll , the 

othct· rrom Moscow . . \mcriran troops hacl 

hc~lll\ otrupying a small cot nt·t ()( wc.-;tcrn 

C<·rm,\11)' southwest of .\ atltcll dc·vr11 cl.l)':i 

before, and the press photogr~IJlhcrs h.1d 

filrcl pil tlll rs -;howing German r i\ ilian-., 

gcncr.tll)• women and ~mall <"hildren, trcting U.S. :-;oldicrs. The \\'ash in ~trJn l ahk, 

.tddt·~-.rd to Eisenhower, c amc (llllll G<·n-

,., ·~11 ~lar:o; h;lll. "The Prc.~ id cnl drsil'l'O that 

I tmnsmit 1 he following mcssa,g ~ to you," 

ltr Wl'tllC: 

'l'lwrc hnw appeared in tlw pn·~s l)ltoto-

~· .tphs of American soldier1i flaL('rnizing with 

( :r•mt.tns in Germany. These photugraphs nr<' 

• Mt'mo, SIIAF.F G- 1, ,uh: CondiiC'I of Allied 

l'rOUII' drld Cc:rmau Cbar.acteri•l•n in Dt•fr·.u, (6) 

Aug II, in SII AEF G-1, 250.7. 

'~ l'ulll, Or·p CofS for ACofS ('; I,~~~~~: Conduct 

of Allit:d 'l'ruop5 and Gcrm:'IJI C..:h;u;trH·ri,lics ill 

l)dl':tl, 2·1 Aug -14, in SH \gl~ (; I, 250.7. 

ronsidered objcnionablc by a number of our 

people. . It is desired that steps be taken ~o Jsco~trage rra l!'t'lllntl i0 11 by Olll' l !'OOps Wtth ~he .111 -

habitants or Genll:1))~1 and that pubh<:altOil 

of such photos be dl cctively prohibit~d. n 

1:rom 1\losrow, ~laj. (;en. John R. Deane, 

r hicf of Lltr ~lilitnry ~li sion, reported that 

Pravda, l wrslia. m1d u,.,/ Star had c.m icd 

Tass quotl'S un 20 ~l·ptcmber [rom Lhr /Illday ExpreH, London, regarding Amcric an 

troop;; fr<ttrrni1.ing with Germans.u The 

Russians wc·re as }'Ct uowhcrc on C:rrman 

soil. 

Eisenhuwcr rrplic.cl to Marshall on t IH' 

~me da)' asking him to assure the Pn·.;idnll 

"that upon (jrsl apprarnnrc of the pit'lllt ·~ 

of _-\meri(·an troops fraternizing with Germans, I repeated prim orders ilg:litt<.t thi-. 

practice.'' lie had b.-;ucd personal order,, 

he added, to .til < ontm.wders "insi!'ting th,ll 

fraternization h\' upprc:sed completely.''' 

Therewith ll(' an what for the next t<•n 

months tbc: st;.tffs st •·ovr manfully to dcpic·l 

as a righteous, even noble, entcrprist· the 

SHAEF nonfratcrnization polity nhoul 

whirh the tmop-., utH'onccrned with !JI'<'~i ~ 

denlial m• p11hlir opinion, preferred l O develop vatiOU'> cllld l)lC)~I\} Sl'Un'i\ow .. idea' 

of 1 heir mvn. 

]CS /067 

.-\lthou~h Jhc JCS .tnd SH:\Ef fro111 the 

beginning h;td t'(lnlt:mplated a period of 

tnilitar}' admini trati n in Germany aftct' 

the surrcudcr ctnd before a permanent, 

ri,;lian-uircrtcd uc r upation took -;hnpl', 

planning for I hi-. c;o-t ailed middle pctiod 

'Cahlc i\CofS O PU, to SHAEF, 21 Scp -1 I, 

in OPO 1

1

'lh, ~·( iJ (ca...-s lb- l. 

• Cahll' ~lilit.try ~ltssiou, ~lo~ow, Dr:\ne to 

SHAEI-' for F.i,t'nho\\et, 22 Sep H, iu II AF. ~ 

G-1, 250.1 - 1. 

'C:1hlc, Riwnhowrr 10 l\farshall, 22 Scp II, 

in SHAEF t: 1, 2~ 1 I. 
U.S. POLICY EMERGENT 99 

U.S. TROOPS AND UtRMAN U1VtLIANS (September 1944). This a11d a few other 

pictures like it provoked the President's order agai11st. fratemizafio~t. 

had become practically impos<'ihlc h)' Dday. Di.c;couraged in their struggle to have 

London become the seat of combined posthostilities policy-making, tile Briti'>h were 

pushing for conversion to tripartite planning and the virtual cxclu i()n of 

SHAEF- hence also the CCAC in Washington- from any role in the governn1cnt 

of Gernutn)' after Lhe surrender. Sintc at 

the time it then still seemed likel y that the 

Allied entr}' into German}' would fullow 

a smrender negotiated before the troops 

had crossed the German border, the JCS 

and the CAD saw the British aucmpl to 

eliminate SHAEF from the p ostsurrender 

period as a grave potential threat to Eisenhower's unity of command at what might 

turn ou t to be a confu ed and dangerous 

time. On the other hand, there did not 

seem lo he any wny to give Eisenhower 

guidance as combined commander, even 

for the middle perind, except through some 

form of tripartite agreement. Hilldring confided his frustration on this score in a lener 

to Smith in which he pointed out that two 

recently suhmilled SHAEF papers on 
100 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

posthostiliLies Subjects re nl:cted Careful planning but could not he regarded as authorita tive because no higher level policy had 

ycl l>cen rm~tlatcd. He thoug ht that lbe 

Joint Post-War Committee, a J CS committee created in J unc 1044 tu work on postwar 11lilitat'Y pla ns, mig ht provide the 

machin er y for esta blishing U.S. views 

which, when transmitted to the Ei\C: and 

a pproved , would become guidan ce for the 

combined command. Otherwise, he could 

onJy ho pe that the CAD a nd the Joinl PostWar Committee working dosely together 

mig ht somehow reduce the ha ndicap 

imposed on SHi\EF by the lack of 

inst ru ti ~ 

Even though the success of the invasion 

increased the C'hance of an cad y German 

collapse, the only agreed instru ction the 

CCS cc.>ul<.l produce was a lhree-srage updating of t'he old RANKI N concept, which 

it fo rwarded to Ei.scnhower on 19 J unc. 

In the first stage he was to deploy tactical 

air forces in the Low Countries a nd France, 

in t he second to set up a harrier manned 

hy g rotmd forces t<l prevent the German 

troops from ret urning home, and in lhc 

third t(J occupy sh·ategir :treas in Germany 

for the purpose of en forring thl· surrender 

tenm;.v On the object of the ot-cupation the 

CCS was mute. Whl'n nothing more came 

by tlte fin·;t week nf ,\ugust a nd time appe:~red to he growing short, SHAEF finall y 

l:tmverted the three CCS stages in a 

som<'wha t expanded fom1 in tO a plan ('odenamed Ti\I.ISl\l1\ N .

1

'

1 The TAI.IS 'J\IAN dire<.-

tive t hen became the only a pproved post-

' Llr, Hilldring to Sn1itlt, t .Ttl! +1·, in SHAEF 

SGS OH. l. 

• Memo, SHAEF G- 3, Chief, PHP S1ohsec, for 

ACofS G- 3. sub: Post-Hostilities Planning, 26 Jun •t4, in SHAEF G- 3, 2.542. 

•• SHAEF G-3 to all Staff Divisions, sub: Operation 'l'Aa.tSMAN, 6 Aug ·H , in SFIAEF G- 5, 

11 5.25c, J acket I. 

surrendet· g uidance for Lbt combined 

forces. 

SHAEF, however, regarded T ,,LrSMAN 

as utopian. The plan <lssumcd a defeated 

Gcnllany that was econon1icall y and administrativel y intact and it assumed a Ge.rmau govetnmen t capahlc of acknowledging 

defea t. But in Aug ust a German government Cilpal>lc of doing so would already 

have surrendered: Europe was invaded in 

the wc~t ; France was ho und to be lost soon 

and probably the Low Co untries as well ; 

the ::>oviet forces in the east were closing 

to the Vistula; a nd Hitler had only na rrowly esc aped death at the hands of his 

own offi cers. 

The presurrender dir·el' live CCS 551, 

and earlier some J CS papers, had envisioned SH:\E}' forces fig hting their way 

into Germany; hut they, too, had assumed 

an intact surrender at some point of the 

bulk of the Gennan tenitory. In Aug ust. 

SHAEF was beginning to anticipate an a ltogether different ending to the war, one 

whic h mig ht leave Germany a tota lly 

burned-out wreck, foug ht an·oss by the 

<u'mies, ~Ul d with no national authority. 

either civilian or military, to sig n a surrender or prevent complete interna l l'haos. 

W orse >•ct, the country, ecouot1licall y and 

politi<:ally prostrate, might weiJ become the 

stage for cliehard-N azi gucn·illa wal'f a re." 

On the 23d, Eiscniwwer se ~t these view!'. 

to Washing ton, pointiDg out that if lhey 

proved corrcr.t his !'esources would be 

ba rely enoug h to get the German armed 

fon·es under control, cal'c for displar.ed persons, and establish mili tary government. 

T o keep the economy from collapsing a~ 

well would be '' utterly impossible," and he 

asked to he relieved of the economic re-

"Memo, SHAEF G--5 for CofS, suh : Directive 

for Militar y Government in Germany, 2 1 Aug 

•H, in SIIAEF G 5, 2:1, J acket 2. 
L'.S. POLICY E~fERGENT 

~~ ihilitics assigned to hirt1 under CCS 

.')51.' ~ 

Eiscnl•owcr's cable arrived in the Pcotagc,.. on 2t1 i\ugtt!\l, just two ch~ys ltcforc the 

handbook stot·m broke and on the snrnc day 

the Ul'itisll ofTcrcd their propo,-;;d in the 

C:C:S Ltl -;hifl postsurrcndcr planning to 

thr Control Council groups and the 

CC.\ C( L ). The three evcnt.s ogct hl~l' were 

uouud ((I ··aisc (I spectacular turmoil. l?.i:.cnh OW('I' had in eiTect proposed a rC\'ision of 

CCS lj5 1 that would convrl'\ it into a posto~ t ilit ir.; clircctivc, since, in his view, there 

probably would be no sur'r(' ndc·t'. In doing 

so h<: tlwca tencd the long-sta nding tlritish 

policy of rcstrirting combined plan ning 

mndltctcd in '"'ashington to tht· period befm'f the surrender, and he tollidcd ht•ad-on 

with the new British eiTot•t to shear him 

of almo:-.L all postsurrcndcr authority ;1;; 

combined commander. The Britic;h proposn l. on the ot her hand, strur k nol only 

at SH.\F.F httl al the hegeuwuy in military 

govcrnmcm planning th ai the Vlar Dcpnrtmcnt claimed for the CC:i\C: m 

\V;tllhington. 

1\ frCioy oiTcrcd a cot11promise. The 

C,\D wm1ld draft an interi111 po utrcnd r 

dir<'nivc which would give ·~isc nh nwcr 

what he asked for. \ Vhcn the two gm rrnmrnts a ppr-oved it, the directive would be 

sent to SH.\EF through the C:C:S; tlwrc-

<t ft CI' thr )\pelling-out of cit h, · CCS 55 ! 

or tlw pnst:-11rrendcr dirertiv(' would be left 

Lo tlte Control Council ekmcnls with the 

CCAC( 1.) •·c.solving a ny din·c rncc.~.· ~ T he 

arrangement was not exact!)' atl equal split. 

Tha t Sll.\EF and the C,\1) would lr.avc 

muth for the Con trol Council and 

C:C. \ C: 1 I. ) to decide Wits dm1htful from 

" C.nhl\·, SC:A P.F 613, SHAEF 11(,rw.Jttl, 10 Wnr 

Ucparlnlcnl, 23 Aug H, in OPU, ABO 'i87, sec. 

7- J\. 

" History ul the CAD, IJk. V I. elt. I, pp. 52 55. 

lUI 

the out·ct: hut 1 he Bt·iLisJJ mcmhel's of the 

CC:\C agt'<'t'd nn 29 .\ ugust to l'uhmit lhl' 

idea to London a long' with a draft :~Il : 

to Eiscn howc1' tdling him he could p.la u 

along the lin<'s lw had dcscrii.Jed <uld wotdd 

he given a po-;L-;un'l:llclcr directive 1.11~ · '' 

The repl y (rom London came on 11 September and rcj\!rtcd Eisenhower's rstim:-~tc 

and l\ I(.'( o~ ·!'I compromise. The Briti h 

governme-nt did not a~rcc 1hat the Gcrntatt 

crono111it- structttr'C would collap ' and 

insisted tha t t·vcn in apparent chao~ Eisenhower ·Jwuld C'()Uilt on finding stable <:lc·-

ments through ,.yft(t l• to restore an orclcrl>• 

ec:onomi<' lifl:.•·• '!'he Dritislt members in th t~ 

CCi\ C t ltet·cu pun proposed to tell Eist:n· 

bower lltal he ou d do his best to carry 

out CCS 55 1 in its exi..,ting !om1. "' SimI' 

the CAD was h} lh('n working to get appended to the hand book an even mutt· 

radk:~l <; tatCtllCIIt on economics than sc

howcr h:~d rrqucskcl, Billdring asked tht· 

U.S. Deputy G !i, General Holmes, ICl g-et 

the 24 • t~ t I'I'CJII('sl willtdrawn, whir h 

was donor. on I fl Sept em her ~ In the nlca ntime, however. the War Depanmcnl had 

become t cmvitH cd thM a postsurrcntlcr 

directive "'"" imptrativc hccon1st· t>f Eisenhower·~ n<>cd ro1· one, hcrauc;e of the British 

dri\'c to c.,pturc the postsurrenc.ler plan11ing 

for the Lonclon-h:tS\'tl ~~~cn e:~, and, nhovc 

a ll, hcl'~lll~t: of the haudbook contro' cn;y, 

whid1 had raised Lht• mt>~t scrio11s l halkngc 

yet w th<' milit:wy rok in the occupa tion. 

The intcmal tt'u gg c o,·er occupation 

polit-y arnon!.( U.S. ngcm·ies, whi<'h for lhc 

rest of the war WCJtt ld ovcr ... hadow anything 

that had gone 1111 between the .\mcl'icanr-. 

"Cable dr:th, C.:CS to SHAEF, no dnlc. in OPD, AllC :l87, S('C. 7 A. 

" I bit/., p. 5G. 

" CCAC 122/2, drafl, 11 Sep 44, in OPD, A DC: 

3H7, ~cc. 7- J\. 

" History of tlw CJ\J), hk. V I, ch. I, p. 57. 
102 THE U.S. ARMY LN 'J'H£ O CCUPATION OF GERMANY 

and the Bdtish, began, at least for the War 

Departmen t, as a completely unanticipated 

collision. On 1 September the T're.sit!ent 's 

special assistant, Harry 1-lopki.ns, anIH>L\11ced the formation of the Cabinet 

Committee on Germany to be C'Omposed 

of the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury. The next day, .in a preliminary meeting at which M cCloy and Hilldring were 

present along with officials of the State and 

Treasury Dcpa•·tments, the Treasu•·y represeotarives presented the !vforgenthau Plan 

for Gennany, and :Nh·Cloy raised what to 

him and H opkins was the more germane 

business of a n interim postsurrender directive for Eisenhower. ts The Treasury representatives apparently assumed, not without 

some reason in the lig ht of l'ccent events, 

that lhe Cabinet Committee existed primarily to give Morgenthau a voice in the 

deliberations on policy for Germany. 

Deputy Secretary of Wa r McCloy, bowever, had a considerably different opinion 

since it was Secretary of W at ~timson who 

had asked the President a week before to 

organize such a committee for the purpose 

of developing a German policy. Stimson 

had done so knowing Morgcnthau was intere<>ted in the German question hut not 

knowing how much.'u At this time, the 

handbook con troversy was still in Lhe futu ·~thou h only hy one day- and Stimson had been concerned over the seeming 

imminent'e of the German defeat and the 

complete lack of U.S. policy or even of a 

decision ns to which zone the American 

forces would occupy. 

"Rcprodurcd in full in Henry Morgcnthau, Jr,, 

Germtmy (s Our PrnbltJm (New York: Harper 

and Brothers, 1 !H5 ), pp. 1- ·1. 

•• (1) H enry L, Sti1nson nnd McGeorge Bundy, 

011 Actiue Sr.n•ice ill Peace tmd War (New York: 

Harper and Brothers, 19•18), p, 569. (2) Morgenthatt Diar)• (Gerl/ltlll)•}, vol. 1, p. ~7. 

Later the interim directive for Germany, 

which became known a<> JCS I 067, would 

generally he taken as only a slightly anemic offspring of the MorgenLI.wu Plan. If 

U1is aS.'>\Jmptioo is true, then the hinh must 

have occurred at the· 2 :-)cptcmber meeting; 

but there the War Department and Lhe 

Treasury were talking abou t essentially two 

difrerenl things. The 1vlorgenthau Plan 

purported to be a permanent solution to 

Lhe German p•'oblcm. The War Department, except for Stimson iu his capacity 

as a cabinet member, did not then or later 

cla im a voice in deciding what would u ltirnately he done with German)'· What it did 

insist on- without prcjudic·e to any subsequent decisions- was a technin tlly 

workable policy for the period of military 

rel'\ponsibility. In this regard, McC:IO)' objected at the meeting to the chief features 

<)f the iVIorgcn thau P lan , namely, ~ provisions for pastoralizing and partitioning 

the country. All other considerations aside, 

he argued, the provisions would simpl y 

have spawned more troubles than the military t'om mander could have handled in the 

immediate aftermath of the war. 

Nevcl'thelcss at the meeting- and later 

in JCS 1067- therc was a greater similarity beL ween the general tenor of War Deprutment and Treasury views than would 

have been likely even a week before. The 

views of the one, however, did not c.lescct'ld 

from those of the other. hut both came 

from the same source, namely, the President's expressed determination to punisl1 

Germany. The t'cart iou to the handbook 

had emboldened the Treasury lo submit 

a comprehensive plan for German)'. Thifi 

reaction had at the s11me time alerted lhe 

War Deparl mcnt to the danger of being 

made 10 seem to have adopted an untenable ·'soft" position hy Lhe simplistic a.rgurnenL'i of people ·'who were ullerl)' innocent 
U.S. POUC:Y E~rER T 

of :uly realir.ation of the extent and complexity of the problem. ' 

For .McCloy especially, as lhe senior War 

DcpRrtment officia l most deeply involved 

in occupa tio11 planning, the iSiiue was not 

primarily one of <·hard'' or "soft" schools 

but of feasibility, and he went into !he 2 

September meeti11g prepared to opt for a 

feasible " hnrd" policy. Above all be wns 

determined to pre.<;crve the War D ep:ut -

mcm·s predomin an<'e in the planning in 

' Vashington a.<; well as the theater commander's in the field during 1hc militat')' period. 

With this goal ar<'omplished he ~.:o ulti 

afford to il<'rommodate the tone of the 

Morgenthau Plan and ignore the Stlbstan cc, the lone having been already imposed by the President's statements in any 

case. 

The J\llorgenlhau Plan was in t.he long 

run only incidental to the revision of the 

War· Department's thinking. Hnd the 

plan's influence been greater, the ultimate 

result might in fact have hcen less unsatisfactory; but the necessary compromise was 

much more ftrndamenta l. The emphasis 

until .1\ugusl 1941· had consistently, perhaps 

even somewhat blindly in the light of opinion developing elsewhere, hcen on making 

the Am1y an in trum nt of enlightened administration when it occupied enemy territory. After August I !>44, as far as Germany 

was r.onrerncd, enlightenment in tl1e 

!\rrny's thinking gave way lo justice as the 

President conceived it, hard and cold, but 

at least not to the black retribution of the 

T reasnry pla n. The shift wns a ret rcat to 

a politically, if not morally, more dcJcnsihle 

position but no surrender. 

ln the Cabinet Committee mect;ngs, 

beginning on 5 September, and in mcmoran-

•• Ltr, McCloy to Eisenhowe r, 2-1 O ct 'H , i11 

USFET SGS 334/2. 

dt1rns to the President, Stimson made himself a leatling orponcnt of the i'Vforgcnthau 

Plan >vilhin the government. 1\fter the 

111ceting <Jn 1hc 5th, at which he had ~tood 

alunc aga im t J\1forgenlhau's rropo5<tl to destroy the R11hr· a nd possibly :tlso the San t'. 

he wrote : 

I cannot conceive of sucb a proposition 

being Pitln!r possible ol' effecti,·e, and I ca11 see enormous genera l evils coming from it. 

I can conceive of cndcavor·ing lo meet tlw 

misuse wlrich ( ;erma ny lr us rcn•ntl)' ntadc or 

this p roduction by wise systems of conti'OI ot• 

tnrsteeship or even transfers to other nations. 

But I cannot conceive of turning such a gift 

of nature into a du theap. 1 

On the 6th, to .1\Iorgenthau's chagrin , 

Slimson ppe< d Lo be ma king headway 

in convincing the Presid nt. "~ On the 17th, 

although Morgenlhau had by then a ppa rentl y prevajled with Lhe President and the 

Prime .1\linister at the OcT:\ OON Conference in Quebec, Stimson decided, ncverlhe· 

les.<;, to submit n memorandum he had written lwo tlays earlier. In it he COJldernned 

1he philosoph y of Lhe plan. "We cannot," 

he wrote to the P resident, ''reduce a na tion 

of seventy n\illjon who have been o••tstanding for )'ears in the arts and science'> a nd 

highly im lustrialized to poverty . . . . It 

would he just h a <·rime al'i the Gcnmms 

thcmscl v<·s hoped to per pet rnte on lheir victillls- il would he a rrinw againsl civili:tation L~e !' 'J 

On lhc 22d, McCloy met in hi~ office 

with his counl crpa rls from Lhe State and 

Treasury Departmenls. In a n ali-day session they worked over a CAD draft entitled 

:• Memo, HLS (Stimson }. t111 titled, 5 Sep 4-+, 

in 1\SW 3 70.8. t~<: a lso Srimson nnd Bundy, On 

ll r.tiue Scn•ic.:, p. 570. 

" Blum, Morgtutlw u Diaries, vol. rrr, p. 362. 

"' ( l l Memo, Stimson for the Presidem, 15 Scp 

·H , in 1\SW, 370.H, (2) Stimson and ll11ndy, On 

Active Service, p . .5 78. 
104 THE U.S. ARUY IN T HE OCCUPATION OF GERJ\1IA TY 

"Dil'ecLivc tu SCAEF Regarding the Mili~ 

tary Goverumcnt of Germany in the Period 

Immediatel y Following the Cessation of 

Organized Resistance." 'With their inforlllal a pproval, the direc.:tive went to [ltc JCS 

as J CS 10G7."' It was the product of a 

Lumultllous month. Allied troops were inside Germany and might soon occupy the 

whole cuuntr)'. Eisenl10wer had no directive, and whether OJ' not he would have 

a rniliL<.tr)' government mission was far from 

certain. 1\t Quebec· the President and 

Prime Minister had put their okays on the 

economic features of the MorgentJ1au Plan. 

Whether the leadership in occupatiOli planning, even during the milita ry phase, 

would remain with the ·w ar Depanmenl 

~Lc; CJuCstionahle. Undcl' pressure from t'he 

White House, U.S. offi cia l opinion on Germa ny had hardened tn a degree thnL would 

for monrhs to c:ome dismay and baffie 

many who saw the results but HOt the 

da rker all erna livcs. 

Few doruments ns imp l'l<~nt as J CS 

1067 ha ve IJeen \vritten under such intense 

and diverse inl1uenee." of the moment; 

n<:verthclcss, if not enlightened, the document W~!> wha l it was intended to he, a 

proper military direnive givi11g the theater 

w mmuuder workable instructions on which 

to base dctc.Lilcd planning. t\t the same 

time, it was not, as its authors were no 

douht well aware, an adequate program 

for administering a conquered nation. The 

directive disavowed any intention of stating 

poliC')' beyond tha t of a "short term nnd 

milita ry character, in order not to prejudirc 

whateVCl' ultim t~ c polidcs may later he de-

" JCS I 067, lJircttivc to Comm:u adcr iu Chief 

of U.S. Forces of Occup<ttion Regarding lhe Military Government of Gcrma.ny i n the Period Immediately following lilt' Cessation of Orgauizcd Resista nce ( Posl Defeat ). 211 Scp H, in OI' D , ABC 

31!7. 

tcrmined upon. r. Its object was to establish a "stern , a ll-powerful military admjuistration of a co11q lleretl country, based on 

it ~ lmconditional sun•ender, impressing the 

Germans with their mjlitary defeat <md the 

futility of any furl her aggression :· ~ Jn language it was redolent of tl1e 'l'1'easury phio~oph . In substance it was a n expa nsion 

of fi ve points, none originating with the 

Morgentha.u Plan, on which the WarStatc-Tt•casury meeting of 2 September and 

subsequently the Cabinet Committee had 

agreed unanimously. They were : dissolution 

oi the N azi party; demilit arization; conLrol.s over communications, press, propngand a, and educ;a Lion; repar<\lion fnr lbosc 

countries wa nting it ; and decentra lization 

of the Cc,·nwn governmental structure 

(without a decision either way on parlitinning- the country) . A sixth point- aimed at 

permanently reducing the (krrnan standa rd of li ving to the sul>slstenc:c level, 

climinatiJ1g Lhc German economic power 

posi[ion in Europe, tnd com·erting the German CC'OIIOI1l y " in such a manner that it will 

he so dependent upon in1ports and exports 

that German)' <'annot l>y its own device<; 

reconverl to war production"- had been 

considered and dropped. It had been acceptable to Morgen tlun.1 as a lighlly Cl1l110 u -

11ngcd entering wedge for his plan and had 

been vehemently rcjened by Stimson fOl' 

the snmc reason. On the mattc1' o( relief, 

the directive resta ted th e disease a nd unrest 

rnrnwla and disrouragecl importation of 

relief 1<upplicc;, but did not prohibiL them. 

The cnmomir section of the directive 

prohibited "slep!Oi looking toward the 

"' Department of State, Th e Ctnt/creuces at 

~tlta 1111d Y 11 lta, 1945, in "Forejgn Rclatimas of 

the U nit e d Swtes" (Washing ton, D.C., 19!'15) , 

p. 11 3. 

''l U nsig n ed papcrj German cc up;~tion Policy, 

O ct •1-t, in ASW, no . 
U.S. POLICY EMERGENT 

economic rehabilita tion of Germany lorl 

designed lO maintain or strengthen the German e<.:onomy" and placed the responsibility for maintaining economic cout.rols on 

the German people aud tile German Ull -

thoriti es.~1 This section has been cited by 

no less an allthority o.n the occupation than 

Walter L. Dam as evidem·e that JCS 10G7 

was 1']<l rgely a Treasury dol'nmcnl. "~· The 

Treasury influence was, however, mostl y 

coincitlcntul. In response to Eisenhower's 

request 10 he relieved of rcsponsihiHty for 

sustaining the German econm1l)' and the 

Pr<.:siJent's reactiou to the hnndl)ook, the 

CAD had, at least two weeks before the 

meeting at which JCS 1067 was drafted, 

wriu.en an almost identical statement on 

economic policy as the first of the three 

prindples to be allached to the tlyleaf of 

the handbook. (See above, p. 89.) No matter what. its origin and even though it was 

later a ltered somewhat (see below, p. 2 J 2), 

the economic policy was going to prove unronuna.Le. Nevertheless, in Slating the 

policy, the War Depa rtment was nol rnaki11g the .\nny thr instrument for ac·hicving 

the long-runge aims of the M()rgenthau 

Plnn, hut merely taking from Eisenhower 

the responsibility <..luring the initial occupation period for preventing Hn economic collapse, which Ei~;e nh wrr believed was 

incvilahle. 

.'\ pparenrly the directive was ac•ccptahle 

to Secretary Morgcnthau, not because it 

imw poratrd his plan but because it did 

not prcjndicr the eventual implementation 

:: ( t ) Department of State, Malta and Yalta, 

iu "f:on:ign Rci<Hio ns,1' pp. J 60 and 14:!- 5•1. (2) 

Stimson and AL1nd y, O u Acliue Sendee, p, !i70. 

( 3) AI orgenl ht1u Diary ( CeJ'I/1(1)') , vol. l , pp. 

5 19- '.lS. 

"' Waher l.. Do1'11, "The Debate Over American 

Occupalion Policy in Germany in •~ 945," 

l'olitic(ll Stil'nre Qtwrler/y, 72 :'1, December 195 7, 

p. l~lol 

105 

of the pl~n . At the moment, Morgenthau 

did noL need to have the plan written into 

a shorHcnn milita ry directive. H e believed 

that he IJad it established as high national 

policy both of the Un ited States and of 

Great Britain. \t\lhen his confidenl'e on this 

score evu poratecl, as it soon d.itf, the d.il·cctivc became a great deal more important 

to him and to the history of the occupation, 

nol because it incorporated the plan but 

IJctause it was the only approved U.S. 

policy sta tement on Germany. 

The d irettive received JCS approval on 

24 September, and several days later H opkins carried it to the \t\' hite House. H e had 

hec.n involved in the w•·iting since the 2 

Septem!Jer meeting. L11 the Cabinet ComJrlittee., H opk.ins hatl seemed al the beginning to favor the Morgenthau Plan, but 

he had later npparently developed at least 

a pru;sing ambition Lo become the United 

States High Commissioner for German)' 

m1d had then joined the War Department 

representatives in p ushing for• a less restrictive statement. "" The Presirlent, according 

to Hopkins, spent forty minutes reading Lhe 

dir·cctive ;.md then said it was in accordance 

with his views.s11 

ln lhe aftetmath of Quebec. Roosevelt 

had begun to find the Morge.ntha u Plan 

an emba rrassment. The l944 election canlP<Lign wa.~ getli 11g inlo fu ll swing, and on 

24 September the mnjor Sunday newspapers had run articles on tbe plan, the 

majority of them highly critical. Three days 

later the President telephoned Stimson from 

Hyde Park to tell hi111 tha t he did nol really 

intend to make Germany an agricu ltural 

nation. \Vhen he next saw Stimson in early 

O ctober, he said Morgcnthau had " pulled 

""1\f orgeutfwu Dir(TJI ( C:MIIIIi11Y ), vol f.. pp. 

52 1- 2•1 and p. 62·1. 

•• Uusignecl men to dated 29 Scr +4·, in OPD, 

ABC 387. 
106 THE U.S. ARMY ~ THE OCCUP!\TlON OF GERM1\NY 

a boncr1" and he seemed ''staggered'' to 

lcan1 thn1 a passage about agri ·ulturalization and pn-;toralization was in the a,grcemcnt he had initialed with Churchill at 

Quebe ~' 

In t~arly OclObcr, JCS 1067 suddenly he-

' am<: a valuable document to the Pr • ic.lent tcmpornrilr as eviden<'C1 shoukl he 

need it, that it and not the ~lm gc nthnu 

PI~"' w:ts thr approved U .. polky for Gcrman)•-lO the War Departn1cnt for many 

months w ('omc as the only statcuwnt 0 11 

Gct·mnny it was going to gel. Having clcnicd ;u:cepting lhe 1\l orgenlhHt~ Pl:111, the 

President soon also professed romplctc lack 

of int<:r<:st in postwar planning for Germany. To the Secretary of Stat(' he wl'lHC, 

"il is all ver·y well for us to mnke all kinds 

of preparations for Germany but there arc 

some matters in regard to surh treatment 

th:H lead me to believe speed in suc. h matters is not an essential. .. . J tli likl· mnking plnn ~ for a ronntry whic-h we do uot 

yet occupy. 11 ~ 

11 Program. for Getmawy? 

JCS 1067 was a U.S. doC'umcnt. s 

surh, although it was sent to Eisenhower, 

SIL\F:F could not put it iuto forre trtttil 

it wa..~ npJJI'Oved and transmitted through 

1 hr CCS. After the uproar OVC'I' the Morgcnthau Plan, the War Department mot•e 

than ~'VCt' wanted il approvcd- 71nd with~ 

out han ~es becnusc the likcllboud ()[ 

agreement within the government on any 

othC'r doC'umcnt or revision wa): cxtrcmclr 

slighL T he hope was that the President's 

innucncr woltld he enough to quell British 

rcsistann· to policy originating in Washing11 (I) Stimson and Bundy, 011 Artiur Strt·ice, 

p. 5RO. (2) Dcparunen1 of St.tl<', Mnltn n11d Ynlta, 

in "Porcigu Rt•latious," p. 155. 

.. Deparlmllnl of State, Foreig11 /l~/{1/i s, / 944, 

vol. I, p. :150. 

ton and n ow, in tlw instance of JCS 1067, 

cxdusivcly mndc there. Hopkins, when he 

took the paper to lhc President, had asked 

him to "write· " not'e . .. ancl <~Sk the 

Prime Minillt<'r to have his nitpickers h\)1 

ofT the documCJ1ts.''al But in Octohcr· Lhr 

British put for·wnrd in the CCAC a draft 

directive of their own. l t differed from JCS 

1067 in a tHullh<'r o( respects, most pninfully for the ' "'nr Drpartment plaru1c'l'll in 

that it could bt· taktn as an expressicm uf 

long-tcnn policy just then the most highl y 

explosive suhjc< l in Washington. 31 

That the Drilish direcUve and JCS I 067 

would die in ~he CCS fr<.)m lack of artion 

by either side soon became clear; thus the 

War and Stale n cp«ll'lmCnlS attempted to 

salvage their onr viahlc piece of polic y 

guidance by submitting it for tripartite 

adoption in the E,\C. Pending thi!> event, 

which wns not t1> br expected soon, the 

CAD sent JCS 1067 to the U.S. Croup 

Control Council to he used in planning for 

the postsurrcndc1· periocl. 15 As Supreme 

Commander, Eisenhower would have to 

continue under' 1 he presurrender din'cfi vc, 

GCS 551. 'Vickcrsham, on his n·turn from 

a trip to WMhinglon in Nove111her, reported, "Thr fc(·Jing a t home is that 

SHAEF, in the pre-defeat period, should 

follow Docnmc11t I 067 as closely as pos.-..ible"; but how scnh wer ac; combined 

t·ommanclcr was to impose a strictly U.S. 

policy on the Br·itil>lr contingent in SHAJo:F 

was not explain ·d:'n 

"' Unsignrd nwmo datrd 29 Sep 44, in OPD, 

ABC 387, ~t'C. 4- B. 

•• Memo [no -ounc-], ~uh: The British Drnh 

Directive for Ccrmauy, I No\• 44, in ASW, 370.8. 

» Memo for Rcl'ord,. H. L. S. Stim~on], 19 

Dec 41, and ~l<·mo {or Record, H . L. S., st•h : 

Flnnncia l Directive, JCS I 067 [no date], in OPD, 

ABC 'U1 7, ~N . 1 n. .. US Cp C(:, Min of Meeting of Staff C:onfrt· 

encc Held 20 Nov 11·1, in SHAEF C- 5, :IUH . 
U.S. POLICY E:MERGENT 

O ttobcr \Vas the kind oi month in 

SHA£F that September had been in W ashing ton. l::>omc Lroops were in Germany and 

many more might soon join them; but the 

handbook was h<Ulging fire, and all previous 

poli<.:y assumptions had obviously hcen 

supcrscclcd by the developments con<:crning 

the handbook and JCS 1067. The Morgcntltau Plan, meanwhile, bad been a godsend 

for the Germa11 Propaganda Mi nistry. 

Even the fertile mind of Prop:-tganda .J'vllnister J oseph Gochhels would have been 

hard pressed to devise any better mcaus to 

stiffen the spines of a population and army 

reeling under a disastrous summer's defeats. 

1\ltlwugh SHAEF did not yet hold 

enough G erman territory to make the confusion over polky obvio us, it had arrived 

at the point wher e an announced milit ary 

government program could h ave enormous 

potential influence on the wa r. All that the 

German people knew so far was what 

t heir government told them about unconditional surrender and the M o rgentha u Pla n. 

In the second week of O ctober the Psych ological W:ufare Division (PWD ), SH AEf, 

circu lated for comment n projected set of 

g uideline.'> on military government propaganda for the Germ<ms, in which it proposed to offer them opportunities to rebuild 

for a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic 

future. Col. T. R. H enn, the deputy chief, 

answered for the Opera tions Bran ch, G-5. 

Although he was a British officer he apparently spoke for the whole branch. The 

PWD paper, he said, e..'<pressecl views on 

wbi<'11 the U.S. a nd British ('ivil affairs 

officers "always have lleen in complete 

agreement," namely, ''lbat we must plan 

beyond the short term view; tha t, in pi·<tetice, neither of our nations will allow civilians in Central Europe to starve; [and] that 

il is essential to avoid repeating the mistakes of 1918-19 (when the blockade of 

107 

Central Europe was not lifted for two 

months) .... " H owever, he declared, the 

doctrine of the professionals was no longer 

what mattered. The publicity given to the 

MorgcnLhau controversy hat! confirmed "to 

the last detail every statement of enemy 

propaganda for the past five )'Cars." A restatelllcot of policy rou ld onty be effective 

if £isenbower \Val) willing to £onnu1ale 

policy independently of the CCS.l$7 

Tbe Operations Branch was con•ring 

close to ta lking mutiny, and the nexl d ny 

the G-5, Ge11era l G rasctt, called the first 

of several meetings in his office to devise 

propaganda themes that tile Psychological 

Warfare Division rou ld use without putting 

SH/\Ef' m rebellion. The result was 

austere: the objective was to be limited to 

forco;;talling a srorc hed ea rth policy by impressing on the Germans that they wo uld 

have to fend fot themselves economically 

after the wa1'. Glimmers of hope were to 

be given them in the form of promises to 

er<tdicate Nazi a))d Gestapo rule, purge the 

school system, rest<lre religious freedom, 

a nd permit free labor unions. Material assistance in a ny form would not be mentioned, but the Germans could be told that 

t he 1\llied annies wou ld import their own 

ood.~8 

A little later in the month SHA£F propaganda received a small and equivocal 

boost from Washington. In n speech o n 18 

O ctober the R epublican tRndidate for 

president, Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, had acnlsed t he R oosevelt administra tion of stiffening rh.e German resisLance by its poliry 

towards Ge rman)'. The Presiden t replied 

., Memo, SFt:AE.F G- 5, Dep Chief, Opns Br, 

for Ex1:c G- 5, sub: Policy to German Civilinns, 

12 Oct 'H, in SHAEF G-5, 807. 1, Jacket 1. 

'

4 Memo, SHAEF CofS for PWD, sub: Propaganda T reatment of Military Government, 20 Oct 

44, aucl Analysis Sheet, SHAEF G-5, Hist Sec, 

30 Dec 44, in SHAEF G- 5, ll7.05. 
108 TilE U.S .. \R~lY II\' THE OCCUP.\'1'10 ' OF CEIU I:\NY 

three d.t)'" l.ttct, " promi,ing ~tcm retribution for "all thoc;e in Gt·rmany directly rc-

~pcm~ihk for· thi-.. .1guny of mankind"; but 

he did not ~pedfknlly r-ndor~c. or reject, 

the ~lor~cnthau Plan. I k -;aid he did nol 

believe "tlwt God eternally condemned anr 

1~11 c of htun.\llily," .md offered the German 

people a c hatH t' ''to cat n thci• wa> hack 

into tlw rcllo\\'hip of peace-loving and lawahidin~ nat ion-;,'''" 

T aking thr )>prcch .1!'1 a guidt'. ,\l c Cloy 

Lold Smith th.tl "ome pr·upa~anda reas.c;mann~ 1o the (kr•ntau JlC'oplr was in order. 

Tt should nol, however, ~o beyond il:Lting 

the "averag(' (ict'tnan" feel he "C':tll work 

in pcacc If IH' abides by !IH' rc~ulatious. ·• 

M<"Cioy bt•licvcd that thi-. aim rould he accompli ... hnl, cut tlw one hand, h) promising 

"puni ... hmcnt or W,\1' niminL~I'i ,Lnd l"Cl'ilkitr;llll Ct•rflliell" Kcncrallr·· and, 1111 tlw 

oth~·•, II) "r.tctual and wl01 ful nc,,·s of 

urderl)' life in \llico-lln upicu territory, 

thing ... likt· habit'' ht·ing hnrn and women 

hanging out wash. " 11 

S II ,\EF waitt•d tltrou~h Ottulll'r .end 

into November ll<'forc L'-<luin~ it~ own mililal') government dire< tin~. \\'h,ll it then 

put lotw:ud wa"l nn :1~1tingcn t pt!-tis of 

CC:S 55 I pJu., tlw four principle.; the CCS 

had nrd"rcd .dTixc·d to the fl) leaf nf the 

handbook. The clircctiw ~a't tlw .ermy 

group t ollllll.lndcrs the following :;even 

mi~~ions unly: 

I. Imposition of tlw will of th1• Allies 

upon orrupicd Ct•e·nmny. 

2. Cart'. l'Ontwl, :1nd l(•pau·iation of displat'ecl niwd N:etions nationals and minimunl rare nr<"r~~nl'}' to control enemy refuge<'' and di~placcd per'Suns. 

3. t\pp1chcnsion of war climinal~. 

• juhn I. Snell. l>il~mmn 01 rt (;nmtlll)' (Nc" 

Orlt>nm: llaLl\rr I'I'C'~~. 1~'1\, p. 1011 

"Cnhlc·, ACWA J(. frQm MtCioy to F.'J OUS." 

for Smith, 7 No\ II, in IIAI~F c: 5, 117.1l5. 

" Ibid. 

4. Elilllination of nmdsm-fnscism. Ct•rman militarism, tht• Na?i hie·raiCh)·. and their 

collaborators. 

5. Rl·storation and JllairH<•nanct• of law 

and order, a~ f;~r .1~ the milit:n-y sit\lation 

permit.~. 

6. Protection or l 'uitcd Nations ptopl•rty, 

control of <.·rrtain propcrtit'•. and com.crvation of Cennan foreign exdwngc a~ts. 

7. Presctvation and cst.tblishuwnt of :.uitable administr:umn to tlw l''<lcnt recJuired to 

accomplish tlw :thO\ c dirccti\'t'!>. 

The fou•· h.mdhook ptinriplcs, rt.•rapilulated vcrbalim, were given as rc•<;tf'i, Lions 

on the mi~s s. , .. 

The dircnivc ,·oultl hard ly he rq.:·artkd 

as an ;u hicv<:mrn t lly tltmw who had 

worked and tmilwd roe· tnnnr nwntho; to 

make militarr gnvcrnn1ent a purpoo;dul instrument ur national polil'y. ( :Cllulld l lcnn 

c.xprcssed the dilemma of militarv ~ovcrn· 

ment when he wrott.•; 

It will take a quarter c-entury to rliminnte 

the theoric ... on '' hiC'h :ni~u• c:unc to powt•t·. 111is can on l)• h(' done by t'duc-ation of the 

UCXt gc-neration rot• which We have rnacle II() 

prepar:Hion~ and have 110 piau. We are proposing to c::tst ou t ~::ti'ism-militMism. but ''<' 

ha\·c nothing to put in its place. \'\'c ofTcr 

no hope. no ith·:·els or dcmon·aq· or world 

citizenship, nnd no prospcC't or an cronomic 

future.'" 

The future of military govc•nw1cnt in Germany was indeed f01 too lou~ going \o br 

officially :'1.<; hleak as Colonel Henn snw it. 

On the o ther hnnu, arnaics llHast rei~· nwrt· 

on men lhan on paper S('hcnws. Tlw voicr 

of Colonel Hunt wall not dead, awa· was 

the ~·ommon hocJy of doctrine al'qllircd at 

C:harloLte-wilk and Wimhkdon. 

"S HAEJ~, Office of ehc C.:ofS, to I Ita,, t\ C:p' 

21, 12, h, ~uh : Dirccei'c fCll M•ha.ccy Cmt·ruuu•na 

ur German) Prior IU DL·fcat or Surremh:r. IJ Nov 

H, in AFIIQ G 'i, Din•c:tiH~. Milieary (;o\'e.nmcnl of Germilll)'· 

"Anal)•sis Shcee, SIIAI·:P e \ lli•l S!'l', '10 Oct 

H, iu Slli"H:F C: '>, 2'>, J<~ rl.<· a 2. 
CHAPTER IX 

Tripartite Agreements 

The Sttrrender lnslntmenl 

Putting a surrender into writing would 

not seem to require the intensive dTort of 

an imcr~ovcrnment<ll rommi§iOII mm'<.' 

than a yt•ttr before the event. In Wol'ld 

War I, the Unit·ed Slate.<; and tbe Allies 

had left the armistice to the general:; in the 

field, who, when the time c:~mc, had pm· 

dtH cd a donuncnt cfTrt tivc enough to end 

tht: <:onflict. But the years between tl1c wat-s 

had rrwakcl. from thr Wol'icl War l1 virwpoittt, a c:Hastrophic: clckct in the 1918 

,u lllisticc, tlamCI}'> the Germans had not 

hrcn t wwintcd of tht'ir dcfeaL. .'\t the b st 

minute 011 6 November 191 B, the Getman 

1\rmy hnrl rcfttscd ro send n military representative to negotiate• with the Allies. Mathia$ Er:thtrgcr. a dvilian and a defeatist 

in tht· eye.<~ of ~ome Gcnnnns, had negotiated and signed the armistice. The military 

lc;ndership, aided by right-wing politit'i:ms 

and pt·c.--s, had for two decades thereafter 

daimed to hnve been swhhcd in the ha~ k. 

ln the United State">, ntrlll)' hclicvcd th.H 

Hitler had been st~cc cs.-;ful at mancu,·cring 

his countt')' into w«r lltTttust the Gcrmun 

people and soldiers lwcl lwcn hoodwinked 

i11t0 bclic\'in~ they had not rC<tlly hccu tkfcatcd in 1918. Both th(· form and thr langu:lgc t>f the surrcndc1· ronsl:qucntl) 

.;ccmecl to lw l't'llt'ial itt J)I'Cvcnting a thii'd 

world war. 

ThcrdtH'r, i11 agreeing a t M osrow in 

Novcmhrr 1 ~14:l to makc the writing of .1 

'IUtTClldc•r im.trumcnt the first ta~k fo1· the 

Eurupc<Hl :\dvi$ory Commission, the .\llied 

fon.:ig11 nlinlstcrs had not selet:tcd 1111 innocuous assi.gnment for a body thC)' viewed 

with mixed cmntiuns. The :\meriCHns iJJ 

pat'licular, a.c; little a$ thciJ' enthusiaslll was 

for the London-situated E:\C, attached 

great nifi ~.:a tc to the m;,mncr in wltich 

the surrender was ar<"omplished, probably 

more than either tbc British or the lL~­

$ians. The British sa\v tltc task as a major 

milestone in modern diplonM( )', 1 hough 

neither an absolute end nor a IJcginning. 

The Russians wnnl<~cl to documctl\ the fact 

of ,.j( w,- y; the legal asperts <·on<:cmcd them 

less. The .\mc1icans tended to 'il'C tltc surrender <ts <tn end in it~clf, an end 1wt only 

to German stab-in-tltc-back 1 hcorics lll1t 

also ({I the need rot' u.s. intervention in 

Eurupean wars. 

When :\n1ba.~ador Winant, dtairing tbc 

first formal EAC ~c·ssion on 14 Januar)' 

1944, su~gcstcd that the commission make 

the sur•·cndcr insLrumcnt the fit~t ilt'tt\ on 

its agcttda, the British representative. Sir 

\Villi:un StT;mg. immediately "uhmittcd a 

seventy-paragraph Dt·aft Gennau .\rmislit-c. 'J'hc document, filling thirteen lcgaJ-

-;izc page.'\, was formnlly drawn up and in 

effect J'cady for nin~. Thr Sovict delegate, Amhns. tdor Gow;cv, had nothing w 

submit. Neither had Winant. His instt•urtions were awaiting JCS arprow1l in \Vashingwn. and his military ad,·isrt·-to-lle, 

General Wickersham. W:1$ also still in 

Washington. 

The State, '\'m', and NaY)' DC'p.mments 
110 T ilE l'.~. \R~IY li\' T liE OC..:LU P \'1'10:\ 0 1 GEIUl!\l\Y 

h:11l set up tllr Wurkiug Srcllt'it) Contmitlft· ( W SC) in D c1 ember, rompo~rd of 

member" of carlt t>f 1 he department' and 

ll gctl with pacparing .tgrced instnu lions 

and information for \Vinant; the \VSC had 

uot attempted to do as the British had. 

huwe\'C.r, atJCl writr a cc men document. 

It td, instead, listcu t wcnty-seven provisions deemed essential in a sunendct' dontment fol' Germany. 1 

l\{orc impo•·wnl tlaan the.; 'r\'SC lbt were 

tlw t oncepts developed at higher levels in 

the State Departtl\Ctll :md in the J CS 

thal the surrendea· dorument ought to be 

brief, a ttesting ma inl y to the fact of ullc:on· 

ditional military sw·a•<•ndcr, and that sped fk provisions to he impo ·cd on Germany 

should be relegated to orders, prodama-

~. and ordinances. These latter documents would be ~uctl under the authol'ity 

a('C'Jtlired through the unconditional smrcndcr and would in no way ronslitutc a 

contract with the Germans, thus avoiding 

from the outset any :u g umcnt over terms; 

liter{' would simply be uonc. By J anuary, 

the JCS had concluded th:u all il wanted 

the Germans to sign was an admi,sion of 

t'Omplcte defeat. S11ch a document, the 

Joint Chiefs believecJ, would leave no room 

for quibbling and would not imply any 

t' Uil\111itments to the Germa ~ 

Winant ciJ·culated til<' \VSC/JC · propos<ds in the EAC at it · second nH'l' ling 

' WS lOA, Pro H fo1· Imposition on Cc:l'lllllny 

111 lht• Time of Surrcndt·r, 6 Jan 44, and JCS 

G:t!i/2, ProvisionR (or Imposition Upon (;rrm:my 

n1 thl'l Time of S11m:ndcr, lfJ J an -14, ill C:CS 

:lU7 ( l:t- 17-43), sec. I. 1 (I ) Ltr, J CS to Sec or State, Ill Ocr 4:~. 

iu OPO, ABC 387, tee. 1- A. (2) JCS 623/ 3, 

nst um~nt and Acknmdedgurnent or Uncondilionnl Surrender or GermoJty, 29 J an ~. in CCS 

381 ( 12- 17-43), sec. I. (3) Ltr, Adm William 

D. l.t!nhy, Chm, JCS, to Sec o ( State, sub : Support 

or U.S. Views (on Uncoudltional Surrender lrlNlru· 

mcmt), 5 Feb 44, in OPD, ABC 336, sec. I, c;~ses 

1-5. 

on 25 J anuary. T he Rus:-.ians lllill had re-

"eivcd no in.;lnH tious of tlwir own. and the 

British a nd ,.\n1rrican ro1ll c:pt.; were too far 

apttrl to be readily usable .t.'l the husis for 

uegotiatinn. lu fal't, as maucrs stood, hoth 

conce pts wcac heing pl c<>rnt~·cl not for d1sc·ussion but for adoptio n nton: or ltss i'll 

Into. Wickt'l-:;ham, who It ad hr·ought 1 he: 

WSC/ JC · papers to London , regarded 

them as orde ~ to be ob. crvcd to the letter, 

which w.1 .. prolmbly cxnrtl} how the vVar 

Department wanted him to interpret Ius 

mis: ion.a 

The British draft proposa l, on 1 he other 

hand, had hccn found comple tel)' unacceptable in W nshing ton, bC'ginning with the 

word "atmistkc'' in the title. The word 

could he tnkr.n to imply a ta•mpor'ary cessation of hostilities, not a surrend<·r; fmthermore, one of tht Germa11 comphtints about 

rhc 1918 rmi ti ce had been lhnt they had 

been lrkkcd into sig ni11g what nmountcd 

to an un conditio nal surrender under the 

guise of an armistice. The length of the 

document also seemed to rc:clurc it· potential force as a n unconditional !'urrcmler 

instrumctcl, sine e hy muncrali ~ .;pecifk J'equirements it !crt room r())' tltc insinualion 

that the vi(·tors' powers wcr<: o nl)' those spe· 

cifically daimcd in the donuncnl. 1 J n 

vVashing ton, too, the Brili$la ddrgatio n's 

f ull-fiedgcd lllii'I'Cndcr dOC'\ITilt'llt, nhviousl)' 

designed 10 hl' a finished prnduct and not 

a starting point for ncgot i:uinns, had 

rekindled 1 he long-standing- irl'it:llicm a r British attempts to seize the lcackrship in postwar questions. The WSC's in'>tr uctions to 

Winant hnd ttt least left tJ1c wtiting to the 

Euro peau 1\dvisory Commi ion. 

Prohnhly the J undamcntill i.ssuc both for 

• H ~to ry o( 1 h(: CAD, hk. Ill, ch. f, p. 60. 

'JCS 623/3, sub: Instrument ;md Ac:knowledg· 

ment of Unr.ondi1ional Surrrndrr, 2Y J an 44, in 

OPD, ABC 3U7, sec. 1- A. 
'1 RIP.\RTITg \ GREEi\IENTS 

WHshington and l.ondon was the mctlning 

of unconditioua 1 :-;urrcndcr. The Br·itirs h h1r<l 

wr ittcn what they said wns an liiH'Ondition,tl SUITellcll'l\ hilt the)' f'<l lll'd il :111 

:rnni!!tke, and to \V;r-.hington it louf..rd suspi< imrsly conditional. This suspirion was 

strengthened when a Briti h higlr-lcv<·l intelligence e.<Jtimnrc dcsrrilJetl fea r: of the 

cnnscquence.-; of utlronditional sun t•m.lcr as 

the ~erond of I wu for res preventing a mmplct(' breakdown in German morale. The 

ot her waJ> fc;rr of the Gestapo.' .\sa 111allcr 

of fac t, Brit i-;h nncl r\mcJ·icnn intclligcnrc 

opinions wert• in l'onsic.l<-rablc agreement ' '" 

lhc effect or the IIIH't111ditional \ll rncler 

polky, a nd the J C:S would before long appeal lo the Pn!:iitkut- unsucccs.o;full)· - to 

modify it, by doing nt least what clrt' 131'itish 

were allempting in their draft :-un·cndcr, 

name-l y, slnting their llt't~ ning spN·ilir:dly." 

No one in the War D(•partmcnt, Jrowcvcr. 

seems to have cunsiucrctl il either proper 

or expedient to try to spell oul the: meaning 

of unconditional surrender in the F .. \ C 

J ocument, prohahly because nobody w:IS 

willing to give up the legal faCL of ttncondit ionnl surrenclcr- ;ls tlw Uritish wcr·c proposing to do for thr ~a ke of making tlH' 

idea more palatabk to tire Germans. The 

War Department did not want the polk)• 

nhn ndoned, only clarified enough to lay to 

rest wha t seemed to ,\mericans tht• ha cl~, 

ptopaganda-i nspircd fears of the Germans. 

'I'he review of 1 he lengthy British terms 

haLl also evoked <l rcas:scssment of th~ WSC 

proposal whir h wou ld ha,'e produced H 

substantial d oc'IIIHent if its l wcnty-scvcn 

pf,iuts were all indudccl. Consequently, the 

W;~r Depanmrnt undrnook to write iL<> 

• J IC ~l/13:i, suh: gm•r.1 of Uncondilion!11 Sur· 

tu11dc r Pol:cy 011 German MOrillc, 3 1 .J nll •1•1, in 

OPD, ABC 387, scr. I A. 

• Memo, JCS for the President, 25 M:l r 44, 

:•••d Memo, l'DR for the Joint Ohi1•i$ of Slnlf, 

l Apr 44, in OPD, ABG 3117, ~ec. 3. 

11 1 

own draft, whk ll would cr11h1Jdy a.s far as 

possible thr c:oncen u·atcd cs.'lcnc:c of unconditional surl'cndcr anti offer a clear alternative to rhe British version. I Iilldring had 

lhc t.lraft a~ \vritten in the Civil t\f'Tairs Division in hand the dll)' before Winant prc-

~entcd 1 he first U.S. l>l'oposnl in Lhc EAC. 

Comprcs:-;cd to thjrtccn p:wngrnphs a nd 

typed doublr.-spa•e, it filled only two <tnd 

one-half -;hrcts of legal-size papct·.' 

Apprcwcd h)' the JCS, the C,\D draft 

went to rhe EAC in the fi r ·t week or Febtuarr along with arguments for it<; adoption 

and, inft:n:ntially, agajnsl ndoption of tJ1c 

13rit i.~ h n. The CAD dr·llfl required 

the Ccrmnn signatories to make three acknowlc ~lllcnls: that tlwir militaty forces 

wer<: Wlally defeated a nd incapable of furl her rc.._i.,tancc; that their rcwur<'es ami 

people wer•c: rxha.usted to the poilll wltere 

further l'rsistn nc:e was rutik ; nncl that the 

country w<ts ready to submit witlmul que.c;-

tion to nny military, political, economic, or 

territorial terniS which the victors might 

impu~c.' C:nrllr':'lr)' 111 t lw British draft, 

which had not specified who would do the• 

signing, the U.S. draft required che signalure of the " highest Germnn M ilitar·y Authority" Hncl relegated the German civilian 

signatory to second place. The original instructions to Wina nt had alread y insi tctl 

on mf\king the German High Command 

acknowledge 1 he defeat \vhc.c hrr or not a 

civilian government e.'<istcd that wns capable of doing so.n 

A week later the U.S. st;1nd received 

some moderately disC]uicting reinforcement 

from the Russians. Couscv presented a 

twenty-paragraph Soviet draft which almost c:q unlcd lhc U.S. version in brevity. 

' llirtory of thl' CA D, hk. VI, c:h, II, p. 40. 

' Dcp:lr\rt)('ll\ or Slate, PoreigTI nrtntl<ms, 1944, 

\'01. r I llP• ! 67 -72. • Ibid., p. 1 Ol. 
112 Ti lE U.S . . \IU.IY l'\ ri-fE OC:C:ll P.\TIO:\' OF GERr-. A~1· 

The nt ~e for di quiet <'Otdt! ltc dcducTd 

from I he title, '

1

Tct•tm or Surrcndc•r for 

German)'." TJw U.S. version was cntitkd 

ument autl .\t k11owledgment of Unconditional Surreudcr of Germany:· The 

Russians used the tct·m '\mconditiomd surrrndcr•" twice i11 their preamble btH in the 

tcxl concentrated overwhelmingly on military matters, ggest io.~ other con seq ucn tC'> 

only in an a t·tidc dealing with occupation 

w ncs and in a brief rcfcrl"ucc to additional 

"political, economic, and military·· rtqttiremcnts. "' In the EAC, the Ru&c;ians did not 

conn:al that they wanted to mnkc the ad 

or Slii'I'Cnder :'IS pa inless llS possible rcw the 

Ct~m1ans and leav<' the most unple:tsunl aspee ts to be revealed latt·r. 

In mid-Fehnmry, the EAC hncl three 

complete drafts before it, had made no progre~ toward :tdopting :\11)' one Of" wr•iting 

:tll)'thing of its own, aucl hnd found nwving 

on ln :m y othct subjc<'l irnposo;iblc hcrn usc 

tlrt' Russians inll cd on settling each it<'m 

mmplctcl)' before going to the next. The 

\mcroicans ancl Uritish. as had ha ppened 

before, were locked in a conflict as ntlH.h 

rcHH t•r•ned with whose view wa'i ar< eptcd 

as with what was nrrcptcd. WiMrnt ronrplaincd tha t he really could not sec ":r great 

pr•artir;ll dill't·11·ru e'' between the three 

documents. but in \Va~hing n the adv:mtagc~ of the ~hort U.S. draft were rc~arclcd 

a-> great enough to r·cquire a lcllcr fmrn 

Rooscn·lt to C:hurrhill upportin g it. 1' To 

keep Wickershnm from wavering, llilldring 

forwarded part ol the Pr·rsidcnl's letter· t<1 

hitll. , .. i\t the ~a rrw time, having ndoptcd 

tltc prarticc of mr·ctiug formaJl)', the £ \ C: 

roukl uut C\'Cn ll'ntntivd}' search out art·as 

of n.qrccment. Each delegation tnlk(·d for 

'" I b•d .. 1>11 173 7!1. 

'' Ibid., ()fl. Ifill .111d tiJO, 

I H ;I(IITJ' vi tltc r,,n, hk. VI, ch. tr, p. 77. 

the rccor·d and defended itll OW tl draft in 

t:vcry detail. 

.\t the end of the first week in ~!arch, 

the ueadlm k loosened SOillC\"hat when, Oil 

\\'inant'.s suggl'l>tion, he, Stran~. w1<l 

Gousev met informally in Gousev's private 

office. Sp ~n king unoffirinlly, Str•ang said he 

thought his .t{()VCTnmcrH might ngret: to a 

short oc: t~m rti , since it wws wh al both the 

Ame•·icanR and the Russia ns wanted, pro-

\'ided all point" co,·ered in Lhe British draft 

were ind11tkd in the supplementary proclamations and orders. \ViMnt thought the 

U.S. govc·r•rtn)<:nt would accept this provision. GOI.tscv agreed to Rhort t't;r'nlS and 

seemed to lind the U.S. draft at'<'eptahlc 

e.xcepl fM paragraph \'Jl whic•h rcqujred 

the Gcrrnnn i\ttthoritics and people to cooperate in <tpprehcndin~ war criminals and 

making them available fot• tl'inl. The Soviet 

govcrnnwnt, he said, did not want a reference to war rrirninals in the donune.nl because the men who cntrw to sign might 

themsclve~ fall into thi,'> ca tegory and 

might, \lwtdor·e, refuse to do business at 

all. He a lso indicated that his govcrnmcJ1t 

would no t wa nt the proposed proclamations and orders Rhown to the Germans before they had sip;ned the surrender. Wha t 

his government wanted, he said, was to get 

i ll\ unconditional mil itary surrender a~ 

qtticklr a.-: po-;sible and thereafter get the 

Germn.ns dis;u·med and km hili ~ctl. The 

c~ t, lw implied, would follow nnturall y, 

and ' '\'ina11t rather chillingly bcranw aware 

that whrn tltr Russians Ra id " unconditional 

surrender'' they mcanl it. 1'\rithcr the 

:\merirans nell' lhc British had ever rcallr 

contemplated a full}' unronditiunal surrender. Under the U.S. proposal, the proclamati n~ :tnd <JI'dcrs woltld have restricted 

the wc ~'l of the vi tor~ about a<; much 

as if the same provisions had been induded 

in the suncnclcr instrument as the 81itish 
TRiPARTITE AG IE NTS 

dc rcd . \llh ough not " t'Orltracl with the 

Germans, these proclama tio ns and orders 

would have constituted a contract amoug 

the Allies. T ltc Soviet Union, Winanl now 

began to suspect- as the British possibly 

had earlier when they wrote their long 

terms- might n ot be interested in eithe r 

form of suc h a contract. The questions 

were whether rhe RtL ia_n s would ue willing 

to go on to the proclamatio ns and orders 

after the surrender instrument was writte n 

a nd whet her they would o bserve them a fter 

the surrender was sig ned. Gousev said that 

tJ1ey would1 provided the surrender in trll

ment w as completed first. t:l 

Winant, Stnng, and Gousev had after 

two futile months found a means by which 

they could negotia te, and a fter two s<.:heduJed meeting'S in M a rch tl1ey n eve r met formally again except to sign documents read y 

Cor submission to their governments. G etting th e authority to negotia te took longer, 

certa inly for Winant a nd proba bly fo r the 

o ther two as well. In the sei'Ond week of 

M arch , Adm. Harold R. St.aJ•k, Commander, United Sta tes N nva l f orces in Europe, 

nnd \,Yinnnt's chid naval dvise , told 

1\dm. Ernesl J. King that progress in the 

EAC was being held up because Winant 

felt bound by the U.S. draft surrender instrument. ln response, the J CS re laxed its 

sta nd slig htly, snying it wanted " every 

e ffort" made to get the U.S. document 

adopted but did not " ptedudc n egotiation 

with a view to fonmdnting recommendations Co the three govennnenls." 1 1 This concession was not. enoug h, a nd lwo weeks 

later Wirke•·sham w ent to Was hing ton to 

explain wh y Winant needed mor e la titude. 

" Department of Stn,lc, f1'orcig11 Rc!latiuus, 1914, 

vol. I, pp. 197- 99. 11 JCS 623/ 6, J nslrumenl and i\cknowlerlgcment 

of Ut\conditionaf s ,,l·rcmler by l! ~m ny , 20 Ma r 

'H, in OPD, ABC 3ll 7, sec. 1- i\. 

The JCS tlten revised its \'iews, which were 

sent to W ina nt Cl!l 10 .\pril. The JC:S still 

rr.quired n <> hort doctlment limited lO the 

three maill fea tures of the U.S. draft but 

wa~ willing tu <\I'Cept different wu1•ding and 

"acljustmrnts of points of view" made in 

tht EAC. tr. 

Since Washing ton ha tl a lr cad)' agreed to 

iucludc 1 he poin L<; to be omitted frorn the 

Bl'ilish dra ft in prod ;tmatio ns, on.lcr-s, <tnd 

other policies to be writte n la ter in the 

£:\ C, full agrermenl with L be Bri Lish became relatively easy as long Hs lhe sun·cnder instrument was not exclusively a n 

American product. Agreement with the 

Russians was a different m a tter. The Soviet 

draft lrnns spccilicd in three scparale 

places tha t the G erma n a rmed fo rces, including the S.t\ . ( a pa ramilitary ol'ganiza -

tion of the N~azi pa rty) a nd the Geslaf;o_. 

a t the fro nt, inside Ge rmany, and outside 

German territo ry, wr re Lo he ded:.arcd prisoners of wa r upon the sig ning of the surrentl er and "be '>tation ed at such places and 

in such m anner as may IJe determined by 

enrh A llied Commander-I n-Chief o n his 

own front."'" Althoug h the American$ a nd 

the Britis h in tlw spring of 1944 were not 

Jjsposed to he loo moved by the future 

plight or G erma n tronps Lbe)' did not propose to usc G ermans for d labor, 

' " hit'b was the onl y rogcnt re<tson (or decla ring tb1cm prisoners of wa r nfter the war 

was over. 1-\n•tltcnnorc, sin<.:e they were 

committed lo obser ve the H ague and Geneva Conventions, they recoiled from the 

thought of having to give millions of defeated Germa ns ra tions and billets :rpproxi-

" ( l ) JCS 623/7, I nstrument a ud Acknowledgemen t of U nconditionnl Surrende r by Germany, 

'I Apt' •l·'t, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 1- A. (2) Depa rtment of State. ort~ig11 Relations, 1914, vot. r 

p. 2 10. 

•• Depnrtrnent of State, Foreign Rch1tio11s, 1944, 

vol. I, pp. 174 and 176. 
11 4 THE U.S. AR1\IY lN T HE O <.:CUPATIOK OF GER ANY 

matcl y equivnlcnL W wha t t. hcy provided 

for their own troo ps. Gouscv, t(> allay the 

Western le ate.~; ' q ualms, said the Soviet 

Union would abide lly the co11 ventions 

even though it tlid not regard itself as 

bound by tiH.:n·1, which GUTied lillie conviction sinre neither th e Soviet Union nor 

Germany had ol>set·vecl the conventions 

thus far in the \Var between them. Later 

Gmtsev oO'ercd w <ldd ;Ln aniclc providing 

for tr'eatmcnt of the prisoners of w ar " in 

a manner• lO be prescribed l>y the repn:sentativc." of the Allies."'' Whethe r sur h an 

artidc would relieve the Wcstcl'tl .\!lies of 

their obligations undtr the convent ions was 

doubtful a t besl. \\'hal was rcrtain was that 

it would kc the surrender instrument a 

most tla ngc nn t!> duC'mncnt if the Germans 

leamed its t'Ontcnts before they surrendered 

and while they still held \m ~·;l n and 

British prisoners. 

In May the E.\ C suiJsided ag:rir1 into 

semipand ysis. The Soviet delegate<; refused 

to ta lk about a nything l>ut the surrender 

terms and refused to ('Otnpromisc on the 

pt·isoner o[ wa r issue. The Americans anti 

British were read y early in th e month to 

let tlu; Soviet Union have the pr ~O II I'S or 

war as long as they were not required to 

do the same with the German troops who 

fell to them and <rs long ns token tripartite 

<·ontrol such as the Russia ns had alreaJ y 

suggested was c!~U thli d re!Znrding their 

treatment. But as lhc weeks pas."cd, il 

hegan 10 a ppear I hat the pri~o 'S or war 

were nol the rea l hit c-h .. \s long as the Russians a nd the Germans were alone on the 

mainland of Europe, the Russians did not 

seem to want to comntiL themselves at all 

to a mu ltib teral un conclitit)nal surrendet•.'' 

" H istory of tht· CAD, hk. V I, ch. II, pp. 

100- 102. 

" Mc1110, I ,l Col H enr)' Cartc:r fo r Col Lewis, 

sub: Tri11 10 J.onchm 10- 12 M ay, 1:1 Mal' ·14, 

in OMCUS :S/ 35, :1 19.1 , 

In June the atmospher<: changed . . \t the 

end or the first week senh ~ forces 

wCI'e irt Norm<utd )' anti thus d uscr to the 

heart of Ge.,·man y th<rn the Sm·ieL al'lnie:;. 

The need for agreement was acquiring 

~o c urgency in Mosl'ow a:-; well as in 

\Vashington and London. On 10 June :\ CLing Scrrela ry of Stale Edward R. Stnlinius, Jr., asked Winam lO burry up the 

surrender terms because the vVHJ' Department was, " with the invnsion now in progress," prcs.~ g for head\vay on plans for 

the occupation. Within the hour that Stettiniu~' ruble left the dr par nt , one from 

London arrived in which Winant reported 

tltnt, on the dny IJdore, the three cl:::ga c~ 

had reached agreement on the surrender 

terms, except for details, and Gu11sc,· had 

agreed to begi n taking up other qucstions.'

0 

Oo ~cv had :wc:eptrd a slalement that all 

ll'lCI11bcr-.; of the Gcnmrn armed rorces were 

llhj el' l lo brill,!.( cda d pri~o s or war 

''at the disrrction nr the Commander-inCilid nf the Armed Forces of the .\llicd 

State concerned , . . <~ nding further der·isions .tnd . .. snhjcct to sur h rouditiuns 

a11d dirct'lionf; a<> nHt)' IJc prc~r rill tl liy the 

. \II icd Represent atives.""'' l f 1 he So\'iet 

Uniu11 wanted manpower. the new terms 

g~ 'C them a sil.ahlc bemus ~~~ also dcJining 

as nw mhcr:-: of the Grrman armed force!:' 

a uxilia ri es equipped with weapons, whir h 

could eventua ll)' have induded every halfway ahiC'-I>odied Ccnnan malc between sixteen ;tnd sixtr. 

The Lcx l of lhc draft entitled ''Un<"o ndi-

~i md Sun·ender of Germanr," as signed 

in the E.\C: on 25 July 1944 and suhmill cd 

to the gn\'crnmen t" for a pprova I, co d 

of fourt een articl e~ ~ Jt was di,·ided into 

'" Dcpartll1Clll or St:tl(1, Fotei~u RnlalioiiS, 1944·, 

l'ol. I, p. 2!1:1. 

'' Ibid., fl, 2fl7. 

" I bid., p p. 256- (i I. 
TRIP \RTITJ~ AGREEJ\IEl\TS 

1h1Te IMrts. In 1bc fi ~l pa1t Gl~t'llliiTl)' acknowlcllgccl f'Om plctc Ill iEl ~• f)' clef cat on 

land, nt sea, and in the air. T he secolld 

patt was a series of milita ry at•tidcs prov i.diug for the end to hostiliti es and giving tlte 

Allies the power to demobilize a nd disarm 

the German fortes. In the third part the 

Germans would he req uired lo bind t.hcmselvcs lo carry out unronuilionall)' ot.hcr 

poliliral, adm inistmtivc, cconomil', fimmcial, and milit al')' requirements which the 

.\llics would subsequently present. ~~ T he 

proclamations, orders, ordinances, nnd instructions )'l!l to be written, which the Germans would not sec before the signing, 

wou ld convey the full meaning of this last 

pnrt to the Gcnnahs. 

The C.\D regarded the surrender instrument as a succ ·cssful compromise from the 

U.S. point of view. Its chief weaknesses 

seemed lo l>e that it provided for an uncollditiona l surrender without expli citl y defining the term and that it t'lntiripated a s<~ 

of some homs between th<: signing and the 

tease-fire. But it met lhe U.S. req\Jircments 

for brevity a nd broad lang uage. T he U .S. 

compromises had been ones of form, while 

those of lhc British anJ the Ru~s s had 

been substa ntive. The British h<\d !'acrificed 

their long Lenm. The Russians had relaxed 

their sta nd on the prisoner of war question 

;1nu had given up the attempt to sugarcoat 

the don11 nent to induce the Germans to 

sigu.!!;j 

Tlte Zones 

.\ mong the various reasons for the German milit<U)' resu rgence after World War 

I , one frequen tly cited Was the failure of 

"' Ibid., pp. 25·1-55. 

.,. Mc1'10, 1.1 Col Edgar P. Allen for Director, 

CAD, sub : Unconditionnl Su rrender of Germa ny, 

20 Ju n H, in CAD, 01•1 (7- 10-42), sec. 7. 

115 

the Rh inda11d nt:cupatinH- hcntusc il affc lt~d o11l)' a small part of Ge m<~ny to 

bring hot nc to the Germans the meaning of 

ddcat. ~ lainta in ed hy the French ;~nd British until 1930, the Rhineland occupation 

haJ given the Germans an object on which 

to fon ts their resentmen ts without giving 

the i\llle.s any worthwhile leverage, either 

politic<l l or military. Co scq , 1he 

World Wa t· ll planners always com;idcrcd 

a Lot;tl otrupat io11 t !J he IICce.<;s;. r)' to 

gua rantee success in preventing a fut11rr 

German outburst. .:'\e.ither was there a ny 

seriou" dn ubl tha t Lhe countr)' should he diviclecl into zonrg, one for ench of the m:1jor 

victorious powers. The logistics of such an 

arrangement 1vcre infinitely simpler Lhan 

would be the ra~c in a combined occupation , an d the risk of inter-Allied fri cti on 

would be red uced. ln an y event, neither the 

United Kingdom nor the Un ited e.~ nor 

the Soviet Union would have been willing 

to relinq uish conl'rol over its own forceg a nd 

its independent power of decision lo the 

extent necessary to set up an in tegrated 

occupation . 

• \ zona l division in embryo appeared in 

the first C:OSSAC: report on R ,\ N KIN pre-

!lented tc> 1 he Curnl ,incd Chiefs of Stair at 

the Q u,\DRANT Conference ( Quehce) in 

. \ tlg ust 191·3. The COSS. \ C: stafr, then 

mostly British, assigned nort hwesr Germany 

ill cl uding lhe Ruhr to the British nnd the 

Rhine valley (rom the Swiss border to Dues-

~cltlo rf to the Americans. COSSJ\C ciid not 

l.l ltcmpt to determine an eastern illnmdary 

for either zone sin ce it did not know how 

mur h of Germany the Soviet forces might 

occupy and would not itself have enough 

troop:-; before I !144 to deplO)' them deeper 

in to Germany. 'J'Ite assig11ment of the zones, 

the COSS/\C plannf'rs pointed out, was adju d LO the plan for OvF.IH.ORD, which in 

positioning Lhe B1·itisb forces on the lef1 
JIG THC U.S \R~lY 1:'\ THE OC C.U P \'1'10:'\ 01' GER~I.' '\Y 

ll.tlll.. \mulcl t.tl..c them tlu ou~h 1 ht• Low 

( :ountric., into nort hwl·~lt' lll Gc·rman)', 

whitt· tltt· .\nlCril':uls, landing on thr right, 

wou ld swc•ep crt!<l.W<m.l and lill'ik(' in l.t> Gc•·-

•n;ul y ;dong the upper Rhin<· vall<')'.~' V\'hilc 

t la t· lo~ir of 1 he t.onal arran~t.'llH'Ill ,, ppt'cll'Cd 

ine~t .tp.tlllt· to 1 he British at Qt• \DR,\:>~T -

·" it did tu them throu~hout tht• long 

ttlrllll h' c,f .trgument 1 h.tt follnwrd the 

\nwrit·,nl); "'''c unwilling to ,,, ~t•pt it out 

or hand, and the ronfcrcnrc ;~djm11m:d 

without lllclking a clc<·isinn on R \:-I KIN. :·. 

Sonw "'ccl..s later, in Ortol>cr, ~ l tJI'I-\'HI1 

took to \Vnshingwn another lalt llH nl on 

R ,\NI<IN. In the intr.-im, he hac.J rcrc ivcd 

.t ren·ntl\' rompleted. high-ln·cl Briti'ih rcpwl t tllH t.'rllin~ occupation :zone'l. Writtt·n 

in tlw \rmt-.ti<e and Po."t-\\'ar (tlllll\liucc, 

"hit h ~<~d Deputy Prime ~lini~·.tc'• Clement 

\ukr ,,, it~ thnirman aml imluded thcForci n ('t rcl<tr)' and the ~,., • rtou v fur 

War in its membership, tlw II'J)Orl divided 

.til ur C:Cilllnny into thi'C(' ill'~. In the 

northwestern zone, wltirh would h1~ British, 

tit~: l'l·pm·t ind~tdcd , ai<Jng with 1 he Ruhr, 

tlw north Gc·rman porh, llamhurg Hnd 

Url.'rtt<·n, and the Kicl C::\na l. To the 

Unittd St.1t!'S it assigned, as C:OSS.\ C had 

e.ulic·a, tlw ... outhwc,;;tern t cme, add inK a 

"J>hC'at· (lr influence in Frn•HC to tlw .trcn 

of lJ.S. rcsponsihiliL) sinrr tht• American 

lim·-; or -.upply and rommuniraticm" would 

pr<''>lllll:tlll> run across Frant·t•. ~~~ Two J C:S 

agencies, the Joint Stmtegic Survq' Comtllillt't' and the J oint StaiT Plannt·•s, rcvil·wt•d llll' new R ANKIN proposals. The 

joint mtc~ic Surver Committee n dlcd nttrntion tn the long-standing drt i'ion to 

ll l'lt\nCOII Sulh!~C, scs, Sl!i\F.F, lli•IOry or 

( OSSAC:, M.t) H. in USFfn SGS 'I IIII. 

• ~la tlorr. Strrrtegic P/an11ing for Coo/itio11 ll'or· 

fort, p 22b. 

Willi.un M. rr:mklin, ''Zonnl Jloundarics and 

1\(•(t'" 10 Ht•rlin," ll'rnld l 1o/ltio, I h : 1, OC'tobrr 

l!lG'I1 p. b. 

withdra''' U.S. ful<l" from Europe t[ltk~l~ 

after the 1'11cl or )Jo-;tilitic'i for dcplu) !))('Ill 

to the P:trilit· :1nd a'ikd for polity gtdcl:lll<'<' 

on the U.S. role in the occ;upalion in general anc.J tile an eptal1i li l)' of the sou! ll Wt'~\­

ern zon<' in P·•• titular. 111e j oint !';ta ft 

Planner-; advi,cd t.tl..ing the question-. lo the 

Pre:idcnt, "intt· tht JC\'ised A:-:KI~ .tppearcd tu t·mhmh Bliti.;h \\' ar Cahinrt .md 

Forci~n Offi{c J>O'it''"" poli<·y.-• 

The P 1 tsidt'lll look up the rcqtH''l f111 

!{Uidanc<' unan.tting from the joint studk'> 

on ~l November in a meeting with tht 

Joint Chid:; alloa •·d the ballleshjp Iowa C'n 

route to ( :airo. ( :ontrmplating t1 m·rd to 

maintain <~ll on·upatinn force of ahoul :1 

million U.S. trOCIJh in Germany "for wH' 

year, maybe two" a fter the surrendet , ht 

stated his 1 cquirt•ntcnt.' for the zone'>. Th<· 

teiTitori.,l cli-.p<hition-.. he "aid, in orde1 tu 

facilitate luca~in~ up Germany into three, 

possihl)' fi vt·, srp:u•atC' states a ftCJ· the w:u, 

ought l() con fmm to the geographic :-~ubtli­

" isions t>f lhl· l'!HIIJII')'· He saw these en tities 

<L'i being :1 Homan Cat holic south, a J)rotcstant northwest ex tending to Berlin, ,tlld 

a northcast('lll t~ n which he des( ih~:d 

as ha\'in g " Pru sianic;m·· a." itc; rcli ion. To 

illustrate. Rntl'\Cvclt drew the houmlaric"' 

in pencil un a N.ttiunal Geographit Sorict) 

map. St<~ lin , he I hought, might okay 'm h 

a division, and ht• hdievcd the Joint Cllidl< 

"would want to" make A:>~KJ N ruttform 

to it. He did not lik'· the idea or the United 

States t<tking the southwestern zont' nnd 

therewit h having to take responsibility fo1 

France. The United States, he believed. 

should tilkt• the nm thwcstern zone in Gr•· 

m<mr whc·t c it would ha"c direc-t an<"'-' 

~ ( I I J li\101')' of Ji ll' C:AD, bk. VI, ell. I, pp. 

6-8. (21 COSSA<.:/ t'A/ Pian 26/ .J, Outlittl' uf 

Oprralion~ for C:h 11 Affairs PlanniuR R.r.NKll\ 

Case "C", 15 Nov 1:1, 111 SHAEF C: 5, ll!i .2~ , 

jnckcl I. 
0 National Geographic Sodcl)' R oosEVELT's CoNCEPT oF P osTWAR OccuPATION ZoNc.sjor G'ermall)' drawn in jmzcil by 

the President himself on Cl National Geographic Society mafJ while en rort le to the Caim COI!{ere!lce. 

TR RT I' ~ \G EE~lENTS 

lu ou~h H•c'llH'II aud ll .uuluar~. Tht• Cni1cd 

State ... , he said, \hould al~o h,l\ c Berlin. and 

the Soviet Union C'Ou ltl tal-c the territory 

to the ca~l. · 

On 4 Dec:emhcr, at c .• iro, l\l:u. hall prc-

'etHed the Prc-o idcn '~> wi,he., wncerning the 

northwc ... tc• n .uHI soutll\\ e,tn 11 wncs to the 

Combined Chiefs of !->tall. who then dc-

<'idcd- uowillingly on t lw p;1rt of the Britic:;h :mel :-omewh:H r·clunantl)' on the pnrt 

of i\lm ll. who had w.tntcd a firm derision- to din'rt COSS.\C: to examine the 

implications fm Ovsru 01m planning of a 

~witch iu the wn •s.~u Dut the COSSAC rc'-

port, delivered l.ttcl in thr month, ronLrihutcd nothing new. (;eneral i\ forgan maintained th;tt in t~ rd er 111 put the ,\mericans 

in the northwest zone. Ill' wmdd either have 

to rc\•ise the QV~RI.OIW deployment 0 1' be 

confromc·cl :dtc•· the !!III'IWJdcr with an adminislr.llive tan~le while• the U .~. and 

British fore c.; u ns.o;ed cmh ot her'..; lines of 

communkation'\ on their '""> to Lhc final 

zones. The JCS had conceded a certain ineleganc-e in the uen~ssit y for trading zones 

hut had rcfu"-cd tu -;cc it"" tht• m erwhelming 

problem it appc.•rcd to lw tc1 the Brite h. 

Jn the meeting on the lawa. the Prc.c;idcnt 

had suggested, if need he, :-ttting up a separate occupation army whir h could be 

broughl in lhrough the 1101thwcstern German porto. \vhilc the Ov"RI.ORU troops wcrr 

cx1t111g from the southwcsl through 

ra t.~' 1 Most likely, thr Bl'itish did nol 

reall y expert Morgan's report to accomplish anything, "in('e the 1-oniug question, 

" Departmelll of St.11c. C:oiro und Ttltrtur, in 

" Foreign Rclaliom,'" pp. 25'1 55 

'" ( I ) /b it/., p. (ill!\, (2 ) :H tT, Slr11lr11ir 

P/otwi11g /liT Cnn/itiCJn W arftlrt, p. !17R. ~ ( I ) IJcparlmcnt of Su\tt·, ( 'aito and rl~tnn, 

in ''Foreign Rt·l.llton~.'' pp 251 nnd 6q9. (2 l 

CCS Precis ami Auion ShrN, SHAEF, ~ub: 

RANKIX c., SJlhl'rl'i or 0fi"IIJIIIhOII 011 the Contr• 

ncn1, •I Fell •11 1 in SJIAl-:1-" SGS '171. 

I 17 

ha\"in.g hcromr UIW uf natiun,tl pol in. 

would eventual!) h.t\ c· lO h<· dec idrd lwtwecn the Prc.o;id<·nt and the Prime ini'>tcr. 

In J anuary, at the fiN g,\C ~:c ting. 

Sir Willi am "trang "uhmittt•d the findings 

of the .\rmistire :tnd Po'it-W.lr Commillcl: 

as thr B1 ili"h propo"d 0 11 t.ones. Well 

known t o the J CS .mel the P1 <':;idctll 

through KI N and thl· C:airo C:ottfcrenre, the Brili~h tlti11king wn..; still totallr 

new to \\'ina nt .tnd to the Stale Department. Furthermore, neit her was )l'l olWare 

of the objections raised in the milit:H)' talks 

or of the t.onal division lh<' President had 

drawn on lloa•·d the J tntJt1."' 

l\lcanwhilc, UH' l'rrsidrnt \ ronn·pt or 

the zone<; had opened up .1nothcr .1rca of 

potential U.S.- B1 iti"ih tOill<·ntinn. T o farilitnte administration rand o~.;ibl) dismemberment, the British proposal laid the t.onal 

bound a de~ .1long cxi-.tin'-' ( :caman intnnal 

politital houndarie-.. In hi.; rc~ion.1 l cont ept, the President ll.td ]Mid little .liiCn tion 

to ahli:.hed politit nl subdivi..;iono,. His 

and the Britic;h propus.d did agree approximat ~\ on the lmuntlal\ IJttwc•tn tlw notthwcste,:n a nd southwc. ... t~l n t.OIH'.,, "hie h the 

President had drawn alonl{ the line of the 

.Main River a11d tlw IHll'thc•·n h<> und.u·y of 

Bavaria, the trnditionnl dividing line bel ween north and o;outh Ccnn;ut). J n li'\ing 

the boundary hrlwrrn the wc,tcrn t.ones 

and the eastern znnt', however, the British 

followed the Ctl~ l'll hiJrd~r~ of l L111 nvcr, 

Braunsthwcig, and ll c'l-1\C-N~Lo;~au, which 

lay as m uth as 150 miles west of the line 

the President had drawn and ldt Berlin 

deep in the eastern zone. lkrlin. in thr British version, was to hc<·omc· a rombincd 

zone. Omilting Ea'll Prussia, as lhl' British 

proposal did. lhc nm l hwcstrrn and L~te rn 

u Franklin, "Zonnl Bnund;uic\ ;md Arct''~' to 

Berlin," p. I I. 
I IB THE U.S. \R~ Y 11'\ THE OC:C:UP:\'1'10:'\ OF CER~J.'\NY 

1orH:.s wen·. <t< '<·ordil\g to the British reckoning, almo:-;t exactly t:qual in population, :lltlwtwh the castcm zone was about a fifth ::> 

brgcr than tht nmt hwcstern w ne in ai'Ca. 

T he soulhweslcm zouc wa.'l :;ubst:mtially 

smaller than the other lwo, . t full third 

smi'\llcr than the ea'\LCrn zone in popLtlalicm 

and even smaller than tha t in ea.~~ The 

British nnner~ suggested that the United 

States rnighl , if it wished, a lso ta ke re pon

sibilitv for Austria, wh ich would give it an 

area :~ li htly larger th11 n the Soviet .wne 

and a populaLion about equal to either of 

the C)ther zones. ~ 

_c\l the end of the first week in 1:-ebruary, 

the President lOok on the t:~~k of seeming 

the northwestern zone for the United 

Slates. On the 4th the .British Chiefs of 

Stan' had r•cplied to the change in R ANKIN 

proposed by the JCS at (;airo. T o !vforgan's arguments for keeping R ,\ NKJN as 

it was, the BritLr;h Chiefs added a rlaim 

lO "a peculiar, Brit ish interest in overseeing 

the German nnval dil'armament, thus declining "to agree LO the U.S. <.:o unlerproposals until such time as the U.S. Cltiefs 

produce reasons of overriding importan('e 

'"The U.S. and British fig11 res, compilr,d nt the 

same time, vary sorm .. ·whal as is shown by the 

following table: 

Briti>h U.H.- WS(; 

-- l'op11lo-

.\re.n 

I'Qphl•- tlon unn Area millinnll sc,.mi. million.\ $(1. mi. 

-- Northwt.stC!rn 7.0I1t" 22.5 57 .~ 0 24 .8 50.500 

Sou(h'''Ut('rn Zone: 15 7 47 , tOO 'IS.G 45,600 

E3!tern Zunc:: 223 76,600 22.2 71 ,IX)O 

2.2 1·1.300 

., Department of State:, Poreigu Relatiort.l, 1944, 

vol. T, pp. 150 -.'i:t See also Philip E. !'vfosely "'!'I 0 . f C ' lC cccapallon o •crmany : New l.ight on How 

the Zones Were Dr;n,•u," Foreig11 A/lairs, 28:4, 

July 19!Hl, pp. SB0- 604. 

in favor of their acceptance.":•• Thrr.c days 

later, Rm:s<-vcl l dispatched a C:<lhlc 111 

Churchill. '!'he qualms of the U.S. milit:u·y 

al,out letting the northwest zmle go to the 

British most!)' involved a lurking- suspil'ion 

tiMt the British were man<·uvering for longterm economic ad,·antagc in tile Ruhr and 

through possession of the North Sc11 ports. 

The President's allitudc, however, was determined! entire!)' hy llll unwilli ngnes.'i to he 

tied dO\vn in Europe after the war, pnrtiy in FnuH'c. which he <\ppn ren tly expected to fa ll inlo chaos as soon as the Germnn g rip was Joosened. For the President, 

German~, northwest or sollthwest, was unimportant except for the implied as.<;o<:iativn of France with the southwestern zone. 

To Chul'chill he wrote: "1 am nbsolutdy 

unwilling to police France and possibl y 

Italy and the Balkans a<> well. After all 

!' ranee is your baby a nd it will take a lot 

of nur ·ing to bring it to the point of tlking alone." H e sugge'itcd lhat since the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff had reached nn 

impasse, tire two ()f Lhcm hnu d make lhe 

decision to change RANKIN.•n 

The answer from London rec<1pitulatcd 

the British positions a lready takeu and 

added an expression of fait h in the ability 

of France to govern i!self ;u1cl possibly even 

help take over the U.S. zone in German)' 

if _ merican troops had lo be wr·ilhdrav,rn. 

On the Last day of the month, the President 

made a second appeal: "Do please don 't 

ask me to keep any American forces in 

France. 1. just ('annol do it! 1 would have 

"CCS Precis and Action Sheet, SHAF.F, sub : 

RANKIN C., Spheres of Occupation on the Continent, 4 Fc:ll •J.+, in SHAEF SCS 37 t, 

u ( 1 ) w~r Cabinet., Chiefs of Staff Committee, 

Anne)(, Col>>' of a Tolcgram (No. +57 ) dated 

7 Feh 19·H from President Roosevelt to the Prime 

Minister, tl Feh 44, in SHAEF SCS :!7 1. (2) 

Dcra nmcnt of State, Foreig11 Rdations, l!N4, vol. 

I, p. 166. 
TRIP.\RTlTE .'\GRF:EMENTS 

tn bring thttTI :til hack ~" With thi ~ 

plea, the c·xrhangc stopped for tht•ec 

months; lite impasse had gone as hig h as 

it COlt ld. 

While the President and Prime Minister 

were engaged with each other, the Russians, perhaps unintentionall y, brought the: 

question closer to soltttioll Lhan anyone 

could have expected. In February, Winant 

had no instructions from Washington ou 

the zones other than thnt the United States 

insisted on occupring norllnvestern Germany and the JC:S rollsidercc.l a zonal system lo be " the most prac:tical so uLion. '; 

Gousev was insisting on taking up one subject a t a time tn the Ei\C and the disnlssion of thf' zones seemed to be a long way 

off in any case, until Gousev presented the 

Soviet draft surrender terms for German y 

on 16 February. The c.lraft induc.lcd a dct<tiled description of the :GOnal boundaries, 

whic·h proved LO match almost exactly the 

botmdaries proposed I>)' the British.!'b 

In Washington the apparent BritishSoviet agreement was a su rprise, and an 

unwelcome one, in that it threatened to 

move the zonal c.lispute between U1c British 

and the Americans out of the R AN K IN · 

0VERt.Orm context and into the area of t ripal'lile decision, which, if nothing else, 

would iofringe on the War Department 

and JCS determination to exclude the EAC: 

from mi li tr~ y concerns. Probably, the milil.nry staffs in Washin.({ton preferred to leave 

the negotiations on boundaries in 1 he .President's hands along with those rehttcd to 

11tc northwestern u1d so11t hwestern zones. 

"' Department of Slate, For.:ig11 Relll/iOns, /944, 

\'OL I. pp. 181 - 1\2 a nd lt\9. 

"' ( I ) JCS 72'{, Administration of GermanyOccupation Period, 22 Fch ·H, in OPD, ABC, 

3117, $C<:. A, (2 ) Dcpa t·tmcnt of Stnte Foreign 

N1 latio n~, /[144, vul. I, p. 186. ' 

"' n~partrnclll of Stat<>., Fotcigll Rolati(}IIS, 1? f. ~. 

vol. I. fl. 177. 

t I ~J 

!11 HI\}' cas<', the sta tTs rcgarc.led the Presiden t's opinion Otl l>ounclar·ies givc11 aboard 

the l uwa as l1i nd ing on tbemY The problem was a particularly tir klish one for the 

State Depal'tmcnt, which had to give instructions lo Winant but had so far been 

excluded from tile clisru!'sious between the 

JGS and the PresidcnL and in the Combined Chiefs of StafT. On 19 1.;-cbruary, 

. \ cting SeLrctmy of Sta le Stettinius sent a 

map to Lite White House showing the zonnl 

hound trics as the British proposed them, 

asked as nearly poinl-lllank as possible 

what decisions hall a I read>' I ,ccn maJe, and 

suggested that the PrcsiJ eut mighl want 

to outline his current views for transmi."sion 

to Winant since a S<,viet proposal similar 

lo the British one had been made. The 

Prcsidcn l replied tltat he did not agree wiU1 

the British dcm:trratiOJl , lntl he mentioned 

no altunative and c·onfincd his comments 

to the rc<,sons why lhe United ::>tatcs "houkl 

have a northwe!'tern zone. 

A week later. Hilldrj11g passed on Lo the 

State Dcpartmem the U.S. paper on the 

zones presented to the British at Cairo and 

a redraft of U1e map the Pre.">idcnt had 

drawn aboard th e l owa, which had not 

been shown t<l the British. (lltfajJs I and 

2) The map, redrawn to emphasize an 

,\meri<'an northwestern zone, left Berlin entirely in U1c Soviet zone (the Pres dent ~ 

line had passed through the center of the 

city) bu t extendec.l tile boundary south of 

Uerlir1 farther cnstwa rcl l.h«u bad the President to tr~kc in the Lcip1.ig-Cottbus railmad 

a nd three conncctiJlg lines from Berlin. HI 

Philip £. Mosely, then Chief of the Divi-

.'>ion of Territorial Studic." in the State Department and a member of the Working 

""Sec nlso Mosc•ly, "Ntw Liyht o n How the 

?:ones Wt!t'C Drnwn," pp. 511(1- ()().J , 

'" M:1p reproduced in Department of State, 

F<1reig11 !?elations, I !N4·, vol. 1. facing p. J9G. 
J?() T HE U.S. 1\RUY IN T H E OCCUPATTON Of G£R~ ANY 

BAt. riC 

Sell 

BERLIN() 

G E M A N POLAND 

... , ,:::> 

~ I SWITZERLAND , 

( ......... \ / ... ('' d I ' { j l~ t 

> I I '-

~-""' ,, ' ITALY 

\) 

MIIPI 

Security Committee, has described the consternation raised by the map in the Sta te 

Department; in fact, almost two weeks 

elapsed before Stettinius forwarded it 

gingerly to Winan t " for [his] recommendations."11 Winant, who assumed, as appru·-

•• ( I) Mosely, "Nc,v Light on How the Zones 

Were Drawn," pp. 500-60'J.. (2) Department of 

State, ForBign RBlatitHu, 1944, vol. I, pp. 179, IM, 195, and 207. 

YUGOSLAVIA 

~--~'---' 

,....-· (-- HUNGARY 

ZONES OF OCCUPATION 

BRITISH AND SOVIET PROPOSALS 

SOVIE T ZONE 

BRITISH ZO NF 

UNI TE D STIITES 7.0NE 

AUST RIA. AND Ut<ITEO lfTATES ZONE 

JOII<T lONE 

0 50 I I I I 

100 !GO " IL£5 I I I 

0 50 100 ISO IULO .. ETERS 

cntly everyone in the State Department 

did, tha t Lhe map had originated in the 

J CS, thought his recommendations important enough to warrant sending his Counselor of Delegation, George F. Kennan, to 

Washington to deliver them directly to tl1e 

President. At the White House on 3 April, 

Kenna n stressed Winant's concern over the 

suspicion tha t would be aroused in the Rus-
TR IPARTITE J\GREEl\lENTS 

N()I?TH 

S£A 

Fronkfvrf 0 

R M 

j '2 1 

Sh L rr~ SE'Il 

POLAND 

/:>' 

' AUSTRIA 

I 

,f SWITZERLAND 

Jr---, ,.r, , ( " ~ )- I I I '---! _,......, ' \ \_, ' 

__ \ ITALY ; 

lv!A P 2 

sians' minds by a U.S. proposal to push 

the border of the Soviet zone from 50 to 

150 miles farth er cnst than the Russia ns 

a nd the British had agreed upon and additionall y deprive the Russia ns of the important railroad junction at Cottbus. 

Although it took another month to get 

a decision for Wina nt, the President seems 

actually not to have attached g reat signifiZONES OF OCCUPATION 

\ UNITED STATES PROPOSAL \ S01fi £T ZOI<e 

BRITISH ZOtl£ 

YUGOSLAVIA UNITED STATES ZON E 

0 0 10 0 ISO MILE'S 

b do 

1 

1bo 1l ~ KI LOMETERS 

cancc to the zone boundaries. The instructions sen t to Winant on 1 May were 

worded so as to lay emphasis on the U .S. 

claim to the northwestern zone. \<\finan t 

was allowed to concur in the boundaries 

of the Soviet zone "as prop osed by the 

Soviet Delegation" a nd in the boundary between the northwestern and southwestern 

zone<; "as. prop osed by the British Delega-
122 THE U.S. 1\R1!Y Il'\ THE OCC:UPKI'JON OF G~R~ Al\Y 

tion.'' \Villi rc.<;pC<'t lo th~ two we.~tern 

Y.ones, however, he was still to ins.ist on. 

1\ mcrican posscssio11 of lhc northwestern 

zone.~~ In \ Vashington later in ·M<Ly. 

Wimmt himself discus..,ec.l lhe zones problem with the Presidcnl and persuaded him 

not Lo a~.;cept a boundary between the two 

western zones while possession of each zone 

was still uncleciJcd. ·~ 

The border between the e<l.'ltern and 

w<>stern zone.'>, the11 , was settled in ciTed 

before the q uest.ion came under formal consideration in the European Advisory Commission, whirh was ried up wiLb Lhe 

surTender terms through l\[ay and afler. At 

the time, the bargain was a good one. In 

later years pcr.iodir redi~coverics of the 

Roosevelt map would cause talk of Ameriran "giveawnys"- all based on the as.sumption th ll the United St:\tes ('ould have 

disposed of Gcrm tny ron1pletely at its own 

discretion. In the spring of J944, however, 

when the zones were dmwn, the '"'estern 

1\llies still had the North Sea, the English 

Channel, and the Alps between t.hem and 

the nearest approachc.<; to Germany. If the 

German collapse had <'ome at a n)' time in 

the foreseeable future, it would have come 

on the front in the Soviet Union; furlhcrmorc, in this event, SHAEF did not expect 

tu be able to do more than secure lodgements on Llu; coast and in the Rhine valley. 

Laying the hmmdat·ies of the western zones 

f~nher cast was slightly utopian. The Rus-

•~ Department of Stale, Foreigr1 RtJiatiur1s, 1944, 

vol. I, pp. 207- 11. 

"The: houurlary hctwc~n the we~tt!rll zones was 

fixed at the Quebec Con(erc.uce in September 

19·14 . At that time it was drawn farther nonh ();ast 

of the Rhine nml farther sonth west ol the Rhine 

than in the original British and Soviet flroposals. 

The shifts cnt;ailcd n ~mall increase in the arc11 

of the southwestern ;t.One, ( 1) Department of Stale, 

Foreign Rlllatiuns, UJ44. vol. I, p. 231. (2) Frallklin, "Zon<~l Bounclrorics and Access to 13erli•','' p. 

19. (:l) Strang, Home out/ Abroad, p. 21 ~. 

sians, no doubt, knew this tuo, n1ad they 

were al first in nu hurry to put the agree~ 

mcnt in writing. 

\'\1hile the Russians, still insisting on tak~ 

ing one thing at a time, kept the E,\C 

working on the surrender terms, the tug-ofwar between the Americans and the British 

over which zone each woLtltl occupy continued hehind the scenes as D-day drew 

d oser. Ncedi11g a dc1·ision that would not 

<H the l:ost minute throw the '"hole OvERr,OJm dcployn\ent into conft1sion Eisenhower in May ,·everted to a proposal he 

had first advanced three months earlier. 

namely, L!aat the United Stales should 

refuse to accept any specific zone and agree 

onl y to accept militar}' responsibility in 

Europe as long as the principle of unified 

command was retained. In Nl:ty, Steltinius, 

on Eisenhower's urging, look th<~ idea to 

the President, who said he was fearful that 

a combined command would still somehow 

involve the United States in responsibility 

ftw France but professed himself to be 

open-minded. £ncountgecl 8iscnhowcr, 

maki11g dear now lhat he was thinking only 

in terms of a c:ombined administration in 

the twu western zones, sent his proposal Lo 

the War Department once moa·e. 11 Eisenhower hclicved later that his proposal was 

rejected because it would have seemed ro 

establb;h a British and .\mcrican purtnersllip against the Soviet Union. a;; t\clually 

two other reasons were more pcr·Linent: the 

JCS ~nd the CAD had from the bc);{inning 

m nsiclered sepa rate zonc.'l essential, and the 

Presiden t wa~ lJy no means as open-minded 

as he had said. Tbc President was not al 

" l.tr, Ei~enhowcr Lo Marsha ll, I 'I Fch •H: LLr, 

E. R. Stcttiui11s to Hun Wm. Phillips, II May 

•H; and l.tr, Eiscnho'''er to Marshall, 27 Ma)' 

H, in USFET SCS ~! 71. 

'·' Dwight IJ. Eisenhower, Cnt$adc i11 Europe 

(New York : Doubleday a11d Company, lnc., 

19~1.1 ), p. •f31. 
TRII'.\R' lTI'f. AGREE~JE.f\:'J'S 

tlu: tliOIIICnl in a moutlto wck!llne suggestions, either civilian or military, thai the 

United States occupy anyth ing lntl the 

rtol'thwcstern zone. 10 On 31 May and 2 

June, Roosl'w·lt a11d Chmchill exchanged 

cable:-; reiterating Lhe stands they had taken 

in February, each implying th;\L he 

assumed Lhc othc1· had accepted his 

position. or 

In .June, hn vi ng completed the surrender 

tenns, the l.o:AC was reaJy lo move on to 

the protocol on zones. By the end of the 

month ll1e rornmi:-;sion had a tentative draft 

ready. which accepted both the three zones 

defined in the earlier British and Soviet 

proposals and Greater Berlin us established 

by a German law of 1920. On I Jul y the 

Soviet delegation crcnted n mild stir on 

the !\merkan side by submilling an 

amendment also dividing Berlin into three 

zones (sectors), a northeastern Soviet seclor, a northwestern sector1 and a sout hern 

sector. The decision on who would occupy 

each of the lac;t two was left to Lbe Ameticans and the British. Until then all the proposals had presupposed an international 

administration iu Berlin, possil1ly even including other members of the United N:ttions, and the United Stales instructions to 

it!> delegation had specifically opposed dividing Berlin into national Sel'tors. A hurried inquiry to the State Depa rtment 

hrough r vVinant the answer that the 

Uni~ed Stales (presumahly the JCS) did 

not like the idea of laying out sector boundaries in Berlin before the extent of destruction and availability of fa cilitie!i were 

known, but would agree in principle to sectors within 13erlin provided the running of 

the city remained a combined function.'" 

"'History of the CAD, bk. VI, d1. V, p. !19. 

" Department of Stnte, Foreign Relatio11s, 1944, 

vol. I, pp. 2U and 232. 

'"Ibid., pp. 187, 2:17, nnd 240. 

\\'hen llw ('Otlln ii:-..,ion nH'I (Ht :l!i Jul r 

and si~tlcd its rcpm t to the govcrnment!i 

on tl11· surre-nder terms. the zones prolCll'ul 

sC<'nH:d likely to follnw qttickl)' i hut Llwee 

days latet· C:ou~cv ~trclclenl) :ultlOUJH:t'd that 

ltis government did nol w;mt LO pass on 

a paper in whi<·J1 blanks appeared. The 

British and t\n1cric:tns would have to make 

up lhcir mind<> which zones thc:y were going 

to ou:upy before the prolorol left the rommission, and, he implitd, the Soviet delegation would not move on ln ot her matters 

until n decision was made.'"' 

For the moment the E,\C seemed to 

have lapsed into paral ysis again, hut the 

war was not going to let this happen. The 

dcC'ision (m the western zones wou ld be 

made, and the Ru1>sians would llc brought 

arr.und before it was made. \Vhile the State 

Department protested in Moscow against 

the <Lc;sumption that the Soviet government 

could set time limits on negotiations hetween the U.S. and British governments, 

J.o:is;cnhower's armies rolled across france. 

Whether Stalin was disposed to pa)• attention to the protests is not known. That he 

watl'hed the progress in France, however, 

is cet•tain. \'\1ho might hm·e made the hest 

bargain on the zone<> be(' a me uncertain, 

and as it did , Soviet interest in the work 

<>f the E,\ C: perked up remarkably. On 3 1 

:\ugu)>t, Gou::;ev at:ccptecl the zones protoGol 

with l>l:mks in the statements on the nortJ1-

we~tcrn and soul hwc:;tern zones and the 

northwc<;tem and southern sectors in Berlin, and on 12 September, Winant and 

Strnng sig ned it for )>ubmission lo the three 

governments with the blanks still appearing. 

Meanwhile, the ~tand off with the British 

over the zones had become an exercise in 

futilit y. T he War Department had never 

taken the affair quite as seriously as the 

, Ibid., p. 262. 
12'1 THE U.S. \R~ Y lK THE OCCUP \'1"10~ OF GERA !.\ ~Y 

President h:td, and <tftcr thr inv:~o;ion it 

wnntcd a ddinilc decision either way more 

1 ha11 it " 'anted n parliculrtr zone. At the 

<:nd of jill)', StiJHsoH wld opkin~ th:LI they 

!tad t<J get the President lo de<: ide; his 

hdng ''l•cll-hent"' on the thwc~lcm zone 

WiiS n mistakc.:.il 1 n a cable o( 17 August, 

Eiscnltowcr tolcl the Combined Chids of 

St11fT th~tl at the speed his troop." were moving th<')' would he in Germany sooner than 

he had expected aud iu their origiunl dc--

ploynwnt British 21 :\rnl)' Cr•o11p on the 

left nnd U.S. 12th and 6th :\rmy G•·oups 

on the r•ight. The British, of course, were 

ddightcd. The JCS were 110 1 :-;o pleased at 

the possibility of having the U.S. forces tll:-

< upying liOnthcrn German} while- tlw Prc.c;idcnt wa~; still arguing f<.1r the H<lrthwc:H<:m 

zon<'. lwt the> C(mceded tlwt for· the moment ~i~en owcr had no !Jetter choice."' 

:\ week l:tlcr Stimson urged the President 

to t:tk<· th<' southwestern :mnc.: and gnvc him 

five gootl reasons for doing ~<o.r : mbabl~· 

the P• <·~< icknl was hy then himself aware 

that his main reason for rejecting the sol tlh~ 

wcslcl'n ~o ne , the supposed X>~ tliiJ crat n 

tr·ouhlcs in Frnncc, had pl'clly wdl evaporated. The Frcn<' h had proved rCtllarkahly 

willing and nhlc to take owr tlwi•· own 

Tair~, and with RoosC'vcll's approval 

giscnlulWCl' w n.-; already tr:tnsfcning de 

fnrto administrative con ti'OI to G('ncral 

Ch;triCs dt• Gaulle's CommittN~ of National 

f ,ihrr•atioll. M 

At the pcnin~ of th<" OcTACJON ConfcrCtwc in Quebec on 12 September the Combined Chiefs of Staff rcfcrrc·<lthc allocation 

or Wilt'~ w the Presid<'nt t~nd Primr l\1 in is-

,. Stim~ou :\nd Bund)·. o,, Act it,,. .'irr: icc, p. 

568 

•• History of CAD, uk. VT, eh. V, · -15f. 

., Stimson and Uundy, 011 Actil't: S11r/ticc. p. 

.169. ., Cole~ 1111d Weinberg, Sold/us IJI•cQ•IIt" CQutrnon, pp. 71·1 16. 

tcr with :1 stt~gc::~ti n from .\dmiral King 

thnt the United State.-. would he mw·c indiucd lO arrcpt tltc southwestern mnc if 

iL cuu ld us<' 1 he nor•t II German ports. ~ 

far as the ronfcrcc·:s knew, or were willing 

to s<l)' either then or fterw~t rd, the P1 csi· 

dent was still acbman t on having the northwestern zone. No more was heard until the 

morning nwrting of t.hc JCS on the 16th 

when ,\dmiral William D. Lcnh) mlnoum cd 1 hat the United States would take 

the so ttl hwestc1n t.nnc· and get acre.<;.;; li<'I'CJ)\.-; 

the uorthwcstem (British) zone to the 

ports.'" Lea hy said some years taler thnt 

Rooseveh had L()lcl him he took th<' zon<· 

otfter Cltnn hill in a " tedious arguntcnl" 

convinced him that the nort hwestern zone 

\vould he 111orc valuable in the future to 

the Briti~h thau t o the United States .... 

Secretary Morgrnthnu said immediately 

after tlw confcn·nce that the President had 

told him hC' held up agreement on thr zone"> 

until the last minute to make certain that 

the 13riti , whC'n thC)' were in rha•·gc iu 

the Ruhr and Snar, would hnve to i111ple• 

mcnt the tl gt tttlr tu Plan there.~" 

On the I C1th, too, the Combined Chids 

or !::>taff approved a. signmenl of the ort~ 

of Bremen ancl Brrnwrhavcn to the United 

Sta tc.'i to~cther with transit rights nct r'~" the 

Briti$h zn u~ w Br'('tucn. Notkc of the decisions went Ill Winant on the 20th with in· 

structions to prc~cnt them in the ~A , 

where an1cndrnrnts were then wri(lcu to 

fill in the l>lanks in the protocol. A paragraph aclclt-d !c) the description of the southwestern zmw C..<~crwd for the commandc·r 

of the U.S. rorc:c.s the rights to "enjoy such 

transit fnc ilit irs'' a•'d "exercise such cuHU'Ol 

•• H iM01y uf till' C:AO, hk. V I. clt. V, p. 49f . 

'"' :lllatlofl', Straft'gic /'Imming for Con/it ion Jlfrnfare, p. 5 1 l n . 

"' ep;~rtmc11l or Stall', Malttl rmd Ynltn, in 

"Foreign RrlnlinnR,'' p. 13fi. 
TRIPARTtT£ AGREEMENTS 

of the ports of Bremeu and Rremerhaven ... as may be agreed hereaft er by 

the United IGngdom and United States 

military authorjties to be necessar y to meet 

his rcquirements."G; 

The amendment Lo the zones protocol, 

while termin ating one year-long AngloAmeri an dispute, UJ\Yeilcd another that 

threatened for a time to be equa lly duraiJlc. 

In nc:cepting the OcTAGON arrangement 

Smith <~nc.l Hilldring had l>o!h intct'prctcd 

the word "control," used in refct·ence to 

13rcrnen and Brcmcrhaven, as meaning full 

ront1•ol a nd administration, including militat•y governmeut. The J CS had also added 

a requil•emcnt for control of certain contiguous a reas (several adjacent Land and 

Sladtkreise), which together with the cities 

W<'re to hecome part of the U .S. zone. The 

reason given was the probable need for 

German labor and facilities in reh a bilita ting the rt n~ The British interpreted control to mean control of the port facilities, 

uot complete administrative rontrol. R emoved from the purview of the EAC IJ}' 

the wording of the amendment , the controvcrsr simmered for several months in the 

Combined C hiefs of Starr, seeming, like the 

zones is.<;ue, d estined to go eventua ll y to t he 

President and Prime Minister. The resolution, in fact, did come just llcfore the Ya lta 

Conrcrence. In early January 1945, M cCloy, probably tryi11g lo avoitl invt.>lving 

the President, offered a compromise: if the 

British gnve tbe Americans the degree of 

control they wanted, the Americans wo11ld 

ag1'ee to Jllake the ir policies conform to 

those of the suno tmtling area in the British 

zone. Altho ug h t he United Stales would 

'' Scnatl! Committee on Foreign Rela tions, Docu- lllimls 011 German}•, 1944- 1959 ( Washiugton, 

!959 ), p. :l-5. 

" Department of S ta te, Foreign Reloliolls, /944, 

vol. r, pp. :15·H a nd !l6!Jf. 

125 

get the best of the compromise, the British 

Chiefs of Sta ff, pos.<iibly noL e.xpecting 1 he 

Prime Minister to do as we ll against the 

President as he hat! on Lhe nriginal zone!\ 

question, accepted. n An agreement sig ned 

at Yalta in earl y Februaqr cr eated the Bremen enclave, which wa!i to sta nd chiefly 

as a short-lived monument to the wartime 

Anglo-American contentio usness."0 

In retrospect the effort a nd the energy 

spent on securing transit across the British 

zon e might seem to have bee11 more profiLa bly expended seeking access lo Berlin, and 

the re lationships being what they were, if 

Berlin had been in the British zone the disc ussion would very likely have 1H~c n more 

intensive. This is noL to S<l)', however, tha t 

th ::: intramura l conten tio n with the British 

was a llowed to obscu re the need for access 

to Berlin . SHAEF took up the question as 

earl y as June 1944 nnd concluded, as the 

\t\l<u· D epartment wo uld later, that free access across the Soviet zone Wall prefe,·able 

to corridors or selected routes. SHJ\EF a lso 

learned that m:Hters suc h as this, wbich the 

B1'itish and .'\m(:rirans discussed freely and 

as often as not heatedl y, could scarcely be 

taken up with the Russians at alt.(:t Once 

""Summary Sheet, ACofS OPD for CofS, S"ub: 

Allocation of Zones of O ccupation in Germany, 

23 J an H, in OPD :136 (see. 111) (case 5 1- ). 

"'Goverr:ting I he Bremen e r\c lavc, cut off frotn 

L~ norrn~l economic and admi.nistrative ti cs with 

the surrounding territory of Lhc British ~one a nd 

severa l hundred cniles removed frmt• t.he U -S. one, 

:~tcr proved both unwieldy and unnecessary; and 

on I 0 December ~5, the a rea outsiclt• the cities 

of Bre rnen, Wesermucndc, and Brcmcrhaven was 

trnmfe rrerl to Btiti;h control. U.S. 1nilitary government teams stayed i11 the cities, but they operated 

undtlr British supervision thereafter. 

"'Memo, SHAEF G-.1 for Staff Divisions, sub: 

Organization and Administration of International 

Zone, Berlin, I }1111 44; Memo, SliAEF C--3, 

Future Plans S11b-Section, for SHAEF G- :l, sub: 

Organization :wd Administralion of Internationa l 

Zones, Berliu, H J un '1-4·: Ltr, SHAEF Polit ical 

Officers to Col CrM:ehrook, s1 •h : Orgar\ization and 
12G T ilE U.S. AR~ l\' I~ THE OCC:UPJ\TLOI\; OF GElU lt\1\ y 

the zone.'> protm ol ' '""' signed, the Western 

t\ llic..,· a< l • s to Bcr lin wa.-; implied ; and 

during the dis< 11'-'ion of the November 

amcndmcms the So\ ict delegate, Cou.o;;e,-, 

sugge;tcd ao; wa., later done- that the 

statement u11 ' "'""it .trrc><>'> the British zone 

be kept general. le;l\'ing the details to be 

worked out l.ttt·r. ~imil•11 arr.111gcmcnt.'> he 

said, would lw made ing the U.S. ~nd British fonts acn·:-,., .\('It)$.-; the . o\'ict zone 

to llcl'lin."' Thcn·nftcl' the War Department nnd the .J C:S as-;urm·d that the mat tcr 

nr 11' :1 11 it :Hro~'l the Snvi<:t Will ' would he 

hnndlcd I>)' thr Ettt'OfWlll1 !\dvisol')' Commi~~iun or til(• C:CIJ\trol Council, which was 

then still cxpt·t•ted to IJc:gin work with the 

Soviet mernher:o; prest•nt before the surrender. :\ftc·•· so11 w di~n••..,ion in the U . . delehration al Yalta, the JCS proposed ~n 

irHct im militnr}' agrctnwnt c'>ta blishing freedom of transit ntm.s nil three zones. The 

British accepted in t.·arly ~ l.trr h. The So,·ict 

Cencr :ll S1.t1T did not :lnc;wcr.'', Probably 

no one wac; o;urprised. The agreements cont ctnin,~.t t r;llhit to Bt t:mcn "ere made 

between 1hc U.S .. and Rt iti ... h militiln' authol'itil.."<, hllt in the So\'iet Union h affair- were almo,<;l llC\Cr lcfiiU the discretion 

of the military. In .mr ('\'cnt, nt the time the 

United State.' wa<~ fa r· ~· inte rested in accc.o:s to i\ll)' place in Gcrm:\lly than in the 

Adml•listration nf ln trrnnticnn1 Zone, Bl'rlin, 23 

J1~n . :11 ; MNHo, SII AF.f.' C ~ for SIIA EF Staff 

Dt wn~, s1 •h : ga i~ntion nnd Adrninistrntion 

of thr l ntc•rnntionnl Zon<' llc·rlir1 2•1 j 1111 44 in 

SJ-tA gF C: :1, '~11 11 .!1 '1 S~ ' ' 

" Depnrtmcnt of Slltl<', flllttigu R1!/fllio11s, 1944 

vol. I, p. ~Hl-1. ' 

•• (~) ~11 • .JCS to U.S. ilitnry M ission, Moscow, 2~ f'ch ·1'1, iu C:A)) 0 11, 7 10 12. liCC. JL 

(~) Mm US (;tl (,;(;, Staff M~ ing of Qi,·ision 

DlrcCIUr<, J (i Milr ·l'i, in OMCUS 178-1/3. (3) 

~tcmo, SIJ,\F.F, "'"''·•nt Secretary of the General 

~tafT, f<•r CnfS, \llh · Frc•C'dum o( l'r:tn~i t J\t'rOss 

7..one of OrciiJ);llton, tO ur .J5 in USFET SGS 

'l71. ( t l ll t\ICII) nl lhr C: ·\I>, l;k, VI, dt VIII, 

pp. I 7. 

exit from Eurup<·, \\hie h 1 hr fit C'I11Cn enclave pro\ idcd. 

Tilt Gt>ntrol M arhincry 

The osrow Confen•nce h.t<l 1 hargt•d 

the E.\ C, a'> its next ta''- after drafting thc 

surrender terms, wi1h making tC<Oillmc·tldations to the three governments on the 

tntH·h inCI')' req11ir('d tO (' ll!lllll' f uffilhnent of 

the tenns."• The protocol on t.on c" intervened later as a prclimii!HI')', a ll wit a vc·xi ng 

one. In t he Britis h view, th ~ 1-:,\C: itself eonsrituled- or ought to have COIII'titutt·cl - an 

m~ort_a l pari of t ltl· ro111 r•ol mat hin cry. 

ThJS v tew was shnrc·d hy Win;\nt and some 

of his ad ,·iscrs hut not by tlw other two ~ov· 

ernmcnts a nd cmphntic-:tll)' not h)' the \Var 

Department. T lw Rtit i'h Fordg11 Officl' 

bad circulatc:d t o Washi 11 ~ton .tnd ost ow 

in j ul y I 'HJ .tnd ag.lin lt.l the dclc~att~'l iu 

oscow i11 !'\0\cmhcr .1 ptnpo .tl for <~ 

L" nited i\ :\1 ion-; < <lllllHi,,inll to O\ t•r..ec .111 

occupations cst.ll>lishccl in l·:urop!' as a re-

'<;ult or the war and the <lfllli'itit c.,.' ·. 

In Januarr I CJ44, ,, on~ with tlte British 

papers on surrender tctm-. and t.OII<''i, Sit 

William Strang intr()(hu ed 4l pmpzy;al con-

:crning the E. \ C wllic It indlldcd a fJ•OJCded Europea n c·ommis..,ion .mel under it 

a high_ c~mmission ro t C:c• IHiUl)'• This higlt 

commts.o::to n , as tile British !\:1\V it, W()Uid 

provide a t~ ip lrtitt· rc11tntl ltllthorit)• havmg under tt the Gcmwn r~dm ini lt :tt , 

including the part" or the ('('lllt'rt l govc ll ~ 

men l ~ha t su rvi,·ctl, a ntl t ht: ocnt pat ion 

f?rccs m the zonr_<.;, \VIIilt· tltc lil-(htiug contmued, \he military romma nclrr<.; would he 

supreme and thl' <' sc·nti.tlly <"i"ilian hi h 

•• Dcpartml.'lll of St,tlt', 1-'M,.IJIII /lrlntinns, /913, 

\'OL l, p. 756 

~ ~fcmo, OPD, Pnloq• Section, J!l Oct 4 J, in 

OPO, ABC 187, •cc. ·I F.. 
TRIPARTITE J\GREE1vlENTS 

commission would be advisory. When 

hostilities endcu, the pos.itions would he reversed. The commanders would be subOJ·dinnted to tbe high c:cmunjs.o;ion a11d shorn 

o( their independent authoril)' except for 

the right to appeal to their governments 

and to decl a re martial law in their separate 

zones if necessary. 116 

In Washington, nJcanwhile, Lhe CAD 

and the JCS had settled on scvera.l principles which the)' took to i>e f undamcntal to 

any planned control organizC~tion for Germany. One of 1 hcsc principles emanated 

from the President. ln O cwi>er 1943, befo re the 1\t!oscnw Conference, and ag~in before the Cairo Conference he had cxprcs;ed 

a strong desire to sec Germany pa•'litioned 

into three or mo re sep:waLe tates. ~~~ For this 

reason , and because it han11onized with 

their own lhinking, derentra lizntion hecame a watchword with U.S. military planners working o n tht: control ot'ganization. 

Secondly, in December, ·war Department 

planning had assumed that o utright military government woltld probably have to 

be mllintaincd in Cermllny for a lime aftr.r 

the surrender; therefore, the EJ\C ought 

not to dcvi~c a permnncnt control sy~tem, 

particularly no t su1ce its mandate was 

limited to the immediate poSl<;urrender perio(J.O~ Lastly, the \•Var Department was 

convinced, a~ il a lwflys had bee n, of 1 he 

need to preserve the I heater r.ommander's 

supremacy during the period of military 

necessity- a period whic:h the War D epartment thought could possibly <'Ontinue after 

organized resistance ended. 

The U.S. proposal on control machiner)' 

"'' Dep::trlr11CJ\L of St;,tc, Forl'ign Relations. 1944, 

vol. I, pp. 155- 59. 

•• ( l ) Departmeut of State, Poreig11 Rt luthms, 

194.1, vol. I, p. 5•11. (2 ) cp::~ rtmem of State, 

Cniro r111d Te ltm11 , in "Fo1·cign Relatious," p, 253. 

., ltr, JCS 1o Sec of St:Jtc, At>pendix B of JCS 

623, 18 Dec ~, in OPD, ABC 3!l7, sec. 1- A. 

127 

transmil'tccl to Winant in late February reflec ted t he War DepMtmenl principles. 

The zones would be administered separately eHepl Jnr Berlin, which would be 

under a combined authorit)'· The combined authority, to be called lhe Control 

Council, would be o•nrosed of the ranking 

commanding gener:1ls c1 f the three occupying powers. In addition to its direct responsibility for Berlin it wuuld supervise "those 

govewmental and economic activities 

which the occupHtion :Luthot·ities may cl<:-

tcm1inc s hould continue to function on a 

national basis in Lhe interest of stable and 

ordel'ly ]ife in Germa ny." The Control 

Council would co-ordinate previous!)' n.ppJ·oved policies and could recommend 

policy changes 10 the three govenu11cnls, 

but jt wo uld have no command functions 

outside Berlin. The zone ronu1'1Hndcrs 

would receive their instructions t.bJ·ough 

their natLonll.l military channels, and policy 

woultl come from the three governments.

09 

The Soviet delegation had nothing lo 

ofler of its own and, in keeping with Moscow's insL~tence on taking things one al a 

time, did not comment on the WesLem proposnls. The British und Americans were u1 

anoLhe1' deadlock. The British con repl of 

a European high commission :1ppcared calrulated to pry polic)•-making away rrom 

W a<> hing ton and pos.<;ihly ~addle lhe United 

States with responsibilities outside Gert-n<tn)' ; the idea of a Gennan big.h comm1ssion raised a threat of high-powered civilian interference. On the other hand, the 

emphasis in the U.S. proposal on continuing militar)' government after the surrender 

seemed to the British to impl)' also continuing the romhined command and the \!'lash -

"' (I ) JCS 763, Administration of Gcrmany-

()c;cupalion Period , 22 Feh ~. in OPD, ABC 

3117, sec. •1- A. (2 ) Dcp~1 rtment of State, Foreigfl 

Rclfltiolls, 7944, voL I, pp. I !\5-!J!l. 
128 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GER:tvlANY 

ington-dominated Combined Civil Affairs 

Comrnittee (CCAC). 

With the Russians providing plenty of 

time to make compromises, the British and 

Americans cautiously moved a little closer 

together. In May, the Br.it.ish delegation 

('Onceded a period after the surrender in 

which the military would remain supreme. 

ln July, Winant's advisers suggested 

elevating the three Allied commanders to 

a "Supreme Authority"- a kind of military 

high commis<>ion- and having the Control 

Council under them administer Berlin and 

act as a central administration for Germany to the extent needed. 71' 

By summer, the British and Americans 

had become at least as much concerned 

over getting the Russians to talk about the 

control machinery at aJJ as over the flaws 

and pitfa.lls in each other's proposals. 

Gousev stayed silent until 2:1 August. The 

Germans surrendered Paris that day at the 

climax of, fo1· them, two disastrous weeks, 

and they were obviously soon going to lose 

all of France. Although the zones question 

was not yet settled, Gousev offered a plan 

for control machinery "to cover the first 

period of the occupation of Germany immediately following her defeat. " For their 

own reasons, the Russians, like the Americans, did not want Lo make a long-term 

decision. Also like the Americans, they 

wanted the initial rontrol to be milita.-y. 

The supreme authority, they proposed, 

would he exercised by the three commanders, "each in his own zone of occupation." 

Together the commanders would form th<." 

Control Council which would settle proh. 

lems common to the whole of Germany anrl 

control the central organs of the German 

government. The Control Council would 

meet at least once every ten days. Under 

10 Depaftment of Stale, Foreig11 Relntioll.f, /944, 

vol. I, pp. 185- 87, 247f. 

the council, a permanent Co-ordinating 

Committee would conduct the day-to-day 

business. Also under the Control Council, 

a Kommandatura, consisting of the three 

sector commandants, would provide the 

city administration for Berlin.11 

From the point of view of the U.S. occupation in Germany, the Soviet paper on 

control machinery was possibly the single 

most important document submitted .in the 

European Advisory Commission. l t coin ~ 

deled with the Morgenthau controversy 

which had raised talk in Washington about 

appointing a civilian high commissioner for 

Germany. The War Department's claim 

to an exclusive military period was 

in jeopardy again, so seriously in October 

.in fact that Secretary Stimson and Under 

Secretary Patterson worked out a War Department position they hoped Lhcy would 

be able to maintain. Predicti11g chaos in 

Germany and a split in U.S. public opinion 

on Germany, they argued that " thoroughly 

sound" military government was the only 

answer for the first phase of the occupation. 

T hey concluded that therefore, in lhc .first 

phase, other government agencies should 

not be involved and a civilian high commis~ 

sioner should not be appointed.;~ Whether 

they could have defended their position, 

however, ii the Russians had leaned toward 

the BriUsh-proposed r.ivilian high commission is at best doubtful. The President still 

believed civilians could do the work better 

than the military. 73 

Relieved at having the Russians commilled lo one control system and in a hurry 

to get something on paper, the U.S. and 

"Ibid., pp. 299- 301. 

" Memo, Patterson for Still\son, sub: Military 

Or.cupaiion of Germany, 17 Oct 44, in USFET 

SGS 3311/2. 

"Department of State, Forsign Relations, 1944, 

vol. {, p. 409. 
fRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS 

British delegations accepted the Soviet 

proposal a lmost tn the word in drafting the 

"Agreement on Control Machinery in Gcrrnany," which was signed and submitted 

to the governments on 14 November. The 

Russians appettred to have devised 

a bri1lian1 compromise. The Ame,•icans got decentralization and an unequivocal position for the military commander; 

the Br•itish received a promise that the military period would be brief ("the period 

dw-ing \\fhich Germany \Viii be carrying out 

the basic requirements of unconditiona l 

su rrender") and an apparent c:ommitment 

lo write n second document dealing with 

long-Lenn control. 7 ~ The only reserva tions 

the War D epat·tmcnt experts had ""ere that 

too much ceuu·alization was implied in the 

term "Control Council"- t hey having 

lately come to prefer, because it was less 

specific, "Supreme 1\ulhoriLy''- and that 

not <:HO\tg h sternness was evident in the 

language of the agreement.;~ One omission 

in the agreement, its fa ilure to provide a 

name for the whole control machinery, 

Inter• caused a sma ll flurry between the British and Americans. The British objected 

lo the term " Milil<Lry Government (or 

Germany" and I hr Americans oppo::;ed any 

Lise of the word "commis.~ n. " Both fina lly 

aciepled " Allied Control Authoril y for 

Germany, »;o 

Crosscunents 

The Moscow Conference, 'vhen it cr ea ted the EAC, provided for c·onf.;ulta lion 

" ( I ) Scnnte Committee, Domonenls on Germ arty; J)p. 5- 13. (2) Departmelll of State, Foreign 

Ue/{ltiolls, 19111-, vol. I, pp. 404- 06. 

,. l\1fcmo [no sou reel forM r. M cCloy, sttb: Protocol AgrecmcnL in EAC 14 Nov 44·, 2!\ Nov 1

H, 

in ASW :no.~ . 

'"Ltr, Wi ckcrJ<h<lm to Smith, 2!1 De(' ·11, :n 

USFET SGS :\3•1. 

129 

with other members of the United Nations 

hut 110 1 for admissio11 of new members. 

Security-the over·whelming preponderance of Lhe U .S., British, and Soviet 

contributions in the war-nnd questions 

concerning the validity of some exile govemments' claims to be their countries' 

represenla tives seem ed to justiJy the three 

principal allies' ta king upon themselves the 

decisions pertaining to ending the war. In 

Novembe r 194·3, none of Germany's continental neighbors coLIId make a compelling 

claim to a major voice in inter-1\lliecl aJ{airs 

in any case. fo'ranre, the largest n eighbor, was 

represented by tire Committee of Nationa l Lil>emtion , about which the United States 

had recurrent severe doubts and which the 

Soviet Union declined ro take notice of 

officially. J n August 1944, the situation 

changed. Northwestern Fran ce was liberated; the Committee of National Lihera -

tiou became the Provisiona l Government; 

and the country Lll'ldertook to resume its 

place militarily in the Allied ranks. The 

Provisiona l GovewmenL at once asked for 

0\ direct voice in the EAC discussions on 

Germany. (Previousl y it had been invited, 

a long with the e-xile government~, to submit 

its views in writing.) General Charlc<> de 

Gaulle in early September expressed a desire to Ei'ienhower lo participate jn the milita ry government of Germa n)'· '

7 The British Foreig11 OfTice promoted the French 

request for direct consultation until the 

Soviet govemmenl look the lead in la te 

O c'tohcr and proposed admitting france 

to the EAC as a permanent member. 

No1 wanting lo be outdon e hy the Soviet 

bid for french goodwill, the United States 

and the British promptl y agreed, and on 

27 November the French ambassador at 

" ( 1) D c t)arLment of State, Poreign !? c/ntions, 

I!JIJ4 , vol. I, p. 6(i. (21 Hislory of CAD, bk. 

V I, <.h. \1 ll , p. I. 
130 THE U.S . . 

1

\lU.JY IN THE OCCUPATIO •. OF GERl\1!\.NY 

London1 Rene ass li, became the fourth 

member of the Europca11 i\dvisory Commts.'>tOit. The con11ni~s ion hnJ rushed 

through the zone.-> protocol and control 

agrccmcnl llcforc J\fassigli took his seal, 

hoping to avoicl having to go throug h the..<;e 

matter:; at length aga.in; hut the tempo of 

the procectlin~ would certainly not he 

increased by ndmiuing a fourth party, particularly nol one under as ntuC'h compulsion to reassert it clf in Eul'ope<tn affair;; 

as was france. 

Between November 1944 ancllVIny 1945 

tbe EAC made no new agreed r•ecommendations on German)' to the governments. 

In the summer of 1944, Jraft prodn.malions, genenll ordc1·s, and eli reel ives lo the 

o<·cupation forces had been suhm.itted in 

the Ommis.'Sion, Inn none would he acted 

upon I 1efore the surre11cler. After France, 

in ea rly Januar·y 1945, asked fot' a full partnet ·hip in the occupation, including possession of a zone, which Wi ts arcon.led al Yalta 

lite next month, the dot'uments on the surrender, zones, and r·ontrol machinery had 

to IJ(! amended to the accompaniment of 

wearying negotiations. . \t the :;arne lime, 

as the wa r drew lO a clo!\c, 1 he Soviet willingness to gc in four-power planning 

pmgrcssively declined. The Soviet Contml 

Co unci I element, long :1 wa itcd ant! in fan 

promised in tJ1e near r\ltllre in the fall of 

1944, never appeared; nnt! as tht· monlhs 

pa ·ed, the olher members became tlonhtful that the Soviet government wou ld even 

honnr· the agreements it h:1d already 

11ecepted. 

The likelihood or the U.S. ~ovcrnment's 

exerting inALJencc to stimulate acti vity in 

the EAC, while nevcr vet')' strong. evaporated complctel)' in the fall or 19H. On 

the surface the trouble wa<; in the ~)'stem 

of commu11ication. !\II instructions to 

Win<IIH had to he cleared and approved 

in detail by the Stale Dt>parlment, the J oiJlt 

Chiefs of Staff, the Civil AJJairs Division, 

nncl the 'Vorking Security Committee. Few 

completed the ent.irc: process. Only five 

full)' tle<tred poliq' papers were seut hetween J anuary and October Ul44. Everybody involved knew the marhinery was not 

working and deplored it, Winant most 

of all. 1 n October, sumnting up a 

lengthy recitation of complaints, he wrote: 

" I would like lo Sa)' that T do not think 

nny conference or commission created by 

governments for a serious pw·posc has had 

k ss supporL from the Governmenrs (·rcttting 

it than the European Advisory Commission. At least I tlo not know of !Ill)' like 

example in recorded history.":s I n WashiJtgton, 1\{aj. Grn. George V. Su·(>llg, the 

seniut· member of the Joint Postwar Commillce, wrote in a ll1(1r<; pragmatic· vei11, 

"If adequate steps are nor takcu to :::peed 

11p clispHLch of pending questions in relation 

to the F.:\C, I am very much afraitl that 

when the dehacle in Genmmy comes we 

will he caught with out· pants down. ":u 

Undollhtedly, Winnnl·s dissatisfaction 

stemmed in large parl fro111 the restrictive 

military view of the F.AC"s functions, 

wh ich had not c:hanged between January 

and October. However, even on matters 

where no doubt~ about E/\C: competence 

rxisted, action in W::t.'ihinKion was painfull)' 

slow. At the time Win:tn! wrote, for· inlan cc, he was ~t ill awaiLing a rc sc to 

a rcvisim1 of the U.S. proposal on control 

nlacllincqr that his advii'Cl"S had worked out 

in July. He did llCit gel an answer until 

the end of Ortoher.""1 

'' Department of Stale, Fureig11 Aff(lirs, /944, 

vol. r, p. 35 1. 

'"Memo, Maj Gen C. V . StroH~ fo•· l\lr James 

C. Dunn, sub : COt.tlEA aml P.ACOM Mcss:-tges, 

27 Sep •1·1, in CAD 3:l4 ( ~) ( I ), sec. II. 

"' Department o( State, 'Foreign Relatio11s, 191<}, 

,·ol r. pp. 2-f(j nnd 375. 
TRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS 

Whjle the W ar D epa rtment was not indined to expantl the E AC's area of competence, it was willing to improve the 

machinery for action on approved matters 

before the comtllission. !\ meeting of Stntc, 

' 'Var, and Navy Department 0fficials in 

M cC loy's office on :w Septernher traced 

much of the difficulty to the anomalous 

position of the W<.1 rking Security Committee wh.ich, wh ile it was generally supposed 

to co-ordinate State D epartment and Wat• 

Oepnrtmcnt- C~ views, actua lly had no 

specific t:harter <utd a relatively low-rankin[{ 

mem bership-on 1 he military side a colonel 

from the J oim Postwar Committee, a lieutenant colone l from the CAD, and a Navy 

lieutenant, junio r g t·ade. As long as the 

Cabinet Committee, created at the end of 

August and includ ing Sec-retary Morgenthau, was in existenct:, the ' •Vm· Department was reluttant anyway to deal with 

policy at a lower level, even through the 

CS. ~' In O ctober and November, \vhen 

the Cabinet (iommiUet' hcr:un(' inactive, 

the Secretaries nf StaLe. \>\1ar, ~Uld the Navy 

he ld a series of rn ~eti gs caku ated apparently to forestall further Treasury Depal'tment inte rventions in Lhe planning fol' 

Gennan)'- from whir h a new committee, 

the Stale-War-Navy Co-ordina ting Committee (SWNC:C), evolved. The SWNCC, 

organized on the a~s i~tant secretary level, 

look ns its p t'()vinc-e "~til q ucstio ns of policy 

o n politiro-militaq, ma tter:<{'; its subcommittee on Emope took over the duties 

formerly performed l>y the Working Secm -

ity Comm ee ~~ The SWNCC operated al 

•• ( l ) Memo, I.t Col D . C. Fahey, Jr .. for Gens 

Tansey and Roberts, 29 Sep '1-4, in CAD 33•1· 

-' ~) (I), sec. ll. (2) Memo, /\ACofS OPD 

for Cell McNarncy, s11 b: Amh. Winant's Report 

on EAC Diffic,dties, I 0 Oct 44, in OPD 336 (sec. 

ll } (cases tfi- ). (3) History of CAD, bk. rr, ch. l, I'· 50. 

.. J'bid., p. 53. 

131 

a high <.!nough level to be able to act for 

the departmeuts and deal directly with the 

J CS. 

A lthough Lhe SWNCC elimiuated, as 

mud1 ac; was possible, the tedmical bottleneck in communication ~ between Washington and the E AC delegation i11 London and 

provided an importanl source for policy decisions on occupation affairs, it did not 

solve for Winant the prolJlem that bothered 

him most1 namely, the narrowness of the 

r ange within which he could negotiate. H e 

saw the EAC as the place where many 

questions pertaining to Germany ought to 

be decided. The W<u· Department saw it 

as the place where only certajn specified 

q11estions wonld be decided and in the fa ll 

of 1944 was indined to IJclieve that the 

surtender dorumcnl (with the addition of 

the proclamation a11d geueral orders, then 

no t completed), the zones protocol, a nd the 

control machinery agreement just about 

constituted an ample output for the EAC. 

The contt·oversy over the M orgentha u 

Pl a n and the President's reaction to earlier 

planning had made all levels in the department very chary of commitments on policy 

for Germany. Moreover, the direction that 

the E AC seemed about to take appcated 

likely to infringe on !he t heater comma nder'!; freedom of decision . The EA.G had 

thirty-eight British draft directives before 

it- ranging in subject matlet from t he general treatment of Germany in the postsurrender period to the conh·ol of leather a nd 

footweal'- that wo uld, in W ar Department 

opin ion, have ho und the zone commamlers 

to a rigid fonnub or administration.sa JCS 

1 067, as stringent as it was in tone, al least 

left the zone commander latitude in its ap-

" ( I ) Depanmem of Slate, Foreign Relations, 

194-1, vol. l , p . 361n. (2) Memo for Record fno 

soutTe], ~uh: The British Draft Directives for Germany, 1 Nov 44, in ASW 370.8. 
132 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GER!YL'\NY 

plkation and even some leeway in interpretation. It also had the President's a pproval. 

The War Dep<trl!Hent, which had been relieved to get Lhis a pproval in the first place, 

refused to put it i11 jeopardy a[ler Lt. Col. 

John Doettiger, the President's son-in-law 

and a member of the Covcrnmcnl Branch, 

CAD, reported in e~ fl y November that h e 

had "heard the President express the view 

that the planning for Germany should not 

go too deeply into detail a l this time, a nd 

that major decisions, political and CC'Onomit:, 111ight be deferred until we got 

d<~eper• iuto Germnny and were able to view 

conditions at dose ge:· ~ 

When Winant carne to Washington a 

few days later. M cCloy and Hilldring told 

him rhat rhe War Department would nol 

approve deta iled directives written in the 

·Hi tory of CAD, bk. 11, c.h. TV, p. 73. 

EAC since the department had a general 

directive, JCS 1067, whic h should also be 

used in the EAC. The reason they gave 

for this st.-"lnd was to avoid •'tying the hands 

of tire {;Omrnandcr in the field by directives 

issued at governmental level which he 

r oulcl not alter.''"" In London on 20 November, Wickersham, just returned from 

Washing ton, told the U.S. Group Control 

Coun cil, Document 1067 is now our 

'Bible.' " It had been "recommended," he 

said, that the E.'\C not prepare any directives. The War Department preferred to 

have the directives written by the Control 

Council elements "and . approved by 

the military a uthorities on this side." 8 0 

'' ( I ) Ibid .. p. H. (2) Memo of Conference 

ht:lc,l in M.r. McCloy'.< Office 0 11 !l Dec 44 at 

1030 AM, in ASW 3 70.fl. 

"' US Cu• CC, Nlin of Meeting of Staff Conference Hclcl 20 Nov H, in SIIAEF C-5, 3 1.04. 
CHAPTER X 

The Rhineland Campaign, 1944 

lvlilitm·y Government In A dion 

Two hou rs before clark on 11 September 

1944 a five-man patrol from First Army's 

\1 Corps w~tded across Lhe Our River into 

Germany. By nighlfa ll, two other patrols 

had crm-scd and brough t hack souvenirs: 

a German cap, some currency, and a 

p ar kcl of soil- the soil, no doubt, very similar [0 that of Luxembourg ou the west side 

of the rivet'. 1 Behind the border opposite 

V C:ot·ps lay the Gcnnan West Wall in 

1 he rugged, heavily woodcd1 sparsely populated EiSel region . Appropriately, since V 

Cor ps had been the. first corps in the Army 

to establish a rivil a ffairs section, a V Cor•ps 

military government offi cer posted the first 

proclamations in Germany in one of tl1e 

border villages on the J 2th. But V Corps 

was headed for frustration, surprise, and 

heartbreak; a nd the few miles of German 

territory forward of tbe We.~t Wall was all 

it was going to gel for a long time. Thirtyfive mi les to the north, VTI Corps, a lso of 

First Army, rossed the border out of Belgiurn and took R oetgen on the 12th. No 

metropolis, Roetgen, sandwiched hctwccn 

the horder and lhe forward edge of the 

West \1\' a ll, norrnal'ly had a population of 

2,500. 

First Army wns operating in what Lhe 

G'•rmar1s <:all the Dreilaende1·ecke. the 

eorner where the boundaries of Germany, 

1 Charles B. Ma<'Donatd, The Siegfried Line 

Ctuii/Jaigll. Unilt~d Str.lcs Arrny in World War 

IT (Wct$hington, D.C., 196:$), p. !l. 

Belgium, nnd Lhe Netherlands meel. On 

tlte German side, the dty of Aachen sits 

in the corner astride a corridor between the 

Maal; ( i\ileuse) River on the northwest and 

tlte H uertgen Forest on the south wl1irh 

opens toward Co ~Jgnc on the Rnine forty 

mjles to the cast. Vll Corps p roposed to 

pass between ,\ adten and the Huertgen 

Forest, encircle Lhe city with an assist from 

X IX Corps on the north, and be on its 

way vja Dueren to Cologne. By 16 September, it had driven a wedge ten mlles deep 

and twenty miles wide into Germany south 

of Aachen. I n this sliver of lerl'ilorywhid1 was, however, two-fifths of the total 

area SH !\E l•' forces would occupy in Germany l.>efore 1945- militnry government 

began when temporary detachments were 

stationed in R oetgen on J 5 September, and 

on the 18th in 1\lfonschau, the fir t Lantlkreis capital to be captured. In the next 

several days military government took OVC'r 

in six ot her communitie.->, Kornelimuenster, 

Lammer-sdorf, Rotl, Schcvcnhuette, Vidll, 

and Zweifall. In the planning, on!)' ·Monscha u had IJeen considered. The other 

were not ad1ninistrntive centers. 

The civil affairs detachments of tbe 

1st European Civil /\fiaiJ·s R egimen t 

( ECAR), which hnd come throug h France 

with First Army, ina ugurated military government in German)', beginning with 

D8B I at R oetgen. The)' were integrated 

detarhmcnts, each having one BriLish 

offi cer, •1ncl were scheduled to he withdrawn and reorga nized into ntilitary gov-
134 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERl\IIA 1

Y 

P oSTING T I·Jr. 0 RJJ1Nr\ NC:ES 

ernment teams wh ich would be exdusively 

American. The procedure was the !;amc 

everywhere, as it was to be throughout G erma ny. First nun c tl1e posting of the Supreme Commander's proclama tion a nd the 

ord ina nces. Here a tempora ry hitc h had 

developed. SHAEF had sent out the proclama tions on J 0 September hu t had to 

withdraw them promptly for revision w hen 

W ashington raised objections to the la nguage. U ntil the first week of O ctober, 12th 

1\nny G roup substituted a " Notice to the 

P opula tion" announcing the occupation." 

• J oseph R. Starr, U.S. Milit:wy Government 

Operations During the Rhineland Campa ign, p. 

T he secon d step was to find the Buergermeister ( mayor ) or, if he could not be 

found or· was obviously a Nazi, a ppoint 

one and thereby esta blish a link to the 

popul a tion. 

Next came a series of security actions. 

T h<' first was to collect weapons, ammunition, and explosives in civilia n possession 

and confisca te radio lransmillers and other 

means of rommunicaling with the enemy, 

including pigeons. T he orders to surrender 

prohibited .items were followed by bouse-tohouse sea rches, which in fought-over are as 

3•1, in H i.st Dh-, EUCOM, U .S. l'v(ilita ry Government in Gcrm:my, CMH tile 8- 3.1 DE. 
THE RHINELAND CA1v1PAIGN, 1944 135 

Ct\'ILIAN$ TURI" IN WEAI'ONS AND CAJ\t.ERAS 

frequ ent!)' Lumed up s~ablc collections of 

arms lhat the- civjlian.~ had not turned in, 

probably more out of feat• than malice. For 

convenience and for security, the civilians 

also had to be kept out of the way of the 

tactical troop~. 

Often the nmtmandcrs would have preferred to have the rivili<tns removed altogether; in t·arly Ot lohcr V Corps tried 

evacuating a rive-by-ten-mile area in the 

Eupen-Malmcd)' sector where the inhnbiLants were nominally Belgian although real 

lo)•altic: were difficult to detem1jnc. V 

Corps· G 5 thought liulc of the experiment 

at the begin ning, and even less later. lt appearcd CJnly to prove what milit ary government doctrine had assumed all along, 

namel)', that people cou ld he ('Ontrolled 

best at home. Moving them was expensive; 

imposed hardships on the old, the )'Oung, 

and the a iling; made the evacuees economic eharges of tJ1e occupation forces 

when their own crops and propei'L)' were 

lost Ol' dnnmgcd; aud probably allowed dissidents to conceal themselves more easily. 3 

From the sta rt milita ry governmentand, after the V Corps' cxpedencc, the tac-

, lfqs, V Corps, AGofS G-5, After Action Report, -t Nov 44, in SHAEF G-5, 17.1 1, Jacket 

I. 
136 THE U.S. TY l N THE OC:C:U P TJON OF GER~l l'Y 

tical rouuuands too-preferred to rely on 

cin:ulntion restrictions and tltc cw·rcw. The 

strillJ,rcnc:y of both tended to depend somewhlll on the tactical situalion and the whim 

of the I oral commander since 121 h Army 

Group ditl not have a uniform policy. In 

gcnci·al, no one was allowed to travel mor'c 

than lltrcc miles from his home, and g:Hhcring:-. ut more than five people, c..xccpt in 

food queues and in church, were pt•ohihitcd. The <·urrcw was alwars at lcnst from 

sunc;et to sunrise, and very often local commandct"S extended it through [he day light 

hours as well, giving the ll1CJl un hour in 

the morning and evening to go to and ft·om 

wot•k nnd the women an hmu· or two cluring the day to fetch foocl and water. 

T he key to populalion conti'OI w:~s knowing who w.l<~ being controlled; this prohlem 

W>uall>· pro\'ided the dctachmruu; with 

thcit' first hig joh. Every adult dvili:~n had 

to he registered and issuecl a registration 

cat·d, whkh wou ld give lllililary governmen! 1\ pt nt hold on him. In the 

lOwr's o(·c·upied in September, however, 

there appc:ll'cd at first to be almo!lt no one 

lO register. The German authorities, to 

avoid the propaganda embarrassment of 

hnving Cc1•mans uudcr Allied l'lllc, had 

ordered all inhabitants to evacuate to t11e 

cnl>t. The towns seemed empt )' f()r several 

days aflet· being occupied, until those who 

had tliRubcyrd the order felt s<1 fc enough 

or l>ccamc hungry and thir!>ty enough or 

.illSI. c'tu·i{)U!S enough to lcav<· the cell ars anti 

woods. None or I he pl<tccs O<'('ll pit:d j n 1944 

had their usual populationR, hut on the 

:w('rngc, C'll.duding Aachen, ahout a third 

of the people stayed behintl whirh. after 

the war had passed through the communitic~. wns mo1·e than most of the towns rould 

s~ or the land could supp01'l. 

0 11 21 St·ptcmber, C:ompanit·~ G and H 

of the 2d 1-:CAR arrived aL Fit~l 1\t•my, 

and a week later Drtachment 14C2, commanded hy Capt. Robert A. Goetchcus, 

Look up its sta tion in Nlonschau, becoming 

the fi t'St delachmenl lo reach its pinpoinL 

!oration i111 German)'· Upon seeing the mili· 

tar)' govcrmnent detachments, First Army 

developed a suddcu trong preference for 

going into German y with d1e civil affairs 

delac.hments lhal had accompanied it 

across France. The military govcrntnc111 

clc.tachm<:nt.,, Fir-st :\rmy complained, '"ere 

understrcngth and the personnel were ~ 

clas.sified and nol sali. ficd with their assignments; and they were particularly short on 

interpretCI'S Hlld J)liiJlic safety offiCCI'S, Of 

twenty-four ollkcrs as igned to puhlir 

safety, l'i.rst Army G 5 reported, only nine 

bad police experience. T he European Civil 

Affairs Oi "i n ( gcAD) explained thnl 

the dctachmcntos had heen set up iu a 

hmry, and some of che omissions had been 

deliberate to leave \'acandes for experienced officers from the t iv"il affajrs detachments being disbanded.' 

Since the b11lk of the detachments were 

not yet needed in Germany, First Army billeted them in barracks at Verviers, Belgium, which it d<'$ignaled a the M Tt-:rt 

(code name for I• ir,;;t • \rmy) Miljtary Government Center, and sent them back to 

·cbool. First Army C- 5 believed it still had 

somcU1ing lo teach even to officers who had 

a ll'eady been hunt c.l from school to school 

for a year or ntore. In following the German Army through France, it had become 

unhappil y uwn r·e that the stereotype of the 

German ofTircr a<> smatt and efficient and 

the Amcl'i<'an as ppy and careless could 

not be shrugged ofT as Nazi propaga nd:\ 

when faced with civilians who had ample 

'Memo, llqs, 12th AGp, ACofS G- 5, Opn~ Br, 

for ACofS G- 5, 12 tit AGp, s11 h: O pns Meeting, 

Civil AlfnirH, 29 Scp ·H, in SHAEF G- 5, I?.! G, 

J ackct I. 
THE RllJNELt\1\TO CAMPAIGN, 1944 

experience from which to make exact comparisons. M ilitary govemmcnt was competing with the image left behind by the 

enemy. In this competition, Fit'Sl Army 

G ~> hnci concluded, mora l supl:riorily and 

tcehnicnl expertise needed to l>e backed by 

what Americans too oflcn regarded as 

superficial appearances: offi ces arranged 

uol only to he worked in htu to look efficient, fl ags prominently displa)'Cd, officers 

who looked aud acted tbcir patts. r. 

T he stnfTs were not m\lch bette•· prepared for the move into Gc·rmnny than the 

c..lclachmcnts were. G- 5, I 2th 1\ 1' 1HY G roup. 

aft er roming lo the Continent in the first 

week (} ( ugust, had been 0 11 the run ever 

:o~in\C tu keep up with the fr·ont: Lo Pcrkrs 

ami Laval in August, to Vcrsumcs in early 

Scptemhct, and to Yerdun at the middle 

of the month. In these weeks, while the 

c lllt')' into Germany approached at cxpre..'IS 

train speed, EGAD had to be hro\lght over 

from England and the <:ivil l'lffairs detachments in France regrouped and •·etrained 

for Germany. The latter was itsclC n monument al job, not the leao;t part of wltich was 

scpamti ng the British offirc~ from the de1:\cltrnents and recalling the U.S. officers 

nttarhrd to British detachmf.'nts with 21 

Army Group. 0 

gc,\D, out of the picture aboard shi p 

orr UTAH llcnrh when the fh'llt dctncbmcnls went into Germnny, wa:< badl y situntcd nt or hef rt vclin e~;, either lo 

keep ill tour h with the dclachm<:nts at the 

front or to reorganize and tra i11 1 hose that 

stayed uchincl. T he division headquarter· 

• M!.'IIIO, fiqs, r:int Army, AC:o£S c 'i, for All 

Concerned, 'uh: Military CoverumetH Cou(c>rcnees 

9- 10 Nov 41, 16 Nov -14, in SH AEF G- 5, 17. 11 , 

j ut·kcl 3. 

• n qs, 12th Arm)' GToup G- 5, to SHAEF G- 5, ~uu: Narrntivc Rcporfs of G-5 SecTion for the 

J\ on h~ of ugu~t nnd September t944, in SHAEF 

C- 5, 1'/, 16, Jackel 1. 

137 

occupied the "only t•ha teau on the only hill 

in the village," a moderately elegant structw·e with an elaborate stone staircase outside, formal gardens, a pa rk, and no 

heating . . For rcasous of health rather than 

rank, officers over forty-one years old were 

billeted in tht chateau. T he remaining 

officers and the enlisted men lived in tent$ 

and shellrr v<~ in the adjacent woods. Be· 

cause of the blackout, lights and fires were 

prohibited aftc•· cla rk, and the days were 

beginning to get shon and the night$ co d.~ 

G-5, First Army, was, after G 5, 

Corps, the oldest U.S. civil affairs- militar)' 

government section in continuous existence, 

having been activated on 5 November 1943 

by Col. Damon M. Gunn, then the civil 

affai1 · officer and late•· the G-5, and hi!! 

executive ofTirct·, Maj. James S. Thurmond. Unfortunatcl)', at the army level, 

seniority had not hccn much of an advantage. G unn and his offi cers had spent 

months getting civil affairs accepted as a 

legitimate stnfT function, and as long as 

SHAEF's plnm; for military government 

in Genn il ny wcr'(' 11n~ett ed , which wns 

until D-day and beyond, little guidance 

had filtered th lt to 12th Army GI'OI.JP 

and even less to Fi l Army. Th e Army C- 5 

historian has recorded as a towering event 

in the prcinvasion plan11ing the rer.eipl of 

150 copie.<; of FM 27- 5 on 16 Marrh and 

of an approved tahk of equipment 0 11 tlw 

17th. Only one copy of the field rnnmml 

had been available in the whole army until 

then. T he Standard Policy and Proccdu•·e 

had come in earlier, but it took i\ full 

month to tmvcl tlw 114-mile distance from 

London to the umy in Bristol.8 • s pan 

' Dct E t ~3. War Diary, in OMGUS -1 13- 2/ 3, 

decim::~l 314 .81. 

' First Army C- 5, History of G-5, Fint U.S. 

Arm)', No,· 43- Mnr •H, in SHAEF G-5, 17. 1t 1 

J acket 2. 
138 THE U.S. AR~IY IN THE OCCUP \TLO~ Of CER~L\NY 

of the highest U.S. eau quartcn~ in rontinuous action since D-da)', C 5, First :\rmy, 

had accumulated much practical experience in civil affairs and was confident of 

its aGility to install militar)' government in 

Germany; hut the front. was at. the German 

border before copi<~ of the handbook arrived from SIIAEF and the fi rst directive 

for Germany came down from 12th Army 

Group. 

The Germans 

The Germans were ca.-.icr to undet--,tand 

in the ahli!ra< t and from a distance than 

as flesh-and-blood people in their own communjties. The French had been friends and 

allies- even if frequently not very friendl)'· 

The Germans were enemies :'lnd alleged inveterate disturbers of world pea ce; hut how 

well they lived up to their image seemed 

to depend on the angle and distance from 

which they were ohset·ved. G- 5, First Army, 

was struck hy their orderly behavior and 

reported that they kept to their homes but 

seemed to be watching the troops with 

great interc:.t while attempting to t'Onceal 

their curiosity. On the streets, the arm)' 

reported, Lhe men saluted the . \merican soldiers or tipped 1hcir hats politely. The chit-
THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN, 1944 

dfen were more (rjendly. Many of lhem 

ventured to wave at passing soldiers, which 

their elders a Uowetl them to do.t' urther 

J·emoved, Headqua rters, EGA 0 , described 

the Germans cu; outwardly blank, stolid, 

and ind.iffctent, while inwaJ·dly harboring 

"subdued, latent hostility mixed with fear." 

Most of them, EC.-\D claimed, shied away 

from anyone in uniform <md remwned 

stubbornly tacit urn under questioning.''' 

An observer from the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF, who accua lly entered the occupied a rea, reported: 

the crossing of the Germa n fl'ontier is something of a shock. Even in Nazi Germany the 

cows have four legs, the grass is green, and 

children in pigtails stand around the tanks. 

Self-indoctrination by yc·ars of propaganda 

make it a shock to redisccwer these trivialities. 

All the officers with whom we spoke reinforced this. The people left behi.nd in this 

area are human beings wit·h a will to survive. 

Just because we a re conquerors and they 

know it, they m·e in certain ways easier to 

handle than the libera ted Belgians or Frenchmen. They know •·hey mu~1· obey our orders, 

and if they are aiJowed to survive and reconstruct their lives by self-help, they do not of 

themselves cause any trouble. Behind the 

front line, for instance, every road and byway 

is littered witlt cables, telephone lines, ett·. 

Minor sabotage would be child's play. It has 

not happened because the people a re not ininterested in the war b11l looking after 

t hemse I ves. 11 

On o ne score everyone agreed: the Gcril'HUl civili ~ were noL causing trouble. In 

the first three weeks of the. occ:upatio n not 

a single serious ad t~ga nst t he Allied troops 

was repo t•ted. One offi<'CJ' said he had been 

• Hist Rnt, G-5, First Army, t- 30 Sep 'I ii, in 

Sfi AF..FG-5, t7ti,Jackt!t l. •• H qs, ECAD, Ccnr:ral Intelligence Bulletin No. 

2~4, 2 Nov 44, in SHAEF <i-5, i5, Jacket 2. 

"SHAEF, PsyWar Div, Mr. R- H. S. Crossman, 

fn>prcssions of a Brief Tour of Occupied Cc.rmany, 1

1 Nov 44, in SHAEF SCS 09 I .4 / 1. 

139 

doused wjth hot water ft•om a farmhouse 

m nig ht. Some sniping was going on, but 

the military government officers were convinced it was the work of German troops 

since it occurred only in the areas dosesl 

to the h·onL •t 

One questio n that could rwt be a nswered 

was whether Lhe Germans in the ocr.upied 

areas were typical. P rC'Ibably, they were not. 

The out-and-out Nazis could be assumed 

to have obeyed the evacuation order. On 

the other hand, the <:it.izens who had stayed 

could not be shown to he particularly a ntiNazi. If asked, most admitted that they had 

stayed because tbey did not w;tnt to leave 

their homes a nd pro perty and that they had 

uo t considered wh a t they did a n act of defiance. Their strongest motive for staying, 

n,exL to looking after property, was apparent!)' their desire to get out of the war. 

While the ntilitary government o!Ticers 

t'ould leave analysis of the German charar;-

tcr in general to a time when Lhey had 

more c~sure, they had to make derisions 

on the character of cel'lain Germans immediately, u amely, those whom they uppointecl 

to ad rninistrative posts in the O('Cupied 

conurniiHtlC.'i. Su\ lt decisions were a lmost neve!' easy. l t was o ne thing to be 

determined to e liminate nazism, another to 

single o ut a man from a n always small co ~ 

Lingenl of cantlida tCli, none of whom ins pired genuine confiden ce. One of t he first 

and mo~t ft'tlsl rating d.iscoveries was that 

administrative ability usually went h a nd in 

hand with political taint ; the Nazi party 

had been thorough i.n en listing able men 

oue way or another. The Germans themselves had unintentionally helped solve 

\\dmL was probably the easiest pa rt of the 

prol;lem, getting rid of Nazi incumbent'l1 

IJy evacuating almost the entire (·jvit ad-

,. Hqs, EGAD, General lnrelligcnce Bullelin No. 

2:1. 
140 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

minL'l tration, includ ing the police a mi fire 

clc(>artmenL'i; bur Lhey had also either destroyed Ol' taken along the locnl records, 

which left military government nothing to 

go on in reconstructing the ~.:mme s 

Ol' in t•hccking on the people who had 

stayed behind. One infor ma tion source the 

Germans had overlooked was lhc Churt•h. 

Since the occupied area was overwhelmingly C:atholi{', t11c priests knew nearly 

everyone and u great deal about local politics. I n the early weeks, before hoth became 

a hit more wary of each othe r, the detachmcn rs relied heavily on the priests for advice, and :1 few priests became tcmpora J'y 

B"ergermoislers in their commu nities. 

The (jn;t appointmenr.s were irnpr'omptu 

and usually nl o impermanent. One morning ir1 0<'tobcr in Wuerselen, a coal mining 

town of 16,000 inhabitan ts tlOI'thcast of 

Aachen, while fighting was still going on 

in the ut s, a H err Reuters stepped oul 

of his cellar refuge onto an almost deserted 

street, just where an i\meri<:an major had 

·topped hjs jeep. R euters, fifty-eight years 

old, had worked all his adu lt life as a cashier al one o( the coal mines. His saln.ry had 

hecn 100 small to support a wife hut uffi

dcnt for him as a bachelo1· to cultivate middle class appu rtenances, surlt all ;, wing 

collar lllld a rro('k coat, without whieh he 

ucvcr appeared in public, not cvcu on that 

moming in I he wake of battle. While the 

major, taking him for a more distingujsltctl 

citizen lhan he was 1 que.c;tioncd, him about 

candidates for a ppoin tmcn( as Bttergermeister, a minet· happened nlong and told 

t11 e major tlun Reuters himself would mnke 

a good tna)•Or. T he major c-ontinued up 

the street and questioned n few other 

people who agreed tha t Reuters was a decent enough fellow ; the next dny a soldier 

delivered n document to R euters' door appoirning him mayor of Wuersclcn. T he appointment wM only the second litic l 

c..xperienC'c of his life, hut there bad been another and il wa:; to be his undoing. One 

day in 19n 7 he <~ d received a 1101 icc l\J 

pay the ~i pafly initiation fee and l><·gin 

paying his monthly dues. Afraid of o~ing 

his job, he had paid and been a part)' member ever since, without a ttending any meetings or benefiti ng from his membership, as 

his econonti<· t:ircumstances amply allcstcd. 

H is term in office under the occu pation 

lasted eighteen days. On being dismissed 

he said sadl y that he had hoped " to dedicate the last days uf my life to the i\mct·ican Hen·en." His su<:ce,c;sor, H err Jalll'>Cil, 

a bookkeeper· in the Singer sewing mnchinc 

factory in Wucr clcn, was not a Nazi. He 

had not joined for· IW<) reasons : he had not 

been asked and his boss had not joined. 

H e h ad no di!ICC1'11ihlc political l'Onvictions 

and did not want to be mayor. The military 

government orTiccrs wondered who was the 

beuer man. u 

In Stolberg, another mining town, th<: 

3d Armored Division uncovered a bon:\ 

fide Nazi fluct'f.!tmnaister) Dr. Ragh, who 

had been in offi ce incc 1935. Under the 

Wdma.r Republic, he had been a leading 

member of one of the m iddle class parties, 

the Dcut.schs Vo/kspartei. After the othrr 

parties W CJ'C abolished in the spri ng of 

1933, he hnd joineJ the Nazis. He had sccw-ed tlle appointment in Stolberg through 

the infl uence of Cattleiter j osef Grohe of 

Cologne, who R agh said had chosen him 

not becau:>e he was an active Nazi but because he had rome to respect him while 

they were political opponents in Cologne. 

Under R ngh. lhc government of Stolberg 

had been markedly less Nazi than those of 

the surrounding 1owns, reporledl>' to the 

., OSS, Research nu<J Analysis Br, European 

Political Reporl, vol. II, No. I, 5 J an 115, In 

SH AEF C-·5, 7.32. 
THE RHINELAJ\'D CAMPAIGN, 1914 

annoyance of Lhe local party leaders. 

People quesLioned about him said he had 

done his job well and had made it clear 

that his party membership was a formality, 

necessary for heing in office. While conceding that he was the kind of man who would 

probably win in a free election , military 

govt;rnment dismissed him. His successor, 

Dr. Deulzmann, \V:.t.<; just the opposite type. 

His ability as an administn\tot· was unproven, l>nl he was not a Nazi. He had 

s11pported the rep1 tblic in the 1920s and 

had not switched a fter Hitler came to 

power. He had been a primary school principal slated for promotion. When the Na~is 

came in1 he was demoted to the r:lnk of 

ordinal")' teacher. In tLppointing him to replace Ragh, military governmem had deliberately chosen political chm·acter over 

administrative efficiency, uo doubt both out 

of moral conviction and out of knowledge 

that a Bttergermeistet with Ragh's past service under the occupation wouJd make 

headlines in the press from London to San 

Francisco. The local clergy and reportedly 

the people seemed to support tile sacrifice 

of efficiency for character. For military government the Ragh case, nevertheless, raised 

qualms aboul deter'min1ng who were "active Nazis 0 1· a rdent sympathizers." 11 

F or the detachments, the chance to get 

some experience with authentic Germans 

was exhila rating in itself. In O ctober, D etachment E 1 H 2, slated for Cologne when 

the fTonl got th at fa r, moved into Alsdorf, 

another mining town north of Aachert. Alsdorf, with a usual population of l 2,000, 

lcs...- than halJ of whom were in evidence 

when E I H 2 took over, was no Cologne hLtl 

11 Memo, 12th AGp (;-!i, Govetnmerit Affairs 

Branch in 1he Field, for Chief, Government Affairs 

Branch, sui.): Government Affairs in Stolberg, 

KornclimucrlSII'r, Breinig, 2 Ocl ~4, in SHAEF 

G- 51 17.16. 

141 

a challenge nevertheless. since the town was 

at tbe front itself and since the detachment 

had a special job to do. The two local coal 

mines, nru.ned Anna I and Anna H, were 

in danger of flooding, and the detachment 

had to extract enough coal from them to 

generate power to keep the pumps running. 

To a<;complis h this task, the detachment 

had to have a bulkhead built to seal off 

one shaft that ran b«.hind the German line. 

Being among the firsl in Germany was 

someth ing to write abour and one of lhe 

detachment othcers exu lted: 

It's just like the book, putting up the proclamations, taking over the best place in town, 

and calling in the Buergerrneister to lay down 

Uncle Ike's rules of the game. The Buerger- meister is just like the book too- a middleaged, efficient public servant. I don't know 

if he's prompted by fear or gratitude at being 

fl•eed of the Nazi yo.ke, but he's been most 

cooperative, and has gone out of his way to 

maKe us comfortable. Our offices are set up 

in a neat 4-room apartment, and after swapping desks for beds and maps and signs fol' 

knickknacks we're the damdest combination 

o[ comfol't and order yon ever saw. We've 

even hired a cook-charwoman who builds the 

fi1•e, cleans, (lnd then serves our noon meal 

in the vacant apartment above. Today we 

found linen, china, silver, and even flowers 

on the table. She had borrowed them ftom 

the Buergermaister. After three days of having people clicking thei1· heels at me and calling me "He rr My-yor" I'm beginning to feel 

like God Inc.15 

Working praclically at the front added 

somet hing thal military government personnel <.lid not expect to experience often. 

E I H 2's billets were located forward of the 

nearest regimental command post. Day and 

night lhe town shook from lite blasts of 

both U.S. and German artillery, and the 

detachment memhers acqujred a soldierly 

"Ltr, ElH2 to ECAD, Maj Ckmen~ to Maj 

Howard Cunlocke, 2 1 Oct H, in SHAEF 0 - 5, 

17. l2, Jacket 5. 
11·2 TF-TE U.S. AR~I\' fN THE OCCUPATION OF GERt..·lANY 

skill al distinguishing hy SOtlntL between 

moruu~ and an titank guns anti between 

.50~ and .30-calibcr machine guns. Nobody 

"' ,ts shooting at them pccifirally, h11t the 

f10m did not move for nearly a month, and 

lhe Gerrnans occasional1y dropped a few 

rnunclc; on the town. On the morning of 

I 7 November, Capt. Arthur K. Olsen was 

killed anti Tech. 5 John H. Bergmann 

\I·Ounded by a shell that hjt in the street 

uutside the detachment headquarters. '

0 

Afte1· the nonfraternization order ap~ 

pea red, 12th Army Group wanted to know 

what the troops thought about the Germans. lt g~we the job of finding out to Maj. 

Arthur Goodfriend, editor in chief of Stars 

and Strij>es, who was going through the 

replacement system incognito as an enlisted 

man anyway looking for story material. 

Opinion on the Germans, Goodfriend on~ 

rluded, r.ould he compressed into a few 

typical G.I. vignettes: 

These Germans aren'L bad people. We get 

alcmg with them O.K. All you've got to do 

is treat them good nne! you have no trouble. 

These people aren't real Germans- they're 

Catholic. This part of Germany is all Catholit. They're g(>od people a.nd don't have any 

or this Nazi feeling tOIVard us. 

Hell, these people are cleaner and damned 

sight friend lier than the Frogs. They're our 

kind of people. 

One military govcmmcnt officer inter~ 

vic\vcd by Goodfriend estimated thirty days 

as the interval before the onset of eomplete 

fraternization. Goodfr ~nd douht<>d it 

'vould take that long. The temptation, he 

said, was great; the opportunity was also 

great; and the American soldier was "by 

nature kindly and generous in his treatment 

,. P et E I H2, R. cport or Operations 16 O ct- 17 

Nov 411, 16 No\' H, in SHAEF C-5, 17.12, Jacket 

5. 

of other peoples, friend and roe alike." 

Nonfratcmizatjon. Goodfriend was on~ 

vinced, estaiJiishcd a standRrd difficult to 

define and pursue that wns " beset every 

inch of the way hy the attractiveness uf 

many Germans, especia lly women and hil~ 

dren, which tends to weaken the strongest 

deter·mination to he aloof.·· furthermore, 

the ofTi ccrs were not setting an example, 

he observed. They wete subject to the same 

Lemputtion ::ts the en listed men and shared 

their confusjon and conflicts. 1r 

Apparenl'ly as n by-product of Goodfriend's tour in the enlisted ranks, militnry 

government in Germany received its first 

blast of pre<>s criticism. Aside from one or· 

two allusions in London papers to Nazis 

rel Lined in office and pictures showing alleged fraternization, the civilia n press had 

so far not taken murb interest, critical or' 

otherwise, in the OCC'upation. The big nrws 

was nt the front. But, on 20 O r.tobct·, Sl.m.r 

rmd Stripes ran a 1 hree-\olumn articl·· 

under the hcadlinr "Don't Get Chummy 

With J erry." The gist was in tbc opening 

paragt'a phs: 

Here's wf1 at's going on around Aachen: 

l ) German civiJians are giving Yanks the 

V-sign. the glad hand, free beer, big smiles. 

plenty of talk about not being Nazis at hea rt, 

and hurray for democracy. 

2) Some G.I.s and plenty of ofEters are 

retuming the smiles, flirting with the Frauleim, dl'inking the beer, and starting to .think 

whal nire foiks the Gennans really are. 

3) Gennan civil an~ are being removed 

fro11r Aa<:hen and driven two miles in U .S. 

Army trucks to l...uetzow Barracks, in Brand, 

a submb of Aachen. To move them out is 

U lllattel' or Strict military necessity, but these 

Nazis are being quartered in the best build-

"Memo, Editor in Chid, Stars and Stripes, 

fen• Ch, Sp I nf Scrvi~es, !;toh: Fraternization Between German~ and Amcricau Officers .1nd .Men 

[no date], In SHAEP G- 1, 250.1- l. 
'l'HE Rlll ~EL\:"\0 C \~lP \lG ~. I<H4 14J 

A \Cil J<N C\'ACUF.F.S ARRIVING AT BRA NO 

ings outside AachC'n. Tlwy are being brought 

there in Arm)' vt•hicles. Thct'l' nrc canvas co,·-

ers over them [the vehicles]. The)' h:wc alrcauy T'C('Civcd 20 tons of Army foocl.'11 

Whcthc•· the first two paragraphs would 

do more to arouse indignation or to stimulate envy among the troops not yet in Germany '"as no concern of military 

govcmmcut. The third paragraph, howe'er, implied that the Germans were gelling 

soft treatment from military gO\ cmment a t 

the expense of the U.S. soldiers. Aathcn was 

then encircled; and as the troops pushed 

"Stars and Stripes, 20 Ocl ·14. 

into the heavily damaged dty, First Army 

G-5 bad untiCI'Iaken lO evacuate the dvilians found in cellars and homh shelters to 

the barracks in the suburb Brand to get 

them out of lhc way. Fortun ately, Col. 

Gustav 0. Dittmar, executive officer of 

First Army G- 5, witnessed the evacuation, 

and he was able to assure the higher hcadqucU"ters that all of the civilians who were 

able- men , women, a nd children- walked 

the two miles lo Drand ; ontr the aged and 

sick were moved in trucks; and the trucks 

had canv-as tops because the weather was 

rainy and they were also being used to haul 
Ill I'll I: l".~ .. \lU. I \' lJ\ T H r:: OCCUI' \ IIU\ 01•' GER~I.\'\ \ 

.;upplit.:S. 'l'hl: food lor tlu.: r ivil ia.ns, he rePllrlCd , came 1\0l fr·om . \ rmy !;'locks l>11t was 

ei ther requisitionrd locally or l<tken from 

captur ed Gennan depoL'i. '" 

As instruments fo1· sh a ping re latio ns between the popula tio n a nd the Q!'cupa tion 

forces, military governmclll courts were regarded as :most impo rtant. They were expected, on the o ne lumd, to enforce sternl y 

the authoril)' cla imed in the proclama tion 

a nd ord ina nces md, o n the other, to p oint 

up for the G ermans the difference between 

nazism a nd dernoc:racy by giving fair a nd 

impartia l trials to all accused . M otlelcd 

after Army cow·ts nHll'ti al, the military govemnwnt rom ts convened on three levels : 

summa r y (one oiTicer), iJltet1Tledia te (one 

or more offi cers), and ge11era l (not less 

than three offi cers). Summary courts could 

impose up to one year in pri~on and fine.~ 

in marks up to $1 ,000; int ermediate courts, 

teu years i n prison and fines to $10,000; 

a nc1 gcncrnl cotnis, the deatb pe nalty and 

unlimited fiucs. 

The first summa ry court in Germa ny 

npcncd in Kornclimqcnstcr late in Scptemi><'r. The judge, an Army rapta in, presided 

behind a kitchen table on the g ro und floor 

of the town inn. In the first case, military 

police a ccw;ed four women of returning, 

in defi ance of notices posted throughout the 

town , to homes in a t estrir ted military nrea 

from which ti~C)' had been evacua ted four 

da ys e::~ rli . The charge..;;. rea d in German 

a nd Engli ·h. were expla ined to the accused 

by a fom1er tourt interpreter from Aacheu . 

The Gel'lnnn lawyer who r epresented t he 

wom en pleaded tha t th<:y had retumed to 

their homes to get more clothing. The hearing lasted fift een min11tes. E aeb of the 

wome n was finecl 2,000 ma rks (reduced 

•• Memo, AC:ofS G- .'i, First Army, for ACofS 

G- 5, 12th AGp. sub: di to ri ;~ l in Stnrs a11 d StrijJes, 

22. Oct 4•1, in SHA EF G- 5, 17. 11 , j acke t l. 

lo 200 011 rcvic>w) ;tnd g i''Cll thirty d.Lys 

to pay or six months in ja il.~" 

In October, a lso in Kornclimuenstc1', ~h e 

fir:;t int rm ~diate c:ourt tl'iecl a w oma n, 

Maria Jensen, for concealing records of Lhe 

NS Fr(luensclwfl (the Nazi women's orgmlization ). She was senten ced Lo six years' 

rn pri:;o mc t. ' In early November, Fir t 

A rmy G- 5 held the first genera l (OUI't a l 

the M A$TER Milita ry Govem ment Center 

in Vervicrs lo give the detaLhmcnts trainillg there a c hance to obser ve. The court 

tried Lwo men [rom Stolberg charged with 

harboring Getman t:rcJops. T he defense 

a rg ued tha t the a rea was not occupied, onl y 

patrolled, at the time the German soldiers 

were found, and tha t the soldi ~ were deserters being llhcltercd in response to A llied 

radio lppca s. The two men w ere 

ac:quitt d. 2 

During September and O ctobe1·, summary and intermedi a te courts tried twentythree cases involving twenty-nine persons. 

Twenty-five of the acc ~ed were convicted. 

i\ (ore than half of the on·enscs were minor 

d rculntio11 aJlCI curfew viola tions. T he 

Gerrnrtn.'i were living up to their r ep uta tion 

fo r o rderliness. 

Aachen 

Col. Gerha n.l Wilck, the last German 

comma ndcr in a~; , su rrcndered th · 

city a t noon on 2 1 O ctober, hut shells from 

he hind 1 he Germa n line 110 t much mo re 

than a mile away continued lo f a ll for d ays 

;tflcrwa rd. The garrison had been complete ly cncil'dcd for five da ys a nd had been 

under ground a nd ail' a ttack [or more tha n 

~• H qs, P.CAD, General Intelligence Bulletin No. 

n St rr, U .S. Milita ry Government Opera1 ions 

D uring the Rhineland Campaign, p. 9'L 

"' Hist Rp t, G- 5, First 1\rmy, 1- 30 Nov + 1, in 

SliA EF G-5, 17 . II, J ackcr :~ . 
T il E Rlll!'\EL.\::'\0 C:\.\1 P \IG'\, 19.J.l 11

15 

AAa u eN AP'rt-:R THE BATTLL 

a ntonlh. The city, which had already Leen 

heavily bombed half a dozen times earlier 

in the war, was 85 percent destroyed . Of 

the I GO,OOO inhabitants, First J\rmy had 

found and removed 5,000 to Brand and 

H omburg. A few thousand more turned up 

in the ruins a fter the surrender and in surrounding communities, eventually raising 

the total to 14,000. Some of the rest, no 

doubt, were dead and buried under the 

rubble ; most had either followed the evacuation orders or dispersed into the count•·ysidc to areas not yet captured. 

The t\ar hen detachment, F I G2, moved 

in on the day after the surrender. lls thirtyfive officers and forty-eight en listed men 

had by then been running the Bra nd refugee camp for a week and a half and 

had begun screening men for municipal 

posts- withoul mut h luck, since almost all 

the qualified candidates also had relatives 

on the German side and feared reprisals 

against them. After some searching for 

bujldings in usable condition, the detachment set itself up in a fonner Gestapo headquarters and a courthouse. The city was 

virtually empty. The SS had evacuated the 

fire and police departments, including the 

fire engines, ancl the municipal records had 

been removed. Stores and W ehrmacltt food 
146 THE U.S. A1Uv1Y IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

dumps were unguarded anti being rifled 

by the troops and the few Germans left in 

the city. " 

To re!ltore order, VII CortJs assigned the 

690th Field Artillery Battalion as military 

government se<'u ril y police. In their own 

a reas Lhe divisions for·mcd roving squads 

mounted on :Y.-ton weapons carriers. J\t 

the military government center in Verviers, 

First Army G-5 hegan an experiment in 

tra ining 1'apwrcd German policemen for 

work under the occupation. After evacuating them, tJ1e Germans had put many of 

lhe Aachen police a t the front, and some 

had been captured. As prisoners of wal' 

they could not he used, but since they had 

been raptured in police) not Welmnacht, 

unifc:>rms, First Army decided that Lhey 

were not actually prisoners of war. Starling 

with two dozen of these policemen, first 

Army had nearly a hundred in training by 

the end of O ctober. The experiment was 

<t qualified succes.<;. Only ten of the ret ruits 

tumed out to be professiona l policemen; 

the I'CSt had come to the police force late 

in the war from nonessenti al occupations; 

a nd the ten professionals all had been Nazi 

patty members. However, they were bette1' 

Lhan nothing. First Army kept the professionals as inst.ructors and put the others on 

duty after they had some training • 

F I 02 was a regional detachment that 

expected to assume supervision of all detachments in the Aachen Regiertmgsbezirk; 

hut the whole RegierungJbeti7'k was not occupied yet, and the control that did exist 

" Hist Rpt, C- 5, First Army, 1- 31 Oct 4·4, 3 

Oec •H, in SHAEF G-5, 17.11, Jacket I. 

• Wltctl the school moved to A11chen in the 

spring of 1945, the ~:x- Nazi instructor raised a 

popular stir and brought a flurry of denunciations 

to military government. Office of the Chief Histo· 

rian, EUCOM, Occupation Forces .ill Europe 

Series, Public Safety, 19(l7. CMH file B-3. t CA 

l B. 

was in the hands of the G-5's of the tadicu.l 

units. Moreover, the division and regimental boundaries sJ1ifted frequentl y, at 

lin.1es a lmost every day, and each new command seemed to have its own concept of 

how military government ought to he con -

ducted. Ne\'ertheless, after F I 0 2 settled in 

Aa<:hen, military government officials in 

the area occupied ~o far, which would not 

be greatly increased before the end of the 

coming winter, be.gan to lake t11e measure 

of the jol> that lay ah.eac..l. Sooner or later 

the front would move on, but miJitary government wottltl stay. F or Lhis one corner 

of Germany, the war seemed to be over 

and the permanent occupation beglnnjng. 

I n one respect this prospect was awesome. Aachen lay on the western fr'ingc of 

the Ruhr industrial comple.x, and even in 

ruins it was a highly sophisticated area. 

T he PUIIJlic Relations Br tn , G-5, 'Fit'St 

Army, gave the following description: 

Germany is different from France. France 

was mostly small towns that received water 

from wells. Except for Paris, power was supplied by small, widely separated stations. Th<" 

section of Germany now before us is Pittsburg, Youngstown, Detroit, a11d Tolcd<l 

rolled in to one. The telephone system is auto· 

rna tic and probably better than at home, having a complete undergt'ound cable system 

where long distance calls can be dialed to 

almost every city in the country. The large 

industrial cities, like Aachen, are served by 

tremendous power and gas systems. 2r. 

Under Lhe rul IIJie, lhc utility systems were 

still almost intact. The Germans apparently 

had nol had the heart to destro)' them. But 

if the systems had been more primitive, 

they might have been m ore usclnl. The 

" Memo, Hqs, Fir.a Army, ACofS G-5, for All 

Concerned, sull: Military Government Confercnrc~ 

9-10 Nov 4·1, 16 Nov ~4, in SH AEF C- 5, 17.11, 

Jacket :1. 
nwn whn rould have repaired and run 

them WCI'C' gone. 

Winter w <tS coming, and life in Aachen 

wru; 'OOt going to be easy. The most (lplimislic prediction First Army G 5 would venture was that the a1•ea might just be able 

to feed itself Ll11·ough the winter· [ 1'011) loc:aJ 

!ltock'l and from what could he gathered 

rn th~ C'Ollllli')'Sidc pro\·idcd " 110 more 

pcopk return.''"" Privately the military 

government officers worried that the ar·ea 

might be picked clean llefOI'C the winter 

came. The detachments reported persistent 

louting by the troops. Each llC\v unit passing through r ut a swath, taking along 

~<rad os, food, hicydcs, crucifixes, doors, 

cooking utensils, and rattle." When questioned, the soldiers expre.."SCd the belief that 

having fought for the property, they were 

entitled to it, particularly :lincc the Gernuuu; had acquired so much wrongfull)r.~ 7 

Pa radoxically, the troops also seemed to be 

the best guarantee that the German civilia ns would sun1ive. Maj, Gen. J. Lawton 

CollinR, commanding VII C.:Clrps, clcdared 

that the Germans would have to h<: fed 

one way or another because the 1\rnerican 

soldier would not permit women and children to starve while he was well fed. 28 

SHAEF policy was to turn the problems 

of their existence over to the Germans 

th<:msdvcs. Aft er moving into ,\adten, 

FIC2 crcntcd a new functional !lubdivision, 

the Specinl Branch of Public SHfety, to 

screen lhc political background!; of candidates f()r municipa l offi ces. The Special 

Branch was going to hecomc a prt·mnnent 

"' H1st Rpt, G-5, First Am1y, 1- 3 1 Oc:1 44, 3 

Dec +1. in SIIAEF G-5, 17.11, Jnckct 1. 

'' ON EI H2, Report of Operations 16 Oct- 17 

Nov 4•1, 16 Nov 44, in SHAEF G- 5, 17. 12, Jnckrt 

5. 

"' SllAEI·', l'syWar Div, Mr. R- H. S. Crossm:~r1, 

111 lrcsxion~ of a Brief Tour of Occupied Gcrmnny. 

H7 

and pervaosivt fi.xntt'C in the occupation, 

as wns al-;o its chief weapon against nazism, 

tl1e Fragebogcn. t\ dcceplively simple-looking questionnaire, the Fragebogen required 

the rL'Spondcnt to li!!t all his memberships 

in National Socialist and milititry org:\nizations and to 11upply a variety of other information concerning his salary, associations, 

and employrncnt hack to the pre-Hitler 

period. '\'ith the information in the Fragebogen military government expected nol 

only to be able to detect overt Nazis hut 

also sympathizers, militarists, and individuals who had benefited materially from thr 

Nazi regime. 'l'hc Special Branr h in 

Aachen opened with no public recordc; with 

which to verify th1~ information in the 

Fragebo{!tn and onl)' one agent-invcstigntor 

from the Counteriutelligcnre Corps ( CIC) ; 

consequently, the hrnncb rcsor!ed- a.c; most 

Special Bra11che:; did later- to hiring Germans to che\ k on Germans. 

On 30 October, F 1 G2 installed Franf. 

Oppcnhoff as Obe1'bnergemzeisler (chief 

mayor ) of Aachen. His was the most important appoirllmenl yet made in Germa ny 

and one thnt was <'el'lain to attract attention on both sides of the front. Military 

government was roncerned over press nnd 

po)jtical rcal'tions in the United States a nd 

England; Oppenhoff was concerned for the 

safely of his t'clatives in unoccupied Germany and for his own life. Earlier in the 

month the SS newspaper, Das Schwarze 

T< orps) had written that there would he 110 

German administration under the orcupntion because any official who colhtborated 

with the enemy could count on being dead 

within a month. ao 

Oppenhofr \\1:\.'1 a nnlive of Aachen and 

a prominent CaLholic layman. H e was nn 

,. Press and turormlltion Office, The Federrol 

Republic of Crrmnny, The Bulleliu, 12 May 70. 
148 THE U.S. ARMY I N THE OCCUPATION OF GER1viANY 

expert on Nazi law, had been legal representative for the Bishop of Aachen, and 

had defended some t:asc.c; [or Jewish Iil·ms. 

Knowing that the Gestapo was interested 

in him, he had taken refuge in Eupen, 

across Lhe I 10rder in Belgium, in the first 

week of Septemller, taking his wi(e and 

three daughters witl1 him. When he returned to be swot•n in as mayor in Aachen, 

he was <done. 

11 '

1 

On the day Fl G2 moved tn, the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives ( MFA&A) 

Branch of fi'irst Army G-5 began a survey. 

With a history dating to Charlemagne and 

a special position as the coronation city of 

medieval German kings and emperors, 

Aachen had been known particula rly for 

its architcdural treasures. Of these only 

four- the cathedral, the Ponttor ( lhe fourteenth-century rity gate), the Fran kenberg 

Castle, and the H aus Heusch (an oJd pa tJ·ic:ian dwelling)-could be described as "to 

a degree spared." The most important was 

the cathedtal, which housed the coronation 

chair, the so-c:alled throne of Charlemagne. 

The cathed1·al was in rather surprisingly 

good condition after what it had been 

through: live fires and. a direct bit by a 

heavy bomb, which, had it not hcen a dud, 

would surely have demoli!ihed the whole 

structure. A six-man fire-fighting force had 

stayed with the building throug h the bombings and the siege; when the Americans 

arrived, they were stiU there, on guard 

against fires that might be started by German shells falling in the city. The archives, 

library, and movable treasures had been 

taken out earl y in the war, and the heavy 

coron;nion chair was intact inside a mas-

.., ( I } Hi.st Rpl, G- 5, Fitst Army, 1-31 Oct 44, 

3 Dec 4·1-. in SHAEF G-5. 17.11 , J acket I. (2) 

OSS, Research and Analysis Br, E1rropcan Political 

Report, vol. I, No. 40, 0 Dec 44, in SHAEF 

G- 5 7.32. 

on•·y shidd, lhc Ooor beneath it reinforced 

against the bombing by temporary brick 

at'Ches anci. oring.~· 

The most sensational " find" of treasure 

was not in Aachen- there practirally 

everything of value had been removed several years before- hut at Rlmburg Castle 

in the northern outskirts. Lt. George F. 

Stout, r.,,{FA&A, first rmy, and Lt. James 

B. Luwood, MF A&A Officer, D etachment 

EJH2, made an inventory in the castle in 

the third week of O ctober. By then the war 

had pac;sed through the old place with a 

vengeance. The SS J,ad tnken away the 

owner, Siegfried von .Brauchitsrh, l col)sin 

of the former commander in chief of the 

German Al'my, a fter the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler. Subsequently 

the Germans had used the moated structure 

u.s a field hospital and to billet troops and 

had constructed a. pill box in one of the 

buildings on the grounds. During the figtning for A achen , German infantry had holed 

up behind the stone and bric.k waiL" for 

a short but hi tter exchange with troops of 

XL'( Corps coming across the Wunn River 

out of H olland. When Stout and Larwood 

arrived they found every window broken 

and the masonry holed by artillery and bazooka shells. J nside, the fumiturc, paintings, and art objects were in fairly good 

condition considering what had lJeen going 

on around them. The two biggest discoveries wca·e a diamond and platinum Liara 

and a collection of ancient coins, which appa rently neither the Germans nor the 

Americans bad previot1sly suspected were 

therc. ~ 

11 SRAEF C- 5, MFA&A, to ACofS C-5, sttb ; 

Report on MFA& A for Feb 45, 3 1 Mar '15, in 

SHAEF G- 5, 130.1, J acket 2. 

"' Memo for Record, Ninth Anny, ACofS G-5, 

sub ; Additional Arl Treasures at Schloss Rim burg 

[uo date], in Ninth U.S. Army, 17.1 4·, Jacket I. 
THE RIIINF.L.\NI> Ct\MPAION, 1914 

AI onrd1au 

Mon ·chau in peacetime had hcen a quiet 

border town tud.tcl inw the valley of the 

Roer River and framed on the cast and 

west b) wooded 1 idges. I I!". medieval-looking, hc:uncd nnd ·tuccocd, three-story 

houses huddled uvcr nnrmw st1ects had 

made il <l local tourist attraction until tJ1e 

OrgoniJatiun Tmll, the Gemlan military 

construction agency, built the West Vlal\ 

around it. A;; a l.mulkl'eis capital it had 

the appurtenances of a moderately elevated 

status, a jail, a courthouse, a 1\ teissj)arkasse 

(coun ty bnnk), two hotds, nnd the offi ce 

of the Llllldrat, the rbicf adttlinistrative 

onlcer of th(· 1\reis. When the Amrricans 

came in the third week of September tJ1ey 

were vastly l~'l interested in viewing the 

·ccnery th.m in crac:king the West Wall and 

breaking out into the open country lying 

northeast of us hau between the Rocr 

River and the :~ou thcrn edge of the Huertgen Forest. '1 he 9th Di\i..,ion took the 

ridgeljne on the west and pu-;hcd it outpost 

Linr into the vatiC) nnd om w the ea<;tem 

edge of the town, but the Germans held on 

to the heights on the ea<~ . I n the surceedi11g 

Ill< lilt hs while the Americans and Gennans 

-.hcllcd rnc h otiH' r' f1•om the ridges and the 

Ccm1a11o; sporadically clt'Opped rounds into 

the tc1wn in tlw valley, ~lonsrhau added 

to its other modest a ttai nments n place in 

the history of the mTupaLion. 

When Dctuc:hmcnl T4C2 was given 

Monschau as its pinpoint assig nment, no 

one suspected th.11 surh a thoroughly average 1 dcta<'llrnent of two o!Tircrs, a warrant 

omrer, and six rnli!-.tCd men would have 

anythiJlg hut a rou tine rnrcer in n hackwater Lmtdkrl'is. 31 C:oetchcus, the com-

" Be,ides lhr comm:lnd(-r, L1. Willinm F. 

Schmidt, \VO (Jf! ) j:lcJ.. ~. Milner, Cpl. Rnlph 

C. Most, Trch. 5 llerbert P. Fr3M, and P(c.'s 

149 

mander, a.<; a captai•l, held the average 

rank for detachment commander;. 

While waiting to move inw Monschau, 

I4G2 estabJjshed itself Cor !'cvcral days in 

Roetgen, six miles to the north, which was 

by three or fou r hundred inhnhitants actually the largest c:ommunity in the Landkreis. Roetgcn pruvidc·d :111 I Ill\ nrnishcd 

introduction to the small towns of western 

Germany. lt had a flour tllill and a police 

department consisting of one man, age 

sixty, who made hi!l munds on a bicytlc 

and presided over a jtdl with one rcll U1d 

a. toilet, Il also had a dvil dcfC11Sc organ izntion and a voluHtCCI' li•·c dC'pm·tnH'nt; <~arh 

house had a stinup pu111p and a box of 

sand, hut there had not I wen any li res in 

recent years as R oetgcn had not hccn on 

the bombing schedule. The MFt\&A function reached its fullest p~ihlc scope in 

Roetaen with the pcxting of ofT-limits igns 

on a~ hunting lodge outside tnwn, whirh 

contained some painting.~ of uncertain 

vaJue. Roetgen was, as a detac hmc.:nt SUltioned there later rrponcd, ··a t)•pical rural 

village in which the resitlcn"" oht")' the 

rules- no brothels, no r<~ports of a black 

market, no intoxicating liquors sold, and 

all military rolllcs free of 1ivilian trnffir."u 

l n Monschau, 14G2 opened its headquarters in the movie 1 hc;lter h\1ilcling. 

Herr Scheibler, the a<'ling f.flnrlmt, nlrcady 

broken in, reported for his instructions 

cvct•y morning al ten. On 29 !-ieptemher 

the registration of c-ivilians started, and the 

U.S. !lag was rais<'<l f1l the hcaclquarter!i, 

the detachment brlievccl for the lirsl lime 

in Germany. l\ day (':Hlic•· the clc•<:tririty 

had been turned on ngnin. ~lonsc hau received its electricity from a small water 

Floyd S. Ehnl'r, P-ilrrt I r frednck~. and Heinz 

Jauch. 

"Det Hist, Dr~ C:t l12. 2 t Oct- 10 NM 41, "' 

SHAEF G- 5, 17.11, J:u:ket -1 
150 'I liE t'.S. \R~IY Il\ THE Q( .( .L'P.\ flO' 01' GER~f.\1'\Y 

fkii.DING A BRlDGt·: rN 1\foNSCH,\U. CafJtain Gor•tchero Stft011d f rom the Left. 

power plam on the Rocr River. The 9th 

Oivisi{m·s outpost line looking into enemy 

tcrriWr}' wac: four b lo< ks from detachment 

heaclquancrs, and arLillcry shells ~oin g 

holh wa)'S rumbled and whistlctl overhead. 

Tn hs subsequent dail)' reports the detuchmcnl interwove the drama and triviality of the occupation: 

l Oc·t: The Buergermei.Jter oC l\ l uetzcnidt 

reported enemy patrols contacting civilians 

for food and threatenjng the fives of him and 

his lntnil}'. 

6 Ort: All civilians ordered evacuated 

from Ka h crherberg to ~[almedy within the 

next two days. No h'ansport being provided 

by tactical units, and the movement involves 

1,100 persons. The people ar Kalterherberg 

knew about the cvaruntion 5 hours before the 

tactical units tolc.l the !V[G detaclunent. 

Enlisted men esc-orted a civilian truck to 

Roet~en to g!'l 4,000 lbs. of t)•e there to b!' 

ground into llour. 

7 Oct: Ten enclll)' soldiers surrendered ttt 

derach111elll headquarter'S. Among them was 

a soldier with relatives in Monsrhau. Before 

beinf;t taken to the PW enclosure he was allowed to visit his mother, sister, and brother. 

Photos taken. 

8 Oct; Buergermeister of Muetzcnich r-eports U.S. soldiers broke into his office in the 

sch oolhouse and stole 12 cameras, 7 pair binoculars, 15 :-abcrs, a ll of which he had been 

retaining by order of a tactica l unit now 

gone. Wanton d estruction of gardens also rc-
THE RHINELAND C:AJ\lP!\1GN, 1944 

ported. This serio1.1s because the t:ermans depend on them for food. 

Pr•ovisionnl MG police dctadnnc11\ has 

moved to Kalterherberg to protect the evacuntrd village from looting and plundering. 

9 Ort: C:apt. Goetcheus rt>qucstccl arrangerrtcnts for Protestant c·hurrh ~cr viccs for civilians and U.S. soldiers. 

I 0 Oct: Capt. Goetcheus held a stunm<H'}' 

t'tHu't to tt)' four civilians for violation of circulation. Two were convicted and fin<'d. Two 

were dismissed on technicalities of borders 

and insufficient evidence. 

II Oct: Capt. Goetcheus went to Kalterherberg to confer with the C.O. of the MG 

police detachment. \t\'hile there noticed two 

:.ides of be(.>f hanging in a schoolyard GP of 

the !ora l tadical unir. Also a local farmt'l' 

reported loss of a heifer'. Investigation 

I'CC'JliCSLCd. 

12 Ort: Evaruation of the part of Monschau outside the tactical outposts but inside 

the city limits was ordered on recommendation of the tactical lroops owing to possible 

subversive activit)' by small, roving enerny 

patrols. 

Two Ge-rman soldiers of a patrol were 

killed. odi~·s taken to the local cemcte1y and 

IJ11 ergcrmeistor ordE>red to have them bUJ·iod. 

13 Oct: Buergermei~ter o f Muet7.cnich 

reports U.S. troops using public bathing 

hcilities in local schoolhouse using up the 

SWflilablc water suppl)' at an alarming rate. 

l·t Oct: [Report on the missing heifer from 

Det. "A: 20th EngineeJ" Bu.] !VfC officer·, 

1\ lonsrhau, said he saw a cow hanging io the 

vicinity of \"!\N 1 TY l28th Division 1 Rear 

Headquarters. Capt. Welch investigated, but 

cow hnd been butcherrcl, so he t:ould nol 

identify it. Lieutenant at the headquarters 

knew nothing about thr cow. First sgt. knew 

about the row but did not know how it got 

there except that it had bern brought in by 

some men who found it \voundcd from artillery fire. Lt. Anderson of this dctnrlnneut ob-

~cn ecl a li' e row standing in the back of a 

2 ~ ton tr·uck on 12 Ort. 

16 Ot·t: Woman prisoner received from 

Aaclwn to br confined [n !oral jail. 

18 Oct: Three boys, 13, 14, and 15 years 

old. tried for attempted theft of U.S. prop-

(·rty cousistinl{ of dtOrolatc bars and cigarrltcs. One ('Onvicted. Two acquitted. 

151 

\\'oman from Zweifall taken into prison 

for six months for possession of Jir·earms. 

.19 Oc1: Dllring- the night all windows on 

one side of the MC building were sha ttercJ 

when ''" enemy shell burst on the roof o f a 

building 50 feN nway. 

l laving trouble with CIC. Do not brlicvc 

security threatened so ha\'e concentrnted on 

assuring food, proper administration, and 

property protection on the assumption these 

will prevent unrest. J [ave done these nt the 

e..xpense of looking into past activities or present civil servants. 

21 Oct: First Protestant services held. 

Many solclitrs attended. Arrangements made 

to obtain I ,500 kilos of soap and 500 kilos 

of salt from !)tolberg. 

22 Oct: During tlw night another artillery 

shell struck the sarne building struck three 

days ago. 

28 Oct: During the night au enemy patrol 

demolished Ule interior of the schoolhouse 

being used as the Buergermeister's office in 

Muetzenich. 

German polil'Cmen in Muetzenich reported 

four U.S. soldiers in a jeep climbed through 

a. window and stole 2,150 RM (ReichsmarksJ, 

3 gold bracclc•ts, 2 gold wristwatches, a necklace, and a ring. People were a t the time attending ('hurch.~r. 

I ov: Went to Stolberg to buy soap. Two 

civilian trucks with military escort. 

2 Nov : On<' enlisted man escortrd civil inn 

trurk to Stolberg for• salt. On return dropped 

some salt nt Roctgcu and picked up shoes for 

l\ I onscha u. 

3 Nov: Another trip Ior salt and soap to 

Stolberg. 

Capt. Coetchcus went to Roetgen to make 

a rrangements for fihoC's from !>uppl)' at 

Roetgcn. 

Submit ted rt'quisitions for food . 6,500 civilians in the Landkreis now. R equisitioned 

food for two months. No sugar or salt has 

been available for lwo months. Salt is needed 

for sJauglttcring c-atlle. Local vegetables nor·-

mally not enough for the population, and this 

., Periodic Rerorts, Oct I4C2, -1 - 28 Oct 44, 

a11d Rr>t, Oct /\, 20th Engineer Un, 10 CO, V 

Corps Provi~ional MG Polict: Bn, suh: Acriviric~ 

of lloc: DeL at Kaltc.:rherbc.rg, 1+ Oct •H, in V 

Corps 205 - 5.1. 
152 THE U.S. AR1\1Y IN THE OC:CUPATlON OF GER~IA Y 

CIC CH.EcK IN MoNscHAU 

year the crops a re rotting in th e fields because 

Lhe people have not been aUowed to go out 

to get tbcm. No hay or other fodder for tbe 

cattle. 

7 Nov: Civilian truck and enlisted escort 

went lo Stolberg with a load of beef. Re- turned with soap for Roetgen and from Roetgen brough t back 10 sacks of meal to be used 

as cattle feed. 

8 Nov : First snow. Seventeen artillery 

shells fell on :Monsd1au during the night.'

10 

Snow fell again on the 11 tb and continued falling for U1e next three days. Wha t 

•·• Pe•·iodic Reports, Oct ~G2 , 1-8 Nov +4, in 

V Corps 205- 5. 1. 

was left of the summer's crops, pota toc! 

especiall y, was buried and frozen. In nor· 

ma l times Kreis M onschau was no more 

than 20 perc:en t self-sumcient in grain and 

potatoes and impoJ'ted 200,000 tons. Now 

not even the pot a toes in the fields, which 

would not have been enough to last the 

winter, could be dug. Roctgen had enough 

grain to make up the bread ration for nine 

more weeks, provided the mill couJd be 

kept running. F I G2 in Aachen undertook 

to admin ister a ba rter system for the distribution of food between the occupied comm unities, but the most that such an 
.IIT.tll!.l,«'llll'tll c cHtld do in th<' lnug nm w<t..; 

rqualil.l' the ~hortagcs.~~ 

Oth· ddkic·tH )' 1 he Cermnns wert' uot 

likely to :mflcr timing lhc r<1ming ruonlhs 

wa~ in '(11 pcrvision. Lmulkrt>ir .M onsrhan 

had two <ktathrnenls pernntucntl y <~ ss c..l 

and other-.; coming and going uri tt•aining 

n~ gn cnt<o. (The whole o< cupicd a rea, 

whith had hccn l'latcd to ha' c four drtar hmrnt:< a t mosl, had l wentr-one dctarhmcnL.; tlcployc<.l on l Novc111 bcr. ) ll was 

good tra ining, and the detachments of 

tltcmscl\'cs did the Gernw ns no visible 

ltaml. M onschau , because of the peculiarity <tf its position, also aura<·tetl visitors 

fmnt lti lt · r>taffs, wur con•cspnndcuts, nnd 

wave<> of CIC: teams. These teams seemed 

to reg;ard Mons<hau as a hotlontlei'S pit of 

suiH crsion, each refusing to accept the 

judgments of its predecessors a nd usnally 

lorking up some Germans who had previous!)• been screened and <~~sccl . On one 

day, ;r CIC team OUTied ofT as SIISJ')CC'tcd 

prisoners of w;u· six men, induding the 

town's o11ly dcnlist and the nt:lu who operatt·d llw power plant. Coctchcus n:lrievctl 

both the dentist on the rondition that he 

h<' kept locked in the town jail during curfew houn;. ,,. 

In the ~trond week of Drr<'rnhrr, CIC: 

and (; 2. i~l .\nny, performed " fulllit ale ~c urity rheck in i\lomwhau t() ciist owr· and arrest unregistered pcn;ons and 

to discourage would-be spies. Fifty-four 

thrcc-mnn teams descended on the town 

bcforl' dawn on the morning of the 9th. 

\t cvcr·y h ()USC, one member o( a team 

stood guard outside, one gathered all the 

re iden ~ in one room and ch<'rkcd their 

" M•·mo, 0 1'1 G I H2, suh: ~port or Conference 

of JunR61111tliJin~ in Monsch;111, t R Nov 44, V 

CorJlS 205 5.1. 

"' Mc111o, E.CAD C-2 for CO, ECAD, suh: Report of Miss ion Performed 15-21 Nov 1•1, 21 Nov 

H , in SHA El~ C- 5, 17.1 2, Jnckcr 5. 

153 

n:gi~tration, .uttl the· third sc•nrrcd ;til tlw 

kcrs lo lm knl door:- and cll':tW<'t'S .md 

scat'ched the building frnm top to lltl\tOtlt. 

Everybody ciH'Ckrd was round to lw •cg ~­

tere<l. T lw contralmnd picked ll[> 

amounted to .1 few t'arncras ami binoculars, 

some picc:t's of Cct mnn military uniforms, 

and ~Oill C .S. ratiClllS. .:\o l)tlC W:IS 

a rre.<;t cd :'" 

Shells w n ti mtt .. '{l to r a II in ~ lonscl w u, 

more frcquC'rHI)' in the Iau er half of November: twelve on the 20th, nine the next 

day, and nine thl' day after. One round 

hit between the military government ltcadquarlerli and the building next door rausi11 g 

in the formrr a shol't drc·uit in the clcrtt·ical 

wiring and a fire. T he civilian vuluntcer 

fire depa r\mcnt put the fire out. At first 

the casualtic:s were few a nd all civilians, 

who were taken tu 1he hospital in Eupcn 

in .\m1y nmh11lann:s. GoctchetLs thought 

lhc enemy was tr·yi11 g to break the civilians' 

morale b<:r:nrsr the shells came mostly i11 

the earl)' 111orning when the people were 

either on thr wny to or a t lvf<L'SS. On the 

25th, th1·cc hit the Catholic church during 

the service, but uu one was injured. The 

shcllfire kept the detachment busy finding 

lodging for civi lians a nd billets for troops 

d1-ivcn out of d:ltllaged buildings. In the 

early a ftcmoon on the 29th, t hrec ells 

hit one of the hotels causing casualties 

among the troops quartered there, a nd that 

even ing anolhcl' half-dozen shells hlt a 

schoolhouse wounding several soldiers 

seriously.'" 

8(1/llu of the Bulge 

Winte1 came cndy to western Germany 

in 1944. After the heavy snow in the mid-

• H qs, Fir.cl Army, ACofS G-2, Counterintclli· 

gencc Report No. 15, 9 J an 45, in SHAEF G-5, 

17.11, <~ckel '1. 

•• Periodic Rcport5, Vel 14G2, 15- 29 Nov H , 

in V Corps 205 5. I. 
154 THE U.S. \R~IY H\ T HE OC:C.UP.\TIOX OF GER?\L\NY 

die of November, rain alternated with sleet, 

:mow, and <'old. Clouds brllshcd the tops 

of llw evergreen forest ami sent swirl!! of 

mist and ft,g down to the ground l!cucalh. 

'l'lw Eifel, the German cxt,:nsion of the 

. \rdcnncs Forest, could hide an ami)' or 

two o•· three witb all their troops, Hl'tillcry, 

t:1.nk,, Hnd l'>Upplics. Hitlrr knew thk On 

1hc llloruiHg of 16 December, three 

nnnic-,c; h:1lf of the entire German fot'<'CS 

in the wc..;t- allacked along a fifty-mile 

front in tliC Ardennes r.·om ~r u 

south to l':r.htcrnach. They ~ aiming for 

Antwerp LO c:ut off Eisenhower's whole left 

A:mk and, Hitler hoped, fol'<"<' tlw Western 

Allies lo ron1c to terms. The result was tlw 

Bulgr, H ixt y-m iJe-dccp wedge dr·ivcn 

through the ,\rdenne.'> almo.'\t lo tlw Meuse 

Rivc1·. Fi1~1 .\rrny's \'III Corps took the 

WOnlt of the a ttark C':\St of Jln~ O~llC'. \' 

CtH'JI:S was hit bard too hut held on to its 

anrhor nt M onscha u. 

The lmlf uozcu milita ry government detachments deployed in Gc•'nl;Ul)' fJo uth of 

Monsrhau a ll c.c;;capcd. 18(;2, whil'h had 

ht' Cil stationed at WinLcr-scllt•id, fought it · 

way out with the troops of thr 14rh Cnv-

~tl y Group. I4H2 at Bu llin~cn had to 

lt'r\\'C iD> l'quipmcnt hchiud. But Civil 

\(fairs Dctnchmcnl DGG I at C:lcrvaux, 

Lmu·mbourg, was overrun. nnd its eight 

oOiccn; and men were c~tpt ur 11 1\ Ionsr.h:w was in the midst of the two-hour art iII cry ha rragc t haL prec-eded the n !lack on 

thr mcwning of the 16th. I4G2 had permission to lc,\Yc Monschau on the 17th hut 

d,:dtkd lo st:t)' : 

.. . det:1d1mcnt ,,chides and tta.ilcrs wC'l'(: 

brou~ht lO the west side of the Roer River. 

"(I) Jlist Rpt, First Army C ~. I :I I Dt'<' 44, 

i11 SHAET' C- :i, 17.t t, jackt'l I. (2) lllt~. !::<.:AD, 

to SIIAef' (.; 5, Mto; Activities of thr F.C:AD, 

1- :i l Jnu ·15, 1·1 Fch cJS, ln SHA£F G- 5, !7. 12, 

j:1.rkct (), 

All pcrsonnd wt'l'(' instructed to park :tnd 

hold it rcndy out of sight of civilians. The• 

civilian population wns ordered to stay indoors 

in lowl'l' and wc:stcl'rl sides of buildings. C(lnferenec of dclorhnwnt officers resulted in n 

decision to ('V:H'IIi~tc· nnly in the most extreme 

necessity ror th(' foliO\\ ing reasons: ( I ) pl'tS· 

encc in town assists th<' local tactical unit ; 

(2 ) depanurc would be obvious to civi lians 

who h:we nln·nd)• Sl'l"n a g roup and a battalion headquartt'I'S lcn\'c and would have serious effect on momlc po~s ibility resulting in 

a mass <·,·:t(·uatiun that would be diffkult for 

tactical units to control; (3) military govcm- ment would be• handicapped in the future in 

the 1\reis if the unit departed leaving thost• 

who had ('OOp<'rntt:d nl the mercy of the Ocr· matl military.' ~ 

i\•[on!ichnu had nrver been n l'thlline a~

signmcnt, and Coctrhcus was not surprised 

a week l:nc-r \vlwn a civilian hmught hi111 

the following lctt<·r: 

Dear Sir. 

trif'd l o lll! l Gennan troops ncar 

l\[onsclta u. As I could lind there no Cenn:111 

troops, l sur•t•cnder because I am hurt and ill 

a nd :11 Lhc <• nd of my physical forces. 

Please bi• kind enough to send me a doctol' 

and <tn a111bulnncc as I \annot walk. 

I am lying in a hed at M.r. Bouscherr'~ and am <1Wtliting your hdp and orden;. 

Ft•t-illt'rr von dcr H eyd lt> 

Lt. Col. 

Conunandiug German paratroops 

in ~\l()l' l-l\ almedy are:~ . 

14G2 took von clcr Hcydte prisoner and 

cventuall )' 1':1!1 its score of captured German pa ratroopers to twenty-five, most (Jr 

them hrongln ir1 by local ivilians.·~ 

Fot• a month tht: hattie a nd the wintl'l' 

swirled ;u·ound Monschau, Lhe latter at 

times appcal'ing in the detachment rcpw t!< 

as a lmost the woNc : 

40 Period ic Rt•port, Oct IIG2, 17 Dec •H, in 

V Corps 205 5.1. 

n Period ic Rcpi)rl, n et J.IG2, 22 Dec •t•l·, ill 

V Corj>S 205- 5. t. 
W IJcc : Tow11 siH•IlecJ continuously for 

lwt!ntv ·foul' hcJurs. Populaliuu loltl lo stay 

dosr t<' htunes. Capt. Got'l<.:heus made stvernl 

trips to iuvestigutP areas shelled and assist in 

oht;1i11i ~.~ first ~1id by tactical unit and reJltlllal nf injurc·d ci\'ilians. Two civilians 

dead . 

I C) Dec· Population of Monschau remninin!.\ ral111 and cooperative. 

Tlu:re-fourthh of population of 1vfuetzenich 

t'\ ar·ualed themselves on 18 and EJ Dec 

across the Belgian border toward Eupen. 

~v uetzenid1 had been under heavy Hl'tillcr)' 

lire for three days. The people were led by 

lh(• acting nue/ germeiJter and police. 

21 I >ec: Pfc. traveled to Brand to obtain 

~'Uj)plies six days overdue and found Colllpatl )' G lJCaclqum·tNs had moved to Holland. 

C.O., G Company, stated supplies and 1nail 

would bese11122 Dec. 

D<·t:\dnlll'tlt is gratt>f11i Lo V ISU/\L [!)9LII 

l)ivisionJ. ~ otlt~>r lacti< l units rvacunlt!d 

on the Ji:\th nnd 17th and bridges were prepared for rlt" ·H;lition Lhe population became 

apprehen~i,·e. The outward attitude of 

oll"it:ers and men ()f VISUAL was helpful in 

restorine- confiden<'e in U.S. t1·oops being able 

lo d1·knd the town. 

24 Dec : Five hlJndred head cattle a nd 

horses face slat vation because of no fodder. 

Oats has been used for humans. Some has 

heen sent to fry to save the horses which will 

be needed in the spring. Restrictions in travel 

make it in1possible to gel fodder. Tactical 

units say present situation renders any rclaxat ion impossible. 

Capt. Goctcheus asked pet'li11SSIOn for 

people to go 011 t and feed cattle. No passes 

to be issnecl under any circmnstances. 

26 Oer: C.:ol. Gunn, G-5> 1st Anny, and 

Lt. Col. Pharr, G- 5, V Corps .. . went to 

I4G2 and talked to Capt. Goetcheus about 

evaC"uating Monschau, Kaltcrherberg, and 

tvluctzeoirh. At end recommended no evacuation be made. 

29 Dec: Supply or fat for baking bread 

exhausted. German nrtillery shells con tim•c 

to fall. 

30 Dec: Jv(en frou\ the security guard relieved CalLie feed ing situation by hauling 

seve11 loads of hay to Reichenstei11 and 

1vlonschau. 

3 j an: Large nmounts of organizational 

!55 

l'quips11rn t , :unnHtlltttOil• :tnt! jc·t it'nn~ wen· 

ldt bchi11d by units tha t C\aetvted ()n lfi 

De<·. Prt\'<Jtc proper!)', inrlwJinp; ~.o,·es, typewriters. nnd fumitmc \H'l'C taken in liru of 

issue U.S. Oovcrnme1'' pmpe1 ty and c<JuiplllCnt when troops de) ,·Jted. 

8 Jan: 1 feavy snO\\ for past 36 ]u)Ut'S. Civilian trucks that have· bt'ell tii i\•'Jl b) sermity guards lo ba\tl f1>••J for rh ilians cannot 

operate. Request two (·• X G 2 Y:: ton ll'llt:ks. 

T,,·elve-ycar-old girl kilkd by sheiJ. Some 

civilians l.;illcd almost' ,·ery day. 

11 .Jan: Gcr111an Civilian R::ttior~ Report, 

Prriod 70: Daily allowanrcs--normnl not to 

cx('eed J .400 c<.~lories, actual 977 (,:lllories. 

Electric supply cut in hnlf. FlO\'' of Roer 

Rive•· hns decreased so thct•e is nnt enough 

water to turn the gt•nerators fast enough to 

grt necessary voltage. 

I 3 m: Two U.S. 6 X 6's travelled to 

Aarhc.:n a11d Stolberg to get oats and t·ye flour 

for the ~andkrei$. Two head of sla ughtered 

beef lnken to Stolberg jn trade for rye flour. 

19 Jan : Capt. Goetcheus went to Aachen 

to arrange ni1\e tons soap- scabies increasing. 

Alntost a blizzard. Militat·y government 

truck$ could not move. Monschnu shelled. All 

electric service stopped-lack of water.'1

'

1 

The German 1\rdcnnes offensive wns the 

severest lcsl of civil affairs- military government since D-t!ay. The detachments had 

thought they were about a t the stage where 

they could relinquish direct control and 

conrtne f hcmselves to supervision of German agencies. The civilians had seemed 

I'Onvinred th at for them t.hc war w:L<; over, 

and the fear of Nazi reprisals against those 

who colli\borated with the occupation ha d 

abated. The German offensive strur k ~u·d 

at both those imprcssil'ms. T he civilians 

sudden ly realized U1nt far from being out 

of the war, they were back in lhe thick of 

it. Seeing the roads fill ed day ;tnt! nig ht 

with convoys of troops and supplies going 

"(1 ) Periodic Rcpon, Der 14C2, 113 Dec 4A- 20 

Jan 115, in V Corps 205- 5. 1. (2) Periodic Reports, 

91h Division, OMC, to ACofS C-5, First Army, 

;,10 .Jan '1·5, in V Corps 205- 5. I. 
156 THE U.S. ARMY I N THE O CCUPATION OF GERJ\IANY 

CoLLf.CTING RrmsHEETS D u RlNO BATTL £ OF THr: J3 uLCE 

in all directions and not knowing \vhat wao:; 

happening, they were gripped with {car 

that the Nazis might return and take vengeance. on them. Military government detachments, often not much beller informed 

than the rivilians, had to supply courage 

and stamina to thousands of frightened 

people, suppress hysteria where it threatened to break out, control refugees, keep 

the roads open for military traffic, anc.l in 

some places, provide security against German paratroops and partisans. 

As they did at Monschau, the German 

civili tns in the occupied area, while freely 

admitting that they were inwardly terror 

stricken, remained outwardly calm and 

orderly. There were no reports of civilian 

acts against the occupation forces. The 

ma joril)' of defendants in military government courts were charged with minor 

circul ation and curfew violations. Everywhere, including Monschau, bank deposits 

increased:'G The fear did not degenerate 

into panic. The police stayed at their posts, 

including those trained at Vervicrs, some 

of whom had been brought into Aachen 

a week before the attack, where, for secur-

"' Ni1\lh Army, ACoCS G-5, sub: Bi-weekly 

Casurn, 13 J an 45, in SHAEF G- 5, 17.14, Jacket 

2. 
T HE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN, 1944 

ity reasons, they were lodged in the jail. 

The city officials in Aachen, plainly Lhe 

most prominent candidates for reprisals, 

declared their willingness to continue at 

wot·k, even 1 hough they knew they might 

be r·isking their lives. To accept Germans 

as allies would have been awkward, but 

12th t\rmy Group did instruct the detachments confidentially to lake along the Germans who had collaborated with lhc 

occupation if evacuation was necessary.'"1 

MiJitary government learned some lessons Lhat, had they been heeded, could 

have made the whole occupation a less unhappy cl(perience. A detachment in Mcrkstcin ~.m1cred all radio sets turned in [or 

secur·ity reasons. ll gal 400 sets- and a 

Oood of wild fipeculation. In H erzogenrath, 

\vhcn bicydes were C>rdcred turned in, min-

~<~ Monograph, SHAEF C- 5, Hist Sec, sub: Civil 

Affairs, Military Government in a Defensive Opor-

:uion, May 45, in SHAEF G-5, 60, Jacket 3. 

157 

er~; stopped going to work and doctors and 

nUJ'Ses coulu not make their rounds; rumors 

or various sorts of impending requisitions 

spl"'.mg up as the news spread. On the other 

hand, when tamouflage iinowsuits failed to 

arrive for the troops and the tactical units 

senl soldiCJ'S from door to door collecting 

bed sheets, one corps collected 60,000 in 

a few days. The :o>oldiers explained what 

they would be used (or, and most civilians 

co-opera ted without grumbling.H 

The battle of the Bulge put a period lo 

a phase in the occupation. Dreams of an 

early victory evaporated, and the Aachen 

experience of the fall of 1944 slipped out 

of mind. The victory would <"orne, Lc; would 

the occupation, but on harder terms. Hitler 

had bought a four months' lease on life, 

:md the German people would pay. 

'" SHAEF, PsyWnr Oiv, Weekly Intelligence 

Summary, No. l9, 3 Feb 45, in SHAEF, 7.35. 
CHAPTER Xl 

Getting Ready for "The Day" 

ECAD 

Hcndquartcts, ECAD, moved lo Troycs, 

tighty mile;; east of Paris, in Oc tobcr I ~) 44. 

Thcrr, :'\L Camp Tank, in the roncrctc fi nd 

steel llllildings of a former Dain1ler-Bcnz. 

(1\ltomntivc: nssemhly and repair hop , the 

hcadqunrtct"i> had space enough to billet itself c•omfortably- after the winclo,..,s hlown 

out in !mule were reglazed. In the move, 

the unit ~ or ECAD went cparatc way~ 

ncvc:r to he nsscmhlcd together in one plare 

again : llcadquart ers, 2d ECAR, and its 

company lwadquarters disp< ~c<l to vn••ious 

locations in Belgium and northeastern 

l'l'fii)G(: ncn r•cr their dct at hlll ilt ~, most of 

which wt:rc by then with tactical units; :~ d 

ECAR WI'IH to Chartres. The detachments 

of lsL EC.\R were being disbanded nnd 

their pc·t~uunel transferred to the other two 

reginwnts as rapidly as they I'OUid he relcnllc' d from civil affai~ a...;signmcnts in 

l· mnc:r and Belgium.' 

~Ct\D was beginning to show two seriuus flnws in its rota:eplion: its relationship 

with the clct<\c."hments tended lo become incO'crtual after they were a!l.achcd to lactical rommatH.Is; while, on the other lmnd, 

EC !A l)'ro; existence created a hiatus in the 

tactical commands' responsibility for the 

dct::~rhrrtCIIls. When Maj. ihon W. 

Buffington, C- 2, ECAD. und<·rtook an inC~ Wnion of the detachment ~; in November, 

' Hqs, ECAD, to SH AEF G- 5, ,uiJ; A<'tivitie.< 

of the- ECAD 1- 3 t O~t, 17 Nov H, iu SHARF 

0 - 5. 17, 12, Jaekel 5. 

he fit t had lO get lravcl dearanrc from 

12th Army Gmup, wbkh complied uuly 

with the understanding that simila1· dcnranccs would have to be secured (rom cadl 

of the armies and COI'ps. The C- 5's of First 

Army nod V II Cor ~ gra nted the dcarances, after expressi ng unhappincs~ over 

the spirit and ability of the detachment 

officers. G- 5, X fX Corps, flatly denied pcrmi .sion to vi!lit itll dctflrhments io Cc:rmany 

and added a demand for u copy of all c:ommunication!l hctwcttt ECAD and the de· 

Lachmcnt~. At the MASTER ~lilitary 

Government CctllCr in Vervicrsl the scnim• 

detachml'nl ronHTtnnder said he w:1s nndcr 

orders not to comnntniratc outside the <'enter except thrC~u h lo'ir':'L Army 5.~ J\f'. an 

E detachment commander he had expected 

to have scm1c c·ontinuing contact with his 

subordinate teams; he had none. Only a 

week IJcfon:, however, VII Corps G- 5 had 

complained of the ' 'headache'' ca.used h) 

having to supcrvL-;c fourteen detac-hment-; 

in Germ;tt~ y. ~ 

For the detac-hments still under f·:CAD 

control, ciu~t stationed in france was bcc·oming a repeat of Shrivenham and Manchester. D ctach111cnt E I C3, Lt. Col. James 

R. Newman cornmanding, and its lhit•tyonc H and I cktarhmcnts went to Chartn.:." 

' Memo, ECAO G 2 fur CO, ECAD, suu : Rc· port of Mission Pl'rformad 15-21 Nov 44, 21 Nov 

oJ-4, in SHAEF G 5. 17. t2 , J acket 5. 

• Memo, Fir~t Anny, ACofS C-5, for .A,IJ Con· 

cerned, sub: Military Government Conference !l- 1 0 

Nov 44, 16 Nov H, in SH AEF G-5, 17. 11, <~ckot 

:t 
GETTING READY FOR "THE DAY" 

with the 3d EU/\R. El C3 and the. detachments- the milita ry government contingellt !or Wue rltemberg-would have a 

long wa it a head of them. In November 

they were back a t daily lectures a nd language clas.o;es which, as they continued 

through the winter, spawned a CI'UShing 

boredom. Newma n resorted to periodic appeals. Duri11g the Bnlgc he tried self-interest, comparing the comforts of Chartres 

with tl1e hard$hips being endured hy the 

fl'ontline troops. Later, he a ttempted to 

rouse the offi cers by u1·ging tbem to devise 

ways for the enlisted m en to pass Lhe time 

constructive ly. Fina lly, he was redur cd to 

recommending r eading, study of curre nt 

events, and physical fitness for a ll. ' 

Memora bl e evc11ts were rare everywhere 

in EC/\D. Lt. Col. D. 1. Glossi>renner, the 

division's executive offirer. put together <1 

saxophone sexte t which was rema rkable because it proved quite popular and a lso l)ecausc it was the second such ensemble 

C los.<;hrenncr had organized, the other ha ving been formed while he served with the 

42d 1nfantry Division in fra nce in World 

Wa r l. Even more notable was a mission 

perf ormcd l1y the Division Se1·vir:e ComJJa ny in October. I n a COJWO)' of twentyfi ve dump trucks. fifty-eig ht men of the 

Service Company <~ nd H eadqu a rlei'S Company, :Jcl EG/\R, nnder M aj. Arthur M. 

( :ory, nwvcd ~ hi ilion Allied milita ry 

ma rks from London to the va ults of the 

Ba nk of Fran ce in P:1.ris nnd other depositories in Fra nce. The fifty-four taus of 

money, wort h $1 22,352,000, was the m ost 

vn luahk single cargo to pass throug h the 

SH/\EF supply line in t he n un pa ign.r· 

' Dct E l C:J , War Diary, Oct H - Mar 45, i•' 

Q;vtGUS 11 ~-2 3, derinHII :!1 +.8 1. 

• Memo, ECAD C 2, S\lh ! Reporl on Mission 

uf SIIAI!.l' Det. No. fi:l, 2fl Dec •l·t, in SIIAEF 

C- 5, 17. 12, J ackcL6. 

159 

EGAD also received some publicity. For 

six weeks beginning in ea rly Janua ry 1945, 

Congressman Albert Gore of Tennessee 

sc1·ved in cognito as a private with various 

types of military government detachments. 

Later, many newspapers picked up a part 

of his r eport to the Congres.':i tha t described 

some of the men in military government 

as having been tran sfe rred there because 

they were surp]u!; or misfits elsewhere. 

Fewer newspa pers, however, printed the 

complete statement in which Congressma n 

Gore characterized military government 

personnel on the whole as carefully selected, 

competent, and qu li£ed. ~ 

In November, D etac hment A I A I joined 

f.C:AD in Troyes, setting up its headquarters in the city hall of the fnu bmtrg SainL 

Sa vine. !\ 1 A I, the U .S. Berlin detachment 

designa te, ;:~m c on order!; from SHAF.F 

and was .not entirely ha ppy to be in Troyes. 

The de tachment commander, Col. Fra nk 

L. H owley, had wanted to go to tile more 

<:omf orta ble and quieter summer resort of 

Ba rbizon in the forest of ]conta inhlcau 

outside P a t-is. Unde r Howley, who was a n 

advertising executive in civilian life and a 

cavaJry officer until a hack injUI-y sent him 

into the Civil Affa irs Tra ining Program 

( C1\ TP) , A I A 1 had become the premier 

U.S. r ivil a iTa irs detachment a nd had held 

the two most glamorous a11d demanding 

a'SSignmen ts in th e '"ar so far, C:herbourg 

and Pat•is. In Pa ris it had supervised 

twenty-three detachments with 13() offi cers 

and 220 enlisted men. It moved to Troyes 

with 16 offi cers a nd 4·8 enlisted men.' AL 

Troycc;, as the detachment historian Sla ted, 

'·.\I t\ 1 ceased to be a mere detachment 

a ttached to Lhe 1st EC:AR <m.d atta ined 

• Draft EGAD History, Sep ·~5. in USF E'f CAD, 

Hisl Doc fil e. 

' AI.Al , H istory : Paris, iu SHAEF C- 5, 17.23. 

J acket 2. 
160 'll lE U.S. t\R~I\' lN Tl-IE OCC:UP:\TlOl'\ OF GElUU\NY 

111ilitary stat us lL'l f>t:tachmcnt ,\ l t\ I, 

EC:A D.'" The cktar hnl<.:tll ;Liso hcgH11 r·cbuilding lO its utl ri~cd strength for Bcrliu, 77 oflkcn; ~·ncl t50 cnlisrrd mcn.

11 

l lowlry set a. the fu-st training ulljrctivcs 

complete sclf-suiTidt•ncy in operation!', 

dowu t.o cooking and housekeeping, rn d 

,, state of disriplinc superior to any other 

unit in the Army. Dr. W<dter L. Dorn, atlacllc:d as an OSS ( Office of Su·ategit Servin .. -.; ) civilian expert adviser, developed a 

program of instntc·tion on Germany and 

built up a speciali:c<·d library on Berlin 

largely from m11te ri;tls r·crenlly caplun:d in 

C<·r·many. 

Prnclirr nnd Policy 

One of the most uiscon cening t·xpcri-

<:nrcs of the c:~rly occupation was the discoverr that the policies emanating from 

Washington wtJl.lld not only have to be impo,;ccl 0 11 the Gcrmnns but on the nH:rit:ans as well. What seemed to he clcmcttlar)' 

justkr In the \'\'bite House, and hcnt r :1lso 

in the CAD and po.<iSibly even in SIIAE F, 

uid not automatica lly seem so on lhe 

ground in Gc:rmany. Here the Gt rmnn,;, 

alleged rwLion of inncr-s against pcat·c and 

hwn:m decenr,y though they might llr, benunc people who rould be sick, hung-ry, 

and frighten<'d, old :-~nd young, prrtty :tnd 

pitiable, guilt)• nud innocent. Even though 

tlwy might J<'t l'pt the idea of German mllc<'tivc guilt, the 1\nwri<:an soldier!< did 

not feel at l':I:'IC as agcnL~ of rolll•t·tivr 

retribution. 

Nonfratemization, no douht, was the 

poli<·y tlu1.t mel the ral'lir.'\t, strongc.r;t, and 

• AlAI, H istory of AlAI Detachment, Dil! 

Stru/1, First Phnsc, in SHAEF C 5, 17.23, J nckct 

:1. 

' llqs, ECAD, to SIIAEF G- 5, sub: J\('tivitics 

of the ECAD I 'lO Nov 411, in SHAEF G 5, 17. 12, 

J nrkl't 5. 

in the long run most stu•ccssful resistance. 

Il 'vas r'Clicutcu as a physiological frustration and in its prohibit ion of any kind of 

unollidal contact with Germans, including 

l\haking hHrlds and givin~ candy to children, ns an awkward and irksome social 

quarautine. Generals as well as privates 

found it hn•·d to have tn ignore r hildrcn.'" 

Worsc1 in a way, were a ttempts lo defend 

the policy, which either sounded arhitrary 

or ,;cem('d ttl di.<;paragc the . \mcrican intelligence, <Jt both, as in the rollowing effort 

by ECAD : 

Ame•·icnn fOI'ces occupif!d the Rhineland 

after the lust wnr. At first th~ Germans hated 

them, bltl later the allit11dC was more 

friendly, even ~ubse rvient. 

This tilllt' it will be different. Many German towels :1nd cities are in wins already and 

man)' moa•t• '"ill be before the end of the 

lighting. Th(• Nazis plainly m<'<m to hang on 

to the bittc·r violent end, then go underground a nd <.:a use all the t roHble and casu nlLies they can. 

The majorit)' of the Gcrulans support the 

Nazis. Tlt(!Y hold democratic ways in contempt. They will try to make friends with u), 

to try to get favors, to create sympathy for 

the "pool' downtrodden" German people, to 

make us disagrC'e among out·selves, or just to 

get a good chttnce to slip n knife into an 

Allied solcliet·. They will hy to stir up ill-feeling and mis1rust between the flritish and 

Americans nnd between both nnd the Russiam;. They will try to makt• the: occupyin~ 

forces frcl sorry for thentselvcs and under- mine tlwir will to finish the job. OONT Rt:: 

1\ SUCKER FOR GOEBBE'LS' ECHOES! 

It will he• f'Specially difficult for personnel 

of lllilitury government to avoid rriendly relations with Germans. But non fratcrnization is 

the rult'. ll will be strirtly f<>llowed. 11 

•• Mrcnn, Fir • Am1y, ACorS G 5, for All Cou· 

cerncd, ~11b : Militar)· Government C:onfl'rence 9- 10 

Nov 44, 16 Nov 1H, in SHAF.F c: 5, 17.1 I, Jacket 

3. 

"Hq~. 1-:CAD, sub: Conducl o{ Members of 

This Cor.uunnd in Occupil'd Gt·nn:llly, 28 Oct 

H , in SJI AEF C 5, 17.12, ] :\dcl'l S. 
GETTl NG READY FOR ''TJIE DAY" 

After two months of the oc-cupation, lhe 

uonfraternization problem began Lo settle 

down in aL lcasl one respect. The fines for 

viola~ions were becoming standar·clized: 

$10 fo•· ron versing with a German in the 

opcu, $25 for unauthorized presence in a 

( ;crm:m dwelling, and $65 for· cohnhitntion 

with :t German woman. The last fine, a 

month's p:ty for a private, could he higher 

for other ranks, but up to 15 December 

only one such fine had been imposedwhich, pct·haps, reveals much ~bout enforcenlenl of the li cy.•~ 1

o one denied 

that enfot•ccment, particularl y in the matter 

of what was comjng to be called Lhc $65 

que.~tiou, was a problem. A mnjOI' cliiTiculty 

was that fraternization was a punishable 

offcn . .'~C ror American oldiers hut IIOl for 

the Gennnns against whom, the commanders in the field concluded early, cnforcenwnt would probably be easier and more 

effective. SH.\EF found itself having to 

point out t'cpcatedly that nonfrntt·rniza tion 

was meant to reprcc;ent un altitude of 

t\llicd tr·oops toward the G(:t•m:ws, not one 

of the Germans toward the Allies or one 

whic·h in any sense dcpcndru 0 11 the cooperation of the Gem1ans.u 

The nonfraternization policy hnd one 

virtue.:: its meanjng was ckar. The same 

could not be said of most of tht: othet• polit ics omin~ oul of Washington. In the fu-st 

plarc, they came late. The SHAEF and 

12th Army Group interim directives of 

September, wl1ich had not inclutlcd the 

latest policic~, were not replarcd until November." Until then the only fo{Uidanrc the 

11 Ninth Army G- 1, Operational Extract of J ournul, 1- 15 Dec H, in Ninth Army 109 I. 0 OF, first Army, ACofS G- fl, suh : Orders Prohibiting Fratcrnitation with Allied Troops lly Getr- ln!'ln Civilians, Germany, 14 Dec -1 •1, in SHAEF 

G-5, 17.11, j acket 6. 

"SIIAP.F, Office of CofS, to Hq~, AGp~ 2 1, 

I 2, 6) ~~!J : Directive for Mllitary Government 

161 

armies and \C."-'iCr commands had was contained in the fout• points on the flyleaf of 

the handbook. More importanl tbough was 

the apprrhcnsion in SH AEF, aft ct• the 

flyleaf and the directive were out, that the 

spirit of the tww policies was not taking 

hold. The rnilitary government officers 

showed dismlt)'ing persistence in doing a 

gootl job nrrording to the standard~ by 

which they had been trained. 

The fi~t point in the fl yleaf, also included in the SH l\ Ef directive, prohibited 

"steps looking wwarcl economk reh ahilit n~ 

Lion of Germany .. , As a practical matter, 

there w a:> almost nothing miJjtary govern ~ 

ment could h11vc done in the fall of 1941 

even if it had wantecl to, but it had taken 

one smllll step. Ot1 5 October, Detachment 

1402 had rcopt ned the Kreil hank in 

1\[onsc.:hau. In the following weeks other-s 

were opened at Roctgen, Stolberg, .Bucs· 

bach, and Aachen. The purpose, psycho· 

logical r:1t her than economic, was to givr 

the occupntion a n appea rance of permanence and stability. SHAEF had misgivillg~ 

from the beginning, and Colonel Bcmstcin 

went to First Army to talk to Colonel 

Gunn: 

CoL Bernstein : We arc not supposed to meddle tOO IIIIlCh in the financial structure Of 

Germany .... V·lc have no program for 

banks ... . Our job is to observe. Can we 

assume the responsibility of l>O iving Ger- many's problems in a half-baked way? No. All we can do I:; let the Germans do it- ancl 

if anything goes SOI"I')' it is their responsibility. Our job is not to JW<>tect and build up thr 

fioancial structure for the counuy as a whole_ Col. Gunn: 1 do not thil'lk we arc trying to 

do Ulis .... 

Col. Gunn: Js nn orderlr regime of life in 

our rear areas nCC'I'Ssar)' . Just answer thai 

one question. 

oJ Germany Prior lo Dufcat or Surrender, 9 Nov 

44, in AFHQ G- 5, Directives. 
162 Till·. U.S. AR~lY ~ THE OCCUP \TION OF GER~ I \NY 

Col. llrt nstdn: In terms or finance now- if 

they c:111not t•lear tlacit c-hecks through bank:., 

will it hun northing? 

Col. Cunn: I'm l\Ot fl'fcrring to thal. T mean 

lack or riots, l:wk or uecd to hold supplies, 

lack ol nC'cd !or troops to patrol streets- is 

th il> 11<'<"1'5.\:11 )' ~ 

Col. Oct nstcin: I dn not think it i~ nt>cess:tr)' 

to ha' c au orderly regime to the cxtC'nl that 

the (:rrmall' had Olll! h<.'fot'l' tlll' war. , .. 

Col. Guun: I mean the barest clements of 

order. 

Col. Br 1 nslri n: . . . f Ol' Lht moment at 

lcnst, we :u'i' not planning to givt• the Germans the typ • of trc·ntmcnt we i\re givinf.{ 

I t:dy ot· Francr. Wi• Me bound to b<· blrlmcd 

for tlw incvitabl<• /lnnncial chaos in Germany. 

Our rr\ponsibility is to our r.rmirs nnd to our 

peoplt•; .111<1 to rat't)' out tlat• affit·mati\"<' policirs or Ulll Pn.•sidcnt and or fr. Churchill. 

Col. Gunn: Do you think it is necessary to 

ha,·c a a•gimc where it isn't necessary to luwc 

soldic.•r, pol iring cvrt )' block? 

Col. Hcrnstrin · The nn<;wc·r to that is 

obvious ... .1 ~ 

SI IAEF's t'ollr<'rll drc:pt·ncd when milit.lry govcrnnwnt rcpmtcd a tOn.'>idcrahlc 

sue cc--s in its halll.iug opt•rations. Deposits 

eve!") wht•t t" 1 onsbtcntly cxC"crdrd withdrawals- at ;\lon!irltau ('\"Cit during the 

hct·tic d.t)'S of the Bulge. The hank at 

. \:H hrn • ,., c•ivrd G 17 urw accounts and 

deposit · of ovt.:r a milliou Rcirh onm ks in 

the first thrf·r wccks it was open. J 11 Decemher it louncd n hnH million Reit hsmarks 

to the: <'it}' nf Aachen and 50,000 to the 

I i~hopric .

111 

G-5, Fir'Sl \mt)', with salisfartion, look 

the '-liCl e s of the hant...s a:-. t1 gauge of the 

dTc•ctivtiH"-" of the Cl<"ctrpalion. SH,\EF, 

without -;,ni,.f.H·tion, appat cntl) did too. 

•• Note• of Confrr<'ncc in Col. Cunn'' Officr, 

II "10 II · l'1, II N<>v II, in S II AF.F G S, 17.11, 

:~ckct :.J •• Jii\l Rpt, FirM Am•y (; 'i, Ore• H, in SIIA£F 

c 5, 17.11, j.,.·k··t .J 

. \ ctually, hot h scrm to have uvcrloukcd one 

point: the Germans C"ould do .dmost nothin!~ with their money ex('cpt pul it in hanks. 

There wru nothing In hll}' thar " 'ao; nul rationed and very lillie that \\1:11\. 

By December, uuc thing l>CCnted c lt-ar lo 

SHAEF: the r rc cnt drvrlopnwnt:-. in the 

philosophy or the oc:c:upation had not pcnt:-

tmted to militnr y ~cw~·•nulcnt itt the fidd. 

/\s General Mr~lwrry stated, "This j., 

dearly undcna:anclahlc in view or the fact 

that these military govcrnmc:nl oiTiccrs receiivcd th<'ir training- al Sbrivcnhnm and 

elsewhere withnul the lwndil of the most 

recent CC!:> poliry ... .''" 1\ rorr•t•c•tiVC' 

was necd<'d, nnd G-5. SHi\l':F, supplic.:d 

it in the following letter to tlw .trmy groups 

and EC:.\J): 

The esscnre of •. . policy i,; that no rfforl 

\viii be mndc to tchaiJilitate or succor the 

Gc·rman people. Ratlu·t·, tlw sole aim of ntilitrury (!'O\ernmrnt i\ to ruttht>t' ntilitary 

ob jectjves. 

All planninl!, di1 cction, nnd insu·ut tion by 

U.S. l'lemcut~ t·ont•t•rning military g<wern· 

mt!nt should be guidf'd by 1]1is polic)• which 

reflects (i rm U.S. ' it•ws m; k uuwn in tit il> 

headqunrte•"'· Principal points to be <'mphn· 

sized a1·e tht:' following: 

a. German}' "ill not I>E' ''liberated'' but 

or<:upic>d <h a dl'ff·.nrd nation, 

b. The Get naan peoplt• will lw tnadc> to 

realize that all 1wcrssnry <.tcps will be 

takl'n to pn•vt·nt illl)' fut'lht•r :tllt'IIIJ>I 

by tht••n to conquer the world. 

c. No steps will lw taken lonkin~ toward the economir rrh:1 bilitnlion of 

Genll:tlly. 

Reports rrona the firld indirntc that military government deta<'hmcnts and G !i st::.ffs 

of subordinate !orrnations arc inclined to try 

to do too much too tdi cv~ the ptoblt·zn~ or 

the German p('oplc. Tlll'r(' !'<'ems to be n disposition to approach Ill(' 3dll1inistration or 

Gc:rmany with the idea that il is our job to 

'" l.lr, Bri~; Grn Fr.mk MC'Sht•rry 10 Britt ' 1. 

Robuins, 21 Dt'<' II, in II AI~r (; 5, 1\0'1/ 1. j.1cl<ct 

I. 
GETII'\G RE.\DY FOR 1111~ 1),\Y .. 

111akt· C:ermany a "bapp)' land" :tK:Iin. It is 

t·ssenti;ll th;ll all military govcrntnt•nt pcrsnn111'1 IJ,· drsaht~srd of this cont•rpt.l' 

EdifJse Pla11 s 

In tlw o11tline plan is.c;ucd on I 0 Novcmlwr J<J1l, SH \ EF dcsuilwd Ecr ~'"~'· as 

pl.111.; .uul preparation.<> for upcrations in 

J:urupc in thr C\cnt of a Cernt.\11 'uncntkr. Ec:tti'SF succeeded R \"1 10:"1 .md 

'l'\tt:.M \N. Strictly speaking, ~; inn· it inror·poratt•d the work done simc summer, 

Eta.rr•s rt was 1hc same as 'l'ALISJIIAN 

a nd wou ld havr continued to he< ailed suc h 

h.rd Sll!\EF not learned in Or tohc·r· that 

the nrc.uriug of the cocir word " r:\tiSl\1 \N.. w.rs J..nm,·n w tht• cnclll} .

10 But 

~c1 PS~ \\';Lo; actu<tll}' mort· th.ul jul>l a 

sul"titult' fur R..\~K t-: or I' \I ISM \N 

rnr;uHC·d. R A:"'KI" ami 'J'\Irsr.s \N ht~ d as-

:.umcd a formal surrender cit ht•r before 

\II icd tr•oclps had crossrd the German 

ho rckr or hdorc they were dct p illlll Gcr111any. ·:c r.•P ~E defined tlw :-;u!'rendcr in 

1 wu "'·')'": as an instrument formally signed 

hy .r German go,·ernmcnt or tlr~· German 

Higlr Cmnm<tnd, or as a dct i-;ion to he 

t.\l>.t•n hv ~h.cnhowcr \\hen the 111.1jor il)' of 

the (;cr;,.lll forces had capilul.tH•d 111 hccn 

mt'l puwnc:d. B)' in trodurin~ this second 

.tncl .rt tlw time seemingly more liJ..cl) pos.<;ihility, Ec t u•sF., although it pttr'!Hlttl'<l to 

Ill' a n1ilitary operation, hcrnme .tctunll)• 

rnm·c· a dc•-;igna tion of a stale w t'lltHiit ion, 

n.untl y, tlr ~: end of hostilitic''\ nnd thr hcginnin~ or the occupation. 

'l ite UHtline plan spcrif1rd .1 pt im.tr) 

phaw in which the SH.\ EF fun<''• ;rfter 

' I 1r, IIAI F G-5 to CC's, fi and 12 AGp$, 

1urd (:0, ECAD, sub: Policy iu 01·cupird Ccrm.my, 7 Drc 11, in SI-11\ F.F G :i, llrl'l/ 1, j nckN 

I. 

"Sll A gF AC, suh: CodcwurdN, 2R 01'r. H, in 

IIAr r C: 5. tt.5.25A, J acket 2. 

the rulla p,t· 0 1 'urrcnder would run<;ummatc On t{t ww h) a rapid a<h .\Ill c· 

deep into Uc't'llt:tll). The plan also t 'Oll· 

taincd I he hint or ·' rare for Brrlin i hul 

the E c t.IPSB plat1nit1g, as il ((Jtllillm·d 

into the wiutn, m'vcr did ~e t duwu In the 

sta~in g of .m ope rat ion. In late J .1n11at), 

an airlmrnt• str if..t· to "rizc Berlin w;ts Jlolllinally 011 the· ·'~e nd .t fnr Ect.JPSF; hut .11-

th ~h , II< h .1 .. tri~ c wo uld have t.1ken 

week~. t~,,ihl ) II lUll I h'-, to mount, nothing 

had been done 10 prepare it. SH .\EI• obviously expected tc> execute only the SC< ond 

phase: i lie r•outin c ckployment of orce~ 

in 1 he W1'$LCrll mncs. Consequc'tlll y, 

EcLtPS" plannill ~ hrntme almost cxd\1 -

sivclv C'Olll l'r ru•d with five objective.-; <.c·t fot 

the s~t cmd ph.l~l': ( I ) prima ry di annamen t 

and control of the Crnnan force-.; ( 2 ) en~ 

foncmc11 t of the terms of surrender or the 

will of Sli.\J:F in the event there W<l' no 

surrender; p) e'\t,thlishment of law and 

o rde r; ( 4 ) hc innin~ of I he total tli •m rm <~­

ment of (.knn.'n}' i :md (5) redistributio n 

of Allied for<'<'S into their national t.one-;.~·· 

In the s~·cnncl phase, F.c uPSE her a tiH' 

not a n upcraticm hut an administt'aliw 

plan fo r cst.1hli., hin~ the occupation in ( ;t·rman y .. \s smh it h.td rt -.ingular ddidcncy: 

SH . \EF "·'" a c wnllinetl command, ycl r11 1 

ccmhined pnlit) cxi.,ted for the post host iiitie!> period nr "''" likel y• Ill l1e io;..,ucd .• \II 

Ei."cnhown had were the CCS ptT<~t ·­

render inK! ructiurrs. The five objectives for 

the sct'ond ph:t"' W<' l'l' handcrafted ltJ avoid 

any en< m.tdrmt•nt 0 11 the existing pnlic)' 

va< uunl ; tltn·d cue. thr ohjcC"ti\'C" alo;;o praclicalh omitted a mi 'ion for mililar )' ~0\­

crnm.cnt, the: c_,t,thli,hrnent of "hit-h would 

logicall} lw S ll \f.F's primary rune ticm in 

E cLIPSE. I he unl) fc:L<>ihlc remed y '' ·'' 

=• SliAf:F (Il l 'lol, Operalion Ec:t.n•st:, AIJflll'-

ciation attd Oufllllc Plnn, 10 Nov 4•1, iu SIIAEF' 

G- 5, 11 5.25A, J nckl•t 3. 
164 THE U.S. ARl'vfY lN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

to assume an extension of the CCS presurrcnder policy into the postsurrcnde:r period. 

C:onsequcutly, in its Ecr.tPSE planning, 

SHAEF G- 5 took on the following additional objectives frorn the SHAEF presurrender directive of 9 November: care, 

control, and repatriation of displaced persons i apprehension of war crim inaJs i establishment of propet·ty and financial controls; 

elimination of nazism and militarism; and 

preservat ion of a suitable civil admini~tration to accomplish all the objectives.

2 1 

In writing the outline plan, SHAEF predicted that German rcsistan<·e to Ecu PSF. 

would be low. The Germans, the planners 

expected, wouJd know Lhey had been ovetwhelmingly defeated and would be too 

ph)1Sically and spiritually exhausted to continue the stntgglc. Some sabotage might be 

attempted and some of the Nazi leaders 

might attempt a dramatic last stand, perhaps in the Bavarian .\Ips, though it was 

most 1111likel ~ Tnstinrt regarclin g the Germans was better in November 1944 than 

it would be a half year later. (See below, 

p. 255.) 

The Carprl and Static Plans 

Whether· military government went into 

Germany after a surrender, as TAI.IS1-L\N assumed, or, as EcLIPSE suppo!>ccl, 

in the wake of the lnst hallie, its first mi~S

sion would be to seize governmental control 

in all areas m;cupied hy SHAEF forces. In 

tltis respect the planning for military government in Gcnnany had differed from tbe 

plnllltit1g for civil affairs in libel'ated coun-

" SHAE.F G- !i, P.c:J.tPSE Memo No. U, Digest 

of Military Covcrnmclll Con~iderations for Germany, ~ Dec H. in SI-IAEF C- 5, ll5.25A, jacket 

:l. :u Sfli\EF ( •H \ :H. Opcmtion F.<'t.tPSF., Appre· 

cintion a nd Outline Piau, 10 Nov <H, in SHAEF 

G- 5, 115.25A, jackl't 3, 

tries. Under RANKIN the concept of 

pinpointing- the as.<>i&rnment of specific dctctchments to specified localities- had been 

introdnced for Germany. In liberated Lcnitory~ dctachmcms would be assigned where 

l hey were needed; in Gennan y they would 

l>e a:'isigned to ~~.c;sert Allied control. 

R :\ N KIN, however, sa id nothing about 

how detachments would get to lbcir pinpoinl assignmenL'>. The war remedied this 

omission. By the cod of summer 1944, tbe 

armies were either at or approacJJjng the 

German border and would mosl likely 

sweep ro~s Germany in Lhe Llcployment 

they then hnd, whether the Germans surrendered or not. for military government 

the effect would be like unrolling a carpet: 

control would he extended across Germany 

fi'Om the border eastward as the annie.<:. aclvanred, the pinpointed detachments taking 

11p I heir stations as the locations were 

ttncoverc.J. 

The ca rpet made its appeanLnce in the 

J ,J 86 South Plan Amended, which EGAD 

issued on 13 September J 944 and which 

thereafter went by the more convenient 

name Carpet Plan. ~;s Two ECAR's, the 2cl 

and 3d, with 2 1:3 detachments and 1,428 

functional milit ary government omcers 

were to provide tbe. carpet. The nrea to 

he covered, al first the U.S. zone plus the 

Rl1indancl from the zone bounda ry north 

to Duesseldorf was later increased in the 

Ect.IPSF. planning to include the whole 

southem third of the British 7.one. The ca rpet was a thin one. J detachments (four 

officers and six enlisted men ) were assigned 

a reas with population!> up to I 00.000. To 

provide coverage for the nut•l·hwnrd exlen-

, fnm· companie.<; of detachments pinpointt:d for southern and eastern Bavaria 

had to be transferred north and given tem01 ECAD G 3, Organizational Development per 

~ Records lno dnte], USFET CAD 322. 
GETTING RE1\DY FOR "THE DAY" 

porary second as.~ gnments in Westphalia 

and H anover in the British zone . .!!< 

Devised for T ,\l.lSMAN, the Carpet 

Plzm was adapted to EcuPSR and retained during the advance into Germany 

in 1945. somewhat Jess satisfactorily at ea<:h 

suctc:..<;ive stage. The carpel was primarily 

a method of guiekly providing area military 

government, hut after September the movement into Crrmany was anyt h.ing b11t fast. 

Conllcqucntly, lhe armic." found themselves 

having to set up and maintain military govcmmcnl centers for dctarhments they would 

probabl)' not socm he able to deliver and 

could not usc for anything else. [n the fall 

an irksome and seemingly endless roLtnd of 

detachment transfers hegflll as oper·a t ion<l I 

plans ancJ t<i.< tical boundaries changed. Tn 

the drLa1 hmenls ~cparated from their parent organization, ECI\D, and not integrated 

into the :-~nnies moralc :inggcd. 

The least satisfactor y aspect of the Car·-

pet Plan was that it did not re.solve the 

problem of the lr{lnsition from SH/\EF's 

:u1Li-i\MGOT philosophy of military government in the comlmt phase to the regional 

approach projected for the permanent 

O("t'upation. [n a fHst, unopposed sweep like 

the one anLicipated in T J\LISl\t,\N, the 

prc.:blcm muld have hecn expected to re-

<;olvc itself quickly; the cm·pet would be 

laid and regional administration established 

in a matter of weeks at most. Not so under 

the conditions that would prevail. Furthermore, alt hough the Carpet Plan a:;signed 

regional deta(' hlllenls, the SHAF.F directive 

o( 9 No\"(:rnhcr reronfirmed military government as a romnmnd responsibility and 

only projettcd the regional system as the 

ultima te fornt of military government. 

"USFF.T, Gcncr<~l Bonrd, Stta<.ly No. 32, Civil 

tdTnirs ;mel 'vfil it:~ry C:ovcmme111 Organi:r.ation and 

Opcrnta ons, 1 '\ i\tay 16, in Hist Div, H(]s, E1'0, 

97-USF 5 O:l.O, p. 112. 

165 

'"' hilc the carpel was being laid the combat 

commands would direct military government, each within its own tactical houndtrics which would rarcl)' if ever coi ncide 

with rbc German regional boundaries.~.-. 

Since the Carpet Plan was concerned 

with the whole a rea that U.S. fo rces would 

o<:ntpy on the ;tdvanre into Germany, and 

nnl spcl'ifically \vith the U.S. zone, EC!\D 

at the end of October a lso submitted a 

Static })Jan to provjdc for permanent depiO)'I11CJ1l into !'he zone. I n the first stage 

of the Static Pla n the detachments stationed outside the final U.S. zone would be 

\vithdrawn. ln tltc second stage, 25() dclarhmcnts would he deployed in the U.S. 

zone to provide complete <'overage down 

to lhe Ln.ndheisc and Stadlkreise, and the 

permanent occupation wnuld begin. To 

c:nmplclc lhe Stati(· P lan, lhitty-scven new 

detac·hments would be needed thirty-nim~ 

afler Bremen and Dremcrhaven were 

added. ~" 

The rhange (rom the mobile phase of 

the C<trpet Plan to the static phase would 

require a command reorganization. When 

the carpet had been laid and active operations cCi\sed, 1-:Ieatlquarters, 6th i\nny 

Gn":up, which in September 1944 moved 

in o n the right llank of the front nftcr making the drive through southern France, 

would be withdrawn; and 12th Army 

Group wotrld assume command of the enlire U.S. zone. The tenure of 12th Army 

Group was also likely to be short. When 

the combined command w;~s dissolved, the 

U.S. element of SH AEF would l>ccornc the 

" SJJA EF, Office! o( the Co£5, rn Hqs, A Cps 

2 t, 12, ti, S\tb: Direcrivc foa· i\1 ilitary C:ovcmment 

of Cemmny Vrior to Defeat or Surrcnclcr, 9 Nov 

4, in AFHQ C- 5, Direc tives. 

"'' ( I) Hqs, ECAD, to SHARF, sui>: Acrivities 

of the t.::<..:AD I Nov-!lO Nov ~4, I!) Dec H, in 

USFET CAD :1 1•1.7, ECI\D. (2) General Eoard 

Stud)• No. :l2, p. !)7. 
166 THE U.S. AR.i\1\" IN THE OCC:UPXl'JOK OF GERi\IAN\' 

IIendqtlat'lrrs, U.S. Force.<> in tlw f.uropenn 

Tlwater· ( lJSFET) ; Eisenhower as theater 

C'ommandct• and military govel'nor would 

~c thr thc11ter staff in the WJH: nnd the 

U.S. Croup Control Council lO carry out 

his tripartite obligations in erli n. ~' In the 

sltift to thr Static Plan deployment, the 

armies would hcrome miliwry dist1·irt 

IH'aU(jtlill lCI ~. Originally there were to have 

hc<·n (our militaJ)' districL'\, but after I ~th 

\rmy Group pointed out thnt thr whole 

zone was actually only about the sr6C of 

the stale of Mi& .. issippi and that Bava ria 

would hnvc to be arbitrarily split in half 

to provide the fourth distrirt, the rll1Jnl>er 

Wlls l'~'dur.r. d to two. Bavaria would bcromc 

th<' Eastern Military Distric.:t, and the Wcslcm Milit:u·y District (later to b~; reduced 

hy tmnsfer of territory to Frcn<"h control ) 

would inrludc the Lnender Hesse, HcssrNns~nu, Wucntcmherg, and Baden.~~ 

Since the zone ;md milil:H)' disll'ict 

boundaries followed German .tdmini~;t ra

tivc· botmda rics, the transition to the Static 

Plnn wottld make possible the; iustallnLion 

of rt•gionaJ military government detachnwnts. 'l'lw SH AEF prCS\II'I'Cndrr directive 

c·nvisioncd this development ami ;luthorizrd ;1 G 5 tcc.huical C'hannrl uf comm:md 

on m.tltc~ which did not "aiTcct tnctital 

uprratiou!i ur c·oncern the SCC'u1 it)' of :\llicd 

troop~... But military government would 

also remain a command responsihilily of 

tile: milit:~ y districl commanders, who, 

with their corps and divii:ion ro rnm mdcrs, 

"(l ) fvll'mo, SHAEF, CofS, for 6th ACp, 12th 

AC:p, ~uh ~ R<'spon~ihility During l'o$t-SurrNtucr 

Period, II Ort H, in USfF.T SCS 322. (2) 

cmo, I!.TOUSA, Co£5, Cor CC'~. Amty Groups; 

Acting Dcp, US Gp CC; CC, Com Zone, ~uh : 

U.S. Orgnni:r.alion and Planning for OrruJI(IIion 

of C:t·n n:my, 16 Dec 1+, in SHAEF SCS 322.3. 

M~•uo , Hqs, 12th AGp, for SHAEF, ~uh : Terrltorinl Or!(anil'.ation of the U.S. Zone, •1 J<~n 45, 

lu SfiA ~P () 5, 20. 1. 

would I)(' rhargcd with laking clircd action 

if the security of their forces was threatened 

and who were to be informed of all military 

governnw11t ltchnical instrucLions. 'J'hc 

milita ry district romma nder could suspend 

such instroctions "when in his judgment 

condjtions within his district require."20 

The Carpel :.wd Static Plans put gc;An 

in the pcntliar position of cxpe1ienciu~ au 

acute personnel shortage at a time when 

most of the personnel it had were not employed. 1 n Novcmhc1·, ECAD and 12th 

Army Group suhrnillcd separate requests 

to ·washington fnr increased officer and enlisted allotments. The War Department, 

which had :--inre D-day already raised 

ECAD's ~u th i7.ed strcngLh (including 

other tha11 tlctadtmctll pcrsooncJ) to 2, 768 

officers, 120 warrant ufficers, and 5,366 enlisted men, was reluctant to approve an increase when the end of the war might soou 

make thousands of men available in 

Europe."~ 1 n December, McSherry went to 

Washington to p1'omotc a boiled-down I'Cquest for 740 offi ct:rs, 16 warrant offi cers, 

and 1,07 1 enlisted men. When rhc War 

Department told SH Ef that it had no 

unaJ1ocatcd troops from which to make an 

increase, Smith r•cpliccl, ''What the hell am 

1 going to do to mdk this personnel problem ... ?" He asked for at least an allot· 

menl of grades nnd ratings, aying, "fWcl 

wiU secure the hodic.o; over here,'' and implied thal Ill<' "bodic·" would he scnu·cd 

"from th<: hnc-kdoors of o~pital s" if 

necessary. 

In Fcbnutl')', the W<lr Departmcnl npproved a lCtllporary overstrength up to rhc 

number SH.\EF had r•cquestcd, thcrchy 1'C· 

""SHAEF, Ofllc'c of the CofS, to H<ts, AGps 

21, 12, 6, suh: Direc:rivCl for MiJitary Go,·crnment 

of Ccnnany Prior 10 l)l'fcat or Surrender, 9 Nov 

·~ 4, in AFHQ C 5, Oircctiv<-s. 

" Hqs, I•:Ci\D, to SHAEF G-5, sub: Activities 

of lhe ECAn l :l l Dec 11•1, in SHAEF G-5, 17.1 2, 

J acket 6. 
GE'rf!NG RE \ IW FOR ''TilE D,\ Y" 

lievin~ for the momclll unc prc'\.'\ure on 

EC.\J) while int 11 'ifyin~ another." Becau e EC \0 tlid not ha\ r " fixed table 

of organitatiou, promotion" had hccn diffi-

' uh. \flrr t:C \ D ,,l,<l hr< .um: an o\'er-

:-trcn'{l h org.uut.ttion, promo I ions "ere 

doubl) diflu ult 'im • tiH'.Ilcr regulations :til 

IJut prohihitcd promotion-. in ovcrstrcngth 

units., .. 

1'/tc DiJ/Jlflrrt! J>rrWIH Rxrrlltiue 

Dut·ing the t·a l'ly monr hs of OvERLORD, neither tht· clispl acl'd person (DP) 

nor ref ug<'c problems mlttcria'li7.cd to l he 

extent rhat h<rd been ft:arctl. The wcc;tcrn 

£uropcnns, hy Llwn wise in the ways of war, 

for the most pan '-larccl close to their homes. 

The easte111 l·:ni'Opeans cnrountered were 

ne.~r r nil Sm•ict nation.ll" forced into German service after hcing raptured on the 

Eastern Front. Thr qnc'\tion of their status 

was a dclic·atl' one that would not he 

answered until th~· Yalt.1 C:onfercmc, hut 

in the mrt~ntimc tlw (;erm.m uniform g\larantccd them pri,nncr of war treatment. 

SH .\F.F handkd < i' ilia no; under rhe Outline Pl.tn for Ref u~<'C" and Displaced Persons ('I J un<• I C1 II ) , "hirh pl.tt·ed the 

responsi bilit \ on tlw loc·al ~o' crnmcnt~ and 

restricted the militat)' involvcnwnt to relief 

where it w.ts C"~cnt al <1ml tn pl'<'vcntion 

and control of disC:\'>(' that might a lso 

threaten the health of the nlili!aJ'Y forces.'

1

a 

The flood of d isplnccd persons, however, 

w<~s still cxpc< ted wh\'n Ccrma ny collapsed 

"Cahtc, SII Af.f M;~iu (rum McSherry to 

AGWAR for l.lilldrinq, :10 Ore 1\ I; C::tblc, 

ACWAR to Coni %om•, I I J;m 15: l\lcmo, McSlu·rry for Smith, 21\ J.•n ·I 'i; Cnhlc, AGWAR 

to HAF.~', 25 F't·h I 'l, 111 USFF.T SCS ~00.3. 

= Ce11cr.1l Uoard Study No. 12, pp. 100- 102. 

, lJSFF."I, \.runill Oo.1rd, Study No. 'l5, Dis· 

placed P1•r<on•, Rt•fugl·~·s .md Rcco\·c rcd Allied 

l\lihtary Personnrl, 11 \f.ty IIi, iu lli•r o, .. , Hqs, 

ETO, 97 USf 5 o·UI, I'· ll. 

167 

or wben the Ge1 marl'. \Vcal.l'ucd .rnd roultl 

no longer tontml the milli(lfl<: or fortcd 

Ia bore"' withjn tlrc·ir hounci.lfit·'· 'I he OP .. 

were there, and -;omcthin~ \\lluld have to 

he done ahout 1 hrm ... um•~·· m latrr. The 

questions were, ''hat and how mlKh. The 

German haudlmnk and r.lll)' SH \EF 

policy propo~cd to make them ,, rc.spomibilit)' of the Germ.m .wlhfll itii'S whn " 'ould 

care for them in 1 'ntr ~ until tlwir· own governments ;nTangl·cl repatriation. Whether 

the Germans, even 11ndrr· Allied sttpcrvision, could he propel' uardians for 

p•eople thC)' hacl su long oppr'l·s:;cd, hO\v· 

ever, was doubtf11 l; and SIT.\ EF G 5 t·onduded shorlly uftrr D-day thal ~omc kind 

or special DP rram-, wou ld l>c nrt'dccl and 

that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation .\dmini•Mation ( UNRR.\ ) wns 

the o~ r.tl sourrc of .;urh pcr;onncl. sinrc 

to set up military tcanh in EC.\D would 

dissipate milit.tr)' gm crnment ~tH·n~ " 

For H.\EF G ·, in the 'lunmcr or 19+4 

the most ominous .t..,IX'll uf the DP prohlcm 

was, ~Ls always, rlw ui~htmar<' pu....,ihilit~ 

of million.; of people 'trc.u11irll{ nut l)f German). doggin~ ro,ub., ( n·.rtin~ .1n a\'.t-

<~LilC' e of crotwrnic prohlt'nt' for the 

war-weakened lihcra~c·d ro11ntrics, :md 

spreading dise.1~l', t)•phu' in particular, 

ac <Y.~ Europe. l•'utlht•rntorc, 1 he 1 r'itk:tl 

~I age, lhc start or II II' Jl)!l. ~ DP l)l(lVC'IlH'111, 

would most li~cly come al .t highly inopportun e momc111, '"'"'l'l), whrn Gr.t•m:Hl 

m ntrol broke dowu and SJ I.\ E I' forces 

were nol vet on tht• :-;cell<'. If the DPs were: 

to he pers~ acl<·d to stnnd fa'lt, it would have 

w he done in ad\':IIHT by an on.kr or by an 

appeal. General Culliun .rncl the DP 

Branc: h, SHAEF. did ntH bclit·vc <'ithcr 

,. ( I ) SHA EF c: ~. lli•t S1•t, Anal)~i' Shrel 

[no aatrJ, ,uh: (; 'i F.'l OUSA mrnul, b Jnn •11, 

in SHAEF C - 5, h0 I. (l C •t'lll'r.JI lJu;ml Stuoy 

1'\o. 35. p. 12. 
168 THE U.S. ARMY TN THE OCCUPATION OF GER!vlANY 

method had much chance of succeeding 

with people who would experience their 

first ta$tc of freedom in years; but in July 

t·h ey decided to try an appeal through psychological wl'lrfarc channels for what it 

might be worth. l\ standfast order seemed 

to be ruled O\.tt, for the time being anyway, 

si nce SHi\EF's cntlhority to is.sue orders to 

Allied citizens, Sovid nationals i.n particular, was in doubt. Consequently the appeal 

merely inr<Jm1ct.l the DPs that they would 

a·e<·eivc food <.tnd shelter and help in getting 

home nnd conclltded with "Stay Where 

You \r ~r. 

TALISMAN rtnd EcuPSE and the 

possibiliqr of a German collapse in the fall 

of I 94-1 !em urgcnC)' to the DP planning 

even thottgh the DP problem was nonexistent in the early stage of the Rhineland 

campaign. The Germans still had a tight 

hold on the people behind lhei.r front, and 

the movement was eastward rather than 

westward. At the end of January 1945, the 

Aachen DP center housed only twenty-nine 

displaced persons, all of them Poles, and 

intelligen ce reports ( whit h later proved 

correct) indira ted that the Germans were 

moviug the forced laborers out of the 

Rhineland.au Nevertheless, in SHi\EF planning during the snme period, the DPs ndvanrcd to top priority among the concerns 

of the otrnpation, and, nolahly, the emphasis shifted fl'Om control lo welfare. A 

ma~s migr:alion was still to be feared, hut 

henceforth it could, at least, prol>ably be 

confined to the boundaries of Gem1any. 

The prcs urrender directive for military 

govetnmcnl made care, control, and repatriation of Un ited Nation11 DPs the second 

of seven major militnry government ohjcc-

"" SHAE.F C 5, !list S1·e. Analysis Sheet, 2 Aug 

·111, in SI-IA F C- 5, I I I .05. 

"' H!st Rpt, t 2th ACp G-!",, .Jan 45, :H Jan 

•IS, in SHAEP C- 5, 17. 16, Jackc:.t 5. 

lives. 3 ' As such it berame a cornmnnd responsibility, one which SH AEF further defined in n memo, "Displaced Persons and 

Rdugees in Germany,'' issued on I B November. The DPs from liberation to repatriation '"ere to be cared for as a direct 

militar)' concern, and commanders were to 

en1ploy all available resources to this end. 

To the maximum cxtent1 the Ge~man authorities would be required to provide food, 

shelter, medical attention, and wages and, 

in all of these mallers, give the DPs priority 

over the German populati<.m. During the 

opposed advance into Germany, military 

govcmment detachments opcratiJ1g in Lhe 

normal military chain of command would 

be detailed lo work with the DPs. In the 

later stages and in the static phase the Displaced Pe~-su s Executive (DPX) woult.l 

take over. 38 

In rrealing the DPX, SH AEF ro nfe~Tcd 

on displaced persons a distinctive status in 

the occupation and established an administration for them that was separate to some 

extent from both military government and 

the tactical commands. Within SHAEf, 

the DPX hecame the first example of a new 

form of organization that cut across existing organizational as well as national lines 

to co-ordinate work in a specific functional 

a rea. l n the 18 November memorandum 

SHJ\£F rontemplatcd using officers from 

the U.S. and British Control Ccmncit 

groups and the 'Women's Army Corps; and 

on 25 November Eisenhower concluded an 

<~ greemcnl with Governor Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, authorizing 

UNRRA~ reams to he recruited in Belgium, 

Luxembourg, tlte Netherlands, Norway, 

, , SHAEF, Office of the CofS, to Hqs, AGps 

2 1, 121 6, sub: Directive for Military Government 

of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 9 Nov 

+1, in API £Q G-5, Directives. 

.,., General Uoard Study No. 35, pp. I :~- 15. 
GETTING READY FOR "THE DAY" 

and Franc·e to assume ''to the maximum 

extent" the handling of the DPs.a" These 

groups would he associated in the DPX 

with tl1e G- 5 l>rauche.<; in SHAEF aud 

its subordinate staffs, Lhc 111ilitary government DP det:L<:hments, and combat and 

servil·c personnel deta iled to DP work.~ 0 Tn 

the EcLIPSF. planning, SHI\EF lowered 

considerably its estimate of the mnnhcr of 

DPs from the 21 million talked ahout earlier, hut :-;till expected them to number dose 

w 10 miUion in all of Germany and over 

n~ million in the western zones. The work 

of the DPX 'vould he to persuade tbe DPs 

hy every means to stand fast, move them 

into as!\cmhly centers where they could he 

given food, shelter, ::md medical care, ar'ld 

arrange their orderly and early return to 

the com1tries of their origin." 

War Crimes 

The post- Wot'ld War lJ prosccutjon of 

war crimin als had its formal beginnings in 

the Moscow Declarntion of 1 November 

1943 and the United Nations War Crimes 

Commission, whi<.:h began its work in 

London in J a nuary 19H. The M oscow 

Declaration pledged Lhe three mnjor allies, 

speaking in tbe interest of all the United 

1'\ations, to seek ouL Axis war crimina ls aud 

return them for punishment to Lhe countries 

in whic-h the altocities had been committed. 

The dcdnmtion impljed further that major 

war criminals, whose offenses wet·e nol restric ted to a gcogrttphical area, would in 

some manner be punished jointly by rhe 

" SHAEF Admin Memo No. 39, sub: Employment of UNRRA Personnel with Military Forces, 

25 Nov 44, in USFET SCS 3~H. 

•• Ccnr.ral Board Study No. 35, p. 14. 

"SHAEf G-5, Ec t,tPSii: Memo No. 14, Control of DPs, 13 Dec H, in SHAEF C- 5, 115.251\, 

JackeL 3. 

1()9 

Allied govemmenls. ~ The \'\1Rr Crimes 

Commission was charged with gathering 

evidence and compiling lists of Axis war 

criminals. 

War nime.-. had been a lingering concern 

of the anti-Axis nations throughout the 

war, a co11ccrn that iu part reached hack 

to 19 W a nd the Paris Peace Conference 

where provisions for trying accused Germans hnd been written intn the Treaty of 

Versailles but not enforced. Before November 1 !l43, the U.S. President, the llrilish 

Prime tvfi11ister, and rhe governments in 

exile had issued numerous warnings aimed 

pat•tic.ulal'l)' al deterring the Germans from 

executing hostages and from mistreating 

and m urdering J ews. That m any crimes 

against Allied soldiers were also tCJ be expetted could he inferred from Hitler's 

"Commando" order of 1942, which rcful\ed quarter to enemy troops on raids or 

missions behind the Ge1man lines, and 

from the official encouragement, beginning 

in I 943, of civilian attacks on downed U.S. 

and British airmen. The victims of such 

policies, viJ.i ~n and militat·y, could number in the millions and Lhe perpetrators in 

the tens of thousands. 

Tn spite of their seriousness, war crimes 

were for a long while a subject on which 

the U.S. authorities spoke sternly but acted 

with elaborate caution, both for good reasons. As long as hostilities lasted, verbal deterrence-the promise of punishment- was 

for the U .S. govcmment the only feasihle 

approach. The other possibility of actually 

lrying war criminals as they were captured, 

although a more positive deterrent, could 

nlso bring reprisals against U .S. prisoners 

of war iJ1 Gerrna.n hands1 and American 

public opjnion was e.'>pedall y sensitive to 

" Ocpartmcnt of Stale, Forr.ig11 Relntiotts, 1943, 

vol. I, p. 768. 
170 T HE U.S. ,\ IU.l \' I. . T i lE Q(:CU P:\T IOJ"\ OF GERJ\1.'\:'\Y 

the welfare of prisoners of '"" ·. In Noveml>t t' 1. 3, while Ei~c nh owcr was still commanding in the lvt:cditerranean, Serretary 

oJ State Hull TTrged and Eisenhower agreed 

that no puh it y should he given to the 

captu re of war l'rin1inals or to cvidcn<'c !'OIIedcd against them. Hull even advised 

against any artions thal might reveal individuals t(1 he undtl' suspicit)n, and Eisenhower, to ilc on the safe sitle, rorbatle not 

unly trials in the theater but nil publicity 

on the subjc<'l. 1

'

1 l n December, when the 

Soviel Union tried and condemned three 

German soldiers al Kha rkov for gas van 

atroritics. Hull <~nn un rcd that the Unit ed 

l:tt es did not regard "direct handling of 

war rrimin;ds'' <IS fall ing within lhe terms 

of the Mo~cow DcclaratiCln. 11 When the 

GL'rmans threa tened lo tr}' captured Brilisl1 

and American ai1•men ( rcpris:lis againsl 

Soviet prisoners or war being somewhat 

uperlluou~ in ce neit hct• the rman~ nor 

the Soviet Union recognized any rules in 

their w:11' aga inst each tJth cl'). the . tate Department assured the Ocnn s 1 hrough the 

Swiss of !'Ontinuing U .S. strict ohscrvanre 

of the Geneva Convention. "' 

In the plans for O ' 'ERI.ORO, hoth the 

Standard Polity and Procedure nnd CCS 

55 1, the presurrendcr militnry !?;O\'Crnlllent 

directive, m;tde the ;IITCSl of war crimin;1ls 

<t tl olJjcctivc of the occ:upalion. CCS 55 1 

directed ~iscnh wer lo have arrested and 

" held for investigation and subscguent disposition" .\ dol£ Hitler, hi~ chief Nazi assnatc.c;, nud all wnr nimcs suspects, including 

those o11 the War Crim e~' Commis.<>ion 

Dcpa.r1rn~nl of Swte, Foreif!ll Ur/ntilllts, /94 '1, 

vol. I, p. ·127 . 

•• l)rp:II'IIIH'TH llf Sl:tlr, 7'/lt• n rithh Com/11011· 

W/1(1/lh, EriSfB/It E11rope, 'f'he Far 1\nst in "F'orei~n 

Rcl:>tions of tlw United St:Hcs, [043," \'OI. Tl I 

( W nshington, D.C., f1J()3), p. ll·19. 

Dcpr~rtmcnt of Stall·. Ptnrign l?clttlitm.r, 1914, 

vol. I, p. 1126. 

lists.'" Neither clonllll<' nL, howe\'cr, applied 

ou tside til<: Gcrrnan l>or'ders. a nd procedure 

for dealing with wnr n inws tlevclopccl 

slowly. 011 20 .\ugust. 1944-, SH..\EF cst:thlished a tandin~ court of inquii')' in G- 1 

to cnllrrt and pl'(:serve c,·idenrc "onl y in 

cnses involvin,g Allird militarr personnel." 

The court of inquir'y w:ts not moiJile and 

< ou ld only lte<1 r witnesses and rec-eive- evidence brought to it. •; In the first week of 

Scptrmber, j ltSt hdorc the first troops 

< rossed tl1e German border, SH.\EF instructctl the army Kroup commanders to 

take all war criminals into custod y "so far 

as the ex igencies of the situation permit,'' 

hllt the anny ,groups were not given instructions on the invcstigat i\'c procedures fm· a no t her three months. '' 

:\ good part of the reason why lillk hacl 

heen done a t SH.\ Efo' up to !he late stllllmcr '' nd f;LII of I !l4 '1 apart from I he 

l·nncC'rn for rcpri:;a ls which was always prcdl)mimlnL- w:•:-; tiHtl cqunllr little was being clone in Wash ington. In .\ugnsl the 

J oint Chiefs of St<tff were just beginning 

to \vork on a wn1' n imcs directive, J CS 

10 . which at tbat -;tag-c coustjtuted 

main ly a definition of war crimes.· ~ The 

law af; to the nature and punishn1cnt of 

\v · crimes was f;u· from prec ~c. The Re-

-"pcm:;ihilities Commi~ on of lhe Paris 

Peace C:onfcrcnrc in 1919 had listed thirtrLwo ~pec ifi c war crimes. In Hl4·3, the \\'ar 

"CCt\C 69/ 5, D irective for l\IC: in Gc rn• a rty 

P1·ior· to Def!'at ot• Surrende r, 29 t\pr ·l·f, in OPD, 

/\ fl(; 'ln 7, sec. 4- /\. 

" ( I l Rt? t, EUCOM, Dep ] i\ for W:tr Cr·imcs, 

for Pniod Jtut 1·1- Jnl ~1!, 29 J ul ·Ill. (2) USFET. 

Ct·ncrn l Board, Study No. B6, War Crimes and 

Pnn.ishmeut of W<tr Crin1inals, 15 May ·16, iu 

~t Div, Hq~, ETO, 97-USJ7 5- 03.0, p. 7. 

"Cencml Bourd Study No. 86, p. 7. 

"Chief o f Counsel for \>\fa r C rimes, Piunl Re-

/)l>r/ lv the Scrtt•lflr)' uf tltt.< l lflll)' 41! tho i\'uttll· 

bi'T.f! War Crimes Trinl.r U11tler Control Council 

l.nw No. JO ( W:tshingtott D.C., I!H!l}, p. 2. 
GETTJ NG READY FOR "THE DAY" 

Department's Judge Advocate G eneral had 

identified forty-four· crimes.''" JCS 1023 accepted the following as a general definition : 

"The term ·wa r crimes' covers those violations of the laws ami customs of wa r which 

constitute oiTenses against persons or property, committed in connection with milita ry 

oper·ations ur o<.:cupation, which outr::tge 

common justice or involve moral turpitude. "~' Neither the two lists nor the deftniLion ext<:nded the concept of culpahillty llcyond the commjssion of specifically idenLifiahlc acts, and whether such acts could even 

be successfull y tried was doubtful. Although the .Judge Advocate Genera] had 

found no bar to trying war criminals during 

hostilities, the United States was obviously not inclined Lo exercise that prerogaGvc .~ As a further <1bstaclc, FM 27 10, 

Rules of Land W arfMe. appeared to give 

most defendants an easy plea hy providing 

that members of armed forces would not 

be punished for n imes "eommitled under 

orders or sancGou of their government or 

commanders ... ~~ 

Nevertheless, la te summe r 1944 was as 

r ru<'·ia l a period in the U.S. thjnking on 

war nimcs as it was in other ma tlers concerning the ocnrpation. I n the outline of 

his plan for Germany which Morgenthau 

sent to Stimson on 6 September, he included a proposal for de<tling with war 

crimin a ls which specified that a u~t be 

made l1eforehand of the "arclt criminals ... whose obvious guilt is recognized" and that a fter be ing captured a nd 

identified they be cxcctttcd hy firing squads 

"' Department of State, Foreign Relations, / 9-14, 

,-ol. I , p. 1272. 

"Chief Cou11sel for War C rimes, Final R ej1ort, 

1>. 2. 

•= D epnrtlucnt of Stntc, Foreig11 Rt/ntions, 1914, 

vol. I, p. 1269. 

"' Rpt, EUCOM, Dcp JA for War Crimes, for 

Period June '1-i -Jul 4H, 2!1 ~ol 'Ill. 

17 j 

wiLhout tria l. Specific crimes " leading to 

or causing the death or persons" were to 

be tried by military commissions.G' ·M orgenthau had ta lked to Hilldring about the proposal some days earlie r, and Hilldring had 

wondered bow pcoplt.: would get on the Jist, 

<t question Morgcnthau seems never to 

have answered to his own satisfaction. 

Stimson, in his memo to the President on 

9 September, ranked the proposed war 

crimes policy almost equally with the ceonomic p rovisions in his objec tions to the 

M otgenthau Pla n. The accused , he insisted, would have to be charged , hea rd, 

and a llowed to call witnesses in their defense; the punishment would have to be 

accomplished in "a dignifi ed manner consistent with the advance of civilization" fo1' 

the sake of " the greater effect on posterity." 

He proposed thal an international tribunal 

l>e set up t.o u·r the "chief Nazis" and that 

the other war crimina ls be returned to the 

scenes of t heir crimes ;ls the M oscow Declaration required.

55 

Although Stin1son subsequently withdrew fw m the argument on the economic 

future of Gennany, he bcc~tmc more pastcl y involved with the war crimes 

question as time passed, not on!)' continuing to argue for orderly trials but making 

himself a leader in the development of the 

legal philosophy on the whole stthjccl. His 

first reac tion to the M orgenthau proposals 

seems to have been that all charges against 

major r~ s well as lesser crimin als would have 

lo ba'\ed on violaGons of existing laws of 

war. l\lfuch as he abhorred them, he said, 

he did not see how crime!'> committed in 

German y or committed lldorc the war 

began, s uch as the killing of J ews, could 

be considered crimes which the United 

"

1 M orgentlwrt DillY)' (Ge rmany), voL (, p, 5Hl. 

"' ( I ) fbid., pp. 486 and 612. (2) Stimson and 

Bundy, On Actiuc Ser11ice, p. 584-f. 
172 THE. U .S. ARMY IN T ilE O CCUPATION OF CERl\LAl\TV 

Stntes W11ld punish •·any n1ore than Gcrm;my would have a right to intervene in 

our country lO punish people who are 

J1'hin~ the Negroe);:'''" 

.\ftcr the Q uebec Confe•·cnce, when he 

ltcard tlwl the President a mi Prime Minister had leaned towarcl the idea of executions witho11t trials, Stimson a ppoin ted a 

panel of \'\la r Department lawyers lO study 

1 he q uestion!'' Although he remained opposed to maS!i summary e:xecutions, his 

thinki11g on what t·onslituteu punishable 

offcn:-cs dmngcd. From the study, which 

continued to Lhe end of the year under 

Stimson's active leadership, a plan elltergcd 

for a gr;n1d Ct)nspir:l<')' trial not only of individuals hut of organizations <ts well , su<:h 

as Lht: SS and Gestapn. The cha rge would 

l>c conspiracy to domin ate the world " l>y 

means whnlly contJ'a ry lo interna tiona l 

:1w."~~ The law wo11kl be less the rules of 

war than th<> prewar international agreements wh irh bad sought to oullaw war itself, pnrticularly the Kellogg-Briand Pacl. 

Stim~on w as cnco11raged when, after telling 

Roosevelt the story of a conspiracy case he 

lwd tt'icd agai nst the .\meri('an Sugar Refining Company in I 0(), the President 

"gave his very frank approval to my suggestion ... that r.onspit·acy wi th all of the 

arton; broug ht in ft•om the top lo the holtom, or rather with all classes of actors 

brought in . . . would be the e.~ t way to 

try it. . . :·~o 

l n the fa ll, spurred by Secretary Stim-

"' ( I ) Memo for Record, H.I .. S., 9 Scp H, iu 

ASW :no.H. (2 ) .\,lorgenth(l ll Diar)' (Ct!rmany), 

vol. I. p. 612. 

'" im~on aud Ruudy, 0 11 Actit•t Se1'uice , p. 

5H5. See ~o Dcparlmclll of ~;, Caito and 

Tehrt111, in •rforcigu Relations,'' p. 1100. 

,, lvh•mo, Ba·ig Ct!n Adam Richmond for SHAEF 

<J-1, suh: Wa a• Crimes, 23 Dct.: 4+. in SHAEF 

C - 1, 000.5- .!l. 

· SLimson nnd Btmdy, an Actit·o Sen·icc, p. 

586. 

son's inLercst, Lhe War Department begnn 

to :!('quire organizations ror· dealing with 

wa r tritncs. At the e1td of September, ou 

instructions from Stimson, the Judge Ad vocate General e~ l>li r. d a war crimes offi ce 

whi<:h some wee ks later, by agreement with 

the Navy and Stale Departments, became 

tht; Nationa l War Crimes 0ffil'e.

0

" The 

mi~s n of the office was to coJiert evidence 

of "crucl cie.-s, atrorities, :tnd arts or oppression'' against members of th e U.S. Armed 

Forces or other t\mcl'icans and to apprehend, try, and execute sentences on persons 

against whom cases were devclopcd}ll 

Stimson kept the handling of polic;y in his 

owtl offi ce, naming /\ssista nl Secretary of 

War McCloy as his reprcselltative " in all 

ma tters involving war crirnes" and charging G-1 with stafT snpervision of pla ns and 

policies.''" In ovetnber, F~ l 27- 10 was revised to eliminate the plen of superior 

orders.aa 

By year's end some of the new thinki11g 

in W<L'ihington wns IJeginning W rear h 

Europe. The J CS had submitted I 02:1 to 

the Comb ined Chids of StafT in O <:tober 

hut, wheu the scope of the U.S. a pptoacJ1 

expanded shortly thereaft er, did not press 

for its ronYersion in to a combined directive. 

Consequently, Eisenhower, as Supreme 

Comma nder, could onl y continue under 

the limited guidance he had received earlier. The Wa r Depa rtment, however, could 

issue instructions to him independently as 

'" ( I ) Chief Coua lsel for War Crimes, Final Report, fl. 2. (2) Depart ment of Sta te, Foreign Re/(1-

Liou.<, 1944-,vol. l, p. 1392. 

"' Ocpa rllncllf of t~ te, orei.~n Relatiolts, 19'14. 

vol. I, p. 1:192. 

"'Chief Couusel for Wa r rime~, Fir1ttl RejJ orl, 

p. 2n. 

•;a T he elim ination was not comple te, however. 

Paragraph 3·15.1 t>rovicled that acts under orders 

:~.y he t nkcn into co ~idcra ion in dr: tc rmining 

c nlp;ahilit)•, ei!hcr hy way of defense or mitigation 

of punishment.'' 
GETI J'\<.: RI : \D\ lOR ·'f'lll: D.\\ ... 

Ccnllllt.tlldim• (;c•tlC'r.d. I 'I 0 l !'-, \, .tnd em 

~ 1 lkc l'lliiJc·• 1 he ud.~c· \dvoc ate ( ;cnrral 

directed the· 1 llt'all'l jud~c .uh m ;tie ~cncral 

lO -..cr IIJl ,, '' .u 1 111111.."- nllu ,. ,jmilar to the 

CIIH' 11'1 l'lllh ( l(',lll'd ill w ..... hiugton. To 

f.i,c·nhu'' rt, (, I c•,pl.litwcl, ·• :\1 r. !'-,tim-.on 

rc~.11d'o llH' ill\1"-li~.lliOII of \\;lr ( tilllC" ns 

,, ,1111jn 1 t>f lop impmt.llll e .... 1 The theater 

w,u otillll'' lu,uHh "'''In lol'l'hargcd with 

inn·-..tiguting w.1t' 11 inw-; .tllcged against 

.\ntt'l it.lll'- ami, for transmi,,ion w the ·•Ppt·op• ialt· govc·• nmrnts, :tlo;o nimes against 

natiollal-; nf otlwr United N.llions; 111 11 no 

wa r· c 1in !-~ wr•·c· 10 he ll'il-d.''' 

The l'~;~·c holo.~ic :d \\'a• f:tH' J)i,·ision, 

ll.\1 . whic II liked to c.dl it~t'lr 1':-~ \\':u 

but \\1'111 lliOIC «HN'I\ .ttiH·l} and ror renly 

'"' the initial-. .. P\\' (),'' or ig-in.tted as one 

of two m·w ~c·nc·~;tl ,t,dT cfi,·i-..ion,, (.; 5 a11d 

G G. i11 l'dl"'·'" 111-14. In tlw \ptil 111+4 

S H \1.1 tcnt~.tnit.ttion. (; 6 ''a' <tholished 

.md it-. fum tin11' \\('It' di' i<kd hc·twcen two 

o;pcrial ''·'IT dh j..,ion-.. J>ul•lic R<'l •• tiun-. and 

p,yc hologiral \\' .11 f.tu· Brig-. <.:en. Rohcn 

. \. :-.1 c C:hu c, '' ho h.td hc•c·n . , ,,i,tant Chief 

of St.tfT, (; G. dtu in~ ito; hricf exi.,tcrwc and 

lwfc;rc th.11 Ei"t'tdtel\\t'l\ chid of informatioll and tt•nsnt,hip in tlw ~lctlitcrrancan , 

IH•c.tnw thc· di~t'I'IOI of 1'\\'D. ,\ -; -;uch he 

was •h-'~'~<'cl not c•ntirrly happily with 

follt' dt•p~tlic·s, t';t< h of wltolll rt·p•·escn tcd 

a powerful U.S. or British civilian agcnry, 

nlullcl~, thr Ollirl' of War l ufunn:1liun and 

OITirc of Stratt'l(ic St'l'\'h e:- t ll.S.) and the 

Political lntdligt•nn• Department and i\[inistry or lllfOIIllation ( 13titi ... h) . The u.s. 

•• ~lt·mo. llril( r,, . ., i\tl.lln Roo luuouul for SHi\F.f 

C- 1, '"" W.1r Cnoul''· '1'1 llc•1 II, iu SHi\Ef 

C: I, 0110 ·, .II 

I 1r. \\'.11 l>o•tH, ,\( '• In ('(;, £TOUS1\, ~uh: 

E•t<~hli•h•t~t•nt c•r WJr ( 'rime• Onicc,, 25 Dec H. 

in Sll.\l r G I, 000. '> .7. 

173 

nperatin~ p<'t,OIIIll'l h.HI hcc·n "rlrc tt•d on 

the hao;i_.., u( :un:u.l~t· l..ncl\\ lc•d~.t<' ,tnd or rupational hac ~l:lllllllll ·II HI '' t'l c· lllll'\th l.,'~·•duatc' of the p,, c hnln~ic.d \\ .11 f.uc St hool 

at Camp Rite· hit\ \1.11 ) l.ltltl. 

l'~ychologi1 al '' .u f.uc <1111 in~ Ovt·ltt ORU 

had 1" o broad p111 J>f''l'': tu 1111dcrminc l he 

rnem~ -..oldict \ "ill to li~ht .lite' In iuflucnrc 1 ivilian opinion in "'"Y' ll'rful lCI 

SH .\ EF. Tlw fir-.t ohjrc ti\1•, whirh often 

had to l>e· allunecl ICI tlw inunc:diatc· 1 omhat 

l>i:l!aticm. was t.klcgatcd to the :uttl\' group<; 

by PW D . The ~cco d CJhjc·c t iw, ovc•r "hirh 

PWD rcta inc·d dircn control, took !'{'V ral 

forms: propaganda to r.·iencll)' proplr~ !oilill 

unclrr Gct·nutn ocntpation, o;o-rnllcd C'Onsolidatioll prnpagand.t in lil,c·ratt·d t ountric-<. and pWJM~:lltd.t to tlH· Ct•rnl.ltt 

people. Thi.; lao,l fo11ll wa' going to ma~c 

P\\.D an impo1t.11ll .tgt'IH \ in tlw m c ttpation bee <IU"C ~~ J \l-.1 pl.111nin~ .1"-'ltmcc.l 

from the hq~inning though it j, nut 1 teat 

wh\' that the mi,,iclll l<l nmtlun ptnpaganda to th<' Ct'tllt.llh dut ing till' \\;11 n.ttu-

;~ll~ al-.o ctnlll.u cd tunltol rJf inlntm.ltitlll 

in Gcmlan~ undn IIIC' m t up.•tion.''' I iiitar~ ~II\ t'lllll\Cilt, I h.lf~t d \\ ith l',lTIIIill!!, 

all lllhn :ISfl('l h or ClC I IIJ>ol\iOII puJic \, Wa;, 

thcreh~ C'-< lutkd !rom lltt• ptup.tg.ttHia 

llllJo-"iiOII, • \ o; :t 11.."-llfl. mifilill) ~ll\'Crtli11C: Ilt 

tended :dwa~~ to loo~ 011 tlw uc c 11pation 

as primarily an c·x<·r1 i.;e in .~o, ct nmcntal 

administration, whik PWD and i1 s ~~c e~-<· 

~ rrgnrdcd it as an OJll'l':tthm oil lhC' Ccrman mi ntl. Doth wnt• n il id :q>pm:tr'l 11'"-, 

but 11nclou lllc'dly tllt'Y W<H ild lln\'t' l>cl'n 

more cfTccti\'c <'nuthiul'd ratlwr than mmpetine; with carh other. 

Public informatiou pol it)' dt•\ doped 

~ ( I I SIIAf:r', rwn, Au AttOIIIII or ~~~ Opl'r:l· 

tion in th<· \\'r,ccru F urc•pl•au < ·""1'·"11"• 11111 I 'i 

Scp ~'i. in 0~1Gl S .!I:! 2 :, (21 O~ GUS, lCD, 

His1ory, 8 ~LI)' 15 Ill J uu 1 .. , 111 0!\IGt'S 

2-12 I '5, pp I '1, 
171 'I'll E U.S. ;\lUI\' I:\ 11·ili OCC:UP.\TIOI'\ 01' GER!\1.\i\;Y 

skM1)1• It tlid nol fig ure in thl' tnilitat')' govemnwlll plnns, and PW 0 was engro:o;scd 

throughout 19++ with its opcmtiona l 

cs pon ibiliLie . CCS 55 1, while selling freedom of sp eech anti press as essential, <Httborizecl only a negative program of <·ensorship 

tnd rontrol in the in Lcrest of military security und to pn:vcnt i'\;,tzi propaganda . J C:S 

I 067 ordered the German information scl'-

vi('CS, inc.;lutling moving pirtures, to shut 

duwn completely, prc'lumably pending an 

ov<·rh<utl ltnd suhsequcnL estab lishment of 

free speech and pres~. Bul the order said 

nothing abou t It ow 1 hese freedoms would 

he aC('omplishcd, <~ntl lt was not a combined directive. 

1\s the armies drove into Germatt)' in the 

fall of 1944, PVVD's chief roncern was with 

the Germans on Lhe other side of the front, 

to sell them unconditional stll't'endcr i( possible and, in a ny (':ls~, to c·ondition them 

for tht' militnry government to carne. Restrictions imposed from 'Vashington reduced appeal-; for l>oth purposes to a 

pot•trayal of military governmem as !'Item 

and all-powerful but just- a combination 

thai m;Hic ruwond itional surrender ahout as 

attracti,·e as j udgmen t Day. 

The lack of some1hing to say hera111e 

painfully evident after PWD acquired a 

first-dass vehicle fnr reaching the Germans, 

the !50-kilowatt R;tdio Luxembourg rr<wsmitlcr, nne of the most powerful in Europe. 

The Gennnns demolished the main control 

room in Luxemhomg Cit y on I s,:plemhet 

while U.S. tnl<Jps wcrr still sixt)' miles 

awa}' : hut at the tt'ansmiUer outside the 

cit y a civilian tednli cian, who knew where 

sp;rre lubes had llecn hidden away, convinced the German r hief engineer that 

smashing the t ubc;s in 1 he transmitter would 

do ;1 permanent cncHtgh job. On the 1Oth, 

the 5 th .\rmorcd Divi:-.ion raptured the 

transmitter. Four tla)'S later the spare tubes 

were recovered, and on the ~d Radio Luxcmhomg welll hack on the air."~ Gelling 

~ wo nalional and several civilian agcncic-; 

and military staffs to agree on wltnl to 

brcadcasl was a great dea l more diffir ult, 

ns was <1 lso the attempt to explain a poli<'y 

to the Gcl'mans that wns not clenr to 

SH:\EF itself. :Vter two months, one o( 

1v Clure'~ British depu ties thnughr thing:<; 

were almost hope less cnongh to wnrrant 

gi,"ing up and rever~ing lo ''purely tactical 

leaflet and radio work.'"1

lf 

:\her military government moved into 

the .\nchen area, PWD's mission with regard to the Germans took on a new and 

unforeseen a.o;pect. No need Lo con trol or 

sa niLizc the prcs.r.; existed IJecatt!ie there wa.s 

no prc'is; tt nd without electric power tmwlt 

of the lime, the Gctma ns muld not listen 

to their radios. The implications for the 

f11ture were clear: occupied Germany w:\s 

ttot going to be a hotbed of resurgent Nazi 

p ropag;rnda; it wa.,<; going to he nn information dese rt. Experience soon showed Lh::tl 

the one <:ould be w; potcntiall>' dangerous 

as the ot ht r. If the occupation had no 

voice, tltc j..>eople wcmld live on rumors. 

The pre~s urcs of Lhe time were too great 

for them to cxi:<>l in an inform:11ion Yl\Cilum. 

In November, PWD bcgnn publishing 

n weekly paper, Die Neue Zeitwr.g (The 

New NewsjJlljJer), at its hcadCjWH'Lcrs in 

Lnxeml>ourg. The press run of 23,000 

copies was enough to !>Upply ahoul one 

ropy for every five persons in tlte occupied 

area. PWD appa rent!)' proposed to relieve 

the information drougl1l and simultaneously give l'he Germans their first lesson 

in dcmocratit· journalism, hence the tide 

•• SHAEF, PWD, An Account nf Its Operation 

in the Wc rn Europcar\ C<~mp<ti n, !H4 l5, Scp 

·f!i, iu O~ GUS, 2'12 215. 

., Memo, Mr Crossman ror Ccu tvl cCJure, I 0 

lkc 1-~, ir1 SHAEF, PWD OH.I. 
GE'I ll~G RE \UY l·OR "Tilt: DAY .. 

and the pic lllll''\, '" ·'1>~ •. uttl rc .. tme articles 

in the rirl't i~\u<'. IJif' .\ rur Zt'ilung would 

ltiC\'C its d,lY hut not for .dmost a }ear. The 

-.ccond i~u~ 1·amc out in .tu,tcre fornMl as 

Die .\lillrilun[!r" ( ( unwwniwtimn . 

SII.\Cf h,td (h,-cLm:d it \\oultl nm let iL-. 

rco;outlC. llc 11'-<'d w pruvid(• .tll)thing for 

the German~ other thau onic i.tl military 

govcrnrncnt 'onlnHtHit alin ~."u 

In J alllt.ll)', SllAEI puhlir information 

poli<:}' fM the on upalimt lwgan to take 

form. \I : llUclcd ilitnr)' Government 

Law No. 19 1 to the prol'h11Halic111 and orcJina nc;cs whic lc lllilit:tt'Y gov<·t·nnH'nl posLed 

in ever}' oc·cttpicd <'Oillncunil)'· The law 

ordered a shutdown or nil media of public 

cxpres.'>ion: pr<"''-"• r.tttio, mavin~ pirturc.o;, 

1 healer, nnd lllll'> i< .tl pe t rllnnnnrrs. Tclc,·ision nnd o;;ouncl 1 r< md in g.,, ovcrloo~cd at 

fir;l, were l.tler .tddcd tu tiel' li;;t. The Germn.n-; woulcl h.wr tu get nlon~ on Radio 

Luxcmhouag, Die Millriltm ~. and the socalled .II ill rif1111 t:,1hlnrttn ( information 

... hcch) th.tt Sl [. \ EF .lllthorizcd the army 

group:; to puhli-.h ·'' tWNird. \II three 

would c.IIT) unl) oflid.tl .tnnounccmcntc; 

and 'illlllll1MiL~ uf inttt 1\ational news. Gcurral ~It C:hur o,aicl, '' It i' P\\'0 policy no/ 

to t•ntcrtain the Gcrna.ms.''rn To avoid 

m,cking tl u· \ c m)' .1 JWI mancm press service 

for Gctm.tny and, rnnlt ary to some opinion in P\\'1), n11l)' irtl'idc·nt:tll)• to begin the 

clcnHH'I'Ht ic l't'<Jl'it·n lation or I he (; ermnn inronnalion di t~ PWn wtndd , \Vhcn conditions pc•·mittcd, li n· ~c cn rcfull}' <~e ec ed 

individ ual GcntHtn<; o1 s puhlishcn;. Neither 

rorpot'alious nm• as'>ocintions would l•c 

litcno;cd bcttuh<' thty wl:rt diffintll to call 

"' I Itt<. 12th AC.p C': 5, 1\C!oCS C': 5, P11hlic Rl'lation~. 'lllo Dr..rc R••tunt 011 C':rn11:1n L:~nguage 

Anm· SJtoii'OOrt•tl Nl''"JI•II>c~"<, J un 15, in SIIAEF 

C 5, 17 lit, J:~t l~t•t I I. 

' ll.uCIId J llun' 11,, f'rc'l' Rroril'ntation, vol. 

I, 11 2ll, in lieu Di\', FUCO~I. US. ~lilit:1ry 

(,oH•rumf'nt ,., c;c-rou:ln), C:~lll fill' R 1 I DE. 

17!l 

to accounl. J-:, rnw.lll'r (i('aman' would 

opcn1tc the ncw,p.tpct .mel other tllC(Ii.t 

and be cnnttollnl thiClll~h the liu·m.in~ 

power.:' 

..J Plarc fnr tlu Ccmlrol Cmwnl Crnup 

The U. . Group C:u1111 ol ( :oulll'il wa.' 

guided b) tlucc -.mu«..,: tht• E \ C: ".\ grecment on Control ~lac hinr•' in C:t•t tn0'\11) ,'' 

JCS 1067, <md SII.\EI·. Under the 1-:.\ C 

agreement, the U.S. Croup Comrol Council was actually lhc nudcus or wh:cl was 

to he rnllccl the Control St.ciT, sitwc the 

Conlrol Council wo11ld consist of the lhrt·c 

commanders in <hid a nd lhc Co-ordinating Committee of thl'ir dr pntir .. , who hatl 

not )'Cl heeu a~p(li 1trcl. In Nm•t cllllcr, the 

cn·oup rcor~ani:r.cd into twrlvc divio;ions 

~rc Yidcd for ill t IH' E \C .tgn•t•nH'IIt: militar~ : nav;~l; aic; traii"J"Hl; politit.ll; ceo11om it· ; linatut•; ttp.tr<~ticlll ' ddl\ctic", .tnd 

restitution; inlet nal afl.til" .tm' 1 ommunication-;; le~al ; pri-;onl'J" of wac .wd dio;-

plac cd p<"r;on'; :uld lll.lllflOWCI .': Tu I !:•"-<' 

di,·i.o;iuns were added an intdligflll <' o,ctl it111 

in the hC'adquatl<'c" ,, •• rr. :1 puhlit rcl.ttion-; 

c;cn·icc, and :en infm mat ion c·ontrol sc·r\'ic c, 

the Iauer two tu he ltt'<Hkd h) Brig. Cen. 

frank .\ . ,\ lkn, SII.\EF'o; public rdt~tiono; 

chid, and G(·ncral ~1.-Citu c wlr<·n 1hry had 

finiJ:hed their duties with Sl r \I ~ F. The 

majcrily of the diYisions, ill r;ttl, lt<1d lt111· 

poraq• o r acting clircrtcws, prnclin~ civilia n 

appointments in some ca~('o; nnd rclcnsr of 

c.., ce~ from SH J\EJo' in other!;. Tire projected nurlcus group o;trrngt h was 1,200 

offirers; the nc·tual st•·cngl h in Nnvc'mhc1 

was 175 ollin·•-:; :11td l.'l 'i\'iliano;. '·' 

·•o:-o.ICUS, lCD, ll iuory, R :\l ny 15 'lO Jnn 

46, in O.MCUS 2 12 115, PIJ· 2 I. 

::Senate Commillrc on Forci~n l~l'l 01tiun,, DoCII· 

mn~ts 011 Cnmnll)·, lfN4 /?'i9, H ?\by ~9. (l 

7. 

- O~ICUS, lCD, lli•tM>'• II ~l:cy I~ :10 Jun 

IIi, in 0:\ICUS 212 1/5, pp 'I II 
176 T ilE l•.5 . . \ JU lY 1:\ TT IE 0( CUP.\1'10'\ OF GI·:IUl \::'\Y 

JC:S ll)h7, as the U,:-,, Croup Control 

Conndl's l3ihlc, wa~ a lormidahlc lc:-,t in 

c·xcg<:sis. On the other hand. the grottp w;lS 

under ordct'- to tll;tkc its plans in ;u·c·ordancc with E.\ C t'Cconm1CJ1datiom• lo the 

three gm·ct•nmcnts, nnJ in th(' absrnt'f' of 

these lo IJe guided hy U.S. views pe nding 

before the commis:sion; hut the E.\ C had 

not made any rcconm1em.la lions to the governments beyond the sut·rcndcr inslrumC'nt 

a nd th o~e on the zones and control machinery. T he War Department regarded 

JCS 1067 as a U.S. view to i>c put before 

the E.\ C, but it was being revisctl in Washington and had not yet been !iuhmilted .• \1-

ready. however, the origiua l JCS 1067 

seemed ro conflict with the agreement on 

control mac hinery itt one inslanl'e. The 

agreement required the twelve divisions or 

the Control Stall, as one of lheir r hief functi . "w control Lhc corresponding Germa n i\Jinistry or Central Institution''; and 

Strang, Winant, and Gousev had assumed 

in their report that there would be ut the 

outset som e sort of Germa n central administt'<t tion throug h which the Control Staff 

would operate." JCS 1067 reCJuired the 

int111edia te disn1issal of all m embers of the 

N:tzi pa r't)' and a ll "ardent snpporters." It 

was difficult to conceive how anyone working in a German mini. try could fa il ln qualify as at lcasl a.n a rdent suppon cr.•r. 

Tlte agreement on eontTol machinery 

had given the Control Council a role in 

the postwar administration of Germany, 

hut pending the surrender and actual 

establishment or tripartite w ntrol, definition of lhe role was left to SH AEf, whidt 

was where the War Department wanted 

it to be. Defining a mis.'lion for the Control 

;, Dcpartm!'nl of State, Foreign R e/{1/ious, 1.944, 

,·ol. I, p. •l05. 

'" OMGUS, lCD, History, 1\ May 45-:50 J un 

46, in OMGUS 2+2- 1/5 . p. 17. 

Cound I ~rouP" 1":1 i~cd scn·ral prohl(•ms. 

T he C:ot ltl'ol Ctn ttwil would i>C' ,l tr ipt~rtitl' 

lmc.ly, hctwc.: .tn) pl.mniug sho11ld lwvc l>cf'n 

on a tripartite basis frnn1 the sta rt. T he 

Russians had sa id the) were selecting their 

personnel anti would senti them to London ; 

they had thereaft er su idec.l in to silence.'" 

The U.S. a nd British g roups were in London hut not m -ordin ating their work C..'>-

rcpt thro ugh SH .\EF, which could hold 

a tight rein on the Americans but not on 

the British. \'\'hat the Control Cnunl'il 

groups hac.l to plan for was ~o in questkm. 

That SH .\EF wotlld he dis.'iolvcd soon after 

the s\lrrcndcr hnd !Jerome ac-cepted 1 hinking-. H ow ever, SH. \ EF would he responsil>lc for inaugurating the occupation, which 

SH, \EF interpreted to include " rcsponsiIJility for control of the German forces, 

militar)' goycrnmen l, a nd di:-;handment a nd 

di~armam nt in its widest :sr ~e :· Furtltermorc, SH.\ F.F had instruc ted the a rmy 

groups tu make no agrcement1> on policy 

with the Control Cuuncil grou p!i without 

it ~ ('OIH'Ltrren ce and to holt! no meetings 

with them without SI-L\E.F representati ves 

prc~enl. ;-; Exa<'tl y wh at the Control Council groups \vould plan for th e period aftCJ· 

S H.\ EF was dl-,soh·ed wns also in doubt. 

Jn the fit t week of DccernlJcr, in a staff 

memora ndum which superseded the socn lled Treaty of Portsmouth a ncl became 

known :.s Lhe Treaty of Vcro;nillcl\, SH.\ Ef 

sel some doubts to rest, at least Lo its own 

. atisfartion. During the prcsurrencler period, the Control Council groups would he 

~c tr lh e British under their own government, the Amcri n1ns under Eisenhower 

''' Dcp;u·tmcnt or State, Foreign R elatious, 191/4, 

vol. r, p. 9. 

"Ltr, SHA.EF, AG, to C:G's, AGps, s11 b: Relationship between Army ro ~ a nd Control Commission (Co.unc.il), l j Nov + 1, io OPD :~3 6 (sec. 

I I 1 ) ( C:~scs 5 1- ) . 
GE'J"IT\G RL \DY FOR "'L'IJTo: 1> \Y'' 

as ( :omm:tiiCling C:cnca·al, ETOUS.\ htal 

tlacy \''llldd work "'in < loscst liHison with 

c;~ da ollH'r'' to <l"-'\lii'C tlaal Lla cir plans autl 

!:;H .\EF's were in .t rccm nt. Until the 

Jvc mw nls dr<'idecl to disband SH.\ EF, 

il would lu.: rcsp<msihle fo1· the <l<'cupation 

in Germany and wou ld execute poliric::< 

tr·ansmittcd 10 it !hro11 gh the Co111l>i11cd 

C:hids of Sta lL Thr Control Co111wil 

g roups Wt>tdd advise t)n l'<>ntrol mar hincry 

:tnd on "measllres !o br takt•n lo implrmenl 

cstahlishec.l policies.'' • \n)' of their personnel 

in Germany during the SH!\EF period 

would be uuder Sl lAEF n>mmand/' 

L:ucr, :-51-I.\EF <Liso gave Lhc U.~. Group 

Control Council two planning missions: to 

pla n [or Lbc conlml of the German ministries a nd central ngenrics and to plan for 

the U.S. participation in the Control Counril and its subordinate bodies. Plans for the 

U.S. zone, however, w<·rc to he worked out 

in the U.S. clement of G -5, SH.'\£1·'.;'' 

The over-all bleakness <>f the immediate 

fut.urc of the Con trol Count·il groups was 

''Staff M emo No. 1:10, SHAF.F, AF, sub : Re lationship Be tween SJ IAEF ;md the U.S. r.nd Dt•itish 

Elements of the Control Commission/ Cou ncil for 

Ccm1any, 5 Uec H, in OPD :l:H) (sec. Il l) (Cases 

5 1- ). 

:u ( 1) Hqs, US Cp CC, Planning Directive No, 

:H, 10 Dec +1, in OMGUS 12- 1/ 5, v60- I 1/ I. 

(2) 1.tr, Wickc rshnm to Smith, I J nn •15, nnd 

l.lr, Wicker.sham to Hilldring. 12 J an •15. in 

Sllo'\EF SGS ll H·.I. 

177 

t•tlin·rd :-oalH' \1 lt.al IJ\ l'l.tn Co1 DC:l 1'. 

In late Scptrll)hrr, SH.\EF had rather 

,·ague I) :tgt·ecd tt) let a snw II minil\tcrial 

olllro l team enter Berlin aft er the city wns 

orcupiccl lo dn some preliminary cconna~<;

sancc for the Control Coun('il.'" Later in 

the fall , wlwn it still seemed that the British 

and .\mcri('ans would cnler Berli n first, the 

idea was expanded and given the: rode 

nanH' Goi.DG\JP. Untler GoLDCPJ', Lhc 

U.S. and British Control Counril groups 

would furnish ofli cc rs and enlisted men Lo 

f<nTn an .\Jvnnt'cd i\lini~tcrinl Con trol 

Gro11p. Linder SI-I.\EF's command, the 

.\c.lvanccd ~Iinistcri l Con trol Gro1ap 

would suppl)' a mobile control party for 

each of l he Gennan ministric.s and ccnlr<tl 

age11 ries. The control parties would be 

ready to move in :'lncl ta ke charge of German mini:>lcria l pcrso11ncl and rerords as 

soon a~ 1hcy were \JnCovcred, presumably 

in Berlin hm anywhere in German y in case 

the e;ovcrnmenl cli!ipersed.' ' By the time the 

contrul parties were organized in January 

I ~145, wllcn or whether they would cntt:r 

Berlin ha d ilcconw doubt[ ul. 

· SH A EF G- 5, Opns/ Fwd/ 803, sub: Agreemcl11s Reached on Milit:-~ry Co,·crnment of Berlin, 

21\ Scp ·1+, iu SH AEF C - 5> :-1 1. ' ' ( I ) Hqs, US G p C:C, Planning Dirc·c ti vc No. 

29, ~uh: :\tl\'anccd Ministerial Control Group, 12 

Dr:c H , in USFET SGS, ~Il l. (2} Hi~t Rpt, US 

Cp CC.:, 1-:11 Dec H, in SHAF..F G 1, 17.05. 
CHAPTER XIT 

The Rhineland Campaign, 1945 

The /lard Wit~ln 

On l\l•w Year's D:t) 1945, eight Grrman 

dh i'itllh nll~u. ked south out of the aar attl'mpting to trnp Eisenhower's thinn~·cl-out 

fl.ml.. in :\l!>ac·e. In the :\rcknnco;, the Battle 

of thl' Bulge was at its height. During the 

next few days the flghtin[.{ '" 'Oimd lhstogne 

was ns hitler as any since D-day. On the 

othcr hand, as for getting to his strategic 

nbjc<tivt', \ntwcrp, or anywhere ncar it. 

llitlcr no longer had a ch,tnl·c. IIi" r hief 

of the . \rm> General taO, Grneraluher.;t 

J feint Guderian, had tOld him as mm·h 

oil C:lu i'>tOla.'\ and had also told him that 

the Rtt"-~ian~ along the Vistuln wrre ready 

to unloo-;c their· most powerful oiTcnsive of 

the war. C:all ing the report on the Russians 

I\ o:,;~a t bluff, however, Hitler refused for 

a week to ron cede that 1 he lwcnkthrough 

to Antwerp could not he made. Hr then 

waited flw more days before taking his 

spc:u head force, Si.xlh Panzer ,\mly, out 

of the frnm in the Ardennes, and took another wed. making up hi~ mind 10 div 

mantle tlw rest of the huildup in the Dulgc. 

Wlwu Hitler returned to Berlin rrorn his 

e~ lcrn Fmnl headquarters on 15 J anu-

:•ry, tltr Vistuln line in Poland wns rotlnps-

•ng. Two weeks later the Ru ians were on 

th~ Odtr Ri\·cr at Kucc;trin, thirty-five 

•uric" rrom Berlin. On the 26th, J'\ lnrshal 

(;cwg-i K. Zhuko" rcportcdl) told Stalin 

he C'ould I><' ready to anack toward Rcrlin 

in fo111 day,,' In the wo;t, lh<' U . . armies 

'S. ~hh·ournko, "K ak p/allirot•o/tll /)or/l'dlln)'o 

Attlll/)(1111) ~1 P~ rtugromu ~itlnnt·sJ.n)• Gumn11ii," 

I' O)'flllltl·tlltmrltllskiy Zl"""ld (Mny I fl65), 

were harcly bark to the line in the \rdennes t h;u the}' had held in Decem her, and 

in \lc;a~ e the Gcrnmns were still fi~htin~ 

hard. Who would .lrrive in Berlin fin;t 

seemed not 10 he a question anymore. t\t 

the speed they hncl rllovcd in Janunry, the 

Rus~in ~o~ rou lcl have been fi rst on the 

Rhine. 

In and :u·uund .\achcn the orcupation 

was nearly four months old. Most or the 

civilians iu the rit) were lh·ing in cella ~. 

air raid shelter,.., or bunker.; without heat. 

cleccricit y. gas, or running water. The mtlin 

thoroughfarc.s h<td been cleared for militar)' 

trnffic; cl~cwherc the snow cover had sof ~ 

ened hut could not enlirel)' conceal what 

was "a fanlnstic, stinking heap of ruins."'' 

Cabbage soup and potatoes were the slHndard diet. On the ration, each adult was 

entitled to hnlf <t pou nd of meat and hones, 

a quarter pound or butter, and one loaf 

of bread a week, when available. In Stolherg, the <~t'< ond largest occupied rnm· 

munity, thrcc-qunrtcr.; of the population 

was eating nt soup kitchen aod gelling 900 

lo 1,000 rnlorks a day. The few tru('k<; 

owned b)• the ritics were being used 10 rollect food in the <:ountryside. To pay for 

city servitcs, :;ur h as they were, and make 

pension and retid pa)'ments, Aachen wns 

seJJjn~ uff tlw a l!andoned pro pert)' of 

evacuees.' 

'Office, Allrrcl Na,al CinC, to SHAEF G S, 

Mob: Cen11.m Ch ilians nnd 1\lilit:uy Co\l'tlllllrru 

Control, I Apr 1~1, in SHA£F G-5. 1101, j uc:krt 

3. 

• Hist R.pt, 12th AC":r, C- 5, Feu 45, 2n Felr 

+5, in 51-J.I\gF C: !1, 17 I G, Jacket 6. 
Till. RliJ'\EL\XI> C.\:\1 1' \JG'\, I!H5 

Tlw t·c onom) was prostmlc. In Stolhrr g 

nu slt•rc-; wnt· open. The nmnidpal lahm 

ofTit(' in .\ar hcn had rcgistt•rr.cl nil nlllrbodicd inlmbitants for work Hl t'lca ring rubble and r(•pairinR roatl-... The wor·k was 

t111piud, :mel for one job on whk h 200 

work<'l'l' W{'r'\' l'alled, seventeen appeared, i l 

typic nlturnoul. For all johs tlw on · \vorkcrs 

to he fouml wrre hoys under «ixtccn or old 

mrn. .\lilitary government W:\.'1 undrr 

orders not W roncern ir-clf with reviving 

tlw German economy, but it had an interest 

i1r roal, which in winter ranked next to 

food ~ a oec·cssity of Life. T he Aachen 

111incs had formerl y cmployt•d 20,000 men. 

[n Fduuary 1!145 there were 1,000 working in thr mines; :'\nclthey had a t~-pc ccnt 

tatr uf t~ >Scntceism , herau:;c the ration wns 

not enough to ustain a man :\1 h('IW)' work 

in the rt1inc~. <llttlmincrs could not hur :'\nything \Vith their pn}'· The workers eaxiest 

w scrnrc and most reliable wcrr thmw employed l1y the Army. Army n'lployecs received n noon meal- :;omething whil h wns 

gtlirtg tO j)l'O\'C a major attr'attiOJI ror tnany 

Germans in the coming months and years. 

Til(' rJH•td was prepared and served on the 

j<>h partly for the ·ake of etonomy hut ll so 

hc<.'1HISC if the worker was aUowcd to take 

the fuml hnnw, it usually weut w his 

[;unil)'· 

nw rivilians' feeling of relief ill being 

out o£ the war was beginning to give way 

11nckr· l he hardships of the winter to a subdued n·scntmcnt:' But the re.o;cnuncnl was 

nnt at a level approaching resistant:c to the 

orc upntion. Of 4fl7 cnse.c; tried in ' inth 

t\nny military government courts up to the 

end of j nnuary, threc-quartcn; WCI'C for 

minor circulation and curfrw violations. In 

the 1 wo rnost seJious cases, ottc defendant 

'Oflirr, Allied N;<val CiuC, to SliAEf' C- 5, 

suh: (:crman Civilia ns and Militnry Covt•rnmcnt 

Coutrol, I 1\ p,. 45, in SHAEF C- 5, flO:l, J acket 

!l . 

17!1 

~ot tw~:ntr )C<II"< for spreading rumors pn·· 

judiri;d to ,\llit'd ntn~:s s and the other gut 

fifteen year'! :1ncl a I 0,000 Reithsnwl'k fine 

for disohcdienn: lll military govcrnnH·nt 

orders. Tlw other rn!'ics were sometimes interesting hut hardly e\'idence of a threat 

lo military scc.urity. Even ha rboring German oldit~rs, ,, ~cri s crime, usnallr 

urned out not 10 have been motivated hy 

malice. ln one instance a mother wanted 

tn keep her so11 at home; in anothct n 

homeowner IICC'Clcd someone to £i'\. his 

house and the soldier was handy with tools; 

and in a third a soklier turned himself in 

after a lovcrl\· CJlrarrd with the woman with 

whom he W(\S livi11g. He went to a prisoner 

or war camp, she to jail for fifteen month'i. 

Jn Schaffcnhcrg, outside t\ achcn, a mnn 

was sentcnrcd for holding a public meeting. 

He had hired ;t nlrpenter to repai1· his 

house and a t·mwd h:'ld gathered to watch 

the C'arpcn tt·r work. In Brand a summary 

military guvcrnrnenl court fined a civilian 

I 00 marks for· calling the Buerwm11 cister 

a thief auu a Nazi. The review bonrci reversed the ~c nt < c on the ground that civilians ~bould he encouraged to C'Ommcnt 

on public t>ITi<·inls. 

Nonfmternization cases againc;t civilians 

continued tu 1nnrhlt: the courts. I n Stolberg, a surnmnr)' C(Jlll'l found three womt ll 

guilty of arting i11 a manner prejudicial to 

the good order or members of the Allied 

forces. The military policeman who made 

the arrest statrtl he had entered an apartment lllcl found the three listening to a 

phonogn1ph with two U.S. soldiers. The 

review board took tire position that the 

soldieJ'S might have been guilty of frntCJ'-

nizaLion, bur in the absence of immornl 

conduct, the women could not be charged. 

In AadH~n. n summary court found two 

girls guilt)' of inviting two American soldiers into n house matked "off limits." A 
I flO THE U .S. :\R~IY TN THJ7. OC:CUP/\TIOI'\ OF GER~I.\:'\\ 

TRIAl. IN A MtLITi\R\' C:ovrmNMENT Cou RT. The two Germon women were cont•iclcd of illcf!ol border crouing. 

review hoard set aside the convictions because the off-limits signs had been posted 

solely to prevent fraternization and tlwrcforr con:-;tituted an attempt lo shift l'CSponsibilit)' for nonfralcrnization from the 

military to c-ivili.tns.' 

• ( I ) Hqs, Ninth A1·111y, ACofS G- 5, s11h: Bi· 

weekly CAS UlVJ, 27 juu ·15, in SHAf.l' C- 5, 17.11 , 

J acket 2. (2) Hist Rpl, Hqs, First Army, ACofS 

G- 5, t- 2fl Feh '15, iu SllAEF G 5, 17. 11, j ncket 

7. (3 ) llist Rpt, q~, Ninth Anny, 1- 2U Feb 

•15, in SHAEF G- 5. 17. 11, Jacket :.l. (·I) Hist 

Rpt, llqs, First Army, ACofS G- 5, 1- 3 1 ~'inr 45, 

in SHAF.F G-5, 17 . II, J acket 9. 

l n Janua ry, 1\achen hcr amc the firM city 

in the occupation to have a licensed newspaper, the Aru;/l(nier Nfll'hric:ltlen. P:utly 

for the experience <tnd partl}' in the belief 

thal it wns time l<> get on with re-educating 

the Germans, the Psycholngkal " ' nrfare 

Divi~; ion sent n press control team into 

1\achcn to set up a plant nnd find a liccuscc. The plant d:d not proYc to be 

much of a prohlcrn. The huilding and press 

of th<' former /\nr hrn newspaper hnd survived the battle f:lit'ly well, Hlld some ncwspdnt was un hand. Finding a publisher was 
THE RHJ NE L:\I\'D CA.MP IG , l!l45 

more cliiTicult. The press control oiTiccrs in-

' et'viewcd every newspaperman in Aachen 

but could nul come up with one who, besides heiug profe~iunally qualified, had an 

unclouded poli tk:tl past. Determined not 

lo <·om pwmi:;c politically for the sake of 

compelcnxc, they fin;ally seulcd on a 70-

year-olcl ex-rmuposing room foreman. 

Hcinrir h Hollands, who had been unemployed since I ~J33 because he \V<Is a Social 

D cntOt't'H l. H ullands had no experience at 

writing or editing and ncithl:r did the other 

Germans on the staiT; so for the firsl 

months the pa per war; 11l()stly a prodttrl of 

1 h.c U.S. and British o!Titers on the prc.<>s 

cont·rol team. SHAEF cased its restriclions 

on what could be printed to permit local 

news but not features or editorials, which 

nearly confined the p:~p r to the stereotype 

format of Vie Milleihwf!e'/1. Hollands had 

other lrouhlts as well. The electricity went 

on and ofT, and when it went off the metal 

in the typesetting machines hardened ttnd 

had to he reheated; furthermore, Lhe curfew interfered with distribution and newsgathering. The local news helped militaqr 

government 10 stifle rumors hul sometimes 

inadvertently increased discontenL. The 

people of Stolberg, for instance, began to 

<.:omplain when they found oul that the 

r urfcw in A:ld1en was an hour later than 

their:- and when they read that the Aachen 

residents were getting extra sugar ancl marmalade rntions. 11 

Ollcrl >ucrgermeisler OppcnholT en tered 

his third month undCJ· the occupation in 

" ( 1) SHAEF, PWD, Weekly fnlclligencc Summary No. 2 1, 17 Feb <15, in SHAEF G- 5, 7.:15. 

(2) Hqs, 12 111 AGp, ACofS G- 5, Public Rc•la tions, 

sub: Draft Repon on Ccrm11n Lan~~uage ArmySponsored Newspapers, Juu 45, in SHAEF G-5, 

17.16, j ackt'l 14·. PI) OMGUS, TCD, History, 

B Mny ~5 30 Jun •16. in OMGUS 242- 1/5, p. 

1UL 

l Hl 

Aachen in January. So far he had sunrived 

the threatened Nazi vengeance anti had hecome alluost n hero l)y volun teering to stay 

in the city through the ~t of the rdennco:; ofTensive, an act that may have been 

more dangerous than he imagined since 

Hitl<'r at one time wa~> dose to switching 

the objective from Antwerp to :\nt hcn. But 

Oppcnhofi had also become a political 

liability. His appointment ranged back to 

the days when a recommendation from the 

Catholic clergy was the hc.c;t a man could 

h:wc, and he had the hacking of the Bishop 

of Aachen. But a closer look revealed that 

the Chu rch bad been not so murh antiNazi as neutral and, having so survived 

Hitler, was indined to remain the same 

Juring the occupation.; Oppenhoff and his 

f(lllrtecn depa rtment heads, all his choices, 

pmvcd 1o h::l\'e n ~; imibr bent. Except for 

one nominal party n1ember, they had not 

been Nazis, and like Oppcnhoff, the Gestapo had from time to time had an eye 

on them; but they had apparently not sacrificed OJ' risked very much during the Iazi 

regime. In fact, all of them had prospered. 

Scvcr<1 l, including Oppenhoff, prided 

themselves Oil having rejected the war and 

avoided military service. Their method, 

however, had not I )ten one to inspire in 

J\meri ean minus much confidence in theiT 

motives. They had helped each other- as 

they snmctimcs seemed to he doing again 

in the city government- into draft-exempt 

managerial jobs in the Nazi-owned Veltrup 

nrmament works in Aa hen. ~ 

Politically the men i11 the Aachen city 

admin istration haflled and c·hagrined the 

' Hqs, Ninth Am1y, ACoCS G- 5, sttll: Bj."•cckly 

Ct\SUM, 27 Jan -t-5, in SHAEF G ·5, 17, , J acket 

2. 

' Hqs, Gth AGp. s11b : German PW opiniou of 

1\llic:d MG, 20 !leu •15, in SHA~F G -.'i, 17.1 8, 

Jnrkct 4. 
1132 1'111~ U.S . . \lUI\' IN THE OCCUJ\ \'I'ION OF GElU. lAJ\Y 

.\ mericam; who had c:omc into Germany 

cxpening lo dcC'ide a rkar-(1Jl issuctltmorra<·y vcr"!lus :\azi lot alital'ianism. 

'l'hc.-;c . \mcric ans felL that every Gcrlll all 

who was :mti-Na"ti must he citber :L dcmon •at, a willing t·mwcrt to dcmorracy, or al 

wmsl ;1 ( :ommunisL the last, in the spirit 

of the wnrtin1 e lli we, bcing eguatcd with 

a democra t. O ppenhoff, by his own definition, was anti-Nazi, hut he was also quite 

frnnkl y :mtidcmocratic, and he aclmilled 

to hav1ng r ho!':Cil a staff a11 d appointed city 

workc1'l> whose ~ agreed with his own. 11 

He was an authorita rian, apparently of the 

Bismarckian scho<>l. Some of his colleagues 

were proponents of the Stnendestaal, a 

semifacist dass state of the kind the i\ustl'ian l'hanc·dlor Engelbert Dollfuss had 

organized in !\ustria in the early 1930s. 

Oppcnhon· disliked f<tn atin \1 Nazis but saw 

nothi ng wrong with employing those who 

had changed their· minds or who had 

joined the party for business or professional 

reasons.

1

'' 

Allhough disenchantment with OppenhofT'· adminjstraLion set in early, the sometimes pcCltliar cir·nrm11tances of the time 

gave him a surprisingly solid hold on his 

off1ce. Competent non-Nazis were among 

the mresl commodities ever·ywhere in Germany, not only in Aachen ; in the managerial d professional gr oup!; they were 

praetirall)' nonexistent. In Strassburg, 6th 

,\rmy Group ca ptured the personnel files 

of the Deutsrlte Aer.ztebund (medical association ) of L and Baden. Of its membership, whirh eompriscd all of the doctors 

and dentists nnd many of the public health 

offirinls in Baden, less than a quarter had 

' Hist Rp t, First Army, ACofS G- 5, I- 2H Feb 

~5, in SH AEF G- 5, 17.11 , Jnckct 7. 

'"Saul K. Piiclovcr, e .... j)Ul iiiC II t iu Cen/14111' 

(New York: D uell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 

244. 

110 or only slight party ronnections. 11 The 

mcdit·al profession had one of the highc'it 

percentages of Nazis, IJul law, teachi ng, 

:utd pul die atlminstraLiou were not fa r he, 

hind. 13ona fide poli tic.:<tl opponents of the 

regime, if they had slll'vivcd at all, were 

genera lly old men, like Hollands. O ppcnhofT and his colleag1tes were competent, 

perhaps irrepluccablc.. and consequen tly 

a ppea red jndispensablc, to the Americans 

more than to the Germans. To their fellow 

i\ac.:henel's they rcprcsenled a new eliLe, not 

of money ( O ppenhoiT's sal at')' was 4;)0 

marks a month ) 0 1' rea l power (the ,\ mericans held the power ) but of survival. They 

had eluded the Nazis painless!)' and somewha t profit<lbly anti they seemed to be handling the consequences of defeat in the 

same way. They were not living elegantly 

hut they fa red a great deal better than U1e 

average cellar or bun ker dweller. To the 

occupati-on forces, lhey represented stability. T he tattiral commands in Aachen 

changed from week to week and, in crises 

h as the Bulge, sometimes from day to 

day. ~lhin six weeks in December and 

J anuary, the over-a ll comma nd shifted 

from Fit'St 1\rmy lo Ninth Army and then 

hat k again ; the military government detachment had three commanders before the 

end of Det:cntber. By the time OppenhofT 

had been in omct:: three months, be knew 

IIIO!'e about running ArH' hen tmder Lhc ocn rpalion than ~tny of tJ1e .1\mericans. 

OppenhofT himself was no problem. H e 

and a ll the Germans who worked under 

him served entirely at the pleasure of military government aud, whatever thei1· politics, executed only American policies. H e 

was, however, a reminder tha t desp.ite all 

planning, the purpose of Lhe occupntion 

" H(p>, 6th ACp, ACofS G- 5, sub: T he German 

Medical Profession in Batlt:n, 20 J an 45, in SHAEF 

G- 5, J7.1 H, Jacket 5. 
TilE RJJI\EL.\'\D C \~IP\IG'\, 115 

ww; stilloh"' lll'C anti tlu• 11w!lwtl tJl m hh'vin ~ it in doubt. T u destroy the N.t'l.i n•gimc 

wa)! .m often statcd Unitc:d Nations ''':11' 

ai111 clatin~ IJack to tl1c .\tl anlic Clwncr; 

Inti did this policy ntcan th1' t:limi11at ion 

uf en:r >' pan y member, cv c. u at the price 

of illt Oll\'l!lliCfi('C tO the OU'll(>aliOII forces? 

.\1 ilital'Y gm·crlllll\'IH had ;rs<;umccl thnt aJoi 

long as hostilitic:- wntinucd, iL'i fiJ-.;t t c..-;pon-

~ihilitr was t11 the coruhat CJmmantl~. 

which would benefit most £rom ;m orderly 

and dTidcnt 1·idl admiui~l l':'lti on. W;'ls 

dc11a:t.ifk:uion tc' he pushed to the point 

wlwrc it might impair n1ilit;11'y govcrnlllCill 's l'r venc~s and sn a!Tc•C'l the internitS nf the twops ~ Men like Opp<·nhofl' and 

hi-. c·ollcagur-; rai.~cd a still mon· diflicull 

C}lll'~tion: \\',,._it the business of till' <l('CII(><ltion to hriu~ dc-morrar) to Ccnnan)•? The 

\m('rinul:< 1 on~idcred t hcmsd\'l."' imlivid u-

,\11)' ,md cctllccli\'cl) as nalw al apo~tks of 

dc·nHH't :11). The occupation plans " 'ere dc-

\'b<"d to dcmon:-;tratc, in the «'<ll ll'l S}'Slcm 

for in tanc <·, the tliA'crenres between totalital'ian and dc.nlocnuic methods. Nt:ithcr 

till! polic·y nor the plans, however, provided 

fut• a n a< tivr dcmoc-ratizalion progran1. On 

the other hand, dcmon'atizaliun wa .. s so 

romprllingly logical an ohjcctivc, sn murh 

whnt the war ultimate!~· w;t~ all ahout, that 

it wao; llnund to llrromc the :-tanclard 

ag;lill'•l whirh tlw mTupatinn was 

lllt'<ISlii'Cd. 

The: Psydwlogical Warfan· Di\'ision, 

SII.\EF, did not have Lhc amc priorities 

and t't'sponsibilitics a~ milit tl') ~OV l'11t1l<'nt. 

I Is job Wrl'i [f) create an inl;~gr or the oc. rup.uiotl in tlw Germ;m mind, ami 10 do so 

PWI> wantt•d to get on with th(' husinrs.-; 

or d«'lllOitatiLalion. For this pmpo.;c, the 

Oppcnhoff ndministration was nut itlcnl 

ra\\' 111aterial. Tn January, tim'<' n1ptains 

from ~) olo~ e~tl Wnrfnn•, Sa ul K. 

Padcwc r, Paul Sweet, nntl L<'wi~ F. Gittler, 

11:. 

ill\ l~li g,ttrd I ht· \ ;u hl'll cit\ ~0\ CIIlllH IIl 

and wcrl' di~nt.t)'Cd. Their report rl~ttl gcd 

military .!(1>\ Cl'llllll'lll with lw\'ill_g <lllowl·d 

a new elitt· to emerge one " made up ol' 

lec hnida ns, nwycr~, engineers, busine..;smcn, manufacture rs, :1 ntl r hurchme11 ," <tnt.l 

one which was perhaps not Nazi but certainly t.lid not fit the :\ merican picture of 

dcmocrar'y. u The rcpon, according to Padover, revcrhrrat<·d I lu oughol\l t.hc Emopean Thentrr of Operntions.u The three 

captains from PW I) had ~igna lt·d the 

arri,·al of a powC'rf11l ally for radical 

denazil1c:-t tion, the trnditional .\merir··n 

demoncratic idcali:-;111. 

On a starT lOlll' in J nnwtry, howtwrr, 

Brig. GC'n. t·:d1 F. Wood, direc.wr ()( the 

Prisoner of \\'ar anti Oi. placed Pc·l'SOJ1S 

Diviliion, U.S. Gmup Control Counril, 

foulld the trend in 12th ,\ rmy Group G 5 

to he awa)' fro.n a t•igid interpretation of 

Lhc dcn.l/.i!kution prnvisions of .J CS I 067. 

The G-5 1Jclicvcd that some Nnzi-; would 

ha,·c to ltc' w<nl bccautle otherwise the field 

romma ndcrs could not he given what they 

wanted nwst from tnilitary govemment, an 

efficient rivil administration. Experience so 

far, the G - 5 oflitcrs pointed out somr ,vhat 

mefullr. had shown that most local Na~i 

onl1 ial~ had anJuircd their ptlS&tsons 

through cxpcrit>nre and ahility, not h)l virtue uf pa rt)' membership alone." T he trend 

noted hr Gencntl Wood was shortlivcd. 

The Aachen cxpcricuce had dem tratcd 

how diffinllt it wns to defend the appointment ()f <:\'e n some non-Na~is. The 

newspaprt• I'Of'l'tspcmdcnts were still nmrentratin~ on the fiKhling ·, hut at lr.ast 

" Padovcr, E .\flt'rtml'ul in German)', p . 222. 

n I bid., p. 2li2. 

"}.Jcmo, US Cp C:C:, PW nnd DP Oi1•, for 

Dis&rihution. "'"' Trent!~ in Allied M(: ~•nd 

Admin, 26 Jan 'i Ft'b 15, 3 Feb ·15, in OMGUS, 

PW ~nu OP Div W:or Dia.->o, Ol\fGUS, :1 t•l.lll, 

C:J\tH filrs. 
IB4 1 Ill~ U.S . . \R~IY ~ THE OCCUP \TIO!\ OF GER~L\~)' 

one, ~I.tx l.(·tncr, '' liting for the \c·w \'urk 

papc1 PM, had <llrcady crhonl the < rltirism expressed in lhe PWD's rcporl on 

Aachcn. 11' In early Milt'(!h, I :.!th :\rmy 

Group ordered all Nazis removed from 

puhli(· ullirrs and other pofiitiuns of li'W\1 

and inflttC'IH'C .. \ few wct·ks later', ()th Army 

Gmup followed suit. 1

'

1 

In ;\ad ten, First . \nny began weeding 

out tlw dL~ \ administration after it re-

"llllted control in February. Oppcnhoff wa,; 

regarded as being of dubious va lue but was 

not dil'misst·u.'; On Sunday ni hl , 25 

r-. 1 arr h, while Oppcn hoff wa~ visiting his 

neighbor, Herr Fausl, whom lhc :\mericnns 

had rcn:ntl)' removed as Ru er~er ci l ~r for· 

lndu~t y. three men dressed in German 

p:tratroOJ)lT rovcralls eutercd OptJenhofT's 

hmr~t·. Tlw)' awakened rite maid and 

ordered her to fetch him home. \\'hen he 

t'rlliiiWd with F;IUst. they told him they 

had jumped from a plane, W('l'(' on their 

way hark to the German lin e~, and needed 

rood nnd !!hc·ltcr .. \ rc·ordi ug to •'n n~t. Oppenhotr oiJjccLcd that aiding them would 

jtupar•clit.c his position with the .\ mcr·in111s 

and urged them LO surrender. \\'lwn an 

a r!{lllnt'tll dcwlopcd, Faust slipped :tWCI) -

to J.(rl hrlp, he said. The next moruing 

OppenholT\ hod) was found <rumpled 

up in th1.• hHilway. He had been t 

th rcJit~h the h<"ncl. During the <~amc lll , 

a lank de-;troycr unit bilkt<·d nrar Oppcnlwll"s home dist overed th;cl its ttl<•phone 

had I{OII(' dead. Two men S<'lll nul to look 

"SHAL-:F, ACofS G- 5, C-5 Weekly Journal of 

lnro,·mncinn No. li, 28 Mnr 45, in SHAF.F G- 5, 

17.1u, J·•CkrL U. 

•• (I I llq~, 12ch AGp, C -5 Oprmtional I nunu:-

lion• No. 5, II Mar 45, in SIIAF.F G 1. 17.16, 

}ilckcl 6. (2 ) l\lcmo, Hqs, ti1h ACp, for UG's, 

7ch !'lnd lsi French Armies. buh: Di~<po.,lllir:nion 

from Offic<' of Nazis nnd C:rrnc.1u Militarists, 10 

~f:lr ~~~. in SHAEF C -!'1, t 7.1H, n~kcr 5. 

n !list R1ll. First Army, ACufS (; ~. 1 ~U Frh 

15, ln SIIAF.F C- 5, 17. 11, J:wkrt 7. 

for a hrcnl. fotrnd the line had IJcrn t uL. 

The officrt• in thargc then sent out a third 

man to stand guard while repairs were 

made. While the first two were wnrkittg, 

the guard saw th c·cc men walking towal'd 

him from Oppcn hoJT's house. When he 

ordered them w h;tlt they turned, mn into 

some bushes at the side of the road, and 

disappeared. • \ search the next morn iug 

turned up a Gl'l'rHan belt and a mu~cttc 

hag han~ing from a fc·nrt ncuhy, <tpparentl)' :1bandoncd <tht•r it l)ecamc en tangled 

in the \vire."' 

Oppc.nltoff tlied as many Germans did 

that spring, unmonrned and wit hont many 

questions asked. The Americans fottnd it 

hard to sec Oppcn hoiT as an anti-N:~zi 

ma.rtyr, and one favorite theory was that 

his clisgtuutlcd and recently discharged m llcague<;, uf whom Faust wa.<> one, hac! <'Ommilled the murdcr.'11 Six months later, after 

the war s flVCr and Oppcnhoff ucal'ly 

forgotten, intdligcncc investigators uncovered the true story. The order for the murder had 1' 0llH' from Himmler and been 

carried nut by border police to set an cxnmplc for the Werwo/f, the allegedly sponwncous, 1'\azi-spon~orrd, German guerrilla 

and undcrgrQund resistance organ izalion . :" 

The staged killing, ordered in Janunry anct 

planned b)' nn SS general as if it were a 

major operation, was probably tht Werwolf's most !le ~a tionnl achievement. 

Ou the Move 

For drt cdtmc:nts sidctrac:kcd in the 

ami}' militar)' government centers, the winter scerHcd wo ~e than the previous one in 

'' H ist R pt, lha>, FiNl Army, ACofS G 5, I :u ~f r 45, in SIIAEF G 5, 17. 11, j nckcl •1 , 

'" Pndu,·cr, E.\Jitriuu:ul in CtmiQTI)', p. 24 7, 

"' <.:SDI C:/ WEA BAUR, Weekly Tncclligt'ncr 

Summary No. ·1, 2 Ort ·•5, in OMGUS 3/35, 

decimal :150.0!1. 
THE RH INELAND CAMPAI GN, 1945 

Shriv<·nham. The front had not advanced 

any farther into Germany after November. 

Mea nwhile, the pinpoint assignments had 

changed so often to keep pace with shifts 

in plans Lhat it was hard to believe anyone 

Wet)) going anywhere, The la test stratt:gy 

gave the priority to M ontgomery's a rmy 

group which inc luded only the U.S. Nint'h 

Army. Thil'd and Seventh t\rmies apparently might be parked on the German border indefinitely, and first Anny's prospects 

were not much brighter. ln the third week 

of Februnry, Ninth 1\ rmy, the one with lhe 

most substanlial mjssion, was stn.nding on 

the hank of the Roer Rjver waiting for the 

wate1· to go down. The Germans had 

opened the dams upstream and fl ooded the 

valley down lO Lhe Meuse. Fi1·st Army b<\d 

taken t.hc dams, llut Lhc Germans had done 

their work well and blown tl1e gates in time 

to get maximum efien from Lhe mill ions 

of tons of water pouring into the vnllc),· 

Nevertheless, lhe dams were no longer 

a threat. The flood crested, and when it 

bega n to recet.le, the war rhnuged. l u the 

early morniJ)g darkness, behind a 2000-gun 

barrage, Ninth • \rmy nossed the Rocr on 

23 February. Nine days later the n•·my had 

a spea 1'11ead on the Rhine opposite DucsseldorL First Army joined in 011 the south and 

at the end of the first week in Marc h got 

whnt Ninth .'\rmy hacl wanted and not 

fo11nd, :1 bridge on the Rhine, at Rcmagcn. 

Against crumbling G erman rrsistauce, 

Third and Sevcnlh Armies then cleared the 

southcm Rhineland dtLring the first three 

weeks of March. 

Ninth Army found scarcely a soul in the 

first ten miles east of the Rocr but htttl uHc:overcd half a million civilians b)' the time 

it rear hed the Rhine. Except for the evacuated zone a long the Roer and the cities 

where the bombing hnd caused many inhahit<Lnt!) to seck saf cr pi arcs, more GerHl5 

ma ns were staying home this time, with 

Nazi party blessings. The Nazi leadership 

did not even u·y to conceal its nightmare: 

a refugee wave raised by the Russians in 

1 he cast meeting a similar wave from the 

west somewhere between Lbe Rhine and the 

Oder. If such a meeting took place, nothing 

would move in Germany, military or civilian. The Cauleilers had encomaged the 

civilians, women and children especially, 

to stay, ,excepting onJy those whose skills 

could give advantage to the enemy. ~· 

Ninllt i\ rmy, advancing from Aachen 

northeastward toward the Rhine, had thr 

first look at the Germany of 1945, and il 

was a dismal sighL Detachment I 3G2 entered J uclit h on the third clay. Lying on Lhe 

right lmnk or lhe Rocr, the city had been 

bombed from the air and blasted by artille ry. The people were gone. The physical 

destruction was pul at 1 00 percent, probably a wartime record for tities in Germany. W hat the bombs had spared, the 

shells had C'hurned into complete uselessness. WiLh nuLhing to govem, the detachment turned to direr.ting lraffic. T he other 

com1nunitics less than ten miles beyond the 

Roe1' were in a similar, if not quite as bad, 

condition. 

Muenl'hen-Gladhach, about balfw~y between the R oer a nd the Rhine, was a 

diffe rent case. IL was a study in contrastssome djstrjLts badl)' damaged, oLhers almost intact except for the windows- the 

work of the tir bombardment. Craters in 

the streets showed where recent bombs had 

hit. Gravel patc hes revealed where older 

r ralers had been. Buildings were sliced in 

two, <lfiU frequent!)' where a wall had col-

" ( I ) SH AEF C- 5, CA- MG Weekly Field Rerorl No. 12, ;1 1 Mar +5, in SHAE.F G-5, 17. 16, 

J ackel 9. (2 ) SHARF, ACofS G-5, C:- 5 Weeki> 

j ournnl of lnforma1ion No. fi, 20 Mar 45, In 

SHAE.F G- 5, 17.16, J acket 8. 
J!l(j THE U.S. ARMY TN THE OC:C:UPATlON OF GERl\1/\NY 

lapsetl, the furniture could be seen in place 

in room~ on upper floors.~:! The walls left 

standing were covered with slogans: Dein 

Gnm- Heil 1/it/er! (Your GreetingHdl Hitler! ) ; 1'aj)far und Treu . .' (Brave 

:u,d Loyal) ; Die J7?·<ml fuer die 1I eimal.' 

uic II aim(l/. fuer the Front! Th<~ front for 

the Homeland! The H omeland for the 

front! ); Erst jclzl Recht! (Now more than 

ever! ) , Here and there, grim-faced older 

civilians could he seen painting out the slogan$ with whitewash. 

In Krcfdd on the Rhine, l 00,000 of the 

169,000 population had Stayed behind in 

the huge conc:rcte air raid shellers to await 

the invaders. i\s soon as the front passed, 

more inhabitants began drifting in from the 

cnuulryside. The local news].mpcr, the 

Rlu:inisrhe Landeszeitun[!, had published 

its last is u~: on I March, the day before 

the .'\me.-icans came. It~ headline bad read, 

"Enemy .\ttcmpts at Bre tkthr ugh in the 

West Repulsed. " The Landeszeilung buildlflg was among the few still standing in the 

<'enter of the rity, and its roof was gone. 

The local Labor l•'ront chief had had an 

<tpa rt~Henl inside. He: had obviously left in 

a hlln)' The breakfast table was set, and 

his personal stationer)' was in place in his 

desk. The street outside bad been called 

the Arlo![ llirlerslrassc since 1939. Within 

ho\.trs the rcsidcnLc; had reverted to calling 

it Rheinslrasse. I n &ome places, rivilians 

looting abandoned stores and homes fell to 

nrgui.ng among themselves, obli vious to 

the t\tnerican tanks and trucks PJ!ling 

cast.2!

1 

Ninth Army's Psychological Warfnrr 

Sertion took the first of innumerablr public 

" Hist Rpt, Ninth Army, ACofS G- 5, t-:1 I Mar 

·15, in SHAEF G-5, 17,1 ~ . .Jacket G. 

"' Rqs, Ninth Army, P and PW Sec, sub: Extt·:H:t 

of PsyWnr Civilian lnterrog:-uion Report : Krcfcld. 

5 J\lfar 45, in Ninth Arnty, P and PW Sec I OY- 3Y. 

opinion samplings in Muenchen- Gla<.lbacb 

a few days after the O('tupation began. The 

Germans professed to be relieved that the 

!\mcricam; had come, because. the occupation meant an end to the bombings. One 

liftcen-ycar-old boy added that for him it 

meant he could play soccer and not have 

to attend Hitler Youth meetings; and he 

liked American chewing gum. Many inhabitants also professed to l>c ami-Nazi for 

va rious reasons. Some claimed religious oiJjcctions. Others seemed ~imp y to be unhappy that after all their sacrifices, Hitler 

had lost the war. Some wanted to reserve 

judgment until they saw how the Americans treated them. Nearly all said they expected hard times. N<'verthelcss, the} 

co111plaincd about the rntions they were 

_gelling and about having to give up their• 

homes to troops. ' 

The w()rkhnrses of military government 

on the mo,·e were the I dctachme.nts, composed of three or four officers apiece, five 

en listed men, and two jeep~ with trailers. 

Except in the big dties, these detal'hments 

rcprescnlcd lhe ot:cupatiou to the Germans, 

nt once 1 he 1rhingc s of a new order nnd 

the onlr stable inHuence in a world tun\ed 

upside down. They arranged for the dead 

in the streets to he buried, restored rntioning, pllt poli('c back 011 the streets, and if 

possible got the electricit y nne\ w<~ter working. They provided care ftl!' the displared 

persons and mililary government comts fol' 

t h.c Cermnns. If troops needed t·o be billeted, tbcy requisitioned the houses. 1f the· 

army ncedccllabor, they secured it through 

the labor office. Under the more stringent 

dcnazifi,:ation diredives put out in ·March, 

they were res ponsiule for getti1ig everything 

done without using Germans who were 

, , IJ qs, Ninth Army, P i'lnd PW Sec, st1b: The· 

P<•oplt· of Mucnc.ltt:n- Glnt.lhach after Occ~tpat ic.lll. 

17 1\,Ia.r 15, in Ninth Army, P <~nd PW Sec I 09 :~9 . 
THE RRJ1\ELAJ\:D C.\1\lPAJG 1 1945 IH7 

----

U.S. 0FFICF.R SWEARS IN ,, Burmcr.R111EIS'l'Ert ANI) Frn: "Poucr, MEN 

tainted by nazi!\rn. " Bu. y" was the word 

that described t hcse detachments c.~t 

hll).)' witb getting lornl government running 

again and with stre<H)lS of German!; reporting to be registered, wanting favors, wanting passes, or reporting rapes and looting, 

confident that the omnipotent military gov-

<-rnmcnt would he aiJie to ferret out the 

guilt)' from among thuusnnd · of soldicrs.:r. 

For the rivili.tn-., living and eating and 

staying out of jail all ucpcnded on a military go\ ernmcnt ofTkcr's signature on their 

n'r.:i"tration c;t~·do; all(l on any passes they 

lli ~r Rr>t, Ninth Anuy C- 5, I 11 ~r 45, 

"' SHAEF G- 5. 17 II, J:n·kl·t 6. 

might need to lle om during the curfew 

hours or to travel bc)•ond the three-mile 

limit. One <ktarhment rommander 

claimed to have signed his name 540,000 

times in lcs.c; than a month. ~" 

Since, in an opposed advanC"c, predicting 

when specific localitjcs woulu be reached 

was impos.o; iblc, the armic.o; :-;cnl oul spearhead dcta< hmcnts in the ftn.t wave- I detar hmcnts whose pinpoint fl.'-<:ignmenls 

were cast of the Rhine. Their joh was to 

move with the divisions in the front, slopping onl}• long enough lo post the procla-

"'SHAEF C -5, DP Br, suh: Rt•.t>on of Visit 

hy Col. c:ary, 27 l\lar ·15, in SHAP.F {";- .'), 27-18/ .J. 
188 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE O CCUPATION OF GER"MANY 

mations and ordinances, issue circulation 

and curfew orders, and remove the most 

obvious Nazis. They sometimes appointed 

an acting Buer~ermeist.er who would then 

frequently have to he left to struggle with 

the new rules on his own until the next 

unit came along and, as often as not, dismissed him for incompetence. 

One spearhead detachment was Ill D2, 

commanded by Capt. Lloyd La Prade and 

pinpointed for Landkreis Fricdhurg north 

of frankfurt. In the first week of March, 

T 1102 t rossed the Rocr River behind First 

Anny. On Lhe 9th, the detachment look 

over Bruehl outside Cologne, appointed a 

Buergermeister, received orders on the 

same day lo double back to Ew;kircbcn, and 

on Lhe way was diverted to Linz am Rhein 

in the Remagen bridgehead. Sunday morning, 11 March, the detachment ran the 

" hot corner" at Remagen and crossed the 

bridge safely, becoming lbe first detachment across the Rhine. L a Prade set up 

his headquarters in the town hall at Linz, 

which happened to be a mile upstream 

from the bridge and directly in line with 

it. The German planes on bombing runs 

came in low overhead, and on the second 

day one dropped its bombs short, wounding 

cne officer and an enlisted man. On the 
29th, having counted 200 bombing sorties 

and evanmtcd some thousands of Allied 

prisoners of \\lar and displaced persons to 

the west side of Lhc river, I I J D :l turned 

I .inz ovc•· to its assigned detachment and 

headed south to join Thjrcl Atmy, which 

was lhcu dosing in on .Frankfurt. Four days 

later, nflcr helping lo quell riots amo11g 

politital prisoners at Dicz and Butzhach 

neat· F•·:u1kfwt, the detachment moved to 

ils station at FriedhUJ·g.~1 

l n the hig cities the pinpoint detachmcut~ moved in immediately, somctirHe.s 

l>dure the fighting ended. l•'it-st At·my began dearing Cologue, the largest city in 

the Rltinelaud, on 6 i\ larcll, and Detachment 1·: I H2 arrived on the 9th. At the last 

minute before the Americans came, the 

Na1.i Gmtleiltmg had sent criers through 

the litrcets directing the women and ,·hiJtlr en :\lid men over sixty to eros.~ over to 

the cast side of the Rhine ; but, cxcepl for 

pa•·ty big shots who left wearing Wehrmnchl greatc-oats over their party uniforms, 

f CW f ollnwcd the di.reclions hl:('llii::IC they 

would have had to go on fool with only 

the possessions they couJcl t:arry ill lhcit 

hauds. Some, women and r hiltlrcn in particular, had lc.ft earlier either to escape the 

homhing or avt1id tl1c occupation. First estinu\l<$ put the numbe.r who stayed at 

100,000 to 150,000, but for weeks there 

was 110 wa>' of telling how many were living 

in cclln rs or hiding in the out!!kil'ts. The 

mnsl signifin tnt dutnge in comparison with 

communities otcupied earlier was a g reat 

ill<'t'l·a.!W h1 Wehmwcht deserter~, Vnlksrlulm men, a11d policemen who had \~t yed 

hchiud in rivilian clothes. Act·orcling to a 

stron~ rumor, a hundred Ceslnfm agent , 

called " die racrhe1lde SrlwF' ( the :wenging hand ) , had also stayed , to kill anyone 

ll i~ t Rpt, Uet G-34, T.K Fricdln•rn, ! ? Sep 

•H ~ L ]11l 45, i11 OM GUS 8- 2/5. 

II:Hl 

who collahonuctl. lf the rumor was IJ•uc, 

the agents must ha\'c put caution before 

vengeance, because the}' were never ltc;tt'd 

from. 

The first. Americans into Cologne p~'onounccd their welcome ' 'tenific.'' They 

had not scrn anyth ing like it in Germany. 

The days were brigh t and sunny. llcc:rha ll ~ 

and rc.st:.wr·rmt!l oCTet crl free beer and wine; 

people on the streets looked ~~ the troops 

as il they were heroes; and to those who 

could understand C crn"lrtll and to the many 

wbo could not the eivitians said, "Endlich 

seid I h r ~ekrn Hmcn. Seil } nhren hnben wit 

auf Eurh gewtl?'lel." (.\t last, you h:wc 

come. W c have waited years for you.) 

When the wcathl r became drea ry two or 

three days later, the mood appeal'cd lo 

fade. and tltc t\nK• kans decided upon reflection tha t the joy had been " paten tly 

false" anyway ~ 

Finding the city a wr·eck and over 70 

percenl destroyed was no longet a surp••isc, 

but the r·ellar· life tha t had sprung up under 

the constant threat of air raids continued 

to astonish llw Americans. The average 

citizen seemed 10 find spending his life 

underground entirely nonnal. :\ typit·a l cellar c:ontainetJ ht:tlding, a stove, a cabinet, 

and some decorations to give the place a 

homey tom h. In the cellars, the inhabitants 

had even developed a brisk trade and social 

life. Many were c~ita nt about coming up 

into the day light and facing the new risks 

of tl1e ocrupation, hut most were out in 

a few d~ )'S :~ravenging among the ruins. 

The milit:Hy government officers observed , 

as they h<td elsewhe re; that rhe fit'Sl t•c:tction 

seemed to he to regard all unguarded prop· 

erty as free for the taking. 

For ~ I H 2 and iL<; commander, Lt. Col. 

"SHA EF, ACofS G-5, G-5 Weekly Journal of 

Information No. 6, 2H 1vf:u 45, in SHAEr··, C-!i, 

17. 16, J acket B. 
190 THE U.S. :\lUfY Il'\ THE OCCU PJ\TlOJ'\ OF CERJ\lt\ :Y 

IN THE \VAI< I( OF BA1-rLE a Gan11rw woman Sllfl!C)'S the u•reckage of It er firoperly. 

R. L. Hyles, the hig problem was lU rebuild 

the citr administration under 12th .\nny 

Croup's rcccm and rigid directive against 

employing Nazis and without leuing a 

rliqu(: like the 0 1w in Aachen emerge. The 

drta('hmenl had lU do more of the work 

of running the rit)'. handpicking tht' offi-

' ials at ctll kvcls, not only at the top, ~nd 

~upcrvb;ing those who did qualify since, if 

they were up to the new standard of political pmity, the r ha nt es were their other 

qualific·ations were weak. R yles' prize appointee was Dr. Konrad :\denaucr, who 

had hcen Ohnburr~etmrister of Cologne 

from 19151019:13 when the Nazis forced 

him out. He had hcen in jail for severa l 

months after the 20 July 1944 allcmpt to 

assassinate Hitler and, aftc1· his release, was 

prohibited from returning lO ( :ologne. To 

wait out what was left of the war, Adenauer had settled in Rhoendorf on the right 

hank of the Rhine five miles downstream 

from the Rcmagen b1idgc. 1 n his !'C\'entieth 

)'Car, he had done poorly at choosing a refuge from the war hut brilliantly in setting 

thr stage for a late politi cal rareer. When 

the bridgehead front passed Rhocndorf, 

milit<~r}' ~ovrrnmcnt hrought him to Co-
THE RHINELAND C:Al'vlPAJGN, 1945 

lognc <1n d r einsta lled him as Oberbuerge?'-

meister, in secret for the first two mon ths 

l>etause his three SOliS were in the 

Wehrm ac t.~11 

Cologne dem<mstrated on an ominously 

large scale something t ha t had been observed earlier a t Aachen : the helplessness 

and hopelessness of a city cut off from its 

liiclines to the outside. The city admioistratiou , Germa n and American, could do 

pnletically nothing about getting the railroads, the powr.r grid , or the food distribution system fw wtioning again. Fortuna tely, 

the breakdowns in these services antedated 

the occupa tion, a nd the civilians h ad adjusted to them. The cella i'S conta ir)eu stocks 

of food and coal, and the city had sevent ylive wood-burning trucks. Electric·ity c:ame 

in sporadically over the German grid . 

\o\1heu it was on, the civilians could tune 

in their radios and hear the German stations across the Rhine broadcasti11g tha t the 

new chief of police in Cologne was a 

"cocky Jew," that the Ame t;cans were forcing women to bury the dead dug out of 

the rubble, and Lha l hundreds of Negroes 

were standing guard over German civilians 

and rotTing them Lo clean up the streetS.

30 

T he detachment believed tha t the populalion llenefired by being able al last lo compa re Lhe Nazi pt•opaganda with reality. 

Third Army's 1Oth Armored Division 

ente red Trier on 1 March, and Detachment F2G2 moved in two days laLe r. Lying 

rl0sc to the West W a ll. Trier had been 

under a rtillery fire and air homha rdment 

for lltOnths. The people, except ror about 

"" K ouracl i\denaucr, Eri1111 enmg.erz I !N!"J- 1953 

(Sllillgn rt: Deutsche Vcrlags·Anstall', 1965), p. 

15- 22. 

10 ( l l Hist Rpt, First Army, i\CofS G- 5, 1- 31 

Mua· ~5, i11 SH AEF G- 5, 17. 11 , J acket 9. (2) 

5th r nrormntion and Historical Service, T he Re· 

lwhilitnlion of Cologne, Gcrm11ny, 16 May 115, 

iu C~ ll l fi les. 

191 

4,000 of the normal 88,000, had eithet' 

moved east or gone into hiding. Electricity 

a nd wa ter were out. When the detachment, 

under LL Col. S. S. Sparks, a rrived they 

[ound tha t most liie h ad settled in the 

Kemmel Caserne ( ba rracks) on the heiglt ts 

above the city, w hich w a<; beginning to fill 

up with displaced persons fil tering in from 

the easL. Tn the first week, Spcuks appointed 

Friedrich Brdtenbac:h as rivil leader in 

T rier- a voiding the mm·e dangerous title 

of Buergermeisler- and registered tJ1e population , which by the time the registration 

was completed had risen to n early six thousand. As long as the count did not go above 

ten thO\ISand, the city promised to be in 

relatively good shape for the time being. 

People who stayed bad stocked u p on food 

in advance, and rdthough the city was 80 

to ~0 percent destroyed , the housing was 

adequa te. The b ig problem, as it would be 

in n1ost heavily bombed cities, was wa ter. 

The only reliable sources were three Army 

chlorination tanks a nd a trickle still running in an aucien t R oman aqueduct. W hen 

the detarhment discovet ed it could get a 

little electricity by tapping the German 

power g rid , it began work on getting the 

big pumps tha t served the city water system hack in operation . The reservoir and 

the pumps were in good condition, but 

troubles soon began t.n multiply. Fit'St the 

electric lines serving the pumps were dead. 

The trouble was eventua lly traced lo a 

switch h ouse that an Army photo group 

had deC'ided to convert into a baggage 

room. When the pumps were turned on, 

th e leaks began to show. The geysers in 

tile streets were spectacular, hut worse were 

the breaks deep untlet·grotmd which were 

har<.l to locate a nd repa ir. R estoring the 

water );ystem would ta ke months. For a 

while, wha t was left of Lhe city seemed 

likely to htrn up before the wa ter was 
192 THE U.S. Y IN T HE O C:C:UP/\TTO OF GER1\1 ANY 

ConLENz, I\ lARCil 1945. I n the bnrkground tht• forts at l:.:hrcnbreitsteiu. 

turned on. Careless soldiers and roving displaced persons ntUsed so many fires that 

the army had to send in the I 240tlt Fire 

fighting Pla toon to help the local volunteer 

fire department. The first day without a 

fire was 29 arch which, Sparks noted in 

his report, was also the first day the displaced persons had not been allowed to 

leave the Kemme! Ca'ieme. ~• 

The dclarhments a t Cologne and Trier 

did not have to contend with enemy sheU-

•• Hist Rpt, Third Army, ACofS C- 5, 1- 31 Mar 

45, in SHAEf' G- 5, 17.1 0, Jacket IJ. 

fire or counteratlarks. At Coblcnz, on the 

Rhine nt the mouth of the Mosel, tlw sjtuation was different. Lt. Col. M. W. Reed 

took Detachment G2 in behind the assault troops on 20 Ma rr h. H e opened h is 

headquaners in a hospital on the bnnk of 

the M osel near where the as.-;;.wlt boats 

landed a ncl moved to 1 he city ha ll in the 

a fternoon after it wns secured. The inhabitants we re even less a problem lhan a t 

Trier. 1 n the fi rst plate there were only 

about 4,000 people in the city, and few 

ventured oul to hring their complaints or 

reque.<;L<; for passes to the detachmen t. Gcr-
Ti lE RH I :'\EL.\~D \:'11P:\1G ~, 1!1<}5 193 

1\ltLITARY t:ovER N~ NT llr·:ADQUMt'mRs, Conr..r.Nz 

man forts on the heighh at £hrenllrcitstcin 

a1 ro:s the Rhine kepi nearly the whole dty 

unucr observation, and anything I hal 

moved, even individual persons, drew nrtil· 

lcry or sniper fire. At nig ht, from the gun 

platform of Fort Constantine in the city, 

the tletnd1merH rould watrh one artillery 

duel going on downstrcl'lm between First 

.\1'111 )' and the Germans around the Remagcn bridgehead nncl another closer al hand 

uplHream between Third i\rm)"s artillery 

anu the un~ at t::h r·cnl>reiL<;lein. Overhead 

the tracer and mortar fire, <'lC'C't)mpanicd 

h}' the thunder of the . \meriran howitzers 

firing farthc•r hark, made a pcrmnncnt fireworks di"play. On the :?5 th, a German 

patrol raiJed downtown Cohlcnz and sent 

some civilians and a smaller U.S. patrol 

running to the city hall for· sa ety.a~ 

Bcfor<" the end of March, 150 detachments were dcployecl in Germany, almost 

two-thirds of the tott\1 EC::\D strengt h . 

Nintl1 and Third :\rmics had committed 

all the detachments assigned to them, ex-

<:cpl fol' some E detachme-nts. Not all of 

the."ic d<·l ctrh men ts would I )C needed perm a-

"' Ibid. 
194 THE U.S. \R~IY l i'\ T HE OC<.:UPATlO . OF GE UI.\~Y 

IH'IItly in the Rhineland, hut nil wcr<· husy. 

H and I dr1arhments wen~ holding areas 

three :1tlu four times the size they had l)('cn 

dc:;ignccl fot•, llld an averngl' small town 

was getting only abouL four u•• fi ve <lnys 

of actual military government in n month. 

To hdp the detachments keep order, 

among the tmops ;md displac-ed per~ons as 

muf' h a~ among the Germans, the armies 

<'Onvcrtccl field artillery bannlions to security ~lliltd duty and began au1h01•i'l.ing 

them ll> nppoint Buergermeisll!rS and post 

the procl;unations and rdinan ccs. ~ '!'he 

speed of 1 he advance threatened to make 

EC.\D's predicted personnel shortage an 

imminent reality; and the War Department's temporary overstrength nllotmcnt, 

whi<'h reached SHAEF in late February, 

did not I'ClH It EC.\D until M.~r h. Then 

the offit.:et-s and enlisted mcu still had tO 

h . rouno, tl'aincd, and organized into dctathmcu ts. One modest piece of good luck 

helped. O n 22 February, EC:\D opened 

a ll<'hool at Romill y Sur Seine lo give Air 

Forrc untl airborne offil'C11l I wo weeks' 

t•·ni uing in military government li ni»OJL .\t 

the end of the first course, nineteen gra(lualcs tequcstcd lransfen$ tnto the divi~io , 

having- been advised "without proselytizing 

111' J)I' misc.~'' how to go ahou1 il. In the 

<~t't ond mursc the school shifted to tl'uining 

hoth officer<> assigned lo EC.\D :.nd ECAD 

<~n li l<:d nwu nominated for• lidd commi.ssiows as second lieutenants und er the recent 

allot rncnl."' 

Slwrt hanckd or not, military govern-

" ( I ) Hqs, ECAt), sub: Activities o£ thr ECAD, 

I :11 Mnr '15, ] May 45, in SHAEF C-5, 17 . 12, 

Jnckl'l 6. (2) Hqs, Niuth Army, Bi-weekly 

C:ASUM, 21 ~lar 45, io SH ARF 0 - 5, 17 1·1, 

Jat·ket 6. ( 3) Jiqs. V Corps, ACofS C 5, to CO, 

Milit.1ry Govc-rnmrnt Security C~oard~, !IIIIth 11A 

Un, ~11h: MG Opm, 15 1\lnr •15, in V Cor11s 

205 5.5. 

ll q~, g(:AD, Mlh: Ac1ivi1ics ol 1hc ECAD, 

mem wa.s propelled onto center stage iu 

March t 945. T he war would nol wait. 

Training and practice were over ami the 

real on.:upatiou was 0 11. The n<tlion llwt 

had almost conq ucrcd Europe wa:-; being 

brought :1s low as any of its victims hnd 

been. Germany's long-range future, if it 

had one, was undet ideo; the immediate 

future W<l.'l in the hands or the G-S's and 

military ~ovcrnmcnt detachments, and 

even the)' wet'<' unsure of what it was to 

be. For the moment, whitt they saw most 

dearly WCI'C the approaching shadOWS of 

two relemlc·sR companions of war, disease 

and hunger. 

The G etmans wt•rc not starving, yet. lu 

the cities, reduced populations and rclla •· 

sto< ks coulhinccl w rnake lhe shorl-trrm 

outlook detcpliv<'ly bright. Se.1rchcs in the 

hnsemenl$ or ab<lmloned dwellings regularly turned \lp sma ll reserve'>, mostly potatoes and homl:-cauned vegetahlc.'i. In 

Germany nmu· milling was still a local industry, mid the mill!'i usuall y had some liltground grain OJ\ ha11d, which could lie 

extended hy sttl ing the cxtranion trllC up 

to ~~0 p<'rrcnl. !-iomc places had lopsided 

surplu ·cs. 1\lzt')', i11 the fe rtile Rhine plain, 

had 5,000 c·xccss hms of potatoes but Jlll 

meal other tlmu hon;e meat und not nu~t h 

of Lhat. One 1 bing was certain ever}'wherc: 

the GcrnmnR W<'l'C l>l·tt<~r ofT in arrh I tl·15 

than they wen: likely to he again any time 

soon. T h-e Rhind md, like all weslern Ocrmany, wns a food deficit area. Norma lly, 

the hnlf of lite Rhineland south of the 

P.fosel imported a half million tons of 

fbOu every day, cqui,·;llem to one Cifty-<·ar 

trainload; hut 11<1 lt'ains were rUJming, nor 

wns thl'rc enough tr~tnspo lation lo ensure 

the movement nf lora! produce. :\ SUt V<')' 

1-26 Fch 45 and 1- 31 Mar •t5 , 17 Mar ~5 nml 

7 May -15, in SIIA IW C-5, 17. 12, .J acket li. 
'1 HE RIII NEL.\:\'0 C: lP GN, Hl15 

~; lwwt•d ~ufTtcirrH livcst01 k to provide half 

the minimum mont hi}' nwnt tonnage; 

t•nottgh rltir·kcns to suppl y onr egg p<'r 

pctson pt:r month, "provided 300,000 pcoplt• do 11 0t like eggs' '; enough milk to give 

C<•rh ,·hild under ten a pint a wc<:k; and 

enough butter to provide each tonsumer 

with a h;tlf pound a month. 

'J'hc statistics, however, were Jess chilling 

tlwn what the detachments had rcpc>rted 

clul'ing thci( ma rch to the Rhine. fn the 

t•outttryside, fields were unplowed and 

pr·netir.ally no one was at work on the 

farms. The young men were gone ; the rcgistnnions showed th at 90 pCl'("Cill or l he 

mnlcs wcr•c ()Vt:r fifty years old. The fm·eign 

workcn; and prisoners of wnr who had 

made up the bulk of the agricultural labor 

force quit nnd took to the roads as soon 

as the front passed. There were too few 

or:~c.-;. 'rhey, like the mcu, had been 

tlraflctl into the W eltrmarltt. Finally, thousa ndi: of aacs of land were mined and too 

dangerous to work. 

Famine lurked in the unplowed lklds. 

~lilitnry government told the Gcl'nmus that 

wlwt tltC}' expected to cat during the next 

winter· thC)' 'vould have to raLo;e themselves. 

For whnl it was wonh, the a rlllic.S ordcr'Cd 

tht troops uot to usc locnl fC>od, and militarr government tried to pcrsu;~dc the forc·igu worker~ to stay on the farms. J n a 

more practical vein, SHAEF in~ tru d the 

am1y gn,ups to restrict the farnw•-s' movements as little as pos.<>iblc. t\ s a r<:sult, n1ost 

unit:~ limited the curfew to the how · between sun!'cl and sunrise, and in the J.alldku~iu m<my allowed free circulation 

throughnut the Kreu during daylight. The 

!~peed of the drive to the Rhine brought 

one lllH'xpl.'rtcd dividend : the retreating 

Gc:rman$ did not have time to get a ll their 

lt •s t~s arrO!$S the river. By the end of the 

montll the :Hmies had rounded np sc r<~l 

195 

1 hous;wd .md ''ere tuming them o\·er to 

the rmer-s.~~ Undl'l' the pressure o( the 

wa r and existing polic)' restrictions, militarr 

government could nol tlo more. To provide 

f0r ac·utc cmcr ndC"~ and for the clisplaccd 

person_,;, 12th t\nny Croup moved 110,000 

tons of relief supplies into Germany dur·ing 

l\farrh ; by the end of the month Third 

, \rmy alunc had issued over 7.000 long tons 

of food to di!iplnc:cd cr<:o s.~a 

r n rold logic, hunger was the Germans' 

problem. ll could be argued that whatever 

hefeiJ them wns their own doing. But the 

ricketts-in rnirrOcH'gan ism, which causes 

typhus, did not trouble itscH to distinguish 

between vinor anti loser. It accompanied 

w:tr hut \Vfl.'~ not C.OJH rned with justice or 

with causes, nny more than was the body 

louse on whkh it traveled. On the drive 

across th<' Rhineland dl the am1ies disc·ovcrcd cases of typhus. The 6th Army Group 

found several in a ramp for R ussian fc> rcetl 

laborers ncar Snarhr·uccken. Some innl::tLCS 

hnd wnndel'('d off, and, predictably, the 

disease also began appearing in surnlunding DP camps. In Cologne a small epidemic had bcg\m from two separate l;Oun:cs 

before the . \merkans arrived. In J nnuary, 

a do' tor and s<·,-c:ral SS guards csrortiug 

political pri<~oncrs eMtward had fallcu ill 

and entered the hospital in Cologne. In the 

confusion of war and the continuous bombing, they were at the hospitnl two vcck:~ 

"'( l ) Hisr Rpt, Gth AGp, ACofS G-5, 1- 3 1 

Mar 45, in SHAEF 0-5, 17.18, Jacket 4. (2) 

Hist Rpr, fir~t Army, ACofS G-5, 1-3 1 Mnr ·15, 

in SHAE1~ C- 5, 17.11, jacket 9. (3) Hist Rpt, 

Ninth Amly, ACofS G-5, t- 3 t l\lar 45, in SII1\F.F 

G-5, 17.14, J nckct 6. (•I) Hist Rp1, Third Army, 

ACofS C-5, 1 3 t l\l nr 4:1, iu SHAEF G-5, 17.10, 

J acket 4. ( 'i) 5th I nfoml:uion aud Historical Scr-

''ite, suh; Poo(l .1nd Agriculture, XXIII Corp5 

Area, H j un ·15, in Fifteenth i\rmy 11 !)-2. 

" Hqs, 12th ACp, 1\CofS C- 5, to CofS, sub: 

Prcscnl Status of Militnry Government, in SHAEF 

G-5, 17.l6, jnckct(l. 
I!>G THE U.S .. \R~IY 11\ THE OC:C:U ATlO~ OF GER~lANY 

before their cases were diagnosed as t~ phus. 

Dr then they had infec ted severa l nurses 

and others on the hospital stafT. The second 

source was the Klingelputz prison where, 

owi ~ to overcrowding a nd ncglcrl, the 

Germans did not detect the disease until 

after it had passed from the prisoners to 

the g uards and been carried outSide the 

walls. Having seen at first hand what the 

disease rould do, the army and army g roup 

G- 5's reported that they rould not prevent 

its sprrad to the troops with the resources 

they had, and SH.\EF issued orders nmking public: health a command respon .. 'lihility 

and the concern of all U.S. rncdiral offi cers 

in Germany. SHt\Ef also ucgan shipping 

in enoug h van:inc to inoculate all displaced 

persons. ETOUS.\ , t•hargcd with ma intaining the n>mmunications zone across 

France, scl up a rordon sanitaire on the 

Rhine ft·om the Netherlands to the Swiss 

border <~ntl a llowed no civilians to cross 

without an examination and DDT dusting. 

Pcn;ous going west into France were dusted 

with DDT at the border control stations. 

At the end of the month authorities were 

far from ccrt<tin that the disease was being 

stopped. Colognt• still had 185 suspected 

cases, and the re was no way to isolate carl·icrs am ong the clisplnced persons, short of 
TliE RHI Lt\ '\D C:.\ l\ IP.'\ fG:\, ~)45 

a rigid and prohal>l} uncnforreablc sta ndfnsl order. a; 

Monnment.r, Fi11 e ll·rts, a11d Arl'hives 

The M.on11menls, Fine J\rts, and t\rrhi\'es branch ( 1\1Ft\&f\ ) had not tleve.lopeJ even to 1 he modest proportions envisioned itl ea rl)' 1M4-. SH.\E F nnd 12th 

Army Gro11p had i\IFA&A sections in the 

G- 5, anti each "E" dctarhmenL had space 

for one ?vi 1":\ &.\ offirer. In the advance 

in March and April 1945, the armies employed one officer apiece on detarhetl service from the E detachment<> ~ On the 

other hand, the monuments multiplietl as 

the front moved into Germany. The monuments, including archives, in the SH AEF 

official list totaled 1,055 for all Germany. 

By 1:\te March, 12th Army Group had 

identified 600 in the path of its advance 

alone. SHA_!l.F had listed 15 monuments 

in :\ achcn. After the city was captured, the 

number rose to 66. The li!>t made no provi-

«ion at aJl for art rollections, libraries, and 

archives evacuntcd from the cities and <~­

I'O:>ited in remote places to keep them safe 

during the bombing; and 12th Army 

Grol.lp had fouml or knew about 11 5 items 

in this categMy before the end of 1\lan:h.'w 

Because of the nntut·e of the war, even 

having many more MFA&!\ offirers could 

not have prevented the lllosl extensive 

losses. T he bombs had generally done their 

wot·k days, weeks, or months before the first 

" ( I) H ist Rpt, I :!th 1\Gp. /\CofS C- 5, 1-:l l 

Mar ~5, in SHi\EF C- 5, 17. 16, J ackl'l IJ. (2\ 

HLqt Rpt , Cith ACp, 1\CofS G- 5. 1- 31 M<~r 45, 

in SHAEF G- 5. 17.1fl. J;lckt l 5. (:\ )5th l nformntion and 1-listorit l Service, The Rchnl1llitation 

of Colognl', Gl'l' l ll;Hiy, lli May •15, in CMH fi les. 

"' USFET, Gc1H!ral Hoard, Stud y No. :16. 

"'' !list Rpt, 12th ACp, AGofS G- 5, -~ 1 Mar 

·15, in SHAEF C- 5, 17. 16, .f a<:kct k, 

197 

. \mel'icans appeared on the scene, aud 

MfJ\&A had left to itself the sad task of 

assessing what had sut•vived and what was 

gvne for good. In the old rily of Trier, for 

instance, the only structures found undamaged were the Roman ruins. T he l.mmbcr·s 

had obviously tried tt) a,·oid the churches 

l>ut were only partially successful. The 

cathedral, the oldest omunc~que l.'hurch 

in Gcr·many, had taken one dirert hit, and 

the bell had shaken loose and fa ll en 

thwugh the tower. The Liebfraucnkirche, 

an ea rly Got hir stntclurc dating fmm thr 

th.irteenth renluTy, 'vas badly damaged, 

and the c.ighteenth century Pau linuskirchc 

had a hole in its roof. In IJoth structures, 

all the windows wer'c blown out. The most 

l h<tt could be done was to make the l>uildings weal herl ight to prevent adJcd damage 

from the clements. 1 n buildings so old, 

whatever was left was valu:-thle, ancl clo~e 

inspection revealed thal some things, such 

as the paintings in the interior pillars of 

the Licllfrauenkirche, had sutvived pr;wtically intact. oo~ 

Muenster, fifty miles e;u;l of the Rhine, 

was the only city in Ninth .\ rmy's pat h on 

the first leg of its march across the north 

Gcrm<lll p lain, It was homhcJ and burned 

on S11nday, 25 1\'l arch 1945. Capt. Louis 

13. LaFar~e, I\i nth .\rmy 1v£F:\ &:\ olficcr, 

WI'OLC iL<:. epitaph: 

The greater part of the old city of Muenster is gone for good. It is little better than 

rubble with the towers of the medieval 

<'hurchcs alone standing to mark wha t the 

<'ity onre was. All the fine fourteenth to eigh- 't~fl nth century buildings arc gorw. 

Tlw r:1thcclrnl sustained direct hits on the 

western porrh and the nave, and an unexploded bomb lies near the saC'risty door. Tile 

nave is rooness. :mel mud) of the north wall 

is gone. T he south face remains ~ta nding and 

''' Hist Rpt, ThirJ Army, /\CofS G 5, 1- :! J M a r 

•l!i, iu SHAEF G- 5, 17. 10, Jarket •1. 
1 r IIJ '11-lr. t '."'\ \R~l\' 1:\ I HI: O( .C l ' P\110'\ OF GE I \'\\ 

• Ul Jll i'litll'h lllliOIH'IH•d flw WWt•t-., ha\·e 

1<1\t tlwu rook fhc- moa·c pn·d ou:. lliOVl':lblc 

propl·tt) ~ lu irkc·cl up in the bottom l>torr 

uf tht• tm,t·r~. Thr appm:tchcs w both towers 

an· 'o tOH't eu with 1 ubblc th.1t the It casu res 

mr ~'' ~aft· ac; they ('an be. 

!'her<· i<i lillll· thnt c:m b<· done at present. 

'rtw D ullljlfob.lt [prior] n:spomibll' for• the 

tn•a\llll' j, dc•ad . • md a nrw Ollt' lt.ts not brt'll 

appointed. 'J lw :m·hitt•ct is old, ill, ab:.cnt. 

ami IISI'Ir·'~. and a new nppniutrnrnt must 

lw made. The bi,hop and tht> vknr general 

hnvt• migrated to the villagt' t,f S,·udenhorst. 

;trill th(' on ly ,,.,idrnl canon who had concer·n 

in the mntil•r is nn old man of sorucwhal 

d<•ft•:t 1 t vic•ws. 11 

1

1mh;t111 )' the lca:-t c< ~~at')' rao,;11alties 

wt•rc tlw ao;tk~, of whid1 t h<' Rhinrlnnd 

h:ICI .t l.trgc uumhcr. ~loxt. gl'ncra lly loratc•d in isolated -:pm.;, had 'lllll<' thr ough 

tlw bon thin~ well; hut t·a-,tle.; hav<· military 

·'''<>' i.llituh, and '\Oillctim<.'" thl· artillc~ nmld not rco;i-.t Ia~ ing in :r rcw I'OIIllcl . ('!as·-

! IN ~o W('t'e llii1101'Cd to han• fahuiOLLS 

wine t dl.rrs, '' hirh nMtlc 1 hrm m:1gnets for 

tlrir-..;t} troops. The}' al~o made attracti\'c 

t'ommand posto; and lrillch, nftr' n the onlr 

one." for mile.-; around. U nfonunatcl)•, he-

(.,111~<' I hC') WC'I C' I{CilCI'a Jl y '" ft· fr ()Ill })(}tnhing-, tlw Crrman-. had dmrt• nothing to 

pruh·r 1 the ra..;tl<.~ or tlrtir c oiiiCilh ancllwd 

u"cd them to "lore a rt work .\llcl archives 

cv.uuatcd from 1 he <. itic-.. From c" per icnn:. 

~ r r. \ &:\ offiCI.' ~ ranked thC'Ill :I'! the lc:i~l 

sa ft• dcpo<.itoric:-, aftc·r ordinarr rountry 

01 ~cs and rar lrdow dntr'( he!'\, tnonnslcries, and ho pitals . . \ft c r 1 hr. expr.l'it·rwt~s at 

Rimhur·g Castle and a raslk of lhe Dl'utschrmlt•t~ at Skt-sdiJrf ntar .\.11 hrn, where 

:r divi,inn had '>CI up it<> romm.md po<.t and 

mo\ rd va lu;tlllc rn r·,·<·cl pant•lling frum tht: 

•\ ;\l'ht:n Rathaus ( cit)' h a ll ) out into the 

wc.rtht·r, 1111ih had hlTll tJrdcred to invcn-

" SIIM·:r c 'l, \IFA&A St•c. to A<.:ors G-5, 

'uh: Rt·porl on 1\lfA&t\ for rhr ~lonrh of April 

1!11 5. in SIIAI·:F (; r,, 1:10.:!1. 

lOJ) all' .tlu.thlc·, .1nd ... ror(' them un<kt lm I. 

and ke\' ; hut "'I< h 111 dt·t~ ''err noturiou'h 

hard L~ ('II fort l' in a fl uid situation.' • · 

One cn-.tl<- which had not cscapeu tlw 

a ir raido;; wa'l the Sr hftm . \u gu,tu o;hut~. 

located in Bnwltl. . \ugu.,lu'lhu rg had lll·cn 

a fine t::>.amplc o( baroque :u chitct t111c, 

c omplctc "it h .r g t.rnd stairra...;c, c h.lpcl. 

gan.lcn,, and out I) in~ lodge. On I 0 Oc. 

tohcr 1944, ,, Kingk homh dcstrO\'cd the 

north wing. On 18 Decem her, · srvc·ml 

mh~ lrad hit nrar the ('hapel, and the 

onc.:ussion~ smaslwd the pll\stcr l1:t1'0CJ trc· 

and rococ·o interior. On 4 March, Lwo days 

before th<' c·astlr fdl into \mcr t~tn hands, 

tht·cc artillery shell'> struck the main l>uiltliog. T C! ti1110il)1 tahn later incliratcd that 

no Gcnnan tmops had hcen in or ncnt• 1 he 

lmildjng. One -.lwll blew a ('OI'Iler orr the 

roof. The other '''o d etonated insidt• and 

did cx1e11'i' t• d.un.t~c. Before the milita ry 

govcmmcnt dttat hmcnt arrived in Brrwhl, 

troop~ bivouacked 111 the Schloss and 

caused more damage. /\gain iL was a cast• 

of lr}'ing t() salvnge something from the 

wreckage. D<·tad11ncnt II 0 2 found au 

architect, .1 ma.,tcr <.trpcntcr, :~ nd a dozen 

carpenters and lahurcrs and put them to 

work patching th<' roof, toring 11p tlw 

wall<>, a nd putting- rarclhoard in the windows. ~J:ucrial had to be scavenged fi'Oill 

other rui11., i11 the l'ity. The detachment station ed 1 wo Cr1'111a11 polil'emcn 011 the 

!,"l·ou nds, hut tlt<'y hncl no nuthol'ity ovrr 

U.S. soldkrs who I'Ontinued Lo go in a nd 

out as they pll•ascd.'" Augustw;burg sccmrd 

Jjkely to illlfTn the ..;amc treatment as Rimburg. 1\lnth ,\rmy (; 5 had inspcncd Rim· 

.,_ ( I I Ibid. ( 2) lli~t Rpt, 12th AC1>. ACofS 

C-1, 1-28 Ft•h II, in SHAf:F' C- 5, 17. 16, jMkrl 

6. 

" Dct II L>2, wh : Survey of D:unaqe 10 Schlou 

.' ugustt~bu g, Rrporl on ~l ra\u es Taken 10 SMc-

~ua rd ll. 27 ~l.lr l'i. in SII AF.F C: ~. 130.5. 
THE RH.JNE.l.AND C:\t\lPAIGN, 194·5 199 

~lFA&A PosTS RooM rN \Vr1rcH MusEt.:liJ PlEcEs ARE STORED 

burg Castle ~gain in late February and 

found the furniture and arL work scattered 

a bout, some thrown into the mo;u, and the 

lot·ked rooms hroken into a nd rifled." 

Lt. Col. Vlebb, SHAEF's 'MFA& A adviser, toured the two BritL-sh a rmies and 

U.S. Nimh Army in March. Pillage and 

wanton destruction, he concl uded , were at 

least a combined effort, being a!; prevalent 

among the Dritjsh and Canadians as among 

the Americans. At Juelich, he saw slashed 

pictures and cases of hooks from the 

" Journal, Ninth Army, ACoCS G- 5, 1- 28 Feb 

•15, in SHAEF C- 5, 17. 14, Ja ~. 

Aachen Ubnrry broken open and thCLr contents strewn about by souvenir hunters. 

:\ware that the prevailing mood was not 

one of kindliness toward Germans or their 

property, he pointed out that the Ger·rnan 

collecLions also contained looted art work 

whic:h the Allies had pledged to rco;tore to 

their rightful owners, and these pieces too 

were threatened. SHAEF G-5 fon'larded 

Webb's re port, adding, " It is appreciated 

that <1 ce rtt~in amount of 'toughness' may 

he desir<tblc in occupied territory and it is 

noL suggested that we should instruct our 

troops to act in Germany as they have usually in liberated territory; nevertheless, it 
:lOO ' 1'1 II ~ U.s. \R.\1' 1.'\ T i lE O< < L P \110\ OJ' c:LR \I\ \Y 

j, itnpcut.ull th 11 \llu·d ltoop' 'lwuld nut 

dc·.;rtl:ttl' t hun ht· ... 111d ... lwuld nul dc•..tro~ 

\\OrJ-, or .111 loolnl r111111 Cllll .tfli('.;;."'' [I 

"'''· in f.tt t, nut .1 ~ood time w atlcmpt 

to t till\ t·•t tltr 11 UlJI' into ~u. udi.tn'> of Germ.m c uhua t·. ( :c·ncr.tl !)mith JM"'-Cd the 

\\'chh tcpmt 1111 to the: Mill\ group.; with 

the 'liKhtl) c·quivm .al t lllllllll'llt that looting 

had to lw t·ono;ickn·d .1 lc._o; clc:.pirablc 

ofTc•n.,c· on l'llt'tll) trrr itw) tha11 1111 lihera tc:d tc1 ritnr) hut ou~ltt to Ill' dist ou raged 

rcw lltt• sukc or 1111' re .. titutioll poliC"y and 

''to int prc:;'> 1111 tht• illllftiJit,\lltS the fat t that 

their < tHICJli<'I'<H'S a t'<· supt'rior· to them not 

only i11 military prowc''-S l>11t in thcir moraJ 

slatrdard<;."'" 

Tht• /)fl Flontl /1r~ins 

In Janu.u ) JCJ~'i. tlw IWC:IIt)-ninc Pol<!:\ 

in the (,Imp .11 Br.atHl \\Crc· the onlr displ"n·tl fWJ. Oil" hdd h~ II \ EI' in Germ:my. On il \l.uclt, the atmy groups 

reported 145,000 0 11 h.uld in centers <tnd 

45,000 ' hippl'd out to Ft .111c c, 13clgium, the 

Nct hcrl.lllds, and l .m.t'tllhcmrg. the Iauer 

mo.;;tly t c'IMII i;ltnl c ititcn~; of thc::.c countriN hut ,lf,o i111 l11din ~ c.t'>tt'm Europeans. 

i\ 11 )' th t~u.;and" more had not reported to 

I he cc:ntcrs or had 11111 } c·t hlTII cvanmtcd 

fmnt the· divi.,icm ar•t·a .... 'J'Iw number of 

DPs on ha nd ltacl dnublnl in tltc lasl week 

of the 1110111 h and, whl'rcvcr the R It in c was 

l'ros.o;ed, lllllltiplicd with every 111ile thal the 

fmnl llloved ('11~1. By tilt· time lite Rcmagen 

ltricigchtad att.ti11cd 11 11 art•a of fifteen 

" t.lcmo, II F <.~ ~~ • .MFA&A, for Ch, I nter· 

ual AlTair~ llr, ~uh · Pill.tl!t llrt<.l W.mton Damage 

hy Allird l'rnnp,, 211 ;tr 15; ~Jerno, SHAEF 

G- 5. I Olt'llt.ll All a in llr, lor r. I, suh : Pillag<' 

01nd :~nton Oant.t'lt' !.)· lhc:<.l 'I roOt>~, 22 M a r 

15, in Sll t\Jo: r (, 1. 2•,o '2l. 

• ~l cmo, Sll \l . C'ofS, fen C:(;'s, 21, 6, 12 

1\Cp~. ~uh. I ootartl( lty Alht•d Troop~. 28 Ma r 

15, in USrE I S(.S 250 I. 

.;;qu.uc mill''• 11 wllt.tiuc·d i, iOIJ J)JI, ~ {·, 

rCir CH'J~ "l(ll.lrt' milt• l.lf..Ctl. 

1 he itll<"fligt'IIC I' l<'fXIII' nf the flll'\ iOil\ 

fall had hct·n • onct 1. Tht· (in"'·"'' h.,d 

1110\'Cd lllolll) fontd J,\J,(II Cl"' IIlii uf tiH' 

Rl1incland. 'I he numh~ , of pn n th rcc m·-

ered, tltctdo ct·. "''' Jc.,, th.111 h.tl( tlw tut.tl 

th.tt h.td been the11· •• ~ l,ttt· ,,., ~t ptrml • t 

1 !H-1. wltic h wa .. lm k}' ... inc·e thc- DP pwb· 

I em e\'Cil \\it It t ItO\(.' wlto WCI C Jd l \\ i\'\ i·~­

grr than h.td hccn a nti< ipated. t. J()d~ was 

hugely surprised wltc11 tlw DPi ig11 orrd 

SH .\f.F's nppcals tel st.tlHI fa st. Tlte DPX, 

however, hnd ex pt:rtc·tl 1 hose 0 11 f:ums, 

where lodging :ttHI l'ood wf·t·c: as:-urt•d, lo 

stay al least SC\'t•ral wc•ck'; tlwy lwei 11 0 1. 

Like the ntiH.:t'!;, 1 ht')' !tad t.l~ 1 to til(' wnds 

as soon as they ~1ww thq were lil!l'ratrd. 

O n hit ~ t 1<'~, 011 wa!{tll1', ami on fou l, cJj,_. 

placed persons , ,, ranwd ,1\\ ,, )' r c lllll tltt· 

rural di.,tri<"l" .11 the 'amc ti11w oth<'h ''rrr 

leaving t O\\ ~ aucJ dtif, " '·" '), the Ru"-

'>ians <~nd Pole-. c'pccialh , hc.uling no pl.wc 

in particular other than .twa> frnm whet c 

they had hcen. Cut loos(' ltnm thr Getman 

ccononn- and unable to prm ide for them-

:-clve-, th <'}' hcc tnlC the: '"·"'l{l'S of the first 

U.S. unit thcr met. In a f.tirl~ t)'pk .ll in· 

stance, the 5th Infantry Division, on one 

day, 27 ~farrh , found It)() IW:. in tltrct' 

towns in its scctm, 400 mor<' on the road-. 

behind the front, and anotht·• :HJO in the 

area un cove•·cu i11 the day's advanc·e 

together, enough Lo fill a ~I)O -s iY. C rantp. 

.\sseml>l y c·<•nteJ-s run l>y the nnnks quickly 

rc;tchcd populations of 10,000 or more. 

Western Europea ns 1·ould hr kept tllO\'ing 

toward home, but tln 12 J\Ltrdt SII.\EF 

dosed the border to thr Pole.,, w•o; ian ~. 

;u1d other ca-.tcru uropcans rur rc.tr of 

wrecking- the alrrad) wc<tl- I· rctwh Ct'Oil· 

omy. The e;,-;tcrn EuropC:tll'-, \\lit) made 

up more th.ln h.1lf ()( all the J)J>,, l~t·tl'. th cr 

hct· <~me :111 UIMntidpatcd lung-tt•rm r<'.;pon· 
THE RHINELAND CA1 [PAI GN, 1945 201 

R ussiAN DPs PREPI\Rt·: M r-:At. IN CA111P AT TRIER 

sibiJity of the occupa tion for ces. Unanticipated too was Lhe am ount of care and 

supervision they needed. H omeless, wit hout 

jobs, knowing neither English nor Ge rma n, 

e la ted a t hcing free l>ut uncerta in about 

the future, sometimes restless, sometimes 

a pa lhetic, they caused problems in more 

than just feed ing, housing, and road-dearing, as the DPX sad ly discovered . SHAEF 

had proposed to turn the DPs over to 

UNRRA teams, but in March only seven 

leams appeared. T he H and I detachments did the work; they were som etimes 

reorganized with a doctor, U.S. or French 

welfa re workers, and J\llied lia ison offi cers 

attached, and often operated without assistance and as a sideline to their milita ry government assignments. 

T he two la rgest DP assembly centers 

estahlished d uring the Rhineland campa ign 

were at Bra nd, outside Aachen, and at 

Trier. Both were in former German army 

lmrracks. The Brand camp, afte r being 

used in the fa ll of 1944 for German refugees, had later been used as a hospital. 

Kemme! Caserne, ou tside Trie r, had been 

a German Stalag ( prisoner of wa r cmnp ). 

IL had no wa ter supply, and when first 

Army surveyed it on 7 M a rch it was pronounced too foul for a nything but emer-
202 Til ~ tJ.S. \IOIY I'\ T H E OC<.UP 10~ OF GERJ\ L\ .'\Y 

l{l'll< ~ ll~c·; II\' thc·n. hnwt\'lT, tilt• DPs wen: 

:111 j,·ing h) Lht• llulldrccb and thn<· was no 

11lhc•1• plowc to pul them. SnnH· t':tllll' 011 

[oot ; lllOSt W<:I'C IJm up;hl back h)' Slip ply 

trucks n·turning fro111 the l'runl. \Vi1h in 

days 13nllld IT<tc lwtl a Jlii[Hilaticlll of 

I [>,00(), 'I' I j('l' 12,000. The kl~i<IIIS, n utr h. 

and FH' Il' h could he !-.Clll at rn"' tlw border 

to'' as d lmmr as {;ISL as 1 hey an·in:d .. llld 

700 tn I.()Cl() ,, d.ty were ptoc <''-'<t·d thrvugh 

tl11· t·amp'<. \ftl'r SlL\EF du.;ccltht· [)()rclcJ 

to <·a.;tcr·u ~u ropcans, the Ru~.; ie~ns ancl the 

Pnks ht•c:ullC permanent inmate~"· l\ 1 aj. 

dvill B. YtJrlwcs, who W<ts willt FIC:2 

in 1\;wht'n, rcmrmllercd lhl'an vivid!)' whc11 

lw ws·otr lht• dctaduncnl's rt·port :1 ca ' 

later: 

lu Aachc·u thc·s·c were thousands of Rus-

"i:lu I )P~; . ... They lh·ed in a huf~t· ra.rernc. 

and It 11111~1 be said titer wc•n· (ihhy in th<> 

highest dq:(r(•e. T hey ruined the li!{hl wires 

P\'t'T\' tinw th"v wc·re installc·d · tf'lt•plwne~ 

''C'I'C 1 ippt•cl 01;1; windows wcr~ broken ns 

soou as tht:y 1\'c>rr inslaiiPd; fi t·c:s llt'okc out 

''al•ciduall:llly"; a liaison officer was ll turdt•n•d ; nnd the camp was in a con~tnnt slntc 

of dmos. The tactical troops assumed "respomibillty'' for tLe cilmp. They issued pnsxt•s 

C\t'r)' ;~ftt·nwon for a group of DPs tu vi<.it 

th.;> town. Thr visits \I'Cl'(' lootins:- expeditions. 'J'hc DPs would lea' c• tlw ra111p with 

CIHJll)' baJ>k<'IS and briekasc-. and rctum at 

nighllnll lond('(l down likr c•:uncls with all 

llHIIIIWI' of goods. 

l'vl urdrr~;, rapes. and robbcrir~ abounded. 

Sc•\rt·al Russians were pttl in prison, but ti t~ ·)' 

aust cl so tmtch trouble they hnd to be tut•ncd 

ovt•r to tlw penitentia l')' in E:tmwh. g, . .,,.y. thing wrts n111 on a hands-ofT kidglovc polic)'. 

whirh wns not conducive to clisciplitlt' .• : 

1 hircl . \rmy IJcgan ph ~Lo;i ng out 1 ht· ramp 

at Tril•t' after it cilplurcd Baumholdr•'. 

whil It h.td mwr ac comnludatcd SO,OOO 

Gl'rJH;an !mops .. md otllcl" Crll/'1111'1 in 1 he 

" lli'L H1H, l)(•l A- 210, 2 jod II, lto OMC:US 

:~ 11 10. 

osl'l .sncl Rhine valkys. S. S&t. C. ~1. 

Tipograph .':'\' thl! t<llllp at the hright o( 

the- ra 11qmig-n hd<ll'c ltctlcr arrommc>cla1 ions wcrl' fo t111 d; 

Tilt: Cantp 

Ili~ll una hill tw(•rlnoking Jlw l>li~!Jt~·d ri1y 

of T1·icr, 1 he ('amp consists of a nu111lwr of 

bleak ,gt·l'Y!>lUilt' barracks disposed nrouud n parade gl()nnd. /\l n distance tJlc huildiugl> 

still seem to 1 ct:lin M>IIIC nf their formct utili- tary pritllnt·'>~ :md llt~atness. Howcvc•r, uu 

do$et· in~pcrtiou till')' present a spertnclc of confusio11 and ltlllll:ll1 ckgradacion wltic·h i~ 

clifliruh to dc~cribc. 

Liter:tll)' lhollsttnds of fontll'l' Cl•t'tll:lll 

sl;l\·cs of nil nntionnli tic·s are constantly arriving or dcpnl'l in g. 'l'lw camp is adrninistcl•cd 

only b)· thn·e officers nnd six rnlistcd 1111'11. 

aided IJy two fl•tnalc• mt•mbcn; of tlw French 

• \n11y. 

S.11111:11 \ Conclitiou.-. 

Appt~llin ~. J\b SOI~I) as I arri,·ed r lwc·:ulll' 

unplcasamly aware of the stench of lnull:\11 

exc.:rc11u.•nt. I myself witnessed Ott' upnuts of 

the camp who in plain ,·iew were drfcc;tling 

in the rubb •q• in tltrir barracks. No fat<ili -

ties for b:1tlsint: oa· washing existed except foa· 

water h:uaiPd in con tainers from nearby tanks 

and ptt1a1ps. Tlw itt lcriors of the b~ti uings, 

excrpt one• wht•rr Frt•nc-h P\ Vs m•e hmss<'cl 

art· inclc; • .,nihnhlr filthy and disorderlr; all 

sorts of lillt••· fmtn !woken bo11les to :11 tic ·~ 

of clothing lir litl'l·\\ 11 ahout nn the floor. Tlw 

O<'cupants li\'1' in t·xtrcmdy t'IOwded and unsanitary <·onditillns a11d therc exists rt gr;~vc· 

da11gcr of clisc:l$(' of t•piclcmic proportiOn!\ a 

danger not only for tlwrn. but ;dso for t\mc1 ican tmops in tlw l'ily whc·re the occ· pant ~ an• a llowed t o circul:ttP. 

The on·upan ls for the most part hnv(• 11 0 

chan.r.:c of clothing und pitiably ft·w other be· 

longings. I .t s~UIIIC from the fact that lilany 

of them cwllinually sn·atrhcd thcmsch·cs that 

the exi!itt'll<'l' ll( bod)' lite is widespre~tcl . 

It must lw ndlllillc·d that tbe DPs tltc-tn· 

selves do littlt• or nothing to <lllt',·int(· theit 

own miserable ~ituntion. With a bit of initiatil"f• and nrg:sni~:tlion. having plenty of time. 

thrr cou ld ~'nsi l)' tid)• liP the place. Yt'i , ju~l 

this spark of initiuti\'1· :tnd org<Jnization se<·tn~ 

to br lacking. ft u1llsl be recognized thnt the· 
Till Rill'! I \~Jl t \\11'\1(,'\ , 1'1}5 

t;llllJI j, ltlll> a \t'f) ~I III)X'IOII\ 111.1~(•\ Jilfc 

... toppnw pl.lt t•, 1\tlh ,,.l11c:h llnnt• nf tlw ornt· 

pa111~ •cl•·••• ""'' ltim~cll, ettrll !toping lcJ lw ofl' 

on !tis \\':tV llolll!' in a dnv (ll so. En•11 so, 

IJ11• ~:111i 1;')' I'OildiiiOilS ;)I';' SlH'it tltnt tJH')' 

rnuld onl) lw tnlc·rntcd O}' JWCI!Jlt· 11h0 ha,r· 

J()Sl tlll'il ~1'11\ili\ il)' f<H the ni('t'tit•, or ri\ jJi:.-:1· 

linn .tml h;~\1' h:icl their powl'rs of scll-n·li-

.tnn• uudc•ttllltll'd. 

I Ill' Ru,,ia II' 

Thl· Ru~ian' set'm to ltaH' ,urrc•t~•d llw 

\HII't tll't:t ad.llion of all the I >P~ iu till' t'<llllp. 

llwy ·'PJI·II rntly nrc often dl'unk in dw tla) · tillll' olb \It'll ns ill night, and tht·y :'11'1' not 

abm p \'ntlliling on th<? pn~sng<'ways 11r ill tlw 

lc•,•pinA qnartns. The)' loll nro11nd in t lw 

Slll l, t'mHiuc•t I0\'1' nO'rtit·~. or go dow11 tht• !till 

.rnd IIMidt••· throngh the city, of whi<·h till')' 

"·'"' ftc•<· 11111. I'll<'}' take tl<·light in pill:wi11g 

or dt''' 1 oying CC'rmall propc•t~ . l ~aw o1w 

l 'Awk ill tlw tnwn \dto was ''''''lllatil':lll) 

,);), Inn~.: "" uphol~tc•rro ,ofa. \\hen l .l<ikt•d 

l1itn, in Ill\' h;rlting Ru~\i:lll. 11h' he \\'a~ 

dnin~ it, ht• '1nilt-d and S;)itl. ",\'rrrni/1!..) 

( ( :<·rnlilll } ,'' and rnntinU<·d intlust rio11,ly at 

his\\otk.' 

Sll.\EF'" polic·y w:1s lO ~Wif'illllt't the 

DP .... allll \~'lPs ( rccovcrccl \llircl mililM~ pcr~llllllcl , the latter in the Rhineland 

1111"11}' l'r<'nc h .md Rll'-'iau pli,wH'I'S of 

".II', .Hkqu.\tc· rood, -;hclt<'l, .111tl am·dic .ll 

r;11 ,. ,II tiH· G<'rman.: cxpt·Jl,l' ln I hi' lllaxillllllll l''lrllt, .md nut or ''" '~ 1( .... 111111 <-"' 

\dU.'liC\l'l lll'<ts.,aq . .:\ ilit;u~ h.u1.11 k.; pro-

' id('cl tlw mo'l c1Tic·ic11t hcm-.in~, ll111 whnr 

thct t' '' Cl'l' no barracks, ntilit !II) ,go\'<'1'11· 

IIH'III r1'(j 11 b:i tioncd hotel~. s1 Ianni:-;, fac ·t oq• 

huildin~-.. or private w:-~. ,.\t a small 

phu t' ra lkd Lautercrkrn in I he Thirtl 

.\ram .llt'.l, the /JuerJ!l'lllll'irtn L•ilcd w 

. u ram:c span: for OPs ,,, mdc•u•cl. One 

11ic h1 ,, 11111 klnad of thirt~-lh l' .11 rh t•d, <lllcl 

militat" ~m·ct nlliCJll nH>n·cl tlwm ill \\ ith 

' ~lt·mo, SIIAEF, PWD, S S1:1 C. ~I Ti,,o~:ra ph 

for Cllpl n. v. ~t cGran:than, suh: m)li'C'-iOH~ 

uf Di~ll ·11'~111l'l11 Camp in Tri••r, I h Mar l!i, in 

SIIAI•:F C 1, :IB:U. 

him ··· Till' I w .. ',., l'i\ c d 2,()()() c <till! j,., '"1•-

j,!cn · pc·1 d.1\ : IIH• R\~fp, lt'll'i\c·d .1 

' .S. p1i\'.rll'·., Jatillll. ~.hOO ca lwics. Lonll 

GC'rnl<ln nrTic i:d ... \V(' II' lc>ld how !IIIII h rond 

w.l"' nrf'ckd a11d that if thty did not providl' 

it. milit;~n gm t'IIIIIH'IIl '' ould 'tcp in and 

l.tkC \\h,tt \\,1, llt'('tft>d rro111 ,[CIII'"• \\,\IC· 

hou-.t'. 111 .111~ pl.tc c c•l,c· it t 111tltl I•<' found. 

The (;t'l'l\\,111\ ~~~~ \\ h.tl "as kh. 011 tlw 

,1\'CI';.\~l' , 1hu11l I, I()() t ,rlork..;. I he c·.uHp ,\I 

Br:r11cl 11!-.1'!1 HIO,OOO 1.ttions in il' fir,t ten 

days, mi,tin~ o r l \\'0-.lllcl-onc-half lflll"' 

or \'Cl1Ctaillt•" ,.. olll:tinc'd rrom !he Gtl 111:\IIS 

!nea l\}' a nd I'Hpt•trt•d JIIP.!tnnn('h/ sloc ks 

Ll'll!'kc·d i 11 from 11 dq>ol a1 Lit':!-{c. Tlw two 

tlleal~ a dt~\ t'•H It tuok four hours lo ~n vc·. 

T\\'CJ 'nl.tllc·r camp' .11 Duisdorf j,,ucd a 

quarlcr lltillicm s.1tio11' in f arc h. ami ,i, 

lhou.;;,ncl hl.ntkt'l' and ei~ht ton" of Rt·d 

Cn"' tlolhint! \t K1dl'lcl ,, militan ~O\'­

eJ nmC'sl\ p1 i' ,,,,., (i,,, c I,,,._, Irvin ~ !'!t~:lll. 

ran ,, ''""P lor UltJ(l DP" in a pri,ou. ·ro 

fc·cd them Ia· ;o.npplif'd Oolll' to the Krddd 

bakers a nd nwd<· them hake hrcad and 

S<'l'lii'C'd e·ofTcc• fmm the troop~, milk fo r 

rhildrcn fmm f.t1tn.,, meat rrom German 

warchOII..,(''• :111d polatm•,; and harrcJ,_ or 

sauc1 1-.r;utl fn1111 till' p1 i<;on rc~llar. 1 Pn-..;ihl) 

Lhc mu'l ekg.mtl~· .lppuintfd l':tlllp wa<; •• t 

.\lll ath in thl· l\inth \m1~ an.•.1. It "'"' 

;;ituatnl i 11 .1 1.11 ~~· fot mer pri~on and '"IH'I • 

\'i,cd It) an I dl'lac hnwnt and .t "anitaay 

rol nlill~ l !liiiJI:IIl). The 3,000 Drs Wl'll' 

fed from capt11rt:d slnl"ks tltat ind udcd butter, honq·l>uttl'l', fl o111', t'icc, pn11w~, ma('a· 

mni, l>pnghrtti, nwat, CI'S<t!7. t"on·rl·, c·mua, 

~ugar, soup sw1 k. and cl1icd vcgrtahlcs . 

The pti,on f.trlll .1 short d ic;tam c nway "'Pi~t RIH, I hml '\rnty. AColS G-.:1, 'H :0.1.11 

-!5, 111 Sll t\f:l· (; '1, 17 10, Jarket -1 . 

'" i~! RJSI, l·tt,l A11ny, ACofS C :>, I 'I I :'\las 

IS, in SH/\EF (; 'i, 17. 11, J ackt·l 9. 

"' 1li~t Rpl, Ninlh /\"")', ACofS C 'i, I 'I I :11 

45, in H/\l~F C: ~. 17. 11 , j acket G. 
20+ THE U.S .. \RJ\lY 11'\ T HE OCCUP1\TIOl\ OF GERi\11\ NY 

plied potatoes and mil k. !\ bed factor)' 

dclh·errd n1 attrc!'Scs. and in a <'roc!-cJ'Y factory, thr clctarhmcnt turned up enough 

1p~, howls, and pbtcs to feed 20,000 

pc rso G~ 

'll1c car<' at1tl fuctling of the Rus.<;ians 

was l'Hl'l'icd out from tht' beginning-as it 

wnuld be lO the end to the accompaniment of nightmarish political overtones. BefMc D-day. knowing that the Germans had 

recru ited cHptured Russians into collaborator milita ry 11n it ~, SH:\EF had ~L'\ d the 

So"ict governme11 t w1Hit it wanted done 

with its nationals <'aptured in German uniform. lVlosrow had blandly replied Lhat tbe 

problem would Jlol m·ise because there were 

no such persons. In Fnmr.e, the a rmies had 

begun pit-king up Russians serving with 

German units, but it ww.; October 1 ~) 4 before lite So\'iet i\filita ry 1\fission a t SI L'\EF 

ad rn ill cd their cxi~ re.r.a Having made 

lhc ad111 ission, it demanded that the Russia ns fl(l longer be rega rded as prisoners of 

wa r and he segregated and accorded special 

statug ;L'l " liberated Soviet citizens." When 

SH:\ EF c:omplicu, the Soviet desire. conccruing ration scales, pay an d privileges, 

and wcJrking co dit ~ became progressively mO!'e exacting, culminating after the 

turn of the year in a demand thai so,·iet 

civili ans, of vv hum soml' thousands were in 

SHAEF's hands, be given idcntin d treatment with the prisnncrs of war. In lhe 

me;ulti nw. owing to ('onsta nt So\'iel in lerfercn(•(', Ji.-.riplinc hnd her.ome almost impossible to maint a i11 among th e " liheratecl 

Soviet ritiztns,'' :mel in J anu ary SH t\EF 

" SHAE.F C 5, D P Br, sub : Rerort of Visit 

by Col. Gary, 27 Mar 115, in SHAEF G- 5, 27-11!/4. 

•• Tile Soviel Army lind 20·1 C)ffirrrs, includ ing 

~tl'era l gtmcral officers, atu.chcd to SH AEF. T he 

OJtly lilliSOII the Sovirt 1'(0\'CI'IllllCnt r rrmillccl with 

its fo ct~~. howt~vcr, w~1s thro11gh the lvlilitlll'y M ission, Mosco\\', whi,•h lt.ld a tenuous access to the 

So1·ict General St::tff. 

<t.~ d the Wa1• D(' pan mcnl to as~ g-n tW() 

3,000-spac:c troopshirs to take the Russians 

home."' Btlt they wer•e not going tn IJc disposed of that easily. On a d os<:r look, the 

SH.-\Ef Provosl Marsh<tl <'Md uded thal 

lhc United States clid not have a right 

undc:r the Geneva Convention lo transfe r 

Russians captured in Gf'rman uniform to 

Soviet custody. Under tile t:onvention, the 

uniform, not a man's actual nationa lity, detenninctl his right to prisoner of wnr status; 

conseque ntly, if any of the Rus:sians were 

later killed or mistreated, the U nited States 

could be held rc.c;ponsible and its troops 

sub jcctetl to German reprisals. T h<U the 

Rus~ ians would not he given such preferential treatment at home as I heir government 

dcmnndecl for thern from SH t\EF was 

readily deducible from a recent l3ri£ish c..xpcricnn:. The Bri tish had repatriated al>mrt 

10,000 Ru~s s t·aptUJ·cd in the Mcditerr·ancan theater and had :seen them m<•lThed 

away under heavy guard as soon <t , thc.y 

landed on Soviet soil.:.r. 

By cat·ly February, when the Big Three 

nJc t at Ynlta, the Soviet a rmies <~ d overrun c·amps holding Western prisoners of 

war, inrlucltng :\mericans aml Brilish, in 

Pola nd a nd eastern Germany. The main 

ohj('t tive o( the .\merican a nd British negotiawrs thus became to secure good care and 

a ::.afe and speedy return for their own men. 

Tltc t·hicf Soviet imcresl w~ s to get all of its 

citizc11s I )ack wl1cLlrer the)' wan led to ret urn 

" ( 1) M emo, SH AEF AG for Com Zone, sub: 

Russian Natio nnls Captured While Servi11g in Gc rllll\ll Armed Fo ~es, It\ Oct + I; Cable, S HA EF 

M:tin to M il itary r-Jission, Moscow, 7 Nov 4~; 

a nd Cable, SHAEF M;~ in to AC WAR. 12 j a n 

·15, in SH AE.F G- 1, :iii:!.61H. (2} Memo, US Gp 

C<.:, PW and D P Div, for Distribution, suh: d~ 

iu Allied M G and Admin, 28 j lln- 5 Felt 45, fl 

Feh ·1·5, in OMC US, PW and D P Oiv War Dia.ry, 

O~ GUS, :l H .!l l, CMH files. 

'-' .~r, Rcc:ko rd to Ba rker, 2•1 J a u <15, i•1 SH AEF 

C- t, Hl l.61B. 
THE lUIINELAND CAMPAIGN, l!J45 

or not. The Soviet negotiat ors demanded 

tha t rdl the.ir nationals- those captured in 

German uniform, liberated prisoners of 

war, and civilian DPs alike- be regarded 

as .forming a single group nf " li berated 

Soviet citizens" for repatriation and for 

t reatmcnt while under Stfl\.EF's control. 

In a protocol signed on 11 February 

Lhc Russians had their way: they would 

get hack all their citizens in a lrade for a 

murh smaller number of vV estern pt'isoners 

of war liberated hy them. Tbe meaning of 

the article ou repa triation did not have 

to be faced right away but the meaning 

of the artirle on treatment did. Strictly interpreted, the artide nppea rcd to entitle 

former ~ov et military personnel, either prisoners of war or those captured i11 German 

uniform, to tt'en tmc.nl equal to that given 

U.S. troops of the 1me rank and entitled 

Soviet DPs to at leasllhc stnndard of living 

of U.~ . privates.5

'

1 

Since SH. \ EF was already pra<:t ically 

c0111111ittcd to giving the former Soviet militat·y personnel tre<~tment comparnble to its 

own troops, the most remarkable feature 

of Lhi!i aspect of the agreement was the provision linking the- Soviel DPs to Lhe scale 

for privates which, SH AF.P' told the C:ombinr.d Chiefs of Staff, wmdd impose imposiblc suppl y requirements. In terms of food 

:l iOnC', raising the rations for nn c~tima d 

1.4 million Soviet DPs frnm the planned 

:!,000 calories to the 3,600 calories of a 

U.S. private WOII Icl requ ire an additional 

II 0.000 long tons of snpp li e~. Furthermore, 

to rn ise the rat ion I or Ru~" ans a nd not for 

other DPs wonk! he adminisLrativdy dint-

"'' ( t ) JCS 126fi/2, U.S.- Sovict R eciprocal 

Ag•·ecmcnl ou l.iberalcd Prisoners of War and 

Civilian~, Ill Fch •1·5, in CCS :iltl.fi (7-•1-14 ), 

~ec. 4. (2 ) Cahlc, SHAl.W Maiu to 1\GW/\R for 

CCS, sub: U.S.- Sovict Agreement Dated It p,,h 

•15, 24 Feb ·15, '" SllAEF G- 5, t>5U. 

205 

cult and politically dangct'OUS; hut to guarantee a ll DPs 3,600 calories would require 

at least half a miJUon additional tons of 

supplic:s.n• /\f'. it was, SHAEF wa~ having 

trouble geLLing shipping for the supply commitments it had and was not certain 

it could maintain a 2,000-calorie scale for 

D P:;!.; The DP rat.ion stayed at 2,000 calories, which appeared to he consonant with 

the protocol after SH/\EF decided that the 

sense of the agreement had been to provide 

for a u CtjllillC food. clothing, housing, and 

medical Lreatmellt not to establish a fixed 

::: tantlard.n" 

SI-L \Ef conceded that the DPs had a 

specinl c:laim on Sl-1/\EI" resources and, af'. 

the most numerous and obvious victims of 

Nazi exploitation, on German resources as 

well. They were to be am()ng the f:k st to 

witness the dawning new age promised in 

the Atlantic Charter. In Lhe plans the DPs 

were a convcuicnl abstraction; dealing 

with them in the fl esh , however, quickly 

proved to be an altogethc:r un<~nti cipated 

ex pericnre. For one thing, the designation 

"DP" turned out to be al111 ost syuonymous 

with ''Russian" (with an admixture of 

Pol co; and other eastern Europeans). They 

were Lhe majority, tht> real slnve laborer!;, 

the ones most in need of ca re, and thr. most 

" The U.S. Gro11p Control Cull neil c~tima cd 

the reqllil'ed cxHa tounage ns 680,000 tons. Rpl 

N(J. 6, US GJ) CC, PW and DP Div, 2:1 Fch 

~5, in OMGUS, PW aud DP Div •r Diary, 

OMGUS, :! t·l.S l , CM H files. 

''' Cal•k, SII/\Ef Maiu to /\GWAR for CCS, 

sul1: U.S.-Sovicl Agrrcmcnt Ua ted II Feb +5, 

in SI-IAE.F C- 5, 65ll. 

;.~> SI IAF.F :1 lso dcddcd later that Article :l of 

the protocol in st[pidll.ting one hasis for privates, 

uoncom111issitmcd officers, and offi cers diJ ttot re-

'l••irc cxnct ('quality with U.S. pcrsooncl in the 

S<III1C rnnks. (1 ) Me111o, SllAEF ACofS fo•· CG, 

Com Znnr, $llh: U.S. U.S.S.R. Agreement Relative 

to DPs attd PW~. 23 Mar ~5 1 in USFET SGS 

:lll:tti/ 11 , vot. I, (2 ) Department of Stntc, Malta 

and }'nl/u, in " f-oreign Rel:llions,'' p. 8()6. 
:ZOG T HE U.S. AR~ Y 1 ' THE OCCUP\TIOl\ OF GERi\IANY 

n;asperaling to care for. P\•VO invrstigators 

sent out <luring the campaign pronounced 

them Hn~tonish in y well-behaved'' and disrni~scd German complaints of looting Hnd 

lllll'tdy llch<tvior ag ''a mixture of hypocriS)', 

irupudcn<-c, and subtle propagC1 nch1 .'"'" The 

lllilitary g<1vcmmcnt dctar hmrnts dealt 

with them more intimately, and their judgment.; uniformly m along the li11rs cited 

<'.tl'lic-r l rom Brand and TritT and the folowiu ~ from a ramp for Russians at 

Ncm;tach: 

Lacking dit•cction the nlnJOt'tty of thrsc 

DP~ live voluntnrily in the dinicst <'Onditions it~~a inah c, and it is difficu lt to induce them 

to clct~n their quaners. In the ramp :11 Neutadt a " tuayor" :tnd a " police force" were 

appointt'd and the "mayor" was insll'll\'ted 

to have the place cleaned up before tlwy Wl'l'C 

fed. Lo<ltiug of wine cellars and tlw l't>sulting 

dr·unkcn or~ cs luiVc creatl'd troublt'. , .. llt•at<•d arguments and loss of t<•m1wrs h:wc 

c·nus<•d two murders to he cornmittcd here. 

Till' bodit·s Wl're thrown out or the building, 

and it wn~ onl)• nrte1· spcrilit· orders were 

givc•n that tlu~y were buried. It is impossible 

to find o11t which Russians killed tht• otlwrs.0' 

The dawn of the bright new worltl was 

ck :u·ly nol ~o in g to he strcnt. 

The G- 5 Fi('ld Stm·er 

In tlH· third week of tltl' r:lrnpaign 

Sli.\EF C 5 Forward cnnva!"scd 12th 

,\r•m y G t'tntp and its armjcs and ('CJllc· ludrJ, 

"The stri,·tl y tactical theory of military g:ovl'rnmcut has bruken down of its owtt wt ight 

under prcs.<~ urc of practica l ,·cm!<idcrntiOIIS. . . .'' The armies, the intended chid 

Ilist Rpt, First Army, ACofS C 5, I :H Mar 

·15, iu SH AEF C- 5, 17.1 t, Jackl'l . 

" Wk Rpt, Hqs, XXI Col'p~, to en, St•vc.nth 

Army, :11 Mnr •15, in SHAET1 C: 5, 17. 111, .Jnckct 

5. 

btncficiaries of the tactical system, conc:cded that ttn nrc:a as large as the Rhineland roulcl not Ill' administered for long 

withjn <tdJiln-Hy unit undar ~, '"hi< h 

somctinH:~ divided ritics in two, as the First 

Army- N inth nuy boundary did at 

.-\ achcn. The dctarltmcnts wct•e being 

showered with regulations br wcti<-al commantis above them and could fiucl themselves simultant!O\tsly taking orders from 

platuon 'ommarHier-; and army headqu<'rters Ol' anr staff in between. One 1 det.l ~ 

ment wa~ unciC'r two corps and thrc(: 

divisions wit hin fiv<: days. However, some 

funl'linns, main l)' agt•iculture and food clic;-

trilnttion. were too broad for the armies to 

control. Tht> 12th Army Group wa.-; h;n·itlg 

to take a hand in co-ordinal ing the armies' 

operation-., and SH .\CF G- 5 expected the 

early rt'!lult In h<' n compromise hrtwcrn 

the tactiral <~nd territorial systems, probably to lw adtit·vt·d ll)' jmaalling tin· t'Cgionnl E dc•tar hmcnts.

11" At the end of tlw 

mont h, owcv~.:t', a(ltr l hc front had moved. 

across the Rhiue, the compromise wa!oi 

ac-hieved wit !tout 1hand 11in g the pt'incipk 

of tart in ti t ontml. Headquarters, Fifteenth 

\nny, wltid• SH.\EF had been ing for 

odd jo ~, m()vrd in to set up a hlot·king 

line on the river <llld a sumed krritoriaJ 

G- 5 rcspon:-ihilit) for the Rhinehmcl. 

The field stuYey also found a dclh it•nry 

in politi c;tl guidanrc which il pn·dictt·d 

rould ha\'C ' 'r<tlnmitous rest.dl!l in I he not 

too distant future." All rnili tary govcmmcnt arlivitics had political implicatioos, 

hut the guidance from the top '"as so 

meager lhal poli( y tlevelopment- stt( h "" 

it wa wa.-; hei11g lt'ft tc> the det.lt hmcntc; 

in the field. The SI 1.\F.f polic-r so fnr was 

all ncgatiw: to dc-;troy nazism and 111iliw ~ 

"' SHAgF <: i Porw:~l'<l to DACOS G ), suh : 

Field Surv~y, 12 22 _t..;(nr 5, ·I Apr 45, in Sll AEI: 

G- 5, 2n.1. 
THE RHINEL.\ 1\D C:!\~ fP 1 , ~)11. 5 

m. Nothing had been decided ahoul 

wha t lO put in the place of nazism: yet. 

jw;t by appointing people, military government was creating a po1irjca l complexion. 

Wi thout gui.dancc, the detachments were 

following the ir own political likes and djs207 

lik e~ OJ' ··cl ying on the Germa n d c rg)', 

which meant tha t in the Rl1ineland the 

politic<J.l outlook of the Catholic Church 

was becoming nanl.' ~ 

"' Ibid . 
CHAPTER XIII 

After Yalta 

T he Fate of JCS 1067 

Scrrc-t:u y or State Edward R . Stettiniu ·, 

Jr., dispatched J CS 1067 tu Arnhas.sador 

Win:mt in London on I 3 J nnunry I ~45 

with instructions to present it in the European Advisory Commjssion t~s the U.S. 

proposnl for 0111 over-all directive for Germany.' !\s revised in the SWNCC (StateWar-Navy Co-ordinating Committee), the 

ducumcot had undergone an important 

change. In the September 1944- vcn:.ion it 

had hcc11 an interim dirertivc for the period 

between the surrender and the r..<;tnhlishmcnt of the tripartite authority. The rcviNion exte-nded it into the period after the 

lripmlitc authority was cstnhlishcd and implied that it would stny in force until the 

gove rnme nt~ had formuli\tcd ong~range 

policies. Consequently, the revised J CS 

I 0()7 wa~, in addition to hcing a statement 

of occupation policy, a chart<:r for thr commanders in ( hicf as memhen; of the Control 

Counril. 

JCS 1067 wa.<; agreed U.S. policy, but 

<1s far "'·" the Sta te Departn•cnt was ronrcrned, the ;•grccment was lcs.<; than halfh<'a rtcd. anH~s W. Ridcllcbcrgc•·, t ht chid 

of the l)i,•isiun of Central European 

AfTairs, who had worked on the revision, 

tomplaincd about the " intrnm;igcnt attitude" of the \'\'ar Department representative.-; and dcsrrihed th<- <lorument as 

''!!Uhlltantivcly ... lhe same a11 drafted hy 

• M r. Slctliniu~ h:~d succeeded Cordc•ll Hull ;\S 

Sccrctnry o( Slate· on I Dcccmhr•· l!N •t. 

the Treasury Departmcm some months 

ago." He lwd recommended that "iJ for 

various reason!! the Department thinks it 

mw;t . •. approve .JCS 1067 for submission 10 EAC ... Winant be advi~cd h)' 

us that he should nol jnsist upon JCS 1067 

to a point where it will unduly prolong the 

negotiations."" The Advisor on German 

Economic All a in;, Emile Despres, who had 

also worked on the revision, while conceding that 1 he Vhr Department acted in itc; 

own interest and not the Treasury Department'', found the policy equally unpalatable. 3 Winnnl I his poljtical adviser, 

Philip E. Mosely, dcdarcd JCS 1067 \lllsatisfactoq' in general and objected lo most 

of its partintlars. The disconlcnt acqu ired 

an intercontincntnl dimension when Leon 

H endersou, former director of the Office 

of Price Administrntjon and the State D epartment and Foreign Economics Administration <'hoke as adviser on economiC' 

a ffairs in the occupation, returned from 

Europe " in :-t highly c-ritical frame of mind 

with rrgnrd to p!::ms and preparations ... for· military government iJl Ger· 

many" a nd ac-utely 11nhappy with the economic implications of JCS 1067.4 Among 

lbe multitude of Stale Department objcr-

, Deparun('nt of Stnte, For~ign Relations, 19•14, 

vol. 1, p. ~ 21Jf. 'Departme-nt of Stnt<'t European Addwry CQm· 

mitsiQn; A11Jiritt; Cttrmmcy, in "Foreign Relations 

of the United Stnte~, 1945," vol. III {Washiugton, 

D.C., t96U ), p, •113. 

'Ltr, HilldrinK to Smith, 24 Feb 45, in SHARP 

SGS 334. 
AFTER YALTA 

Lions to the document, three predominated: 

namely, that il wns an infringement by the 

Departments of War and Treasury of the 

State Dcpnr1mcn1's policy-making function; that it em plmsi:led the authority of 

the zone ('ommanders to the practical exclusion of the Control Counril; and that 

the Morgcnlhau Plan lurked in the ecouomic: provisions only faintly disguised. 

011 the eve of the Yalta Conference the 

Sta te- Department's opposition to J CS l 067 

smoldered in deepening frustration ; the 

only way ou t look a prrilous c-ourse directly through the vVhite H ouse. Hilldring 

wrote to Smith, " It U CS I 067] is at present 

the policy of the United States, a pproved 

on the highest level, ~u1 d so long as that 

is true, we will, of course, as good soldiers, 

ha~c ou r plans on it. '·~ 

The Yaltn meeting, being chiefly concerned with other matters, was not cxpcc·ted to define an occupation policy for 

Germany, ,lnd, in fact, it did not; but the 

prolorol did include partial decis.ions on 

reparations, war crimes, dismembetment, 

and a scat on the Control Council and zone 

for France. The cqnferees also agreed in 

principle on dose co-ordination of laws and 

administration between the zones, removal 

of active Nazis from positions of importance, dissolution of Nazi ins£ituLions, and 

confisnuion of German external asscts.r. 

Two weeks after £he conference, the President turned over the potpourri to ettiniu~ 

and instructed h im as Secretary of State 

to take responsibility for seeing that the 

"conclusions" were cnrried forward. 7 Sud-

¢ Ibid. 

• Memo, McSherry for CofS, S"llh : Milit<try Government Problem> Requiring Immediate Agrectn<!nl wi th the Russians, 27 .ft\n 15, and Ltr, H . 

Freeman Matthr.1v~ 1.0 Smith, 15 Fch 45, in 

USFET SGS 0 lo1 , l. 

'Dep:Himent of Smu•, Fo1tig11 RelntiiJ ns, 1945, 

vol. 1 [ [, p. 3:t 

209 

dcnly, the pall of frustration in the departmeJlL lifted. 

On 10 Marr h, citing his responsibility 

for the conclusions reached at Yalta, tet~ 

tinius se nt the President a State Department draft dire(.·tive for Germany. It came 

hack rhrce days Inter with a n "OK FDR."s 

On the 14th, in the SWNCC, the Wnr ami 

State D epartment representatives talked 

al>oul rewriting JCS 1067 in lig ht of the 

new tlirenive, knowing tha t the two c.:ould 

not survive side by side. From the Army 

point of view, the heart of J US 1067 wns 

the latitude it gave the 'l.one tommander 

in his ovvn zone. The revision had stated : 

"The agreed policies of the Control Council shall be dcterminttlivc throughout the 

zones. Subject to such policies the administration of military government in cath of 

the wne<> of occupatiou shall be the sole 

responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief 

oi the forces occupying each zone. " 0 The 

10 Ma rch clirective1 however, specified: 

"The authority of the Control Council shall 

he paramntmt throughout Gem1:my. The 

zones of occupation shall be area<; for the 

enforcement of the Council's decisions 

,·ather than regions in wh ich the zm1e conmandcrs possess a wide latitude of autonomom; power."'" for the Army, these four 

sentences were the issue. 

Bul there was another is."ue, namely, the 

degree to which the zone commander 

W<Jllld be ('barged with maintaining controls on the German economy. l n the 

revised J CS I 067 as in the orig inal, in response to Eisenhower's desire not to be required to sustain an economy he thought 

was ho11 nd to collapse, the Army had insisted on making the Germans solely responsible for all controls on pric('.~, food 

' ibid. 

' Ibid., .P· 379. " Ibid., p. 4S·L 
210 THE U.S . . \Ri\t\' 1.. THE OC:C:UP \'1' 0~ OF GER~I.\ 'Y 

distl'ilwtion, t'nrploymcnt, pmdtH lion, 1'1'-

ronslt uction, di.<;Lrihution, c·onsun1ption, 

housing, and tran portati n. 11 Tile tr h 

1t) dii'CI'ti\'c lllC\dC CCOIIOI11it' t'Oil ti'Ols H I'CS!)OIISihilit)' of the: OCCUpation authorities 

nnd M'\ign<'d the pt)wcr to formul:ttt' policy 

lo the Control Council.''' The sccoud i ·sue 

was duuhle-harrcJcd, aimed al the . rm~ s 

dcsit•c to avoid an onerous and potcntiallr 

imp1 '"ihk mi. sion, hut C\'tll tt\01'1' at 1 he• 

.\•l org1mth:llt philosophy of pmmoting Gcrulan ('t onomir wcakn~s. 

Tht President's okay and initials mndc 

the State Department directtvc n powcdul 

doc unwnt hut , al' Stcttinius quick!)' found 

llll(, not rtn unassailable one. The wrakncss 

wa~> in a sCtl$t.' t'ongcnital. In the t hargc 

w him, tlw President hnd -;tatcd. "you will, 

I knm'. wi~h to c·o11 fer with otiH'I' oiTit i.tls 

of th~~; Government o11 m:~ttt't'S touchin~ 

upon their re.,;pecti,·c fi elds.'' In forw:wding 

the di•·cnivc {o 1 hr White llouc;t•, St< ttiniu~ 

ha<l rr. ported tha t he intended to est ahlish 

";111 infoml;tl pnlir)' <:o mnlill< ~ on (;erm;my IIIHkt• till' c-httil'llW11Ship of I he 

Department of Stak and including •·cprc!<entatiw~ of War, Navy. Trca'iury, and tlw 

Foreign gronomir . \d ministratiou:·• ~ 

On the' 15 th, Stettinius m et in hi" ollkc 

with ~timo;nn, l\ (o rgenthau, • \ssistant Sccn·taty of thr Na'r H. Stnl\·c Hensel, and 

. s.~;islitn t to the Foreign Economic . \d ~m· 

Hcn•'Y H . Fowler to acgu:tint them with 

the 10 Manh directive and have them 

n:lllll' their departments' llll'tniWt'li to the 

Informal Policy Commillt:c 0 11 Gcn11any 

( I PCOC ) , whit'h was to he rltairr.d hy .\ssistant Scrrctary of St:ttl' for Economic 

\fTairs William E. Clayton. Stimsnn, who 

had no t scrn thr document h<·forc, said it 

;'l>tWarrd to place ''a good deal of cmphaII fl,,tf., p. :SR7. 1

' Ibid .. p. ·13(i. 

" f/, id., pp. 1:13- 3+. 

sis'' t,tl\ <-'entrnlization, in regard to hoth 

policy fortuatitm ;uHi administration. He 

hacl 11 0 quan•c•l, he -;aid, with the assumptio n th<tl G c1 ttt:tll}' nught to be trcat1' d as 

one nati011 Ot' with c-entralized pr>lky 

formation, but he did nm hdie,·e that nd. 

mtnistration should h~ ''handed over to a 

l'Cntr..ll office.'' 1\ lorgcnthau had not sf'rll 

the donunettl <·itlttr, bur he had hrard 

aho11t it (ronl ('( :toy earlier in the day, ;ts 

Stimson pmlmhl)' had also. T o ~lcC:luy l11· 

had been notH·on1111ital, saying, "it's up to 

Stimson 1o tnk.c thr lead on this thing."' ' ,\t 

the meeting, ltowevcr, he demttndcd to he 

told "just lrCIW muc h ... of the present 

Gcrm;U1 c·t·ntrali!.<·t.J govrrnmcnt" wu-, to l1t 

continued. His impn~ion was, lw sa id, 

that "the G~:rman Empire is to h<' <'011-

tinunl through the medium of 11 n'ntl':\1 

unit in Bt·•·lin.'''• 

. \ftrrwa1•d , ••rparcnll) ll owi ~ :t rahi· 

net meeting o n lht I Gth, St.imson t:tll-<·d 

to the Pr·<·sidcnt and told him the Statt· Department directive would prevent tire :oldicr~; fl'OI"'l doing their joh in GcrnHHl}'· Thc 

.-\ rm)', lw said, s trained f<H· a Z.OIIll l 

operation and tilr zone commander had lCl 

have "complct<· residua l a uthority'' in matters the Cuutmi Council did nm take over 

and handk centrally. T o McCloy, Stimson 

iJtdicated he st ill fdl hadly ahout thr turn 

that polk)' on Ct•rmal1y had taken at the 

Quchec C:onrcr'tlt<:e nnd wa.c; n ot plc·nF.rcl 

with the State I kp:-trtmcnt's interpretation 

of Ya lta Inti was determined to keep himself and 1 ht War Department out of polk)· 

decisions. I Ic instruncd :M cCloy :'s t hr 

Wa r Dcpal'ltlll'llt's t hief negotiator to lr.tvr 

politic-al and economic questions to others. 

The .\rmy woultl ('1tn')' out any agrec·d pol-

",\lorgrntfwu DinT)' (Uermmty), vol. II, 11. 97(i, 

" Ocpanuwnt or Stntl', Forrig11 Relations, lfNS, 

1·ol. Ill, pp. 1'\2 56. 
AFTER YALTA 

icy on thr.se ma tters, provided they were 

administrali vel y feasible. 

Stimson's talk with the President was i.ncond usive l>ut on on e point highly enlightening : the President told him that he did 

not rn mh< r the State D epa rtment directive and, lo his krwwlcdge, had not read 

1t. 10 The Secreta ry forwa rded a report of 

the ta lk to McCloy and Lhen witbdre\v 

from the affa.i~', leaving McCloy to defend 

the Arm)"s case in IPCOG. An interdcparlmcnlal committee a t the assistant secretru-y level, however, was n ot the place to 

perform major surgery on a document 

hearing pre.<;identia l approval, as :tvkCloy 

had helped demonstmte during Lbe !'<'vision 

of JCS 1067 in the SWNCC. If necessary, 

McCloy apparently proposed to a ttempt to 

get JC.:S 1067 and the I 0 Ma rch directive 

recognized in I PC:OG as co-ordin ate policy 

statements without ma te1•iall y altering 

either one." This potentially fascina ting 

piece of sleight of hand was not going to 

be necessary, h owever, because McCloy 

had an a lly whose reach went far beyond 

the subcabinet level, Secreta ry of the Treaury M orgcnthau. 

Thci1-s was a strange alliance. Stimson 

remained totally aloof from it, and McCloy 

could only p a rtidpn te in it to promote the 

Wa r Department's limited objectives. Morgenthau, on the other hand, had to produce 

a substantial vi<:tory for the J\rmy if he was 

going to salvage any p art of his own occupation philosophy. For him JCS l 067 was 

a compromise, ha rdly more tln'tn an entering wedge for the l\IIorgenthau PJ::.n, but 

he had to fight to save it if he wa nted to 

ptTA-;crvc any cha nce- of the full-fl edged plan 

1Jeing put into effect. AIJove a ll, he had 

10 M orgtmtltnu Diary ( Cettnany ), vol. IT, p. 

J0,13L 

t: Department of Sta te, Foreig•• Relations, 19115, 

vol. I [J, p • .J 6!1f. 

211 

to :;cutlle the State Dep<Htment directive. 

In doing so he was impervious to the scrupks that had bothered Stimson. '"' riling 

to Stettinius on 20 M a rch he a ttacked the 

views in th e directive as "completely opposed to the T reasury's views on these 

issues" and as "contrary iu major respect.;; to decisions made by this Governm ent prior to Yalta; and ... opposed in 

their most important implira Lions to the 

views which 1 understa nd the President 

holds on Gcrmany."' 6 At a luncheon il) Lhe 

White H ouse that same day, M orgcnthau 

persuaded the Pr<'.'5ident to reconsider the 

10 March direcl.ive, which the President 

again said he did not remember signing."' 

Two clays later 1 he President summoned 

Ac ting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, 

Unde r Secretary of Wa r Pa tterson, nnd 

McCloy lO the While H ouse. Assistant Se('-

reta ry of Stale Clayton and Mr. Roosevelt's 

son-in-law, John Boettiger, were also present. No Treasury representativc.c; were included, h ut M orgentha u had presented hi.o;; 

views in writing at the luncheon, and ?virCloy believed l hese papers were on the 

President's de.<;k during the meeting. The 

President said there were many clements 

in the 10 M a rch directive tha t he d.id n ot 

like, and he wanted the directive 

rewritte11.2u 

He seemed to want to compromise on 

the main issues bet ween the depart ments. 

He said the St·ate Department directive 

placed too much emphasis on centralized 

administration, bllt he wanted provisions 

for centra l administration of some national 

public services, such as telephone and 

Wmsporta tion. He did not want military 

government to administer economic con-

" Ibid., p. 160. 

" Ibid., p. 469. 

,. Morgwt hau Diary (CemiOII}!), voL rr. pp. 

1070- n. 
212 THE U.S. AR~IY ~ THE OCC:UP:\'1 10~ OF GER~rANY 

trois, .;uc h n~ ratil>lling, but ht• I relieved the 

(krrnans ought to he required to m;~ioiain 

thf'm. He suggested, as a possihilil)', appointing 1 hl'<'c-mnn German cnmminees, 

whirh wot1ld be told what was rcquil'cd 

nncl if they failed would he taken mll nnd 

-;hot. Nc·il111·r did he believe that the occupation authurities should undertake to prc-

'>crw a lllilliltlt1111 standard or living for the 

Gcnnan-. rthovt' the starvation kvtl. H e 

talked a~ai11 ahuut soup kitl"hcns hut did 

not ohjc•ct to the djscase and unrest formtd:t. He alluded several tjnws 10 the dcindu!<Lrinli~ation fcatmcs of the !'v[urgcnthnu 

Plan, saying n·pcated ly that he did not 

want to di111inatc Germa11 heavy indu~tl') · 

lie hnclmadc! n mistake at QudiCT, he said, 

:tnd he hl.nm·d it on Churrhill, \vho in 

dr;aftin~ tlw nwmor:tndum h;HJ u.;cd the 

wor•d "p:t'>toral," which th<· Prr~idrut :\nid 

he would nc:V<'r' h:wc thoul{llt ()[ U'>ing. He 

did uot ht'lievc in suc-h things a); r·uining 

the mint·q nr· destroying industr) and 5pet iftcally would he willin~ l Q kt the Ccl'-

mans have nmchine Lr)Of and lor<Jrnotivc 

inclu~trics, a.o; long as they uxcd tlwm for 

lht•ir ow11 intcmal needs.~' 

On tlw 1110rning of 2:l March, thr St<•tc, 

War, ;mcl T1•eao;ury mcrnhcn\ of I PCOC 

mel in ~lorgenth:\ll's offirr 10 w1 ilc a directivt• for Gcrmnr• > hased on the ~uidancc 

t'Ct·civ.-d the day before. The rc-;ult read 

a,'i follows: 

The authoriLy of Lhe Conu•ol Counl'il w 

foJ'IIIItl:lft• policy with respect Lo matters 

nn'c.•t·ting C..:C'J'11lany ns a whole shall be p:~ralliOunt, anti its agreed policies shalllw r:lrried 

(llll in euch zone br the zone commander. In 

the :tbscnC"e of such agreed polki1:s, and in 

ut:allt'll> cxdusively affecting his own zone, 

the zon(· commander will ex('l'Cisc his authorily in :u rortlam·e with dirC'ctiws n•cdved 

(rom his own go,·ernrnt>nt. 

•• I bid., pp. 1070-7:1 and l llli- ltl. 

Tlw ad111inistr:nion of affairs in Gcl'lflnny 

should be dit'I'C:tt:d toward the d<'ccntralization of the politkrd structure and thr dcv<'l, 

opmcnt of ll)cal r't•spnnsibility. The Gl'rtnnn 

econo111y shall a lso be decentralized, l'xc!"pt 

that to the ll1inil1111111 1•xtcnt required for the 

purposes x1:t forth llt'rein, the Control Council Ulay f'l'flllit or establish central control or 

(a) essential n!ttional public services sud1 :h 

railroad:., comrnunications, and power; (h ) 

finance and for-cigr1 affairs, and (c) produc--

tion nnd distribution of essential cnnHnndities. There shall bn t'ttuitable distribution o( 

sucl1 conuuoditics between the zones. 

Controls 111ny lw Imposed upon the C:rl'-

tn:ln ecmH)IiiY cmly ns they may be nN·<•ss:u-y 

(a) to c~HT)' om programs of industrial disa rmame-nt and clc:militnrization. reparntions, 

and relief for liber:uHd a reas as prcsn·ibed 

by higher· authority and (b) to assure the 

production and maintenance of goods <tnd 

services r('quircd lt> rtwt>l the needs of th(' occupying forces and displaced persons in Gl"rUiany, aud I'Ssential 1<1 prevent stnr\'ation Ol' 

such disc<l$t' or l'idl unrest as would cndangeJ 

the occupying fOI'ces. No action shall be: 

taken, in ''xccutitln of the repnr:ltions 

progt'alll or• otherwise, \\'ltich would lend 

to support bnsir living standards in ( h•rmany on a higher lcvrl thiln thut xi ing in 

any one of till' Jwighhoring United N:11ions. 

[Here follow finmwial pro,·isions relatt:d to 

n•parations, ,,,hkh arc Ollliued.j 

ln the impositinn r111d maintenance of economic contmls, Gcrrnnn authorities will t(l 

the fullest e'<t~nt JH'ac·ticable b(' ordcr<·d to 

proclnim and :tssurne administration of ~twh 

controls. Thus it shuulcl be brought horne to 

the German people tha t the responsibi lity foa 

the administration of such controls nnd (or 

any breakdowns in those controls, will l't:sl 

\\'ith tlw111sdvt·s and their own authorities. 

The Nazi party and its affiliated and supc•·-

viscd organi:wtioos and all Nazi public institutions shall br di~so \'ecl and their rP\ ktl 

pre,·ented. N:l't.i <llld militaristic propag:lnd:\ 

in anr (orrn shnll be prevented. 

There shall he t•stoblished a coordinated 

system of rontrol over German education 

design<'d C'Ol11plt>ll'ly to eliminate ~azi and 

militarist doctl'irws and to make possible the 

dr,·elopmcnt of <:1<-rnorratic ideas. 

Nazi laws whit•h pmvide the basis of the 
\FTER YALT.\ 

Ilitlt•r n•gime or '' hich establish di riminatium (In grounds or rare. l"l'l'<'d or pnlitin tl 

opinion, shnll be· abolished. 

t\11 JIWillbcrs or the Na?.i pnny who have 

been mot·c· tha,, nominal p:ll'ticipnnts in its 

nl'tivitic·b. and all other so ~ hostile w ,\IHc:d Jllll'i'ClSI'S will be I'C11liWI'd fr•om publiC' 

ofik <· nnd from positions of responsibility in 

priv:He t•nt<•• prise. 

\\ ar rriminals and thosc wllCl hrwc- pat tiripntcd iu plnnning or c:-an-ying out Nn'l.i enterprist'S itwol\' in~ or resulting in atmritic'l; or 

war ni me..,, shall be a n ested , brouAhl to h·ial 

aml punished. Nazi lendel's <tnd infhwutial 

Nat.i supporters and nny other persons dan1{C'I'Ous to the orr upation or its objectives. 

sha ll bt• :uTt·stecl nnd i11tcrncd. 

.\ suitable program for the restitution of 

prOpl'rty lo()tcd by Gcrmnns shall be rarricd 

out promptly. 

Tlt1• (~ <' tan armed fort·rs, induding tlu• 

Gl'n<'rn l Staff. and all paramilitary organization~. shall he pmmptly demobilized ancl dis. 

bnndvd in )lith a manner as f>Crtnn ncntly to 

pn•\'t•nt tlwir re\·i,·al or renrg:~ ni1nti on. 

'i'hl' C:crman war potential h:~ll be dcstr·oyrd . ~ /'art of the progrnm to nttnin this 

nhjt•rliw. n 1 implements of w;u· and all spedalizrtl fa!'ililirs for the produrtion or i11'1Tlatlll'lll ~ shnll be seized and cl<~s tmyc•d. The 

tn:tinlt•tl:ll\1'(' ;wd produc tion of all :tirrr:-tft 

nnd implen1cnt~ of war ~hnll be preve nted.~!! 

Th<' W.u· Dcpartmcm upplkd mo t of 

tlw languag-e in the dirct live. Yt•t, on the 

chid point., of c-ontention it w;rs a rmnpromis<". ·'" Clnyton nd~[, C:lur ag•ecd. based 

on tht· Pn .. ·sidcnt'.s st at enH'Iltll n( tlw dar hefmt'. ' l 'h<' l'rntr~d administratiotl was wcakc.1 

than tht State Departnw•H had wanted, 

Inti thr aulhot'ity of the Control Cottttl'il 

was "pnmmo11nt," 110t mrrcl y "dctcnn inati\'c,'' as iu JCS 10(i7, nud thr zone 

r umlllittldr r's nuthoriti<.-s wonltl no t aclministt-r l'C onomic control!>, but lh<'y would 

- ( I I Summary of U.S. I nltint u~l Ddc:~t 

Policy R<-btiug to Germany 22 r.tnr ·15, Initial 

J:I)R :n 1\l nr 15. iu OPD :1:16 (S~r!ion V ) (C:ms 

IIJ.I I jot ). (2 l Drpnrtrnent of l:itatc, Purt•igrt l?clttrlon,, 1'1./5, v•>l. I 1(, I)P. ·171 - 7:!. 

213 

nmke SUt'C that tlw Germans did. JCS 1067 

had left <> ur h control!' entirely up lo the 

Germ a n'l. J CS I 067 hnd not !ipcci ficd n <kliberatc rrcl urtion of the G<!rmnn crmtomy 

in the sr <~c of thr Morgenthau Plan, and 

ucithcr did tlw new directive. Morgcnthan 

was disappnintc:d with the paragraph on 

the. German war potential hut <;aid he 

would nw urge anything that McCloy and 

Clayton th ht went beyond what the 

Prcsidcllt hatl o;pt·dficd, C'>pccia lly !lin< c he 

wm; certain th:tl th(' President was "so rommilled to a prograrn reduring the size of 

Cct•man l1 t·avy ind11stry" that he was ccrlain to issue mol'r cktailcd instrurl ions 

later. :~.1 

In the· aftrrnnon, Morgenthau and Cr<:w 

took the directive to the ·white ou~r 

where the l't't''\idt' nl d it and, .tt }.lor•-

gentbau·.; pmmpting, :tddcd the wor•c.ls, 

"This sllpCt'l'l'ck."" ~l nh lOth." .\ftc·r• the 

signin!!. thr l'••co;idcnL·s secret<try, Crace 

1\tll}', hrou ht in a memorandum t'OJH<•ining a sing le pitt'agraph lhat the Prcsicknt 

aJ<lcd :1 ~ tltc tltird paraj.\raph of tiH' dir't't ~ 

live. It n·acl : '"C:crlll<tny\ ruthlco;s warfare 

;111d fanati cal NaL.i resistanc-e have destroyed the Gerrna11 eronom}' and mack 

<·h;ws aud <~ ufT ring incviLalllc. Tilt Germans cannt>t C!irape ~po ihilil>' for \VItat 

thl')' have hrmtght n11 themselves.":!' Wht•n 

the paragraph latl'r headed the list of basi<· 

militar} govcrntn(' lll ohjcrtivcs in Germany 

in Lhc fin:-~ 1 ,·crsion of JCS I 067, it rt'ild 

like an llllli iHltiS <"r ho or lhe Moq~l!n lhall 

Plan. ln lht· Whil<' llO\ c office tl1;1l day, 

Morgent hau had no idea where it cnn1c 

from. i\h ( :loy cxpl11incd later that he 

"guc"-'lcd it mi~inatcd in J ohn o('tti ~<'r·'< 

brain."' Jl " 1 ltought, and 1\ lorgcnthau 

agreed. it a~ .. 'ioll nf prc.ttr good pr·<·tt} 

» M otgc11llwu /)itlr)' (Grrmnny), vol. If, p, 

I 120. 

" I bid., p, I (17'1. 
214 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION Of' GERMANY 

good propaganda:•:u. Neither saw any gnifirancc in it beyond thal. 

The 23 March dircc·tivc went to Winnnt 

in London t.be next dny with an explanation that it superseded the 10 Mar('h directive- and th 11 JCS 1067 would be 

withdt•awn- lntt without clear instructions 

that if was t<J be submitted in the EAC. 

.\ftct· n heated discussion in TPC:OG when 

1he Wnr, Treasury, and Foreign Etonomk 

. \dministration m<:ml>ers learned that Winant had not beet\ instructed to prt>sCnl the 

direr tivc and after \ Vinant asked what he 

w<•s to negotiate, if anything, Grew told 

hirn to negotiate the directive as a p•·otocol 

of a~rccmcnt a.s "n matter of hig hest pri()ritv.''~'' J CS 10Ci7- also, if less t'Xplidtly 

suprn;cded- wcnt lO rPC:OG lO he I'Cwrittc·n as IPCOG 1 and become thr tlircctiv<· to the U.S. comm:mdC'r in Germany. 

P;u·l T \ Politic·al a11d General ) and P:m 

Ill ( l'innnrinl) or I PCOG I were written 

within a week from \\'a r Dcparlmcnt drafts 

wltit h inrorpo••atcd rntH'h of thr detail 

from JCS IOGi. Pa •t 11 ( EronCllnir ) tt)ok 

al111osl another four week-. ~ the Tn:a:;tll')' 

mc·mhers attcmptl'd to ~v• itc in provisions 

making the Germans Clltircl)· responsihk 

f<H ~:nmomi c rotllrols.~ 1 In the 1inal vcn;ion, 

the implication 1hat the 1.one commnnder 

wot•ld require the Germans to maint11 in 

Ulntrols wn.<: )cs.<; < lc:u than in the 23 l:trr h 

din:rti\'c. hut not romplctcly eliminated as 

the ' l'l'easur)' wanted.'" 

In the meantimr, on 12 :\ pril, II arry S. 

- Ibid., p. 1079f. 

,. (I ) Ibid., p 110'1. (:l ) Dcpanmcnt of St:\tc, 

Jlorr•&" RtloliortJ, 19•f5, vol. Jll, pp. •173 :~nd 

li9. 

" .lfr.ut(t11lluw Dint)' (Gcrmn rty ), vol. II, p. 

11 71. 

'' JCS 1067t fi, l>ir•·•·llvl' to the nnnaud~:r in 

Chid U.S. orce~ of O<·cupntion Rc>g.u·ditll; !lac 

ilit:lf)' GnvertUtH'tll nf Ct·m1any, 211 Apr •l!i, 

inCCS3R3.21 ( Z 2:1 .~ec.7. 

Truman surceeded to the Presidency. On 

the 26th, I PCOG approved nnd sent to 

him a complete draft of I PCOG 1. The 

following morning the members of 

IPCOG ;tnd Crew and Morgenthau, who 

at the \.Vhitc H ouse conferences always 

stood in for the Tre<lsury member, H arry 

Dexter White, went to the President's office 

to explain I PCOG I and the 2~ NL'lrch 

directive, whic·h he had uot )'Ct seen. Mr. 

Truman ~;nid he wished to study the papers 

and asked the ('OJnmittee to gel the directive ready quickly for final npproval. 20 

The JCS ~ave its concurrence lo lPCOG 

I 011 I 0 May with a proviso l h:.H the directive be amended to allow Eist•nhowcr ro 

continue the pt•oduetion of synthcti<" r ubber 

and oil, aluminum, and ma nc.~ium to meet 

the nced11 of the occupying fbrn~. The 

Presiden t, i11fom1ed that l'vforgenlhau 

wanted l0 h;l\·e such plant!! d<:slroyed hut 

that the \Vaa· and State Dcpn•·tmcntc; believed l·:iscnhowrr ought to kC'cp at least 

the c;ynllwtic- oil plams to sa\'t' o n U.S. imports, said he entirely di a~rcctl with Morcnthau. ·· Four d ays later, n pprovcd by I he 

President witlt the JCS amendment, the 

directive Wt' lll to Eisc11howcr ac; JCS 

106 7/8. 1 

"' ( I ) Department of Stat<', fo'ouiRII Rcolotiolls, 

1945, vol. 111, 1'1'· -10:-1- 50:1. {2 J H:u·ry S .. Truman, 

Memoirs, vol. I (New York : D<>uh lcday aud Corn· 

pany, Jnc., 19'\'t) , pp. 101 nnJ 105. 

•• ocpOt'lll ll'lll tlf State, Porl'igll nc/(ltiorts, / 945, 

vol. I II , p. !Jil!.lf. 

" Ahltouf(h JCS 1067/Il was tht· flnnl version, 

the diret·tivc contiaut<'d to b<- referred to as JCS 

1067. Thr \l'rsion made public in October 19~ 5 

and ~ubscqnrul y cited in most work$ on the Sllhject \Wts JCS I 067/ 6 of 28 April I!).! 5, which 

did not coutaln 1he amcndml.'nt I'()IICt:'rning the 

ahnninum. tn:.,::nr,ium, Mtd $yn i1Wii c~ plant. . Sec 

J ames K. Pollock nnd James II. l\t eiscl, Ctrmtmy 

Under OcctiJinlioll {Ann Arbor: (':, Wnhr PlLbli$hing Co., ttll7). 11p. 100- 15, 111\CI ll njo llolborn, 

Amcricn11 ,\/ilitot)' Col'ertiiiiOII Wa~hington : Infantry Journal Ptcss, t 9·17 ), pp. 157 72. 
t\F'J'£R Y,\LTA 

War Crimn 

Br the tum of the >'Car J<H4- 45, the war 

"imcs question was hcroming urgent without having bCC'Il hrou~ llt mca'\urably closer 

to n "olmion. Thr \\',\r, St.llt", and Navy 

Dcpartmcnt.s had worked .<;incc November 

1111 a rrcom mend at ion to the President for 

a grand con'ipiracy trial. t\s the War and 

State DepartnH'nts dn:w doser w agreement on the wording, the Navy became 

incr·casingly uninLt•rcslcd nnd finally wilhdrcw nltogcthcr, stating that its interest was 

limited to the traditional concept of war 

crimes as singk idcntiliablt acts. T he Trcnsurr, also ronsultcd, refused to give its concurrence without provisions th at would 

have allowed any of the United Nationc;, 

;tS a lll:!tlCr nr fir•;( priority, tO cfnim <lnd 

dispose of alleged (;,.,man war criminals 

a<; thC)' saw fit. Where the President stood 

and how he would rc:u t to the <rpproach 

or the War and State ))cpnrtmr nts had 

l~een unccrtni~ a ll along hut. appear<'d parIll ~rlarlr so Ill Drccmbcr when he apporntcd J ud~c Samuel I. Rosenman as his 

spcd:d adviser on war l riruc-;.J: 

imu l~ ancously, thr time fM influencing 

the Pr<'!H dcn~ was hccomin~ threateningly 

short. The Brg Thrrc rH('<·ting al Ya lta was 

'rhedulcd fur early February, :md a derision on wnr crime;; was likely to be made 

there: The British gowrnmcnt was alrc:tdy 

prcssmg for an answer to n question that 

co11ld sruttlc the ronspirary trinl before it 

wao; even pn>pcrly lauuchcd. In late September, the Unitc·cl Nations Wnr Crimes 

~:ommission had proposed :1 United Natron<; 1 our t to br <·rca ted hy tr•caty and he 

rd with trying nil wnr <rime-, cases.3~ 

"R. A W,uu.•rkt•r, ))r;~ll :\IS, HistOI)' of the 

Office of rhc- St'crc·rary or W.tr c:h to War Crimc-5 

1'1' 25, ;n, iu GM 11 files. ' • ' ' 

"0 ~'t>.trlmrnt or Sl.lrr, Fm''l:" Rdntm,,, 19-14, 

\ol I, t>f>. 1370 ?to 

215 

The .Bri~i h go\'trnmcnt vchcmcntl)' opposed the rdca of n lrraL)' C'Ollrt, ostensibl) 

on the grounds that setting up such a cou rt 

would take imukral1ly long; it wamed a 

srrict imerpretation of the oscow Oct !aration of I 943, under whir h each nation 

would Ll')' the person'> aCli ~Cd of having 

mmi~ted crimes against its subjects or on 

ItS terrJLory. l n nn aitle 11/Ctll(liYt: or 30 Octobe r, the British had a<;ked the U.S. govl~ nmen t to join in tommuuit:ating these 

v tcws to the War C:rimc'\ ( :o mmission. ' 

The difficult)' of a11i ing a treaty court 

could not be denied, blll an intcl'national 

tribunal was essential to the War Department's concept of a conspiracy trial, and 

an lfTirmative answer to the British c·ould 

have hecn a crippling llluw tu it The State 

Department dehyed an11wrring, hut hy latr 

r~ecc mher the t0nli11Ut'() sil<:ncc W<LS hcginnrng to arou~e su"picion in the \\';\r' Crime:. 

Commission thai the United States 11nd 

United Kingdom were not interested in 

the problems at nil, nnd the Briti h were 

talking about presenting their· views 

independently. J) 

In the fin werk of J anunty :1 hr cnk ap· 

pe.'lred when the PrC'idcnt, on the 3d, 

a!<kcd the Sccrrt<'~ry of State (tlr a report 

on the status or prorcedings in the War 

~rimes Commc sicm, particula l'lr conccrnmg l he approach the U.S. l't'JWC$cntativc 

wa.o; taking, and indil'atcd h<.· hclicvcd a 

nmspirary indi ctment and nn indil'tmcnt 

for waging :~gg 'C"-<; ivr warfare IHI~ltl to he 

inrluded. Jc Durin .~ 1 ht' next t hrcc weeks . . ' 

rr.·' meetrngs with J udgc Roscnmau and JustJcc Deportmen t rrprcscntali vco; . timson 

'

1

1bid., pp. 1389- 9 1 

"'Ibid., p. I.J06f The Soviet Uniun \\OIS not 

a member of rhc Unitl'd N:uiom Wnr Crimes 

Commi~~ion, having n-fmcd ro joiu lu•rau~e 1t was 

nc)t allowed sc:-.11s fur each of ih $ixtccu n:publirs. 

" Department of Stllll', .\!alta and Ynltn in 

"Von'i~'' Rel:uiou~," p. ·101 ' 
216 THE U.S. J\Ri\ LY IN THE OC:C:UP:\TION Of GERMANY 

and McCloy, with the State Depmtmcnt 

agreeing, Sllccecdecl in getting tbc V~Lr Department thinking on war crime trials written i_nto a mcmonrmJum for the Ptcsidcnt. 

Two days before th e last draft- the twelfth 

written in cc Noven1ber 1 944·-\ovas completed, Stimson repeated his views tn the 

Preside11 t IHtl was not '\urc whether it 

regi-;tered. ":'; 

The memorandum went to the:: While 

House on 22 J anuary. f11 it the t·uncept 

of criminaJit)' wns broadened, partif'lll:trly 

vis-a-vis Stimson's original thinking, to 

include " pre-wa r atl'Orities and those C'Oillrnilled aga inst their own nationals, n<'uLrals, and stateless persons. as well as the 

'"aging of an illega l war of aggression with 

ruthless disregard for internationa l law and 

the rule.<~ of w:v." Su(·h c-rimes as tlwsc 

committed inside German)' before or clming tlac war whif'h ruuld not be d:L<; ifi d 

as iT s against internnl ionnl law or 

existin!{ German lnw would, evc rthclcs~, 

be· tried and punished bem use to rln so wns 

dcclnrcd United N;Hiou!\ polic)' and he-

<·a tJSC postwar scrlll'ity, the rehabilitation 

of the Gennan people, ami lhc demands 

of justice required sud1 action. The tria ls 

would he carried out in two stages. T o conduct the fi rst stage of tria ls, an in ternational 

co,u·t would he created hy c.-.;erutive agreement, thns avoiding 1 he t'lnnhcrs('>mc prot·ess of e.'>l<~b li hing a tr<'aty court. The 

highest ranking German leaders would he 

brought before the tribunal both as individual defendants and as rcpresent<ttives of 

:'>lazi groups aml organiza tio11s. They 

would he <'hargcd with spcrifk <:rimes and 

with " joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise which included and intended 

"' ( t ) Stimson and B1mdy, 011 llctil'e .~·en·ice, 

p, 5117. (2 ) Winnat' kt-r, Draft MS, Hist of OS W, 

p. 35. 

these <' rim e~. or was reasonably cakula ted 

to bring them nbo11t. " The tribunal would 

adj uclirate not on ly the guilt of the persons 

brought before it but also the c:omplicity 

of the organiza tions incl uded in the 

charges. J n tile second !'tagc, other t'Olltts 

would try the rank and fil e members of 

organizati()nS that the internationa l tribunal hac! fou nd to he criminal. Where specific arts or atrocities could not he proved, 

mcmbcrshi p in 1 he pro~crih d organization 

would he considered ample evidence to sustain a ronviction, and the nature and exten! of the individua l's participation would 

dctermi11e the severity of the scntence.as 

The mcmoranJnm included a draft executive agreement for an international tribullal. Steuini\lS quricd a copy with him to 

Yalta , but, <'Ontrary to State and War Deparlnlt'nt rxvcrtatiom;, war crimes were 

barely mentioned at Yalta nside from the 

cu:o:Lom<try press releases promising swift 

punishment and a statement in the protocol 

submitting the question Lo the foreign scr rc~­

ta rics for a report in dttC rourse.:

11' The President h01d not ar k11owledged receiving the 

memm·andum before he left [or the confer-

<:Jl('C. ;1ncl aft er he returned, gave no sign 

that hC' <lpprovcd it or, intleed. that he had 

rcacl it. :Mounting specnlation in lhc newspapct.· tm lhc war crime..:; CJti CSt ion, talk in 

Congress about its t<tking the lead, and 

sotmdings in the White House by thr \Var 

a nd Stntc Departments con!'erning the 

rncmorandum a ll fa iled to bring a 

rc.«pcmsc. '" 

The silence had nol been broken on 6 

March when the British Ambassador, Vis-

<'OIInt Ha lifax, reminded J\ <·ting Sccretnry 

of State Grew that the nirle memoire of 

" Depannwnl of State, ,\•laltn nud Ynltrr, in 

"Foreign Rela iious," pp. •102- 11. 

" Ibid,, p. 979. 

'" Winnackcr. Draft MS. Hisr of OSW, p . .J<l. 
AFTER YALTA 

::30 October 1944 had not }'C:t been ;U1-

swerc:tl. The British government, he tddcd, 

hclieYed a discussion of wa r (Times and war 

criminals would he mutuall y advantageous 

anrl. tbcrdore, invited Brig. Gen. John 

\'Veit·, direrwr of the W;Lr Dcpartmenl 

(National) Wa r Crimes Office, and Green 

H. Ha<' kWot·th, Legal ~or lo the State 

Dcpnt tm<'nt, nnd an)' other o/Ticials the 

Stale or War Departments wanted to send, 

to a meeting in London at the middle of 

lhe nwnth. The invitation was aL once an 

opportuniLy a ud '' potential pitfa ll; an npportunil'y to solicit n prco:; idential opinion 

on 1 he memora ndum ; a pitfall in that if 

the attempt failed, the .\mericnns would 

h;we a hard time persuading the British 

to accept an a pproach that w a.<; not eYen 

atloj)tcd in Washington. Pn:.;; um , th<' 

British would no l hnve ~s cl the invi tation 

without knowing what they w.mtcd tn d(). 

The as.-;umption could a lso he made that 

what thr Bt•itish wanted would di!Tcr considcrahlv from what. thr .\ mcrio lllli 

intended to propose. .\t YaiLa, Prime i\ 1 inisle t' Churchill had ~r~id as he <l pparmtly 

also had at Quebec rour and ~~ half momhs 

before- that he preferred to have the 

major criminals shot without trial. 11 That 

President Roosevelt did not lean more toward Churchill's thinking than toward 

Stimson's and the War Depanment's was 

by no nle<uls certa in. 

All in all , the outlook fot• a satisfactory 

meeting in London was not bright, and ten 

days l1ad elapsed before the St·nte Department informed :;.. fr. Roosevelt or the British 

invitation, asking him to authorize Judge 

Roscnm<m to head the U.S. delegation a nd 

hinting that a uecision ( lll the J anuary 

memorandum wo11 ld help get the war 

" Dcparhnctll o f SlrtU;, i\of/1/l tt nil(/ Y11/1a, in 

" Forci!'(n Rclntiol\s," pp. '100 ll nd !H!J, 

217 

crimes program moving. T he ropy returned 

from the White House carried an okay, but 

whether it could be co tru d as applying 

to the brief resume of the J anuary memorandum included in the message wns 

doubtful. T he State Department waited 

until la te in the month to tell Lord Ha lifax 

tha.l J udg-e Rosen111an, ;Llready in Eu rope 

on 0 1 her I tusinc.-;s, would c.:ond urt the disc-ussions in London to get Iter with General 

Weir and Unl. R. i\mmi Cutter, whom the 

\Va r Department was sending. ~ The Wa r 

Department representatives, wary of going 

unprepared into talks with the .Briti!lh, had 

used the interval to r~ up :1 detailed 

agenda and a summary of thr U.S. point 

of view. 111 

.\ ftcr two meetings, on 4 and 5 .\pril, 

the m·gotiati<> ns in London were: deadlorkcd. The .British insisted on having the 

worst half-dozen Ot' so ofTenclers, inrlucling 

H itler and Mussolin i, :;ent enced by " politiq l'' means. T he farthest they would go, 

even tCJHl.l ti\·cly, wa~ to permit an :trraigunwnt stating the offenses w be drawn up 

<llld presented to an int<'r-. \!lied tribunal. 

The trihun ;-tl would pass on lhe truth of 

the arraignment wi thout cunsiderinp 

whether what wa.s ·~ed was '·a crime 

l> y any law,' ' and the Allied governo1ents 

would determine the scntcncco;;. 1 1 For the 

next week, 1v-hilc the British negotia tors 

awaited m·w instructions from the Wa r 

Ca binet, the :\ merieans consulted with 

Washington b)' cable. Stimson ·s first reaction was 1 ha t the Bl'itish proposa l deprived 

the trial of the judicia l character he considered essential. J udgc Rosenman i.nclined 

toward accepting the British approach pro-

" Dcpartmcnl or State, F l/rtl i.f4 tl N el(lliOII.f, 1945, 

vol. lfl, p p. I 155- 57. 1

' Winnackc ;·, Dr~ft .M , Hist o f OS W, p. ·15. 

" Dcpnrtmc nL o f S ta te, Potcigu l?elatin11s, /945, 

1·oL Ill, pp. 11 5!i 6 L 
218 THE U.S. AR~fY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

videc.J the tribunal wac; military rather rhan 

civilian, the sentencing was done hy the 

court, and the arnLignmem was fully ciocumented (the British wanted jt " in :;omewhat general tem1s"). Stimson believed 

Judge Rosenman's conditions were essenrial, as was :1lso an indu ion of the conspiracy charge in the arraignment; hut he 

r·emaincd fea rful that the .British procedure 

would diminish the efferl on world opinion. 

The talks broke off on 12 April when President Roosevelt's death forced J udge Rosenman to r•eturn home. They probably would 

not have gone on in any case, since the 

War Cabinet on the same day decided 

unanjmously against coLLrt trial in any 

form.•r. MrCioy, who had been in France 

C\nd arrived in London on the 15th, saw 

no way of reopening the discussion at this 

stage even though he brought with him 

General de Gaulle's agreement to the 

American position. 

I n Washington, the uncertainty over the 

war ,·r-imes question was g reater ~han 

ever- but only for the moment. On the 

17th, Judge Rosenman gave President Truman a report on the talks in London. The 

President at once said he did not believe 

in a political disposition or the (hid criminals and approved the stand the U.S. negotiators had tnken, asking Rosenman to 

rnrry the matter forward at the forthcoming meeting in San Francisco to draft the 

United Nations Charter, which thr Al lied 

foreign ministers would attend.40 With the 

White House hacking, the ' Var, Stntc, and 

Justice Departments decided on the 20th 

tC) stanu finn on the January memorandum 

at San Francist o and, if the British balked, 

to npproaeh the Rus.c;ians separately. They 

derided also to underscore their stand by 

., Wlnnnck('r, Draft 1\lS. Hist of OSW, p. 47. 

"Tnun:~n, Alcllloir.r, vol. I, p. 211-1·. 

beginning to set up the U.S. clement of 

the court. )\if rCioy suggested several candidates to head the prosecution for the 

United States, among them Supreme Court 

t\s.'iociate J usLice R obert H. J ackson. On 

2 1\ lay, Mr. Truman made public J usticc: 

Jackson's appointment as Reprcseutative of 

the United States and Ch.ief Counsel for 

the Prosec ution of \Var Crime.<~. Thr trial 

procedure, the President added, ' "Will he 

expeditious . . . but one which is in keeping with our tradition of faimcss towards 

those accused of nime."17 In San f rancisco 

the ne:xt day, Judge Rosenman explained 

the American proposal to the British and 

Soviet delegations. To the surprise of McCloy ancl Colonel Cutter, who wer'c also 

present. and of Judge Rosenman himself, 

Foreign Sec retary Anthony Eden !laid the 

British posjtion had recently changed. The 

War Cabinet, £den added, still saw objections to a forma l trial for lhe most notorious Nazis, hut if the United States and 

t.he Soviet Union wanted such a trial it 

was willing lo bow to them in the 

matte .''~ 

J\fter ] \rstirc Jackson's appoi.ntment, 

\'\1ar Department concern with the major 

war crimjnals rapidly became peripheral. 

J ustice J arkson, a-. the Pre.-.ident's pe1 ·onal 

represcntal ive, carried out 1 he lengthy 

negotiations after San Frandsco. On Secretary Stimson·s o rders, McCloy ser up in hi!: 

own office, sepa rate from the Army ::itaiT, 

the OfTicc of 1 he Chief Counsel. Its main 

functions were to give Jackson administrative assistance and help him as~eml>le a 

staJT. McCloy kept in touch with the negotiations through the summer, hut by then 

he had lcs.c; to do with influencing the llies 

"EO 9547, 2 M:~y l!i . 

"DcJ):Irtrnclll of Stnte, Foreig11 Rclntio11s. /94!i, 

vol. I II , pp. I I fi 1- ("i<l. 
AFTER YALTA 

th;au with ootJ1jn g the way for J ustit·c 

J nrkson with the U.S. occupation authoritiC$ in Germany, who were not inclined to 

wc.ll omc independent agencies into lhcir 

bailiwick."' 

While the trial or 1 he majOI' criminal!\ 

was ntl Iunger <t direct Army concern, the 

npprchcnsion and cvcn lual trial of offenden; ag<t iust sperific laws and wmgc.'> of war 

still wctl' :\ nny responsihilitic.s, as would 

he the members of organizations found 

guilt y ,mdcr· the conspiracy charges. The 

numbct• or case.<; in these: c:\lcgori<:s was 

hound to l>r vastly larger than <~l th e top; 

yet, in early 1945, almost no machiner)' 

existed fur dealing with them. SllAEF and 

the nrmy groups were cngrOl;.'!Cd in the 

final drive ap;ainsl Germany, .u1d it \"as 

the last week of February before llcadquartcrs, ETOUSA, set up under' the 

theater judge advocate a war airncs hr:mch, 

the War Grimes Group, in accordance 

wilh the n crcmhcr 191·4 inst ~r li s from 

Washington. 

The ETOUSA lclter of 24 Fchr•twr·y :-u1-

nouncing the Wa r Crimes Group did, at 

lc:t.<;l, ~·nvis n more than jl&St anoth<T in~ 

efTcttual staff agcnry. The War Crimes 

Croup was to work thrmrgh the ar·mr 

Kroups nnd armies to collect evidence nne! 

to "arr:ange for apprehensjon and prompt 

trinl of persons against whom n primn facie 

<'fisC ill nwdc and fo r ex.ccution of SCntCil('t'.S 

which Ill II)' he pa~ed. "''

0 Plans railed for 

uinclecn war crimes investigating teams, 

ench consisting of four or fi ve offi cers, including a legal examiner, and five enlisted 

men, a court reporter, a photographer, and 

iut crpreters. Their mi..."-Sion would he to fol-

.. Winnuckt-r, Draft MS, Hist of OSW, p. 52. 

"'Seventh J\nny, J udge At.lvoc:~ w Set, War 

C:rilnc~ llr, sub: History of Wnr Crime5 Br. From 

(;r<mtion to :J I 1\!Jay 45, 2 1 Mny ~5, in Scv<:nah 

Mmy 107 25. 

219 

low up reported rrimcs and prepare n~c.s, 

without as yet proceeding to Lhc n·inl 

age. ' 

The l1cginning had been made, il11 L it 

was only that. 'l'hc war was moving nt full 

speed, and the expert personnel Llml tbc 

War rim e.<~ Group needed was nc.xt to impossible to find. T he numher of court~ 

martial wns at its wartime high, and men 

with lcg:cal training, particularly court reporters, were in short supply; and a r hcd\ 

turned up only five pathologists in the <' 11 · 

tire European theater/·: Consequently, the 

investigating teams materialized slowly. 

Only seven were organized before the war 

ended. Thr in~cllige re agencies, charged 

with locating and detaining suspects, were 

engaged in innumerable higher prio•·ity rnterprises. ( :ommands changed; units 

moved; and in the shuffle even susp C<'Is in 

custody wcrr lost or forgotten. T o hccomc 

lost among the fat·eless thousanch; in the 

prisoner of war· and detention camps was 

not difficult. The turmoil and confusion a t 

the end of a war was just not conducive 

to orderly legal pmc:c.'iSes. In the second 

week of (arc·h, SIIAEF added to the ronft.Lc:; ion an<l to rhr potential work load of 

the War (;rimes Group by ordering the 

automalir arrest of entire categories of Gcr·· 

rmms: the Gestapo, the Sirherlteitsdicnrt 

{ SS intcl li ~enc , SS officers and se nior 

cornrni~" n<'d oflkcrs, a ll member'\ o ( 

the SS Totenkaf;flJc rbaeude ( conccntratiOII 

camp rds), Nnzi party officials down 

to OrtsgmJ;jmllsitsr (Local Group 

Leader), H itler youth offi cials. and sundr)' 

others including all fcrnalc members of the 

•• (I) !bit!. (2 ) EUCOM. Dcp JA for War 

Crimes, Report of 1he D cp JA for War Crimes. 

}\me 194•1- july l!l•tfl, 29 Jul •}8, ETOUSA files, 

p. 21. 

" Gencrnl RMrd Srudy No. 86, p. 8. 
220 THE U.S. R~IY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

SS .~ 1 TIIC individual ofl'cnder became· a lmost too rare to wao;lc time on. 

I n large pan, as late as the end of Fchru-

;lr)' 1945, the cxtt·nt of the war crimes 

prohlcm was still unappreriatecl. At first 

the War Crimes Gronp was thought of as 

being directl)' nmrc:rncd o nly with a<:ls 

again~>l U.S. troops and U.S. nationals. The 

g reat majority of the crimts, prcsmn:lhly, 

wt·rc 1 hose tht• Gcrnt;ut:. had wmmittt·tl on 

oct upit•d ter ritOI)', and they would cv<·ntually he the co~t rcrns of the restored !!;OVt' l'l11l\Cnts. Whnt hnd been and woulcl he 

goiug on in Gcnllany was not )'Ct a<'tually 

!ll'<'ll , and the owt·clo nc \'Vorld Vhlt' I ;lt rc:wit)' pro pagand a had left nn enduring legacy 

of :.kcptici.o;m on tilt' :~ uhjc t. 

Cousequently, the true criminality t) £ the 

Nat.i regime, for· all that had hCt'll !;aid 

about it, was un c•noJmous shock .1ncl surpl'ise \vhen it was nnt<Wncd in tht• last two 

mo nths of the war nnd the douht ~ ~vnpo

r·atcd. Combat Photog..-uphers recorded 

rou ntl ~ atrodty ~~ c·ncs in sLill :uld nwtiun 

pi< tun'S, hut no war ,·,·inw.s persouucl were 

tbcrc to tlontment thr c rimes. Unrortun:ndy, ha\'utg tvitkllcc of the crimes on 

film was a fRr 1 r)• fmm bei ng t.bk to idrnt ify and convict the t·rimi11nls. 

In mag nitude the German crime-. vast!}· 

O\ cr-shatlowed rrimc" wmmiued in Germnny hy U.S. troops, hut they did not 

romplctcly oh~>rurr them. Looting was ~o 

widespread as to he regarded as a soldierly 

sport. The USFJ·:--r General Board ral t1 ion eel that its study of war <Times issued 

in the ;;pring of Hl46 should not be colltru l to imply "thnt conduct .tmong 

.\mcrican troops w:1" alwars hcyond rcpi'O:H'h.'' :\side from looting, the honr•d '" ~'" 

nwnre or "sul>iitantial rharges" of mistreat-

•'J.tr, SHA EF i\(; to Distribution, Mth : Arrest 

•tl\d Detention 111 {l~nnany, in SHIIEF C: 'i, 

000.~ ·2. 

mcnt of prisoners or wnr, induding one 

general •·ourl-martial procc·eding against 

Americans nrr\lscd of murdering prisoners 

of wtlr. In the latter insta ntc, the tvidencc 

h ad hcrn held insufficie nt to sustaiu a convictiou without, in the board's opinion, 

leaving any assurance that the accuseJ 

were innoccnt. r.• Of the crimc.'i rommittcd 

h y U.S. troops, the best- though b y no 

means mo.'H accurately dor.umcnled was 

rape, and it showed a "spiral increase" in 

the dosing month.-; of the war. Between 

July I 942 and O<·tohcr 1945, 904 rape 

cases were g-cd in the J.o:ut'opean theater, 5~2 of them in Germany. All tolu , 

487 solclice-s were tried for rnpcs allegedly 

committed in the momhs of h and 

,\ pril 1945. By no mean ' a ll tht• inc:idcnLc; 

wen: l'rportcd o r, of tho.<IC tTponed, 

broug ht l<t trinl, and tlw conviction ralc 

was rclativdy low. The Judge Advocate, 

Seventh Army, referred fl1 ras<'S to trial 

in April and May 1945. Mut'C than half, 

47, were tri<·d, resulting in 24 :u·quittals 

and ~ C'ouvictions. Tokmnn: on the part 

of the t'ourls was prohahl y lc~ a factor than 

the w<·iglu of the penaltic.'i and tltc difficulties of proof. The convictions in Seventh 

.\ nn y rcs11h cd il'l eleven dc:1th sentence..;;, 

seven life sentences, and severa l fo r twenl)' 

anu fiftC<'II yrars. The legal requirement, 

a manifest lark of consent hy the victim, 

"'"-" miii.'ling in so many rases that at last 

sonH' courts began to hold t h:'ll ••a man who 

enters a strange house, catT)•ing a l'iflc in 

one hand, is not justified in believing he 

has accomplished a scdu ti ."~L Tf not all 

the rrinH'S or C\'Cn a large percentage were 

•• Ibid., 1'· 6. " ( I ) USFET, JAG, Hi lory, Brnnr h office of 

the Judge Advocntc Cenernl, 18 Jul ·t2- 1 Nov 

45, In Adnlin Hi t Collection, ETOUSII, Nr. 55911, 

vol. f, p. 2•19. (2) Sc\'enth Amty, J11dgc :\dvocnto 

Sec Rprs, I D<'c H - 3 1 Mny ·I 5, i•1 Seventh Anny 

107- 25. 
AFTER YALTA 

punish ed, sotm: we re, and these severel y. 

!\ lureO\·e r, as the Ge nera l Board la ter 

point etl oat!, the re was a diiTerence between 

Lhe individunl o!Te nses of the U.S troops 

a nd the S)'Stenl ali<·, officiall y sponsored 

Nar.i < riminalit y."'

1 

In the last weeks of the war, influen ced 

l>y '''hat was 1JciJ1g seen in German y, the 

war crimes program gathered m omentum. 

ln .'\ptil, lhe a rmies began setting up war 

t rimcs branc hes a nd liending out field invcstigali11g offi cers with c·lerks and intcrpre-

~ to gather evidence a t the scen es of 

<:rime<; :as they we re uncovered. Suspects 

c·ould nor yet be srgregated, hut three prisoner of wa r enclosures in the Normandy 

.Base Sccti.o n, Comrnunications Zone, were 

set apnrt whe re they a nd unfri<:ndly witnesses could he cong regaled.r. 7 At Spa, 

Belgium, SHAEF opened ASH<.:AN, a 

holding a nd interrogation n:nter fo r top 

Na zis a nd milita ry ffi ce s~ r.~ At its rear 

headquarters jn Versailles, SH A EF set up 

the Central Registry of War Criminals and 

ecuri ty Sw;pcc.ts ( CR0\1\'CASS). CROWC.\ SS was to mainta in wa nted Esls, par6<·-

lllarl)' of peri\om; who mig ht be turned up 

in prisoner of W ;'l r C'amps. ln lbree weeks 

the rcgist.ry arcwnulaLed 70,000 c<;. P 

A Missiou for the U.S. Group 

Control Cowtc:il 

The Et\C agreements on zone." nnd conI rol machinery made one radical <"hange 

in the pla nuin_g concept fo r t·hc administra -

tio n of occupied Germa ny : they added 111 

"" General Board, Study No. ll6, p. 6. 

" EUCOM, Dcp JA for War Crimes Report, p. 20. 

"' Memo, SHAEF AG for CC, 12th ACp, sub: 

f.stafJiishmcm of Sperial Detention Centers, '2 7 

May 4.5, in SHAEf C- 2, :38:1.6- 4. 

" Ltr, SHAEF, G- t, to AG, 7 May +5, in 

SHAEF C- 1, 000.5- 2. 

221 

e!Icrl a fourth phase to the three phases 

SH A EF had liSed as a planning basis since 

Slash 100 . . \ <:cording to Sla!:h 100, milita ry, that is, SHAEF, control would end 

in the scrund phase and 1 he perma nent O<'-

cupa tio n ta ke over in the third. The Ei\C 

ngrccmcnts added a Lhird temporary (lJld 

still military p eriod, that of the Control 

Council. U pon the inception of the Control 

Council, SHI\EF W()uld be disbanded, hut 

Eisenhower would remain as mi lita ry ov~ 

crno r in the zone, commander of the U.S. 

occupa ti on forces, and a member of th e 

Cnnt rol Counc:iL Rephwing his two staffs, 

SHAEF and ETOUSA, he would ha ve 

one, t he H eadquarters, U.S. Fo rces in the 

E ttropean Theater (U SFET), which 

would a bsorb F.TOU SA a nd the U.S. side 

of SHJ\EF. 

During the Control Council period, 

then, SH J\EF would no longer exist, but 

USFET would continue and inherit the 

U.S. side of SH AEF G-5 and tbc questiort 

0f it.~ htti hip to the U.S. Group Control Council. The answe r to this questio n 

was l1ound to hinge on two considera tions: 

one, the built-in rclur t:ancc of a hurcau-

<Tatic organization to contemplate its own 

demise; the other, tl1e tr Depa rtment 

view of the Control Council's role in the 

occupati.<m. With regard to the first, in the 

fa ll of 1944, the U .S. element of SHAEF 

G-5 a~ powerfully sitlmted to pro tec t its 

future in U S.FET. Il w as a full-fledged, 

fun('tio n ing, <md- mosl important- decision-ma king organization. The U.S. Croup 

Co ntrol Coun cil was nol. i\s far as the seco nd nmsideration was concerned, W a r D epartment CAD opinio n a t least could 

ha n.Ji y have been mo re fa vora ble towa rd 

the pro jected G :>, US FET. Hilldring, 

writing lo Smith on 2 November 1944, 

took fo r gl'antcd that the theater G- 5 

wo uld h e the opcrnting milita ry go rn~ 
'I'IIE U.S. \IHIY 1!'\ THL OCCUP \ '1 TO:\ OF GTW.:O.·IA:\Y 

ru<·nt .tgcncy in thC' l .S. zom·.'1

" 'l'l11rs <'11-

ruur<tgcd, Smith :l!'cCptcd a stafl' ~ 11d y two 

weeks later in which Eisenhower's two milit:tr)' government' stafl's wert assigned separate roles : the U.s. Group Control Council, 

polic:y-making in l3crlin: and the G- 5, 

USFET (sec <~hove, p. 1 ()() ), implement at icllr in the ~onc~.'11 

.\t the san)(' time, 1hc talk ahotl! appointing ::-r civi lian high rommissioncr for 

Germany that accompanied the advent of 

thr Morgcnthau Plan rmd the seemin.!!; imminence of the end of the war hroughl up 

the queslion of the. appointment of the 

deputy military governor, who would heatl 

the U.S. Group Control C()unril. McCloy 

proposed that the deputy 011ght I o be a rc

ular officer· of sHu1ding. The War Department particularly did not want, HI lcal;l for 

the initial period, a high powered rivilian 

rommissioncr wnrking Olltsiclc the military 

chain of command. Eisenhower agreed but 

was willing to accept a civilian as his deputy, especially i[ the civilian were McCloy 

or t\ssisL:mt Secreu:u·y of War Pallerl'on, 

whose name had been mentioned ns a 

candidate. Eiosenhower agreed, tno, that the 

deputy probably ought to begin working 

himself into the job soon hut added th;1l 

Wickersham was doing an ''extremely good 

j(ll>" and could carry the planning through 

to the f'nd. Apparently, if he could not get 

McCloy. for whom he had already a!'\ked 

early in the year, Eisenhower would raLher 

have waited until he could spare a senior 

general fmm Ht\EF.''~ 

<h Cable, Hilldring lo Smith, 2 Nov 4•1, in 

USFE.T SGS :tl<\/2. 

•• Memo, Mnj Gcn R. W, Crawford for GO!ns 

B·~ll, Barker, Holmes, Wickersham, McSherry, suh: 

Organiz<nion of 1hc ETO for rhc Occt~ pation of 

Germany, t6 Nov 44, in SHAEF SCS 322.:!. 

"' Ltr, McCloy to F.iscnhowcr, 24 Oct ·H, and 

Ltr, Ei~enhowcr to McCloy, I Nov 14, in USFET 

SGS 33•1/ 2. 

When vVi< kct•sham rrturnccl from \Va:-hington in Novcmbtr, ltc brought hark, for 

Ei:;ctdtnwcr's ;rnd Snrith 's infurmntion only, 

the name uf l\{aj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay as 

the War Department's choice for the clcpntyship, Clay, who as Dir·ct:tor of Materiel, 

.\rmy Service Forces, supervised tbe military pmdu<'tion pmgr<llll, hatl recent!)' 

romm.mckd fot· a timr the I'\orn1~uH.ly I3asc 

!->en ion, at Ei:;enhow{T·s r·<·q uc:st, to speed 

1l1<: flow of supplies through Chcrhourg. 

After only n. three weeks' slay in Fnmce, 

he had relunw.l to Washington to rcpml 

fL1r Eisenhower ou a threatening heavy-

<~111mtm iti n shortage.'"' Eisenhower had 

wanted to retain him in the theater and 

wa:; willing to hnvc him as lire deputy fur 

military governmrnt. Stimson, however, de-

<'ided rhat as lon~ as Cerm;ln rcsi!';tancc 

cominuccl, the: :llllJilunition problem was 

more important and thcrc£ore a!'-signed 

Cia)' for :-tl least sixty clays to the Office 

of War Mobilization and Reconversion. 

When Hillclring proposed appointing an interim deputy llnd alluded to ''disquieting 

reports'' that the U.S. Group C:ont!'ol 

Council 's work was "more or less aimless 

and inc!Tective," Smith assured h_im thal 

Eisenhower would he willing lo wail sixty 

days, lhnl no change in the U.S. Group 

Control CoUJwil was netc.s.'>ary, and llrat 

he did not agree with .Hilldring's views on 

the "ineffectivcnes.s of our stnfl' Vork.''"~ 

"' Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New 

York: Doubleday aliCI Comp<1ny, Tnc., 1950), fl. 

:1. '" C:thlt:, Hilldring to Smith, !i OP.c: 4•1, an<l 

Cablt•, Smith to Hilld ring, 7 Dec -to!, iu USFF,T 

SCS :tH/2. Hilldring had visited London in Ol:toIH:r and r·etmned to Wa~hi1l ton co•winced t iJ:H 

the joh as acting deputy had ''developed beyond 

Wickersham's capaiJiliilcs." Rc had described rhe 

U.S. Group Control Council as "drif1ing aimlessly'' 

:llld auributed "95 perce nt of the rro~tblc to vacill:lling leadership." Eisenhower <~nd Smith did nor 
AFTER YALTA 

During Llw wintt , I he U.!:i. Gmup 

( !omrol C:o11ncil worked em its Basic Prcli11tin ar)' Pl:tn which, logcLitcr with iL" elaborations and su pplem nt~;, even tuallr mac.lc 

up a file that General Clay later desrl'iiled 

as being " hC)'Olld the abilit)' of one m:lll w 

comprehcml.' 'Hr· SHAEf, in the meantime, 

r.ompleted one " final" C- 5 t'corganization 

for Germany at tht• end of f ebrua ry and 

<mother in late ,\ pril. Together, they did 

fi mdl)' end the scp<u·ation of policy and 

operations within G- 5 a nd al>olishcu the 

remnants of the ~pec l sta fT. H<:nrcfonh 

! he C- 5 fuul'lioual branches were responsible fo r poliC'y, planning, and opera ti ~."' 1 

On tht: ot her ha nd, the U.S. side of 

SH.'\ Ef' G-5, at least, w~ts now intenl on 

appl)•ing the distinnion i>et ween policr and 

opera tions to the U.S. Group Control 

Council a nu the futur<' theater G- 5. 

In l\[arch, the U.S. Grrmp Comrol 

Cmmcil moved lC\ Vcrsailks, leaving a rear 

cr he I on in Lomlon to ntai n t:tin ron tact 

with thr E.\ C and lhr British C:onlrol 

C:ounril clement. The move brought the 

. \ meriran \.ontrol Council personnel in 

r.ontarl with events on the Contineul- and 

under rloscr G- 5 snutiny. One particulnr 

weakne~s 0-5 had found in the Basic Preliminary Plru1 'vas "·omc tenden cy to assume lon the parl of the Control Count'ill 

power to givt· orders to Lhc U.S. zonal staff 

agree, possibly bec.'ltiSC whatever driftiug the Control Council group wns doing was not nim lcss 

ns fa r as SHAEF was concerned. ln SmiLh's view, 

the ma in fHtrpose of the group fOr the time be ing 

w:ts to "assemble a corps of experts on the civil 

~i e•." H e wanted l<> ltold open the jobs in the 

exccuti\'c t:~A' fur "outstandin.~ omru:~ ncl s and 

df officers he re, who arc no" conducting tiiC' 

wa t·." ( 1) Cable, Hilldring to Smith, 2 Nov 44, 

in USPET SGS 14 /2. (2) Ltr, Smith to Hilldrin.ff, ~ J\•l:n 45, in CAD Ol•l·, 7- 10-42, sec. TT. 

'"' l.tr, C lay to Hilldring, 7 M:ty 15, in OMGUS 

177- 1/:l. 

"'Ce11cral l.l o~trd. Sludy No. ~'.!, pp. 52- 5<f. 

223 

and snhordinate cchelons."r.; This tendency 

Wi\S rorrerlecl in two directives- one issued 

on ~ l March, I he other on 29 .t\pril. The 

first tlirt:('tivc limited the U.S. Group Control Coun cil to negotiating in the Control 

Council a nd developing policies "consistent 

wiLh appro,·cd U.S. ,·iews in conjunction 

with the joint theate-r staff.'"'' Wickcrsbt'ltn 

rnnnagcd later, willt some effort, 10 get the 

words " in ronj11nction with'' changed LO 

"in r.onsu ltation with .''''~ ' The second direrlive defined the twu stafTs' functions as 

follows: 

I. TJ1e U.S. Group Control Council 

will he the U.S. element of the Control 

Authority. 

2. The theater sl aiT will be specifically 

charged with excnttion , i111plementation, 

and supervision within the zone of approved U .S. and Control Council policies.'" 

Jn \'\'ashing;ton, howcvrr, the \•\'ar Department had , in the President's 23 l'vfarr h direnive a11d the revised J CS 1067, accepted 

the Control Council':; authority HS paranlount: a nd Hilldring thereafter <.:ond udcd 

that in the long run Eisenhower would 

clearly have onl)' one "taff for military government in GennRn y, the U.S. Gro1.1p Control Coun ril. '

1 

Whjlc t.hc staffs ""ere jockeying for position, one genuinely r.rucial step toward deciding tlhe future of the orcupation was 

'"OM GUS, Conlrol Office, Rislorical Branch, 

History of l\'!ililary Govcrnrncut in Germany, 8 

May ·15-30 Jun 46, in OMC US 21- 215, ch. VIII, 

p. 25L 

''' H qs, US Cp CC, Planning Directive No. 21, 

'II M:11· •15, in OMGUS 12- 1/ 5, VG0- 11 / J. ~·US C:p CC, Starr l\•l ccting of Division Directors, 2 Arr· l:J, i11 O MCUS 12 1/5, VG0- 12/l. 

"'lvlcmo, llqs, ETOUSA, Cors, fo r Di lribution, 

sub: Rela tionship or Dcp. Mil. Gov. and U.S. 

C:p. CG to Thcat<'r S1afr, 29 Apr 45, in USFET 

SGS :-1221:1. 

" m s1ory of the CAD, hk. VT, eh, XII, p. 66. 
22 1 'I'Ht: lf.S. \RAIY 11\ Till•: OC:CLTP.\'1'10'\ OF GER~L.\ . '\' 

l.tk<·n thr ;tppointttwnt of the- Drput)' 

1\•l.ilitary Governor. .\ ftcr December 1944, 

the disc·tt!';sion of 1 he appoi11tmcnt, never 

very mthu~iw.:tic on the Europran side a nyw:t)', had faded. Writing to Hilld.ring in 

<·arly J\ l:m·h, Smith mentioned the need 

for a dcptll)' l>ut c;aid Wirkcr hr~m co1dtl 

c lll'l'\' c,n ttntil one w;ts appoi11Lecl. He was 

111on: onn~rnctl at the time willt finding 

a c hirr ft1r the theater G< >. who c joh he 

tlc:-,cdl>ed :.>< l>ci11 ~ "a~ importattl w· more 

impol'l:lftt " titan that uf lhe deputy; he !\ug-

~cstccl Cl:t).;.J Hilldring had told Smith a 

wn;k c·:u·licr that the War Dcp<~rtlllenl w:1s 

:H tiwly cn.g;\gc•d in sclcc:ting a deput y i>11L 

pro1n ised on I r "some ofTiri:tl won l . . . 

before· Inn~( and did nnl mention Clay or 

<lll)' c>Lhcr candidate:-. ;:1 C:on;;cq ucntly, 

Clay's appointment :1s Dcplll)' fi itHI')' 

Gov<:ntnr at the c11d of MHrch, " 'hie h was 

a su rprisc lP Ch1 )', cq ua II y surprised Eisellh()wrr and Smith when he .> pcarcd 111 

SII.\E F ht'iH.Iqu:trtf•rs 011 7 .\pril.;' 

Upon his :11 rival tt l Sll.\EF Forward in 

R<: im:-;, Clay, liS he relates in bis memoirs, 

had a title without ;t job.'" Military government was ;tll in the hands of(',_:;, SH.\Elo', 

:111d t hr welcome Smith gave him was lc~" 

than warm. But he had imndad rr~dcnt ials: :t pr<:J\idcntial send-off arranged by 

his former r hief in the Office of War Mohilizatinn and Rcconver:-ion. Juslirc J amc.c; 

F. Byrnes; a commitment from the \'Var 

Department 1 hal he wo11ld l>c Eisenhower's 

deputy in fact and nol he l)llricd ~onwwllcr·c in the general staiT; and a promorion 

.: T.tr, Smiih lU ll illdring, :1 March ·15, in CAD 

01~. 7 10- 12, sec. I I. 

"' T.tr, Hilldrlng to S111ith, 2•1 Frh ~l, in SHAEr 

SGS :l:l+. " ( I) Clay, De(:isitm ;, Oumauy. pp. ·1- 7. (2) 

S11rnmary Sheet, UirN·tnr, CAD, 1<:1 OPD, 111) : 

Pr.rlionrwl for U.S. C:p. CC, !W J\Iar 15, in OPD 

331> ( ~cc. I 1- A ). 

"' Clay, Dtcisit.m in Gnml/111)!1 I'· H. 

tu lictllcn:tll.l general in the offinl-(. On I tl 

\ pril ETO U~.t\ created the post of Dcpllty J\[ilitary Gm·crnor ;mel announced 

C:hty':; a!;.<>igumcnl to it. A week Inter he 

look rnmmand of the U.S. Group C:ontrul 

Council. ''1 The 2~ . \pril tlirccti\'c on the 

rclatiow;hip between the U.~. Group Control C:omH il and the theater G- 5 appeared 

still to lcm·c some ambig-uity in Clay's position ;L-; Dcpnl)' Ivlilitary Governor: he. wa<.; 

to J,c in direct charge of the U.!::i. Group 

( :ontrol C:tllltwil; he would represent the 

( :omm:mding General, USFET, on the 

c'(J-ord inating committee of the Control 

Council \vhcn it was established; and he 

would l1c advi~cr·· lo the Chief of Staff 

and the Comm;lllclin~ General USFET, 

for military .~ovc rnmcnl '''ithin the U.S. 

zom· in Gcrnwn)'· ln this last capacity he 

would '·~>cc III'C coordination dirccll)• 

tl1rouglt" the theater G-!i.;; But the 2~1 

\pril clircc•tiw w:1s less authoritative than 

Cltty's own definition written on 11 .\pril. 

In it ht pmpo~o;cd to "wot·k directly throu).'{II 

the G ~ Divisions with the several commnml C\hclons'' and as he later told 

Hilldring claimed Ct.'> Deputy Military Governor " fu ll charge for the commander in 

Berlill and in addition . . . staff supcrvi-

::;ion over G-5 a('(ivitics within the U.S. 

zone ";~ 

Not cvcryottc; kuew yet hut the lrug lc 

for power was over and General Clay had 

won. 

'''OM GUS, History of Military Gowrnmcm in 

Gcrm~ny, ch. VIII, p. 25. G<'ncrnl Wickersham 

bcc;•mc Assistant Deputy Milicary Governor until 

26 May when he asked to he relieved from duty 

for' rc11sons. of fan1ily health. 

"M1•mo, Hqs. ETOUSA, CofS, for Distribution, 

~t b: Re lationship of Dep. Mil. Gov. and U.S. 

Cp. CC to Theate1· Staff, 29 Apr ·15, in USFET 

SGS :l22/3. 

' ' ( 1) Department of State, Foreign Rulatio11s, 

!94.5, vol. I If, p. 9:l•J.. (2) l.tr, Cia)' to Hilldriug, 

7 M:\y 45, iu OMCUS 177- 1 /:l. 
CHAPTER XIV 

Eclipse 

T!tr• U11hr Porket 

\II the anni<'-. had c.:ro~<;ctl the Rhiaw befor<' tlw rnd uf :..J.m h. On the 2Ht h Eist·nhowt·r ~>Ct :'\inth . \rmr on the north, nnd 

Fir-st and Third .\r·mirs, on the sout h, rllU\'-

illf{ to snare the Ruhr in a swrt pin~ nlvdupnu.·nt that wou ld reach cast 120 milt~'< 

to tlrt.: \Vc.'\cr· RivC'r'. l,(ltcr jn tl11• da )'. in 

:r rahlc a<ldrc.;scd " Pcr::onal to ~!.11'1'-h:d 

Stalin.'' Ei">crlhnwn wid the Ru~-;iano;, ;u' 

he h.1d already in(ormcd the British aud 

l i,S. Chic.fs of StarT, tlrat he propos<·d to 

t losC' an cnc:in lem<·nt of the Rul11· in the 

vicinity of Km;.-;cl and then turn tht :Hmk~ 

t'lrsl to meet t IH; Rus.o;ia n'>, prohahly in the 

Leipzig- Dre.-.ch·n :1rca. Sub.<;cclll<'rlll)•, tu 

1-.<'<'p the Ccn11an<; from ~etting up :t redoubt in tJ1e .Davar·ian nnd ustri<lll lllountai ns, he \\I(Jtlld send force.~.; south tc1 link 

up with the R11s.~ians on the Danube btl wt·cn Rcgenr-;blll'g :1nd Linz. 

H:1ving lost thl• West Wall nnd h:wing 

failed tn hold on tl~t• Rhi11C, the German 

:u mit-<;, rcinforrccl by ovc:r-nge and underage Volksrlmm nll'll, wl'rc nothing like the 

opponents they hrtcl IJct:n even a frw weeks 

car·licr. On the southern mm of the enrirdcmcnt, fo'i11it ancl Third \rmit~ were 

alrtady halfway l•ctwccn the Rhinl' nnd tlw 

Wcscr h} ni!-{htfall on the 28th. Ninth 

. \rmy drove cast and south, mel the First 

\rm~· point at Lippl(ladt on I ,\pril, and 

dosed d1c noose tiJ.~hlly around Gt'r·marl 

• \1'111)1 Croup Bin tht Ruhr the 1wxt dny.' 

1 For a complc.-11' lactifal description ~rc Ch.ulr• 

The two PWn captain!>, Gittler and 

Padovcr. follO\~cd behind Ninth 1\rmy and 

dc•wrihcd the st•cnc: 

The troffic keeps goin~ l·ndlessly to thr 

east. Strc:1111iug hack an· tlr1: hngc COM Z 

trucks bl•nring the prisonc·l':l. They smil<!, 

wave, sial'(: with awe at the bu~sy Americans 

buildiug brid~es, patching ro;.1ds. unloading, 

loading, hennng f01·ward. You can stand on 

1111 intersection and rounl clw prisonrrs by the 

thousand~. Whrn the)' look at the ruined 

town!; whc•rt· rhrrc had hccn l'c:sist:u,re, the) 

jnl'l -.tan· o~nd 'lhak,. th-!l IH•ncls. 

P:tst ,ht• n-win cities of rcsistanc:c•, past the 

broken l'oncls nnd shattered farmhouses and 

torn-up fit•ld~, we suddenly come upon towns 

that :.taml inlnl'l and fields that arc grern 

and fanner~ who are at thrir job workiu~. 

There wa!. no fighting in lllr-sc areas, and the 

pcopk hnw profited. Then in the open country b<'hind Mu<'nster and south to Paderbom, 

vou src tho\l~nnds and thou ~nnds of liberated 

fo reign workt•rs and prisorwrs of war from 

e,•er)• aruty iu E.urope. Mingling with thern 

arc Gt·n11nn workers walking bark home 

ft'ona lhc Ruhr·. This is thl' great ruigralion. 

When )'Oil t;alk with therrl you see the sense· 

le-ss. dr.,pcrat<· measures the N:•%is took to 

transpcllt labor back and forth nrross Lhc 

land dur·ing tlw last six wrcks. 

rn l.ippt'. whrre the Gcrmnns \W'I'e SUI'· 

priscd and l;tll'f'l'ndered by tl w lhousnnds, the 

:lnrit'llt pirtua·c~que beauty or the towns and 

rounttysid<• is prcsen·etl. Thf' towns operntc 

normally: t1w ricld~ are rich with cattle. The 

farms and lmm.es stand al> before. Rarely do 

you ~re American soldit>rs in these towns. 

Nevcrthclt!Ss, there is order and tranquillity, even wilhout German ot· Allied authority . 

13. Mnrl)()nnld, The Last Offtllsivc. (WMhingtoll, 

197'q, 
Tl 11: P.~. \IOIY J\; ri-II: Q('( .t 'P \ 'I lOX 0 1· GER~I \ '\ \' 

'\llit•d p1twl:unatmn,, hm,t'\1'1, "'<' po,tcd in 

t'\'1'1 > 'ill.t~c· .all tlw \\:I) up to tht· 1110~1 for· 

w:11'd line''· (;pflnan childJc•n WOl\'1' n' you pa'~ h) .1ncl til<' old l>l'oplt• 'mil<'. 1·:, t'I'\'Clfll' 

f:lJI, OH'I hiul,<'lf to gi'c )'Ou lwlp and i•ifOI'-

IIhlltnn nnd diu·< tinn~. 

F 10111 !.1 pp<· > 011 \ucldt·nl)' t·mnt• 1<1 Pacll'l· 

hm n \ nd .1~:1111 appt•:u· the (;uniliar 1 uins 

;111d htUkt•n lift•: pc·oplc· '<':l1chim• in llw tubhit· fm· ~mnt• trinl..c:-t <11 po~M'''ion. I it'tt· thC'rl' 

h.1d be<·n tc,bt.llll't' <llld tlw til) lt.ul p.1id fnr 

it. \\ t· t:1 lkt•tl to a s<~ ddlclll:tkt• l "hn "a~ trying to < l<·ar .1way tl~t• dc·lll'io, t\IOlllld hi~ busi- ll'~~. I h' is nn~1 )' nnd npolugt·ti<·. " We• lumld 

han• 11~c·d our hunting guns on the nz1 

l.it'tcr.'' hl' says. "Thr n thb would not have 

OC'C' UI'I'C'CI and Wt' Wflltld h:i\'1' ~l'l\'t'd 

l'OIII('l hing."~ 

1T ad death not a II too nf 1 t·n !-I iII hccn 

waiting around the nc:-:1 r onwr, 1 hr war 

would h,l\ t' been little lliCn'f tlt,m :1 .;our 

jnke b) \pril 1915 .. \t \t nJ,c·n, ""'''' an 

S~ ollic t'l c ;tndid.ltc "' lwnl pulled tllll tlw 

tl:t) ht•lme the \ mcrica n<> c .un<', thf pc•nplc 

lnulic·d to fill in the an tiL111k ditdu:s 

anmnd the town. The 9 th Pant.t'l Division 

troop-; tktailcd to defend Olpl' clrovr thrm-

-;elvc'i to a prisoner of war c .tgc in tht•ir 

own trut ks. 1 fn one ~ma ll tm,n, .1 milit:\1") 

f{OVC111n1CI11 ptthli< safc•t r nffi< cr, (ailed lO 

quell <1 di-.turhancc, found a di,plared pcr-

"'on ht'itl iug a German m·t'l' lht· lw.tcl with 

a ,-,u·tf.,quare, framed pit't urc of /)a 

F111'ltrc,.• When EC.\D Tcr h. 4 K<'nncth 

D<"nni~o fcmnd himself the cml)' \mcrican 

in a German town, he commantlctrTd a 

hiry< le ft'cun :t rar k in fmn t of a r·;1 fr· and 

I'Ock down lhc street !;houting: ''Arlrtllll.f!.. 

Amr1iknnil'rhr Hnml; en." \\'hilt• the Ccrm.ul:., i1H ludin.l{ three onin''" who111 he 

: I C'l\1\ F <liulcr anc.l S.lorl K. P.uto, ,., , "U11 

lhc Wt•-cr Rilrr," 111 SHAEF c; 5, 17. 11 , Jnckcl 

q. 

~~ ~~~. 12th, AC:p, ~P , t>.otl) Stunm;try of 

l ncrii•Rrnn•, II Apr t5. in S IIAF.F ~ 'i, 17 II. 

J ad.C'l fl. 

' IIi' I Rpl, 12ch A~p. C: .1, Apr I •,, 111 S IIAF.F 

G- !l, 17. 1b, J.ukcol 10. 

saluted ottl uf h.thit, ... namblcd feu 'O\C'r, 

he pedaled thmnl.(h to\\ n and ha1 k to the. 

. \merit au lint•. 

Thit•d . \rnt) 's 5th Di,·ision c .q>tlnc·d 

Frankfurt 011 ~!) \l:n r h. Caught in a uarrowing- po1 kct ht.·twl't'n Fir<;t .\Jill \ on thr 

north .mel 'I hied \m1 ~ 011 the .. ~uth .1111..1 

cast. tlw pcoplt· h.cd J..ncm n "hat "a' , 11111-

in~ tw· uc·.11 h ,1 \\t•ck. l'hc Cnulntn 

ordered tlw men to lea\'c the 1 it\' on tht> 

24th. Snti1C' did; man) did nm, pt dc•rin~ 

to wait out lilt' r nd in the c-ellars and ail 

raid hnnl..cr"'. 'l'lw lll'Xl dar wa!l Pnln1 Su n· 

day. On on da~ artlll<'rr ll ~ ht:gan to 

fall iu l Itt• city •• tnd :tl night, wl tt'll tltt• 

firin~ snll'> id etl, thl' m:1r ami ralt lin.~ nf 

\ mcriran t.mJ..~ 1 a11 it·d arro'~ the' ~f.tin 

Ri\'er frnm the ..,outh. The \V<'atht·J wa!< 

fine, tnclll~ lil..t• ~l t\ than ~lan h. Tlw l'il\ 

"cnt 011 a '>J>I'Cl' ,,, looter" plnndl'lc'tl tht· 

proper!~ uf 1l u"e "lu1 had kft. llw , hot>-

kecpel"i tried to ..,,.11 on I t ltcir .;tot"'· Buttt'l, 

scan<' ~; inc t' hdm<' the war, rou lcl bC' 

bought h) IIH' t·a,c· and wine o:;omt·t inw« h)' 

the lnwkcthtl. aud the butchers ~"" ' m tl 

fou r or £hi' tilllt'' tlw k t;'almeat ration. On 

Thur;da) thC' \nwri< .ms ramc: the scmc t'l 

and .;kirrni ... hn-. fi ~l. keeping under 1 cwc·t 

d<>-"c tn lmildinl.(' ami hehind the ruhhl<' 

pill-s lini ng th<' ..,trt•t•ts: a nd then tlu· columns '' ith r iflc·s .;lnng on their -.hnuldcr .... ' 

The war wa.; 0\'Ct' rm FranJ..full. \ftl'l' 

twenty air raicl:-, tlw homl>ing wa~ rnckcl. 

The siren:-; WP\tl cl not he hcnn.l again , nor 

the anli:'!h'c'l':tfl g\111 '1. nut the cit y wr.s all 

hut dead. The llllsincs.-; clistrkt was a brick 

and e wildcrnc'" in whil'h tlw olcl l'c·:-idcnts could hac dl y find their wav aro11nd. 

N . . . 1 o tr<uns wt·rc ntmllng and no -.trcflt ar-.. 

' Hq., ECr\D, to SII AP.r, ,uh: Auhicir\ ul clw 

ECAD, I '10 Apr •11, 111 SIIAEF G 'i, 601 

• ~t adlo•n Lo1Pi and Rirh:ard Kin1, FtnttA(utl 

101d die dui wiltl1'11 j ,/rre ( Fr:wk(url a. ~I : 

Vt!rlag ·:tuldurt~·r Uut•t:hcr, 19hll), pp. II 17. 
ECLiPSE 227 

U .S. TA~K CRASJ.-.n: s TrrROUCH R u tNS or- A GF.Rl\·IA N TowN 

The telephones were out, and the electric 

lines and water and gas mnins would take 

months Lo repair. The Chid Military Government Officer, LL. Col. H oward D. Criswell, Dela(;htnent F2D2, fou nd a non-Nazi 

fonner ed itor of the Frankfurter it.un~. 

1<\' ilhclm H ollbaclt, and had him sworn in 

as Oberbuergenneisl er. 1 n the railroad 

yards, Germans and displaced persons 

raided stranded W elmnach t suppl)' trains, 

and seventy Russians died from d rinking 

methyl alcohol taken in a raid. Of the 

3 1,000 J ews who had inhabited frankfurt, 

one o£ the oldest J ewish communities in 

Germany, military government officers 

found 140. They had he en employed under 

the Nazis in ccmet<~ries and at cleaning 

toilets. Living in segregated houses, one 

family to a room, the)' had in the past three 

years not received any egg, meat, milk, 

white fl o ur, wine, tobacco, or rlothing rations. Jv[ilitary government requisitioned 

houses and a hospital for them.

7 

On the edge of the Grueneburg Park in 

PrankfuJ·t stood a man·el, a spariotts highrise office building belonging to lhe I. G. 

Parhen ca rtel, unlourhcd by bombs and 

' Fra11k{urte r Presse, I 0 Iay 45, in SHAEF 

G- 5, 17 .16, Jacket 12. 
22H TilE U.S. \R~lY ~ THI~ OC<:tiP \'1'10~ OF CER~I \~Y 

wi~ lc hardly <·,·c·n :.1 winduw llrok<·n. Tt 

~ct nwd lik<:l)' to l1e the only huiltlir1g big 

c•w,ugh to howw ~H \EF (:tnd USFET) 

ldt ~Landin.t; in wc~tcrn Germany, and 

Smith cabled Wasbingto11 l{l make sure 

that FrankCmt, which might IJt• considered 

for as.c;i~tmwnt to the French wnc, was kept 

iu tlrc U .S. zone.~ The Germans later suspcdt'd that 1hc U.S. ,\ir Forrc had spared 

the huildin~ deliberately. More likrly, the 

:lll~iair< c·aft bnuerics in the Crucnchurg 

Park •mel the adj:-~rcnt Palm Garden had 

ill(llt('fll'Cd the l>omber· pilots lO pick lc.-;s 

hnznrclou~> targets. 

1\tkanring north from Ft·ankflll'l, 'f'hircl 

. \nny 011 iulo the future Sovicl zone when 

it orrupicd the western lip or Thur in~ia. 

On 4 \ptil, the 90th lnfnntt•y fJivio;ion took 

Nlcrkers. a few miles jnsidc 1 he h<mkr in 

l'huriugin. On the mornin~ of the (ith, two 

military policemen, Pk. Clyde llarnton 

:1nd Pf1·. ttlhony Kline, cnfot•cing the rusomnry ordl!t'S against rivilinn l'irntlation, 

tnpp~;d lwu women on a rmtd oulside 

1\ferk<'rl\. :)inrc both were frcndt displnrcd 

prrsons and nne wai' prcgr1atll, 1 he fl. fP!-1 

Ul.'l iclcd catltn llcan tn arrest tlwm to rscorl 

tlt<'fll hack into the town. On tlw way, ns 

the)' pa~'lc'd the rntranrc to tiH· Kaist't'ocla 

lo:a lt mine in i\fcrkcr:>, tlw women talked 

nhnlll gold that the Gcrntaus had ~tnrccl 

in the mint· . o much gold, the) said, that 

unloadinA iL had taken local civilinns and 

displaced persons who wct•c used as lnbor 

R<'vcnt y-1\vo hoLtrs. By noon tltt: iilor·y had 

passed from the MP lirsl sergc<111t lo the 

l'hicf of staff and on to the division'" C-!l 

offi<'cr, 1.1. Col. William .\ . u~<;d l, who 

in a few hours had the news <'onfirmccl by 

other DPs and hy a British scrgcanl who 

It ad hccn cmplo)'cd in t ht min<' !l:'l n pri-

'Cr\htc, SHAEF For"•:.rd to 1\CWAR (Hull ), 

16 Apr •15, in SHAEF G . Ops. :l!l?- 15. 

soncr nf \\'l\1' ;111 cl hnd helped unlu.,cJ t lw 

gold. Ru~·-wll :tlso turucd up an a<;:si-;lant 

dircf'tor of I lw Nal ionnl Gallel'ics in Rc' l'iin 

who ndmilt<'d he was in Mcrkcrs lo c·;tr<• 

for pai111inh~ stored in the rninc. The gold 

was rc:portally tiH: entire re.<:erve of lhc 

RcichriHmA in Berlin. wlric·h had ntovf·d 

jt 10 1lw nticw aftt'l' the: hnnk building was 

homllcd out in Fchruarr I 945. When Ruo:-

sell lt:um·d that thr mine had thirty mik" 

of gnllcric·., and five <'ntr:ln<:cs, the cli,·ision. 

wbid1 had :tlrC<td)' detailed the 7t 2th Tank 

Battalion to gmu•d the Nfcrkcrs cn~rantc, 

had to div('rt tire whole 357Ul Jnfantry 

Regiment 1n f(lt:ll'd the other four . 

Thr next mornin~. after having ';lC<II II 

raigcd in the hoilrt'S ovcroight 111 ~e ncmtc 

clendcity fm tlw lifts and ventilators, RlL'>-

sell went down into the mine with a pttrty 

of division orTi< Crl', Ccrman mine ofl1rials. 

and Signal Corps photographet . N{'ar· tlw 

entrance to lltt main passagcwny they 

found 5!'>0 hag~ containing a half hillitlrt 

in pnpcr· Reirhsmnrk.f." 1\ slcc:l vnu lt cJ(HH' 

• Th<' di~<·ovrry th;ll Gt•rn1:1m. had pos<ihtr Yl' · 

moved nwtH')' rf~c c•ntly •.• i~NI uspicion~ conn•ruin~: 

the u:>f'~ lo "l11d1 11 ruight he put. Dr. Wc•rm·t 

Vcick, a l?fitlt.rb(IIIA offic·ial who gave him~rtf up 

to militnry '(oliN mueul in Mcrkl'rs on It Atu il, 

itt.\istcd, h<twi'\C't, undt•r intensive qucsriuniu~. lh.tt 

lite monC)• \\:'IH lwin~t t.ok('n out for noml;1l <'irrul.l· 

tion hccau~e th1• /td(h.lbnuk'J priuting prc·.,.~c·' hnd 

l•rokcn do11 n. ~ Yt•irk c•xplaincd, he tuod sc:vc•ral 

other l>au:k euopl<lYI'r~ oJ loaded I ,000 hngs of 

monr)• itt 11 milruml box1:nr on :1 April. Thr next 

moruing till')' h.td dt·ridecl lU unload the car ngain 

when they t••:•n•cc.l th.•l ic could not le;we Me rkel'> 

hcc·amc or fl hiOI\Il lll·idgr. Tht:y WCr(' nhout hitlf 

6nishrd 1dor11 th('y hrtucl that the Amcricnu~ "''"' 

lc~< thuu , ,,.o miles away. The ~cnior offiewl thl•n 

dccidrd thtH hr \Vii'> hndly needed hack in firrlin, 

lockt'd chc v:tull. anti drove off h)· c:~r "lulc> \'eid. 

1\Cill to gc•l loh •uitca~c. Whcn Vcick returned 

to the tnittt•, tht• Atrwticaus wert' tht•r,•. Thr) 

scardtt•c.l him, a~kcd whnt ht! was unlu::tdiug, uokt~d 

at the ntOIIry, nne! moved on. He and th<• l.thoren 

then finished lt11kt(lding the monr)· nucl ~ll\l'ke d 

it iu the passa~tc outside the vault. 
1-:CLIPSF. 22H 

on the entrance to the tunnel :mid to contain the gold was locked. ln the afternoon, 

after having tried unsun·es.<;f\tll) to open 

the door, the party left the mine without 

havi11g seen the treasure. 

The next d~t )' was Sunday. l n l hr morning, while Colonel Bernstein, Drput)' Chief, 

Financial Branch, G- 5, SII AP.F, read 

about tl1r lind in the New York 11 rrald 

Tl'ibunt''l Paris edition, tlOth lnfantr) Did-

:-.icHI engineers blasted a hole in the vnult 

wnll to rrwal on 1 be other side a r()om 75 

f<'ct wide and 150 feet deep. The floor was 

covered with rows of numbered I 1ags, over 

7,000 in all, each containing gold hars or 

gold coins. Baird paper moner was stacked 

along one wall; and at the hack a mute 

rcmindct· nf nazism's Yirtims ali~cs were 

piled fillrd with gold and silver looth fillings, eyeglass frames, Wi1Ld1 rases, wedding 

rings, pearls, and prcr ious stones. T ht.: gold, 

hctwern !)!) and B I pounds to the hng, 

amc:tJiled to nearly 250 tons. In papct 

money, ;dl tht' Europc<m cun·encies were 

represented. T il<' largest amounts wcr<~ ~)(I 

million Fn·urh fratH'S and 2. 7 hill ion 

Reichsmm ks. Th<' t rcasure illme><;t made the 

400 ton~ of art work, the best pieces from 

the Berlin museums, stacked in the mine's 

other passagts seem like a routint find. 
2JO Till-. I I.S. \R~I\' 1:'\ 'I I II·. OC('lJP \1. 10.\ OJ.' CER~I \XY 

On Stmd.t\ .1ftct tlfll)tt. Uctn'>tc:itt, .tftl·r 

du•t kin){ llw IH'''~Jiilfln •;tm) '' ith Lt. Col. 

R. l'uppt'r Barrc·u. ( .hid, Fin:mci.d 

llranrh, G 5, ~t h .\nn) (:nmp, flew to 

Sll. \ EF Forward at Rlwim~ wht·fc• lte 

'>pent the ni ht, il hcing too 1:\lc h) then 

w Oy into Cktlll,tn}'. \t uoor1 on ~Iomlay, 

h<' arrived at Gcu. CcC>rgc S. Pntttm ·~ 

Third 1\rmy raJqt~<lt tcn; with ittlitl'ttC'-

tions from Ei~c·n owr r to 1 heck the eontents of the tiline and '" ran_1 c to ha\'C the 

11'(':\!\urC' takC'n aw .• y. \\'hilc· he wa~ there, 

rml<·t'l' arriwd for him to lnr:tlt' a c.kpnsi-

(ory fal'lhrt' l1at'k in tlw SHAEF zone und 

supervise the moving. I3f'rmtein a nd R;tt'l'<'ll 

spent Tncsd:t)' lo<1king for a site and fill<~llr 

sculcd on the Reidubank building in 

Frankfurt. W<'dnc.sda y, at Mcrkcrs, the)' 

planned the move and prepared for clislinguishccl visitors hy having Germans tmw 

up Lhc mine m.tC'hincry. Thr next morning, 

Eisenhower. Bmdlcy, Patton, and ~lnj. 

Gen. Mamou S. Eddy took the I ,600-foot 

J'idc down into the. n1ine. When the)' 

stcppecl l.Htt ~t the foot of the shah, thl: 

pr•ivate on guard 'i:lhllNI and, in Lhe underground stillnc~, w;u; hcnrd h)• all to mutter, 

"Jcs••s Christ!" 

The move hcgan nl ()()()() on Salnrday 

morning, 14 \pril. In twenty hours, the 

~old and CUJ'I'('IH v and .1 few l'ascs of art 

work were i(),tdcd on thitt) ten-ton tnu ~s, 

c:u h with a 10 pen en! ovcdoacl. Down in 

the mine, jeeps with trnilerli hauled 1 he 

trc<L'>IIre fmm tlw vault lo the shafl, where 

t hr l<mdcd trailer:o~ were put aboard the lifl.-; 

.tml brought to the surfar{' .. \t the \'ault 

entrance an officer registered each hag 01 

item on a load slip. and al the truck ramp:-

:tn o!Jicer nnd an enlisttd man chc('kecl th e 

lo.td slips .md \Trifled that every item thnt 

left the vault w;~s lo:ulcd on a u·uck. Finally, the ofTircr recorded the truck number 

and lhc names and serial numbers of the 

dt iH' I , tfiC' ,t <o:.. ~t.lllt dt iVC'I, :tlld Lftt• ~ll ;trt) q 

a..--..igunl to Lite trw k. 

'l'lte < onwJy kf1 ~lnkcrs 1111 Sunday 

ntntninj.\ fur the !15-mile trip to Fr11nkfurt 

,,·ith .111 t'~t m·t (l( fiw rifle plalliOn;;, lwn 

tllat !tine ~.;un pl.tlOons, tt·n tnttltipk-monnl 

.ttlli:tirn ;lft \t·hit fc,, and Piper t ul1 all() 

fightc•r ;1ir c·ovcr . . \11 this protec lion, howC\'I'r, wax tlCll cnnuglt Lo prcYcnt a l'lllllor, 

which c.,urran·d prt·iodi< :dly for }"l':tl'l> ;tfter, 

that ow· truckload nf ~old (or art work ) 

disappeared on tlw W:t}' to ftankhtrl. On 

St11Hhl) aftrrnoon .ttld throughout the 

night thl· lrut:k!; were 11nloadcd in Frankfwt, c•a(·h item llt'ing c·hecked :tgainst tht> 

load list<; as it calllc ofT :1 trurk and again 

when it w.1s moved into the Reirhslumk 

\'aull. Two infi1ulr}' c·ompanir.s rurdoned 

ofT the :ii'Ca dUJ·ing the unloading.'" 

T I1C' s:m1e procedures, except th:H a huntlrcd Gc·rman prisoncr'l of war did the 

work, w<:r·c followed ill lmtding tlw arl oiJjccL<; :~hnard <t second truck toJWO)' on 

Mondny, and a simihr security g'lHli'U c~­

t·orLed the trucks to l•'rankfurl thC' next Jay . 

. \Iter l he lllain treasure was rcmOV('d , the 

mine was "'ill a ~l.lh hag of valtwllko;. Rc-

<·on nai~-;a nrc of the <>I her ent r:Hlrc<; had 

l111'11Cd up rnur hundred tons of Ccrmnn 

p:'ltt·nt orrin: records, f..ti[l wti/Je tnnlct·ial 

and :t111111ltnition, Gl'nnau ,\ttll)' ll igh 

•·• Tht! ttoltl rcmain<'d in the Rcichshn11J. vatoh 

llttdcr i\rttty control 11n1il 24 Jnnuarr I !11h " 'hen 

('011lrol an.J responsibi lity (or it paSSl!U to the ltt(!'ri\IJi cd par.~lion A~tc•ncy. The agency wos 

dwr(!<:d with returning the gold ()II a prorated 

basi~ to gmcmmct ~ havin~ claims on it and 

"ith making :1 sul»tnnti.ll ;'lnlount / 2.~ illio~> 

in mocw1.1ry gold, 111"" ,til "nou-rrwnct<cr)• fo(Oid" 

and all ~o·ca ll ed lll'irlc· ~s fund~, accordiii.K ((I a 

Mthscqil<'ll~ agrc!'mc•nt of t •1 J une 1') I Gl :t\ ail~blc 

to "•tooH"t'pntrinble victim~ of Germ:111 .tr.tion." 

'11tc latte r nmomH went mostly to corupcuslHc 

nnd rc~l·ll lc• J cwi:<h vktilll' o( nazism. Thr So,·ict 

Union "·u not jndndcd in the distrilntttCln, ~o incc 

it had r<'linquished all claims to captl•red gold 

iol the Poud:un Agrccmctll. 
r.n.IPSt: 

( :unun.tnd 1 t'l ords, lilll'at it•s a11d rity (11 '-

l hi"'·" ( inllttding 2 million boni-s from Berlin ollld tlw GoC'thc CIJ!In·tion fr·ont 

\\'c·im:1r ), und thl' filc·s of the Kr1q1p, ll c·ns' ltd, :ntd ol her •·ompanit·-"· The pat('lll l'ttmds i11 flMlilular were pnlt'llli.tll} as 

\:dtt.1hle "" the gold ; hut ' l'hinl ,\rmr 

tH't'clcd it' 11111 l..s, and lktn..,tc·in had tu settle, 1111 21 . \ pril, fot· a small o;n c·n -tt tn k 

rmH O) tu mm·c the neam o{ the patent 

n•cords, c;:nnpks of the Kr·upp a11d li en-

"' Jwl fik..,, and sr,·t•nd clottll high quality 

m ino-;c opt·s. 

I ·•·nels fnuncl in the Rcirhsll(lllk ecord~ 

at ~ c·rk<'t~ al~o helped llll<'O\'t'l' a dn1.r11 

other ltTasurc caches in piHn''l nc cupiccl b)· 

I u;. lW'l co; that hrougltt illlU the vault in 

Fm11'-furt hundrccls nwrc gold attd ii\'CI' 

l1.11 · • ..,onw platinum. rhodium. :md p.tlladium, a quarter of a million in U.S. gold 

doll;u~ ( t ht• ,\fcrkcr..; mint: ~ct the record. 

huwc,·r r, <'Ontaining 711 l1ag!; nf U.:-). $20 

gold pit•r t's, $2!1,000 lo the bag), a million 

Swi~" gold fmrH·s, and a billion Frenr h 

fmtH "· '' 

The fmnt nlll\·cd 011: tltt• troops rt:ad 

.dwut llw trca,.urc- in Starf tllltl Stu'ftel ur 

l'ank and prnhahly onl~· \ .\gucl~· n.•ntcmht·n•d tht·~ had been in or nrar .\lcr'-cr". 

\not !act• !> pot was more lik<·l~ IU "ti< k in the 

111Cl1101'ics of those who pHsst•d throu h it in 

t'itrl) .\pril 11J.I.5. On the Cith. tlw ·lth .\t -

mmcd division LOok Ohrdruf, thir t~· mii<'S 

('a:;t of crkcrs, H small city Ilardi)' tnw- hccl 

" ( I \ SHAgF, (1 - 1 Function< in E'I'OUSA 

Opl'!'a ti on~, ~Icrkt•rs Herriugcro- Ftankfurt A••t•!t> of 

C:t!t'many, 9 Apr lo 22 Apr 15, ill CM II fik~. 

(2 I !list Rpt, 12 th ACp, AC<>fS C- 5, 1- '10 Arn 

H, ht SIIAEf C:- 5, 17.16, J;~rkrt HI ('1\ RJlt, 

S llt\1::1". G 5, Col Bcn l5tcin to Bri1; C:l•n F . .J. lll<Sht'rry, '<Uh: Dcvdoprmmt.• i11 R1·ultl\',ol tlf Trcn-

" " C (rom Kn i~c roda ~line at ~h rkt•n:, (;t' H11·1'1)'. 

18 Apr 15, iu SllAEF, C- 5, 1! 11 . ( I ) C::~hl~, 

SllAgF nin, Ei.,cnhowrr for C:CS, CCAC:, fi 

uy ·15, iu SHAEF C- 5, 1/ t:t ('i ) C:ahiP, SJJAF.f 

w AC1WAR, lfJ Apr •fS, irr USPE.'I' SCS 12:1.3. 

l1~ the \\':11' • • \ lc1p a hill 1111 the ontskitto.; 'ilon d 

a 1 ow of empty l>totu.: SS barracks. On ;, 

ncar!J~ hill w.1s ,, < lusll'l' of low, dirty, and 

wcatltt•r-hc:ttl'll wooden lntildings. Thi:-; wa~ 

Oltrdntf No1 cl , wot•k ••amp for the Burhl'nwald t'OIH t'lllration tamp. \ \'hen the troops 

entered. lltt'Y found t went y-ninc bod it.'' •>n 

thl' I'Clttnd in front nf the admini..,tratiull 

httildin . \ o.;Jwn dio.;ta nt c aw:t} w:t<: a ~a

lows atttl uot f.u hry<nHI it a shed in whi< h 

fifty-t\\o n.tk(•d !J,>dies wnc stacked in tkt~ 

of fom, cn\'crcd with what appc:.rcd to IJc 

powtl<-rcd lime. Tltey apparent!)· llild hC'cn 

aw;~ iting tt'an:>pw·tatinn Lo pits in the for<:::ot 

where ll('t\VC'Cil two and three thou a11d 

<1thcrs had l){'t.'ll buried during Lhc sil\ 

n1o1llhs lht· t.unp had <'Xislcd. o~t h.td 

died nf cliscast·. hut tnnsl abo had marks 

o n their f;H'<'" and head" and hruist.•.s on 

their hoclil''· \ thil'd group, nine ch;\rrcd 

tm-.,o~. (;& ~ o~mottg :t'\ht'-; under a rough inc·incratnr mack of railroad tic" and rails. 

'l'h11sC in front or the administration IHtilcling were the IIJ OSI n•cctHi y dead- all shot i11 

the had: of the- nt:l'k. 

Oltrdt·uf N<wcl was not n proper CtlllC<'tltrntion <amp. It had nn gas dwntl1er o' 

hig h-ptJ f<H'rtl:ttH'(' nrmalorium. The c.kathf' 

t here W<'r!' t'aU<;<'d hv disc<t.<;C and tll'glr' I. 

helped ;tlnng hy ()\'~ rw rk and hnt;alit r. 

The iurlHIIC~ had ht•c:n employed at digg~ing 

,t tunnel. pmlmbl~ a.s a site for an under 

g rountl farlnry .. \ thousand had lwm 

there a wrc·k before the Arncriratl!' C' Hllll'. 

In the :;urn cding- days the gu:mls h:tcl 

rwm·hc-d 1 hn~l' who l'nttld walk a w:ty to 

the CH'il. .\ t llOOll Oil the nth tWO huo.;s('<; 

had mmc [1) ta'-l' out the hcdriddrn ~irk. 

D~ then .\mcrk:tn ;ll'lillery lire rould he 

heard cnming cln~c. and the commandant 

lo~t hi-> nerve. scm the bu;;sc.<: nw:t)' empt). 

and hot the pr·isoncrJ> with his pi<;tol. . \ 

dozen nwn had hidclrn in the 1 amp hnilclings and survi ,·ed lo tdl abou t the la:~t da.':-
Til~ U.S. \IUlY 1!\ 'I'll E OCCUP.\'I'IOi\ OF GER1\L\ '\Y 

011 Ohrdruf~l\ord a 11d In itlnttif) the dead, 

among whom was an J\n1crin m pilot who 

had bt:en impri:;oncd there aflc.:r hcittg shot 

down nearby and had contraned typhus. 

:\ mong the fir"l persons that Lt. Col. 

J ames ll. Van \Vagencn, the 4th .\rnwrcd 's militnry govCI1111lCnl officer, look 

011 a lou r of the camp was Albert Scbneicler, !Juergcrmeislt!t of OltrdruL Srhneicler 

had hccn a party member sinrc 19:B, l)u t 

he had ;dso been an honest and con:o;ci!.!ntious mayor, nnd he had not skipped lown 

altcad of the _.\ mericans as other Nazi omc. ial:: were doing. H e was shocked I >y what 

he :;;nv. 1\ dmitting- there had been rumors 

in the: ltlwn, he d a imed simply not to have 

believed Gennnns ra pablc of sud1 atrocities. On Van \Vag~ 's orders, he agreed 

Lo summon lwtnty-five prominent men a nd 

women who were to he tnken to view the 

ramp the next 1110rning. In the morning, 

a soldier who had h~: n sent to fetch him 

alter he failed to appear nt the :;lated Lime 

found him and his wife dead in their l>cdroom, their wri!\Ls slashed. C- 2 investigators 

l'onrluded the S<hnciders' suicides wcJ'c 

motivated hy sincere :,hr>ck and regret over 

what hatl happened in l heir town. One of 

tlw mosl frustrating psydwlogical problems 

of thc early on:upation was going lo he 

how to ntakc lht' German people rea lize 

tll<' horror of thr. ro11rcntra tion ('amps. In 

Ohrc.lt'uf, however. aft er thr Schneider:;' 

Sllicic.lt:s 11 nd after others had been taken 

to sec the ra lllp, the citizens sermctl to he 

nvin cecl. '~ 

Thr' Tu.ru lo tl1e East 

'Thr dosi ~ of the Ruhr pocket in the 

first week of April opened a J 25- rnilc~wide 

" ( 1 ) H isl Rp L, Third Ao•my, G- 5, I - 30 Apr 

45, in SHAEF C- 5, 17. ll.l. (2) Hqs, 12th AC:p, 

P&PW, Dnily Summary of Intelligence, 12 and 

15 Apr -15, in SHAF-F C 51 17. 11 , J acket 9. 

hole in the 1 Ctltt' l' uf I IH' German front. 

Ccncralfddmar-;ltall \'\' aiLCI' Model's Army 

Grnup 13, 1 he 400,000 I roops who ultl 

lu,vc hcen there. wel'c locked in the pocket 

and hard l)' t·ounted HO)'!nnrc in Bradley's 

decision lo send his three armies' main 

forces racing eastward into the gap. By tbe 

wcck'l; end, Ninth and First ,\ rmies were 

hr,ading <UTOSs the '"'escr River tnwm·d 

:Magdeburg and Leipzig. T hird :\m1y, alr•cady sorncwhal farthe r cast, waited for the 

ot her two to come abreast before beginning 

its drive toward Chcmnitz and Dresden. 

V Corps ju111ped ofl' from Kas~cl on 5 

,\ pril. Lvke 1\ achcn and Cologne before it, 

lhc heart of the city was bombed out. 

• \n1ong the ruins, th<: rcm;tining 30,000 inhal>itants of what had been a C]Uartcr million 

population rummaged for 'lost belonging;;, 

their own or· other people's, Ot' waited pas-

:\iw lv for whnt would come next. Four days 

latct: and twenty-fi ve miles J;tr"thcr east, V 

Corps took Goctlingcn. Exccpl for some 

l>omb damag-e in the railroad yards and 

to the power plc1nl , the war had nol 

l011Ch<:d the city. The nue'rgermeisler perronneL! a formal :llld q11ite unnecessar)' surrender· o n the l'ity hall steps. The only 

Ge rman 1 ronps i11 town were 10,000 hospitalized sick and wounded. :\ n attempt to 

mobilize the local Volksstw-m had eoll apsccl 

several days l)efoi'C when t iH' city commandant <"a iled such a move crazy. after learning- that the men hllcl only had ten cl ays' 

tra ining in the past six months. S'vollcn hy 

n:fugces from 'Kassel and Berlin, the popul:ltiun was up to 70,000 from it~ normal 

50.000 inhal>itants. The University of 

Goettingen \Vaii open and holding some 

chlsscs, until G- 5. V Corps, ordered it 

d c.:scd in r.omplianre with SH !\EF's standing orders. 

The onl y recorded exchange of fire in 

Coet tingcn was not between Americans 
and Germans but l>ct ween a German g<·n -

cnli and the C'nltljJO. General der Jnfantcric Friedrich ll os.<;l>nch, onrc Hiller's 

adjt•L;ult hut n •t cntl> c.li:ani!i•wd under a 

doud for having allemptcd to order a 

breakout from Ea-;t Pn1ssia, was undt•r 

treatment in the lllli\'trsity di11ic for an car 

infcrt ion. lllncs.o;cs that needed to he treated 

in out-of-the-way places were common 

~11110ng German generals in those days, hul 

o~ba<'h had not h<·cn forgotten .. \n hour 

before the • \ meric;HlS arrived, an SS major, 

a unifortlled polict'man, and Lwo men in 

civi lian rlothes rang the doorbell of his 

house. Warned by friends to expect the 

GeslaJJo. Hossbach ran out 0 11 an upstairs 

bakony nnd engaged his callers in a pistol 

dud until they- obviously prC<iSCd for time 

- r1111 to a ('fir thry had parked a t the <·orncr and drove on·. The Americans were 

rather plem;cd to have turned up a genera l 

who had been af.{ainsl Hitler, not so plcnsr.d 

when 1 hey dis<'ovcrcd he was "a Pru:sian 

of the old school " who dc.'ipisrd the clcmorracy Germany had under the Weimar Rcpuhlir. Ncvcrthdcs.c; they dc<:iuecl to let him 

keep his pistol for lhe time hcing in case 

his visitors returned.' " 

u ( I J After Action Report, V Corps, 1\C:ofS 
234 TH E U.S . . \R~ Y l l\ T l fF. OC:C \TIO~ OF GF.R~ Ai\Y 

i'\.mJhall"iCII. Oil the edge or til<' Hart. 

~ lonntains, i~ thitt >·-eight miles cast anti 

SOltt h of Goet tingt•n. First .\ rnty'l' VII 

Corps, nwving fast. took 1 he town on I I 

.\ pril. . \ g;tin the . \ merin tn'i wC'rC astoni'ibt'tl and -.lmkcn by what they unc·m·crctl: 

a toll<"Cillf"alion (,Imp witlt ~,()()() I"Olling, 

unburied hoclit:l'i and 2,00(1 SlltYivors all sic·k 

and ncarl)' all in the last stages or starvation; a sla\'c labor camp; two rompkte 

nndcrgt'c)tll1d factot•ics; and a trcasLtrc mine 

C j, Apr 1'1, ll ~t ar I 'i. in V Corps, 205 5. (2 ) 

Jl q~, 12th AC:p, P&PW, Dnily Stuntmtry or lntcll ist·nt<', l'l nml II Apr 15, in SII AEF C: 5, 17. 11, 

J :H:kct 1J. 

with unu'iual nntlcnts. T ht corp"i l 

rounded up S(Tcral hund red Ccnm111 ci,·ilians to bury the dead in tilt' concentration 

camp and c\'ictcd several hundred ulhcr:-

front their homes in the town lo pm,·idr 

;u romrnotl:tl i1ms fot• the s11 tYivors. Thr 

~J.OOO displarcd per ons and pri~oncrs of 

war in the slave labor n llnp lwei IJCCII employed in the Millelwerk, one of the underground fa< torics. In the l,t:-l month.; they 

had l1ecn d)ing at tht· rate of 150 a week; 

and IJ,()Cl() wt·re ">ick, 1,00() with lllhcrculosis. The 1\"ordwetk, the other factory, wac; 

an as~cmhl y plil nt for jet aircraft ('llgincs. 

The Millrlwerk had all the eq uipment 
LJ PSE 

1·:1'\TIV\NCI( 1'0 NOIU>li;\ USI·:N \' 2 PI.Al\:'1' 

needed to manttf.u Lut'<' \ '- 2 rm kcts, from 

the c·om ponent~ to the com plctccl pro jecti lc, 

and tht Cenn:lllo; had left hchind enough 

finished parts to mal..c 250 roc kcts. The 

13cmtrodc ~I inc, outsitlc i"\ordhauscn, rnntained the cmn in~ of Frederick the Great, 

Frctlcrick Willi,ml I of Prus.c;ia, mtd Paul 

von Hindcnl>urg <md his wife; the Prn~sinn 

royal regali a, scepter, orh, crowns, helmet, 

hwatlsword, and seal: over two hundred 

regimental standards; the best hooks from 

the Prussian myal lil>nH)' ; several dol'.cn 

pah1< t· tapC!'itrics; and 27 1 pnimings, all 

\'aluahlr, among them sc,·cral h)• Luras 

Crnmtt·h. The MF.\ &.\ officcJ·s r·ould find 

only one dcf<-rl in the mine a.c; a storngc 

pi nrc: alrthough it was drr and had a cono;tant temperature. it had been u. cd since 

19 ~7 to hnusc " munitions factory and still 

held 4UO,OOO tons of ammunition, some of 

iL in high!)' doubtful condition.'' 

Between Cocuingcn and Nordhausen, 

First . \ rmy had cros.-;cd into the f111 urc 

Soviet zone, a<~ Ninth .\nny also did al the 

" (I ) Hist Rpt, 12th ACp, 1\CofS C 5, :\h1y 

·15, in S HAEF (! - 5, 17. 16, :~ckct II. (2) Hist 

Rpt, First Army, ACofS C: 5, 1-:10 Apr <15, in 

SHAF.F G- 5, 1711, Jacket 10. (:J) ~~<~mo, q~. 

USFF.T, suh: Norclh:msen Cavems, 7 Jun ·15, in 

USfET SGS 600.ri, ,·ol. I. 
236 TilE .~. \R~l\' 1:\ THE OCC't ' P.\ 1'10:\ OJ' GEIUI \?\Y 

--amc tinw on it..; drive tn Magddmrg-. The 

111ilita1) gm't'l'l1111l'lll l':tl'p<'t had hcl'll getting t hintH'I' ~itH e tlw bt·ginning- of the 

month l)('cattsc it had been ~u ctt hGcl <~ast 

and north at the sanw tinw Llwl Llw pinpoint lm :tlions in the sot~t h W('t'<' being ml-

<'Ovcn•<.l. \\'hen they cntt·rccl tiH' Soviet 

11om·, tltc .wmic.'- ran 'omplctc:ly out uf 

tl'.lincd th·t.whmcnts, and ftum the wne 

horcler Wt':>l to tht: Rhine thcr n>tlld not 

:1( hirvc <·vcn the planned minimmn uf one 

1 dctaclum.'lll for every two J.rmdkrciu:. 

EC:\ I) had he~un I raining its n!Tin:t' ovcrstwngthj hut the first hundred would not 

he availallk until the third wt·ck in .\pril, 

.tncl the l.vll huudrcd nnl until late M.ty. 

Tilt· <11111ic~ r'C"ortcu to pro"i"ional dctachllll'lli ~C and drew the persoond fmm their 

0\\" lllltkal tmops. 1'\inth .\rmy set up the 

l'\inth \nny ~filitnr) Co\'es·nnH'IH Unit, 

lntJddt·d Ult ;m ECA D q~imrnt, with 3 

c·onlpnnit•,, ·l ~l dctadmll'tlls, and 900 

ofn('t'I'S 1111<1 men. The dctudlllwnts trnincd 

for two wn·ks. 17irst .\rmy put a tho\Jsa nd 

nHin·rs and men into fifty-two j)l'ovisilmnl 

dt'llH lniH:Ilts. two mon: tlmn the tot<d of 

its 1\'~ular militnry govemnt\'1\l dctachmt·nb. and a~igncd nne tmincd F.U,\D 

otlit'<'l' to t·ac h provi~i(Jnal dttac hmcnl. 

Third . \rm) \, three rorpo; used antinirnaft, 

field :ntilkr~. anc.l ~nalt oops to ))\tl togcthl'l' a dozen detachments api('l C', nnd the 

nnll)' G 5 ran fifty officer~ thrmt~h "Charlolii'Willc in three days'' in Frankfurt. I n 

ull nrn1ics, the corps nnd division G 5 staffs 

lollk ovc•t• dc:tachmcnt functions. The 80th 

lnf.tutrv Di,·ision G-5, for instHnrc, in mid-

\ pril rnnchu ted militar)' government in 

·~ t ftnt, \\'t'imar, Jen:'l. tnd Gt·ra. " 

u ( I I Aflcr A~:tio1L Report, Fi~t Army, 1- :lO 

;\pr 45. in i~• Arnl)'• lfll-11.3. (2) lliM Rpt, 

ll .~ , Third Artll)', AC:ofS C- 5, Apr t!i, in SIIA EF 

G -5, 17,10. (:1) Hqs, Ni1iLh Artt~y, J\UofS G- 5, 

Ri-wct•kl)• CASUM, fl 11ay ·15, ln Ninth Army 

C-5, 109 !i. 

. \ 4th \r rnun·d Division tank c·olu11111 

ltc:.H.Iing c:ll>t pa~l \\'cim;rr on 11 .\)Jl'il rllcountcrcd Oil(' or t he• tl'angest sigh tS Of l)H' 

war. Two PW D observers, lst Lt. Edwat'd 

A. T cnnclll>aunt ;wd Egon W. Fleck, a civilian. clcsrl'ihcd what the)' ~aw. 

[We] turHI!d a <'OIIICI' onto a main highwa, 

and saw thousands of rag,_~ed, hungry looking 

men ma1d1iug in OIU<' rl)' formation, 111ard1• 

ing east. 'l'hl• nt~•n wct'c armed and had lt·MI· 

crs at th('ir side~>. Some r>latoons l'arTit•tl Jiflt·s. 

SOILIC platoou:; had Pnn: erfausts on their 

shouldcr.s. Some t•nrried hand grenadc•s. The> 

laughed nucl wtl\'t'd wi ld!)' as they walked. 

Their captains sn llttcd gra,·ely for them. 

They \1'('1'(' or lllrll1Y 11:ttionalitics, a pblOOil 

of French (ollcl\\'Cd h)' a platoon (I[ Spnniards- platuons of Russians, Poles. .l••ws, Dutch. Somr wor(' stripr·d com·ict 11il~. som<' 

ragged t: .K uniforms, some shreds of t' i\ iliart 

C'lot he~. Tlw~c \\ f'rt• the inmates of Buchenwald walking to wm as tanks roal'ed by nt 

twentr-11\'(• urill•s pl' l' hour.' 0 

The tank oflkns or·tlcred 1 he marrhrt~ 10 

lnrn h<rt'l.., and Fleck and Tcnncnhattnl lt·ft 

the colu mn to lmvl' a look al the 1';1mp. 

There tlrcy found anothrr fantastit· scene. 

. \rmcd inmates stood guard at tile lllnin 

gale, a l wo·-stcwy, wooden structure hcariu~ 

in large lcttc•t-s across the entr;uwc the 

mollo "Ruhl udc1 l 'nrerht. mriu I' fJlt'llunrf'' ( Right 0 1· wrong, my Fathcrl:tlld). 

J nsidc, wild I)' dtccring prisoners ru~hcd to 

shake tltl·ir hand~. Other~ wen: lm ~ 1 hrowing hinontf:trs manufartur·cti in the ra111p 

shops ow·r the IJ:t 1'1 JCcl wi 1'e fence lO troops 

passing h )' out~idc . 1\ rmed guards in prison 

dot.hcs patmllc·d the grou nds, nntl a few 

words fmm them wrrc enough to quiet the 

cxc·ited nowtl-i. The \mcrican~ notir(·(l at 

once that 1 he gu:•rds looked hcalt hi<'r than 

the others and later learned why: they were 

mostly German t·ommuni ·ts who had Sill-

•• H qs, 121 h 1\Cp, P& P\.V, ~uh: Buchcnwnld, 

a Prelimin:~ry Report, lH Apr ·15, iu SFIAF.r C ), 

1 7. I. I, .J nckN I 0. 
ECLIPSE 237 

SliR\'lVORS () 11 n ucfl El'IW 1\t.O 

vivcd by helping the SS manage the camp 

as lltey were now helping the Americans. 

Opened in 193 7, Buchenwald was a 

camp with a history reaching back into the 

prewar Nazi era. Inside one building, Fleck 

and Tennenbaum saw a thousand scaled 

tin cans containing Lhc unclaimed ashes of 

prisonet:<; who hml died in the 1930s. Such 

niceti es had long ago stopped being observed. Tn the SS offices and quarters they 

saw lamp shades, bookends, and other 

bric-a-hrac decorated with tanned , tattooed 

human skin, prodnrts of one of the hobbies 

of former commandant Karl Koch's wife. 

The Koch regime, which ended in 1943, 

had been the most bestia-l. Since Ll1en the 

camp had been run LO get maximum work 

from the prisoners with minimum food and 

maintenculcc. At the end the death nue was 

about lwo hundred prisoners a day; but 

the 50,000 who died Lhere in the eight years 

before 1945 were not enough lo rank Buchenwald with Auschwitz or the other extermina tion camps. 

In appearance Buchenwald was everything, and mo1'e, that the Americans had 

imagined a concentration camp to be. An 

immense barbed wire fence, screened on the 

outside hy a dense pine forest, endosed the 

rows of one-story hutme11ts of the main 
T HE U.S. :\JUlY Jl' THE OC:CUP.\ 1'101'\ OF G£R~ I >,''a' 

ramp und the twenty-seven low, wooden 

h;trws encirdcd by barbed wire that were 

know11 n~ the litlle camp. The "little camp" 

was tbt• quarantine station for· new prisont:a-s, pcrrrw11ent quarters for J ews, and the 

as-;cmbly area for transports w the dea th 

c:~ mp'>. Tennenbaum and Fleck noticed 

'"hen thC)' arrived that the gates lo thill section were rlos.cd and guarded. The "aristoat~" in the main camp did not .!llow the 

little camp to join their r rte<lom celebration. 'J'o the right of the main gate, ofl" the 

edge of the parade ground where the prisOilcr'S (as many as 90,000 in 19'14 ) had 

J;tood for morning and evening roll call, 

wa~ 1 he rt't:matorium, separately cndo ed 

hy H high hoard fence. The incincratoa', a 

rnodt•l of technical cffit•ierH )', could reduce 

a "t .~e,'' eighteen hodit'S, to Mhr.'\ in 

ahmu twenty minutes. The basement 

hotL~cd the furnace and the ''strangling 

room," a novcl install<uion even in the 

maralwc world of concentration rampli. At 

gr·ound lcvtl. condemned prisonen; were 

hurried thmugb a door into a sltor·t, rrnr·r·ow 

ronidor witlt a four-l>y-fom-Coot opening 

in the lloor nt lhc far cud. Tlmnrglt tire 

upc uin~ they fell thirteen fctt to the ton-

( rctt• basement Aoor where, if th{' fall djd 

nut kill them as it often did not, SS men 

KHITOtcd them arrd hung the hodi •s on 

hooks along the wall until thr incinerator 

new war- rc·;tdy for them upstairs. The crematorium had been shut down fnr• a lime 

in }.t[:u·c:h, when the coal suppl)' ran out, 

h111 hnd been runn ing again in pr·il. The 

. S guards had oot had time to dean up 

the c·vidCJlCC before they fled lhC C!l!ll p Oil 

tlw lOth, :llld th ~ left hehiud a truckload 

nf n:tknl t·orp.o;cs in the yard and llllcon-

:ounwd hone<; and skulls on the indncrator 

gralc~. 

Thcrr were 2 1,000 prisniH!I'S in Buchenwald at the liltcration, ahotil half tltc numher that had been there a week endicr·. The 

SS had mar·chcd the others cast, toward 

Leipzig. U.S. ftghtrr· planes were keeping 

the colulllllS in view but could not lirr wilhout cnd:tngcr·i ng J)l'isoners. 

The 12th .\ rrn y (;roup had assigned rcnsihilit y for the t·oncentration camps to 

t.he Displarcd Pc ~o s Executive ( DPX), 

and on the day after liberation l'>t Lt. 

Walter F. ~mrno11s, commanding JH' 

Detachment I 0, took dtarge in Bur hcnwald. H t• had fond and clothing hr:ougltl 

in from Cc.:rmnn stocks in Weimar and 

J ena and sci 11p an emergency hospital in 

ll1e SS barracks, where inmate physicians 

gave scv(:nly blood transfusions from the 

American blood hank the first day. On the 

fotLrth and fi fth days, to redure the death 

rate, whirh ww1 far less Lhan hcfor·c hut 

was still about twenty «t day, the 66th Medical Battalion and a complete 500-bed 

evacuation laospital tame in with enough 

medical upplir~ w treat the 5,000 tast's 

needing inmacdiatc attention. By then 700 

l'ases h;rd llcrtt ln:nlcd, and Ge man~ had 

hecn put to work improving 1 he sanitation. 

A particuhu· problem for Emmono; anJ 

his det:l\hrncnt wn!l the rnultitutlc uf visi. 

tors that cksccrH.ku uporr them and their 

charges. T he tac-tkal Lroops, as alw:\ys, 

mo,·cd <Jn qukkly, hut after them C':\11\C' 

newspapcT t'('portrr-s anti visitors from other 

headqumtcrs and frmn Allied governments 

and armi<•s. Rudwnwalcl had been nll international ramp, ;mel among the thirty-onr 

nati w~it ie.s r·cprcsentcd there were men 

prominem in variow: fields in tltcil' own 

counll ie.~. T he pl'isoncrs' desire to be away 

from the plncc· and lhc ''isitors' <·:,gcmc."" 

to do something for them resulted in numcr ~ un uth ol'i~cd departures; l1cfore 

long, reporl!i were coming lmsk uf r:'lscs in 

which fot nwr· inmates died before reaching 

home. Finally, 12th .\ rrny Group had Lo 
ECLIPSE 

proltihit visits to liberated t'OIICCntmtion 

cnrnp!\ without approval of th<: army 

commandcrs. 17 

In the second week of April the dam 

broke. Until then, the Germans had herded 

as man y displaced persons and prisoners 

of war ns they could eastward, as they had 

done earlier in the Rhineland. Between the 

W~er nnd the f:lbc they ran out of space. 

The Soviet advam·c to the Ode•· River had 

also ra ised n wave of refuKecs, prisoners of 

w~1r, and displaced persons tha t had filled 

ccutral German}' and was continuing westward. Nin1h Army encountered columns 

of /\mcric:m and British prisoners who had 

been on the road since Janunry, first 

llltu'c hing Wl:Sl from camps in Polnnd and 

then rece ntly headed ca.st again. The other 

Rt\M Ps (recovered Allied militar)' personnd ) were mostly mixed with the civilian 

0Pl'l, ho1 h gJ'OUpS having been USed tL'I Ol'cli11flry industrinl and farm lahor.'8 

Maj. Philip Shafer, head of the DPX, 

T hit•d /\rmy, had one officer and two enlisted lllcn under him on J April. In t'hc 

field he had twelve DP d<'lt~c hm nts 

( ei~hty-scven officers and men ); thil'tcen 

rrc,wh Mission Militaire Liaison Administrntiue ( M ML/\ ) welfar e teams, each with 

one offir cr, ~ male driver, and two or three 

c·nlistcd women; and a scaltcrin~ of 

rrcnl'h, Bd , Dutch, a nd Polish liflison 

and medica l offi cers. Totaling 2:w individuals, they were soon having to denl with 

11 ( I I f i~t Rpt, Third Anny. ACofS C-5, Apr 

·lfl, h• SHAEP G- 5, 17.11 . (2) SIIAf~F, G 5, Hist 

Set', suh: Report on Gcnnan CoMNHrarion Cnrnp 

fot Political ri~oners at Buchcn,,·ald hy Lt. Col. 

P. va.h Wyck Mason, in SllAEF C- 5, 60, J ncket 

3. fl) USFET, c,,.neral Board, Study No. :15, ,,, 20. ( 1) Enj(en Kogan, The 1'huny nnd Proct1'ct 

of ll<~ll (Ne-w York ; Fnrra r, Strnus, 1950 ). pp. 

lfl 57. '' Aftl.ll' Artion Report, Hqs, Ninth Army, 1\CofS 

(; 5, I 15 Apr •15, in Ninth Arrny Jl)!,l- 1. 

239 

1,500 time.<~. their own numher of DPs and 

RA~IPs. dozen UNRRA learns and 

eleven emergency OP detachments atl<.kcl 

during the m<>nth were barely enough to 

keep the ratio from going bigher. 11' The 

armies fo rmed fift y-one DP detachments, 

J'eccived forty-t hree Ut\TRRA teams and a 

like numlH'r of ~ L. \ teams., and still had 

to divert tnrti<:al units ranging up to the 

size of a di un (the whole 29th Infantry 

Di,·ision for instaurc) 10 DPX duties. By 16 

April they had lll1<'overed a million DPs, 

and they would pa1;s their second million hefore the month wa~ 011L NinLh rmy jssued 

200,000 ration:; a clay; Jcirst Army, over ~~ 

million a week. The food came mostly from 

captured sto< k.~, hut First :\rmy aL<io requisitioned 20,000 tons of imported military 

go,•ernmcnl relief upplie.<> . Nimh Army 

used four sc·vcn-story huildjn~ in a forme r 

German 1\ l'lny complex near }.lucm;ter as 

its supply renter. The 12th Arn1y Croup 

reported 350 r:-uHps established wirh capacities betwc<·n 3,000 and 30,000 persons. 0 

As had h<\ppcncd in Lhe Rhineland, the 

DPs' first impul~c was to get away frotn 

where they were; and on ce they did, they 

seemed hcset with the desire to keep moving. The former prisoners of war, especially 

the Frem:h and Belgians, who remembered 

the lessons of I 910, kept off the roads. T o 

reduce the nuw o{ the others, the armies 

set up < hcc·kpoint!l nnd patrols on the main 

roads and had them turn over the DPs to 

the nenresl villnge nuergenneister with 

orders to hm1sc and f ecd them from local 

re<sourrcs. The riv('l's, from the Rhine eastward, bcJpcd sonwwba t to keep the DPs' 

wanderings compa rtrncntalized. 

'' Hisr K111. llCJ ~. Third Army, ACofS G - 5. AI'' 

•l!i, in SHAEF G 5, 17.1 L 

"' Hist Rl>l, 12 tl. AGp, ACofS G- 5, Arr 45, 

in SHAEF G 5, 17 .16, j acket 10. 
210 THE U.S. \R.\1'\' 11\ THE OC:(.UP.\TIQ;'\ Or Glm~tA!'\Y 

Expcrtin ~ th.u they fould be ,t,u trcl on 

their W:\)' home soon nftcr ~ jurH tion with 

the Soviet forrc.c; wa.;; made, the DPX 

\Hmtrd 10 hold the ea!;tC'rn Europeans as 

filr ca-.t "' possible. The Frenr h, Belgians, 

and Dutr h were repatriated as falit ac; transportation <nuld be found, a!O mnny as 5,000 

a da) from earh of the ;mnic.c; { 46,000 

from Ninth \rnt)' in April and 74,000 from 

Third .\rm)'). When, as the front advanced 

to th<' r.L,t, the armies wrr·c lc.'s and less 

ahle to 11pare their own trucks to haul the 

DP!! hnr.k to the r<'lilroads, tire DPX secured 

fifty French truck compani('s to keep the 

rrpalrintrs moving; and on 11 April, Third 

Army bq an a westbound DP ail'lifl fr•om 

Fmnkfur t. 

The p~ycho ogy and behavior of the DP-, 

if 110 Iunger a shod<, were as muC'h a pu7.zle 

and <1 prohlem as thC)' had hecn in the 

Rhineland. The PWD observe~ .Lg;tin were 

the least nJarmed. Padover nnd Ciuler repor trcl: 

On thr (;c•rrnan highways and byw:-rys one ~ee~ a \1"1 itablr Voidkcrwnndrruug thous:.nd~. tt'lls nf thousands of men, in small 

gr?ups and large, carl)·ing buncllc$, c-arr)•in11, 

~urt a'C!I >II appcd to their b:~cks. carrying 

bulginJt hnndbags, are marching ral>l and 

rnarchin~ ''est. M~n>• wear :-habhy grren unift'll'lrrs they arc Red Am1y PWs. Frenchmen 

.md Hdgians :llso still wear tht•ir old army 

uniftll nrs, nnw almost in t!\lt ~. Poles ;1nd 

I >uwhrrt\'11 nnd Serbs wear any kind of r·ags. 

Thl'ir' ( :r'l'lllfln rnrtstcrs lwei not kC'pt tiH•nr 

in ~)~lr cs. ' J'Irc•y were surpri si ~ly che(•r'f ul, surpnsrngly orderly. 

Now tlwy all march ... in the dir•cction 

of ho!m', 0<"casiona lly lhey ht•lp thrrnselves 

to hr ekcn~ 0 1· loaves of bread or a pair of 

pants. bu~ tlwy are ordcrl}' and obedient, 

even the J·rcnch. Thrre seem~ to be no vengt•:IJI<'e in tlH•se people. no lust for tlf'sllnction, nn dr,irc to make the Germnn~ pay for 

what they have done to them, to their 

countri('s. 

Tht·tc i~ rr\uch talk about looting. German 

rnrmers sny the Eastern workers arc stealing 

their <"hickens. Grrrwln workers say that tht' 

_Russians arr lm•aking into homes and helprng tllcrnsch c<. to nrc cs~i tirs. German middleclass people sa} th:rt Russians nrc animals. 

The truth i~ that the Enstem workers aa• astonishingly wcll-bt'havcd.: 1 

On the other· hand, in half the milit:lr) government court l a.srs tried in tht~ Ninth 

.\rmy :wca durin~ April, the ncc·uc;cci were 

DPs. Looting oftc11 tlec lined dramatically 

in the \'icinil)' of tit;htl)' romrollc<.l camps, 

but not all thl· DPs wanted to live in tlrr 

t·amps. Some prdc·rrrd to experience tlrci1 

new Cou nd r l'CCdorn lC) the f ullc.c;t. Othrrll 

were no t exactly the innocent l·t inl~ of 

nazism l ha 1 the Americans presunH·d 1 hem 

to he and did not want to risk heing rtcognized. ~[an y wandered cross-country or 

along hal'k road$; living on what they could 

beg or ste<d. ometimcs the)' formed ,trmcd 

~angs of thitl) or fmly men and turned 

to outright banditry. Such groups would 

not hesit:Ht' 10 ~kirmish with patrols sent 

to Aush them out, :md on at lea.c;t nne occasion A W 0 L U.S. soldiers were caught with 

them. The milital')' governmenl reports 

agree, however, that the DP-;, induding the 

most cstl~c; and unr ul} mnong them, were 

completely friend)~ to \ mcricans and th.cl 

the trouhk they 'ausl'd wa-, V:l!Stly lcs.o; than 

it mig ht have been had thq r ho!icn to uscthe powC'r' inh<'rrr\1 in their numbers to take 

organized vengeance on the Gcrm u1s. 

Among the DPs, the former prisoners of 

war were usually the easiest to hand\€', 

They kn.rw the ttCn:.o;,-;ity for discipli ne and, 

ailer years in captivity, wanted to rcfurhish 

their sdf-c.-;tCCill hy rontrihuting to thr vi<. 

tory. In the camps ;tnd ac;scmhly t·cnter._, 

the French usually were quirk to e...tahli.<~ h 

order among thcm.,ch-cs. The Ru.sians 

were less rl'ady to organize independently, 

"Gittler ;md Pado,•cr, "Up the Weser Ri .. er," 

in SHAEF G- 5. 17 .I I. :-~ckct !l. 
ECLIPSE 

and tlte ca111p c.lelat:hments often had to 

rail on the Soviet li.tisun offircl"\, .t Detarhmcllt III G~ did in tht: ollowin~ : 

5 April /94S 

Col. ~icc·olai T .i~rhrwv:~ky of the Russian 

Army visited the ramp on nn inspection tour 

and was ad' ist•d h)' ~bj. !George B.J Mehlman that the Russian leader was very con- scit·ntiou~ :md hnnl working but that he 

lacl.cd the nbilil)' to obtain obrd iencc or discipline frorrl tiH' Ru\sian group. Maj. Mehlman rcqucst<•d the RuliSinn colonel to appoint a ne\v leader ond vc~ t in him the authority 

of his offirr. Cnl. l .isrhnc"skr ordered that <~II the Russians be asscmulcc in one group 

in ordc·r thnl hr mig ht spt:llk l(J them. When 

I hey had been s~ ttbll-d, thr rol(lnel ha-

<~ cd them nl length on the fn rt that L11c>• 

Wl'I'C being p J.H:c•J Ulldf•t' the f>rOlt!CtJOO of 

the U.S. milit,1T)' nnd that he was directly 

ordc1 ing theul to obey all orders given them 

and that ht• W:t\ going to appoint new leaders 

and cst.tblibh with in tht' Russian group regular Ru,;sinn Arrn)• cli~dplinc and thal he was 

formin~ b.ltlaJion!>, corupanic,, and squads 

and that ti,.,('iplinc and obedience must be 

rigidly enforced. Col. Lisclmc,·sk>• or-dcrt'd all 

rhe fotml'r Rms1:m ,\rmy offic-c•n; nnd 1\COs 

to rnll in. dNl1i""IOR tJ1e rest. lle perronally 

intCI \ j('\\ t•d :tlltl M'll•c·tt•d (rom I hi' group of 

forrrwr Ru ... ,•.m oflkrn. a ne'' Russian leader 

:md stafT, batt;tl iou rumru:mdt'rs, company omrrt:llltlt•~. c·nrrtpany officers and NCOs.:~ 

The dct;u.:luncut., lea rned enrly that the 

Russian!! nnd <)I her eastern European· were 

frequent!)' quite willillg to selllc down to 

the good lifr in ramps that ofTcrcd welfare 

pwgrams and lu:-.urics, partic-ularly liquor 

and radios. The trouble was that their expectations t'lcnla tccl ,•apidl y, and their demands kept iu('l'easi ng. Since the luxuries 

had l<l c·cmw from I h{· Gc•man~, limits were 

soon reached. During tlw month, First 

.\ rmr provided c:wh of its DP detachments 

with a scnarity ard detail, whkh was by 

"' II IG1, Wo~r Ui.~r'), ~l.tr J uu •l'i, iu O~ CUS 

111 '3 'J. 

2+1 

far the most effective, if not the most dC!irable, means of DJ' t omrol." 

While the DP flood had come later thnn 

expected, that uf the w rrcndcring German 

lroops came earlier. ' I hr plan~ had nnticipated U.S. prison~r of war holdings to 

reach about 900,000 h) :H> J unr I !145. On 

15 .\pril 1.3 million prisoner.; were in U.S. 

hands. Another ()00,000 rap tur e.<~ wcrr. expected in the next two week-; and at least 

thal many mort in Mn y. J.cg-ally they were 

all entitled to the bnsic rations and qu<'lrler~; 

f~arni ed to U.S. tr{lOps c1f 1hc same rank. 

In fact, however, SH/\EF had never contemplated extending su('h trcnlmcnl to so 

many G<:rman soldier!!. gxpcrting the big 

wave of prisoners w t:onlc with the surrender or collapse, HAl F propo~cd to 

take advantage of the EAC ·urrcnder pro-

,·isions a.nd create tlw c·ntcgOI)' tli ~a rmcd 

German troops," which would make the 

bulk of the W chrmat Ill a German rc~ponsibilit)' pending dLo;handmcnt J n .\pril, ho\Ve\'er, th<' war wao; still on ; Am<'ric·:-m 

prisoners were ~ti ll in Ccrmnn h.md'; :mel 

30,000 Germans were already su rcndcrin~ 

C\'Cl)' day. B}' mid-.\pdl, S l 1.\EF had allornted 50 U.S. oOit (:I'S. 1,000 enli-.tt•d men, 

and 13 antiaircraft hnu.tlions to prio;o)tt r or 

war guard duty. J uo;t wc.o;t of tht' Rhine, 

12th Army Group was scllting UJJ four huge 

enclosures whid1 c:ould hold 50,000 mru 

each hut which would uol have shelters "or 

olher comforts'' until the pl'iso l'~ themselves huilt them from loca l matt:rinls.:·• 

"' Hist R p1s, 12th AC:p, Fir~t Ar111y, Third Anny, 

and Ninth Army, Apr •l .'i. 

"(I) S HA EF. C - 1, PWX l)r, suh: Rct>Ort on 

Enemy POWs, 19 Apr 45, in SIIAEF C-1, 

383.6/ 1. (2) Cnhlc, SIIA F.F M.1in, Ei,rnhowcr 

to ACW A R for CCS, suh: Armbtict•, Control nnd 

Disposal of German Armt'd Force<, 10 Mnr 45, 

in SHAEF C- 1, 387.4/ 1 (1 ) C hie, CofS SII AEF 

to AGWAR for Hull from Smith , 16 Apr 4S, 

in liSFET SCS 37t, Grrmnny, 1 ol. II ( I) C<•ulc, 

SHAEF, C- 1, to ACWAR. ,uiJ: Equilliz:uion of 
TlJE U.S .. \RMY l!\ THE OCCUPATION OJ~ CEIUIANY 

C,\1' I' I Rl· 0 ( ;, RMANS IX t\N hti'RO\'ISEO TOCKAill 

On .\ pril 15, Lt. Col. F. V.,n \\'yck 

ason, SH.\EF G !"1 hi,lorian, and C:apl. 

Jesse <.:. l3ccslcy, dvil aO'airs historian for 

the Ctmln1uniralio11s Zone, set ou t fl'om 

Luxcmhomg in " r<·con c;rr to Jollnw Lhc 

route Third Arl1l)' had taken into German)'· For Mason tlw "fi ~l point of interest" w;t-; Bad KrC"m:narll , twcnt)• miles west 

of the Rhine no);:;;ing at ~lninz. Ao; he dccrihcd it: 

The milit:u y go' t•ruuwlll dctadmu.·nt comm:'lllder had Iris lnrgc'l .tttarks not from the 

local popul:ltion. but from the deurands of 

PWs Undrr 511 )0 At~rrrmcur, in SIIAEF G- t, 

311't6 i I~ 

the high bras.~ in our own Mill)' · I lis time was 

so taken up with finding dachshund puppies 

for Genera l Bbnk and loratitlg pcoplC' to rut 

the lawn for Colonel So-and-so Lhat lw was 

hard put to nd rninislt•r· thr town . 

I hncl a look nt the jnil which was well 

supplied with Nazis and c(· s. Then went 

on to the PVV cage on the rdgc or town. We 

arri,·ed a t sunset and snw a brc:.llhtaking 

panorama, 37,000 Gcrnwn, ll ungarinn, and 

other Axis prisoners ronmin~ in a raged nrra 

of about half a squ:ur lllill·. 'I'IH'}' certainly 

were not coddled th£'n•. 'l'hl')' ~ll·pt on the 

bare gi'Ou nd '' ith "hate'\ cr rm !'t ing th<')' had 

brought with thrut. 'I he} got l\\0 "C:'' rationlt 

a day and that '' '" all. ThrH' was .t '£'paratc 

eoclosu re for offirrt'S \\ h<TC thc:y \\ Cl C SO 

tightly packed they h:ul batc>lr room to lie 
J·:C:U PSE 

down. ;111d 1110rc trucks kept co111ing up every 

few tninult's. Adjoining it was nnothrr enclosurc• fot• nbout 500 Ge1man WACs nnd nonnlc<llC'al pc·t-sonnel that Wl'l'l' Sl tt'jll'i ~i ly 

good looking on the whole. Fortunalcly for 

thrill tht• wc::~ther was good ;tnU c·cmtinued 

to be good for soml! time ::tftcrwnrd-;. 

I" C'ommnnd of the camp wrt~ :1 1st Lt. 

of infantry with lrss than 300 men. The boys 

lm1kcd n bit sr-rious as they rouch~·d bt:hind 

thtir mndtine guns. for tJ1erc was onl)' onr :.~rand of wire and no search lights ro,· night 

tirm:. flc·riodicallr some Germans did try to 

get loose, but they were alwnys cut down be-

(on• tht')' gnt 50 yards distart<'c. 

Fl'Om Frankfurt, the hisloriHlls drove to 

Wcintrtt' on the Attlobtlhtl, nnd IVIwmn 

found the trip a great plcmmt·c '·nft er 

humping one's hacksidc owr 1 he inac<lihly 

rutted nod ruined roads of Frnnrc." Belwrrn Fr:tnkfurt and Weimar they p<~--scd 

into the :uca in whit h Third rmy had 

ruu out of trained miJjtary govcrnnwnt dcwchmcnt.s, nnd they "scnsrd that ~o mrthing was «miss the moment we hit 

Weimar'': 

Tlw fc·t·ling of something being nru iss was 

uot lrsserwd b)' finding German policcwcn 

in full uniform and canying loaded carbines 

iu frnnt of the town hall. wht•rc appareutly 

militnry go\crnment of sonw kind was being 

s<·t up. h wc·stigation reveal(•cl the reason. The 

acting I ilitnry Governor w~t~ a completely 

untr•aitwd Lt. Col. of the field artillery who 

had btcn flt·ing in the Jim• 56 hour-s bdorc. 

Lt. Cnl. Billingsle)'• t·hr offin·r in t)ucsti<ln. 

scc•nwd infinitdy relieved to hnvr trained mi littlry go\'crnnwnt officer:> suddrnly appenr. 

nnd lw 1n·gcntly requested thnt I hrc•ak our 

trip nnd lend a hand in sellin~ up military 

"ovct•ntnt•ttt in \\'eimar. This we did, ntnong 

tht• lirst acts being to disarm tlw police nrld 

lHing him up to date on dire<'tiws t•onrcr·ning 

displaced pc>t-sons. It appears that tl1c whole 

:11 t'a \WI~ uudl'r Lt. Col. Rillingsl<'y, and none 

of his uffil'<'rs bad the least grounding in 

the n•:spon!>ibility nnd powers of utilitat)' 

go vet nttwnt. 

Fnt•thtr to assist Lt. Col. Billingslcr, Cnpt. 

Bc:cslt)' ond I undertook to visit v.trinus detachmenls uf hi~ J)t)st in the sut·munding 

country. ln this c011m·<·tion we visited Edurt, 

Langcnsalz:.t, \!ullt tu~ , Apolda, and Jena. /\11 

of these ritic•s, with the exrcption of 1\pold:'l. 

had suffered from 25 to 40 percent dnsn:1S''· It was ittll't \:~ting to obsen·e the dirJ'c•t t'm c 

in the attitude ol the inhabitants in thos<' 

towns whic·lt had bC'en smashed am.l thOSl' 

" ·hich hod uot. Thosr in the unltit towns 

were arrogant and lw:-tile. Such was the eor1-

dition of :\p<1 lda wlt~·r<' we found an artiiiN) 

I st Lt. and '10 utc•n holding down a cit)' of 

70,000 nonn.ll population and at least 15.000 

transients. L t. I Jurtt w::ts doing a line juh 

under the d r'C'UtttMances but lacked knc'l\,1!- edge or bis ri~hts. When we told hitn lw w:t!> 

"Cnesar" in that town, he was -pleased and 

immediately issttrd orders for the mwst CJf 

the Nazi rnayor and {'(1ually Nazi poJjce rltief. 

JJe listen<-d alllc'llti,t•lv to all we said and 

when ltc> rcolizcd his J;<,wers, he was n much 

happier hoy 1han he hnd been a collplc· of 

hours Ca l·lit•r. RI"(':IIIS(' of the attitude or the 

inhabitants. we nrr:'lng<·d to station a p:'lrticu· 

larly hardboilt·d haunlion of infantry in thnt 

town,," 

While ~ l :tson and Beesley were ''' 

'Neimar, Fir~! \t rn{~ V C01·ps on 19 i\pl'il 

took Leipzig, the fourth largec;t city in Germany. To con tt•ol tlw c-ity, swollen hy DPs 

and ref ugccs from iti'i normal 700,000 populntion lo CJver a •nillion, Lhc corps tk!iignatcd Col. Jim Dan Hill, Commanding 

Officer, !90th Fic•kl ,\rtillery GrouJJ, a<; 

military c omm:tttdC'r of ipz-i.~ and gave 

him three field artillery battalions, four 

securiry guard clrt:whmcnts, and l.,rovisional t...tilitary Oovt:rnment Detachment 

i\. DctachmrrH 1\ hnd sixteen officrrs and 

twenty-four en listed men, hut only two of 

Lhc officer-s had t\'t'tt a small amo\tlll of 

prcvicus militnt·y government cxpericnc:c:. 

H ill and hi.; t mops entered Leipzig nu the 

19th while fighting \v:t); still going on in 

the Napoleon Platt. <~rm""~ ~ Battle of 

the Nations 1VlontmWrll, which in its c«v-

"'SHAI?.f', C- !i ll .~t Sec, ''Cerm~tn Apt·il 

19,15,'' 5 May •15, in SHABF C-5, 60, 
244 THE U.S .. \R1\IY IX THE OC:C:UP,\TlON OF GERMANY 

ScF.NI·: 01> n1r. ATROCITY AT T1H:K1.,, 

crnou'! stone ~~~l.'!e provided cover for a diehard Gl'rman colonel and a company or 

so of soldiers. Some sections of the city were 

dcslJ'O)'ed. Other sections were uJHouchcd, 

however, and in them the elc('tri<: service 

ro1llinucd without a break, water service 

could he restored in a few days, and the 

strcctrar '}'l\tcm required only minor repairs to \\1ir·c and trark. Tire 'azi 0/urbuer. l'll/lei r. Iris deputy, and their 

families had committed suicide. Hill divided the city into three military polir:c 

zones aml put a battalion in each wne i 

the Gcrmnns, however, were nut as much 

a threat to order as the Allied liaison 

officers who, he romplained, "lend to get 

emotiona l with the DPs and gel them all 

stirred up.'' His main difficulty with the 

Germans was gelling them adjusted to 

doing C'ommon lnhor. They had become acnlstomed to having foreign worker-s do the 

menial joa1s. 1 

. \t Thekla, just outside Leipzig, V Corps 

unco,·ered a small conc·cntralion ramp. On 

the afternoon of the day before, the guards 

had herded over three hundred inmates 

"" Hqs, I 90th FA Gp to CC ,V Corps, Report 

of Militnry Cou1mnndcr, Stad tkrcis Leipzig, 7 .\lny 

+5, ru1d After Aclion Rrpurr, Hqs, V Corps, Apr 

•IS, 6 1\lay ,15, in V Corps 205- 5. 
EC.LIPSP. 

into a wc,odrn h.111 M ks building, doused 

it with g;t-;olim:, .111d -.ct it cm fire with thermilr gr('n.tdr,. Tho ... r '' ho r.tn from the 

building were -.hot. \\'hen the . \mericanJ> 

cntcrrd, tltt fir(' \\,1\ still burning, and 

scvent)-fin· llodic... wert• h.mgin~ on the 

<"On<Cttiua wire ,111d dctlr ira II) ehargcd 

l>.trllrd wirt• S\11 r uunding the ramp. Somchnw about a humlr cd had managed to 

ownpt· to fr<•rclcnn. In ac·col'dnnce with 

standing in.,tnH lions from Eisen hower to 

make· tlw C:<'l'nlall'> hur y alr'o<·ity vir.tims 

in thr mn~l prominrnt and Im itable spot 

in till' ncan ·~t towr r, lltilit:tl')' government 

fli'Ckrt:d tlw IWWiy appoin!l'd Leipzig 

/Jucrgt•rmci,!lt•r to ~ll pf)ly sc•v<: nty-llvt~ casket<: :rnd two l11rndr'1·d C:CniiHil tivilians lo 

dig the gravro;. 'I'IH' ~itt· wa., the parkway 

;dong lh<' r11ai11 road into T..cipti~' · most 

beautiful c t'llll'tt•r >, thr Surrlft ird hof. The 

1 it y ;d;;u had Ill prm ide •l < r~-. and n 

\HC,\Ih for <'Oil h W ol\ (' 1 and .Iff I it} officials 

mtcl .r hund1 cd ot hct prominent cit izcns 

wc1 c 1 c·qui1 cd tn .tW·IId the funeral. Three 

U.S. dt<~pl.llll,, repn·~nlin~ the three 

f. tit h,, 1 ollthll't~d 1 he \CI'Yic-c. Several hun-

<.lrcd f)]><; dr upped llowrr.., urt the gra vcs 

as, ·' ll'pori<T nutccl, "did a few o f the 

ncarh 110() C1·rm.tm. who attended 

vulunt.n·ilr :· • 

\l:r~on .111d Tkc~k)' ""w l.cipzig the day 

.lftcr it w.t!o taken: 

Tht•t'f· wt•n· plt'lll)' of dr:rcl hodirs ::111d still 

llllr 11in~ IH>IISI'' in 1 hi' suburbs. The troops 

('::trTict.l tht·ir lii'111S in vl'l')' hnndy positions. 

Rivers of pr ~O ih'l'~ WPI'!' dri,·ing out of 

LPipziA' iu suppl)• ll'uC'ks, goin~ bark empty 

10 tlw railhead~. l .t·ip.-ig was terribly smashed 

in tlw l't'lllt•r hut \Oilll' of the ~ubu rbs seem 

lO br in pn·lly fait shapt•. Tlw Burrgcr/llcister 

and tilt• Obrtl>unRNIIIrtl(t'r committed sui-

" I li<t Rr11, Fir-~ \rmy, 1\C:orS C: 5, 1- '10 Apr 

IS, Mid Pfc·" Rl'lt'.cW, l'il"\t Anny, C:-5 PRO. 

•ull: Burial uf 1\trodty \'iclilll\ (no date], in 

SIIAEF C: :i, 17 I I, J.~t·l. c•t Ill 

245 

c;idc togethe-r Wtlh tlwir familic~. We saw till' 

latter gtoup nl the offict• the father, lhtmother, and a \t'IY ptl'lty IR·)·car old 

daughter. 

The police prohh•m in ,\ cit)' o£ this siz! 

was of a special intrn-~l to 111c, so we spent 

the bulk of 0111 tinw with C:olonrl G1rrn, 

Public Safety Officer on Colonel I lilt's stan 

He had, of cOlll'l>t', di~.uuwd lcht• polirr) :111d 

ri?CJUired them to wt•ar uniform cttp~. tlouscrs, 

and boots bul wilh rid linn coat ... r k ~nid ,, 

was nec<•ssnry hc•c·aiiM' :.n many triggcr-hnpfl} 

"doughreeL'' w<·n· luo~c lltld hncl !~hot half a 

dozen of his men the• d:t)' b(•forc· thinking the}' 

wr.rc soldiers. The 1111iforms wt'rc distinctly 

similar. Suclr polite as l't.'ltl:tinrd \\1l'l't' stolid l)' 

obeyin~ orders ;n1d nl'l'cstillg th('ir prrvinus 

bosses just as lrappily as tlrl'Y lt ncl political 

victims a few days c•nrlic•r. 

C:olonl'l I Jill invited us to join him in lis. 

te11ing to the norninntinn llf :r Ill'\\ Utlf'fJ:I'Tmci3ter fot Lcipl'ig. It wn<; n ~olemn hundt 

of Doche who ;tppc•:m•d, Or~t• thinqo they 

were ,·er) nn .... im•~ 10 knnw ,,ould 1hr R"'-

siath gain c,·<·nlu;tl JKl"'t'~'inn of tht'it C'itY:,~~ 

The two c:tafT hi.,t urian" had. half .,criously, hoped w rncl t hrit trip in Berlin. 

1fa:·on, a World \\';~r I veteran, 1 c~.tr<lcd 

Lhi'l occasion ,1-. hi~ :oc·t ond .lttt·rnpl tu ~<·t 

there. hut he w.t... cii<;.tppuintc•cl ,l~·lin. 

Ninth .\rmy wa-. .,tnppnl 011 the F.llw, 1101 

mut'11 more th:t11 .t d.t)•\ mat< h from Berlin, hut Eiscnhown had dcddcd tlwt the 

army would P,ll I) (I f:lll hrt•. \\'h('n r ason 

and Bcesle)' startc·d lw·k from L{·ipzi~, tltC)' 

also missed what n11rld lr:wr l1rcn the next 

best finale fot• thcit· 1rip, the Amcric-<111-

Soviet link-up 0 11 ::!!) Apri l :tt Torgau 0 11 

the Elhe River, thirty milt·s <':tsl of Leipzig. 

.\ nig ht <;t<lp al Mumdcn, north of Kn<;.<>C I, 

hcwe\'cr·, pi'Oduccd a 1 ar r c·xpct·i<'nr<·, n 

reasona.hly bona lid<' em <'\II HIT with the 

W erwolf organit.ation: 

That t·,·ening. Squ:tdmn Lt·ndcr Gordon 

Frrisen ftlw loc-nl militan ~O\C'rnmcnt dr-

~ SHAEF, ~ Hi~t Su, "C:rrm.1ny April 

!915;' 5 ).J.•y 1:1, m SHAI-.1- (; 5, hO. 
24G 11-IE U.S. ARMY l N THE OCCUPATTON OF GERMANY 

tachmcn t was Btirish) . .. invited us to assist in the interrogation of a pair of Ilitlcr 

J ugend toughs c:augh t with a notched pistol 

and a supply o( explosives near· one of our 

bridges. Theit• attitude was typica l, a t first 

openly defiant, then as hunger and fatigue 

began to work, more and more malleable. 

The amusing thing about these youths and 

the Nazis we subsequcnt·ly questioned \.vas 

their complete willi ngness to betray one anotlwr once they wete cot1 vinced that a friend 

had tntllccl, and it rettuired very little persuasion to m •wince them Lhat they had been betrayed. To the disappointment of some of ou r 

men. it was quite unnecessary to become 

physica l in the interrogation. 

As :1 result we organi7-ed a raiding party 

of four officers nnd six en listed me11. We 

picked up three m~is in possession of illega l 

:trnts. All of them lied like troopers to start 

with , lmt invat•iably would lead us to where 

the weapons were hidden - generally under 

tlte ~:w~s of an outbuilding. lt was very picturesque because of the full moon and the 

ligltt it threw rron t the helmets and weapons 

of tht· lltC' ll . .• . 

We lopped o fT the even ing with a raid on 

:1 n inn in Li te sub,n·bs wh ich ht1d beeu established as a sort o( headquarters for the local 

''werewolves." One of the Hitler youths hnd 

ncl ulitted that there were four female military 

personnel al the inn , one of which was his 

swcety. I lc lJctntyt·d Iter quite du.'erfully. The 

result was, we wooped down on the inn and 

ransacked the plare thorougb ly. Among other 

things. Oushing a C .I. who was certainl y 

qualified for the sixty-five dollar question.

2n 

The ne xt d ay ·Mason and Beesley crossed 

Into Luxembou rg "where people. smiled 

and waved, and one could look at a pretty 

g irl withom hn ving that sixty-five dollars 

in 1 he lmck of c>ne's mimi. " 

lnt.o the Redmtbl 

Seventh Army's primar)' mission during 

the fi1·st three weeks in April was to cover 

the 12th rmy G ro up's south flttnk. In 

doing so the army bore east and slightly 

.. 'bid. 

nor·th across northern Baden and WueittemlJerg and into Bavari a . The German defense on the Rhine had heeu weak, and 

at the end of March, Sevemb t\11Tly held 

a l>riclgcl1eacl tha t tied in with Third 

Army's un the no rth and rea1:hed south 

acroS.'l the Nec kar River and embraced the 

('ities of l'viannhcim and H e idelberg. 

The pinpoint detachments were standing 

by. Fl E2, under Lt. Col. Charles D. Winning, m oved into badly d<nn aged ,Mannheim on 2H 1\.Iarch, and T2E2, Capt. 

Alben H askell iu conummdl Louk over in 

Hcidcll>erg two day!! later. Having IJc<·ome 

accustomed in the Rhineland to :;ecing 

nnthing hut fl a u ened cities, the J\mcri cans 

were surprised to find Heidell>erg romp lctcly undamaged. The university was intan, and the shops and bank~ ayed open 

whil e I lie Git y changed hands. The Buergetmeisler and the city ofTicirtls were at work, 

ex('epl fo1· the police chief who had disappea red along with the men of his Coree. 

'f'hc war had not completely bypassed 

HeideJbct·g however. Its e lectric power 

came from MannJ1eim, and until the lines 

<md plants were repaired there would not 

he any, nor woLLld there be any waler, 

hcC'ausr. the pumps in the wHle.r syslem 

were electri('. T'he people, 24,000 rno rc 

tha n lhe B(),OOO peacetime population, 

lnoked well fed , hut the food situa tion was 

dose to catastrophic. The whole municipa l 

reserve was o ne tra inload of potatoes, Oour, 

mel rann ed hcef fat lhal ha d become 

stranded in the railroad yards after the 

bombing had cul a ll the rail li es ~" 

East of H eidelberg, the Germans seemed 

determined again to show they had some 

bite ldt in them. Heilbronn held (Itt\ und er 

bombing and a rtillery fire from 5 tn 12 

•· Wk Rpt, Hqs, XX I Corps, 1o CG, Seventh 

Army, 3 1 Mar ~5. in SHAEF C- 5, 17 .18, J acket 

5 . 
ECLIPSE 

,\pril, and so man y people were buried in 

the ruins •·that Heilhronn bad a noticeable 

stcnr h all during the summer of 1945."3 1 

• \t Nuremberg, eighty-fi ve miles fa rther 

cast, the Genmm~ put up a four-day figh t, 

fr•om 16 lO 20 1\ pril, Lhat brought down 

a final wave of destruction on the already 

hadly bombed old city- a wa,·e which unfortunate!}' hit 1 he medic,·al relics much 

harder than it did the banal structures in 

which the Na1.is had staged their prewar 

party rallies. 

11 History of i'vlilit:uy Government in Land 

Wuerttcmhcrg- R;Itlt·n 10 30 June 19·16, pt. I, p. 

L:t4, in o~ cus 109 :11:1. 

z-i 7 

Lt. C:ol. Delbert 0. Fuller wok Detachment E I B3, fifteen officc1' ancl ten enlisted 

men, into Nuremberg on the 21st. The 

population was a third its normal 450,000 . 

1\ hunt for the city officials turned up the 

Ober/JUergermeister and the Gtmleiler of 

Fran<'onia dead in the GeJiaj)o headqua.rters. ThC)' had killetl theansclvcs. Only a 

few cit)' employees responded lO the order 

to report for work that was hroadcastcd 

by sound tru cks. The police headquarters 

was demolished, and ncarl)l all the police 

were prisoners of war. Germans and DPs 

loolcd food warehouses undcltrr'ed by Lhe 

225 street< ar conductors thal the detach-
24:3 THE U.S. AR~lY IN THE OCCUP.\TIO!'\ OF GER~IJ\!\:Y 

NntF.~IBERG, APRIL 1945 

mcnl had drafted as tempora ry police, and 

reports of rape and rob herr by U.S. troops 

piled up on the public safety officer's desk. 

An MFA&A survey showed that thirty-two 

of sixty-five listed artistic monuments had 

heen lotall y demolished and another eighteen badly damaged; fragments of valuable, centuries-old stonewofk and scuJpturc 

mixed in with the rubble promised to make 

the clean-up job in the cjty unwmally lcmg 

a nd paiwtaking.•= 

The fight for Nuremberg was a last 

fli cker in a dying war. From the Rhine to 

l> Hist Rpt, De[ 13- 211, 20 Jun <Hi, in OMCUS 

!l l- 3/ 10. 

the Elhe, Germany was subdued, and the 

staiTs we re polishing the Ecw>SE plans. 

(Sec above, p. 163. ) All hough it could not 

hegin as <111 operation untiJ either the Germans surrendered or Eisenhower declared 

them defeated, EcuPSE wa~ alrend)' in 

effect as a condition for the greater part 

of the SHJ\F.F area in Germany. 3

:' GoLDcuP (sec ahove, p. 177 ) was ready, hut thnt 

it rould he put into effect was hec-nming 

increasingly douht ful. The mosl rercnt 

planning had added to GOL.DCli P the 

SHAEF Spec-ial Echelon , 287 officers and 

, SHAEf, C ~. ECLIPSE cmor:~ndllni Nn. 

1, 25 Apr ·15, iu SHAEF SCS :lll7/2. 
ECLIPSE 

869 enlisted men, cha rged with making 

contact with the Soviet clement of the Control Coun cil am.! beginning to set up the 

central Allied a uthority Ior German y; Lh1.1s 

far, however, t,he Russians had not given 

any sign of being willing to establish direct 

contacts. The Special Echelon's destina tion 

was pre.')umed to be Berlin, but as to how 

the force would get there, SH E F could 

only say, '' ft is ... probable th a t the 

forces of SH £1•' will only enter Berlin on 

Soviet invitation, possibly as a resu lt of negotiations a t the governmental level." 3 ' The 

Mini teri l Control Group, broken up into 

seventy control parties, had a m ore promising fut-ure. SH1\£F had a ttach ed ministeria l control pa rties to the T ( T :u-gel) 

Sllb-Oivision, G- 2, which was sending its 

own teams a eros.<; Germany behind I he 

armies to ga ther scientific <tnd industria l intclli.gcn<'e. V\lhcn the reams ('arne upon 

documents or personnrl of possible political 

va lue, they called forward the appropriate 

minil'teri al control pa rty. Experience was 

b earing 0111, ln a greater degree than had 

been expected, the assumption that tJ1e 

German govcmment would be dispersed 

outside .Berlin. Bits and pieces of govemmental agencies were turning up in widely 

scattered locations, sur h as Army High 

Comllla ncl records in thr Merkers mine 

and thr c-ryptographic section of the Foreign Ministr)' in a castle outside Leipzig. 

i\ifosl we re vnluable finds for various rcasons but. nevertheless, were only fragments, 

not the sul1stnnce of govcrnmcnt.=•r. 

On 22 .\pril, S<·venth ,\rmy a11d Third 

:\ rmy turned south int o the a rea of Lhe 

redoubt. From the outset the operation had 

" SHA!l.r, C-:l, Pl:l n GOt.l)t;l'r. IH Apr •l 'i, 

in SHAEF G- '1, 2 1550/2/ :1. 

~' Mt•rno, SI-IAP.F, ACofS G 2, for Di lri bu ti , 

s1oh: Ministerial Control Parties, in SHAli.F G- 5, 

llO:jj2. 

249 

more 1 he cha r acter of EcLIPSE than of 

OvERLORD. The Gennans were finished 

ami ne ither in the condition nor in the 

mood to make a last ditch stand anyv•hcre, 

even in the mounta in strongholds of a~ 

varia. Seventh Army's 1Oth Armored Division took t-...v enty-eight towns in a single day 

em 2~~ April. By the 27th, both a rmies had 

cros.'led the D t\nuhe, and the cities of Ulm, 

Augsl>urg, and Regensburg were in their 

hands. Where pinpoinl detachments were 

availah le they generally moved in on the 

same da)' as the comba t troops. Ulm, for 

il<: size the most heavily bombed city in the 

south, was a ruin. W a ter-filled homll crate rs covered bl ocks where factories and 

houses Jmd once stood. Tbe streets were 

I'Ough p aths through the ruhhle. But the 

500-yclu -old Gothic cathedra l still stood, 

towerlng above the nattened city around 

it. 0 At /\ugsburg, a German civilian, Fran_z 

Hesse, driving his own automobile, led the 

tanks of 3 d Ba tta lion , 15 th Infantry, 

th rough Lhe roadblocks and into the city 

co receive th e garrison commnnder's 

SliiTCnde J'. 1 

Third Army's marr h took it acros.c; the 

borde r into Czechoslovakia, where, being 

on liberated territory, military government 

again became civil affnirs but, as civil 

affairs, function ed more in the manner of 

militnry government l)erause the Sudeten 

Germans outnumheretl the Czechs by ten 

to one. On ente ring Czechoslovakia, Third 

J\rmy encountered a new problem, German 

DPs. A quarter million Silesian Germans 

fleeing the Russians took rdugc in the 

U .S.-or<'upicd a rea before roadblor ks were 

set up to stop I hem. They were. in despera te 

su·aits, having no place to turn for ass1s-

"'' History of Military Governm,•nt in !.and 

Wur.rucmhcrg-Uauen, pl. I, p, 126. 

., CO, l.'>th lnrant.ry, to CG, 3d Tufantry Div, 

30 A11r 45, iu OMCUS 76- 1/ 10. 
250 Tl m U.S. ,\RI\IY l i\' THE OC:C:tTP \TIO~ OF GERI\Ii\NY 

MASS F uNF.ML for t'OIIceu /tfltinu Cfltll/1 jlrisonetJ urJtrt!ererl b)1 tlteir gur, •tl.v in t ltc 

lost dttys of tltt• wnr. 

tam•e. 1'vlilimry government put some itl 

camps and billttcd others with the Sudeten Germans and gave Lhem subsistence 

from captured German rations.=•s At the 

Flossenburg concentration camp, ten miles 

from the Czech border, 186 typhus rases 

tai.srd the threi\l of an epidemic, c.-,pecially 

from the 16,000 prisoners that the SS 

guards were man bing south, ahead of the 

front. 26th Di,·ision G 5 kept track of the 

exodus by the trail of bodies and hastily 

" After Action Rt•porl, Hqs, V Corp~. ACofS 

C -5, Mny -15. in V Corp~ G- 5, 205 5. 

dug mass graves the prisoner columns left 

behind.," 

The G1·t nmn~ were conCJucred and their 

propcrl)' was " lil•erated." Looting had become !<OllH!thing of an art. Soldien; 

sta tioned t hl'mscl,·c.;; outside militnry govcmmcm offi,·cs and interl'cptcd ri"ilians bringing in weapons. Tactical units po ·tcd thci1· 

own cmHralmnd lists in whi< h they included itcrns as various as automobiles and 

jewelry, and the military government de-

" His! Rt>t, Third Arm>'• ACofS G- 5, Apr ·15, 

in SHAF.I~ G 5, I 7. I I. 
ECLIPSE 

tadtmrnts <H'quircd a new and, for the 

most part, unwelcome function as tanical 

wmmatHI'> and indi,·idunl hi ~h-rank in gofTit:ct-s cq ui itioncd it ems of doubtful mililHt')' ~cfulncs.<; through them. The retreating flle!tnnfll'lil troops hnd ('Onfisratcd 

matt~' ltic )dc.:s and autontoltilrs. The U.S. 

1 roops lool.. most of the rcsl. '" r n tlw IHst 

week of .\ pril SH.\ EF :-;topped ;Hccpting 

/?(•ic!tsmmk rurrent y for cxrhange into 

•• ( I I lliMory of :\lilitary Co\'t·rnmcnt in Land 

Wut•rllt•mherg Ondcn, pi, I, p. 127. (2\ lli;.t Rpt, 

Dl'l I I 02, II X lay ·15, iu S II:\EF (; 5, 17. 11 , 

J:.<'k<'l 7. (:ll Wnr Diar)', Dct III C: l, Mnr to 

Jun 15, ln 0:\ICUS l l:l :V:L 

:l5 1 

dollars hrranJ>e trcmcndou.<; amou nt.; dubi· 

ously acquir<"d were known to he in the 

ha nds of I he tJ•oops. '

1 

Sin!'C the U.S. troops, German civilians. 

anti DPs all looted, then~ was some debate 

O\'Cr whosr behavior was the 111 0sl reprehensible. In tht' DPs defense it wns frrqucntl)' sn id th;tl they took onlr food , 

dot hing, and ilrms for their own comfOI't. 

The • \ mcricans could daim the 1\anct ion 

of militarr <·uswm. Bul the Gcnnan.; stole 

from eaC'It other. On the other hand, the 

.. SH:\ ~F. AC:o(S G 5, Financial nr. RI'POI'I 

or C:onfl'r<'tH't' H r·lcl 11 1 SHAEF Fomnrtl, \!5 Apr 

15, iu SII AEF (i 5, I. 
252 THE U.S. AR~ IY IN T HE OCCU PATION OF GER i\lANY 

mgc to loot Wi'IS shortest lived ;nnong the 

Germans, a nd the milita ry governmenl detachments discovered that in their hume 

\:ommunitiC$ the Germans larked the 

anonymity and rnohilily of the tt·oops and 

the OPs and l'ould often he prevailed upon 

to rctul't1 wl1aL they had taken. In :\nshach, 

the Lnntlkreis food oiTicer put Olll an oruer 

dem<tndin!{ Lhc r·ctum of all looted stocks 

and got b;t<'k more th •n he knew hat! been 

taken. In l:knsh(:im, the German police 

chief r·erovercd a hundred ton~ of Wr.ltrmacht supplies hy hinting rhat l1e wa.o; 

about to begin making arrests. '" 

Dadmu, fifteen n1ilcs northwest of Munich, was thr largest corwentration 

camp ntpturcd by U.S. fot·ces. Its rolls 

listed 6:>,000 pri~oners 32,000 in the main 

l'ompouml :.nd 1 he rest in satellite work 

earnps. The :\merirans cam~.: 0 11 29 :\ pril, 

a Sunday. Work hall stopped in the n1n1 p 

on Vcd e.~da) , and an evarualion was 

hdng organi:led. One transport of 4,000 

prison ers was able to get away, but the 42d 

and 45lh lnfanu·y Divisions covered lhe 

forty miles from the Danube faste r than the 

Germans expected . At noon on Sunday the 

camp was quite. and the SS guards were at 

their posts in the towers when the cry 

' 'American s!" went up. A prisoner rushed 

toward lhe gate, and a guard shot him. 

Outside, a sir1gle Ame rican soldier stood 

looking casua lly a t the towers while the 

guards eyed him and others who were two or 

three hundred yards way. When the Americans op ened fire, the guards in the gate 

tower came down , hands in the air. One he ld 

a pistol behind his back, and the first 

American shot him. [n the n ext few minutes 

a jeep drove up; in it we re a blond woman 

war rorrc~pondcn 1 <md a chaplain. Tile 

chaplain asked the pril'oners, now rrowding 

o: Hisl Rpt, 'l'hin.J Army, AC:ofS C 5, Ar11' 15, 

in SHAF.F G :i, 17.11. 

tO the gate, to join him m the Lord's 

rayer ·~ 

Oaehall, dating back lO 1911, was 

among the first concentration ramps set up 

in Genmuny nnd the onl y one wit h an unbroken existence through the whole Nnzi 

period . ll had all the appurtenances: the 

motlo over the gate (A1beil marht F1·ei, 

Work Liberates), the electricall y charged 

l>~trhrd wire fence, the gas rhamher, the 

rremntorium, the starved prisoners, and the 

present'e o f death in the form of human 

bodies pil ed like logs. Bad as it was, the 

prisoners considered Darhau to he superior 

to ha rd labor f"nmps like Ohrclruf and 

vastly superiol' to deat h camps like Manthauscn.·" Most '\m~rirans found sur h disLinrtions hard to ro111prchcnd hut nol those 

who ~ll sm" Mauthausen wh<:n it was nncovrred u week la te r. 1

" 

Seventh J\rmy G-5 had prepa red for 

Darhnu. O n the morning after liberation 

two lmtteric_,; of Lhe 60 lsl Field Artillery, 

th ree truC'kloads of food and mcdkal supplies, and a puhlic nddrc.o:;.-; sotiJld 1 ruck arl'ivcd. C:ol. Kenneth E. Worthing-, G- 5, XV 

Corps, took commnnd, antl Detachment 

II :~G;~ assumed milita ry government responsibility for the ramp and the city of 

Dit .. hau. The :{,500 bodies sl~u ked in several places inside the compound were left 

until a ft et· a war crimes i•we lig~•tion team 

made its survey. On the third day, two 

400-bcd evacuation ho~pita s, the ll 6th 

and 27 , moved in. The prisoncn;' dnily 

" Hq,, S<'l'cmh Army, ACofS G 2, Dnchau Report fno dntc), in Sc,·enth Arnoy 107 2.0. 

' ' SHAEF, PWD, Report on Dachat• Cont•c ~t trrotion Camp, t 2 May •IS. in SHAEF G-2, 

GBI / C I/ CS/:IB:l.7 - 1, Folio 2. 

" In rvlaulh!IIISCll, lhc Cl'llll'r or :1 camp complex 

amu11d l.itl'l. in A11s1ria, prisoners werr worked 

10 dt·nth ill slont• qtwrrics. Thin! Army t'v~ <· ~t nll'd 

the 2:1,000 prisoucrs as quickly as tht•y could be 

rnovcd ;111cl hurnc:d lhP di~c;w·- n 11d vcnuin-infcstcd 

l11 tildings ICI the g round. 
ECLJ ~L: 

t.lti ~. hll(l t·aloril..-.; carh when tlw .\mrti-

' ""' :u' ivt·d. was ra.isccl mmwdi.11rly to 

1,200 and within two wt·ck-; w 2 100 

I . ' t·u nncs. "' 

'l'ltt' small city of Dnrhau wa-;, inn ~ny, 

lllOI''' of ;t di-;wvcry f(Jr thr \lllCri<all'l than 

tltt> camp it,clf. It hncl cxi'<tccl ~ide h)' side 

\\ith th<• camp for twelve• ><'aro;, The trar ks 

<•n \\ hir h tt.tinc; hrought in pt i~Cllll't'\ and 

c '" lo,td' uf rnrp...cs for the c rcm,\101 ium ran 

throug h lht• ril}' along thc• Nihclungen 

Str;t,.,c, .utd the guard.;; fn·qucntly m:m hed 

pl'i "~OI1t't' work details thr•c)llgh the streets. 

,\skNI wlwtltcr they realized that in the lnsl 

thrr<' ntotHhs nt ca~ t 13,000 people had 

loo;t their li\'t•s bare!} a stonr's throw from 

them, tltc c itizcns of Dachau claimed shock 

:tnd '"' pt i'r .tnd answered, " 11'o.r kc>e11ttlttt 

wit 11111 ?" \\'hat could we do?). ,\,ked 

"hcthcr the) had seen thr pri'\oncr; •·nme 

in nu the railroad, ther insi!\tcd that the 

train-; nil rame at night :1ntl that the rars 

Wc't.l' Nca lcd . The camp had hrou,ght prospertly to Da rhau, and many had profited 

clil'rc tly fnu11 it. T hose who had not hcncfitt·d wcrr mot·r willing to talk. They !'aid 

that l)('uplc knew what wa!. going on and 

\\(.' 1(.' cli\turhcd h~ it hut hnd hten arraid 

10 ,,I\ anything for fear of C'<.Onomit I ctafiatiun .tnd even more a[r-aid 10 do .un thine; 

hct.\u«r the ~ha ow of the 1.unp ~c; hung 

t>H' I thc·m. Se'"·cnth .\ rnty G '} reached, 

(or till' tinH:, a rcmarkahl)' l'h.tritnhlc 

<'OII c l11~i n: 

Nn dtin·n or D:tch;lll is witlwu t n d('rp 

sense· that OIItf'thing wa~ wl'ong, terribly 

"11111g, on llw outskirts of thc•it luwn . Those 

"~~~ rr:lll)' did not gi\'c a damn w('rc few. 

liiCI'<' who did show opposition ,flould be 

·• Ml'f1hl, fl,,,, XV Corp< to C(; Sc:,cnth Army 

'ult; G 1 R••I>On, Concent'ration Camp' Dachau' 

'i M.l)' t'i : Ml'mo, SHAEF G- 5 Ch OP llr ~~ A(;o(!) G 5, (uh: Vi<it to Dn h~111, j II May '45; 

l'lbg, C:C:, Sc·v•·mh Anny, to SIIAEF, fJ Jun 45 

ill SHAgf(; 'i, 271 7.~. I 

honorr·d. nut it 'hould be pointed out in ju\ 

tire to till' ut!w,., thnt the}' were people ''"" 

rould ~c·rlttti<' tlwtmclves from the t'<Jtt\lttu-

~~it)' 1\'i!l\tlul h:trllting their SOlll'lt'l> of lll('Oil ll'. I 1 

T roops of' the 42d and 45th Divisions 

who liberated Dachau in the afternoon 011 

29 April wrt C' fighting in Munich the next 

morning dnd by nighfall had, along '"ith 

XV Corps' other three divisions, captured 

the city that was the capital of Bavaria and 

the birthplace of nazism. Not an industrial 

center, its a'>'loriation with nazi:;m had, 

ncvcrtlu.:lcs.'\, made Munich a target for nir 

allacks, and in lhe end 80 percent or the 

cjty w:ts damaged or destroyed. The 

M unirh milit:H'Y government detachment 

F I F3, uncler Lt. Col. Eugene Keller ar~ . ' 

m ·cd in the mwning on the 30th. A' 

hefittcd a pinpmnt detachment with a 

rcar"'l training fot its ac;signmcnt, the J~­

man truck and jeep < olumn drove straight 

to the 1\lari..:nplatz and wheeled to a stop 

before the city hall. A few apprehrnsivr 

Germans, sclcc ted f•·om "white list"" or 110n-Nazi~ and anti-Nazis and notifi<'d to 

he prc .. rnt, wen· waiting at the rnlrnnrc. 

Keller told one to nrt as temporal')' /lltl'lgermeisl('l . Sotlle detat:hmcnt officcl"i \\COl 

out in thrir jeep" to in..-pect the watct, ga,, 

sewage. ami clcC"lric planLs. Other' inspected the pulic c· .md fire dcp.trtlll('llb, 

intcn·icwt·d the lc.tdiug Catholic itllcl 1.11-

thcran rlcrgy, rw q~u:stioned educettors ,uld 

welfare workers. The banks wcrr r loscd 

and the tu''~spapcr ofTi\es and radio staticns ~ei~cd. Sound trut ks hroadcastcd instructions and c scntial world news to the 

population. The "llMl and efficient pcrformanct' of the dct.tC'hmcnt was marred by 

only one hitch. It was one that alnw-.l all 

the del ac hntcut.; were c.xpedcncing: thr 

" Hqs, So·vo·tttlt Allll)' , ACorS G- 2, Dadwu Rc--

pon fno da11•), in St'Vl'nth Anny, I 07- 2.0. 
..'il 1111·, ·.~. \IC\IY I~ T JI E O< ( t 'P\ IIU~ OJ' GI:R\1 \\Y 

\IARII:l'l'l.,\'rl', 7\Jt NtCtl. 011 t/u• /rf/ . till' fl l )' hal/, 

t.utit al unit!i b.t hiwall~ dumped their pri-

'•lltl't"' of war em the nearest militdt y go,·-

Ct'ttllH'tll olli< c·!i do<H~tcp. For dll' first wn·k, 

tit~ • llWillhcr:; uf Jo'J f-':3 sha red tlwir Cfll:tr'ICI'S 

itt the l il y hall with a di~ro ulatc amlcottfu~c d rolknion of prisoners. 

.\s tl11· C'r:tulc of nazism, J\'lunir h hall 

hcc•tt slated fo r especially rigoro11s military 

gm't't nm<·nt. hut the cit) frolll the outsel 

Jlnl\'Cd to he :l' I rat table as !111>' ot her in 

Gcrnt:tn~. In LH t, l\r unir h could daim 

'OIHCthing that the .\mcrirans had nut 

fouud .11tywlu:rc ct~c in Germany, an ac ti\'C' 

anti-~.tt.i n·-;il>Utnrc. Two tttttkrgmund 

gnnq>)., 1 Itt Preilwitsaklhm Ntl)'OI'II and the 

/Jnyeritr he 1/ii{I/JOii:;l'i 0 7. had <:tagcd :m 

uprising two days before the '.:). troops 

a rri,·ed .. \llltoug h they had not hccn 0 \ 't'r'-

, .. ,.hclming ly <: ttn ·rs.'lful ag:tinstthc 1\a? .~ l'\'Cil 

at that latt date, tiH'Y were more than willing Lo rclir"c tit<· :\ntcri cnns of the lntrd cn 

of running the city. :\fLcr accepting a tlltn tl>cr nf Lhcir nominres for appointments, 

howc\·er, military go\'crnment learned that 

allli- ' a:r.i<; <'ould in sontc ways he as troulllcsontc lO ha ndle as Nazis." 

" ( I I i\nuu:tl u;,, Rpt, !Jet F. 211, 1 J ul •IIi, 

in O~ GUS 711 1/ltl. (2) q~, EUCOM, Ili.~t 

Dil', S prci:tl Stlll lit· ~, ,·o l, I, 11 0. :1, 1\lilit::try Co\'t'rnmcul ill 1\l urrklt, 1!1 15 -17, in C:\IH file.~. 
E< :I.IPSE 

The rcdoul1t, if it existed, was expected 

to li(' in the tnc)unlains scn1th of Munic-h, 

pt'ub;1hl> c-entered on Hitler's ,·acation n·-

lrtal ;II lkrd1 es~adc n. To a degree, this 

(' titllal(· ""s correct. In mid-J'vlnrch, Hitler 

h;~d lll:lalcdl y given order:; to set up a forIres.;; in 1l1c mmu1tains, a nc.l since then trainloads of goods <tnd material had hecn 

funneled lly tht hundr ~ imo southcrn Ccr111:111> p;trtl)' hecausc thcr had nowhere 

~c to g(l . . \l war':; end there we re m·cr 

11,000 loc'(llllOtiYeS sou tll or the Main R iYcr, 

twil't I ht' numbrr ordinarily opc:ntting 

tlwre. Loaded lwxcars blocking the ramps 

a11d -; t:ttions had contributed to the rnilroad 

255 

breakdown. 'l'h(; 1\lunich clivisjon of the 

Raif'/ul,a/111 had a 14,000-car jam tha t wail 

not full y unsnarled as late as Junf' I ~H-5. "' 

The huildup, stwh as it was, had c-entered 

at Berchtesgadcn whe re Hitler had contemplated establishing his headquarters if ht 

\\las dri,·cn out of Berlin. H e had spent sevtral 1TlOJ1lhs each year during the war in 

hi~ retrea t on the Ohcrsalzhcrg and had 

a communications center nc·arl>)' I hal was 

•·• ( I ) Hist Rpt, OlvL(;B, Tr:tnsportntion B,·, Jttn 

IG, in O:VICUS 65 11 / ll. (2) 0!\!(:US, Conti'OI 

Oflirr, )Jist Br, History of U.S. 1vfilita r)• CovcrnIIIC'Ilt in Gcrm:wy, H May ·15 - :i() Junt• ·Hi, Jul 

·17, in OMC US :ti- 115, Foldrr XIV li. 
2.% I'I I F ll.S. \IOI Y 1\ '1'111·. OtC:L.P\11 0\ tH' Cfo: {~J\\Y 

;1-.; good ;1..; tiH' (lllc the \rrn ~ mai1'1tainnl 

lor lain1 at Zo:-scn out::; idc Bcrlill. On the 

night of llitkr•'s hirthd:1y, 20 .\ pril, Rcidl:>· 

umrscha ll Hermann Goering. alisOJ'lCd lesser Nazi hig shot<;, and sections of the 

arm<:d fcm C'!->, army, ami air forr.c sta1Ts had 

mo,·cd to I3crchlcsgndcn c~pct't in g Hiller 

l() rollow in (I few days, llinrc the Russi:Ul!; 

had by then almost cncirdcd Berlin. Thous:tnds of l;1horcrs had worked cl:-ty anclnighL 

for .1 month building fortifications, and 

weapons. :unmunilion, and food hitcl rolled 

in as fast as the railroad marshalling yards 

multi handle them. ll was a ll wasted ciTort 

however. Hitler decided to end his t nrcer 

in B(•rlin, and in twenty minule.<;, beginning 

<H noon on 25 .\pril, .\llicd IJombers 

a:> ed the fortifications . . \fler the bombin ~. the erstwhile defenders or the redoubt 

h('<Hird smHh h>oking for rduge in the . \u-

..; trialt T yrol. 

Goering, whom Hitler had at the end 

"tripprd (If ,dllti:; title!'> a nd office.-; inrludin1{ 

Lhnt of ~: h Game Kce.p.cr, mer~ed from 

I ~ mountains some days later to ret urn 

hricn)' tn the limelight a.<; '' figure in the 

tllOSl puiJiicizccl frat erniza tion incident of 

t ht· \\'ar. llc o.; urrcndcrcd- hy nrrangcmcnt on :t <H tnlr~· ro:u.l to Bri . Gen. 

Rohcn Stm·k, . \!'\sista nt Di\'ision Com111 \IIHlcr. ~6 th (nfantr)' Di vision, who wa!'\ 

photographed haking hands wirh him. At 

I he division hcndqu;u·tcrs, l he press reported. tlw division commander, !vlaj. G<·n. 

Jnhn E. thlqui , interviewed Goering in 

pri,·atl', g:1vc· !tint timt' to h:rtlte <t tld ltl 

l'lw11gr his unif11rm, ate < hi1 k<·n with llilll 

a t lunch. :1nd pro,·ided hilll and ltis wife 

wit l1 a ni ght's lodging in :1 t':tst lc.''" 

On the moming of 4 day, when U.S. 

:{d Jnfanu·y Di\'ision troops crossed into 

Lmulkreis ht cs~a d<:n, the /_andra/, 

Em i I .J awh, wns the n•ost i 111 pon ant oiTirinl 

left. Even the local part)' lender-;, thr ,,·reifleiler a nd the Orls rufJ!mllei/er, had taken 

to the mount<1 ins. _\t two o'dock in the 

afternoon, J acob drove in his cnr to meet 

the mcrirnns a nd surrender the town. 

Detadllncnl l3G:!, under Capl. R .• \. 

Bryancl, arrived 1 he next morning and 

suffered the only ca . .,uallics known to have 

been inntrred in Berchte::;gadcn, two men 

injured when a time homh exploded in one 

of lhc l\'reis eadqu ;, te ~ ofliccs:;a Bcr-

( htcsgadcn would ha,·c been just a <;mall 

tm' n with som<' rinc scencr) had it twl been 

for two reminder!< of the pao;;t : the .\dl crhorsl, Hi ilcr's cla horale g uc.-; t house on the 

t:h itl , rcncht:d h )1 an elrvawr run 

t hrou!!h a +00-fool copper-lined tunnel in 

tltr mountain; and the Bcrghor, Hill er's 

hnmc on the er~n lzi> , now l>(lmhccl. 

burned, a nd lonlcd- an approp1'i<! lc monument to ll1c Third Rcil'h. 

... Cable, ,Marshall lo Eisenho\\'Cr, s1 'h: Coc,·ing 

r ricndlincss, t:l l\l ny ·l.'i, and Cahl(•, E isenhower 

I U cc·~. 12lh ACp, T hird a nd SC\'Crl lh Armies, 

J.l. May •15, in USFET. SGS 250. 

" An~tu l Hist Rpt, Del E- 3 1 I, J un ·16, in 

o;v!CUS 77 1/ 10. 
Cl 1.\PTER X\. 

The Victory Sealed 

\'11nrllfl,1 nt l?ri1111 

ll u111' l1dOH' d:mn on llw morning of 7 

~Ia\' Ill·!">. ,, du,lt'r of rmTc•spondcn!-> and 

prc~s a net twwsrt•t·i photogra phcrs waited 

<~lone cud of th(• C :{ war room nt SJ-L\EF 

fmwaa d llcaclcpma·tc•a-s in Rc•ims. ln the renter or l ilt' 1()()111 stood a l:tl'g'C'. l'll1pl)1 table. 

\1 ()~ {(), ll'll \iiit•d of11n•r.; ClllCrl'd and 

tool.. ~~·.ll" i\1'0\llld tlm·c -.idr ... or tlw t:thlc. 

C:t·lwtai-. ~111ith .111d or~·'" hr.,dcd thrccoiTit t'r l .~ .• md Uriti'h dl'lc~.ttim1'; Gt•n. 

Fr.tlu,:oi-. ~1'\"t't l•·pn· ... ,·ntt·d Ft.lllr<'; .md 

~ L\j. <:t·n. 1\ .m ~CHI'•I.q><ll o'·· ,, ("oloncl. 

.llltl ,, lil'llh' llallt "l'H' the ~m ict HIIHin-

\!t'llt. \\ lll'll .11J \\I' ll' .. e.1h'd, tll~.lll (,\Jkd 

in lhc· Ccrm.lll", Cl'IICI;ti<lhcN \lf11·d J odi 

<IIHI '"" olht'l"· 'I""' c•nt<'a('(l, tlit l..rd thrir 

ht•c·J... .md I!·" l' ... m.tll milit.u' hem,, \t the 

1.1hlc· 11ohcl<h '"'" c·d C" ept ~mith, "ho 

\\"ol\'t'd I he ( ;CIIll.lll" IC> -.t',lh 011 the UIWC< llpiC'd ,jdc· of the tahle whc·1c thC) . :\l faring 

a largt' '' .111 m;t p -.howing tlw . \llicd fon·cs' 

latc.<H dispo,ition..;, ~ 1 aj. C:cn. Kenneth 

\V. 1). Strong-, SI1.\ EF :l, ;,r1i11g .ts intcrprclct', 1\lOOcl lwhind till' (;\'l'llltrll" :tnd rratJ 

out 1 he ~liiTl lldn term~, more for the l>cncfil of the pn:S.'> than for· the Germans, who 

were (amiliar enough with them a lready. 

. \ ftcr St rr>lll-' finisht'd, Jodi rosc· and ded;\rccl, in the n:tmc of Lhe (icnnan .\rmy, 

N:-t\'\, alld \ir Font•, th.tt he '\UII'Cndcred 

unr~mlitiou.llh. Till' clocttmt·nt wa ' then 

si.~ncd. .llld Jodi .111d hi., part left the 

I O<ltll.' 

~ll'nlU, Sll \F.r, ,\C:nfS (. i, for \II Brandtct. 

SH.\Er· ... \\,lllillll' nti"'ion "·'' oOillplctccl, hut '' ith .t l,ht-111111\llt' ''' i ... t. \\ h.tl 

the Gennan-; signed at Rt:inh W<h the ".\ ll 

of ~1ilitat ' Surrcmkr,'' writh'll till c•t• d:l\~ 

hdorc in '1 hc II \I~F (; ~. not till' pai;,_ 

o.;takinglr ncgotiatt•d E. \C '\III'J'C'rHlt·a· in-;t a'tlmcnl. 'l'ht• rhitf lltllhor of till' 111'1'< 11dl'r 

donnncnl "ig ncd at Rt•int'i was ;a 13r•itislt 

colonel, John Counsdl, an :11 (OI' and tlwatrinll manat:t'l' in fi,·ili.ttl lift•, '' ho had 

dlcerfHIIv "< rihiJcd" lll\11 h of it f101ll tlw 

tcrnl' fn; tlw (;c'll\1,111 ~llttC'I1dt•t ill t.il~ 

2 .\1.1\ pultlio;hnl in .\/t/1 1 ami .\t,iJu''· 

lt.s o;i_, -.ltml pa 1 a~r.t plh num• mun· l h.111 

two "CillCncc-. ln11~ ''mph .tllttnanl thl' 

Genll<llt High Conllli.IIHI' 1111< c111tlitiunal 

-.urrcndc1, to t.tl..c dTrt l flft, -ninc millult' 

before midni~lll on ll \[." . 

'H.\L:.F l1<ttl itu hukd tht• L.\C -.uarcntlcr imtllllll<'lll i11 thl' ~c ttt•st• pl.tn-. 

and had a Mll11t'd it ",,., 1 he duc llllH'Ill tlw 

Germans would ... ign if tht'\ -.igtH•d mw .tl 

all, which h) the lime .J ndl ·ll'liwd h.td 

begun to scent llnlil..cl). Th<' E.\C wa-> h~ 

then at work 011 an .\llil'd pmo i:unation 

of the CC'rnH\11 ddral, :tnd rl!ll hing- had 

been done to t lcnr 11p sC'veral defirienrics 

in the urrcndcr instrument lhitl lta<l tlcvdopcd sinc·c it was a pprovcd h)• 1he government<;. O ne· o.,lipttp wa~; !hal. .tit hottl{lt 

SH.\EF had rcn·i,Td wpil'' of the -;ursub: Uncondlltonal Surn•ndrr, 7 M ,o)' l"1, in 

SHAEf G '>, 10. 

: John Coun\1'11, ( c>tllllrll'l 0 '""""' {I ondon. 

Barric "lnd Rocklill,l'lhi ,,IIR 50 . 

. Po\!111'. rh .. ~U/Ifflll( ( (1111/llntttl, Jl. lflll. 
Tf-m .S .. \IOIY l~ THE OC'CUP:\' 11 0~ OF GEJUI·\ '\Y 

rt•ntlct inslrumcnt, none had lwen sent 

orTil'iall)· through iL'S <"hannd of t·omm:111d, 

tllr CCS. When Winant tried ttl t·orrcn 

this omi:-;sinu on 4 1\lay, he ran into :111ol her 

c·ontplic·ation. :\1 \'alta, Roosr\'clt, Churchill, and Stalin had added a );in~-:lc word, 

" di,.rncmlwrmcnt," to the rights the: vic tnriuus pu'' I''" rc:;cn·cd for thcm.,cl\·t"- " 'ith 

rcg.ml 10 Germany. The rhangc had not 

been <'OIIln\llni<'atcd to Uw Ft't t\C'h.' J.'illall}, tht· smrcnclcr in..o;trumcllt required 

the signal nrt· of the ''big"hCsl Gc•t 1111111 !'i,·ili.tn authority'' as well as the higlwst military a11t luu·it y. Hitler :-~d kilkd hintsclf on 

:HJ \ pl'il. Crossadmiral Ka rl l)oc·nitz had 

anndu11n:d him::;clf "" Hitkr"s appointed 

Mll < C"-"<11' two clays later and h.td initi:tlrd 

the m·gol iations fo r lhc surrclldcr; hut the 

\llic:-. did nOt rec-ognize him a~ head of 

'>late, .md his authority, except pc~">ihly 

owr tl"· armed forra; still fighting, w:-~s 

douhtful. Berlin, the t'Hpital, had fallen to 

the Russians on 2 .May, ami lc:~l'ly all lhc 

I'CSl Of ncrllli'\11)' W<l!\ aJrC<lCi)' nt' t'llj)it cl hy 

one or the other of the Allies. When Winant 

ln kl~d to Stllirh on the Gtlt, Wi11ant a~ <·<·d 

that tlw .\ cl of (ili wry Surn·n<.kr wnuld 

;tc·c·<mlplish the purpose with the "lt.:a">t ronu·ovcNy and delay." :\ 1 his t'tqtu·st, Smith 

had induckd in the short clorumcm .1 srnll'tlc·e tlhlig"al ing the Germans Lu atrcpt the 

~AC: tl'll11-: as well, if they wert illlpC>s('u.r. 

ll t\ F had sent drafts of the t\u of 

M ilit:tl')' Surrender to Wal'hitlgton, London, and Moscow on 6 Nlay ru1d r'<'c<:ivcd 

n·.wtions frolll Churchill and Witlanl IJefot't' the "ittning hut not ft•om \\'n hington 

'D~Jiartnwnf of Stille, Furrig11 R!'llllltlllt, I ?f5, 

\(II. fll , liP· 2(!h 11. 

' ( 1) Ibid •• PI'· 284 aod 28'1( (2) ('ono for 

Rr('o•d, ~il( tll'd 1..1-l.S., suh : Surrcmll'r Tt•tfll~ Ncf\Otiar..,tl in ~AC:, II May 45, in OPD, AllC :HJ7, 

M·C. 1- D. (:l I l.rr, War Dept., ·isn('d F.d, IU s.nlth, 

11 tvlily 1[1, iu SHAI::F SGS 3fl7. 

or ~losruw.'' Mos< uw'-< response rc:tt lwei 

Reims on the mot ning of 7 J\lht )'. .;;i>. o111~ 

after the (;('t'tWIII'l had o;igncd. It prartir:tll)' 

acn1sed EiscniHI\VCt' of making :1 ll'uc'C' wilh 

Lht (;enr HillS that would allow them to 1'0 11-

limtt• the \\':tr against the Sm'iet Union ; 

and il in;;il>ted 1110 late hy then thai 

then· be ouly OtW ~igui g ;md that i11 Bc.:rliu. SH. u:F had proposed signing fiht at 

Rcimc; and lau·r· at Bc.:rliu to save time and 

I ivc.-;.' 

The scnmd signing wao; held, amicl'll uhvious cvidc11n· of Sovicl pique. in Ikrlin 

shortly before midnight on the 8th. Exrcpling pcrh:tpo;. tlw Crr·mam;, the least happy 

maJt of those who had IH'en prcsem dw ing 

tltc surrcndt·r <tl ci111~ was General Sou~laparov. H<' was rt'c·a llccl to ~ofos' 0\\ nn tiH' 

s;tmc <l;t}. C:olund Counsell saw him lc.l\·c 

the SH. \ EF \c·niw om, crs' mcs.' :-~f cr 111' 

rcccived the order ·•an old man, sa~gin~ 

at the knees, his fan· drained of all rolor, 

his eyes exprcso;itml('~-;. '" 

President T•·untan and Prime Minister 

Churchill :tllliOlltH'Cd the surrcmkt• on 1l 

J'l [ay. The SoviN ~owrn lll withheld its 

an nounrcnwm until carl , on the 9tlt, after 

the ceretltolly in Uerlin. l n Germany, thr 

troops :llld di:.phr(·t·d pcn;ons bad \'Ciltcd 

• Drp:ll'trnent of SHit<', Pureig11 llrlutlom, tt/13, 

vol. I I I. p. 211 1. The 'trong'''' rt•nction from W;"h· 

ington nfu•r tliC· >igniul> rattw .from ssis t~ooll St·t•1•· 

tary of W.1r t~{: oy. who wn.~ at lht• United 

Nations Confcr(•nc·t• in San Francisco 111olil !olh:t 

V- E Day. llr said it wns "incn~dihlt·" thnl the 

EAC surrt•mkr in~tru rm~r ll lwc.l "bt·e oo simply for-

~~;o en ami ignorNI." ITi, conccru \\ ;'\.~ mostly ()t•J'o 

sonal, ho" l'\'\'f: in •·:orly 19·1 I he hat! ~lrOIII(iy 

;~d\ ocatcd a $hOrl ~u rrc:ndc·r dorumcnt nncl h··· 

licved he \\Ould he ~u:.pcc cd of "h:1ving p111 <HII' 

O\'er on State• and ,guw•n Smith 10 use hi!> '"''"~ " 

C I ) Dcpnrtnwut of Starc, PurfiJ!II l?t!iali<ms, Jf/tf .'i, 

\'ol. Ill, p. 2'10, (21 l\lc111o, G.l\.1.. fur Ct•n lJ t~ll, 

12 May -lS, in 01'1>, AnC :18?, ~,, ._ I D. 

• Cahlc, ~lol•t.•rv 1\l"•iou Mosco" lo SliAP.I: 

FWL), 7 ~!tty .p,, iu SII AF.F C- 3, Opu~. A, 

:1111.1 I. 

' COIII1St1 11. Gtl!/11111//'} () /illliOII, (l. l 55. 
1'1 11 \IC lORY s t:\t.l.ll 

the· it <'Ill hu,,,,,m in .t pa·m.tlliH' c dd u.tt ion 

ulllht' ni~ht of the 5th; the• Cnm.tll' thrm-

.,clvl•., had lillk to cclchratt·. 'I he militar) 

~uvc·t niiH'lll dc:tarhtlll'tlls tlott·d llw oc ca-

.,jc)ll in rw 111'\ imil.tr lO the• fo ll owin~ ('tllr) 

fwm the journ.d of HI \ 2, s,,,,rht urcJ..<·n: 

II :\Ia)' ul'~d.n 

lliOO fit"l :~ll: 0730 hu•akfasl : 0830 

nllio·• · tall Lt L:lt-<.t·n to ro\ rr pmpcrl\ 

ronunl dutic•s :uul II'C'l'i\'l'cl ,,hat infornuuion 

ht• c·ould ftnm :\Jr. L<':\lh.ttl. Lt. \ 'ngl'l M"lll 

l'n•hlt• to Frit•driC'h~thul on procun•mcnt for 

1282d Engin<'f'l' C:omtrurtion B:~Ltali on. Lt. 

Tfa11·is invrStig.Ht•d COtllplaints of looting on 

the part of 1 >P~. CPrnl:lll civil in11s, ;llHl 

ft•cnr h :~ntl U.S. troops; invc•stigatrd thl' 

l'S<'<IJW of :1 Russian rrbonC'r ft'llltl the J)l' 

hospit;d. Ll. \Vclol rht'dwd wau•ltousrs for 

r hlm idt• of lintt· twtdt•d fot ~anitarr purpo~t· ... in I >P r;u 11p~ ( ':tpl. Youn~ iuvc~u .t l.'d the 

"'-'' intltural situation in Sn:ula11tc•rn l.and- ~un. C.:.tpl. Laid c·elltfl'nc·d with loral indus· 

11 ial l<'adcts. (.;11\Hdlill ~poke· <l\1'1 Llw radiu 

and tltd::trt·tl tlw wnr in Europe is O\'CL In 

Saarbrucckt·n. it w:1~ juo;l anotlwr clay, with 

the Gcmt:ut pcoplt· going about tltt'ir bu<oincss 

as uwnl. Cpl. Pflugt•r n·lcbratt•d lh hootin~ 

himsc·lf iu th<' heel nnd was lmNpitalin·d. 0 

,\ -; f;•r ao; tit~· .\mrtirans nllllu tell, the emotional imp:tl t on the CllliOt ~ wa.' o;light. 

Their f«ith in ';,tor')' had been undermined 

hy the dde.u .1t Staling t·ad in !l ~ and 

shattcr<.>d hy 1 ht' Normandy Iandin!.{. Few 

had rct.tincd an)' real hope for a German 

\'ictory nflt'r the J\lli(·d fon r'> reacht:d the 

wc. r11 l>cll'der. In <'ontmst w 1 he rcac I ion 

after tlw .-\ rmistice i11 I !l I fl. they dearly 

l'CCOp;tli1.Cd tltt• rael of a COIIIJJit'lC military 

defeat. On the other hand , SJJ,\EF's Psyc-hologil':d Warfare Divisiott, during interrogati n~ .tftcr V E Day, found a pcrva"i"c 

tcndcrH v ;unung tlw (;,,,mans to dLc;rlaim 

pcrson.tl rNpunsihilit)' for the disaster. 

The) retreated lO an itllcn-.c prt•orcupaLion 

' Oct II IA2, Uaily ) outu.ll, Mny •15, in SJIAEF 

c 5. 17.2'i 

"ith Pill d~ pti\ .lit' .tll.llt'-, l~SOIII'cl Ill tiH' 

argumt·nt olth~ " ld1·tnrr ,\lunu" l thc littk 

man ). aud e·~tdJt-,,J) rq>c;ltcd the plu.a ... c· 

.. ue/o~t/1 11/ttl ln·fw,!.!, l'11" lied lo ami 

clc.1 ci,·ed ). '" 

. \her tlw o,lttrt•nd<•• "'"" sign<'cl, 1 ht· t c:-

mainin~ quc;..tion f111 till' \l lit''~ w dec idt· 

a.~ what, t-:>..1! tlv, h.td hccn an urupli-<IH'd. 

The Gcm:r-;d Uo.u tl cone lt~ckcl l.ttt'l that 

Lhe Gcnu,lfl ' l.lle' \\ ,,., t'xlingui..,hc:d .tl 

Reims and tlw 'it trH"' at·quircd '\el\'cr<· i~nt) 

over the Gt•mwn [Wopk. It ritc.·d Crotiu-., 

who defined llllwnditional :\lll'n·ndc•· as 

" pure surrc·ndcr .. , whi('h make~~ the one 

who SUI'I'CtH.kt'S :1 Sllhj<•c ( <lltd IIf('l'~ lhC 

~overeign power 011 hi lit to \vhom t bC' surrender i, m.tdc. "" I mmcdiatcl}' aftt.'l \ ' E 

Day, Ei"'· nhow<'t '''"" not so e r rtain. T he 

\ <'l of .M ilit;ll') ~111 1 c·ndt' l h.td pmlurcd tltc 

~uhmi ....-;ion uf tht• Gl'tlll.lll ,IJlllt.'d feu 1 <'" hut 

not neceso;aril ~ of thr (:ctm.tn gu\<'tnmenl. 

whir h was ju't tlw nppo,itc nf wh<ll h.ttl 

happened iu I 1J I fl wlll'll the < ivili.m~ had 

signed the . \ rmi;..tic r and the milit.u )' had 

not. :\'either did till' ,\ e 1 Clf :\lilit:tr)' Surrender PI'O\'itlc: fo 1 \lliccl u'tsumptioll of Mtpreme a uthority in Gnmany. \1-:o mis.-:ing 

was :lllthorit) to r-.:1 luck the ~urrcud cu 

Gem1an forrc... from the prisoner of war 

provisionc:; of the I Iague and Grnc·v.t Con-

,·cntion;;.': The :. : was aw~\rc of thl'.'<' 

omi•sio ~, too, and 011 12 i\lay submitted 

to the g;ovnnmcnto; a draft " Jkc laration 

Regarding thr Defea t of Ctrlll;ul)' and 

the .\ssumpticnl of Supt'<'t1W .\utltol'ity by 

the .\Uicd Powcl':'" thnt ronthincd Lht: cs· 

scntials or lite .\ e·t of i\ lilit a ty Sliii'ClldCr, 

'" SHAEF, PWD. Wc..-kly l utl'lli'tl'tt<'•·, Summ:uy 

No. :~1, 11 May t'i, in SIIM:F C.: 5, 7 'I 

"Gcncr::~l Uootrd, Study N11. fl'i, Jl. 12. 

" ( 1! Mrmo, Sll AEI', ACofS (; 'i, fot C:ofS, 

~ub: As~urnption of Suprt·mr Authority in Gt•rman)', 1·1, May 15, 111 S IIAEF C 'i, 627. (2 ) 

Cahlc, Ei~t'nho"rr to CCS, J.l 1\lay l!i, 111 SII AF.l1 

C-3, Opm. C, '1117 I 
260 TilE U.S . . \Ri\ IY ~ J'HE OC:< .UP.\ 110'\ OF GER~I.\:'\'\ 

the F.AC . !llltTcnder instnarnrtH, :Hid tbe 

proda111atinn of the German drfr.m that 

the E.\ (: had worked nn just before 

I he 'iiii'I'C!Ild<:r. Wl1cn the governments approved, the declaration WitS lO be iss11cd 

twcr the !lignatures of 1 he <'Olllrtl<tnders in 

r hicf in Germ:tny. ~ 

Plnubu rg lntrrludc 

Tlw 1hird sciuence in the AC: dr.dar:t~ 

lion n•ad, "The rc is no c·en 1 ra I Govern mcnt 

or u~l writ y ln Germany capablr of ac·<·rpting rcsponsihilit y for the maintenanc<~ of 

lll'(lcl', the administration of th<: country, 

and romplianrc with the requirements of 

1 he \'it'lorious Powcr.;.''

11 This sl;ttcmcnt 

\\:IS not yet quilt acntr;\lc. On the Flcnshlll g Fiord. dose to the D a nish border, in 

a former nav)' rorpcdo school at M uerwirl-. 

. \ dmiral Docnitz held a p<Ht'tllially arguable daim lO the heachhip of the Crt man 

slate. In n political testament, written on 

the night before his death, Hiller ltacl tonfcrrcd on Docnitz the presitlt-ntia l powers 

under the Weimar Constillltion that I litter 

himsl'lf hnd as'!umed in 1934 after J linucnhw,l( died. Docnit7. had nm rtl'civcd the 

t Lament , hut he had nuthcnti< rllcd tr;m-

~w riptlS pf radio messages from Berlin informing him of the appoitHmcnt, :tnd he 

had begun preparing a "white hMk'' to 

dcknd his rlaims. "' In negotiating the surr<·m.kr, Sll.'\E F had studiedly igtHircd 

11 D<'pllr'tanr 'H of Statr, Fotr.iJ!n t~lli>nj, ! 04S, 

\OI, I It, 1,, 2U!I. 

'' Dcpnrtmt•nt of State, TreMits ond Oillfr In· 

lrlllfllifUtfl/ ;leiS Snit!S, No. 1520, 

'' (I) Or:rfl White Book, in OK W 11192. (2) 

Mt•mo, S IIAF.f' Control PMty ;n OKW, :.ull: 

Mcctilllt lwtwt•t·n Mnj. Gen. I.owcll W. Rook~o 

(nod othei'\J nne! Cross.'ldmir"l Docnit" in l'lenshurg on Ill Mny ·15, in JIA~F' G 't GCT 

322.01-2/<i i'S. See nlso :~hcr l.tll'ddt•-Nt•ur:llh, Nl'~i TII/1[! no(!llfl~ ( Goc.ttingt'n: l'vlu!>lr'rschmid\ 

~sc rl sch;d tli w Verlag, 195 1 ). 

Docnitl. while at the same time dealing 

with him, indircrtl> at lcnst, and tolerating 

his gov nHlH nl 's cxistcm c. 

Docnitz had :-;urrcndcrcd 11orthcrn Germany, in<'htclinl-( St'hlcswig-Holstcin and 

Denmark, on 5 ~lay, thus making him:;df 

and his propk \'irtual prisor.crs of Montgomcry's 2 I .\r nl)' GI'Oup; Jwwever, from 

a little island nf territory around Flensburg 

and ~ f ucrwil.., Docnitz c:onlinued to contl ~t !'t go\'crnmt•ntal and military nffail'!>, <IS 

far a. he was still :thlc, up until the gcncml 

cca!\c-firc li nd for 1\0111<' days thercaft<~ · The 

Soviet General St;dT protested aritlly 

SH:\ EF's havin~ permitted the C:ct·m:lll 

ncgotiMors at lh·in1s to usc terminology 

snrh a.-. "new government'' and "Grrnwn 

Govcrnnwn t" iu their messages to Docnit1. 

hct·au.-;c, the Ru ian-; said, they prcfCITCd 

to " do ht~<; inc;;.~ with the German I tigh 

Command and nc1t with the German Go\'-

crmncnt, wltirh in actualit\' docs 11 01 

exist.''tn The Russians, owev~ , who had 

been the lin;t tn ct~ rn about Hitler's death 

and the testament, had at one point oiTcrt'd 

to allow Docnitz to .tsscmblc his govcm· 

mcnt in Berlin. 

.\ frer V- E D.t)', the small ttrca a round 

Flensburg .Mucrwik became an enclave in 

the Other wbt• ICll:tlJy OCTllpiccl \OUI\tl'y. 

.\rmcd Germa n :;oldiers marched in the 

streets and ~tood guard ouL'>idc the oHirc•ct 

~nd rc-;idcm·c·"' of thr member.; of the ~-:ovcrnmcnt. Thr Rci('h '~; war fl ag still flew owr 

Doenitz's hc.:adq ua n crs, and Allied offi<'crs 

who had husi nrs.'> tlH.'rc a voided n ppcnri ng 

to gi,·c onkrs . .\." a government, Docnil7. 

and his :tS.<;twiat('-; htl ked nearly all thr r. -

l'entialo;, above all, C'tuHac:t with the people 

they propo:;('(j to ~o\'crn. i\lhert Speer, 

Hitler's armament and munitions minister 

"C;r!,Jc, Milirnry ?vli~~ion M oscow to SIIAEF 

FWD, 7 M ny ~. in S IIAEF \.-3, Opn~. C, 

3!14. 1- 1. 
THE VICTORY SEALED 261 

Ar< ERA PASSES as Germans e.\'clwrtge street signs. 

who had become Doenitz's minister of economics and production, proposed that they 

dose up shop completely after the surrender was signed to escape becoming a 

laughing stoc-k; but Docnitz and the others 

hclieved that they represented at least the 

continuity of the Reich. 

The one resource Doenitz had in plentiful supply was executive talent- though 

not often the kind that was likely to find 

Allied acceptance. Like Speer, many others 

from the upper and middle reaches of the 

Nazi governmental hierarchy had made 

their way to the flensburg fiord. From 

among the less tainted, Doenitz found 

enough men to assemble a complete, even 

elaborate, cabinet of experts, all suffering 

from the same di!lability however: the organizations they had headed were smashed 

and the rec:ords and people scattered all 

oyer Germany.' ' \-\Then the British troops 

surrounding the enclave did not move in 

to arrest them after the surrender, a wild 

hope sprang up that maybe they could survive hy making themselves indispensable to 

the Allicc;. Doenitz put the specialists to 

" (I) Karl Docnitz, Zehn jahre rmd Z wan.zig 

Tflge (Bonn: Athcnaum-Verlag, 1956 ), p. 471. 

(2 ) Albert Speer, Erirwenmgll71 ( Berlin: PropylaenVerlag, \969 ), p. 199. 
262 THE U.S. ARMY lN THE OCCUPATION OF GERM/\ 'Y 

work writing proposals, and j odl began lo 

talk about ·'overwhelming" the Allies with 

memoranda, lett ing them "break their 

teeth off" on the big problems, and eventually playing the Rus.~ ians a nd the Western !\!lies off against each othcr. ~ On an 

emotiona l bin!{c, the <·ahinet met every day 

to work on polishing its own organization ; 

it even acquired an offi cial photographer. 

Doenitz took to riding the five hundJ·cd 

yards between his quarters and his <>ffice 

in one of Hitler':; f>ig M e rcedes limousines 

that had turned up in Flensburg. 11' 

On the morning of 12 M ay, Maj. Gen. 

Lowell W. Rooks a rrived at the OK'"' 

( Oberkommando der Wchrmachl, High 

Command of the ,\rmed Forces) in Flensburg at the head of the SHAEF Control 

Party with orders ·'to irnp<>sc tht> SCAEF's 

will on the German High C:o mm<1 nd ."~" 

1\flcr taking up gua rters fot' himself and his 

party aboard the Patri(l, a pas.senger s hip 

docked in the h arbor noL far fmm the tot·-

pedo S(' hool, Rooks called in Docnitz and 

ordered him to a rrest Gencralfeldm;.nsrhall 

Wilhelm Keitel, Chjef, OKW, and turn 

him nver as a prisoner of war in reprisal 

for an a lleged fa ilure of some German 

troops to cease resistance against the Soviet 

for ces at the specified time. 

D espite its ominous beginning, Doc.nitz 

considered the meeting highly encouraging. 

H e believed it constituted a rec·ognition of 

him as the head of sta te."' Rooks reported 

only a great desire on the part of Doenitz 

and his group to create the impression 

"Kriegstagebuch des Oberkomma11d0.1 tier 

Wehn11Milt (Frankfurl a.M. : Bernard and Graefe, 1961 ), vol. V I, pt. 2, pn. J.t.99- 1507. 

,. Speer, Erin uenwgen, p. 499. 

~· Memo, SHABF, CofS, for M aj Gcn Lowell 

W . Rooks, sub: Supreme Hqs Control Party, 

OKW1 I I M11y ·l!i, in SHAEF G- a, Opns, C, 

:Hl7--7. 

" K riegstagebt•ch ties Oberkommtwdo.r der 

Wehrmncht, vol. V I, pt. 2, p. H!l:l. 

" that they a rc the best people to issue 

orders:'"-" What Doenitz inteJ·prcted as 

recognition was npparently mo~tly uncertain ty on the part ()( Rooks and S I-IAEF 

as to what to think or or do with thi!-\ 

strange military-political menage that had 

dl'iftcd 11p out of the wreckage of the Third 

Reich. 

Rooks tn t\)' h:we had instructions to expion~ the pos.-;ihility of using Doenitz and 

his people as :m instrument of Allied control. :::' If ~o, he did not ~1 rry long over his 

decision. On lhc 15th he lold Smith, " It 

is quite obvious tha t 1 bis headqu arters is 

a rapjdly decay ing r<>nccrn with lit Lie 

knowledge of present rvcnls and practindly 

no •Nork to do." H e snggcstcd , !=:uhj ect to 

the needs of .- \ EF and the army groupsl 

disbanding tlw OKW as sonn as possible. 

On the 17th. R ooks, his British deputy, 

Brig. F.. J. Foord, and the SHAEF Politi\al 

.\dviscr, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, 

jointly recommended al lolishlng " the socalled ac-ting government" immed iately. 

The next day they questioned D oenitz 

about the manne r of his appointment, hut 

only to satisfy their ru ri o~ it . SHAEF had 

a lready requested Mo~cow's agreement to 

the arrest of D oenitz and the others with 

him who were in the automa tic a rrest calc-

"'Cable, SHAEF Co•1lrol Part)• a t OKW to 

SHAEF FWD, 13 May 45, in SHAEF G-3, Opns. 

c, ~117 7. 

"' Prime Minister Churchill, who usually found 

ways to r.nmmnni(.1\ tc his ideas to SHAEF, was 

talking about "leuing things slide for a while" 

and using th11 Dornitz govcmment as "a handle 

with which to manip11late thi~ conquered people." 

In his first postsurrcnucr mt!Cting with Eist!nhowcr 

on I 6 Mny, he snid he wotold not be averse to 

IISiJig suit:thly q11ali ficd Ge rm:tsls to rcorga11h-:c and 

handle German problems, possibly "some of the 

Cennan generals alrcad)• in 011r hands.'' (I) Winston S. Churchill, Triumfih and Traf.(ody (Boston: 

Il ot~glot oto-Miffii• l Compauy, 195:1 ), p. 756. (2) 

War Cal!incl, Chiefs of Staff Conlmittcc, Minutes 

of Conference He ld 16 1-.·fay 45, in SHAEF G- 3, 

1/ GPS. 
TJIE VICTOR\' SE.\LF.n 

got ie-. .uto h.u.J instnu ted Rook(, 10 " take 

.111 -;ttps l\hort of an·cst'' to jnliun: that 

l)ocnitz n'W>Cd executive f lll1l tions." 

Tlw Americans were, in a wa)', more inLrl'l'l\lt'd in a Soviet OK W mntl'ul pat'l)', 

under Uaj. Gen. Trusov, who a1 dvrd srvt'l\d d.L)'S .1ftcr them, than thcr were i11 the 

Gl'J 010111"· Nr> ot her clement of thr el . .tmr.\lC <iol OCt' P and Sll. \ E r Special 

E\ hclon Ol~ollli.z.1.tions had <;0 r... made 

t:mH.u I with the Ru<;.<;ians. To lll ph y. 

Trusov gave the impression that the Rusllians W(l lliC'd .t co-ordinated .tclministration 

in (;C'I many hut had IIOl )'t't fm•mcd ;lll)'-

tilillg li k{' the U.S. and Driti'\h ( !on\l't)l 

( :ounril groups.~r. Rooks saw in the Ru. -

'-ian-;' behavior a latent thrc.tl to S H.\ EF's 

still-t hcl'ishcd nonfmtcrnitatirm polin. Tltr 

Rtni.ms. he reported, '•fratc·taliled \dwlcht';lll<'dh .'' The enlisted men t.tll,cd lo Gc•-

man wcm1en on the o;lr<'CI<;, Tht· cat'" of 

the pla11c that brought tht• Ru-.-.ian-. got 

tit ltnJ.. with German offit ct~ in Fkushurg 

ami l'lldl'cl up kissinu them. The pilot lricd 

to bring llil('k a German womnn to thl' airliclcl nn a motorcycle. On hoa rd the /

1

(1/ria 

.l So' iet offic·ca had hecn !\CC'I\ clrinJ..ing and 

lauglting- with 1 hrce German offit eN ill It is 

c-.tbin.-·· 

On tlw Hlth, the So\'ict rommano havin~ a~1ecd, ' H.\EF ordC'rtd 21 .\tm) 

GtOIIJ) to arrc.<;t the Ducnit1. ~t1vc rnmcnt 

ami the OKW. Col. C. \\'. Stt.•watl, Jr., 

dn;nihcd the arrest <L<: il O<'<'tiiTccl on the 

111orning of the: 2:~d : 

1 C t ) Cnhlt•, SI-IAEF Control l'.or I)' at OJ... W 

·" !)JIAP.f FWD, 17 :\1:-.y l'i : C.1hlr, S JIAEF 

111 Comrol J>.Ht), 18 :O.lay I !'I, 111 SIIAI-: t c; 'l, 

0111". C:, 187 'J. (2 ) CaMe, Sllt\EF Mo~in Er~rnl"mrr • to ACWAR to CC:S, lA ~l:ly 15. in 

SliAF.F SCS 250.1. ~,J,tc·, 1\Jurphy to Set" of St.lt<', 21 Ill;~)' ·l'l, 

in C1\D ()t I, 7- 10- 12, sec. 13. 

.. 111r'ltlCI, n ooks for Smith, ~uh : Nonlra!CIIll7.:l· 

ltllrt 11olil')•, 26 May ~5, irt SHA~ 1 (; I, 2'10.1 tO. 

263 

At Ill \~I . ,\dmiral Doenitz. Gent••·•' 

Jodi. t\d111iaal \011 Friedeburg and thrc:t• 

other offirrrs r;lllll' runrching down the dork 

and wCI'l' <'Srortrd up to Lhe ship's bar where 

a long table had bvcn prepared with t:hairs 

on btlth sitk~. ''~')' much in the same w:l)' 

the \\'::tr room in Rht'irus was arrangt·d. J r 

C\'CI' a tmll\ with a (jdd marshall's nutcm 

looked tuthap)>)', DO<'niti' did (after ht· ramc 

out). Rook!> 11111~1 havt' taken almost nn time• 

to delivt'r hi!' 11\t'$'>:\gc. The German<; wrrc· 

marcht.>d on and put into cars to takt• thrm 

home to pat k. 

By the tintl' D urni11. emerged from the itttervirw. the main street of Mucnvik W.l'l 

filled witlt 13t·itish tanks and with troops 

rounding up thl: Ccnnnns. The G1't'mnn 

harrac-J..l-1 wc1 e luut c.:cl, :tnd, Stcw.trt reported, "lh<' t omplrxion of the town 

changed ow1 ni~ht from he1ng optimistic 

to o;utlcn ttuirt. " :: Ref ore the day's end, 

Doenitz, !-,pl·r•, Jodi •• md the other top war 

n·im~ suo;pcc t~o were moved to .\ SHCAN. 

Generaladmirnl 11:\ns Georg von Ft it·dt:· 

burg, who had made the partial surrcnckr 

to Montgomery and who had been al 

Rcims wilh Judi, al lkl'lin with Keitel, and 

finally on t h<' Pat ria with Doenil7., slwt 

him<;t•lf. 

\/ utili~ in llerli11 

Since the unconditional milit.tr surrender had .tlrcady been accomplishnl, tlw 

most signifirn ut pas.<.;nge in the Dccl:wation 

Regarding th<' l)('fcnt of Germany au<l the 

Assumption of Supreme Authority l>y th<' 

. \llicd Powcrs w,ts that pertaining to lite 

a.~'iumption of suprl'llle authority. It tc•rtd 

a<; follow<;; 

.;; Memo, Col <.:. W Stt:\\:lrt, Jr., for Crn Craw• 

ford, s11h D"}olution of rhc OKW (Nord ) >11lU 

the so~:lllcd AI IIIII! ( .trman Co\'ernmc.-nt, 21 ~~.,,. 

~5; ~f~:rlto, SIIAEF, G 1 Opus, for ACotS C c;, .•nh: A rre<l ol /Itt i " It German Co,·ermncnl, 2:1 

Mny ·l!l, in IIAt ~ (: :l, Opns. C, 307 !.1. 
26+ T l m U.S . • \JUlY It\ THE OC:CUP.\TJ ON OF GEJU l \:'\Y 

The Co\l'IIHnc·nts n( thl! l lniwd States of 

.\mt>l i<':l, till' l ' niun of Soviet Socinlb.t Rcpublic·s :.nd the l ' nilt•d Kingdom and the 

Provi~ional GOH'I llltl<·nt of tiw F~nc h Re- p~tblk . hcrcb)' a~~unw supreme authorit)' 

with • c·~pN t tn C:n·many, including all the 

po'n-''1> pn.,~c .. ;sed J,y tlw German Government,.. thr lligh Cornman<.! ;1nd any state. !~urllnp,tl. 01 .looal ~O\'l'llllnent or .ltlthority. 

f hC' :1'-\UIIli>IIOil. for thr )lllfJIO'-l'S Stated 

nbO\'C, nf tilt' ~aid uuthority and powers docs 

not IITt•(' t the nnm·x:uion or German)'.~" 

The ,rc ond St'lllCII<'C lllitigatc<.l the traditional ulti11tale dft'c'( of uneonditiontll surt't'tHICI', tht' pt·rmanetll l'Xtinction of the 

dcfratt·d 1\lill<'. limier til<' drd ~r :H on how- • 

ever, the Gcrmnn stair, ncvcrthdcs.~, did 

rcalic to t•xi<;l, even if only pro, i~inna lly. 

The l .• w of hrlliAcrcllt on 11pntion al-;o no 

lon~c1 applied to Ger111an) . The . \llied 

SO\e rt·igntY w.1s c omplt·tc, li1niH·d onl) hy 

it:. own dec io;ion, .md the rclation,hip was 

that or t llii(JUcror and suhjn t. The de( lal'atioll "'·'' written to ht· i!o~llt·d hy thr rcprcsentutivc.o.; of the Allit·d stq>remc t·ommands 

on the authority uf thrir goVCJIH11C'nts and 

in tlw intcrc<;t'l uf th(• United Nations. 

President Truman approved the declaration nn H Ia)', and the War Dcp<utment 

imu uctcd ~ic;cnhowcr to .1rrange to have 

the four c <llllllltllldtrs in German) i sue it. :!11 

~kC:Io) romnl<'lltcd th.ll, sintc one !;lipup 

had already been ntadc:, L\E F should be 

careful nut to m.1kt• :motlwr and !ihould 

I herd ore lll ke no act ion 11ot a ))proved beforehand IJy tht: f<HII' govcrnmrnts. '"' The 

other g-m·ernments Rtllmlitwd lhl'ir formal 

appro\'al within a week. 

1n the meantime, howcvt·r·, nllhough the 

drc l:11.11ion 1 <'lllaint•tl a formality. an al-

" D~p..rllll('lll ,,( St;IIC, 'l'rtol1o o11d Othtr 111-

lullolumol A ell Sni;-s, Nn 1 'i20. 3 Dt-parllnl'lll or Sr.olc·, PurCI/t" Ul'lnfllllll, JfJ45, 

vol. Ill, 11 2(n. 

"Cable, Mnnhall 10 F.i\l'nho" t>t II ~L1y 45, 

in CAD 101,1117 2,!cc. l~ ' 

lllOl\l supcrfluoth ... t.ltcmcnt or ,\ de {nt to 

condirion, it had become cntan~lcd in a 

knot of tangcnti.tl prohlrms. One pwhlcm 

"''"-" that Gcmsrv wantt·d to add the ~ovictsponsorcd Polish ~ovttllllll'lll ;1-; ouc of thr 

.-\llies '' ho would be gi\'en advanrr topic.; 

of the dedara1io11. ${'vcn Eurupran .\llicd 

gOtvemmcnts, it11luding ncithct the Poli"h 

cxjJe gcl\'crnmenl in London nor the Poli'>h 

"Lublin .. (later \\'armw ) K<NCiument, had 

been cono;ultcd in writing tlw original -.urreoder inst tllllH:nt anci wnuld br !>ihtMn the 

declaration. The British wanted to ndd to 

this number the Dominions, Jndia, and 

Bl'azil. When Strang r<riscd the quc'ition in 

th e E1\ C: on 10 ay, Couscv nt oncr proposed iurluc.ling the Warsaw govcmment, 

which neither the Unitl·d Kingdom nor the 

United States n.'CO,I{nizcd." 

\Vhik tht• E.\ C: ne~utiated the Poli,h 

question, tht' ,\mtriram. and thr Btiti'h ckhatted '\Ollie other subjects among thcmsellves. B01 h g• oups a~<;umcd, in f:wt ltup<"d. 

that the :;igniug of the declaration would 

at lt omatir<~lly bring th<' Con1rol Counril 

into being, sinc·c the signatol'ier; wuuld :llso 

he: the mcmhcl'. of the Control Counril. 

Activating •he Control Council howc\'cr . ' could force dec i.<;ion!: ronccrning SH \ EF'o; 

cxjstencc and the Slli\f.F-hcld territory in 

~he So,•ict 1.01\C tkrisiOilli Ull whirh opinIOn wac; both mixt!d and divcrgt·nt. Eisenhower made a stmng cas<' for keeping 

?H/\E!o' unt~ l tlw fm·cc!! wel'c rcdi o~cd 

111 thctr nalumnl zones and the Contml 

Council wns ope•·ating eiTcctivcl y wltirh 

his staff prcdit ted, would take :11 lea$! thre~ months :'~ The Briti<;h, wh<> !tad ltmg desr Dep;trlmerll of Stale, Porrig11 RrlntrtJttt, 194$, 

vol. I II, p. 286. 

"' ( I ) Poguf', T/., Sufnl'mf Commu11tl, I'· 511 

(2) ~lcmo, SIIAEF, ACofS c: '1, for CofS. ,uh: 

Rt~depl~ymcnl of U S., Bri1ish, French, .u1d Sc:wier 

Forces rnto Zonl'$ of OccuJI:tlion in f:crmnny 1 1 

May -15, in USFET SCS 171).5 ~. ' 
THE YTC:TORY SEALED 

sired SH.\gF\ early di$lm11tlmcnt, opposed 

prolonging the c'omhincd command formally hetiiWiC existence of the commnnd 

would logicnlly require I he declaration to 

he gncd onl)' by Eisenhower as i\llif·ct 

Supreme C:m1m1a11dcr and t\larshal 

Zhukov as Soviet Supreme Comm~tndt' . 

On lhe other hnnJ, however, ther appar-

<~ntly did nol wnnl to sec SHJ\EF ft>t'll\ally 

disbanded before a decision wns made I'C'· 

garding the ST IAEf-hcld Soviet territory. u 

Truman hnd proposed, in laic . \plil, 

making the troop and hounch1ry adjustments as l>non as a govcr'rllltCnt dcc:larcd 

itself ready to take over its :LI\.'Iigned ICJ'l'iIOI )'· But Churchill had ohjcNed l1t1th to 

•·Jetting the Russians . . . order ~·s bark 

at auy point they might Jecide'' nud w 

·'yielding up ... :111 enormous tcr•ri-

[()r)' .•. while all questions of our spht!ITS 

in Vienna or arrangements for the oc·cup<llion of Berlin remain unllelllcd." The President <UH.l the Prime Minister had fimtlly 

<t!{rced to propose setting up the Control 

Council first and then rcciisposing the 

troops in the wnes. Swlin acknowledged 

the message hut, exrept few ngreeing to n 

" temporary tactical demarcation line," 

ignored the proposal.'

11 

Talking- to Eisen howe•· on I() tvl.ay, 

Churchill indicated that he did not wnnt 

to sec all) clct'ision mnde on HAEF'~ 

status thnt would give the Soviet Union 

a11 exc.:usc tu pre..c;s for a withdrawal from 

it~ zone; therefore, on thr 24th thr Bl'iti~> h 

argued in Wa~;hington ftlr separating the 

dedsions on HAEF and the Soviet terrilOr)' from til<· declaration and the activation of the Control Counril. They wanted 

" War C:nhin••l, Chiefs of Staff Comrnilll'C, Min· 

111c~ of Conftrl·nce Held J 6 Mny 45, in SHAP.F 

(; :i. 1/ GPS. 11 Orpnrtmt'nl of Stale, Fc>reigu Relations, I!NS, 

vol. I l I, PI,· 240, 241, 2'*'1, N5, nnd 2~9. 

265 

to make tl1<: with<h :n~al from the Soviet 

zone in particular. they later explained, 

conLingcttl on the sclllcrncnt c1f the! "whole 

question of future rclaLions" between the 

Wc.<;tcm Allies anti the Soviet Unitm in 

Europ<:. The Statr Department inclir.ated 

L.he U.S. ~ovcmmcnt W <L'i interested above 

aU in gc·ltiug the Control Council CJ'itahtishcd aucl working and would not delay 

the withd1·awal fro111 the Soviet :~.one if the 

Rus.«ians made it an is.o;ue hut would 

"defer" the clccisiom; on SHAEF and the 

Soviet ~.one temporarily- presumably at 

kast loug t•nou,gh to gnu,ge the Soviet 

t'Caction. :tr• 

I n the end it was Eisenhower who 

brou ~ht tllC' matter to a head, though not 

by his or the U.S. govcnuHent's choirc. On 

29 May, Winant recommended in the EAC 

having 1 he <'ommaudcrs in chief mecl in 

Berlin on I June, sign Lhc dedar:uiun, form 

the Control Counril, nnd put the protocol$ 

on 1.onr_.; and ctultrol madtincry into force. 

The P.AC had by thc:n solved the Polish 

quest ion. Jt would tnmsmil the declaration 

to th<· original seven Allied govcmmCnL'\ 

tl1rough it'i Allied Consultation Committee, 

and the British government would give 

copies scparalcJy to the Dominions and 

fndia, the U.S. govrmn1ent lo Brazil, and 

the Soviet government to Poland. Gouscv's 

ins1ru1 tinns from Nfoscow were slow in 

coming. hut not unusually slow for tlw Russi~ns, and on 4 June he reported that his 

government bad acc·cpted Winant's rccommcmlatirm and wanted to hold tltr rcremonr in Berlin the nc.xt day.3

" Ei cnhower, 

meanwhile, had asked on 2 J une how he 

'"a" lo respond in ctt<;C the Russians raised 

the question of their 7-onc, as they seemed 

likely t(l do. The JC:S told him that the 

withdr:.~wal from ll1e So\'iet zone "should 

" Ibid., rr· :l o~. :l05, :wd 1011. " lbitl., pp. 1!4, 3 15, and :12:1. 
266 THE U.S . . \ lUIY 11\: T HE CClJ l>.\'J'JO ~ OF G EIUI.\ .'\Y 

no t he a question precedent to c.~ bli

nt<:nt of the Control Co,,n cil." If thr Russi:tn!\ rn iscd the poiut, he was to ~ay that 

ir was ·'one of t l~t · it ems to he w orkt·cl o ul 

hy th<' Control ( :oundl. '' ~ 

On 3 ] uue, Eisen howcr :\ent lU tl w .J CS 

his pro posed agenda fo r the first meeting 

of lite Control C:ount'i1 1 which he expected 

would take plat l' .tftc•· the (ormal signing 

of tht· dechm 1tion. He expected to di'lcuss 

a lonttion for the C:orlll'ol ,\Ulhoril)\ either 

in Berlin or clscwh<'rc:, a nd, jf in Bcalin, 

tlw qu ~ tions of tra11sit and communications to the cit)'. l ie wntdd ta lk ahot1l movin!{ the U.S forces oul of the Soviet hOIW 

if the Russians broug ht it up, hut lw would 

not make a ny commitmentS without consulting the J CS. H the Russians asked, he 

'''oulcl expla in SII.\EF's contjnuing cxistcnn· as Rn interim a rnwgement fur th<: 

pc·•·ind in wb ich tlw U.S., British, and 

Frcnr h forces were being redi::ttrihuted to 

I hei1• zones. a~ 

The planes carrying Eisenhower nnd hL-; 

party ltmded a l Te111 pclhof a irpon in the 

late forenoon on the 5rh. After reviewing 

a battalion-size hoi1C>r glt:trd, he wa ., taken 

II)' cn r to the southcA rn Brrlin suh11rb 

Wcndensrhloss, as were a lso Moulgorncry 

a nd the French (·ommander in c hief in Germa ny, General J ean de La ttre de T as.c;ig ny, 

when they arrived - separately. of course, 

to emphasize their tus as prc.~e ntat es 

of tltcir respective rmmtries. The ll ivc 

thmttgh Berlin, 1tlong streets lined with 

Soviet troops :md with srarcely <t il)' Gc•·-

'(I ) JCS 13N, W ithdra,,·a l of U.S. VorCL'S 

from Russian Zont> in Gc:mlnny as a Coro llary 

to F:stalllishmeru of the Corllrol Couucil, •I ,lun 

•15, iu CCS 3!H ( 6 20 H), src. 3. ( 2 ) Tntnli\11, 

Mfllwirs, vol. I, p. :101. (:1) Cable, Hqs ETOUSA, 

to Ei~cnhowc , 1 Jun 1

15, in SHAEF C- 3, OCT 

384. 1 2/CPS. 

•• Cable, Eiscuhowcr to JCS. 3 J un •l'l. in 

Slft\F.P C-3, O pm. C, 367 1. 

mans lO he SCCII, showed tllt• cit y w 1>(: 

heavil y d a tt\:Jgcd ; but ill Wcndensch1oS!'. 

wooded and lying betwcc·n two lakes, the 

w<~ r had 1Hisscd tbc cx ~;; ,ivc villas, untiJ 

rc<·<·ntl} 1 he pmperty of n•ovie ·tars and 

importan t Nazis. Zhukov lived in one of 

the villas, :11HI he rtssigncd one lo each of 

the Westcm co mm nd ~ for tlw day. t\t 

a privalc •He<'ting, Eisenhower presented 

Zhukuv with the Chief Cornm;mder g rade 

of the :~ion of er t and then returned 

to i:~ quarters expecting w he ralled for 

the sign n~ t crcmony shorlly, ~t in c the time 

set, noon. w:•s alread y pa l. 

Hours passr.d withOJ!l anything more 

I ,cing heard from or seen of the Russians 

mhcr th ;ul thc ou~ ld Ts, who 

seemed n o l even 10 know what the gathering w:-as f M in t lw first place. Fin tll y, when 

Eisenhower .md Montgomt'I'Y threatened 

to lctt vc without signing, they and de Lattre 

were cal l<:d to the yacht dub where the 

ceremony w:ts to take place, onl y to discover wlwn thc:y arrived thHt the Rw;sians 

insisted lhey could not sign because the 

wording c>f !\!-tide 10 of the dcdaratjon 

c-ould he ronslrned a.-; requiring them lo 

arrc.<;l J apaue.-;c na[jonnls found in German)', a11d they were not at war with 

J a pa.u . Eisenhower ordered the passa ge 

taken out, which amazed Zhukov, who bad 

to check wi{h Moscow before accepting the 

deletion. By the time the Rus..o;ians were 

ready it was approaching five o'clork, and 

Eiscn howcl'. who intenckd to return to 

Frankfurt that day heforc dark, was again 

becoming impatient. 

T he signing took o nly ;, few minutes. 

Seated nt a large round tnhlr, in a blaze 

of <trr lig hts a nd photographers flash bulbs, 

each comnlan<ler in chief signed four copic.'> 

or the dcl'lnmti on : in English, French, Russia n, a nd G(•rtllan. When finished, they adjourned w ith their int rpr er~ nnd a few 
THE VICTORY SEALED 267 

~\RSliA ZnuKov (Center) PouRs A ToAST o.t thP 5 }ILne 1945 meeting in Berlin. 

General Eisenhower (left ) dejJorted immediatel)' after the toast. On the right are 

Field Marshal J\1/ontgomerr aud General de Lattre de Tassigny. 

aides for a private u<tlk on the clubhouse 

porch.30 Aft<:r a brief preliminary conversation, Eisenhower, apparcnLI)' as.<>uming 

from Lhc EAC's agreement that they now 

constituted the Control Council, asked 

Zhukov whether Lhe control staffs could 

,. ( l ) Harry C. Butcher, M)' Three Years: With 

Wumlrower ( N<:w York: Simou and Schuster, 

I!H6 ), p. 0~17. (2) Clay, D<!r.is:io11, pp. 20 23. 

(3) Bernard Law Montgomery, Tire Memoirs: of 

field-Marstwl Monlgomery (New York: New 

American l.ihrary, 1958), PI'· 336-39. (·I) Alexander Werth, ll11 rsia at Wnr (New York: E. P. 

lJulton & Company, 196+), pp. 9R3-U5. 

begin work:"' Zhukov replied that they 

cou ld not. When Eisenhower talked about 

an agenda and schedule for Control Council meetings, Zhukov said the troops 

should be established in their proper zones 

first because he could not study questions 

relaling lo Germany while he did not con-

"' The EAC statement, which Eisenhower received bc:fore he departed for Berlin, read, "Upon 

signature of the dcclarnl ion the four represcnlative.~ will constitute the Control Council in order 

to deal wilh matters affecting Germany as a 

whole ... . " Cable, Winnnt to Eisenhower, •I Jun 

45, in SHAEF G-3, Opns. C, 387-1. 
268 THE U.S. ARMY TN THE OC:CVPATfO!\ OF GE ANY 

trol his own zone. On remarks by Montgomery about the difficulties of sorting out 

the tangle created by the war and getting 

the troops into Lheir zones, Zhukov commented blandly thal the war was over and 

he wanted to know l1ow long the redeploymem would lake. When Montgomery estinlat cd U1rcc weeks, Zbukov sai9 that was 

'\·cry sati ;u tory''; in the meantime they 

rould gather their Control Council staffs. 

Si nce Eisenhower's and Montgomery's instrurtions did n<~t allow them to make \0111-

mitments on the withdrawal, the meeting 

ended with only a decision to refer the 

tJUCSI i.on to the l{Ovcrnmcnts.'" 

The Russians ha.ct an elaborate banquet 

planned, but Eisenhower declined to stay, 

the naa~ion having become a contest in 

stuhbornnes.<> on both sides. Shortly after 

six o'dock. Eisenhower and his party, 

whirh included General Clay and U.S. 

Group Control Cow1cil personnel who ba.d 

planned to tay in Berlin, rlcparted. The 

"OMGUS, Hi~tory, Office of Military GovcrnlilCrlt for GcrnHIJiy, ch. III, 11· 2J. 

Russians had given no sign of being willing 

to accommodate Clay and his people i.n 

.Berlin even overnight. 

Summing up his impressions a day later 

in his report to Washington, Eisenhower 

said he believed Lhe Soviet Union would 

join some form of Control Council and 

would allow lhc Western Allie..<;' troop~ to 

take over 1 he it· zones i.n Berlin when the 

withdrawal from the Soviet zone was accomplished. (Zhukov had said at the meeting that he had no objection lo establi ~hing 

the Coni rol Au thority in Berlin.) Eisenhower added, however, that the Control 

Council ('Ould possibly "l)ecome only a negotiating agency and in no sense an overall 

government for Getm<my." To prepare for 

this contingency, he suggested two a lternatives : administering the U.S. znne as an 

independent economic unit or establishing 

three-power c:ontrol in the western zones 

and administering them as a unit.4

" 

"'Daily ntl!c~, Allied Declaration on German 

OcfcM, 6 Jun 4:), iJl OPD. ABC 337, ~cc. 1- D. 
CHAPTER XVI 

Germany in Defeat 

Thr! Cmpet 

Dy V-E Dny the military government 

cnrpct was laid in dimensions larger than 

any plan had contemplated. It stretched 

act•oss the Rhineland ami the Ruhr iuto 

CCIItral Gennnny to the Elhe and the 

Mulde Rivers, into western Czechoslovakia 

Lo Pilzen. and south in10 Austria past Lim~, 

Snl~hurg, and T nn-;bruck. The carpet w<1s 

a thin one, 250 EC D military govemmcm 

ckt~whments and about 200 provi<;ional detachments drawn rrom the combat n·oops.' 

!though the mc,vc:mcnt and the fig hting 

had ended, milit<H)' government command 

was :-:till entirely in tactkal channels- from 

ui\ L'lion to corps to urmy lO army group. 

Fifteenth Army rorwollcd the R hincland. 

On II May, when First rmy became nonopcr'ational, Ninth Army assumed military 

govt:rnment responsibility for the area cast 

nf the Rhine and north of the i\!ain River 

and for the Bremen enclave. Third Army 

hdd northern and eastern Bavati:"l, the 

wc..<.tcrn Sudctcnl.md in Czechoslovakia, 

and a dozen Umclkreise in Austria. Scvcnlh 

i\rmy straddled holf of Bavaria (indttding 

Muuich, the n1pital), Wuerttemberg1 and 

Baden. H eadquarter'S, 12th Arm)' Cr·o~rp, 

took command of S<:vrmh Army on 16 

May and thcr('with became responfliblc for 

military government in nil U.S. ~orcupicd 

Gcr111any. 

1 Memo, Hqs, P.TOUSA, ACofS G- 5, for CofS, 

sub: Personnel Retruircmcnts (no date], in USFET 

scs 200.3. 

The U.S. Croup Comrol Council, resigned tC) a delayed cnu·>' into Berlin, enjoyed an advancement from the rearward 

ranks of S H.\EF i\lain, at Versailles, to 

a spearhead position with SH AEF Forward, in Frankfurt. When SHJ\EF for· 

ward op(:ncd in the l.G. l<'arbcn building 

in Frankfurt after V- E Day, the U.S. 

Gmup ( :omml Council set itself up in a 

Farbcn plant iu nearby Hocchst. H oechst, 

a Fnrhcn c'CHilpany town, w;ls ideally suited 

to a militarr occupation. The houses had 

been dcsi~ncd for assign rncnl to Farhen 

employees accordi ng to rank. Headquarters, EC,\0, rnovcd from Troycs to Bad 

H omburg, ten miles northwest of Frankfurt, and sclllcd into a collection of resort 

hotels spn•·cd from the bombing because 

they had been used as hospitals during the 

war. 

The E detachments, a fter their long 

winter's wait, were in Gctmany and working, though not yet e.xcrciqing the regional 

upervision for whic·h they had been designed. Sonw detachmenL~, like E 1 C:3 

(Land Wucrttcml1crg) and E2C2 ( Land 

Bremen ;uHl the enclave), had entered their 

areas in April nol far behind the combat 

troop!'. Others, like E 1 F3 ( l.a11d Bavaria ), 

took up their stations after V- E Day. All 

had problems, among which inadequate 

personnel in numbers Md in specialized 

skills- wns the most com111on. The Land 

detachment commandet·s lcnmed, as CoL 

Cha.t'le.~ E. Keegan did when he t·ook E1f3 

into Munich on I 4 May, lhtll the govern-
:no THE U.S. \R~IY lX THE OC:CLIP:\TIO:'\ OF GER~IAKY 

mcnt.o~ they had come to supervise were 

pr<\tlic:tll y nonexislenl. Tn Munich, the 

government building:< wcr·c b:11Jiy dam-

·l)'.:'cd; lhc mantstrics had cilhcr been 

bombed out or evacuated; lh<· Rl·ichsslattlwlter (head of government \Jndct the 

Nnzis) had reportedly been kidnapped hy 

the SS; :tnd, for lhe near fuwrc :\l lc:-tst, 

the Seventh Anny- Third Anny boundary 

rutting through Bavaria was more important than tile Land politir:tl ou ndaries.~ 

Col. ilion C. Welker, commanding E2C2, 

had a tight, if entirely artilidal, nrc~\ in the 

Bremen cndave, hut he shared it with two 

flHljor generals, one comma11ding iH~ 29th 

Infuntry Division, the other the Bremen 

PMl Command. a 

Military government operation:., with 

few cxecptions, were being rondu1 tcd as 

they had been during the combat phase, 

hy the !oral detachments under the supervision of the tactical commands and sometimes in competition with the sct·uri ty 

troops. ;\rnong the exceptions, E I F3, as 

OflC of its first acts, appointed a German 

food and agriculture administrator for 

Bavnria, thereby recognizing a regional 

prohlcm though by no means sc)lving it. In 

two directive'> affecting the entire U.S.-

IWrupiccl area, 12th Arm)' Group tuth

rizcd the a·eunifom1ing of the German 

polire and the reopening of lower courts. 

The poli<:<:, in old W ehrmndtl 11niforms 

dyed some color other than fidd gray, 

r<ndd not he armed but conl<l cany ni.ghtstirks. The courts were to nHtk<· a beginning 

nt dcnring up lhe backlog of ordinary civil 

and n iminal cases accumulated before lhc 

surrender, provided judges and lawyers 

• wk Rpt, Oct EIF3, 21 May 45, in SHAEF 

G-5, 17.16, Hist Rpu, 12th ACp, J nekct 14. • Functional Histol'y of Milit:~ry Covemmcnt, 

27 Aptil 19·t5- 30 June 1946, Brcmc•l Pnclnvc, 

in OMCUS 39- 3/5, p. 7f. 

could he found. :\1 least 80 percent of the 

members o( the legal profession had hrcn 

Nazis. Twcnly fiv~ Gennan cout'tS wr.tc 

operating b)' 1 be end of ~lay. The opening 

of the German <:ourts did not affect the 

jurisd iction ci milil:ll')' government courts, 

which had tried 16,000 cases hy V -f, Day, 

70 perrrnt 011 <'\trfe\11 :~ncl rirrulntion 

charges.' 

\&A was one of the first military 

government functions to be centrally coordinated . Because of the shortage of personnel, it'> functions had not been delegated 

to lower staffs to the c.xtent others had ; 

moreover, it had become the trustee for a 

greater quantity of art treasures than had 

ever been raptured hy any other army in 

history. At the time of the surrender, al· 

though they did not know it yet, the U.S. 

annies held the contents of all the major 

Getman nr•t a•cpositor·ics except the H:unl>urg museums nnd, apparently, nearly all 

the an wotk the Nazis had looted in the 

~ountric.c; occupied hy Germt~ny. The 

march into the south had uncovered dozens 

of rache.o;, 11moug them Einsalzstnb Rosenberg loot at Ncuschwanstein, the Rothschild collections at Herrenchiemsec, Nazi 

Foreign Minister j oa<'him von Ribhcntrop's rollcction at Gaihacb, and, in Austria., mines at Laufcn and Alt Aussce- thc 

hrsl mine t·onraining the collections of the 

Vienna l\' ttnsl Mstorisr.hesmuseum, and tl1<' 

other bolclinl{ the best of the Ei11.wtzstab 

Rosenberg lo<>t, probably intended originally for the great museum Hitler had 

planned to build in his hometO\vn, Linz. 

ln neighboring salt mines at Hcilbronn 

and Kochendor(, Seventh Army made finds 

that rivakd \hose of Third Army at Merk-

' ( I ) Hq>, 12th ACp, Legal Br, to ACofS 0 - 5, 

sub: Branch Activities, t8 Jun 15, in SHAEf 

C-5, 17. 16, Jacket II. (2) General Board, Study 

No. 85, r>· 32. 
GERMANY IN DEFEAT 271 

Gr::RMANS Q urw E U P for mformation and ndVIce at a military government detachment headquarters. 

ers. When the MFA&A officer, Lt. Jame~ 

J. Rorimer, went into the mines in late 

.\pril, he saw, in cavernous gallerie~ 700 

feet below the surface where the temperature never varied from 67° Fahrenheit in 

winter or in summer, thousands of paintings and works of sculpture, millions of 

books, all the stained ghtss from the Strassburg Cathedral, the crown jewels and throne 

of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and, in addition, an I. G. Farl>cn poison gas factory, 

a Heinkel jet plane factory, locomotives, 

fireworks, and stores of oil and aluminum. 

On into June, depositories came to light 

almost daily. By the end of the month , the 

number reported to Headquarters, 12th 

Army Group, came to 849. The l\ilf A&A 

job was to locate the caches, identily their 

corllents, check on their condition, and see 

to their preservMion and s<Lfckeeping. The 

12th Army Group established collecting 

points at Marburg, Wicsbadcn, and 

Munich; hut getting the objects to these 

point~ was a massive undertaking. J'v(aj. 

Louis 13. LaFarge estimated that just moving the contents of the Alt Aussce mine to 
272 THE U.S. ARMY l N THE OCCUPATION OF GERt-.11ANY 

:Munich would ta ke the sixteen tmcks a t 

his disposal ix weeks." 

Organiza tionally, military government 

was most advanced jn the a rea longest occupied, the Rhineland. After the Ruhr 

pocket coiJa psed in mid-April, Fifteenth 

Army converted itself into a predominantly 

military government headquarters by assigning military government functions to 

all its stafT sections-religion and welfa re 

lo G- J, public safety and censorship to 

G-2, finance to the inspector· general, and 

so on. The a rmy's two corps, XXli and 

XXIll Corps, took over subareas-XXII 

Corps in the Duesseldorf- Aachen- Cologne 

districts, and XXI fi Corps from Trier and 

Koblcnz south . Early in May, !he army 

brought in Detachments E1A2 and E1G2 

to organize Ger•rnan provincial and district 

governments and at the middle of the 

month installed Dr. Hans Fuchs as head 

of the Germnn administration for the entire 

Fifteenth Army atea, then designated as 

t.hc Rhine Province Military District. For 

a brief time Fuchs became the highest 

ranking German oflicial in the western 

zones ( his province was soon to be divided 

bet ween the British and Fren ch zones). 

Fi11ding men for the higher posts who 

had no Nazi involvement was an a rduous 

business. fuchs had held a similar position 

under the U.S. t\rmy of occupation after 

World W a r I and had been president of 

the Prussian Rheinprouinz under the 

Weimar Republic; he had been in forced 

rct1rcment during the twelve years of the 

NRzi regime and was seventy years llld." 

"( 1) SHAF.F, MFA&A, to ACofS G- 5, sub: 

Report of MFA&A. 9 ] u1 1f5, in SHAEF G-5, 

J:l(l.21. (2) Hqs, 12th 1\\.p, ACofS \.- !i, s~ 1b ; 

Na rr:uivc Summnry, .Tun -1-5, 9 Ju l 45, .ill SHAEF 

G-5, 17.16, .Jackel 1:1. (3 ) History of Military 

Gove rnment in l. fmrl Wt>CI"llemberg-8adcn, vol. 

1, ch. IX, sec. 111 , 

• Hisl Rpt., 12th AGp, ACofS G-5, M ay •f5, 

29 Juu 15, in SHAEF G 5, 17.25, jacket S. 

The other appointees were, like Fur hs, men 

who had not worked under lhe Nazis at 

all or, if they bad, had held much lower 

ranks. Some were women, for whom the 

Nazi discrimination against their sex was 

proving an advantage under the occupation. The search {or canilidates had required the combined efforts of rnilil<try 

government and the Counterin telligen ce 

Corps ( C JC ), and a t the end of May some 

positions. were still unfilled. At Coblenz, the 

hunt had not yet turned up enough qualified persons to begin esta blL<;hing a district 

administration.' The recruiters had not 

only to weed out Nazis hut also to steer 

clear of overinvolvement wilh other political factions. They found it especially hard 

to determine when Catholic priests we re 

making recommendations "as public-spirited gentlemen of the dergy" and when as 

" leaders of the Center [CatJ1olic] Party 

seeking post'> for their candidates."" 

F our da)'S after the surrender, EiscnhQwer reminded the am1y group commandeJs that the purpose of military 

government was to control German government~ ! a uthorities, not to govern- if for 

no orher rca.c;on, because the military forces 

themselves could not provide the manpower to nm the government under any 

t ircumstances. H e instructed the rommanders. to relax the circ\JJation and travel 

restrictions enough to allow German officials to function beyond the local level ( Fifteenth Army had reopened the intercity 

telephone system in the Rhineland for its 

German offi cials), and to put .in the E detflrhmcnts at once with the mission to recstahli!sh German administrative machinery 

' Hist Rpt, XX Ill Corps, I 0-2:l May 1·5, in 

)L'{IlT Co p~, 223- 0.3. 

' H ist Rpt. 12th AGp, ACofS G-5, May 15, 

2!1 Jun 4 5, in SHAEF G- 5, 17.251 Jacket 3. 
GER~l 'Y IN DEFEAT 

at tht: regional level" By the end r)( the 

monc h 1 he E detachments a rrived cast of 

the Rhine: :rnd began to organize Gcnnan 

administrations up to the Land level. 

But Eisr:nhower's instrurtions did not 

afTcct the ,;o-rallcd tactical theory of militar·y ~rwcr umcnt that SHE F G- 5 had 

critichwd in the field urvcy in March. 

Fro111 wp w houom in the SliE.\F-occupicd :\l'cn, milit<1.ry government remained 

tight!)• locked into the tactir:tl ronmumd 

hann ~. This arrangement meant that, cxrcpt in the Rhineland where Fifteenth 

Army had as.o;UJncd the char·aclcristics of 

a ruilitary government staff, milillu·y govCt'llnH'nt nnd the German admi11istrations 

had lO f llllt'tion Within unit boundaries, not 

German politiral undari~, and that 

down <lt lc<L"l to the regiment and battalion 

level, tnr·ti<'nl r·ommanders had morr military ~ovcrnrnent authority than any military government detachment. Thr E 

dcttlr.hrncnts ronld organize Gc·rman administrations, but the ehanrcs of their authority, to say nothing of the German 

o!Tid:tl!i' authority, reaching nc:ros..<; the ncar-

.c~ t rorp.'l boundary were not good. i\1-

thou~h. with the wa r over, units no longer 

were ron!ltantly on the mow, 1 hey .cnm 

moved frcqucml)' and cultivated their own, 

~om rtinw.s idiosyncratjc, conecpts of military govcrnmcnL 

For thci•· own reac;ons, the tactical command~'!, from the army groups on down, 

were also finding fault with the " ta<:tical 

theory." ' l'hc 12th Army Group complained in April and agnin in May that 

itli rc~ponsihililics exceeded its resources, 

particularlr in matters that reached beyond 

even its f.rrflung boundaries, sucb as produrtion control, operation of the railroads, 

and nmintcuan rc o£ the electrk power sys-

' Msg, SCAEF to CG's 21, 6, and 12 ACps, 

1 1 Mny 1·5, in SHAEF C- 5, f.IO:l, .J :.H:kct :1. 

273 

tem.' 11 XV Corps protested thlll the plans 

had never <'ailed for torps to conduct regional militar·y government. Its three-offi cer 

G- 5 section was rc~s pon ibl e for supervising 

twenty Landkreise and two Stadtkreise in 

southern Bavaria and in Austria, and all 

the regional adtnini~>l ative centers for these 

f{reise W<'rc outside the corps bounclarics. 11 

On Lhe other hand, at the top, the reason · 

for having f)\ll militnry government in llw 

tactical r hnnncls in the first place seemed 

not to ha\'C lost their force. Late in May, 

Hilldring told Clay to watch military government: "Tltc G- 5 IJoys have a tendency 

to fall umln· Bf'iti h influence in setting 

up ... on what they call a lerritorial 

basi·. but whi<'h really means outsidr 

normal milit•u·y channels. \Vhatever the 

theoretical justification, if in practice the 

military governmctJt officer (a lt. col. ) il

ting in the same town as a division commander (maj. g<:n.) is independent, God help 

the lt. col. and you r milit ary govemmcnt.''11 

Thl' Country 

Whatever ri!(C the defeat may hnvc 

meant to the rm ~, it mcam that thty 

were goiJig lo go hungry, probably ror· a 

long time ; and thcr were hungry already. 

The SH AEF maximum daily ration for 

nonnal C'O Ru mcr~ was I ,550 calories, but 

the unt~< actually being issued ranged 

from 804 cnlorics in Hesse and Hcsse-N::tssau to l, 150 calories in parts of the Rhineland. The normal I'Onsumers were the m·w 

•• Hist Rpt, 16h ACp, ACofS G-5, Mny ••5, 

in SHAEF G- 5, 504 . (2l Memo, Hqs, l 21h ACp, 

Col W. A. Dniley, for CofS, sub: Qnc rion~ 10 

be Disnused "i1J1 SHAEF, 27 Apr 45, in USFF.T 

scs :l22. 

"Memo, lt ~. XV Corps, G-5, for CC, suh : 

Military Govcrnmenr Opcrnlions, 20 M:~y 45, in 

XV Corp~, 21.1 5.a. 

'' I.1r, Hllloring to Clny, 21 May <15, i1r OMOUS 

177- 1/3. 
274 THE U.S .. \IUfY (;'\; THE OCCU'f>.\TlOK OF CERJ\L\!\Y 

pr et~ ri:!t or !lie oc·r upntion. The gcnt•'Y 

wer e tl1l: "hcnvy·· <tnd .. very heavy" workers, r:tilruad wc rk ers and miners for instance, who cuuld get ttp to 2,800 calories. 

The out-and-nut nrisloiTa ts were the selfsuppUers, thnt ~, the fa rmers, who did not 

have to truuiJle themselves with ration 

r arcls. The normal r.onsumcr was not slatving, lmt if he sulJsistec.l entirely on his r·aLiun, which no one really expected him to 

do, he was vcr)' close. to it. l\ typical week's 

ration issued dming May of 1945 consisted 

of the following : bread, 3 pounds; meal, 

4· ounces; butter and fat, 2 ounces; sugar, 

7 oun ces; marraroni }lltd spaghetti, 5 Ottnces; 

potatoe-;, 6 pounds; some crreal :-~del d to 

the children 's ratiou ), 6 ounces; milk (only 

for children ttp lo six ), l quart. The lotal 

was le<..-> than 1 ,000 ralories per day. and 

the difference \vas mack ''P lly n,clding ,, 

few 0\ln <.'es of green veg<'lahlr.s " rrovidcd 

trucks can he found lO haul them and provided the people r an eat rhubarb without 

suga r.' '' a 

The 6th and 12th t\rmy Grottp swvcys 

indicated that there might he enough food 

in Germa ny lo feed the Gcnnnns until the 

next ha1vest at the existing r<~ti n scales, 

if the necessit y fnr feeding large number1; 

of displac:cd persons and disarmed Cerm:=tn 

troops did not h t-'>1. too long into the summer. The spt·ing planting for I l45 wns 

abou1 90 percent of rm tl. hut it h:=td 

been done lnte :md the rcsulls were doubtful. 1\[ilitmy government had helped. 

XXTTT Corps distributed I 0,000 lOllS of 

seed t<~tors in its area. Fifteenth Army 

secured I 0,000 tolls of German anti 2,000 

" ( I ) Hqs, 12th AGp, l .cgal Br, to ACofS G- 5: 

snb : Branch iv iti~s, Ill ]1111 '15, in SHI\EF 

C-5, 17.16, J:~ ct II. (2) Hh lnf~~rmati n :wrJ 

Historical Servict>, suh: Food and ri ulture, 

XXIII Corps Area, 1·1 J une •1·5, in Jliftc•cttth Army, 

11 5- 2. 

IC>n" of imported far111 and ganle n seeds, 

most of t hem tr:tnspot'ted in Amty trucks. 

J\ I ilitary government set 11p farm nmrhincry and automotive repair shops in the 

Lrnulkreise. The shops r ould make one 

usable lru<:k o 11! of two Ot' three wrecks. 

In the towns and cities, mili tary government wo rked to protect the food resources 

of 1 he people <lnd to gel 1 he proccs.')ing 

plants running again. In Erlangcn , the detal'hment allowed Germans whose houses 

had been requisitioned as troop billets to 

have C~ to their g<1rdcns. In Anshach, 

the detar ltment dislrilllll ed garden seed. By 

!he ettd of t-.la y, mills in Freising were producing 20 tons of Aour a day for Municb, 

aucl a creamery was proce.<;sing 50,000 

qu rt~ of milk. Tn June XXI 11 Corps 

listed sail, nom , meals, rere<ds, potatoes, 

nnd bread ns 110l lo he requisitioned from 

the Gct1ntms for feeding displaced persons. 

Third ,\r111 y, by using central repair and 

strict surveillanee, taiscd the number of 

vehides· available for civilian transpot'l in 

its :trca from 7,500 in J\!lay to 25)000 tn 

June.' ' 

SH.\E.F G- 5's estimate of the German 

food situation was, if anything, more pe.c; .,imistic tha n that of the army groups. It prcdi d sporadic' starvation in mban areas 

before the harvest nnless food was imported. The most obvi ous rca~o n for this 

prediction was that not•tmtlly the SHAEF 

at·ca was only 60 to 70 pcl"cent :;;clf-s\tfficient. Thf' difference had come from im-

" ( I I llqs, 12 th AGp, Legal Br, to ACofS G-5, 

suh : Bra•1ch A<·tivitics, 16 ]1111 ·15, in SHAEF 

C: -'i, 17. 16, .Jackr.t 11. (2) Hist Rpt, 6th AGp, 

AC:ofS C- 5, lvlay 45, in SHAF.F G-5, 5-4. 

(:-!) Hist Rpt , Third Aml)', ACofS G-5, May- .fun 

45, itl ETOUSA, Admin Hist, Nr. l•Hi. (4) Hist 

Rpt, Fih<>rnth Army, AC:ofS G- 5, Apr +5, in 

SHAEF G - 5, 17.25, Jackl'l l. (5) M< mo, Hqs, 

XXIII Corps, for CC, S11h-Area~, suh : Feeding 

of DPs, 2 6 ]1111 •1·5, in XXflT Corps, 223-0.3. 
GER~li\NY £N DEFEAT 

port~ and from eastern Germany, now irl 

Soviet hands. The wesl·crn sections that had 

produced some surpluses, Bavaria and 

Srhle.o:;wig- H olstein for instance, were having tel feed popu la tions swollen by refugee<;. 

The ])ig it y popu la tions were often ha lf 

of nonnn 1, but I he rural towns and villages 

had as much as two a nd a half times the 

u:iua l numhe1' of people. Furthermore, the 

freeing of tl1c displaced perw ns had cut the 

farm labor force in half; the bombing h::td 

dr.stroyed processing machinery and impaired the <.listrilJUtion sy·tcm; and era ~e 

of the homhing, which had prevented the 

ca);t-wcsl movement of g rain dur·ing l he 

past w inl el', western Germany had begun 

the year with a food shortage. SHAEF's 

program was to Cll('Otll'<tge agrir uhurc to 

the utmost- one of the few a reas in which 

the Germans would be given Allied encouragement. SHAEf td grt~ nl d permi:::.sion 

to re-;tart the agricultural machinCf)', fertilizer, and insecLicidc indu. tries; and 12th 

Army Group had released 237,000 prisoners of war a!; Ltrm la l10r hy 1 June and 

would release over 200,000 more la ter in 

tht rnontlt. Whether the effort would suereed was clouhtfu l. "' H owever, the G e•·-

mans would have to be fed. As General 

Steams, ETOUSA G- 5, sa id, " While we 

can say they brought it on themselves a nd 

to hell with them, the fact remains that 

the Supreme Commtlnder, who will be 

Military Governor of Germany, will he 

forced hy public opinion at home t·o take 

at least minimum steps to prevent starvation."'" Although the decision was not an 

easy one- all of Europe was short on 

•• SHAEF, 1\CofS C - 5, Weekly Jo11rna l of T nfortnation, No. 15, 16 j11n •15, in SHAF.f' G- !i, I:H.I l. 

"' Hqs, C:om Zone, ETO, Comm;1nd and General 

StnfT Confc:rc1H:c, ·I May •15, in ETOUSA, Admin 

1ri~l Collection, Nr. l•lli. 

275 

fuocl- $HAEF J, c~an importing 650,000 

tons of wheat for Germany in J unc. t; 

Competing with the food shortage fo r 

the status of number-one rri~ s was the '>tate 

of German coal production. ln May, a 

group of U.S. nnd British expert., the Potlc..-- H ynclley Mission , s urveyed the European coal rcquircmenL'\ and cmwluded, 

"Unlcs.-; drastic steps are taken, there will 

ocf'ur in Northwest Ettropf' and t he kditc rrancan next winter a coal famine of such 

severity <ts to destroy all semblance of law 

a nd order, and thu!> delay any ch nncc of 

reasonable stability."'' This ch illin~ prediction cx tingoil'ihctl whalcver life was left in 

the l'vlorgcn tha u Pl an's proposal for closin~ 

the German mine.<;; hut the outlook for 

Germanv a~ dark nevertheless. The anticipated r~a l deficit for nonhwest Europe exduding Germnny in the year rrom J une 

1945 lo June 1946 was 25 million tons, 

unless m a l could he gotten from P ola nd, 

\·vhich w<ls highly unlikely, from the United 

State.", which would requir·c four hllndrcd 

16,000-tnn shi ps full t·ime a nd so """s impossible, or from Germa11y. The PolterH ynd ley Mi~s on rcrommcnded taking coal 

from Germany "without any regard for the 

conseque nces to Gcr·many." The question 

was, the mission report eonecdcd , whether 

German production could be raised lo a nywhere near 25 million lons. Either way, the 

Gcrn1ans would suO'er. 1\t the time, production '"as :·W,OOO tons a d;ty, 3 percent of 

no rma l, and 2<},000 of these tons were 

being used to run the mines. 'The mines had 

over 5 million tons on hnnd but on ly enoug h 

" (I) SHAEF, J\CofS G-5, Weeki)' J ournal of 

Lllformation, No. 15, lfi Jun ·15, in SHAEF G-5, 

13 1.11. (2) Ilqs, Com Zom·, ETO, Command 

;~ud General Staff Confcrcm:e, :~ 1 j ut 45, in 

F.TOUSA, Admin Hist Collection, Nr. 146. 

" R cpor1 hy tht· Pottcr-llyndlcy ·Mission, 7 Jun 

15, in USFE'J' SGS 1Hi:l.:l, vol. I. 
276 TilE U.S . . \lU\IY l:\ 'J'HE OCCUP.\TTO!\ OF GElUIA1'\\' 

I rnnspon to nwvc- 19,000 tons n day. 1

" A 

J\E F solid fuels confcren('e in April had 

estimated 12th :\n11)' Group's ronl requirements nlone ~t 200,000 tons a monLh. ~'l Not 

much wns going to he left for rhc Germans, who wen: dependent on coal for 

heating, clectritity, railroads, food proces.sing, and even running water. T n Wieshadtn, military government Look coal from 

the gal\ \vor·ks and scraped the coa l dealers' 

bins to geuerate enough electricity to keep 

the city water system workjng. By [he end 

of April, pradically the whole power grid 

south of the Ma in River could have been 

operating had there been coal, lmt the railroad freight service had to be restored in 

order to bring in the coal, and it wo11ld need 

t·oaJ itself. Thr miners had to be fed much 

more than the average 1,0.00 calories a day 

if they were to do their work; and even 

if they dug the coal, Germany would have 

last daim on it. If the coal famine was 

going to result in acute unrest somewhere, 

llt.e P ottcr- H yudlcy Mission preferred to 

see it in German)' and said so in its report: 

"Siroultl it become necessary to preserve 

order h)' shooting, it would surely be better for this to occ-ur in Germany than 

elsewhere."" 

hr the midst of shortages the Germans 

were rolling in money. I n May, 3,000 

bunks were open in lhe 12th Army Group 

area, and they bad a total 3 Lillian Reichsmmks on deposiL. Deposits exceeded withdrawals by so much that the banks were 

in trouble ; LhC)' had no place to invest. In 

military gov~rnment r.ourts, the defendant 

who rould not pay a thousand-mark fine 

out of his pocket was rare. Everybody had 

" Ibid . 

'" Hist l~pt, 12th 1\Gp, ACofS G-5, Apr 15, 

in SIIAEF G- 5, 17. 16, Jacket lll. 

"Donnison, Cir•i/ Affuirs ((Tid Military COIIBI'II· 

men/, Northw~sl Ertrope, p. 't05. 

money from high wartime wages and from 

c.:omp~nsation for bomb damage. The Nn~i 

government, to sustain morale, had paid 

homh damage claims promptly and without many questions asked. As the owners 

of the German 450-billion-mark war debt, 

however, the banks and the people were 

bankrupt. Jn April, th~ mark had sold (in 

Spain) for 4 :! cents. SHA EF maintained 

an exchange rate of ten to the dollar for 

th~ Allied military marks when t.hey were 

exchanged by u.s. personnel, and none for 

Reicltmwrks. What value the Reiclwnark 

had was derived from its being an·eptcd 

in payment of fines and taxes and for rationed goods. For the purchase of such goods 

its value was about 30 cents, maintained 

l1y government subsidies to the producers, 

whose r·eluctance to accept the money even 

with the subsidies was increasing and, no 

doubt, c.:o ntrihuted to ortages ~" 

One direction, other than agriculture, in 

which mjlitary government was willing to 

give the Germans encouragement and assistance was education. Some military government officers believed the schools ought to 

be left closed and the Germans kept in 

ignorance-; but the predominant opiniou 

was that properly regulated instruction of 

c:hildren would be the best foundation for 

the future. Schools were also a means for 

preventing juvenile delinquency whil'h, as 

the threat of active German resistance 

faded, became one of the ('hicf public safery 

concerns of military government. In May 

1945, all the schools were clo~ed; some had 

'' ( I } Hqs, 12th AGp, Legal Dr, to ACorS C-5, 

suh: Branch Activities, IH Jun •15, in SHAEF 

G-5, 17. 16, Jacket l I. (2) Hqs, Fifteenth Army, 

ACofS G-5, CA & MG S11rl1marics, No. I, 2; 

and 96, J I May-4 Jnn 1·5, in SHAEF G-5, 17.25, 

Jacket 6. (3) U .S. Sc11atc, Specinl Committee Investigaling the National Defense Program, 1-i:'<ct:utive Session Testimony, 5 Apr 46, in OMGUS 

177- l/3. 
GERr.t,\ NY ~ DEFE.\'1 

alrcatl) been dosc:d for scvcml months and 

;;;nme, li ke tlw:;e at t\achcn, sin('e. September 1944. In the defeated country, abo ttl 

all the children had in ~tbund aucc were 

temptations. Before the surrender, military 

government had picked up reports of nationally organized adolesrcnl gangs going 

by c;urh names as Snake Club, Red X, and 

Edelweisspiraten. Their acltvtttes had 

ranged from listening to swing mu~ic and 

we~u in!{ zoot suits, to laughing and applauding ,in the wrong place.~ at Hitler 

Youth meetings, to draft dodging and petty 

gangsterism. They were likely to f-ind new 

things to do and many rcrruirs if the occupation left the children unsupervised. 

Likt~ everything else irl postsurrencler 

Germany, reopeniug the sch ools was not 

easy. SH AEJI required that before they 

could be opened, suitable buildings had to 

he readied, non-Nazi teachers certified, and 

new textbooks printed. Many sC'hool buildings had heen destroyed, and those 1 hat had 

not wac nearly all being used as DP 

camps, troop billet~, or hospitals. ·Many 

teachers could not survive the first hurdle, 

the denazification Fuzgebogeu. None of Lhe 

old textbooks were ronsidered suitable, and 

just lo reopen the first four grades in Lhe 

12th ;\rmy Group area would require 

printing six-and-a-q uarter-million new 

textbooks. Since it was not difficulL to 

imagine the publicity efrects of slips in the 

textbooks or the appointment of a few stray 

teachers with questionable political antecedents, military government would have to 

provide intensive ~> uper , which it was 

110t ready to do. The E detachments had 

spaces for three eduration officers in their 

tables of organization and the F detachments spaces for two; in Ma y, however, 

only one E detachment and no F detachment had an officer who carried educ:ation 

as his first assignment. During the war, the 

277 

cdttC:;)til)n omcer's sole fllnt tion hncl been 

to dose' Lhc schools, and this t<l'>k did not 

require a fuii Lime educaLional spec-ialist. 

In Aac:hen, Fl G2 had heen working 

sin re earl y in the year getting ready to reopen the sc oo . The detachment had 

plates for new textbooks made in England. 

The first set of pla tes disappeared on the 

way from London to Paris, and a second 

!-:Cl had to be nt ade. In April, 40,000 ~exthooks were printed. By .May, FIG2 had 

found a superintendent of schools who had 

not been a member of the Nazi party, bcc.;ause he was half J ewish, aud twenty-six 

teachers, twenty-four of whom were 

women in their forties and fifties who had 

been housewives during the Nazi period 

and so escaped party involvement. Finally, 

on 4 June, grades one lo four in Aachen, 

with a thousand students, became the first 

to reopen in postwar rman a 

"The Nazi Party," 12lh rmy Group 

G-5 reported in Lhe third week of June, 

"seems almost to have vanished from th.: 

earth "~ ' This was almost literall y true. The 

Army security service.~ were arresting the 

most prominent and dangerous Nazis by 

the Lhousancls. At the end of June, 50,000 

were in jails and catups. The arrests of the 

Doenilz government and of Goering anJ 

other prominent Nazis in southern Bavaria 

filled up the detention center known as 

AsHc,,N, which had moved from Spa to 

Monclorf Les Bains in Luxembourg. Mililary government, working LO bt'ing new 

people to the fore, installed its appointees 

n ( I ) H<1s, ECAD, <icncrnl Intelligence Bulletin 

No. 40, 2•1- Mar 45, iu SHAEP G- 5, 17.1(), pt, 

I, J acket 8. (2 ) Hist Rpts, Hqs, 12th AGp, ACo!S 

0 - 5, Apr, Ma)•, Jun 45, in SHAEF G- 5, 17. I G, 

J ackets 10 a nd II. (3 ) H ist 'Rpr, Hqs, Fiiteenlh 

Army, ACofS G- 5, ] 11n ~5, in SHAEF G-5, 17 .25. 

q~, 12th AGp, Legal Br, to ACofS G--5, 

suiJ: Branch Ar.tivities, ttl Jun •15, in SHAEF 

G- 5, 17, 16, Jacket I L 
278 THE U.S. t\R~ Y IN THE OCCUP1\TION OF GE.RJ\lAJ\'Y 

with much ceremony and ;til the trappings 

of oflicc. J ts star wM Dr. Konrad Adenaucr who, after he openly assumed office 

as Oberbuergermeistcr of Cologne, quickly 

became the most prominent and most popul<lr politira l fi gure in the Rhineland. On 

31 May, military government pem1ittcd 

Corpus Chr·isti Day celebrations and parades in Cat holic communities; and the 

local officials attended, something the 

people had not seen in the twelve years of 

Nazi rule. ,\!though the Nazis were no 

longer a d~1ngcr, they could still he an embarrassment. AsHCAN was in a ninetyroom resort hotel outside Mondorf. The 

furniture had been taken out. Each room 

had one canvas cot with two blankets and 

no pillow, one straight-hack chair, and wire 

netting across all the windows- more to 

keel? the prisoners from jumping than to 

prevent their escape. They a te prisoner of 

war r11tions, usuall)• C and K rations. Although ASHCAN was secret, a SHAEF 

inspector who visited it in the second week 

of May, while the Goering fraternization 

incidcrn was prominent in the U.S. press, 

recommended moving it. The out-;ide appearance was too sumptuous, and he 

shuddered at the thought of what some 

newspaper reporter might make of the 
GEIUl.\:\Y 1:'\: DEFE.\T 

name "Palace.-'' r hisclcd in stone in eighteeninch-high letters over the entrance. z' 

o11~ing theJlllielves looked like a hopeIt ~<;." job ror the Germans. The trotJps and 

the displt1cccl persons always had first 

rhoirc. and lhc population was totally out 

of joint. So\lthern Bavaria, which had hccn 

a (avoritt· refuge from the bombing, had 

LUI estimated two and a half million people 

mut·c than its normal population. Ahout 

half of an estimated seven ntillion refugees 

who had escaped from eastern Germany 

ahead of the Soviet winter offensive were 

ill 11 \Ef' territory. Undamaged lOWns 

nnd dtics had a third to a half :1g:1in as 

many people as nom1al. In the heavily 

))omh<·d big cities the populations were inncasing- in Cologne, for in~tancc, at a 

mtc of 2,000 people a day during Mayhut the ritics could not ac:commodmc an 

their former residents and were beginning 

to discourage the return of those who did 

110t hnve needed skills or assured places to 

liv<:. Military govenunenl did not regard 

where or how the Germans lived :!IS its 

conccm, :-t lthough it provided some it1di1·ect 

rdid by tiloving the newly arriving Sudeten t•cf ugcc...-; out of overcrowded B<IV<Iria 

and lw t;rcve.nting residents nf the nrca that 

wo11ld he handed over to the Rus.~iaus from 

moving west. The worst consequence of 

unsettlement and overcrowding, :t typhus 

cpiclcmk, did not materialize. Serious outbreaks in 1 he c:onccntration rnmp!!- over 

fom t·houllnnd ca:;es in Dar hau alone- led 

12th i\nl'ly Group to send out typhu<;-findn (I I f-l qs, USFET, suh: U .S. Security St:;trch 

for Nn7.is, II Jul -15, in Admin llht, F:TOUSA, 

No. 155 (2\ llqs, Fiftel'rllh Atmy, ACofS G- 5, 

CA & l\tC Summary No. 96, II M.ry ·~5, in 

SllABf' C !i, Jacket :i. (3 ) War Diar)•, Det II A2, 

May ·15, in SHAEF G-5, 17 .25, Jarkel 5. 

(·1) Memo, SHAEF G- 5 Forward for ACofS G-'1, 

~u >: lmpc1:tion of As n c A:o:, l.'t May ·l!i. in 

SIIAEF G 2, :\B:-1.6-4. 

2n1 

ing teams :tttd dusting teams. By the end 

of Mhy thC)' h.Ld clrlnuscd a million persons 

and had usr.d fifteen tons of DDT, and rcpor·ts of new l:ascs had decreased. Tuberculosis and vcnercn l disease.~. however, were 

on the rise.~ ~ 

The wm·st otT of the Germans were the 

refugees who had no home.<> to return to 

and the nm<;l pitiable were the children 

who had been cvnnmtcd from the bombed 

dtie.o;. T he refugees were con!'igned indefinitely to living on the r harity of communitie.'\ in which tlrcy were, to say I he 

least, lrnwclcornr.. The children, who had 

been kept in <:amps in isolated spots, wer·c 

liOmetimc.-, found abandoned and hun ·~·· 

Although milit:try government did not provide relief for German refugee<;. at this 

stage not even for· st:uving children, it did 

compel the frequently reluctant local Getman govemmcntll to assume responsibility 

for them. The military government detachment in Londkrcis Eher-sberg southeast of 

lv!unicb ncquin:d an unusual brood, 200 

hal)ies, all less than lhrec months old, in 

the Heinl Ho1'11lnncl, an SS Lcbensboru 

establishment h,trracks. In the hnrnwk~ 

were ~~ hundt•c(J women, "all attrartivc, 

perfect phrsi< ,,( spc<·inwns,'' blood-typed in 

the SS a~hion~ nnd some pregnant. The 

babies, offspring of women Jjke these <tlld 

SS fathe1:, had been destined lo hc1'0me 

t hildren of the tntc. ~' 

Understanding the Germans wns not 

easy. Military govrrnmcnt seemed to have 

the strongest popular support in the pl::ttCS 

,. ( I) llqs, 12th ACp, l.cglll Br, to ACofS G- 5. 

suh: Ur:wch Acrivltre.,, 18 Jun 45, in SIIARF 

G- 5, I 7 . 16, J nckc•t II. (:!) Hrts, Fifteenth Army, 

ACofS \. 5, Wl•,.I-.Jy Mili1:1ry Go\'ernrnt·nt Survey 

No. 1, :!l\ M:1y •1'\, in SHAEP C-5, 17.25, JnC"kr.t 

3. (:\) llist Rtll 1 Ort R-261. 26 Jun 46, in 

OMGUS IW :l/ 10, 

" Hist Rpt, Or!t ~·'16 1, :.!~1 Ju n ·Hi, in OMGUS 

77- 2/ 10. 
2fl0 THE U.S .\Ri\lY H\ THE O C:C:UP:\TIO . OF GERi\lANY 

H ovstNC \11/As A PRORLF. M 

where denazification was the most thorough. The commonest complaint against 

denazification was tha t it did nol reach all 

of those who had profited from the N azi 

system and the wa r. Instead of underground politica l a ctivity against the occupation, a kind of bela ted anli-Nazi uprising 

seemed lO he eve pin ' The number of 

persons "willing, even eager,'' to act as informers a~ not entirely a pleasant surprise. 

Milita ry government had expected that the 

" Hqs, J 2th AGp, Legal Br, to ACofS C- 5, 

sub : Bra.nch Activities, 18 Jun 45, in SHAEF 

G- 5, 17. 16, Jackel II. 

displaced persons and those who had 

suffe red under the N azis would wa nt to 

get even, but many Germans with no such 

motives came forward lo denounce their 

neighbors as N azis and " to tell where the 

loot was hidden. ' Rumor-m ongering was 

a nationa l m ania. lVlost of l11e stories concerned wildly oppressive regula tions supposedl y about to be imposed by the Allies, 

an a lleged impending Soviet ta keover of 

western Germany, and an imminent war 

"' Hi t Rrt, 6th AGr , ACofS G- 5, Mar 45, 

in SHAEF G- 5, 50-J.. 
GERMANY IN DEFEAT 

between the Western Allies and the Soviet 

Union. Least understa ndable was the 

people's apparent indifference to the suffering of IJleir JeJiow countrymen, especially 

the stranded refugees and the jail and concentration ramp inmates. [n Bavaria in 

M <t)', a few Catholic priests were the only 

ones doing welfare work among the refugees. Up lO the. end of the first week in 

May, SHAEF PvVD observed, " no German individual Ot' rivil organization has 

cxprcssr.d the slightest concern" for the conccntratiou camp victims, and no voluntary 

offers of fnod , clothing, Ol' medical aid had 

been rnade.a" 

Aside from the military government 

detachments, SHAEF had two lines of 

communjcation to the Germans, Radio 

Luxembourg and FWD-produced newspapers. Both forms provided an austere fa re 

of news, military government instructions, 

and atrocity stories, although the strictures 

originally imposed on D£e I\1itteilu.ngen 

had been rel axed enough in the spring to 

allow PWD to print papers with a slight 

loc::\1 cast. By V- E Day, Di(' Milleilungen, 

with a press mn of ~00,000, wa$ overshadowed I>)' a o~en Army-published 

"name" paper$, largest o( which were the 

Frankfmler frtme (!)00,000), lfessi.sche 

l1osi umo,ooo) . and 1\.oe/nisr.her J{urier 

(850,000). At the end of May, the papers 

had a combined circulation of over 5 millitlll. t\11 were weeklies and, except for their 

names and some local news, were standardized in makeup and content. The one semilircnsed pap ~ the Aacltener Nacltric!tten. 

printed 37,000 copies. Distribution was 

no problem: the news-hungry Gern1ans 

ronstituted an insatial>le market. The Lim-

..,( 1) Hist Rpt, 13- 26 1,2.5 Jwt ·16, in OMC:US, 

B0- 3/ 10. (2 ) SHAEF PWD, Weekly l ntellige11ce 

S11mrnary No. 32. 7 Ma>' ~5. in SHAEF C- 5, 

7.35. 

281 

itations were paper, ink, presses, ~~ nd 

trn nsporta Lion. ~~ 

Afler the surrender, PWD became suddenly and uncomfortably awaJ·c that it had 

a rival in the east. the Soviet-operated 

Radio Berlin. Tbc Germans were listening 

to it more than would have been expected 

even considering that R adio Berlin was on 

the air in German nineteen hours a day 

while Radio Lu:xernl1ourg's German-language broadcast::; were limited to about 

four hours a day; and PWD listened, roo, 

to find out why. What it heard were variety 

programs, music, fri e11dly d1<tls with listener-s, and announc:crnent.:; of movies and theaters reopening and of alleged special 

t:offec. and tea rations. One morning mtt<Sic 

program wns entitled "Let's Start the Day 

With a Gay Hea•·t,'' and the announcer 

advised his listene,1-s, "For greater pleasure, 

you uld listen on your balcon y amid 

flowers." On 22 Ma y, the clay the Rus.sians 

put flerlin on os('Qw time, the announcer 

who read the notice concluded with 1

'Thcrcfore, my dear listeners, you must nol 

forget to set your dotk forward an hour 

before going to :;lccp. " The PWD monitors 

noted a sharp contrast with U.S. policy annmmcements and an even sharper contrast 

in tone. 3 t When PWD asked J 2th Army 

Group bow extensive tl1e popularity of 

Radio Berlin was and what could he done 

abo11t it, the army group replied that the 

Soviet programs were the main topics of 

conversation of Germans in all walks of life. 

•• The papers were dr:livered in Army trucks, 

1111tl PWD figured ouc ln•c-k was rcq,ircd fot every 

70,0(}0 <:opies printed. ( i • Hqs, 12th ACp, ACofS 

C- 5, Puhlie Relations, Drufr Report on Oennan 

Laoguagc Army-Spo• rcr! Newspapers, Jun 115, 

in SHA.EF C- 5, l l.lfi, .Jackc• J.l . (2) SHARF 

PWD, Weekly Intellig('llcc S11rn1'1.t-y No. 36, ~ 

Jun ·15, in SHAF.F G- 5, 7.35. 

" SllAF.F PWD, Weekly Intelligence S11mmary 

No. :15, 2!1 Mar ·15, in SHAF.F C-.'i, 7.:10. 
282 THE U.S. AR}.IY I N THE OCCUPATION OF GERtvfANY 

TROOPS DtSTHIIl tlTI·: CERi\IAN-LANCUAr:F: NEW SPAPERS 

They liked the entertainment and were impressed by the stories of rapid reconstruction in the Soviet-occupied territories. The 

programming for Radio Luxembourg, the 

army group's reply concluded, needed to 

take into account the enormous hunger for 

escapist entertainment in Germany and 

needed to put a better fa ce on SHAEF occupation poli cy.:':~ Subsequent army group 

and army as.<;cssmcnts agreed that Radio 

,., Cable, SJIAEF, from Clure to 12th AGp, 

26 Ma)' ·~5; Cablr, 12th AGp to SHAEF for McClure. 28 May 45; and US Gp OC, Tnfonnation 

Coni rol S~ icc, Spc<"ia l Rt•port, I() J ul ·15, in 

USFET SGS 0!! 1.·11 2. 

Berlin increased distonlent in western German y. The Germans praised the Soviets' 

apparent willingness to distinguish between 

Jazis and non- 1azis and complained 

about the " dour and grirn " quality of 

Radio Luxembourg and Lhc ·'dishwater 

taste'' of SH AEF's press and radio output; 

however, (cw S<l icl they would prdcr to live 

under the Soviet occupa ti on. ~" 

•• ( I ) cmo, Hqs, 12th 1\Gp, ACofS ('i - 5, Public Rehnions Br, sub: Military Govcmmcnt a.ncl 

Rus~ian Rad io, 12 jun +5, in SHAEF C - .5, 17. 16, 

.Jacke t H . (2) H qs, Ninth Army, ACofS C- 5, 

Weekly Militarr Covcrnmcut Summar)' No. 2, 4 

Jun 45, in SHAEF C-5, 17. 14, Jacket 9. 

(:l ) SHAEF, SGS, uh: Report of H arry .J. 

Schneiders,\) .J un •15, in USFET SGS 09 1.-1 12. 
GERMANY IN DEFEAT 

The Queslion of Polic')• 

DuriJ1g the week the war ended, Col. 

J oe Starnes, on a mission for SH AEF, 

finishcJ a two wceh' tom of Germany. He 

had traveled two thollSand mile.<; and talked 

Lt) military government officers from the 

army group G- 5 's on down to the spearhead deta hm nt . He had seen more of 

Germnny than any other \-\1cstcrn observer 

so far, and he reported to General Smith: 

Germany's military power is desu·oyed. The Nazi Party is de-ad. More! than 20 million Germans are homeless or without adequate slwlter. T he average basic ration is es~ 

than I ,000 calories. 

The abi lity to wage war in this generation 

has bec>n destroyed.:

1

: , 

1\llilitary government, SLarncs said, was applying the presurrender directives with 

common sense, lnrt it wotdc..l be sever'ely 

handicapped hy the lack of a constmc:tive 

postwar· poli<·y, He recommeuded setting 

five ohjenives for immediate postwar 

policy al the highest level : ( I ) revival of 

agriculture; ( 2) re.'lloration of transportation and ('ommuniration ; (3) resumption 

of coal and iron pmduction; ( 4 ) revival 

<.~nd C'Otl\'ersion of industry for civilian production; nnd ( 5) adequate housing. 

30 

In one of his first letters to the C.\D 

ft·om Eumpe, Clay told Hilldring on 7 

May, ''The progress of the war in Germany 

has been much mon; destructive lhan most 

people a t home realize." Therefore, be said, 

he hoped LhaL his directives from Washington would he kept "flexible nncl general" 

1111til enough information was gathered to 

"enable you people at home to develop 

sound policy." He added that being "hard 

on Germany'' did not e<lll for unnecessar y 

destruction of the economy. '.Vhat w«s 

" l.tr, Col J or SHtrn<'s tO W. B. Smith, 5 Mny 

•15, in USFET SC':S 01 ·1.<1. 

... !bid. 

283 

needed could Qnly be acromplisilcd in the 

long run if the Germans were allowed a 

" dc<-cnt standard of Jiving'' under controls 

that wou ltl prcvcn t the ex pans ion of industries adaptable to war productinn.:'7 Althoug h he did not say so directly, Cl ay had 

the limitiJ1g ec;onomir provisions of JCS 

I 067 in mind when he asked for a fl e:xihle 

directive. He had not reau JCS I 067 before 

he arrived in Europe, and he either did 

not know about nr was not impn!ssed with 

SHA EF's earlier desire to IJe relieved of 

responsibility for the German economy. He 

ngreed with his finan<.:ial adviser, Lewis W . 

D <lltglas, that the Gem1ans, " the most 

skilled workers in Europe," ought to he 

llSed to produce all they could " for a c-ontinent which is short of everything." After 

writing to Hilltlring, be sen t Douglas lo 

Washington to argue rheir viewpoint with 

the CAD.~' 

Hilldring answered two weeks l«ter, a fter 

he hnd talked to Douglas. He said he fell, 

as Douglac; did, Lhat a t Lbe moment it 

would l>c easier not to have an economir. 

d.irc<'tive such as the one in JCS I 067, but 

''in the long pull,'' it would he hcst to administer Germany a long lines laid down hy 

the government. While he was convinced 

that long-range policy ''must bubble up 

from the farls you discover" and Lhat he 

and McCloy had "planted the seed of this 

idea·· in JC:S 1067, Hillclring also felt th at 

it would not he in the Army's or Clay's 

interest for Clay to he personally responsible for formulating economir policy . .JCS 

" l.tr, Cluy to Hilldring, 7 May 115, in OMGUS 

l 77- 1 ;:1. StJC also lette r dated 21i April cited in 

John Cimhcl, 7'/i e Amerita11 0HufJntiou of Cerlltlm y ( Swnforcl : St;mford University Prrss, 1968), 

II· 6. 

'' ( 1 \ Rohcrt D. Murphy, Diplomat Amoug 

Jl/(lrriors (Garden City: Do11l>leday a nd Company, 

Inc., 1!)().1 ) p. 251. (2) Gimbel, The American, 

Otcupfltirm of CP.IIIIflll)', p. 7. 
T HJ: U.S. AIUIY ~ fHE OCCUP.\TlO:\ OF GERM:\1\:\' 

10()7, Hilldling wrote, put the U.S. govcrnl1H'nt 11chind the occupation. vVithout it, 

Clay's gn·atcst problem mig ht be " the 

ll~nking fire that will fall on you from U.S. 

sourer_<;." Hillclring predicted that soon a 

"brig ht lig-ht " of public scmtiny was going 

to !.hinc ou Gcnnany, anJ when it did, 

Clay was going to need two assets ''lurked 

,lwny in }'Our' knapsack: . . . the suppon 

of the Covrmment" and ''the <"~l puhlit· 

relations counselor in Christcndom:·:on 

~inrc J <..:S I 067 was <t U.S. tlircctivc, 

nnd lu:ncc technically not in forrc during 

the period of the combined command, 

SHAEF was in fact exercising some of the 

flcxibilit >' Clay wanted. In th<' lnst week 

nf .\pril, SH.\ EF had e.'ltablishcd the Production Control .\ gency. tJudcr (; 4 :\t all 

eve . the ngenq· had a tr<'n th of I ,400 

o(JH tl~ and 5,800 enlisted uwn--not ., 

great dr.tl ~c.~~ than the cntir~ strength or 

militar y government- and :\ l w<r·f(lld mL<;-

sion : to ~cc urc industrial production both 

for· Allied military needs 1111<1 for German 

civilian needs. Nearly everyone tndtl)' 

agreed that a third stated mission, to hold 

Gcr111an c-ivilian pmduction to the minimum. w.l!< meaningless; with tilt· ccononw 

at a standstill, Lit~ whole idcn was to g~l 

it going again. In ~Ia r, production control 

groups and ~ccti ons at armr :\nd lower 

lc\'t'ls worked to r<"!>t;trl irltlustrics o·iving ' :-, 

priorit)' to agl'inrlturnl mn ltin cr~· and upplirs. food procc-;sing machinery, medicaJ 

~npplic~, textile«, and c.onstr'tH' tion ntilterial~, and, of cour~~ c. coal, liquid rucls, and 

luhrk~tms.''' ln ~J ar. on Clay·~ advice. 

' l.tr, lflllclrutg '"Cia)', 21 M:ty 1'•. iu 01\ICL'S 

177 1/:1. 

.. (l l S II AF.f, St:JIT 1\lrmo No. I Ill, H J\pr 

15, nrul "-''''!'o. SHAEF, J\CoCS G-·1, Cor CofS, 

•uh ; Pr·octuc:twn Control in C:C'rmauy, 'J. I Apr ·15, 

in USFP..T SGS Ml.1/ l . {21 lti" Rpt, Sr"·ntlr 

Army, Ili 1 Sri', 'Ill Sep l:i, l11 St•vcuth Army, 

107 :1.0. 

SH. \EF cstal>lislwci 1 he Economic Ctmtrol 

.\ gcnr)'. Under C 5, the Economic Conti'OI 

Agency wns to d('al with prices, rtttioning 

and distribution, impm·ts and exports, ,~

culturc, Jishct·ies, and "determination of 

essential civilian requirements for all commodit.i~. "" The agency's instru ti ~ did 

not -pccif) as.-. c(~ for the Germ<m cnmomy, lmt ~rttin~ it up for any other puq>o.'~r 

would hn \'<' he Cit pt>i ntlC."-"· 

1'ht• /)/ ~ llomcwnrd Bound 

.\ftcr V- E Day, SHt\EF G- 5 reckoned 

the total munbcr of displaced persons 

uncovercd in SHt\RF-held territory, in-

< luding tho-;r alrcad)' repatriated as well as 

liberated pri.'loners of wnr, to he 5.2 million. 

. \ll hut ahout a million were in the :trt:ao; 

of Lhe two U.S. am1y _g-roups. They were 

heing clll'cd fol' h}' I 02 Ul'\RR,\ team.<:, 

about an equal numlwr of French M ML.\ 

teams, nnd, wlwrcvcr necessary, by the 

lonll militnry govc:rnmcnl detachments. 

The WC$\t'l'll Emopt•ans were eavin~ as fast 

as transportation could he provided. Jn 

.\ prilthc n•patriation rare had hccn ~5.000 

persons a wt•rk; in I\ fa)' it jumped to OVC'I' 

200.000 a wcd,. '

1 

\\'illing though Sll. \ EF was to h :n '(' the 

displatrd pcr.~ !\ CJfT its hnnds. 'lome would 

ltavc to :\ la ~ a while, partirulad y the twc> 

million Sovirt c itizcns. heutuse their government hnd not inclil'atecl when or· where 

iL would rccci\'c them. For those who 

:;taycd, Sll.\ EF Ol'dn·rc.l ''the conditiu11s of 

" ( I I :\tc••n•>, SU AEf', Actg Oct! CoCS, (M Gcn 

Smith. <I ~( y l'l, .ontl Mt•mo, SHAEF, ACofS 

G-5, for C:ofS, '''" ' Gcrrnnn Economic Co111rol 

Agency, II ~lny ·15, In USFET SGS OP I.:S . 

(2l ETOUSA, C\0<13, H Mny 45. in ETO USA, 

Ad min i~l Collcc1ion, No. 146. 

•~ ( I I SIIAF.T·', 1\CnfS G-!>. Min oC ~l rl'tin!f 

" 1th Bmndr Chid~. 9 Jun ~5, in Slli\E!·' (; 5, 

:157:1, .fackC'l 2. {21 Celll'rill Bonrd, Study No. 

:1:;, p. :HI. 
GER~ AI\\' IN DEFEAT 2H5 

\\.ESTROUNO DPs BoARD A TRAIN in the yflrd.! 111 Wcimnr. 

li vi ~ ... improved to a standard as high 

as resources permit and without consideration of any adverse effect on the living 

eondition.c; of the Gem1ans.'''n While the 

German ration fell below l,OOO calories a 

dny, military government held the D P ration cver)'where at 2,000 caloric.s or more, 

even when thi~ requirement meant, as it did 

in the Fifteenth Army area, drawing food 

from U.S .. \rmy stocks." ln the cities, the 

" Jl i,t Rpt, 6th .<\Gp. ACofS G-5, May 45, 

in SHAEF G 5, 50•!. 11 Hq~, Fifteenth Anny, ACofS G- 5, Milit:~ry 

Government Summa'l· No. 2, 4 J un 45, in SHAEF 

G 5, 17 .25, J ackl'l ti. 

detachments moved thousands of Germans 

( 10,000 in Munich for instance) out of 

their ome.~ to make room for the displaced 

persons, and sick and wounded German 

soldiers were tra nsferred out of hospitals 

to provide hcds for them. H owever, the 

armies fo und SHA£f's repeated advite not 

to confine the DPs too closely easier to accept in principle than to carry out in practice. The best camp <·ontinued LO be those 

in which Lhc residents were kept under 

fairly strict romrol. •r. 

., Hist Rpt, 6th ACp, ACofS G- 5, May 45, 

in SHAEP C 5, 50•1. 
286 THE U.S. AR IVIY IN Tfill OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

For the western djsp ~ced persons, the 

DPX did its br..st to speed them on their 

way home. Third and Seventh Armies sent 

their DPs by train to Metz and to Luxembourg City where the trains were separated, 

: ?me going north lo Belgium and Holland, 

the others continuing on into France. Ninth 

Army routed its trains to Liege, where Civil 

Affail"S Detachment A l fl operated aroundthe-dark sorting cen ters in which the 

repatriate-s were separated by nationality 

and rerouted to their destinations. Although aU DPs were dusted with DDT 

powder at the 12th Army Groupts cordon 

sanit.aire on the Rhine and at least once 

more when they crossed the German border, a few persons infected with typhus 

made their way into Belgium and France. 

SHAEF's "case-findillg teams" traced them 

and dusted their contacts to prevent the 

spread of the disease.M' At Lauterecken on 

the most heavily traveled line, the one to 

Metz, XXIII Corps maintained a rest and 

feeding point for the DPs. The corps engineers buil t box latrines along the tracks and 

laid a quarter mile of water pipe with outlets every twenty feet. M<>:dical personnel 

ran a delousing station and provided first 

aid and ambulance service. Every passenger received two-thirds of a day's ration, 

consisting of can ned fish or meat, canned 

biscuit, and chocolate; and expectant 

mothers, bahie..'>, and obviously undernourished persons were also each given a 

t an of U.S. evaporated milk. 17 The record 

days at Lauterecken were 27- 31 May1 

when almost 55,000 displaced persons 

passed through. 

In the camps, d1e eastern Europeans predominated. Baumholder, the former Ger-

""General Board, Study No. 35, p. 38. 

"XXIII Corps to AG War Dept, sub: Report 

of Operations, lO< ll May, 5 Jun +5, in XXIll 

Corps, 223- 0.3. 

man Army training center east of 

Trier, had 17,000 Russians. The Army 

provided general supervision- interior and 

exterior guards to control the DPs and regulate traffic- and supplied the food-staples 

and processed foods hom the Army Quartennaster Depot in Trier and vegetables, 

butter, and milk requisitioned from the 

Germans. Soviet liaison officers ran the 

camp on a military basL'i. Each barracks 

had a leader who took roll once a day. The 

DPs operated a shoe shop, tailor shop1 and 

bakery and cooked their food in big German Army kettles. An UNRRA DP team 

handled the paper work, ran a kindergarten and a school for older children a nd 

staged concerts and shows in which the 

DPs pr.rformed. Nevertheless, Maj. Marvin 

A. ones~ 161st Field Artillery Battalion, 

the U.S. officer in charge, was appalled hy 

the Russians' cavalier attitude toward life 

and believed the relatively low mortality 

rate only proved that the Russians had 1

'const:itutions of iron." Seventeen DPs, 

however, had died from drinking wood alcohol. Patients in the hospital, he said, 

"started •·unning around" as soon as they 

felt a littJe better. The Russian nurses did 

not know how to plot a fever chart, and 

the Russian doctors mixed typhus and 

tuberculosis patients in the same wards. 

The I lOth Infantry took over a camp 

with 7,400 Russians at Bad Homburg on 

1 May. The regimental executive officer, 

lst- Lt. Donald V. T averner, reported, 

"People . . . were running wild, going 

into town and killing Germans, then com~ 

ing back again." After the regiment turned 

the internal administration over to a Soviet 

liaison officer, Captain Patrizuk, it reported 

that from then on there was "never any 

friction between the Russians and the 

AmeTicans.'' Patrizuk organized the DPs 

into three regiments of three companies 
GERi\lM\Y IN DEFEAT 

carh ; gave them physical training and military drill; and setup guard and police forces 

a nd a jail. At the end of May, when repatriation to the Soviet Union began, the 

Homburg camp became a transit slop. The 

east·hound trains were loaded al the H omburg railhead, and each day trucks from 

other ramps brought io DPs scheduled for 

shipment out the following cia)'· D11ring 

their overnight stay they were given a medical chcrk and some entertainmcnl. The 

next morning, they boarded trains to the 

accompaniment of Russian hand music. 

T he Army provided four days' U.S. rations, water, and medical supplies, and the 

2fl7 

men of the I lOth I nfantry collected tocHhpaste, chewing gum, candy, and cigar·eu cs 

to gi,·c to the DPs. 

As they h<1d during combat, Army enlisted men frequent!)' played an important 

part in ma naging the DPs. Sgt. Edward 

Beatie of the 5th Ra nger Battalion organized a mixed camp of Czechs, Pole<;. :1nd 

Russians- <' formidable joh- in a former 

con centration and work camp at Poerkcing, and even succeeded in gelting lhc Poles 

a nd Russians to work together on the camp 

police force. Third ,\rmy awarded Pfc. 

Frank R ykowski the Bronze Star for helping the DPs in a ramp a t fuerth to run 
2fW THE U.S. ARMY JN THE OCCUPATrON Of. GERMt\NY 

their own mess, clinic, and entertainment 

program. •s 

for three weeks after the surrender the 

only Soviet nati(mals being repatriated 

wer·e the 28,000 ~.;aptu ed i11 German uniform during 1944. The shipment, which 

had starled in late .March, went by boat 

from England and from M arseille to 

Odessa. The ships returned wiU1 troops of 

the \¥estern Allies whom the Soviet armies 

had liberated, inducting 2,8511 i\mcricans.'

10 

Or1 Soviet insisten<'e, SH/\EF ex('hangcd 

the Rus.'iians' German uniforms for U.S. 

clothing before emha rkat ion."0 To carry o11 t 

its obligations under the Geneva Convention, and also because of qualms over the 

reception the men would get in the Soviet 

Union, SHARF had ordered that the R ussians WO\lld be returned only on a voluntaJ)' hasis. Until the surrender, SHAEf als0 

had to be concerned a.hout giving the Germans a possible excuse for reprisals against 

the U.S. prisoners they held. On 10 May, 

throu~?;h the Military Mission Moscow, Lt. 

Gen. K. D . Golubev, Soviet Deputy 

Plenipotentiary for Alfairs of Repatriation, 

complained about rhe ''abnormal attitude 

toward Soviet citizens." The Russians, he 

sa id. were being asked surh questions as 

" 'Who wants to go home? ... I especially insist," he concluded, ''on the return 

of all Soviet I' it izens without depending on 

their agreeing to return home." "' SHAEF 

" ( I) Fifteenth Army, !ith J nformation nnd Historical Service, st1h : Di~p1a('.cd Persons, 14 Jlln 5, h1 XX TTl Corps, 22:i- 5.0. (2) Hist Rpt, Tbird 

Army. ACofS G- 5, Mny- Jun 45, in OMGUS 

76-3/ 10. 

•• The Exchange with tlu: Soviet Forc:cs of Liht!rared Personnel- World War II, ln CMH files, 

pp, •I and 9. 110 Memo, lfqs, ETOUSA, Provost Marshal, fnr 

G- 1, suh: Unifonm for Liberated Soviet Citizens, 

1 May •15. in SHAEF C- t, :Htl .6 1!1- 8. 

•• Cable , Military Missiort Moscow 10 SJ.lAEF 

Main, Opns Di,•, 10 May •15, in SHAEF G- 1, 

:Hl:I.G/ 8. 

then revised its procedure and permitted 

th~ men on ly to he asked whether they 

daimed ~ovict citizenship anc.l were willing 

to relinquish their prisoner of war atus ~ 

In the first week of June, Eisenhower 

reporled lo the JCS that the number of 

Soviet citizens captured while serving in the 

German forces and still under SH!\EF control was under a thousand. H e proposed, 

l'ii nre the "danger of German reprisals on 

otlr own prisoners" no longer existed, to 

turn them over w the Soviet Union; and 

in the following week he ordered " German 

prisoners of war . . . who arc claimed to 

he Soviet citizens and whose citizenship as 

such has been established will be transkrrcd to Soviet authorities for repatriation ."r•J H e did not, however·, broach the 

obvious next C]UCsLion, whether force was 

lo he used against those who could not be 

repatriated any other way; it was a question that would also have 'to be answered 

sooner or later for some of the DPs and 

for the additional thousands of Russians 

in German service who had ~.;orne into 

SH AEF"s hands a fter the sw-rcnder. The 

12th Army Group, for example, was holding a contingent of 45,000 Cossacks and 

11,000 of their ramp followers who had 

surrendered wit·h the German armies in 

Austria. T n Cze('hoslovakin, Third Army 

had 7,000 Russians who had fought on the 

German side and could claim prisoner of 

war· status because they had surrendered 

before V- E Day."' 

from beginning to end, probably the 

'·' C~lh c, SI-iAEf' I-.-lain to Miliwry Mission Moscow, 15 May •15, iu SHAEF G- 1, 38:-1.6/ 9. 

"" Cable, SHAEF fon1'<1rd, Eisenhower to 

ACWAR for .JCS, 5 Jt•n •15, nnd Cahle, SHAEF 

M:.tin to AJ.FNOR, 10 Jun 45, in SHAEF C - 1, 

:18:1.6/ ll 8. 

"(J) Cahlc, SHAI'I,F Forward to AFHQ, 12lh 

1\C:p Msg, t7 May ~5, in SHAEF C- t. :183.6/ :1- 19. 

(2) X 1 I Corps, Rcporr o( Opcrarions, 9 MO'Iy- 27 

O ct 45. in XII Corps, 212- 0.:!. 
GER.MANY IN DEFEAT 

least cdifyiug aspe<:t for SH AEF of having 

Soviet citizens of any variety in its custody 

was the endless shower of carping complaint$ from the Soviet authorities. Already 

before V- E Day, SHAEF had investigated 

so many baseless charges from the chief 

Soviet lia ison officer, Maj. Gen. V. M. 

Dragu ll- among them one that 850 Russians hound for Odcl;sa had been diverted 

to North t\frica and forcibly enlisted in the 

Foreign Legion- that it refused to a r.ccpt 

any 111ore without some evidence to substantiate them. In May, Moscow took over. 

On the 21..1, PralJlltl printed an interview 

with Col. Gen. P. I. Golik<>V, rhc Plenipotentia,·y for t\JTairs of Repatriation , in 

whit·h Golikov asserted that all Soviet-liberated U.S. and BritLsh troops, '' except for 

small groups," had been repatria ted but 

that l he A meric:ans and British were holding Russians in camps and mistreating 

them. Subsequently, his deputy, Cioluhev, 

alleging " rude" violations of the Y a lt<t 

agreement, leveled a series of charges at 

SHAEF: Soviet citizens were being kept 

in pris<ms, given "miserable" rations, 

d!'nicd mcdirat treatmenL, poisoned with 

methyl akohol, and fed poisoned food. ~ 

On 16 May, Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, 

SHAF.F G- 1, went to Halle, twenty miles 

norl hwcst of Leip:tig, to meet General 

Golubev, coming f1·om Moscow via Berlin, 

and to arrange with him a system for exchanging DPs and liberated prisoners of 

war a('t'oss the dema rcation line. Barker 

had with him Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Mirkclsen, Brig. R. H . S. Venables, and a sma ll 

pat'l)' of tec hnic:tl st·rvices offil'ers. Golubev 

"'· ( I l Cahle, SHAI!.F Main lo Military Mission 

Moscow, I!"• Mny 4:., in SHAEF C'.-1, :l t\~.6/9. 

(21 Mcn10, SHAEF, Political Adviser, for CofS. 

2 May ·15, in Slli\f F G- 1, :l!l;'l.6/ 8- u. p ) C:jhle, 

1\lilit:try Mission Nl nscow, from Deane Lo Eisenhowt:r, 7 Jun ·15, in SHAEF G- 1, 3U:S.6/fl. 

2139 

came with forty officers, including six 

major generals, and flft)1 enlisted men in 

a convoy that inducted a U.S.-huilt armored rar and a fully equipped radio 

truck. The Russians were armed with 

pistols, suhmaehinc g-uns, and rifles. The 

n<:xt morning, at their first meeting, Barker 

proposed sendh1g airplanes at once to bring 

out the U.S. and Brilish prisoners of war. 

After makiug some excuses ahout 1 he re not 

being serviceable airfields- which Barker 

knew was not true and said so-Golubev 

made it ''very dear that neither now, nor 

any time in the future, would they permit 

Allied Airph111cs to be used for movement 

into or out of their territory of prisoners 

of wa r or DPs . .. /' The Russians then 

brought out theit plan for the exchange. 

Obviously written in Moscow, it was cast 

as a legal document., and its tenor was "to 

extract compliance to the last degree" with 

its provisions and with the agreements 

made at Yalta . Among its specific provisions were some that would have allowed 

Soviet repatriates to take with them unlimited amounts of ' 'personal effects" and 

up to GOO pounds of food per pcrsou, that 

would have requjred SHAEF to provide 

each repatriate with three dn.ys' rations at 

the exchange point, and that 'vould h ave 

prohibited any movement of the repatriates 

on foot as long as they were on SHA EF 

territory. 

When Barker insisted that he had not 

q)me to renegotiate the Yalta agreements 

hu1 to work out the technicalities of the 

excha nge, Golubev agreed to have a drafting committee set up to work out a plan. 

The t;ommittee met a ll day and all night 

on the 17th and inw the moming of the 

l8th anti accomplished nothing-. The Soviet 

members were obv iously not a llowed to depart even in details [rom the te:xt they had 

brought wiLh them. Thereafte1•

1 BHrkcr ne-
200 THE U.S. AR!\TY 11'\ '1'1-TF. OCCUP.\TIO='! OF GER!\f:\ NY 

goti atecl directly with Golubev. The going 

was slow, since Colul>cv himself apparentl y 

<·otdtl not make suhstanli,•e decisions without approv;1 l fmm i'vloscmv. On the 19th 

and 20th, the talks sta lled for twenty-four 

hours on the qttcstio11 of how far the Soviet 

repatriates could be required to walk. Finally, in the earl y morning hours on 22 

May, llarkcr and Goluhev tomplcted and 

signed a plan. Under it, S.Ht\EF would set 

up reception dclive•·y points on its side of 

the deman:alion line at Wismal', Wuslmnrk, Ludwigslust, Stendal, Magdeburg, 

Leipzig, and Plauen ; and the Russians 

would set up poin ts at corresponding locations on thci1· side. !\s the plan worked out, 

the Soviet repatriates tlid not have to walk 

very nntrh. SHAEF ag reed to transport 

them w its delivery points l>y rail, truck, 

ancl ai1• and to ca 1'l'Y them ac:ross the line 

lo the Soviet reception points by lrur k.r·(' 

During the talks at Halle, Ba rker proposed converting his and Coluhev's groups 

into a permMent committee tn deal with 

repatriation questions. Goluhev refused hut 

anhounred tha t he wanted to send Ma j. 

Gen. S. Y. Vershinin and 162 Soviet <.:ontact personnel into western Germany to 

minister to the: " hundreds of thousands of 

Soviet citizens [there] under difficult rondit ions and more th an ever in need of the 

support of our officers.' ' When Barker 

~L~ked him whether he •would let the 

French, for example, do the same on Soviel 

territory, Goluhev was non committal. 

Barker later t'old General Deane at Military 

Mi:'-<:ion 'Moscow, "A scheme surh as this 

amoun ts to creation of a Soviet empire in 

"'(l l Memo, SHI\EF, ACofS G-1, for CofS, 

suh : Rc!port on Conft·rence with Russir1n Officials, 

23 M ay <t5, in SHAEF C- 1, 337/ 2. (2) SHAEF, 

G- 5 Dh·, DP flr. DP Report No. 32, 2fl May 

45, l11 SHAEF C- 5, fi. 

the SH AEF area, which would give them 

boundless opportunity for rriticisnt-also 

intelligence." When Golubev, several days 

later, cablccl from .i\{oscow to "demand insistingly an immediate decision," n arkcr 

told him thal General Dragnn, the r hief 

Soviet liaison offi cer, already had 153 Soviet liaison offi cers under him and no new 

organization was needed. 

i\ftel' the H alle con(ercnce, Golui>ev 

toured five or camps in SH AEF territory. 

He had agreed lO let one of Barker's officers 

tour fi ve Sovi<'l camps on the: snme day, 

but when tbe U.S. oiTicer visited the first 

ramp, the Soviet major accompanying him 

produced an order with Gnlubev's signalLLl'C limiting the tm1r to tha t one ramp 

only. Later Golubcv <'Hhlecl from M oscow 

that he b;1d nol found the lreatmenl of 

Soviet riti1.cns ~a ti ar y in a single one 

of the five camps he hnd visitcd.M 

T he excha nge had begun before the 

Halle agreement <~s d. On 20 M ay, 

the Soviet forces turned over 2,000 liberated U.S. a nd Bril ish prisoners or war. B)' 

the 26 th , 60,000 eastbound DP:-: had passed 

through the SHAEF delivery points, nnd 

by the 28 th , all of lhe 28,662 liberated U.S. 

troops reported in Soviet hands had been 

returned.''" ln June the rate or repalliation 

of Soviet DPs rearhed 2:>0,000 a week, a nd 

on 9 J une, SHAEF G- 5 reported lhat thr 

repatri ation of all DPs had pHssed the halfway mark. As of 1 July. 1,390,000 Soviet 

citizens h<1cl gone cast, and the Soviet forces 

had dclivert>cl SOO,OOO western European 

Drs and prisoners of war. The westem 

•• Cahle, Military Mission Moscow to SHAEF 

Main, 5 .J un •}5; 1.11', l3arkct to Colubcv, 9 Jun 

45: J.tr, Barker to Dco11nc, 9 J un •15: and Cahle, 

Military Mission Moscow to SHAEF Maiu, tfi 

Jut' 45, in SHAEF G- 1, :'lll:l.6/ll. 

,, The Ia u er figure ind 11 des I hose returned (•a rti er through O dessa. 
GER.\L\:\Y 1:'\ DEFEAT 

Europcnns still in camps under I 2th Am1y 

CJC>up control were then down to 6,583. 

The number or Soviet citizens leh in westem Cr• many was below 700,000 and being 

, cdurcd a~;l, leaving 87 I ,000 ol<'~, the 

larg<'.'SI n~llionnl DP group. The Soviet authorities had not included them in the 

ca'lt west exdunge, and the W.m;aw govCI'Iln1Cnt had so far not made any armngements to have them returned. ·.o 

The Weltmu1t ht 

T n the last week of 1 he war, on orders 

f•·om Admiral Doenitz, the main objective 

of the German troops still fighting had been 

to sutrrndcr to the Western J\llic.'>, which 

they had done hr the hundred! or thouands. What was left of the German :\rmy 

Group Vi~tula after its retreat from the 

Odcr River and Berlin took rdugc behind 

the 21 Army Group and Ninth Army lines. 

T hird ,\rmy, in Czechoslovakia, let in 

125,000 German troops before the sur-

··cudcr. \u tria was jammed with the remnant<~ or the armies that hnd hccn on the 

southern Clank uf the Ea')tcr·n Fr•cmt. Mcnnwhile, the U.S. troops were rounding up 

and eroin~ into makeshi£t rage...: what was 

left()( the W rl11m arht in southWNtr.rn Germany, and t.lontgomery'l\ amli\'.." werr acquit•ing lhc entire garrisons of Holland, 

north G< rman y, and Dcnmnrk. When 

SHAEF G- 1 added up the totals. th e figure.., rnmc close to 5 milli on prisoners of 

w:.r and disarmed enemy truops in SH EF 

,. ( I l SII AI-:F. ACofS G 5, ~lin of MC(•tings 

with 8r01nrh Chitfs, 9 jun l'i, in STIAEF G- 'i, 

'l'i7:l, j;lr kct 2. (2) Memo, SIIAEF G 5, DP Dr, 

'uh· Rus<iiln DP(, 'l J ul 45, in SIIA EF G 5, 29.2. 

P) lil t~. 12tlo AC:p, ACofS G 'i, Norr:~ti,•e Summ.~ry for Month of june, 9 Jul •l'1, in S liAEF 

(; 3, 17. 16, J.u·kt>t I:\. 

291 

cllo;tody, well ovl'r 3 mi11ion of them heing 

held by U.S. Cmr~ " 

The discrepancy between the numbers 

of prisoners in U.S. custody and in British 

ClL';tody W:lS H lingering point or COntention 

between the U .. side or SH.\EF a nd the 

British \'\'ar Office. Under tl1c Fift y-fifty 

"\ grcement, made ill 1944, the Briti!~ h and 

_ \mericans had cac h undertaken to assume 

responsibility for half the prisoner<~ no matter who captured them. After Fehruary 

194-5, the U.S. fo t'CC!\ had made the most 

capturc.c:, but the British had rdused to take 

their hair, argt1i1)g that they did not have 

places to keep them or men to guard them 

on the Contim' nt nnd that av in~ thcl'tl 

to England would arouse public resentment 

and advcn;cly afTct l ritL<~h troop morale. 

After \' E Oay, F.i.~enhower repcatccll)' 

tried to get the Briti h to take at least several hund•·ed thO\L'I:-tnd prisoners, with remarkable lark of o;uctcs.<>. When Seventh 

_\rmy negotiated with the British command 

in Austria for 9,000 W elmnarltt horsc.s, the 

British said they would have to send along 

enough pri~om·• - to care for the hors<'S; 

they sent 82,000. On I J une, Eisen hower 

informed the \Var Offl<'..c that the . hurtage 

in the Bri1i h "arc-ount" up to then 

amounted to 25 million prisoner-days' rations and was growing at the rate o( 

900,000 ration-; every day. 01 

~· RctJOrts of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, 

give a totnl or 7. 7 million CCl'Jn:ll) military pcr~o

ncl disposed or l>y U.S. forces between ll Mny 

9·~5 and 15 J uly 19115, including Vo/kssturm and 

olher parnmilit:try groups, cnmt> follo\\ C~, and 

prisonel'll returned from Norwoy, Italy, and c;unps 

in the United State• and Engl:llld. ( I ) Memo, 

ACofS C- 1 for Staff, ~nil : Oi\llnndmrnt Oirtctive 

No. 5, 14 Jun -I!>. in SHAEF G-1, :183.6. (2) OMCUS, l)c:miliuuiz:uion Cumulative Re· 

view, in Mouthly Rrport of the M ilitary Go,emnr, 

U.S. Zone, 20 AUR 46. 

.. { I) Cnhle, AC:WAR, from Mol'llh:lll to 

SHAEF Main, 2!> Mar 45; Cable, SIIAEF G- 1 

to ACWAR, 21 Apr ~; nnd Cnblc, SHAEF For-
292 THE U.S. ARlvlY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

PRISONER OF WAR CoLUMN marches t.hrough Jvlunich. 

Food was the problem. Registered prisoners of war were entitled to 2,000 calories 

a day, and working prisoners, 2,900 calories. The disarmed enemy troops could be 

given the normal German consumer's raLion; therefore, SHAEF had intended to 

transfer all German troQps inside Germany 

to disarmed enem>' status after the surrender, but the legality of this move was 

in doubt at least until after the Berlin Declaration was signed. 62 According to the 

ward to War Office, I Jun ~5, in SHAEF C-1, 

383.6/ 3- 19. (2 ) Memo, Hqs, Seventh Army, 6 

Jun 45, in Seventh Anny, 107- 0.19. 12 Msg, Com Zone to SHAEF Forwlltd, 2 Jun 

EcuPSE plan, the disarmed enemy Lroops 

were to be fed, like the DPs, from German 

sources; but while the DPs were scattered 

in groups of thousands and could theoretically live off the local economies, the troops 

were concentrated, sometimes in the hundreds of thousands. On l6 May, Bradley 

cabled Eisenhower that the Welmnacht 

stocks the Seventh Army had been usi11g 

lo feed its dis<Lrmcd enemy troops would 

run out that day. In another four days 

4·5, and Cahlc, SHAEF Main, Eisenhower to 

i\GWAR for CCS, 10 Mar 45, in SHAEF G- 1, 

30 7.4/ l. 
GER1\ IJ\I'\Y 1!'\ DEFEAT 

Seventh , \m1y would have usrd up a ll it 

could get from c-ivi lian sources in its area. 

The othe r armies could not help because 

1 hey were in much the an'lt~ position. 

"These disarmed forces;· he maintained, 

"will c·ilhcr have to be fed or released!' 

H e ••sked for immediate aulhoril)' lo dis-

('h:ll gt thr disarmed en em}' force.-; and for 

U.S. Army or military government rations 

w ked tltcm until the discharge could be 

rornplctcd.n' SHAEF could not authorize a 

"blanket release" of German force<;, Eisenhower l'cplicd, because t·heir discha t•gc had 

to be "strictly contTo!led in order lo pr·cvcnt 

wiJ csprcad disorder, or ot iH l' conditions 

whi<'h militaJ')' government agencies will be 

unable w ,·ope with' '; the t•clcnsc of the 

categories already approved (sec below) 

would "tax the adminisu·ativc machinery 

(or n considerable time .... Until such 

time as indigenous resourn's ran meet the 

need<' he conduded, I 2th Army Group 

could usc imported mil t;;~ry government 

food for the disarmed forces. Preferably it 

shcltdd use the imported food f01· feeding 

1 he J)Ps, and the indigenous food could 

lhus be saved for feeding the German 

tr oop~.n· i mported fooci, however, was not 

a renl .solution either. Brig. Gen. Rohc.rt 

I. Litt kjohn, Chief Quartermaster, Communications Zone, pointed out that there 

was a food shortage in lhc United States 

and in thr theater. Including the prisoners 

of war, his ration strength was ove1· 7 

million, an d he was having to reduce the 

rations of U .S. officers and enlisted men 

by len percent to meet it. M oreover, t he 

War Department had made no provi!!ion 

for rlothing and camp equipmen t for the 

Q C3l>lc, lfqs, 12th AGp, to llAI~fl Forward, 

If> M.•y 45, in SHAEF SGS 370.01. 

••<.:nbl<', SHAEF to 12th AGp, IS 1\hy ~5, 

in SIIAEF C-:~, GCT 3811.3- 1/ CPS. 

prisonc ~. Littlejohn recommended ·•set# 

tling down to 500,000 in three months.''M 

SHAEF iss11 cd three disbandment directives in May. l)i hnndment Directive No. 

1 authorized the release of agrirullural 

worken;, rCJn l minCt'S, trans portation wO!'kers, and others in kry occupations. No. 2 

auth orized the discharge of women, and 

No. 3 of men over fifty years of age. Directive No. 4, put ottl in early J une, cle~ ~~ed 

the Belg ians, Ftcnr.h, and D utch who 

had served in the W ehrmacht to their 

governme11lS.''~ 

A C- 1 inspection in early J une revealed, 

howevei·, that the attitude of the arrnic!' 

was "to di~<'l l:trge as many as possibll: as 

fa<;l a.<; po:-;sihlc without a great deal of at· 

lenrion lo n •teg{ll'irs." The average rate Cor 

12th .'\mly Group was 30,000 a day: Third 

•\rmy a lone had t'<'lcased over a half million disarmed enemy troops by 8 Ju ne.:. The 

armies we re working against time. nl ~ 

the 13ri tish a ccept cd the prisoners and 

troops du ~ on their account or unless a 

large mtmhcr wrrc •·clcased, the ra tions, ac·-

corcling to G 5 estimates, would run out 

wit hin the month. ~ 

The discharge pl'Ocedure was sjmplc and 

generally similar to that devised by CCA 

of 12th Armored Division under Brig. Ccn. 

Riley F. Ennil!, which got the job of dishanding the 84!,000 troops ~ent by the lll'itish with the hor.\cs from Austria. The 

., l.tr, Corn Zone, C:h, Qt\•1, lo SHAEF, ACofS 

G-4, 2:1 ~v ay •l 'l, and Cahlr., ETOUSA, Com Zone, 

to SHAEF Main, 23 May 45, in SH AEF G- 1, 

383.6/:'1. 

.,. ( I ) McllllJ, ACofS G- 1 for SmfT, sub : Disbandment Directive No. 5, 14 Jun 45, in SH AEF 

G- 1, 383.6. (2) t\(('mo, SHAEF, ACofS C-1, for 

AG, sub : Dishnullmrut Directive No . .5, 29 J un 

45, in SHAEF C- 1, :187.'1/12. 

" Memo, SH AEF C I, Assl G- 1, for Ch, German Affairs Oiv, uh : Rrport of Trip, 9 .Tun 15, 

in SHAEF U I, :HJ?!I/1. 
294 THE U.S. AR~lY lN THE OCCUP.\'rtON Of GER?\1ANY 

separation renter was an old cavah·y school. 

The men lined up in Lhe stable rompound. 

On cnLcring the building, they removed 

their shirts and raised their arms to be inspel lcd for· the SS blood-type talloo. (SS 

men were held either as pri.<soners of war 

(ll\ if they had enough rank, under nutomatic arrest.) . \ fter they were inspet:tcd, 

German do<-tors gave thrm superficial 

physical c.xaminations and separated an)' 

who were obviously sick. Next. the men 

filled out counterintelligence questionnaires 

and were interviewed briefly to determine 

whether they were subject to autmmHic arrest or had technical skills IJf intelligence 

interest. Those who fell into ncithct• rategory were given slips stamped with a "B" 

:1nd could be discharged. Tho~c with an 

"A'' slip were put unde.r automntic arrest 

when they r·eachcd the end of the line. 

With a "C" they were held as prisoners 

of wru·. The next step was w Ci ll out the 

so-called P- 4 fom1, on whic:h t'hc !!Clldier 

was required to give his na111c, the names 

of his rlo!le t•clatives, and hi~ plnc.c of 1'<' <;

dcncc. Arter completing the form, he 

tlll'ncd his Soldhuch ( pay hook ) over to 

a German clerk and received n disrhnrgc 

form and instructions on how lo art. H he 

was going to a place in the Scvcmh Arm)' 

area, he was also given baH a loaf of black 

bread and nhout a pound of lat'd, his rations for the trip, t~ nd could le;,vc the stable 

to wnit for· :t truck to take him home. CCI\ 

had five truck companies working day and 

night hauling those discharged. Jf his destination was outside the army Men, the 

soldier went to one of several small temporary camps to await transportatio11. Outside the remer, CCA set up sixty guard 

posts to hlork all roads <1nd paths leading 

in, lc.'\.<; to kn:p those inside in than to keep 

others out. Upon learning of the center's 

c:xistenre, German soldiers who hn<l deserted late in the war or had been captured 

and turned loose by U.S. troops tried to infiltrate the center to gel themselves officially 

dischargcd."8 

On 29 June, SH AEf G-1 sanctioned 

wl1at the armit.-. were already doing and 

in Disbandment Directive No. 5 authorized 

a general tljsrJwrgc of German natiot'lals 

held as prisoners of war and disannecl 

enemy troops, excepting those in automatic 

arrest categories, SS men, war crimi al~. 

or residents of the Russian zone. The last 

group would have lo he held until the Soviet authorities agreed to receive Lhem. 60 

From then mt, the separation centcr·s ran 

at full tilt until the middle of August when 

the glut of prisoners ·eemed about lo become a shortage. SHA EF had cont r·arted 

in July to provide 1.3 million prisoner-; for 

labor in France and smaller numbers for 

Belgium, Holland, nnd Luxembourg; and 

the U.S. forces W<'l'l' using over half l\ million in Militar}' Labor ~ervice Units. For 

the next srvernl mo11lhs, the numbers on 

hand p'lus the contingents to be returned 

from the l Jnitcd Sta tes (370,000) and 

from Norway and Italy were just nhout 

enough to lll('Ct the mmmitmenlS.'0 After 

the summer's rush wa~ over, the presence 

of prisoners of war lhre«'ltencd to become 

:t permanent feature of Lhe occupation. For 

the U.S. fon·cs, they were a useful source 

of labor as \veil ns n willing ~ since they 

were heller fed thau they would be on the 

•• Memo. [q~. Scvc!nlh Army1 6 Jun . in 

Seventh 1\nny, 107- 0. 19. 

., (I ) SH A r:f G I to AG, sub: Dishandmrnt 

Directive No. ;,, 2!'1 Jun •15, in SHAEI~ G- 1, 

387.4/ 12. (2 ) nteJtrO, SHAf:.F G- 1 for SHAEF 

StalJ, suh : l)i~bandmrm Directive No. 5, 1•t Juri 

45, in SHAEI7 C- 1. 3!13.6. 

~ ( 1) Ltr, J-I ~F () I to SHAEF AG, suh: 

Ccrmnn rw I .nbor, 1 ~ J ul 45, in SHAEI~ G I, 

383.6/3. (2) final Report, Sevr.nth Army [Mrrr 

46], in USFF/1', lfistoricnl Program Files, T lfi?/5. 
GERM.'\ NY TN DEfEAT 

outside; furlhermore, no matter how many 

disbandment directive.c; were published (the 

last, No. 26, was issued on 29 November 

1945), there seemed always to be thousands of ineligibles; the skk and disabled, 

w~t r crimes suspects, SS men, who might 

he charged as members of a criminal organization, and members of Lhc General 

StafT. ;1 

The General StafT ofTi cets, in cluding also 

all generals, nppcared for a time to he the 

likeliest candidates for permanent detention. Be<·mtse their appointments had hecn 

for life, SH AEF had ordered all rlctive and 

retired General Staff offi cers a rrested, " not 

so much to punish them for their misdeeds 

:t'\ to urc that Lhcir opport\milics for 

planning and making preparations for 

future war ... are reduced to a minimum .' ~ One re<"unittg proposal, last submitted IJ)' SH AEF G-2 on 27 April J 94·5, 

was to "exile all General StafT officers and 

all generals forever in a group and imprison 

them for life ill an area under the control 

of one or all of the United Nations."'~ 

The future of the General StnfT oO-icers 

and generals was going ro be t~l> tanliall y 

tlilFcrent from the one G-2 propm;cd for 

them, which in fact never went beyond the 

talking stage. 1n Washington, the War Department G-2 Historical Branch, later the 

Historical Division, War Department, and 

eventuall y the Office of the Chief of l'v[ilitary HistOI')'· needed information <m German operat on~ for the war histories it was 

f & Memo, H qs, USFET, Dc·p CofS, for Major 

Commnnds, suh: Status of Enemy Prisonc_rs of 

War, 26 Scp ·15. in USFET SGS 31!3.6/3. 

" Memo, SHAEF for CG's, 12th, 21, t~nd 6th 

AGp, suh ; "rreatmenl of Senior Gerrmut Comman· 

rlrrs and Staff Officers, 29 Apr 115, in SI-IAF.F 

C- 3, :!1!7 .·1- 5. 

"' Memo, SHAEF, ACofS G-2, for CofS, sub: 

Di~posal of Officer~ of the German General Stalf, 

'L7 Apr 45, in SHAEF r; 1, 387.4/1. 

295 

going to write. Col. S. L. .\. Marshall, chief 

of the Historical Division, ETOUSA, 

needed the same kind of information fOI' 

his division ·s history of the Europea_n theater. In the spring and summer of 1945, 

ho\vevcr, Ge.rn1an military records were 

only just being uncovered and war crimes 

and intelligence inve.~t gato s wottld have 

first caiE on them for a long time. Interviews seemed to o(fcr a useful subs~itute, 

and in July 1945, the Historical Brand1, 

G- 2, sent Dr. George W. Shuster, President 

of Huntet• College, to Europe at the head 

of a mission d1arged with interviewing 

high-ranking Germans. The transcripL'> of 

eighty interviews thnt Maj. Kenneth Hechlel', a member of the mission, conducted 

with Genn:m officers held at As H CAN so 

impr<:l':o;cd Colonel Marshall that he authorized Major Hechler to transfer ~omc key 

German officers to a prisoner of war cnclosme at Versailles, where the theater historians would have a better opportu nity to 

interrogate them. After the theater historical activities were moved to Frankfurt 

in earl y J 946, the Historical Divisio:1, 

USFET, took over Disanned Enemy 

Forces Enclosure 20 at Allendorf, Hesse. 

The division as.c;embled there all of the German generals and General Staff officers in 

U.S. custody whose pec~onnel records indicated that the)' would be able to provide 

infornu11jon pertinent to the history of U.S. 

campaig ns in western Europe. Later, prisoners with knowledge of the Mediterranean theater and the German <"ampaigns 

against the Soviet Union were a lso inc:luded. Under Lhc former chief of the Gen4 

eral St•lff, Generaloberst a. D. franz 

Halder, the officers were. put lo work writing studies for use in the Army historical 

prograrn ;md in tJ1e training courses at ser4 

vice schools. i\fler nearly all were released 

from prisoner of war status in J uly J 94 7, 
296 THE U.S . .-\ IU.JY It\ THE OCCU PATIOr\ OF GERMANY 

many rontinuctl to work full or part time 

undct• General Halder and a control group 

of senior Ocrman office ~, tttming out hundreds or hi tori c::~ ) manuscripts and providing infmmntion for Am1y historians. I3y the 

time the program terminated in I )5~>, most 

o( tlw )'oungcr officers had found mauageri<d positions in industT} or had •·csumcd 

their military t<treers in the Bundeswehr 

of Lhc Gcnnnn Fcd<'ral RepubliC'.'' 

" (I ) B<!tl L Wilc·y, i~torical Program of the 

U.S. Army, 93~ to Present [no date), in CMH 

files. (2 ) Draft of JHIJH:r "The Usc of Captured and 

Related Records in Offici:!! Military History" dr.· 

livered by O~trnnr Finke at the National Archives 

Conference on Cnpuu·c•d Records, I :l-1 + No\' I 966, 

in CMH files. 
CI I APTER XVI I 

Zone and Sector 

A cr:esr /<1 flrrlin 

.\fter the ceremony at Wcndcno;chk1.s, 

Prinw ~(inistcr Churchill on J june made 

oue morr nllcmpt to have the American 

nnd Uritish witbtlrawal from the <l!i."ignccl 

Soviet m 1w put oiT until the Ru~s ians came 

to trr tns 011 the other questions pertaining 

w Germany and . \u'ltria. Prc.-.idcnl Truman rq>licd that het·ausr of the c'\isting 

agreement on the zones, he 1 ould not 

"delay the withdrawal of .\mcriran troops 

from the Soviet zone in orde1· w uM' presSUI'(' i11 tht selllcmen t of vthcr problems ... , 

Dy cable on the 14th, Truman told Stalin 

he wa<; ready to issue instructions to the 

U.S. tl'oops lO hegin withdrawing into their 

own t.onc on 21 June "in accordan<·c with 

arrungt•nH'nt~ bet ween the respective commamkr ·, including in thc..;c a1 rangcmrnts 

simult;mcou~ movement of the 11ational 

garri-;onl\ into Greater Berlin nnd provi!!ion 

of free nnc<;S br air, road, ~u'd rail from 

1:1.1HI..fmt nnd Bremen to Berlin fo1 U.S. 

[orccs. " : T o the President's su rpri~c Stalin 

• tskcd for a postponement. Mar~>hal Zhukov 

and the other Soviet c:ommandC'rs, he said, 

W<Rtl<.l he in 1\•l osrow for n victor')' pa radc 

on the 24th and for a meeting of the Supreme Soviet and would not he ;~hie to return to Germany until the end of the 

lll()llth. Jlc <.ugg~ted, instead, o;t,lrting the 

movements on I J uly and addc·cl 1 h:rt h) 

1 F<lfl'l'j:rr RtlatiottJ, lfJ•IS. vol. II I, J'lll, 1:12 34 

I bid., p. I :15f. 

lhen thl' "ork of rk:uing mines in Berlin 

would alsn be mmplcted. Truman agreed, 

with the p1ovi o that enough U.S. troop., 

he in Berlin hcflJrc I J ulr tu carry out preparation« for tile forthcoming Dig Three 

confcrc11 rC :-;rhccl ulc:d to IJcgin in Berlin in 

mid-Jul)'-'' 

In earl y J LIIH', Mnj. GeJl. Flo)•d L. Park'! 

became Commanding General, Headquarters, Berlin District ( U.S. Sector). • On thr 

15th, S H \EF bcg<m trying to arrange for 

Parks to taken lcwnnai.~;.•;an e party to Bcr· 

lin to s111 v1·y the site and start worl.. on 1 he 

a<.Tommoclations for the U.S. delegation to 

the Big Thrc~ conference. Six days later, 

after a rwnhincd effort by the :Military 

l\41ission and the Embassy in Mosrow and, 

finally, ~1fler :t s~rong hint that othen.visc 

the ronfcrcrwc might have to be delayed, 

the Ru~o;ians grudging!)' agreed lo let Pa1·ks 

and his part}' go to Berlin ~ 

Parks :md an advance party of a do~cn 

' ( I ) lbul.. Jl. lH. ( 2 ) Truman, Memotrs, vol 

[, p. 305 . 

'On 20 May, SliAEf had designated the Hradquartcrs, FirH Allit•d Airborne Army, as the coni· 

llincd fic- rlin Distrlrt headquarters. fn June, under 

Parks, lh<' U.S. Element~ of I lcadqunrtc ~ nnd 

Headquartrrs Cnmp;"'Y• fir~t Allied Airborne 

Anny, lwcnmc the U.S. Berlin District su1fT, 

( I ) Memo, Sl l1\ RP, A\.. for Oinribution, ~ub : 

Organi.t.'ltiou of c1 ~. Ucrlin District, 16 ~by 45, 

in HAI::~· G 'l, I " .05. ( 2 ) SllAEF, Ccnctal 

Orders No. !l, 17 Jun 15, in USFET SCS 322. 

• Dcpartuwnr 1'r St:11t:. 'l'l1t Co11{ercnc~ of Iluliu 

( Potrdmn ), ( 1145, in "Foreign Relation~ of the 

United Starr,,'' I'OI. T (Washington, D.C., 1960), 

pp. 100 II, 
THE U.S .. \R~f\' ~ THE O<'C.UP.\'1'10:'\ 01• GER~tA:\Y 

offirt·~ l:mdcd at Tcmpclhof airfield in 

llcdin on the afternoon of the 22d ; rhc Russians took them through the city to BahcliiIH·r·g in the ~;o uthwestern sui)UI'!)::;. The 

main clement, designated the Preliminary 

R~~wnnaissancc Party for Berlin, was to 

conlc by rand the next da . C:ol. H. G. 

Sheen, who was in the Parks &rroup, rc-

('orded what he ~aw : 

The bomb damage in the ht';lrl nf the <' ity 

i~ dillkult to drscribe. In ccrwin arc:ts the 

stcnrh of unburied dead is mo~t overpowering. Jo'J•om 'fempclhof to the \t\Tilhclmsstrnsse 

not oJW undamaged building i:~ standing; 

l'OOfSt Ooors, and windows are gone, and in 

nr:u1y cases the fragmen ts of only one or two 

walls arc standing. Many of the streets rclll:tin passnblc, but rubble cover'S the siclcw;rlks and large numbers of streets are still 

blocked oR' because of bomb craters and 

debri~.n 

At BaLdherg- the mosll)' undnmngcd 

former German film colony where the Russians had chosen to billet the delegations 

to lhl: Big Three meeting- Pilrks met his 

Sovid hosl, Col. Gen. Sergey N. l<nrglov, 

Sl:\liJ\1S security chief. Kruglov show<:d 

him the houses reserved for the President 

nne! lhr U.S. C'Onferecs and the C<:cilienhof 

Palace in Potsdam where the meetings 

\~O~ll d he held; in the evening he sent a 

t·nse of wine and some champagne. He rcf\, ~cd w talk ahout the entry of U.S. troops 

into 13crlin, however, saying his authority 

cxlcr~dcd only ro arrangements for lhc <"Onfcrcncc, whir.h were confined Lo the Dnhclshcr·g-Polsdam area. H aving been w11l'lled 

by the Military Mission before he ld t 

Ftankfurl that he might have some trouble 

if he Lricd to open the Brrlin question, 

Parks did not press the point.; 

• Mc111o, SHi\EF C-2, Cl Sub Oiv, for Orig 

Gcn T . J. eu~. sub: Report o( Visit ro Brrlin, 

27 .Jun •15, in SII AEF C- 2, GB I/ C: l/ CS/ U9 1.1 A . 1 ( l ) Department of State, Confert'II CI' of 11nrlin 

On the rcttll'll fli~ht rhe next aftet·notm. 

Parks followed tile Bcrlin-Halle ArJ.tobalm 

looking for the trut k <·tm\·oy of the Prdirninary Rcrnnn:til>.•Hill<T Pa t•ty for Bel'iin. Tt 

was supposed to have crossed the Elbc early 

in the morning ·nd should have reached 

Babclsberg hcfon: he lt'ft. 'When he spotted 

the head of the rolumn1 it was three mile.'! 

east of the Elht: nnd still fifty-five miles 

away from Berlin. Colonel H owley, rorn· 

manding the <:onvoy, had reached the Elhc 

bridge at Dcssau in the morning on time. 

With him he had I 00 trucks, the l 3G enlisted men nnd 85 ofTi cers of his Dcta('hment .'\I '1, and severa l dozen officers and 

175 enlisted men detailed to work at the 

conference site. Al thr bridge, the Russians 

had refused to pas.-; more than 50 trucks, 

37 officers (araually a total of 50 hut min11s 

the officers with Parks) , and 175 enlisted 

men- the C.'<<tt'l numhcr specified in the instructions from Moscow. Howley, after 

a rguing with successive Soviet generals for 

seven hours, had finally crossed the river 

with lhe numb ~ lhe Russians stipulated. 

He had left A I A 1 behind, which made him 

and three other officers the only military 

government personnel in the part of the 

c·onvoy allowed to continue. 

The .\mcricans hnd learned omething 

about the Ru · ians at the Dcssau bridge; 

they lct\mcd mOI'C on the road thal dtt)'. 

Howley described the scene: 

The trip from the Elbe River to Babclsbcrg 

was an exJWr'it!OC'C out of tlris world. Rus~ n 

displaced pl'l'sons whn !tad gaily marched 

across the bt·idgc nt the Etbe were seen 

wearily struggling on foot toward the railhead at llrrlin. Horsl'drawn convoys dotted 

the road. P.:IC'h vehicle was drawn by 3 Or 

4 horses with n m,unber of spares tied to the 

side. Often young foals tottled aJong in back 

(Potsdam ), i11 "For'<'og•' Relarions," pp. 127- 32. 

(2) Cable, Military MiK ion Moscow, Deane to 

ETOUSA, 22 Juu <15, in SHi\EF SGS 510/2. 
ZO~E AI'\0 SECTOR 299 

Br,.RLIN, MAY 1945 

of lhc mar·cs. The Russian boallike wagons 

were piled high. They were driven by one 

mustached Russian with another sleeping on 

top of the wagon. Tlwsc were supply trains 

reminiscent or n11r C.:ivl "''ar. Thousands of 

horses wrrc in thr firlcls guarded by Russi<~n 

soldiers. The troops were dir·ty and disinterested in our progn'ss. They lookrd as earthy 

as our own combat troops at the end or three 

weeks in the mud. Tlw rountry was deserted. 

Fields were unattended, and no Germans 

were in sight.ft 

The rcconnai..~·mncc, such a'i it was, ended 

al Bahcl'lhcrg. The Russians refused to 

• OMC, Bulin 0i.'lln<'l 1 Military Covemmcm 

Repon, 4 Jul 45 3 jan 46, in CMII files. 

allow the party memhcrs to enter Berlin, 

and guards prevented them from leaving 

the U.S. compound at 13ahelsberg. No one 

would even have set eyes on the city 

had H owley not secured permission on the 

26th for himself and his deputy, Lt. Col. 

J ohn ]. Maginnis, to make a two-hour trip 

to Tcmpclhof airfield to confer with a U.S. 

air crew due to arrive there. When the 

Soviet NKVD (serrcl police) officer, who 

went along to make certain the J\meric·ans 

did not slray from their stated mission, 

showed that he did not know the shortest 

way to the airfield, Howley and Maginnis 

had the small satisfaction of laying out a 
300 '1'1JE l'.S. \R~IY II'\ 'J'JIE OCl Ul':\'1'10.'\ OF <;ERt-.1:\i'> Y 

route thnt took 1hrm lH'I'O!!S five of the <~ ix 

horuughs in tlw U.S. :i<'t:Lor.1

' On rhe 28th, 

the militaf)' gon:r nment officers went l mck 

to H alle, as H owley remarked la ter, "convinced that we would tH:vcr l1c sent to Berlin for any military government work.'''{/ 

The frustrati()ns would indeed never 

end, but the wait to get into Berlin was 

not going to be as long as Howley fea red. 

On 27 Jnnc, Genera l D eane cabled to General 1vf a rshull from the Milita ry Mission 

rvfoscow, "Soviet General Staff has ju!\t informed me . .. that instructions have 

been given to appropriate commanders regnrding free nrces.<; to Berlin and Vienrta."''' At tlle srtme time, he informed Eisenhower that Zhukov was back in Berlin 

" with full power to settle all questions on 

lhe spot. " 12 

General Clay and LL Gen. Sir Ronald 

\1\' eeks, M ontgomery's deputy military governor; went to Berlin on the 29th to confer 

with lv{arshal Zhukov. Zhukuv, whom 

Clay afterwards described as cordial hut 

unpredictable, demonstrated borh qualities 

at the outset.n He accepted the <tgenda 

Clay and W eeks had brought with them 

as the l>asL-; for discussion and turned at 

onc:e to the first point, which con cerned a rrangements for the U.S. and British fortes 

lO enter and take ovct their sectors in l3etlin. After some desultory discussion ahout 

how many troops the Western Allies would 

bring in, however, he asked how long the 

• J ohn J. Maginnis, Jvfilit ary Couemmenl Jrwt-

,wl: Notma11dy to Berlin (Amherst: U niversity 

of Massachusctt~ Press, L971 ), pp. 257- 59. 

•• OMC, l3erlin District, Military Government 

Report, 4 Jul 45- 3 Jan 46, in CMH files. 

" Cable, Military Mission Moscow, Deane to 

Marsball for Eisenhowllr, 2 7 jun 451 in USFET 

SGS 370.5/ 3. 

"Cable, 30 Mission to SHAEF Main, 27 Jun 

~5, i11 USFET SGS 370.5/ 3. 

" OM GUS, History, ch. II r, p. 7. 

.\mcrican!; would take to t vacuatt· the p:.Ht:s 

of the Soviet 1.onc they held. When Cla y 

said the plan was to begin on 1 July and 

to complete the turnover in nine days, 

Zhuknv wanted to kn ow why it would take 

so long. The Soviet forces, he s(lid, could 

take ovel' the entire area in twenty-four 

hours, and, he added , the quicker the move 

out of the zone, the quicker the '"' estern 

Allies <.:auld enter Berlin. Coldly, he let it 

be seen tha t what was important for him 

was a tmdc : t.hc approximaLel)' 16,400 

sq uare miles of the Soviet zone that 

SHAEF held in ext:hangc for the 185 

square miles of the western sectors in Berlin. Obviously not expecting SHAEF to 

agree to so lopsided an exchange if it could 

be avoided, be furthermore specified that 

rec-onnaissance parties might enter Berlin 

on I July but that the main body of the 

ocrupation troops would have to wait until 

the d ay the movem ent out of the Soviet 

zone was completed. When Clay asked 

why, if the U .S. forces released a third of 

the territory tbey held to the Soviet force.-; 

on the first day, one-third of the Berlin 

force could not move in on that day, 

Zh11kov simply replied that surh an arrangement w a5 impossible. The most he 

would aliow, after Clay had agreed to the 

complete U.S. evacuation of the Soviet 

zone hy midnight on 4 J uly, was that the 

U.S. and British forces could begin moving 

across the Soviet zone toward Berlin on the 

3d. 

The remaining items on the agenda prima rily concerned road, rail, and ait· access 

to Berlin. SH AEF asked for two highways, 

three rail lines, and open access by air in 

an ar c bounded by lines drawn from H amburg and l"rankfurt to Berlin. Zhukov, sayin!{ that one road and oue railroad ought 

to he enough for t he 50,000 troops the British and Americans had said they would 
ZOl'\E .\1\IJ SECTOR 

h;wc in Berlin, ()ffcrcd lbc A utolwlm lkrli del> g Hanover. rhc rnilroad 

paralleli ug it, and one twenty-mile-wide air• 

corridor from Berlin to Magdeburg and 

wcsl. The air corridor, he agreed after some 

a rgument, would he divided in two over 

r-. agdel)urg, or1e lane bearing soulhwcst toward Frankfurt, the other west toward 

Hanover. Clay reserved the right to reopen 

the access question in the Control Council, 

and Zhukov coolly replied that possibly all 

points dis(ll!\Sed a l Lhe meeting might he 

ch,mgcd. When Clay asked for unlimited 

use of the rc;ads, Zhukov said he did not 

underst<md just what the British and Americans dcsit•ed. It would he necessary, he 

stated, for vehicles lo be governed by Russian road signs, military polire, and document checks, lmt there woHld be no cargo 

inspection ; lhe Russians were not interested 

in what was being hauled, how much was 

being hauled, or how muny trucks were 

moving." Event·ually, Clay would come 

to think he had been "mistaken in 

not . . . making free access to Berlin a 

condition to our withdrawal into our occupation zone."'" At the moment, however. 

under instructions ft·om McCloy in Wnshington not to press contr l matters to 

the point of dissension, he was most concerned with gelling the Control Council 

established and working. T o McCloy he 

reported after the meeting, " I still feel that 

with patience and und nding we will 

he able to work out central controls over 

a long perion of timc." 1

" 

" l l ) FtJteign Rotations, !945, vol. Ill, pp. 

~53 fi l. (2) Msg, SHAEF Main to U.S. Head. 

q11 artc rs, 'Berlin District, 211 J uo 45, in SHAEF 

G-5, 1103. ( 3) SHA EF G-5, Draft Notes on Meeting at Berlin on Friday, 29 June, 29 Jun 45, 

in SHAEF G-5, 803/1. 

" Clay, Decisio11 i11 Germa11y, p. 26. OM GUS, History, ch. In, p. 7. 

:.> 01 

Howle)', after hi!i Babelshcrg trip, had 

rert uisitioncd a f:ll'ln outside Halle, and he 

planned t.o move Detachment 1\ I At into 

camp there on Sunday, I July. On Saturdn y, he t•ec.eived orders to proceed to Berlin 

instead. In the morning, in battle dress anti 

with full field packs, the detachment 

headed east across the Elhe. The. convoy 

moved through the Russian control points 

without a hitch, and by nightfall, Al AI 

was bivouacked in the Grunewald, the 

parklike wooded area on the southwestern 

outskirtc:; of Berli11. 

On I\1onday morning, Parks, Howley, 

and Maj. Gen. Lewis 0. Lyne, the British 

Berlin distri ct commander, met Col. Gen. 

.\.leksandr V. Gorba tov, the Soviet city 

commandant, at his headquarters. In spite 

of some stiffness- most of the morning was 

spent just tryi11 g to reach Gorhatov hy telephone- the meeting resulted in two important decisions: that the U.S. sector would 

comprise six boroughs ( VeTwalttmgsbezirke) in the southwestern part of the city, 

Zehlcndorf, Steglitz, Tempelhof, Schoeneberg, Kreuzberg, and Ncukoelln; and chat 

the Americans would assume control in 

their sector a l midnight on 4 Jul y. Gorbatov agreed to allow U.S. military government offi cers to reconnoiter the boroughs 

they would control and, after the tour, invited the British and Americans to a tea, 

whi<·h t\trned out to he a full-course dinncr.•r The Russians arcepted Parks' invitaLion co n formal ceremony of occupation 

to be held hy the U.S. forces in Berlin on 

the afternoon of the 4th. 

The 2d Armored Division, \vhich together with First Airborne Army paratroops formed the main Berlin occupation 

force, began to move out on the morning 

" Hist Rpt, OMG, Berlin District, 1 Jul 45- 30 

.T un 46, in CMH files, vol. I, p. 22. 
302 THE U.S. ARMY TN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMA:\ Y 

A.LuES MEET IN BERLIN. Souiet troops greet Sig11al Corps jJltotographer who was 

one of the first Am.erica11s into the cit•y on 4 }t1l'y 1945. 

of Tuesday, the 3d, expecting to dose to 

Berlin by midnight on the 4th. The armored 

division passed through Halle, which would 

come under Soviet control on the 4th. 

Zhukov had said the division could use the 

H alle-Dessau-Berlin Autobahn, but only 

until the 7th. After this date, the road 

would be closed because of the conference. 

The Russians stopped the lead convoy for 

a hall day at Dessau, however, claiming 

that a bridge ahead was unsafe. To be out 

of Halle on time, the division then had to 

make a hasty detour sixty-five miJcs north 

to Helmstedt to get on the Magdeburg-Berlin Autobahn, only to find itself caught 

there in a traffic jam with British units to 

whom the Russians had given a similar excuse when they forced them off a road farther north ~ The railroad proved to he 

tot;;~lly unusable; the bridge at Magdeburg 

was out. The line had been double-tracked, 

but the Russians had torn up and taken 

" ( 1) Msgs, Hqs, Berlin District, to SHAEF 

Main, 'I· Jul 45, in SHAEF G- 5, 803/ 1, Jacket. 

5. (2 ) Dennison, Cil·il Affairs and Milit<try Couemmellt, Northwest Europe, p. 269. 
ZO:\F. \1'\D SECTOR 

May one tracl nnd all Ll1e i~al equipment ; the first military train did not get 

1 hrough un1 il l.hr end of Jul y. 

On the afternoon of the 4th, Pa rks held 

lhe oecopation ceremony in the Adolf Hitler Cascrnc in Berlin with as much of the 

2d Armored Division as had a rrived. After 

t11e parade, which some Russians had attended, he received a message from Zhukov 

stating that the Americans would not ue 

allowed to take over lheir senor at midnight as agreed but would have to wait 

until the Kommandatura was set up. The 

Americ:ms, by then Lired and thoroughly 

irritated, suspected the Russians were stalling for lime to finish stripping Lhe western 

sectors, and Parks, after failing to reach 

Zlmkov, told H owley to take over the seclor anyway, adding, ''13ut don't get into 

too much trouble. " 10 

H owley's borough teams moved in early 

the next morning. By nine o'd()(.;k, they had 

raised the American flag in each borough, 

posted Lhe prorlamation and ordinances, 

set up summary miJitary government 

rourts, ~nd notified the Buergermeisters to 

obey orders. The Russians were late sleepers, and it was eleven before they came 

around to protest. The language differem:e .

hampered discussion somewhat, but both 

sides had essentia lly only one point to 

tnake: the R ussians, that Marshal Zhukov 

said " No"; and the Americans, that General Corbatov said "Yes." The Russians 

said that they had their orders, and the 

Americans said that they had theirs. In the 

end the Americans stayed and the Russians 

stayetl. In a day or two, when the Russians 

learned they would not be punished for 

having failed to expel the Americans, some 

of litem became quite friendly. Inter-

•• OMG, Berlin District, Military Government 

Report, 4 Jul 45-3 Jan 46, in CMH files. 

303 

views generally were t·onductecl with murb 

headshaking ove.r the ronOkting orders 

and ended with elaborately eordinl 

handshake.-;. 0 

The Americans at last had a chance to 

see what they were gelting. \t\1hat they saw 

were mostly the effects of the 75,000 tons 

of bombs the U.S. and British air forces 

had dropped on the city during the wa r. 

In all Berlin only :~00,000 dwelling units 

out of what had been a million and a half 

remained undamaged. T o haul away the 

rubble, they estimated, would take sixteen 

years a t a rate of ten fifty-car trainloads 

a day. Of the onre great Berlin hns fleet, 

thirty-seven vehirlc.s we re still running. 

Steam engines were being used to haul the 

streetcars to save electricity, and less than 

a tenth of the subway cars were operaule. 

The hridges over 1 he city's many canals had 

nearly all collapsed under tile bombing and 

artillery fire or had been Llown up by the 

retreating German troops. Sewers hanging 

under Lllc bridges had fractured and were 

pouring their sewage into the canals, which 

were stagnant and covered with scum, 

breeding places for billions of flies and mosquilo!-i. Graves market! hy crude wooden 

crosses could he seen everywhere, even in 

the public squares and along the streets; 

and thousands of corpses lay unburied 

under the rubble. The people were getting 

64 percent of a 1 ,240-calorie daily ration. 

The Russians had put Germans, mostly 

women , to work on the mountains of ruhble, using some debris to fill in the c.rate1'S 

in the streets and arranging the rest in less 

obtrusive patterns. 

The Germans seemed relieved to sec the 

Americans arrive. Although Lhe Soviet 

c:ommand had not imposed nonfraterniza-

'

1 (I) H.ist Rpt, OMG, Berlin District, vol. 1, 

p. 24. (2 ) Earl Ziemke, Battle fc>r flerli11 (New 

York : Ballenline Books, I!Jfi!l), p. 145. 
304 THE U.S. AR~IY lN THE OCCUPATIO 1 01~ GER!\fANY 

R ussiANS LEAVF: THE U.S. SECTOR OF BERLIN 

tion in the stringent fom1 Lhe Americans 

and British were still trying to enforce on 

Llternselvcs, Lhc Russians' official arbitrariness and individual unpredictability had 

aroused inserurity and c~u· that persisted 

even though they also often displayed personal generosity and kindness, and even 

Lhough looting and plundering had subsided and rnpc had hecmne an unnecessarily strenuous war or attaining what 

hundreds of women in the almost starving 

city were willing to provide for small 

considerations. :• 

"Ziemke, Blllt/e for Drrli11, pp. 149- 53. 

Clay, Murphy, Parks, Howley, and a 

battery of interpreters went, together with 

their British counterparts, to talk to Zhukov 

in the Soviet headquarters in BertinPankow on the 7th. The spirit of the meeting \Vas not at all fri endly. Zhnkov said 

he was wiiUng to set up the Kommandalura, hut there were matters of food and 

fuel supplies to be settled before the Soviet 

authorities turned over the '''estern l'ectors. 

The Americans and British were going to 

occup)' their sectors and in doing so, he 

said blandly, they would also have to assnmc rc:-:pousibili1y for feeding the people. 
ZO~ ~ }) SECTOR 

i\n:onJing to his ligures lltcre were nearly 

800,000 Genllans. in the . \merican sec tot 

nnd !JOO,OOO in the British sector, nncl they 

woulu requit·c 40,000 tcHlS of fMd pt'a' 

month. Berlin's normal supply S}"'tem, he 

tn<tintaincd, had broken down roanpletely 

and was not likcl)' to l1c restored soon. I lc 

also insisted on the W C'ilCt'n J\llics' suppl ying lltal'ly nil the cit} 's coa l, hcrnu~c, hl· 

daimccl, Upper Silcsitt, formerly the r hicf 

soun·c of con i for Berlin, bad been transferred to Polish rot1 lrol nnd wns no long<:r 

pan uf Germany. Sini'C the British and 

Americans hnd a•xpcC'tt:d to get food for 

their "tOnes frottl the pl'im<~rily agricultura l 

eastern zone, and not to ha\'e to ship it 

thcrr, and sin ce neither the Unilcd States 

nor the Un t~·d Kingdom had recognized 

the ~oviet transfer of Upper Silcsia to P tlland, the western r'<'pa•rsentatives, hadly 

shakc:n, broke ofT the meeting to consult 

their ).tOVCrtll11CJliS. 

Clay, nevertheless, ~tme nwa · somewhat 

cncoumgccl h)• Zhukov's appa rent 'vvillingne.~s tn set up the Kommandatura. He 

thought this attitude might establish a pattem for tht< C:l)ntrul Council, nnd to pi'Cservc it he and his parl)' uncl Weeks nnd 

his p ill'l)' returnec.l three days later prepared 

to ns.<ntmc rc.c;ponsibility for the food and 

coal pending :o;ubsequcnl de ~ to llc 

ma<.k cithct· at the Potsdam Conference or 

hy the Control (:()unril when it came into 

hcing. Zlaukov agrer.cl tn keep Berlin sup· 

plied until the Western t\llie.c; a:ould begin 

to get shipments in- ,vith a commitment 

to a•cpa)' him, of course; the c-onference 

then moved ott lO 1 he organization of the 

Koanmandatura. Cia) tried again fo get the 

original U.S. view ac(;eptcd that the city 

should l>r administered as a unit. Both lhe 

British and the Rur.sians obje,·ted, and in 

the end the S). tem that was proposed for 

the Control Conncil wns. ..also adopted Cor 

305 

the Kom mamlnt ura. This lwdr would lw 

rcsp1>n!<ihk Cor central administration, hut 

each nation would have full conll'Ol in its 

uw11 sc<"lor ; ftt a·tla<·a·moa·c, it was to be quad· 

ripan itt·, Zhukov having agreed to let the 

French comrn<lllclcr-tlesignatc, Rrig. Gen. 

Gco!Trcy de Beauchesne, sit as a 11 observer 

until .l French senor was as.'>igtwd. On 

qua-tionc; of tll\lllil'ipnl ndmini tration the 

western reprc cntatives were ~rc more at 

a disadv;utlag<·; wlaik the Ru~" ans had dctaikcl knowledge of conditions in the '.'it)', 

they ltad practically none:. Consequently, 

they felt forced to let the Soviet organiza· 

tion and lcgisl;ttion rc111ain in dTctl even 

though they knew that the rule of \111!lnim~ 

ity in the Kununandatura would make 

dl<UI~('s c.liflic111[ later ~; 

On the II th, the nwrnl>crs of the Kom· 

mandatura, Par•ks, Lync, Gorhntov, and de 

13eaa ar hc ne, met to clccitle how tlwy would 

opcrntc. To tltc fir'!'! qucstiCin on llw 

agenda, when the Kommandat\ll'a would 

begin to fun cti()n, Pat·ks answered, "This 

i.s the first meeting." Tlw others approved, 

and thC)' elected Corlmtov chairman for 

the rcsl of Jul y. At nin<: o'd od : the next 

morning, the Suvict milita ry ~ovc rnment 

detachments wilhdrew from 1hc western 

scr s.~' 

= For a de«·rir>tiou of htm 11 ... Soviet ;mlhoritic$ 

had uxr<l their two monthN u( du ivc control 

ill lll'l'lin to Ot'IJ'llllizt· the lllttnicipal Mlutinistratioq 

in thrir own intcrc:.l, sec Wolf!,-ang Leonhard , 

Chilli of 11t~ Rt!l>olutioll (C:hic;'l!o: licnry Regncry Co., 195!1), pp. 207 3:11!, 

:• ( I ) Cable, SHAEF w W:1 r Dept, 9 .}ul •15, 

in UAU, 0\ol (l,·nllany, 7 10- 42 ( 1}, set::. ll. 

(2 ) Dt'J)!lrtmcnt of Swtc. Cfl11/r•e11r.t' <J/ lltrli11 

{ f'oudm11 l , I !MS, in "Fort•ign Rt•lntions,'' PI'· 

631 !1•1. (:i ) Cnhlr, W ARUOS to C:(;, USFF.T, 

for Cl:1y, 1 1 .)Ill •15, in OMC'i US !l;:i5, ucc. :~22. 

( •I ) f r istorical Summary of the AgrN'llll'nt and 

F.vc1H.'I Which l'n·ccdc:d the first Meeting of thr 

i\lliccl Control Council [no d:ltc), in ~1GUS 

:lSI) I / 5. (5 ) lli•t Rpt. OMC. Berlin Oi~trict, vol. 
106 T il E U.S. \IOlY 1'\ 1HE O<CtiP.\'I IOl\ CH CJ·:IC\L\'Y 

fio/li11g 1/11 ( fii/U'I 

~lilit;IJ) ~m c•nmcnt railed the operation "'rolling thc < ,11 p~·t. " The t~utic nl romman d., li"Ctl tlw term "redispo.;ition" lO 

avoid "redcplo) mcnt."' whkh w:t" rC$CJ'Ved 

for the tnxlp mu' emcnt~ from Europe to 

the w:ll in the Pacifir. Fo1 hoth, the withdrawal to the fi11a l U.S. t>tCIIpntion zone 

"'"" a nH\K~iv<' joh. On V E Day, the U.S 

force:. held 1:{ pCI'CCIIl ( 7H,OOO square 

miles) of the .• r,•a within the I CJ37 German houndaric~, whil'lt wall the whole 

( with minM cxc:cpt ions) of the assigned 

U.S. ~c>nt: (4 1,4·00 :-;quare miles) plus an 

area almost as large in thr Drilish and Sovkt 'l.otlCll. ~ 1 Thr carpel would have to he 

rolled and the lal't krd unit~ l'edisposed 

from th<' west, cast, north, and south, and 

within the zone the hotuld<~l'ics of Third 

and Seventh , \uni''" would have to he readjusted, h<"forc the armk-s could become the 

milit<lf)' cli..,tri< l t ommancls. 'l'h~ obscure 

bchavio• uf the Ru inns and belated decision on the houncla1 io; of the Fn·nch zone 

nddcd <ml pli l'~ltiom .. 

The mowmenl out of the British zone 

wa~ c-ompleted hy .,ta~cs in J une. Fifteenth 

A• my r<'l inquishrd thr northern half of the 

Rhcinprcmi11z. and Ninth J\rmy evacuated 

~m1 t hrm l lanovcr, Br:\llnschwcig. W ec;tphalia, and the pnrt of the SC)viel zone conI igtJOIIs tt1 thr Btit h zone. ~r. Sinlllltam:ously1 T hird and Seventh Anl-ties rcdisposcd thci•· II OCJ ~ within lhe U.S. zone to 

give Third Army romplctc control or BaI, pp. 4 7 50. ( 1\ ) OMC1 US Control O ffi ce, Quad· 

ripartilr Ar(' ~ 10 :1nd Coutrol of Berlin, vol. li 

[no d.tlc), in OMGUS 23 2/ 5, fold!!r V205-3/2A. 

:• I bul., ( 6 ). 

" ( l l C:.lhlr, 12ch A(;p to Ninlh Arlll)', 19 May 

·15. in SHAEF G 5, fiU1! I. (2l llqs, Fiheenth 

Anny, ACofS G 5, l illt,ory Covt•mment Summary 

No. ·1, t 8 Jun 15. in SIIAEr G 'i, 17.2!1, Jackel 

6. 

varia. Tb1· da} a ftc• thb mm c wn., M' om 

plishcd ( 15 J unc), I l< .td~ualler.;, Nimh 

. \rnn, dosed down, ancl ~event h \rill)' asswn~d command of it." troops and territory, 

by then mainl>· the . pt~rt uf the Suvict 

zone but induding ,,lc,u thr U1 cmcn cncl:we 

and, temporarily, tlw J eadq .trtcr~, Bcl'lin 

District.=

01 

When ( :lay and Zhukov t.tll.cd in Bcrli11 

on 29 June about the withdrtl\\t:tl fru111 the 

Soviet zone, Zhukov said h t' wanted it done 

fast and without C('remc>ny. Il c did not desire formal reliefs, he sa id. In r;~ , he 

wanted a two- or three-mile gnp l>elwccu 

his advance guards alld the .~. rear 

guards.~• The Commanding General, 

Seventh Ann)', Lt. Gen. Wade H. llaislip, 

arra11ged the deta ils with Col. Gen. V~Lssily 

I. Chuikov in a nwcting at \Vieshadcn on 

the 30th. An·ordingl)', lltr Ru sians sent 

reconnai ·sanc·e pttrtirc; to !Wiccted points on 

1 July. For the next three tlar~. hoth force:; 

moved to an a~ ecd phetsc line cath day; 

the last line, reached at midnight on 4 Julr, 

was lhc O\ iet 1on.d hmdC'r. The Ru.'\Sians 

rcftLo;cd to tnkc over any p1 ~oners of war, 

and SHAEF had to ru. h at the Ia! l minute 

to evacuate 40,000 hospitalized pric;o1tcrs. 

Chuikov also s;lid hi!\ orde!'jl were not to 

accept any displaced persons other than Soviet citizens; SH:\ EF's instructions, however, were to leave all DPs who wanted 

to stay. The question, whir h had been left 

hanging, turned out to he: in1mntcrial in 

any case, since practically no OP:; othc•· 

than Soviet citizens nnd not even nil of 

them- wanted to stay. Dc£orc the exchange 

began, SH EF had c·mptied thr Mrrkcrs 

anc.l Nordhauc;en mines and the M iltclwcrk 

"'Seventh Army, C 'J Diary, 2 and 10 Jun •15, 

in Seventh Anny, 107 0.:'4 .0 

" SH AEF' C-5, Or:U1 Note' on ~ll'c:tuuc .It Berlin 

on Friday, 29 Junr, 21) Jun l'i, in SI!AEF G- 5, 

80S/ I. 
ZONE AND SECTOR 

a nd had resettled 600 German scientists 

and their families in the final U.S. zone.'R 

The last to he evacuated was the F rcnr h 

zone, and the movements oul of the other 

two 60ncs were nearly completed before the 

fin nl decision 011 its boundaries was. made. 

ln February 1945, anticipating the action 

of the Yalta Conference, the Fre nch Provisional Government had asked for a zone 

tom posed of the German territory on the 

left hank of the Rhine from Cologne south 

and, on the right bank, Baden, HesseD<:II'mstadt, H esse- Nassau, and H cs.'ie- Kassel. ~~ Surh a division, while. no doubt very 

satisfactory to France, would hilVC been 

highly inconvenient to the United States, 

since it would have interposed a broad 

hand of french-occupied territory between 

the British and American zones, thereby 

reopening the qucslion of acres.c; routes to 

Bremen, nncl it would have cut the U .S. 

zone ofT entirely from the Rhine River. 

After Yalta, the de G a ulle government a ttempted lo press its desires as a matter of 

1·ight, and as time passed, SH AEF found 

reasons why it also could not relinquish 

ot her a reas. Fn,mkrur1 c:ould not be let go 

because il was the only suitable site for the 

Supreme Headquarters. Eisenhower for a 

while thoughl he could give up Baden and 

W uerttembcrg, btll then he found that he 

needed Mannheim, in Baden, as a Rhine 

port and the K a rl<;ruhe-Stutlgart-Uim 

Aulohahn a nd ra ilroad. What he then had 

left to offer the French were the southern 

halves of Baden and Wuerttemberg and a 

bridgehead east of Kohlenz. These areas~ 

""' (I ) Draft Notes on a Meeting at Wiesbad'en 

on :iO Jun, 2 Jul 45, jn SHAEF G- 5, !!03/1. 

(2 ) Msg, SllAEF G- 2 to 12th AGp, 16 .Tun 45, 

jn SHAI!.F C~5, 803, J ackel 4. (:l ) Mc:mo, US 

Gp CC. FIAT, for CG, USFET, t6 ]1ol 45, and 

Memo for CofS, 6 Apr 46, in OMGUS 3/35. 

.,. Department of State, For11ign R e/ntions, 1945, 

vol. 111. p. 182. 

307 

together with what the British (Jffer ed on 

the lefl side of the Rl1ine, made a waspwaisted zone about two-fifths the size of 

either the Briti.c;h or the U.S. zone. T he 

French were not plea!'ed and argued for 

control of at least tbe whole stale of Baden 

or, fa iling that, a t least Karlsruhe, the administrative center of Baden. It was the 

first week of July before the Frenrh accepted Lhe zone as offered, with a provision 

for a review of the IJOundaric.'l la ter. The 

signjng of the amended zones protocol was 

!hen delayed until 26 July by uncertainty 

over the French sector in Berlin, which 

cvcn tua ll y comprisetl two boroughs of the 

assigned Brirjsh sector, R einickendorf and 

Weclding, the Soviet U nion having refused 

al Potsdam to relinquish any of its terrilc))'y. ~0 

The exchange with Lhe French was the 

on ly one in which the U .S. force.<; acquired 

new lert'itory. Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, a nd 

some of the surrounding [{,-eise bad been 

under French admjnistration since A pril. 

Detachment HI E2 recorded its experience 

on moving jnto K a rlsruhe as follows: 

T he policy of the French seemed to be to 

remove everything that could be moved . 

When their vehicles were not enough they 

asked for U.S. help, and the detachment was 

directed by the Regicnmgsbezirk detachment 

to supply its one truck. During the wl"ek following entry into Karlsruhe every office!' 

spent most of his time trying to stop the 

"equipment repatriation" !hat extended even 

to our own persona l billets. On one occasion 

we had to alert the security troops who, at 

the point of a machiJ)e gun, blocked the attempted removal of the city's fire engi nes. 3 ' 

In Karlsruhe the population grew by 

2 1,000 people in the week after H1E2 a r-

"'' (I ) Ibid., pp. 261, 322, 340, :iH, 363, 36·~n, 

a ud 365. (2) CAD History, ch. VII, pp. 6L- 63. 1' Hist Rpt1 Det HI E2, 11-3 1 Jul 45, in 

OMGUS 4- 10- 2/ 3. 
308 1l"lE tJ.S . . \K~IY IX THE OCCUP \ 1'10 ~ OF GER~J.\i\ Y 

rin-d. Dctarluntlll 1-riG:i umkr ;..tnj. 

o~<'ph l. 'J'aylor had been in Lmu/f..ruis 

1·:-;slingt•n for ten days :11 thr end of .\pl'il 

ancl ltnd turned the area over intart to the 

Fr~nch. Wht<n ~G3 rclui'IH.:d on 8 j11l y, 

tltc f\ I{Jis was "stripped . . . of work 

horses, auwmotivc equipment, mat·hinet·y, 

and food and medical supplies,. hut not 

of I\'azis; the French had removed only the 

Bucrgcrmdrtr.r of Esslingen. 3

: On Sunday 

morning, 13 Julr, DetachmCill E t :\ 2 scm 

a rkaning detail to work on th<· buildings 

it w:-~s going to occupy in Kal'lsr\lhc. When 

tltc Fr•cnch departed later in the morning, 

they took the detail's truck, J,mint. pails, 

bru~IH'~, ;md ladders with t Item. :•a 'vV est of 

the Rhine the exchange was c\nicd out 

111orc rcl·crlwniousl}'· Uaj. Gen. I I. J. 

Gaffey. rommanding XX I I I ( :Qrps. rc-

,·civccl General de Joslard <lc Monsal1crt 

with a fifteen-gun salute otnd a gunrd of 

honor and formalized the transfer of the 

.'IOU I hem Rhineland with the hoisting of the 

Frcurh flag. ' 

When the last exchange'!> with the 

French were completed in 10 J uly, Scv~.:nth 

. \nn)' was wholly within 1 he 1 e11'itory it 

would administer as the \l\1t<stcrn .\lilitarr 

Ois11 ic·t (the U.S.-held portions or Hesse, 

11 Hiu Rpt, Oct G-23, 9 Jul 15- 15 .flln 16, 

in OMCUS 1- 10/ !i. 

.. Hll!tOry or ilitary Govcrnlll('l\1 in J.:md 

Wucrltl•mberg- Badcn to 30 June 194(i, pt. I, p. 

151, in OMCUS -109-~/3. 

"Upon tlH~ transfer or the XXII I Gorp~ c:~ 

to French control, Fifteenth Army'~ mis~ior1 in 

tlw occupntion ended; and the army'~ hcndqunr· 

rers, huadquartcrs company, and ~peci:tl troops, 

under Lt. Ccn. Leonard 1'. Gt!row, hccn.rnc the 

st:lfT of the USFF.T General 13o:~td rhnrgcd \"ith 

preparinl( ;1 detailed analysis or the straiC!U', tactics, nnd ndmini5tr.uion employtd hy che U.S. 

fore<'~ in F.urnpe during the w<•r. ( I ) 0JJI1' Rpt, 

Hq>, XXIll Gorp<, 20 j ul 4.'i, in XXIII Gorps, 

223 0.3. ( 2 ) Memo, Hqs, USFET, C - 3, rot C:ofS, 

sub: Comiuuation of General Board, 12 Ott 45, 

in USFF.T SC;S :122 TGB. 

Baden, :-~nd \\' uc·ll h'mhcrg plus 1 he Bn:n1cn 

m e lave ). Third .\1my held all of Bavr11-i:-t, 

the Ea~IC'r n Military District, but it also 

still hacl two <·orp~ in Czechoslovakia . .'\1-

though the (;~ech government had staled 

a dc'Sire to hnvc hoLh the U.S. and ~ovict 

forces lea\'C its tcrritOI)', it had privately 

;tsked the .\mcr•irans to stay as long as the 

Ru. ·ians did. Eis<·nhowcr had told arshall that ftc t.oukl begin the withdrawal 

from Czechoslovakia nny time hut added, 

" lf Czech independence is to be maintained it seem!! undesirable that RussiH 

sbould he left in sole orcupalion." 3r· 

SallliuK in the Zone 

.\her 10 Jul y, U.S. fortes did not octupy 

anr tcniwry iu Germany that was not pnrt 

of the U.S. zone; military government 

entered what wns termed the imem1ediatc 

statu!\, that is, between the mobile phase, 

which ended with the redisposition to the 

zone, and the fina l ·tatic phase, whirlt, 

owing ro r h;m'-'cs in the Static Pla11, had 

yet to he achieved. Although the ;,on<' 

would IH· rechH'<'d hy the territory 10 he 

C'cded to J.'rcm:h control, EGAD had roneluded hdot'C \' F. D:t)' that because of the 

unanticipated inrrca!ic in the population of 

the U.S. zone, the 250 pinpoint dctarh· 

ments contemplated in the 1944 Stati•· 

Plan would not be enough. I n staff studi,.s 

in Marrh and April, ECAD pmjectccl a 

second ' 'final'' static phase "to cffct:t a 

more complete :mel thorough coverage of 

the U.S. zonc."30 In late June, Clay ap-

" Cable, lvt arsltall to Eisenhower, 13 j1111 15; 

Cable, Eisenhower 10 Marshall, 16 Jun ~!i ; 11nd 

Cable, JCS to Ei~o11howcr, ·1 Jul 4:>, i11 IJSI,.ET 

scs :no.s;:J. ,. ( I ) Mrmo~, C I, 2, 3, +, for CO, £(;AI), 

2-1 and 26 M~r •15, in USFET CAD, EGAD 3.n 

(2 ) Memo , Jlq~. EGAD, for G- 5 SHAF.F, $1lh : 

Recommcnchnions ror Sl.•tk Plnn (Second PhiiSC ) I 

·J. Apr •15, in USFET OAD, MG Pl<~ns. 
CHART 2-U.S. ~vllLITARY CovE RJ>:MF.~·r R n.ATIONSHIPS ( STATIC PHASE. AL'tJFST ·Dt·:<:Elllfii'.R 19-15 

I Military Governor I I Control I aJso I I Council Theater Commander 

I 

I 

USFET G-5, I I Deputy I co-ordi~atlng 

after 1 Oct. 45 I I Military Governor I I Commillee 

OMGUS (Z) 

U.S. Group Control 

Council, I Control 

after l Ocl 45 I Staff 

OM GUS 

I 1-leodquarters, Eastern Headquarters, Western Headquarte~, Berlin Military District Mllilory Dl•trict 

offer I Ocl. 45 after I Oct. 45 District 

OMG Bavaria OMG Western Oistricl CU.S. Sector) 

I Lond Detachment Detachment AlAI 

after I Oct. 45 after l Oct. 45 I Berl in 

merged into OMG Berlin j I Kommondaturo 

OMG Bovorio Di strict 

I I I Reqlcnol 

(Regierunqsbezirk l Land Delachm.,nt Land Oetochmenl Land Detachment 

Wuernemberq-Baden Greater 1-lesse, Bremen, Delochmenb ofler 1 Oct. 45 alter 1 Oct, 45 alter I Oct. 45 

I OMG Wuerltemberq- Boden OMG Greater Hesse OMG Bremen 

Londkreis and I I Stod ~rels Regional Reqionol ReQional 

Detachments (Reqierunqsbezirk) (Reqierunqsbetlrk) (Reqierungsbeztrk) 

DeJachmenl$ Delachment.s Detachments 

I I Londkteis ond Londkrels and Londkre•s ond 

Stadtkreis Stadtkreis Stodtkreis 

Detachments Detachment~ Detachments --
:'I I 0 THE l 1.S. \R~IY 1:\ THI·: OC<:ll P.\TIO'\ OF Gt:Rl\1 ,\ '\\" 

pt'ovcd '"' EC: \ 1) propm;:tl to w1c the 

offic ~n; and mrn of the appro~im atd y two 

hundred pro nal dctachmc:nts, all of 

which lly l hen had at k<tst six weeks' cx-

~: ri c in miliLaty gnwmnwnt, to in-

' IC':t ~c thC' number of dctarhmcnt-; in lhc 

zouc to <I I 9 and pro,·idc at ka~l one clcliH h11H:nt in each Landkreis and one in 

cvrry town with a populatiou 1WCt' .ooo ~; 

( Ciwrl 2 ) 

Cons<'qucntly, the intcrmcdi,ttc status at 

first c;ec.nwd likely to r nlminfltc in nlmost 

,, doubling or tJlc number of tkl;l(:hmcnts 

tn he stationed in the zon<:; by 15 July, 

:i4(j dct a<'hmcnls were deployed. In the 

tl1Ca11limc. however, f.CAD surveys and 

1<111fr.rcnrcs with the army C 5'-; had dc,·clopcd requirements for fewr.t· hut stronger 

dct:l< hm nt~. During the rest of the month 

<Utd the first lwo weeks of .\ugwu, EC:.\0 

disbanded the provisional det:\rhmenls ami 

I'Om<' ( detachments, using their personnel 

to augment the la rger detachments. When 

til(' static phase began on 15 August, the 

numb~·· or dctac:hmcnts was down to 269, 

one for each of the 4 f.aender, 12 

Rcj!iertwgslwzitke, 44 Stadtkreisc, and 209 

l.m11/kteise in the zone. T lw numhct· of 

dctarhmcm office r~ howe''('l\ had iucrcascd 

from 2~600 in mid-July lu 2,HH7 on 15 

:\ ugust. ~~ 

The conversion from the intcrmcc\iutc 

o;tatus to tile static ph nse ~ down the 

< urtain on E. CAD- no doubt, in I he opin ~ 

ion or many or its members, 110111' too !;()011 . 

" Memo, llr1s, F.TOUSA, C- 5, for CufS. soh! 

l'er<'lnncl Rcqltircmenl.s for MG l'th itie~ [no 

llr•tr], in USFI!.T SGS 200.3. 

" ( I l EGAD G- 3, ECAD ~t:~niza ci on and 

OC'vt-lopmrnt 19+5 [no date), USFET CAD 322. 

(2) Gl'lll'r •• t Board, Study No. 32, pp. 11 7- 22. 

(3) guC.:OM. Office of the Chirf HistOI'inn, Orgnui~ lli•)ll anJ Adminiscmtion of the F.uru pear\ Thcntc•r ami Its eadqu rter~, I\H7, in CMII, ll-3.1, 

t:A!i, p. 1~ . 

!n June, tluw US T onit·ers, Col. Henry 

Parkman. Jr·., Col. IIarry P. Cai n, and l.t. 

C:ol. J\litt Jwl \\'olfson, ~t\Cic a grneml illspenioll nr the n1ilitary government dctadlmcnls in the U.!-i. zone. They condudccl 

that " the usduluc:o;-; of EC:\D is <ll an tlld 

su far as dc·tac hnwlll!\ in the field a rc con~ 

c.crncd.'' The mo"t common c.;omplaim of 

the dctadllllC't11 pt'I'S<II1ncl, both !JffiC<'fs and 

enli!': ted, wa' l> tagnntion in grade. In the 

1 detarhmcnrs, for instam·c, almoJH rvt

one was a t lcn:<t one step below his table 

or organization gradr or rating ami had 

been for lwo )'Cars or more. The funcl a -

rtlenta l tt't'tlthl<.:, as the USFET inspcctofll 

discovered and the detachment members 

had know II r or 11\0IIl h,o;, wa~ tha l EC.-\ n was too remote phy!!ically and too often 

cxdudcd from nrtual military govc111111Cnt 

to e.xCrl'isc 1 <mtpt·r~·nt author:it y ovct• the 

detachments. After rcadjng the irtspcetor'l¢ 

reports, Brig. Gt . Cla rence L. !\dcm•k, i\ :'>-

sistant Chief nf Stall G- 5, USFE.T , on 10 

July ordcr•td ECt\D ''washed out.'' dT1'('· 

live 1 S<:pl'cmbc:r. On 15 Augwa , control 

of Lhe rivil affair·s regiments pa .. "-'>cd to tilt• 

military di!!LI'irt commands, the 2d EC:AR 

going to the Wt«tc rn Military Distrirt and 

the 3d C!\R to the Eastem Military Di-;-

trkt. The dctadlllltllls were reassigned ami 

rcnumiH·t <:d, the <k:signation being hy l )'PC 

and number onl)'. The Land dctadm1cnl 

for Wttrt'tlemhcr!{-13adcn, for instHIKC, 

E l C~, became E I i the Land detachment 

for Bav:tria. Gl F:1, became 201. n 

The G 5 inspection cast doubt e~s well 

on the whole· ronccpt of organization nnd 

trt1ining for milittn')' government adopted 

in World W<1 r fl. The inspectors rated the 

%0 Col Henry Parkman, Jr., to ACofS G 5, 

USFET, suh : Nntc'' on 1-li1ita ry Go,•ermncnl ln 

Bavaria, 22 Jun 15, .111d Memo, H!]S, US FJ T. 

ACofS G- 5, for Branch Chiefs, sub: Col Pnrk· 

man's Renon, 10 J1d ·1!i, in SHAEF G- !i, 602. 
ZO"i t·: \'\I> SECTOR 

morale and spirit of the clctac hntent~ as 

liltrpri~in l~ ~oocl .. . con~:idcring the 

cxaspt•ratingly long wait anti rl'pt~atcd 

training in various pools a nd schools before 

rinally getting down to the real job for 

whirh tlwy t.unc overseas:· llt)WCVCI', 

noting that company grade officers t•erruitNI (t•um the tactical troops CU)ti given 

short periods of training had performed 

well, they r'Ct'Ommendcd recruiting more 

"with the view not onlr of filling 1;hortagcs 

but t<l the gradual replacement of older 

militnl')' government offi cer.;; who h;we 

grown lil'c<l or stale or otherwise proved 

ummtisfactm·y in perfornum<·c." 1

'

1 Militat·y 

government officers in Lhc field sometimes 

pul tht' problem less equivocally, ns in the 

following: 

1-.[a uy offit'f't"S and cnlistcc.l men have 

workt•d for th ~ detachment. Those c-mning 

from tac·tknlunits 1vc oftt'rl dmw IIIOit' efficient and honest work than those tt•aincd for nlOtith~ in ECA J) school!i. The sc·ries of pools 

in whit'h military go\·crnntcnt oflin·rs wt'rc 

forced to stngnnte for o,·cr a rear wns ns dc.ious a systen1 as can br conceived. There is 

hardly a m:tn who has passed thr·o1tgh it who 

ltas not givtm c-oHcrclC t'viden('t' of dt•nwrnlit.ntion in llw mo:;t exael s<-nst• of tht· word. 

Tlw long, stt•rilc.: inanivity a nd the· th<'nrNirnl. lt.llf fish half fowl militnl')' raiuin~ kille-d 

allt•rHhu:.insm iu office~'!> and men , nnd moll\' 

lx-ca111e ~ubjf'ct to a cot~~plt•tt• mora't 

brt•akdowu. 11 

The trouble wns most serious in the lower 

level dt:tar hnlCrHS, which suggests 1 hnt the 

wcaknc/\s w ;t.c; not inherent in ( :olcmcl 

Hunt's vision of a lrajncd military govcrnrnc·nt Corn! hut rather in lhe Wor·ld \-\la r 

IT interpretation of it, which insisted on 

equal pr ep(1ratio n at all levels and rc.•Halted 

•• Cui Henry Parkman, J r., to t\C:ors, USPET, 

~11h : Note; on Milit:try Covcrcuncut in Bavaria, 

22 Juu ~5, in SHAEF C-5, 602. 

1-l i~t Rpt, Ocr E-232, Ma)' '1!}.-jlltl 46, in 

OMC:US 77- 2/ 10. 

in cwcrl raining, ovrrorganir.atio11, and 

1rnderrm pln)'lll<'llt . 

Settling military government into the 

Eastern Milit:tr)' Distritt posed ll(J pi'Oblems. The distl'i<'l and the Bavt1 rian !.and 

boundarie-s eoi11ridcd, and all of ava i;~ 

was in the U.S. zont:. When the Land detachmcnl <~~tahlishctl itself in Munich and 

E and F cktachmcnts took over the major· 

political 'tthd ivisions, the framework for regional control was complete. 

The \'\'estern Military District was a 

clifrerem case :II together. 1 ts external 

houndari<'s were in doubt 11ntil after the 

final decision on lhc French zone, and internally it was a dutch of administrative 

anoma lies. From north to South (excluding 

Bremen ) tlw district was made up of the 

Prussian rrovinCl'S of Kurhesscn and Hesse· 

i'\assau, f .tmd I ~t\ northern Baden, and 

northern \\'ucntcmhcrg. Across its micldlc, 

dividing it in two, stretched a curious creation, the SHAEF rl~ve. When t.he idea 

of the enrlave was born in April 1945, the 

rationale appareutly had !Jecn that SH AEF 

as the combined command ought to have 

::t degree of scp~11 atc territorial status, and 

the originnl propo.•ml had heen to set n:<idc 

the event y-livc :-;qua re miles of the Frankfurt Stadtkrt'is. ~ By the time SHEAF ~h.in 

moved to Frankfurt on 15 June, the: enclave had grown to embrace the Stnd/kreisc 

Frankfurt, Hanau, and Offenbach and !lve 

Landkreise in JJ c.'<Se- 1 as.o;au and Lnn.d 

Hesse. N o military or civilian agencies 

could billet there wit.hout SH/\Ef' ap· 

proval, and the admin istra tion of militlll)' 

government in the enclave, delegated to 

" In military govcmment the opinion penist<'d, 

and was diffi<'ult to refut<', thar the only reason 

fur the cnchwt· "n~ IQ J>rOvide a lcind of personal 

fiefdom for the Headquarters Commandant, 

SHAEF. Set• ll11rold 7.iuk, Amuirm1 Militllry Co1·· 

emment iu Ollrtlllllty (New York : The Mnr.mlllnn 

Company, 19117 ), p. fill. 
312 TIJE U.S. ARlviY II\ THE OC:CUPi\TlON OF GER.M.'\1 Y 

12th t\nny Group anu Lht: armies in the 

rc.~t of Lhe U .S.-ocn• pied territory, was 

lransfcned lO Brig. Gen. Robert Q. Brown, 

Headquarters Commandant, SHAEl<'.•:s 

Clay'!i first thought was to make a single 

Land of the Western Military Dislrict, but 

it would still have been split in two lly the 

enclave; furthermore, Ambassador Murphy ob,jedcd because the creation of a single unit conflicted with the Allied policy 

of dccclltralizati()n. The next best solution 

wns to set Llp three Laender: H esse-Nassau 

( Kurhcssen and H esse-Nassau, less the territory tra nsferred to french control), Hesse 

(the old Land Hesse), and WucrltcmuergBadcn (the northern halves of these two 

Laandflr). This arrangement left the WesteJ'Il Military Distrit't with six separate administrative centers: Brf'men, M a rburg (for 

Hesse-Nassau ), Darmstadt (for Hesse), 

Stuttgart (for Wuetllcmberg-Baden ), 

Frankfurt (for the SH J\EF enc:lave), and 

Heidelberg (the military district 

headquarters). ' ' 

In the new VVuerttemhcrg-Baden the 

populations of the two f01111er Laender had 

at least one.: thing in common: they both 

regarded the divis.ion of their ~tatcs between 

tht• U.S. nnd French zones as the greatest 

misfortune that had befallen them as a result of the war.'·· The two states of H c.<;se, 

however, hatl offended the i\merinm sense 

of administra tive emcjency. Economically 

they a nd thr. SH:\Ef cndnve formed a single unit, and there was no good reason for 

., ( 1 ) Memo, no source, suh: MG Proc<~dnre in 

the SHARF Encl;u·<', !J Apr 45, in SHARF C - 5, 

803/ 1. (2) Memo, SHAEF for CG, 12th AGp, 

snl>: Dirc<·tive on SHAEF Enclave, :l .Jun 45, 

in OMGUS :1/:15. 

'" ( I ) US Gp CC, Min of Special Meeting with 

Cen Haislip, 22 .Jun 45, in SHAEF G 5, !l03/l. 

(2 ) History or Military Govcrnm~nt in Land 

Cre:lll'r Hesse, 19·15 ·16, ln OMCUS -12- 1/ 5. 

"Hist Rpt, Det EIA2, I J ui-!JO Sep 11·5, in 

OMGUS 9- :l/ 5. 

their separate exjstences- as, indeed, Lherc 

had not been sin ce 1866 when the Czal' 

of Russia, :'\Jexander II, who was married 

lO a H essian printc.<>s, had intervened to 

prevent Prussia from uniting them. What 

the German governments thereafter had 

been nn alJle to do, military government ac--

c:omplished rather quickly a,nd easily. The 

big obstacle was the SHAEF enclave, 

which at first seemed destined to he taken 

over by USFET and become permanent. 

In the second week of J uly, however, after 

SJ-1 .\EF had been disbanded, G :1, 

USFET, rcromtllertded to the Chief of 

~taff that the enc·lave be abolished because 

''Control by the eaclquartc~ Commandant .. . is beyond his ability." Smith 

agreed, and in the conversion lo the static 

ph~L<;e, miljtary government control in the 

former enclave passed to the \'\'estern Mili~ 

tary District. ln September, arguing that 

the merger would promote local pat.rioti::;m 

and thus serve the dccentraliz."'tion poliry, 

G- 5, USFET, secured an order to combine 

Hesse-Nassau, of which the former SHAEF 

entlavc. had been made a part, and Land 

H esse in a new !.tmd Greater H cssc.'1a 

The cstalJlishment or the military district, Land, and regional boundaries in jLdy 

(ll1 d .'\ ugust com pletcd the framework r or 

territoria l mil1tary government, and in 

1\ug-ust, Seventh an d Third t\rmies relieved 

their corp~ and divisions of command flmctions with respect lO military govemntcnt. 

The chain of command then passed direnl)' 

from th e arm)' commanders (as mili tary 

distrirt commanders) to the Lnnd. regiona l, and T\reis detarhments. Third 

'" ( l ) Memo, Hqs, USFET, ACofS G-3, for 

CofS, s11h: SHAEF Enclave, lfJ J ul '1·5, in USFET 

SGS :l71.2. (2} Memo, H(JS, USFET, ACofS G- 5, 

for CofS, wb: Orgnniz<llinn of Wcs.tem Military 

District, 16 Scp 45, ill USFET SCS 322. 

(:~) OMCUS, Org Br, Organiz11tion of Westcru 

Military District, 22 Mnr 47, in OMCUS 2 1- 1/5. 
ZONE AND SECTOR 

J\rmy went :\ step r urther and com hi ned 

the Land detachment for Bavaria with the 

J\rmy C- 5. At Lite district and theater levels 

a G-5 technical < hannel Lo the detachments· was au thorized. The instructions 

specified, however, that ;U theater and district levels the rnilitary t'ommand channel 

would "always he comrolling'' and that the 

advr.nt of tcJTitorial military govcrnmeut in 

no way removed from a corps, division, or 

subordinate commander ' 'the responsibility 

for taking diJ•ect action in military government matters when the security of forces 

undeT his command is prejudir.ed." '.,. 

The conversion from tactical to territorial military governmen t control wac:; 

more easily accomplished on paper than 

in t.he La.ndkreise and Sttultkreise. A year 

later, Maj. Gen. Oliver· P. Echols, talking 

about the problem, which was still very 

much alive, LOid the Senate Special Committee Tnvcstigating the National Defense 

Program, ''l'vlilitar·y government had a 

hard time taking over. When fighting 

troops take an a rea lhey consider Lbat they 

own it. ~ After four months of the occupation) Seventh .1\rmy G- 5 complained, 

"MosL tactical units, troops and commanders alike, do noL kuow what military government is or what it is supposed to do." 

Eveu the new units corning in as replacements, while slow in comprehending the 

functions of military government, were 

11 (I) Hqs, ETOUSA, Organization for Military 

Government of U.S. Zone, 13 May 45, in SHAEF 

G- 2, Gni/ CI/CS/:122. (2 ) Memo, 12th AGp for 

SCAEF, sub: Assumpliou of Rcspor\sibility for Ccr· 

tain Functions o( Military Cowrnrncnt, 19 .Tun 

45, iu SJIAEJ! G- 5, 003/ 1. (3) Memo, 12rh AGp, 

internal Affairs Br, C- 5, fur ACofS C-5, sub: 

Rcporl of Field lnspcction, 5 Jul 45, in SHAEF 

G- 5, 17.16, Jacket 111. (4 ) General Board, Study 

No. o2, pp. 120-22. 

"U.S. Sen01t<~, Special Commi ttee Tnvestigating 

the National Defense Program, Executive Session, 

!i Apr 15, in OMGUS 177- 1/ :l. 

313 

quick to ;1ssume the p!'erogatives their predecessors had held during the war.~ 0 As 

Hilldriug had preui1·ted) a military government detachment commander- at most a 

colonel and more often a captain or 

major- whatc\'er his authority on paper, 

was no mat ch for a major general c.:omm;uH.ling a division when the two oc.:cupied 

Lhe same bailiwick. Always, the division 

commantler determined when the security 

of his rorces reqttircd an intervention in 

military governrnenl. Colonel Parkman's 

report on the inspection of military government cited the difficulty of getting the tactical commands to limit their- interpretation 

of the word "security."r.u 

The tug of war between the wc:tical commands and military government unfOJtunately could not be conducted entirely out 

of the sigJ1l of the Germans. Sometimes the 

result was only harmless embarrassment, as 

when Detachment E l C~ had to relinquish 

the Villa Reitzenstcin, which had traditionally been Lhe governot's rc idence in Stuttgart, to Headquarters, I OOth Infantry 

Division.;~ ' t other times, the confli cts 

among the :\mericans threatened to undermine the authority of the occupation. The 

German civilian oflit:ials were often caught 

between military govemme.nt, which had 

appointed them but did not have the power 

to protect them, and the tactiral troops, 

\vho either ignored them or b·eatcd them 

as if the war was still going on an d they 

were all Nazis. I n Amberg, in northern 

Bavari:-r , after being repeatedly cnlled on 

the c<~r pct by the 4-th Armored Division, the 

civilians asked the milit;lry government de-

" Hist Rpt, Eas!C'I'Il Military District, 15 Scp ~ 

Oct ·15, in OMGUS 71i- 3/ IO. 

,,, Hist Rpt, Third Army, C- 5, I Jul- 111 Aug 

·15, in OMGUS 76- 3/ 10. " History of Military Govc:rnrnen t in l.flnd 

W11erttembcrg-Badcn pt. I, p. 150, iu OMGUS 

409 3/3. 
314 TilE U.S .. \R~l\' ll'\ THE OC:C'U P.\TIOl'\ OF Cf.R~IA 'Y 

tachmcm uot w issue anv more orders without c karin!.{ them first. with the tactical 

C'()ll\Jn,\1\cJt,.·'·' 

At lngobt,,dl, part of the stafT of I he 9th 

1 nfanu v Dh i!.ion bec-ame involved in a plot 

with G~rman civilian. to ovt•rthrow the c-ity 

~(I\ ('n\UI<'nt.-' 

The Spoih 

One of the earliest lesson-. of Wurld \ ar 

l l w;\." the pmential crucinl importnncc of 

technology. From the beginning tlac governmen ts- fortunately the Allies mon· thnn 

Llw Germans expected scicl1lifir and tech· 

nica l pmfkienc)' to influence heavily and 

pcrlmps cvt•n decide the outwmc of the 

war. J\ new . r ientifie devic-e M a new ind~L.,trinl prorc-;.;, they believed, could he 

worth divisionoo; or even armic'l; and haulcs. 

pcrh.•ps even the war, rould he \\'On or lost 

in the l.thoratorv or fa(torv. In occupied 

cncm) tcrr it or)', ~rientific .1~cl tcchnirnl intclligcm·e might reveal the ·tate or the 

enemy'-; advancement in par·tirulnrly dangci'Oll" area-; surh as atomic fis.sion and 

r11iglrt unrm·er proCC! sec; M clcvirc<; that 

c-ould he converted to .\llicd u,c. 

During the planning for the im'asion 

SH \EF ,ct up the T (Target ) Sub-Divi1oion in (; 2 to plan for ime.lligcnrc c."Xploit:llion of scientific and indu'>trial targets. 

It wa~ at first composed of five U.S. and 

tln·ec British ofTirers and thirteen enlisred 

men and women. In February 1 !145, on 

the eve of lhc advance into Grt•rnany, 

Sll.\EI•' rrralcd the • pl'ci:d Scllions SubDivision tu ro-ordinatc the operations of 

tht' T ~uh-Oivio;ion and ~cvcral other G- 2 

"(t l 111'1 Rpt. E:ult'rn ili1.1ry Di\tricl . 15 

SrJ' II On l"t, iu OMCUS 7h '\/tO (21 Annu:tl 

RC"JIOrl, 1"11-1 F.- 2'lei, I M:\y 1~-'l O Juu oJti, in 

OM(; S 77 '1/ 10. 

"Anuual Rrpon, Det E 237, Mny -1'1 J un •16, 

iu OMU S 77 V IO. 

section. and ·ubdi vi~;ions with related missions. T Sub-Division, meanwhile, had acquired a field clement, the 6800 T fon·e, 

which would reach a 1,700-man '\ti'CnJ{t h 

in April and, with the later addition of the 

CoLoCUl> rnini~tcr ial control parties, went 

well over 2,000. During Mar and June. thr 

force put nnothcr 1,000 in\'cstigators into 

t.he field. 

.\mong it!. high priority targetc; the T 

Force listed synthetic rubber and oil t'atalysL'\, new designs in armored rquipmcllt, 

V (rocket ) wen pons, jet and rockrl propelled <~irnaft, naval equipment, (jeld 

radios, stx:r'rl writing < hemic:als, aero mcdi· 

cine research, glider-:;, and "sricnlific and 

industrial pcr~onnlitks." During the drive 

into Gern\.111\ and the first weeks after the 

surrend<'r. T . Fore<' nwmined . om<' :l,OOO 

planned t:\r!-{rh and uncovered 2,000 

other.;. The ~rand prize target, of <Oilt"Sc, 

was the Millclwe,J.., the V-2 plant atl'\ordhausen · hut to the scientific and tcrhnicnl ' speri;tlisls, (l(,curncrlls, patent records, 

optica l device-;, high pressure pumps, gca t 

grinders, 1 ir·c wr d 1 wisters, and supcrsonit 

wind tunnel.; wcr<' often almost as scnsntiomll. \Yia•11 l:u~r numhcr .... of German scientists and economir and industrial expert" 

began to he di.,c·ovrred in late pril, Spt•-

cial c< tion!. Suh-Division et up the 

F.ncmv Pcrsonntl Exploitation Sec ti<>n tn 

manage and intcrr•og:llc them. For it ~ mosl 

impot•tant ('barges, the Enemy Pct'l'onncl 

Exploital io11 Strt ion t.<:l a blishcd a cl<'lcn I ion 

center, D uSTBIN, first in Paris and later in 

Kransberg C:nsll<' out.-.id<' Frankfurt. OusTBIN was 1hc scientific and indu"trial economic I'Oimtcrp:trt of .\ S HCA:-.1, and some or 

its inm:1tc.-s, sud' "" .\lhert Speer .md 

Hjalmar Sc h:u ht, wrrc candidates for hoth 

cenle~. 

The top tcchni<'ians and leader.r; of the 

German rocl..et development program, 450 
ZONE t\ ND SECTOR 

nf whom had been evacuated to southern 

Bavaria late in the war and had there surrendered to U.S. troops, formed a special 

g roup. ln July, the Secretary of War approved Project 0YF:RCA!?T, the shipmCJ tl 

of ~50 German specialists- mostly in rod(-

ctr}' but a lso indt1ding some in other fields 

of milir ary signil'kance- lo the United 

Stn tcs. What use might he m ade of these 

specialists, asjde from their possibl y being 

al>lc to contribute something to the war 

against J apan, was uncertain, and one of 

the most compell ing a rg uments for hrlnging them to the United States seemed at 

the lime to be simply to put them beyond 

the: rear h of Soviet recruiters. The Russians 

had captured Peene111ueude, the German 

rocket rescarth station , and a cquired lhe 

lvl itlelwerk in t.he rcdisposition of forces hut 

had missed out on Lhe researc h and development personne l. Had the leaders of the 

mrkct g roup, Professor Wen lher von 

Braun and Gen. V\' alter D ornbergcr, not 

derided for themselves thal in the long run 

the United Sta tes was the best place lo 

carry on their work and had they not 

held th eir colleagues together, OvERCAST 

mig ht have come to nothing. The War Depnrtmcnt insisted nil OvERCAST personnel he volWlteers, sig n contracts for cme 

year, a nd agree to leave their families behind in Germany, in order to forestall romplaints from U .S. soldiers who could not 

bring their families to Europe. Under these 

conditions, few volunteered. Those who 

!tad families refused to leave them to face 

the hardships of the firsl postwar winter 

a lone; and it was not until the late fall, 

a fter USFET agreed l() provide housing 

:u1d a 2,300-calorie ration for the dependents, that OvERCAST began to progress ~• 

•• EvCln so, at the end of june 1946, only 195 

mrn had hcen shipped under OvERl;AsT (by 

then rcnnmcd P,\l'eRr.t.IP for security reasons). 

315 

Although the GoLocu r teams did not 

uncover a ny inta{·t parts of the G erman 

government, at leas! non e conside red worth 

:;a lvaging, they had by the end of May tol· 

ler.ted 750 tons of documents a nd nearly 

a thousand German ministerial person nel. 

To house and exploit the documents a nd 

personnel, Special Sect ions Sub-Di visio n in 

J unc opened t he .Ministerial Coller ling 

Center in a former munitions plant at Hessisrh-Lichtenau ou tside K assel. In the summr.r, the cetller's holdings in crea.'\ed to 

1,420 tons of documents, 46 tons of mkro· 

film, a nd 1 ,300 GernH\J1S.nr. 

Early in 1945, foreseeing a V<IStly increased military a nd civilian inte rest after 

hostilitits e nded in Germany, Secrcta1·y of 

War Stimson had sent his scien tific consultant, D r. E. L. Bowles, to Europe to help 

set up a single high-level scientific and technologka l intelllgenrc org;wiza tion. La ter, 

in :\ pril, among his other assignments, 

General Clay had atquircd the job of 

USf"ET :.dmittcd Lhat it had touched off a second 

psyd10iogical crisis amoug the potential recruits 

by f<tiling 10 g ive adCflllate housillg of the families 

of the fir~ I men who lcfl'. ( I ) Memo, ASF for 

C:ofS, 17 /lllay •l5, and Cable:, AACofS, OPD, 

to CG, USFET, 19 ]ul 45, in OPD, 2a6, Gc•·many, 

sec. V, Cnses 10•1- . (2 ) Cable, AGWAR to 

USfiET, 22 Jul 45; Cable, AGWAR to USFET, 

6 Sep '15; <~nd M<.'mo, USFET, ACoiS G-2, for 

CofS, suh : Projet·t OvERCAST, I Nov 't!i, in 

USFET SCS :.Hl:U/ 4. (3 ) J-lqs, USFET. ThcateF 

Comm<~nde r' s Weekly Staff Conference No. 27, 

26 Jun '16, iri USFET, 97- USF!l- 0.5. (+) See 

a lso J ames McGovern, CROSSBOW aut! 0 V ERCAST (New York: William Morrow & Co., l nc., 

1964 ). 

" ( I) Lt Col Joseph S. Piram, Background and 

History of Field I nformalion Agency, Technical, 

ll Jul ·H- 30 J un 46, in EUCOM, T 298- 1/2. 

(2 ) OMCUS, 7771 Documtmt Center, General 

llistory, 2fl Apr ·17, in OMGUS 21- 1/ 5. 

{3) Memo, SHt\ IW, AC, for CG, 12th AGp, sub: 

Ministerial Collecting Center, 1 :~ ]Lin 45, in 

SHA EF G- 2, GBI/CT/ CS/09 l.l- 3. (•I) Memo, 

SHAEF, AC, for CC, 12th AGp, Htb: Special 

D etention Centc•·s, 2 7 M~y 45, in SHAEF C- 2, 

3!l3.tl-4. 
316 THE U.S. AR~tY lK THE OCCUP T lOK OF GER\\IAi'\Y 

working with Dr. Bowles in ca.-rying out 

the mis.c;ion from the Secrctar)' of War. 

Since the new organizatio11 would have to 

he eon1binctl for as long as SHA Ef existed, 

Cl ay had selected as its chief Brig. R. J. 

Maunscll (British). who was already chief 

of 1 lw Special Sections Sub-Division, and 

~L'> the deputy t.hief Col. Ra lph M. Osbome 

( U.S.). Clay also gave the organization a 

nt~mc, field Information :\gcnc-y, to whit h 

Jvl:•un.scll added the word "Tcrhnical'' to 

make n pronounceable acron}'m, FlAT. 

FJ x r was from the ·first conceive-d as 

a posthostilitics agency. It wr>uld inherit 

from the Special Sections Sub-Division a 

military mission and, in th<~ smtrch for information to usc against J apan, ;ilsn a wattimc mission ; bm in the long run it would 

he oriented at least equa lJ y towa rd civili <ut 

intrr(' . .c;Lc;. Chief among its interests \vmald 

he " the securing of the m~jor, and perhaps 

only, material reward of vktory, namdy, 

the advancemen t of science and the impi'Ovcmcnt of production and sta ndards of 

living in the U nited Nation:-; It}' proper cxploitatiou of German methods in th ese 

ficld:; n FI.\T's scope was therewith extended to take in scientiiic ;wd industrial 

procco;.scs :md patents having civilian as 

well as military applications . 

• \lthou.gh Clay, Bowles, and M~\lnseU 

<'nvi~ioncd FIAT as having exclusive "control <ll1d n<:tnal handJjng of prrati ~ con-

<'crning t~ mny personnel, documents, and 

equipmen t of scientific and industrial intcr-

~t," they discovered before long that to 

scl up :'Ill :'lgcnry \vith su<'h Swl'cping authority iu the hureaunntk thil kctR of 

SH \F.F wn.s not possible. Dirt:tl control 

of operations was already in the hands of 

,. Mcmu, SHAEF, t\CofS G- 2, for CofS, suh: 

F., tnhli,hmf"nt of a Field Jnform;1tion Ajtctlcy, 

'J'cchnical, 2 Jun ·15. in OPD, :1~6. ~cr.. V, Clr.$5 

10•1 . 

various long-c.<>tahlishcd SH._t\EF ekmcnts 

and would remain there- except for 

Dus-rnL'I, whic·h came under Fit\ T a long 

with its paa•ent agcnc·y, the Spccia I Sections Sub-Division, on 1 J ul}', and the 

6800 T Force, which h)' the time it pa!i."ed 

to FIAT (on I August ) had prartically 

finished a"-'icssing its assigned and unccwered targ<>ts. The one new T Force operation in the Fl!\T period was conducted in 

Berlin in j11ly and Augll!>t. : In its rh:utcr, 

issued Ht the end of ay, fiAT was authorized to "ro-ot·dinatc, integnttc, and dirrct 

the activities of the various missions and 

agencies" interested in :-~ icntifi r a nd tec-hnical in tell igcncc but prohibited from collecting and cxpluiting such information on its 

own r~ponsibility. ' 

Ne,·er the hi~h-powcred intelligence unit 

Stimson had wantl'd and, after SH.\EF 

was dissolved, an orphan shared administratively by the U.S. Group Conrrol Counril and USFET without being adopted hy 

either, F li\T ewntuall)' came by its distinctive role in the occupation almost inadvertently. In the summer of 1945, from its 

offi ce in Fmnkfurt Md branches in P nris, 

London, and Bedin. it provided acncditation, support, and sctviccs to civilian invcstigatoz · from the Technical Industrial 

Intelligcn<:c:- CommiUI'c (Foreign Economic-

.\dministratiou ) then arriving in Buropt: 

in large numhrrs to <'On:lh German pl uw1 

and labomtories for informatjon on everything from pbsti c.o; to shipbuilding ru1d 

building materials to chemicals. As military 

units that had been engaged in gathering 

" OMGUS, Conlrul Office, Historical Br. Hia.· 

tory of Field Information Agency, Tr..rhnict1l, B 

May 45--..'W Jun ·16, in OMCUS 20- 3/ 5. 

"(1 ) JiAl~F, CofS, to distribution, sub : 

Esiablishment o( Til AT, 3t May -45, in O PD, 33ti, 

sec. V, a~• 10'1 . (!l ) Memo, H qs, US Cp CC, 

for Distrilwtion, •11b : F.stnhlishmcnt of FIAT, US 

Cp CC, 14 Jut <15, in USPET SGS 322. 
ZONE A~J) SECTOR 

tec-hnical int<'lli~('IH t· were r rtkployed heinnin~ in th<· late Mtntmer. FIAT frequcntl)• also bcr;ullc the nr'IICidian uf lhe 

documcnLc; .md equipment the} had 

collertcd. 

~rc.-.nwhilc-, in June, Prcstdem Truman 

had establi,hccl the Puhlit at ions Board 

under the Dire< tor of War i\ lohilization 

and Rccorl\'crsi<m and iu,trurtcd il to review all :;c icruifit and u·rhnit al information 

developed with government r und<; during 

the war with a view townr·cl dcclas.'\ifying 

and publishing it. In 1\ugusl, after V- J 

Day, (he Pr'<'-"iclcnl also mdcl'cd "prompt, 

public and general dissemination'' of scirntilic and industti:d inf<tl'lllation obtained 

from the rncmy :1nd n-;.-;ignc:d this re.'\ponsihilit r a-; well to the Publication Board. 6

' 

:\t first informally ancl lntrr, ir' n ecemhcr, 

h)' War Department order, FIAT acquired 

the rcspon~ihilit\' for thr Puhlin ttion Board 

program in Gcm1an) and a mi<><.:ion, which 

was the 'amr ouc in fat t that had been 

forc..-.;een for it in June, n.tmely, to exploit 

Germanr' :wicnt ifir and indu ·trial secrets 

for the hcncfit of the world. \s the military 

intelligcnc e pro jet t<~ were c omplctcd and 

phased out in late I !145 and early 1946, 

the volume of c·ivilian investigations ittcreased; Fl 'I' mi< rolilrning teams ranged 

acro~s Gcl'rnany, and the Frankfurt office 

screened, edited, nnd tr an~latcd reports before hippin~ them to the United States. 

By tlw end of thc first year of the occupation, F1 AT had processed over 23,000 reports, hipp~d I OB items uf equipment 

(whole plant.; .;omNimes were counted as 

singlr itrms), and rollcrted 53 tons of 

document-;. nn 

.. EO 9561!, II Jun 1~, nnd EO fl601, 28 Aug 

l'i, 111 Fn/,n/ Rf'J/'IIa, vol. 10, pp. 9568 and 

10960. 

.. Wuh f>l'pntltnl'lll u( (~nunerce finnnciaJ support .md t>erwnru~l. J:l I AT continul'd invtltigatioru 

317 

SHAEF"s wartime mi,-;ion cndecl on 

\"- E Day. The l<&st rc idual mi-. .. ion, the 

rcdisposition into the zones, wo.\s completed 

on l 0 J ul), and the Supreme Command 

terminated 011 the 14th, llc adqu.~rtcrs, 

USFET, under 1-:i~cllhowcr as Theater 

Commander and Smith a'l Chief of Staff, 

had opened in Frankfurt on I july; and 

when it)) inrremcnts fro111 E'J'OUS!\, 

SHAEF, and 12th ,\tm)' Group \"ere fully 

assembled, il was, with :3,885 offircrs and 

I 0,968 enlisted men, an irnpnsin~ org<~nization in it!i own right. USFET comnmndcd 

only U.S. troops, hul its splr(·J'(' of responsibility ex tended ut idc 1 he zont' in Cermany into England, Frann:, Belgium, 

1\orway, and Austria. Two militnrr govrrnment ·tafT-;, the U.S. Group Control Counc-il 

and Lhe theater G 5. Wt)ulcl pruvidc thr 

U.S. dement of thr quadripartite administration for Germany nnd guvrrll the zone. 

The 12th Army Croup c ca.o;cd ito; operations 

on 25 July, .tnd therc;tftcr U. FET <~1'10 assumed direct command nf the occupation 

force.<;. 

SH.\EF had usrd its nuthCII'it)' to bring 

into being a number of rombiucd agencies 

whkh, while they did not ro ~ti lltlC a central administration for the western zones, 

were a more suhstnntinl Sli'P in this clircc· 

tion than would be made again for several 

years. The agencies indudcd the Allied 

Printing and Paper Control Board, the 

Rhine Navigation Agenry, the Resources 

Allocation Board, the Production Control 

.\genry, the Economic Control gc11ry, the 

until 30 June 1947 and conlimll'd microfitmin!t 

until 30 Sept('mhu o( thnt yr!lt ( I ) Piram, B:~ck

grotmd and Hi•lory of Fidd lnfonnation Agency, 

Technical, 8 Jul II 10 Jun lh, iu EUCO~f, T 

298- 1/2. (2 ) Mt'mO, Aug C,;h. CAD, (or St:c W.tr, 

sub: Termin.uion Dall' for FIA'l , II Jun H, 

in CAD, 011. 
316 T HE U.S. AR~ IY 1 . T HE OCC:lJP_\TJOK OF GER~L\XY 

Combined F.vidence Collecting Center for 

War Cri111c.-;, the DPX, FIAT, nnd 

C ROWC,\ SS. The functions of the agcndcs concerned with economic matlcr·s went 

to the Control Council and to the zonal 

administrations. The Combined Evidence 

Collcc•ting Center, CROWCt\SS, nnd some 

other or!{ani:r.ations that roukl not he divi<.lcd or· a:-.. igncd cit.her 10 the Jkiti-;h or 

U.S. commands passed tempora r·il y to a 

Combined . \ dministratiYC .iquidutin~ 

. \gcnqr. Fit\ T separated into it :~ British 

and ll.S. c·omponents, h111 the Oritish 

FIAT stayed in Frankfurt. The two components occupied the ~ame building, nt 69 

Burgrrstrassc, Frankiurt, ••nd Iuter the Dircrtor's 8\lilding in the T. G. Far·hcn plant 

al T Ioc<:hi!t, and cont.inued to w<>rk doscly 

t ogctlwt. n l 

The Displ;Kcd Person-; Exefutive ( DPX ) 

wall a special ca<;e. In the month of July, 

UNRR:\ had 2,656 per.;ons in 332 Dl> 

teams deployed throughout the western 

zones. h planned to more than doublt: its 

pcrsound, set np a central ltcadquarlcrs for 

Gcr·man y ncar Frankfurt, and then take 

over entirely the care and supervision of 

the displaced pcnions from the military authorities. For the interim, whkh wa.; c.xpt~rtcd to be about three months, tlte DPX 

continued rt!\ the Combined Displnrcd Pcrr-to ~ ~xcc utive ( CDPX), ope rat ir1g under 

the existing SH!\ EF directive.~ hut witho11l 

authOI'iLy to make new li cy. ~ 

Along with SH AEF, the Combined 

•• EUCOM, Office of the Chief i..~torll\11 1 O •gani:.mtion nud Administration of the Eurot>l!nn The-

·llcr and It~ Headquarters, 1947, in CMII file 

U 3. I, C.:t\ 5. 

"' (II C:thlc, SHAEF Main to CG, I 21h AGp. 

6 j ut 45. in SHAEF G 5, 2772. (2) Cable, 

USFET to ACWAR, suh: Fifth Heport on Status 

tJ( UNtUtA, 20 jul 45, and Memo, USFET, ACofS 

0 .'i, for CofS, Mtb: Summary of UNRRA/ Milltary 

DP Program•, 21 Jul 45, in USFP.T SGS :J:H. 

Chief of Sta!T and Combined Civil A!Tairs 

Committee so virt1tnll y passed ont of Lhc 

picture as far m; G~:nnany was concerned. 

The USFET channel o( command from 

ash in ~ton was IPCOG, the SWNCC. 

and the C~. Soon, this changed also. Oti 

16 ] uly at Potsdam, the President assigned 

"the nrccs.<;nry clirrr.tion of our activities 

nnd negotiation' pertaining to the u·catmenl of Gcr111arly <tnd t\ustria'· to the Wn1 

Department nnd thr Sttttc DepartmentSlate 10 deal with policy, ~llld \V;•r to tlcal 

with ''the excwti vc and administrative :IspeeLs." lPCOG, i11 which the ca~ury 

D epartmen t and Foreign Economic i\clmini!>tration wen· n.:prt·scnted, su sequc·t~tl y 

ecru cd to rxist.' ~ 

As a kind of houscwanning for the zone, 

USFET plnuncd nnd, in forty-eie;bt hours 

beginning f\t daybreak on 21 Jtrl)', executed 

a c:heck and xca r'<·h operation code-named 

TALLYHO. The objectives were to check 

the rredentia ls of all persons in the zone, 

civili<Ln O l' military; to search all premises 

and indivirluals for prohibited artides, such 

as firearms ancl stolen U.S. government 

properly; and w sc;.~rch for e,·idenrc of 

hlack-markctccring. Staged in secret, to the 

extent that an operation emploring 

163,000 t1 00 ~ in the Western Militru·y 

District nlouc rou ld he kept a scrrct. 

TALL YHO appnrcm l)' did at lca"t lHkc 

most German!< hy smprise. It ra ised a fasttraveling wave of rumors: that there had 

been a ilhrct~k, that an American offir.cr 

had been shot, that the Ame1·icans were 

making a last minute search for loot hdmc 

turn ing lllc 7.on<· over to the Russians. After 

., ( I ) Memo, A<5l l>cp CofS, OPD, for Src 

jCS, mb: Communications "ith CINC'•, U.S. 

Forces of OccutJ·•tit)l1, Crrmany and Auslria, 2 1 

Jul 45. in 01'0, AllC 387, sec. -t-E. (2) Memo, 

J ames F. Byrne~ for tho President, sub: Ttrutinurion of JP(;O(:, 'lO Aug 45, in CAD, 014, .Jul 

·1·5- 14 Scp ·15. 
ZONE AND SECTOR 319 

SoLDIERS CHECK PAPc;Rs OF A CIVILIAN 

the surprise wore off, which took no more 

than four hoUJ'S, the Germans became Cjllite 

('O-operative; and some of them began to 

arrange their property in neat displays, as 

if for "showdown inspection. " The search 

brought in 2,747 illegal small arms, 2,658 

miscellaneous items of Army clothing and 

equipment, 340 AWOL soldiers, and evidence for 23 fraternization cases. The confiscated black-market goods amounted to 

100 gallons of gasoline, 1,000 pounds each 

of sugar and flour, 75 pounds of roffee, 

138 automobile tires, and 300 pairs of 

shoes, which in total, USFET G- 2 coneluded with not quite flawless logic, constituted " no evidence of an organized black 

market. " Of the 83,000 Germans arrested, 

77,000 were held for nothing more than 

impropet· identification papers. In the end, 

however, USFET believed TALLYHO was a 

success in that it impressed German population ''with the serious intention of the 

American troops. "G·I 

"' Memo, CG, USFET, to Army Cmdr's, sob: 

Co-ordinated Security Control Check and Search 

Opera tion,. 1 Jul ·1·5, and Hqs, USFET, ACofS 

G- 2, Report on Operation TAt.t.YH O, 18 Scp 

~5. in USFET SGS 33:U. I6. 
CHAPTER XVII£ 

The Occupation Troops 

On V E Day, Eisenhower had sixty-one 

U .S. divisions, 1,622,000 men, in Germany, and a total force in Europe numbering 3.077 ,OOO.t \'\'hco the shooting ended, 

l h<: Jivisions in the fi eld llecmnc the occ\1-

pation troops, charged with maintaining 

law auJ order a11tl establishing the Allied 

militaty presence in the J efealed nation. 

This wa_<; the <trll1)'-type otcupaLion. 1\ C'ounLerparl or I he military govanment carpet, 

its object was to control the population and 

stin e res.istan<·e by putting troops into every 

nook and cranny. Divisions were spread out 

an•oss the rOttnt rysidc, snmetimes over 

great stretches of tcn·itoq'. 'l'he 7Hth Infantry Division, for instance, for a time after 

V- E day was responsible fur an area of 

3,600 square miles, almost twice the size 

of the state of Delaware, and the 70th Infant ry Division for 2,500 sq uare milr". Batta lions were dcpkJ)'eu scp;uatcly, and the 

company was widely vie\-vcd as the idenl 

l lll i I for independent deployment he<· a use 

billets wcrr. easy to find ami the hauls frulll 

the billets to g uard posts and checkpoints 

wou ld noL he exce~sivel y long. Frcquenlly 

single platoons and squads were deployed 

at substan rial djstan<:es from their company 

headquarters. 

The oc:cupatio11 troops manned lJOrder 

control stations, maintained checkpoints at 

' ivh•nto, Hqs, ETOUSA, foJ< Gen Eisenhower, 

suh: Strength of Lhc U.S. Forces, 30 Apr 45, 

i11 USFET SCS 320.3/2. 

road junctions and bridges, sen t out roving 

patrols to a pprehend r urfew and t:irn tlation vjoJators, attd kept stationary guards 

at railroad bridges, :'\rmy installations, DP 

<~mps, ja ils, telephone exchanges, factories, 

and banks. In the first months troops were 

plentiful and almost everything of importance- and some nol so important- was 

rd ed.~ ln effect, the combl\L forces became military government security troops. 

The army-type occupation was rompt•chensive and showed the Gerrnans Lhat they 

were defeated anti their count!')' occupied. 

This type of occupation was presumably 

capable of squelching incipient resistance 

;;; iu ce none was evident. On the other hand, 

it employed a much larger nun1bcr of 

troops than would he available for the perm<utent occupa tion and did so at considera ble cost in combat potential and 

discipline. The la rger units lost their cohesivenes.'>, a nd in ~ platoons and companies 

dis<· ipline weakened. Iron ically, the 

supposed t•hicf beneficiary, milil<try government, r.on tluded after two months' experience that the better plan would have been 

to form the orcupational police l>attalions 

General Gullion had asked fur and been 

refused 111 I ~H2. The tanical troops 

thoughL in terms of military sccurit)1 and 

therefore often £ollowed different priorities 

~ {I ) EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historia11, 

T roop Basis and the Disposition of Forces. 19117. 

in CMH file 0-3, 1. , CA 20, p. '{, ( 2) EUCOM, 

H'isL Oiv, U.S. Military C·oven1111Cll t iu Ct~nnany, 

Operations from L:1te March to Mid Jt~ly 19~ 5, 

J !)50, in C Mii fil ~ ll- 3. 1, DF, pp. 79- 93. 
THE OCC.:UP.\'1'101\ TROOPS 

th<1n would h.l\ c ht·cn most w>cful to military govcrruucm. 'I he puhlit ~afcty officer 

in ~Jarhurg. fur irt'itarwt, t'()lnplaincd that 

he W:\S lla\ in_g tCI spc•nd OlOSt of his time 

rxplainin~ t<l the t,tltical troop" wh} they 

should, hc,idt•, pniiCt till~ potcnti<tl c;ahota~l' targch .111d t her king pa.'-! c.,, nb o suppi)· .~uarclo; fr>r tht• $200-million worth of 

art wo1 1., 400 to no; of Gcrmn n Foreign 

Offit e l'l'lOI'd,, ;111d fl1

) tank (",U'i loaded 

with lllt'l'tlll y, .dl of \Vhit h \Wif' in military 

govcnHlll~llt rustody. 1 

The rlHI~l obvious ddcrt of the blanket 

occupation wa~ its impcnnarlcncc. The vast 

majority nf the troops were ~o g to be rcdcplo>'Cd ritiH't' to 1 hi' Pacilie or home for 

di'iC'hargc. Tla·ir work in Germany wa'i 

fini<;Jwcl the d.ty tlw war ended. Some 

troops would he there for 'weks, some f(lr 

month<;, IHtl all wnuld he almo-.t con!>tantlv 

on the mo\c outw.ml. In Jul} , after th~ 

\\it hd r·aw;d to the /one w:L' t omplcted, 

11.\EI• puhli,hc•cl ,, ll'' i'\t'd dt·plo~mcnl 

plan. II "·" ha,cd nn .ln a,-;umcd permanent oc-ntp.ttiuu rru n· of 6 divi.;ion<;: 1 ror 

the \\'c,tcrn ~lilit.tr) Oi"ttitt, 4 for the 

£a,tern ilit;11 Di,ttil'l, I ( lc.<;s I regiment ) ror B<•rlin, .mel I I c·ginH'Jll for Bremen. The ·'"'')'•type orntpntion would he 

retained but 1 t'' i~t' . Two rcgi111cnts, one 

;~rmon•d .llld om• a it bornr, would he 

trained and held •·cadr ''" a mobile !<tdkin~ 

rorrc. The otht'l"' wnttlcl l>r st:tlir and engage in ot·r upatioll tllrly hut wmdcl he stat ioncd in n'!{iiiH'nt:d , 0111 t·ntrntious ncar 

rnain udmini!>tr:tti,·c tcntt•rs and not again 

dil'..;ipatcd I >)' li.illalions ami nunpanic.'i.' 

1 Mt•tno, SIIAI~F. i\C:ofS r.-s. f'uhlk Safety 

)llh: T;wtic;tl I riK•f" iu Supporl of J.lilitary Co,.: 

enmtelll, I. Jut lh, ill 0!\lr.us 177 2/:1. 

' ( I I t:01hh•, 1-:i-t•nlu''"'' to Di~lrict CG'~, 29 

jul t'i, 111 0~1\.liS 1/:45, dl'<'. ~~!11 . (2 ) Memo, 

USn: 1', A(:C,(S (i i. for ('o(S, "'I>· Oi\trihution 

of Occup.won.1l C:toutul I· ortt''· II Auc; 15, in 

SHAEF SCS, 17<1 

32 1 

N ott-FMt N ttil:atimr 

The han on fr.ttcrniLation had hcen in 

fon·e ci~ht nuutth~; h> \' l:. D.t) long 

enough in the up inion of tht)~C '' ho had 

to enforce it <tnd, 110 uuuht, tno long to 

still lhose rcquir <'d tu uh'c'l\ \~ it. ;\ftcr· his 

tour of on:upic:d GcrnMn)' in late .\pril, 

Colonel Starnt.."' n·nmHncrHJcd rcvi'<in~ the 

nonrraternization order.; " to n rommon 

se ~c ha..o;is immediately !after) lto.-;tilitics 

cease. . . . • \ non-fratc-rn iza 1 it\11 pol ky 

nn)•whcrc," he told S111ith. "with any 

people with whntn '"\' at't' not ;II wa r· will 

appear c·hildish, s<:nsck:;s, .tnd in a ver·y 

short time all of liS will l>t aslwmed thal 

we ever behaved in stu h ,, manncr:•r• 

Three days after the o;urrcmlcr Bradley and 

!:imith talked allo\rl rnndif)•ing tlw polir); 

at almost the same time in Wa-.hington, 

:\larshall wa~ t,dking to gJn\cr Davis. Dire' tor of the Oll~tl~ uf \\'ar I nfm m.ttion. 

The subject w,,,_ the Goer iu~ rase and the 

alleged friend I~ tr c.ttm<'nt of m IH't hi~hranl..ing Germ;m' whit h. Da"i' '"id nnd 

:Marshall rcportt:d in ;I t .thk tn Ei<.,cnhower, hnd .trou-.t•cl •· .tn intt'll~(· public reaetion, apprnac:hiug and in man> c-ases 

reaching hittcnw-..;." Smith lau·r· st·nt a 

copy of lhe ctthlc to Br.ldl('}' ,,•it h tlw C'<Jmment, " ll sc·cm!; to tile that thi-. i-. a fairlv 

good answer to mar t onvn sa tion.''" · 

For lwo month-. tlH'reaft<'r, SJI.\EF 

wrestled with itself, trying d"~pr r:tldy to 

enforce tltr nonfratl'l'nhr.ation policy :1 nd, 

just as clcsperalt' l)', to gc:t rid of it. du~cd 

with lctlers, tclc~rams, ami cditOI'bls protc.sting tlw Gocrin~ in< idt't11, J\larshall 

ordered Eiscnhnwcr on 1'1 J\l.1y to "~l imu

• Ltr, Col Joe Stnrnc' to r. .. n W II Smith. 

5 1\ln)' ·15, in USF T SC;S 011 I 

c Cahle, ~lar.h:tll to Et<C'nhm'l'r, I I l\1.\y ,,.,, 

and I tr, Smith to Bradh·y, 12 M.ty 15, 111 USFE1 

SGS 250. 
322 THE U.S .. \R~tY IN THE OCCU PATION OF GER~lANY 

late ~tofi<:s nncl pictmes showing the st<:m 

attitude of American military perl\onncl" 

towar·d German prisoners o( nil t•anks. For 

a start, Eise11howcr issued a public :;tatclllCIII disapproving all fomlS of rratcrniza1 ion and an order to the U.S. conummds 

threatening to deal summarily with ::Uly future inddcnts.r A week later, however·, he 

<L"kcd Clar's opinion on a switch to the 

milder· nonfr:Hernization policy stated in 

the 1941 Wa r Department's ''Guide to 

Germany.'' (n his reply, Cht)' summed up 

the dilemma in one sentence: "While it is 

r·ceogni7.Cd that discipline iu the Army 

houlJ llOI be: governed by puhlk opi11ion, 

we cannot wmplctely forget the effects of 

public opinion ... _, He believed tlral to 

rrlax the nonfmtcrnization policy, except 

po..-~ihly \vith respect to sll\;:1 11 children, 

would he "misunderstood b)' the prclSS and 

tire pllhli<".'' Howc,·er, he was apparc.rllly 

r·onvinccd thnt the "Guide'' policy was the 

ouly fcnliil•lc one. and he rc:c:ommcndcd 

having a tudy made to dr(('nninc how it 

w uld be put inlo efTcct afl<:t• th<: combined 

r.nmmnn<J tct·m inated. ~ 

Meanwhile, at-rests were: being mndc, 

f'nsc~ were hcing tried. and good combat 

soldicn; \VCr<' getting had rcror ~. As a tlelnn'ul, 1 he jud!{C ad vocal<''~ frcquc:ntly 

trit·d the C'it-<~cs a. violations of standing 

MdN-s under the Articles of War, which 

rou lcl result in as muth as six months' conftnenlcrll und two-thirds' Joss of pay. Wlu le 

no onl: imagined that any rakulablt: pet'-

Ct~hlr, ~larshall to Eist•nhowcr, J:! Mny 115 ; 

Cnhk, Riscrrhowcr to Marsh:lll, 1•1 M:1y •15; ru1d 

Cahlc, Jo:i~cnhOIH! r to CG's, 12th AGp, Third and 

St•vcnth Annie . U.S. Air for<'<'>, 14 M:~y, in 

USFgT SGS 25U. 

' Memo, \.('n Eisenhower to Gcn C.:l:~y, 22 May 

•15, :~tad Mento, US Gp CC, Office of Deputy 

M ilit:try Govcmnwnt, for Gcn F.i.eniH"I\\'('r, 51th: 

Nonfrntrr ni~oc!OII Policy, ~ Mny •15, In USFET 

SGS 250. 

cemage of tltc offenses was being detected, 

the number of trials held was not insignificant. The 28th 1 nfantry Division, for example, had sixty cases on its docket in 

mid-J unc and was going to try cvct•y one 

by court martial trndcr the Articles of Wal'. 

In May, the XXIII Corps· judge advonttc 

tried twenty-five rnscs against enlisted mcu 

and two against officcrs.9 The n~pcctor 

General1 Seventh :\nny, investigated four 

cases involving ten generals. The gcncrnl~ 

probably fared hetter than the enlisted rucn 

similarly charged. Generals Dahlquist and 

Stack and Drig. Gen. Walter W. Hess were 

found to have "engaged in social coutac.·t" 

with Goering, and Maj. Gen. Frank W. 

Milburn, Maj. Gen. F. A. Prickett, and 

Drig. Gen. W. II. Maris to have ''engaged 

in friend!}' contact" with Field Marshnl 

Gerd von Rundstcd t in violation of the 

nonfraternizaticm polit:y. The other two 

cases were declared not to have constituted 

fraternizatiOII. The investigation took almost three months and, the nonfratcrnizntion poliC)' being all hut defunct hy then. 

ended with n t·ecommendation to take no 

further action in any of Lhc cascs.to 

A curious myth associated with the non-

• Rpt, Fifl(•('llth Army, 5th lnfonnation nnd Bis• 

torical Service. mb: Nonfrnternization Policy, 

XXIfl Coap~ AH·Io, 2:l .I nn •f5, in XXIII Corp~, 

22:S- 5.0. 

"' In the other tw(> <:ases, the Seventh Army 

insJ.)eCLOr gct~~·rrrl found tlwt aj. Gen. ll lallwCII 

D. Tayl01·, Brig. Geu, C:erald J. H iggins, and J'3rig. 

Gen. Wi ll l;~m N. Oi ln10n: ''engaged in rontnct 

with" Field M~• sha l Alllcrl Kesselring but did 

not fraterui~c nnd thut Maj. Gen. Rolwn T . 

Frederick, "hcing unnwarr of the fact thnt thl' 

Excelsior ll ot~·l in ~lu11ich was fully occupied hy 

Americ:ll) p<·•'<tliHlt·l," did not cng~e in (r:\l!'rui~a· 

tion when he S'l't' otclcw~ that resulted in sonw 

American office~ :lt\U enlisted men hcing evinrd 

in the middll~ of thr night during a rain stonn 

to make room for n party of German genernk 

Memo, 1-lq:s, USFET, ACofS G- 1, for CofS, s11h ; 

Fraternizat ion by (:('rwrnl Officers, 6 Aug 45, in 

USF'ET SGS :!50. 
THE OCCUPATION TROOPS 

NoNFR,\TERNJZATJON 

fraternization problem was the belief that 

lhe ordinary soldiers objected most to the 

han on friendliness to young children. On 

2 June, Eisenhower reported to Marshall, 

"Continuing ::;urveys among our troop~ 

show that non-fratemization rules arc fa irly 

well observed except in the case of small 

childr•en." Because the American soldier 

could not be stem and harsh with young 

r hildren, Eisenhower continued, " the fear 

o( all commanders is Lhat the breaking 

down of the order with respect to the child 

will cvcnwa lly have its effect on the whole 

proposition and upon discipline in general. " After some discussion a::; to what 

constituted a small r hild ( Eisenhower proposed twelve years as the age limit, hut 

M arshall wondered " how a soldier is going 

lo tell the age of a child before being kind 

to it?") a nd after Marsha ll decided lhnt 

public rC<H'tion '"ould he favorable, Eisenhower announcctl the lifting of the han on 

fraternization with children on 11 June. 11 

The soldier's ttrgc to befr-ier.d small chil-

"Cnblc, Eisenhower, Pe rsonal, to General Mar· 

shall, for eyes only, 2 Jun 45, and Cable, r-.'l:trshall 

to Eisenhower, eyes only, 4 J nn 45, in SHAEF 

G- 1, 250. 1- 6. 
324· THE U.S. t\RMY lN THE OCCUPATION OF GERl'vfANY 

dren, however, was not Lhe real issue. Of 

five provost marshals interviewed in June, 

none mentioned c:h ildren as figuring in his 

frnternizalion cases-or, for that matler, 

any other Gennans except women. Maj. 

William Hill, 28th I nfantry Division, said: 

"Soldiers arc going to have their fling regardless of rules o r orders. If they are 

caught they know what rhe punishment 

will he. H owever, that is not stopping them 

and nothing is going to stop them." Maj. 

H a l N. Briggs, 35th Infantry Division, 

added, "There is n lot of r raternization 

going on and we know it, but to catch them 

is a different thing. ~ 

Exactly huw widespread fratemization 

was no one in authority seemed to know 

o r wnnt to know. Nint h Army repotted that 

German girls and U.S. soldiers were somelimes s<:~ 11 wulking in purks. ·The Gth 

.'\rmy Group noted a "surprisingly lnrge 

numher of young women"- Wacs, their 

french equivalent, and DPs- appea1·ing in 

the company of U.S. soldiers. Few of the 

girls, according to lhe army report, were 

in uniform . and most of them spoke German which "made it impossible to tell 

whether a soldier was violating the rule or 

associating with an Allied National." >!r The 

soldiers were more randid. They joked 

allo\ll the opportunity being given lhe Germans "to see Americans engaged in the 

most widespread violation of their own 

law!' sin<'e Prohibition·· a nd about putting 

on Frcn(·h uniforms so that they rould fraterni'l.e without a guilty conscien<'e. 11 

12 Rpt, Fiftee rlth At·my, 5th Tuformation ami 

lllstori<:al Service, sllh: Nonf ruternizal ion Policy, 

XX III Coq>s An•:t, 22 .fun 15, in XX IH Corps, 

223- 5.0. 

'

1 (I I f1iKl Rpt , Ninth Army, AC:ofS, C-5, May 

45, in SHAEF C 5, 17-H, Jacket II. (2 ) Hist 

Rpt, 6th ACp, ACufS C:- 5, Mny ~5, in SHJ\EF 

C-5, 504. 

"Rpt, fifteenth Arn1y, :'ith Information and 

One thing could not be ignored: in attempting to (orce on its troops a wholly 

artificia l standard of conduct, the Army 

was putting itself in a position that was 

both lucli<..Tous and potentially dangerous. 

No amount of pious exhortation could, 

once lhe fighting had ended, convince Lhe 

soldiers that they were not the chief and 

possibly jntendcd victims. Some said that 

" the polic:y is just to give the brass ~he first 

crark al all the good looking women." 

Others saw "tb<' German soldier getting a 

disdmrge, donning c:ivilian clothes, and 

making love to the women wb ile lh.cy [the 

U.S. troops] arc the ones virtually in pl'ison."' " Stafl's that bad engir1eerecl Lhe defeat of the Wehnnnr.h.t were having to 

match wits wilh their own soldiers and 

were losing. The powerful Headq uarters, 

12th Army Group, struggled with the problem of how to 1cll a female DP from a Germau Fuwelein and came up witJ1 the 

following solution: "an armband four 

inc hes wide, made of materials in the colors 

of Lheir respective nations will he worn on 

lhe lert an11 hy AJiied DPs as a symbol of 

rccognitio n." 1

'; One unit t1·ied is.<;uing huttons to the DPs, and the unit newspaper 

announced the move under the headline 

''Bunon, 13ullon, ' .Yho·s Got the Button." 

ln the Fifteenth Army area, a CJO detachment was reportedly sent lo watch a security gt~::nd dwwhment that I! ad been 

detailed Lo shadow an MP private who was 

suspcl.'tcd of flirting with a German girl. 17 

The Germans, SHAEF PWD reported ruefull)', could hardly fail to notice that someHi~tori ca l Service. sui>: NonfratcrniY.ation Policy, 

XXJ ll Corps An: a, 22 .Jun 45., in X-'< liT Corps, 

22:i 5.0. 

" I bid. 

'" l.tr, Hqs, 12 rh AGp, LO cc·~. Al·mies, ~ub : 

E11forcemcut of Nonfratcruization, 15 Jun 45, in 

SHABF G- 1, 250.1 I. 11 New York Times, 1:1 Jun 45. 
THE OCCUPATIO r TROOPS 

thing had gone wrong ''when large signs 

'Don't fraternize' have to be displayed 

every 50 yards or so.'' In Frankfurt, where 

barbed wire preserved the monastic seclusion of the SHAEF I'Ompound, the Germans were remarking that the .'\mericans 

were a people wbo built roncentration 

nunps ami put themselves in them.'' 

Lastly, thr venereal disease rate was tising 

<ulc..l wit h it a knoL of contradictiom. The 

SH/\ EF J udgc /\dvocatc pointed out ; 

T lu• very cst<tblisltnrcnt of prophylat:tic stations and the directi\'es n:quiring reports of 

the l'ontraction of ,·encrtd disease a re indiralive of the rNtlistic view which the Army has 

heretofore takrn of this problem. Soldiet's wi ll 

fraternize in thr nw rtner indil'atccl, in ~pitc 

of any rul e~ to the con tra ty, and should th<')' · 

fearfu l of lwing tr•ied by <'Ollrl martial fc)r 

sudt ft•:ttrrni;mtion, ;1\·oid tlu• ust• of prophylaxis or clH:ckllp, \·cnercal disease may bcrOlllf' rampallt t~nd complete!)' out of 

COI\ti'OI. ' " 

On 4 June. SJ-IAEF , \vith desperate 

ill ogir, published orders stating : ''Contraction of venereal disease or the facts conccnring prophylactic trcatmcm will not be 

used directly or indircdly ali evidence of 

fr·atcrnizatiun. . . . """ 

Fiuingly, rwnfraternization did not end, 

il disintegrated. On 19 June in Washington, Eisen hower said that there could he 

no fraternization in Germany until the last 

Nat.i criminals !tau been uprooted. Two 

days later nt a press c·onferenC"e in ;\ bilene 

he talked about abating the nonfratemizntion policy "<~s sQon as the trirnin als Hnd 

" Memo, Sl IAP. P, PWD, In ! Src, for Cit, PWD, 

~nh: Possihlt Rclaxatillll of Fraternization, 30 M:1y 

·15, iu SJ-MEF C - 1, 250. 1 II. 

"'Stan· ,\fin utc Sl.c·ct, SHAEF, JA, to G- 1, 17 

Mar •15, in SHA EF G- 1, 250. 1- 10. 

'" Mt•tno, Sll AEF. ACofS C I, for Distributiou, 

suit! Poll<'y olt R1·lntiuns 13 twc~cn Alli<1d Oc:rupatiou Furccs aud the I nhahi ta rlls or Cenl1;u1y, ·I 

Jun ·E), in SHA~ ~ C I, 250. 1- 2. 

3~5 

dangerous clements lamong the Germans) 

at'e sorted out.'' On the 25 th, in a group 

interview a t the ' Valdorf-1\storia Hotel in 

New York, GeneraJs J acob L. Devers, 

Joseph T. McNarney, a nJ William L. 

Simpson, all recently returned from important con;rnands in Germany, agreed tJ1aL 

" non-fratcmization must and will be rela..-xed in the ncar fut 'c "~' On 10 July, 

SH /\ EF announced that non fraternization 

would w nlimte except in special rases. Relations with German girls and lhe Germ::tn 

public, the announcement explained, were 

only part of the picture. Security was more 

important, and there might be serious trouble in ~he cumi11g winter·; therefore, the 

troops could not he pcrmiucd to J ratcrni ze. ~~ Four days la ter, Eisenhower annou need, ''ln view of the rapid progress 

which Jms been made in carrying out Allied 

de-Nazification policies . . . it is believed 

desirable and timely to pcrrnit perJ\onnel 

of my command to engage in conversation 

with adult Germans on the streets and in 

pul,fic placcs.''"'1 

Joyonsl)' dul>hccJ "the fra ter·nization 

order" hy lhe troops, tl1e Eisenhower revision went into effeel on Lhe 15th, a Sunday. 

Gladwin HiiJ, correspollcleul for the New 

York Times, described Lhe scene in Schicrstci n on the Rhine River: 

Tlrrrc was a 11ew watdt 011 tht· Rhine 

today- by hnnd holding t\m('rican G I 's and 

(:erman girls Laki ttg a(l\i'lntag(• of tire relaxed 

f(•strictiuns on fratcrn i;r,ation. 

In tlw !tot Slrnshinr of n Sundar afternoon 

they st~l on gmssy l'i\'C.:rbanks. rhugged up 

nne! down streatn in /\r11 eriran boats, and 

:ripped around strt'!'ts with tl\1' zest ol a child 

' ' Nr.w York Times, 19, 2:1, <rnd 25 J un 45. 

"' I bid., I 0 J 11l •15. 

"'' 1\•!c rno, S!li\C:F, i\CofS C:- 1, for Director, 

Phulic Rc-lntions Div, suh: Pnrtial Relaxation of 

N6rlfratcrni-.ation Poli(y, l!l jul ·1·5, in SHAEF 

C:- 1, 250. t- t.l. 
326 T IJE U.S. ,\R}.lY 11\ THE OCC:UPATJOJ\ OF GERJ\1.\NY 

I 

• 

r RATJ-.R:-:IZAT IOl' 

di\'ing intt• a box or n111d)' prl'viousl} accessible only br stca'th. ' 

Seventh 1'111)' l'l'P<>I'tcd an immedia te 

free and open minl-(ling of soldi c•·s and German civilians and asked for daririra tion of 

the a nnou ntcmcn l hcnwsc its rommander.> 

:1nd M Ps had no illstru\ tions concerning 

whit h types of rontac 1 were permissible 

and which were uol. 

Taking it" guidan< c from Eisenhower's 

me. sage to the onHnand~ and the War Department, which stre:-.,cd the limited n:-tlure 

=• Ne\\ York Timn, lti J ul l;i 

of the modification, SHt\EF (; I prepared 

a clarifying directive. In it, G 1 defined 

public places as parks and streets or enclosures such as railroad stations, concert halls, 

theaters, a r·t gall ri c~;, market pl ace.<~, shops, 

and city halls. In SuC'h places soldiers rou lcl 

engage in conversation <Jr cxC'hange "customary fom\S of wccting" with adult Germans, and walk and sit with them.:·. 

General Patton, the Third . \r ill)' C'Om-

"' ~lemo, USFET, ACorS C I, for '1 ht'ntcr 

Cmdr, sub : Amcndmt'nts 10 Dtn"r ll\'t') on Nonfrnremization. 19 Jul 45, in USFJo:T SCS 250. 
THE O CCU PATION TROOPS 

nmndcr, however, urgently ref) uestcd permi.<;sion lo hold organizalional danres wilh 

Ccrm~n girls ns invited g uestS, while Generals Clay and Adrork proposed 10 extend 

the G- 1 definition of public places and exdude onl y private home.'\, hotel rooms, 

IJrOLhcls, and \rm pon~>o rccl socia l events 

sur h as the dances 1LLon wt:~nteu to give. 

This last event, they mainlained, could not 

he considered puhli<'. G- 1 proLcsteclth:1t the 

Cia y-. \dcork de fin i 1 ion r.ould possibl y a llow 

soldiers tO eonsorl with undcl'irahlc women 

in cnlmrcts while prohil1iting sponsored 

dances " under controlled conditions." At 

the end of the month, the problern we11l 

to Eisenhower; he responded with, "The 

Thc:a1e1· Commander wishes you to IJe advised tha t he considers his m;1jor commanders ftdly competent to interpret and define 

the LCI'm 'public places' within the spirit 

of his intentions and th a t he doe.;; not ' "jsh 

lo publish any f w·Lher deftnitions or interpretations in this con nett on ,.~ , 

Although nonfra teruization had still not 

pc,sitivel)' been pl'Onounccd dead, from 

then on the USFET staff was roncerned 

only wit h arranging the ftmeraL The debate over the dcfinilion or publi<: places 

r11mbled on sporadical ly, hut in the meantime enforcement ce.-1sed. When the Con-

~r l Council,:\~ USFET's urg ing, ended tbe 

han entirely, efTective I October (even 

though the Control Council had not im-

"' Memo, CC, T hird Army, for CC, USFET, 

~u : Enlisted Men's D <tnces, Cc rrn:~n Girls, 21 

j ul 'IS; Memo, USFRT, ACofS G-5, for CofS, 

$Hh: Amcndm~nr~ 10 Directive on Nonfratcrnization, 23 Jul ·15; t.tcmo, USFET, ACofS G-1, for 

'!'heater Cmdr, s11b: Amendments 10 DiTCctives 

on Nonfratcrnizalion, 26 J ul 45; 11nd Memo, 

USFE.T, Dcp CofS, for Distribution, s11h: Social 

Associa tion witt> Ge rm an~. I August ~5. in USFET 

S(:S 250. 

'' Mt!rno, USFET, t\CofS G- 1, for CofS, suh : 

Nonfratt:rnizatiou t"olit:y, 29 Scp ·15, in USFET 

scs 250. 

:327 

posed iL and the French and Russians hnd 

nul observed it), the only prohibitions left 

were those againsl marrying Germans and 

billeting in German me ~r By then the 

sui>ordinaLe t·ommands had even begun to 

sponsor fnu rniz~lli n. Quite. a few experimented with systems of social passes. The 

passes were issued to giTis of presumed good 

r haracter and ~dmittccl them to unit social 

events. UnfCirtunatcly, som e implica tions of 

being registered m arie it difTimll to iJHerest 

th e kimls of girls the commands wanted 

ost. ' 

ln November, after six months of lhc 

occ:upation and nearly thr-ee months of tolerated fr a terniza tion, USFET surveyed soldier opinion on the Germans. Nearly 80 

pcrtcnt of the soldiers inlervicwcd said 

their impression was favorable. They most 

liked the Germans' de:tnHness and industriousnc-;s a nd nlost disliked their "air of 

superiority and arrogance." l\lthough c..xa ctly half still liked the English J,e.c;t, 28 

percent said they preferred Lhe Germans 

and onl y 1 I percent t he Frenrh. Less than 

ha lf (43 percent ) blamed the German 

people fOJ' lhe war and fewer ( 25 percent) 

imputed to the people responsibilit)t fot' Lhe 

concentration ramp atrocities. The solrliers 

were nlso nsked bow mur h time they had 

spent during the previous seven days and 

seven rl ig hts " ta lking" (including contacts 

"other tlhan those of purely tOJWel'sational 

nnture") with Germans. Few had associated m all with older Germans and fewer 

still with men their own age, while 56 pcrc:cnl had spent some time "talking' ' with 

German girls, 2:) percent for ten hours or 

morc .~ ' 

' ' H isl RpL Seventh Army, U May-.:lO Scp 45, 

in Scvc·nth 1\rmy, l 07- :l.O. 

:o Hqs, Sf'ET, t&E. Rcsc:1r!'h :~ ll' , Swdy Nn. 

I. The Amcrk ml Soldier j n Gcrmruly, Nov 5, 

in USFET SGS 250. 
3211 '1' 11 ~ U.S. \lUI\' IJ\" THE O<.CllP.\'1'10.\ OF CI AI \ i'\Y 

W.utinw pl.lllnin~ h.nl ol "-'illlllCd th.ll a 

l.1rgc p.tll nf tlw folll'' 1 rqui1 cd to defeat 

J.rp;u t \\nuld t lllllt' from l.ur opt· .1ftc1 hc>Stihtit.., c·ndr<l tllt'r('. In carl} Nnwmhcr 

ICJH, l.t. (;t'll, Bll·hun n. ~Oilll'IVcll, Cum11\andin ~ (;t·twr.rl, \nm ~cr. it c Forces, 

h.tt.l told J:i,cnhm"'' : "Tiw Europt•an Thcatn of Opc•r.ttiCHh ... will in ran lle-

(()IIH' .1 ha.;c, tilt' lcw;1tion of rcs<Jun es 

wl1ich we· will wi"h lo divl'rt In usr in the 

Pacift< .... We arc going lo plarc immediate dcrll<1111ls 011 yo11 to J>tll )'OIII' mac·hinc 

in rcvcnw .wcl thi-; at lt tinll' when you will 

have In l>c !:tying nt\l your billeting «rcas, 

linr" c>f rummunications. p()rt~, railroads, 

ami other farilit ic.; for rnur juh of maint.tining ordr1 in <:t'llll.tll) _. •• ,. Suhscqtlt'nily, 

wi th tht• 13.tlllc of the Bul!tC' and the drhc 

iniCl Cn m.tll) •ill lllllllth' .riH'.td, l(•c lc plo~-

111Cnt pl.mning ~mll h h:,d ~Uilt' to ''ork 

in the Pcnt.rgon .111d ,,, I k ,ulqu:utcrs, 

J:TOUS \ . 

By the thi•cl \\ Cl'k in ~l.11c h 1(145, 

SH \ F .ullit ip.ltl'cl lr.l\ in~ to 1 clca-:c a 

milliou .111d ,, h.1lf l1rn1p' fur the P.tc·iftc 

and h.l\ ing to ~'rlll .tlluiiWr fiOO,OOO men 

honw for di~c h.uxc. 1 ( .onccruin~ the c;hiptn<'lll honw, C1·nc•al 1\rar-.h,lll t·ahlcd to 

Eiscu hoWl'f: 

rl is bn'()lllillg illl t·a~illg r ·'l'l'·ll'('lll tlt;\l 

the rnsk of r('adjuc; ting- thl· J\1'n1y ::mel 

prou1ptl)1 rdrnsing lo C'i1·ilinn life those 

puoplt• who <II'C SIII'Jllll\ lO lilt' IH'I 'd~ or tlw 

.):1punt·$o' w:tt' i11 •1111' 1ha1 ''ill dl·Juaml till' 

'l.lr, SultWfH'II lu l·:,.,•nht"'''''• I Nm· II. in 

LISFP.'I' SCS J?IJ, , ul. I. 

'' St-IAE I:. c: ~. l~ t·d ·plc•>' '"'"' llo wf, Ill .\l:lr 

15, on liS ~ I SC:S 17tl, 101. I For ,, tJi,tu,,ion 

of o·,·oh lu11 W.tr I lt'll·IMillf'lll .111cl J (;S n·dcpiO)· 

llll'lll pl:tn' in 1111•· Jtll I .oml the lpoin~ of 1!11.), 

>oN' Ruht•ol W C:tt.~l.ll') •IIIII R11h.ortl .\1 l.t'ii(IIIOII, 

Cloball Ql(islics n111l \"lllll't)· \\' ,,.fun~ron llnotl'd 

Stall's '\1111) 111 \\'cnhJ \\' Jr II , Jllt)ll I , pp. 'i !CI-46, 

177 71•, and '1IJI 111 

lliOSt 111\Sl fll~h .11111 IIIIN H'll(IIHI' dlllll!o 1111 

the pnn of ,.,~ )1111!'. I fl·.u 1ha1 1lw \\t'il•ht 

of public OJ>IIIIIIII Ill II II' l .S \\ill ht• ' 111'11 

that moh•s<> till' t.t~l.. " ltaucllc•d lllllJWrl\ \W 

may be forn·d In t:tl,c· IIH',I'lll t'' 1ha1 \\ill m· 

11'1 f1·n· \\ j I h tc•dt•JIIcl\ II 11'111 .11111 ll''lllt 111 ,t 

pmloru atimr nl rlw J .i p.tlll'W ,,,,~, 

~fa~hall ..:tipul.ut·d th;tt tht· uni" to ht' 

.;hipped to 1 he Pac ilit "t' l c to < c> nt.lin on I) 

the troop.;; lra'>l c·lig ihk for· dist lrargt. and 

those being "cnt hmnt• w<·n· 10 he onl)' tht' 

most eligible-. li e r('llll'llrht·r't'd, Itt• -;.tid, that 

in World War I thl' unit :-.hippc·cl 11111 first 

was often the tiiW nrost ronvc11icut rat hc:r 

than lllOsl <1<::-wrving.:'" 

What would tlctt'rllline wlwthc·1• 11 man 

stayed in tlw oc t~p lliOII fol'tT<; in German~, we nt to the f'.1c ili1 . o1 wt'llt IHtll\1' 

to he di-;dtar~cd w;,., tht• . \d ju,tnl St•rvirc 

Rating. Tht: mt ing w,,, r:dt 111.11nl individuall~ for C\ cry cnli'ot< d m.tn in the thcatcJ 

on the ha.;is of om• point for l-.u h tllolllh 

of sen icc since ~cplt mh<'r 111'10, one poin1 

for each IIIOnth nf m ,., ~· ·'" ,,.,'it c , jn< c 

Sept em her 11HO, fi\ ,. puinh fur l'.lt h dl·t oration m h.tllk -.t ,u , .rnd t\\ciH· poi11h for 

c.arh child undc1 c·i ht~·~·n up 10 ,, maximum of thrt.·c. J:i,enhowt'l infmmrd thr 

conun.antl<; lh.H tht· ~ \\!Hrld h,l\t' l<l he 

read~ ro rck.t'>C tht• m~·11 '' il h hiJ,:h ..,, Ctn·~ 

"when tlw lwll rim~s .... The fairnr-;.o; 

and spc<'d," hl' sl.•tt·d, " with wlticlt tht' 

rcdeployn1cnL is l':trri<·cl ntlt will IJc rc · 

nec:lcd in p11l>lit- suppur•t or thl· l';lt'ifi< ra ntpaign , in 1hc fmurt altitude (Jf the public 

to the :\ nny, nnd in lhl' ro11fidcrwc of thl' 

returned soldier in tlw .\rmv tornm,t nd ''"~ 

Tlw hell r·ang o,;oonn ll;a11 nn}'OIH.' in 

Europe anticipatrd. E' I'O US.\ had t·xpcncd lo '"'' c about .1 mo11t h .tftrr the 

"' Cahlc, ~l.lr,hall to l':i'l•nhlll~<'r 17 \ pr Jfi, 

in USFE'I sc;s '170, 1ul I 

"' l.tr, Ei~t·uhm'\ r tu I 1 (,,.n I t'llh II. llrl'rrron, 

1'1 1\pr ~5, in USI'F: J <;(,S '1711, 10l I 
T il E OCC:U P.\'J'IO!\ TROOPS 

surrender to get n•:1d y and then eighteen 

months to complete the :-bipmcnL<;. On 8 

May, the Wa r Department a nnoum:cd 12 

JV[ay (IS R- day, the da}' rull rcclcplormenl 

a nd readju!':tmcnt would begin. The .\djwacd Scn·irc Ra tings would have lo be 

":dn da tl'<l I I}' 111 iduight on I he I th , and 

tlu·•Taflet· thq • would determine all en listed 

as.-;ignnwnts ( olli( t·r~ wen· IICJl yet inl'111dcd ). On the night of V E Da) the War 

Ocpanutcnt reduced the romplction ti111e 

fr·on1 <·ig-htccn months to twelve and rnised 

tlw shipping qnota for J une front 60,000 

t1'oops lo ~40,000. Two days la ter 1 he department ra iled for 1 7,:i00 men eligible for 

c.lisch:•rge to [)e hipped l!y ai•· or walCJ' in 

~l ay and ordrrccl a minimum of 35,000 

in Jun e. ' 

' l'h<· nitica l s•·orc wa~ H;) for enlisted 

men ( 1H ftll' <>n listed women ). Those 

with 135 or n H H'C' points on the .'\d-

,iustcd Service Rating were cligiblr for 

discharge. Those wilh fewer pointspending reduction in the store- would 

sen ·c either in the: occupation or be 

redeployed to the Pat:i fir . FM these men 

and wonJCII in partintlar lhc Wa r Deparlmenl t•ck ;•·'i''J 11 filnt entitled "Two Down 

and Onr To Go. " ,t\11 nHwement:; werr to 

lw Jllad<> lly romplete units, whirh nccciisitated a rcshuffiing of personnel th1·nughoul 

I he th,•atr•· <a nd the classification of .til unit~ 

into four rat<•goric.<;. Category I Hnits w<>•T 

thoRl' <>rhcchdcd to ay in the CKc-npation, 

Category IT unit!; were those lO I 1e redeployed lo the Parific:, and Category ITT 

units wen· those !)ring eo ~a zed either 

11 ( l ) Cahlr. Mnrsha ll !o EiscllhO,,l',., ll !vl;.y 

l.'i, in USFET S<.:S 'Hl:l.:l. (2) l'vl<'ma, USFin', 

D(•p 1\CofS C:-:l, for Dcp CofS, s\rh : Rccl cploymc-nl 

"Ur,s•· ~nd " Downs," 5 Nov 15, in USFET SGS 

:170, vol. V {:lt M t'mo, ETOUSA, Rcdcploymc-rll 

Coord in:uing Group. for D cp CofS, 11 h: E<rl'ly 

Re111rn of U.S. Personnel, I :l l'..Iay, in USFgT 

SCS :~ 70, vol. I 

fol' the Pacific or the occupation. Categ-ories I, II, and 111 wc,uld contain no tnen 

with point sc-ore!; of 85 or over. Category 

I\' nnits would h;we only tncn with 85 or 

murc points and would fun< tion as vewcles 

for rctuming tltcnt to the United Stales. 

fn nw•theastcrn Franee, between Reims 

and C: ons-~ ur- \f rn e and the Aisne 

River. E.TOUS.\ cc;tallli.<;hed a n ass~ mbl y 

a!'ca to nc<·ommodatc 2:>0,00() nt cn in tent 

(·amps. Other ramps, c·apal,lr of housing 

11 p tr1 60,000, were buill in st:1g;ing areas 

nntr the embarkation pnrts of Lc H avre, 

Lt ~cill c~, and Antwerp. Th~ l'amps were 

named (or brands of cigetrette.'>, such as 

Herbert Tareywn, Wings, Lu cky Strike, 

and Twent y Grand.:

1 

•• 

For the first two months the shipments 

unt c."cccded the Miginal ' "' ar Deparlmcm 

qlJOtas. Nc:trl) <)(),000 111C'll were shipped 

ont in .l'vlay, ;dmosl 70,000 of them had 

high :-:corc"l.'"1 Units went in to the assembly 

:u•cas and on w the staging areas with minimum essen tia l equipment to eliminate the 

nccc'>.<>ity for packing and loadi11g heavy 

it ems. Allh<mgh they were !'lupposed Lo he 

trttvcling light, ETOUSt\ mders permitted 

the ti'Oop~ to carry war trophies " to the 

full c:-;t l">:tcnL practicable;' C:.'\cepting only 

cxplosi,·c-; and nonmilitary articles removed 

from enemy dead. The 20 th Tnfanlry of 

5,000 men cml>arkccl with :W,OOO ~o venir 

wea pons."; 

No ni<~tler how high the rate of J eparlmcs, however, hundreds of thousands of 

" ( I I Cable, Hqs, ETOUSA, to Dis1 rihulion, 

10 May 15, iu USFET SGS :-\ll:U. (2 ) J-[qs, 

USFgT, ACofS G - 'l, Oudinc Pion of F11nctions 

a nd OpPt<lliOII or Rcdeplo)•mtnl ~scmhly Area, 

no cl::llt•, in USC:t-:T G- \ :170. 

•• EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historinn, Redeploymenl, I!H7. in CMll file B- 3.1, CA 20, pp. 

112 aud 83. 

C:~blt', Com Zom~, lo USFET, 13 Jul 45, in 

USFET SCS 3:10. 1 t. 
330 '1'1 IE U.S . . \RJ\ 1\' 1:\ THE OCCUP \ 1'10:'\ 0 1· GE l \ 1'\Y 

tnr.n were going to h:wc to wait monthJ; 

il<·forc t heir turns ca 111e . Since 1 hey could 

have conslitu tcJ a mommH:nta l morale 

problem, especia lly whiJe the nonfr"lernization policy was in fo rc·c, the redeployment plans inr h1dc<.l pr vi s fo r training, 

cd uratio n, and n:acat ion pt'Ograms 

throughout the theater. 

The tra ining progr am , whir h was to 

havr pre pa red the low-srorc units for C'Otnbut in the P acific, never sta rted. t\ fter 

R- d ay. the nit~ were continuously occupied resh uilling pe1:'3onucl a nd moving into 

the rcdeplo)'ment "pipeline"; consequently, 

H eadqua rters, 61 h A rmy Group, which was 

to have become Lhc R edeployment Tra ining Command, founci it impossible to 

schedule even sho rt <:ourses. i\ ho ut the only 

units likely to he in one place for a few 

<:onsecutive \veeks were those in tht: assembly a reas wa iting (or ships, a nd they by 

then had turned in their equipment and 

mig ht he rushed off to hoard ship at any 

tim s 

T he education prog ram, aside from sustaining morale, was conceived ~o as a 

e<~ s of smoothing the lransition to <·ivilian life and of compensating soldiers who 

had had their educations interrupted hy the 

wa r. T he showplaces were the Shrivenham 

!\lllcrican University (ca pacity 4,000), 

Bia rriLz Amcric·a n U niversity (capacity 

12,000) . and the W arton American Technica l School ( <:ap acity 4,000 ). In addition, 

Lhe theater secured spaces fo r 32,000 sold ier-students a t thirty-five European c·ivilinn colleges. The instructo rs fo r th e two 

American universities were required to 

have M.A. or Ph.D. eg ee~ or their C(juiva lcnt ; a bout ha lf were hired fr·om U .S. colleges and universities. The two-month 

' ' EUCOM, O ffi ce of tht' Chief Historian, T raining, 19tH, in CMH fi le 8- 3.1, CA 23, pp. 3-9. 

<·oun;es, in fi e lds inrluding agrirulturc, rcn umc.:r'n:, c;<h H':tlion. .~ i nccri ng, fi ne 

arts, journalism, a nd liberal arts, were to 

l1e t'nnd11c·trd in a ne;l r-c.ivili an ntmosphcrc, 

reveill e being the onl y req11ired military 

fo rma tion. The students began aJ;sernbling 

at Shrivcnham in the second ha lf of July 

a fter ~;e nh owe r ca lled on the comma nd::. 

to give rhe program vigoro us supporr and 

fill their q uo tas with ''men who a re qualifi ed and interested '' l>cotuse "the eyes of 

America are on this progrnm.' 'al• The first 

rourse l>cgan a t Shrivenlwm, in the former 

American Sc-hools Center, on 1 Aug ust a nd 

al Bi rrit :t~ in a group of resort hotels, three 

weeks la ter. The W a n on American Techni<'a l S1·hool opened in mid-September at 

Warton in La ncashire, England, whil'h was 

la ter than the o ther two because of the time 

required to insta ll machinery a nd instructiona l equipment al>o11t $10 million 

worth in a ll. "' 

For those who could not m eet the adm.ission req ui rem en rs of the theater-level 

schools, the p lans pro\'ided comma nd 

schools to be opera ted h )' units clown to 

ba tta lion level. The instructors were qua lified military personne l a nd r ivilians, inr luiling, a fte r the nonfraternizatio n rules 

were rela xed, English-speaking Germans. 

The comma nd schools were a massive 

underta king. Seventh Army issued parks of 

I 0,000 textl>oc)ks to each of its divisions 

and supp lied hundreds of microscope.,, 

tra nsits, levels, phonogra phs, a nd o the r instrucUonal items. I n August, Seventh Army 

a lone o per ated 134 schools, offering ~ 

<:ourses to nea rl)' 44,000 students:• By 

"" Ltr, Eisenhower 10 Major Commands, 17 Jul 

•J5, i11 USFET SCS :153. 

'" EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Education and lnfo rmalion, 194·7, in CM.H fil e ll- :3. 1, CA 2 J. 

" Hisl Rpt. Seventh Arm)•, H :M::ty- 30 Sep +5, 

in Seventh Army, 107.:1- 0. 
T l IE OCCUP.\T lON TROOPS 

lcr-. CRI Alll PARLOR. inlentled lo boml morale duri11g retfejlloyment and readjustment. 

OclObcr, the theater total was nearly 300 

schools. Soldiers couJd a lso take free courses 

for high school or college credit through 

the U.S. Armed F orces Institute, whi<:h 

had its ma in offi ce in M ad ison, Wisconsin , 

and a European branch in Chclta nham, 

England. Detween May and September, 

o,·er <13,000 soldiers were enrolled m 

USAF I COUI'SCS. I!! 

ntcrtain mcnl and recreation programs, 

cons.itlcred important to mora le during the 

wnr, were conLiJlucd a fter tbe German sur-

" TSFET, Progress Report, Nov 5. in Admiu 

Hist Collcctiou, I?.TOUSA No. 4•1!1. 

render. The sixty-six USO (United Services Organizations) shows in the theater 

on V- £ Day played to three-quarters of 

a million men a month. St~lrs such as J ack 

Benny, Buh Hope, Raymond M assey, a nd 

Shep Fields colltinuccl to perform, hut the 

lesser known professionals became noticeably mo1·e tcmpermt:nta l a fter the war was 

over and ra1·ccr opportunities at home 

beckoned. USFET a lso h ad to point oul 

that the USO performers were there to 

entertain the enlisted men and not to acr 

as social companions for high-ranking 

offi cers. Jeep Shows and Soldier Shows, 

using Army personnel, provided additional 
T ill·: U.S. \ R t\IY IJ'\ Til E O(:(.liJ' \ '1'10;\' OF CER,\1.\;\\' 

li Vl' Cll tC'J'lainnH'Ill. 'J'hr<"<:· lllld rou r-111an 

.J eep ~how tCi\111" pcrrornwd attd hclpc·tl 

units stage LIH; it n\\'n shows. T he Snluicr 

Show t·ompan ies were la rge h l.o put 

on Broadway pbt ys . • \ t first the)' were· 

limited , as. they hau been Juring the war, 

l o plays with all malt: s, sut'11 as Colden 

Uoy :~ d HrcJ t!ter Rat. In the stlllllllcr their 

r<' JWI'loircs cxp;u ltkd whf'n US F ET provided func.Js fm· hiri ng civilian actresses, 

who were sonH·wlml astringentl y design ;tted ''( :i,·i I ian . cs.~; T cdm ic ia ns." "; 

During tht• summer, Seventh Army opera ted a Soldier Show School giving sixt)'· 

man 1 la!>sc.<: instnll'tion in staging, cnsting, 

.md uirc<·ting w mplcte showi'. As hac.J heen 

tile r:'lsc dttring th(' wa r, the mos1 :IV!Iilahle 

and most heavil y attended form of enterlainmcttt w:L'l lhc motion pic•turc. Out of 

a total a ttendanc·c of 32 million pcopk 

at all Lypcs of entcr1 <1 inment in tvby 1945, 

26 million were al motion turr~. An estimated eight oul of every tr n soldiers ~nw 

at lt:nst three ov e:~ a week.' 1 

To provide lll'tivr and passive diversions, 

USFE.T Special Scrvire..., stocked 2 1,000 

haskc tl> ll ~i . l OO,OO(l dozen tabk ~ 

k tlls, and nea rly 150, 00 d ecks of card!\ 

a nd issued , b)' November 1 ~14.1, 144::1 lib ra ries ( each containing 1,000 cloth-l>ound 

hooks), dose t<l 15 million pa pet•had .. 

honks, a nd over 44 million magazines. The 

most popul ar spectator s port wns football. 

.t\ survey showed thal :HJ.l haskctl lall teams 

had drnwn 2 1,250 spectator·, I ,200 LO uch 

football lcams a mere I ,200, nnd !JO 

football team:-; 379,000. ,;, Rest evidence o f 

increasing partiripalion in one un pl;mncd 

"EUCOM, O ffi ce <>I thr C.:hi1•f H isto rian, Rt:l:rcalion and Wclfa rr., 19·17, in Ci\.fl-1 fi le ll.3- 1, CA 

22. pp. :Ill 60. 

II j bid., (). :16, 

''TSFET, Progress Rcpud, Nov 15, iu t\dndn 

Tl ist Collection, ET OUSA No. I·HI. 

lt·istll'<' tilllt' aetivi t) w .1-; the vclll~ra l discnsc 

rate, wllirh went u p fron t 50 cases 10 190 

pe1· I ,000 l roops per yea r in the first three 

ntonLhs o f the occupation (;1nd w over 250 

lly l he end of 1945 ). T he :\rn1 )' It au u n ticipai<:U this problem, ln1t a check i1 1 Mtmi d l, 

where :'1 pproximalcl>• one bundrcd new 

venereal disease cnses were oCl'ltrring each 

week , d that the three· ma in prophrlac lic SL<tLiom wen' giving :tl m ost Lhrce 

trea tments a day. 11' 

F1trlou gh lr<l\ cl appeared to l)c the i>e.'>l 

prop for morale. 1L offered Ct) lllhl' t with 

l'i\'i]i;lll society, relief from the milita ry 

t'<Jutinc and lhr stq.> poscd strain of nonft·a tcrniza tion, instruc th·c expr rienrc, and a 

I:L<;te (with a marked GJ navor) nf whnl 

had former! } been the life of the privileged. 

Before \' E Day. ETO US.\ opened the 

Ri viera Rencational . \t•ca in sottllwm 

Jo'm iH'C, with 1 B,OOO acc·ommodations at 

Nice (fo r enlisted nicn ) and Cannes (for 

olliccrs). lncx pensh·c toms in Franec, Engl:md , Belgium, Holland, and SwilLerhlnd 

were oiTered a ft er hostilities end ed. P aris 

atlrancd the most soldie r-sightseers b)' far, 

and visit!'; there had to l)c limited to fort yeig-ht hour::; throughonl the summer of 

194,5. 

The U.S. zone in G erma n)', in spite of 

l he w;1 r d am;1ge, ofi'cr ed a va ricl) nf tourist 

ntlractions. (.\ st;-t ndard military govcrpmcnt jnkc was th a l the Russians had recei,·cd the agrir ulture. the Briti!'> h the 

ind ustt')', and the .\mericans the scenery.) 

l11 lhc summer of 1945, US FET Special 

Services o pened a rest <1 nd rcncation center 

<tl Bcrchte:.;gaden tha t riva led the one on the 

Rivicr<t. C ivilian guide.'> rondur tcd Lours for 

tltrec hunch ed men a d:'l)' a t Hcidclhcrg. 

"' H,ls, 'I'SFF.'I', O ftkc of 'l'h<:alcJ· C hief Surgeon , 

~u ): V('nerc•11 i~c: se, E.a ern Milil:ll')' District, 

15 Nov l.'i, in USFET SGS 720. 
'1'1 IE 0( Ct ' P,\TJO.'\ TROOPS 

'I'll <· 111<1 ! popular tnu rs in Germany werr 

the Rl tin<· jo11rs. Frum three rivcr~ide hotds 

at ssman~hattSl' ll. p<trtics of soldiers were 

taken on lltOtor rides tu poin ts of hllcre~l 

in the Rh ine , ,tllcy. T hr clima~ of the 

thrrc-day tour w<ts :t seven-hour l1oat ridr 

from 1im: to Kol>l<·nz .. \t Serhcnhein t. 

ncar nn nlt <·i 11 1. ~rvc 111h \ rm} main -

ta ined the ''Specia l Service Cit y," which 

hmased the Soldier Show Srhool <L" well as 

uthc•· atltldil' and musir schools a nd provided billets .tnd messes for Rcxl Cross 

workers, USO tmu pes, and sold ier-tomists. 

It rould accc>mntotlntc nca rl)' ~,00(1 person~ 

a nig ht anti scn ·rd 4~, 0 nlenls per week . 

. \ t Karlsruhe , the main junction fur leave 

trn ins going to Fr<uwe, the Karl ruh c Hotel 

cot lid billet I ,000 prr.sons a nig ht and serve 

.').()()() meals a U:l)'· The most unusua l hotel 

was at Kassel where a large a id raid she lter 

had been converted into an underground 

hole! \vii h :wcormnodmions for two hundred people. Possiblr the most e legant lwtel 

was t he ( :.tstk Sdtncnstatl l ncar J\ [arhurg. 1

; 

l3y mitl-sutnmcr 1945, the scan..:h for 

morlde-:-;11sU1ining \'i cc.~ wa,., being 

-;trctched to, :tltd perhaps somewhat beyond, thr i11 it ~ or fr.asibi li t)'. In Jul)', Geneml I nrsha ll \ isit ed Paris and the 

Bcn:hLesgadcn renter and pronounrcc.l thr 

efTorts bci11g made there for murale "splendid,'' hut he ta•nc away worric·cl thett the 

enlisted men were still not gettiug the " feeling of i~td epcnden< c whir h all . \mc ricans 

crave.'' He ropo~ed Lhal each regiment, 

for a week at a time, give trucks, rations, 

and gasoline allowanres to sma ll groups of 

about len men and let them go anywhere 

t hry pleased except into the Soviet zone. 

Eisenhower thought the idea was good and, 

" ( I ) EUCOi\•1, Recreation and Welfa re, pp. 

129-:11. (2) Hist Rpt, Seventh Arm)•, H ;~y 30 

Sep +5, in Seventh Army, t07,3--0. 

r;lllWr gi11gcrh , p ltSS<'d it along 10 the . \rill) 

romnlllltdcr~ with t ht: rommc tll thai he 

wottld ''like to sec stt c:h cxl'u rslons permitted 

insofar :L" ltwal onditioll~ will rrrmit.'' The 

rr~u lt was the csta l 1lishmcnL of a t'HI<'gOt') 

known 11s Military Vacation Toms, of 

whicl t ft:w were takt'tl. Confronted wit h n 

steeph' t·i:-;ing train< atticlent rate and a 

gro.,v it ~g I 1lack market, roml11<lndcrs, mt•(·h 

a!> they might have agreed with the spirit 

of General Man;hall's proposal, could not 

lu·ing tlwmsch·cs lO lllrn loose on the roads 

of wcstcm E urope small groups of men in 

trucks \Vith no supervision. 1

' In September, 

USFET's 'vV.\ C Staff Director, Lt. Col. 

.Mary A. Ha llaren, proposed revok ing the 

prohibition on social <·ontarts between enlisted personnel ;mu o£Ti rers of opposite 

sexes s a means of boosting tht> morale 

of cnlist<:d wl!men. T o 1 his proposal 

U~ FET c; I gave short .shrift, saying the 

in terest of high-ranking male offi cers in cnli:;tcd women would undermine the vVAC 

orTiccrs' a uthorit y. Besides, G- 1 felt the 

problem wmlld soon go away hccaust: all 

~u·s were to be redeployed hy I April 

I ~l11i. '" 

In spite of the oll'erings in educa tion, entertainmen t, and ecre li on, surveys condueled in July indicnted th at the high-score 

lllCll wantetl nbove all to go home. An 

Army-wide survey revealed that in the 

Pacilk particularly, delays in gelling the 

digil>lt.: men home were gcnentt ing dissatisfaction with the whole point syS[em. I n 

Europe, where the wnr was over a l least, 

" ( I ) t .tr, lvi:Hsball to Eisenhower, ~! I Jul 45; 

l.tr, Eisenhower to l'.'la rshall, 17 Aug ·1-5; and 

I lr, gi$cnh ower to Major Commnnds, 18 Aug 

~'i. in USFET SCS 'I'W.I l , (2) EU(;OM. Recreation <tnd Welfare, p. I Ci2. 

•· Memo, 1-lqs, USFET, ACofS C-1, for CofS, 

suh: Policy Covcmiug 00'-Duty Associatious Bclwccu Commissioned and Enlisted Personnel, 20 

S1'1> ·1·5, i11 USFF.T SCS 330. ! \. 
THE U.S . . \IUl\' 1 . THE OC:<:UP.\'1'101\' OF GF.RJ\fAi'\Y 

mil rl lll d isgt'ttn t len tent was cs~ evident ; 

hul almost half the n•rn complained th<tt 

their orrirct•s had giv<:n them no explanation for thr drlnr in their departures. 1\{om 

toncctl y a~snmcd that the cause was a 

shoctagl' or shipping space IHll said that 

tilt:)' had nut he<.:n so informed. Shocked 

to disrovcr I hilt ,til the eiTort and expense 

might go for uothing because of a simple 

failure to cotnnlttnirate, Eisenhower 

ordered: ··noth offi cers and en listed men 

will llc fully informed of the reasons for 

delay in ronncrtion with their return home 

and cw frivolu11s an~wcrs will 1,, . . iven to 

Hll)' inquiry on this subject."''" 

Tht> sC.('ond atOmic bond> was dropped 

in Japan on 9 \u ll~t, and the next day 

Marshall told Eisenhower to he ready, ns 

so011 as J;tpan !'apitularcd, to reverse lhe 

redcplnyntcnt- rcadju tnwnt priorit irs. Fir:~ t 

pri ri!~ , he· sa id, should ~o lll t lw n1cn 

eligible for dcmol,ilization, those with 85 

pniclls, and plans should also l>e made for 

moving mil the men with at least 75 poittl!>. 

Wlc<:n Ei:-;erilwwer asked for a month to 

denr the pipeline or more than ~80,000 

low-score men alrcauy procc~sc d and awaiting shipment, Mnrshall replied : "Thr pressure here is terrifiC'. 'l'he demands for 

rmin tlion of Sclcni,·e Sn\'icc incrta:-;c 

daily, a WHit of :1 tnOnth hcfC!I'C' met) he,gin 

In pour i11to the U.S. will greatl y acn·ntwttc 

0 111· clifTitullics."'" On 15 \u thc War 

Department dircl'tcd Ei::;cnhower to reverse 

the pt ritie~ immediately and prepnre Lo 

ship 1111L 1,716,000 men by lhc end of .J:~nttary I ~146 . f<o-s hall informed Eisenhower 

"' lvl cmo. om,c of tlw Chie>f of Staff fU.S. :\nn)•] 

for tilt> Chief of St;dT, sui,>: MPR Section 10, 

23 Aug ·15, ~ nd J\ t~lllo , H CJ S, USfET, G- 1, for 

UofS, I Sep ·15, in USFF.T SC:S 3:·HU I. 01 Cahlc, :~r~ ll to Ei~cnhowcr, tO Aug ·15; 

Cal,lt, r::iscnhowt'r to }..l nr5h:tll, 1'1 Aug ·15: C;tl!lc, 

Marshall lo Eisenhower, I 5 Aug ·15, in US E'I' 

SGS 370, vol. 1 f I, 

lltal he <:ould 11 0 t cxpc:< t to ha ve an y men 

with -"<'ore-; over 45 ldt in the theater a fter 

I .\pril 1946 t~ nd therefore should ~creen 

0\1\ from among the low-score men in the 

pipeline s many men with less than 4·5 

points as he rould. ~·" 

Since R- day, the dct·isi\'C' dement in the 

long-range plann ing for the occupation had 

I1CC11 t)l<' O<Tttpatiun;d Troop Ba . ..,is, the 

total number of troops lO he leJt in Cern 1<111)' t and .'\ ustria ) after 1 he redeploymen L and 1·ead jusunen t were completed. 

The ori!{inal 0!'rupational Troop Basis was 

4(H,500, to be reached a rear and a half 

t~l'tcr the surrender. In May, thr \Vnr Dcp::trtment rcJurcd the limt to one year. In 

.\ngust. it reduced tht' ntnnl,et· of troops 

to ~70.000. with a strong intliration that 

tltc final figure would he suhst antiall~· 

lower. The shipping schedule set in . \ugnst 

wmdd I )ring- US F ETs st rcngt h J own to 

thi~ numl>er l>y the end of J a nuary I D4·6. 

'I' he low point would 1 !C n;acbccl in the 

111iddlc of the first postwar winter, when 

('iVi l lliWCSI, if it O(Tllrred ;11 ;dJ. WHS to l1c 

expct:ted in Germany and wlwn lht' .'\rmy 

would pmhalll~· still ha,·e to l'are for a bout 

H half million DPs and gmu·d many thousands of war prisqners a nd internees . . \ftcr 

US I.'ET pointed nut that it would btke 

I 00,000 l roops just to guard and mnintain 

the $fl billion (six million tons) or nrplus 

propert)' left in the theater, thr. \ ar Departmen t in Septcml>cr approved a liquidal ic;n forc-e of :137,000 troops, which could 

lw used to postpone the reduction to the 

Orn cputional Troop Basis tmtil 1 Jul)' 

I<I,J.Ci. Concerning the dlk ienry nnd quality 

,, ( l ) Cnhlr, l\•lntshall to !;:i ~cnho , I I Aug 

15, iu USFE.T SCS :170. 1·ol. Ill. 12 l USFET, 

G- :l, WC'ckly Sumnwry of Acti1•icirs, :11 Aug 15, 

i 11 USFE.'I' SGS :1 19. 1 I / 6, vol. I. {:I\ J\..lr mo, 

USFET, Drp ACofS G- :1, for Dcp CofS, suh: 

HcdcpiO)'I11('nt ''Ups" and '''Downs," 5 No1• •15, 

in US FET SGS :!70, vol. V. 
'J'!I E OCCt: P.'\'1' r Oi'\ TROOPS 

of tlw troop'>, however, either in Lhr Liquidation Furrc or the Occupational Troup 

Basis, the War DrpartnH~nl bad nothing 

10 on·cr. Tht~ point '\('(IJ"C was lo he the sole· 

det('nlrinant of \vhctha a man wcrll or 

stayed, and all high-score men woultl go. 

Until January some relatively experienced 

men would he available while awaiting 

shipping. Thereafter pul>lit opinion would 

determine how man)' troops uf any kind 

stayed, and i'vlarshall tolu Smith, "lt will 

he clifficLJl for· the Arm}' to ex plain each 

c:1se arising without a thorough investig;a1 io n .. ,,,,. 

The War Dcpannwnt supplied enough 

ships to transport over 400,000 men in Sepl(:mher and proposed to do the same in 

October; hut in that month it had to rctum 

th<· Quean Elizabeth <.~ nd llquitnnia (each 

n tplll>lc of tran portin~ 20,000 troops a 

mont h) lo British service and had tO loa n 

the .British ten Victory ships in order to 

keep the Queeu MarJ•. In NnvemllCJ'. the 

troop rwmber again went over 400,000 

when Liberty a nd Vinory ships were sent 

l!;wk in llallasl from U.S. cast <'Oa!>t 

p01·ts-to the H1 ro mp nim nt of threatened doc-k workers slrikcs-and the hallieship Jll nshiu.!flrm, three heavy n uisers, fom 

light aircraft carrier:;, nnu Lhe raptured 

German liners Eurnpo and T"ulcnni(l were 

prr§cd into service as troop transports. ,\t 

tilt end ()f December the theater slTength 

was clown lo 6 1 + ,000 l roops and was 

9:~.000 below the combined total of the Oc1 upatiotHtl Troop Basis and Liqu idation 

Force.'" 

... ( I l Urafl, T SFC.T. ACofS G- 3, Redeploy· 

nwnt Briefing, :1 Scp 45, in US ET G-::1, :no. 

C2) Cable, Handy 10 Smith, :lO A11g 45, in 

·~UCOM, StaO' 1vlcssagc Control, Jul- Dcc ·1·5. i) 

Cahlr, Smir h to M a rshall, 24 Oct ·15, in USFET 

SCS 100.7-J. (·II Cahlt·, AGWAR, WARCOS to 

S•nith, 5 Nov ·t5, in USFE.T SC;S :170, vol. tV. 

'

1 I I ) Draft, TS.FET, ACofS C-:l, Rcdeplormcnl 

\\'hen Uh<' war was over cvci')'Onc WHJlted 

ltl go home faster than any fcasihlr llrheduk c•mrkl move them and with an intcnsit) 

that was TIOL going to l>c diven ecl l>y any 

anHHlnl uf penm;t.<;ion. On \'-J t~)' the 

students a t Shrivcnham American University stayed away from d nsscs and asked to 

he scn1 horne. \"/hen some who failed the 

midtcm1 examinations were rcwrncd to 

thdr unit.<;, there :-~s a ra h of attempted 

failures. Shri,·cnham and Warto11 hoth 

dnsed at the end of their senmd term. Biarritt. went in to <1 third tcrn1 with its enrollmc t down hy half.~'· The .Riviera 

Rcncational . \rca had more French ri,·ilian employee.-; ( 7,000 ) tha n sold ier-guests 

( 5,GOO ) in Oc·tobcr. Paris held up well as 

an :tltranion, l>n t there the length of stay 

rould he increased in October from fort yeight hours 1n a full week. USFET Special 

Service; ra11 a c·ontesl for Sold ier Shows in 

which UlC best ~how was to be given a three 

months' tour in the United States and indi,·idual performers would recci,·e prizes 

from Ho•llywood stars. The comest drew 

three entries.;"' T he loss of the two British 

lir1e rs and a related fa ilure lo ge1 all tlOpoinl men out before the end of October 

ht·oqg hL a plunge in morak in spite of detailed explanations from both the War Department and US FET. 7 

\Vi1hin three month!> t~ ft er V .T Ony, the 

13rie ling, :1 Scp 41, in USFET C<l, :!70. (2) Cable, 

AGW/\R, WARCOS to USFE.T, 2:l Oct ·15, in 

USFET SCS 370, vol. IV. (:~ ) Mt,mo, Hqs, 

USFET, Redeployment Co·ordination Cp, for Dep 

CofS, ~~~~: M ornhly Rpt, 1 Dec ·15, in USFET 

SGS :122. 

·" EUCOivl, dut:n li on and Informa tion, pp. !l l, 

16, and 79. 

"' RUCOM, Rcrn a1i011 :md We lfare, pp. GO, 

\0. :1nd I l~. 

~; C:a t,tc. USFET Rear to USFET Maiu, 17 

OcL 45, and Cable, AG WAR, WARCOS to 

USFET, \!:l Oct 15, in USI' E'I' SGS ;-1 70, vol. 

IV. 
THE U.S. 1\RJ\fY I:\ THE OCC:UP.\'1'10:'\ OF GERi\1.\ ·y 

arm}1 th.ll haJ (kftHtc·d l'\azi Gemmny was 

uo nwrc. In a November 1945 combat 

cffirienc·y assessment, Smith reported operational uudcrstrcngths uf ofTiccn; and 

('lllistcd men and high pcrc•cntagr.s of pcr-

!-lonnrl '' poorly trniJJcd in tbC'ir duties . . .. 

.\ trnincd, htllanccd fcHTC of infantry 

;~ m1 r, and air and supponing combnt 

troops·· IH· continued, "no longer exists. As 

a resu lt, the fol'c ·c.<; within this theater are 

tod:t }' tuJahl<· to perform r~ny st:riou:- ofTen -

sive opc:rations. 'l'hc capabilil)' to cany on 

limited defensive operations is "lightly b..:lter . • \hility to pc:rform . .. oc-rup<1tiuna l 

duties, to rontrol the German popu lat ion, 

and w uppres.~ locd uprisings is rated as 

s~1 t isf:11"1 ory. ~-

Cutreury Control 

Curren c)' trouble began rven before 1 he 

lrC10lJS were properly deployc·d in Germany. 

l n Marr h 1945, Firsl and Ninth A rmies' 

finance officers turned in $52.875.60 worth 

nl Reichsmarks thal they had excha nged 

into Jollars for U.S. troops before- t he Rocr 

Rh·cr c rossing.;;11 Neith er the Re ichsmarks 

nor .\llicd mililat•y marks were convertible 

fm· the Germans, hut hoth were acc:eptecl 

fro111 U.S. personnel a t the rate set for 

.\!lied military marks, tc.n lo the dollar. 

The Reichsmarks were already obviously 

wo1'th :J great deal less. In an attempt to 

head off a possible flood of Rei<'hsmarks, 

ETOUSA, on 15 Marc h, limited the dollars an individual could send home 1o ;tt\ 

<l mnunt equal w his month's pay. Sinn· 

dollar co ver~ li s of German currency 

were onl}' made fm· transmissions to the 

._ Cnhle, Smit h lu Hull, 17 N ov •15, in EUCOl'vf, 

Staff Message Comrol, .}1d Ul!c ·1'). 

'" W:1ltcr Rundell, Jr., /J/nck Market M oney 

( B:uon Rouge: J.ouisia na Stale University Press, 

1961), p. :l:l. 

United !'$tate:;, the tro ~; would hopefully 

:u least lw discourC\ged from acwmulatiJ1g 

excessive!)' large amounts of Reirhsmarks.

11') 

The advance into Germany not only expanded the troops· opportunities fot• black 

nt;.trkct uealing in Rcichsrnark!i· with fn\lemiz<Hion as an incvit al,le hyprodun- hul 

pul the .\rmy in the q11c.<;tionahle rnol'al 

posit 1011 of oll ·crtin.~ lootcd German 

mo nt')' into . \mcri can dollars. au nted ~ 

too, by the nightman· of someday having 

troops a.uempti 11 g t<' C'(mvcrL a cache like 

the one recently t!IJ< overed n L 1vierke rs, 

ETOUS.\ o n 19 April ~top d exchanging 

and disbur<:ing Rcichsma rk:o; al together m\d 

ordered 1 he j.)ust n!Tin:.<; <II HI PX"s to slop 

accepting them for pun base-.'" 'lite· action 

was cfTertive, parti cularlr in •c-lic,·ing lhc 

.\rmy of the embarrassment c,f k vitilllizing 

illegally acquired anu prnbal•ly \\ etri Illes.« 

mone)'· .\ftr r V- E Dny, howewr, ihc llu•:ttc-r command ppt~rcnt y a!;.<:umed that tht 

ctll'rc> ncy control problem waJ': about lO disa ppea r ; in early Jtntc it began a llowing ~o

diers 10 t'unvcl'l and send lwmr !o;avings and 

gt~ mblin g profits in add it ion 10 thl.!it• 

nwnth"s pay. :\ perfunctory ottlh was sufficient to qualiry a lmost any amoun t ns gaml,ling prollls."~ 

In the meantime, after the !'tJrrendcr, lhe 

,·ah1e of the Reichsmnrk on 1 he bbr k n1arkct had dropped to 200 Lo the dollar. l'crr 

the Germans the Allied military mark!; 

were wo rth abou t the same sinc·e they coltld 

only exrlut nge them o ne-for-one ror Rcichsmark~; IJul the • \ me ricnn soldier, who sold 

rations, ciga rcue.o., c-andy, or any or ll nntl-

'" P. UCQl\,1, O ffi ce of the Chief Historian, Currency Control, 19-+7. in CMH lilt• u.:l I , CA li . 

p. 10. 

'" McJlto, USFET, ACofS C - 1. fo•· CofS, suh; 

Currency Exrhange Control, 29 Aug '15, iu 

USFET SCS 12:1.5. 

''"' EUCOM, Currcn<·y Control, p. I 0. 
THE OCC:U PATTON TROOPS 

litudc of things (including government 

properly) llmt the Cel'n1am were willing 

t o bny HL l>lack mnrket prices, rould convert the Allied military nwrk.c; a t ten l<l the 

dollar. Dealing in Reichsmarks, hr soon 

learned, was onl y li htl y more inc:onvenicnt. Wltik the Rcichsnwrks could not 

be converted dire~tl y, the G- 5 Currency 

Section periodi<':dl)' put blocks of new 

Allied militmy marks iJ1to drr ul ation and 

ac:rcptcd Rcirhsnmrks in exchange.'':' Probably no army ever had so many sun :essful 

"gambler-;.'' They could ydl y mis~, of 

course, with the odds pegged at twenty to 

one in their favor. 

f n the ens tern ?.one, the Russians were 

p<1 )'ing ofT their troops, most of whom had 

not l>een paid for many nth~, in ,1\llied 

military rk~> printed from the duplicate 

plate!' givctt to them in 1044 . Unlike the 

U.S. soluier, the Soviet soldier did not have 

a choice as to how much of hi!' pay he 

wa nted to take in marks and how much 

in rnhlcs, and the Soviet authorities would 

not ('()nvcrt either the Rcidtsma rks or 

:\!lied tnilit n•·r marks. T he so ldi ~ bad to 

spenu the money or risk being transferred 

oul of Ge rmany and losing it. 1n the first 

weeks a fter the surrender, while the border 

was almost hermetically scaled to everything else, the Soviet marks began toming 

aero~ in cxrhange for cigarettes and 

ca ndy; some ~; aid the Soviet troops \vere 

even giving the money away. Dotlbting a t 

first that the Soviet-printed marks could IJe 

identified exrept by experts, SH!\EF told 

the War Department that the whole mone-

"" Memo, USFET, ACofS G- 1, for CofS, suh: 

Currency f.x~: ge Control, 29 Aug <1·5, in 

USFET S(;S 12:1.5. C- 5 also opposed \he >~ 11 

on the c·orwc:rtibilily of R eichsma rks to dolla rs, 

:~ppi!r ndy l>(•cnusc it tended to fL>rthcr dt prcss 

the val>tl' of lhc indigenous (;llrrcncy. See Rundell, 

Wack M (uket Jl-!on&)', pfl. 3:1 -35. 

337 

tmy progr am was enda ngered. The dHnger 

wa.o;; indeed there I ltll not llecause the 

money was unidentifiable. Someone, probabl y in the Bureau or Engraving MU Printing in \'\'ftshington, D.C., had a rranged 

that the plates thr Russians received were 

not c.:xarl duplic·ates; the Soviet-printed 

urn cy could l>c easily identified by a 

da::;h prin ted ahead or the serial number.

11 ' 

SH .\EF's foreboding, neverthelcs.<;, l>era rn e reality in Jul y Mtcr the U .S. gar ~on 

rnt ercd Berlin. Soviet soldiers willingly paid 

as much m; I 0,000 .\llied military marks 

for wristwatches and nearl y as fantastic 

prices for cigarettes, candy, soap, and almost anything the U.S. troops want<'d to 

sell. On 24 July, the Berli11 District stopped 

selling postal money orders and war nd~; 

the trnops had drawn a million dollat'S in 

pay during the month and had !'ienl four 

million dolla rs home.';;, How much more 

money the troops had nobody knew. When 

£nfantry Reorganization Company K , 400 

men being redeployed front Berlin, 1\ t'ri vcd 

at Carnp L11C'ky Strike in the last week of 

.July, every man had :c;on1e Soviet marks; 

une priva te had 70,000.~;~~ 

For USfET the. <iuestion was, '"' here 

would tl1c d ollars to r.onvett lhc m~u s 

come from? Presumably, in the long run 

n defirit t'nuld he passed to the Germans 

along with thr other ormpation costs; hul 

in the meantime, if the total amount the 

t roop!'i sent home exceeded the at.nount they 

drew in pay, the excess dollars would be 

"' ( I ) Cahlc, SHAEF w:~ rd, Eisenhower, fo•· 

CGS, 2<1 1-.hy 45, i.u SHAEF C- 5, 11 5. (2 ) Memo, 

USFET , ACofS C- 1, for C:ofS, s1> l>: Currency 

Exrhn11gc Control, 2!J Aug ·15, in USFF.T SCS 

I '21.5. 

'" ( I ) C.:nh!c, ex;, f.lcrliu Di <~t ri , lo U SPET, 

2·1 J•d ·1'i, i1l lJSFET S<;S 12:U. (2 ) EUCOM, 

C:urrc·JIC)' Goulrol, p. 12. 

'" Msg, C:ha nor 'Rase Sl'rdon 10 USFE.'l' Rear, 

25 jut ·15, in USFET SCS 12:1.5, 
:33R T HE U.S . . \R?-.lY ~ Tr-JE O CCUPATION OF GERl\L\1'\Y 

ones the theater did not actttall)' h<lVC. , \ 

dteck s.hO\ved I hat the Derlin District's dolh•r ovcrJraft in July was covered in tl• c 

theatet l0t<tlS. It al:;o showed, however, t,.hat 

the murgin was ~eu in g thin. Jn lvfarch 

l ~) 5, in lhc midst of the \vRr, the tronps 

had drawn $50 million nwrc in pay than 

they ~ent home, in Jul y cml)' $1 7 million 

ll1 () I'C: .''; 

The <mswer- namely, LO stop ronverting 

. \llicd rnilit ary marks- was clear hut not 

cas)'. The Allied military marks were evidence of U.S. determination to administer 

Gcnnany as a sing'le et'onomic unit. The 

Soviet Union, although it was not convert -

ing, had not repudiated the .\llied military 

nutrks ns tbe occupaliou ('Urre.ncy; it had 

merely made th<" money prarlically worthIes.-, Lo its own 1 roops. USFET could either 

do I he same- with r eadily predit'lahle troop 

and press reactions- or adopt some other 

currency for its forces, thus leaving itself 

open to accusations of having been the firsl 

to break the principle of economi c unity. 

The Rll!;sinns, of mursr, could hnve rai!ied 

the same ehargc if only their marks were 

not converted. U nfortnnalel}', to pn::servc 

the> principle, USFE'J' had to ignore the fact 

that there was no other :<iolution ahle to 

withstand the pressures, and ingenuity generated among the ps l1)' the prospect 

of fnntastic profits. 

Effective at t.be end of the first week in 

.\ugnst, USFET restricted the amount that 

could be sent out in any one month to the 

sender's pay plu~ ten percent and requ ired 

commanding ofricers to vcl'ify ami certify 

the transntittal.'

1

N The nhjet't was w remove 

the fre(•-wheeling gambling profits allowance, which could have been octomplished 

had the llnit commanders been ahle and 

.:; EUCOM. Currr. nry Control, p. li(j, 

"' Tbid., p . ~. 

willing lq enforce the restriction ; but with 

redeployment in full l)wing, many had 

nothing to go by excepL a soldier's word 

tha t he had not already sent out his 

month's pay plus ten pen.·enL, perhaps scvCl'al times o,·cr. 0Lhcr commanders took 

much th e same ntLituc.le w; they had toward 

lonting. that the soklicrs were rntitled to 

a tangihlc share in the vit'wry. This auiluuc ;dso !it'eJ!l ~ tu have l>cen sh<1red hy the 

thea ter ,·nmnwnd, until tht situa tirm 

reached a point ''her<' the troops sent home 

more dolliu'S than had hecn a ppropri ated 

for tbejr pay. This point was fast l1cing 

c~~C . Tn .\ ug1.1St the exce.<:..<; of pay over 

tlollar transmillals shr·ank to $6 million. 

The cxrc.c;." was a 111illion dollars higher in 

September. hut, no douht, on ly beca use 

more troops wen: in the redeployment pipeline and stationed outside Germany. In 

Cer·m:•ny alone the ddlcit was proba ltly nlrcady substantial. In Frn.nkfurt, the 

USFET Headquarters Command pcr·sonncl sent home: nearl y tlrree-quartcrs of a 

million dollars more th an they drew in pay 

in Septcmher.':u When USFET, for reasons 

not cogewly cxplnined, lifted all rcslril'l ions 

on dollar transmillals in October ns a preliminary to instituting a system of c·utTeTwy 

control hooks, $36 tllillion more left the 

theater than had con1e in ~ pay. The Wa r 

Department hastened to inform Eisenhower, "Whatever usc of dollars is sanctioned l)y your theater, either directly or 

inwrcctly through inadequate contru'ls, to 

meet 1 he !'On version of f orcign cun·encie.os 

ill CXC'.CS.<; of those Hll10lll1lS derived rnml 

pay and allowances or from dollar instrnmcnts is entil'el y the re.<;ponsihility of )'Olll' 

theater. . ,,," 

'"' Meu1o. USFET, H c,s Comdt, fur Dc: p CofS, 

~uh : Trallsmittal of f'tlllds, I 6 Oc:.t -15, in USFET 

sc:s 1. 2!"1.5. 

'" Cahlc, AGWAR, WARUUDIV, to CG, 
'1'11 1·: OC:CU fl \TTO~ TROOPS 

Cut rent y l'onlrol houks were introdurcd 

on HI l'\c>vr•nber. E<1rh ofTiccr or enlisted 

man wn~ givt·n a hook in whi< It were enler~cl 

hi:; rash and hank deposits held in the the-

<tll'l', net rn-.h pay for tlw last three months, 

and amount-; "''Ill out during this period. 

Sull~cquently, nil pa) and allowances :ulCl 

othC'r lega lly nrqu ircd funds would have 

tl> lw cnlc•·cd, a nd any amounts sent home 

would he deducted. When au indiYidual 

kfl the thrntcl' ht 'vni\ entitled to cxchan~c 

1 tlrTcnr~· only up lo the hal<mce in the 

ll(lok. The l'nlisted men'<~ books were hckl 

hy certifying onicers, who were req ui r('d 

to i11iti d C<l<'h entry; orTirt•t'" hdd their own 

hook:;.:' 

S(lnle wcaknc."\Scs of the c urrcnry C'Ontrol 

l11•uks were obvious from tlw outset; othcr'IO 

tool, more tiltlc to emcrgr. The hooks, for 

instance, cnabkd every prt'soll in the lhcatcr to send all his pay honw if he wisiH'd 

anti live rmirdy ofT hlttrk market profits. 

They also enabled those who had nut gotH·n their pr·ofits out du r·ing October and 

tlw first ten cla)'S of November Lo lcgititnizc 

'liii~Manti;d arllount.-; in their initial cntric". 

In the 50 hh P:.tratroop. c~iment, fnrtyfolll' rnlistctl men had d rawn $12,000 in 

pny .tnd allowanres in the three months 

hdw·e the introdurtion of the ho ~, and 

they had sent $13,000 hom<·; ret their fir~l 

ckdarations tot.dcd $21,000.· ~ The enterprising ;dxn qui<'klr diswvcrcd that til<' 

honks, whit h were printed 0 11 single slwc.'ts 

of plain whit e paper nnd folded to m~tk<' 

USFEl', 2·1 0t't ·l'i. in USFf1.T SCS 12~ :; . Tt.r 

full 'lOr)• of till' 0\ ~rdrnft, "hirlt l'wntually f(rCII 

111 11\':trly .1 quarlrr billion dollotrs. extc·nd~ '''c•ll 

lir:ycmd thr s<·opc of rllis volunw. It did, ltowrvrr, 

-rrrntlin rlw rcspomihilitr of th~· thcntcr anti was 

linully li(tniun~t•d them• withoni Ml(1plemrutnl ••P· 

Jlropriatious. Src Ruudell, 11/Qrk tlfotket ,\f()tltr)', 

p. llllf. 

"Start tmd Stripn, 12 No\ If>. 

" f·:UCOM, ('ltrrl'nt:y (.;olltrol, p. :ll. 

four page.,, c auld c·.tsil) he rountcrfcited. 

The) lc;u 11cd very !'ann. too, that initi>~l~ 

<'auld I><' fot·gcd and entries altered ::md tlut 

loopho t·~ still existed. F01 several months, 

th(' l<'lrgr'.rph rumpanit·-:, for inslnnrc, did 

a boo111ing husincs.;; in tckgra phcd flowers. 

The <'nmpanies ac:c·cptcd n1a.rks, whkh the) 

<·xpertccl SFI-':T to I'Onvcrl, and the florisls delivered not flowers b11t money, for 

a commi:-.o;ion.:., 1\cvtrthrlcss, the book!' 

<.lid. at ll'ast temporarily, doud lite full and 

free enjn) men I of hhu k market profits. In 

November, the tbealc• was short S 17 milli ~ ll~ll dming cnrh or the next two 

ntonlh); the troops converted $2 million less 

than thry drew in pay. ' 

Pnlice-T yjJf (), lljJnlion 

'l'lw 11 i nc-divisiun pt'nnanenl 01 C'lt pal ion 

fori'C planned for Ctnnany soon hcgttn to 

look lil,e an outright <'Xlr:waganc {' afler 

Jap;ur .suncndercd. The .\rmy expected to 

l1c dcJWn to lwo million men h)' ~0 Jonc 

I ~)4(i and to lt:wr " ut111osl diiTkull)' in obtaining maupowrr ln sustain 1 v('n that 

trcngth." 1:or the wholr .Europcfln theater, 

tlw \\';u· Depm·tment furra-;tcd a 111'11 ;•hie 

strcngt h of five divisions, with further redurtions likdy after 1 July 1946. ~ In Octoher. ~l.tn-hall asked Eisenhower to consider 

goinR o\'er to a polin.'-l)'pC occu pation similar 111 one heing devised for J apnn. in 

which :1 ttatiw Japatwsc polke for'<'c under 

.\ mrt•ir·an supervision and backed b)' U.S. 

l;wtkal unit~ would tak<· over practically 

the <'tllirC rc. pon. ihility for security and 

order in the t ount1 y. I lc also suggc-;tcd considering wltt·thcr f<u·c·i~n ntnnpowcr- Ccr-

;-, f bit/ .. p , :11. 

., Ibid., p. h6. 

"· Cnhh-, ll.111dy 10 IIIIth, !lO A1111. 15, in 

EUCOM, Stall ~le'-'l."lgr C:nucrol, Ins nnrl Outs, 

j11I- Dc·t' •1';. 
'HO TilE U.S . .'\Rt-.JY 1 Tl-tr. OC:CUPJ\'J'tO'\ OF GElUIANY 

GENERAl. II ARMON J JI:SI'ECTS A Cor>:STAillJI..ARY D&TACUMENT 

man, Polish, 1orwegin11 , Danish, or 

Dutch- co11lu be substituted for AmcriC'an 

manpower in the polil'c fon·e and in the 

•. tclical unitl> "to rcdul'e requirements for 

U.S. manpower and expense." Eisen hower 

accepted the idea of a police-type occupation but objened to using Germans on the 

ground of adverse public reaction, anti<:ipated in hoth Europe and the Unjted States. 

The War Department therea fter raised the 

possibility of recruiting other Europeans 

several times during the succeeding months 

before finally dropping the whole idea hecause of various difficulties, among lhem 

expense, language problems, and danger of 

increasing the prcs.<Jurc for the withdrawa l 

of all U.S. forccs.i'' ln the meantime, 

USFET undertook to devi ·e a police-type 

occupation of its own. 

A beginning had already been made in 

September, when G- 2, USFET, recommended creating seturity forces for each 

military district ( ancl Berlin and Bremen) 

to he composed of ~ r Ps, CIC detachments, 

'" ( I ) Cable, AGWAR, WARCOS to USFET, 

17 Oct 45. in USFET SOS 371.2 (2) U.S. Constabulary, H ist Subsec, G-3, Maj James M. Snyder, 

The Estnblishment of the U.S. Constabul:!ry, in 

Hist Div, liqs, ETO, 97 USFB-0.1, pp. 3- 5 and 

22- 25. 
TJ IE ()('( l ' P \'1 O~ TROOPS 

ami dist rirt nmstahularic.-;, The di.;lrin 

<'onstabul;lt i1)s would bt nwc hanit.C'(.I {':tva ir)' group~ taken from the lartil':d units, 

giV!' Il spcria l int> tr·ucLion in nlili(:ll')' govcrnllH'tH l.tws and ordinances, train cc.l in cmtducting r·aids and l\Can·hc.._, and cmplo)'Cd 

ns quiC'k , mobile sentrity reserves. C 2 also 

proposed u distinctive uniforlll, hut G 4 

1 uultl nut :~ upply an) !'>pcrial items of drcs.<>; 

and when the districts activated their <onstahula,·ir:o. in November, the unl y di'\tinguishing rll:trks were 1 he lew·rs " ()(:" 

pain Led in yellow on r he fronl of the lrrlmcl 

I i lll' t'S. 1r 

Fw r1r thl' idea of the distriC'I ,·<msla bul:tri(·s, l iSI:Jr l' in the fall of 1'11

15 evol\cd 

the concept of the United ))tate..; Conswhulary, n 11rlf-su lTicient seem it y fon c for• thr 

whole zonl'. Calculating on the basis of one 

Oll~t:\hk ( plw; signals, sup pi), :t nd air l't'-

l'Onnai.-..;;utc<: ) for 450 Gcrm.tn:;, Ei:;cnhmvc' infw~~tcd the War Department that 

a C'Oillil!II>Ubry of :3 8,0()0 lllC'I I WOtrld fw 

t'IIOIIg'h to t•stahlish poli1·c··I)'P<' mn trol h)' 

I J nly 191H>, assuming that lly tlrrn tire surplus pt'OJH'l'ly. DP, and prisoner of wr11• bmc.Jcns wou ld haw hccn suhslanti;rlly 

climinat.:cl. The estimated sn\ ings in thr 

Occupational T roop Basis would nnaount lo 

1'!1,000 spat·c..;. since the ~u pp ting tal'tical 

ti'OOJ'!o. t'CJIIId lit· reduced to lhrcC' divi.;ions 

ulld one army headquarters.·' 

Thr organizational plans, • ompleacd at 

the llll'll of tht: year, provided ft H' a llcadquartcr•s, U.S. Constabulary, c:ompnrahlr 

t<> a corps hcadquancrs; three brigade 

hcndq\larlcrs, one for cat h l.attrl rapitnl ; 

niaw rrgimcnta l headquarters, one for each 

" ( I ) Memo, Hqs. USFET, C 2, lot '"fajor 

C:mdr~. ~uh · Organization of Sr•·•trity f· nrcc~. 10 

Sc•p ·lr,, in USf"Ir!' SGS 37 1.2. (2 1 Snyclt<r, ~•tablisluueut of C:on~t:tl nl<~q•, pp. 9 II 

'' Snyd1•r, $tab i~hment or CollS<:thulary, pp. 

1·1 16. 

RL ~inull_t~llll'::h/..; ;111d tWl'III)'-!>C'\Til !';quad 

rons, lm·atrd so :t'l to covet• one or more 

1\reise.;'' ~ad1 l\tjuadron wmrld haw d1rct: 

rncrlr;.tnizccl and two motorized tmllp~ 

(thirteen nwn l <1 llw troop) equippt:d witla 

5 ar•mw·cd 1aro,; 111ounting :n-mm. t'all· 

nons (the mrchanit.cd troops only), qu.tr· 

tcr- and la:df-ton tru('ks, .30-calihcr lig)H 

machine tilt !~, Thwnpsnn suhmachin(; J;{lllls, 

rifles, phaoh. ;ltld w de and voice radios. 

The U.S. ( rt l.tlllll t~l')' w:1s to lw an 

elite fon c of handpicked men, distingui:;hahlt• fr·1>111 the other troops hy their 

highly polislwd ra troop boots, servile 

coats in place of the standard ~enlt l' 

jacket, gold :~ k scnr·vr'>, Sam Brown<: l>dts, 

and lantucrcd hdnwt liners cirdcd with 

a half-luch hhw stript• Oankcd lty two halfinch ydlow .;tripes .111<1 with the ( onstalwJary insignia ( a gold djsr border ed in hhtt' 

with the k•ttrr "C" in blue pierced by :t 

holt of li htnin~ in red) on the front.'" 

.\s lnlt" as micl-Fc·hllli:tr)' 1946, how(:Vl'l', 

the U.S. Constabulary consisted only of :t 

pla n and : 1 lw:tdqu;u•tcrs. When Maj. Gcu. 

Ernest N. Hannon was appointed c·ommanding gf'tH'ral un 10 J anuary. he was 

(or a time tht~ sok nwmllcr of lhe ron~ta mlary. By mid-Fehruary, he had sclcc·tcd a 

hcadrpaaltrrs l'taff; on the 16th, a nnlstahulary school opened in the former Adolf 

Hitler Sc h11lc at So111hofcn to Lrain nlCtllIJers of a cavalry reconnaissance squadmn 

as teacher.> for tlw main body of the coustahubry yet to he al<signed. 

OY The U.S. Con t.olwlary did not fm1ction in 

Berlin, the Brrmcn enrl:we, or Frankfurt, :lll of 

which had latic ~cruri ty forces direclly rc~pon~iiJI!' 

to USFET. 

•• ( I l li q~, USJ,.E.T. to Cors, War Dept, Ntth: 

Policc-Typ•· Mc·rhod or Occuvation, 22 D ec 45, 

in Hist Div. . WI'O, 97- USFR-().20. (2 ) Snych•r, 

Est~Lhli hmcm of Coustnhulary, pp. 32· :16 :Jud 

52- 54. 
CHAPTER XIX 

Potsdam Germany 

Quad ti f>ol'tile (;1)11 Lt•o/ 

The occupation en tercel the q uadt·i partite ph<tSe shortly ltfter noon on 30 July 

1945 when the llied <·ommanders in chief 

assembled in the ron(erence room of the 

U.S. Group Control Council headquarters 

in 13erliJ1 for their f-irst meeting as th<' Control Cot~n c. il. 1\l the same Lime, Tr11man, 

~ln lln , and Clement Attlec, who had rephtretl Churl'hill Lwo Jays earlier, were 

al>oul to hc~in th eir· final mcc·tings Hl the 

Cccilicnhof in Potsdam. Because Lhe conclusion nr l he PuL<;dam Conkrenre had 

been dclaycc.l :;omcwlrat hy I he change in 

the British government and hy an illne~s 

of Stalin's, the Control Council c·ould not 

yet transact ;t ny sig-nif"i('anl IHtsincc;s. The 

Rus.'lians had taritl)' mncle their pat'titipation in the (our-power body depenJenl on 

a sa ti n('lory for them ·outcome of the 

t:dks among the heads of state; and 

Zhukov, even ;~t this late date, would agree 

only to set a sched ule for future mertings 

(on the 10th, 20th, ami 30th of each 

month ) and to establish a mtaling chairmanship, wi1 II Eisenhower taking the chair 

for the ftrst month. VVhcn Eisenhower proposed al'tivatiug the control machinery, 

wlikh was composed of the Co-ordinating 

Committee (formed hy the deputy mjJitary 

go\'ernors) ::t nd the d irectorates. the bodies 

that would do tlte day-to-day work of mnning Germany, Zliukov demurred. He 

would have to get h.is governmen t's ratification, he sa id. 

The oL~clam C:onfcrcllce protocol, 

signed on I \u ~l, gave the ConLrol 

Council iL~ charter and it miss . The 

commnncl crs in chief, individually in their 

own ?:ones and jointly as members of Lhe 

Control Counc·il, would cxcrc·ise supreme 

authority in German)'· They would also, 

as directed I>)' their governments, lle responsible for developing orcupation polirics; the European Ad visuty Commission 

would he dis.<;olvcd.' I n addition to admin-

~tc ring <tnd observing agreed policies, such 

as demilitnrizntion, dec en trnlizat , and 

denazification, the Control <.:ountil recc:ivcd 1 wn mis.'\inns: one wns c:ru c·ial fmm 

the U.S. point of view, the ot her from the 

~0\ it· t point of view. The first mi. inn , 

which Prc~iJenl Truman had put before 

the runrcrcnce al its opening $C.'5-~ , wa.<; 

to ndminisLCt' Germnny as an economic 

unit.~ Twman, no advocate of the l\'l orgenthau Plan, had ncC'eptcd SeneLHry of the 

Treasury 1'vl orgen t hau'!'\ resignation nn 5 

J uly a ft er refusing to have him al PoL"-

d:tm.:• The President's own thinking ' was 

closer to that of Sli111son, who had wrillcn 

to him the dn.y lteJore the conference 

opened, ''The problem which presents itself is how to render Germany ha.rm1<>-s as a potentinl aggressor, and at the 

(Questions aA'ccli11g rht selllement of tlw war 

and an evt•nllml peace treaty with Germally werf' 

as~igncd co the Co11nci l or Foreign Mini~tcrs established by tile collferencc. 

• Truman, Memoirs. vol. I, p. 3•15. 

• Ibid., p. 327. 
PO'I'SD M ER~ i\ Y 343 

SESSIO N AT OA~t. President 7'ruman is at lit e far sidtt aftlt a table with Satretnry 

Byrues tmd lldmirtd J.enlty on his right. 

same time enable her· to play her part in 

the necessary reha bilitation of Europe. · q 

Tu urcomplish both purposes, Stimson had 

urged treating Gcrnwny as an cwnomic 

unit and stimulating her peacetime production while eliminating her wnr plltCntial. 

The President, no cl()uht, wished also w 

avoid the political <'onsequences of a divided Germany as well as the eronomi<' 

tonscquenccs to the 1\merican taxpa)•Cr of 

having to maima in a zone thal had no 

I Depa rtment or Stille, T he ConftreiiCI! of flllrlitl 

( Pout/am ), 194-5 in " Foreign Relations,'' ,·ol. I I, 

p. 756. 

prospect of heing able to support itselL ~ 

an earnest of U.S. commitment to Jhc 

prim·ipk of ct·onomic unity, he was willing 

to assunl(; a share in financing supply imports for all four zones on a ha!iis to lw 

determined hy the Control Co\mcil ; and 

on 29 July, he nssigned the procurcmcm 

and financing re hilit y for such a program to the War Department." The conference protocol ncc-epted economic unity a.o; 

a principle anti charged the Control Coun-

'(! ) 1/J.id., vol. r, p. -1·92f; vol. ll, p. 82 1f. 

(2 ) T he 'President to the cc <~ y of Wa r, 29 

Jul +5, in O PD :136, sec. V, Cnscs 10<1-
THE U.S. AIU.JY IN THE OC:C:UP.\TION OJ•' GJ.:RMANY 

l'il with selling up central German uc- parltnents fm fin:lllce, lntnsporl, 

rommunicalj\lll~, foreign trade, aud indusIf')'. The prcdominant- pO!'-<;jhl)' cxdU$ivcSovict <:011('(!1'11 wns with reparations. not 

from its own zone whCt'C it was a lr('<ldy rolltc·ting on a sca le w suit itseH but from the 

wc.c;tt•t•n zones. 1\ftcr long1 frequen tly shnrp 

tlchatc, the ronfcr<'nce gave the Control 

( :ount'il the scwnd mi~sion of C!\tablishing 

a level of industry for Gennany, thnt is, dctcnnining how mu<·h of its cxisdng pr()duetivc eapacitr the rounu·y would c~·d to 

subsist without being nble to threaten the 

pca<'C again. ny cxrc.o;;s would ltcrome 

available for reparation~, with 25 percent 

from the we.c;tcrn WIIC'l going to the Soviet 

:t('('()ltlll." 

The Control Counril held it« stcoud 

nwcting on 10 August in its pcrmnncnt 

qua l'lcrs, the building in which a year earlier· 1 he infamous Na1.i People's C:oul'l lr:1d 

1 ricd the participants in the 20 J ul)' plot 

il!taiust Hitler. In the high-ceilinged, newly 

rcdt•rorated !l~ion'l chamber whcrr the 

Nazi judge, Roland Frcislcr, had lumdcd 

delwn lr i.o;; scntcnn :s, tlte military g(lVI' ni ~, 

fl anked hy their deputies, poEtical ndviscr~. 

;rnd secretaries, took scat~ around a large 

oval table. nterpreter~ sat behind rach 

dclc~ation , and rct·ordcn; ocntpicd tahlcs 

in the- rorncrx of 1 he room. The rc~ol ut ion 

a('tivating the contl'(t! machint•ry wa~ 

quirkly :'ld<>ptec.l, and the mec tin ~ prorccdcc.l in an atmosphere of gre:Ll personal 

amiability; but when the responsibilities 

uc:quircd ao;; a rc.<:ult or tlw POlsdam Confcrc·n( r rame under consiucration, the Frenrh 

member, Gen. Pierre Joseph Korni~, annouurcd that he wo11ld h:we to •·rr!l.crvc 

'' ll. U. R:llchfurd ;wei W. 1.), Ross, Unli11 Nr/111· 

tnliOIIf As.ripww•t (Chnpcl Hill ; Ur11vcrsity or 

North Carolina Pn·~,, I 'lot 7 1, p. 43. 

his o~ili '' wilh regard to the l)otsdam 

decisions. v 

The sult~cquenl rnectin~c; were t·onductcd, in the words of one observer, with 

"few dic;scnsion~. all things tonsidcred," but 

with ' 'n tone of fataliLy."" Ft•a twc, not having hccn represented at Potsdam, did not 

regard it!;c(f as bound hy lhe agreements 

made there; and in the Control Council. 

General Koenig vetoed the !)t'oposcd central ro 11 olilil· agencies onr h)• one as they 

came up, cvcmuallr induding also a proposal to cst~hl h a post office department 

and a l<lW allowing German trade unions 

to orgt~n : natiom1, 11 )'· In rat'l y Oclobct, 

Gen. Cha l'lcs de- Gaulle told the- French 

press: "Francr has been invaded three 

times in n. lifetime. l dC> not want C\'er w 

sec thc c~tah li shmcnt of n Rei< h ngain."" 

The Rus.;;i:rn!l seemed to want to see the 

C<'onomit: ngcnties created, lntl when the 

War anti St<tlc Departments uuthorized 

Clay, in Ortol>cr. to C'tllCt' into a trizona l 

arrangement. neither the Russains nor the 

British would agree.'" The U.S. represen tative.<; rctu rnccl th<'n for almo):t nnothcr year 

to the: futile s~ of tryi11g to secure economic unification on qtntdripat•tile terms; 

nnd the Control C:ounril rctnaincd, as Clay 

prec.Jictcd it would, a n<·gotiating rather 

lhan ll govcr11ing hody. ntpaltlc of cnnctjng 

legislation lmt c omplctcly d<'pcnd('nt on the 

separntc ~mml au thoriti<'s for enforcement. 

While till' French :tttit\ldC ;dune was 

enough to nipple the Coni rol Council, it 

in fact orll y nw.sked a fundamentally more 

formidabk oh-;t~H le 1o the trrauncnt of 

German~ :r. an C<'OIIotnir unit, twmcly, t h<· 

'OMCUS, fli~rory, l'h. Ill , pp. 1<1 17. 

• Jbid., J). 16. ''Ibid., 11. 19. 

•• OM(; US, Conlrol Office, I list Rr, ~ub: Civil 

Admiui;.tra&ion iu Cermnny, 16 l.)cc 46, in 

OMGUS 2 1 2/5, folder Vll-2 AB(:. 
POT J) 1 GER~L\~Y 

Soviet insi,lt'IH'<' at P01!'da111 that, a-. ~lc­

(:1!,) put it, ··anything an} hotl y captlu·nl 

dew~ not c o1mt as repara tions." In other 

words, th e Rus.<; inns proposed 10 lake' whaiC\'t'r' tllc'y liked cull of their I.OIH' without 

rcKard f(lr thf' lc:\·d of industry and without 

inc ludinl{ thtir arquisilio ns in the total of 

their 1 ep:u•ations arronnt: thu.;, eastern 

Ccrnl.lll)' r'<Jt cld hccmnt• an crouomk 

dC'scrl c·apahlc of cndles.<>l)' -;oaking up <'<'Onnmit as.~i~t.ttlC'c for the cxclnsivt• benefit 

of thl· So\'l·it Union. President Truman, 

~ 1 t•( 'lor w id tlw mcm hers of l he U.S. 

Group ( :ontrol C:ounril, w;.t-; :rda rn<rnt 

fl!{ain~t :rllowing- the United Stall'S In llC' 

put in the position of finanl'ing n·parations 

feu· tIre So\' itt U nion." Hop<' of r C'ason:r hlc 

So"ict 'o-opcration in administering C crrnan~ as an cconomit• unit dirHnwcl ftu•thc.•· 

.tftcJ Scptctnl1cr when work hc:gnn in the 

Concrol fT 011 the level of indu~lr')' plan. 

Octcrminnl to have 1 he na:n:imurn rapit nl 

asset" from the wc.-; tern ;,ones mnc.lc availalJI<· for' r'c'j)<traLions, Lht' Rus~ ian~ We're 

read y to strip the whole Gcr111an crotWlll)' 

Ill tlr<· I HHH' <and , in allernpting> In do so, 

plung<·cl ell<· ncgotia.Lions into a ta ngk of 

run flit'tiiiJ:' 1'ta i~t cs ~ 

Potsdam (lllt/ Policy 

Sinn· JCS 1067 and its cx an~ion by 

US FI 'l' into a militar-y government dir•r.t -

ti\'C (i..,surd on 7 July 1945) were held 

rrncl ca· ~r.C tll il)' clrlssification un til the end 

of tire fit·~ t wc<·k in August, tht· m~dnm 

Conmmn iqul- of 2 .\ugust was the fi rst 

oOidal knowledge the Gcr111:m people had 

of tire \Hied plan~ for their countrr and 

for dwir 0\\'11 future under the occupation. 

"W.ar Di.")', US Cp CC, PW and OP Div, 

A11>1 •15, iu O~WUS 3t4.1l l, C1\!ll fil e~. 

" R.111 hford nne! Ross, /Jerli11 u,.parnltMI Assignlll<illl. pp. Ob JO:t 

345 

For thl'nt, the new-; wa-: rt stunning blow. 

The territory l'ast of 1 he Odc1' and t\cisst· 

Rivers \t/:ts lost; factories would be dismantled for' reparations; ;-rncl with wh<1t 

wa" ld t or its l:rncl nnd economy, the c nun -

try would ha\'C to 'illf>port added milliun'i 

of Germa ns :rhoul tn he expelled rr·orn 

Poland. Czecho:<lov01l..i", . \ustria, H ung.ll')'. 

<tnd Rumania . . \11 allu"ion in tire 1 OJIImuniquc to ''prirllar y cmpha.!~is .. on ''the 

developnWlll of agrh ulturc and pc<H'cflll 

domestic inch ~t ic.«'' ;tppcared to echc1 the 

~I rg nthau Pi au; lhc n1ain purpose of tlw 

occ-upation ~wen wei lO I 1c to con vi nc·c t lrr 

Gcnnan~ of llwi I' ''total military de· feat " 

and lcav<.' thenr to t>ndure the ''dian~ 

and SlliTcring" lilt') had l>rou.~ ht upon 

t hcru.;ch eo;;.' 

The au~u·r c· pr Ol.(l arll \ttHI hard langawgc 

of the Potsdam C:omnntuiquf w as not new 

to the U.S. tll'!'l tpation au thorities. ~fuda 

o f it had also appt•arcd in J CS I 067 and 

was t<rkc11 almost verbatim from tire Surnmal')' of U.S. lniti nl l't)sl Defeat Policy Relating tQ German)' of 2:~ ·Marrh I ~)45. 

To rnilitHt')' governm<'nl, however, the 

PotsdHm decisions signa led lhc h<"ginning 

of a posi~ ivc pmgr:rrn for the oc·cupat inn. 

,\!though the ton<' of the 23 ~f arc h sumlltar) emerged strunKIY from the Pot-;dam 

Communiqul":, tlw c orucnt was significantl y 

altered in the clonunctll that the Pre!;ident 

pre>entcd to tiH~ ronfCf'CnLe as the U.S. proposal fo•· initi al control policy in German y 

illld W(l$ f Ul'tht:r tnOdificcJ in the VCI'Si(ln approved by the ronfcrcn<.:e. The decision to 

administer Germany as an economi,· unit 

and <tnotbrl' tCJ provide uniform treatment 

for the German population appeared to 

eliminate dismen~hcrmcnl as a possible 

u ( I ) C:thlc, F.isculto"cr to JCS, 7 Aug 115, 

in USFET SCS 000. 7. (21 State Dcp:1rtmcnt, 

The CoufcrtJ II t:l' rl/ fll'tliu (llntsdam ), in '' ~o cign 

Rehnions," vol. tt , 150:! 07. 
Till·. U.S. ,\fC\JY I~ rHF. OC<:UP.\TIO'\ 01' GF.R~LANY 

.\llit·d aim. Mon~ illtj)()J'l<tnt fot' t'lll'l'l'ril 

milit.n·y govnnmcnt opcraLion~. Pot)lcl:tm 

opened the wa) for a poli1ical rch<~hilita

tiun of Gem1a11)' thut would ctmhl<' the 

Get mans '·in due nmr:.c to take th<.·ir pl:wc 

antong tht· free nml pcnccful peopk•s of the 

world'' ;tnd "allowed and encouraged" 

dcmcH't'atic political parties, loc:;d :;el£-govcnlntcnl ( to he c~t ·nclrd up to the l.untl 

level ''as rapicllr a-. may be justified'' ), and 

free trade unious. Harxh as the ewnomit 

provisions of Potsdam appeared to I){' to 

the Germ;ws, they were more mndcrate 

th<~n some proposed and existing U.S. polidc:s. \Vhcreas JC:S l 067 put the ct~ ing on 

the German swnd:n·d or living at tht.: ow t 

level among the neighboring nat ions, Potsdam J>Cl it al the avcr:1ge of the European 

rmmtrics. excluding Dritain and I hr Sovirt 

Union." Potentially, then, the German:; 

t'Otild become d igihlc for relief <H 01 level 

c:cmsidcrahly above the disease and unrc..'il 

fot'!l'lilaThe Presicknt, the JCS, and Ei~cnh wcr 

.tlso made individual derisions in Jul)' th:lt 

\vould be as important to tbe Gcnnnns in 

the U.S. zone as th,· provisions of Potsdam. 

ln OM decision, white <tssigning responsibilily lo the War Department for procuring 

and financing import to Gcnm111)', tht: 

Pr<"sidcnl spedficd t hnt the :Huhotizntion 

would remain in fotrc "whether or not an 

ngrccd program is fo1111U iatcd and carried 

out hy the Control Council." He lltcrehy 

npcncd the way fot' n separate r<'lid progntm in the U.S. ~o e.' ·~ J n another clccill< . US Cp CC, Analytic:.l Sertion, 5uiJ: 

Note~ on Di!Tcreurt~ Dctween Agreed Rc·port of 

'l'rir>llftitc Coufcn•m·c of Berlin ;md JCS 

1067/ li/ 6, 14 A11g •15, iu OMGUS ~5U 2/5. 

" ( I) Sumn1ary Shcl't, ACofS OPD to CofS, 

~uh: Gtmll:l n l nlt•rino Vlooancirtg, 5 A11 g 15, in 

orn, 336, sec. v, C::!Sl'S 104- ' (:!) Cohlc, 

AGWAR to USf't::' l , 5 Oct 45, in USFE'I' SGS 

091.3. 

sion, <tiTt'pting the ron< lllsions of the ot~ 

lt;r-lf}'tHiky M !~S ion , th<' J <:S ordered Ei~ 

('nit ower as .1 mcml wr nf the Control 

Cowu il 111 atl\u,·atc tltr rxpmt flf 25 million ton'> of Grrman mal during 1 h<' period 

ending .\pril I ~)4(i, a lthoug h n•cognizing 

that •'this may c.lclay indtlslrial resumption 

[i11 Grn11anyJ, rause unemplo)'11lC11l, unrest, 

and dj•,satisfanion amon~ Ccr111an!: of a 

magnitude which may lll!CCSSit:\lc firm and 

rigoroul> artiun.''''· [u a third eci~i<.m, 

Eisenhower, at a l.;SFET G- 5 (·onfercncc 

on 19 J uly, stressed the need to help tlw 

German~ prepare for the coming winter a nd 

<LULhorizcd the usr of .\ rmy trucko; and military drivel'S tn I! ring in t h<' h:u·wsr ,

1: 

On G .\ ugust, Eisenhowrt· lwcame the 

first pr<uninCtll .\llied fi~-ture to talk directl} 

to tlw Cct•mnns by radio. .\ Ctcr thrc<' 

months, ltc ~;tid , the o<·rupation and denazifil'at inn had progt'C.-;s<'cf enough l(J 

allow hint to :;peak to them about ~ 

for the ftnut·c·. The nlonths ahead would 

be hard. 'I here would be food nnd Lran sportation !\horragcs and no ('(l;d for heating 

during tlw coming winte r. D:tiWtgrd house.<: 

wou ld hnve to be repaired. The Army was 

providing tra nsportation, hut otherwise the 

Germuns would have to solve these problem'S themsdvcs. Ther would have to work 

and hel p cnch other. ..\s n token of a 

brighter future to come, he told them that 

ther would he allowed to fonn trade unions 

<lnd engage in local politics when thC)' 

showed t'r acliness for health y exercise of 

these privilcgcs.''1

" Bleak as 1 he message 

was, it w~.., a firs;t-somc w()u]d la ter thi nk 

"Cnlllt- f111111 U.S. Forcl..,, Ut!rlin, {rom JCS 

to USFE'J', :.!G Jul ·15, in USFE'l SC:S 46 ~.3, 

\'OI. f. 

" Mf.'oolo, I !qs, USFET, ACofS (; -5, for CofS, 

19 J ul 15, i 11 tJSFf:T SGS 4~1. , 

" Msg from Ccn .. ral Eisenhower to the German 

Pe.ople in tht• U.S. Zone, 6 Aug 45, in AdmLn 

Hist Collc<'ticm, ETOUSA, No. 155. 
POTSD.\~1 CER~J \~\' 

,, fal,t· 1.1\ of hope. 'l he war, .n laM, was 

o\ cr. The t'nt'lll) c ornmandrr had hcn1mr 

a watt <'l'nctl .md rt'!.ponsiblt• .tdmiui t rator. 

The Sub jcrll of I hr Poliry 

Bttlin in the sumnwa of I 945. thou~h 

on l~ tenuou~ly reo;tored ;1~ the ctpital, was 

more than rep• r'cntativc of the nation's 

woes. Dh ided, ot rupied h) foa rign troops, 

ill ttl i~ol.ttc·d, the t ity "a.<> ''" h.land of ~ 

million peoplt- in .1 CCIIt tlla y fur whiC'h it 

had unrc been t lw economic as well as politica l hub. For mo~t of July, until the railr·oad hrid~c on the EIIJe River at 

J\l.tgdebua•g- was n·p;drrd, food and roal 

train.; from thr western t.OllC.'i had to be unloaded ;ll the l'ivcl' and rdoad('(l onto Soviet-manned trains on thr ot hca side. The 

fiN U.S. train did not arrive in Berlin until 

the end of tht• month, and pa <;.~engcr ervice 

would not resume until Nu' em her.' ~ In the 

U.S. sector, "" in the othef);, the Ru. sianu 

had di-.mantlcd and h:\UICd away 95 percent of the industri.tl mac hinet)'· What was 

left w.1s huritd under rubble or was useless 

owing to l.tc k ()( coal and drt tr idl" to nm 

it and raw material-; with which ;o work. 

The first firm tu oprratl.' iu 'l'l'mpclhof. in 

thr . . l>Cctor, sharpened u.;cd razor 

blades. In the fall .1 radio manufacturer 

began turning out a maximum dozen 

sets .t da)', ;md several met t~l fahrirators, 

011 t)rders rmlll military govcrnn~cnr, 

startc<i making stoves und rooking 

utensils out of salvaged materia s.~'' T he 

must visihll' part of the work force in the 

summer and f.ill .1nd foa m.1ny months 

to rome were the Truemmcrfrauen. 

women who M'avc·ngcd ~ablc hril'k." and 

other building materials from the rubble. 

. "OMCUS, C(lntrol Onice, Il l$\ Sec, Quadriparhte Arc:c,~ to :wd Control of Be-rlin, vol. I r, in 

OMc;us 21 2/5, foldc:r V2Cl5 tl\ 

• lii\t Rr>r, 0~1C, Berlm Oittrirt, I'P· 88 90. 

:H7 

llomhi ng, {k~t ruc lion of hridgt.~ iu tlw 

firml battles, .uld the hrenkdown of the 

transportation ~}stem hau rnlun:d lhl' tit) 

to a sprawl in~ t luMt'r o{ viii<~~C.!-, each .1 

hlock or two of haiJitahk 01 neal'!)· hahitable buildings in whit h pc~'lih )• a <,torr 0 1 

two remained open. In dayli~ht the rt·~idenLS sallil'd ou t <>II foot in sc.m h of hi.H 1.. 

market goods .1nd firewood. Frw went out 

after dark. Nighuime wao; the Ru ....,ian ... · 

favorite time for pkkin~ up politiral suspects, as it had been with the N<11.is, and 

they were not particul:\r nhotll ~ector 

boundaries or about whom they vktianzed.~' Ruined a~ the l'ity was, il still 111 -

lracted German rcfugrcc; from <'asl of 1 he 

Oder River and from c~cthO!\I()Vllkia. 

More than three-quarters of them were 

women ami children; 1 hey came hy the 

thousand. in the <;ummrt of 1945, ometimcs bringing dic;ca.c;c with them. Disea ·t· 

was nothing new in Bcalin, howrvc·a. whit h 

in the first month., of the ocrupation "'·'" 

swept hy waves of drseaH<:t )', l)•phnid frv~·· , 

and diphtheria, all sprc;lcl hr scwagr leaking into the watCI' S)"'tCtll from fn\c turcd 

sewer pipes. Usually the acluh<~ and older 

children survi\'cd, hut the fir-;t wave of 

dysentery, whirh the Berliner;; <ailed 

hunger typhoid, l..illed 6.'} pcncnt of the 

new I 10m I ml1ics. :: 

Clay described Berlin as "the rld'~ 

largest hoa rding hot~ "lc, with ;til of the p<lp· 

ulation on re ief. "~=~ t\ftrr the bridge at 

Magdeburg was reopened nnd the food 

trains brgau r11nning into the dty rq~ulal'ly, 

the dail)' civilian ratiou rose gradunlly from 

" Hqs, Sc"cnth 1\rttt)', 1\C.:ors c; ·2, C 2 Bulletin 

No. !Xl, 28 No1· 15, in S~H·nth Army, Opn' Rpt, 

Annex No. 3. 

"'O~rC , Berlin Dl\trkt, lllllitary Co1•rrnmC'nt 

Report, ~ .lui l'i :l j.111 Hi, in CMJI file-~ 

"' Memo, 0:-.ICUS, DrJ) Mtlitar)• (!oq:rnur, for 

CG, USFET, sui); Supply of Food to Civilians 

in Berlin, :! Ort 15, iu USFET SGS OH.I 
TilE U.S. \R~l\' J'\ THE OCU IP.\TlO'\ 01· GER~l:\'\\' 

lcs.'! than 800 raloric:- supplied in July to 

I ,250 calories, which the Rus.'l inn~ had set 

as the nHLxintum nttion fo r n ormal ~o um

ers before the Western .\llies arrived. The 

I ,250-ca lorie r·n tion was more than the 

Germans in the western zones were getting; 

hut the Germans in rhe!ic zones, even those 

who li ved in the la rge l'itics sur h <ts Frankfurt and Munic-h, could sometimes forage 

in the rountryside, trading personal belongings to the fa rmers for potatoes, eggs, or 

meat. Berlin was an island, cut off from 

the outside, a nd the 13e l'liners had to live 

on the ration, or on the hlack market. Col. 

M. D. J ones of Cla)''S Redeployment Coo rdinnt ing Group reported what he saw o n 

a visit to Berlin in September: 

A t)•pital uwal consistt>d of $CI'\'ing 

spoonfu l .of ranncd stew, 2 or 3 boiled pot:.ttoes tltc size of golf b:\IIS, I handful of h::rrdtack <'rlllllbs. I cup blad\ coffee 111ade froru 

leftO\'f!r grounds from u.s. messes, and I 

spoonful of w~tet)' g t'<IV>'· [Jones was describing the rurals scrvrd to a relali\·CI)' small 

and fonunate group. those who had jobs with 

the 1\rrnr.J 

A meal two maids were ea ting in the billet 

[ orrupicd. which they dairucd was their· 

only food for the day besides lh(' meal described above, consisted of llh thin slices of 

bread, 2 small hnlf-green tomatoes, 2 y.; small 
349 

RP.RI.INtms RECJ·:JVE BREAD RJ\TION VRO.M " TRAILER because tltert• is 110 trausjJort<tlion to bu .~i 11 ess areas. 

potatoes, and I oniou half the iz e of one's 

thlllitb. 

On se,·cral occasions 1 saw childJ·cn a nd 

old people ga thering g rass in a park, they 

~a id for food. 

Althou:•h man)' chi ldren looked IJealthy, I 

a lso saw Jwn)• co,·ered with SOI'('S. Thr sores, 

l was told , were the r esult of a n inadequate 

diet- J.he slig htest bruise would rester. 

l saw no fresh ,·eger;lbles in the markets 

and was told there were none in lht U.S. 

Sector. Onl)' 3 out or 15 IIICal ntarkets I 

,·isit<·d had any 111 eat at a ll. One had 20 lbs. 

which ll'as rationed % lb. to the customer.24 

" USFET, Rcdeployrncut Co-ordina tion Grour, 

Gp Ch, Observations in Berlin, 11- 12 Scp ~5, in 

USFET SGS 11 1·1.1. 

.\rti:;ts and entertainers, eo;;peciall)' the latter, lived better than a lmost anyone else. 

Out of res pect for "culture," the Russians 

had put them in the highest r:uion category, 2,500 calories per day; such a ration 

was othe rwise restricted to very heavy 

workers. l\s a resu lt, the normal consumers 

in Berlin were well entertained if poor!)' 

fed. Next best off were the manual laborers 

on essential jobs, who could thus qualify 

for in creased rations. Public offic-ials 

worked under the eye of military government for presurrendcr salaries and stood 

ncar the bottom on the ration scale. On 

the black market, of course, afte r the Ameri-
~50 TilE U.S. 1\RJ\l\' II'\ THE OC<:UP:\'1'10 1 OF CERM .\ NY 

n tth !'amc CVt't')'thing I'UIIld he had: buurr, 

!)palll, hce.~c, ranncd mcnt.;, and licptor. 

f'hc prircs in marks ran into the thcnas;uah; 

fnr sma ll qunntities. \mong the Get•mans, 

,\mcrican cigarettes were the preferred cm -

rcncy, because they had all inlrino;ic vnlue. 

.\ can on of any .\merkan hrnnd, ,,,hkh 

t'Cl'il the U.S. 1\0idjen\ 50 C'CiltS in the PX, 

wns worth 150 mark~, $15 nl the U.S. r<liC 

of exchange, and in Dcrlin could bring scvct•al hundred dollars itt tll;ll'ks. tdt cs 

\H're the small cha ~c.::. 

In thl: lJ.S. zone pmprr·, the military 

government economic specialists watdwd 

for sntall spark.o; of life in 1 he industrial 

machine that had ennblccl Germany to 

wage war for six yc; ~ agninst h<df the 

world. Out of their wartime profits, fac·l oJ')' 

ownt•rs I'Oilltl afford to clean up· nnd put 

llu:it• planls in order; lml afterwards <Ill 

they could do was wait for coal, clcctddty, 

and m:Herials. In July, 111ilitary govcrnrncnL nllO<'ntcd mal to run one newsprint 

paper mill and in Septernl>er enough roul 

10 reopen a mlling 111ill l<> make );hec:t 

metal for rooking and hcnting stove.-:. 

The fir.-t window glas.<; was produn'd 

in Bavn ria in September, nnd a month 

la ter o11c r hcmicnl plant in WuerLtemberg-Bnden began making sodn a<sh nccdrd 

for gla..o:s and soap, while anothet sta rted 

lt) prodU<'C rakium ryanamid for nita•ogt•n fertilizer. The plt111 ts were using ldtover and scavenged materials, howevrr, 

a nd when these were exhausted they would 

have a hard time getting new oc s.~·· or 

the whole industrial t>..stahlishmcnt in the 

u.s. zone clhoul 15 percent was in wol'l .. illg 

('Ondition in August and was rnnning nt 

"' Hqs, Sevcnlh Army, ACofS G- 2, C- 2 Bulle tin 

No. 90, 28 Nov ·15, in S~ven th Army, 1~ Rpt, 

Annex No. :t "' OM(;US, P.,·ar• Oiv, O c:rupfltion Report, Industry, Scp 47, iH OMGUS 15!1·2/5. 

about 5 pc1't em ol <':tpa< ity. Out put \\1:\S 

meager . • \ll the soap produced in J uh·, for 

instanrc. anaounted to no more than a n 

ount'<' ami il half pea· pr.r~on. ~' Onc-limt' 

sale.<; tlf a spool of thread per person and, 

with the II~\· of ratitH I roupon~, of 10 (;erman-madc cig::tretlcs ( or 2 ~ ci.~an\ ) were 

cvcnt.s ('Overed in the Hcwspap(•t-s. ~' 

Coal wa~ the key. In Jtdy and 1\qgust, 

the output was 15 pcr('(!llt of tlw 19:)5-

193() mo nthl)' ;wcrage. very iJlCiu try rc-

·tarted inrreased the ..,Jmnagc. The amounts 

that arri"cd wer e always smn llcr than 

thosr );hipped. Of I :lO cn d oatls ron!;igncd 

to Nurcmber~1 70 rarlmtds nrrivcd. Another I ,000 tons nf c·oal disn ppcared 

completely en route from uni h to 

Nurembcrg."'fl In his (i :\ugust radio spcec.:h 

Eisenhower told the Ccrmans to cut wood 

Cor the t'Qrtling winter bct·ausc there would 

IJe no ,·onl for heating, nnd during the late 

"ummer and fall military government 

emlntrkcd on a wuoci-C'tltling program 

throu!{ho ut the ~o e. The ,\rmy supplied 

power saws and <tXCS and miliwry trucks 

lo haul the wood in a.rcas the German 

trucks t' ould not reat h. Wood-n.ttting progress bcr ame a required :mhjcct or military 

government dclachmenl reports, hall many 

dcta<'hmcnts found tllnt the idea did not 

•·c.ally <·at h on with the Germans until 

a fter the first !;pell of rold weather in 

October. 

The Transportatiou Corps' !\filitary 

Railwa y Service, s11pcrvising the German 

ReichsbnJw. had ~)() percent of 1 he lirst-line 

railrCiad track in the r.one open hy Septcm-

" J CS 15 17, Summary o( the Jul •15 R1:port 

of the Militnry Governor·, 1•1 Sep -15, nnd JCS 

1517/1, S\IOHllary of th~ Au){ ·15 R<·port of the 

N£ilitary Gov<·rnor, 18 Oet •15, in CCS '18!~.2 1 

(2- 22- H ). ~ec, 9. 

"' Wu ,, /!ote (Breuu•nl, l:l and 16 Oct 'IS. 

"' i~l Rpt, Oct B- 2 11 , 
I'OTSIM:\1 GER~I \KY 

bt:r ;and hncl a thrott.l.(h train ntnnin~ from 

Frnnk£mt to Pal'is. But txrept for city .tnd 

'>Ullin han Jinc<i, which W<'fC t'R'><'lll ial to gd 

the Uctman ri,·iliaw> IMck and fonh w 

worJ.., the railroads carried only ll.S. 

tt•onp.,, DP,.,, and lllilit.ll') '1llpplic<;. 'l'hl' <'HI'S 

r:ttl with leaking roof<; ;ultl hrokc11 windows 

IH·t::llt!l<' uew g btss and lat• paper alway!; disappeared on the rirst nm.)'' Civilian goods, 

uw . ..,tl~ fam1 pr<Jdtu t' and firewood. 111ovcd 

h) truck; and the 100,000 trucks and 

1111~~rs in Lhc 'l.Onc had been so dirHinis.hcd 

by requisitioning;; of both the Wehmwrhl 

and the U.S. force~ that less than a quarter 

of tltcm were op<•rabk. In Scptemhet·, tlu.: 

\ rmy relc.'l cd 12,500 llurplus militnrr 

lt 111 ks fur s:'l.lc 11> tht• Ccrman autht>riticg, 

f.vcn without tr.msportation, as the 

1 ravd ra-trictions within the zone gratluallr 

cnc;t·d nnd finnll)r Wl'l'<' alwlished alrogetht:t' 

in \ugust, the Gcrnmn:. l>cc:ame a restlcsi\ly 

nwlJik people. By 1 ntt J.: . by hot>sc and 

wagon, or on fool rarryin~ their po-~co;sion~ 

on thdr hacks, they < r[:-;.<;rros,c;ed the rounlt~ 'S idc ookin~ f01 relatives or for plat ·~ 

to live. For the cit y dwellers, periodic trip!: 

into the country with spare pair~ r1f shc>t·s, 

r'ttgs, ut· other houNthold furnishings nnd 

pi<'<<'" of dot hin.!{ to lt':tdc for food were 

~~~ oming neccs-.ary to survival. ' 

When the U.S. (;roup Contwl (:(luncil 

tnu~ a survey during S(.•pteml>cr in Ft•ankfmt, Nuremberg, Kas<;cJ, anti Stull~art , the 

Ucnuans most fl'rqut ntl)' mentioned fo(J(I 

nnd how>ing n." their malo worries. t\ check 

of the inhabited dwrllin~ show<"cl th:tl 

tltr<·r-quarters IICcclcc.l rapairs. ~Ion· than 

h;df had no \dn ow~; a third had tlarnngcd 

·O M GUS, Contro l Ofli<:t•, Hist Br, US MC 

ln \.t·rmuny. Rail Transpon, J•il -17, in OMC:US ~3 l/ '1. folder X IV (), 

' 'Cumulative Hi•t Rpt, ~flliwry \.oq·tr1tn('nt, 

~r~ul Du\'<lri:t, :lO Juu Ill, iu OMGUS b 2/~ . 

I'Clofs, .It tel a quarter unsm11HI walt :-: :•~ J 11 

Frankfurt alone, 173,000 }Jl't'Sons lived in 

h;t llWill ~, sh:u k~. :\1\d ruiw. that would 

not be lmhit:d1lc in wint~r. , \It hough military !4ov<·rnmcnl on.lcn·cl lumwowncn; to 

n:nt out spare rooms ami promlltcd pm-

.f{rams for 'la ka~i g hujlding m;~t<·t ial s Irom 

the dcbJ'iR of I he i>omililll(, 1'0llli1111ing requisitions f()f' troop autl DP billets acluall}' 

decreased the living sp.trr :wnilahk to the 

German-;. lu Wucrttemhcr~-13adcn. a fiftb 

of the population wa<~ inadl'CJilatcly housed, 

even hy prevailing German standards. In 

Wucrzburg, Bav;tria, one of the mo!> l 

heavi ly homlwd cities, tiH' !'l.ri,OOO population were ncurlr a ll living i11 ruins. In Bremen, 62.000 J)l'l :ons lived in 1 h<- basements 

of bombrd-om house<>; others li\'ed in 

flimsy sh<u:k:;, iu air raid hunkers without 

lig ht or ventilation, and in rooms without 

doors, windows, or roofs. When cold 

weather appt•mtched in Ortollct•, military 

governm<"nt initiated a forced exodus to the 

rou ntry diMr ~ of ~0.000 Jll'Oplc from 

Ht'idelhc ~, I 0,000 from WuL·t-Lhurg. and 

similar munhcrs from other ritics.n 

.\lthongh, t'ontrarr to S H.\Ef 5'~ 

earlier prediction, the Cnmans were not 

starving in the summer· of )1145, m;llnulrition ' a.'< uudouhtedly n contributing cause 

of some d('atlts, particular!~· in Berlin. The 

U.S. Croup Control Council interrogators 

conduded that the Ccnnans were not as 

ttndernoua·islH:d as tl1<')' lonk<'d ; on the 

other ltaud, lllilitary government in Bavaria 

believed tlw Gt'rmans look rei I >cl ter phy

n tlly than they -;hould have, mnsidcring the 

"' Hqs, Seventh Am1y, ACorS G 2, G- 2 Bulletin 

No. !ll, 6 Ore 15. jn Sevrmh Ar111y, OpliS Rpt, 

Annex No. :1. "" ( I ) Hid Rpt, Enstcrn Militnry District, 15 

Nov- 15 Out· ·15, iu OMGUS 7fi '1/ 10. (2) History 

of Militnry Cowrnment in /.nut/ Wut•rttcmbcrgBadcn, vo. I, in OMCUS 110 IF I. (:ll Westr 

Bote, 17 Nov 45. 
THE U.S .. \R.:-.tY IN THE OCCUP \TIOf\ OF GER .. \ IAl\Y 

1\IAN\' Ll\' 1'1) IN Sllt\CKS MW RI'INS 

rations they were getting. J\t the end of 

\ugust, the USFET Chjcf Surgeon, Maj. 

Gen. f\ f ol'rison C:. Stayer, reported 1 hat 

nutritional survey teams had fO\md that 60 

pc1'<:t:nt of lhc Germans were living on a 

tlict that wo\tld inevitably lend to di!;case.<; 

caused hy malnutrition. Stu·veys, he said, 

already shrnvccl \'itamin rlefi('icncir"-; and 

wdght lo'!S in hoth adults and r hiklrrn. Oet·ausc 1 he issued rat ion, whi1 h varic·d downward from I, l!lO C<llories per day, was not 

enough to tain life, and the adtlitional 

400 to 500 calories that the average German was a,._,<;umed to he getting ft·om cellar 

storks, home gardens, and the lllack market 

were not c·nough to sustain productive 

labor, Stayrr re('ommended raising thcration to 2,000 <·;doric.<; per day. 1 n September, Clay applied to the Combined 1"ood 

Board in Wnshi,tgton for an import allotment for Gcrmt~ny, expe!'ting "to get our 

!ihare hut not nt nil smc it will he enough 

to supply the 2,000 ndories recommended 

b)' the health o!Ti<:cr .... , ' Clay said he could 

not ask the Food Boa rd "to <tccept as a 

" ( l l Fin;tl Rpt, Scv<'lllh Army. ACofS G- 5, 

25 ~lar 1(i, in USFET, Hi~t Div, II Oiill/ 100. 

( 2 ) Memo, O~lGUS , n~p Military Governor, for 

CG, USFE.T, suiJ: Supply of Food to Civilians 

iu Berlin, 3 O('t ·15, in USFET SGS 014. 1. 
POTSOA~I GERMANY 

TROOPS SEARCH L u ccAcr:: FOR BLACK MAnKET Cooos 

premise that food should be supplied to 

Germany on a scale equal to or greater 

than that supplied to other countries of the 

world who have suffered from hut did not 

initiate aggre.o;;sive war." 3

" :Moreover, therequirements for Germany would be large. 

The total agricultura l output of the U.S. 

zone from November 1945 to September 

1946 wou ld only be enough to supply 938 

calories per day to the normal consumer. 

An increase to 1,500 calories would require 

543,000 tons of imported food, and an inO> Jbid., (2 ). 

t rcasc to 2,000 calories would require 

nearly twice as much. 3

" 

On the black market, in the zone as in 

Berlin, a ll kinds of goods were available 

at astronomical prices in marks and often 

only in exchange for items of value, such 

as cigarelles, sugar, butter, and coffee- all 

of which functioned more as currency than 

as consumable commodities. The "banker" 

for one large black market ring was ca rry-

•• ( 1) JCS 1517/ 4, Summary of Nov +5 Report 

of the Military Governor, 14 Jan 46, in CCS 

:133.21 (2- 22- -14 ), sec. 10. ( 2) Cable, OMGUS 

to AGWAR for WARCOS, I Nov 45, in OMGUS 

12- l / 5, v60-20/ l. 
THE U.S .. \RMY It\ THE OC:C:Uf>.\TI01\ OF GER~ ANY 

ing •Hwrly $300,000 in diaJntmcl.; \vhcn he 

was nrrr)o,ted. The DPs, bcca11sc of their 

privileged :>talus, and Lhc U.S. troops, 

UNRR/\ employees, and Red Cros.'( worker~, hcrallsC of their acce:s.':l w U.S. goods, 

figured prominently in the black mnrkct. 

The Crnn~tns part!}· depended on it for 

thcit subsistence and partly ~·5wd it as a 

means for rcmvcrling their mcmcr into material gClods as a hedge against inflation. 

Bet auo;c sc: ~ h opera lions likt' TAt.t.v uo 

C'(tiiSiStl:ntly fnilcd to turn up sulliricnl rvidcnrt!, USFET and the military districts 

for scvct·:d months pcr U<Id~d 1 hcmsclves 

that the hla<'k market was nothing to worry 

about. Ill Scpleml>cr, 0 11 thr apparcm 

n.'l~umptiotl that the peopl<> involvt•d were 

mnstly soldiers wanting to trauc f'iga•'t·ttcs 

ut· dao1·ol:-tlt' bars for souvenirs ami Germans wanting to oblige tlu:m, USFET 

C)pcrwd nlfkially sponsore-d l>nrtr•· rnar-

~ct~ i11 Stuugat't and Jo'ra11kfurt 1 bus 

l'lllllt'ihuting to the furlhcr lllldcrmining of 

c:onfidcnrc in the c utTC11C)'. In tlw fall, certain J,y then Llaat a black lll:u·kd existed, 

U.~F ·:T hcgn n w com·ern itsC' tr with the 

profc~~Sional operators who were definit<'ly 

<'t iminal11 :and might al,(l h<> Nazi~ U!'ing 

the hl.tck market to support lht•tnsclvcs in 

liar tmtlcrgrunnd <md who dealt hc:wil)' in 

U.S. ~ood~ and supplies pilfered from 

/\ nll)' dumps; hy the end of the ycur an 

average of $ tO,OOO worth of snpplirs a clny 

wa-; di!;<lppcari ng from the QuarlCl'llHISlC r 

depol at Ludwigshurg <lion c. T n 0< ~ohcr, 

111ilitary police searched two pass<:ngc r 

trains tomi ng into Bremen and cmaflsrated 

a truddond of illegal goods, mo:;tly . \ rmy 

J)I'Opctl} :and black-market lau~hlcred 

meat. 

C:crwiul>· the most numerous :111d probnbl the most SU('<.'cssful black markdcers 

were not the professionals hilt the farmrrs. 

The)' were· required hy lnw to dclivrr all 

their produn·, except ~ubs ten ce allowances for thcmsdves and their families, at 

fixed pri('CS to authorized distributors. 

Under the: Nnzi regime the Reich Food 

Estate had kept records on the produnivity 

of every farn1 down to the last egg and 

quan of milk; hut in the many plac·cs 

where these records had not survived the. 

war, n1i litar) government had a murh 

looser hold on production. In Bavaria in 

the fall nf 1 5. the legal hutchcri11g of 

hogs was !"10 pc•·rcn t below normal, and 

sb" sugar heel procc...c;sing plants hatl lo I 1(: 

doseu duwn cc:w~c the farmers had di-

' 'eited the IJccls to the black market. The 

farmers argut·<.l tltat they in Lum had to 

h::trter to g<~t wol!l and equipmcnl, lmt the 

people in the titic.s widely suspected that 

mosL we.J•c· well on t hc way to arquiring 

enou~h propertr to he ablr to carpet and 

furni:sh tlt6r c·uw hn11ts like parlors if they 

wanted. t 

£xccpl for hhark marketce•ing, ~01111.' 

1 hefts of f011cl :mel fit·c·wood, and pcu y vio· 

lations of Ill i lilill')' gt>vcnm1cn l ord imu ~res, 

the Gernwn civili:an crime rate was low. 

sometimes almost clh ·onrcrting lr low ft>r 

the \I'm~· agcnties charged with rc.·rclill!4 

out a nd su pprc~ ing resistance. In October, 

after five months of occupation. Seventh 

. \ rmy G - 2 lwlirvcd Gcrmanr to he :. "simmering rauklron of unt·cst and discontent" 

and clailllcd 10 hnvc detected a " motmlin!{ 

autlncio ness in tht~ Germa n populal ionl'; 

but as t'OIHTClc cv id cn~ c G-2 cO\tld only 

cite some· illicit traffic in interzonal mail 

( then still prohibited ), a "strongly worded" 

:n ( t ) Memo, ll q~. Sc,'enth Am1y, ACofS G 2, 

sub: Thr Black ~(.,rkct in Sc\·enth Amay Area, 

:\lar ·16. nml ~h·1111), IItts. Seventh Ami)', ACofS 

G - 5, suh: (; 5 Report on Bla1·k 1'vfa rket, I I ~lar 

·16, in SP\•cnlh 1\1111)', \.ofS files. (21 EUCOM, 

Office of the Clait•f II i\tori:111, Public Safety, I !It! 7, 

in CMH fi ll• II :u, CA Ill, pp. 109- 13. (3) Wrur 

/Jote . • ~ 0!"1 '15. 
POTSD.-\~ 1 GERM \~\' 

Werwoif tln·eat to one mililt1t'y gf)\'Crnltll'rll officer in the Wc.<;tern Milhnt )' District, and a protest against denazification 

ft'OIII tiiC r:vangel icaJ C:h Ul't' h or W UCI'llCJnIJt g. ' Patrols occasionally found ckc:apitatioll wires stretched aero~ ro<u.ls, i11 cptly it 

wrHdd st:em, since no death .. 0 1 inj1u·ics r·esullnl from chcm. ~ljlitary governm<:nt 

public ~n fcc y officers from :l('allcrcd location'> reported variotL" anti-orntpation 

leafk1s aud posters, some thre:th ttga inst 

German gids who associated wich U.S. 

~oltli ::~, and isola ted atl<H::kll on soldiers. Althnugh not a single case was <'nnfirmed, 

possibl y the most talked ::tbout rrimes 

again~t the otcupation wet'e the alleged castrations of U.S. so ldier~ hy Gcl'man civilian'-. When the commanding offic('r of 

Dctarhn1cn1 £ 38 2, in Erha<·h, Hesse, was 

askccl to investigate one surh rumor, he reptJt'tcd that not only had thCJ'<' hccn no castr:Hion hut that there had 110 t been t single 

;llt;H k on U.S. milit <try pert'onucl in over 

four months of occupatil'>n. ~'' The niOI\l 

prc'!Sing concern of public safety olnccrs 

wn!l often with getting the German polite 

Olll of their I raditiona) ninctecnt h <'Ciltttry 

Pr ll!<.."(ian dl'ill sergeant lmHorms ancl into 

\mcri<:~lll st )'les, usually mod!'ird em the 

uniforms of the ·ew \' ork C:ily police. 

\>\1 hcr·c·vc•· troops were sta1io11<:d, t!!pc<·ially 

i11 towns and smaller citie;, prostitutt•s :mel 

' amp followers were a moral pl'()hlcm, 

placed nddcd strain on food supplies, housing, and medical facilities (freq uently also 

on jnils) . and raised mixed fcdin&rs of disgttxl and je~lousy among tlw other rivilif'lns. 

Itt quarrels with other <'ivilialls and with 

,, ll<ts, St>vCHHh Army, ACofS C. 2, Wr,•kly Intellil(rtw· Sun11nary No. l5, 24 Oct 45, 111 Seventh 

t\ 1111y, Opus Rpt, Aunex No. 2. 

.. Weekly S1nrunary, Oct E:l u2, 20 0 <'1 ·1·5, in 

OMCi US 7- '!1/5. 

the police, the pro.;titutes did not hesitate 

to call 0 11 their .'WidiCJ' friends.'" 

The Get man!! attributed all violent 

crime!' to the DP~i and militai·y ~OVC I'n · 

mcnt relucla11tl y cnmc dose to ngrcciug 

with them. Of 2.5 million DPs origi11all y 

in the U.S. Zf>llC, all hut 600,000 hnd been 

sent home hy the· end of 'eptembcr, and 

General Wood rclJt.lrled the repa1riation 

problem "Mth!!tantially solved. ••<~ But those: 

who stayed were becoming a special pt·oh· 

lem, ilei ng a h:ll'(l core of largely nonrcpatriablr stateless persons. /\bout half 

WCJ'C Poles, ror years the mo t mi ·ea ll d 

of the Nazi forced laborers and now l OI'JI 

between their clc.-:irc to go home and their• 

a pprchcusion nhout the future awaitiug 

them in Communist Poland. The rest wert· 

tl ts, r'on-C('r111:111 J ews, eastern mo

peans other thnn Poles, and- although 

many fewer· than there had been- Soviet 

ritizcns, most of \vhom tried to daim special status <t s Ukrainians. USFET policy 

made repatriation ('ntircly voluntary rot' 2111 

DP!I exn:pt those who came from witliiu 

the prc-J ~)39 ))()unclaries of the Soviet 

Union; mnu y hnd legitimate rcal!ons fot' 

not wanting lO rctum, principally fc;u· of 

pnlltiral cu· religious persecution. ~ the 

tota l number o£ t hc.<>c displaced persons de· 

•• The tcmion wn~ ~;rc:llcst in a reas where Nel{l'O 

troops were wrlon<'d, ~incc they, already frcling 

discriminated ng01iml by bolh lhe Army nnd the 

Germans, frt qucntly interpreted effort ~ tu curb 

prostitution as 1•111.1\hc r form of discrimin:~ti olt. ln 

Ku nzr.l ~:a , WII{'I'Hcmlwrg, Negro soldiers u( the 

35tlth Fie ld Artillery Battalio n beat 11p the local 

jaih•r when he rdu~cd to rclea.~e prostituiC$ heillR 

held for 1'\'11\'t N tl di~!'nse lrcat.rnem. Later the 

whole police iu Ktw1uelsau tried to resign 

after• hcitt,~t rhren rl'llt'd th:lt they would he- killed 

i1 they interfer~d with the prostitutes. .Memo, Hq~. 

USFET, lmc·mnl Affllirs Br, for CC, Western 

~Iii Dist, ~uh : 011n~ R111 on Det H- 52, in OMCUS 

10- 2/5. 

" W nr Dinry, US Gp CC, PW and DP Div, 

~9 Scp ·15, in OMCUS 3 14.8 1, C MH Rlcs. 
356 THE U .S. ARMY IN THE O CCUPATION OF GER1v1Al\TY 

TANKS Mo\·r. I N to keep order in Yugoslav DP camp. 

dined, however, the percentage of doubtful 

types among lhose who remained, such as 

crirninals and Nazi collabora tors, constantly increased, aor; did their influence on 

the others. A questionnaire, similar to the 

Fmgebogen used for the Germans, tried on 

240 DPs in a camp at Regensburg, Bavaria, revealed that 40 percent, if they bad 

been Germans, would have been in the 

mandatory removal category, Lhat is, unemployable in responsible positions and 

possibly subject to rrest: ~ 

"EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Public 

Safety, p. 11 9. 

Among all categories of DPs, uncerta inty 

about the future, free rations and lodging 

without having to work for them, privileged 

status tmder the occupation, and virtual 

immunity from the German police bred indolence, irresponsibility, and organized 

criminality. T heir access to Army, UNRRA, 

a nd Red Cross suppli e.or; made them potent operators in tbc black m<u·ket; the 

camps p rovided havens for blatk market goods and bases for criminal gangs; 

and the 1\rmy-issue clothing thal most of 

them wore was excellent camouflage for 

the crimina l elements and an effective 
mean~ of intimidating Lhc Cernl4w,..

13 The 

I 00,000 0 1 more DPs who did not live in 

r.antJl.'i or who drifted in :111d out of them 

al will m nstitutcd the nttC'I ~ of :a kind 

of i\rmy-~; ponso rcd underworld. Evt:n the 

fonnt'l' ('ont:cnlraLion camp in111atcs were 

becoming nn anno~ u1 re. Many prr cd 

iu wearing their convict uniforms and were 

willing t o regale an y newspaper t·cporler 

who would listen with uppoo;ed ne-w a trocitic • ..; hci11g inOic.ted upon thcm hy the ,\nny. 

!-lome were lr)•ing lo make their pt•ivilcgcd 

(;talus permanent hy having ofTidal-looking 

do< umrnts drawn up and hndgr~ made. 

1\t lhc s;unc time, storic." aiJtntt the DPs 

in U.S. newspapers were tn tki11g> litem 

objects of particular puhlir find offirial !lympathy. l11 the summer lhc U.S. representative on the 1 mcrgovcmmcnt nl Comrnittce 

on Rdugccs, Earl G. Han·i-;on, vil1itcd the 

C'Hlnpll as President Trumatt's spl'C'ial cmis-

~~~~·y :mel recommended selling up separate 

camps for• Jews. Later, aflcr' Saul S. 

Elgart of the ,\merica n J oinl Distribution 

Commillce surveyed the J cwi'!h c:t~ mps, 

UNRRA undertook lo distribute Red Ctoss 

pn< kagrs w the J ews, thcrcb)' raising their 

ration to ovc-1· 3,000 calories a day. Iu Seplcrnhcr, Eisenhower personally inspcC'tcd 

scvcml DP C'nmps and announrcd that gencr·al o ffiC'Ct"'i would inspect a ll C'nmps. AI-

"F.i~owhow r llf•licvcd th:H thr- Wl'arinl( of thc~e 

urliforrns hy the DPs and other up~. including 

.cmw Gcrmtr n prisoners o( war. w:1s also n major 

C:\ 1150:: or dec lining troop morrrlr- in thr Into IImmer 

or l!H!i, rr nd he pro posed our nuir~g the U.S. sol· 

dil'r~ with tlw I!J!i8 hluc dress unifonu for off-duty 

wcrrr. Gt•neml Mnr~hall replied tha t lw undrtJ<tood 

tlw prohlrm but h('licvcd the procurcrncnt of the 

fCitlliu:d :1111011111~ Of doth and feather I\Otold provoke civilian protrsts :11 home, where hoth tOni· 

rnoditil's wrro• irr ihort $Uflflly. USFin t•fforts to 

provide the OPs with clothing dyed su•nc (Jther 

rotor hr<H rght f)rotests of discrimin:~tion from them. 

l.tr, Ei~enhower to M:srsha ll, 2 1 Srp •15, and Ltr, 

M:mha ll to P.isenhowcr, 5 Ocl 45, in USFET 

SGS 121•1. 

357 

though 1 he ins.pcttions showed the camps 

in gcnCJ'<tl to he adr.quate and the larger' 

one-; often excellent with kinderga rtens, 

hap ~. mcdira l facilities, electric lighl!~ , 

flush toilets, and nvNngc food rations ahovc 

2, I 00 calories a day. the pres.') and puhli< 

concern did not ahntc. In late Septclllbcr. 

Eisenhower ordered the military government and milit~try a uthorities to req ui.<;ition 

housing for DPs from the Germ<ll1S without 

any hc<:itan t·y, pt·ohihited an y restrinions 

on the DPs' frc<:dom of movement, and 

made food and sa nitation in the catl'IJ)S n 

concern of a ll responsible officers. " As n 

c·onscqumn:, the OrTice of Milit<try Governmcl1l fot· av:-~ ria reported later, " tht:t•e 

were so many inspections by generals, pt~h

lic heahh oflirc....... correspondents, nnd 

other pl'ivikg<:d cmi~aric.; of interested orgaJtizations lh<t l the objects of S('Wtiny 

thcmselvc~ cried f()r a respite."'" 

Upon hcm·ing of the order to let the:: DP$ 

come nntl gCl as they pleased, the dctnchmenl in I hargC' of 15,000 in a CHITlp at 

Wildflc('kcn, t3avaria, observed tlwl ronsidering tlw mnr n~rding and looting whirh 

bad taken place when only 1 percent a cla)' 

were allowed to leave, it looked to the 

future ''with grcnt ro crn. "~ 0 The dctadtmcnl's a pprehension wa•; not unfounded. 

DP dcprcd ntion was the ch ief reason for 

rea 1·ming the German police in September; 

until then, lhry had onl y carried ni,ghtslic.ks. Military government recorded 1,300 

DP raids against German in Bavarin dllring one week in O ctober, and in ~omc 

country disttirts people were airaid to lcnvc 

" { I ) EUCOM , Office of the Chid J l btori:w, 

Pui.Jiic S;tfcty, p. 67. (2) Opn~ Rpt, q~, Seventh 

Army, II M oy-:10 Scp 45, in Seventh Army, 

107-3.0. 

" Hist Rpt, W t·5tMII Military District, 15 Nov 15 

Dec ·15. in OMCUS 76-:V lO. •·• fbid., l!i Sc•p 14 O c t 45. 
THE U.S. ARMY IN TH E OCCUPATION Of GERMANY 

their houses even in the daytime. Many 

hu-m r,ommunilics [ound a new use for old 

t~ ir ra id sirens: lo wnr-n of approaching DP 

bands. In Munich, DPs constituted 4 pert'Cn t of the popula lion but were responsible 

for 75 percent of the <:rimes. Military government courts in Bavaria held 2, 700 ttials 

between I June and ~0 October in which 

tlispla<'cd persons were accused of serious 

crimes, such as murder, robbery, and looting; nnd in Bremen, a DP population of 

6,000- 3,500 of them males over fourteen 

years of age- tommined 23 murders, 677 

n1hhcries, 3 19 burglaries, and 75~ 1 hefts. 

Organized gang;o; armed with pistols and 

automatic weapons operated out of the 

Brcntc11 camps. When an elgin-man gang 

murdered thirteen Ger·ma.ns dul'ing one 

night in November, soldiers of thr. !1 5th 

fnfn,ntry raided tlre camp from whil'h they 

had come nnd unc-overed large quantities 

of illega lly slaughtered beef and U.S. property. Afterward, in protest, the DPs flew 

hlark Aags and placed large sig ns at the 

ramp entrn nc.e read ing "Ameriran Concentration Camp for Poles."" 

Next to the hl;wk ma r•kct and the DP:,;, 

German youths wert milita ry government's 

rnosl worrisome mncrrn. :Many c:hildren 

were completely ndrift, orphaned by the 

war, unable to find their families, or simply 

abandoned. AlJ were idle. Schools were 

closed; youlh organizations, other than a 

few :>~o>onsored by the U.S. forces, were prohibited; and entertainment and recreation 

"EUCOM, Office of the Chief Hi~tori , Public 

SnJuty. p. 119. (2 ) .Oct E2C2, F1111Ctiounl History 

of Military Co\ ernmcJil in rhe Brew en Enclave, 

Oct- Nov 45, pt. II, in OMGUS :lfl-:1/5. (:1) liL•nctional H is tor)' of Military CovPrnnwnl, Bremen 

f.nclavc, 27 Apr ·15 :iO Jun +6, p. 95. (·I ) Hqs, 

EUCOM, Jlisl D iv, Military Government in 

Munich, fl· 15 . (5 ) Memo [no ~ourcc], sull: 

Offenses hy OPs. 17 Nov ·15, in USFET SGS 

:111:1.7. 

facilities were requisitioned for the U.S. 

u·oops. The worst olf - and most dangerous 

in the eyes of military gtlvernment- were 

lhose in their late teens. Although too 

young to have served in the Weltrmadl.l 

ami experienced the sobering effects of defeat in the field, they were old enough to 

have tbsorbed Nazi artiwdes. T he Freikorps and the Nazi storl1l troops had found 

many recruits among a imi .1' group a fter 

World War I. Under the occupation, these 

young people were becoming sidewalk loaf-

('rs. They rould not continue their educations OJ' learn lrades, and the onl y jobs 

being on·ered involved <·leaning up ruhhle, 

which wm; nut nti~,.: ing in ci1her the short 

or the long r11n. So lhey gathered out of 

the sight of the Americans, made.: up bawdy 

vcr:;c.~> ahont the i>ehaviot• of the U.S. soldiers and German ~J: trl s, at times threatened 

l o shear the hnir of gids who had soldier 

friends, a11tl sometimes, military government officers suspected, rigged clerapitation 

wires or a ttempted arts of sabotage. Their 

aetivities were all quite amateurish hut 

might not remain so once enough young, 

l1ut more ex perienced, prisoners of war relttrned hmne. ~ 

In the summer, though far from read}' 

to democratize the German educational system and by no means certain how tc) go 

about il anywa)', the detachments work<'d 

under USFET orders to get the sd1ools 

open and the r hildren and teenagers off 

the streets. Grade.~ one throu h eight 

opened on 1 Onoher with slightl y more 

students th an in l93D, hut with about half 

tbe tcarhers and buildings. Since the teachers were as politica lly pure as military govemment and the ere could get them, they 

" ( I) f. UC:O~<I, OAjce of the Chief Historian, 

P11 hlic Safety, p. 102. (2 ) EUCOM, liist Div, 

Military (';ovcrnrllCnl iu Munich, p, 18. (:l) H ist 

Rpt, Dt•t G-·12, Oct ,.5. in OMGUS 10 2/5. 
POTSDAM ER~rt\ fY 359 

Pr(INTr.Rs ssE ~ll\1 ·: D t:: NAZII'IE.U T r.x-rnooKs 

wcr·c consequent!)' oft en persons whu had 

been away from the profession \ long time 

ur· who werr the produt'ts of a~h t·mu·scs 

in pedagogy that the detachments ran 

when too mil ny professionals in their dis1 riels I urned in unsatisfactory Fra)!ebogen. 

Tire average age of the teathers in 1Vlunich 

was fifty-seven, a nd the pupil-teacher 

ratio was eightr-nine to one. Secondary 

st hools were the most difficult to slHff and 

did not begin opening until November and 

DcccmiJer. Althoug h "pep talks" on democracy alway~ accompanied the openings, 

the education offi cers' subsequent visits lo 

the srhools werc nwrc frequently in the intcrcst of discipline. Nazi textbooks had heen 

rigorousl)r screened out, hut their replacemenL'i, rcli<.s from the " 'cimar RepubliC', 

were so met imcs not reall y antidote.<; to militarism and nationalism. The fifth-year 

reader contained items such as Frederick 

the Great's speech to his troops before the 

l>alllc nf J.euthen (' 'Let us bct'l t the enemy, 

or let us he buried b)' his haueries. . . . ") ; 

a rontcmplation entitled " ,\t the Funeral 

of My 1-'r·iend Lieutenant \Vurche, Killed 

in J\ct ion, 19 15 ' ' ; and Liliencron's "Ballt'ld 

of the 13atllc of Kolin." The seventh-year 

a rithmetic hooks used the economic and 

territ ri d los.-;e<: under the Treaty of Ver-
:360 T H E U.S . . \RMY I N THE OCC:UP \1'10 ~ OF GERl\l .t\NY 

saillcs as problems. On the Oylcaves, 

USFL::'l' indudcd the clisdnimer, ·'The fact 

of reprinting does not inlply, seen Jn.>nt lhe 

cdlH:ational and mher points of view, thnt 

lhis buok is ah::;olutcly without object on.''•~ 

The newspapers, as the following exLrrt<' LS from th~ W P.ser !Jote, published ill 

Bremen, demonstrate, mirrored a dark 

Ckrm;tny: 

3 Ot•tober 

Children undc•1' I B nnd prcgntlnt \1 omen 

wi ll gel an additional pound of applPs or 

pears in their rations. 

5 Onober 

Couul !1e1·nadotte will a rrive on Monday 

with General ~i~cnhowcr's pennission to aJ·-

rangc for Sl"ttin~ up so11p kitchens to frrd 

German children during tht• winter. 

10 October (w:mt ;~ds ) 

Request information ~1bout D. Luerssen, 

lnst a member of the replacement battalion 

at Riga-Strand ( J.awiu). 

Opera singer w:11HS a piano, to buy 0 1' on 

loan for n •nan's suit. 

I !l O ctohc1· 

Lidn Baro\'a. Czed1 movie n<· tn·ss who c.ollnbor:Hcd with' the Nazis li as been arrested 

;11td tumcd over to tht> Czech tuthorities. 

Last night the strer.t sign on Friedrich !::bert 

~trecl [recently renanwd nfter the first l)resiO<'IH of thr Wcima1' Rcrublic) was pninted 

O\'f'r, and tltc ncwspttpl't· kio~k at the m:tin 

po~t office wtts smeared with Nazi slogans nnd 

swnstikas. 

16 Oc.tobt-t' 

General Cia)' said tht' American cwrupatinn wonlcl stay in German)' for rnan)· yr·ars. 

1\skcd if it <'ottld bl' as long ns ,1 gt•ncra t ion, 

he said it rouJd 11ell b<•. 

Who enn gin' infom•<Hion concerning Corporal C.:laas MuelleJ•? 

" ( I ) JCS 1517/2,. Summary of Sep 45 Report 

of the Military Governor, 13 Nov 45, in CCS 

'lG:l.2 1 (2 22-+1 ), sec. 10, (2) After Action Rpt, 

F.astcrn Military Governrnent StaJT, Sep ~5, in 

OMGUS 72- 3/ 10. (:l) Annual Rpl, Det B- 262, 

Jun 46, in OMCUS 10- 1/5. 

\\'Ito can give infonnation t'o1l<'CJ'ning Fltd-. 

/\uxili;u·y Gisela Slo111berg? 

:w 0<'toocr 

~Lonika \On Dittlllllr, duughter of Gener;1 l 

Kltrl ~ DilltHrlr, Na7.i t·ndio <:unlntrnlntor, 

\\'!IS pickL\d up Wl'l and hungry on a street 

in Oberammeq~nu. 1\ftt'r lwr arrrst shr trirJ 

to <'OilmJit su icide by jumping from :~ 

111indow. 

[u Brem e n, SS Gf'neral Count George 

I Iennig von Bas~ew itz-B hr was aJ'J\:St<'d. lie 

had hcen polite chief of Hamburg and a 

friend of I lein1·idt J limmler. 

T he firsl Liberty Ship, Willit1m F. Cody. 

entt'red l~r men harbor. 

3 November 

Heel' brewing h<IS bee n stoppr.d in na,·aria 

because the barley Jnust be used to make 

Oour.:'" 

Jl Les,wn in Democracy 

JCS 1067 established a~ one of military 

government's basic objectives "the preparation fot• n.n eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic hasis." 

Concerning politir$, however, lhe directive 

instructed Eisenhower, "No political activities of any kind shall br coun tenanced unleRc; authori1.ed by you," and added, ''You 

will <l~'lu e that your military govermncnt 

does nol become committed to <tny politir.al 

group." t\lthough the finil sentenc1~ seemed 

fain tl y lCJ afllnn a con trolled resumption 

of poliric(ll anivity, the sec:ond cr hoed a 

moJ'e fundamental premise, namely, that 

militaJ'Y government should be nonpnlitiral. 

FM 27-5. as published lwCJ years earlier, 

read, ''Neither local political personalities 

nor organized politi('a( groups should have 

a ny part in determining the policies of rnilitar·y govcrnmcnt.'n" SHAEI? G - 5, there-

"' Weser Rote, in OMGUS 39-3/5. " War Dept, FM 27- 5, Army-NO!')' tl111nua/ of 

Mililar)' CotJdrl/ 1116111 nnrl Ciui/ Affnir.r, 22 Dec 

43, p. 10. 
POTSDAM GEJU L\NY 

for<:, hat! assumed all along that the br~t 

way to keep milital')' government 011\ of 

politics was not to allow its prM·tic:c and 

had planned to prohibit politi<'al a(tivity, 

not to revive it. 

The prohibition wn~ almost totall)• !'Oeltivc in Gcrma11y aftc•· the surrender, no 

doubt hc('ausc tlw twelve Nazi years had 

ldt little with \\ hirh to renew political activity. No part), other th:\ll the N:-~t.i p:ut~. 

had existed lcl-{allr or even illcgnlly in :my 

organized fw;hion- in Germany since 

I ~ti !. The Comnumist and Sodnl lkmonatic party leaders ha ll either been jailed 

n•• hatl emigrated, and the leadership of 

the <1ther partie." hacl <~itl1er hccn as.llimilatr<l into thr Na?.i !'l~tcm or, with the hdp 

of the GeslaJ)(J when· needed, rcdtJ< c·d w 

t·omplctc impotCllt:e. The Gcrn1~ul pl:ople, 

ncv<:r notably cnthu~iasti• about pal'ly politi<'s. rememlltrcd what had happened w 

the Muxist and bo11rgcois parties Ulldcr 

Hitler and what wn" happening to the 

Nazi.~ under tlw orrup;1tion. Con"cqucntly, 

when SH.\EF G 2 undertook to irwc·~tigale 

Grr•man poliliral Hltivit)' in early J uly I !H5 

it roulcl not find any " in the trad itional 

sc•nse of thr term .. .. Normal political 

i:;suc.-:," it conc.l uclt:cl , were relcgatcJ "to the 

status of ncatlcmic lJUe;:;tions;· th<: suhjc:n 

of low key di. C\1!1..'\ion ;unong a few scatl<'rcd 

~ur vivor.; o! the old pnni(:.'>. ~ 

On the otlwr hand, in the field, military 

governmen t had lwcn learning silll'C 

A:trhcn Lhat poli tir.o; was more than jnst 

1wrt ics and party rivalries. Gcr•m;111 appointees invariably r<:prcscntcd social, rcligiows, cconomif, and -with or without 

party laheJs- politknl outlooks. The alJ· 

o;cnrC' of a po~tivc politiral progra111 nwant 

'' Memo, SHA in ', 1\C..:ofS G- 2, for llt·nd, Gl, 

~""; cr Reporl IO he~ ~uhmirted LO CCII C:lny, ~ 

Jul ·l!i, in SHAF.fl' C 2, GBI/ CJ/CS/ 091.1, folio 3. 

36 1 

only, as the G- 5 fidel survey pointed out 

in Mard1, that politiral dirrrtions were dctermiawd h}' special interests ·urh as the 

Chu rt h w· hy individu<tl~ and cliques. 

Hcm·c. ntilitar~ gm·e•·nnwnt, willingly or 

not, WlL~ invul\·cd in politirs, nnd most dangerous!)' so because it would ha ve to bear 

the entire r<:!iponsibility fm th e poli tical 

conscq11cnrcs of the ;wts and 1 haracter of 

its supposrdl)' nonpoliti< nl appointees. General Cbr. who had 111i~ed the Aachen 

aJTair, ltad his own lcs.-;on in June when 

a wilder swnn broke over the appointment 

of the i· t pt)stwar Minister President of 

Bavaria, Fritz SchaeiTcr ~cc below, pp. 

~H4 fi() ) . Seeing militar}' government in 

Bavaria trapped in a rrO!l'ltirc of pres.<i and 

puhlic rcrrimination.~, Clny wrote ttl 1\lc--

Cloy. "The <'xpcricm:c in Bavaria seems to 

me to indi< :llr the desirability of relaxing 

the ban on pnlitit•al ;11•tivitics as promptl y 

ao; possible.' '·' ~ 

The Potsdam decision tn allow and promote dc.:mnc r:~tic political panic.<~ in Germany wao;, therefore, not mnvckome to tht.• 

U.S. O<'n 1pation nutho•·itics; and the day 

after his 6 .\ ug11st spccr h, in whirh he tokl 

the Gcm)alls they would he pcnnitted to 

cngagt in lor'al political activities. Eisenhower ill~ rurted the milit<ll'Y distticts to 

begin lit nsing parties at the /( rcis level. ·I 

The public· reacted, tlw \1\'C!!tcrn Military 

Dist• it l ··cponed, with "swnning apftLhy:· 

J\ few survivCt'S or the pre-Nazi parties, 

mostly Communists and Sori<d Democrats, 

asked dcqultory que: tions nh01 tt licensing 

procedures, wbich the military govcrnmcut 

officers rould not an wcr because there 

were n<.lnt:. Representatives of would-be 

, l.1r, C:lny to McCloy, 15 jul •15. in OMGUS 

·110- 2/:1. 

•• Cahtc-, I et~. USFET, ACofS C: 'i, to CG's, 

Westeru ami ~a,lcm MiliJary Di~tricu, in USfl'ET 

SGS 014.1/ 1. 
TilE U.S . .'\R~lY ll'\ THE 0( CUP:\T O~ OF GER~I.\~Y 

movcme11ls occasionally dJ·iftcd intu detachment ofTicc.s. In Munich, for instance, 

a groHp ~ nlling itself tile League of German Cultlll'C proposed to rnlly politicnlly 

1 hr dtvmcrs of art and cull me. The vast 

majority uf the Germans, tile tletn< hllll'lltS 

agreed, \\t!"(' occupied with other things, 

'lllc h ns food, housing, and the other pmblcms of c.xC;tcncc in a defeated and dcv-

:•statcd nllmtry. These Gc·rmr.ns took 

Eisenhower's offeJ· as evidcnrc of approval, 

whi<"h tlwy rravcd, but \VCI'e willing to let 

the iS.'liiC dmp there, feeling that politic-s 

hud ln'{lug1H on all their LroubJc, in the 

fi1'Sl plac<·. Those who had h<'rll pro-Nazi 

·without ha"ing joined the party were rongrnlulating themselves on a rHu·r·ow rscape 

and were not willing to risk another even 

rcmotd)'. In KurhCSSCJl, the rrgional detndmlcnt put thc majorit}' of the fanners 

iu the Iauer ralcgory and saw clnl) the 

u•·h:w WOI'"crs as expecting tn l>cndit in 

all)' way from tcstored unions and polilit"al 

p:tl'ti(o.<;,"·' ' l"ltc torpid publir cspon~r at 

!t:nst s:wr.d military gov<:rnnwnl much of 

the embarrassment of not being <tblc to 

ac·tn:tll)' lircnse political parties. Neither 

USfET unr the military distrit-ts had 

wOI'kcd uut the procedures n11cl, thrrcCorc, 

they had to put a free1.c on the whole program for nearly two months:··n 

In the intrrim, nit hough in no way 

tvinri ng a g rmmd swell of dCill{I<Tatic enthusiasm, n pa•'l)'-political pauc:rn beg;w 

lt) <'ll lcrgc. l n a limited sense, the Soviet 

zone provickd l he model. .'\ ir'<·;HI y on I 0 

j11rw, the Soviet Military 1\ dministration 

in the ?.onC' had granted permi~-;ion In nsga-

· ( I l O M(; , l.oud Bavari:~, Curnt~ :lliv!' I list 

Rp1, :JO Jun Hi, in OMGUS -l1li ?./:1. ('1) Jliu 

Rtlt, Oc·r 20!1, Sf"p Dec. 15. in O~JGUS I 'l/5. 

.. Wk Rpt. Det t 205, 2R Sc:p ·15, in OMCUS 

I 2/ !i. 

nize '·an anti-fascilll parties." "; B>• tlw end 

of the month, fo11r parties with national 

potential h<td secured licenses: the Communist pat'ty, the Socia l Democratic pal"ly, 

the Christian Dt'lllOc t•n ti c: Union, and the 

Liberal Dctnon<ttic part)'· .\lthough the 

Soviet au hor itic~ would not have ohjc(·tcd, 

none exn;pt lhc Communist part)' regarded 

itself as hradquartcrec.l in the Soviet wnc. 

All had root-; reaching hack into the pn·-

Na~i p(~riod and, cxt:cpt for the Communist 

party, were j11!1t beginning to [et'l their way 

into the new era. 13y being licensed in tlH: 

Soviet zone, IIIey acquired corporate cxh;-

lenccs hut not mttch more. 

The first parties on the scene in Uw U.S. 

zone were thr Communists and the Social 

De moe rats, in that order. They s hared orw 

big advanlagt•: rwithrr bore the Nazi taint. 

The .'ori<~l Dcmonats could daim the di-;-

tinrtion of h:winJ< IIC'Ctr the only one of the 

old partie.-; (the Communists had been outlawed hy t!l('n ) to h;lvc voted against ~l e 

gmntin~ uf tlktatol'ial powers to Hitkr in 

Ma rc h I !U:{. The C:or11 munists, while their 

record undc•t• llw \Vrimat· Rcpuhljc- !:hnwtd 

them to be nltiiO!'t "·' larking in respect for 

dcmocral"y as tire Nazis, had been the part)' 

most ruthlc.-;sl>• pcrsenrtcd by the Nnzis; 

and since !her were proteges of one of the 

victoriou~ p oWCI'S, they were also h)' definition demurratk. ln the U.S. zone, the 

Communi~ts and the; Snc·ial Dcmocr<-~t'> ;d;.;:' 

had two c·omnwu problems: the opposition 

of the Cat lw lir Chnt·rJ, and the absenrc 

of a working \Ia~ majority. The Communists also had to rolltcud with the negative 

effecL-; of "r um ~ :md reporLc; from 1lic 

Soviet Zone"; the Sot·iHl Democrnll( hncl 

!o deal with " kh wing a ttracted hy a So-

>; Bc:\tt Ruhlll \"Qfl 011\ICII, DOCI/1/11'11/J Oil c:n- /11(111)' U11der OtcllfJntion (New York: Oxford Uull"crsity Pres~, I !1:15 ), II· :111. 
POTSO.\M GER~fA iY 

vil·t ·.~potNH cd Communist hid for uni!y of 

the \vorking rlass parlies/'

11 

()f the JJre-Nazi middle clas.-; parties, the 

two showing t.rongest signs or Jif<: WCJ't' the 

Cl'nlc r· l':u't)' and its Bavarian cotuHerpnrt, 

the IJavarian People's p:'lt'ty. Traditional 

tit:' with tlw Catholic- Chnrrh hdprd thrm 

to cli~>.'lodatt· themselves front nazism, although thl'ir mcrnhe.rs were uot tthvnys 

sut tC"-''ful in doing l\O as individu.tls. U.S. 

milit.1ry government, with ~omc misgivings, 

had ht•cn n:lativcly gcnero11s in appointing 

their potCtHial leaders to administrntive 

po~ ~ \lndt:l' tht occ:up<ttion, most notably 

Dt'. Adcnaucr a.c; Ohcrlntergctmei,tter o[ 

Colognr nnd Fritz Schaeffer as Minister 

Pn:sidcnt of Bavaria. But thrc;c parties hc:~itatcd tc> enter postwnr politit·s in their old 

G.ttholi<' stance, pa rtly hcc-ause their more 

JWOgrcs...,ivc leadership wanted to give them 

a broader ba-;c of voter appeal ;md partly 

htcnusc in the case of the Bavarian 

People's p:-~ny esperiall y- thrir actions 

tinder the Wcimnr Republi c were not 

ahovt' reproach, hut mosll y hct:\usc they 

were ofraid they wbtlld not he able to comprtc· ag~t in t the Communists and Sof'ial 

Ocmot:mts. For this Ja<.t reason. they would 

ju~t n~ soon have seen the P''ohihiti()n on 

pulitin.d "' tivit)' prolonged, and they were 

ftu t ht'r'lllOI'<' spurred to IU'eak with the plli'l 

•utd take the lead in promoting "Christian" 

pac·tics as soon as the Social Dcmonnts and 

Communists heg;m to organize. 

'l'hc idea of a Christian p<lrty or parties 

\IIJitin.~ all ronfes.-.iom through thcit• comnton opposition ro Marxist athd.;m, after 

ht·ing wrillt:n into a rurmal PI'C>gl'niJ) ill 

\drnam:r's Cologne in March 194!), took 

hold more Ot' Jess independently in all p:1rls 

of Gcn,lany. Advocates of such n p:tl'ty in 

"' ( I ) ll "cory o( Military Covcl'llmcnt in La11d 

Wut•tnembcl'g-Badcn, f)L I, p. 2•17. (2) ffisl 

l<.pt, 01'1 P.'!C:2, Scp 45, iu OMGUS 7-:l/5. 

3(i3 

the , 'ovict ..:one gave it a name, Christian 

Democratic Union, em 25 J une whcu 1hcy 

l'ecurcu n lircw;c to form it. Tn th<~ U.S. 

zone the ltalllt' Christian Social People's 

party Wll); n10rc frequently used until Srptember, wht:n Chl'islian Demorratic Union 

(CD U ) nllltC into gcne ~l use in the l.ncutler of the Wc:~ tt'rn Milit:try District and 

Christian Social Union ( C:SU ) w ;t.-; 

adopted in Bav:u ia. By che tim<' they 

emerged in tlw U.S. zone, the C:DU and 

CSU wert·, in the words of one ohsct-ver, 

"a hanq11Ct for political gourmets." The 

CDU in pal'lir ular attempted Lo embrace 

all clcnH'nts opposed to communi!'im or social dcrno<Tary for religious or any otht l' 

reasons, and cvrn ~ome that were not op· 

posed. Tts right wing catered to indu!'\ll'ialists, big husin1'~e~. nnd large andow~e s, 

while its left win~ looked for support from 

civi.l servan ts, sm<tll shopkeepers, and fanner-s and, in w01 kin~ dass areas, endorsed 

socializ::ltion or some indw;Lries. The CSU 

addition ally presented itself as a defender 

of the l3a v11rian way of life and as a stau nch 

ally of the Ca tholic Church. Both partie.~; 

also let it he k1111wn 1 to the marked ;uuJoy-

:lll<:e oi military government, that 1 hey 

were prepared to welcome repentant 1<1.zis 

to their 111 k.~, aud both endorsed tht view 

that denazHicntion should be limited to the 

" real'' Na1.is, the small numbers in tlw lop 

leadership. The: rr.:st they dismissed as Musmnzis, Nazis J,y c-ompulsion. 

The T.ilwral DcmocraLic party, licrnst·cl 

in the Soviet zone in J unc, was a revival 

cf the old German Democr atic party. Similar offshoots of 1 hl' German Democrats in 

the U.S. wuf' wc11t hy several namc..'i, 

most prominently the Democratic People's 

pany:·~ avill~ a nineteenth century lih~ 

•• The \'nrio11s "democratic" parties did not 

merge nationall y until I!H8, when lhcy bream!! 

the Free Drmocratic pnr1y. 
1'1-JE U.S .. \RMY l N T HE O CCU PATION OF GERMANY 

end outlook and being both defenders of 

private enterprise and private property and 

Jtonsectarian, 1 hey were closer to the average \meri ~.:n 's id e<.~ of a polilical party 

than the <)I hers. Their weaknesses were an 

appeal limited to the middle d~l')S and the 

need to find n middle g round between the 

Social Democra ts and the C:DU-CSUI,r,th of \vhom stretr hcd thcit• programs so as 

to leave them practically 110 common 

grou nd. The Demon a tic People's party 

had a minor stronghold in \Vuerttemberg-Baden, where one of its founders, 

Dr. Reinhold M aiet, was rhe Ltmd Minister President appointed by military 

govcrnmcnt.r." 

M ilitHI')' g-ovemmenl political analysts 

WOI'I'iCd ah()ttt the paucity Of leadership 

ta lent in all partic.c;. Too mnny good men, 

they believed, had either been killed, 

broken, or· driven out of the ou ntry hy t.he 

Na~ s or were too old. Except for the few 

who h ltd survived the concentration camps 

o1· orhrr fonnf; of Nazi persecution, those 

who were left had apparently been, al hest, 

"poli tieal omre oy~," too insign ifi<·ant to 

have attr·aclecl the Nazis' allcntion. However, tlte one mnjor new political figu re to 

tppc r in Lhc U.S. zone, Dr. Josef Mueller, 

leading founder of the CSU, nonplussed 

the Americans . • \ prominent lawyer ;md 

member of a Munich patrician family, 

M ucller •d the attrilmles of a t ypi('al Bavarian, including a double c:hin. He was 

aiRo ~1 . peeled of being- an in triguer and 

a "double-tl'iple-rros.<;er." H e n dtivateu 

good relations with the l\mcrint ns hilt re-

"' ( l ) Hist Rpt, J.and Hesse, Jun 1·(i, in 

OMGUS 42- 1/ .'i. (2 1 History or JVI ililllr'Y Gove rn· 

mcnt in l .mld WucrttcmiJcrg·Badcn, pc. I, pp. 

2117 :i:l. (:1} OMGB, Political l ntelligcrlcc Br, 

Yearly Report of Polilic<~l Aclivi ties in l3ava ria, 

I .J•rl ·16, in OMGUS ti5- l / 10. (•I) Gcrh11rt Bin· 

dcr, J) ~utschl/llu/ St:it /1) 115 (Si t~ll ga rt : Sccwalu 

Verlag, t 969 ), pp. I Oo 2 1. 

portedly told his followers that, " in a 

pin< h.'' it might l1e n ecessary Lu go over 

to the Soviet side. He gave information to 

U.S. illlclligence agencies lmt was thought 

also to have contacts with Russians. While 

pr<> fessiJlg to reject the rightist OHtlook of 

the old Bavarian People':) party, he argued 

for leniency toward nomina l Nazis and accepted them intu the C:SU. His memhcrshi p in I he ll bwehr ( countcrintclligenc:c) 

<l11ring thr war would ordinarily have been 

enough to put him in the ma ndatory removnl, i[ not automatic arrest, category 

under the oc:rupation ; however, he had 

spen t tl tc last months of the war in a concentra tion camp, he had th e confidence of 

I he Catholic hiera rchy in Bavaria, and he 

had ;t pportaiJ e rla.im lo have been a 

go-between with the Vatican for the German re~i!SLHncc while he was i11 the 

/J bwehr.'11 Perhaps, as the summer of 194!1 

wore on, Mueller's best attribute in the eyes 

of military government wa.s lhal compared 

to his strongest rival, Minister President 

S< ·haeffer (see below, p. 385), he w <L<; heginninl{ to look like a sterling chnmpion 

uf J.rmorr acy. 

ead~, or llOt , however, lhc Germans in 

the U.S. zone were going to t~ te demorracy soon -sooner t h:.1n an yone expected. 

They were not going to get il because they 

w;tnled it or i>crause they de.sen·ed it hut 

because Ccnern l Clay believed in learning 

hy doing and- probably as much as for 

a ny other rcason- becaw;c the end of the 

w:t1' in lhe Pacific jnspired him to conv<:rl 

neccs.<:ity into virllle. J\ftCJ' V- J Day, 

US FET G- 5 records showed that 40 percent of the ofli cer<; and 50 perc.e11t of the 

cn li~'> ed men in milit ar·y governmcn1 wo\.l ld 

•• ( I ) Rpt on CSU lno l'OIIrce, no date], in 

OMGUS 6~ 10. (2) O MC G, Political ln1c lli· 

gcucc Br, Yearly Report of Political Ac tivities 

in 'Bavari;\, I Jul ·16, in OMCUS 65- 1/ 10. 
POTSOt\~1 Glm~I.\:'\Y 

l1c di~ihlc for di!'t harge by I he end o{ 

I ~l45.' " With thi!-i information in mind, on 

16 Scptclllhrr, Clay wrote to !\It Cloy I hat 

he had worked ou t a program fur loral 

clc<'tions in the U.S. zone. He totllinunl: 

1"111· Pot,dnlll Agrcc·111ents rnll for n·stmalton of lora! :.elf go\'l'mnwnt as •apitll> as 

C'Url~i,ll'nl '' i th tlw purposes of thc• m·rttpati<>n rr tlw Gennans an· to lt•.IJJI Ul'IIIOn:wy. 

I thin!-. till· b<-st wa> i!> to ~tn•t on quit·kl> . 11 tlw lxlltOJII. Rc.-,idrs, thilo will lwlp m 11'-

dut (• the J>I'I"SilllOCJ IIC'CUCd rm miltt;ll) ~0\­

' '"'""'"'· With umn) officel"ll u•1u1 nin,g to the 

L' S. itt thr coming ntonth~. we will 11ut be 

;•hlt• I() htnff" a lnrgr nur11brr of lor:d detnrh111l'11l~ . Yc•t, wf' ron hnrdl)' \,•ithdntw llw d<·-

l:rc luu<·n" ttnlil oflkial~ appoilllt•t.l b) \lb hav«' 

ht•c•" tL·plnrcd b) mher~ sc·ll'l"ll•d by 1 ht> 

C:c•tlllolll\.1a 

l'o111 d.\\t; I.Her, ordcn; went out to Grtm.tn Land government to writr clrrtion 

t ock"' and to the militar) distric·b to prcJW"C for ckction." in Januar}' 194() in rommunit ic~ ( Grmeintle ) of k<\S than 20,000 

p1'ople, to be followed in ~lan h nnd fvl.l}' 

by <'lcrlions in l.tmdkreife and romiiHmitics 

\vit h 20,000 to I 00,000 pcopk. Elrnions, 

a-; it ''"'lltd out, were announn·d ahead 

uf the pl'Orcdurcs for licensing political 

panir..;, Tltc prorcdurcs did not n•.trh the 

drt.H hmcnts until the first week of 

Onolwr.'·' 

\p.ut fwrn Clay nnd his starT, the ronst'll'oltS of the .\mcricans ami Gcrm;~ns was 

tltat t lw plan for elections wa~ premature, 

dangerous, and potentially -disn);t mus. Clay, 

in fac I, lllld M cC:Ioy Lhnt some of It is ow II 

• ~lt•mo, He, . USFE1 , ACofS \. 'i, for C.:ors, 

~~~~ . l'rojt"r;tm for Introduction of (:J.I\\ified Ci\'il 

St•rnn·, h St'Jl IS, in L'SFF.I SCS 200. l. 

'l.cr, C.:l:~y to McCloy, 16 Se11 15, 111 OMGUS 

110 :!;:! 

•• ( 11 ll t~IOty of Mihtnry UuH'rJtnwnt in J.n11d 

Wu(•rllt·nlbrrg-Baclcn, pt. I. 251 . (:.! ) Annual 

lli>t J(pt, lkt E 211, :1 Jut IIi, itt OMGUS 

711 t/ 10 

365 

adviseas wrt<' urging him to postpone the 

elecliom.'1

·' Dortrinall>'• Cla)•'s dcri.,ion appeared to he llaming hcrc."y to most of 

military ~owmmcnt. Although no such 

program existed, it had been a fundamemal assumptiou of military ~overnment 

that the Ccrnuu1s would be subjected to an 

extetl<;ive pc·riod or education and training 

jn democr.Ky. Pre~iclcnl Roosevelt, afler all, 

had t.tlkccl in trams of a whole generation . 

To huld elet tiuno; ;tftcr eight months anc.J 

'' ithout the C:<•tm,ul l harartcr having hc<>n 

remolded in .tnv si~nifirant way could only 

l>e jud~cd ft•ivolulls or cyniclll. Ftarl hermore, as a pt'H('tical mancr, early ekC'tions 

appeared w oiT<"r nothing hut disadvantage;. \1 the end of Ort(lbcr, lora I partie-; 

had heen .lpprovcd in onl) <;jx of the Baval · 

ian ''". rciJt•, In the important ~ tunkh 

Strrullkn•ir, the second part)', the Social 

Democrats (tlw Communists were (i~t , 

was not liccn~cd until 17 Novemhc·r. In 

. omc /'1.' reisc 11ot a soul showed up even to 

talk allmat fo~tnding .t part}'· .\nd USFET'<; 

rules did not exactly encourngc would-he 

politicians m promote speed in the granting 

of Iin~I11>C.'I. The narne~ of twenty-five sponsors we• c rtquircd on each npplk(llion ; 

and each spon.;or had to suhmit a pc~omd 

Frngelw ~e11, whirh brought him to the attenti()n of Spr< ial Brandl :~nd CIC im·c-.tigatol"". The pcopk. the politicians, and the 

mjJitnry government detachments all 

wanted tilt• c•lcrtion!i postponed. When 

Loui:-; P. J .c11 hnl"t, Chid of the Berlin 

Bure<~u, .-\ssocialcd Press, toured Bavaria 

in the <:('cond \\ tck of October, he reported 

t.hat public and military government opinion was prcpomlcr:unlr against cat I) elc<-

tions . . \ q~t.llll"r of those rc.,ponding in a 

poll taken in unic h st.1ted ratcgorirall)' 

., l.tr, Clily to McCloy, 16 Srp ·IS, in OMGUS 

410-2{:1. 
366 'J'HE U.S. 1\RMY fN THE O CCUPATION OF GERMANY 

that they would not v0te i11 any election. 

Even !\cla lbe rL von ' Vitldsbach, pretender 

lo the Bavarian thro ne, vacant since 19 18, 

indicated 1 hal he proposed to wa it a while 

!Jefore a ttempting to re,·ive the monarchist 

rausc. The p<ll'tics that had been licensed 

seemed tn he nrmpaign.ing against the clcrlions as much as a~ain t each other. None 

of them wnnted to ri'lk thei1· Oedgling organizations in (I lest or strength; and since 

many of the prospt:ctive randidates were 

alread y military government appointees, 

they did not wanl to risk their johs."'1 In 

mid-Ortober, Clay himself I old the Ci\D: 

"Except fo r [fourJ c ities mentioned a bove 

"" ( I ) OMG, Laud Bavar·in, C.:tnn11lalive Hist 

Rpt, 30 .Juue •16, iu OMCUS •1:16- 2/:1. (2) Hist 

Rpl, J.flllil l-lcssc, Jnn 46, in OMC US •1·2- 1/ 5. 

(3 ) Annnal Hist Rpt, Det E 2J:J, ~ Jul •16, in 

OMCUS 78-1/ 10. 

and som e smaller cities where political 

pa1•ties a re in the.: process of fOl'mation, 

complete political apathy is reported frC>m 

nearly every section of [the] J\mcril'an 

Zone .... There is significant unanimity 

in repo rts from Military Gt>vcrnmen t in 

stressing this fact a nd in observing that 

lthel Gennan masses a re entirely unready 

for self-government and jgnor·anl of demonatic prorcssc:s and responsibilities.""; 

Neverthe less, in a USFET directive of 23 

November, he <ll'dered the Land milit ary 

governmen t<; to set firm datcc; for the Cemeinde ~.:lcc ti ~ in J anuary a nd autho rized 

U1em to license parties at /,ond level, a ha rbinger of more importanl elections to come. 

t.: Foreign Re/otions, 1943, \'ol. I I I, p. 9ll l. Tlw 

four citie5 were Suollgart, FrankfurL, Kassel, a nd 

Munich. 
CHAPTER )0 

The First Freedom 

I(. /) Or~nnizalirm tuul Poliry 

Of 1' '~ident Roo. evclt\ Fnnr l•tc<'doms 

I he first was f rcedom <>f Rpect h and expreo;..,ion. ,\s it applied to the individual, 

freedom n( speech wag rc~:m c:d by U.S. 

orcupntion policy as a natural right, 

althoup:h for the Germans somewhat cirC'llll1R(Tihcd. Collectively, in regard 10 the 

cornnntnitat ions media, it was to be gmntcd 

to •Jw Gcnnans under Lul lt~ ~c afttr Nazi 

and ot her· undesirable influrn<'<'-" had been 

eliminated. The instrunwnt to do both wa.s 

thr I tlfMmation Control Di"ision (1 CD ), 

USFET. 

The I CD, headed h)' General MrClure 

and composed of the pcr:;onnd who had 

fol'mcd the U.S. side in the Psyrhological 

W.tdarc Division of SHi\Jo:F, was a Sperial 

Sta!T divi);ion of USfF:T.' Until Dcrembcr 

~1 45, when it was lt'ansfcrred 10 1hc urwly 

crcat<·d Offirc of Milit:u y Gov<:rnmenl 

( U.S. ~o ne ), ICD functioned separately 

from militaq• government, as lwd r>wn, SH \EF. It.; r hicf field agcnrics were two 

Distr·irt Information Scrvires Control Comllland ~ (DISCCs) . The 6870th DlSCC:, 

pinpoint ed [or the Ea.c;tcnl Mili lary Dislt'irt, had been organized in Janu:Hy Hl45. 

1 A policy and planning Man·, the lnform:uion 

Control Scrvke ( fCS L also under Mc.:(.;lurc, was 

orgnnircd :1< a SJlCcial section of tlw U.S. Group 

Co,llrul Council. After a IJrlet ~lay in Frankfurt, 

h lllO\td 10 Berlin in August I C).l5 to tnke part 

in IJtt:uJripartite information <'Ontrol planning 

wluch in 1 ht' lirn >·ear had little• in 011c•nrc~ on 

opl•rnclll! ~ in tin: wncs. 

The 6H71l>t D ISCC. assigned to the Western Militaf) Di'ltl'ict, was fonned in February nrou nd the pl'C.':>S e ontrol team that had 

founded the llnchmrr Narhrichlen. l. ;~tc:r 

the lCD nlso rreatcd the 6840th Theater 

information Servircs Control Comll)and 

(TTSCC) to l1J1 I' sc c·crtain zoncwidc· 

activities ;md the information Control SCT· 

tion for lhc Berlin !l<:ctor." 

The 1 C:D and its subordinate <·ommaods 

had two mio;siono;: the first was to alt as the 

communin \lion-; link between the Cerman 

people and 1he U.S. urrupntion authorities; 

the second was to rotHrol and rcron~ 

stitutc tile Ccrmnn information services 

'·as instrumentalities of a democratic, pcan' 

loving soc-iet ."~ ' l'hesc missions were to be 

accomp li cd in tlu·r c phases. l n the· first, 

using lhc authorit y of Military GovcnlnwaH 

Law No. 191, all media of puhlir t~xprc"· 

sion in Gcnnanv would he sh\1( llown, 

which Wn!l done ' as areas wer·c orrupicd. 

In the o;cwncl ph:~sc, PWD and ICO would 

operate scln.trd instnm1ent.-; of puhlir informat ion, ,l;ll('h as newspapers and rauio 

stations, ~1~ "ovet·t" organs of the cwcupntion. The lhird phase c:.tllcd [or a gradual 

revival and return of the media lo German 

hands t htou h licenses to he given to "carefully selected anti-Nazi, democratic-minucd 

Germans.''' 

: H ist RJ)I, lC D, !I M:ty 45- 30 Jun •16, in 

01\IGUS N:! 1/5, Pfl· 12- 17. • J\ lem<), ti el~• USFf.T, JCD suh : Priority ltll 

lCD Activitil·~.? A1og 15, in USFET SGS 091.'1 ~. 

' USF'P:r to C(:\, l.;;tslcrn :wd Western J\filit:u')' 

l)istdcts. ~uh ; Allministration of Military <lov(:rn• 
36H THE U.S. \R~1Y li\ THE OCCLIP.\TIOI\ OF GElUJ.\;\Y 

\t the tim(' of the sun·emlc:r· all Sll.\EF0< rupicd rcr·r itUJ') was in the second stage. 

NewspHpcrs anti radio stations wrrc: shut 

down and theaters, moving picture houses, 

.rntl WIH'C't'l ha lls were closed. Tlw infmm:~­

tion Gcn11ans rcc·cived came from Dit! Mit· 

triltwg, other .\n11y newspapers, and Radio 

Luxembourg. PWD's second phnsc policy 

wa~ tu "maintain and deepen till' mood of 

P""-'ivc ,,cquic"rcnce rto th<· occupnlionl." 

1t1 cm·uuragc food production, and "to 

nrous<· n st:nsc of collective rc~pon ihilhy 

for GCI'IH<Iny's crimes.'' This last point was 

,l{(ling to be~ a permanent- anti pcr'IIHtnelltly frustr·rtting- element of U.S. information :t< tivitic-;. 

Undoubtedly influenced by rhr more 

dulcet timbre of Soviet-operated Rndio 

Berlin, PWD relaxed its polic )' slightly nt 

the: end of May. In the pr~ and rndio, 

Ccrmnn :mti-Nazi writer were to he given 

limittcl opportunities to exprc-.s themsdvcs 

on political subjects; and cultural artivitit·s, 

p:ll'ticularly music, were to hr CIH'Oitraged. 

Stories and broadcasts having to do with 

( lf'nnan guilt would djtferclltiat<: ltt:t ween 

the Nazi rriminals, who were to ilr punished, .tnd the German people, who were 

to he told thnt they could .llont· ''h) hard 

wm k. uat ional restitution, and a dmnf{<: of 

hcat·t." 

In late J une, two rvcnt" w:lwrcd in the 

third phase : on the 27th, Holh1nd!l, t.'ditor 

of the ilarltenor Nachrithtcn, rcr.C'ivcd a 

lieensr, and on the 28th , PWD <lltlhorized 

limited licensing of other• newspapers. 

Thc.~c papers were to he suhjert to prepublication censorship and thcit· tone and 

t'<JillCnl would he the same M those of the 

offirial papers. the rationale being that the 

Cc.nmms would be mclrc willing to acTcpt 

mo•nl in lhl' U.S. Zone in Crl'lllfllly, :10 ,1111 15, 

in CC:S :111 :1.21 (2- 22- 44 ),scc. !J. 

ideas from ot hrr Ccm1ans, espec:iall}' the 

roncepl of rollc.ctive guilt to whit'l• thtit 

rt:sistam c itH l'(·asnl as more crimes were 

revealed. • 

.\s it tunH:d out, only one papc1, tlw 

Frankfw·t el /?1/Jtt!.rt ha11, was liccmcd 

under the 2B J unc. dirct·tive. The Pol~d;un 

promises of ftN' pC<'t h and press and Eisenhower's offer in the G .\ugust spet'dt to 

c.'tend 1 h{'S<.~ freedoms " hy a g radual proec<>S" to the Germans in the U.S. zone 

hl'Ought <tnothcr directive on 9 AugHsl. In 

the dirc<'tivc, t<:n ntathorized licensinK of 

German iuformation services to engage in 

reporting, cdito•·i:d Wl'il in g. and discus.~ion 

on a "wide variety of subjects, provided 

military !';et'lll'it)' is 1\0( jeopardized." 'Postpuhlic:ation ll<'rut iny su pplamed prepublication rcmorship, ami full freedom of 

speech and JH <' '-~ WC'f(' envisioned in rutllt' t• 

stages.r. 

P1 ~ss Con/tal 

When the redisposition was completed 

and SH.\ EF (!i~olvcd in mid-July, the on ly 

new-,papcr' i><:ing published in the U.S. 

zone wc'r·e tight ovel't :\m'ly paper'!!, all 

weeklies, with rt < mnhined circulation 

slightly O\'t.'r three million. T hey were slated 

10 he phased out ~ lir.ensed paper-s 1ouk 

over the :mw; thq• s<·rvcd; hut in tht: 

meantjm~,:, in .\ugust, two more were 

added, OIW in Stuttgart, to serve the parts 

of W uen tcmhcrg and Baden acquired from 

the Frendt, nml the J(/lgemei11e Zciltmp, 

in Berlin. Tlw tlllgPmeine ZeiltmJ! appcnred Lnrt·c tintt~ wc<·klr, altcrnatin~ with 

, ( I I Aht l{JH, tCJJ, II ,\1ay ~5 -:10 J un IG, 

iu O~ CUS 2 12 1/.'i, pp. 6- ll. (2) OMCUS, ~n. 

TCD jou1s ~lilit;~~y (;ovc-mmC"nl, 22 Dec 15, in 

O~JCUS 2·12 l/5. 

• Hq~, USJi' ~ 1', IC:D, Directive No. 4 for lnfor· 

m<llion Co111rol Sl!rvke~, 'l Aug 15, in USFET 

scs 091.'1 12. 
THE FIRST FREEDOM 

FmsT Ltct;:NSED NEWSPAnR CoMES OFF PRt~ss. On the left Editor Hollands of the 

" Aachener Nachrichten." General i\1 rClure on the right. 

a British-published paper to give the western sectors in effect a daily ne,vspaper. In 

September, reflecting the progress in licensing, Lhc overt papers declined to five, and 

in late November the last of them stopped 

publishing. 

The 6870th OISCC, under Lt. Col. John 

Stanley, had moved into Munich al the end 

of April; and at the same time, 6871st 

DISCC, under Col. Bernard B. McMahan, 

had settled at Wiesbaden in the Western 

Military District. Since the overt papers 

were edited centrally in PWD and ICD •and 

printed a.nd distributed by army press 

teams, the DISCCs concentrated from the 

first on working with the Germans. Enforcing Law· No. J 91 was the least of their jobs. 

Although military government detachments, often unaware that information 

control was not one of their functions, 

sometimes briefly tolerated so-called black 

newspapers, the German newspaper industry was dead. The problem, preliminary 

reconnaissance showed, was going to be to 

recruit acreptahle Germans and find 

enough plants and presses to resurrect the 

country's newspaper industry. Goebbels' 

Propaganda Ministry had kept a tight hold 
Ti ll·: U.S. \R~IY JJ\ 'I'IJE ()<.(:t l J',\Tl O s\ CW CER1\I \ i'\Y 

on a ll puhlir i nformation 111 c<.lia, allU kw 

pcoplc who haJ W)1'~1·d d~aa·ing the twelve 

)'<:nr 1'\.at.i period, pnt< lically nom· in jourualism. c.:oulu meet the D lSCcs· poli tind 

standards. ln tile homhl~d-out cit ics, the 

presses were still I naried in the ruhhlc. 

Ncven!Jekss, in 1 he beginning, the li1 ensing procedure inAue.Jtceu the pace of pres.<; 

revival ll)()l'C th~Ul the liVa ilahiJit y OJ' pCopJC 

a nd prc!'Srs did. The 28 June an ~ ,\ugust 

Uii'Cl'liVCS made litensing puS.~ iiJi c, hLll lhC 

prolcdurc req uired both I CD and Dl SCC 

clearances, and lCD alone had the uth ~ 

ity to issue licenses. Under this system only 

two papers secured license.<;, the Frankfurter 

Runtlst hau on 31 July and the Rh in ~ 

Neckar Zeitu11.!! in H eidelberg on 5 September. The program firc;t began to move 

in earnest a fter I I September, when IC:D 

q~a cd the licensing authorit y to the mil~ 

ita l'y district commanders, who acted 011 

the D1S<...:Cs' rccommenda tion1i. During the 

month, five paper~; received license.-; in the 

'\'\'('.stern Military Dist•·icl, inclttding one in 

Bremen. Al tbe end of the month in Berlin, 

Der Trtp,esspiegel received a license; in Lhc 

first l wo weeks of October, The Eastern 

MiJittH)' District licensed live pa pers in Ba~ 

varia, beginning in Munich on the 6th with 

the Suetldeu.tsche Zeitung. By the end of 

the year, tw nty~lhrcr papers, with a coP1-

hincd circulation of more thnn three mil~ 

lion, were publishing in the zone, Bremen, 

and Berlin. Because of the paper shortage, 

all were restricted to twke~ eek y plli>liration except De1· T agesspie.!J.el which was a 

daily. 

.\fter January 1946) redeployment, the 

paper shortage, and the dearth of qualified 

and acceptable German journalists in rea ~ 

ingly made th clve~ felt , and in the next 

six months only twelve newspapers received 

licenses. Both DISCOs had begun the occupation with close to a hundred offi cers. In. 

JIH' fir:.; l t brei' 1110111 hs of 19+6, a·cdcploymcnt rc·duced this strengt h l1y hniL The 

pool of potential li< t•nsecs had lwgun to n lll 

dry alt•r ady itt the fall of 1945, a11 d the 

@70th ~C:C had had to look foa• rmigr<-

jlltlrn:tlist~ in Fn1ncc. For three ntontlts heinnin g in Frhru:ary I !146, 6870t h D 1 SCC 

stopp<'d lircnsi11g ncwspapcr11 in 13 nva ria 

t'omplt-tdy while it se11 t ~couts to Switzerland, France, England, and the British and 

Frc11 ch zones.' USFET slowed 1 he licensing 

program further after the tmn of the year 

\¥hen, to save p<tpcr, it restriclecl the total 

prL-s.s run for t lw zone to one paper for 

<'very five per:'ions. Consequently, the 

papers licensed Inter were fewc•· <rnd 

sntaller. '\ dozen of 1 he papers licensed in 

I !145 had allotted press runs of more than 

I 00,000 copies. Der Tagesspiegel, the 

f/rnnkfu.rfer Rundstlum, the Sueddeulsche 

ZeifL£71_!!, and the Slullf!arfer Zeil!mg 

pri nleu 4{)0,000 to 450,000 copir.<;, and several 0t hcrs among the 1 ~145 p<lpCt'S had cir-

('ulations ranging- from 150,000 LO 300,000 

topics. Among the 1946 papc•-s only the 

Hnrli.u:!te Neue.rle Nnrhrir !tten, in Karlsruhe, received <l I 00,000-ropy allotment, 

a figure thnl a~ a pparentl y not rcarhed:' 

Finding li ce see.~ was thr prr.c;s <'ontrol 

offi1·crs' fir l and dl y most critical task. 

Besides having newspape r edjt.orial a nd 

nHlll(tgcment experience, the candida tes 

had lo have been anti-Nazi- not merel y 

non-Nazi- anu prndemocratic. ICD added 

one ot her reqtdrement: tha t, as a rule, 

licenses be granted to groups of individuals 

n:presenting different social, politi cal, and 

rdigious outlooks rather than to single persons. Beca use no more titan one paper 

t:ould he licensed in a single area, ICD 

; Hisr Rpl, OMG, Bavaria, 1945, Jun 46, jn 

OMCUS ~:16 21;1, vol. rr. pp. 20 1- 03. 

' His! Rpt, lCD, fl May ·15- :lO J un <16, pp. 

21- 2·1. 
'lifE FlRST rREEDO~"I 

wanted e<tt h paper lo 1 <·prc~<:t\1 ~cvr ral 

()pinion:-, hoping thcrel>y .1l~o to hre<-t k the 

Gcl.'lll•ln hal>it of a partisan prc:~s ' 

J n selling nr 1 he Snetltliwl.rrlw Z11ilung 

in Munich, the GR70th DISCC l'('ChH rd a 

field of 250 applirants lo three. The rhicf 

t·ditlll', Emil Goldsch:-lgg, had Nlitrd a 

!'io< ial Democrat ncw<;papcr in (unkh hcrorc I i, had heen itl'l'C'~lt'd hy llll' Cesltt/JO twin'. and had been rcjc .. tcd as nn 

,\rm) rt•scrvc: o!Ticcr wlwn he refused lQ 

si1-.'11 .1 paper stating that he would al>ic:k 

hy Nnzi rwinciplc~. August Sdawingswin, 

1 he publisher. had been a nwmlwr of a libc·t•nl pca~a t group RIICI a k:adcr in the <ll1liNazi Rt•irhsbmwer movenwnt clur·ing the 

1920'1 and c<~rly I 930s, ami hd()l'C t !133 

had publisht•d several provincial newspapers in southern Bavaria. The C'uhural 

<·ditor, Ft·arw. Schoeningh, had nlitcd the 

independent Catholic literary periodical, 

llorhltmd, until the Nazi!' put it out of 

husin<.•ss. 1') 

In tht ]l)ng run, the most distinguished 

rarly licensee was Dt'. Thcndor· I leuss, who 

w:rs a foumlcr of the Rlrein-Nrrkar Zeitung 

and ~Iini tcr of Culture in tlr<· (irst /,fl /1(1 

goVI'rnmcnt fm· \Vuerttrmbcrg·Baclrn nnd 

l.rt~ l' ~r 1 vrd two terms as Prr\oiidcnl of t hr 

Cc11\1<111 Federal Republic. 

.\lmn-:1 without exception, tht liccn:-;ec.c; 

lrad h<'t'll awar from ncwspaprt work for 

a ck< :Hk Ol' more and thus needed advkt• 

0 11 <'OIIlt'lll and makeup and hdp at turning 

mH papers in plants whcrr dcnridty, 

paper, ink, nutchjne pans, and <:vcrytlring 

cl'lr wcr·c short. The D I SC:O; su ppliccl the 

.rs..;io; t;mrr, induding lt'< hni<•nl ndvicc <111 rr-

' It:[) rwthoriz!'d liccrL~ing >CCOIIU JJ:lJII!n in 

''itic• nwr I UO,OOO population in April 191 G, hur 

only cmc ~uC'h pn(IPr, 1hc Fnwl..fur/'' ,\ r11r l'ro11•, 

n·n·iv<•d n llrrusc heforc :lO J unc I tJ·I !i. 

'' lli ~r I{JH, OMG. 13a,•nrin, 1!1-15, .)~111 16, in 

OMCUS ·I:Hi 2/i, vol. II, p. J(, , 

37 1 

building pl:Hll' and mntr oiling c·in uh11i011 

and !'iupplit·.s. f11 Wtaendltlrg, the 6B70th 

DISCC hrou hl in :\merican rivi li<lll spc· 

<:ialists to l'tlluild a plan[ out of a pile or 

ruhllk." C:ensurshi p was not a problem. 

Po~ih l )' ht't·a us<· t hl: lir.enscs were v~tl11ahk 

(no paper C;,ilt•d to c:dl out C\'Cr)' edition ), 

the edito rs wc1'<: l'l<thorately careful lO ITspctl llw limit" on " 'hal they multi p11hli . 

although some ('OJnplained about having 

to hush up incidents in\'olving U.S. 

.:old icrs. 1 ~ 

Sinrc JHIIIt of tire licensees owned pri11t· 

ing plants and l he rule ngainsl licensing 

corporal ion" lin tiled their ability to acquirt 

capit al lO lmy plants, USl•ET pcrmiucd 

1 CD to u~e 1 hl' <·onfi.;ration anci requisition· 

ing pOWCI'S or the OC"CUpation tO put them 

in busine"-"; th ~c powers were not used in 

any othr1 inslnnrc to benefit Germans. 

Plant owners, who in the first place lmd 

no choic<' a nd 1hc se-cond place cou ld not 

use the plant:> without lic:cnscs anyway, u~uaJiy wcr<~ willing tnough to turn over· tlw 

properly til n n·asonable rcnl; bul rcn had 

to be tOJH'cmed also for the future when 

American protection was gone-. Vicwin~ 

low capital and pl:llll.<i acquired by for<'Cd 

rentals <L" poor foundations for a d<'lllO· 

era tic p•·c·._o;, I CD worked to a~u e th(• stirviva) of the licensed papers. In the Gt'rman 

Ln11d governntcnts it promoted tax exemptions and other favorable legislation, and 

it requi1·cd the license<$ to pay 20 percent 

of their gros.'l receipts into a c·apitnl rund. 

Most impMtant, JC: D secured authority fo1' 

the DIS<:O>, ns ('nstodians of reqt•iJsitioncd 

plants, to off<•r til<' licensees lot~g-tci'Jn 

lenses with options to bu)'· ~ 

"Hisl Rp1, OMC, Bavaria, 1945, ]1111 46, i:r 

OMGUS 4% 2/:i, ,·ol. II, p. 198. 

"History of Military GovemmCnl in IA11tl 

W uerttcmhcrg· Hadc11 , voL r, p. 131 fi. 

•• ( t ) f-li~t Rpl, fC:D, {l May 15 '10 Jurr 46, 

in OMGUS 2·12 1/5, pp. 6 and 25. (2) llist 
372 'ttm ~ .\Rl\IY I'\ TilE OCCUP\'J'IO'\ 01' C:J:lO. I \"\' 

\\ h1lc allcmpting to put tlw pr~-.; ou a 

:-.ound llll-.incs.<; Ccmtiu~, lCD ,\1-;o had lO 

conc;idc·r .l pt'I'Sonncl prohlc111. , h "<L'> tlw 

c·a.<;C in puhlic ~crvic l', the \oun~l">l liccns<'l-... 

\\'ere in their mitlfonic.s anti lllOSl othn-. 

were in tlu·ir fihit''> and sixtirs. Qualified, 

politic all> .Krcptahk yuungt•r men wt•rc• 

scarce. To pet pctuatt' a Gcnnan demo· 

rratir pt ~'""· . new ~cnet atiun of jounMiic;t" 

would hav<' to l1c f'('< ruitcd ;n1d trainrd. 

Work on thi~ cuornwus task hcgan in I ~Jil5 

in tlw /)culsrlw 1/ f.~emcint• 1\'flthrit hle11 

Agentm ( D.\ N,\), the German General 

News Agency. 

Late in June, in :111 attic 100111 of a hotel 

in Bad Nauheim, two lCJ) lieutenants, 

four cnli'\tcd men and a half dot.cn civilians 

from tht Office of War [nformation started 

the Gcr man N<•ws Srrvit•t· to provide a 

new-; file for thl' ovt·rt ami lit cno;cd pn·~. 

Bccau~c the initial", DND in German, 

looked .ulu sounded wo mut'h like th()l; · 

of the Nazi news a~ency, DNB, they Inter 

r han~cd the namr tn 0 ,\ N.\ .. \ftcr the 

.-\lliccl J>1<-"-' enilc, which SH \EF had 

operated in London, c losecl in September 

1945, J) .. \ Ni\ llccanw the exdu.:;ive source 

of world and nation.ll new:. fur the liccn~cd 

press in tht· U.S. 1.one .. \!though DAi\.\ 

thcre.tftcr q11ic kly herame n fnli-Aedgrd 

news <;crvicc, having cuntrat'ls with the 

U.S. pre•-.-. sen ire,, l'Xchangt· agreement'> 

with the New York Times and 1/nn/r/ T rilmne. .111<1 tclct)'J>C Jinks 10 Fra nkfurt, 

Muni ch, Slullgar·t, Wicsbatlcn, a nd Nurcmhcl'g, it consi-;tcntly regal'dcd training 

young Gcr mane; in journalism a-; a prirmu: 

mission. Expcctin!{ to turn DANA ovcl' to 

German liren ccs, thr Americans hcgan l'l'· 

c·ruiting Olin~ nll'l1 in the '\UIIIntrr• of I 945, 

giving p1 cfcrcntT ovtr· those who had 

Rpt, OMG. B:wari:t, 1c11"i, June lh, in OMClJS 

1'\6-2 '3, vol. II, pp I !J'J and 202. 

''orkcd 011 l'\.li·i 1'1.1 papc·t-.. to those "ith 

no t'' pn it-nee bnt .111 ti-N .IIi bar kg roll !Ilk 

The hr-.l three rcrruit-. \\'I'll' hired on ~I 

Jul~ tlirt·<-tl) nut ,,r p1i ... mwr of ''ar t.t~l'"· 

B' tlw end of tlw ~car, J'W \\t'r'C t•.lirwd 

aut! working a<; ll'JlllltCI'S. Their avcr:t~c 

age was twent\·-<i,. 11 

J(.' J) Out•ll 0 /)('JIIIicm' 

. \ltltutt lt emotions ( n nd polil )') t.liswu r· 

aged nny thought of entertaining the Ccrmaus, mu< h less rourting them, dming tltc 

first months of tl~t · cwnrpation, lCD rn·ognizcd frtHll the outsl'l the ncl·tl to 'nlightrn 

tl1c1ll and to m.tiutnin dircrt t onlart with 

them. Enlightenment rould hc,t h1· uccnmplislttd, after yc:a rs of Nazi-dominated in· 

tel let tu.tl i<;olation, by ~iving tht' Germans 

a ,·ic" uf the out,idc world, cspecinll) of 

tht' U nitcd State .... The fir-;t ..,tcp, aimed spccifirall) at widening their Jwtiwns, \\:t-; tlw 

npcuing of the \ merit'an J.ihr.try in Bad 

Homburg em 4- July 1945 with a <;lOt l of 

:H>OO hools, I 00 U.S. periodic ·""• and II) 

Briti~h and Fr eut h period it .ds. To rcadt 

a widl'l' audicnt <', a mag<llinc, Die tlmerikmtiuhe Runtlsclwu ( .\m<·tkan Rcvil-w) . 

devoted to dco;t riptions of .\ mcriran t ultural lilr and t·ditt' d and printed in N1•w 

York. went 011 sal<' in .\ugusl. For lhc time 

lteing, in the S\11111111'1' of 11145, radio and 

.\rmy newspapers provided adequate links 

within Germany lu·twccn tht: occupation 

aul horitic'i and the population. Looking 

ahead. tht· lCD alsn planned (t) maintain 

11 Arrnuct<'mcul• lwtl hccu madr 10 haw th•· 

liccnM·d nrw~papcr puhlisiH'rs \.tk!' over UANA 

al llu· end of 1!1 l'i, lutt difficuhit•, O\Cr 1hr Trotd· 

ing '' ilh the Elll'ITI)' Act, ~tclt would h;wc 

prohihitcd conlruf'll '' ith the tJ S Jlrcss ~rn·i rcs, 

delayt•d thc liccmiu,t.; 1111111 Oc1ohcr 1916. ( I ) l i~t 

Rpl, O~IG, C:rc.•trr llt'ssc, Ort •15, in 01\IC:US 

t2-3/5. (2) Hi't RrH, lCD, II Mny •15 30 Jtt~l 

1&, in 01\IGUS 212 1/5, pp 211 :JO 
'I'l l E Fl RS'I FRl D0 \1 

lllW IW\''JI:l[ll'l .lft{'l' Ill<' ,\1'111) pn.pc1 ~ \\tl'(' 

pll.to;c.:d out, .1~ .111 organ of the U.S. forces 

'"'cl as :1 l'l'lllindtr to the litcnsed press llmt 

it roulu llc rcplaccu ir irs pcrfonnanct' was 

unsatisf<lt'lory. 1 ' 

\\"hnt tl•r lnfnrmmion Coml'OI Di vi-;ion 

~urcccd<'<.l P\\' D, its primary mi•;sion, as its 

tilk implied, wa~ to control the Gcm1an 

information scrviC'C:s. J\pplll'CIHiy the lCD 

:ts-.untcd that :ut) U.S. information w the 

Get m.tth would come from other ;t~c ciC">. 

-;urlt rts tltc Ollit·c of W:w lnftll'lnalion, 

whi< h published Die ,lmerikrmische 

RzmdJt lum und furnished maLCI'ials from 

the: .\mcl'i< an Library. The pns~ivc supervisory ph.L•w, however, harcl)' tn1tlastcd the 

t'hang<·ovc•·· While emerging r:.u;t-wcst 

~tl'ains in the wartime alliance inrrcascd the 

need w make the United Stateo; known to 

tfl<' (;CIItl:lllS, practical advantag1''1 dt'n10l\-

slratcd the logic· of having <tll U .S. infonnation activitie-s centered in (;ctmnny. lCD 

was on the lln:ne, had c.xpcricnccd people, 

and had in J\•[unich I he l'c1elkisr.he 

!Jcobachter printing plant which c•onld procltlcc all kind!; of puhlicati<ltlll for tltc Americans as it hnd for the Nazi pnrty. Mntcl'ials 

printed abroad, however, lmd to be 

hruught long distances through an un('ert:tin transportation system. The Office of 

War [nfonmuion printed an edition of a 

second magazine, Heute (Today}, in London in J une H>45, hut because of transportaticm trouhks the magazine did not go on 

salt- in <ic:l'many until mid-September. 

Die i1111crika11is('he Runtlsrhau, made up 

tn()st l)' of r<·printcd a rticles of wdl-known 

American writers, conlinurd to be edited 

in New York hut was printed in Munich 

after December t945, when tiH' volume of 

it5 qu:utcdy issues was incrc<L'led from 

50,000 to :WO,OOO copies. lfeult:, a pic·ture 

''US Cp CC, ICS, Special He port. I r. July 

·15, i11 USfF:T SCS n9t. ·112. 

IH:tgat.inl' imil.11 to l.ifr and /.rml... lll!1VCd 

ils enti rc opl'rat iwt to ~ hmich in Dcn'rlr· 

her, whtlt' it publi~hcd hiwcckl)' issue:; of 

~50,00() r·c>pics. Nauc Awlese ( New Sl'lr.c · 

lions). a /lt'(ll/('1''> Di~e l l nx· ur JlH)Ill hly. 

t'n rried nni< k.~ fl'(lJil .\llicd (including 

French ;wd Soviet) puhlinttions and W«S 

edited in I .ondon ; it als<l hq~Hn printing 

U.S. zone editions of 300,000 c opiC.'> in 

I unich in D<·< emhrr. "' 

The . \ merk:m Library opened in Bad 

Hum I nu·g iu J ttl)' h11t moved to Frankrnrl 

in Scpt~:ml>cr; two similar libraries were 

opened i11 Nown1la:•· and Dcccmhc•·, one 

in Berlin and ont· in Munich.' ' Founded 

primarily as rdCn'IKC libraries for writet'S, 

educators, and nt lwr professio11als, thry 

proved so populilr :t:. soon as they opened 

that reader's ( arcls had to be i~o;ucd. 'l'lw 

library in M unkh, set up in three rooms 

in Lhc Univte t"\ity of Muni~h·s medkal Ji. 

llrary, issued 2!">0 t':trds its fir..t week of 

t)peratiott and !tad a waiting list of 500 

people. J\ iter thC' 1111'11 of the year, the: libra rics, redesignated " U.S. i nfornl<ttion 

centers,'' adllliltcd the general puhlit- :1!1 

quickly ali thrir facilities could be expanded, and the stocks of U.S. news· 

papers nnd p('l'iodkitiS, for whir h the 

Germans seemed to have an endles.<; hun~(·r, 

increased. 

In the fall of I ()15, as the licensing program ga tll(·rcd momentum, lhe Puhli:-~h i ng 

Operations Scc:tion, lCD, bcgnn work on 

the pcrnwncnt overt paper projected early 

in J uly, to whit h it gave the name used 

hrieAy in :\ac·hcn a year before, Die Neue 

Zeilun~ (The Nrw Newspaper) . The mast-

•• (I) HiM Rp1, OM\., Btl\'atia, 1945, Jur\ 46, 

in OMGUS ·136 2/1. vol. II, pp. 212- H . (2) i~t Rpt, 1\.0, II Mny l!i ~0 Jun 46, in OM\.US 

2+2- 1/ :l, J)IJ. :1? ~() . 

"A11oth rr five liiJrarit'S opened in the (irst half 

of 1946 at Stutt!(l\rt, Mnrhurg, F.rlangcn, Rtgt:ns· 

burg, and ll••iclc lht:rg. 
374 'I'll£ U.S . . \R~lY 1:\ T HE OCCUP.\ l'I OX Of GER~l.\1\:Y 

hc;\d of the fir~t issue ( 1 H 0< whrr ) nnnoHnrcd it as ''The • \ mcricun l cwspaper 

for the German People." 1\lthough it was 

sti ll <1 11 (H'gan of the U.S. ore :~ and a l~t it 

acll nonishm(:nt LO the liccn:iCd pres.-;, its conrcpt had l'xpanded since ]11l)': it wns now 

a lso to pt·ovide an example for the German 

press or ohjrrtive reporting and high journalistic stnndard5 and to widen tht• view 

of the reade rship, gjving them infotmatiou 

.tlmut the world and educating them " to 

the ta k · 'vhic.:h lie ahead t1f tlwm." 1\lfCitu·t' nlso rhnnged the ori\'ntation somewhut i11 November when he.: ::;pccificd tha t 

.11 0 pcr{'cnt of the space he dt•votccl tu 

America and its viewpoint • 25 perc·cu t to 

worlct ncwx, nnd 25 perc(·nt to Crt'llHin 

new!; of national intercst.1

' 

Pl'intrd in Munil'h on lhc T'oell.i1rhe 

/Jf'obarhlrr presses, Die Ntue 7.ctlzmg nppCHt·td twic·c a week. em Thursday Htld 

Sunda)', in the U.S. zone, Berlin, and l3reJP<'ll . At first produced entirely hy U.S. pcr-

:~o nnd under tvlaj . . Hans }fabc and Maj. 

Ha11s ' "' allcnhcrg, who hnd IJccn ncwspnpct• rclitor'S in Germany and .\ ustria hefore llitkr, Die Neue Zeituu.r.t, ik~ D.\ . 1 A, 

lntc:l' lludCt lCJOk to give opportunit i(:-. and 

trainin~ to Ccnnans. The d rontl:u ion rose 

fmrn 500,000 to I ,500.000 in lW(l months 

withom gelling clo.o;;c to salllr:Hing the market. Oc;llcrs reported a demand for at least 

3,000,000 c·npies, hut the paper· rta ~c 

hdd the press run to I ,500,000 a fter Jnnu -

my I fJ 6. Tn <me survey, 50 pcrr<:nt of the 

people questioned said they read Dit• NPue 

Zrilung, often third, fourth , or fifth hand, 

in prdcrCn<'c to any German pnprt• hccnuse 

iL\ qu:1lity w"s superior to that of the 

lircnscd pre."-.<~ . While Die N l'Ul' /.eitu11g 

nvoidccl fi1wncinl competition with the 

lircnsec.l prc'i..~ hy not c<trrying ad"crtisc-

" LCM, ~053, 21! Nov 45, iu OM GUS 2•fol- 2/5. 

men Lo;, it admillcdly had two impot·tnnt 

competitive advant.Lgc.<;: better ncrcs..'i to 

world ami nation:d news and freedom fwn1 

the romtr ints, r(' ::~ l and psychcJingin\11 

under whirlt the licensed editors worked.'" 

NcvertJ1cks..'i, it wns prohahl)' the hc.•;t and 

possibly the mo.•;t effective of all the attempts to demonstrate freedom of spcc<'h 

and pre.;s a~ understood h)' Americans. 

Ot /t('r .\1 erlia 

Tn another l>ran<'h of the press hook 

pllhlislring' ancl ill radio, fiJm; theater, 

and musk, JCI) was also committed t< i thr 

climinalion of Na~i inOucnre:i and the 

propagation ur ckmocracy through ('()ll\ ~ 

and li rc usin~. Evt·n more than the newspapers and prt•iodirals, among which sumc 

scallcred t~pnrks (J( independence r~ d 

stayed a live for a fC\.\' years aft er 1~)~3. 

these othct· media had been instruments oC 

the Nazi regime. ,\s nazism's intellectu al 

and emot ion:1l props, they would have w 

he purged of tllltlcsirahle people and of 

pm l'n ll · the ('lltirc previous twelve years' 

Olltput of books and films. ;\ t the Sl\ll111 

time, Soviet tompctition and the Gcrm<tus' 

need Ior <·srnpc from their everyday existences ext.•rtcd strong prc.'\Sures to sweeten 

the rC.'Iltlt ing f'llllllr'al deprivation. 

Books wnc a spet in I problem. Nor•mally, 

per utfJila Germa n book consumption was 

at least four• tim ('~ that in the U nited Stutes 

and aft er the.: bookdcalcrs had cleared Naziinfluenrecl and other· unarcepta.blc works 

off their shelves, tht~y had nothing k ft to 

se ll. ~" ICD ·uspt•t·tcd that hooks infl ucu(cd 

•• i~t Rpc, 0:\1(:, nvnri~, 1!1·15, J une •16, in 

OMGUS 1% 2/!i, vol. II, pp. 210 12 . 

"' Brfon· clw wnr, th<' uunu:1l avera~rc of tit ll'' 

published in c.:er11t<111 w:aJ 17,000; in 7hr Unitt•d 

Stat<·s it wn~ 9,(100. Alchough the German JIOII"I.ttioo was hnlf clint of tht• United Stat<>~. rhc tot nl 

munhcr of (Opics princcd wa!> also larger. 
:ns 

A UTHOR Svni\ttTS M t\NI'SCRIPT FOR rc.:n Ct.t·.;\1\ANCE 

German opinjon as much Ot' mor<· th<m ·ny 

other medium, which inc-reased the need 

to prevent Germans from reading the 

wrong mnlt'rial. In any event, gelling rid 

of the oltl hook induslr)', although it was 

rnore work thnn in the other· media and 

SII(TCS.'li\'C inspections l1 lwa )'ii llll'tlccl \I p 

liomc ol!jectionable volumes, was easier 

thaJt geuing the industry restarted on a new 

cours<'. To avoid the stigma of N:'\zi-style 

book-h11rning, ICD issued stritt orders 

against burning, arranged to have sample 

eopiL"" deposited in research Jibt·aries in the 

United Stnlt-s, and pulped the rest. 

Tlw l'lcnnup opened the market, hut the 

industry suiTcrcd from paper, ink, and 

rmt<·hine shorlitgrs and most of all from a 

dearth of publishable manuscr·ipL<>. Books 

took time to writt, and the war and nazism 

had crippled tlw literary profession. rCD's 

insistcrw·c on th<' same political standards 

for hook JHtlllishcrs as for newspaper licen!;eC'> rmt her slowed lhc revival, especiall y in <"omparisot1 with the Soviet zone 

where the poli<·y was to license the hooks 

rather than the publishers. ICD i!'Sucd its 

first license.<; in mid-July I 945, one lt> a 

publisher uf r·cligious literature in Munich 

ancl the ot lwr to a puhlisher in Heidelhr.rg 

who proposed Lo issue general works. I3y 
376 THE U.S. J\R~IY U\ THE OCCUPATlO~ OF CEIUI:\ I\Y 

Oc.:toiJcr, the Dli>C:Cs h;td received a lltOtJsa ntl applications hut g ranted only ten lice se~. In the nexllhl'c.;c JYiotJlhs they iS.'itled 

cigi11 tinw.s as many, l>ut the increase was 

not inuncdiatcly rdlcnctl in p1·oduction. 

'J'hr first eight hoo!-s c:ame ofr th e prc.<:scs 

ill Onohcr, twenty-four more in NovcmIJc,·. Ullc.l sixty-n ine in December; hut most 

were <·ithCI' technir:d or liturgica l works or 

t•rprints. To l1dp rrlicvc the drought of 

genera l reading material, the Office of \V;u· 

[nftJrnmtimt had in the rncnntimc supplied 

:~ 5,,)00 copit:s each of twcnt)'-five U.S. titles 

in u·ansla tion. 

Dt11·ing the early months of the ocru patitm the: film exhibitors we!'c in a::; bad a 

situat ion as the oo -.~c lcrs .. \!though JCD 

hnd ov<'r B,OOO r·ccls of fenture film in 

valllls in Frankfurt. very few were likely 

tn he approved for Gcrm<1n postwar vicwi,tg; JC:D's reluctance to sponsor cntcrtainmclll fM th<: Gem tans pcrsi ·ted longer with 

rcg:11'tl to fi lms than to ;my uthcr medium. 

lC:D slCiwed tltr opening of movie houses 

through h~~ summer of 1945 and, together 

wit h at>11le shortages of electronic equip111CI1t a nd ra\v frlrn 1 delayed the licensing 

program for 11ew productions throughout 

the whole lirsl )'Car. • \It hough 1 CD held 

large, government-owned UF 1 ( Universum Film G.m.h.H .) studios in Munich 

and Berlin, the onl y film made in them before I ~)4 7 was the U .S.-British ncwsrrcl 

Well in Film ( Wodd in film ) . 

ln mid-July 1945, the only movie houses 

open in Lhc U.S. zone were the ten in Slultgart that the Frenr h, less devQtcd lo sanitLZing the German mind than lire .\merieans, 

had let stay in business with tbe films they 

had on hnnd. By lhen the DISCCs had 

inspected nc<lrl)' a 1 housand movie houses 

jn the zone hnt had approved very few (or 

reopening. !\I{ ore than 80 percent of ! he 

exhibitors, U1C)' found, had been pnrty 

mcmbc1:,;; and while the exhibitors m uld 

IIOt in0uencc the ('OiliCIIt t il- LllC fil111S they 

owcd, ICD decided that, having profited 

from running J\azi pmpaganda, tlrey 

should not a lso b<: a llowed to profit trnder 

the occupation. 1\ t the end of Jul)', ICD 

authorized a gr·adual reopening of movie 

hou!>cs, beginning with four in Berlin and 

eleven in th(' ZOil(', dl to sl10w one-hour 

new;-;rcel program ~ 

The g radual approat:h would probably 

have persisted longer than iL did if the advent of winter had nol intensified the need 

to take the Germans' minds off the hardships of c:uld wtathcr and to keep the young 

people off tlH· streets. ln la te Septe-mber 

less than a hundred cinemas were open ; 

by the end of 1 he yea r 350 were showing 

fi l111s and others were scheduled to open 

in the new yct~r at a rate of two a day. 

In September, J CD released a dozen German-made films and acquired thirty-three 

:\ mcrican features. 

However, nol all Lhc J\merican films 

turned out to he suital>lc for GeTman audicm:es. Some, comedies and fantasies in particular, were simpl)' unintelligihlc to the 

Germans. Others seemed to on firm the Nazi 

propagandn picture of America. One such 

fiJm, briefl y exhibited nnd hastily withdrnwn, was the i\lftlltese F(llcon, starring 

Humphrey Bogan, a lightweigh t thriller 

which, ta ken li terall y, seemed to glorifr the 

underworld and denronslrate the ineptness 

of Ll1e American police. The audiences 

themselves preferred any kind of Ger·mnn 

f-ilm to the Americm1 products. After an 

undisting uishetl German picture ra lled 

0 fJerelle consistently drew larger audiences 

than the American features by as much as 

60 percent and after other films promised 

to do the same, TCD established a policy 

" Hqs, USFET, Circular No. 120. I Sep 45, 

iu Admin Hist Collectiorl, ETOUSA, No. 73. 
THE FIR ST FREEDOM ~77 

Ot•TOOOR CONCERT in 1/eide/berg for Americans and Germans. 

requiring a ll exhibito rs to show American 

films for two weeks before a nd after each 

run of a German feature. 

Until II. November 1945, when USFET 

retumed the studios a nd transmitter to the 

L tL'Xembourg government, broadcasting for 

the U.S. zone was cen tered a t Radio Luxembourg. Radio Munich had started operating in 1\·[ay with 100 kilowatts. Radio 

Stuugarl, wilh 100 kilowatts, a nd Radio 

Frankfurt (first with I kilowatt a nd later 

with 20) wen t on the a ir in June, but until 

November a ll three received their programs 

from Radio Lnxemhourg. The three stations in the zone joined in the summer to 

form one network, the Stteddeu.lsche Rttndfunk, hut because of troubles with the la nd 

lines, the net work did not function well in 

the earl y months, and Radio Munich 

Gnally withdrew to become an independent 

station.:!" The sta tions rema ined under 

Army control thro ug hout the first year, 

"' Berlin had no U.S. •·ad io service umil Febru· 

ttry 1946 \\'hen n Drahlfunk system went into 

operation in the wcstem sectors. The Draht{u11k 

programs were scut over the telephone lines. Listeners connected their sets either tO their phones 

or to a telephone wire 01nd could receive programs 

without disturbance to the regular telephone service. ru 13remen, :. one kilowatt U.S. station went 

on the air in December 1945. 
TI IP. U.S . . \R t\1\' li\ 1111 ~ O C:<:UP.\ 'I'ION OF GER.\1.\NY 

while ICD negotiated legislation in the 

Lw1.d govcrumcnt~ U1at would a llow the 

stations to he turned over lO independent 

brnndca.o.;ting corporaLioris. 

The ~lcl'n :~rli tl fare of tht• postsun·cnder 

weeks gave way in mid-July lO more va ried 

t)l\lgraming. Besides news and military govcr'lm1enl nm1ouncements, Radio .Munkh 

ofTcrcd broadcast~ of Sunday chlll'l'h scrvic:c.:s, conc:crts by the luni ch Philharrnon ir 

orr hcstra, and v<~rious instructive features, 

such ns ·'The Buergermcister· Speaks" and 

"For the Farmer." In October, for the 

same rensons 1 hat had inspired a change 

in the policy on films, Radio Munich added 

~~ program for y()u ng people; an audience 

participation program " 'fhe Listener 

Speaks"; a comedy series; a popular song 

ser•ies and one of .\meri can folk songs; and 

"Ten of tlre 'Neck," modeled on the U.S. 

program ''Your Hit Parade," iJ1 whith the 

German listeners chose lht: len most popular American songs. lvli]jtary government 

officers in the field stilt t'omplained about 

the: programming. One described Radio 

i\1unkh as being "ns popular as a Aea on 

a dog's back," to which ICD retorted that 

the Bavarinns prohahly did not want to 

listen to anyth ing hut yodeling. ICD's own 

surveys in late 194·5 and early 1946 showed 

thn t lhe listeners preferred German music 

to any kind of • \merinm music:,. excepting 

possibly fo.lk songs, and many were continuing to tune in the Soviet-operated 

Radio Berlin because it hroadcasted more 

German musir. However, a large majority 

preferred the U.!:). stations for news, ot her 

than that of the war crimes trials.~:~ 

"' (I ) Hist Rpt, fCD, H Mny ·l:i -:~0 Jun •16 

in OMGUS H2- l/ 5, pp. 11 16, 49- 5(1, and 75- fl.'J: 

(2 ) History of Militar·y Covcrnmcnr iu Land 

Wuertternh(!rg-Badcn, vol. I, pp. t 31l7- Y6. (:l} Hist 

Rpt, OMC, llavaria, 1!)·15, J un ·Hi, in OMGUS 

~36 , vol. II , pp. 0 :111. ) Hist Rpt, O.MG, 

Grcall·r 1-! ('~st , Oft 15, in OMCUS 42- :J/ 5. 

l\ · and lite thc<tLer, altlww~h LC<'hni~ 

rally lite easiest of the media to conlrol, 

offered lltcir own distincLive problems. Beeause the legitimate theater::;, opera house.~, 

and con('ert lt alls were usually Jocateu in 

1111' ( '('1\(('fi; or <:i lk's, 111<111)' had been ckstroycd in the bombing and ll10se LhaL hnd 

survi ved were cq ~ri sit oned for U.S troops. 

l CD licensed 130 theater companies and 

musical groups by November 1945, but 

1nost had no place Lo perform regularl y. 

In Wicsbaclcn, :\rmy SpeciaJ Services requisitioned the Delttsches Theater fo r lhe 

Red Cross .. \n a11t iaircraft anillery unit oct·upicd the Prin.zrcgentcn Theater in 

Munich. fn Nu remberg, the music-loving 

6 lOth T :mk Destroyer Battalion monopolized Lhe loca l opera company, which was 

fortunate for the performers since many of 

them were Nazis who would not have been 

permitted LO perform for civilians anyway. 

T he state, opera hou!)e in Stuttgart was an 

American enlisted men's club, and the 

occasion a I German performances rherc 

played to the accompaniment of ping-pong 

g:~mcs in the oyers. ' 

Tllr denazification procedure:-; in the lwo 

media req uired that not only certifiable 

Nazis he removed hut also that performers 

and producers whose work had been closely 

associated with nazi!'lm he blacklisted ami 

kept front working under the occupation. 

One of Lhc most tlistinguished per~onalitics 

on the I >lacklist was Wilhelm Fuertwaengler, d~wt · of the Berlin Philhar•monir 

Or he.~lta. Very likely, Lhe most thoroughly 

blacklisted indi vidual- by a special quadripartite decision- was Norbert Schulze, 

<'omposer of "Bombs Over England" and 

"Lili Marlene." On the whole, however, 

IJ!neklisted performers fared !Jetter than lhe 

e ther suhjen:; t>f denazification. T o the 

~ lugeuorg U rcwilz, cd., Stqtulte 19115 ( Duesseldorf: Eugeu Dietrichs Verlag, 1970 ), p. !50. 
I'IIJ~ FI RST RI·: Er>O~I 

lingl·ring c·h:tgrin o( lCD and DISC:C. unit 

Spc1 ial Service ffi cer~, looking for Clll('l'· 

taiunwnt for the· truups, were oft en all tou 

williug to overlook the hlacklist<>. 

1\lu<>k COillt'<ll olnrc·r.; had a ~> H'tia f 

W()I'I'Y· SH!\EF J\ I usir control r n~ti U< tion 

No. I ( 19 July 191}5) prohibited all milit:u·y marches and all songs associHtcd with 

the Wehmwcht or with nazism; funhcrmorl'. it titcd a ucccJ to pre\' cut performam cs of othc1 t ypc of '·inOamm.ttory" 

music· as well, wil houl seeming to rc:;ort 

to Nazi-style ntlt tll':\1 tt imcntat inn. This 

inslrtl<.: tion impo~ctl 011 the DJ ~CCs the 

large, and often pc·llifogging, joll of S('I'Uliniting concert progrnms in order to rlimiU:It<' .o;uch :'\a1.i-appropriatcd works a.<> 

:-)icgfried's func·ral mnrdl from tlw Goel-

/('tr/nemmeru/1~ and the slow 111ovcmcnts 

nf Dcethovcn's Third and Seuenth Symphonil:s: to prevent ' 'muskal sa lO a~c," surh 

as the playing of Beethoven's Emira or 

Strauss's Ein llcldcnlcben on H itler's birth37!1 

day; and to identify and c.xdut\(' non-German WOI'k~ th:•t roulcl '·encourage clangcrmt" 

lendclll ic-.." for example, Sil>clius Finlmttlill 01 Chopin's R ell(l/1(/i()nnr,, Etude 

hcraust• o( their intense nationalism. 

With the appointment uf Pruefungsawsrltuesse ( examining hoa rds), theater and 

musk hcrH mc the first entertainment and 

infonmtlion media to acquire a degree or 

self-regul ation. The first such board, madt: 

up of uniou delegates, Lrwd nnd city cultural aftain; reprcscntati\·cs, and privatt• 

citizclts, c~a n to fundion in Stuttgart in 

nrrh . The boal'ds screened the 

Fragebo~tm of producers, performers, and 

lhea lt.:t' ownC'r · and compikd lists of approved :lppl c:m ~. From these lisLo;;, a fter 

lhry were c·hcckecl by the tllilitary government. tlw munit ipal authuritics could select 

their 1 hea ter rompanies and on hestras. ~ 

::~ H L~t Rpt, I CD, 8 Muy •15 '10 ,l un 46, in 

OMGUS ?.•12 1/ 5, J>P· 41"1- !ifl. 
CHAPTER XX I 

Reckonings With Lhe Pasl 

/)t> II(IZi jt((l/1011 

' 'The qut li • who i:-; a ·azi is often n 

dark tiddlc,'' Third A rtll)' G-5 reported 

more than a 1110111 It aflct V ~ Day, adding, 

"Tl1r <]U<''>tion what is a Na?.i is also 11 0 1 

caS)' to nnswct·." ' In nffiri;d trm1s, hmv<'V('t', 

tit~: questit>ns wen' 11 0 1 difficult t() :\11-lwcr 

.1t all. \I F had ~ go workc<J out 

.tutvmatir arrest categories ranging from 

the top Nnzi leadership to the loca l O rtrw ufJPe111eilt'r. fi'Om the wp GeslafJo i1gcntR 

w leaden; of the Hitler Youth, the PeasantS"' 

League, and the Labor Fron t. Furthct·-

more, thou<;and'! of suspcrts were being arrested: 700 a d:t)' in 1\la)' and J une, ancl 

a total of over I fi,OOO in August. In Srptt'mher, 132,000 suspects were being held 

in internment C'amps, away from the politic•al scene and available for possible tri:1 l 

nnd sentencing :1s members of crimin al organizati n!\. ~ They wen· <l ll presumed to he 

confirmed Na1.is and, 'vith some allownnrc 

for excessive t.eal on the patl of the Countcrimclligt'l11 e Corps ( Cl C: }. the va'>t majority douhtlcs.<; were. Usu:dly, of course, 

they did \vhnt they cou ld to c·oncea l their 

identities and their p:~ ~. Some succeeded 

110 doubt, hut most were not hard to lind. 

Capt. Arthut· T. 1\:rumRnn, whose detarh-

' Hist Rpt, Third Army, ACofS G- 5, May Jun 

45, in OMGUS 76-:V IO. 

• { I ) JCS 15 17/ 1, Surnmnry of Aug 45 Report 

of •he Military Governor, IR Oct ~5. Jl\ C:CS 

:Ht!.2 1 (2-22-41 ), sec. 9. (2) JCS 1517/2, Sumrna')' of Sep ·J5 Report of thr Militilry Govcruor, 

in CCS 383.21 (2-22-W), set•. 10. 

ment's ottt-of-thc->Vft)' Lnudkrei1, ,\Jt.cnau 

in nurthwc:{lern Bavaria, wns a favorite. refuge for those nc('ill.f4 autnntatic arrest, reported that ne<trl)' all '>uspect.s, once they 

were identified, could bt· brought in hy 

post• ards telling thl'm to report to the delachmenl orft(·e at ;1 sprcifted time.:• finding out who had llcen pnrtr members, 

whet her import ant enough to merit arrest 

or merely mnk and file, was aJso not diffirttlt. The pal'ly hnd kept excellent rc( ords, 

which ol'1cn passed into military govcrnlllent 's hands intact. The dctadmtent at 

Wasserllllrg am J nn, fur example, had 

t went y-l·ight lists and rosters mvering 

everything fr•om par'l)' and H itler Youth 

membership to dr.liwrics of hoots a nd uniforms.' The !Jest evidence, the part)''S entire 

central rcgi.-;u·y of 12 million cards with 

photogruph. , turned up iu Munich in a pile 

of wa.'>tepapcr waiting to he pulped. ~ 

It wns on the gray fringes of denazification that 1 h<· question of who and what 

we1 c a~is vexed milimry government, as 

mul'h aflcr \ '- E D:ty n" when the ti t munjc;pnl :1 ppointmen ts were made around 

Aachen tlinc month~ before. The rases of 

Reuters and Jan:oocn :\l Wuersclcn and 

h and Deutzmann at Stolberg were 

being repeated a ll over the U.S. zone. H aving been a part y member did not prevent 

' Hist Rpt, Det A :1:10, !10 Jun •IIi, in OMCUS 

62- 2/ 10 Hi t Rnt, Oct E 28:1, 'lO J un 46, in OMCUS 

78-2/ltl. 

• Wesa /Jolfl. 27 Oct 15 
RECKO!\fi'\GS WITJ J THE PMiT 

a man from being bcttl:r at his joh and 

having a lllore agreeable persona lity thau 

somcom: whCl was not. 'J or• often, in [act, 

the <>p posit<· "ccmcd to be l1'11 e. l>'requcntl) 

1hc a~is h<td tnd ning, experien('C, e1 1Crgy, 

affability, nud not n bad political r·eco!'d. 

The Ameri cans respected rfficicncy ant! 

trusted 1 he men who :-;ccmcd lO he fri endly. 

Iu the words uf one detachment commandrr, if "all the Nazis had been exceedingly unplca ·ant and rude, denazification 

would have been easy."'; l\h>reovcr, the 

man who was individu;tlisti<· enough to 

have stood out against the Nazis was probably not going to Ill in easily with the 

Amcl'icans either. :\ s the Aachen experien ce 

had shown, non-Nazi and anti-Nazi were 

HOl necessacily believers in democracy or 

even, w the t\merican mind, very different 

fronl the Nazis in their thinking. A recurring suspicion among military governmcn[ 

ffi ce a~ qu ir d probabl y from the Germans they had talked to- was that many 

so-called non-Nazis were people who had 

wanted to join the party and been rejected, 

which n1adc them worse in a sense than 

those wh<l had joined out of exl'edien('y 

<lr under compulsion. The Fm.!.!ehogen, the 

Bremen del<lchmenl pointed oul, req uired 

disclosure of membership in the party and 

auxiliary groups ln1L not of applications 

for me111bership or rejections.' 

Whclher 1 hey ildvocated passing a hard 

c..>r a soft judgment on Nazis- a few argued 

£or the latter- military government officers 

generally agreed that if they made a completely clean sweep of the paTty members, 

they were goin ~ to have to run the country 

with oJd men until the next generation 

• His~ Rpt, Oct E 2:32, :iO Juu 16, in OMCUS 

77- 2/ 10. T Functional llio tory of Military Government ill 

the Brcrneu Euclave, 26 i\pr- 30 Sep ·1·5, in 

OMCUS 413 1/ fi, pt. I, p. 1!'>. 

Jil l 

g rew up. The numl)cr of politil'al ac'tcpt-

,thles between the ages of twcnt} and fifty 

who wc•·c also trained and competent was 

c:xcccclingly sma ll. In Lrwdkteis Eichstacll, 

Bavaria, fo r instance, which was by no 

mea ns an exc-eption, when the 64-year-old 

Landwl had a stroke he could he replaced 

only by his deput y who was seventy.8 

What 111ost troubled milita ry government 

olliccrr-; in tlle field, however, was the aiJseiH'C or objective stantlnrds. They were 

l>h.unctl ii they fa iled to find m<:n to fill 

the jobs and, if they filled the jobs, for compromises they made while doing so. The 

policy-makers were in a different, hut not 

better, situation. They had to contend with 

the field officers' desire to conduct dTicient 

government as well as with the un animous 

opinion of the puiJiil (German as well as 

American ) press, and U.S. government 

that denazification was what the war h ad 

lleen about, and insistent on a J'uthless and 

thorough dean up and half expecting to 

llc duped aml cheated. Consequenlly, 

policy wavered . ln March l!l45, SJ-L,\El? 

C- 5 had informally established 93:~ as a 

r.u t-oA· date for mandatory removal. Those 

who had joined the party after the Nazi 

takeove1· in J anuar y 1933 would not be dismissed or denied e111ployment outri.l(hl if 

they could show tha t they had not been 

active members and had joined solely to 

save thei1· jolls." By Lhe end of the month, 

however, the pres.~ and public reaction to 

the Aachen affair had brought about n 

hlan ket prohibition on everyone who was 

or had been a pa rty member nt any time 

or 'vho had been appointed " to nn offi ce 

His~ f<l.pt , Dec B 262, :lO Ju n 116, in OMGUS 

10- 1/ 5. 

• Memo, SHI\EF. ACofS 0-:i, Spccia I Br, sub: 

Proposl'd Organization and Procedu re, Mnr 5, 

ii1 SHI\EF G-5, 17.16, Jlist Rpts, 12th AGp, pc , 

1, J acket B. 
'I'IJ E U.S. :\R;..JY ~ I"HE OCCUP.\Tt01\' OF GEIU !:\, Y 

of puliti•·al imporlalln:" since jnnw11·y 

I q:l:3 .'" \fU.'l numerous dctachmems proteo;tccl that nncl(•r theo.;c rules they could riot 

find euuugh tWoplc to begin reorganizing 

the Germ:~n administraticm, Sfi:\EF, em 

11 J une, ordcr<·d them to st udy the policy 

carefully and cxcrutc it " in accordance 

with it.." iutclll in such a manner as not UJ 

make imtJOSsihlt the ec;tablishmcnt of administra tive machinery.''" Nobody knevJ 

what this ordrr meant, but the arm)' g1·oups 

rc'lcinckd the dircniws the>' had hn·cd on 

tlw morr !-tll'ingenl e;sdil·r polic')', :tnd 

M unit II radio atlnoum·ed that post-1933 

Nazis would again he :wtcptaiJie.'" 

Rer()gniling the need for a clearer statement and taking iL'i text fmm J Cu<i 1967-

'"hich react, "All mcmhcrs of the Nazi 

Party who have hecn more than nominal 

particip!lrHs, all active S11pporters of Nazism or milit<t rism and A II other persons 

hostile to ,\llicd purposes '"ill be removed 

and excluded from puhlic office and from 

positions of importance in quasi-public and 

priv<,tc en lcrpri~;es'' ETO US!\ , on 29 

June, redefined clenazifiratiou policy for 

the time when the Am<'tic'nns would he t'Csponsihlc onl)' for their own zone. Puhlif· 

office was inter-preted as extending down 

to Buergermei.rters. poli ce chiefs, aml "legal 

personnel''; and all persons appointed to 

thcc;e or higher offices ;t(tcr 30 January 

I n33 would he unemployahk. T he lcr·m 

"pcr!IOllS or importance in gmlsi puiJiic i\lld 

private enterprises" was taken to c:over 

executives in civil, economic, and labor organ izations, in corporations, in industrial, 

•• H4S, lith AUp, IO cc· ... ScvcJllh Amly .. ntl 

11rcnch lsi Anuy, ,uh: Di~Ctllnlific :llion frOlll offi ce 

or Nazis tt ntl Gcrmnu l'"Jilitarist~, 30 Mar ·1·5, in 

O~IGUS •Ill 2/3. 

'' T!ist Rpt, 6th ACp, AC:o!S G- 5, I J un lti 

]111 15, iJI SIIAEl<' C - 5, 502. 

" Hiss Rpt. 1 hird Army, ACo!S G- 5, Ma)· j u11 

15, in 01\ICUS ?li-:1/10. 

agrinsllmal, and fimwrial iuc;tillltious, in 

the prt.:~-;. and iu t•duration (in\ luding 

teachers) . Nnzis suhjC'(t to mandatory remov~d were all persons who had held olliee 

in tlw party, had joined before I May 

19J7, ur had joined later and were more 

than nominal member~.' ·' 

Tht ruL-ofT date of U137, of com~~e. itnmc·dillldy sp<1rkcd <1 fresh debate. l t h~ d 

!Jcen c:ho11cn because .tft(:r 1 May 1937 

puhlit t'lllployces had hccn rCCJlLircd to join. 

the party or lose their jobs. Those who 

joined ea rlier, even if uot conflrmcd Nnzis, 

were considered at lca11t 1.0 have been opportunists, since lhcy did not join under 

compulsion. The counterargument '"ns that 

.sonw, perhaps 1111\11)\ who had joined heIon: i7 or even hdorc 1933 rould have 

done so without rc:llizing what nnzil'lll wM; 

the sa111t <:ould uot IH• said for an)'Ollt who 

joined after 1937. 

Nevertheless, military govemmcnl in 1hc 

field WHS s~ isfied on the whole to have a 

specific, ir stringcnt1 denazification ircc~ 

tive. The 1937 cul-oiT d:ll t.: at least did nol 

forrc the firing of ('Very person who had 

held ~~ government jQh during the Nazi 

peri<ld, which would virtually have been 

t11e r<~sc \mder the March policy; hut it 

did disqualify many who h:td been reta ined 

in the {'xpectation that the eru·lier polic. 

would mllapse- as it did after I I J unebecause of its sheer· unworkahilit }'. Third 

Army G 5, whose detac-hmen ts had · reported 90-pcrcenl dcnr~zification al the end 

or J un<', dropped its estimate to GO pcrcent.11 1 n July Seventh Anny laum·hed 

Op('r:ttiun LrFEBOUY (named for a brand 

of soap that claimed to he partict~lnr y ciTecu Hq~. P.'l'OUSA, to C:G, t2rll AC.tl, ~uh: Re~ 

moval of N:l7is and Milit:.rists, 29 .Jun •l5, in 

0.\lGUS I II 2/ :l. 

" Il ist Rpt, Third Army, ACofS C 5, M:.)' Ju•l ·IJ, in OMCUS 76-!l/ 10. 
RECK0!'\1 ·c :s \VI'I'II I'HE P.\ S'I' 

tivc ill t't1111h.stin14 hod> odm·). Undc•t• 

LtH.not·v. Sl·vctllh .\nn) CIC: teams rt:-

rhcckcd the entire Wc:!~t<:m t-.Iilitat')' District, !\rci.1 l)y l\-reis, in the light of the 2~l 

June swndard.,} '• Thrc(· months l:slcr, 

USFET rcpmtcd J 00,000 pcrsou~ dismi~cd from puhli(· Clllploymcnl in the U.S. 

zonc- 30,000 of them in July and :\ugust- and 20,000 rcmovctl from private 

enterprise.,, 

To dcc·idc ;u..lministrativcly who and, 

by implication. what- Nazi.;; were, USF T 

c.liscoveJ·ed, was not going to he enough 

hl)WCVCI' . The emotional issues of denazification were not going to he settled thnt 

easily. They would have 10 he meL under 

tlw bright light uf public opinion th:H H illdring bad mentioned. 

On HI Jutw in New Yor·k, the weekly 

news magazine New Rejmulic ran an artide under the headline "Ravat·ian Scandal," 

in which the author, Philipp Loewenfckl 

:~tated, "Democracy in Ocm1any experienced its first setback with the appointment 

of one Fr·icdrirh [sicl Schaeffer as Minister 

President of Bavaria .... " Schaeffer's appointment was al the time just a day lc.'\S 

Llliln t hrcc week!- old. I.ocwcnfcld accur-:cd 

Schaeffer nnd Lite av~triau People's p:1rty 

(in which h(' had been a lead ing member) 

of supporting the Nazis in 1 he 1920s and 

Ut''><lihcd ~kharffcr a.'i '·nnC' of the \'\' einmr 

R1•public's mc>st diligent gnwe diggers!' 

The arlidr suggc-.;tcd that Colonel Keegan, 

who as commanding officer of Detachment 

E I F:l had sclcrtcd Sc hadTcr and who was 

i11 ri\'ilian lifc a Krw \'ol'k City council-

" (I J Hi~t Rpl, Seventh Army, ACofS C 5, 

ll May-:lO Scp ·If), in Sevclltls Army, 107-:l.O. 

{2) Hqs, Sevcuth Army, ACofS ('; -3, sub: Progress 

of Operation l.svenouv, 8 Nov 15, Seventh Army, 

IGil-4/ 2. 

•• JCS 15 17/2. Summary of Sep 45 Report ol 

tht• Miliuuy Covcrnor, 13 Nov ~!>,in CCS 3R!i.21 

(2 22 11 ) KCC. t(1. 

~ 

m.tu, naald h.s\'t: llc·,·n n< ling unc.lcr Vatican iufltl<'tH't' <'Xt'tTist·d through Drmmratit 

l1o~~ l·.d Fhnn of tlw Bronx.H .\flrr 

ot her U.S. paper;; pi( ked up tltc slOt'}'. Clay 

appoinu·<l a ~prl' :tl boat•d to in\'tslif(atc. 

The hoard fount! that all political outlooks 

wen: 110t equitahl)' r rpt•rscntetl in the Bavarian ~ovrrnmcnt, pnnic:uhu-ly the liberals, hut nmduded that Kt:cgnn·s sclcc'lions 

had hn r1 made on the basis of professional 

qualifitations and anti-Nazi t·onvinions 

and had llflt been innuc11ced h)' •·.m) particular religious, politica l or social group-" 

Cia)' at lhis stage apparently saw the aHair 

as a puhlir relations arridenl, to uc best 

avoided, a..; he.:: sug!;{CSl{'d lt1 Mt:Clo)', hy giving the (;c·t·mans a voice in politic."}' 

Ou the whole, in July and -\ugust, denazifirnt ion of puhliC' oflircs sec111ed to be 

going rcmnrkabl)' well. Mounting figures 

on &.:missa ls brought approval even from 

the Get mans, although some . \ mcricans 

suspected tc~s fol' tlat• pnlil')' l han iu t.lte 

hope thnt an end would soon he: real hcd_ 

H owever, the dena~ifi tlion of pri\'alc cntcrprisl'-" rai~cd guC!.'itions: what, for instance, were important pl)sitions in trade 

and inchs5try? USF£T, in the 29 June directive. 11scd the size of the cntcrpriscntpit:d nvcr a million marks or more than 

250 emp loyees- hut, the Germans themsel\'c. ;tskcd, what <dHJut the Lwo-hundrcdper<'Cill Xazis \~ ho were lucky enough not 

tt> l )l' in the automatir arrest <'tttegorics, in 

public e-mployment , or in the specified 

nsngr of private enterprise, who might not 

i>c emple>ycd ar :11! but, nevcrthelr~~ . had 

ilccn viriom, petty tyrants and had profited 

mightily from the N<lzi regime?'" On 15 

"Nrw ~pub/ir, vol. 11 2, no. 25, ILl Jsm •15. 

"Ltr, C:lay to "'vi<:Cioy, l'i J••l -15, in OMGUS 

4 Hl 2/ l. 

•• H<Js, Seventh Anny, Hist Sec, Report of Oper-

:Hion$, tl May-30 Scp ·15, in Srv1·nth Anny, 

107-:l.O. 
J'HI·: U.S . . \R.\J\' L\ THE OCCtiP.\TlO:'\ OF CF.R.\1.\1\Y 

\11 1411~1. t lSI· ET luo:ttknnl irs ddinilioll 

to induclc f><'Opk in hu~inc. " and pt·ok. ... ~ 

l\iOIIS, rq;ardlcs.'> of sit.c, ' 'whose· ~lnnd in K 

in tJw rOJlltllUilil~ j., nlll' ,,f prontillCI\1 {' Of 

iullu('ltn•."''' If p1•mcn 111 Ill· nwrc· rh 111 

nomir111l i'\:t/\i._, th<·:· were to bt• rernovcd 

from thci1 husim·.,•ws, whit h, if tlu·)· hncl 

hr1'11 llw ownet~, were to lw takc11 umkr 

miJil:t r)' J!;OVC1'1111H'Ill proper'!)' COlltl'ol. 

Fou1· wc•tks nll~r. the dcnazirtration of 

privatl· enterprise ln·okc inw the news. Raymond Dartirll reported in tlw 'ew York 

Timl'f, ":\,,t.Ls still hold .-;nme of cl w hc·st 

johs in rm11merc:c nnd indu.,trr.'' 1\ lilitary 

govc·rnnwnl, It<· t'OtH'Iutlcd, was <·nm·erm·d 

too ntuch wit h JH'<''-l'r vir1g Gt•rman indu<:trinl 

dl~< ic-ncy :md wo little with achievi ng the 

objectives for whil'h tlw wnr had l)(!t' n 

fought. The .1 rtidc also hrought :u1 imporll\111 figure inlo the controversy, General 

Patwn, Commanding Ccncral, Third 

.\rmy, and ~lilit.try CovCl'li(IJ. of BavaJ'ia. 

tll , Daniell '''role, had asked a military 

government fiscal officer who was in,·est ~ 

g<lling Nazi ban~crs "if lw ditl not think 

it sill)• to try to gt·t rid of the most imelligcnt people in Ccr many.' '~ 1 

In the upper reaches of the U.S. command, Patton's view!i 011 dena1.ification 

were• already uneomfortahly familinr. In a 

letter written on II Auguc;t, he h;-~cl sugge~tt·d that Eisen hower pass "a word to tile 

people responsible for civil go,·enHHent'' to 

go 11lOH' si<Miy on dcnazirtration hernuse too 

many u·ainrd people we-re heing rTmovrd 

aud too lll:tny incxpcrielll·ed or incllicicm 

om·!l hmught in .. \s far as nazism was con-

<'CI'ned, he said, " lt is no more possible for 

a man w he a 1 ivil servant in Germany 

•• Ltr, Hqs, USFE'J'. lc.> CG'$ Third Army and 

Se\l!lllh Army, Mth : R1•movnl of Nazis and Mili· 

tari~t$, 15 /\up, •t5, all O~ .l CUS 22- 1/ 5, 

" Nf'\\' Vurk Twus, Ill Sep ·11, 

and not have paid lip set \'il'(' lo n:11.i.-;m 

than it is fw· a mal\ lo be a postm.l'ilcr in 

.-\mel'im ancl not have paid lip scrvirr to 

1h1· Dt·•uocrati~ Part} or Rcp11hlic<ttl l>:lrt}' 

wlwn il is in poWtl .""~ Lntcr in the month, 

in H 11\CCling with Clay. Ill' al~o rwopo~ed 

releasing tltt· intt~lllt'd Nat.i'l, m;my o( 

whom, he said, "wcrr citlwr aged or pregll l\lll."~11 In reply to the ll .-\ugust lctler, 

£ is1·nhower· reminded Pntlon that obliteration of uazism was a major U.S. war aim, 

that JCS 1067 specifically prohibited ret.tining Nazi'i for administrative necessity, 

couw 11ienc<', or expediency, and that de~ 

nazifkation w:l« ' 'a mo~t clclicntc -;ubjccl 

hoth here .u1d at honw" whidt ·'nur govt'mrllcnt:d repl't!,l' lt :tt iw~ .ts \Vd l a& newspapers 

have hcen quick to seize upon ... . ' 

.Meanwhile-, as Clay told ~lrCloy later, 

" things lwC'rl'] not entirely smooth in Bavaria ... ~.~ One or Srhncffcr's minL<:tCI'S 

111111t:d out to havr been a general staff 

(JfTit·n in (;('l'lliHII-ocnrpi ed P(thtnd, Franer, 

aJJd lt al~·· Two uthrt'). were :tlso in mandatory removal rnt<'gories, and anmhc1 

had Lllsifiecl his F raf!.l'bogcn. Forced to s~ 

mis.<: them. !'ir.haelrcr on + .-\ugu"t entered 

a forma l prntest against the "hardship 

and injustic:c" of na ifi cat ion. ~" Schaeffer 

insi:-~tccl that one other offidal, Dr. Otto 

Ces.'>lcl\ ~lini er of W:ti fm :1 time 11nde1' 

the n·pub1ic and a lending figure in lht: 

Gcrm;m secret rearmament of tlw 1920s, 

was an "unoffi cial" adviser and refused to 

let him go, wllil n1ilitary government £or-

"' l.Jr, P:Hlou to Ehrnhowcr, J t 1\ug •IS, i11 

USFF.T SGS 000. 1. 

""' US Cp CC:, StarT Mcctiltg of Div. Dircctol'll, 

27 Aug 45, in O~ CUS 12 1/ 5. v60 12/1. 

" l.tr, J kc to George, 23 AuH •t5, in USFET 

SCS 000. I. 

» Lrr, Clay to McCloy, 16 Srp 45, in OMCUS 

•tJO 2;:!. 

~' 1t iNr Rp1 , Third Army, J\CofS C-5. 15 Aug- H 

Scp ·15, in Ol\IGUS 76 10 . 
REC:KO!'\T res \VITH THE PAST 

IJadc Gessler to set foot in the Bavnriau 

government omrc.c;. \Vhcn Lhc Special 

Draud1 investigated the departments in ug ust, it found 24 out of 39 Fmg<•bo!fen 

rni$-'>ing in the ~fini try o£ Food and . \ grir ulture. 46 out of :., I nli~>sing in I he Ministl·y of Interior, nnd 21 out of :1 1 mi s.<~ ng 

in U1c Regional Econmnir Offirc; ami six 

oniC" ials alrc:'ld)' ordered to be t•cmovcd 

were still at their desks.!' 

ln the first wct'k of September, C<1l. Roy 

L. lJalfercc;, a Regular Anny oniccr, replarcd Colonel Keegan who was retkploycd, although officers, JXIrticularl)' 

lllilitary govcmllH!Ilt orl'icers, were not th('ll 

digihle. On tltr 111!1, Eisenhowct' wl'otc to 

Patton : 

I know certnin field conunandct's h::we felt 

llHidifil'ations to tlt is policy n;~:~ilkotin j 

could be made. Thnt {jlll'Stion had long since 

ht•t•li decided. V•/1• will not compm1nisc wit'lt 

Nnzisn1 in an)' way. I wish you would 111:\kc 

s ui'<' th:ll <~II your subOI'dinatc commanders 

t•cnlizc that the discussional stage of this qtH'Stiuu is long pn.~t and <1 11 )' expressed opposition 

to the fa ithful execution of the ordt'r c-annot 

bt• rt:garded ni~·11 ly by me. I t·xpcct just 

:u loyal service i11 exct' ution of this :111cl otht•a• 

plllicics appl)•ing to the German m-rupalio11 

liN I received dul'ing lh(· WM."-~ 

Schaeffer by this time remained in office 

pl'illl:lrily because nobody could dec ide 

how to get him ou1. \ lthougb militarr govl'IIHHcnt had tbc power, he was too promincul a figure to IJc dismissed arbitrarily. 

c.~iues, cl nis.-; tl appeared to he exactly 

whft! he wanted, in order to su!-ltain n future political reputat ion as a man who had 

M~1o for Rc1·orcl, USFET, ACo(S C: 5, Advi~cr (Or. :.~ cr 1.. Ool'll), sub: Min. Pre;.. fric:drirh Schnc.lfcr nnd the Tardy D ena;(ification of 

lhl! Uavnri;1n C:ovl., 2 Oct 45, in 1JSFET SCS 

000. t. 

.. l.tr. Ike to Cl'orl(c, II Sep ·15, in USF r 

SC:S OOil.l . 

rclused to kowtow to the J\mcrirans.~~· Like 

OppcnhoiT in Aachen, Srhacffea· was the 

kind of German with whom . merican:; 

were lcao;l prepared to dc;tl, n organizer 

a nd good nclminisu·ator and not a Nazi hy 

any cxi!lting definition he w<\s the sort of 

man they had believed they could use best. 

Yet the longer they observed him, the less 

he looked like a proponent of democracy. 

In the I !l20s, he had belonged to the right 

wing of the already c(m ervativc Bavarian 

Peoples' pnny and, in at least one speech, 

had dc'lcrihcd the Nazis as "saviors of our 

Fathcrle~ ncl. ' ''1

" He had l1cen at odds with 

the Nazis throughout their years in power 

and had ended up behind the barbed wir~ 

at Dachau, hm his political outlook had 

110 1 changed. Protesting his anliuazism, he 

persisted in l!ttrrounding himsC'If with men 

whose mrk~rounds were more doubtful 

than his own. , c.hcck in September disdosed sixH·en offi cia ls still working in the 

Office of Food and Agrir nlturc whose removal hnd been ordered the month berore.3' 13y mid-September the hest the 

:\meric'ans could hope for (rom Schaeffer 

was thal he would resign; and on the 16th, 

Clay annoum·cd without tcgret that he 

had , although the announcement tumcd 

()ut to h · pr't'll1aturc.32 

Quite probably, Sch"cfTct• actually 

would have " resigned" by the end of the 

month and thercaftet' 1 he denazification 

"' 111' mny hnve succeeded, too. Elected ro the 

nund~SIIl l{ or tht' f ederal Republic of Germany 

in 19·19, Schaeffer was Finan<'c Minister from 9~!) 

to 1957 nnd thereafter M iuister oC Justice until 

1961. 

, , Memo fo, Record, USFF.T, t\C.ofS G-5, Adviser (Ur. Walter 1.. Dorn}. ~ub: Min. Pres. Frederich Schnl'fTI'r :111d the Tnrdy Denazification of 

the Bav11 rian C:ovt., 2 Oct 45, in USFET SGS 

000.1. 

,. I bid. 

., Min, US (ip CC, StaiT Mr.t'ling of Oiv. Dircc• 

tors, Iii Sl'p It in 0~1CUS 12 1/ 5, vuO t2/l. 
3H6 THE U.S. :\JUlY IN 'l'HE OCCUP1\TlON OF CER~vlAJ\'Y 

l'Ontrovcr"S)' would have simmered more or 

I<!S<' quieti}" had not USFET al midmonth 

llftl'd a wartirnc t'CI1Sorship prohibition 011 

directly quoliug general orficcrs. On 21 

Scplcmbcr Cc11cral .'\dcock, theater G 5, 

.tnd his chief dvilian adviser, Dr. \Vahc1' 

1 •. Dorn, wilh an interested following of 

nrwspapct reporters, went to runi h to 

have a personal look at Lhc Bavarian govt'r'llmcnt. On the 22d, talking lo the reporters about his "iews on denazification, 

Gcnc1a l Pa llon said, ''The Nazi thing is 

just likf u Dcmon at-Rcpuhli<-an eledion 

right."33 The next day his words appcnt·cd 

in newspa pers across the United States 

along with editorial <·on\mcnt questioning 

lloth hi~ unden;tanding of what the wm 

had hcen about and tlic t\nH)'s abilit)' to 

eond11r1 military government. On th<' 2Hth , 

SchaeiTc.:r n·sigucd or wn~ dismissed; 110 one 

seemed to know, or WHnf In say, whic .~' 

Or. Wilhelm Hoegner, om: of two Social 

Democrats in the cabinet, replaced him. 

(11 l"rankft11·t, Eisenhower conferred with 

'Patton for two homs on the 2Bth, aflcrwal'd declining to comment to •·eponcrs on 

whnt thC)' hnd said. 3

" 

Several clays later> Lt. Gen. Lucian K. 

Truscott ~topp ed on the way from llal y to 

the United States to pay his respects to 

Eiscnhowe•-. ,\t his next ~lop, Paris, Eisenhower called him ha<'k to Frankfurt, and 

on 5 October, Tr·uscott wok rommand of 

Third ,\rnt)' •nd the Eastcl'll MiliLaJ'Y Dis-

' 1·irL. Patlon became President of the Gcnt•ral Board, US FET. In his first press 

Hlllfcrcnrc n week later, Truscou told thereNew York 7'iiiii'J, 2:l Sc·p ·15. 

' 'A week l111c•r, Third Arnoy rrpoo·ted to USf'f':r 

lhnt SchneiTer's ••esisnati.on and those of his Minbtvrs of f'iu anct• ;1nd Et'onomlcs and Head of Food 

nnd Agric11hun• had hc!en "accepted" on 28 Scplf:mhcr. Cahlc, l'r,oscoll to CC, USFET, ~ Oct 

15, in USFl\.'1 SCS CIOO.I 0 New York 'timtt$, 2!1 Sl'Jl I~. 

port en<, " 1 ha\'e lch tuu n1any white C'I'O. ·cs 

anoss :'\orth . \frka, lt:tly, and France and 

I hnvc sc~n too many young men wounded 

ancl maimed not to be in complete sympathy with any poliry that designs to cradiratc. t'{1<1l aud hrandt, the evil force, 

1\'azism, that loosed this olocm~t on the 

world. "·

1

'' 

Tho11gh perhaps for ea~o s mol'c immediate than those Truscott gave, somt.:thing 

like ;t root-alld-hr•:t tll h tTatikation of n:tzism w;~s in fact beginning in the U .S. 

zone. In the midst of the Patton and 

Schacfi'c1' aiTairs, on ~4 Septcmllcl', Clay 

wid the U.S. Group Control Coundl staiT 

that he was dissatisfied with the progress 

in deuaziliration and that '·.\ dcci~ion h;u; 

heen made lhat we arc going to denazify 

all pha~cs or German life." 37 Two dnys 

later, before any Inti the regional n1ilitary 

!{OVCfi111H'I1t dctadllllCillS bad cve11 gotten 

tbe news, the radio and newspapers ann1mncrd Military Government Law No. 8, 

which prohibited t!mpiO)'InCnl or Nazi party 

members in busine.<;s in any capadty other 

than COIHIIlOl\ lahor.s' The law applied not 

only to executives and managers hut also 

w ptivat ~ ownern, inrluc.ling owner-operators such as grocer'S, barbers, bakers, and 

lnrlche1-s. 

For the Germans, l.nw ·o. H was the 

mo~t ominous development yet. Complaints 

that dcnnt.ifir.:uion was not going rar or fast 

enough suddenly stopped. The La11d detachment in Wur,·tlt•.nhcrg-Baden said the 

law "engendered a ~p cal fear. " USFET 

used the words "bitterne.-;s and d<:!~pair_" 

.. , DiHr)•, Hq:o, XV Corps, 1.1 Oct- 10 Dec 45, 

12 Oct 45, in XV Corps, 2 15- 0.:I. 1 1 Min, US Gp CC, StaiT tvlceting of Div. Directors, 24 St·p •15, in OMCHJS 12- 1/ 5, vfiO 12/ 1. 

" 1-lqs, US PET, to cc:·~. Eastern and Wt~stcrn 

Miliwry L>i~tricts. sub: Administr.llion of Military 

C:Qvcrnoncut i11 the U .S. ?:ouc, Law, No. ll, 26 

Sep ·1~. in OMGUS 41 1- 2n. 
RECKONINGS ' VITH THE Pt\ ST 

Run\ors among the Germans arose that 

Ll"'' No. 8 was jttst the beginning of <l plan 

to reduce the German economy to chaos; 

when the pany members were removed, 

the Germans told themselves, next would 

be former meml>ers of the Welmuacht and 

so on, until carrying on business of any kind 

would be a <:rime for Germans. Everyoue 

feared an eronomic upheaval that wonld 

leave the t·ounLr)' worse off than il already 

~"a ~" !'he mood was not liglJlenetl when, 

i11 the lirsl week of Ot'toher, the U.S. zone 

was hit by a tidal wave of deuazification, 

partly as a result ol Law No. U ancl 

partly- as the law iL-;elf had been- as a 

reaction to the Patton and Schaeffer 

alTair'$. Within military government from 

top w hollo111 , the lim<' for c..lis('ussion was 

iudc:ed past, at Least temporat·ily. Some detachments dosed dt>wn all tlte businesses 

in their areas and did nol let them reopen 

until the Nazis were identified and removed. At military government offices 

everywhere, hundreds of Germans came to 

assert their nominal party membership or, 

in fcwcl' but sLi11 numerous cases, simply 

lo present the keys to their cstablishments. 10 

Simultaneously another surge of denazification h]t Lhe publi c employees. On Sunday, 

7 October, Seventh Army sent oul !';pecial 

C'Olu·iers Lo every detachment in the 'Wc'il-

<:rn Military District witlt an order from 

General Keyes l'a lling for the dismissa l of 

every public employee in the mandatory 

removal categories by noon on Monday. 11 

To l>e on the safe side, military government 

ofTicers also immediately applied the rom-

"' ( I l Hist Rpt, Dt:l EIA2, I Jul- 10 Scp 45, 

t 5 Oct ~5, in OM GUS 9- :1/5. ( 2 ) Hqs, USFET, 

R!Jl$, anti I nf Br, Pol.itical lutclligcnce Summary, 

15 J:~n ·15, in OMGUS ·118-1 /3. 

" ( I ) Hisl Rpt, Det B 262, :10 Jun ·16, in 

Ol\•lC US 10- 1/5. (2 ) llist Rpt, Del E3B2, Oct 

~5, ll Nov -15, in OMGUS 7- ?./5. II Ibid., (2 ). 

387 

rnon labor specification of Law No. 8 to 

puhlie employment. The deta chment in 

'"' asserhur!{ mn I1111 disqualified 20 medical 

donors {very likely almost <dl there were), 

15 dentists, 51 teache,rs, I 0 majl c-arriers, 

and 20 rural policemen. ~ In Land kreis 

/\lzf'nau, Detachment :\- 330 fonnd only 3 

out of 17 doctors politically dean.'" The 

llren1en c..lctad•mcnl dismissed a quarter of 

the 1 ,600-man police force; and some del<H hmcuts reportedly got r•id of their Ptttz-

/ rauen ( deaning women ) lo r<:durc lhe 

chances nf being caught with Nazis on the 

payroll.'' 

.\ shod: for the Germans, Law No. 8 

was a lmost as mueh a shock for military 

govcrn1nenl, and Headquarter:-, USFET, 

itself was no exception. lL had just released 

the OrtJgnt/JfJenleiler, the lowe.c;t and on<' 

of the most ntlmr.rous automati c a rrest 

groups, from the internment camps. When 

the intongruity of these certified active 

Na~is appcnri11g on lhe streets at the same 

time their presumably less implirnted comr:ldes were heing Lhrown out of their businesses and jobs became evident, as it soon 

did, US FET had to stage a special 24-hour 

sweep, Operation CHESTERFIELD, to get 

them ba<.:k behind l>arhed wire ~" 

JV.Li li tary govet·nmenl officers everywhere 

had to deal with uenazification in an entirely new context. All directives thus far 

had used the word " important' ' or some 

synonym to define the range of private occupations from which persons would be 

cxrludcd. In the 29 jt1ne direclive USfET 

'" His1 Rpt, Oct E- 2!13, 30 Jun •16, in OMGUS 

7H- 2/t0. 1

' Hisl Rpt, Oct A-:130, ao Jun "16, in OMGUS 

1!2- 2/ 10. 

II functional H istory of Military Govc rnmelll 

in !he Rrcmcn Enda ,·c, Oct- No'' ~5, in OMCUS 

:>9-3/ 5, pl. T, p. 66. " Opns Rpt, Third Artn)', I Oct-3 1 Dec ·15, 

in Third Army, 66- 98/?.5. 
3tm TlJE U.S. AR~ IY I . TH!t. OCC:UJ>:\TION OV GERMANY 

had used the size of an enlerpri:se as the 

!'l'itcrion ; in the 15 Aug ust directive it had 

used prominence in the communit y. Law 

No. 8 dropped both these distinctions nnd 

<''ltnblished no othc~ above the level of 

t'OI1HHOn labor. It a/Tcr.tcd potcnti llly t·vcry 

pc1 son employed in w01•k requiring skill or 

responsibility who had been a pa rl)' rncm ~ 

ht·•·. and in effect it confiscated every 'az ~ 

owned business establishment. Military 

govrn tment officers were often not fnr from 

agreeing with the Germans that the rcsull 

would he chaos. ( :ol. William W. Dnwson, 

commanding the Wu rttemberg~ tlen 

Land DctachJHcnt , l'(:po ned: "Neve•· llefm·c have Military Government measures 

hccn received with SliCh open ho!itilil}' and 

their wisdom qur.'ltioncd as today. 'J'he belief in the avowed purpose of encouraging 

the growth of dcmocrat'y in Cemt:my has 

been shaken <tnd aspct-sions are IJcing cnst 

ngainst the pet'Sonncl of Military Govc rnlllcnt, the CIC, and other U.S. Army 

units. ,,c 

Rcl{ulation No. I of L;tw No. 8, i.sucd 

in the first week of Orwbcr, was as important to the future of dcnnzification in the 

U.S. 'l.one as the law itsc:lf. Il laid a pe~rt 

n( lhc responsibility for administering the 

la\v directly on the Germans. Each business 

was required tO determine the status of its 

rmployces and t>wncrs, and none would he 

nllowcd to stay op~·n or to reopen with 

fm·mer active N<\zis in nn y capacity above 

('Oillmon labor. 'VIH:rc owners were involved, the military g-overnment clcUH:hmcnts would take: the IJUsinesses under 

IJfO[><:rty control and appoint non-Nazi 

trustees. Nazi pnrty tlH'tnbership IJefur<· l 

May 1937 m parlitipation in other parl)'-

<..lircctcd activitiel\ would he round~ rur im-

•• lli tory of Military Oovrrnmcnt, Laud Wucrth'lnhrrg-Badcn, iu OM(:Us •HO- l/3, vol. J, p. 

1410. 

mediate l'l'l!loval. 1f the persons affected 

wanted to :-~rgut· their cases, 1 hey could do ~o 

later before appeal<; boards of non-1'\azi Germans appnimnl hy military go,·cmme:nt. ,; 

T he dTcrts of Law o. 8 were most evident in the l'ecords of mi lit ~try government's 

property control ffi ce~ . The detachments 

in W ucrllcl n berg-Baden took coulrol of 93 

Nazi-owned properties in Novc:mbcr, 16B 

in Deccntbcr, and 919 in the first quarter 

of 1946. In Bav;11 ia, miliwry government 

took control of a record 1 .~ I 2 properlics 

in Dcec•rJhcr; a:nd hy Drccmbcr, property 

control hnd become the largest single military govt·rnmcnt activity everyw here in Lhe 

U.S. zone. !\s an index or the: severity of 

Law No. 8, however, the fuel should be 

noted thnt while I .~52 N:u.i-ownc:d properties were taken under property control in 

Wuerttcnnllcrg-Baden hetwc~.;n November 

1945 nnd May 1946, nnotht:l' 1,777 Nazi~ 

oo~ed, mostl y "Aryanized" propcrLies were 

recovered from Germans who had acquired 

them before 1945 in forced sales.'" 

From the beginning, Law No. H did not 

apply to agrin1lture, and the usc or tempora ry re,·•wal>k work permits rnndc it virtually inaprplicable in public health as well. 

Doctors and dentists, !Jarti<·ulal'l y, who lost 

their licenses because of party membership 

went on "'orking with tC1rlporal')' permits, 

which wert· tH'\'Cr revokt'd. Railroad cmploycc.'l, ;\lliOng whom were a large number 

of pnny mc•nher. some in the higher 

ranks aduall)' in the automatic arrest categories- wert already long past ch•c [ot· denazification, under the rule.-;. The USFET 

" Hqs, USFF.T , to CC's, F.:mcm nnd Western 

!\ litit:.ry Diil rich, R··~u tion No. I, li Oc1 45, 

in OMGUS ·Ill 2/:J. 

'' ( I ) Histnq• of Military Oovt•rmncr.t in Laud 

WuerLtcmboerg-Jl:tdcn, ll .M.ay 45-lW J1111 46, in 

OMGUS •I tO 1/ :1. (2 ) Hist ~pt, E<tstcrn Military 

District, 15 l)ec 15- H j an t(), i11 OMGUS 

76-V IU. 
RECKONINGS 'VITH THE PAST 

Service forces) for whom lhcy worked, 

J'Cga rded Lhem as having vital, irrcplncenhlc skills and had argued succc.:ssfully 

thm they were not public cmplO)'CCS 

i11 the ordinary l\Cnse. At first they WCI'C 

nlso exempted from Law No. 8, IJut in early 

Oc·tobcr, Clay exlcndccl the law's c·ommon 

bi>or provision to rnilroad worker:-~. Two 

weeks earlier, he h~d pointed out to Lt. 

Gc11. John C.H. Lee·, commanding gcucral 

of the Theater Servin' Forces, that "iu vic·w 

of the mnny attacks to which thc C'lltirc 

ocrupation program has been sulJjC<'lcd in 

the U.S. pres .,;· potential trouble: lurked 

in the railroad dcmlzi(iration figure.;;, which 

showed that (c:wcr than 10,000 of 50,000 

k11own party members had been removed. 

1'\evcrlhcless, the milroad employee"" C'am<' 

oCT better th<m most. Theater Service 

FMccs secured the authority to retain them 

until their appea ~> were decided; in the 

end, less th11n ~0,000 employees wcr<> 

disch«rgcd.41' 

In addition to imposing the burden of 

property control, the enforcement of Lnw 

No. 8 forc«!d military govemmerH 10 play 

a running game of hide and seck 1virh a 

si7.ahlc part of the German population. 

Sinct• the law did not require outt·ight rell\oval <~f the pcr.;ons <\fTccted, husincsses 

tried to meet th<· law's techniC'nl rcquirenrcnl); hy mcrcl) changing job titles, rmd 

owners attempted to have rel;nivcs or 

fri ends appointed tru~<tce~ or to make deals 

with those who wrrc appointed. M~1ny, no 

doubt, succeeded, and more would hnv<' 

" ( l l ~Iento, oco·1. TSFE1, for G- ·1, TSF'F.T, ~ub: Dcnazifirnriou ()( 1' ransport Pl!rsooncl, 24 

O(·t 45; Cable, Clay to l.re. 19 Oct ·15 ; ;md 

Memo, Director, OMGUS (Z). to CofS, USFF.T, 

•1•h : Removal <Jf N:w.is aud Militarists in tht! 

Ut•iclosbn/111, 5 No1· ·15, iu USFET SC:S 000.1. 

(2) OJ\IGUS, C:onnol Office, Hist Br, ll i~lot"Y 

of U.S. 1\lllitaty Uuvcrmncnt in Gcrmnny, U May 

15 30 J un 46, Rnil TransporL, in 01\IC:US 23 1/ 1 . 

if they had remembered, as they should 

have after n dozen years under the Nazis, 

that the CIC was reading their mail ~n Denunciations brought some to grief, hut most 

employtcs-wisely on their part as it happened- did not share the Americans· faitb 

in thr pCI'IlHlnence o( denazification. 

(Where nlilitary govemmcnt took the trouble w assign ousted Nazis to common labor 

in public works, medical insurance p~tymcnts for hcctrl ailments ose.)~· 

With notnhle reluctance almost everywhere, the local German appeals boards 

began I.e> sr.r·ve in November and Decemher. At first military govcmrncnt officer~ 

believed tlw nppeals procedtu•c was unfair 

because it plared the burden of proof on 

the appdlant. They soon changed their 

minds, however, when they discovered that 

the appc;lls hoa rds, not heing required to 

establish ndvcrse cases, were perfectly content most of lhc time to hear ooly the evidence produC'Cd by the appcllanl!i, usually 

in rhe form o£ affidavits attesting to nominal memhcr.:;hip in the p:U'ty. 1 n LandkreiJ 

Eggenfcld<:n, Bavaria, th<! bourd classified 

the appellants i1'1 810 of the 864 cases il' 

heard ns nominal Nazis and only :{6 as active. J n l.tllld kreis Ebermfl nnslad t, Bavaria, 

the hoard found 2 :u tivc Nazis in the first 

80 cases it heard. .~ The dctarhmcnt in Ingolstadt, Bavnria, dismis.<icd 1 he chainnan of 

its appeals board alter it discovered rhal 

he had nol dcdded against the appellant 

in a single rase, even thmtgh one rase concerned •• war crimes :-uspcel. ~~ t Bremen, 

-. Hqs, St'>'f'lllh Army. A(;o(S (; ~. Weekly Intel· 

ligt>tl<'e Summary No. 15, 24 Oct •15, in Seventh 

Army, Opns Rpt, Annex 2. 

" Hqs, St•vf'llth Anlly, A<.:ofS C-2. Weekly Intel· 

ligcncr Summ:1ry, 15 Jan •lti, in OMCUS 4-18- 1/3. 

,, ( I ) ll.ist Rpt, Del 0 :102, 25 Jun 46, ln 

OMGUS 79- 1.10. (2} l list Rpt, Oct B-252, 2 

Nov 45, in OMCUS 30-:J/ 10, 

" Hist Rpt, Dct E-237, Jun 461 iu OMGUS 

77-:l/10. 
THE U.~ . . \R~IY l K T HE OC:C:UP.\ 110~ OF GERl\IA 1

Y 

CoNCENTRI\TtON UAMP PRtso:>~ER Jo"NTIFIES SS CuARo 

where the detachment kept a d ose watch 

on the hoards and cxerdsed its prerogative 

to review approved cases, the hoards 

rejected 22 percent of the appeals and the 

detachment another 12 percent. The 

boards in Bavaria heard 90,000 appeals decided over 65,000 of them in favor of the 

appcllant.r.• Those whose appeals were accepted- using the figures for Bavaria and 

Bremen as a guide, probably two out of 

" ( I ) Dremen Enclave, Functional History, I 

Fcb-:i I Mar 46, in OMGUS 41!- :l/6, pt. I, p. 

13. (2) Hist Rpt, OMG, Bavarin, 19 ~5, vol. Ill, 

p. 43:~. 

three- returned to their jobs and recovered 

Lheir property. I n february 1946 lhcir 

ranks were increased substantially when 

businesses employing less than ten persons 

were exempted from Law No. 8.r.r. 

W ttl" Crimes Trials 

The wnr lrimcs trials that were to be 

conduned under Army auspices in Germany and would last for four )'ears began 

"' Hist Rpt, Del D 2.J4, 20 Jun +6, in OM GUS 

79- 1/10. 
RECKON'"!KGS WITH THE PAST 

in c·n rly April 1945 in the small Rhineland 

city t~f Duren, t w<·nt y miles ea"t of .'\ar hcn."" 

There, on 7 .\pril, a First .\rmy military 

<·ommission convicted u Gcrmm1 ofTi~c , 

Capt. Curl Druu.,, of h:win!{ rau:-.cd the 

11\U rder of t\V() AIIWI'ic-;111 pris ll t' ~ or WC\1' 

dttring the Daulc of llw Uulgc. The· 13t•uns 

r; ~C W<L'i enlit•cly within the tradil iutml concept of war crimes ns specifi c- a< ts against 

the laws and <;:t l' ~ of war l.'<mmliucd hy 

soldiers during litit~. 

The second case tried under the U.S. occupation brought in nnuther cntcgoa·y or 

defendants. On 15 August 1944, nn J\mcricn n pilot hnd haikd out over the vi llage 

of Preisl in the Rhineland. rural policemnn went to the· !!pCll where tltc aimmn 

landed to take him into r ustodr. When the 

roli< cman arri\'Cd, two Germa u soldiers 

home on furlough were helping the pilot 

ntt l of his pa r·nc-hutc harness. Before they 

had Jinjshed, Peter Back, a lora! Nnzi 

/Jlorkleiler, and a crowd of other ch-iliaus 

appeared on the ~C' <'II e. Back wa~ ra n ying 

a pistol which he fired <ll the Amcrk an. 

wounding him. The Gf'nnan soldict-s protcstcu, but Back onJcred them to stnnd 

ru;idc and shot the f)l'isoner a scr.ond Lime. 

J3ack then c<dled ()n the crowd to tnkc: revenge for a t'crc-nt air raid on a ncnrby 

town, and two persons heat the d ying pilot, 

one· with a hammer, the other with a ch1h. 

The policeman did not .tttempt to prevrnt 

the· a ttacks. Militat')' l'()tllmis:sions illing at 

:\hrweiler tried thl' policeman and 1wo civilians on I June I J45 and I ried Balk after 

"" T ht! in ~ of lt~•~l' ' w:-~r ri mi ~ !'ndcd at 

Dachnu on 30 U<·cc•ubcr I !N7; the Nurcrnbctg 

M•lltnry T ribuna l (U.S. ) comple ted its last case 

<HI H April 19•1U; the OAicc, Chief of Counsel 

fur Wnr Crime~, was dcAc tivilled as an O MCUS 

dlvl~lon on 20 Jurw 191·!1; and the War Crimes 

Hrauch, E nropcnn Conunnud, complr·tc<l 1\ final 

~virw of all unrxeclllt•d .,cntcnccs in hl\c 11l!J J. 

39 1 

he was captured Lwo weeks lalcr. Back and 

the two civili:tns receivcu death sentencc.'i 

::~ nd the policeman life imprisonment. Similar cas<> in which downed U.S. airmen 

were the vinirm would make up the largest 

single alc~o )' of trials involving crimes 

against Americans. By the end of summer 

1945, war tTimes i11 vc:-: tigating- teams collected evidence in 800 such ra!\ ~; the great 

majority t harged to civilians or the po}jcc, 

vcr)' few lO so ldiers ~: 

The ll.H k case was a lrcaU}' extending the 

scope of ~1 r rrimes to include nonmilitary 

ne ls commille:d a way rrom I he l>attJcftcJd, 

when ou 2 Jane Eisenhuwrr asked the 

Combined C:hjcfs of Staff ( CCS) to approve also the prosecution of c:onccntration 

camp comnHindanls nnd guards as war 

aiminak The Moscow Declaration, he 

poinrcd out, prm·idccl fur t'Ctunting Germans for Lt·ial and punishment to lhe countries in whirlt their " abominable deeds'' 

were d (HW hut said nothing ahout the 

(·rimes committed against United Nations 

citizens in!> iclt· Germany. Swift puni!':hmcnt 

of these crimes, he helic,·ccl, would have 

" a salutory ciTcct on puhlit opinion both 

in German)' nnd in A liied ountri es "~~ In 

reply, lhc C..:CS lifted aU "previous restrirtion" on war c-rimes trials, "whether the 

offense<> were committed before or after oc·-

cupatioll ... and regardk c;.-; of the nationality of the virtim.'' '·

1

' 

Ahhough CCS lilted the. tric lions on 

trials, 011\IIY questions concerning the kinds 

of rime~ to he tried remained undecided. 

The decisions were made before the e!1d 

of t 945, hut all the rase · rompleted Ol' 

,, Gcm:rul Board Study Nu. llli, rp. 3- 5. 

" Ca hlc , lt,i c~tlt r to ACWAR, for CC'~. 2 

Juu 45, i11 SJIAE.F SGS 000.5/ 1. 

'"Cnhlc, AGWAR, CC$, to F.i•o•nhowf'r, 19 J un 

15, in SHAEF SGS 000.5/ 1. 
392 T i lE U.S. AR!\IY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GER!\fANY 

brought to trial in 1945 or t.hc first months 

of 1946 fell within three categories: balllefidd crimes, offenses against Americans no 

matter where they were committed, and 

crimes relating lo (Oncen tration camps and 

l!imilnr instit utions. The concentration 

ntmp atrocities were later Lreated as crimes 

ag~inst humanity, but at this time they 

were umoug those not r ully defined. Consequently, the eat'ly :l~es were treated as conspirades to commit offenses against the 

United Nations troops :tnd citiz<'ns, :mrl 

wert: hence war crimes. 

The authority ln try war criminals, how-

('VCI', did not automatically imply the ability W bring thc111 Ill trial. Evidence h:td 

to be collected and suspects and witne.'\.<;es 

taken into custody were sc tttered in camps 

:til over Germany nnd in the libcmted 

I"Otlfltrics. The CROWC SS list of suspC'rts, growing l1y the hundreds every day, 

would eventually reach 150,000 and take 

m<lnths just lo put into usable form. The 

War Crimes Group in Paris was virtually 

out of the picture until J uly when it moved 

to Wiesbadf'n, and the war aimes 

i)I':Hld\cs of the arn1ics, like miJjtary f.tOVernment locked into the tactical command 

t!hanncls, were out of touch with the war 

rime.<~ group and with Cl'lC'h othcl'. Qf the 

five armies, only two were going to be 

around long enough to rontemplalc staging 

more than a few tl'ia l!t 

After moving into the zone, Third md 

Seventh Armies began sorting out and l;eg-

,.~~gntitrg the suspects and hostile witnc.o;ses. 

Defore they w<"re thmngh, they would have 

15,000 altogether, not including the thousands more in imrrnmcnl and prisoner of 

w:u nmps who might he charged as members of criminal organizations. Third Army 

lodged its share in the Dachau conccntl'ation ('amp, and Scvc111 h 1\mty put its share 

into Civilian T ntcrntn<'nt Endo.c;ure No. 7fl 

ncar Ludwigshurg.n•• Civilian 11 spccts were 

usually fairly ca.sy to j<.le11tify by questioning witnesses at the scene, hut soldiers, witnesses as well as perpetrators, had Lo be 

hunted among the ymou~ miJJions in 

the prisoner of war cages, where they were 

likely to be found if they were not dead 

or prisoners of the Russians. Many, no 

doubt, were never found. Where names 

were known, the search Wl\S often surpri

ingly difTic ult. Where lillie more than the 

existence of the crime W<IS known, the difficulties multiplied. One snch instance was 

the Seventh Army's hunt for 1he SS men 

who had shot and killed 120 American 

priso c~ of wnr in a field ncar Malmcdy, 

Belgium, on 17 Decemhc1· 1944. The first 

step was lo srreen all the SS prisoners and 

ideutify those who bad heen members of 

the several elements of the 1 sL SS Panzer 

Divjsion. This job alo11e would probably 

have been impo);.sible if the suspects had 

been iu the <lrmy rather than in the less 

numerow• SS. Over scvcr:tl months, Seventh . rmy brought nearly a thousand SS 

men to Pl'ison No. I, an annex to Civjlian 

Tnternmcut En closure No. 71l. mong 

them we1·c 400 men who had belonged to 

Combat Group Pcipcr, the unit in whose 

sector the massacre had occurred. These 

were kept isolated, totally o\ll of c·ommuni-

('ation with cad1 other; the rest were relurned to prisoner of w:tr' camps. Then 

hegan the long wa it for uncertainty and 

isolation to take effecl. Now nnd lhen, at 

intervals of weeks, a man would he convinced thnL somebody else had talked or 

would gi"c himself away. Seventh Army 

had t.houghl rhe case would he dosed before the end of 1945. In March 1 ~146, when 

"' ( I ) f.UCOM, Dep jt\ for War Crimes, Report, p:lSsinl, (2 ) Final Rpt, S~:voooth Artoly, G- 1. 

Annex N, in USFET , Hist Program Files, 

lt068/ t0n. 
REC:KO"\'lXGS WITH THE P.\ST 

Headquarters, Seventh Arrn)', left the thc-

:ll cr, the sc.m h was still 011 and the sus peeL<; 

were tran'lf<.-rrcd to Da< hau1 where the trial 

ww not finished until October 1947.0 ' 

The Hadnm.tr J l.ospit;d niM! in whith 

German nwdic:al personnel were thargcd 

with havin ~ killrd <15 Poles <~lld Rus.c;ii\ns 

h> injections, hcgan on 8 o, tohcr at the 

War Crime« Croup heaclquartcr'li in Wicsbaden, thus beginning the cases involvin~ 

cunrcntration camp and other mas-; atroc~ 

tir_o;. During the next month, cventh ;\a my 

began its trials :u Ludwigsbur~. and Third 

Army couJ·ts al Dachau began what was 

going to l~e a lhrcc-ycar !IC! !;ion during 

which they would hear 4H9 1 a-;es against 

1,672 acn1sed and pas.c; 297 dea th sentcnces.u: The Hadanrar rase was tried 

under a military commi. ion. \II the :mbscquem cases wea·c tried by special military 

government courts rh.tt had nothing to do 

'~ith current olTcnses against the ~crupatton, dealt exclu~ivel) whh war crime<;, and 

were more like rnilit:u')' c:ommissions than 

like a·c•gular military govcmmcnt court'!. 

Procedura lly, howevrr', the distinction wali 

~ignifkanl. ~filitary 'ommissions operated 

undct· the dahorate regulations for court.s 

martini. The regulations for military governmem wurts, on the othC'r hand, 

spt•rificd: 

... rules may bC' modified to the extent that 

rcrt:tin. steps in tiH• trinl mny bt• omitted or 

abhrcvrated :.o long ns no riglrt:s _l;'ranu·d to 

lht• nt·~usrd '!'e disr·egarded. Op~:ning slatt·-

mcnts m pnnaculna· may frccpJently be omit- u·~l. No greater formality than is consistent 

\\'llh a ompl~·te 11nd fair !waring is d~irablt-

" ( I ) F.lJCOM, L>ep }I\ for War C:rimc' Rc· 

pori, p. •18. {2 ) USFET, JA, Report, 1 Apr ~2 3 Apr -lb. 111 ETOUSJ\ file. 

Mc-u1u, ~?'. G. SimJ>1()n for Sec Army, sub : Surv~y or t n.lls or War Criminnl~ H,•td at 

Dnchnu, Ccnn:wy, 1-l Sep -10 in OMCUS 

1:1!) 1/3. • 

~nd tlw introduction of procedural formalities from the Manual of Courts Martial 

or fwm tr1:1l uidt~ based thereon i~ di~t our

aged txcrpt wh<•rc ~perifit·all)' rcq11ircd br 

thcs<' ruiCli. 

The military governanenl courts, moreover, 

were held to h.tvc Xtcn!>ive powc" wlrctr 

wnr (rime" were concerned, "because a 

state adher ing to the law of war cu. a pan 

of intern.ttional law is intcrt!;tcd in the 

preset vation and e1wor·c.cment of it iaa·espectivc of when or where the crime was 

commitlccl, the belligerency or nonbclligcreuc}' !'latus <Jf the punishing power, or the 

natiowdity of the victims."m• VVith stu.:h 

streamlined prorcdures and extensive 

powc1-s and the prinC'iple of common design, the Darhau concentration camp nasc, 

involving fort)' pcrc;on-; implicated in thou-

·ands of unarcler., was hegun on 16 ~cwcm

ltcr 1<>·15 ;1nd nunplcted in four weeks. 

While the C'.ll'l) lases were being prepared .1nd hr(lu~ht to trial, the c:\tcgor ir., 

of crin1inality were also being vastly <'Xpandcd. In the London Agreement of f3 

1\ugusl 1915 (the charter for the International Militar)' Tribunal }, Ju-;tke J ackson 

and his British, french, and Soviet colleague~ rcwgnazcd four categoa ics of • 0 0 ... 

cnnaes: w:ar names, cnmc.o; against peace, 

nimc.c; against humanity, and membcf'!'hip 

in ,::roups which the International J\filit:•r)' 

1'1 ihun,d might find to be• criminal. Tnkrn 

together, thco;c <:::ltegot·ics made puni1\hahlc 

the COllUllrt or the Weir itself, all Nazi Hli'Ot· 

i1ics connnitlcd <lnrwh<'re at nny time, and 

mrre membership in ccrtnin N:ni organi7.ation <.uch as the S ' and the Cl!sllljlo. 

The l nternational Militarr Tribunal 

opened iL<; trials or twenty-two major rriminals and st·vcn 'azi organizations on 20 

Novemhcr .• \fter rcconnaLsance of ~(u-

" EUCOM, Ucp }A for Wnr Crirncs, Rcpou, 

Jl. 'i2 5fl. 
'1'1 IE U.~ .. \R~IY If\' 'I'H£ OCCUP:\TIO;\; OF G EJUL·\ 1'\Y 

nir h, l lcidelhcrg, and Nuremberg, Slli\EF 

had selected Nut•cml>crg several months 

earlier :-~s the ''best choi(C from the histori~ 

t·nl 11nd accommodations pointo:; of view."'" 

Third . \nny provided the: H eadq uarters 

Command, Intctnnticmnl Military T rilwnnl, which took clwrgc of the pti<~onct'li, 

supplied guards for the court, and furncd l1illetii1g, messing, and transportation 

Cor romt persouncl and wrre.<;pondcnl . 

USFET supplkd pr~'l, rn<lio, aud moticlt) 

picture facilities t~nd rummunicntions to 

meet J usLice J ackson's requirement for• 

"gelLing speedily a nd dearly to the world 

the rctord of cvicJcun: tlcvclopcd th ·c." '~ 

Before the intcnmtiona l trial began, 

JCS 1023/10, dated B J ul)· 194!; hut apJl'" entl>' not i~ucd until Septcmhcr, assi~o:tH~d to USFE'r , the n:sponsibility for 

tr) in~ lr~<>er ofl'tndcrs (;Ill those nol tried at 

lll'Crnhurg) in H11 folll' atego ri ~ nf lhc 

London :\ grecntt rll fnr crimes, routntitlcd 

~incc :30 J amu\r}' HJ tl, including mdal 

and religious pcr<~crulion .'m In Dcccrnhcr, 

'·' Onbl1•, SH;\ RF !\l11in to jmti1·c Rohurt H. 

Jnck~on, 2•1 Ju''" -15, 111 IIA ~ SCS, OOO.VI. 

•Q 'l'ht~ Arnl)' had no jutlicinl rc:;pon5ihil ily 111 

lhf' tl'inls, but until Jnid-St·ptt·mhc r and 1'\'l'tl nftt:r, 

llwrl' was no n~sur:uu:" tltnt it " 'Otdd not, On 

17 SI'JHcmher, jack~on informed Prcsidt•nt Trmnau 

th.lt tile• so,·ict go\'l'llllll('lll hnd just recalled its 

JHO)('cntor and l1:1d not IIJ)I>Ointed a replac1•ment 

11nd thnt ~o fnr the Ru .. ,i.tn< had not produced 

t·itlu'r evidence or " taff. The whole project, 

lu: ~:tid, wotdd "fiulc" if the Unitctl Stmes did 

uot ''fnrtJislt cwryth !ttg including ideas, t>risoncrs, 

twilll·ncc, billets, llll'~S, 11 1d conrtho11sc." nck~on 

rct'UII1111CIIdcd thnt thl! President appoint au Amcr· 

it•;m militJtry commis~iou to tli$pose of tlu· rhnrgl'' 

ll I ht> •h·lar l:~~tcd lOU on~t. ( l I 1\'Jeuw, Tlu rd 

A may to CG, lsl l nf Di..-. sui.!: Hqs. Cmd. l nlcrnll· 

ti()taol !\lili11ory 'I' •huu;~l, 21 Nov ·15, in USfP.T 

SCS 1100 . .5/4. (2) Oahh•, J ackson to the Prt.-sidcnt. 

17 St·p ·15, in USFP.'I SC:S 000.5/ 1. 

"' ( 1) JCS 102:1/ 10, Dirocliw 011 ldcutificatiOII 

and Apprehension of P1•rsom Suspected of Wnr 

Crimi'~ or Otho·r ()(fo•uM·~ .111d Trial of Co·rtaiu 

Olrcmlers, U j ul ·15. iu Ct:S 000.5 ( 10 15 1'1), 

M'C. l. (21 1\ll'mo, ll q~. USFET, j A, from Ch, 

Control Council Law Nu. 10 mndc the 

London • \ grcemcm 's provi~ions the uniform legal basis for pro.~<· ru lion of war 

cr iminal~> ;tnd similar offendcn; in the four 

zones und nuthorized the zone nuthorities 

also to try .Ill)' 11tajor criminals nol brought 

hcfot'e the hnr at Nuremberg." ' 

JCS 1023/10, in particular) a11d Control 

Council l .aw No. I 0 laid a potentially 

mountainous new ease load on the War 

Crimes Cwup. To investigate Mr·oc·itics and 

crimes agninst humanity hnc.k to 30 J anuar)' 1933 alone would prohahly have required a new organization:tl clfort as least 

as e..~lcns vc a" tha t applied to war crimes 

since 1944; nnd trying 1 he members o{ 

criminal ~ani:r.ati c; evoked a -;tati<;tical 

nightmare. Tlw Thcatct' J udgr \dvocate, 

using 100,000 M the appt·oximatc number 

of persons in intcmment tamps 111d assuming a tlll'c<: jttclgr. pa nel would takt· only one 

hour to lry tach person, (ip;mcd that trying 

all dw r:ts<·s would take :{75 judgrs four 

months. The Ol\fCU. Dcnaz.ifkation 

Polity Board, taking into at-ruutH the S • 

most of whom were held :1.s prisoners of 

war, 1111d 1 he S,\ , the party stol'm trooper<; 

of whunt only the leadership hnd so far 

been arrC'5tcd, pointed out that the number 

to llc- tl'icd might well hr :lOO,OOO rather 

than l X>,OO!l.''~ 

. \ ftct• two nmnths nf oftcu agonizin!{ 

-;tml)' in all oOkc: ronccnwd, talk~ in early 

Decem! 1C1· llct >Vc<·u US F ET rcpt·cscntat ivc~ 

and the Oilier., Chid of Cou nsel ror the 

l ntt•run11onnll..1w Sec, for 'IJA, \uh : Org;mization 

for Pro<'('('<.llllf.: AFtt•iust Axi~ ;~r Crimiualsc. 16 

Oct ·15. iu llSfF.T SCS 1100 .• )/1 

"Control Con•adl Law No. )(1, 20 Dec ·15, in 

Ruhm von Oppcn, Doctwti!nls fill \.nmflll)' Uudtr 

Occu /Jof/(Ht, I H I 'I 5.J , pp. 97 tO I. 

'''Telford Ta)•lor, Final Ueporl l o llat• Secrc/ar)' 

of the ilrmJ• 011 the J\ .tierllbi'IN ll' nt Ctilllr.t Trials 

Uuder Co11ir1JI Couru:il Lm•· Su. 10 ( ;1~ hiugtou, 

u.c., t!ll9 1, I'· 16. 
< 'KOKl l'GS WlTJJ T HE P,\ S'l' 

Pmsecutiott of l\ xis CriminaliL}' (J ustic<: 

J ackson's JTi ~: ), resulted in em~; w ndu-

:-iou, namely, " that literal compli nn~ with 

J CS I 023/ 1 0 i · jn ra1· Li c~! out of the question.'' They thcrdorc produced a pl.1n for 

compliance a:> far as it w a<; c~ ihk . The 

USFE.T War Crimes (.;roup wo11lcl l'l' Lain 

c~ ihilit y (or !he kinds of tri als it was 

n lllducting, th nt ~, wa r' • rimes and c·nnrt:n· 

trntion ramp:-. Tlw other lroc-iti c~ sine<' 30 

j <lllltary 19:i:i would he turucd over to 

(:;cr man court<: :ll\ n " test of Get m an regeneration. " .Jarksou's orlice would prepa re 

and, after th<: intt·mal iortal trinl::;, <·ondrtLl 

tlt<' rases against tltc major offcndct·s wh()m 

the International l'v!ilit:n·y Trihtm:d did no( 

try and againq tlw mcmhcn: of •Timin.d 

nrgauizaLions.''" .\ltlwug h the di vision of re-

•' By late j :lllltllt)' ('1 (1), il hcc:unc t'Ct l.llll rhnt 

tht• lrnc rrwtionul ~lilit01ry Trilruna l\ llnd inl!~ were 

n o t going to pt·r•mlt ronvlcdons solrly 011 the ltnsis 

l•l ntcmbl·rship in ('rituina l gan i~ato ~. Kuowlcd~c of the: ~:" imiunlity nnd degrcr of involvement, 

.11 lt•,!!>t, would h."''' 1£• lw proved iu each instance 

\\ hidr 111nde hundrcU~ of thOII$llJidS Of triu(s c:lcar(y 

impo~si olc. Conscqurntly, Brig. Gen. T elford 

'J ;rylor, J<~cks<m'• dt•pul)', dccidrd to let :t lr no~L 

nil the memlwrship rase·~ he h:tndlcd under the 

llc·nn~ification prorrdrll \''• When the itHcrnotionnl 

395 

ibi it y reduced thr .-\n11y's direct share 

to a fr;wlion of whal it 111ight have been 

under· J CS 1023/ 10, it was still large and 

would in the end constitute the majorit y 

of the < a!;cs :'\t'tually lricd. ,\s of Januar) 

194(), 1 he War Crimes Group hat! referred 

B I se~ I<> tria l :'lnd h;~d 2,' 38 war crimes 

and 1:11 mass atrocity (concentration 

camp ) (:tftcs em the dorkct.'" 

trinls cndcd m October I 11·16, Tuylor succcedcll 

:~ckson •~ Chirf of Conn~cl for Wnr Crimes and 

aS$umed n:"pomihilily for 11yiu~ major offende~ 

under Conttol Council l.:lw No. 10. r n the SO· 

called ~rhsl·q rllt rocl'cdinJ.;~, 1111.' Office, Chief 

of Couns~ l for War Crime>, prosecuted eleven 

c(lses agrtimt 1115 pcr.~on' hc·for" U.S. military tri· 

hun:tls <i ttiu~: :1.1 N urellllll•rg. All tkfc ndants we rr 

chargcd with JH•c:i fic crime>, but ll few \\ ho were 

acquiucd of otht•r cha'1lC$ \\Crt' com'icted of mem• 

he~hip iu rruninnl organiz:rtion~. ( I I emo, CG, 

USFET, for CofS, Sub: Organi>:ation of Further 

Pro~c·cding, Against Wnr Criminals aud Cer· 

lain Otlr<•r O tl'ctldt•rs, 5 Ocr ·15, in USFET SCS, 

000.5/•1. (2) SWNCC 237, Organizntion for fllrthe r Proceedings Against Axis Wnr C riminals, 22 

Dec 15, :1nd JCS 102'1/ 12. Or~t:mi7llliou for r,., .. thcr Procet'cllngs Againsl xi~ Wnr Cr1mina ls, 21 

Dec 45. in CCS 000.5 ( 10 15-1:\). sec. 4. (3) 

USF'ET, JlrOM'l ution of Nnzi Crimes Against Get'• 

mau$, 15 Uct· 15, in USFE'I SGS 000.5/ 1. 

"'USFfi.'J', JA, Report, I Atlr '12- 3 Apr ·fl•, in TOUSA fi lr , 
CHAPTER XXIT 

The Turning Point 

Militm y G(ltJt'Tnmeul in th e Slatir 1

1

/wse 

. \her the carpet was wken up, the area 

iu Ccamany remaining under U.S. military 

government control was abo~Jt the il~ of 

the stale nf Kentucky hut wtth live tunes 

the populatiun.' '!'he withdrawal intct Lhc 

zone hnd reduced the U.S.-administcred 

aa·c·a hy more than two-thirds and the uumhcr of people hy aL least as mut.h ; however, 

the c·uJasolidntion and additions of new pcr-

~onnd r.ti.,cd militar) govcmment strengths 

at all 1~ , cis. Between August and October 

I <l45, .tit hough thC)' were :tlread)' under the 

shadow of a edcplo)rmen t, the <1<-tarhments 

t•xperit•nred a personnel explosion. The 

!.and deuachment for Bavaria went from 

,, l111nclrcd officer.; and men (in May ) to 

nc;1rly rive hundred. Detachment E2C2, 

whir h had taken over Hesse-Nassau in July 

with ~') officers and 3G enlisted men, had 

94 uffic:er"\ and 134 enlisted men in Septemhcr .. \ t) pical Land <Uld Stndlkreis detachment, 17E3 "' Ingolstadt, Bavarin, started 

mat \vith 3 officer.; and 5 men and in eplt·mhcr rca< heu a trcn th of I 0 oiTiccrs 

;H•d ~o men . . \!though the phtnniHg at lcnst as far 

'The• ,1ft':\ of tlu: U.S. zone, uot induuiu~ Brelllt'll .ulll Bl'rlin, wa~ ·I I ,000 squnrc mil e>. The 

tolnl an:.• of 1111' fc>ur zone) was 1'18,400 \quare 

nu c~. I he I'H9 population h.1d hccll 13 7 million. 

A ccns••' iol Ot'tohcr I !J46 rcportt•d :'1 populntion 

of 16.9 million for t~c. WucrttC'ml>~ g- aden, 

,uul Bn,·nria .md .5 million (or Brcrnrn. These 

liAIII't'\ iududrll l:trgt' munhcr• of refugf•es, I'Xprllccs, 

and n'l!'ii\Cd tHi..OrWn of Wolr lakell into lht• <LOlli' 

01ft<·r the (all of 19·15, nt which time the populntiou 

wns pi'Ohnbly ;~houl l!l. 'i tnillitm. 

hack as the Standard Policy and Procedure 

in ea rly I 944 h.td cnvi.;ioncd indjr en control through Ge• man agencies, military 

government wa<; <;till funCLionally lo< ked in 

at all admini.l.trati,•e levels. The stngc when 

the detachments would supervise rathct 

than operate seemed no closer than it hncl 

when Captain Guctdwus and I4G2 ran 

Mon!\t hnu as an island between the German and t\meriran front lines. The main 

tlifference wa.<; 1hat the number· of functions 

and 1 he scope of re.c;ponsihilities had incrca!;cd. When the Production Control 

\ gcnry went oul of cxist<·nce in :\ugusl 

1945, iL'I entire .uray of concerns pas ...,cd 

frclll G -4 to C "> and was shifted to military government down the line. Seventh 

Army G- 5, for example, reorganized intn 

two main branches, Economics ancl Industry and I nternal Affairs. Economi(S \\Ocl 

Industry was further subdivided into two 

settions: the Enmomic" section (with subsections for lahor; transpOJ'I(ttion; suppl)•, 

food and agriculture ; and trade and industry) and the industry section (witb suhscrtinns for requirements and allocations; 

reports and statistic<;; oil; puhlit· utilitics; building materials; construction; housing; fore.o;try; ami industrial c·ontrol, whit II 

was further suhclividrcl into machi11cry :\lld 

equipment, mcl<ll , clcctrinll ~quipmcn t 

a nd insl rumcnt'l, <·hemicals, consumer 

goods, and coal and nonmet:lllit minc'l)-

Internal :\fTairs had t~n Sllhsections: ci,il 

government; public safety; posts, tclcphnnc, and tell-graph~ education and religious aiTnirs; legal nnd prisons; finance 
THE TURNING POI NT 

nnd property control ; displaced persons, 

refugees, nnd liaison; public welfare ; publit health; and monuments, fine arts, and 

archives." Not all upper echelon functions 

were also functions of the Kreis dctrtc hments; hut the /\. reis detac hments bore almost the entire hurclen of denazification and 

property control, which they could neither 

pass upward not delegate to the Germans. 

The detachments were also experiencing no 

decline in the military goverument court 

cases. Black marketeering, OP crimes, nnd 

Pragebogeu falsifit·ations more than outbalanced a tapering orr of circulation and 

curfew cases. By November, the milital')' 

government rotu•ts in .Munich had a h:H·klog of 26,000 <'ascs. Nearly all of the dctnr hments were providing some direct 

services. ln M 1111irh, the detachment's publi(' 

utilities experts, i\1Iaj. Elmr..r '"' · Price a nd 

Capt. Louis Wask, restored the cit)''s gas 

service. whith had been om since July ~1 44 

when a botnhing raid damaged the g~ s 

works and rracked the ma.ins. Between 

May and August, using ho rsc-drnwn C'a rs 

at first. thcr also put rhc streetcar system 

into good t:nough shnpc to transport 

400,000 pt:oplc a day." In Bremen, the detachment's ornccrs in ("bnr·gc of fisheries sent 

the first two trawlers out on 19 J uly with 

dust coal in their hunkct · (whic-h gave 

them a top ~peed of c:ix knots, two knot'( 

less than the speed of nn average fish ). Two 

months later, twemy-on(' trawlers were 

operating 0 111 of Wcscr·mucndc with good 

coal and twenty-nine rnor·c were being 

reconditioned.' 

: Final Repnrr, llt1s, St·v<'nlh Ar111y, A(;ofS C:- 5, 

25 M ar •16, in USFET, Hisl Div, 1106H/ IOO. 

> EUCOl\1, I list Div, Miliutry Government in 

.Munich, 195 1. OCI\IH U :i, l . EA 3, p. 3. 

' Funeticmnl Hbtol)' l> ( Milit:u-y Covcrnlnrnt in 

the Bremen Enclav<'. 26 Apr 15- 30 Scp 45, in 

OMCUS ·IH 1/li, pr. I, fl• t 21. 

397 

\rnong the busic...,l 111en of the uccupaLion w<-rc the MFA&,\ officers. The art 

trcasm cs required p<~in taking care, and the 

monuments above gro11nd had to be protected ag:'linst weather damage, theft, and 

vandali ·m. ln Nuremberg, Detat.hment 

B 2 11 used disrhargccl Nazis who had artistic knowledge w son throug h the ruhhle 

for fragments of old stone and iron wot·k. 

The regulations against Germans having 

weapons or holding foreign current'y posed 

a consta nt threat- from overly zealous or 

acquisitive U.S. troops-to antique arms 

and a t'mor a nd ln coin collections. New 

finds were stiU being made. Underground 

v:nrh~ in Nuremberg uncovered during d1e 

summer held the Neptune Fountain, which 

the W elmnat. ht lrad looted ft·om the 

grounds of the imperial palace in Leningrad, <tnd the great fifteenth CCt\lury Viet 

Stoss altar from SL Mary's Church in 

Cracow, Poland. Two months of detective 

work lu·oughl to light, buried behind twofoot-thick toncr<'tc walls and Cll('<\Sed in 

airtight copper r·ontnincrs, the ('T'own, the 

orb, the sceptre, and thr two swords of the 

Holy Ro man Empi•·e. Two Kurcmhct-g city 

offici als who had SL\tbhornly lied that SS 

troops had taken the imperial regalia out 

of tlw t ity in April 1945 received 25,000-

l'rlark fines and fivc-ycn r prison sentences. 

By late summer, inquiric" were c·oming in 

from experts and societies all over the 

wo rld concerning the welfare and ~vhc.reabouts of libraries nnd collections, the state 

of various castles and buildings, a nd in one 

instanrc, the condition of a unique specimcu of an Indian shark preserved in a 

museum in Stullg;lll. 

T he immense task of restoring looted 

trc;L-;ttrcs lo their pr'<)pCt' owners began in 

September when Seventh Army's special 

i\IFA&A team at the Hcilbronn salt mines 

IJro11ght to the sudaC'C and turned over to 
THE U.S. \R~lY 1!'\ THE OCCUP.\ I lOX or GF.R~L\l'\ Y 

I· I'Cll<'h I cpt'('SCnlalivcs tlw ~tnirwd glass 

window-; from the Strassl1ourg C:tthcdt·al. 

'J'Itct'C:\rtn', fr·cighL-car loads of b<>oks, nrL 

objc<'ts, and museum pieces wen· 11\ovcd 

out of the r11i11 C.~, sometimes clirrc•tl y l<t thc:ir 

wn<~rs in Franrc, Belgium, I f<> llantl, or 

fl aly but more often to rollertiug poinL<; 

in Munich nnd \Vicsl>ndcn whl't'c they were 

photogr~q,hcd and idcntificd bdore being 

1 c- turnt~d to their owneJs . . \ spcdal ,·ollccting point at Offenbach handled J ewish 

ar< hive·'· l10nks, and rcJjgious ol>jcC"ls. Some 

two hundred of the mo:st valuable Gct·man 

painting~ were hipped to W:,shing'ton in 

Novcndlcr for safekeeping, l>ul lhcy and 

all other Genwin-owned wmks '"ould he 

restored to their owners when the)' C't> uld 

he Hd<·q wild}' lww;cd." . \ notcwon hy txamplc was the ~tuppach ~lacl nn.l hy 

J\lathias GntCII\\';dcl, a :;mall work worrh 

two million clollnrs, whi<"h 1\ll:.\&.\ found 

in the t-lcilhroun mines and retmncd to its 

ownt'r, a villltgc parish r hu11 h in Bavaria.tJ 

131;wk "'" rkctccring and currency ma n i pubtion, no doubt, tempted 111ilita•'Y government personnel a!~ much as the m•c:upation 

troo <~, a11d military govcrnlll<'llt had S01Ul' 

temptation-> thnt ordinary soldiers did not. 

Thca·c is no rcnsc>n to bclicvl· tlt:~t the degree of resistance in military gcwrrnmcnt 

ranks w<~.-; markcd l) hlghe1· than in the U.S. 

forces a t large, but instanrc<> of c:w h mmplw· ('apilulation as in the fullowing arrount were rare. When Capl. 1'\01 mn11 W. 

I One collc;oclion 110 1 scheduled fo• ••r.wrn 10 c:rrlnl\11 O\\ lwt ir> was the WeltkrugJbtte, lterei, a 

pdv:ncly endowed library of wo rk~ pcrlnining lo 

World War I. ~:scrihed as ronsistiutl,' of 687 cases 

of I)()Oh .11111 It truckloads of tti'ICra tcd mawri:tls. 

it wa~ KiVl'n into the custody of tlw Library of 

Congrt· . 

• ( 1) I fiswry o( Military Gowrunwnt in Laud 

WnCJ'l!t•mhcrg-llndcn, vol. 1, ch. IX. ('2) Hi~l Rpl, 

Ort G 2R, Ocr ·15, in OMGUS, t0- 1/ 5. (:! ) !list 

Rpl. L>ct B- 2 11, 20 Jun •16, i11 OMGUS Il l :l/ 10. 

Boring and Lt. "' nuld J. Lnpiner bC'C'amt: 

the milit<H)' govcn uncnt officer aut! deputy 

in Landln·uis Lnufcn, Bavaria, in ea rly 

1946, they were Oootlcd >vith clnims for 

requisitioned jnv(:!,•y, cameras, silvcnvarc, 

and radio:-;, none of which could be trarcd 

since the t.~t hm nt untjJ then had kept 

pnu.:tic<llly no records of any kind. Among 

the detachment's ( ivili<m employees wrrc 

typist-; who could not type and interpreters 

who knew no Engli);h, The detachment had 

been popularly known as the American 

Gestapo. fn tlll' monthly reports, the dcIHL'lifinttioll scr1 ion::; \vcrc blank. 1\n enlisted man in lht: detachment had lwld up 

the local JJ O~t office for 35,000 mark,'l, 

\Vhen askt·d wh>• dw theft had not been 

reported, the postmaster said lhc s<lldicr 

had tllr ~tr ncd 10 ha\'C' him thrown in j:til 

if he did and the ~cncral behavior of the 

dctnrhm<'nt w.t<~ ~ttt II 1 hat he bdic-v<'d t ltc 

thrcaL.' 

The det achments attempting to do their 

work conscientiousl y had, not surprisingly, 

variou"' C0111plaints, anlong which tlwy unanimous( y agr<'<'d on two. One w:ts the 

seemingly ins<ttiahlc appetite of the upper 

echelons for n·pons. Ever>' new development, !;ttd1 as the licensing of political 

parties and l .aw No. H. :ttldcd requirements 

for monthly, hiwccklr. and special reports. 

A11 avcrag(: l.mttlkll'i.l detachment sullmitted l 09 regular reports durin ~ the 

month uf ( ktubc,;J I !145 and dispatchtd · 

total of 3!l5 <·ornmunic-ations, or, as one detachment figtti'Cd, 1.3 communications an 

hour, eight hour-.; a dll y including Sundays." 

More import<t 11 t, bt•<·nuse it affected the detachments' imngc of thcmsel\'cs and their 

r Hist Rt>t, 1)(•1 ~ HI , :!0 Juu lb, in 01\ICUS 

77 :YtO. ' Wk Rp1, l>t:t 20;,, 22 Nov ·1·5, in OMGUS 

I 2/ 5, 
TI fE RK ~G PO!NT 399 

LOADIN(l Vr·.r·r Sross ALTAR for return to Poland. 

prestige in the eyes of the Germans, was 

the not unfounded belief Lhat th<:y were 

the last ones to know about irnpor·tant decisions. Although not always, as some military government qmcers conterrdccl, l1ut 

cert ainl y too often, the Germans heard the 

news on the radio before the detachments 

received any oflicial word; Law No. 0 was 

,,..ohahly the most egregious instance. A 

good part of the t.rouhlc lay in the split between information control and military 

govf'rnnrcnl. lCD received its information 

al USFET and, not having to co-ordinate 

with military government, could have il on 

the air almost immediately. The same information going to the detac hments had 

to pass through severa l intermediate headquarters, sometimes being revised along the 

way. 11 T he cxistenre of an essentially military govcmmcnt informa t.ion agency tha t 

was sep<mttc from military government 

proved by the r all of 1945 to be a sufficient!}' glaring organizational weakness to 

become the suhjc<·l of a report lo Lhc Prcsi-

• Memo, ll q~. USFKI'. IG, for CofS, suh: Delay 

in Tran~mi~sicm of Orders, 26 Dec 45, in US FF.T 

SGS •161 / 1. 
·100 THE U.S. IY IN THE OCCUP.\ T lON OF GER~li\NY 

dent.'" Ilowcvcr, tlw mo:H embu rra!;.Sing 

episodes, the a nnouncemclll of Lnw No. 

B and the licensing of political partic'i, 

prolwhly owed less 10 organi•t.:-llional lapses 

11 to hi cvcl clforts Lo exploit polidcs 

for publiril)' before they were n:ad y to be 

put into clTen. 

Typi1 nlly, military govcmmcm did not 

lat·k critio; in the summer a11d rail of 1945. 

The N«w llepublic viewed the Schaeffer 

affai1 W> demonstrating " the inahility of the 

As my to tun the civil affairs of an occupied 

t·ountr)•.'' 11 Raymond Daniell 0f the New 

Yo1·k Times C'harged the offi cers responsible 

for denazification with having lost sight of 

tlw ·caso n~ for which Lhc war was fought.' 2 

The H arrison report maintained that militn ry govc:mment officers were timid ahout 

inconveniencing the Germans and more intci'C<~ tcd in getting German communitjes 

working :;otmdly again than in C'aring for 

thr. lWs; fttrthennore, Truman told Eisenhower th:tl the proper policies were not 

hci11g r<H'I'icd out "by some of your ffi c~ s 

in the ficld." ~ In O ctober, dming the a ftcr-

•n;lt h of the Patton and Schaeffer incirlcnt!i, 

the ,\ rmy was completely on the defensive. 

Eisenhower wrote to Marshall about the 

"~rowing RlOml of discontent, rvC'n a nger, 

:uwlllg columnists and editors" that wa~ 

giving thr .'\rmy "a had nnmc wlwn it is 

doin~ au overall good joh.''' 1 Truscott 

talked to reporters about their "qt c~t ning 

the ability of the military mind to conduct 

civil afl'ain; in occupied lcrritory'': a nd 

Smith detlarcd himself ronvinccd that "the 

" l11 th~ llyron Price Rcporl of 9 November 

1915. Sec 7'1111' Dl'flartmettl of Stille n,llrtFtt, 16 

Scp 1'1, p II~H. 

"ll'tw il~Pttblic, vol. 113, no. 15, ll On 4~. 

" New York 'rimes, 19 Scp +5. u Tltr D tr/llututfttl of State /Jullttin. 30 Sep 

·15, pp. 456 61. 

"Cnhlr, F.i.rnhowc.r to Manh:\111 IS Oc::t 45, 

in USf~T $05 000.7. 

Arneritan people will never take kindly to 

the idea of gowrnmcm exercised by military officers."'" 

In trouble wilh the pre.o;s and pul,lidy 

rebuked by the Pre id t ( the While t~ sc 

released the Pr~idenL's letter to Eisenhower 

and the H :H'I'isnn l'Cport on 31 Aug ust), 

militnry govcl'llmcnt's future was indee-d 

murky- e:111d th:H uf the Gem1an people 

even more so. The important questjon of 

whether the 1\rmy was adequately performing its mil\.~ion in (;cm1any was being 

a nswered emotiona l I)' ; and the more importanl qu~:s ti , in human term'>, of what 

was going to happen to millions of Germans, both good nnd had, was in dnngcr 

of not being considered at all. fo••ttmatcly, 

on the clay hdorc ltc released the H arrison 

report, tlw President had sent Byron Price, 

who had been the Director of Censorship 

and who wat~ an experienced newspaper 

man and fo nncr executive editor of the Associated Press, to urope lo "survey the 

genera l suiJject of relations between the 

American fort<!.<; t>f Occupation and the 

Getman people." fter ten weeks in Ocrmany, Price suhmitL<·d a summary of what 

the otcu pation had done and nol done 

since the Stll'r<'ndc•· and a review of the 

problems a head: hunger, C('onomic rcronstmction, and dcmcwr!'ltization. Conccming 

what had been done so far he concluded: 

Taken altogctlwr it lmilitaty governnu·a•t J 

seems 1.0 nu• n nornblc record of pr•ogress, 

whatever uany be ~nicJ by noiS)' lnlC'kSc:Jl 

drivers. No out• who knows the facts rnn fail 

to give Gcnernl Eisrnhower, his Deputy Gen. 

era! Clay, and the stall' of :\lilital)' Govcmme.nt general!)' hi~ t·outinuing confidenn• and 

commeudation, In no other :~one of GcJ•mun}' 

" (I) Di<try, q~, XV Corps, ll Oct 10 Dec 

45, 12 O ct •15, in XV Corp~. 215- 0.:3. (2) Mcano, 

W. B. Smith fM Oymn Ptirl', I 1 Oct +5. in USF ~T 

SGS 0 1<1-. 11 :1. 
'I'IJG TUR'\1:--.G POI\'1 

h:1' ~~~··"''' Jlro!!H~ bt·•·u 111.1dl· W\\.11d till' 

dt•t fatt·d llhjt•t ti\ r·s o( tJw \IJil'cJ OC"I'llll.ltl()ll, 

\s to 1lw fulurl', he WHIIH'd, "'I he Unit~'d 

States must drC'idr wlwtltc·r W(' nwan 1.0 

finish tlat• joh 1 ompctcnth, .111d pru\'idl' t lw 

tcllll', t lw dl'tt'llllinat iou 0111d the fund" r c-

<JIIi ... itl to th.1t purpo,c, or '' ithdrom .''"' Ou 

.!H i\o\ t'rnlwr. t ht Prt--idcut rl'lcasecl Pric c•\ 

ll'port to tht• pre'" together " ,it h a kiln 

to the Sn~t·t.uics of State, \\ ar .• 1nd tlw 

~.n, in \\lrhh he <.lircctt·d tiH·m to "J.(ivt· 

,,udul t ou.,.idt·ratiun tn thi.; n:pmt, with 

;1 view to raking wll.ltCVt'l joint :11tiou nwy 

llr indicaH•d."': 

"\ 1)/ ft job fm s,ldtas'' 

. \t hi' fi, ,.,, meeting "it h cl1c \ntl} tommandcrs on 2 1 J une I !145, Clar told lltt'lll 

th.rt thc W.1r Dcpartmt'llt hdit·vcd milit.11 ,. 

~o:m t'IIIIIH'IIt was ·•not ,, juh for -,olt.litr'S·• 

.md <; hould, tht'l dorc, lu: "t111 ned ovtr to 

tlw pol it it al ,,._ l'oon a-> pr:ut icahlc .•. , Prc·-.idt•nt T111nran had said, ri10IT than n month 

hdurc, that Itt· wanted mntml in Germany 

'hiftcd to livilian hands ,1<; quickly <L'> pos_,j. 

l1k hc1 :t~hl' he helie\Cd it Wil'\ in the .\mcri-

' ;10 tradition "that the miliwr y should rwt 

h.IVC gm C'1nmcntal rcsporr,ihil.it ics I><'}'Oncl 

tire l'equir Clllents of milit.lr) opcnlliort<,, ""' 

lhc Pre:.rclrnt said he wantc.•d the tr'.tn .. rcr 

made ",a.. .. oon as the rough and tumhle 

j, over in Gcrn1any." .\pparently he and 

Ei-cnhowcr felt that rime w<•s growing 

short when they meL at £iscnh0\v<'l's hr:1d-

• Repon o( 8 )·tcm Price In lhe Presidcul, •) 

Nov 15, rn Tlrt' /Jullrtw uf thr l><'/Jntlmttll u/ 

Stntt, 2 Dt•• I 'i, PIJ· llij) 'J:! 

" Ibid., p !111'1, 

''~ in, US c:,, CC, Sr:.IT I\h•l·liug of l)ivision 

dirt"crors, 22 Juu 45, in O~J(;US 12 1/5, 

Vbll 12/1. 

"Mrmo hy 1\oing- S1·Crr'lo~ry u( Sralt' j OM'Ilh 

C. Crew, 10 1\h•)' 45 .• in Fortrifln ntlntio11s, lfJ15, 

1·ol. Ill, p. 509. 

101 

quarter' iu Fr.ru~fllrt in latt· July .llld 

clgrt•c.•d th.ll J.i ~cllhO\H'I \houlcJ !)I ~·lllil.e th\· 

milit:11 \' gm Cl'llllll'lll ill (;lrlllilll) sn .IS lO 

faci litatt' turning it ovt!l' Lo ci\·ilian a11lh01-

i1y ".It lilt' t'<lllic'-t 1110IHC.'IIl."1" 

The ide· a of urf.!.lllil.ing milit.ll' ~m·crnIIH'rll fw ,, < h.n1~1'0\ cr to ci\'ili.tn r ontrol 

"a' ul L Ol ll'l'<' not u IIC'\\ orw. h ·om tlu· 

hrgirming the U.S. G1oup Control Count il 

h.td llcc·11 con-.idtrl•d more a n·hit le for 

future 1 ivilian authorit~ than .m clemc111 

of \rm\ -admini,tt·r t•cl military government. fn \pril I !H5, in his first out lim· fo r 

military govcrnn1e11t organiza tion, Cht)' 

proposed alo;o to bring t ivilians inlo tilt' Lh ealcr G ') c;o that both it and the U.S. 

Group Cuntwl Cu11111 il could ht• "LII'\'Cd 

out nf" the milit.tr\ rommand when the 

:;hifL to tivilian rc:.,pnnsihility oct trrTcd.=' \ 

month l.ltcr, in the organizational clirrnivc 

for milit.u) gm cruuu·nt, Clar to~tnl , "This 

crgarrization mu't hcmme civilian in c-haracter ih r<~piclly '" mno;i-.tcnt with cffiricnt 

performanrr so thnt it ma)' bcnmw at the 

ca rlic· l po);.~ihlc d.ttc a (ramcw()rk for the 

administration of politicnl control in Gelmany hy I hr appwpr iatc U.~. Ci\·il it~cncies.""• lie told the armr romm:rnder:~ at 

the 22 .J une mcctin~ that he was ''infiltrating highh qualified rivilians" into tlw U.S. 

Cwup Comrol C:owH il and tht· theater 

G-5; writing to ~IlCioy three day .. later. 

he .;aid hr undt·l!>lOOd the creation of (l 

Slrpcr·visor·y body for Germany compol-led 

of civilians "to l>c 111)' mission.'' ~" 

Until the war ended in thr Pafifir, the 

"' l.tr, F.r'l:uhowcr to Prr·~idf'nl Tnun.111, 21l Ocr 

·~3, in USFET SCS II I Ill. 

" Mi'mo hy aj Gcn l.uc111s Clay, II Apr ·15, 

in or~i1111 Rdatio11J, 1'1<15, vol. I 11, p. !):~I. 

" Hctll, F.TOUSA, Organ~:uion for ~lililal')' 

Govenuncnl of the US Zone, 11 ~l:.y 1~. iu 

SHt\EI,. G 2, CBI/Cl / C:St:l22. 

'"l.tr, Clny to M c:Cioy, 25 Jun ·IS, in OMCUS •ll0-2/:l. 
'1'11 1·: U.S. ,\JUlY TN T HE OC.C P.\TJOi\ OF GEIOJAI\Y 

l!lnlllt ~ of n1ilitary pt ~~OJlncl available for 

milit ary govcnnnrnl assignments made 

c ivili:wiztltion bdow the lop levels of the 

U.S. Group C:nntr<>l Council and USFET 

SGS G- 5 an uuut'l'<''-"'lll) luxury. Ev<·n in 

1lw U.S. Group Control Council, where the 

ltiiJllhcr of civilians illtTCascd frottl 83 on 

I ay to 326 (}t1 I September, the relative 

prn res.c; in <·ivilianizatinn was slight :-;incc 

tltc munhcr~ of o{fi, Cl"i and enU-<tcd men 

went from 41 7 to I ,124 and from !1!">3 to 

4,012.:: 1 In the next two months, howC'VCr, 

redeployment altcrrd the proportions 

rnpidl)', and the militnl')' sl.rcngtb di'Clppcd 

by nearly 2,000 mc11 while the civilians incr<·a:scd to 429. In the fir'il week of Scplcmbrr, C:by anno\lnc rd a program to indu ~ 

flkct~ in par'litular to r.onvert to civilian 

stnt us in Gcm1:111y. Ou I Ot:lOhcr he in it iatcd a rivil servirt• annlysis of all military 

government jol1s; nnrl Eise nh <~cr ~~ dcred 

the army commandl\ not lo " place any obstaclcc; in the way of thc~e peop e. "~:. 

The power Ktntggk llctwccn t11c lhc:~ter 

G 5 and the U.S. Croup Control Cou ncil 

ended in ju11c 011 CI:.y's terms. He and 

Ge,ncral 1\dco<:k, the thea ter G- 5, ngrced 

to integrate their stafTs; the staff di visions 

would he loc<Hcd rithct· in FrankfUI't or 

Berlin depending on wh<:J'e they wmtld be 

mo-:t effective. Adcock became in effect 

Cl.1y's dcputr. Clay indicated to McCloy 

0 11 25 J une that he c·ontemp1ated H!! the 

next step combining the two staffs into a 

single office or militMy goveramenl. fl Since 

"OMGUS, i~tory, Offil"e of .Military Covtnlmt'nt for Ccm1any, cl1. II , p. 5. 

'" ( I) Memo, llqs, USFF.T, r\ CofS C: 5, fo r 

CotS, ~uh: Program for I lllroduction of Ct ~\i fi d 

Civil s.,rvicc, 6 Sep •15, iu USF'ET SCS 0.:~ . 

(2) Oinry, Hqs, Sc\ cnth Army ACofS C:- :1, 2 Jton 

45- 25 l'vl ar 46, I Ort ·15, in Seventh Army, 

I 07 0.3.0. 

"l.tr, Clay lo McCloy, 25 .June 45, in OMC:US 

110 2n 

the merge r would rcmov<· Lh<' top milita r)' 

govcrnmrnt t•t hclon fr11111 I he lartit:al comm and C' hr~niH s, it would logit·all y do thr 

li:Imc· with lllilit.trr government down the 

line and \<IOIIId ronstilt11(' ,, pic:c·t· or radica l 

surgt'l')' 011 " not entirely willing patient. 

The US FE'J' :tnd military di!(lt'il'l G- 5·!i, 

having 11 0 functions that were not clupliratcd eilltr1· i11 the U.~. Group Control 

Council w· the Land d<:taC'hments, would 

suffer most. 

In miJ-Scptrmhcr, Clay maJc a r hoit c 

betwec11 two directives: one would have 

immediatd)' designated the U.S. Group 

Control Council as the militrtq• government 

authority ami tcmovcd the G 5's from the 

chain of c-ommand; th(' otlwt , whir h Cl ay 

approved, 1 ut as deep hut 1111l <I$ fast. :\ s 

of I Octohrr, the U.S. Group C:onll'ol 

Counril h Ct'tl11lC the omcc of Milit ary Government ( U.S. ) (OMGUS ) and USFf.T 

G- 5 hct'l\lllC the Office of Military Government ( U.S. Zone) . The L twrl dctar hments 

became rJffiC'CS of military gOVCI'nJI1Cnl ror 

their Lacurlcr-Third .\rmr G 5 merging 

with the J3av.trian Land dctar.hment to 

form the Ollin: of Military Government, 

Bavaria ancJ Seventh /\rmy G !'i became 

the Ollkc of ~~ ililnry GovcnHlH'nt (\Vestern Di tri ~' For USFET and the 

armies, however, and thus for the ta<·tica l 

concept of military government. the t;nd 

was in sight . Other directives Lo;sliCd later 

in S<.:plemlwr and the nn;t W{'Ck or O r.toher 

ordered the ;u·mics to cease all military government activity after ~ 1 December. 

USFET C 5, as the Office of Uilitary 

Go,·crnmcnt ( U.S. Zone ), hcnunc lhe rear 

echelon of 0 i'vlGUS upon no lice that its 

runctinlls :tnd pc•rsonncl would be ~md ll y 

" Memo, Ot:t> Military Uovcruor for CC, 

USFF.T, suh : Organization of 1\iliHt(lr y Government, 1 '\ Sr11 l.'i, in O~ IG US 177 'l./:1. 
'1 HE T UR:'\J :'\G POl l'\T 

shifted from Fr·ankf11n to the OMCUS 

hcadCJlrartcrs in Berlin. Ironicall y, hy then, 

since the CorH rnl Cmnwil had f:Lilcd to 

c-;t a blish even I he most rudimentary German l'cn tra l authority, Frankftn't was a 

rnurh hetlcr sit e for the zone military govrwmcnl headquarters tha11 BcrliJr ; howC'vcr, having the headquarters in Frankfurt 

would have nen:ssitatcc.l rithcr witlu.lrawing 

most of Lhc pc ~o n11 l from 13erlin, thus 

seeming to accept the division of Germany 

as pern'lanc.nt, or maintaining a large staff 

in Berlin without Htl)'thing to do.~s 

The day after he approved Lhc directive 

establishing OMGUS and the other offi ccs 

of nrilitary goverruucnt, Clay wrote lo McCloy that the ()hject was to convert military 

governmctll to n civilian operation und separate it from the military forces as soon 

as possible ~~· On 1 Ortober, £isenhowcr 

told tbc army commanders ''The Army 

must he prepared to be divorced from 

military government responsibilities on 

twenty-four hours' nolice.'""' Clay did not 

anticipa te quite so much speed; and when 

he read the preliminary draft of Byron 

Prir.e's report lo the President, which recommended as did the final report, complete 

civili;1nization and the appointment of a 

civilian hig h commissioner, he pointed out 

that the other three Allied governments 

woltlcl have to he i'onsulted and thnt the 

complete conversion would probably take 

until I July 946.~ 1 No doubt, however, 

considering the ofTicial and press rritici:-;m, 

>< oMGUS, llistory, elL I, pp. 63- 67. 

._, Ltr, Cl.-.y to tvtfCioy. I G Sep 45, in OMGUS 

•I tO 2/3. 

"' Di:ny, Seventh Arllly, ACofS G- 3, 2 J11n 45- 25 

Mat· 116, I Oc:t 45, in Sc,•cnth Army, 107· 0.3.0. 21 (I) Byron Price, Pt•elimina ry Ontline of a 

Report un Relations Between the American Army 

of Ocr.ttp:ttion nnd rhc Gc:rma n People, 'I Oct 

~5, in USFET SGS OI ·L I/::1. (2) Mr.mo, Clay 

fot· Price, H O~t ·15, in OMGUS 177- 3/3. 

the .\ 1'111)' would h;wc li ked to get out 

sooner. Sn1 ilit dire< tly expressed this ,·iew 

when he told Price that he frankly tloultted 

whether civilian-; could do a !letter jolt 

than the milit ary, hut " from '' pnrclr scl fi h 

point of view, the sooner the 1\ rnry is out 

of this ,·cry controvcr:;ial joh the better it 

will be for the militar·y service.''~" 

T n Wash ington on 23 October, Scrretary 

of \1\Far Pallcrson a ud Se('retary of the 

N~W)' rmcs V. Fo rrc~ l mel \Vith Secretary of State J ames F. yrnes.'~:~ The: 5uhject 

was civilian control in Germany, which 

P atterson s<ud he hclievcd should be a State 

Depa rtment rc<>ponsibility. They agreed that 

the shift, when it was made, should he to 

a single department ; hut I3 yrnes thought 

the Army had the best organization ·and 

that "it would l>e a great mistake to make 

t.he change now." If the State Department 

had lo take over, he suggested postponing 

the " bad news" for eight or nine months. 4 

Three days later in a letter to Truman, 

Eisenhowcr reminded the Pt·esident of their 

conversion in July and, pointi ng O\ll that 

the foul' occupying powers would have to 

agree, proposed making the transfer to civilian control no later than I June 946.~" 

On the 1s t, the President released Eisenhower's lcttc1· to the press and announced 

t hat t he shirt from military to State Department tivilian control in Germany WOltld 

l>e made l>y I .June 946 ~u 

., Memo, Smith for 13yron Price, 1-1 Oct 45, 

i11 USFE'I' SGS OJ-1..t 13. 

,. Under Secretary of War Pancr.:on had succcctlcd Stimson when Srimson resigned in Septemher t!N!). 

" ( I) t-.·lcmo, CAD, Econ Sec, fur the Director, 

CAD, t Nov ·15, in i\SW, :170.!!. (2 ) Foreign 

Relatio11s, 194-5, vol. rt 1, J>. 989. 

"' l.tr, Eisenhower to President Trun1an, 26 Ocl 1

15, in USFET SGS 0 t•1.11 3. 

"" .tvlcmo, CAD, Econ Sec, for the Director, 

CAD, I Nov 45, in ASW, 370.!l. 
I !II Till·. L .S. :\IL\1\' 1'\ l'HE OCC:LP.\TJO'\ OF <:ElU\Ii\:\1' 

·•wl.' J>u11'l fl 'rnll tlu• f.ow Lcz•e/Job'' 

l'.xpt'< ting in mid-September 10 "'" r lo 

I'CUUu.: rnililar > ~0\ ClllliiCill in the. fidtl 

r10lll it,_ peak Slltllglh of ( fOSC (0 13,QQ(J 

nlliH's'S and nwn to around 4,000 hy t•arlr 

1 11'16, Clay dire:< tnl ,\dl'at k and USFET 

C: 5 to work out a means of reduc:i ng milit,u·y l{overnmcnl supl'J'\'i!'ion lJclow the 

l.mtd lc,·cl. .. \Vt: r:annm,'' he said, "cxp1:rt 

the Germans to take respousibilit) without 

gi,•ing it 10 them. We tlon't want the low 

lrvd job; we wnm the German~ to do it!' 

lie atlucd, " We arc going to mm·c a little 

rrt!-tt. . . U:Jj 

Ou 5 O cwhcr. USFET announrcd: 

1l hn' always been the purpose of thl' L.S. 

Fcll"('l'' to per111i1 tlw (it•rmatl pcnplt· l<l d(•-

vdop n free ~-;on•t l\ll tl' lll , 5hapcd to fit the ll( 'l'( ~ or Gerntall)'. :-.t or'l'()\'('1', iL is Jll:lnifl'stly 

~i 1npl C' r to n>ntml ( :t'l'lltnll)' through (;('1'11111 11 

:uluJi lli~trati,·c m ;u·hillt'l'}' tlmn b)' eutde•r•taking direct operntill~ u·sponsibilitic·s ... . 

" ln order to call'y out this Lonvcrsion," 

USt,.ET ordered the l .fllldkreis and St(l(/tkreif dctnchmcnt-; tu di"orcc tltc111:-;clvcs 

from direct supcrvillion of the Gcnnnn t' ivi li ltl adminstratious by 15 Noven ll>cr 

1945 <tnd the Regicnw,t!.sbe:.irk det,\r hmcn ~ to do S(l hy 15 J)('t'Crlll>er. ,\ftcr the 

la~ot l'lections ( and 110 later than :W . \pril 

l!l46 in the Landf..1 1'i1t and 30 J une iu the 

Slat/lkreise), tlw directive added, the 

Lnndkreis a11d St.adlkreis detachments 

would be disbanded nnd rephwcd with 

two-officer liaisou and security clctachrncnts, which would oh::.erve and report 011 

the German go\'crnmcnts and at t as the 

link l•et ween tlwrn and the on upntion 

(orc·cs but hnvc no nuthority, except 

,. Mctno, USFfo:'l', Clivil Admin nr, for CofS, 

5ub : Proposed O lri'I'II VC5. 4 Oct ·•.J, in USI"ET 

sr:s Ot·t. t. 

in emcrgr ll' <'~, lo intcr'WIH' in theit 

operations.·'' 

O~ CUS, the Land fTHc~ uf mili lal'~ 

g.o\ ernmt'tel , 1 he Gc1 mnu l .mrtl gnver·nments, and ;\ l.nellfiermt ( coun61 of 

ministcrli), 1 <>llxisting of the l.a11l/ minister 

presidents and the Obubuet'ffermeister nf 

Bremen, were lo he the vchi< lc.o:; of authority 

in thc U.S. 7.1)1\e. Bavaria had lrad a La11d 

g-overnment si ne<' J unc. One l.twd government wa!\ installed in \\' ucrucmhtrg-Baclen 

on 24 September and another in Greater 

Besse on 8 Ocloher. On the J 7th, Clay 

opened llw first meeting of the Lncndenat 

in Stutl~<• ·t. Clay indir:lLCd, on the one 

hand, that hr regarded tlw l.flentlerral as 

a zonal suh<;litulc for the c.:cntral authority 

that the Control Counc·il h.cd failed t () 

c5tahli;,h. Ou the other hand, to a\'oid 

seeming to hllvt accepted the Control 

Coun cil's failure as final, lw pt>intcd out 

that the l .nt'llilerrat a~ nciLhcr a legislature llor a zonal executive hut was onl)' 

t•hargcd with t:o-ordinating ti n in 

area-; whcr<' zonewide ur;i(ot mity was 

ne<.:essa ry. 1

' ' T he Laende1rn.l lt q~.lll to function o!Tidnll) :11 its :;crond meeting on 6 November. By llten a joint co-ordinating stall 

composed of representatives of the Land 

minisLeries, a pcJ'manent senctarial, and a 

U .S. advi:<Or) group- thr Rcgionnl Go\'-

crnment Co-ordinating Office (under Dr. 

}<lmes K. Potluck )-wa<; cstal1lished. 

From the field, USFET ::.urvey teams clcsrrihcd llrt r'Cl\C'tion of mililury government 

o!Tirers H'i " I(}() percent " against the irnpendjng ••cmoval of the local military go\'-

t rnment tkt at hments. S(unc ofli c·<'t'S saw 

,, 1-lqs, USI"ET, to CO's, Eastern and Weste rn 

Military 1)istricts, SIIIJ: Rcorg:1nization of Military 

Govc rnmc•nt Cc)ntrol Chnnnols, 5 Oct +5, in 

USFrn SC.S 0 l 1.1. 

.., Hi$l Rpt, !Jet E.li\2, Oc·t ·15, in OMCUS 

5. 
Ti lE T UJC\IXG POINT Ill!) 

(;I NI Ml. CI.A y (Sccolld I TOll/ left ) AT LAEN"DI'.RRAT M lm 1'1:-W. a II Iris right R cgimrnl 

Guucmment Co-ordiufrlor, D1. /'allOt k. Ou Iris left Crueml At lllfl'r aTifl Colonel Newmall, J"!ilrtary Govemmrut Diru/orf for Brwaria anti Crl'aft•r 1/esse. 

tlw 111ow as a kind of trick to reduce their 

rT~ without reducing the work loads. 

Others protested that the German officials 

were too recently appointed and loo incxpcricnrcd to have ;my idea of how lo 

operate the governments on their own initinlivr. n}' bclie,·ed the German!' " would 

quit kly rev<."rt to their old political, 

cconomk, and social customs"; and the 

Germans tbcmselve:; reportedly feared a 

resurgcn1 e of Nazi elements and doubted 

the ability of the civilian offi cia ls to nm the 

go\'Crnmcn ts or to ma intain public peace 

and order. OMGUS hoped that sw·h pr.'lSimisrn c·ould he written ofT as the natural 

reaction of a large organization threatened 

with a drastic reduction in its scope and 

activitic.-;, and Clay let the withdrawal of 

control from the g,.eis detachments go 

ahead in mid-November. The organization 

was not going to he there much longer in 

any e\·cnt. The detachments had lost an 

a,·crage of 50 perl'en t, and in some instances as much as 80 percent, of their enlisted men in October. The offi cers, if held 

Lo the leucr of their commitments, could 
1·06 THE U.S. 1\R i\.IY IN THE OC:C.:UPt\TION OF GERMANY 

have been r<:lainC'd six 0 1 cigln months al 

nlO."L 1'' 

On 2 1 NovcmhCJ, USJ• ET grantccl full 

executive, legislative, and judicial au thority 

to the Land govrrnments individually nnd 

extended to them all the powers formerly 

exercised by either the Land 0 1· Lhe national 

!{overnmcnts. The offices of military government were told, ''The initiative must l>t 

taken by the German au~ ll • itics: the dut y 

~ theirs.'' .\II legislation is..'luccl hy the Laue/ 

governments was to he on 1hcir authority 

alone and "<'ontain nothing to indicate that 

"'( I ) H qs, USFF.T, OMG ( U.S. Zo11e), Inter· 

n;~l Affrurs Div, Opus Br, suh ; Opus R pt of Det 

F..-202, Oct 45, in OMGUS 1- 2/5. (2) Hist Rpt, 

Det E-206, Ocr 45, io OMC US 1-3/5. (3) 

OM GUS, H istory, ch. I, pp. 60 70. ( 4 ) i~tory 

of lo.'lilitary C:overmncnt ill L.artd W11 ernem1Jurs· nadcn, vol. I, p. 1459. 

it wa'\ is..'>ucd in the name of or having the 

approval of military government ·•; however, it was still subject to prior clearance 

through military government. Not later 

lhRn 3 I December 1945, U.S. orders and 

instructions would he issued only to the 

Land governments and wouta pa.'l.'l from 

them to the lower clcmcms through German channels. Similarly, military government would intervene to correct mistakes 

or deal with violations only at the Land 

level!' Military government as conceived 

at Chadollt'sville, shaped al Shrivenham, 

and deployed under the Carpet and Static 

Plans lmd served out its time. 

" H qs, USFE:;r, Oircctor of Military C:ovemmcmt ( U .S, lOll<' ), to D irectors of MilitnryGol'ernmcnl, ."Sub : A<: tion to Strcngtheu Gcrmun Civil 

Administrll tion in the U.S. Zone, 21 Nov ·~5. in 

USFIW SCS 014 11 . 
CIIAPTER XX II J 

Winter 

Thr . rttW11 of DesJiflir 

hom the fin.t si!-{ht in the ~pring of unplmH'd ric·ld..,, !>htlldown roal min<"\, nnd 

r uim·cl dtics, tht winter lO wnw had 

loonwd ()fflinCJuo;ly in the mind~; of thos(• 

'' ho woul~l he respon.;ihlc for administering 

tl 11.: ur-ruprt•cl <'(Jtlntry. In June, pr·cdirting 

a h.1r rrn ''inter for l·:uropc, the PottcrHyndky l\ i~sion rontrmplatcd a possilrlc 

need " to luc-.;('r.'c order h} .,hootin~" in 

C:crm.tn}'.' When he talked to the Cr m~no; 

in \re ~ust. E~ enhowcr '"1mcd them of the 

hard'>hips in th(' month" to rome. Br early 

.1Ulu111u, the U.S. and Britio;h newspnper<> 

were· pe itlting storic.; about tht• approaching 

·~f3nuh· of the. Winter," n battle against 

~~~~ lmc.-.s, st.u vatron. and rold. The orcupatr<HI forces fig~trrcl in some :lC'('Ounts ns 

scmi.tllic~. iii other.- as dispa siunate observer' of .t proplc: l't1d uri ng t hr consccp renr('$ 

of gge~"io , and not infrequent!\' as the 

pmential targc·t of the unregenerate ;1nd the 

drsperate. The third p<lS.c;ihility ore urrcd 

:llso w the U.S. rommand, and in Onoher 

Ei'lrnhower • .tnd Sn1ith decided there wa~ 

"a strong likelihood <>f incidents . . . in 

th~ \' int~:·'' that wou ld r·cquirr "11 trong rc-

~<tlmtton. :\t the end of the month, they 

tnsttliCted militr11 y govcrnlll('lll to warn 

Germ,lfl ofTidal~, from the mini<;ter pre.c;idcnt~; on down, that thcv and their communitic-. would he held• :Kcountahlc for 

·'' t~ again~.;t the orrupi\t ion force.<;.: 

I Dunni~u. c;,.;[ AQtmt nlld .1/ilitar) Cot till• 

''""'· .\'urlhll'''' Europe, p. ·105. ' Mrrno, ll q~, U.:>FF.T, AC:ofS (; 2, for ACofS 

\t fir-.t tlw Crr m.cnc; seemed tuo '''"lnccl 

~cl, a-; .the o;untmer worr on, too prcuc, uprcd wnh da~-to-day cxi~tcnn· to tlrink 

ahout the future. Wheu the har\'C."l wac; 

in and the dail)' r'<lliC>n barely :tllO\'C 1.20() 

caluries, 11 hen the wc·,uhc1 tu.rncd cold 01 tH.I 

there WIIS no I'Oal, when the farmers :mel 

ot.h~r producer., hrnm1e incren-;ingl~· unwdlmg to pnrt with their proclwt-. for 

money, the p<·uple, ac; the \VuerllcmhcrgBaden Office nf ilitary C.:ol'crnmcnt reported, c;ank ''deeper and deeper into 

d~pair ac; th<')' saw a crut"l, cold, hnn~ry 

\~Int l' a head. "~ The har.•est, all thin~s rons.tdered, h.1d hrrn a good unc hut c oulcl 

nm un der att)' rin umstanrcs have been 

good enough tn feed the zonr population 

throughout the winter. Coal output in thr 

Britic;h .md Frrnt'h zonc.o; hild inrrr:~ ed, lnrt 

the rail .utd water transpoet S}«;tCill'l were 

only nble to move ahout 60 per·c·<·nt of the 

coal aw,,r from the mines. The U.S. 1onc 

received hnlf a million tons in August hut 

only 150,000 ton<~ more in Deccmhcr, juo:t 

enough to rnn the railroads and essential 

plthlic utilitic,. When cold weathrr came. 

militar)' !-{O\'CI'111l1enr in Stuttgart and other 

plares req11isitioncd all cmtl supplie.; over 

a quarter ton, and th ~oughout the 70nc 

children were rrquir·cd to iu·ing a piece of 

firewood with them to c;rhool each day to 

heat the dao;-.room•t To the cxccs.sive 

C !i, s11l>: Ccrm,tu c~pon•ihility for Ch·il Ord<-r 

'II Oct ·IS in USFln S(;S 011.113. ' 

• llistory of Militury Co,emmcnt in I tl!ltl 

Wut•rtlcmhrrg-B:Hlc•n, VIII I, p. I 12!!. 
+OB TilE l.J.S. \R\IY I' TJll·: OCC"l· P.\ 1'1 0~ OF (;I R \L\.\Y 

CATH ERINO Fnmwoon, February 191/-6. 

amounts of paper eir mark~ lre~tdy in 

circula tion the 1\llied milita ry marks had 

added billions more a nd raised the feru· of 

an uncomrollahle inflation like lhal of 

1923. H a rdly able to huy with money anything tha t was not ralioned, some people 

were investing in postage stamp5 ; and in 

Lhe cities, many workers reported for work 

o nly often eno ug h lo get their ration cards. 

T he news in November tha t the U.S. 

zone would receive two and a quarter million Germans expelled from eastern Europe 

between December 1915 and J uly 1946 

deepent d the despair. On instructions from 

the Potsdam Confe rence, the Control 

Counc:il had worked out procedures fo r 

taking into the oc<'upied te rritory 6,G50,000 

racial Germans who were to be expelled 

from Pola nd, Czechoslovakia, Hungar)', 

ami Austria. • The U.S. zone's share was 

1,750,000 from the Sudetenland and 

500,000 from H ungary. Thcr were scheduled to t·ome a t :'1 rate of a qua rte r million 

a month in D ecember, J anua ry, a nd February and in la rger numbers in the spring.r' 

' Cable, Hqs, USFET, to War Dcpl, AG, 20 

Dec •15, in USFET SGS 091.1 / 1. 

• After the State Departmeut a nnounred th:u 

X.'< I I corps, the U.S. force in Czechoslovakia, 

would IJr wiihdrawn by I Deccml..:r, it looked 
. \n .lgrn•nwut to ex( hang<' t rfu~<'<''~ lJc1 \\'('~ II thc zone<> plunged the n:fugt·cs into 

gloor11 witllOlll raising the spir·its of thr. nati, ~ rc~i tlr tll !i of lhe U.S. Y.One. ThC' latter 

<'XJW<'tctl I hat relatively (c·w rdltgr.:cs, partindady from the east, would I{O home- an 

opiuion which later turned otll tn be corrcrt.'' Housing and feeding lho'>r (;crmans 

expclkd fmm other countric" W:t.'\ ~oing to 

he cntircl}' a Ccnmm affair (\vii h milit:u: 

gmr'tlllllCIII making sure thi'> rc<> ponsihility 

was being c:nnied out ), and no on<' tknicd 

tha 1 1 he Germans had reason to l h' worried. 

t\~ the Chid of Staff, Third l\t'llt)', Brig. 

Gr:n. Don E. Carlclon, snid : " I ran't sc:c 

with :t rmtplc more million nmting in, how 

titer'<.' i-; going to he romn. Even arking 

thc·m on top of one another. the fa< ilitie..o;; 

.trt• guinK tn be rcaJly husting.'' · 

It appeared for a t;mc thnl USFET 

ntighl alt;o have to disrhtt tgc npwards Clf 

BO,OO() prisoners of war a month into the 

(ot• :1 lime· :1\ if the Sudeten CrrnutnN might l!urst 

into tlw 1.onc iu an uncoutrollt•tl Oootl C:rncr:lls 

C:nd•·to•• :md Adcock discmscd thtll po~'ihllity hy 

tl'lcphOnt' 011 2 1 November: 

C:o~rlt•ton: As ~oon as the (.;('lin·"" l('a liv.c· thilt 

Jl.muon's XX I I Corps is ~oing to 1110w tht'y 1\ ill 

llt'('OinC n\01'(! :111d 111011: I I'll ifirtf, lll't'.lll~t' llCIUIIJI)' 

lw h11\ hc•ru IIH•ir god and prott•CI•}r Hfl thr·11•, 

Atk(>t'k : Yes. He has hccu tht• only one to kcrp 

tht' low lt•\cl C.t.crhs front rahut}: hc·ll with thctn. 

I !1111 nr.·aid tht~y will turn whitl' IIJIOil lw.rrinr: thnt 

I [;muon's corps is going to pl.! I ntH. Word is lwint: 

~~~ ~!:'l d now. ( :nl'll'ton: Yes, The c•ongcstion :tlonj.l till' ltot'dl't' 

nrca i~ hi'I.'Ollling terrifiC- So f:. ·· \\'(' lmvc IH'CII :tiJil! 

10 hand It• it, hut \Vl' don't look to tht• runnc· \\ ith 

.Ill)' rt•al hupr·. 

( l l Cahlc, Marshall to Eisenhu"'l'r, f) Nov ~5 . 

iu USFRT SGS :170.5/3. (2) L>i.tl")', XV C<~rp~, 

21 No,· 15, I" 'A'V Corps, 2 15 o.:t 

'The !\l:.y t<llb censuJO showed ovrr three qu:uters uf '' ntlllion refugee~ from other zone• ~till 

in the U.S, ~one. Am111al Rrport OMG, Bavaria, 

R tru.i(l'c Sec tion, 9 J ul ·16, in OMC:US 65- 1/ 10. 

' l)iary, XV Coo•ps, 2 1 Nm• ~1 1 in XV Corps, 

~ n.:l. 

zonr d11ring the ''inter. Till' !Sitipping 

schedule !'ttlted fot 00,000 tCI be rclllnH:d 

from the: Unitl'd St:tles in December and 

85,000 each month in Ja nuary and Fdt t'tlary. Th(~y wet'<: 10 have heen part of the 

1.3 million allottc•d to France for reltabilit :\-

tion work, hul in late September, the International Reel Cro'i.~ reported that 200,000 

of the prisoner'> alrc.tdy in fren ch h:tnds 

were so undcmnufished as to he unfit for 

labor and likcl>· to die nvcr the wintrt'. Ei..-

enhowcr immC'dintcly ordered that food, 

clothing. and mediral supplies he provided 

for the 1 nost needy prisoners and stopped 

a ll ll'ansfcrs of prisoners to French custody 

until the Frcm It were able Lo m:~intaiu 

them in :H cm·cbuwc with the Geneva Convention. Situ c the U.S. for<'es were hy then 

finding the :i50,000 prisnncrs that the)' o;till 

held in 1:\hlil' !l!'rvke units to be murc 

expensive than hired civilian la bor, the 

<>hipments from the United States would 

probably h:wc to hr dischttrged as soon :ts 

they anivccl, nnd the three-quarters or :1 

million pri!loners in Fra nce might also luwr 

to be brought lmrk and either be discharged 

or otherwise made a German rcsponsihilit)'.~ 

By the fit t wr<·k in Ortoher, Clny knew 

almost for ('Crt:tiu thnt he was not goin~ 

to get en<mgh food imports to raise the J':\-

tion for the winlt:r to 2.000 rnlm·ics per 

day.u In llll' 2H-t.lay mtion period beginning 

on 15 October, the scale would hnrd y 

reach I ,250 c:-. ric.~; nnd he knew thal in 

' ( I) Memo, US £'1', CorS, for Hl'ad or U .S. 

Forces ;\ i~siou to flrnucc, 2 Oct ·1!>, auc.l Memo, 

1-f q~. TSFI~' . Offin, of thr Chic( Surgeon, ~uh: 

Conference ~ Uodl•r French Control, I O ct 

15, in USf'P.T SCS 311:1.6/ 1. (2) i\!Qmo, q~. 

USFET, Pt·ovo~t \l"''h:t , for CG, q~, USf'F.1', 

Sub : Di!opo,ttion of POWs, 26 Dec 45, in USFF..I 

SGS Htl.G/~1. 

• ~demo, O~ <:US, Dep ~Iii Gov. for (:(;, 

USFET, sub: Supply or Food to Civili;ms in lkr· 

lin, :l O ct 4~, in USFE'l' SGS 0 14.1. 
·110 TI-m U.S . . \IUJ \' L\' T J IE O<:CUP.\"1'10.\' or UE R~I ~Y 

unhcat<'d dwdli11g't' this nlli<•n lc,·cl would 

nol he enough to 'HIStain life through the 

wintl'l'. In lhc middk of the month, probHhl) nwrc to •·nisc til<' Gnm<llls' s pi1·.its than 

in the hl'lid llwt lue few hundred extra 

n d\H'ics wnuld nwke any real difference, 

11Hl not al all ecrtaitl yet that he would 

have the imports to support the increase, 

he a nnoLHwcd a zoncwidc I ,500-cak>rie 

t•ntinn l(l lu gin 0 11 12 Noven11Jcr, with 50 

<·:dories mo1 <' 10 be added after I 0 Decemher."' . \ 1 ,500-ralorie ration worked out 

o.tilv ro 51 :! slicr.s nf bread, 3 medium-size 

polatot·s, ~ tal> lcspoons of natmral or other 

,n·c·al, I IL.tspoon of fat, and 1 teaspoon 

1lf :-;ugar. Oi the total 1,500 n tlorics, 1,200 

"'~'' ' in the bread anti oe~. USFET 

,t\ll lwrized :tdding, when available- which 

ll (l one expP<·ted to hilppcn VCI')' often- a 

picc·c of meat or fish "one half the size of 

olll egg'' a nd three tablespoon~ or vegetables 

ot hlT 1 han potatoes.' L To conserve precious 

calories and provide hot me<ds for those 

who would be without fuel to cook their 

own, 1l1c ofllrc!> of military governmerH, 

<;OinctinJcs ul'ing .\ t'trl)' equipment, began 

selling up community kitchens. The kitchens in Hm·aria alone were able to serve 4- ~ 

million meals a montll. Ex<:ept in Berlin, 

where the school children received 190-

ndol'ic ho~ noon meals, recipients were t'Cquirr.d to llll'n in rntinn coupons and , if 

they were not on rclic:f, pay for the meals.12 

[ n the first week of Deremhcr, the State 

Dcpartnrent authorized privme U.S. agencies to ship I'Clief supplies to Germany, 

'" C.:nbh·, OM GUS lo AGWAR for WARC:OS, 

No1• •15, in OMGOS 12 1/5 , v60 20/1. 

" Hqs, USFET, Theatr.r C()Jnmnndl'r's Weekly 

Swfl' Confc~r!•n<·c: No. H, 2() Mar 46, in Hist Div, 

Hqs. eTO, -U SI~\J 0.5. 

c: ( I ) C mnula livc l listorical Report for Lrrll(l 

Bava t·ia, :lO Jitn •Hi, p. 109. (2) HisL Rpt, OMG, 

B!.!rlin, 1 Ju t 45 0 .Tun 46, I'OI. I, p. 100. 

pro,·idcd the uppli cs were cli tril>ut <.l impartially in the areas of greatc~L need.' a 

The first postwar hn~lma , dismal 

thongl1 it was, •vns nnl cplitc a:; bad as it 

mig ht lw ve been. The worst spec imen nf 

a goose fo r the holiday dinner <:ost al ea~l 

a thousand Reic:ltsmarks, when one c·ould 

be hiLd at all; and one hln<"k marketeer 

n1ade a huge profit selling cans or old 

W elmnnchL sauerkraut rclahclcd goulash. 

T he Frankfurter Rund.11 l/(/u described I he 

scene in that city: 

A few ~tails stand ort the wet p:1vc1ncnt of 

the main qu<~l'f' in thf' 111idst <l f Ul(• ntins. 

Cards are for ~a le. also a few rf·d and bllH' 

pencils, son1r <:a rdhoard toys, n i'C" w pitifu l 

things ma<le out of W(lOd, and lots of trashy 

and expensive ornatlwtlts. The old Frankflirter Sa11ta Claus and his a rks full of 

wooden animals iii distnnt ns a drcanr. 11 

In Stuttgart, the hri'\ tmas selection conJ~ tecl mostly of small and expensive 

wooden toys and StHall quantities of 

powc.ler, I i pstick, and oil less face creams. 

1\ lighted Christmas tree atop the StuUgarLeJ· Zeittmg building, the first !\CCn jn the 

city since 1938, stood out painfully amidst 

the dark ruins.' " The weather, however, 

was warm and spring-like. The Frankfurter 

Rundsrhatt reminded its rc;1drrs what such 

we;Hher meanl in terms of survival a nd rc~ 

called also that the previous year hncl hecn 

"Germany had bee11 ctvsecl to r••lid shipmen ts 

until D cccrnbcr on tlw gro~mds thnt they might 

ll!ncl lo negnte the policy of rcstric;Ling the German 

standard of living lo !he average of the surround· 

in!( E••ropl!:'\11 nations. CARE pacbgc slai1lmcnts 

10 individuals remained prohibited tlnlil 5 June 

I Cl•l·6. ( l ) Memo. European Sc1:1ion '!'heater 

Group, OPD, for I. &. LD, sub: Estahllshmcnt 

of CiviJiao Director of Relief, l.l Dec ·15, in OPD, 

/\llC 336 (sec. TV ) (t'nses 155 ). (2) OMGUS, 

Control Office, Higt Br, History of U.S. Military 

Gove rnment iu Germany, Public Welfare, !J Jul 

·ICi, in OMCUS 21 :l/5. 

"PHmk]tl l'ter Ruudschau, 21 Dec 45. 

"Stull garter Zeituug, 19 Dec ~5. 
W l J':'I'F. R 

difl'crent in two rcspcds: the weather on 

24 December had been cold and the sky 

clear, and a hail of bombs had fallen on 

the til)'· Thi<; year al least " no mother 

needs to pick up her child in haste and 

run to the cellar with it.""1 

The holidf\)' was, in fact, n()l completely 

barren. Third Army reported "a certain 

aura of good feeling" associated with the 

season, and the food offices released extra 

rations of sugar and Oour. Throughout the 

zone, the troops gave Chrislm<IS parties for 

'" Frar1k{urlar Ru11dsclwu, 21 Dec ~5. 

411 

ch ildren. In Landkreh '"' ctzlar, for example, the lora\ detachment and the o('(·upation twops gave a hag of cookies and a 

candy bar to each of the several thousand 

school children. ln Bad Aihling the officers 

and men of the guard for Pr.isoner of Vvar 

Enc losure No. 26 distributed chocolate and 

cand}' in the town schools. I n Hcilbronn, 

the U.S. soldiers furnished candy, the 

prisoners of war in the local stockade contrilmted handmade toys, and the military 

government clctachmenl recorded with s~tti~fa on "the presence of a tradiLional 

Christmas tree in even the humblest cellar 
·112 THE U.S. ,\Ri\IY II\ I'IIE OC<:UP.\'1'101'\ OF GERi\1:\NY 

h11rnc. " Souw cllt.u hmrnl' noted, however. 

1 hat the Ccrm.m..; who c·:uue around tu 

th~·m will1 holidn) gn ctin~:; were o(t<'ll 

o;mall-timc Nnzi:-: l1<1ping to ingratiate lt elll~ 

lll'lvc:os, while those who IMd nothing to kar 

or nothing Lo gain stayed awety." 

Three days after Christmas, damp wnrrll 

winds swt·pt ncr~s the .wnc. ln Frnnkful'l 

they reached gale force, blowing off nwling' 

paper and ll:rHporary roofs and blowing 

down wnlls ol thun:1ged lluildinh'S· The next 

11101 uing some: streets wen~ c-overed with .1s 

rll\H h rubble as if there had hecn an air 

raid . The weather stayed warm into the 

!H'W yrar, however; and because il did alld 

military government was ahlc lo maintain 

:t 1,551)-C'alm ie mtinn, the Gt·rmans hrg;m 

to rcro\'cr tlwir -;pirit. The FrankfurlCI 

N 11 nds1. hau r'(·por·ted on "a milliner· who 

bathes in the kitd1en serially, a.o;, of course, 

tvcryone now docs." The r•cport cone hrdtd 

that several -:uch haths taken in various 

~tandi g, sitting, and reclining positions 

were in all n~'>pcct::: as effcc·tive as one "general'' hath.' ' The Rhei1t-Neckm· Zeitu11g 

gave its rcad('rs directions f()r' making hriquctt~-s out of industrial a<~h and cby, 

which when soaked in pitrh or tar could 

be lmmcd to give off "a noticeable amount 

of heat, approximately equivalent Lo not 

quite dry wood.'' The drawback was, the 

paper admitted, that the hriqueues did not 

lose volurr\c in I nrrning, sn the stove had 

10 he emptied after each charge. In Stull· 

gart, students in the audience threw liLLie 

potatoes at the actCJrs in Georg Buechner's 

lfl nyzeck. The theater manager said they 

n Hist Rp1, r.a~tl!rn ?-l ililary District, 15 Dec 

•15 I I J an •16. iu Ol\olG US 7fi :1/10. ( 2) Hi~t Rpt, 

Dct G- 34, Dec 15, in Ol\ICUS H 2/5. (3) lli ~1 

Rt)t, Det C 11, Dec ·15, in OMGUS !) 1/ 5. 

(·I) H ist Rp1, Det G- 26, Dcr ·l'i, in Ol\IGUS 

I 0 1/ !i. ( 5 l Annu .• l Hist Rpc, l>ct E-285, :10 J "" •Hi, iu OMGUS 77 - 1/ 10. 

"F10ilkfurttr illllldsciJ(II', 2·1 L>ec ·15. 

woukl han· thmwn rotten egg-s, but tht')' 

tliu not haH' ally.' '' 

In its most c:rucinl aspects, till' h.1lllc of 

tire winter never quilc maleri;,lii'.nl. 13ct'l\llst· tlw U.S. command insisted c111 hcntrd 

lrain<; for cold-weather transport or (,icrmam cxpdlcd from other countries, the expcrlcd flood of people from eastern Europe 

wns lwlcl to a trickle. T he: fil;)t lr<tinload 

frorH Hu11g:u'y did nm :11'rive until I() J <ttl\1-

ary, and Lhc first load from Czerho"lovHkia 

was ddaynl until UlC 25th ... "' D111 in~ January, USFET dischnrgcd nlmost a hundred 

1 hous;~ nd prisoners of war but, :11 Lhl: end 

of the month, having «ccurecl a!'suranccs 

the pri'loll<.'r.s would he adequaLcl)' t ;trt'd 

for, r't:'<umccl pl'isona of war lrano;fcrs to 

the Frenrh.:' ,\hove nil, the winter was 0 11e 

of the nl ldc l on re<:ord and the 1 /)50-

caloric rntion held firm. T he quality nf the 

l'ation cvctr improved somewhat after rye 

flour "" n low and hncl to he mixctl h;llf 

and half with wheal for baking lll'catl. 'l'ht' 

best ft:d Wt'I'C the DPs, who avcmgcd 2,600 

caloric~ a day, and the inlcrncd Nazis, who 

were g:wing 2,200. Both groups were somewhat o\·crwcight. The normal Genni\n ronsumcrs, who with hl:-\t k market purchases 

were thought to he actually getting about 

,~00 c·;dol'ics :1 da y, were undct•wt·ight by 

:l.<: much ns 20 percent nncl showing signs 

of malnutrition; however, thC)' wnc not 

in ~I( h bad shape as they would have heen· 

had th<· weather been colder. ln Berlin, 

where tltc food and fuel shortages bad bcc11 

expected co be the most severe, Lhc denth 

rate of children under one year dropped 

•• Rlt<'in·i\'t'r~(ll Zcituug, I Jnn ·15. 

"'Annual lll ~t Rpt, OMC, Ba,·ada, Refugee 

Scclion. 9 Jul ·IIi, in Ol\ICUS 65- 1/ 10. 

,, Hq~. USfiET, Commanclcrs's Weekly Sraff 

Confcrcnt'(' No. 6, :.!!1 j_.,, 16, in H ist n;,., Hqs, 

gTo, 'J7 USF9- 0.5. 
WI Ttm 

to 100 per I ,000 in Ocrcmhcr. It h.1d been 

(iGO ir1 July and 162 in December 944.-:~ 

Prohallly, the rise in the food t'<rlion was 

11Hlrc responsible than anything d sc fnr dispelling lilt• r('ar or what thC' winter would 

hrin ~. \.Vhat tht: avcmgc Gt:rnwn c.Jid not 

know wa ... that the inrrc<t"C liure no relationship to thc- fi<'!Wll adcquaq• of t ill' food 

supply in the zone. Suppli~ were obtained 

by drawing hcavil~· on U.S. in1ports and 

could only be sustained by continued and 

incrta<.:cd impt)rL'>. l' undanwntally the food 

itll :llion had grown worse:, not hr,Ucr·. B}t 

carl)' !vfnrch, the imported stock<; were depleted In the point where. used at the r•ntc 

required lo support a I ,550-caloric diet, 

they \VOirlcl barely last another sixty day._.~a 

IJP1, The Resurgent Pwhlem 

"'hen c:cncrnl Wood derl:ar·c!l the DP 

prohlnn sttllstanlially solved at the end of 

~c ptctnl>('l', Lhc Army expcrtr,d that the 

600,000 <Jr so DPs left in tht' U.S. zone 

would nl ~o he off its hands witltin the next 

fnv months. Snmr DPs, Poles r hie riy, 

would wnttt to retum home~ tlu: others, the.: 

.~rH •t llcd st.ttcle..<;s nonrepatri llk~. Halts, 

II~tn ga riau~, "omc Poles, m1tl some Jews, 

cou ld he turned over to UNRRA . . \sa rc-

~~~~ r)f ~rvc al trips to Warsaw ;tnd Prague, 

Wood hnd arranged to move as nttlll)' as 

6,000 Pole" n day b}' tmin across Czcc holovak ia to ~1 nd J,eginning on I OnolJer. 

Thr U.S. forces wonlcl sttppl)' the cars, 

lw omotiVf'!l, and coal a-. far as Pilsen, 

"' ( t I 1 ICJ$. USFET, Tht•atcr C.:o•nma11der's 

Weekly SI;~IT Conference No. t. HI Drc- l5, No. 

n, 12 Fd1 15, and No. 11, HI ~ch 15, in Hist 

Oi", ll 11~, tnO, 97- USF9-0.5. (2 ) JJ , tJSFET. 

Rpts :wd luf Br, Political lntrllig:tnrc Sumanary, 

15 Jau •II,, 111 OMGUS ·lla- 1/ :i, v!l7 10/ 1. 

"' llqs, USFET. Theater Comm~ndc·r's Weekly 

St:liT Confrrcnce No. 13, 19 Mar 4u, in Jlist Div, 

t lqs, ETO, <l7 - USr9- 0.5. 

where C~cd1 loromotivco; running 011 Poli..,h 

t·oal wmdd t;1kc· over ,md mnkf' the haul 

the r C!>l (I( the wny to the Polis h border·. 

Wood had ohsc·rved however, that there 

was " nll lovr o~ " I1N ween l he Czcr hs and 

the Polc:s. 'l'hl· C:zcrhs were nul happy to 

have Poks oll tiWit· terTitory CV('f1 trmporaril}' ; and till' Polic:h KOVCflllll('Jtt , whik 

propaga ndizi11g fm a quick rrtmn of all 

its citiZl'tl!', w:t' ac tllilll)' not rapahk llf tC· 

ceiving the number-; it claimed it wantrd. 

The fifly-scvrn trains that made the run 

in O ctolwr carric·d far lC!>.'i than 6,000 [Wtsons a d;ty, ;,nd at the end of the month 

the Czec ~ slopped the movemenl cnli•'t y 

herau~c Poland faikd In suppl y the coa l. ' 

The Polc.s wcrr nnt goin~ to he sent honte 

as fast ~ had hccn expected, nor wa ~ t hr 

.\rmy going- to br JC'Iieved of its responsibility rnr tlwm :mel llw other DP:- ~IS had :\l~o 

heen expected. When the UNRR.\ round] 

in London faikd to assume suppl), equip· 

mcnt. and t ransporlation ohligat ions for 

the DPs in O ctohrr n~ had been projected, 

the JCS clin·c·tcd USFET to ronlinnc its 

ovcr-<lll responsibility for them. ~:. 

The: Soviet Df>J.>, because of their speri:1l 

stntlls undrr the Yalta .\ gTeemenl, would 

have remain<'d .\IIH)' r.harges in ~my ra•w. 

In numhcr, they were <111 in.signifkanl minority; USFET al thr end of .\u,gust reported the l'<'pntri ttion of Soviet t·it i1.t11s 

99 percent mtnpktNI.~" Politically and ps}'-

chologira ll y, howc·vct·, they were almost <IS 

" ( I ) Wnr l>iaa•y, US Cp CC, PW &lJI' Div, 

29 Sep ~5. in O~ GUS :H4.81. {2) Memo, Tlq~. 

USFET, 1\CofS G l, Opns Br, sub: Rcvol't 011 

Progrcs.< of Polish Rqmlrialion fovc cn , I Nov 

45, in USFET SCS :HI:U. vol lf. 

" ( l ) Cable, llilltlainA to Smith, 5 On ~5, :md 

Ltr. illclrin~ to Smith, 26 No11 45, in USFP.T 

SCS :tH. (2 ) l.1r, Sec· of War to Sec of Statt·, 

16 D('c 15, ia1 OPD, ARC: :136, (sec VI), Cn~<·> 

155- ). 

"' f.COM, Offitf• of 1he Chief Historinn, Dis• 

placed Persons, p , 5ll. 
1 I J "I'IIE U.S .. \101\' J'\ l'l l h O CC 'l ' P\T IO:\ OF Ch R~L\:\Y 

nutclt a i>urciC'n ~ tlwy had l>c:cn wlwn 

tl~t.• it numbe-r" ran in lt} the million.,, \'irllrally l'Wrythin~ ahmll 1 hrtn wa:-; itt di~­

pttlt'. inc ludin~ h o\\ m;my til<' I c Wl'rc. 

f:i, <•n hnwc-r ,,,id tht'H' wc•t c about t:i,OlJU 

"~df-~t)'lcd Gkrainians:· 400 K:tlnwk«, :md 

1,000 fomH:r nwml >tTS of the CcrrliHI1 

force.;, none of who111 wanted to IH! J'('J)Hiriatc·d. Gen. :\. N. Davidov, r hid of the 

Sovkt rrpatriatinn roup, sctid lu: had un -

' oq·a Nl anotlwt 22,000 Soviet ritil.<'ll'\ in 

the U.S. zone living- ouL'iidc ramp.;.~; 

SFET itscH did no1 attempt to tra!'k 

down Soviet citizens jn the zone bttl c.litl 

c·hc<'k 1 hr persons wh01n the Soviet r-rp;llriHtion gt'<> up rl:timcd a nd cventuall~ put the 

lQtal a t just unc.lt'r 1fl,!IOO.:-

' I hr <·nd of tlw t1HtS.'I r<'pa t riation lu ltt 

USFET fa< e \Cl f:u e with the pos.-.ihility 

of having to usc force to send the remaining 

Russians hom<.:. ( :onsidct·ing wh;n prCJhahl y 

nw:titctl tltem 011 th e other side of tltc 

demarkation litw, u surprisingly lar'g<' number- even of tho.;c who hatl o;;c rvctl in the 

German forces-went. if uot checrfull}'. at 

lca .. t without owrt ismnce. No doubt, 

the preferential trcat!llent the Soviet govcrnml'lll secured f<w tll<'m al U.S. expense 

inOncnc;cd some. Prohahl)' the extensive 

.tuthol'itr the .\nwriran. allowed the Soviet 

repatriation offircr-.; to exercise also c-onvinced many rnorr tlt:tt rrsi<;tanr<' was ~t'­

lr~-;. USFET had uot ~rn nt d poli,<' powers 

HI the- Soviet omrl'I'S, however. The DPs 

wlto were left a(tcr :\ugusL \VCt'l' o~tl y 

those who had alre:td}' dcmonstr<tted thttl 

tlwy were not open to pcr.;uasion or ordin.m· intimidatinll. T he) !Jclie,·cd their fate 

'' J\·l erno, Hqs, t;SFI T. lJirector OMG, for 

C:ofS, suh : Release of SCIVlt·t Citizens, H Nov 

•15, iu USFET SCS :JU:I.I.i/ 11 . ~' Ill)~, USFET. 't'hcatt•r Commander'~ W1·ckly 

St:ltf <.:on(ercnce No. I, I U Dec 45, iu His! Div, 

ll c,~. lrl'O. 97-USII<J n .. 'i. 

in Sovit·t and~ would " be worse th:tn 

death, " and l·~ dl'c·bt·,,d tltn would rcsi...;t rqmtriation ''by .til nll'ath i11duding: 

:--uit ide." ... l'lw StJ\ id I'P~'''cntatin ~. Ei--cnhowca· informed the J CS, w<·n· ··most disturbed b)' the llituation and c !aimed '·thi.; 

headqu:trH' rs ~ violatin !.{ Ya li:t."''" .\ t the 

time, while enlisting So\'iet co-oprralion in 

tltc lttrl'(<"r ·~ fTait-:s of the orrupatiCJn still 

emcd po>i..,ihlc, resisting tlw Soviet drmantl)', to ltavl: a ll their people hack hr any 

mean~ w <L't as difficuh as rmnternpl:l.ling the 

human ron.,cquc·nrc<; 11f foi'C'rd I'C'patriation. 

Legall y tltc U.S. rom111and regarded itself 

as obliged to l'ct.u rn Lh<' Snvirt l'i l izens, and 

on politic·al ounds it did not sec how the 

C'\'Cntual usr of force c.ould hr avoided~ hut 

as men and -;olc.licrs, f.i~cn owcr and his 

nfficers foun<l the businco;.o; more than they 

could stotn:tt h. ivforco,·er, in the minor disturlmncc!\ tlrat had already ocTurrcd, U.S. 

troops had S)'mpathi zcd with lite demonstrator:;; a nd fnrced repatriation was likclr 

to provnkr downright rdusal.; to t~rry ou t 

order-s. 11 

On 9 .\ ugust, slightly antirip:tting the 

prohf('m, USFET had !<~ ucd ~ policy for 

for•r illle n:p:ttriation. All pcr:-ons who were 

or <•mtld he proven , before ho:trds of U.S. 

ffi rc ~, to I lt Soviet < itizcn-. were to he 

transfcn·cd to 'am~ under So\'irt admini!'>-

lrt~t . Iu the n tmps, Sovit•t offi,•ials would 

he rc.<iponsihk for P\ttlin.~ the repatriate" 

aboard trucks and lr:tins. Outside thr 

c.amps, the U .S. re~ would uHrd the 

transports. The extent to whid1 the troo ~ 

would he e~pcc tcd lo us(' forrc was left unclear as wac: tht time :11 whi< It tlw polic-y 

"' c;,,hlt·, I ~, lJSFET, F.iscnhow('r', to JCS, I 

Occ 5, '" US FI~' I SGS :IIJ:l.<i/ 11. 

"'Ibid. 

" Malr.ol111 J. Proudroot, Ewo/Jt'(l/1 Nef•rgces: 

1'139-11152 (f~vonston: rthwr lcru U11in~rsi ty 

Press, I '1511 ), Jl. 2 15. 
Wlf\TER 

would l1c put into action. In the first week 

of ScptcmlJer, IJcfore any DPs had been 

shipped under it, USFET suspended the 

poliry and l'eferred the whole question of 

forced rep<ttriation to the JCS. SC'ven th 

.\1'111 )' had asked how ntur h nrtual for<"e 

was to he used. The USFET policy had 

sttLlCd only tha t the U.S. troops would prevent riot!'i and guard the tran1;port!: and that 

milit ary government would al'!'cst nml 

transfe r to Soviet-administered camps person!'i whom the Soviet reprcsent ativ<'#" could 

prm•<· were their titizcns. USFET <1>'5 kecl the 

JCS to review the quc ti n of forced repatriation " in its entirety . , . since injuries 

and loss of life on both sides a re 

incvitallle. ~ 

The War Depanment had morro direct 

experience with the c:onsequen<·es of forced 

rcpaLriaLi()n Limn USfET did h11t was 

cqun ll y uncertain as to what course to take. 

In late 194·4, the . \rmy had discovered 

some .1,000 Sovic:t nationals among German prisoners of v.tnr in ramps in the 

United States.'"' Moscow had promptly 

charged that its citizens were being illegally 

imprisoned nnd dcliherntel)' mistrcnted in 

the Un ited Stales. Many of the prisoners, 

however, insisted thal re<>tOI'ing them to 

Soviet control was cq11ivnlcnt to a death 

'iCntence. Mindful of the probable eonsequrnc:rs for the men hut convin ced that 

the Unit ed States; should not give refuge 

to persons who mig ht he guilty of treason 

to nn ally, the .JCS had r11lcd in Dccemhet 

" ( I 1 llqs, US rET. ACofS G- 5. t<J CofS. sub: 

U•c of Force il\ Repa triation of Soviet CitiY.eJt$, 

:I t A11g 15, and Callie, USFE'I' to CG, Seventh 

Army, G Scp ·15, in USFET SCS 3!!3.6/1 1. 

(2) Cnhl<:, llq~, USFET, ACofS C- 5, 10 JCS, 

·I Scp 15, in USFET SCS 3:'i 7 /2, vol. II. 

_, Ml'mo, ACofS C- 1 for Dcp CofS, snl1: p:~ · 

tri:tlion of C:crman Pl'isoucrs of Wnr of Soviet 

Natior101lily. 2 1 Dec •H, in Army C- 1, 31l3.(i, sec. 

b. 

1944 th:n all prisoners of war in the United 

SLa te~ who claimed Soviet citizenship 

should he ret umed em request of the Soviet 

authorities "whether they wanl to go or 

not."''' For a time those who did not claim 

:::iovict ritizcnship were tWL affected, but 

Clfl er Yalta ;tn effort was made to ~e nd bad:. 

a ll who \VCre known to he Soviet citizens. 

By June 194·5, all prisoner-; had been rcpatri:tted exc-ept I 54· men who bad delayed 

their d-eparture by protests and appeals. 

Tlwy were being bcld nL Fort Dix) New 

.JcrSC)'· On 20 J unc, knowing they would 

soon he p11 1 ahonrcl ship, they barricaded 

themselves in their l>:m·ar ks. Three commilled suiddc. The others, being dl'iven ou t 

of the barracks with tear gas, all'a<'kccl the 

guards with mess kit knives and with du!Js; 

11ine prisoners :tnd three U .S. soldiers were 

injured.:'" The Ru~s ans were finally put 

aboard ship for Germany at the end of 

August, hut hy then over a hundred more 

who had rom:ealed their nationality thus 

far had l1een identified in prisoner of war 

1'amps in the United Statcs.sr. Concerning 

what to do alJout these prisoner.> and about 

thr USFET reque.c;t for a r11ling on forced 

repatriation in Germany, the SWNCC, 

whiC'h had to m<~ke the decision, wns divided. l'vfcCior, the chief War Department 

mcmhcr, believed " tha t somr.lhing ought 

to he done to mnk<: den t· that U.S. troops 

will no longer IJc used to repatriate hy force 

all Soviet citizens." Other members, how-

~· mo, ACofS G-- 1 for Den CofS, suh: Repa1 ri ation of (:crman Prisonr rR of W :1.r of Soviet 

Na tionality, 27 Dct: •t•l , in Army C- 1, 38:J.6, sec. 

(l. 

" Rad uog ram . W :tr D ept, to CC, U.S. Milita ry 

Mission Moscow, suh: Fort Dix 1 rH.:ident, 11 J ul 

·15, in Arnt)' AC:, 091.7 13 ( I ). 

•·• Memo, C::- 1 for (icn Handy, 3 1 Aug 45, and 

Memo, Actg PMG for ACofS C-1, s11h: Prisoners 

of Wnr of Russian 01'igin, ll Oct •15, in Army 

C I, :1!13.6, sec. h, pt. 2. 
TilE l l.:-i. \l~i\IY l~ TI-lE O(.C:UP:\TIO:'\ OF GElU I,\ NY 

,.,.,.,., k it th.d the Yalta ~H·cmcut 1omp!'lk<i for1 1•d H'p:ttriation.' · 

Still awaitittg a dc('i<:ion 011 1 Oetnbcr, 

l·:il'cnhowcl· report ed th:tl "for bumaniIH t•iau reaso ~ and brcausc l)f danger to t ltc 

troop._·· no So\'i4.'l dtiz<·ns had been rcpatl'iau·d ll\ forrc. ·•tf thC' clcci~ n i~ made," 

lw .tdcicd, "to fnr('ihl y tl'illlsfcr, there undoul•tcdl)' will ill' ca wtltic~ :mel perhaps 

lo$s of lift• anwng our troops. We do n•ll 

favor the tt!'o4.' of for• c IHII prefer to have 

llwsc people considered non-rcpatriahlc 

and a rran~t· (or t hci ,. prnr cithlr rc.sculctncm in utllct' ,trca.-:;.'':1' VVhcn Davidov, in 

mid-O rtohcr, submitted as a u·st case a dc·-

mand tlwr K. G. 1\:onopl'lko, n displared 

p<'r1iOil whu had signed a deposition .<:t:'lling 

he did nut wi h to he r<·patriatcd, he relurncd to tht' Soviet Union •mdcr the terms 

of Yalta. USFET placed Konopt•lko 

"ll nd<'r' pmtcctivc and bc·ncvolcnt an'l''lt" 

:111d :-~~ked the J CS for a dc'C' n on him " 

13eforr the JCS decided the question of 

the Soviet OPs, .111othcr l'omplctcl)' un<~n

ti ip tted ~sue aros('. Gcncr·:tl Wood noticed 

the fir~t ,c:;ig n of it whih· he was in Prague 

in Scptcmhcr. The C:t.edl!> tuld him thnt 

lnrge numbers of DPs wrre coming into 

C:t.cr.hoslnv:tkia from Poland. The Czcr hs 

did not want them and did not feed them 

but neither did they try to keep tbcm out 

herau"c if they did the DPs "would he 

killed at the horder."--HI That the DP,c:; 

" Memo for record, t\CofS C:- 1, sub; SWNCC 

,lli/4/ D :111!1 Dr:~ft Report Qtl Snmc by SWNCO 

S11hcommillc1' (or Emopc, 1·1 So.>p ·k, in Army 

G- 1, 38:3.6. 5C(' 6. 

" Cnhlr, llq~. USFET, Eisenhower, to JCS, I 

Ort 15. iu USPF.'I SCS :uJ:I.6/ II. 

"' ( I ) M1•uw, llqs, USFET, Director OMO, for 

ClofS, suh : Rrpntri:.tion of Sovi('l Citizerl K. C. 

Konopelko I U Oct -1>5, in US T SGS 383.6/ It. 

( 2 ) Cable, CC, USFET. tu the War DeJ>I, 19 

Oct ·15, in CCS 38:l ti (7 H ), sec. 6. 

,. Memo, US r.p CC, PW & DP Div, for CG, 

·us Cp CC:, ~uh : Report of Ncgotiatiolls, H - 15 

Scr 45, in OMC US !.1 14.f11. 

themsclvc$ did not w:lnt to stay in Ci'.Cdto-

.slovakia hccame apparent during the· <.U<-

reeding weeks. By November 300 to 4,00 

DP~ a day were coming into the U.S. zone 

and allot her 150 to 250 a cl:\y wert• entering the U.S. ~er • in Rcrlin. Some were 

Poles who had hcen repatriated and were 

coming ba• k, !iometimes bringing friends 

and relatives witJ1 thrm. The great majority 

were Polish J ews. On 15 November, Third 

.\ rmr ha d !Ci,OOO J ews rcgister<'d in its 

('amp<> and Jewish crntcrs; hy the fourth 

week of Dcn·mher it had 26,000 rr t< rtd 

hut' did not know how rnany more hnd 

comc in :tnd nol rel{isten'd. !\I the ral<: of 

influx in 1ovcmhcr :md OC'rC'mher, 

U. FET <'Xpt·cted tlw zone's total .JcwiRh 

pupulntion (of all nationalities) . whir.h had 

llecu ah<>lll ~5,000, to n'a<:h 100,000 hc:forr 

1 he end nf winter." 

Suddenly the DP pt·ohkm, ,,,hirh had 

seemed to hr dimini:\hin ~, was win~ in 

its most trouhlc.c;omc aspert, the ratcgory 

of nonrq.>n tr iaiJles. How many would rome 

wa~ impossible to guess, b\ll USli'ET 

cxpcctC'd the U.S. reputation " for humanitarian hc u(·vulenrc" to nurnct large munhers. •= What made thr proportion. of the 

new DP Wi\vc mosl diffi('\llt to gauge was 

1 hat the: pc()p(c in il were not Yiclims of 

nazi.sm but rdugce.<i from the postwar politil nl s>SIC'mc; of castcm Europe. ,\ USFET 

cahk info rmed the War Department th:u 

they wc!'c ' 'persons who arc or mny daim 

to be pcrser uled her:Htsc of race, religion, 

or politic.-. and those seeking less severe cronomir ronditions a-; well a.c; those desiring 

a politieal-cconomi( climate conducive to 

private cntrrprisc." Arecpting them <1S DPs 

'" Mc111 u, CG, Third Army, (or CC, USFET, 

suh: Gnr(' nut! Administrntion of Jewish OPs, 27 

Dec 45, 1111d Memo, O~ C (Zone) (or SGS. 

USFET, 5 D cr +5, in USFET SGS 381.7/ 1. 

''Callie. USFET to War Dept, I I Dec 45, in 

USFET SC':S :183.7/ l. 
\\'T-KTER 

un tile same rm~ ar- tlt{' victims of ttll)(ism, 

the c-able added, tht·ca\cnecl lo " rai-;t: deli-

< .llr illl<'rna I ion;ll CJ uC.'il ions."' ~ 

The Jews nrow«·d pnrticulat• concern, hrrat tsr of their !;11-gc.: lllllltilcrs :m<l hct·a iiSl' 

c:xistinl{ U.S. policy !tralllcd rxc<·ptionnl 

lrTalnlCnl to J ews. In lite wake of the ll.trt•ison report, tlw War Department hnd a ppointt>d judge Simou H. Rifkincl as 

USFET ;H..I\'iscr 0 11 cwi~b affairs. On his 

.tdvi( <' .tnd that of U.S. labor 11niou and 

J ewish J oint Dio;t r•illuting Cnmmitt <-c tq)r<'-

~<t~ nlativcs nnd in response LO newspaper 

ami go\'crnmcnta l op inion, USFET w;ts 

providing the Jc\vs with rations and acromniOdations that wc.·rc superior lo tltDsc a('-

' ordcd 1 he mht·t DPs nne! had lwgu11 n 

tr:\ining nnd reha bilitation program for 

whidt it was impo tting lC.X'thooks and instt'lH"tors by ni t• fr()m Palestine. However. 

what USFET I'Ould clo for its ot•iginal 

J<•wish DP rontin cnt, Smith told Hillclring 

on 22 November, il did not hclievc it rould 

do fc:w three or folll' times as m:lny. He 

t•xplaincd: 

Six weeks ago . . ow· pi'Ospe<·t.s for rop· 

in~ with till' .Jc:·wish pmlJiem secuwtl Vl'l')' 

lmj:tht. VVe ksww hoi\ many tndigetlous .Jews we• l1 ad. We lwd, ns Rifkind puis it, c·usltplc:tcd the •·escuc phase and were embarking 

cHI what he ralll"d the "domici liary stng<'," 

durin!{ ,,•hich on his rec-ommendation wt' 

pbmwd to in u1 111 att> n ra ther amhitious 

progmm of mora l and vocational tminiu/{ to 

l'quip these penplc• for life in Palestitll' nr c•lsc· 

wherc .. .. This cxtreded our directives but 

lwra use of prcSSIII'C's at hontc, we thoug ht it 

ought to be done:·. 

ndt>r the prr~cnl ronditions we an• doi ng 

tht• bcsl we t·an lo pt'O\ ide additional dres 

aud supplies. 

l n the mt'antimc. )'OU can expect more 

trouble from tht> prrss, since conditions are 

rmTing US b<1ck tO the r CSCUC phase. I I 

II Ibid. 

"Ltr, Smith 10 ll lldriu~. 22 Nov t.'i, in USFET 

SGS :183.7/ 1. 

·11 7 

judgr Rifkincl, tt n<·th<> t· ~s, W:l!oi quite frank 

about wantiug to l rea te n refuge for nil 

Europe:·'"' Jews in Gcnnany " ln t'C-'ll'liC lhr 

rrmn:\llts of a race:' Hr maimained that 

"J ews would merely h<' -; tagcc.J in the U.S. 

zone fo•· nwvcmcnt lo Pa lc-.t inc or elsewhere''; hut other J cwi:slt reprcsentati\'c.:;, 

some of whom talked aho\11' rstahlishing n 

pcrrn nllcnt J ewish cnrlavt• in Bavaria, predicted that the staging pl'd<J<I wo nltl last 

thrcr to fi vt> rears, and Smith d<mllH·d 

whether Jll:lrl) J ew:; c.xt't•pt the young 

would want to go to Palcstirw at ll. ·~ 

The simplest l'olution to th(' problem of 

the new OP wavc- llwug'h po~s ih y not 

practict~l W ll'l to cnforrr Military Government L:tw No. I Gl. which prnhihitcd r i\'ili:tns rrnm HO~~iug the border!, of the U.S. 

zone without military govcnm1ctH permission. In Ocrcmher, USFE'l' proposed to 

< losr the border when chose who hacl infiltratctl nnd the Gcrm:tns expelled from 

eastern Europe under thr ot.~cla m . \ grrrmcnt raised the zone's populntion to 

16,650,000- or hy ahoul a million. But tlw 

idea armrscd rni.~givings in Frankfurt and 

in Wnsh ingtou, as Hilldring indicated 

when he wr'Ol<' to Smilh: 

f 0 gc:m•ral the a ttitudr j~ th711 VOII 411't' right 

in your position that th<' .S. t\nuy now has 

no obligation to furnish snft· h;l\'en to nnr 

per1>011 who is not the ,-ictilll of Xa1.i persecution. How<'vcr, there is :1lso ngrrenwnt " 'ith 

you that the U.S. Annr should not refuse to 

oiTer sa fe hnvc-n to persecutcl's simply ber.ausl' 

lheil' pcrserution has been at tlk hands of 

other th11n Nnzi opprt>ssors. "' 

Smith ~aid i~ chief dc irc was to get the 

Army " out of being a nur~cma id on a gi-

,( 1) f bid. (2) Coble, USFiri' to War D ept, 

~ Dec ·15, nnd l.tr, Truscoll 10 Smith, 2·1 Nov 

15, in USfE'I" SCS 383.7/ 1. 

"Cnhlc, llilldring to Smith, 7 Dec •15, iu 

USFET SGS 383.7/ 1. 
418 TH J: U.~ . . \JUJY I~ I HI~ 0(.( :UP.\'J 10~ OF <.;£R~I.\~Y 

gantir s, ak''; hi); hope ts that Lhc 

UNRR.\ organizatiou rould he improvt'd 

"tc> where it ran "~"' 'm e cntil·c r<-.spun;;illilit} for the DP:-..'· lie adckd, " l am rcall)' 

\ 'CI') ulu<·h worried . . . . \\'c arc going to 

need help from the \Vnr Department.''" 

Hilldring agreed to pte-sent the nwllcr to 

the State Deparll.lCill with :1 tcqucsL for 

''a brondcr· policy" and for rt civilian 

agt'tH')' lo t;tl..c m c·r· thc D P pr·ohlcnt." 

The W.tr D~..pnrlment rcqur};t wrnt to 

the Stale Dcpartntrllt on Hl Dccerni1Cr and 

the· nn~wcr r:1me hnc·k, wilh \Vhat tumcd 

out 10 l>c clismnying speed, on tlac 22d in 

tltc fMm d a prcsidmtial directive urdcring 

the State Dcpartlllcnl to t•-;tahlish consulates at 01' llt'ar I)P camps and to begin 

issu ing visas for emigration to the United 

States. T hl· spirit of the tlircctivr w:ts humanitarillu; its ciTe< I in Hcadquaners, 

USFET, was just hort of tlcvastating. On 

C..:hri!\tm:ts day, Crncrnl ~l r. Narncy, recentl y appoin ted Commanding Ccnetal, 

USFET, cabled: -au 

Expect :mnounrenltlll \\'ill abruptly halt 

p••cs~: nl I'C(Jatriation wm·<'luenll'. Present 

holdings 515,000. Pro:.pech are 350.000 will 

bt: n•patriatcd by 1 Julr 19 )(). If thc~sc 1enm 

or prospects ror goi ~ lo ll.S., it is strongly 

brlit•,·ed tl•rv will not ac<'<'JH l'epatriation. 

Largely as re~ult o( unnuthorized entry. 

population of DPs hns been increasing about 

I 0,000 pe1· month. 1\nnoulwt••nt·nt of cmigrntion will greatly inncasc thi~. 

Recommend announccutt•nt be delayed six 

months. r.o 

" LIT, Smith to l[itldring, 22 Nuv ·15, in 

USFl·:T SCS :Hl!\.7/ l. 

"C;~blc, Hitldrin~ 111 Sitlilh, 7 Der •f5, in 

USl-'P.T SCS :IIIV/ 1. 

"Eisenhower l<:ft tlw thcntcr on 11 Novembtlr 

II> lwcorne Artny C:ltlc! or StarT, and MrNarn('y 

a~~umcd command on 26 No,·emllcr. 

• Prt'.sident'! Dircctiw n11 g migrntion from 

Europe, 22 Occ <15. ;utcl <.:ahlc, McNarncy 1('. 

WARCOS, 25 Dec 1, in USPF.T SGS 04-0. 

Th1· War lkpartmcnt reply read, •· rc.~iuential directive has been issued 22 De em~ 

bcr and pn:ss announccml:nl made.'' '

1 

The Prc'lidcnt said he was acting to r<'-

lic' c human misery and to s<:t au example 

for· the oth,:r c·ountric.:s th:1t wc:rc· ahlc lo 

rcl'civc DPs. He was limjtcd, IJowc' rr, h> 

1 he immigration CJli Ol<~"• whi('h fi:..td the 

number of people atlmittetl w the United 

State-; in OJH' rear at :w,ooo, al a rntc of 

only I 0 pc•·ccnt of tlu: quout per month. ~u 

AltiHntglt the immigraLion progrant was 

not dTcrti\'c to make a perceptible dt•nl in 

US FET's DP population, cspcciall) inn~ 

the qunt<~ll. fw· the eastern opcan cuuntric.-; from which mQ-;t DPs nunc hare!~ 

tot:-~1<-d :~. 000, ndtht:r' did it attrac-t tlw 

flood of DJ>s UcNamcy had fearctl. During t hf' stH.'c·ct·ding months, as USFF.T rontinned its rcpalriatlou progmm, sonlt: DPs 

inlihratcd arross thr bord('n;. Bclw<·rn l 

January ~a nd 30 J une 1946, lhc popuhttiou 

of <·a r11ps ~nd centers innea!icd from 

:10!1,4 26 to :368,41 0, hiLt the total of registered DPs, which included tho~;c living oulsidr. camps, was down slightly lf) 483 ,00() 

on 30 .fune.r.3 The War Dt·partrncnt did 

.. Cnhlc, W ur l)ept to USFBT, :m Dec 45, iu 

USFgT SGS 040. 

"The Dcpnrnnenl of State 8ulleliu, 2.'l Det· 

45, Jl. 961. 

" Tht• DP populmion in the U.S. zone did not 

change sig-nifirntllly d111'lng tlu: next two years. 

On 30 June 19·18, tht• I>OI!UI:ttion wa~ 501,267. 

After I J••ly 194!1, " 'lt('n the Displaced Persons 

AcL or 19.JII '""111 into llfTt~ct wilh rxpandcd quotas 

for t•migrot tion to tht~ U nitcd States (<tnil mass 

('rnigr:uion to the new stale of (srnel became possi· 

hie) , thr DP vopulation dro1mcd hy almost on~ 

half in one year nnd tlwrcafter clt·rlincd to 18:1,000 

hy I May I ()SO, whf'tl USFgT's succc~sor, tho· 

Eui'OJ'can Command, tr:~nsfcrrcd tlte responsibility 

for OP~ to the U.S. H igh Conu11issioncr for Gcr--

mauy. ( I ) Jl ql>, USF£1', T lto:Hor Commnudcr'• 

ct~kly Stalf Confl'n:nr.c No. 28, 2 Jul 115, in 

Hist n;,., Hc15, ETO, 97- USF!J 0.5. (2 ) F.UCOM, 

Offin: of tile Chief lli$lOrian, Displaced flersoa<, 

r- 1111, (:q J"rrdrikscn, 7'/t e American Mi/itar)' 

Occupation of Germm1y, 1945- 195.1, p. 71)(. 
not rctum again to its proposal for putting 

the DPs under a civilian agency. 

The decision whether or not to forcihly 

repatriate Soviet citizens had meanwhile 

c.~ Lcd with Washington from September 

lO Dcccmi>c•·· In late Ortohcr, nfter Eisenh()wcr asked for <tn answer, the response 

from '~'as hin ton read, " ln view of the 

dclicncy of the general situation it has not 

been pos.<>ihle yet 10 reply to the 4 Scptemlwr t ahlr, a lthough it has hc<'n the subject 

of continued consideration at high level.''·" 

•• Cable, 1\GWi\R, Hull, to Smith, 25 Oct 4-5, 

:uu.l Cahlt·, Eisenhower to JCS, I!J Oct 5, in 

USf£!.1' SGS 38:i.6/11. 

•II !t 

On 15 Novt•mbcr, on demands from Davidov, USFET prohibited the emplopnctll 

of Soviet dtit.cns in German fac-toriel\ or 

on f;,rms ami ordered that Soviet citizens 

be denied t'i\rC after 1 December in 

any but Sovicl-administered DP Cilmps. 

USFET had previously dismis.')ed Soviet 

DPs from .\t'my cmployment.r.r. 

On 20 De-cember, a directive from the 

S\VNCC: established the policy on force-d 

repatriation. It instnwtcd USFET to rep<'-

,. ( I ) Mc·mo. I q~. USFET , Director to OMC. 

for CofS, suh: RcJcose of Soviet Citizens subject 

to Rcpatriotion, ~ Nov 45, in USFET SCS 

383.6/ 11. (2) USflf.T, Summary of Decisions, 15 

Nov ~5 , in USF€T SCS 016/1., vol. 1 
1:.?0 '1'1 11 : U.S. \R~IY I;\ THE OCCU P.\'1'10:\ OF CiER~L\ Y 

tri::tl' '\dthmH :·rg.t•d to tlwir pct,on:d 

"isl ll':-. wrd ~~~ fonr if cn -;~al ) .. ~o s 

,,·ho '' t'l't· Sn\'if't • iti1.c•n.-. on I September 

I !l:l9 and wt•n: 1 ••JJlllrcd in German lllri1 orm:-., "c·r r llH'tltl H' ~ of t h<' So\'ict . \rnwd 

Forces on or aft ·r 2~ J unc 1 ~ 1 ;tnd were 

not di!i clrar~c , or CClllld hr dt:monslratr.cl 

''in c;u h ra.;c with rc~t.~o hlc pnrtirul:rrit) ·• to h<t\'C "vohmtaril)l t'l·ndcred aid 

and romfort to th<' enemy." ln all other 

l'a.<;cs US FET was to tnakt' rvr.r')' cA'Mt to 

a~<;u c volumat)' tt'turn to the Soviet Union 

hut was " not amhorizcd to compel involnntary repatriation. ""'1 

For mo t of tlw Soviet DPs- thost: who 

had not IH'cn Gl·nnan prisoners <> f war·, 

served iu the Gc·rmnn forces, or been collnhoralors the S\VNCC directive ended 

lhl' thl'l'!lt or forr.rcl repatriation. It prob-

;d>ly did the ~a mc for those whom the 

Sovicl rcprrscntative: had c·hargcd with 

c·ollahor:Hion, sincr lht· dircC't ivc specificnlly 

cxcludctl c111ploynwnt in GcrrHan industry 

ur agl'in tlttrre a!> evidence of c:ollahoration .~• On USFET instructions. those 

d1argcd as rollnhnrators wcl'e to hf· held 

in U.S. C'll!<lody ami given hearings IJdorc 

hoard!> of U.S. olTkcrs. If the Soviet 

rhargN w<'r't> not ptOvcn the DPs were to 

he '·returned to th(~ origina l !oration of npprchctl icm l>y ,\ mrrir an tmops and resume 

their pt·<·viom; status."'·~ On :I I Dcrembct', 

,.. Cabic, .JCS lo USFF.'I . :.10 Ur:c l~1. in US T 

SGS :lfl:l.h/5, vol. I , 

"'Tbl! SWNCC npparcntl>• did nol give :l 

scpnrn11• t•c·i~ion in the Konopelko rnsc, but tlw 

Rnssi;ul :111d ulhers like him were covered in the di· 

rcc:tivc which al~o ~rwrifir d thar O(Jf'll rcsiMancc: to 

rt'J)atrindou 'hootld IWI 1,,. cou,trucJ !:\~ evidc11I'C 

of ;s pt•non' ' ha in~ gil'l!ll aid nnd comfort to 

the c•wmy. USFET lucl prr,·iously rrported thnr 

Konopclku had l)OI IJt'r•n a mcmher of the Soviet 

or Cem1an forces. C;~h e, Smirh tn H ull, 26 O (t 

·15, iu USFF.T SCS :U!:l.li/11. 

'' J.rr, Hqs., USFF.1 • to CC, Third Army, ub : 

R epatriation of Soviet Citizens, 'I Jan 46, in 

USFET, i~t Dh·. U I IOfiR/69. 

USFET suspr.ndC'd it' rarlit·t ord<'r dt n~ ing 

Sovit•l DPs l':lre iu otlrcr tim•· Sov ~ 

administered cmnps.G0 

Finally, most of tbc Soviet dtib n~ artd 

po~ihly all, f(•tc·ibly rcp<ttri<lltd from Gcr·-

man)' by U.S. troops npp<•ar· tn have: h<:cn 

uteu who had hccn captw u l in Gcnn;r n 

uniform. On HI J nnua11 • !t4(, a detail of 

Third <\rmy troop., men and officers far 

from pkased with their assignmc111 

undertook to put ~!l~l former Soviet soklicr:; 

aboard fl train at Oachau. T he Rltssiarls 

refuseu to leave their quarter-: and, aftrr 

tear gas W a5; used to force them out, 51 wcr·c 

founcJ to have hangccJ themselves, 2 hnd 

stahhn l them ·elves to death, and 20 other" 

had lO he hospitalized for ~cl f-in(lirtcd 

wounds. Of the 368 Russians eventually put 

aboard 1bc Lrain, 11 were f•:>und at tltr last 

minute not to be Soviet citizens ~md six 

escaped en rou te. I n a dismal final sr<·n ~ 

in the SovicL zone, Russian soldiers thl'<'alenc<.l tel shoot the Amerir'an guards if tltcy 

attempted to lcavt· tbc train. Hoping to 

avoid anolher sur h erie~ of event-;, Third 

:\rmy pCJsLponcd f11rther shipments while 

it reworked its prcwcdurcs and awa it1•d tht~ 

results or appeals from lhc Ru!\."ian Onhn· 

dox dcrgr to th<' President and the pe.~" 

Third Army re!;umcd forced repalrintion 

on 24 February whC'n its troops put I ,5fl0 

Russians captured in German unifomt 

abonrd trains at PrLc;oncr or War Endosurc 

431 ncar Plattliug, Bavaria. Five 0f tiH· 

R11~sia s eommillcd suicide nnd othC'r.s attempted it. After that shipmcm, 1,1130 men 

whcu n hmh U1c Sovicl and U.S. autltCH·itiC'> 

"' lf ~. USFET, Surnmury of lkcision, :J I Dl'l' 

·t.'i. in usnrr scs Ot!i/ 1, ,·ol. 1. 

"' ( I ) Fon.•ig11 Ro·lntion$, 11H(I, vol. V, p. Ill f. 

(2) H<t'· 'l1lird Army. AC, to Dhtribution, ~uh: 

ProrNiurl' for Repntrinrion of ur..~ian Nntionnls, 

22 ] :111 ·16, in USFtn, Hist Div, U- 11 0GB/6fl. 

(!!) Opu~ Rpt, Third Army, CofS Set:, I. ]a11 3 1 

Mar. in F.UCOM, P- t 20, 66-!.m, 
\\I'\ I'ER 

1 on-.idt l cd potentia II) cli!{ihl\' Cot forced 

rt•pa t• i,,liotl rrnmined in Cll'ilOd ) in the 

U.S. w tw. In .\pril USFET rrvicwl•d tiH~ 

tt<~t' ). and rcdurcd the numlwr of Ru~sian~ 

it rTgill'<kd :'" rli ihl c to 7tJ4. 'l'hil'd .\ rnl)' 

mu\ c·u om 222 of these nwn on ~ 1\J a y. 

Tht· ' '''t "\'II' o;uhscq ucntly judgrd inC'Ii

hk .1nd '' ere clca~ed. ' 

T/11• .l rmy in Diwrrfly 

Thr•t•r cl.1ys hdore he dcpar tt·cl to .1 s.~u c 

hi!ot appnintmcnt as Arm)' Chid of Swn·, Eist•llhnwt'l' had to tell the lt'onps that the 

I'(IIIChH t of a "relatively sm.\11 mi11ority" 

~ tht'lll tmtld give the U.S. c~ "a 

hacl II'JHIIalion that will ,,, k(' unr rountry 

,, on~ lllnc to ovcn·omc.' ' l ie < itcd re< klc!" 

cit iv in~. pm11 unifom1 disdplitw, .uuJ low 

~t. ud .. Clf military and rivili.lll < out'lC")' 

,,., the t hid :< hm troming,,'·• Tw() '"cckc; 

latct', S1•wnth \nn {~ C:JC ~t tt d, "The 

gt•ncral opinion of the Ucrmans is thal 

,\nHTi can soldiers arc men ~,!Jw clrink to 

\'Xcc-.;s; have no respect for the uniform 

liH')' wrar; arc prone l o rowd yism and to 

hc.1t dvili.ms with no r<'g.,rcl for h111nan 

dghh: ;utd henefit thcmsclvl'o; th10ugh the 

hl.u k tn rl.. ct.'''" While f.i.,cnhowcr '"a" 11 0 

•• C:XIII, C:enl!rnl Refe rence Rr , 'I hr Exch.mgc 

W11h thl' Sm ll'l Forces of ihcr<~teu e~onnei

Wmld W,1 r II, unda ted, irr (!Mil fill:. In April, 

US ~ I h:~d :\pparcnlly used thr•cr c ri1rrin, 1he 

••lght tu hl1Ur nr111s, thl: right to vote In frt••• clccdt ~, nnd till' righ t to hold puhlk ()Hict:, '" tests 

o! Sovit·t l itiv.rnship and had drc la rnl I hose mrn 

"h() did nul po"r~~ one or rnorr of the rights 

11•>1 Ill h.\\r hccn Sovie t cititl'n' A 11'1(111!\t fur 

<~ Wnr Drt)artml'nt opinion on thr e~t.t hl y uf llw 

Into brought a nt'gati\r l't'Jily hut not until 7 

fum: l'llh St•c Furtign RtlolrOIIJ, / 1116, \OJ V, 

I'll 151 'it) .urd 170. 

• J.lr, F.•"·nhO\n•r to All Un11 (~rr unnn cr., ~nh· 

Couduu. II No'' .J5, in USFF.T SC:S 25111. 

... I 11, ~, Srventh Am1y, ACofS C. 2, Wr,•kly lntclligt•nu• SunllnM·y, 2 1 Nov •15, in Scvcnlh Army, 

1\pl of Opns, Annex No. 2. 

douhl i~hl th.11 the troops in,·oh·ctl ' "et c 

a minm it)', reports from Seventh .\1"111) 

ere a nd othn· invc.'l ti ati ~ shown l thr 

natu re of lH~ misroncluctto he more crious 

than he implil·d. 1\ftt' r V- J Day, what ap· 

pearcd t o he :dlllll't .1n epidemic of unpt·ovokcd attacks on German ci,•ilian-; t\ml 

robberies hy U.S. M)ldicrs had spread .tc ~-. 

the zom·. The SnallKa• t polic <" 1 <'ttm.led 

fourteen :H I'- of unprO\'Oked viokt\1 \' 

against ( ivilia n., in the l.tst week of October. Du1 ing one night in Lnntlkrl'is E -;t h· 

wcgc in the Wn\lc'lll Military Distrirt, fivr 

drunken soldiers lwat a loral German otncial, ;u1.d IIIHJihc r> c-ivilinn had his jHW 

broken wlwn hl' tried lo reason with .1 soldier mo lc .. ting a woman. In one "lllall 

to'' n, Bohliugc•n, '' ithin fi"e day" in No-

\'Cmhcr SCJ lcli ct~ heat up L wo i" li ~ ll'-, 1 ri<.'tl 

to stah a nntltt.'r, ln•okr window!'., tr it d w 

steal tl ug~, .111cl robbed four t j, ili.ms of 

watdtcs and nHmry."' T he Offirc nf Military Covcl'tlnH'nt for Bavaria clcsc·rihcci the 

death or n Ccnnnn hoy in a hunting a<·c idcnt involving !'IO dic ~ as "a result of S\H h 

careJC"-'>11<'"" a-; to he nlmosl criminal." Ill 

Landkrl'i1 But ~CII , nlso in Bavaria. thr<'c 

soldiers hunting illegally shot and killed a ll 

18 year-nld irl . a nd in the same 1\rcit the 

t·hief of pc,Jit <' told investigator<; that c;olctie rs d emptied several dips of ammunition at him a t vnriou-; times. o:o Nearly nil 

in('idcnts involved liquM or women, often 

both. The pop\d:tt ion of vagranl w<HHt' l1 

which t IH' i\1'111 )' inadvertently HTCa ~cd 

arter No vetnhCI '""l'll it released pcnirillin 

for treating venereal diseases in German 

women, thcrch)• .,hortcning for soml' the 

''turn at nuncl time'' from jail ot ho<:pit.ll 

a nd .ll ~ othcrc; who had hccn deterred ~ the fra t or infcction- wao; ohl'll 

"' Ibid. "' Hist Rpl, l!:o»tcru Militnry District, 15 St•p 11 

Or t ·15, in OMC: US 71l '1/ 10. 
422 T H F. U.S. AR~ Y I T THf: OCC:UP,\TION OF Crm~l \t'\Y 

~~t the root of soldier attacks on German 

officials and police. By Decemhet·, these atLacks had grown so ulanningl)' frequent 

lhal Trusrotl had to issue wlml the Office 

of 1\1ilitar)' Government for Bavaria railed 

"a public pl<'a" for troop co-operation with 

Lhe U.S.-<~ppointcd German ofTirinls. 11'

1 

Mislwhnvior was not confined cxdu<>ively 

to the euli:-;tcd ranks. In one instance an 

Amcri<:nn officer took an Austl'ian girl from 

Linz w Stullgat'l, raped her three times, 

and then trauspOt't~~d her to Ulm, whct•c: 

he turned her over to the military polirc 

on a f'hnrge of havi11g impropet· papcr.;.nr 

The troop inciclc·nts seemed to l>c nssCldated. ou the one lwnd, with the urge of 

some soldiers who knew they were soon 

going to he redcplo)'cd and dLo;;charged to 

have a lnst (ling and, on the other hand, 

with the inexperience and inadequate 

training or the lowsrore men, who were f:l.st 

becoming the mujorit)' in the occ-upation 

force. What went unnoticed, or at least un -

mcnrioncd1 was the· coincidence of the rise 

in troop incident~ with the hardening of 

oflkial nttitttde$ tow~trd the Get•mans that 

accompainccl the Patton affair. One of 

General T ruscon'-; fi t'Sl arL<; as Commanding General, Third . \ rmy, was to order all 

his subordinate commanders l<l schctl ule 

frequent instruction periods for their units 

to countcrac·t th<: tendency of the soldiers, 

in his virw, to lose· sight ''uf the reasons 

for whidJ wr fo11g-ltt the war' ' and to IJec·omc "tlWl'C and tn()rc sympathctir towal'd 

the Cct•tnan peop.lr."''' While Truscott was 

only tr)ing to i11rukate in the troops a more 

"" ( I ) Ibid. (2) ll i~t R1>t. Del C •II, Dec •l!'l, 

i11 OMC1US <1- 1/5. 

"" Hq,, Srvl'nllt ll.o my. AC:nfS (; 2, Wt•c•ld)• lull' I• 

ligencc Summar)'. 2-1 Oct 15, m Scvt•nth Army, 

Rpt of Opu,, Annex No. 2. 

'" Hqs, Third Anlty, "'h: l,etl<:f l)jrccti\'c No. 

! , It Oct 45, in Third Army, Chit!f of Staff 

Section, !iii CJR (20). 

disciplined and aloof alliludc toward the 

German people, some solclict-s were hound 

to CeeJ encouraged to ruffianism pal'li<-11-

larly when they were drunk. Those who 

had this tendency nlso had before thrm the 

exumplr of the DPs, for whom plll>lic ~y

pathy in the United State-; secu red an almost rompletel)' free rcin from September 

to Dcrcmher, whir h did not hegiu to 

tighten again until the carl)' months of 

I ~146 when the Arm}' quietly reinstituted 

rontn>J-; .tnd put gu<IJ'ds ha~ k in the camps . 

. \t the year's end tro11blr arose from nn-

()thel' uirection. il}1 the tilllc the big l'edep iO)'IIlCill lifts of Ntwcmher anrl DerrmiH:r 

had reduced the theater strength to 

614,000 troops, :m()lhcr 22~{,000 (et1listcd 

men with 50 points, officers with 70, enlisted W CS with 32, and W ;\C officers 

with :n) had hcconu~ eligible for redeployment and discharge. What this contingent, 

and the nearly 100,000 who would become 

eligible after the111, were nol told- because 

lhe information had hcerl cbssifie.d scnct 

in Wa.'{hington- wa:-~ that the freewheeling 

redeployment w;ls to end on I Jan nary 

I Mo. The numhc-t• or troops SC'hedukd to 

he shipped home for discharge would drop 

to 47.700 in january (from 303,000 in 

Detemhcr nnd 400,000 in November) and 

thereafter· level orr at ahout 53,500 l1 

month fnr the next five months. The rates 

would he somewlt:\l dependent, too, on the 

inflow of replacements, and as of midDecember, USFF.T was over 16,000 short 

on the replacemtut~ it had been scheduled 

to r<·<·t·ivc in November. 119 

The troops saw no rcnson wh y the 

., ( 1) rlqs USFET, ThN\lt'r Conun<1nder'~ 

Wc<·kly St:lfT Confcren.-c No. I, I SlOe•<· -15, and No. 

2, 2 .J:w 4G, in Hist Oiv, Hqs, ETO. !17- USF[) 0.5. 

(2) 1\I<•IIJO, 1-lqs, USF ~T. Rc·dl'p Coord G11, for 

Dcp Cors. sub: i\louthly Rpt of Reder, Court! 

Gp, l ncr 15, in USFET SGS 122. 
WINTER 

monthly redeployment Aow could not continue in the h11ndreds of thousands, and 

they were given no reason when Stars and 

Stripes announced at the tum of the year 

that 50-pointers would have at least another Lhree months to serve in the thcaLc1·. 

An announcement at the same time that 

the Army would begin shipping war brides 

to the United States in J anuary raised n 

dark suspicion that the women were being 

given priority over the troops. In Paris, on 

7 J anuary, 1,000 50-pointers staged a protest meeting, and two days later 4,000 

marchc:d on the USFET headquarters .in 

Frankfurt to take their gricvnnce to McNarncy, whom thC)' did not get to see because he was in Berlin attending a Control 

Council meeting. On the 12th, soldiers in 

England carried their complaints to Sen. 

Tom ConnaJly and Sen. Arthur Vandenberg who were then in London. The protests were orderly, and they ended on the 

13th when Stars and Stripes reported that 

McNamey had said rhey " had served rbeir 

purpose."10 

These pr esL~, and others that were 

somewhat less orderly in Manila and other 

locations in the Pncific, had indeed served 

their p\npose. On 15 J anu:H'Y the War Department a nnounced a new dcmobiliznlion 

schedule geared to getting a ll 45-pointcrs 

home and dischargt•d hy April 1946. To 

meet the schedule, USFRT doubled its 

shipping quotas fo1· the first four months 

10 (I ) Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander'$ 

Weekly St:.ff Conference No. 3, 8 j an 46, No. 

•l, 15 Jan 1

16, and No. 5, 22 Jan 46, in Jli't 

Div. fl q~, ET O, 9?- USF9- 0.5. (2) EUCOM, 

Office o( the Chief Historian, Redeployment, JJIJ· 

160- 65. For detailed accounts o( tile dcmoblt.i?:l· 

tion crisis worldwide sec John C. Sparrow, IJisiOT)' 

fl/ Prrsonn11 / D~m bill~ation iu tilt United StaiM 

Army (Washington, 1952). IW• 160-70 and 

24 ·~:l, or R. Alton l.ce, "Tht: Army 'Mutiny' 

of 194G," 'J'he ) ormwl of Amer/co11 lflstor)r, 53:4, 

Apr I 9611 , JIJl. 555- 7 I. 

4·23 

of 1946. In response to an appeal from 

Ei~c nh owcr, who said he had not realized 

how rri tical the Army's manpower situation was before he left Europe, McNarocy 

had earlier reduced the O ccupation Troop 

Basis to 300,000.H By the first week of Febru:ny it was clcZ!t' that the 300,000 figure 

would only be a point on the scale of 

USFET's declining troop strength , whi\h 

would sink to 230,000 by 1 September and 

200,000 before the yea1·'s end. 72 

The replacement'> coming to Europe 

were not on ly unskilled but, in increasing 

numbers, untrained. In November and December 1945, 95 percent of USFET's 

requisitions wct·c for men with technical 

serviC'C specialties. Qf thOliC who arrived 

only 13 percent had sud l qualifications, 

and not in any high degree. Beginning in 

January, replacements wet·e shipped 

after eight weeks of branch immaterial 

training, which did not attempt to go 

beyond qualification with Lhc Ml rifle, personal hygiene and sanitation, and ''orientation for occupation duty with emphasis on 

disciplinc.m3 In the first wcrk of March, 

the theater inspector general made inspections in Paris, M rt1., and several areas of 

Germany and reported the following: 

Discipline is generally poor nnd at this time 

is below desirable standa rd~. 

Definite responsibility for maintaining discipline where troops of various arms and ser· 

vices are stationed has not been satisfactoril)' 

established. 

Incident to the sho rtage of personnel, the 

majorit)' of replacements at'C' not r!'C'<'iving 

n (I ) Ibid., p . 165. (2) llqs, USFET, Tl'lMter 

Commander's Weekly Staff Corafcr·cncc No, I, Ill 

Dec 45, in H ist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97- USF 0.5. 

n H qs, USFET, to CG's suh : Revision of Theater Logistics Program, 6 Feb ·16, in OMGUS 

3/ 35, dec:. 320.2. 

" Hqs, USFET, Theater Couumtracler's Weekly 

St:~tf Conference No, 7, 5 Fch 116, in H ist Div, 

Hqs, ETO, 97- USF 0.5. 
TH F. U.S. i\RJ\.1Y JN T HF. OC:CUPATlON OF ~1ANY 

additional disriplinat•y basic training as 

C>< JICCtcd. ~bny )'Otmg oflin ·rs rontmand impcH·tnnt 

instnllatioos :\nd unit~. Nul!lbers or tht'Sl' 

h:wc not had sufficient training to t•arry out 

thdr adrninistrattvt• rrsponsibility. Sitnilarly. 

thct•c arr many untrained noncmmnissioned 

wer~.· · 

At tile sall\c tunc, military government dcwdHncnts and the H eadquarters, U.S. 

Constabulary, were reporting U.S. troops 

;ts the c·hief SOIII'C"<' of disLUrbances in tlw 

q~. USFI~T, Thcat('l' Commander's Wcelc ly 

SwfT Conference No. 12, 12 Mtor •1·6, in liisl J)iv1 

ll q~, ETO, 97- tJSJI!I 0.!1, 

zonc. 11' I n the !irsl week of April, wben the 

thentcr's weekly intelligcnrc ~> ummary 

showed l 0 I trtlop incidents ill a four-day 

period, M cNarney ordered that all such 

c:ascs he r·epot'lcd individually to him with 

the nam ·s of the units involved nnd the 

specifi cs of disciplinary actions taken. ;n 

" ( I ) Rpt, Oct B- 272, 2fl J un ·Ill, in OMGUS 

Ul- 2/lfl. (2\ llisc Rpl, Dot G- 2:50, Mar 46, in 

OMGUS flO 2/10. (3) i~t Rpt, llqs, U.S. Constabulary, Apr 46, H ist Dl", ll qs, ETO, in 

97-USPU- 0.3. 

'" Hqs, USFE'!', Theater Clommanner's Weekly 

Staff Couf l'rcrH·c No. 15, :! Apr 46, ond No. 17, 

16 ;\pr ·If>, in ll ~t Div, q~, r:ro, !J7- lJSF9-0.5. 
CHAPTER XXTV 

Neither an End Nor a Beginning 

OMGUS Takn Control 

')he di,mantling of field milit.11 ~ government was a<Tomplishcd in les.' than two 

month'\, The I\ reis and Ue~ieuw~:sbczil k 

( r•t:giwa:d ) detachments relinquished most 

ol I hci r functions to Gerrnau a ppoi tllrcs in 

Novcmh<T and December' Hl4!">, :and on I 

j nnu:\1 y 1946, the Offircs of Milit:uy 

Govcrntn{'nl for Ba,·aria, Wucrtlcmh('rgBaclt·u, ami Greater Hesse b('< .•mc ind<'p<'nclem < ommands reporting diJcrtly to Lhe 

Offin: of ~lilitary Gow1 n111<'nt ( U.S. 

/.one ) .wei to O~fGUS. B)· th(•n only four 

fum lion-. remained with the Offirc of 

Military Government (U.S. Zone) in 

Frnnkfurt: legal, public: hca llh nnd wdfarc, 

public R:tfct)', and civil administration. 

When the Land offircs of Hlilit:\1')' govemnl<'nl hc·ramc independent l'Ommnnd'l, the 

.\rmy-milit:tr) district commnnd<; lost their 

authority to supervise military ~ovcmment ; 

.mn in J.muary, Hcadqu:utrrs, Seventh 

Army, hc~.m transferring it.; pcr<;onnel and 

fruutiuns to Third Armr, wltic h wouiJ take 

command of the U.S. Constahular)' and 

•ti l ractira l troops in the zone.' (Chart 3) 

A!\ nn Ot~IGUS historian ohstr·vccl Inter, 

the German ri\'i) government did not hre«k 

down ..... had been widely p1 cdic ted c~rlier, 

I ( I ) IIttS, us rET, suh : R!!\l)<lll~tbtll!y (or MiliI;Jr) Go\l'rllnll'nl in the U.S. 'l.onco, 14 Dec 45. 

"' IISFF.T SC:S OH .I/ 1. (2l ll1•1 S!'c, S"~cnth 

1\nny, suh : Commanding Getll'ml .uad StaiT, I 

J.•u :!II F'rh IIi, in Historico.tl Progmm Ftll'~, H ist 

Uiv, USJ-'E'I' 

but the burden of orcupation on the \1 my 

was not mudr lightened either. The nvilianiz;uion program, which was to ht~\ c .ucompa ni('d the trano;fer of funnion-;, wa-; 

barely gelling orr the ground. The oiTirc~ 

of military government had r.<; tahli'llwd 

civilian prrlionncl sc('lions, but the joh allotment); w<.·rc c·nmcshcd in civil service 

procedure .... Meanwhile, officers eligible for 

civilian nppointmcntc; were chom.in~ 1 cdc· 

ployment wh<.·n their numbers came up in 

preferenc c lu tlw uncertainties of th<• m-nrpation . .: The tkl.lrhment'l had gi\ en up 

most hut not ;all of their fum·tion. , and the 

three out of tlw four ther retained- drnrll.ifi cation, pro pert)' rontrol, and clt'C'lions 

(militn ry go t' annH·nt courts were Lhl' 

fourth ) wrrc incn•asi ng their work loads 

as rcdrployment di111inished their strength<.;. 

Denazi ftn lt ion cw,c-. under Law j (), n \\ Cl (' 

at their JWal.. in D<.·remher and J anuar); 

propcrt~ control .tlonc threatened tu cn~ulf 

the milit:u) govt'rnment organization; and 

the dctarhmrnt~ wcr c ha\'ing to observe 1 he 

c·ampaigus and 'lrn·en the candidate~ :md 

voters in Ill(' fw lhroming elections." 

\\1 hctlwr I Itt~ Ccrmans were able or willing to :assunH' \'Spc)ll~ihility for their own 

affai rs rcm,linecl thr hig question. Orw detachment report described the trnn'ifcr of 

function-. and the elections scheduled for 

: •~l Rpt, F.."\cru ~lihlary Dis1ric:t, lj Dec 

.J5 II Jan lb, m O.M\.US 71>-:VIO. 

• Htt~. USFE 1', Tlu•awr Comm:mdc:r·~ Wcc:kl)• 

Staff Confc•renct• No. I, Ill l)cr 15. in II i~r Oiv, 

Hqs, E'l 0, !17 l'SJ11l O.'i. 
CHAK'f 3- U.S. MILITARY Co o; R:-:~ J::.NT RhLATTO:-:SHlPS >\FTt:R 1 :\ PRH 1946 

Military Governor 

also 

Theater Commander 

Deputy 

Military Governor 

OMGlJS 

Regional 

Governmen1 

ca-ordlnatlno 

Office 

Loenderrot 

Liaison and Security Officn at Londkreis and Stodtkreis Le~el 

Control 

council 

Kommondatura 
'£11.H.ER AN E~D 'OR A BEGINNiNG 427 

J anuary as consliluting for the German 

people "a bum's nLo;h into what passc.c; for 

democracy.''' The Office of Milit<try Government for Wucrttcmberg-Baden detcc:tcd 

'·a glorification of disinterest in politics 

among large sections of the populatiotl.m. 

Tltc chief oiJstnclcs were what the: Germans 

thcntseJves described as their "burnt Dilger 

rumplex," resulting from their rnrlicr excursions into politics, and the known inability of German parties or offirinls to 

inOuence decision!\ on the real issues of the 

time, such as denazification or the economic 

and political futur·c uf the countr·y. In the 

weeks just hcfot·c the election, the word 

"npnthy, cropped up in almost every report on the rcac'lion to the campaigns. As 

the Office of Military Government for 

Greater Hesse reported: 

The leading posts in the panies nn• ht•ld 

by rormer· minor politic-al figurrs who. bC'· 

cause of their insi(l,nifirance, w('I'C not ac--

corded by the Nnzis the distinction of being 

cxtemlinated. They have retained the political mannerisms of pre-1933. )Jt•gotia tions, 

blo('s, and conf ence~ are all ci ~ widely ndul~ed in . Thi5 continual acti,·ity, howevet, 

involves only a fr''' with the masses still keep· ing their clistanc<·.n 

The J anuary elections were for local 

C'Olllll'ils i11 10,429 rommunities '"it h lcs.'i 

than 20,000 people. Beforehand, the military government detachments cher kcd the 1

1,750,000 names on the voting lists for 

Nazis (and disqualified 326,000 ) and r•cviewed the Prageboge11 of all the candidates for the nearly 70,000 seat:-; on the 

councils. The Ge,·m:ms went Lo the ll~ 

on the last Sunday in JanuaJ·y, and they 

1 H ist Rpr, Ot•t Ci !H, Dec 45, in O MGUS 

n 2/5. 

• History of Militnry GovernlTlcnt iu Lnnd 

Wuc•rttembcrg-Baden, vol, I, p. 1460. 

• Hist Rpt, OMG Greate r Hesse, Dec <1 5, in 

OMG US 42-:\/5. 

weJll in astonishingly Jnrgc uumbers- 86 

percent of those eJjgible voted. 

Tn Bava1·ia, the CSU, with 43 percent 

of the vole, was the strongest party, nd 

the Sut'inl Democrats were a poor second 

with less thnn 20 perccnl. The CDU, with 

31 percent of the vote, outstripped the Socia l Dcn1orr·nts in 'Vucrttcmbcrg-Baden by 

a thirdJ while the Social Democrats in 

Greater H c-;se took 40 pcr<:<·nt of the vote 

to the C:DU's 30 percent. The Communists 

and the lillcml partie.'> ca<'h polled le.<;.<; than 

5 pcre<:nt. Throug hout the zone, the 

CDU- C:SU's 37 percent of llw vole made 

them 1 he kading parties. T n t'\11':-ll districts 

they were hv Ja r the strongest parties, and 

their k nd would undouhtcdl) have heen 

greater if all candidates in the sma ll 

rural communities had announced part y 

alfilia t ion11 . 

7 

Tire heavy lmnout for the January eirelions was n surprise that OMGUS found 

" pa rtir ulurly gra tifying'' h ·cause it put 

local ndrninisLrations, uutil then entirely 

appointed hy military government, "on a 

basis or some popula r support a nd underndin ·~ Whether the vote rcpresemed 

an awa kcning of intere.~ t in dcnlonatir selfgovernment, however', " doubtful The 

surcr.ss of thr CDU and CSU, in spjte of 

their leniency toward Nazis, seemed vaguely 

ominous to many military goYernment 

officers. and Lhe parties' close tics to the 

Catholic Church suggc!;led th at their constituents were voting as they were told from 

the pulpit and not (rom inner conviction. 

The Social Democrats, however, seemed to 

have a ttracted a large pnrt of their vote 

' Milicnry Government or Germany, Ge rman 

Covernllwntnl Organization :111d Civil AdministTa· 

Lion, M<1111hly Report No. 7, 20 Feb ·16. 

' J CS 15 17/6, Summa ry of J an ·IIi Report of 

the Militnry Governor, 16 Atlr lG, in C CS 3A3.2 1 

(2- 22 I q, sec. II. 
·12H THE U.S .. \JUdY l N THE OCCUPAT101'\ OF c;gRi\ft\N Y 

simply as an anti-Catholic protest. Some 

uhsr.rvcrs belitvcd 1 he Germans hnd voted 

mainly •·to convince ~elves and their 

nciglthors that th~ i~rma of Natism hnd 

been cradiralcd not llccause it was their 

patriotic duty to ektt men who could lend 

1 hem tn dcmocracy.''0 The Office of MilitHt"}' Government for· Greater e.~c made 

tht following aMiysi~: 

T hl· :.triking irnpr eliSion that ohsrrwrs LCcciwd of the clcrtinns was the fantasd<·:,Jiy 

high pcrcentaKC of digihle voters pnrtiri)wtiug. Whether it rrsulted from a liw ly iuwrt•st 

in thr issues and in the oppot•tunit)' to share 

in the democrati<· proc·css, whct11er it was tlw t>~ire to do what llrilitar>' governnwnt \:Xpectcd of thc111, or wlwthcr it wa.~ anodll'r 

cx:unplc of obcyin~ their supctiort- it i~ 

diffinrh to say. Onl' thing bcttwt<' dc•ur, 

however . . . the Gt1mmn people had 110t 

suddrnlr shaken ofl' the p;tst a.ncl rrubrnn·d 

dcntocrncy. They hnd vowd , but the politkrd 

prind plt's ll'ere obst'lll't• ;111d the faith or llw 

people frail and uncrrtnin.''' 

Similarly, OMGUS i1 ~;d f concl uded, 

"While the voting in the recent t•lcctions 

was gratifying, the fac:1 remains that the 

average Gern111n docs not )'Ct re<;ognizc th<' 

personal espo ibiliti cs which ~o with 

poli1ica l freedom." 11 The least optimistic 

analys<'S C'ame rrolll I3avat'ia. Front there 

the rc•gional detachment for Upper 13avarin 

reponed, " l n this situation a miJiority of 

political pp rtuni~> s, with little artual 

popular support, organized a disinterested 

public into politiral partie!~ and cnronraged 

them to vote in the firlit election.'' Spontaneous politica l intc-rC.i\l, tbe report con-

• Hist Rpt, Oet D '10 1, May 46, iu OMCUS 

7!1 1/ 10. 

'" ll i~ t Rpt, OMG C:rr.alrr llcssc, ju!l .1()1 in 

O~I OUS ~2 1/5. 

" M dltary Governnumt of C:~nnany, C:c•rannn 

Governmental Org:mizntion .ond Civil Adlllinultration, Momhly Report No. 6, 20 Mar ·15. 

dudetl, was 110 more apparent after the 

rlertion than it hnd IJccn hcf e. ~ 

.\longsidc politics, denazification held its 

place as a :-.ore subject. From the beginning 

,\merin ul!i had l.>ecn of two minds: officially they t•rgnrdcd nazism as an unmitigated evil and anyone taintcrl with it as 

corrupted beyond redemption; however, 

more th:~n rt few believed tha t thr fine mesh 

of lhc N aY.i party's net had snared too 

OHIIl)' German~ ror them all to he judged 

hy a single standard. Some artion~, sw: h 

as the usc· of the I 1\ll ay I ~J n <'II tofT da te 

in di tinguislting- between active und nominal party members, tended lo r·rfled the 

second poitlt of view. But the dominant 

trend in the summer and fall nf 1945, culminating in Milit<try Government Law No. 

H, was towmd C'lcvating the idea of permanent taiut to the status of doctl'inc and 

applying it 10 broader segments of the 

population : first to those in publjc employment, then lo IJusine.c;scs wiLh a public a.c;-

pect, and finnlly to aJJ private business. For 

the Gcnuan.; iu all categories who wcrr 

affeded, U.S. policy provided jus! 1wo possibilities : cxtlw:ion from public and priv te 

employment nbove the levd of common 

labor or, if tlwy were impOI'tant rnough 

to rate aulmllalil· arre.;;t, cxdtLc;ion with a 

prospect of some puni!!ltm<.'nl yet to he 

decided. 

Denmdrication had mad<' 1hc Army the 

warder fo1· do·t.ens of internment camps and 

made mil it :try govcrnmC'nl l he custodian 

of thousauds of Nazi propl'l'til:S, piled up 

backlogs or Frageungeu and appeals cases 

in detachment offi ces, and lch to military 

government oOkcrs the joh of tutoring ine.xperienccd Ct•rman officials while keeping 

track of I h1' disr hargcd Nazis. C.:lay later 

" Mon1hly Poll deal Activily ltpt, Oc1 205, 211 

Feb 4!>. in O MCUS 2/~. 
NEITH ER AN END NOR A BEGI NNING 429 

Von..Rs CAsT THEIR BALLOTs 

described the total result as an "administ a~ 

live problem," which it undeniably was, 

and more} ~ ,\s has been indicated, trying 

on ly the Nazis who might be implicated 

in crimin al organizations could have ocr u~ 

pied a battalion of judges for months or 

even years. As long as fv!ilitary Government 

Law Nu. 8 a nd the exclusion of Nazis from 

public and private employment had to he 

enforced hy Americans, military govern~ 

ment strength in the fi eld would h:1vc to 

he maintained at levels that even in the 

fall of 1945 were not feasible; and as the 

"Clay, Decisio11 itr Ccrmoll)', p. 70. 

Schae!Icr and Pallon incidents had demon· 

stratcd, as long as the Americans reta ined 

t.be en tire responsibility for denazification, 

the whole occupation was fused for a political exp losion. 

In his address to the first meeting of the 

Laenrlerrnl ( 17 October 1945), Clay 

himcd that the judging of Nazis would 

eventu ~dly he left to German Lrihunals. 

During a session on 4 Decemhcr, he told 

the minister presidents that the German 

people should take denazification into their 

own hands and directed each of them to 

bavc a denazification plan for his Laud; 

and after the fvlinister President of Greater 
430 THE U.S . .AR~lY It\ TI·f£ OCCUP.\TJQj\\ Of GER1L\:-\Y 

e~c, Dr. Ka rl Geiler, recommended that 

the regulations be uniform in tl1c tJwee 

Laendet, the Laenderral appointed a committee to write a statute for the entire zone. 

Clay's :\dvisers, Lt. Col. Fritt. OppcnhcimCI', Dr. Walter Dorn, and Dr. Karl 

Loewenstein, assisted the Germans. 

from the beginning the German approach differed from the Ameriran i11 two 

fund:uncnt:ll ~pec . While the mericttns had in the main only distinguished 

between active and nominal Nazi , the 

Germans recognized several gradations, 

p a rticularly within the grotlp the Amcric:nns hnd regarded as active, and eventually 

settled ou live : major offenders, offenders, 

lesser offenders, followers, and exonerated. 

Serondl)•, where the Americ.'\rlS had imposed prc.<;umably permanent exdusion 

from positions of influence in public or 

hw•inc...'\S life on all active Na;r.is, the Germans adopted a scale of s<tnctions keyed 

to the offense. •• 

rn the Germans' hands the meaning of 

dcnazifiention also changed. Under mitil:lry f.tOVCrnment it had meallt the removal 

of pnt·ty members from positions of influe,wc in the government and privntc occupation~. 'l'o the Germans it mcnnr ,·cmoval 

of the Nazi 11 tigma £rom the individual and 

his rcinst:u cment in society. The early 

draft~ of the Gem1an law wo11ld have imposed employment restriclioJts and loss of 

voting rights on major offenders and lesser 

restrictions or none at all on followers. The 

OMG US advisers, however, although they 

appcnr not to have objected to seeing cxNa~ i · denazified and restored to social and 

political equali~ . insisted thal nazism be 

regarded not merely as a serious lapse in 

judgment hut ns a crime and demanded 

"Jum•s r.u()rslenau, Entnoci/i~inung (Berlin : 

Llldllcrhaml, l969), pp. 56- 58. 

that the Ge1•mans indude a schedule of 

punishments in the law ; up to ten years 

imprisonment for majol' oiTenders, five 

years or less for offC11dcrs, fines to 10,000 

ma rks fo1· lesser offenders, and fines to 

J ,000 m arks for followers. The fines, the 

Americans undoubtedly knew, would he 

paid in inflated lllOI\Cy and hence have 

small punitive effc( t, hut they would, hy 

forcing a hearing in every case, prevent 

blanket acquittals.' ~ The negotiationR on 

the German law almost broke down in 

January and February 1946, when the 

Americans also insisted that it conform 

with Control CouJ1(:il Directive No. 24 of 

12 January Hl46. The drafts of the German law had ratc~orized as major offenders only persons who had held rela ti vely 

significant posts in major Nazi organizations or general offi cer rank in t11e military 

and had been 11 activists." 1° Control Council 

Directive No. 24 listed ninety-nine categories of persons who would he classed as 

major offenders nnd offenders and recommended very close scrutiny of all career 

military oiTi c;ers, persons "in the Prussian 

Junker tradition," nnd members of university :o;Ludents corps, as well as various 

others.11 But the time had not yet come 

when German officials could stand out 

against the occupation authority. 

On 5 Mn1'C'h 1946, in Munich, the minister pre,<;id<:nt.s, without enthusiasm, signed 

Law No. 104 for LihWlLion from National 

"Clay IIller duulttcd thnt the attempt 1<> pnl 

every party mc•nllcr on trial bad been wise. The 

~ystem becamr clogged with minor cases, and 1lw 

serious offc:lldcrs, who hnd nothing to gain hy 

seeking a speedy trial, hencfitc:d from delay$ which 

later ran into monlhs :llld ye:~rs. See Constantine 

Fit-zGibbon, DMali/icotion ( New York : W. W. Norton Company, 1969), p. ~5. 

" Fuersleuau, Er!tnrui{rtirrrmg, pp. 59- 61. 

" Ruhm von Oppcn, Documents on Gumon)' 

p. 106. 
NEI'rHER AN END NOR A BEGil\TJ\lJNG 431 

Socialism and Militarism. More comprehensive than anything military government 

had attempted, the law would in some degree affect 13.5 million persons, that is, 

every resident of the U.S. zone over 

eighteen years old, all of whom would be 

req uired to .submit a M eldebogen, a shortened form of the military government 

Fral{ebo.~en . Those with chargeable a<;Sociations (eventually 3.6 million) would have 

to appear before Spruchkammer, tribunals 

of local, non-Nazi citizens somewhat similar 

lo U.S. draft boards. The Sjm~chknmmer, 

aflcr hearing evidence on hath sides, would 

place the defendants in one of Lbe live categories and assess the penalties accordingly. 

Those who were exonerated or paid fines 

were considered denazified and recovered 

their full civil rights. 

The Law for Liberation from National 

Socialism and Militarism, like olhcr earlier 

important changes in occupation policy, 

hurst as a surprise on hotb the German 

population and military government in the 

field. General Clay has described the decision to turn denazification over to the Germans as "rc:mtroversial when it was 

rl1ade.'"11 H e wac; right. As a fin;t reaction, 

the regional detachment at Kassel reported, 

"Greater confusion never existed in the 

denazification program. "'0 

The German man on the street ronstrued the law as a wholesale indictment 

of the German people and expressed fears 

I hat it would provoke unrest, strip the 

country of its most qualified people, and 

pennanently undermine the economy. The 

political leaders were caught with a law 

to which they were committed and, hence, 

could not ciritidzc; openly h11t which they 

"Ctay, Decision in Cerma11)', p. 70. 

" Hist Rpt, Del E42C, Mar 46, in OMGUS 

7- 2/5. 

c-ould not defend either without seeming 

to subscribe to the collective guilt theory!'' 

Some American observers, however, believed the Germans were less apprehensive 

about the law then they appeared to be. 

The detachment in Landkreis Laufen reported, 'The average man is of the opinion 

that the denazification task was turned over 

to Germans for the sole purpose of clearing 

the Nazis. The usual remark. when the news 

of the new German denazification law was 

released was, 'Thank God. In lwo or three 

months I'll have 01y old job or my business 

ba<"k !' "~ ' 

Military government opinion on lhe German law ranged from skeptical approval 

to outright condemnation. As the Office of 

Military Government for WuerttembergBadell m-eporled: 

The new denazification law, with its provisions for the certification of all German males 

and females of eighteen years of age and 

over, and fol' classification of the population 

into political categories, bore: a revolutionary 

character. It established a judicial process for 

the purg ing of a people antl ridding it of the 

destructive elements which brought disaster 

upon thern in the course of three successive 

generations. lt was obvious lhat in order to 

acco111plish its purpose, the new law had to 

become the manifesto of a strong, popular, 

anti-Nazi movement, much stronger and 

more popular than had existed heretofore. But . .. only relatively few groups in the 

area had evinced the moral courage a nd historical insight necessaty for the carrying of 

the denazification program to its lo ic<~l 

conclu ion. 2 

The Office of 1\lulitary Government for 

Bavaria dismissed the law as "legislatively 

'

1 History of Military Government Land Wuert· 

tcmberg-Baden, p. 1445. 

,, Hisl Rpt, Dr.t E- 281, 30 Jun 46, in OMGUS 

77-3/10. Hi~tory of Military Govenlntcnt Lcmd Wl)erttemberg-Badcn, p. 1445. 
432 THE U.S. ARMY JN THE OCC:UP TJON OF GERlt.tANY 

and politically foredoomed to failure." The 

parties, 1 he Bavarian asses'SJT\cnt continued, 

were aware tha t the cx-Nazili would compriRe a formidable voting blor 1nd, therefore, would, while giving lip service to 

denazification, manipulate the law to allratl 

the Nazi votes. "

3 The CSU was already refusing to nominate a candidate for the 

Lmtd ministry charged with administering 

the denazification law and at the same time 

demanding trpresentation on the appeals 

bo:1rds in full proportion to iL'l electoral 

strcngtlt. The regional detachment (or 

Upper Bav~tria added that the law was uncnforc:('ablc because military government 

could ucvcr do more than spot chec.:k the 

millions of cases and because "int·orruptible 

administrators arc impos...ihle to find in 

Germany today ... The regional dct~u hrn nt 

condudcd, "The best thing to do is to wash 

our hands rompletely of it and tell the Germ:ms that from now on it i!l up to them 

whether they dcnazify."u 

While the elections and th<~ Law fo r· Liberation from National Socialism and M1litarism touched off sqnalls of controversy 

in Ccrm:~ny, one of the chief reasons for 

their cxuacn<·c- the projected shift to State 

Department control of the ocrupationwa · havinK even rougher going in \Vn~hington. On 18 December, Secretary of \Nar 

Pallcrson talked about the shift with cting Secretary ()f State Dean Acheson and 

Assistatlt Scrrctaries of Stat<: James Dunn 

and Donald Russell. Patterson reviewed the 

\Vat· Departmen t's reasons for· wanting the 

transfer, nnd the State Dcpnrtrnent reprcscnt:tlivcs proposed that the r<:!lponsihility 

remain with the \'\far Department on a 

lli r Rpl, OMG Land Bnvnrin, I May 46, 

ir1 OMGUS I 2/5. 

.. lll ~t Rpt, Oct E-205, Apr 46, in OMGUS 

1- 2/5. 

civilianizecl ba:;is or thnl it be lodged with 

the SWNCC or llrM it be moved loa new 

agen cy- "anywhere," P atterson later declared~ "but in the State Department. "~ 6 

During th <: next several weeks hoth Patterson and Eisenhower allcmpted to convince 

Secretary of ~tate Byrnes that the State 

Department should assume control of civil 

adrninistmtio11 in occupied areas. Other 

solutions, such as setting up a new agency, 

Patterson argncd, woHld not work because 

the State Department would still be responsible for policy, and civilian adminjstration 

under Lhe W<tr Department would not be 

" forthright civilianization."~0 But on 2 1 

January Ei::-c11hower n1hlcci to M cNarncy: 

My brsl cfl'orts and rhosc of Sec. War hnvc 

been de\'tHCd to forcing a decision that State 

Department a~utne control of administration 

of military government in Germany on Ot' 

beJot'e I June. So far efforts have been completely unavailing. War Departlltent will rontinuc to press . .. however, am without 

hope that issue will I)(' settled to our s<tlisfac· 

tion in the nrar· future.~ 7 

O n I 1\ pril, the Office of Milita ry Gov~ 

ernment ( U.S. Zone) dosed in Frankfurt. 

Headquancrs, USFET, was therewith divorced from military government, and 

control would henceforth be exercised exdusivcly hy OMGUS in Berlin ; but the nex1 

step, appointmcrrt of <1 civilian high commissioner, was in the distant future. t\tthc 

end of the month the Secretaries of State, 

\.Var, and Nllvy cndot'sed n memorandum 

on principle<~ and procedure~ for administration of occupied areas which reaffirmed 

:o Memo, Sf'cr(lrar}' of War for Sccrcl;~ry of 

State, sub ; Responsibility for Government of Oecu• 

pied Enemy Area , Prr~('nt Situation, 29 D~c: 45, 

in OPO, ABC :187, s~c. 4-r. 

"'ibid . 

" Cahlc, AC:ofS OPD to CG, USFET, 21 Jnn 

·16, in Of'D, All(; 387, ~cc. 1 F. 
.:\£1TIIER .\:'\ Ei\'D ~OR .\ BF.Cl~XI~G 133 

thl' divbion of policy-making and executive 

r ·sponllibilitics between the Stale and War 

Dcpnrt•Hrnts made in August 1945, adding 

only a somewhat cnhantrd role for the 

SVVNC:C and a Dircrtonllc for Occupied 

Am1s to he formed uncle•· the SWNCC.:!~ 

In its la-;t paragraph, 1 he memorandum 

pl<lvidcd for consultation hctwc:cn the War 

Dq>artmcnt and the St.llc l)rpnrtmeot 

c ontcrning the appointment of a high commissioner, •· t n the event 1 h.\1 il is drrided 

to reconsidrr the pattern of Amcrit·an control machinery during the period of War 

Department responsibility .... " 

Tire Road illtcad 

!'>pring came early to Gcrmanr in 1946 

hut brought no renewed hope, either for 

the peopk or the nation. On !) Marc-h at 

Wcstmin"Ster College in fulton, Mt-;souri, 

Chun hill talked about thr iron curtain tha.L 

had descended across the Europc·nn rontincnt frwn the Baltic.: to t:1c t\driati<'. Out of 

oJTicc, he could say what th o.~t: in otncc knew 

but rould not yet tell to ntion~ whic-h still 

cxpeC'tCcl a hetter reward for 1 heir wartime 

-.ac rificc.s: the world was divided nnd would 

lil.ch remain so I or )'C<\N to come. Nowhere 

was the division clearer than in Germany. 

' l'hC' cmc suhstanU\'C . tcp towt\nl pulling 

into effect the Pot-;dam dr<'ision to trear 

nc.many ns an economit unit was the level 

"Tht Oi1'CCtorate lor Occupied Areas was to 

have <~Y its director an officinl of tho Stntc Dcpnrtnwm who hr~d no other duties th;m policy-making 

for occutlicd areas. General Hilldring, who was 

the director, had been appointed A'siJIAnt Sccret:try of S1n1c for Occupied ArrM in J:ur February. 

~hj. Gen. Oliver P. Echols, who hnd l•t'tn Assistant 

Ikput)' M11itary Governor in Gennnny, succeeded 

H•lldrinl( ru Director of the r~ r l>cpartment 

CAD. ( I ) Department of St:He, PMeiRII lldolioru 

(1/ the U11itul Slates, 1946 (WMhinf(tOn, D.C., 

tiJfi!l), vol. V, pp. 674-77. (2) IJcpnrcment of 

State, /)ullelill , 3 Mar 46, p. 369. 

of indu ·try plan. Completed on 26 Marcil 

1946. 1 he plnn pr'oposcd to reduce the German industrial rapacity to ahoul 55 per· 

cenl of thr HJ3U level and cut the O'Ind;ud 

of living (in comparison with 19313) by 30 

percent. " In the U.S. zone, 185 plants had 

been earmarked for reparations and more 

were hcing surve-yed, but the real prohlrm, 

in the view of U.S. authorities, was not to 

keep Gc-• rn.my d()wn to the contemplated 

lcvcls but to restore the country's ability 

to support itc;elf. Since Germany imported 

food ciuring the hcst of times, the one way 

lo restore the import fl o·w was to scrurc 

sufficient exports to pay for essential imports. In Dctcmhcr 1945, OMGUS hau 

submitted n draft agreement, based also on 

a Pot. tJam dcdsion, for an export-irnport 

program to be opcr,ttcd hy the Atlicd Control Authority for Germany as a whole.a11 

After the Briti h had accepted the propo al 

with some rc:;ervations and the Frenrh with 

more, tlw Rus."Sians, in the first week of 

April 194 6, rejected it outright, dcc:laring 

they would "adhere lo the principle or 

zonal foreign trade and individual responsibilities of tht' tOlllltries for the results Of 

the occupation in their zone."" On 3 May, 

citing the interrelationship of the level of 

indu try plan and tJ1e export-import program Clay announced in Lhe Control 

Counril Co-ordinating Commiuec that, except for two thtcn plants already allocated, 

the Ut1itcd Slate.;; would halt all dismnntling for rcparatirms in its zone " until major 

overall quc.~t ions arc resolved and \vC know 

whal •trca is to compose Germany and 

"'JCS 1517/ 8, Summary or March Report of 

the Milnary Governor, U.S. Zone, 5 Jun <16, m OPD, ABC 387, sec. +- F. ., joh11 II. Rorker, Priming the Cumnn Eeoll· 

omy (Durhum. N.C : Duke University Press, 1971). 

p. 108. 

" fbirl., p. I 0!). 
434 TJ1F. U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERl\1/\NY 

whether or' not that arcn will be treated 

as an economic unit.'' 3

= (M<I/J 3) 

The di,·ision was in the open. War 

rumors, whi<'h had never quite died out1 

again swept a< ross the country. Some Germans seemed to welcome the thought of 

a war, because they envLc;ioned an East-

\Vl:St dash as a chant:c for Germany's salvation or, sirnpl)', hecausc it would give 

them an opportunity to say, " I told you 

so." The more !'oiler minds, hnwcvet', were 

painfully aware that Germany could only 

suffer from <UI)' controversy between the 

Hies, military or otherwise. n' 

In the spring OMCUS launched an export-import program for the U.S. zone and 

secured orders for $16 million worth of 

hops, salt, potash, filtration sand, and lumb<~r while Rimultancously making commerdal import commitment<; (the first in the 

zone sinrr the suJTender) for vegetable :\11d 

field seeds. The Economics Division put 011 

a Bavarian expo1·t !!how in Munich in ~1:\y, 

aucl in J unc SCllt sam pies of dolls, toys, 

t•hinawa rc, cameras, and Christmas lrcc 

om~mcnts by air c.xpro;s to the U.S. ComnH~l·dal Company, a suh~idi ary of the U.S. 

Commodity Credit Corporation, for displ:c.y 

in Nt:w York. In June, also, the Economics 

Division at'l'l\ngcd with the Commodity 

Ct·cdit Corporation to i111port 50.000 tons 

of American raw cotton, which wa<; to he 

paid for· IJ)' exporting GO percent of it as 

finished textiles, leaving 40 percent for the 

Germany crorwrny. Bur the program was 

small and hound to remai n so for a on~ 

time. The deficit, however, in terms o( food 

" ( I ) 1 bid., p. Ill. ( 2) Chronology of 

OM GUS ilnd It ~ Predecessor Organizations, I 

Jan- 1 Jttn 1(), iu OMGUS 2::1- 3/5, pp. 100 and 

11'1. 

" Hqs, Sc\'ctllh Army, ACofS C-2, G-2 Weekly 

Intelligence Sununaf)' No. 36, 22 Mnr 46, in Sevclllh Army, ltnelligrrH'e Summaries. 

and other items that military government 

\.vas importing for the benefit of lhl' Germans, was large and growing. Between 1 

August HH5 and 30 J unc 1946, the dollarbased import commitments for Germany 

<unountcd to $242,285,000, and the lOla.) 

\'alue of exports actually chargeable against 

this sum was $7,277,000.3 ' 

Owing c·hicfly to inn·eased cottl receipts, 

industrial output in the zone rose measurably during the first quarter of 194 6, reaching an cstim:lled 31 percent oi the I 936 

level. The hold on even this much of a gain 

was pr<:carious, however, and the obstaclr.s 

in the path of further progtc.<;s were formidable. Tlw most important obstacle was the 

wuntry's lack of a rurrency. Except for 

purchases nf a small and d\vindling selection of rationed items, the Reichsmark had 

no clonlC'Slir value <Wd was worthlc,c;s iutcrnationally. With milit:Lry go\'crnmcnt 

s()Jnetimcs protesting and sometimes promoting, barter had become the nonn in 

business transactions. Nothing moved in 

trade, 1101 1 hr fa rmer's potatoes nor the output of factories, except in exch;mge for 

some other commodity. The worker found 

it profitahle- and often essential for survival- to spend mote lime trading on lhc 

black market than working on his job, in rc 

his salar)' bought nothing hut the daily ration. Clay, in March 1946, :tppointcd 

j oseph M. Dodge of OM GUS and Gerhard C:oln1 and Raymond Goldsmith, borrowed from Washington, and a starr of 

economi<siS to devise n currency reform. 

They had a plan ready in six weeks, but 

owing to Soviet and French opposition in 

the Control Council, two year.> more wo11ld 

pass before Germany h<ld a working 

curre cy. :~ 

" OMCUS Hi~tory, pt. I, ch. VIII, pp. 7•1- 77. 

" Backer, f'rimiug tlte Ccrmau E co110111)', ll· !) I f. 
I\EITHER AN END !'\OR :\ BEGil'\i\11\G 4 35 

Meanwhile. tht zone was supporting a 

permanent popula tion of half a million 

DPs, a_, the German" in~ expelled from 

ca.o;tem Europe flooded in. . \ n average of 

45,000 of these ex pelled Gcrrnans ramc 

ca<.h wccJ.. in ~fay anrl june totaljng 

920,000 hr th end of J une.30 Only 12 perrent could he <'laS! ifl('(.l a~ fully employable ; 

65 percent needed n·lieL Con trary to agreements made hdo•·c the movement to keep 

familirs together, the coumrics expelling 

German!\ \VCrc h()lding hal·k the young, 

ahl c-bodkd men. Of the arrivals, 54 percent were women, 21 percent were children 

under fourtCCII ye:H'R, nnd only 25 pcrc:enl 

men, many of them old or im:apacita tecV1 

An additiou:d , sig nilic'n nt obl.tacle to 

Ge•·man cconomir self-suflicicnry, in Clay's 

view, w;tc; the oc{'upatiou fcu't'C1 which had 

pre-empted a lnrgc c;hare of the zone's jnduo;trial output :~ c; mur h as half in the 

t•ase of ht1 ilding matcrialo; such as glass and 

cement. While the costs were presumahly 

being r hargcd to the Gcrm ~ns. Clay 

pointed out lo McName)', they were actu"-

ally n~ horne hy the U.S. tnxp:\ycrs at 

1 he a ntc of over $200 million a year for 

relief :;upplic.c;, and 1his situation would 

contill\lt' until the German economy could 

produce enough to pa)' for imports. In ~ 

slatcmcnl thal Colonel Hunt would have 

thoro11ghly approved, C:lar told McNarney : 

Diffir ulti<!s in disriplinc, fl'flt('l'llization, disposnl Clf surplus prupcrty. guarding of intcml'r.s, nncl similar probk·11lS, while difficlal t 

to solve now, have littlr if any bearing on 

hbtory. Tbt• brinf(inJ:: of a mrasu•·c of selfsuffidcntly to tlw Ccrman people and the 

institution of st•lf-){O \'rrnrncnt under democrn tir principles, if sm cts.~ful , will stand out 

OMCn, cfu~e ·l' Scclion, 1\nnu:tl Report, 9 

jul 16, in O~ IGUS 65 l / 10. 

' ll ht Rpt, OMC: ll ,,, o~r , 30 Apr ·16, in 

O~H:t:s 76 3/10. 

in h istOI) ' and pt•J haps will b1·iug a major 

conuibution to the pence of Europe and the 

world. ~ 

For the a\'Crngt Gcrm , however. the 

most pressing concern in the pring of 1946 

was food. The d,tily ration for the normal 

consumer in the a. it ish zone dropped to 

I ,042 calories a day in Ma rch and in the 

French zone to 980 ca k~; thr newspapers predicted a cut hy as much as 50 

percent in the U.S. w nc. Grnin imports 

for the zone, which nl I 00,000 tons a 

month in the last quane r of 1945 had not 

been enough to support Lhr J ,5r>O-calorie 

ration indefinitely, fell below 50,000 tons 

in 1-'ebruary I 4G .~ » G<·nnany was feeling 

the impart not only of its own but of a 

worldwide food shortage. The war had 

converted largc nreas in A"ia and the 

Pacific, whic·h had bee n sclf-c;uffi,•ient and 

had exported vegetable fat'l nnd oils to 

Emope, into food deficicnc)' a reas and had 

reduced European production by an estima ted 25 percent. •n With almost the whole 

world waiting in linc, thr Germans could 

easily guess tha t thcr would not he a t the 

head. On 2 1 ~far h Rrig. Gen. Hugh B. 

Hester of OMGUS went to Paris to see 

former Prc<~ id nl HcJ-ht•rt C. HOCivcr who 

was in Europe on the first of his postwar 

relief missions for President TrumM. 

Hoover· said he fclt as he had in I!) 18, that 

''We will have to feed the Ge rrnans" ; but 

be would not go to Germany or make any 

commitments for it until he had visited the 

libera ted countries. Asked how he would 

strc t\ h out feeding the Germans, Hoover 

replied: '·General, I would give as much 

"' Memo, :~y Cor 1\fcNarncy, 24 Apr 46, in 

0~1GU S 177- 2/ 'J. 

• OMCUS History, Jl t. 1, rh VIII, p. 68. 

•' OM GUS, Control O lllt l', it~ llr, History oC 

U.S. Milit:ory Co\c-rnm1•nt in Cermnny, Econ Dh•, 

Food and Agricnllnre 8 r.lnt h, l'l46, in O MCUS 

21- 3/ 5. 
436 THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

A 1,275 CALORIE DAY's RATION, displa'yed here as a si11gle meal. 

a~ 1 could in April, a little cs.~ in Nfay, 

a little less in J unc and hope the sunshine 

and flowers would keep you up through 

June. And maybe by that time we could 

do something for you."" 

Clay had no other choice than to do as 

Hoover advised. Accordingly, he reduced 

the ration in the U.S. zone on 1 April to 

1,275 calories, which was still about a third 

more than the indigenous su pplies could 

sustain. In the fourth week of May he had 

to reduce again to l, 180 calories. To meet 

"OMGUS, Division Staff Meeting, 23 Mar 46, 

in OMGUS 176- 3/ 3. 

these levels the Army in April and ·May 

released from its own stocks over 30,000 

tons of cereals, canned goods (corn , peas, 

and tomatoes), dried skim milk, dehydrated potatoes, and dessert powder. 42 

The introduction of corn and corn flour 

beginning in June into the German diet 

was taken by many Germans as a form of 

reprisal, since until then corn had been con-

'' ( I ) Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander's 

Weekly Staff Conference Nos. 22 and 2!!, 21 and 

28 May ~6, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97- USF9- 0.5. 

(2 ) Chronology of OMGUS and lts Predecessor 

Organizations, 1 Jan- 1 Jun 46, in OMGUS 

23- 3/ 5, p. 154. 
t\EI'J'Jff\R AN END NOR :\ BEGlt\~It\G 437 

sidercd in Germany Ol\ly suitable as feed 

for ( hitkens. Many of the released Army 

supplies were, in fact, low in ralorir value. 

Wben 1vlcNarncy l:'llkccl to Hoover in 

Frankfurt late in April he pleaded for shipments of wheaL, arguing that Germany 

could not be democratized and would remain politirally \tnstai>IC as long as the 

peopk were for< cd to devote all their 

thought and effort to the daily search for 

food:'a Earlier in the mcmth, aJtel· sman 

dist urhanccs had been reported in the BritisL zone, Clay and McNamcy had issued 

:l p1·ess statement warning that the foou 

crisis mjghl "lead to, unrest whic-h may 

neccs.-,itnte n larger army of OC'<'Upatjon for 

a longer period of time. " 11 

Afte1· 8:! ,000 tons of food arrived from 

the United States in the first three weeks 

of June nnd nn almO!'iL equal amount was 

en mule, Clay rail'eu the ration to 1,330 

caloric'5 per day on 24· J unc. Close lO half 

the tonnage, however, was Army surplus 

food scoured out <>f depots tround the 

world which, while helping to fill stomachs, 

c·otdd 11ot increase the 1nlorir value of the 

dirt as muc·h as an equal amount of g ra in 

wuuld have. The n isis in any c.ase was far 

fi'Otn ove1. l n avari~t the bakers mixed 10 

percent raw potatoes into the hrcad dough, 

and witho11t continuing imports from the 

United States, there would be no hrcad at 

a.Jl in four to six weeks.· ~ Short on f crtilizer, 

"1Iqs, USPET, Weekly I nteTiigcncc Summary 

No. •10, 25 Apr •16, in Hisl Div, Hqs, ETO, 

97 USFB- 0.3. 

"flqs, Third A1•my. Weekly TnleTiigence "Report, 

I 7 Apr ·15, in Hist Uiv, Hqs, ETO, 97- USFS-0.3. 

"The Army had imported 750,000 tons o£ food 

for 1he U.S. zone all(:! Berlin between V- E Day 

and ;{0 June 1!1116 and le:~s d an additional 

172,000 tons from Am1y stocks between I Fehn1ary 

nncl :lO June 1946. ( I } OM GUS, Control Office, 

Hist Br, History, Food nnd Agricultltte Branch, 

8 May ~5 30 jun 46, in OMGUS •H0- 1/3. 

(2) Ht1s, USFET, '!'healer Comm11nder'~ Weeki)' 

machinery, and labor, the zone's agriculture was not likely to proclure as good a 

l'rop in 1946 as it had a year earliCJ'. To 

make matters worse, farmers were hoatding 

thousand<> of tons of food to sell on the 

black market, and the unemployed, many 

of them former white collar workers who 

feared « o~>.<; of soc r~ l status, were refusing 

johs ns farm laborers. Meanwhile health 

c hecks, such as the one in Mannheim in 

which 60 percent of the infants showed 

signs of 1·ickets, reveal.ed increasing evidence of nutlnutrition among the rity 

popul ations:'') 

T o add t() the slra ins on the unsettled and 

unhappy rountry, violence of all kinds, exrepting resistance to the O('tupation authorities, increased in the ct1rly hal£ of 1946. 

lncidents caused by U.S. troops, i[ no more 

numerous than they hild been in the last 

months of 194·5, were certainly no fewer; 

they .included, as they had earlier, wanton 

killing, looting, and threats and assau lts 

on German police and civilians. ln May, 

J ewish DPs in hig camps at Fochrenwald 

and Landsberg, Bavari a, rioted against 

hoth Lbc Germans and the Ameri(·ans for 

no better reason apparently than the unfounded rumors thai some J ews had been 

kidnapped. At tacks by Germans on American soldjers, almost unheard of before, 

were inn-easing too, mostly because of rt·aLcrnization between soldiers and German 

women. German men resented the women's 

willingness to consort with U.S. soldiers, the 

soldiers' a ffluence, and their own inability 

to nmk even as minor competition for lhe 

Staff Conference No. 28, 2 Jul 4(i, in Hist Div, 

H!]s, F.TO, !J7- US1'9-0.5. (3) Hist Rpt, OMG 

Bavaria, Jun 46, in OMGUS 4:16-2/3, p. 285. 

•• ( I ) Wk Rpt., Ol'v!G Wucrttembcrg-Badcn, 12 

May 4·6, irl Hist Div, USFET, T- 353- 1/6. 

(2} Hqs, Third Army, Weekly Intelligence Report, I 7 Apr 4 6, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO). 

97- USFS- 0.3. 
·138 TT-rF. U.S . . \R~ Y I '\ THE OC:C:trP \"1 10:'\ OF GER:\1.\~ Y 

\tnt:rin \11-;, The Negro ttoops, wlw wrrc 

111al-.in,g \IP :111 innca'iing propot'lion of the 

rH'rupation force, were pat'l i<:ulr11'l)1 rcst~ 1l~d l1y Ucn11an men; and 1he Negroes, 

bclj,·vi ll).( thq• were not gt:lting ;111 

<'quai !~hare of the women, HII~Cd wuclgc.<; 

<1~ainst hoth the Germans nncl the white 

J\mcril'a 11!!. '

7 

Evidence thal the Edehueisspiralr11 and 

uthcr underg1·ound clubs were growing and 

thnt the roue harbored what w;1)\ becoming 

a pcnn11nr.nt subrullurc of vagrant )'Oung 

people revived concern for the Gr,mu1n 

youths. In April, the Munich police pkkcd 

up over 900 vagrants les.<> lha11 twent y-one 

yean; old, nearl y a qua rter ot thcn1 gil'ls. 

·rhc ll:warian Red Cross had li ,(JQO vagrants li t~ . It maintained Wtmderlwefe 

(homes) for them, but few, cspcrinlly those 

in the ·evcntccn to twenty-one ag<' 11p. 

stn)'Cci more tha n a few weeks. T he dirc<.·tor 

of one Wa11derltof dcscrihecl the boy~ as 

''completel y c:old and blase, entirely c·akulaling in what they do. They have lost every 

feeling t)f relationship wi th thci1• homeland 

and home with parents and rclativ s, even 

with their mothers. Mcmori{'.\ mean nothing to them. Their only interests nrc food, 

sleep, money. and girls." 111 One example., 

<:rrtninly not Lypical but not unique either, 

wa-; a 12 year-old boy whose father, Ml SS 

officer at ~l uth sen conrentration ramp, 

had committed suicide. The father, according to rumor, had used concentra tion cnmp 

prison<:r!l for riO c practice. The m<}thcr was 

intrl'ncd at Dachau as a potential war 

rrimcs defendant. Placed in a children's 

11 (I) Hisl Rpt, Hqs, U.S. Cor"tnbulary, Apr 

46, in Hisr Di", Rqs, ETO. 97- USFR- 0.3. 

(2) CahiC!, CG. USFET, to Wnr Dep t, for AG, 

I Mny 46, in PMCO, classified dcdmal file, MG 

Div, C:~hll•~ . (3) Hist Rpt, Dct E-2!H, 30 J nn 

·16, in OMCUS 7B-:VJO. 

i~ t R.pt, OMC B;w;tria, I :! I May •16, in 

OM0US 76- 3/10. 

home aftt'l having prnt most of hi' life 

in far from ,•cJil) in.~ :tdult c:ompany, he 

.tdaptecl q11i1 kly and proved to l)c nwrc 

dcvcr than the avcmw: ( hi ld; !>ttl his 

<'Onnsclnr 'td. " lie plays wilh ot hcn; 

aml laugh" and rmnp!< with lhcm Inti h:1s 

no dose ie~ wit h any of the children or 

the Lcnl"het'S." '" The young people who had 

homes and fnmilic.-; but lived in bombedout cities and \v<·nt to overcrowded, barely 

f unt lioning- schools were not much better 

off. Eoys t•ovcd the ·tl'cCl , and girls in their 

early teens lnok<.'d for solclic.r-boyfriends or 

experimen ted with amateur prostitution.M 

In 1\pril, McNnmcy ordered all mililary 

government. divisional, :1 nd higher headquarters to n.~ign nHtturc offi cers lo check 

in to the youth problt-m ''with a view lO· 

ward rot'l'tC'lilli( these conditions and inc-reasing propt·r youth activities that will 

keep thc.<;l' young people out of trouble .... If we fnil in thi.<;," he added, "we 

arc simply making future trouble for ourselves. • During the next month, the !.and 

oiTic'es or military government organized 

youlh r.()mmittccs and sent youth activit y 

liaison offi cers to the tactical units. ln 

Bavaria, for a sta rt, Lt. Col. Kenneth 

E. Van Bu.<~ kir . special youth adviser to 

the Office of Military Government for 

Bavaria, secured f1•om captured Wchrmacht stnrc." 4,000 pairs of skis, 3,000 

jackets, 6,000 pa irs of ski pants, 70,000 

caps, and 10,000 knapsacks. By midJ une, wh en lh<' youth advisers held a 

four-day meeting in M w1ich, Kreis youth 

committeC-'l had hccn organized in every 

Kreis in Wucrttrmherg-Baden and Greater 

H esse and in mm·c than half of the Ba-

.,I bid. 

• Ibid. 

" Hqs, USf.'ET, 'rhl·ntcr Commander's Wrekly 

Staff Conference No. 15, 2 Apr 46, in H isl D iv, 

q~. ETO, 97- USF9 0.5. 
I\E!THER :\N EKD ~OR \ BEGlK 'It\G 439 

varian 1\reise. By Lhen military govcnunenl 

had approved 2,500 yout h roup~ with a 

tolal membership over 300,000; and the 

tartil'al units were uppl in ~ alhlccic equiiJmrut nnd instructors to l<:arh American 

gnmes aud were releasing or sharing requisitioned S>'mnasiums, swimming po ~. and 

!iports fields. ~ 

Oo 5 May every German in the U.S. 

t.onc over eighteen r egistered under the 

L;~w for Liberation from National Sodali~m and Militarism and filled ou t the 

required M eldebogen. H earings we re srhcdulccl to begin ten days later, hqt in most 

places during the two months the law bad 

hccn in effect, the military government detachments had nor been able to find 

enough men to staff the trihunal~ and ad 

as pros<:1'utors. The Jaw required tribunal 

mcmhcrs to he local c.~dc•Hs, known opponcHts of na1.ism a nd militarism, pcrsonnlly beyond reproach, and fair mld just. 

Detachment E- 29 1 in Lnndkreis Wolfrat'>-

ha uscn , Bava ria, reported that finding 

<:(Jrnpclcnt prosecutors and judges was imos.<~ ibk ; no one, whether a nti-Nazi or not, 

w:1ntct.l to judge thdr own friends nnd the 

people they had lived with all the ir liv<:s.~3 

People in La11dkreis Dillingrn, Bavaria, 

were convinced that men who a ccepted a ppointments a .<; prosecuto~ or 1•hairmcn of 

tl'ihuna)s would ha,·c troubl<- for the rest 

of their· liv<'S, and the local dct;tchmcnt re<'-

nnHncndcd bringing in str·angers who 

"co1dd leave town aflcr it was over. "r.~ 

Captain Boring, in Lauclkrci.r La ufen, 

drew up a list of twenty-one passive anti-

" H<ts, USFF.T, Theater Commander's Weekly 

St.11T Confcr('nccs Nos. 27 :\nd 28, 26 Jun ;:md 

2 J nl •16, ln Hist Div, Hq1, F.TO, Cf7- USF!J- 0.5. 

'" Jlbt Rpt, Dct E-291, 30 ]110 15, in OMGUS 

18 3/ 10. 

" ftl•t Rr>t, OMO Bavari11, 3 1 ~f r •IIi, in 

OMGUS 711- 3/10, 

Nazis. There were no t twenty-one a cti,•e 

anti-Na;-.i~ in the {(reds, he said. The prosecutor for Laufen dcdared outrig ht that he 

expected Lobe a ruined man."5 DetaehnH.:tll 

G-297 in l.rmrlk?-eis Neuburg, Bavaria, said 

of its w ndidatcs: "They made a very poor 

impressio n. Some a ppeared to be semi-literate, othc rl'; hordcrlinc mental cases. Th~ 

ten most acceptable were selected and 

approvc-d."An 

A tl'ibunal at Fuersteufeldbrur k, Bavaria, hdcl the first trial in the U.S. 7.0tiC 

on 20 May 194G. Three dcfend<uHs 

pleaded g~till)' lo having beaten nn nntiNazi in 9:~3 and were sentenced to three 

years ;H h:u·d lahor·, confiscation of property, ~nd pro hibition from working at <mything but ordinary lahor for ten yeal' 1 In 

the first ca.~c tried in Wucrttembcrg-Badcn, 

at Hcidcr\hcim 011 12 J une, a former labor 

front official wns found to he an offender 

and sentenecd to imprisonment and loss of 

properly.u These two decisions were not 

enough, however, to lay to rest the doubts 

about the out('ome of denazification in German h«mds. Detachment E-29 1 reported 

on tribunals it had observed, "Verbal evidence hy the dcfrn!lc, and usually hy Nazi:\ 

lcstif yiog on behalf of anotl1er Nazi, L-. 

given more weig ht than documents suhmincd hy the prosecuLi n. "~0 The Office 

of Milit:Hy Govemmcnt for Bavaria asses.c;ed the Ot•rman responses as follows: 

Those who had clear consciences wc l'C 

hoping tlte law w()\dd wipe out the con1pam· 

.., Hist Rpt. Oct E 2U I, 30 Jun 46, in OMOUS 

77-!VtO . 

.,. Hist RJII , Dot G- 297, M01y 46, in OMGUS 

65- 2110. 

,., Hist Rpt, OMC "Bavaria, 31 May ·16, in 

OMCUS 76-3/ 10. 

"' H istory o( Military Covernmem in La11d 

Wuerttcmhl'rg-Uadcn, p. 1436. 

.. Hist Rpt, D«'t ~ 29!, 30 Jun 46, in OM GUS 

78- 3/10. 
TilL L.S. \R\IY I'\ 'IHI: 0( < l ' P\TJO'\ OF GER~I \'\Y 

th c 'H·.alth of thr .'\:~11'. tho<it· '' lm,c• c·on-

~c·i pun•, \H'l't' rtot so cl£'31 \\t•n• ~c·nclinl{ thrir 

Wi\ l'S to lnilw lh<' Wi\ Cli nf til<' llll'lllht·t~ of th<~ Sfi111thktunmt'Y, OJ' tl')•in!j to transfer 

prnpctt) to pt•rsons politicnlly ( kilr, <JI' pre-

/

wring to 1110\'t· (() somC' othl't /Om• wht'l't' thr;-

nw~ \\I'll' 1101 SO harsh. Or ju\( Wfllltlll( f01 

thc•ir fntt• \Vhilt' the l'\azis wt•tc• ~c·un) ing to 

a,·oid ll i:1l, members of tht• S prur hJ.."mmer 

\CI'nu•d ju,c as eager to avoid pru~r·c uti n~. 

r he) citht•J' disliked the ''tonghnC'ss" of the 

Ia\\ cu fc•.m•d rl'prisals later. l'hc• l.und p<~lillral patties \\('1'<' paying lip l-.l'r\ kc. l~ pc iallr 

stubiJorn was thf' CSU \-.hir h !>IOutl fn lost' 

tlil' rno~t by ndopting a strong pohC)'•I1rl 

But, once! more, for denazificA tion 1 he tinH: 

for cli ~c ~sion was pao;l. On 1'1 J une, 

OMCU~ re.•winded all existing tllilitary 

govcrnrHcnt demtzification directives; the 

rcsponsihilil) paAACd ro the (;<'l'lllnns." 

On 28 \pril and 26 May the Gcnnans 

in tlte U.S. zone went to the- polls to elect 

Lfmclkreis and Stadtkreis rouncils. American rrartitms ranged from satisfaction in 

OMGUS with the still high turnouts--72 

pctTt·nt in the Landkreise and 03 p<:rccnt 

in tire Statllkreise-and with thr signs that 

the ciC1 torate were not reverting to their 

pre-I rillrr habit of hacking splinttr parties 

(only the COU and C U and tlw So<'i<tl 

Dcmoctal! drew ignificant pcrc·cmagcs), 

to ot~eptkism of German demonaq at the 

lower military ~o,·ernmcnt lc"el' and some 

apprehension O\'Cr the he;wy vntc for the 

CDU and CSu.n~ Whatever thr clrrtious 

"" Hl t J{tJI, OMC Bavaria, g J Mny •tG, in 

OMGUS 76 :1/ tn. 

"JCS I !>I 7 / II, Summary of Junl' Report o£ 

rhc Mlllt:1ry Governor, U.S. Zone, 3 St'p 46, in 

OrO, ABC 387, ~e<' . 4- H. 

• tn thc 70nc"idc tallies. the CI)U and CSU 

recei"ed 56 percent of the vote in the l.arrdlrrtiu 

.lnd 37.8 Jl('tctr11 in the Stntftkreiu to the Social 

Orrnocr3ts' 29.2 percent and 36.1) t)ercent. In 

Bavaria, thl' lurge~t of the Lnerrdcr, tlw CSU 

~cored 6<1.4 percent in the Ll111tlkr<'iu nnd 43.7 

percent in the- Studtkreise, and the Social Demo· 

mcanL (ur I he futUI e of demO!'T<IC} in 

Germany, the) spelled the end for loral 

militar)• government. T he Lanrlkreis detachments I>C'!'i111JC liaison and security 

offices on I f\by, tnd the Stadlkreis dctrwhment<; were red<"<;i~ atcd on 3 June. 

Within miliwry govcmment, the withdrawal of the drt.u hments was accompanied hy an eleventh-hour drive to 

ci"ilianize hdur' the end of June. The W4 

liaison and 'l'curit)' offices, each wmposcd 

of two officers and two enlisted men, were 

not affected ginrr they were to remain military personnel fnr the psychological ciTcc·L 

of the uniform. 'l'hcsc ofTices had personnel 

problems of their own, however: more than 

a few were in tlw t·ondition of D- 35 7 irl 

Lanrlkreir 'curnarl..t, Bavaria, which t'onsisted of two officer', neither trained in military government .tlld hoth sc\'eral month<~ 

overdue for redeployment, and two 19-

year-old pri\'atcs, hoth also untrained.~~ 

Clay reponed at lhe end of June thal the 

ratio in OlVlCVS was lwo civilians to one 

officer, :mel he expcc:tcd to reach similar 

ratios in the f.nttd offi ces in sixty dny ' 

But as of 30 j une, chr personnel situations 

in Bavaria and Grratcr Hesse were probably not much dilf('rent from (hat in 

WuerttcmberJ{-Badcn where only 90 oul of 

a total of 560 wot ~rr.; were civiliam;. Q$ The 

military gov<•r llllll'nl officer wa.c; goi n).{ to 

be in evidcnrc fol' a while yet; and in A[H'il, 

the School ror Military Government, whir h 

c:rats 22.9 pcreeut nod 37.0 percent. Military Government of Cermany, Ccnnan Go,•emrnentnl 

Organiu.tion ;wd C:ivil Administration, Monthly 

Report No. 10, 20 M .1y 46. 

.. Monthly Rpt, DC'l D- 357, I J un 46. in 

OMGUS 79-2/10 . 

"Memo, Clay for Bull, \ltD: Proposed Reduction 

of Officer Strcn!{th in OMCUS, 28 J un •16, in 

O~ICUS 177 2/1, 

.,. Hi$tory of Military in La11d Wuerltembl'rgBaden, p. 9:1. 
had gt aduau:d its Ia: t class at Clw rlot tcsville in FciJI'uMy and had n Ol tr:tim:d any 

offi< ('I:; for Europe since I 44, reopened at 

CarJi-;Jc Barracks, Pcnn'>)'lvanin, to Kivc 

four-week rou~~ to the estimated 3,000 

1 c•placcrncnt officers tha t military governnlt'nt in Grrmnny would need in 1916. "

6 

Fullv di\'orrcd, finally, military g<wcrnmt•nt ;111d thr tat tical commands in the 

SJ)I ing of J9H1 \VCrc agai11 cxvcrirncing 

fri ction \vith each other or, at lca~t, what 

~Jc-Namey dcsC"rihed as "a definit e loss in 

friendly ro-operation. " In the field, the friction stemmed, as it hnd in the pa..,l, from 

tht' di11 parity in ranks a nd in highct• <·chelon-;, in part, from cjvilianization. Owing 

to redeployment, the military government 

oniccr... in the field were, if anything, even 

mo1 r junior to their counterpart~ in the tactittd cu11l1n:tnds than they hnd been in 

1945. t the higher levels, Clay romplaincd, "Many times U.S. < ivilians nnd 

militnr)' do not look at e;tcb other , .. " 67 

On llw one hand, the tactical c omm.tnds 

fnnn USFET on down did nOI relish heing 

in a support I'Oie where they had once heen 

in command. Recognizing this feeling, Clay 

wid the OMG US divi!;ions they should not 

··~ end cahlcs to USFET telling them what 

to do .•• lhutj call for hdp in'>tcad.''6

\ 

O n !Itt' other hand. it did not seem in 

O~lC: US that the tactical command!. had 

lOI rc<'tly a~'>es:;ed their part in the OC"<'Upation. On th is score, Clay wrote to MrNa rncy; 

• ( I ) Mrmo, I'MG for CofS, sub : '!'rained Mili· 

uuy Govc:rnrn~nt Replacement Officers, 18 Feb 

41>, in PMG, MG Oiv, cla5$ifi«< derimnl file 

352.01. (2) Memo, P~ , Dir, MG Oiv, for Control OfT, $Ub : Weekly Summary of lmf!Ort::lnt Occurrences, •I Apr ·16, in PMG, MG L>iv, classified 

dedmnl file a 19.t. <1 OMGUS, Division Staff MeetillK, :lO Apr 46, 

In OMGUS I ?R 3/ 'l. 

"Ibid. 

~t y hilo~oph)' . : , ~ion!> the At ~~~~· _of 

On·upation :t~ ha\ 1ng a dual I'C\pnnslbllll)' 

in Ct·nn:tny. f' . lo prO\ ide sudt force as 

nccessnrr to ensure ('arrying out the obj('('ts 

of the occupation, that is. support of military go\'Crn1nent. Second, since military govcrnm'cnt itself is a l'r$pomibilitr or the' i\rrny, 

it is most important tha t the 1\rmy handle 

this civil :s llt~ihilit)' of its O\\ 11 accord wit h 

somewhat tht• .,,1me relation between tarticn l 

troops a nd rnilit:~ry go,cmment as exis~ at 

home ami in our prew:tr O\ el'l>Cas stat1ons. 

A civilian high commissioner should 1101 

show later ~ mote zealous interest in sa feguarding th<• C:eranan econom)' in the intt•r· 

ests of tlw U .S. budget and in the interest 

of our objcrt to bring dc111onac.:~ ~ Ccrwany 

than docs the Army now. 1f th1s IS n sound 

philosophy, tlwn your posi tion as theater 

commandl•r is separate and distinct f1 om 

your position a~ ili )" Go\'ernor, and till' 

proper b<~lanrcd relationships bel\,ccn rc1ur 

staffs arc c·s.~c tia\. 11 

The bnlancc that needed to be found was 

between a vit torious army living in a conquered nation and a n army becoming increasingJy ccmccmed for the welfare or its 

former enemy. Jn OMGUS opinion the 

area in whil'lt the most erious imbalance 

CKisted in the spring Of 1946 was that of 

housing requisitions. The Lmrd offices of 

miJitary government all complained that 

there was an inverse ratio between the redeployment or troops and the numher of 

rooms orcupied hy the troops. The Office 

of Miliwry Government for WuerttrmbcrgBaden, for instance, found that while 

troops had occupied 29,394 rooms in the 

Land in November 1945, the number rose 

to 42,002 in Occcmhcr and 43,36 1 in Januarr. ~u However, when Clay e.:'<: pressed surprise that after a reduction from over three: 

• Memo, Clay for McNarney, 29 Apr 46, in 

OMGUS 177 2/3. 

" History of Military Govemment In !.o11d 

Wuerttembrrg-Daden, ch. x, sec. v. 
442 T HE U.S. ARMY J!'; THE OCCUP.\TJ01 OF CER?viANY 

million troops to less th n haH a million, 

the Army was still t'C.CJUisitioning houses, 

Gcnernl Bnrker, USFET 0 - 1, explained 

th tt the troops were now living in smaller 

groltps." The l.mzd offices of milit~ry government, on d1cc•king, also lea rned that 

large parts of the increases were belated 

formal requisitions of houses occupied 

months before, hut they still complained 

tha t too many req uisitioned bujldint,rs wet•e 

hcing ldt v:\cant or undcroccupied. ln 

April, USFET authorized milital')' government to "act ns a buffer between the communities and the tac tical rommandcrs" and 

empowered it specifically to prevent houses 

from being taken from U.S. appointee,c; 

(which had IJCcn a t'cntrring cmbarras.c;-

mcnt to militnt')' government ) or from Germa ns who httcl put mud1 pc~onal effort 

into t•epairing their homes.02 

f or the taCLical commands the problems 

in the spring of 1046 and a fter, as the renewed tension with military government 

evidenced, were to overcome the shock of 

redeployment and settle into the sta t us of 

a permanent occupation force. '>Vhcn 

H eadqua rters, Third Army, moved from 

Munich to Hci.dclherg on J April and l>c* 

came the ground forces command for the 

U.S. w ur., the troop shipments <lU I of the 

theater still hy far exceeded arrivals, and 

the rrinforn:ments roming in were ove•·-

wbclming ly rec·cnt draftees wilh only 

accelerated basic training. Surveys in rciJ1-

forrcmcnl depots in May showed 85 perl'Cnt of enlisted a ·signmcnt · a nd 64 percent 

of omccr assignments to the Ordnance and 

Qtwl'tcrmastcr Corps hnd been made without regard to rapahilitics.'!l The U.S. Co11-

' OMGUS, Division Stoff Meeting, 27 /\pr •16, 

in OMCUS 171\-.:1/3. 

t• OJ\,lGUS, Uivi~ion St:~IT Mee Lings, 27 Apr -16, 

in OMGUS 178- 3/ 3. 

'" 'l~, USFET, Theatrr Commander's Weekly 

stahulary, projcrtcd as an elite fol'ce, was 

having to accept the average spread of reinforcements and had authority only to reject 

illiterates, men who did not speak English) 

and outright undesirahlc'\.: ' While military 

government reported improvement in troop 

rondtwt and di:;riplinc in May, the rate of 

ind dents was still high in proportion to 

troop htr ength; and the curren( r rontrol 

progt:tnl was fast becoming a disaster. Tile 

modest tvorable balance.~ produced by Lite 

currency coutrol books in Dcr rrnhcr and 

J anmlry evaporated in February when the 

troop!'\ sent home $10 million mote than 

they n :ceived in pay. Th<:rcafte r the movement was all downhiJJ <ts $14 million more 

went out than rame into the theater in 

March, $17 million each month in April 

am.l May, and $18 million in June. The 

British, in ~lar , went to military snip, 

which was nul cunvcnihlc into marks, and 

the War D epartment and USfET were 

c·onsidcring doing the s.-'\me in the U .S. 

zone but were con cerned about the effect:; 

on commandc; stationed in other areas and 

ti'Ouhlc.'iome reactions from the Soviet 

Union!" The dearest symbol of the change 

from warlinlc to occupation status was the 

opening o n I March in Gicssen of the first 

military <"ommttnity to house military de· 

pendenls and U.S. civilians, as thl' directive 

read. " in a manner mmparahlc lo· that on 

U.S. posts in 1937.'' ~ US FET expected 

eventually 10 have 90,000 dependents acSt:UT Conf~;:rcncc No. 20, 7 May 46, in Hist Div, 

H11s F.TO, 97- USP9-0.5. n Snyde r, Corullrbrdory, p. G1 . 

" Military Payment Ccrtific11tcs, a form of scrip, 

''·ere introduced in Ule U.S, ~Onl' on 12 September 

1946, ;111d the dollar ove aft~ ended immediately, 

P.UCOM, Ctlrr(lncy Co•nrol, pp. 45- 66. Sec al~o 

R11 nddl, l!ltrck Morket M ont)•, pp. !\0- 9 1. 

•• Hq,, USPET, Continental Base Section, lO 

:.Hiil:J> y Community CommandeN, I Mar -16, in 

Hist Div. Hqs, ETO, 97- USfB- 0. L 
1'\EI'J'llER A1 K!';D ~OR i\ 'BECII\1\JT\G 

l·ommodatcd iu ninety-seven communiti c.<~, 

providing PX's, rommis11a rles, trhcr s, 

lrt·n uty parlors, tli!jpcnsaries, ~nd houses 

Rod aparllnenl~ requisitioned from the Gcrrnnnll. The first specia l dependents' lrain 

arrived from Bremerhavcn on 10 May.;r 

Bctwcrn J June and 1 July, Third :\rmy 

entered the final phase of the g round for<'es 

reorganization and conversion to the polirctype occupation. The U.S. Constahubr·y became opera tional in an on-tl1e-job 

training status because three-fourths of the 

en listed men were recent arrivals and the 

three-division lactital force moved into permanent stations and began training as a 

tactical and limited strategic reserve. ;R 

Army-ad ministered milita ry government 

would continue in Germany for anothe!' 

three years, tbe occupation for nine years, 

and the U.S. military presence for a generation or more; nevertheless, the month of 

June 1946 marked the crossing of a major 

divide. Behind lay two wodd wars and a 

trail of by then meaningless ambitions and 

anxieties. The future was far from certain, 

hut one thing was apparent: il would not 

be anything like what had heen expected 

a year ago or les.<>. The world had changed, 

Germany had changed, and Lhe rationale 

of the occupation had changed. The troops 

who had imposed the Allied will on the 

t'onquered country had gone home, as had 

all but a few of the milit<II'Y government 

officers and men who had accompanied 

:r ( I) Memo, Hq~, USFET, AG, for Distribution, sub: Occupation Planning, 5 Dec 45, in 

USFET SGS, 3:!2. (2} Annual Rpt 1 Hqs, Giessen 

Military Post, Dec 46, in HisL Oiv, Hqs, ETO, 

97- USFB- 0.1. 10 (I) Hqs, Third Army, Operations Plan for 

Reorgunization of U.S. Zone Ground Forces, I 5 

May 116, Third Army1 66- 104. (2 ) Synder, Corlstabulary, p. II?.. 

tlt<:m. The Morgcnthau Plan was an em· 

mr ra~sifl g rnt mory. J US 1067 ronlinued 

as th r ~tat~mcnt of U .S. policy, as n111ch 

~ for any other n;ason, because no one 

wanted Lo tackle the jnl> of organizing the 

jigsaw piccc.o; of subsequent policy and 

practice into a new directive.;, The U nitcd 

Stat<'S was committed to reconstruction , 

rurrency reform, a nd econ omic reunifica1 ion in Germany; and to arcomplish these 

goals> C lrt}' would offcr, on 20 Jul y 1946 

in the Control Council> to enter int<> agreements with any or all of the other occupying powers. Secretary of State Byrnes 

would make the sam e offer publicly in 

Stuttgart irl September. U.S. policy had 

come full rit·<-lc. FM 27- 5, in its first versioH, had advocated making friends out of 

fonner enemies. JCS 1 OG7 had wanted 

hroughl home lo lhe Gcnnans that ''Germany's ruthless WRriare and fanatical Nazi 

resistance have destroyed the German econ -

omy and made chaos and suffering incvitanle."-!1" Byrnes, speaking to Germans in 

Stuttgart, said, "The American people 

want to help the German people win their 

way hack to an honorable place among the 

rree and peace-loving peoples of the 

world."s' 

;• Clay told the War Department that he would 

rather see JCS l 067 amended than completely 

rewritten since a complete rewriting would necessitate wo many change~ in other instructions issued 

in the theater. HI' had found JCS 1067 as modified 

hy Potsdam a "workahle policy," he said. Cable, 

OMGUS to War Dept, sub: Modification of JCS 

1067, 10 Dec 45, in CCS 31!3.2 1 (2-22-44), sec. 

I 0. See also GimiJel, The American Occufwtion 

nf Germt:m)', p. 22. 

"' JCS 1067/6, Directive to the Commander in 

Chief U.S. Forces of Occup?Lion Regarding the 

Military Government of Germany, 26 Apr 45, 

in CCS 3:83.21 ( 22-4 ), sec. 7. 

'' Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Docllments 011 Cerma"}', p. 42. 
CHAPTER XXV 

Conclusion 

The categorical impcralivc for military 

forces probably should he to conduct each 

operation so well that it c-ould stand unqucstioued as a model for the future. As 

a prat·tical III<Htcr, however, this ideal is 

seldom :H hir.ved, hut e.'\.'>01'1~ ran be drawn 

from fnilures as well as successes. In the 

swdy tJf romb:t! operations this is a.'Ciomatic. The rourse and outcome of a battle 

arc determined I iY the interaction of judgments made indepcntlcntly on hoth sides. 

Orcupying and administering enemy terrilory. on the other hand, hn tendctl consislcutly to be looked upon M jnvolving 

primnrily unilateral judgments, which 

therefore shoultl he uniformly cor·recl, given 

the requisite degree of lcc hnicnl competence. 

No doubt, PreSident Roosevelt's early determination to turn the work of administerin ~ occupied areas over to c·ivilianl' was 

strongly motivated hy the belief that civilians hnd more· practice in the skills of govcmmenl and that a sutr<:!»ful occupation 

chicOy required a tmnsfer of these skills. 

Tn fnr t, the :assumption could b ·made that 

<~umini tering occ-11picd enemy territory is 

less dillirult than c-onducting dome'!<t ic government. The population doc~ not need to 

hr r.onsulted; tilt administrator has an 

am1y fll its lmt k; and che purpose for his 

hcing there is ~>implc and direct. The 

SIV\EF Standnrd Policy and Procedure in 

l 944 d<:sct'ihcd the Supreme Commander's 

objective in en<:my territory as being ''the 

nulitary occupation and control of all zoncs 

r)f enemy terriwry for whjch he may be 

responsilllc.'" The fi rst objective of military 

govemrnent given in the SHA£F prcsurrcn<lcr dircetivc of 9 November 1944 was 

"Imposition of the will of the J\llies upon 

occupied Germany."~ The November 1966 

]oi11t M nmwl for Civil Affairs (FM 41 - 5) 

desc ribe~> military government as "the assumption by thr military comrnandct' of 

full cxccmivc, legislative, and judicial authority ov~t' a conquered or otherwise unrul y population." 3 FM 41 - JO ( 1966 ) like 

it ~ ptcdcccssors, defines mililary govcmmcnt as ·'The form of administr:ltion by 

,.,hich an o<:napying power cxcrrises excrutivC', lcgi!;lalivc, and judi<"ial power over Ol"-

rupicd territory.''' The authority of the 

O("eupying power then is apparently romplctc, requiring mninly the organizations 

nnd prnc:cdurcs to e:-¢cr<'isc it. This study 

of the .\m1y t'Xpcricncc in Germany. how-

'SHAEF, Swnclnrcl Polic-y and Procrdurc for 

Comhiucd Civil AIT:lirs Operations in North West 

Europe, I May '1-1, in Admin Hisl Coflection, 

F.TOUSA, Nr. 146, C 5 CA. 

! SHAEF, Onlcc of the CofS, to Hq$, ACps 

21, 12, 6, n1h: Din·ctive for Military Government 

o( Ccnnany Prior to Dcfcal or Surrender, 9 NO\' 

·II, in AFH Q C- .5, Direclives, Militnry Go\•emmrtlt of Germany. 

' Ucvt of 1he ATllly, the N:~vy, and a he: Air 

Forel', FM ·U - 5, ~tc., j oi111 Monuol {(" Ch•il 

A.fft~irs, Nvv 66, p. 26. • Hq~, Dept of the Army, fM 41 - 10, Civil 

AIT~tin Opl'roaion, Oc.1 lifi, p. 2. 
< :O~C:LU ON 

~;ver, has shown that an occupation has 

rcsiuunl chnractcristics or the combat operation and that the fJC:<'Upation is as much 

the final stage of the war as it Lc; the assumption or the victm•'s righ ts and powers. 

Fir:;t :u1d prolmhly most important, an 

orr upation has an objective. In the abstract 

it may be only to assume executive, legislative, and judicial authority in a defeated 

untion; hut as any actual war is likely to 

be fought for some more significant purpose 

than merely tO win, llO nn orcupation is 

likt•ly to he entered into for some reason 

other than merely to govern. Establishing 

n valid objecti ve, as the U.S. cxpcricnre 

i11 German)' demonstrated, mny not he 

Cll!t)' · The combat commander dcalli with 

an existing situation, the occupation planner• with one that dot.'S not yet exist. The 

rom hat commander ~ concerned with an 

inuncdiate military problem, the on·upation phmncr, wMking in the political and 

psydlOlogical milieu of the war, with politiral, economic·, social, t~nd military problems 

uf the future. For the U.S. forces in Gcrmnny after World War TJ the principal 

objective as Rlatcd in JCS 1067 was " to prevent Germany rrom ever again cc oming 

n threat to the peace of the world "~ This 

objective, like the Prc.sidcn t's desire to have 

the inevitahilit • of ''chaos and ufTering" 

brought home to the Germans nnd introdur cd into JCS 1067 nfter the 23 March 

I 945 conference (sec above, p. 213). was 

set at the height of the war, with nn eye 

more to the past than to lhe future. JCS 

I 067 became a dir·et' tive admirably suited 

to preventing a r<:pctition of the 1920s and 

19:10s hut inadequate to meet the situation of the Ink 1940s. This inndcquaty, 

• JCS 1067/ H, Dirrctivc to Commandt:r in Chief 

oC U.S. Force~ of Occ•tp:1tion regarding th<' Militnry (;ovcrnmrlll of Grnnany, 26 Apr ·15, in OPD, 

ABC 387, Germall)', ~"~' · 4- D. 

<tnu nol a11y supposed echo of tile Morgenthau Pl an, was lhe document's great defect. 

The Germans did not have 10 be shown 

the con~~,;qucnces of defeat, .and after 1945, 

Germany was not likely ag;\in to rank as 

a majo r threat to wot'ld penrr. Consequently, the U.S. authorities in Germany, 

left wilhoul a valid principal objective, 

were rornprltcd to c.xploit loopholes, such 

as the disease and unrest rurmula, and to 

improvise. 

A pointlesS or mistaken objective m:~ y 

he lc.·s rr ;~di y recognized in an occupation 

than in a rombat operation. Battle frequently has a way of bril\ging deficiencies 

into sha rp focus. An occupation is Jess likely 

lo be subjected to a clear-cut, derisive t. 

Morcovet', n war of sufficient magnitude 

to rcsull in the large-stale conquest of 

enemy territm·y will also pr'Oh:lhly not he 

concluded without ranror; and a professionally dispas.sionalc military approar h 

will lw h:ucl put to prcvl:l il against an 

aroused public opinion, or even a single 

fixed opinion, such as that of President 

Roosevelt in the rase of Germany. 

In a nnnlmt operation, the ability to 

attain 1hc· objec tive is a major· criterion. Despite apparcnl unreslrirtcd power, the same 

appe;u·s to he lrue of the ohjertives in an 

occupation. In Germany, dennz.ification 

was prolmhlr the chief, i'lt\U certainly the 

most cncr'!!Ctic:ally pursued, tactical objective of the early o<:rupation period. 1L 

was also, ns Donnison has concluded regarding the British zone, probably the least 

satisfactory of all militar)' government 

undcrtakings.r. Before Lhc end of t 945, 

denazification on the terms originally envisioned hnci been proven imprartkal; and 

in the long run, if le."li had been attempted, 

• nn i~on, Ci1•il AU airs twd Military Got:em· 

me'll in Northwest ErtrOfll', p. •II;!. 
'l'fiE U.S. :\R~lY IN T ilE OC:C:UP.\ rlOl'\ OF GER~f \l'\Y 

more might h<wc hccn at·complishcd. Of 

3,623, I I 2 pc1'8ons considered r hargeablc 

under Lhc Law for Liberation from National Sorialism and Militarism, 887,252 

were tried lwf,>rc the German S/mu:hkam1MYII h)' :m J 11ne 1948 with tlw following 

results: 

trihunall' put 2.5 pcrrcnt or their l':\.q(,'s in 

the first two categories (major offenders), 

the British zone tdhunals 1.1 pcn·cnt, :md 

the Frc1wh zone {rihunals 0. 1 percent.'" 

The cou•-sc of dcnnzi ticalion dcmonstt·atc:s 

how ~c itivc the objectives of an occupation cnn l>c to U.S. pHblic opiuion on the 

M <1.\'inmm St.I/IC!Ire Srmclion.l 

Chrii'J!Cd as Found as Permi fled lmjJosed 

Major Offenders 20,306 I ,284 5 10 ear·s 404 

Offenders 318 ,189 18,979 Up to 5 )'cars 7,981 

LesSCJ' orrcndcrs 180,263 97 ,260 J ,000 Reichsmark 75,31)0 

or more line 

Followers 365,160 445,163 Less than I ,000 463,645 

ReichsmMk fine 

~xonera led 1 ,334 16,148 

Proceedings Dism isscd ?08,4 18 

Total 887 ,252 887 ,252 547 ,4207 

The Spruchkammem, during two years of 

tl'ials, found II 7,523 persons to hnve heen 

Na-zi ffcndc~ in some degree- !i out of 

() in the l<IW<'.st offender categorr- and imposed scnttJH'CS or fines of more than I ,000 

Rcichsma rk!l 011 83,775.R Milit:IJ')' government, on 1hr othrr hnnd, under its standards, had, hy 31 May 1946, found 

:~ 14,000 prrsons tn have been snflicicntly 

acLivc HS Nazis to warrant their removal 

hom puhlil' t·mployment and important 

positions in private cntcrpr ~c. The Spruchkmnmem in the U.S. zone were nt least 

as zealous a::; thc·ir counterpart!! in the 

other two wt·stcrn zuncs. The U.S. zone 

' Hqs, ncpt of the Anlly, CAD, Reports and 

1\mtlysis Dr, Civil Mfnit'l; nne! Military Govern· 

rncnt, Backgrottrtcl Summary, 19·W, in CMH file 

II 13- 2.3. 

• B)· 19<1!1, th<' Sprurhktrmnlu1• in th1· U.S. 7.0IIC 

hnd heard " tot:! I or !)50,126 <:<lSI'S. Fucntenau, 

Elltllo<i(tlit!rtlltJl, p. 22!1. 

• OMC.US, gcon Div, A Year nf !'fl(sr/am, in 

C~IH file WAR 10, GEH.- POT. 

one hnnd, and how vulnerable they can 

he Lo rcsi:;tancc by 1ltc subjcrts of the occupa tion on the other, if they go beyond 

1 he limits of the all:,inablc. 

Dcnat.itication and the revcr ~ of the 

coin, democratization, also p!'ovide the 

ha!>is for some ohst·rvations ()11 the rok or 

an oc-rupRt ion force as an instrument o{ 

r-;ocial and politica l rhange. Denazification 

gave the Army the mission o[ rarrying out 

;ts radic~ll an experiment in removing a 

!\Ourrc uf intcmational ronflirt as had hc:<:n 

undcrtnkt·n in modern tilllcs. Wotthy a!i clcnaY.ifiration was ill pl'inc:iplc, it was not, 

as milil:\l'Y govcr·nmcnt was painfully 

aware, realistically <·onecivcd. Condurtccl 

n.s a full-scale social revolution, it imposed 

dangcrou~ train~ on the structure of 1lw 

orrupation witho\ll nc< ~-;ari y promising 

any (ultll'C' returns 01 her than mon• trouble. 

•• Fueniii'Jtllll. E11t11od{i:itrrung, pp. 228-30. 
COI'\C:LUSION 

The tletttocralitaliou program, however, 

<t!TonJ., an example of a difTcrent sor1. By 

nut attempting ns much, it acc:omplishcd 

more. Tls great vil'l ue was that its form 

when c:cnernl Cia)' pm it into cffc< t in the 

fal l of Hl4·5 servcd pranical ami useful 

purpo.~ :.~> Cot both the U.S. authorities and 

the Gcrmnn people. The prcpondct·nm ntilil;tr)' gt•vcmnwnl 0pinion at the tinH· wo11lcl 

h:t\'C favored !\ll extended period of tutc1:1gl'. Jf this view !tad prevailed, the outrome might hnvl' been t h1' snmc as with 

dcna:lificalion : a train of incrcasinglr cxpc·nsivc and rrustraiing programs ending 

in mutunl cli-;appointmenl. Cia}' made 

drtno,·racy as <•ttaimtble an objective Cot· 

the U.S. forrr.s ns it wns ever likely to he 

hy placing the responsibility for its ll~in

mt'nl where· it wouJd ultimately have to lie 

in <U1}' case, with the German people. 

The milit:ll'y administratiou of ocrupiccl 

tcr·t·itory, like a combat opcr·ation, a lso requires unit)' of command. The necessity for 

cfc~r lines of nuthorit y and a single \omm.mdcr on the battlefield is obvious. In an 

oct upation, howcv£"r, the need Lo: apparen tly not so obvious. l.'rom Lhe outset in 

the planning for· Germany, the 'Var Dcpnrtll'ICnl had tc> defend Lhis pr·inciplc 

again'-L n stw11g pre ·iclentinl opinion 1 hnt 

riviliarr;; wert the proper adminislr:'llors fe~r 

orcnpicd territor)'· The is.c;11C was in f;)ct 

never erHirely sculed, nnd the principle w a.c; 

in jeopardy I)Jroughout the w:'lr. Consequently, <'Vcn though there wns no dual 

rommnnd, some of the h;~ncful effects of 

suc.:h a commnnd wrre felt in rhe planning 

for· nnd early occupation of Germany. Certninly, the S11pr·c.:me Commander's rreedom 

of decision was considerably c.~ in matter~ 

pertaining to the occupa tion than iL wa-; 

in affairs clearly recognized as military. No 

policy il'- hop<'less as nonfraternization 

would have been sustained for the better 

H 7 

par'l of tlte year tlor would any starT cntangktHents <\); unseemly <mu unprodut tivc as 

tho!-<' between the SH.\EF- USFET G- 5 

anu the U.S. Group Control Council havl' 

lwtn allowed to persist if they had affected 

t·omlmt opCJ·ations . 

. \side from the tlispnlc ovc1· civili:1n as 

opposed to militur} ,·ontrol, the occupation 

of Gcl'111:\lly exposed <• lntilt-in military 

government proclivity for muddled command 'h:ulnels. World \'\'ar li pmduccd 

two distinct and, tmfortmwlcly, not entirel y 

compatihk modes of militarr government : 

the one territorial tAMGOT) with irs own 

chain of rommnnd, the other integrated 

in to the tac-tinll commamls ( Standal'd 

Pnliry a nd Proced ure). The cxperienr.e in 

Germany demonstrated that both arrangenH'nts were ncrcs .. mry in sucressivc stages 

of the occupation, and both have continued 

to hnvc a place in U.S. dvil affa irs doctrine, as "area :;uppott" and "comn~twd 

support" operations.'' Most likcl~. both 

wottlcl he used again in f11turc militnry governrllent situations, and, \'err likely, lhe 

same problems wmrld at io;c out of (heir cmplo)'lltenl. Territorial military government 

can i>e readily adapted to political and geographic units or any siJ.c from il town or 

county to It whole count!')', but it funrtions 

hc<~ t in 11 separat e milit:tl')' government 

r hai11 of ron1mancl and docs not adjusl weJI 

lo tactical tmit houndaric>.s. lntcgr::~ted milita ry government is best :mired to mobile 

opcrationc;, and it pres<'rves unit}' of romm:Ind and the integrit} of l<lrtin rl bountl-

<lrics. Its span of control. however, is 

liruitcd to the lower governmental levels, 

and, as the EC,\D expcrimeul revealed, il 

lends to set the mil :~ry government personnel adrift from their own parent 

ga niz~t s without making them truly 

11 F~ l 'I 1- 10, C.wil .4/lnirJ Ofil"rnlioll. p. 2- 2. 
448 THE U.S . . \R ~fY IN THE OCCUP.\TION 01: CERMA!\'V 

integral p:uts of the tartkal commands. 

1\n ildditiona l nnd potentially more serious 

J)I'OIJicm is the apparently n:~tural im·lination of military government to want to 

t:onvcn to the territorial fonn at 1 he earliest 

possible time and the cq11ally nalurnl 

tendenC:)' of the tactical commands to 

he slow in rclinqui~hing the pr·crogativc.'l 

they huve acqujrcd during the period of 

integrarcd military government. 

Lastly, <IS Colonel Hunl n:commendccl 

after World '"'ar (, ci.,.;J afTnirs- military 

governrn«!nl is a specialized military function and needs trained personnel. The Wnr 

Depart menl recognized the need early in 

\Vorld W ar II and provided lhc training. 

Tn doing so, however, it exposed Rome conromitnnt problems whkh it was not able 

entirely r.o solve. Chiefly, these prohleml! 

were how to sustain the morale of relatively 

senior specialists during the long period of 

waiting before lhey could be employed; 

how to organize for service in the field a 

civilian-oriented activity operating within 

the military rramcwor·k; anti ho\\1 to sustain 

<ln activity that could only he brought into 

full play a ft er the w(lr had ended a nd the 

rr.st of lhc Army was going horne. Although 

the same problems rould arise again, they 

were undoubtedly aggravated hy lbe special conditions of World W:tr II. Civil 

affairs military government wns new. Il 

existed, O\lt it had no established position 

in the Army. It had to find itself in situations in which neither the commands nor 

the personnel had adequate precedent.s 

from whkh to make judgments. As a result, 

ECAD, for instance, was not a table of 

organiJ;ntion djvision, and its members, a lready disgruntled at having been recruited 

for work 1hcy sometimes doubted would 

ever exist, suspected they were also JJcing 

deliberately denied promotions and being 

treated as second clas.<> sold e~. Furthermore, having gone thrmtgh several years 

()f um:cnainty, the eivil a fTairs- military 

govcmmcnt personnel wrre all too easily 

caught up in the demobilization fever :tfLCr 

V- J Oay. Previous ('rrors, huwrvcr, do not 

have to he repeated. The World W ar II 

expericnrc exists us guidance for the future. 

In particular, civil affairs- military government did find a place in the Army and 

did, a lthough ihc pa th was not smooth , 

achieve organizational and doctrinal maturity. Howc"·er, civil affairs-milit<'lry government will prohably a lways tend to be 

somewhat out of phase with the rest of the 

military structure. The answer a ppears to 

be a trained reserve. 

Of •·ourse, an occupation also differs 

from n combat opcr·ation in various resper.ts 

<1 nd in one in pari icular: the outcome of 

a battle will usually-that of an orcupntion, perhaps, ·eldom- be clear. In a strict 

sen~e, maintcmultC of law and order suffi· 

dent to prevent interference with combat 

missions during hostilities and unrest or to 

prevent resistance l:Her on arc enough to 

qualify an occupation as a success, but the 

judgment of history will demand more. 

And the rmy in Germany accomplished 

more-- more lhan even 1 he detachment 

commander hclicvcd who snmmed up I he 

first year, "We gave them enough military 

government to last a hundred years.'": Not 

every Naz1 received the full deserts due him 

in American and some German opinion, 

hut many rud. Not all the Germans were 

convcrtrd to democ- racy, but they were 

given the opportunity for demorracy without a ny snares or tricks. The tenor of $Orne 

policy statements was harsh to the point 

of being vindirtivc, but the practice was 

as humane as a defeated enemy had a right 

" Hist Rpt, Del D- 300, 24 Jun ~6. in OMCUS 

80-2/lO. 
COI'\C.:LUSlON 

to expect after a long and cle:nructivc wnr. 

Although many soldiers looted and played 

the black market, the Arm)' protected and 

restored the rountt'y"s art treasures ami 

mcm umcnts and imported three-quartei'S Of 

a billiou dollars worth of relief supplies. 

The DPs were returned to their homes, the 

concentration ramp inmate.'> were cMed 

for, and the numerous serviC<;s without 

1J<l 

which .1 modern society cannot function 

were put back into operntion and kept running. C<'rtainl>• after 194<() there could be 

no doubt that c-ivil afTairs military government had provcu its value bot h in and mtt 

of rombnt or thnt the Arm}' had dcmonstratccl its competence Lo manage <1 ma jor 

occupation in the national interest and the 

interest or a conquered people. 
Note on Sources 

The word which hc..'\t describes the 

sourc-e n1atc l'i ~ nvailahlc Oil the post· 

World Wnr II occupation nf Germany is 

awesome. The romhat operations of the 

wa r left wdl·f< tntctmcd, if uflen extensive, 

records and :tftcr tht: victory b ecame the 

subject of interest primarily of two relatively 

snulll fratcruities, the memoir writcr.c; and 

militar)' historians. The OC<'upation, on the 

ot ht!r hand, i11volvcd the Whjtc H ouse, the 

\\'•1 r Department, State Department, and 

T reasu ry Department, the EAC, the JCS 

and CCS, SHAEF, USFET, Or-.•ICUS, the 

tactical command , military government in 

the field, and a bewildering nnay of 

commissions, committees, divisionc;, and 

branches. The records arc massive. The 

published M rmtltl)l Ref!orts nf the M ilitmy 

Gouernor, U.S. Zone, for instance, by 

themsclvc.o; make a set rhe size of a major 

encyclopedia. Considering the scope of the 

subject, however, the amou nt of systematic 

history written ahou t it is rather surprisingly 11mall. T he reason may be that it is 

considered not !<uffidently milita ry to fit 

into the military hio;tory genre and too military to he tr<·atcd :ls general history. T he 

dearth in thut one respect, however, has 

been more than td e tlp for by the Aood 

of memoirs, semi-memoirs, commenta ries, 

ritie'ism~. polemic.._, prognostications, and 

reportage in hook form, in periodicals, both 

popular and 'lcholarly, and in newspapers. 

T h e cx ricn ~e in Germany enrompassed 

many fields of popular and academic inter· 

est, and the occupation engaged as participants more professionals in more various 

disciplines and more persons who felt intense politic;al, social, or moral commitment 

than, prohahly, ::my other undertaking of 

the war period. T o the publications in Eng· 

lish, l!Omc of whirh antedate the surrender, 

must he added the German literature on 

the ()(:cupa tion '" hich has bcc·n g rowing 

apace since the mid-1950s. 

Conscq ucntly, the following note does 

not in a ny way aim to be eit her rompletc 

or comprehcn!\ivc. It li ·ts the oflicial records 

that the author consulted and the published 

works he used. Some other works deemed 

useful for a. l!tudy of the pct·iod have heen 

included. 

Primary Sourcrs 

U11publi.fhed Documents 

The one gr.neraJ comment that can he 

made nhout the up~ of records pe rtaining w the ocr11paLion is that they defy categorization . Individ ually and collectively 

they a rc an archival smorgashord. Where 

information on a specific subject or time 

period is likel y lo be fou nd is all but impossible to prcdirt. Within rerord groups, the 

decimal syst m frequently provides only the 

roughest guidance to the contents of files. 

Taken as a whole, the records refl ect nothing so well as the haphazard evolution of 

the oc<'npation itself. 

.\mong the Washington-based military 

agencies and offi ces rhe ones principally 

concerned with the occupation were the 

Joint Chiefs of Starr (JCS), Combined 

Chiefs of Staff ( CCS ), Assistant Secretary 
'OTE ON SOURCES 

llf War ( :\S\\') t Operations Division of I he 

War Department General Staff (OPD), 

War Department Civil ,\{fairs Division 

(CAD), and Provost Marshal Gcncml 

( PMG ). The PMG records are the best 

SO\Ircc for eArly military government planning, oq~anization, and training. The 

others ,·over the later phmning and operations in Gcm1any, hut the picture they present is not c:ompletc without reference to 

the State Department a•'d European Advisory Commission ( Ei\C) documents and, 

for cruei11l months in 1944 and 1945, the 

M orgenthm' Dittry (sec published sources 

listed he low). 

The Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionuy Forc-e (SHAEF), records 

arc the chid source for irHheater planning, 

organization, training, and operations to 

July 1945. The SHAEF G- 5 index ;done 

lUits 296 dedmal numbers relating in some 

way to th<: cJccupation of Germany. Eac-h 

decimal number represent· one or more 

folders wntaining as mar1y as several hundred pages of documents apiece. The G- 5 

t nformation Branch historical files rmhracc 

the whole history of militnry government 

nnd the occupation hdore and dudng the 

SH AEF period. They include informatiort 

on the agencies in W:,shington and London ; historic.~ and monographs written by 

G-5 hi!itori:.ns; G-5 record~ of the 1\rmy 

groups, arrnics, and the European Civil 

A IT airs Division ( ECAD); and the army 

group and army monthly historical report<;. 

The SHAEF G-1, 0 - 2, G-3, and 

Secretary of the General Staff ( SGS) files 

all contain !luhstanlial numbers of foldcn; 

pertaining to the occupation. The C- t and 

SGS files, fot· instance, arc lhc prime sour('CS 

for information on nonfratemization. 

The European Theater, U.S. Army 

( ETOUSA ), records, while not nearly as 

voluminom• as those of SHAEF, hnvc some 

451 

valu:,ble items on military government in 

the Historical Division files and in the t"\dministrativc History ColJection and on 

U.S.-conducted war crimes investigations 

and tria.ls in the Theater Judge Atlvoratc 

files. The rnost pertinent Sixth and Twelfth 

.\ rmy Group dotumcnt· appear to have 

been inrorporated imo the SHAEF rerords. 

The First, Third, Srwnth, Ninth, and l' iftecntl• t\r111 y G-5 files contain repo••ts on 

military govcrnmcnl operations in the field 

not to he found elsewhere, as do al!<o the 

V, Xll, XfJI, XV, and XXUJ C:ol'ps G-5 

files. The XV Corps records also include 

a headquarters diary for the period 8 October to 10 December 1945 that appears to 

be a mislabeled Third Army diary. The 

USFET General Board in its investigation 

of the conduct of the war made several 

studies having lo do with military government and the occupation in general. 

For the period after July 1945, the main 

collertions are tho. c or the U.S. Forces in 

the European Theater ( USFET) and the 

Office of Military Government ( U.S.) 

(OMGUS). The USFET SGS fil e is possibly the best single source for the period 

before mid-1946. In addition to important 

post-July 1945 records, it contains significant 1944 and 1945 don.1ments taken over 

from the SHAEF file.<;. The OMGUS collection, which reportedly filled over 1,400 

footlotkc~ when i1 was shipped to ihe 

United Stal es, is overwhelming in bulk and 

difficult to research. lt has no indcxc.~, and 

the shipping lists often convey only the 

vaguest impressions of the actual contents 

of the folder.:;. Furthermore, in spite of its 

bulk it is limited as a source on policy- and 

decision-making. Nevertheless, it contains 

an enormous quantit y of information , principally in the form of OMGUS divisionaJ 

histories and monthly and annual dctarhmer)t rt ports. 
452 TH£ U.S . • \R~lY 1'\ THE OC:CUP \TIO~ OF GER~ I \i\Y 

Pttblislu~d DCJc umer1ts 

on~-standing gaps in the documentation or u.s. pl.tnnin~ and poli y development for the ot-rupation were filled in the 

late 1960s wht"n the State Department published the I<J44 1946 volumes of the Foreigtl Relations of the United Stales series 

and the U.S. !'icnate Committee on the 

J udi<iaf), Suhc ornmiucc to J nvc."tigate the 

,\ dmini.stration of the Int ernal Security Act 

and Other I nternal Secu rity Laws, put int o 

print the M Otj!Pttlltau Diary ( (;t'rmany) 

(Washington: Covemmcnt P rinting Office, 1967 ). The M orgenthau Diar'y is 

not a diary in the conventional 'iCnsc hut 

a mnssive colic( tion of minutes, transcripts, 

notes, and dor uments. The spcrifir volumc.s 

in the Fore(en Relations series referred to 

above are HN4. Jl olt~me /, General 

( Wa~hington: Government Printing Office, 1966); 191/5, Volume Ill. European 

Adt•isory Commission: Austria; Germany 

(Wa.,hington: Government Printing Office, 1968); 1915, Volume V. Europe 

(Wa.,hington: Government Printing Office, 1967 ) ; <~nd 1946, Volume T'. The 

Rritislt Commonwealth; Western mrd Central Europe (Washington: Covcmmrnt 

Printing Office, 1969 ). lso essential to the 

histor·y of the planning for the J)OStwar 

treatment of Germany arc the Foreign Rel<llious ~cries volumes Conferences at Washingto1t, 1941 /942 Mid CasfLblrw rfl, 194.9 

( W ashington: Oovcmmcnt Printing Office. 1968); Conferences at W ashirt~lo11 

ami Quebu, /94.~ Wa hington: Government Printing Office, 1970); Cortferenrcs 

at Cairo and Tehran. 1943 ('W:'Ishington: 

Government Printing Offirc, 1961 ) ; CoTtferelrrr.s til Mnlta and Yalta. 1945 (\\'a'ih· 

ington: Government Printing Office, 

1955) ; Tlte Cnrtference at Quebec, 1944 

( Wa<~h in gton: Government Printing Office, 1972); and The Conference of Berlill ( WashinglOn: Government Printing 

Office, 1960}. 

The followiug are additional volumes of 

document pertinent to the on upation: 

Pollocl.., J ames K., et a/., ed:.. Germany 

Under Occupation. 1\nn A rbor; G. Wahr 

Puhlillhing Co., 1 ~14!.1. 

Ruhm von Oppcn, Bc:uc. Dur11ments on 

Cermml)1 Under OrntfJatioll, 19,15- 1951. 

New Ycwk: Oxford U nivcrsity Pr·r_c; ._, 195!;. 

Secretary of Stnte for Forcil(ll Affairs. 

Selected Documeuls nn Gennauy mul the 

Question of IJcrlin. /944 /961 . London : 

H. M. Stationery Offi<·c. 196 1. 

T<1ylor, Telford. Finfll Report In the Secretary of the Amt)' on the Nurenber{! War 

Crimes Trial~ U11der Co11irfll C:ntwril LllW 

No. 10. \Vashinglon: Government Printing 

Office, 1949. 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Documents 011 Ccrmmry 1944-

1959. Washington: Government Printing 

Office. I 959. 

U.S. Senate, Committee on FIII C"i~n Relations. Documents on Cennany, 1944-

/970. \\'ac;hington Printing Office, 197 1. 

Von der Cf\hlcntz, 0. M., ('cl. Documentr nn the Status of Herli11. lf>44- 1959. 

~funich: R. Oldenhourg Vcrln~, 1959. 

Von der Gahlcnt7., 0. M., cd. Dokumente zur Rerlin- Fragc, 1914- 1966. 

~1unirh: R. Oldcnhnurg Vcrlolg, 1967. 

St'rondrlr)' Spurres 

U.S. O[firial lliflnrics 

A number of volumes in the U.S. 

,.\RMY l ' WORLD W.\R 11 ~cries hear 

dircrtly on the occupation or on matters 

related to it. Harry L. Coles and Albert 

K. Weinberg, Ciuil Aflairr: Soldiers Become Covernnrs ('Vashington: Government Printing Office, Hl64 ) , n uunpil:uion 
!'\OTT-: ON ~OURCF.S 

or doc umcnts, il; at onc-e a major source 

em early rnili1ar r government organization 

and n history of civil afTairs- military government opcr'aliuns in Europe outside of 

Germany. Charles B. MacDonald, 1'11e 

Last 0 ffcruiuc (Washington: Government 

Printing O flirc, 97~), c-ovens the military 

operations in Germany jn 1945. Other volumes in 1he s<·r·ics that hear 011 the occupation are the following : 

Cline, Ray S. aJhin~ton Commatu1 

Post: The Operntio11s DiuiJimt. Wallhington: Govemmcnt Printing Office, 195 1. 

Coakl·y, Rol,crt W. and Richar·cl M. 

Leighton. Global J.ogistirs and Strategy, 1943- 19•15. Wa hin~to : Covernmcm 

Pr·inting O ffire, 1968. 

Cole, Hugh M. Tile Ardennes: Tlte Batlie of the Hulge. Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1965. 

MacDonald, Cha rles B. The Sic.tdried 

Lint Campaig11. Washington: Government 

Printing Offic:e, 1963. 

Matloff, Maurire. Strategic Plmmirtg for 

Coalition Wnrfnre, 94.~ 944. Washington: Govcnunent Printing Office, 1959. 

Po&>uc, Forre.,~t C. The SuJ>remP Command. Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 1954. 

The organization and uctivities of the oc:-

cupation forces are described in Oliver 

J. Frcdcrik!!cn, The A merica11 M ilitar'y 

Occupation of Cemumy, 945 195.~ 

(Karlsruhe: Historical Division, Hqs., 

USAREUR, 1953). The planning for the 

postwar treatment of Germany is compart!)' presented in Harley A. Nott er, 

Postwar FMeif!n Policy Prtparation ( Wa«hington: Government Printing Office, 1949). 

While not an official publimLion, Will.iam 

M. Franklin, ''Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,'' World Politics. 16 : I, Octoher 1963, written by the Director of the 

SLate Department HistOrical Office, is an 

453 

excclll'rH !i>llmmary of the St:t.tc Dq>~trtmc nt 

view or tht' :;uhjccl. 

M nnwr.rifJ/s 

Manuo;c:ript hi"torics are scattered 

throughout the records, particular!)' those 

of SHAEF, ETOUS.\ , and OMG US. The 

Land detachment historic." of the first year 

of the ocrupation, in the OMGUS files, 

arc rom pl<·re, detailed works. The others, 

valuable as they oft..:n arc, are Cor the most 

part fragments. A notable exception is 

J ames L. Snyder, "The EstabUshment of 

the U.S. Constabulary," in the Historical 

Division, ETOUSA records (appa rently 

misfiled ) , which is, very likely, as authoritative an account of the subject as can ever 

be writte n. 

Among 1 he manuscripts held hy 1lw Center of Military History are thirty-eight 

monographs m lhc USFET - EUCOM 

(European Command) Occupation in 

Europe series. Written in Germany in Lhe 

1940s l>y 1\rmy historians, they range in 

subjcn m:ttter from the planning for the 

occupmiou to PX operations. The Occ:·upation Forres in Europe series also includes 

a set of multivolume annual historic.". A 

most dul work is c'The History of the 

Civil :\fTairs Divisitm, War Department 

Spe<-ial Sta ff, Wof'ld War TI to Ma rch 

1946," written in the late 1940s from the 

division's Iiles by CAD historians. Book I 

and Book VI, Edwin J H ayward, "Overall 

Civil Affair'S H istory," and Richard M. 

Welling "Germany," are essential to cbe 

study of 1he occupation. Additional pertinent manuscripts in the CMH files are 

Edgnr L. Erickson, "An Introduction to 

Milil;try Government and Civil AfTairs in 

World War 11,'' and R. A. Winnacker, 

"The Oflit·c of the Senctary of War Under 

Henry I.. Stimson.'' 
454 THf.. U.S. AR!\JY IN Tffr. OCCUPATION OF GEIUviANY 

British 0 fficial Hisloric.f 

S. F. V. Donnison, Ciml Affairs tmt! Mililrlry Goocrmnent Central Orgauiuaimz 

and Plannin.g (Londcm: H . M. Stationery 

Office, HJG6) and Civil 4f!air.r and Mili~ 

lary (;or~ernmcnl Nort lt-W est Eurof~e, 

1944-19•16 (London: H. M. Stationery 

Office, 1961 ), in the United Kingdon1 History of Lhe Second World \'\'ar military 

series, deal from the British point of view 

with the same time period :md many of 

the same events that the author has rovcred 

in the present volume. The Grtmd Strategy 

volumes in the United Kingdom series and 

C. R. S. Harris, Allied MiliiM)' At/ministration of Italy, 1943- 1945 ( London: H . 

1. Stationery Office, 195 7), provide valuable collateral information. 

Memoirr and Other Works 

The World War II memoirs of nearl y 

c.vcry high-level U.S. or British military 

nnd politiC'.al figure address then, elves at 

some point to the question of postwar· Germany. Those that touch most closely on 

the subject matter and time span of this 

volume arc Henry r .. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, 011 Active Service in Peace 

ond Wnr (New York: Harper and Brothers, 194 H) ; William, Lord Strang, 11 omr 

(lt~d A IJroad (London; Andre Deutsch. 

l~J56); Corddl Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmill,m Comp:111y, 1948 ); Sir Fredcrirk E. 

Morgan, Overture to OVERLORD ( London: Hodder, 1950) ; and Harry S. Tmman, A1omoirs, l'em· of Decisions (Garden 

City: Doubleday and Company, Tnc., 

1955). LuduJ; 0 . Clay, Deci.ritm in Germany (Garden Cit)': Doubleday and Company, Inr., 1950) and Rohcrt D. Murphy, 

Diplt~ mt'l Among Warriors (Garden City: 

Doublcdar and Company, In('., 1964) arc 

especially notable because of General 

Clay's and Ambassador Murphy's po:"ilions 

in the occupation. 

.\mong 1 he works ronccmed specificHlly 

with the occupation it is frequently difficult 

to distinguish hctween types. Frank L. 

Howley, Berlin Comm(lnd (New York: G. 

P. Putnam's Sons, 1950) and Saul Padover, E.tperimer~t i11 Germany (New York: 

Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946) are clearly 

memoirs. John]. Maginnis, Military Covermnrllt }oumal1 Norrntmdy to Berlin 

(Amherst: University of Ma.'l.c;achusctts 

Press, 1971 ) is an abridgment of a diary 

General Maginnis kept a~ a lieutenant colonel in World War II military government. 

On the other hand, B. U. Ratchford and 

W. D. Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment 

(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 194 7) •1nd John H. Backer, 

Primi11g the German Ecmwmy (Durham: 

Duke University Press, 197 1) arc books in 

which the author's personal experience is 

reinforced hy research. Harold Zink, American Military Covenz.mc11t in GeruWIIJ' 

(New York: The Macmillan Company, 

194 7} is a history drawn from and colored 

by the personal experience of a professional 

historian who was a SHAEF G-5 and 

OMGUS hi!itorian. 

Philip E. Moseley's :utirle.<>, "Dismcmherml·nt of Germany, The Allied Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam,'' Foreign 

11/TniTI. 28:3, April \950. and "The Occupation of Germany, New Light on How 

the Zone!' were Drawn," Foreig1~ Affairs, 

28:4, July 1950, present the judgments of 

an cminem historian drawn from his cxpericnre a:; Chief of the State Department 

Division of Territorial Studies and as Amba ·sador Winant's political adviser in the 

EAC. Walter L. Dom relied both on his 
~OTE ON SOURCES 

skill as a professional historian nnd on 

extensive personal knowledgt: acquired 

Lhrough service in the upper level$ of military government in writing "The Dclmte 

Over American Occupation Policy in German y in 1914-1945,'' J>nlitical Science 

Qunrlerly, 72:4, December 1972. 

T wo rct:cntly published hi torics of the 

occupation arc John Gimbel, The Americtur Ocwpatio11 of Germany (Stau(ord: 

Stanford University Press, 1968 ) and 

l' ranklin M . D avis, C()me as Conqueror: 

The V 1£iled Stoles Army's Occttpation of 

Gemumy, 1945- /949 (New York : The 

Marmillan Company, 1967). Gimbel's 

thorough I)' researched study i ' concerned 

primurily with policy and policy development, In :111 earlier hook, A Gn rMil Comnumit y tmder AmeriG·an OrrupatioiL, Marburg. 1945- 1952 ( St?.\lfor·d; Stanford 

University P ress, 1961 ) , he dc:>trihcd the 

ffe ~ or I he oc..:upatiou at the local level. 

Com!? m Co11queror, its autho1- a former 

t\l'lll)' officer, is a popular account combining J'c.c;carch and reminiscence. Some earlier 

works are Carl J. Friedrich, cd., American 

E:..·futtiences ,~ Military Couemment in 

W orld War II (New Yol'k : Rinehart and 

Companr, Inc., 1948 ), which gives the 

views of scholars who were also closely 

involved with the problems or military government and occupation; Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of GermanJ' 

(New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1959); 

Hnjo H olborn, American MililarJ' Gouemmtml (Washington: Infantry j ournal Press, 

1947), which is a study by a disting uished 

hi.~tori:\n who had first-hand cxperi-

<:n<'c with nazism and with the occupation; Edward H . Litchfield, cd., GoveNiing 

Postwm Gernumy (I thac:a: Cornell Univcrsit)' Press, 1953 ) ; Anhur Scud , ed ., 

This is German;• ( New York : William 

Slo;uw Associates, lnc., 19!)0); and John 

455 

.L. Snell , Wartime Origins of tlze East-West 

Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: 

Hauser Press, 1959). Walter Rundell, Jr., 

Black M fl7'ket M 0 11 ey (.Baton Rouge; 

Louisiana State Univ< rsity Pre.-.s, 1964) 

and Consta11tine Fitz-Gibbon, Denazifiration (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 

1969 ) treat in detail two aspects of the occupation that arc also p rincipal concerns 

of this volume. Henry Morgenthau , Jr·., 

Gemumy is Our Problem (New Y01·k: 

Harper & Brothers, 1945 ) and J ohn Morton Blum, From the M orgentlwu Diaries: 

Years of War ( Boston: H oughton l\1[iffiin 

Compan y, 1967) shed light on the pre-surrender planning for the occupation. 

Among the many Germans who have 

published memoirs dealing in some way 

wtth Lbc occupation, the most prominent 

is Konrad Adcnauer, whose Eritwemngen, 

4 vols. {Stuttgart ; Deutsch e Verlags-Anstalt, I 965- 1960 ), span the post war p eriod 

to 1963. N;idc from the memoirs, the 

publica tions in German fall into three categories: histori<:s, polemics, and--surprisingly- no:;lalgi<t. The histories, except for 

general works cover·ing the whole postwar 

period, sut:h <tS, Gerhart Binder, Deutsrh-

(and Seil 19·15 (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, I 969), for the most part are intensively 

researched monographs. Examples are 

Karl-Ernst Bungcnstab, Umerziehunf? zur 

Demokralie? Rc-educalion-Politik im Bildungswesen der V.S.-Zorte, 1945- 1949 

Due~cld rf : Bcrtelsmann Universitaetsverlag, 1970) and J ustus Fuerstcnau, 

EntMzi fiziemng ( Ncuwicd: Luchtcrhand 

Verlag, 1969). Some of the works in the 

first category are also at least partial <'andidates for inclusion in the second. Otherwise, the second category is small, hut it 

does indudc prohahly the most widely read 

book on the O<'Cupation published in Germany, Caspar Schrcnck-Notzing, Clut.rttk-
456 THE U.S. :\R ~IY IN THE OCCUPATIO:!'\ OF GERMANY 

ierwaeJche (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 

1965). Schrcnck-Notzing freely interpreted 

n wide variety or secondary sources LO attempt to demonsh·ate that the Roosevelt 

New Denl, having abandoned its liberal 

principles before the war began and turned 

to raw power politics, used psychoanalytic 

m<'lhods to "character wash" the Ccm1ans. 

The litct:\ltu•c o£ nostalgi:\, by dc~cribing 

"how had it was" seems to attempt to provide the German!! with a vicarious escape 

from the sameness of prosperity. Examples 

of the fo rm are I ngeborg Drcwitz, ed., 

Staedte 1945 (Du<'.sscldorf : Eugen Oietrkhs Verlag, 1970); Madlen Lorei and 

Richard l<il'l1 , Frattk{rtrt ttnd die drei 

wild en ] nitre ( Frankfurt a. M .: V crlag 

Frankfuttcr Bucd1cr-, 1968 ) ; and Bernd 

Ruland, Geld Wit• !I eu rmd nickts .ztt [ressen (Bayreu th : H cstia-Vcrlag, 1966). 
AC:LS 

ACofS 

AM GOT 

liHCAN 

AT (E) Committee 

Buugetmtister 

CA 

CAO 

CAO 

C:ATP 

CCAC 

CCAC: (1.) 

CC:MS 

ccs 

r.rwx 

CDU 

CIC 

CMll 

(;OSSAC 

OROWC:ASS 

Ci:iU 

DA A 

DCCAO 

or sec 

DP 

OPX 

OusTnsN 

EAU 

ECAD 

BCAR 

cur~E 

Eddu;etsspirltltn 

ETO 

ETOUSA 

FEA 

FIAT 

Fr(lgebogen 

Glossary 

American Council of Learned Sorictics 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Allied Military Govemmcut (used only in lt al~ ) 

Dctcnti(m c·cnte-r for impun ant Gt·rmau wnr rriu1cs suspects 

Administration of T erritories Committee (Europe) 

M ayoa· 

Civil affairs 

Civil Affairs Division 

Civil AO'airs Officer 

Civil Affairs Training Program 

Combined Civil Affairs Comn1ith'c 

Combined Civil Affairs Commillcc (I .ondon) 

Control Commission (Mmtary Section) 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Combined Displaced Persons Executive 

Clwistiau Democratic Union 

Coun terintelligence Corps 

Ccntel' of Military History 

Chief of Staff lu Lhe Supreme Allied Collllllllnder (designate) 

Centt'al Registry of War Criminals attd Security Suspects 

C hristian Social Union 

Deutsche Allgemeine l'•:(Jchrichten A.gentur (German General News 

Agency) 

Dcpn~y Chief Civil Affairs Officer 

Oistl'ict information Services Control Command 

Displacccl person 

Displaced l'crsons Executive 

Detention and interrogation ccntet• for Gc,·man scientific a tld 

technical personnel 

Eut•opc:m Advisory Commission 

Europcllll Civil Affairs Divisior\ 

European Civil Affairs Regiment 

Nov<'mbc•· 1944 posthostilities plan for Cet'l\181\)' 

Gcnuau adolescent gangs of the Nazi :lnd occupatio n periods 

European Theater of Operations 

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

Foreign Economics Administration 

Field Information Agency Technica l 

Qllcstiormairc \tscd by military government to determine 

Nazi :11\d ntilitarist associations of Grrmans 
458 

G-1 

G-2 

G-3 

G-4 

G- 5 

Gaultitcr 

Gemmule 

Gestapo 

GOLDCUP 

HusKY 

reo 

IPCOG 

.JAG 

.res 

Lund 

L(tmdr.rml 

f.andkrcis 

Land rat 

lvf cl rlebog 1111 

MFA& A 

MG 

MGO 

MMLA 

Obtrbuerg(lmeister 

0CTAOON 

OMC 

OM GUS 

OrtsgruPJ!tnleittr 

oss 

OvERCASl' 

OvERLORD 

owr 

P :\l'EROLIP 

PMG 

RAMP 

RANKI N 

Regimmgsbe:irk 

TirE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION Of.' GERMANY 

Personnel section of a divisional or high stafl' 

[ntcJligc•)CC SC<'tiOt\ 

Op\:-t·a tions section 

.Supply section 

Civil affairs- wilitary govel'llntcnt section 

Regional leader of the Nazi puny 

Municipality 

Celteimestantsj>uliui (secret political policr) 

:SHAEF plan for assuming control of Gcr·man goven11ncntal 

agcncit:s 

:""llied I nvasion of Sicily, July 1943 

l nfm·mation Control Division, USFET 

Informal Pnli<'y Committee on Germany 

,lt1dgc Advocate General 

.lt>it\l Chiefs of Staff 

German sta tc 

Council of Ministet• (>residents 

Rural adminisll'ativc area si111ilar to U.S. cmutty 

Chief adminismuivc officer or a Londkreis 

Qucslionnah·c used uncle•· the Law fur Liberation from 

Nazis111 and Militaris1n to dctcrmirw Nni and mili1arist 

associations of Germat\S 

Monuments, Fine Arts, and Arrhives 

Military governme nt 

Military Govcrnmcnr OfTicc:r 

lvfissivu Mditairt ric Liaison Atlministmtive (French organizarion conccmcd mainly with UP care) 

Chief ma}'()l' 

U .S.-British confct·cncc at Quebec, September 1944 

Office of Military Governnwnt 

Ollicc of Militat·y Government (U .S.) 

Local Nazi party group leader 

Office of Strategic Services 

Program to tnt)Vt' German scientific and tt•rhnical specialists 

to the United S tates 

i nvasion of northwest Ew•vtw, June 194'1 

OITicc of War Information 

Sec OvERCAS'J' 

Pwvost Marshal General 

Recovered Allied military personnel (used to designate freed 

Allied prisoners of war) 

Plans for return to the Continent in the t•vcnt of <\ Gct'lltan 

withdrawal or collapse 

Plan for rchu'n w tlw Contin~nt in the CVl"n t of a German 

collapse 

District 
GLOSSARY 

Reichsbalm 

RouNOHAMMER 

ROUNOUP 

SA 

SCAEF 

SHAEF 

SLOE 

S'lm1ch kammc1' 

ss 

Stadtkreis 

SWNCC: 

TALISHAN 

TAL.LYHO 

T/0 

ToRen 

TRIDENT 

UNitRA 

USFET 

uso 

I ·otkssturm 

WAC 

Wac 

Wchrnuu:ht 

Werwolj 

wsc 

The German railroads 

Variant of RouNDUP 

Plan for a cross-Cham\el operation in 1943 

SturmabUilung (paramilitary organization of the Nazi part)') 

Snpreu1e Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

Su premc Headquarters) AU icd Expeditionary F orct 

Special list of eCJnipment 

Gcnnan denazification tribunals established under the Law 

for Liberation from Nazism and Militarism 

SclmLzsiaifeL (the elite military and police organization of the 

Nazi party) 

The area within the city limits of a city or town 

State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee 

15$1 

August 1944 posthostilities plan for Gcnuany 

USFET check and scat•cb operation, July 1945 

Table of organization 

Allied invasion of North Africa, November 1942 

U.S.-British conlcn:nce in Washi.ngton, May 1943 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminjsu·ation 

U.S. Forces in the European Theater 

United Services Ot·ganizations 

German militia composed of men too ymu1g, too old, or 

physically tUlfit for regular military servire 

Wornen's Army Cot·ps 

A member of the Women's Army Corps 

Gcr man Armed Forces 

Nazi-sponsored German guerrilla and resistance movement 

Working Security Cumrnittcc 

Index 

A11ehcn, 79, 133 

capluru or, 142-45 

111ilitr~ry government in, 145-46, lfil, 176-tH 

and u(tl\fratemization, 98 

~choolJ in, 277 

Aaclttlttt Nndtrhltttn, 180, 161, 281 , 368 

Aclwsou, Dean, 432 

Act of Military Surrender, 257. 258, 259 

Arlcuck, Bdg. Gen. Clarence 1.., :110, 327, 386, 

-102, 41l•l, 409n 

Adcnuuer, Kourad, 190, 278, 363 

Mljustc:d Service Rating, ~-1211, :l2fJ, 3:11 

Aolflinistratlon or Territoric~ (gt•rupc) (AT(E)) 

Committee 

C'Atablishcd, 24, 34·, 35 

terminated. 'Hl, 39 

U.S. rept·csentativcs withdraw•'· '1!1 

Advunred Ministerial Control 11ruups 177 

"Agreement on Control Machinery in Gcnnany," 

129 

Agrlcullur~, Gennan, 273-75, 4:17 

t\llt'n, 8rig. Ccn. Frank A., 175 

Allied Control Authority Cor Cr1 many, 129, 268. 

.'ic11 ltllu Control Council. 

Allied lo:llVcrnment~ in exile, 25, 26, 41 

Allied lligh Commission, liO 

Alliud Military Government of Occupied Territory 

(AMCOT), 29, '1:1, •1·4, •17, '19, 50, 55, 68, 

01 

Allied 111ilil<~ry marks, 59, 60, 159, 277, !;!Hi· 39 

Allied I'rrss Service, 372 

Allied Prl11ting and Paper ContrQI Board, :117 

Al~dorf, military government in, , 1•12 

Americ:nn Commission fnr the Jlrou:c:tion and S;~lvatte o£ Artistic and Hbtorie Monumeuts in 

Europe, 54 

Americ.'nn Defense-Harvard Croup, 5•1 

Anwde;;n Juinl Distribution Cou1tlltllcC, 357, '117 

Amcricun libraries. 372, 373 

Amerirn11 Milit11ry Government of Occupied 

Oc~liullty, t918- 1 920 (' h~ H unt Repon ), 3, 

2'1, 60, 114 

Am(:ric:lll Schools CetHcr, 32, 62 

Andl't'ws, Lt. Gen. Frank M., 25, ::l!i 

Aquilanin, :l35 

Anni~ticc (1918), 109 

Armini<:c and Po~t-War Committee (13rilish ), 11 6 

Anny Sprcialist Tratning Progmm (AS'I P ), 7'1 

Army Wnr Colleg,e, 3- 5, pn1sim 

Army-type occupatiuu, 320, 321 

AsuC.\N tlt'ICilti<ll1 renter, 22 t, 263, 277, 31'1 

Assistan 1 S<iCtlltary of State for Occupied A reo~, 

43311 

Assistant Secretary of War. Sec McCloy, John J. Atlantic Chn1t~r U3 

AttltJc, Clrrncnt, I 16, 3·12 

Augustu•la11 H CJhlht, I 11ft 

Austria, liB 

Automntie nrrr~l r11tegoriC$, 380, 387 

Back, Peter, 391 

Bade11, Ill), 1!12, 307, I I, :112. See tllro Wuc:rllt!ll· 

bcrg-l3adcn. 

Baltzell, Mnj. F.. R.., ;1!1 

Banking 11ntl finuncc, German, 161, lfi2, 276 

Ba rker, Mu j. Ct•n. Rny W., 26, 37, :m. 289, 290 

Barrett, Lt, Cui. R. Tuppc•r, 230 

Baumholdcr Cll•cr""· 202, 203, 286 

Bnvnrinn PeOlll"'~ !'arty, :J63, 383, 385 

Beatie. Sgt. Edward, 2117 

Beesley, Capt. Jesse C., l42-46 

Bendctsen, Col. Karl R., 30 

Benny, J ack, 331 

Berchtcsgndeu 

occupation of, 25f,, 256 

•·est and rcc1·calion ctntt•r, 33!'1 

Bergmann, Tt:ch. 5 J<>hn H ., l.f2 

Berlin, 12(\, 177 

bla~:k market in, 3-H.l 

condition& in, 2911, !lO:l, 305 

ruod supplies fo• , :10·1 

Komrnnnd<ltum, 126, 104, 305 

ntw•pnpc~ in. :370 

OMGUS alolished in, ·103 

sectors, 12:J 

Soviet ocr11pation of, 303- 05 

tnw~it righls to, t:!5, 297, 296 

U.S. entry into, :!03 

U.S. view~ on admini1nration of, 127, 12fl 

Berlin mccting or commanders 111 chief, 5 j1onc 

I ~Jof!i, 261i (ill 

Bcrnstcln, 1.1. (;ol. Bernard, 80, 86, 161, 21!i, 

203. 23 1 

Betts, Col P.dward C., 24, 34 

Biarntz Atnl'tic·'"' I 111h•rrsity, 3'10, 335 

Black market. 216. 21!.1, 336, 337, 349, 350, 35'l, 

351 

Blacklists, 'I 
162 TJIE U.S. ARMY IN T HE OCCUPATION OF GlmMANY 

11oard of E1:onomi1: Wod :m·, !) 

3 vr·lliJ{c.r, I.r. Cvl. ,l uh11, 1'1:!, 2 11 , 2 13 

!luting, Cnp1. Norman W 1 !1!11\, 1!19 

Bortr>rt, llugh, fl 

ov~nsdu~n, Sir Fredc:m:lt ~ .• !H, •JO 

Bu" !1•$, E. L .• :~ 15 

Rmdlt·y, Gcne :~ l of thl' Army Omar N., 2'10, 2:.12, 

292, :32 1 

Rt•n nd t•c.fugee and OJ> ca unp, 14 3, 200 

·~ run , Wcrnltcr vr1n, :l l .'1 

Urc111C'n, 76, 117 

BH•nw o r. cl:w~ 

;\hu"~hcd, 125n 

roudit ion~ in, :160 

milit.rry government in, 2!)7 

Ot'l'up:llion of, 22 1, 270 

tWOI> \l rcngth of, :12 1 

in .~ rn Military Di tr , !H 2 

flrrmr.rhnvcn, 12·1 

Bridl((', Col. C. E. n .. UO, 0 I 

llrigK~· M aj. Gen. lla l N., 32'1 

flrlm'll, flrig. Gen. RoiH•r t Q., '112 

Ill un~, <:ro pe. Curt, 111 I 

Dryand, Cnpt. R. A • 25G 

fiuffinjJton, Maj. M illon W .. 1 '18 

Hou c:nu of Engnwins IIIHI Jlwuing, 60 

13yrt1c$, J ames F. 

n~ D irrctor of WfH• 1\l t~hlli z:-~ linn and R(•rnrwrr-

~iO ), 22··1 

a.\ St:o:rctnry of State, ·Hl'l, l'{:l, 4+~ 

C'hrlmwt Commiurc 011 C:C'anu'">'• 102 0(1, 1:H 

C.1ln, Col. Harry P .. HO 

C;,iru Conference, :l!l, I 17 

Crm1p Kilmer, ~ 

Cunop f{ (•y no lds, <i:l 

Ca pturNI records, 2!10, 2·1!J, 317 

Cnptu r~d tcchuc> lo!lr• pl.lllt$ .1nd cquipnwm, 2:11, 

27 1, 106. 307. !H·I, !l lf) 

C.!piiii'Nl tn•asnrr, 229, 2:10, :ti l, :tl:i, 27 1 

Oarlewn, Brig. Ccn Dun ., ·10'1 

Cilrpl'l Jllau. 164, 167, 2li9- 73 

(:. ~:llth\llca Confcrl'ncr, 2'1 

Cnth ulic Chur<'h and t'II'I'!IY• I Jti, H O, lUI, 272, 

:w I 

C:C:S ~5 1. I 0 I , I Ofl 

fiu anl'ial ;wd r'<'Onnmic· g uicll's of, 5!l, ()(I 

"" fm11dom of spccd1 a nti press, 17 1 

:wd Gt•fn HIIl handhook, 185 

on ncmfratcrnit;uion, 117 

politknl guide of, i 11 

J)IC/)M.IIiOJ\ Of, 'i 11 

Cln puhlic relief, bO 

;md war cri e~. 170 

C:c· u11'r Prt rty, :l!l:i 

Ct•lltr•a l Registry ,,f Wa r Criu in ~ nnd Sc,•ut'ity 

~pcm (CROWC:M\S ), 22 1, 'WJ, l•l~ 

C:h.ui('Y• Mnj. Gen. J •lllll' \ 1\ , 2 1 

Chapllcan, Oscar. Ill 

Charlo ttt•svil h• St' hool uf Milita1 y Govcnlrncnt. St!l! 

School of Militnry Covt:muwnl. 

Chawt\Cr, r~j , 1 .. J,, BO 

C HES1'£RPIP.tl' opt•r:ltjon, 387 

Chief of Stafl', U.S. 1\nny. s~~~ Eiscnltowf'r, Cenr.~l .,( the IIIY D wight n.: !l no;h:-~ 11 , Cener~l of the Arm)' George (;, 

Chief of St11 ff to the Supreme Alllccl CommandCJ· 

(COSSAC:), Sr.e 11/.to MtH'(!iou, f.t, Gt'' " Frcderic:k fl.. 

appointee!, 2'i, 21i 

Civil Afl'id ~ Division of

1 211, 2c1, •1:1, •lA 

on Gt'rnllt 11 wuc$, :1 1, 116 

(m inccgtnlt·rl civil affairs, 30. 13 

ou OCCIIJ)3 tlnn J)r)licy, 85, 8!1 

and O vERt.o Ro pla n, 2 7, 11 6 

a nd RAN tOS pl:1ns, 27, 28, ~~. :i2 

Chie fs o f Staff (British ), ~ 

Christian Dc!moc,.a tic Unio11 ((;IJU ), 362, 363, 

'127, •II Cl 

(;hdslinn So\'1:11 Union (CSU), :lll:l, :lfH, '127, 

-HO 

C:hristmas, ~, 110 

(;huikov, Cui. Cc11. Vassily L . 301i 

Churchill. in~ton S .. 2:i, 4:i'i 

on Docni u. govc·rnmcm , 2R2n 

nnd Mor!j.rllthf\11 Pla n, 10:1, tOll, 2 12 

on occ:upation po licy, 85 

on w11r r::rim<'s, 172, 2 17 

on withdr•uw;tl frrlm Soviet ZOIW, 265, 297 

nn ronc' in C:c•rmany, 11 8, II !l 

Circulation n-gulntions, 136. 272 

Civil aJTairs 

Army rontrol of, 9- 12 

conlrol in N orth Africa, 14, 15, It\, 63, 69, 70 

det:tthnwrlt !;U IIiz::~ti , 6:1, G!J, ?0 enlisted pe rsonne l, 73, ~ 

personne l rcquirt:TIICillS for, fl, In, I 9, :12 

pl:lns ror lr:lillil1g in, 6 

Civil fTni ~ <.:t•nu~r, Shrivcnb:un 

ac tiv at~ . '12 

operatiom, h:l b8 

Ci,·il a ffairs dct:tchmcnts 

A IFI , 2llfi 

D:lBl , 74 

DSBI. 1:1:1 

DfiC:I , 15·1 

DOBI, 7!l 

Ci,·il MTaiu D it•cctor:tlc ( British l, 21 

C t\'il Affnia·s Division, V\'DSS 

.rctivu((·d, 1 I 17 

on <.:Ct\ G, :16 

ou <'i\' il nff:tia ~ in RTOUSA, 'l l 

uti C•)r1lf01 C:orrrr\·il, 126- 211 

a nd ~1\C: SliiTt• ndc r in tnrnw , I I I 

nnd h;mcll>nok (·untro\'Cr$y, 117 U9 

mi><.•ion ol, 17 

:md nonrr:rtnnirutiOrt, 'l7, 'Ill 

and posch.lstililiC5 pbnning, W I , 11)2 
INDEX 

Civil Affairs 'l't••dniug Program (CATP ) 

c~ tah ished, 1 U 

grnduates of, ~! 

IHOgrams of, I'J 

n:t:rnitment for, I !l, 211 

Clay, l.t. Gen. l.ud11) 1>., 268 

nud access 10 Rctliu, :100, !101 

t~ppointed Ocputy Milita ry Govcmor, 222- 2<1 

nnd Berlin adrniuistration, :i05 

1H1 civilianb:alion uf ndlitnry govt!l'lllllClo (, 10 1, 

102 

anu denazification, :lit!, 3flfi, •J.28, •129, ~011 

on German fooiJ rallo rt>, !i32 

r.n Gcrm:m Lae111la, :u:t, 327 

.wd German ~c· 1f·gnvc:t nmcnt, 40-1 O!i, ·1 17 

on JCS 1067, 28:~. II:\, 

mission as Dt:puty Militt~ry Governor, 224 

0 11 11onf ratcrni:.wtion, :122 

on pu1itical <~c ti vl ty, :1t. I, 3tH 

on relation~ with G errnam, ·H I 

ilnd technical intclli ~enr.c, 3 15 

Clnyton, Willi:uu E .. 2 1 () 

Coulcuz, I !.12, 19:1. 272 

C:nllins, Maj. C•·•'· J. l.nwtort, l•n 

t:oh11, Gerhart!, I'H 

Colo)lnc, I :!3 

occupatio n of, 1\~J 9 1 

ly(lhus iJl, I 95 

CombicH:d Ch d~ of Staft (CCS) 

nuthority iu ~('tm:wy tl'rminated, :l iU 

anu Bremen <'lldHvc, 12:'1 

.uul CCAC, 36 

on civil atfnirs plmming, 100, 101 

Mid German hnndbook, A7 

nnd flt>sthoslilitil·~ planning, 99, lOU, tnt 

nnd zones in (;,•nnnny, I I 7 

Cotnhincd Ci"il Aflnir~ Commillce ((;CAt;) 

authnrity in Curmnny t<:nninatecl, :l 1 n chnrtcr. ;15, :lu, 40 

.outl ConU'(II CuuneiJ, 'J 1 

11nd Ccnnnu 1Hutcffl<lol., H7 90 

;~n d 0\'EI<LOilll plnn~. !\fi, 59 

0111d postho,tilitic' phmlling, 101 

C<mtl>incd C ivi l ArTairs Committee, London 

(CCAC( I.) l 

t:ltMtcr of, I 0 

;utd Control Co1111Cil, !l·l 

<tnd Ccrmat\ handl>ook, ll7, BU 

.ltld t>lans for C<'" " ·'''Y· 5tl, tOt 

Gomhincd l>i$plnrt·d PtiWII$ Rxccurivc ( (':!) PX ), 

'118 

C()lnbitll'd Evid<-ncl' Cullct'ting Ccnlcr for War 

Crimes, li Agl~, :1 til 

C:otuhill('d Food noard, :152 

Cortltnnnd school~. :1:10 

Cotmna •tding Cc•nt•ral, lJS ~· , 22·1. Sn nlsn Eisl'nhown, Gl•twr.tl of the: Army wi~ht D. ; 

~lcN:rrm:y , Gr•11H"11l J o>cph T . 

463 

Commis~ on Jo1 Protection nncl Salvage of Artistic 

a nd ll i~tori c ntmtcnt~ in P.urope. Sec 

Roheol\ Commission. 

Commiti('C on Protection q( Cultural Treasures 

in WM :\I'C'as, 5·!, 55 

Communist ;c~rty, 365 

Cortct•rtu·ntion camps 

BudHl llll ;old, 236-38 

Dach;w, 252, 253 

Jv ;l ollh lll ~~ , 252n 

Ortlrt~I No,d . 23 l , 2:12 

Tlot•kln, 2-1<1 , 2<15 

Contr<1l Commission. s~~ ContrCJI Council. 

Cuntrol C<llllllli~ion (Milirnry Section ) {CCMS ), 

I 

Control Council 

activ;t t ion or. 265, 267. 2hfl, '1•12 

Briti h vit'Wh oi n, 91, 12(;- 29 

COIIli'OI Ntllff of, 175 

Cn-ot·d itwting Committee of, 175 

EAC on, 126-29 

French p:u•ridpation in, :H4· 

and C1•rm:ut Country Unit, UO 

mission of, 11:1, 7~77, 342 

p~rronnaucc of, 404 

Sovie t \'icw~ on. 92, 9:$, 12!l, 12'1 

U.S. virws on, 126-29, fll- 93 

Cunrrol C:ortucil Directive; No. 2•1, •1:!0 

Control Council Law No. 10, 39·~ 

r:onlflll J(witniu•, 196, 21lli 

Gorp,, U.S, 

v, 2 1, 1:1:1. 13 1, 137,232 

II , t :l:l, 158, 231 

VIII, 151 

XV, 252, 273 

XIX, t:tl, 11 6, HB, l!ill 

XX II , 272 

XX Ill , 272, 21!6, 3 0!1, 322 

Cory, Ma j. Arthur M ., 15!) 

Coumc ll , Col. J ohn, 257 

COIIIIh'liut,·lligl·nce Corp' (CIC), 1-17, 153, 272, 

383 

Conntry ho\bo's, in COSSAC, 211, '10, .J3 

Couns and law, German, 2•15 

Cramer, 1\lnj, C: cn. Myron C., () 

CrisiVoll, t.t. Col. Howard D., 22 7 

<.:umminK, Maj. Henry II., 5, 7 

Curfew n:,1411lations, 136 

C:urn·ney 

rollt•OI uf, 'i'l, 60, 33h :'!(), II '2 

exchnnl{c of, 276, 3:16-39 

infl:11ion of, 27ti, 3;16-:t9, 108 

reform of, I :l·l 

Soviet : .. n,,l·ucc on, 60, :~: 16-:l'l, 1'1 ~ 

triJOil clrnli iiSS in, 336 HI, 112 

Currl'IIC'Y ~o111rnl books, :till, 11 2 

Cutter, C.:1•l. R. Ammi, 2 17, 2 1 IJ 

Ct<'l'ht~.,lov;okca, 21!1, 3118, lOilu, I J'l 
464- THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

Dachau, 252 

Dahlquist, Maj. Gen. John F.., 256, 322 

D:1lc)•, Maj. Gen. Ednunld 1.., 2~ 

Dalf1 c~, Col. Roy L., H05 

Dauicll, Raymond, 384, ·100 

Davidov. Gen~ml A. N, 41<1, 116, ~1 

DaviN, Rimer, 321 

Dawson. Col. William W., :100 

DD'l', 53, 196, :.!7!1 

de 8ratoch~nc, Brig. Gen. Geoffrey, :105 

de Cnulle, GCill'tfll Chnrlt's, 12•1, 129, 21H, 3H 

de l.attrc, de Tassigt1y, General J ean, 266 

Dcanr, Maj. Gt>n. John R., 98 

Dcd:lr:illun R<'gardins the Defrnt of Germany 

and the Assumption of Supreme Authority 

hy the Alli~d Powers, 259, 263-61l 

DCJilllilieatioh 

appeab boar<.b, 389 

in t3flvaria, 383-86 

cn(orccmcnt of, 428, 429 

German administra tion of, SSU 

manda tory removal of Nazis, 11\1 

prnn lties of, 11 :10, 431 

policy on, 90, 108, 212, :HlO 

poAuurrendcr, 277, 3R0-90 

<ltld public llcnhb employees, !188 

public opinion on, 38 1, ~86, SOil nnd railroad employees, 388 

in Rhineland operatiOn$, 140, 147. 8~{ 

statistics of, 382, 3R3, 390 

transfer to German control of, •130, ~ 31) 

Dennis, T ech. •f Kem1cth, 226 

Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO ), m 

STIAEF, <1Cl, 47, 4!1 

Dcp1ofy Milit:tfy Governor. See Clay, Lt. Gen. 

Lucius U. 

Der Tagesspirgt'l, 370 

Despres, Emile, 208 

Deutsche Allg11meinc Nnchriqltten Ageuttu 

(DANA ). 372 

Deut~mann. mayor of Stolberg, 141 

Devcn, General Ja~ob 1.., 28, :iO, 32, 36, 325 

Dew(:y, Thomas E., 107 Di~ merika11 isclt~ Ru11d<cltau, 373 

i~ Mitteiltutgrll, 175, IRI, 231, :Hi8 

Di~ N~ue Zllil~ttlJI, IN, !173, 374 

Dillard, Col. Hardy C., 7, 64 

Director, Civil Affairs Division, WOSS, 17. Su al.so 

Hilldnng, Maj. Cen. John H. 

Directorate for Occltl>icrl Arcru, 433, 4 :n,i 

Disttrmcd etwrny forces, 2~ I. 292. See also Prisoltcrs tJ( w:~r, Cerman1 in Allied hand~. 

Oi$J)I:\~ed J)el"'ons 

IJchavior of, 200, 201, 206, 239-41, !{56, 422. 

<137 

and bl.ack market, 355, :156 

hrunch in SHAEF G~, 53 

rnmps for, 200-203, 357 

CulltJ•ol of, 2'l9, 318, :!57, 351l 

D isplaced persons--Continued 

and crime. 355 

in A~tnl offensive, 239, 2•10 

forced rcpalrintion or, 4 13-16, 120, ~21 

German, 2•l9 

inOUlt 1(1 Cermnny, 416 lfi, 4:15 ncgoti;ttiml~ wi1h Soviet Unioo on, :!011- 06, 

2116 91 

in Ove.ru.ORO plan, 52, 53 

Polish, 200, 205, 291, 4 16 

rations ro.r, 2m!, 204, 2ll5, ·1 12 

repatrhttion, Polish, 4 I :.l 

re(Jatriation, Soviet, 290, 298, 41 -J- 16, 419 2 l 

repatriation, WC$tem F.1oropean, 2·10, 28~. 286. 

291 

SHAEF e stimntcs on, 167, 168. 200, 28•1 

SHA F policy on, 108, 166, 169 

Soviet , 200, 201. 202, 206, 286-88 

ICarm (or , 167, 201 , 231l, 2j9, 284. 285 

Western Europenn, 200 

Yalta Agreement on, 2lJ.I, 4 14,416 

Displaced Persons Executive (DPX), 167-69, 200, 

20 1,2311 , 311.1 

Distl'ict const abularies, 34 1 

Oitnnar, Got Ctt11av, H:l 

Divisitlll~. U .S. 

2d Armored, !c!O:l 

:lJ Aomorcd, 140 

lth Anuorcd, 231,236, 313 

5th t\l'mored, 174 

lOth Armored, 191, 228 

12th Armor ed, 293 

5th Infantry, 200, 226 

9 th I nfontry, 150 

28th l~tfantry, 15 1,322,323 

29th Infantry, 270 

35th rnfantry, 324 

42d lnrantry. 252. 253 

15th l nfanuy, 252, 253 

80th Infantry, 236 

90th Infan try, 229 

991h Infantry, 155 

IOOtlt l nfantq•, 313 

Dodge, Joseph M., 434 

Doenit?.. Grossadmiral K:.rl, 258, 260-63 

Dorn, Wnlte r L., 105, 160, 386, 430 

Dornbcrger, Crn('·ral Walll'r, 315 

Dougl;u, Lewi• W.1 283 

Dragun, Maj. Cen. V. M., 289 

Drahl{o111k radi11 It\ Berli 011 ~17 771 

D\tnliam Pat"k, 7!1 

Uunn, James, ·l32 

DusTntN clctentiou cent0J', 3 14 

East Pr11ssia, l I 7 

Easthorm:, training at, 62, 63 

Enstc:m Military District, S~t: nun Third Army. 

activated. 308, 311, 313 

denazification in, 383- 66 

il'l Static Plan, 166 
LNnEX 

Rn~tcnt Military Dilltricl- Conlinued 

IJ'I)tJp strength of, :{2 1 

TruscOtl rep la r1·s Patton in command of, :1(16 

P.cJ.ols, M;1j. Geu. Oliver P., 3 13, 131tt 

~r:t II'SE Plan 

execution llf, 2<1U 

prepm··.lliou of, 1(;:3, 165 

~c onomic Control Agt'nry, SHAF.F, 281, 317 

l~ cnnomi c policy fot• Ocrm:tny, 89, 100, 101 , 10•1, 

IO!i, 107 

F.ddy, Maj. Gen. onion S., 230 

Jidf'iliJeisspiratcu, 277, 438 

~.h·n, Sir AnUtony, 37, :19, 218 ~durntion, German, 276, 277. ~59 

Ehrcnbreitstcin. fortrcn, I 93 

.i~cnhower, Genernl or the Army Dwiglu D. 

"" aid for Germans, 3ol(i 

<q)flointed SCAEF, i13 

in Berlin, 5 ]11ne HH5, 2fi5-fi!l 

<1s Commanding 0('11('1'111, ETOUSA, 2 •1 

and Control Council, 9•1, 266 

011 dt'nazification, :HH 

.11td DP repatriatiou, 116 

ami final o!Temivc, 225 

3nd German MU'1'Cncl~r, 259 

ou military govcrnllll••lt. 100, IO:~ 

on nonfrawrnization, 97, 98, 32!1, !125 27 

in North Mrirn1 15 

tm occuration policy, GO, 272 

and OvERLORU plam, 42 

nnd Patlon, :liH, 3fl6 

and post1lostilitics '''·•nnlng, 100, 101 

and proclamation to the Gcrm~n peopl~, IH, 

88 

011 protcctiuJ' or art, 55' 57 

IJCl! h at Shrivcnh:Hn, fi(j 

( li t troop conduct, 42 1 

Ull IIJICOnUil ioual ~lii 'e JH.Icr, 61 

:1nd U.S. G1·oup Control C01.1ncil, 'l l, 92 

on wnr rrimr,, I 70, '19 1 

un xones in Gt•rmany, 122 

Elgnrt, SaulS., ~57 

F.u)lllOns, lsi l.t. W.oltcr r., 238 

)·:t~~~J s, Brig. Gen. Rill')' F., 293 

lkt.brrgcr, Mathia., 109 

Et11opc~n Advisory Commission ( E:AC) 

:oud Control Cm111cil, !.12, 94, l2fi 29 

nnd dcclarntion on dt'feat of Gt•tmnny, 25!!, 

264 

cltO!hli~hcd, 37 

liNt session or, I 01) 

fra nce admitted to. 129. 130 

aud JCS I 067, 20R 

nnd relations whh U.S. :1gcncies, I -;~41 

:tnd snrrcndt•r instnnncnt, 109- 15 

termination of, :H-2 

!ct•ms of refcrcucc of, :l7, :l9. 40 

011 Warsaw government of Poland, 26'1 

EU1opclln Allied Contnct Section, 50, CJ2 

Eurl)(lt'llll Civil Aff;1irs Division ( ECAD) 

activut('tl, (i(J 

a t Bad Ii:unhurg, 269 

critique" of, :110, 311 

disbanded, :HQ 

cnlisH~d pt'rsonncl in, ?•I 

at M:111rhrm•r, 72- 76 

mont It• in, 165, :.ll 0, 311 , I •Ill 

on nonfr,ttcrnization, 160 

operMions i ol Clll't11<tny, 150- (il 

organizatir1n and training, 61J- 72 

at Ror hdort•Cn· Yveline.s. 71.l, 1'!1 

at TIO)•C~. IJfl..-60 

Europca11 Civil Affairs Rcgi1nt:n1S ECAR~) 

690ht ( Provisional) . 69, 72 

f>902tl ( Provisional), 69, 72 

690:\d ( f'J•i.wisional), 69, 7'2 

lsl, 72, H, 1:1:1 

2d, 72. 711, 136, 158, 3 10 

3d, 72, H, 15B, :HO 

465 

Europc:ut Civil A/fair$ (F.CA l Unit. s~e German 

Cuuntry Unil, SHAEF C:- 5. 

European Th('nter of OpcrntiOtl~ (lt.TO ). 25 

Europeau 'I hc,otcr of Op~racionA, U.S. Anny 

(ETOUSA ) 

activlltcd, 211 

and AT( e ) Committee, 311, 35 

civil afrnirs mission or,~() 

civil affairs section in, 25, 28, 29 

anti COSSAC, 26, 27. 21l 

nnd curn·ncy policy, :l36 

dcaoivatcd, 3 17 

and clenrwjfication policy, 382 

and ~CAD, Ci!'J, 71 

and cducutiou and recreation, 330, 33 1 

and rcdt'ployment, 328, 329 

and U.S. C. ro11p Control C:ounril, 92, 93 

aml wur nirncs, 173, 219 

Exp ll ee~. CNma n, from lihemtt'd <'Ottntrics, •Wil, 

11 2, -1'15 

Field lnfOtm.otion Agency, T echnical (FIAT), 2 16 

FitM M11t1t111l uf Milita1y Got•tnltlllrut (F:\•1 27- 5) 

and C<•rmnn handbook, tl'{ 

011 111ilitnoy g<)\ICrnnwnt dortrinc, 211 24, 2!i, 

. U5n, u~ 360, 443 

puhlicalion of. !i 

rtvi~ion o(, II!>, 8511 

si11nilk:"'cc: of, 5, 137 

Field Mn11ual of Rules of a11tf W01Jare (FM 

27 Hl), I, 171, 172 

ficlds, Shcp, 1:11 

Fifteenth Arn,y, 272, 307, :lOll 

Firsl Allil.'d Ail-borne Arrr•>'• 2lJ7n, :10 I 

First Army, 7!>, 154, 206 

dca tiv:~tion u(, 269 

and final olfrnsive. 225. ~21l, 232- 35, 269 

:mel militllt')' govemmcnt, 1:16, 137, ~3 , 15B, 

162. S~ 
466 '1'1-lE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCC:UPATlON OF CERM.\ NY 

First Army- Continued 

and policu Lra ining, 137 

RJ1iuc:lnud opr ion~, I :l:i, I ·I!'!, I 0!\ 

Fleck, E11on W., 2:!6 

Food rationing, German, flO, 155, 178, 27:i. 274, 

~52, 110, 112, '1~'i. •l:t7 

Pnt)(l SUflplill~, Cennan, I!H, 195, 27•1 76, :Hil, 

~53, ·1 10, •136, 4!!7 

Voord, Brit(. ~. J., 262 

foreign Economic Adrnir1i~tration ( fJ.::A ), 21 

Foreign Offirr (British ), 129 

Porrcstal, J anw• V., 10:1 

Fort Dix, 21. ·1·15 

Fort Ogkthoqw, 18 

Fowler, llenry H., 210 

Fragtbollt•r, 1<17, :{G5, :JS I, 38-1 

France 

admitted to EAC. 129, I:.SO 

Commillcr of Nationnl f.iber·ation of, 124 

;~nd dcna;dfi catior1, :wu, '146 

parlicipation irl <.:ontrol Counril, 114 

policy on Germany, 1H 

Provisional Covernr!ICnl of, 124, 307 

reaction to I'otsdnm Conference of, :1•1 •1 

ond ositi n of forces, 303 

arid ;~one in Germany, '{07, 'JOB 

Frankfurt, 226- 28, 230, 307 

in SHAEF enclllvc, :-111, 'H2 

as zone headquarters, •I(J:I Frankfrut~r Rrmrlschau, 368, 370, 4 12 

Frederick, Maj. Gen. RoiJcrr T ., 322u 

Fn:c Frcnd1. 25 

Frick Art Rdrrencc l.lhrnry, 5·~ 

P,-iedchurg, Cencraladmiral H ans GcorR von. 2G'i 

Fuchs, Hnu5, 272 

F1rertwanglr r•, Wilhelm, 373 

Fuller, I.t Col. Delbert 0 • 24 7 

0-l. 5, 6, 10, 172 

C:- 2, 5 

G-:i, 4 

G- 5, SHAF.F 

::tctivatrd, •12 

and Carpel Plan, ltH li7 

and drnn?.ifirl'IUOrl 381 

on ECAO, 78 

and E c r.lltSF. Plan, 16:1, 16'1 

nn milrtnry govemm~ ll operJtions, 206 

and Morgeothau Plan. 107, l Oll 

un occnplltiun policy, I 07, 1 OU, I 112, 206 

organir.:11 inn of. ·H, 4H, 40 

"CO 'gn ll~ations of, .'i I, 56, 72, 02, 22:1 

:~nd Static Plan, 16•1-!i7 

and U .S. Group Corrtrol Council, 221 

C:-5, usrr.T. Su 11110 O ffice or Milimry CO\'l'lllmcnt (tl.S. Zone ). 

nctivatrcl, ~ 17 

civilianizatinn u(, •10 1 

;md U.S. Group Control Counerl, 221, 1102 

Caffee, Mnj. Gen. H. J,, 3Qn 

Geiler, Karl, •1'10 

Ccnci'Ul Board, USFF.'l', 220, :181 

Geneva Corwentiorr, 11 :1, 170,20 1,259, 21lfl 

Cennan 

agric.uhure, 271- 75, 1\ !17 

altitude toward N:1~i a t• ocitlr.s, 2:12, 245, 253 

han king nud finaucc, l(j I, 162, 276 

behavior, l!n-H. lH6, 189, 225, 279, :lS I, '107, 

4:t8 

coal production, 275, 276, 346, 350, 407, 43•1 

rontml of dcna?.ific~ ion, ·128 30, 1~!'.1. l Hi 

courts aucl law, 24.'i 

"d~rcn lo , 276, 27'1, :15!) 

electi•m~. 427, 426, 4•10 

e;ocpC' ll ec~. 409, 412, 435 

fl><><l SUJ1plie$, 19•1, IIJ5, 27+-76, 3•1fl, 35!1, IIIJ, 

436. 4:-17 

hou ing, '279, 35 1, ~·1 1 

industry, 284, 350, •I:H 

polict!. 270, 155 

public hc<tlth, 35 I, 'i52, 387, !188, 3891 112, 

137 

puiJiic opiuiuu, Ill(), 259, 2ll0, 2H I, 282, 355, 

:m;, ~79, :lfl l. lHHi, ·127, -1~11. ·134 

railroad~, 255, !07 

refugees, 279 

resist;u\CC' to Nazi,m, 25·1 

resistaNce to occupation, t3U, 13!1, I 56, 179, 

21!0, :i5•1 

~c ool textbooks, :151'1 

self-government, 125- 28 

technicians and scient ins. 315, 31 (i 

German Country Unit, SHAEF C- 5, 72 

activ:\tl:d. 51 J ao-ua 

Bri ~h views on, Il l 

and Control Council, 80 

aud German handuouk. 81, 83 90 

and U.S. Croup Control Council, 9•1 

Germa ny 

dc<:entrllliz:ttion uf, 127, 212 

dcrnilitarizntion o(, 2 12, 2 13 

disannnrnent or, 213 

dim10mhl•nnent of, 127 

economic controls in, 2!'.10, 212, 2 t 3, 263. 264 

food r:tdouiug in, lllJ, 155, 17!31 273, 27•1, 152, 

4 I 0, ·ll 2, 435, •I !l7 

politicnl subdivisions in, 76 

treatmen t of as an economic unit, !H4, 431 

:~~on1·~ in, !{I, 75, 76, ll.'i-26, 'lq6 

Gerow, 1.1 . Ccn. Lc·onnrd T., 308u 

Cesslc1", Otto, 3H4 

CtJ,f/1/fJCI, 107, Il l, 11:1, 139, 219, '23:i 

Gilmore, JJrig. Ccn Willinrn N., 322" 

Giuler, Cnpt. Lewis F .• 18'1, 225, 2<10 

Glosslm:nncr, Lt. Col. ]), 1., H, I 5!) 

Goering, cic :t ~c ll H crmanni 256, :122 

Coctclwns, Capt. Rolwrl A., 136, 119- 5 1, 153- 55, 

:.S91i 
l "DEX 

Gnt•tllul(l'!l, oc<:upa.lior1 of, 2!42 

Uoa.LlClll' 

opcr:\liOns, 2•HI, 263, 3 H, 315 

pl:.o, 177 

C:old~chngg, P.rnil, :n I 

(1"kl~mit , Raymond, 3·~ 

Uollkov, C.:ol. Gen. P. I., 209 

Clnluhc~v, I.a . Gc1l. K. D., 25!> til passim 

Coud(ricntl, Maj. Arthur, H2 

Corbatov, Col. Gen. Aleksa.ndr V, 30 I. 303, 305 

C:orc-, l\ll ~et , I 'i9 

Uuu~ov, F.:dor T., "18, 26 ~ 

ou Comrol Council, 12U, 129 

on ~ll 't('udcr lnstn•m<'nt, 112 15 passim 

a~l'll, l.t. Gen. Sir A. E., 50, I 07 

Gn~au•t Hc,;.,e 

r.I'<'.Hil)ll Of 1 312 

ncwspnpcrs in, 3 71 

Grc•w, j cMr.ph C., 211 , 216 

Gr·ohr, Jo8M, 1'1·0 

Guuttll'lmck, 13rig. A. E. L., !i I, U:.!. 03 

C:ullinn, M.1j. Gen. Allen W. 

,,, Chid, OP Branch, II ~P (": 5, 5!l, 167 

:u ud~e Advocate Gcner<~l , 4 

;u Pro\'On Marshal Genernl, 7 10, H 

C:unn, Col. Damon M., 137, 15J, 161 , 162 

llnbc, Mnj. lhws, 37>1 

l!ntkwonh. Crccn H., 217 

llnd:lmar H ospital war c:rirrtC$ trial, ·~!)!i 

11 agn(' Convention, 113 

ol~llp, Lt. Cc11. Wade H., 6, g(HI 

H alder, Gcnc..raloberst Franz. 295 

Hnlifax, Vi~count, 2 17 

llaiJilfOil, [,t. Col. Mary A., 33:i 

J tulle 

confcrcnrc on D Ps <Lt, 290 

Owwlwwnt A I A 1 at, 299, 300 

Jtarnburg, 76, 117 

11.\novcr, 117, I GS 

H am\C)rl. Nr. Clyde, 228 

I larnron, Maj. Gen. Ernest N., :HI 

llnrri~on, F.nrl G., 357, 101) 

1-(.,skcll, C.:apl. Albert, 246 

Hastings. Col. Frank H., 7 

llt• uhrunrtcr~, Berlin District (U.S. Sertor), 2'1711 

llcndqunrtc•·5 Commandant, SRAEf, 3 12 

I lcl'hl!!r, Maj. Kenneth, 295 

Il.·ldrlhr•'ll 

l'UJHur•· of, 226 

M militnry district headquarcrr,, :1 1 :l 

r,oJUira tOIITS, 332 

tl cirn lloch ;~nd of the SS f.fbtusbom, 279 

Ilcndr~on, Leon, 20fi 

Henn. Col. T . R., 107, 103 

Jlcnsel, I I. Struve, 2 }() 

~le~~r, 166, 3 12. Su ulJu Greater Hcs.,c. 

llc"e·Nam111, 117, 166, 3 1 I. Stu! also Creatcr 

llcm·. 

Heste1·, Rrig. C:cn. llugh D., •135 

Heus.~. Thcodor, 371 

Heuu, :n:J 

Higgins, Brig. Grn. C<:m1d J., 322n 

Flill, Col. ]in1 Dan, 2~:i. 244 

Hill, Mnj. Willinrn, n·l 

Hilldring, Mnj. C:l'"· John H. 

467 

as A~sistant Scc:rt'lary of State for Otcupl.;cl 

Are;1 ~, 4:1'~11 

on AT (E) Com111illcc, 36 

on Brcmt•n enclave:, 125 

Ull (';li'C for nP~, 417 

on t:CAC. 3b, 37 

on EAC funcaion~, 126 

on G!'riii;UI lonmlhonk, 1\6 

on JCS JOG?, 209, 283 

on nonfratr.rni1.tHion, 97, 98 

on 0 VERI.olln plnns, 11:1, '14 

on protcctiOJl ()( art, 55 

Oil SHARF po tho~ti li tics role, 99, 100 

on terriwri:d 111llit nry government, 273 

on U.S. Uroup Conlrol Council, 2221 22211 

Historical vl~ion, lJSl'E'l', 2YS 

Historical Division, War Department. Sn Office 

of the Chief o( .Military History. 

Hitler, Adolf, 77, l?ll, 255, 256, 260 

T-!()(.'gTlCI', Wilhelm. 'Hib 

Holland.s, Heinrich, 181 

H oiii.Jach, Wilh('lul , 227 

Ho!Jne.s, Sri){. Cl'n. )111ius C:., ·IS, •16, 101 

Hoover, Ilcrbcrl C., •135 

Hope, Bou, 3:~ I 

Hopkins, fl arry, 102, LOS, 106 

Ilosshnch, Crnrral Friedrich, 2!!3 

H ousittg, Cct'lllflll, 279, :~5 , -14· 1 

H owley, Col. Fnmk L., 159, 298, 299, 301, 303, 

104 

H ull, Cordell 

and Cnhinet Committee on Germany, 102 

:1nd EAC, .37. 38, 39 

and wnr nimcs lriuls, 170 

H ull, Lt. Gen. J uhn E., 17 

H 11111, Col. r.twiu 1 ... 3. 60, I 00, 311 

Hunt Report. See American Military GOV<'IIIfT1c.\IH 

of Orcuf)icd Germany, 1918- 1920. 

HUSKY, 16. 21 

Hyles, Lt. CiJI. R. 1 ... 190 

Ickes, Hflrl.)lrl 1 .. , 12 

l. G. F01rllcn building. Frankfurt, 227, 269 

Indu~try, G<·nnnn, 201, 350, ·~34 

lnform<~l PQiiry Committee on Germany 

( IPCOG ), 210- 14, 318 

l nfonnl'ltinn Control Division ( ICD), USFT~ f . Su 

nlso Paychol<l~itltl Warfare Divi$ion, SilAF.F 

activated, 367 

and bOI>k l'~•hll hlm: , 37-1- 76 

anti censorship, 3 'I I 

ancl clenn7.ificntion, :Hi7, 369, 370, 374, 376, 37(1 
468 'I'HE U.S. AR.MY lN THE OCCUPATION OF CEJUvlANY 

Tnfomtation Control Division (lCD) 

USfET- Continuctl 

mission of, 367, ~i73 

nut! motion picturl!,, 3711 

anti musk, 379 

.1nd n<~wspaper liccn ing, 369-72 

~U\tl J\Cwspaper plants, 3 71 

.tud radio, 377, 178 

Ulld relations with militnry government, 399 

nnd the theate r, 3'/0 

nnd U.S. edited periodicals, :172-74 

Information Contr,l Scrvi~.:e ( ICS ), 367,. 

1ntclllgcnce Training Ccuuu (British). 1 

International Military Triuun:~l, 393, 39'111 

/own, 116, 11 9 

IPGOC I, 2 14 

nr.k~on, Roh<:rt H., 21 fl, 393, 394n 

J ansen, mayor of Wuct·sclcn, !40, .300 

JCS 92:!/ 1, 93 

JCS 1023,171,394 

J CS IOG7 

:~nd CCAC, 106 

criticisms of, 283, 211~ 

on tlenazlficatiou, 384! 

drafting of, 104 

and ~AC, 132, 2011 

lfMesis of, 98- 106 

rutd Morgembau Plan, I 0•1 

on politicnl activity, 360 

:~nd Potsdnm detlsiom, 3••5 

on public inform:uion, 171 

revisions or, 209 11, ·113, -1 •13n 

11114'1 U.S. Grout) Contr·ol Council, 106, 175 

.ICS 1067/1$, 214u. SM also JCS 1067. 

JCS 1067/8, 214. S6e 11/sn JCS 1067. 

J eep shows, 332 

Jew$ 

carr of, +16, IHI\ 

•·n•lgration of to U .S. zonl!, ·116-19 

survivors in Germany, 227, 357 

war c:rimes againsl, 169 

JodJ, Gcneraloberst Alfred, 257, 262, 263 

J omt Chiefs or Staff (JCS ), II on CCAC, 35, 36, qg 

on combined plunning, 'lS 

coufirm Civil Aff:~ll-s Division, 17 

on Control Co\>ncil, 127 

nnd Con!Iol Council group~, 91, 92, 93, 94 

ou [)[>repatriation, 113, •116 

;~nd gAc, 130...32 

on 0YP.RLORD plans, 5!11 59 

on lurrender in~trumetll, 110- 1•1 

on uncondition:~l surnmder, 61n, Ill 

on wnr crimes, 170, 172 

on ze>nes in Germany, 1. 171 11 U 

joint Mnnual for Civfl Affair~ ( FM 41-5), ·14-1 

J oint Post-War Cornrnittee, 100, 130, 131 

joiut Stuff Planners, 116 

Joint Strategic Survey, I \fi 

jones, Col. M . n., :l•IIJ 

Jones, Maj. MMvin 1\., 286 

Judge Advoc:Ha General (JAC ), ·1, 171, 172 

Juclieh, 1!15 

Kaiseroda salt nun<r, 228- 31 

Karlsruhe 

leave ccnrer in, !133 

occupation or, :J07, 308 

Keegan, Col. Charles E., 269, 31t~ 

Keitel, Gcm;rnlfl·ldmarschall Willlolu1, 262 

Keller, J .1. Col. Eugc!.lle, 253 

Kemrncl Cnstutu., 1!)1 , 201 

Kennnn, George F., 120 

Kinard, Lt. Col. William 1-1., J r., 

King. Adrnirnl Ernest J., 11 3 

Kirby, Maj Gen. S. W., 39,40 

Kline, Pfc. 1\nthony, 22!! 

Knox, Frank, II 

Koenig, Gcncnll Piurre j oseph, :lH 

Kommandatura. Su Berlin, Kommamlatura. 

Konopelko, 1<. C , •116, 420n 

Krcfeld. occu1>tllion of, 186 

Kruglov, Col. Cen. Serge N., 298 

KurhC$scn, 3 11, 312. Su alw Grcatdr Hesse. 

Ln Prade, Capt. !.loyd, lll8 

Laendcrrat, 40 ~, '1·29, 430 

LaFargc, Maj. Louis 13., 197, 271 

f.aGuMrlia, Florr.llo, 16 

Lapincr, Lt. Arnold J., 398 

Larwood, Lt. James 8 ., 148 

Law No. 101 For Ube.ration From N:uional Socialism and Militarism, 430, ·•31 

Lealty, Arlmirnl William D., ~9, liB 

Lee, Lt. Gen . Joltn C. H., 309 

l.ehman, Herbut·t H, 

as DirectOt' 0t•neral, UNRRA, !(ill 

as Directo r Office or Foreign Rel ic£ nnd Rehabilitation, 17, 20 

l.t•ipzig, occupation or, 243, 24'1 

Lend-Lease 1\dmmi~lration, 14 

Lerner, Max, 104 

Level of inoto$try plnn, 344, 387 

Lewis, Col. l::tlgar, 81, 83 

Lewis, Brig. Ccn. j ohn E., 9:3 

Liberal Dumocratlc Party, 362, 363 

LtF£BtJOY dcnalliification operation, 382 

"Lili Marlen~," :171\ 

J .iquidation J?or<•', 335 

Loulejohn, DTig. Cen. Robert M., 293 

Lochner, Loui$ P., :i65 

J.oewenfeld, Philipp, 383 

Loewenstein, K11rl, 430 

l.nndon AgrcrmcJil 1 394 

Looling 

by Allied troops, 187, 199 

by displaced pcri<ons, 252 

i)y Germans, 252 

by U.S. rroopJ, H 7, 187, 199,250 
l i\lJEX 

I,IH'It.OW l3arra('k~. Sc·e Br<~r1d rcfuge1• 111 1d UP 

cnmn 

Lumh:r, 2-laj , C~tu Sir Rose•·, 2ij, ~5 , •IG. 50, 

81 

J.)'nc, Maj. Crn, f.c,,•l• 0., :sot, 305 

McCloy, j ohu J. u•l Bremen cnd:wl!, 125 

as Chainnan, (;(;i\C :, ·~3. 30 

on Control Cuuncil, 9·1 

em EAC functions, I :12 

on Gennau surrcndt'r, 25UII, 26-1 

rm JCS 1067, 21 1- 13 

1111 Morgcnthrm Piau, I 03 

on posthostilitil"l planning, I 0 I, l32 

on propagnnd:1 to tlw Ccrmnns, lOS 

proposed as G 5, SHAEF, 4-3, •1--1, 50 

on reparations, ;j45 

:1 nd wa r crimes 1rial.~. 172, 211! 

McClure, Brig. Ccn. Ruhct·t A., 1 n, 17~, 175, 

367, 37•1 

MeMnJ1nn, Col. Bernard B., 369 

.\lcNarncy, Ccrlet'l\1 Jo;,cph T. 

on DP emigration to U.S., 4 18 

ou nonfrat<'rni'l!atinn, :i25 

tm troop demonstrations, 423 

on troop incidt•llt~, 12·1 

McSherry, Brig. CC'Il, Frnnk j. 

~~~ Chief, Opcr<ttlorlS J3ranch, SHAEF, C 5, •l!J, 

7 1, 8 1 

in COSSAC, 4:s as DCCAO, SHAF.f', •15, 46 

on miJjtary govcrnmcrll policy, 162 

on territnrinl military go,·emment, q2 

MnKinnis, Lt. Col. t~hu J., 299 

Ma ier, Reinhold, 364 

Mnlmedy ma.s~arrt• , :l92 

Manchester, ndlit ~ry government training a t, 

72- 79 

Mnris, Brig. Gcu. W. II., n2 M;~r.ohall, G<.'rteral of the i\nny George 0. 

on civil affairs in North Africa, l5 

on military govrrnnwn1 trlliniog, 6 

Qrl non!ralernizatiOII, ~II!, ~21, 32!i 

tlll policc-typl" oC<'UJ.Hition, :t:J9 

0 11 redcploymc1H, :1211, :-l35 

on troop mora le, ;13:i on 7.0 c~ in Gc••mnny, 117 

Mar!lhall, Col. S. L.. A., 2!l!i 

Ma$011, Lr. Col. f . Van W yck, 242-16 

M;ts:;ey, Raymond, 331 

l\lassigli, Rene, l :l() 

MIISTER Milit:.ry Government t:entcr, 79, I :l6, 

144, 1511 

Mnunsell, Brig. R. J,, '1 16 

Mlllliterrancan sy~tcu1 (of military ~ruvcrn cu ). 

s~e AlliN( 1vlilitnl'y Covernmcnl of Ot•rtrplccl 

Terri tory, 

Mcrkcrs lrcasmc, 228 31 

Meyer, l:lrig. Ccu. V incent , (J'i 

Mic.kclscn, Brig. Gen. Stallll'Y R,, 2B'I 

MjliJurn, Bril{. Gen. Brynn ! .. , ~H 

Miluurn. Maj . Gen. Frauk W., '{2? 

Military govrr-nmcnt 

Army <'01\trnl of, f~12, '1'17 

469 

c.iviliaui1.at1on of, 401 , ·102, 103, •141 

critii'JII(' of, 206, 207. :310, !i ll , '191!, 'l99, 4<17 

dcfinit ion of, :lu d<:ploylllmil of cast of R hi nc, 2·1 1-4-6, 249- !i'l, 

2GV- n 

dcployuwut nf iu RJ1inelnnd, liH- 94-

detnchmcnl organization, 63, 69, 70, 76, 310 

('tlliAtl'd flt't'~Orrncl, 7-1 

functton:1l \uhdi,·isions Cl(, 77, :l!J6, 397 

and Gc:nnnn police, 1-16 

and Gr-11tlrl11 politics, 3611 lit'i 

and l:t•rrrt;•n s~ gov<-rnuwnt, 10:1 06, ·~25 :w 

in intf'rmc:diatc status, :~ 00 11 

in J tn.ly, 22, 2!1, :!0 

mobile phase of, 84, 95, 2n 

organit.ation of, 95, :iOY. l~h 

pcrsonucl requirements or, •t, 17, 18, :!2, 166, 

:H it, :\96, 404, 4-11 

plans for training in, 5, 6 

pres-' rriticisrn of, 12, 1<12, 159, •m :l, ·100 

:1ncl public informa1iott, 173 

relatiom of with tac tical trol)ps, 27:~. 3 13, 320, 

141 

in Sicily, 22 

~ta1ic phn~t· of, 114, 308, '109. :H2 14, 396~1 01 

tnc·tic . .l fnntro l of, 206, 207, 273, 3 12, 313, 

447 

tf'rritorinl control of, 273, :H2, .f-17 

ll'l\lt•i•HI fur, 7, 17- 20, 62- 1111 , 72- 75, 15!1, l!i9, 

•HU 

willld l'nwnl from control, 104, 125, 10, 41 1 

Military g<tvl'trlmcnt co 11rt ~ 

pl'ocedurc.s of, 144 

trinls in, 1·14, 179, 270, 35U, :197 

nud wnr crimes trials, 393 

~lilit.1ry gO\'Crument dcta('hllt<lllt> 

A I 1\ I , 77, 159, 298-:!0 l 

E- 1, 310 

F.-20 I, :110 

E- 291, ·139 

EIA2, 272, :~Otl 

1 U:l, 247 

E.IC:2, 269 

E I C:>, 15 11, 269, 3 13 

ElF3, 269, 383 

EtC:2, 271i 

EIH2, Ill , 189 

F..2C2, 269, 396 

f'IE2, 21(1 

F1 ~. 25•1 

FIC2, l•l!i 40, 202, 277 

F2D2, 227 

F2C2. 191 
4i0 THE U.S. ARi\ LY l N THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 

ilitnry government dctaclnncnt-Condnued 

F:lG2, I '12 

C- 297, ·1·:19 

I II i\2, 2i'l 

ll lf.2, :11>7 

III C:I, :H I 

1 n<:·s. :{ott 

12E1, 246 

I '1!:2, I U5 

1'\C:'I, 25(> 

I IC.2, I :16, 119 'i7, '1% 

1111 2, I::> I 

!1\<.::Z, 15 1 

IIID2, 11\B 

l l '!(;:l, 2'>'.! 

Milltury Govt•rnmrlil Division, PMC: 

I' ~Hihli etl, 10 

hrru 1 ion>, 16 

l\lilhEu)' Govcmmc111 Law No. 8, :!flfi-!JO, :199, 

126 

~Hi it. 11y (.t)wrnmcnt l.a" :"lo. 191. 175, :s6!J 

~lilitary go,•crnment provi&ionnl detachments, 236, 

2-1:1, 2(;!), 3 10 

Militnry V nc01.tion T ours, 3:1:1 

Milkr, Col. J esse I , 6, 7 

Mini~tcrinl Collcctiug Ccutcr, '11 5 

Midm:rial control purtk·s, 2·19, 262, 26:1 , '11•1. 

~15 

M iuiltry of Information ( Dritidr ) , 171 

Mlr1/rm Af ilitaite l.iaison Arlminist rntil•r. (M M l.A ) 

welfare te ... ms, 2:19 

.llilfttlrt•trk, rocket plant, 2:H, 315 

,\lo lmov, Vyachcshw M ., :l7 

lllo nd•>rf l.t•s Jlaim, detention center at, 27!\ 

:>.lom.rhcrt, Ccncrnl dr ~t~hud dr, :sOB 

on~rll:nr, military govcnuncnt in1 133, 136, 

1-1'1- 57, l(.i l 

l\lontl' Cas~ino, 57 

:\ unt~o~omery. Field ~rsh:-~1 Sir Brrna1·d 1 •. , ·16 .• 

77. 1!15, 261l, 26:!, :?Ci5, 266 

onurnl'nt~, Pinl' An~, and Arc-hi ve~ ( :VIfA&A ) 

''' 1\aC'h!'ll, 1111 

"' linal olrt·nsivc, 2:15, :!·Ill 

1n ltnlv, 5·1 

in 0 \ EIU tliW [ll:on, ) ;; ·57 

111 l•ost-'lll'ri'ndcr period, 270-72, 397. 396 

in Rhineland carnpnign, I !)7- 200 

liiOI'fl.<ll, l.t G1·n. Frederick E. 

:lJtpoint•••l ·" COSSAC, :!'i 

a~ Ocputy Chief <>f St.dl', S[IA P.II, 01, 2:1:1 

011 nonfrntcrnizution, 911 

.w.J Ovt.~tr.mu• . 27 

•mtl R hNKt:O.: plam, 27, :11, :12 

on ~one~ in Ccn"·"'Y· 11 7 

lllo rl(l'llth;m, Hcury j ., .J r., II 

,rmJ Ccmwn h;mdhnok, 11h 

inlhtcncr .,f o n War Dr p:1rtrnc111 plam, 105, 

'2 10 II 

.rnd JCS 10&7, 105, :!10 II 

Morgcnthau, llrnry j ., Jr.-Continucd 

and plan for Ucrnrarty, I 02, 12•1 

resignation of, :H2 

on wnr (:Timr•, trial•, 172 

M orgcnthaLI l'hrn 

and German propagnnda, 107 

and j CS 10fi7, 101, lOG 

and Poudarn Communique, :HS 

oo vch t'\''~ on, I().( , I 05 

Stimson views o n. IO'l, 10·1 

and War Oepa.nmcnt, 103 06, :11 0 1-1 

Moscow Confere nce 

a nd r·:AC, '17, '11.1, 126, 129 

~nd wnr c rimes, 16!.1 

OSl'ly, Phil ip E.., 11 9, 208 

Motimr picture co rit~nlalicm, '17(j 

Murll,'r, J osef, 'lM 

Mt~ tCh<.m-CI,rdltu h, OC"t'llpation (If, 185 

Mucrmcr, OCC'IIf)tllion r>f, 197, 225 

Munich 

military gl>VI'I nmrnl In, 197 

occupnlion of, 253, 25-J. 

M•11·phy, Rohcft U, 

in No rth Afric,,, 15 

as Politicnl J\dvi$1'1', SHAF.F, 262, 112 

M11sic r-ro1 ic111ation, :I?U, 'l7!l 

Nntionnl Sncinlist Party, 6-1 

N:Hirmal Wa 1· Crimes Office, I u:! 

N:1r.i a tt•.,citics, Ccrma11 altitude ww;m.l, 2:12, 2·15, 

25:1 

Nwe Ausleu. '1 73 

Nc-urnnnn, Capt. Arthua· T ., :lBO 

Ncwn•·"'· Col j omes R., 151\ 

Newton, Col. llcnry C., 55, i7 

Ninth Army 

deactivated, :106 

and final ofTt!ll~ivc, 225, 2!13 

in Rhincbntl campuign, lfl2, 165, 199, 206 

Nvnfn•tcnri<:<l\ion policy 

enforcement of, 160, 32 1- 27 

gene> is or, 97' 98 

and Sovie t troops. 263 

terrninntio n of, '127 

troop opir1in11 (In, I -12 

in Wnrld ~~r I, 92 

Nord nu ~c , orcnpati(lt1 of, 2:!-1, 306 

Nonn:wdy Base Suc:tirm, ETOUSA Cnmrnu11ie.•· 

ti <.IIIS Zo Ill', 221, 222 

" Norah" nnd "South" p(Qns, 76, (l2, I fl·l 

Nmcrnhcrg-

:~ t <md monuments i11, 397 

captttn- of, 1! 17 war c rimes tri:~ls in. '1!.1·1 

Or.r••pntion rO~ s, 11•1, 135 

Occup:rlion 'J'roop ns ~. :l:H , :HI , •12:1 

Occupminn zom•$, 3 1, 75, 76, :ICIG 

Ut'l!'mlinaliom of, 11 5 26 
1:\1)£)( 

Orct,pation zones- Continued 

n·dispo•itiu11 to, :lOb 1111 

lJ,S mn\', 'WG 

Ot;'I'A<a•N Cnnfcrcnct•. St•e (,2twht•e Conft'n·m:es, 

l!HI. 

C>ITwv, ( !hit•f of COIIIIl<lll r .... l'm~(l(· utivll vr 1\xi~ 

Crilllituility, :195 

0011'1' ul tlw Chief Coumt·l fc11 tiH· l'w•rt·utiou 

ur War C•·iml;.$, 218 

om. t' uf the (;J,icf or }.filitnry lliuwy, 295 

OOtc~ of 1-'orcig:n Relief aud l~ch:•lHiitatio , I 7, 

:w. 21 

OOu ,. ,,( l\1 llitary Go, crnmcnt, B:.vnrl.o 

IICli\illt!d. 102 . .J25 

11nd di'n•tt.ifir~;ticm, 11 I, •1'12 

OffiC'c t~f Mditnry C:uvcrnmeut, (;,.,.,,trr lcs~c 

.IC:tiv.ncd, 125 

'""' Ct•rtcH.In l'i<'ctions, ·l2 7, 'I:OW 

Offirc of Milit"''Y Government (U.S.) (OMGVS) 

:u; 1 iv:nt·d, ·I 02 

•llllhority iu U.S. zone, 401 

.wd C:t'11113.11 cconomr. 13~. I'H 

and Gt•ru•nn clectio•H, 427, ·1211 

001(1' uf ,\1iliwry Govcmmcnr (U.S. Znucl 

.onivatcd, ·I 02 

function• .,f, 125 

11111\l'd w lktlill, 132 

Ollict• of Milit01ry Go\·crnmcnt r~tcm Oi~trict), 

102 

OfliC'o 11f l\·lllitary Govcmmcm, Wurruc-nherg13adcn 

11CtiV.HI'II1 425 

11ntl tl••n:•~ificalion, :~ I 

00k4: of Price i\dmini~lrnlion (OP/\ ), II 

Oflirc• of Strategic Scrvic·c~ (OSS ), ll. 11;n, 162 

Offit•f' nf \<\1ar Information (OWl ). 17 1. 321, '172. 

H'{. no 

Olmlruf, 2:12 

Ohc·u, C,1111 1\•thur K .. 1-12 

0 ''" "" l3<•ac:h, 7-1 

Op<'ratiom Dwi~i tm, '"' DC:S, 17 

OjiJH'IIIII'ilnf·r, l.t. Col. Frit<\, UO 

OJIJH'nhofl , Fr:utz. 117, !Ill, Jill U:l, Hll , ~ltl;J 

nrt•Rflt/)/UIIlcitel, 219 

O.lwrnr, Col. Rnlph M., 11fi 

0\'1(111:,, "'' l'rojl't:l, 315 

Ovt lo .u l 

COSS/\C pl:.n~ for, 26 

ll i\~ · pla11• for, :19, 52- fil 

nnd Jones iu Cem1a11y I I~ 1 'I 

1'11dm\'' C:.•pt S;~ul K .. lfl:l, 22::i, :!·HI 

1'.\l'l:tt< 1.11' l'roj,•t t, :1 I 5u 

P,,,J..mua, (:ol. 1-!enry,Jr .. •q() 

l':~rJ< ,, a1 r.\·n. Floyd t .. , 297, :101. 'IO'l, :10:. 

l':llll·r10II, Rohrrt P., 222 

Ull t•iviJi.lll <"OIIlrol o[ milit:JI)' 1(0\'CI'IHIICIII, 9-11 

fumilll. •10'1, ·1:)2 

ns Sl~crf' :lr)' of War, ·IO'Iu 

Patton, c:cewr:el (;c•orfl\' S .. 2'RI 

on dl'llnt.llit hticm, :WI 

and nonfratc•rnlr.•titm, 326 

relief of, :llltJ 

Pt•ndlciOu, Col. I lr.oll')' i'vld~ .• 72, 77 

"Pocket C:uitl" to Ccrlflil11y,'' 97, :12:! 

Police. (;,•riiUIII, 270, :155 

Polkc·typl' ot·t·••Jl·lduu, 'U9- 11 , ·H:l 

Politiral rl'vrirut.Jiiou 

:wtl t-lo·t tlou~ , 'Hi I, '165 

anll p:orltn, 'l!t2 (o I 

nnd p;ony i~···miteK. ~r.t-66 

Pot~otl.uu tiN i~it ll rm, '115, :J I6, :ll>l 

Soviet inllut'IIC'l' ou, :il'i2 

l'oliriro-rnililnry rout~c• ( British), 5, 7 

Pollock, ja11w' K., 10 I 

Po1sd01111 romfluutitpll:, •1:1:> 

Po1sda111 C.:rlllft•n•m·t: 

n11 d Contml C:o11nl'i l, :H2 

and (}ct'UJ)IIIion polit-y. :H I ·l(i 

pn•p11r:11ious fur. 2!J7, 2!111 

Poll\'r-l l)'lltlll')' lo.•it)u, 275, 276, 3·16, ·107 

Puwt•ll. Ill' III)' , 7 

.J71 

Pn·limillotr)' Rccollnlli~<anct: P;u I)' for llr• hu, 

2~u :;on 

P rc ... s rPoric 11 tn 11011 

i11 hook pu!Jii hinJl:, :HI-76 

:llld Ct'll'lll'" IJI, 'l'/ I 

itlld tlo•u;t't.ificaliun, 'Hj7, i70, :111 

!iutl ICI> poliq•, 'Hi£1, '170 

:ontl 11cwop:qw, llc••·using, 3oll, :no 72 

ohjc:nivt'\ of, lbll 

und PW J)'~ tlm•t• phil,t'S, 167, !Gil 

:ttld lr~iniug 11f )Otllll:'llists, 372, 374 

and U.S. pt'l'iuclic;ll~ for Genna us, 3 72. :i 7:l 

Pritr-, Byron, tOll, HI'~ 

Price, ~laJ . Ehtwr, •;117 

Price rcJ)Ort on miliwry go1·ernment, 101 .\'(lr 

nl"' Pnn·, llyron. 

Prickr· u , ~' 'I · (;,.,,, 1-' A, '122 

Prime :\linistrr, Briti$h. Sa Churchill, Wiltston S 

Princt''!l (;,,,.J,·u~. ~ 

P•·i.otWI"< of w.•r. Allil'tl, in Gt·rmau lt.tlltl$. Su 

Rcr11v•·rc•d 1\llit~cl Miliwry Pt•rsonncl . 

J>risonc•·s (1r wnl', Ccnn:111, in Allied aud~. St'r 

<li1o Ui,annNI ''''''1!1Y Forces_ 

rnpu11t· or, 21 1. 2·19 

di,cJiiii'!(C of, 2!J:l II,';, •IQ!J, 112 

Ei\C policy fin, II '{ 1 !l 

C:c••wrnl St.tiT uO!C'l·rs ns, 295, 2q() 

~hipnwnt \If ftnm U.S., -109 

transft·r t>f to FranC<', .JO'l, 112 

trra twc·111 ,{, 2•11 !lh, -ll2 

untl \\':tt' <'l'illll'!l, 221 

Produnion Control Agency. S H ARf. 21H, 'H7. 

~r'b 

Pr<)Jll'fty c·nntrol. :{1111 

opt•rrttion~, •12!1 

polic-y, IOU 
·172 '1'1 J ~ .S. \R~fY 1:\ T HE OCCUP \TIO~ OF Al\Y 

PI''Ht•xtant chun:hr> nnd elt•rK)', l I G, ::15~ 

Po ovu~t ll lntshal Gl~owr.ol ( Pl\·IC: I. Sa air,, C:nl 

loon, t\luj. Gen. Allt-n W, 

.lttivntNI, 6 

doniJ)wcl from C:rno·ml StaiT, l(i 

~ llht.JI y Uoverourwut l>ovi~io" of, 10 

,ychologk:~ l Warfart• l)ivi•ion ( PWD ) SJI A £F. 

.\'en also I olfomuHion Control Divi~ion, 

US!o'E'J'. 

nud tV!org<'tlllinll Plnn, 107 

:•11d uewspaper liccnsi ng, I !10, Hl l 

:tml occupation twliq·, Ill'{, 'lhU 

i\1\tl OVC'rt IIC\\'~papcr.., 21\1 

ami puhltr infomliltion, 2111, 282 

.1ml public inforrrl<~llou polkr, 17:1 7!> 

.1nd JWOclamatiou to tlw German prnplc, 1111 

l'•yrhologicnl Warf:l.t'e Schuol, In 

Pto ftlir hc>'t lth , Ccrnoa 11 , :15 I, :l52, 'HJ7, :Hill, 'Hl!l, 

•ll 2, •13 7 

Jlulolic fo•lid supplies 

and A'J'(E ) Cotnol1ittcc, ~5 

lind "di>r~1se and unn•M" fonnuln, :!2, aq, :IH1 

for Cc-rmany, 89, I !J5, :1 lfi, 115-37 

fnr North Africa. I 'l 

Puhlicntion~ Board, Offirc- of W.1r Mohilitntion 

:llocl Reconven.ion, ·~ 17 

•l 1i ~hing Operations Section, lCD, USfET, '173 

I! MI ("~"'• Confncm•c, Su Quebec Confurc lltt• 

I !J.J :~. 

Qut·l11•r C:onftrenc.'l's 

1111'!, '10,·18. 11 5 

ttHI, IOJ, 12211, 121 , 172,2 12 

Qur1'11 1\/i.zabelh, 3:~5 

Quc~u i\1111)', ::135 

R.1din Brrlin, 281, :!U;!, 'Hill, :17H 

l< :odio Fr;tnkfurt. :\77 

R;1dio l.uxl'mbhto rg, 17·1, ~R2, :168, 377 

R.Hiio unich, 377, :17R 

Ratleo n•urientation, J77, :111' 

Radit• Stuttgart, 177 

Rn~h . mayor of Stolllcrg, 11 0, :mo I(,..NK IX 

C:nw A, 27 

C:<~st• n, 27, ·12 

(l.~Kc C. 27, :11 , 32, 12, 1011, llli, 16:!, lhl 

RntH'. 1117, 220 

Rt•totll~. captm·cd. :!'~H. 21!J, :i l 7 

f{\'< ~>H•rtd Allied Milimty Pcrsonn,·l ( R:\:\1 PS l. 

52, 20:!, 239 

Rt•dc-pluytncnt, :12 1, '!28 'lb. 122. 42:1 

Rnlt•ploytllt'lll Trni ninli C:oiiHlH\Ild, :1:10 

Rt•tl ispu i t ion 11f nrt·c-~ 

i11 111 llunl 7.11 1\CS, :IQfj 011 

fro ou J.'rcl1ch 1-onc, :1117, :10n 

from So\ ict -zonl' 10h 

Rt•ctl. l.t C:<~l . M . W .. 192 

t·fugc·~~. ell llnMIIi ll d frol'll tl i!tplnrrd wr~om, 

52 

Regiona l CoVI't'""'''"' Co-o~din.ttin~; OAicl', ·10 I 

Remagi'IJ hrkh:r, 1115, IIIII 

Reparation., 20<1, 21:?, 'H ~. U:i 

Resistancr tu Nn;.i tn, Germa n, 25·1 

Rt-sourt"t'!> ll u~:otion Bo;ml, SII AEF :{ 17 

Rcsponsihilitit·~ Ctm un i~sion of lht• ari~ fltw·c 

Coufct'CII' 'l' ( I!) J!J), 170 

Rt• ~. 111 11yor of Wu ~clt•n, I lfl, :1110 

Rhine Navig.otioa ~tcncy, SHi\EF, !i 17 

Rltinc Prn"inn Mihtary Distm·r, 27'1, ~7:1, :lOti 

Rhine ltivt•r, la5, lfl7, 196,3:13 

l{ololtcntror. jtlotrltillt \'011, 271! 

Rickett11n. !J'i, I~J 

Riddl!'hl'rgo•r, J.lmt•t W., 208 

Rifkind. Si11W11 II. . 117 

Ri111burg (.:;~~ li t•, Ji ll, 191.l 

Ring ln nd, A1•tlouo• C .. 9 

Riviera Rrcw :11looud ArC'a, '132, :1:1.1 

Rolwns. Owen, J., !I+ 

RochfMH·n· t·line- ~. 78, I :H 

Rot:kcts ;wd rol'kN technolugy, :l:H, 2:1 i 

Rocr Rivc1, I Ill, 185 

RoctgC.Jt 

military ){O\'l'rllllH•nt in. 11!'1. 151 l h l 

occupation 1>f, l :l:i 

Rooks, M:1j , Crn. l.uwc ll W ., 262, ~lli:l 

Roose1·ch . Fr:onk litt D . 

on :tdmiui~trat ion of libcnurd rcn . I I, 2U- 22 

on i\nny •11ilitaty government troining, 9, 12, 

II 

and Chmc-hill, R5, IO!i, 106, 118, tl!J, 12·1. 

172 

aud cAC.:, :111 

nnd 1-:i ~enh o\,~1' , 6 1, 98 

and Gt·tn1 t'lll hn11dhonk, 136-ll!l 

nn military I(OVt:rlltnC: rH, I :'1 

and Mor!lenth;'lll, !16, 124,211 ,2 1:1 

and t\lorgl'llth:no Plno, I 0 I. IOU, 2 12 

and nrmh-;ltt•rnimtion. 98 

em oceupnti•m policy, H5, !16, 106, 107, 127 

(II\ tmstho•hiJIH'$ planning, IOh, 10'1, 2 11 

mt poMw;u France. II fl 

.1nd proti'C' tion of art, 5·1 

nncl St io n•Ool , 12, 1:1, 22, 102. !fl:l, 171, 172, 

2 10 

t>ll IIII<Onditional ~u rrcndt'r , 2:1. 6 I 

!> II \\ ,If Ulllle.\1 171, 172, 2l(j, 217 

on l.OJit'> in (:o•rttt.llt)'. 117, l W 

Rcu imcr, l.t. .miC'~ J .• 27 1 

R"sl•nm.111 , SnttltWI 1., 2t!i. 217,2111 

Rm 1\U ttA t.\lt tt, 26 

Ru ttl\nt:l', :!: . 2fl, :H, :15 

R1llu·. 10:1. 12 1. IICi, 225 

Russell. cuu~ d. :Hili 

Russt:•ll, l ,t, C ui. Wtlliam A., 22!1 

Ryan. Col. C:ooJu•li'" E... 28 

Rrko\,-ski, rff'. Frank, 287 
'J'ru11tan, Harry S. Comtimot!d 

c)u 111ili1nry P,ol\'t'o ''""'"I pc•o•fotmlllltc', 1(10, Ill I 

.111d .vlorgenthau, :H!:! 

011 Ol'tllplltioto p olk)•, 'I J:!, 'H'l. :Hh 

unci Prin· uli~~un, 100, 101, 40:1 

o11 puhlication ,,f ll•t·lontcal intcllil!••uo·c•, '1 1'1 

on relief ~"Jlltli~ $ Cor Cc•nnany, 34:1, :1 15, 'H6 

1>11 r('pa.rntiHII~ !ll[t 

~nd Stnlirt, 2G!l, 2Y7 

011 war c:rim.,, tri ~. 2111 

(Ill withdt~lw:ll fwuo Sovit•t zo11c, 2fi:i, 297 

' l t•otscott. Lt. (:,.n Ludan K .. !·Hlt., 1011. •122 

Tull)•, Crace, 21 :1 

11th 1\mty Cwn11 

;)l,~orbs ETOUSA rivil affairs, 3 1 

l><·comcs operatinnnl, 77 

111 10 dcna:cilic .ouon, IU:l 

drployu1C111 of, 12<1 

di~handccl, !1 17 

11110 mllit:u·y !l•llt't'nuio·llt , 13 7, I )fl, I li'l, ')0(,, 

269, 273 

21 A.-my Group, 121, 117 

'1'y1'hus, 53, 1!1';, 1%, 279, 286 

U lm, ''ccuplltion of, :II q 

Uou onditional suol'(:mlrr policy 

1111d ceremony nc Rcin1~ . 257 

and E.AC imlrumc:nt, 10!) IS 

fnrto)ltlation or, 2:l 

oltjl'ctions to, ()I 

ra•tion~ to, 258, 2'i9 

und SI-IAE.f' '"~lllmttllll, 257 

llndursecrctary of W;•r ,\'n: Pattcrsou, Rohert 1'. 

Uuitcd alion~ Rl!li('( nnd Rt~hnhillta tiou Atlministr:uion (lJN RRA 1 

tli ~placed p~nom tc:um, 167, 3 18 

mis.~ion uf, !l!U, •l l:l, ·11 11 

IJulrl•d Na tio11s W;l t' Crionct- Cmmnissivu, l(i!), 215 

United ServicC$ Organilmtions (USO), :rll 

Unitrd State> 

;udtndr IO\\'IIrtl tht· ~AG, '~9, 4fl 

.1Citl11dc towurd military govemmenl, 12 

•lllrnction or to n•fugrr• nnd OP4, llh 

!'.ljHnred Suvit·t l'ltiYcm iu, 115 

tlt-rn(lhiliUttlon iu, :l'H, :l:ls, 422 

1) f> c•migt·ation to, 'I I 0 

rnod import~ for C:ct'llliltly, '1:15, 4!!7 

.11ld France. 116, 1111, 12•1, 129, 3(17, :H I, 109, 

l!l!l 

• tnd Gem1:1n rl'wtonltc rthabilit:uion, 85, 86, 

104, 105, 108, Ul, 162, 212, 2113, 21H, :H:I, 

H5.3~G. 1:11, 1•11 , 1•13 

r.o•rn1an c.xJ)<II'ls 10, 1:11 

C:cnnan opinion 011, 282, 303, ~11, ·•'lt. 

tutd Grea t Britaiu, 2fJ. :H, :19 11, Ul, 1)1, 10·1, 

Ill, 117, 11 11, 2 15 - 19, 26•1, IWrt, :HJO 

immigration IJHOUu, ·II fl 

isolationiSul In, 39 

.liiU lsrncl, !!UTI 

United St:tH'' Con timll'<l 

uri 11p1ttio11 zone, 11 5- 1 h 

upiuion 011 d<'mt;.ilkation, !llll 

opinion on I) l's, 206, :lS 7, I :?2 

175 

opiniun on Gcumms, 1JK, IO;i I t:>ll, lll2, lll3, 

\2:!, 100 

"piuion <Ill prisoners of '~:tl', I h!l, 170, 288 

poli<')' on forcrcl rrpatri.otion , •1 19, •120 

polit·y "" ll't•nlmt•ut of J ew), 11 6, 117 

and pu,tw:u· t:oonmiuncoHs ln uropc:, ll G, liB 

Jli'C~~ C'OII1111C'nl ()I) OCCII I)IltiOtl or Cr·nnany, :HI:l, 

'lH I. :lilt), 1100, -103 

:111U pr~:-W11rld War 11 onupation~. !! 

private rt•licf $Upplies for C:cmnnny, •110, 41011 

1111hla clt•ou.lltcl for ct.·mnhilillltion, 3:28, 31 I, 

'!35 

ruhlic n•li..C and rch:tl ~i litation programs, 20, 

, :!\! 

puh!ic;lliwl< lt)r Gc.rm:.ns, :l72 7•1 

roli' in or.r.ttpation planning, 2!1, 'H- 37, 311-<lll, 

su. 101 

role in 'tr;~lt·~ic rJianni••s. 2:1, 2tl 

:tnd S,;virt Union, 2:1, I I 2, I 1'!, 11 I. I I 9, 125, 

1211. 20 1, 258, 26:>, 2/il, !!All 90, 297. 312, 

:Wi,ll-1,13:1 

:ltld ll't'llllll('tH of Cct•tmtny .,~ nn c•c:onornic nnl1, 

3 I '1, •I :l;l, 11'1 

troop cplilt cmt•Ht trainin){, •12:1, +12 

to'ClO jl o't'plttn·nwoHS ft•om, •f22, •1•12 

war <Times tria ls hy, 300 !l'i 

aud war in the Pacific, 320, 32!.1 

Uni\Cr$il)' ur Virginia, 7. s .... ttflu School of ~IiliI ~ I)' (: 0\'l'ITiffiCll L 

U.S. J\rmcd Force~ Institute (USAF! ), 331 

U.S. Chid Colllttsel for Pm>('('Hti<lll or War Crime<. 

Slw ark~on. Robert H. 

U.S. C:ondnlllllllry, :HI, ·12!1, •H 3 

U.S. Fot t'~ oii Opean 'f'lt(·ttl('r (USFET) 

activatctl, ~ 17 

and ch·n;vlfiration, 3ftl, :W7, ~Sill\ 

and 011 I'CIJ:ttri:ltion, .JI'\ 16 

:111d ~A C: pin n~, 221 

:.ml t;<'lno.•ll )•outh program, 1:J8 

aud policc·typc occupation, ~:$!), 3 111 

:11td policy ou currenq•, :!311, :l lll 

in Stntk Plun, 166 

and trouf) rcc:rC<Ition, g2•1, 331 31 

and war crime~ trials, 3!J.I, !195 

U.S. Oo·ootp Cunlrol Counril, ll:l Srr nlso Oflicc 

of Milit;try Government (U.S. Zone) . 

:lCtiv;uNI, 9'l, 9·1 

dvilllllllzllliou of, 402 

3nd G j SIIAEF, 221 

mis.,ion of, 1J•I, 96, 166, 175 77, 223, 224, 317, 

102 

move to G<•nnany, 269 

orgnni:...ti!Ool of, 22 1- 2•1, •102, •103 

U.S. rt igh Conm1issinn lor (:rrrnun)•, 105, 418 

U.S. High Cnnnnissionet for Gc·rmany, 128, 418 
'!' ~ L'.S. \ IU IY 1~ TH I·: OC:C:LIP \TIOI\ OF (;F. ~l.\:\1' 

Stntr-Wnr-Navy Co-ordin:niug Gommittc•c· 

(S'vVNCC) 

.1~ wmm:md :-.nd t h.llllll'l for USFET, :l t!l 

'''t:\lolhhment o( I :1 1 

on (orrcd DP l"t!patri:otinn1 11 11 

••ud .JCS lfl67, 2flll J.l 

,1111J tniJitary g<tVI'I'IIIlH'III (011111)) 1 1:!'! 

Stati~ l'lun, 164-67, '1 10 

Shl)•r•·, i\1:\j, Gen. orri~1111, ~!52 

Stl!nrn~. Brig. Gt"" C•tth t~r·l P .. fl, 32, h2, fi:l, 

6!1, 71, 275 

Stc•lliuiu~, Edward R., Jr. 

nml I!:AC.IH 

itnd policy on Gcrrar:llo)'. J 111, 122, :!0\l, 210 

.oud uneonditie>nal >ttcTcndo•r, fi I 

a11tl ''"r crimes. :11 h 

Stitmon, Henry L. 

lllld I\ till\' I:OIItfol or rnilitnry govcrllllll'llt, I J. 

~1. :.! 10, 211 

.1ncl Ann)' training prngram, I 2 I I 

•>II P.AC, 38 

1111 hiKh commissionrr, 121! 

on MorgetHhau Pl,tn, IO~l 

on outopntion policy, 1·12 

llll po~twar piau' fo• Ckrrnany. ltl2 

on tl•~:hnical um.l 'cit'l1tific intelligence, :'115 

Clot \\'M crimes, 172, 2 I() 

on ·t.oues in Gco•m;,ny, 12·1 

StoiiJer·g, military gover·nut•!nl in, HO, I!J I, 161. 

179, !!flO 

Stout•, l<~rl:m F' .. 5 I 

St•mt, Lt. Ceorgo! F .. I Ill 

Sttilii!J, Sir William, 'ill 

amJ Control C.:u111tt'JI. 126 29 

;uul declaration on Ct•rrnnn)•, 26 I 

nnd ~ttrrcndcr inttrollll('nl, I 09- 1 'i /Nt f,ll/11 

Sto'OIIfl. Maj. Gen. Gcor,llr V .. I :iO 

l:ltr0111;, Maj. Gen. Kenneth W., 257 

Sturt~wbttilttilg (SA), 113 

Strttt~:nrtn Zeituug, ·no, •J I 0 

Snt.lctc:n Germans, 2·19, •IOUu 

Sttrtltftllt•,hc Rtucd{tml.. :i77 St~rddeut~rlu• ZcitUIIJ(, l70 

Snnruoary of U.S. l niti:-.1 Post Orfcal Polit•y RchltitJg to Germany, :11 :t~ l I. 945 

Su[Jrcmc C.:omm;mdcr· Allit:d Expcd it ion:~ry Force 

(SUA EF )' :lO. sr,. u/)o F.!senhO\VCI', C:rowrnl 

of the Army Dwight J), 

StiJHNnr Commander's l'rod.tm:llion to the C:crrnarr People, Ill, 8!1, I'H 

Supr rmr Hca.dc1u:u l(•r>. Allied Expcdition<tr y flttrC'e 

(SIIAe.F) 

;wd Allied High Comrni~~iou, 110 

Uritish views on, II I, fJIJ, 11!) 

nud Con trol Cmt ncil, flO. 17!i, 176 

:u11.J C.:ontrol Count•il J:tt'Ot tJ)~. fi7-<Jil /IIW/111 

on df'n.w.ification, :lli2 

tli~hamlment of, 265. '117. !llB 

:1l Frankfurt, 269 

Suprcnw ll cmdquurtcr:~, Allied ~xpc:ditiOIIUI'Y 

Fort·<· IA I) - OoutinttNI 

.wcl Ct•rm;o II Counl r>' u ni I, flO u:> 

.md Ccrma11 h.tndt.ook, 87-89 

"'' nootfr.ltl'onit..tlion. I bl, 321 27 

011 OCCIIp:lliOn poJi<·y. 107, 101\, (IIJ-b:J, 21J:I 

:tnd po~tho~tiliric•• 1oh•, q 1, 911 100 

and rcdrJJin>''"'''''· 3211 

and So\'it•t citi~t't1~ in Ge.nn:1r1 ~t•rvk••, ~n I, 205 

on transit to lk din, 125 

011 w:.~ · t•t•itucs tHJiicy, 170 

Sweet, Cit pt. I'm II. I 113 

'I (T;t~t·t) S.,h.l)od<ton, G 2, SIIJ\F.F, :l-1!1, 311, 

:un J'.\LIS~ AS, 100, lf>'l, 165 

TAt.LnJC> dll'ck :tnd search opl'r.olicm, :1111, 'it!> 

Taverner, I st l.t. Donald V., 2116 

T>oylor, Mnj. C··n. 1\if<txwell D., :122,1 

Taylor, Brig. C:~u . 'l'clford, :Hl5u 

Tt'chnirinn~. C:rrmnn, :115, :~ tG 

TcchnnloJ;ty, pl:lttl~ and eqttiplnrnt, ~"(l!ttre of, 

231, 271, :106, :H ~. 316 

T(•hrnn Coufrtrncf', 30 

l't•tml.'nhaunt, I sl 1.1. Edward A .• 2'1G 

!'heater rcllric:nlalion, 178 

Third Army, n1, IllS, 1!'11, 19:1 

and fin~tl ,,rrcn~ivc, 225. 226, 22U, 2:16, 2•16, 

249 

and fo ,·ccd l'l'plilrilltlon of DPs, •120 

operat.iom of in Czcchoslovaki<~ , 2· , 269 po~tsurrcndrr oprrntion$ of. 26<1 

rcdispo1>ition 11(, 306 

as U.S. tartit'ltl command. 125, l'~'l. H :l 

and war t"tirnC", tt•i<tls, 393 

Th()rn.son, l.t, Ghrq•lcs A. H ., 5, 7 

Thurmond, tvl:tj. J omcs S., I :17 

Tipugrnpl,, S. Sgt. C. M., 202 

'l'uRctr. 25 

Torgan, 2·15 

Trca~urc, C'l\jlltrrr .,(. 229. 230, 2'll, 235, 271 

Treilsur)' Dcp:1rtmcut, 116, 102, I'l l See uur) 1Jorgenthatt, llrnry J ., Jr. 

"Tn~aty of Poot~1110111h," 94, 176 

"Trc<tty or V(•rsailll!s.'' 176 

ur>F.~>.:T Con ft!r·t:ncc, 26 

T lict·, 19 1, 1!}7, ?02 

'J'ripnnitc ConCt•rcncc of Jlorrign Mtnisters. Sa 

Moscow C:onfrrcnce. 

I roop dcptn!lt•lll'• •I 12 

Troul>ridgc, Lt. C\11. Sir T. St. Vtnccnt, 57, UO 

Truman. 1111-rry S. 

on access lo Ucrlin, 297 

nnd Chmdtill, 26-f, 265, 297 

on cnnt t•ol or rnilitnry govcrnmrnt, 3 1 !\, 40 1, 1

10:1 

on DP cmigr:llion to the U.S., •I HI 

and 1:-1 arri~on rn ission, 35 7 

and JCS 1067. 211 
1\ I>t·:x 

SliM, tiKI, 12·1 

s..,, •ci~<'O Confcl'cncc, 2 lll 

S1 h:u·lit, lljnlmar, :1 1 I 

Schuctrco-, Fritz, !161, :16:J, 3B:J, :JU5 

~dtnt•idc•r, Alhr.n , 2!~2 

::ii'IHIC'IIingh, FranY., 3 71 

School ol Military Govcmmcnt 

;octiv:uc<l, 7 

;o\l~<'k8 on, 12 I I 

[;ocuhy uf, 7, ll 

!(I!HIIItitf'\ of, 18 20, 25 

ptn!l'•"" pf, 7, 8 

rc:oC'tt\atcd, 11·1.16, 110 

"'crotiuncnt for, 17 111 

~dm Yf', Nmhnt, :nu 

SdHI'tcr, G1•orgc W., 2h6 

Scltlll.l.ttrtffl'l (SS ). H 5, 117. 172, lUI, 2 1!1, 237, 

211 I, !Hl2, ~fH 

SdtwiJtJ:;Stcin, August, !l7 J 

Sriruli~t•, Cermnn, 3 15, :1 1 h 

St•c t·t·tao y of tlH: Navy. St·c Knox, 1-'rauk. 

Scc:rctao·y of State. Su H ull, Cord~·ll; Steuiniu•, 

~d".lt d R., Jr. 

Sl'l'tNltt)' llf Treasury. Su or~tcntltnu, Henry 

J., Jr. Srrrrtho y of War. See St.ittl$1ln, l lf·My I . ; P.Htcmm. 

Rullt'o t P. 

Scnnw Sp<·l:iill Comrniucc l uH·•tigating th<· N;,.-

tooual ll c(cn~c Program, 'l l :1 

St•rviccs uf Supply, 16 

Stvcuth Army 

C.OIIIIII:llld LI10ols of, :':lO 

am.l dcna~:ific:t ti ll , 31J2, l!B7 

•ttHI litHtl oll'rnsivf', 246, 2-+9 

ftnot tion~ uf transfem!d h> Thitd i\r111y, •125 

and nonfr:Jtcrniz:l!ion. 322, :12211 

I)O\Uuu·,,,dcr operations of, 269 

.utd wa r l't imc~ trials, '1112 

SI'Vf'Z, Grlll'rlll Fr.tnc;oi~. 25 7 

Slli\P.F ,.,,..J;wc, 311 , :112 

Sh.tlcr, ~l aj . l'hilip, 2:J9 

Shct•n, Col. H. G., 298 

ShtJlJinog aud Supply Coouonittcc ( Btitislt ), 15 

Shl'ivc•nhaon i\mcrican Urtivl•r•ily, '!SO, :i:l'l 

Simr•on, Gt·ncra l Will iam L., :125 

(,th Anny Group, 12•1, 165, I !H, :~ 0 

bU lOtio Theater l nfumlaliou S<•n icu~ Control 

Commnnd (T ISCC), :Hi? 

liB 70th l)jq rio: t Informal ion Scrvit·us Conn ol C:nt11· 

mand ( UISCC) 

nctivn tc·d , :Hi7, 369 

nud uew~11apcr liccnsi1tg, ~70 72 

htl7 ht Ui~trict l nform:ltion Services Conlrol Comm.lnd ( DISCC) 

.u eo vatt•d. :Jb7, 369 

.\1\U ncwxp;~pc r licensing, :no 72 

sr .. \h roo, 57, so. no. 221 

Smith, l.t. Gcu. Waller 13. 

011 care for UPs, ·1 17, ·110 

Smith, 1.1. C:cn. Wnlwr B.- Conlinucd 

0 11 <'mnhnt t•fl'r·l tt V!' ll'~s, 336 

on (lt:riiHilt lt:ondhuok, (17 

1111 Gl't'tn:lll !<III' I<' Jld!'r, 257, 25!1 

ott intcgntu•d r.ivil aFrnirs, 'l:l, •11 1 •17, ·Ill 

loll lootittl(, 200 

011 tnllimoy I(Ovrrtuncnt, •100, ·10::1 

on notlfrrlll'ttu~:otivn, '12 1 

on Q\'I!Kt mw plan•. ·I:J, 4 I 

Sno". Mnj. Gttlf'u, 110 

Social lkmo•m•tot P.u ty, :Hi2, 'Hi5, 127, I IU 

Soldier Shows, !l:i l, 'J:S5 

Somenl"ll , l.t Cf'lt Hr.·hot1 B., 'l28 

Souslt~pa 'IJ\ , Maj Gt.m. Ivan, 257, 2511 

SouthamtH•Ht, 711 

Sovicl Army lir11,011, with SHAEF, 20·111 

Soviet citi~t·u t. r:•J)IIIl'<Jd in German ~tnif.,rm, 2M, 

205, 21l1J. !W9. 41 •1, •119- 2 J 

Soviet M ilitnry Adtollni to<ttion , :162 

Spa, 22 1 

Spnrh, l.t. Col. S. S., 191 

Spcarhc.lcl mHitu o y govcmmcnt dctuchm1mts, 

18(> U!J 

Specia l llran<'h r•f T'uhlic Safety, 117, :iu5, 3tl5 

Special Erlwlon, SIIAf•:F, 2·111, 261! 

Sr>ecia1 St'l'tiom Snl>-division. SHAEF C-2, 316 

Special Service City. "11'{ 

Speci:~ l Sta!T, SII AP.F, 5,·1!1 

Speer, Allll!rt, 260, 2u:i, :1 H 

Spr11cltknmml't dl'llnv.ification tribunals, 4:SI, •J!$!), 

+ lh 

SS Sich lt ~ituliciiJI. 219 

SS T oltmkofJ/Mrbarlldn, 219 

St;~ , JlriA. C c11, Rnbl't't, 256, 322 

Stalin, jOS!!Jlh V., 23 

EiscnlJOwcr nw~~:~ge to, 225 

a t Ptll\tl:oon Coolfl'tl"lltc, !H2 

and Tnunan, 265, 297 

Standard Policy lind Procedure for Comhincd Civil 

Afl'atrs Opt:Lti~<Jt" i11 Northwest Europe, 391'i, 

+H 

in COSS/\C, 33, •I:! 

and (";l'rnoan h.uodltouk, fl3 

on military JlOVcrnrnem organization, tiO on pt•otc•ctinn or nrt, 5:i 

io SI-J I\II, F, 116- 5 1 /l'mim 011 w~1r nimcs, 179 

Stark, Admio·n l l:~r ld R., II !~ 

St nte.~. C:ol. J<•c, 281, 32 1 

Stale Dcp:ortlltl'lll. Su also Byrnes, Jamc5 : ll ull. 

Cord ('JI : Sttttiuilos, Ed"'a£d R., J r. 

un Control Couucil, 209-12, 265 

and c-ontrol in Germany, :118, 403, 4:i2 

Oi\'isiou <If 'J nntorial Studies of, I J'l 

nt\ D P t•mi~;rution to the U.S., J 18 

on JCS I Ol'i7, 208- J.l 

ou snrre11dcf iot~t umcnt, 110- 15 

ott war niml'S, I 70, 2 15 
T i ll·: l r.s .. \JUlY I:\ T HE OCCU P \TIO\ OF GER,\1.\ :\'Y 

l.l S nnurmat .. u ftun·~ 

wuuucl uf, '1:!'1 :!'i. I:! I , 1:!:!. l ;7, H:l 

llt'IIIUUSI r.\1 iuu~ Joy, Jl { 

d••pt•ttdnot< ol, 112, 11 :1 

t·dm•.niooo ~ntl rt·rt'rlllion (o r . :1:11 -;1 1 

ooo oral1· ul, 'l'i I 'll) 

•JpC'I':otiuns ol, :120, 'l21 

'l'tality .. t, 'fHr, II'.! 

rl"l:ui••tn with Cl'rmans. >:l?, I .. !1 , 1'.!2. 1'1::0 , 

·Ill 

rt•l:otiom witlt military .~n ll'ttttlll'rt , 273. :H 'l, 

:l20, ·112 

rc•piHrcmc·nt~ of, •122, 12:1, 112 

$1n·ngtlt in l•:toH>l)l' 1•(. 'l'lO 

strem:th ill Ci<•nnart) ol. '120, ·1:: 1, 11Y-I I, 12:! 

ll.S. 'I )'Jlluts <:omuti<,ion, S'l 

,S. Zhllt'. ''"'" anti population, :J<IC:i, ·117 

Ut .\ll Ucadt, 7B, I:H 

\'an Hu~kirk. r .1. Col. Kctlltcth 1·: .. •I 'Hl 

V.m Wagcnrn, Lt C•tl. j.-.mc' II., 2:12 

\ 't'Jt•li.Jt,, Bti.~t . R I I S., 21\!t 

\'unc:r<.'al diwaw. '125, :rtl, '15'i ~t, 121 

Vcrshiuin, ~1:\j. (;t•n. S. \' .. l!JO 

Vcrvicrs. Stc o\1"1- t 1\lt Milit.n y C:vvt't'tHncnf 

C:!'lllt'l', 

Vo/krrluun, 22!1 

V•~rlwc~. .tJ . Mt•lvin IL 202 

W itdt·, Col. "" rltut D., 2·1, :~ 1 

W.tlil•ubt·rS(, ui. llaus, 371 

Wnr C:abincl ( lltit l' , II !J, :! Ill 

\.Y:or c-rimes 

:-og;~iust U S. n:niunal~. 221!, 'l!ll 

Allied poHry •nt, I Ctll, 170 

Hrlcish npini1111 tilt , ~I'>. 217 

ronspir:wy dtar~rc•s in, I 72, 2 16 

J\C clll. II:! 

rl'itlcu('c in, 2 1 !J, :l!JI, 392 

oscow tlt•tlamtion on. l(i!l. 3!11 

scntcuccs, 22(), :1•1:1 

SHAEF pulirr r1n. lOll, 21'1, 22 1. 'ill! 

tri:tl procedure in, 391 

u·inls, g<.'ncrnl, :1•10 11'; 

trinl, at DJtdwtt, l~l l 

tr-ia lo lC'rtttinrttl'd, :i!l ln 

U.S. polic·y ""· 2 1'1, 2 15. 2 1ti 

hy U.S, ttwp~ . 2:10, 221 

War Crimr..\ C:,OIIfl, ETOUSA. <!JII, 3"12, 31JI, 

3!)5 

\>\'at• D!'p;Jrtlllcnt 

on CCAC, :HI, 'l<t 

nnd romrul i11 t:t'rmany, 'i Ill 

and concrol IIMdtincry, I:! I 

011 cuntrol •of milit:ory govcrunlt'ttl. 10. I I. l~'l. 

1-17 

on r:A<.:, l'-10, I:H 

;~r Dt'f1:11llm·nt Conli~t~u tl 

illttl :-.hm.t••ouh.ttl Pl.111. 10 ·~ ~~"• 

ou pulu •·· I) tw m t utMt tt>tt, '1'1'1 

;trod tHOIP!IiOrt ol l ilt, 'o'> 

111111 t('(ft'IJlU)'Ill('fl!, :1:!11, '1'.! 11, :1:11 

on t•·rHul,,ltilily (.., <h ft tpit·tl ,,.,,,,,, I li 17, I 0 I 

nnd \~.11· 1 1 inu•• ll'i,tl•. 2 1 • 

on ZUlli'" 111 (,<•im;ouy. I:! I 12 1 

War Oflitt• ( lh itt'h \, .> 1 111,117 

\\';u· Plath 01\i u (WI\ P 'o, I 

\\'ar Rc•lid Ct>llll'ul Ho,llttl, 't 

\'V,,r "111\'~ ll irs, :l:l11 

\'\1:11''"''' llll\'t'rttlnl'ltt ol P•1land. :w I, 2111 

\V:ll'tuot t\uwtu ''" i'rdoutt .o l Sdtool, 'I'Hl, 'l:l.'i 

\\';""· C:npt. I <>llis. '1'17 

Wt·lol. I 1. Cf>l. CeoiTt "Y· tb, 17. I '11\ 

Wl'l!lt, J.utH''· lh 

\'\'p••ks, I .t. Co• to . S. l{un;tl<l, '1110 

\'\'t•itnnr, ottiliiiH)' g<l\'t't lltttt•nl in. 21 :1, 2-1·1 

W•·ir, Hril:. (;,"" j11hn. 17 

Wt•llwt', Col lllun C .. 270 

1!',•/ll.rir~·b uNhnt'i, J'l!ln 

tr.·m·t>l/ l!tl, :.! li 

Wt•<t \'\'all, 1 1'1 

Wt••LI'III :.tilit.to)' l)j,ttitl 

artiv;ttt•d, '1 011 , 'i l I 

hound:uic•\ of, :111 , :l l 2 

dt·ttwtilit·:lti"n in, :111:1, :!117 

in Static l

1h111, I (lb 

trt•"l' •tr<'ll"lh ,.f. I:! I 

Whiu·, ll:orry Dt·X'II'r, 2 11 

\V ickc ~hant. lit iJ:. Gc11. Ctlrnrlius W. 

as t\c tin r~ LJcputy Chit•l, U.S. Cmoq) Control 

Cot>IICil, 9~1, 106, I :12, 222u, 22•1 as Chwl. f.lltO()l';Jrt Allit•cl Contrtel Srrtion, 

SliAf.r. 9!!, 93 

:ts C <:HotHt.llttl:\111, S~h<10l of ~l.llit:Jry Golernmcnt. 7, 10, I 9, 25, 5 I ;~s W:\1' fJI'p:tt'lotll'nt ntlvisc·r 10 U.S. Ei\C delegatio n, 92. 112- 14 

\1\' ms.wt~o. 15 

Wild. Cui. Ccrhard, I I l 

'12 

Wimlllcclou Gi1•il AfTa~rs StafT Ccntc•r ( Driddt ), 

Win01n1, .f•thn C. npr>t•inlcd tn EAC, :111 

on Control Council, 2Ci:l 

ott F.AC funrlihlls., 1:10 :i2 

EAC: tc•rms o( rcfcn•nn•, !Ill, 10 

and surrcndt:'r insrrumc:m, [09- 15 pt~uim, 258 

Winning, T.t , Col C:haJie.~ D., 2'16 

Willcb,llat h, Ad:tlhcrt vou1 '}(J(i 

Wolfcrs, i\nw ld, 7 

lf~o11, Col. itch , :1 10 

Woml'u·~ Army Corps ( WAC), 160, '121, 'l29, 

333 

Wood, Brig. G<.'n. Eric F .. II I, IU:$, 11 :t lib 

Working Src:ttrity Cummitu·c (WSC) 

activated, 110 
1:\0EX 

\Vorking Src:urity <.:ommilll'l' ( WSC ) <.:ontinu('(l 

<nul f.AC, I :lit 

:wd surn•ud1••• ius1rumrnt. IO'l- lj fll"lll''· 11 !1. 

12(1 

rlhin ~. Col. Kntnr.th r. .. :!52 

Wtt!'N!Irn, •>n·upation uf, I Ill, :1110 

Wucrlll'IIIIH'rft, I 'j<), I hfi, :!tt'l, 'l07, ;1 12 S!'r o[,n 

Wucrttcrulit•rg-Badcn. 

W oll'rlll'mltco$1-llorl<'f> 

c reation nf, :1 1 '1. 

~wspapcrs in. :J7 l 

\',dt.l (.uuf••n•nc·t•, l ti7 

:uu.l .Jhrn{'rulu!rmt·ut ol (,{'nnnny, .!0'1 

iuu.l ·a,~•nnlnrt.". ~Uf) 

and Su\ ic•1 I>Ps . • W~l. ·II I, I 1.5 

·177 

:1 ud !iodc·t l'it•zens rnp111red in Ct•rnHIII un.fom1. 

20 I. 20:i, 2fl'1 '"'tl ";lr crilnl',, 20'1, 2 1 h 

Zhuku' . ).l.tf"ll:ll Ccur~;r K., 1711, 'l.h"•, 'lhh. 21>11 , 

300 '103, :H2 

Zone., t'\ll>trm·l'rsy, :11, I L'1 'Lh 

u:; OOVERNMEN1 PRINTtNG OFFICE 2003 Q99 -099 
N 0 R T H 

8 A L 

S E A 

, . • -, •. • -y ~ JOINT ..... 

R 

,'~-

/ / SWITZERLAND 

R, Clmfo:n 

c 

r 

A 

L 

I 

/ 

0 

5 

p 

v A K A 

HUNGARY 

0 L 

LITHUANIA 

WARSAW" 

A N D 

GERMANY 

ZONES OF OCCUPATION 

1946 

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY 

STATE BOUNDARY, 1937 

PROVINCE BOUNDARY, 1937 

ZONE BOUNDARY 

,.....,,....., U.S. FORWARD POSITIONS, V-E DAY 

AREA COVERED BY CARPET PLAN 

20 0 20 40 60 80 MILES 

20 0 20 40 60 BOKILOME:TERS