J-S84019-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MAURICE ADRIAN WILKINS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 746 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0003314-2013

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 20, 2018

Maurice Adrian Wilkins appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Berks County, denying his pro se petition filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After 

review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case 

in its March 28, 2017 order and notice of intent to dismiss Wilkins’ PCRA 

petition:

On or about July 12, 2013, [Wilkins] was charged with three 

counts of [m]urder of the [f]irst [d]egree, three counts of 

[m]urder of the [t]hird [d]egree, two counts of [c]riminal 

[c]onspiracy, three counts of [a]ggravated [a]ssault, one count of 

[p]ersons not to [p]ossess, [u]se, [m]anufacture, [c]ontrol, [s]ell

or [t]ransfer [f]irearms, one count of [p]ossessing [i]nstruments 

of [c]rime, one count of [k]idnapping and two counts of [c]riminal 

[s]olicitation. On October 21, 2015, [Wilkins] entered into a plea 

agreement and pled guilty to three counts of [m]urder of the 
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[f]irst [d]egree. On the same day, this [c]ourt sentenced 

[Wilkins] to a life term of incarceration without possibility of 

parole, and all remaining charges were dropped. [Wilkins] did not 

pursue an appeal at this time.

On February 8, 2016, [Wilkins] filed the instant, timely pro se

[m]otion for [p]ost-[c]onviction [c]ollateral [r]elief. On February 

18, 2016, [the trial court] appointed Osmer Deming, Esquire, to 

serve as PCRA counsel for [Wilkins]. On March 21, 2016, Counsel 

Deming filed a [p]etition for [e]xtension of [t]ime to [f]ile an 

[a]mended PCRA [p]etition or “[n]o [m]erit” [l]etter pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). 

[The trial court] granted that petition on March 22, 2016. Counsel 

Deming filed six additional [p]etitions for [e]xtension of [t]ime, 

which in each case [the trial court] granted.

On March 2, 2017, Counsel Deming filed a “[n]o [m]erit” [l]etter 

[r]equesting [l]eave of [c]ourt to [w]ithdraw as [c]ounsel. 

Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 3/28/17, at 1-2. On March 16, 2017, 

the trial court granted Counsel Deming’s petition for withdrawal. On April 25, 

2017, the trial court dismissed Wilkins’ PCRA petition, which he timely 

appealed on May 3, 2017. Both Wilkins and the trial court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Wilkins raises the following issues:

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective due to conflict of interest,

erroneous advice and poor performance?

2. Whether Wilkins’ guilty plea was unlawfully induced by duress 

from the vigorous assaults and threats by victim’s family and 31⁄2 

years of solitary confinement?

3. Whether there was a prejudicial conflict of interest by the trial 

court by dual representation, pretrial prejudice, bias treatment by 

the judge, and withheld evidence against witness character?

4. Whether the PCRA court abused its discretion by failing to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing?
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Brief of Appellant, at 5 (reworded for clarity).

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 

317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011), citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 

482 (Pa. Super. 2005). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless 

there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Id., citing 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Wilkins first claims that trial counsel was ineffective at the time of his 

plea and sentencing for (1) laboring under a conflict of interest,1 and (2) 

inducing his guilty plea with false information regarding harmful DNA 

evidence. 

The standard a petitioner must meet for PCRA relief when raising an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is well settled:

A petitioner is eligible for PCRA relief only when he proves by a 

preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from one or more of the circumstances delineated in [42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542]. One of the grounds enumerated in [42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542] involves claims alleging ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Thus, the PCRA provides relief to those individuals 

whose convictions or sentences resulted from ineffective 

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular 

case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no 

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted that to mean 

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1 Eric Angeles, who the Commonwealth listed as a potential witness for the 

prosecution, procured representation from the same law firm that employed 

Wilkins’ trial counsel.
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that in order to obtain relief on a claim alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove that: 1) the claim 

underlying the ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; 2) 

counsel’s actions lacked any reasonable basis; and 3) counsel’s 

actions resulted in prejudice to petitioner.

Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 678 (Pa. 2009). See also 

Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728 (Pa. Super. 2003) (claims that 

counsel unlawfully induced defendant to plead guilty are reviewable as claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Wilkins entered a guilty plea to three counts of murder in the first 

degree. Thus, the only matters Wilkins may raise on appeal are the 

jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the guilty plea, and the legality of the 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Syno, 791 A.2d 363, 365 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citation omitted). Therefore, in order to be successful on an ineffectiveness 

claim, Wilkins must prove that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in an 

unknowing and involuntary plea. Commonwealth v. Yeager, 685 A.2d 

1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted).

Wilkins also argues that his housing in solitary confinement prior to trial 

and unidentified threats by the victim’s family caused him to plead guilty 

involuntarily. Therefore, we address these claims together, as each implicates 

the voluntariness of Wilkins’ guilty plea.

Under the PCRA, a petitioner is eligible for relief if he pleads and proves 

by a preponderance of evidence that he has been convicted of a crime for 

which he is currently serving a sentence and that his conviction has resulted 

from a plea of guilty unlawfully induced where circumstances make it likely 
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that the inducement caused the individual to plead guilty. See 

Commonwealth v. Stark, 698 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Super. 1997). 42. Pa.C.S.A. 

9543(a)(2)(iii).

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590 requires that a guilty plea 

be offered in open court and sets a procedure to determine voluntariness and 

whether a defendant is acting knowingly and intelligently. The trial court must 

conduct a colloquy that includes, at a minimum, the following:

1. Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to 

which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?

2. Is there a factual basis for the plea?

3. Does the defendant understand that he/she has the right to a 

trial by jury?

4. Does the defendant understand that he/she is presumed 

innocent until found guilty?

5. Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences 

and/or fines for the offenses charged?

6. Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms 

of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such 

agreement?

Commonwealth v. D’Collandfield, 805 A.2d 1244, n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citation omitted). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 – Comment. 

Here, the record belies Wilkins’ claim that his guilty plea was 

involuntary. At his guilty plea, Wilkins recited in detail his account of the 

events leading up to the murder of three victims and stated on the record that 

his guilty plea was voluntary. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 11/21/16, at 12-17. 
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Specifically, Wilkins stated that he forwent his trial because he did not “want 

to put the [victim’s] family through any grief,” and to “own up to what [he] 

had done.” Id. at 16. Moreover, Wilkins signed a written statement affirming 

that he understood the nature and consequences of his plea.

There is no indication in the record that Wilkins’ guilty plea was 

involuntary, and therefore, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective is 

meritless.2 Yeager, supra.

Wilkins next claims that the trial court’s partiality to the victims

prejudiced his defense. 

As a general rule, when circumstances arise during the course of 

trial raising questions of the trial judge’s bias or impartiality, it is 

the duty of the party, who asserts that a judge should be 

disqualified, to allege by petition the bias, prejudice, or unfairness 

necessitating recusal. Furthermore, a judge’s decision to 

continue presiding over a jury trial will not be reversed in 

the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. In order to 

establish an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show 

something more than bias in the abstract; he must ordinarily 

demonstrate that the alleged bias of the judge infected the jury 

or otherwise deprived him of a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Hewett, 551 A.2d 1080, 1082 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

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2 Wilkins’ also argues that trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest at 

his guilty plea. However, even if trial counsel labored under a conflict of 

interest, Wilkins’ guilty plea invalidates any claim of error stemming from his 

preliminary hearing. Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 209 (Pa. 

2007) (citation omitted) (once a defendant has been convicted, deficiencies 

at the preliminary hearing are rendered immaterial). Therefore, this claim is 

meritless.
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Here, Wilkins baldly asserts that the trial court expressed bias by (1) 

denying his motion for a change in venue due to pretrial publicity, and (2) 

commenting on the video which purportedly showed Wilkins shooting into the 

car, killing two men. N.T. Guilty Plea, 11/21/16, at 16 (THE COURT: “I saw 

the video in [co-defendant’s] trial. And clearly there’s no question that [the 

video] captured you shooting into the other car.”).

Wilkins fails to establish the requisite bias, prejudice or unfairness to 

warrant recusal. The trial court’s comment regarding video evidence from 

Wilkins’ co-defendant’s trial occurred after Wilkins tendered his guilty plea and 

provided a lengthy and unsolicited account of the murder, during which he 

admitted to shooting three or four times into a vehicle. Moreover, even if 

Wilkins had established the requisite bias, prejudice or unfairness necessary 

to warrant recusal, he waived his right to file a recusal motion when he entered 

his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 212 (Pa. 2007) 

(guilty plea constitutes waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses).

Last, Wilkins claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his PCRA 

petition without a hearing.

The right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is 

not absolute. A PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing if the 

petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of 

support in either the record or from other evidence. A reviewing 

court on appeal must examine each of the issues raised in 

the PCRA petition in light of the record in order to determine 

whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no 

genuine issues of material fact and denying relief without 

an evidentiary hearing.
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Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(citations omitted). Wilkins’ PCRA claims are meritless, and thus, the trial 

court did not err in dismissing his petition without a hearing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907(1).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/20/2018