NUREG-0170 

VOL. 1 

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 

ON THE 

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE 

MATERIAL BY AIR AND OTHER MODES, 

Docket No. PR-71, 73 (40 FR 23768) 

December 1977 

Office of Standards Development 

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Reprinted October 1985
•- .. UNITED STATES 

C1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 

December 1977 

Docket No. PR-71, 73 (40FR23768) 

TO RECIPIENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION 

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT (NUREG-0170) 

Enclosed for your information is a final environmental statement dealing 

with the transportation of radioactive material by air and other modes. 

The document has been prepared in support of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission's advanced notice of rule making proceeding.published in the 

Federal Register on June 2, 1975 (40FR23768), a copy of which is enclosed 

for your use. 

Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the 

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51 "Licensing and Regulatory 

Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection," the Commission's 

Office of Standards Development issued a draft environmental statement 

on Transportation in March, 1976. After consideration of the 28 letters 

of comment received from the public and from Federal, State and local 

agencies, a final environmental statement on the Transportation of 

Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes has been issued and 

designated NUREG-0170. 

Taking into account the conclusions of the final environmental state

ment, public comments received on the proceeding, and other information, 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will consider the disposition of the 

rule making proceeding announced on June 2, 1975. Persons with views 

on the content or conclusions of the final environmental statement 

which may be helpful to the Commission in its deliberation should file 

such comments by March 15, 1978, with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Office of 

Standards Development. If sufficient need for clarification of the 

final environmental statement becomes apparent, the Office of Standards 

Development will consider holding one or more public meetings for this 

purpose. 

Robert B. Minogue, D ector 

Office of Standards Development 

Enclosures: 

1. Advanced Notice of Rule Making 

Proceeding 

2. Final Environmental Statement
PROPOSED RULES

I-.- 

a- -. 

N

- .... NUCLEAR REGULATORY "-, COMMISSION 

* _", -1- [ CFR Pa•t• 71 nd73J 

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 

.Pckaing end Transportation by Air 

- Following Its oranization under the 

- Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Pub . .c l.w 93..43). the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has stated Its Inten S .... tion of reviewing those of Its reglaltions 

and procedures pertaining to the licens ~~In •lnd a.•.- regulation of nuclear facilities 

and materials which were originally "promulgated by the Atomic Energy 

. - Commission. with a view to considering - what changes should be made. As part of "that effort, the NRC Is Initiating a rule . making proceeding concerning.the air .- - N• -transportation of radioactive materials. - Including packaging, with a view to the , , psioble amendment of its regulations In 

10 CFP Parts 71 and 73, adopted pursu ' ant to 'the Atomic Energy Act ot 1954. a amended. 7be JNRC considers the re.

evaluation of these Particular regula-. ltons to be especially "mely In view of 

- .* ...... . eoncerns that have been recently oz * -. .. , pressed by public ocilals and others as - u.,~ - ' to the safety and security of air ship ment of plutonium and other special nuclear materials through high popu lated metropolitan areas. :. The Department of Transportation 

.(DOT) has overlapplng Jurisdlction over

g AL 3UEISTIN, VOL 40, NO. 1i-.MOHOAY. JT, O . 1977

=368

r
PROPOSED RULES 

safety In packaging and transportation' NRC packain standards are amplUc by air of radioactive materials under the ble to shipments by NRC licensees, while 

Transportation of Explosives and Other DOT regulations are applicable to tans Dangerus Materials Act (1 U.S C. 831- portation of radicactive material by 

835) and the Transportation Safety Act land In Interstate and foreign commerce. of 1974 (Pub. LU 93-433. 8 Stat. 2156). on civil aircraft, and on water. DOT 

and the Federal Aviation Administration regulations In Titie 4) of the Code of 

has similar overlapping Jurisdiction mn- Federal Regulations and FAA regula

der the Federal Aviation Act Of 1958 (49 tions in 14 CM Part 103 cover labeling 

US C. 1421-1430.1472(b) ). It is expected and conditions for shipment and car that the expertise of these agencies will riage as well as certain packaging. NRC 

be utilized In the subject rule making regulations exempt carriers from their 

proceeding, application In view of the controls exer Background of present reguflotis. cised over carriers by DOT and Its con Following a prohibition againtit ship- ponent parts. including FAA. ment of radioactive material by mall in For the purpose of developing and 

1936 to protect unexposed film, safety implementing consistent, comprehensive 

regulations for shipping radioactive and effective regulations for the safe 

material were adopted by the Interstate transport of radioactive material and to Commerce Commission in 1948. T7hose avoid duplication, the DOT (then ICC) 

regulations were based on a report of a and the AEC (NRC's predecessor) en National Academy of Sciences-National tered Into a Memorandum of Under

Rerearch Council Subcommittee on standing In 1966 which was superseded 

Transportation of Radioactive Material, by a revised Memorandum of Under

The basic principles reflected In those standing signed on March 22. 1973. Un

regulations were reviewed and adopted. 

with minor modifications and some der the revised memorandum, the AEC 

elaboration, by the International Atomic (now NRC) develops performance 

Energy Agency (IABA) In 1961 and re- standards for package designs and re flected in recommended International views package designs for Type B ' fissile Standards for the Safe Transport of 

Radioactive Material. In 1964. on the 

basis of shipping experience up to that physical prottction (security) of strategic 

date and an analysis of transportation quantities of special nuclear material. in

accidents prepared by the United King- eluding plutonium, in 10 Cra Part "3. are 

dom Atomic Energy Authority the IAEA spefc to the mode of transport. issm rvise tnspgy Auhortyregulations in- Container designs required to meet ac Issued revid transport regulations In- cident conditions am evaluated under cur corporating specific accident damage test rent regulatons against the following ac• standards which were incorporated into dent test conditions In sequence: 30-foot 

the NRC (then AMC) And DOT (then free drop of the container In the most dam. 

within the Jurisdiction of the ICC) regu- aging p•ostlon Onto a flat. essentially un

lations by 1968. Except for changes in the yielding surface. 40-inch drop onto a steel 

regulations to deal with specific problemns bar to test the ability to withstand puncture. 30-minute Are test at 1475" r and 3-foot leg. leak testing of packages contain- ater timmersion test for eight hours The 

ins liquids, prompt pickup and monitor- puncture teat and the drop test ar engi

ing of p•ackages, restrictions on ship-' neering qu.Llflcition tests. The test condi ments of plutonium on passenger air- flons were chosen to provide reproducible 

craft, opening and closing procedures). laboratory condltions representative of severe 

the safety regulations have remained - transportation accident envlronments. For 

sentially the same since that time, e Iain .le. a 30-foot drop onto sit unyielding surface produces Impact or shock loads The safety standard for tra - which arae s severe than drops of sav tion, as set forth In NRC*s regulation In' rea thousand feet onto targets such as 10 CFR Part 71 and DOT regulations In land. water. or even city streets which would 49 CFR Parts 170-178. are based on two 'tend to yield when struck by the package. 

main considerations: (1) Protection of Because of the conservatls of most designs. 

the public from external radiation and packages, when subjected to tests Involving 

(2) assurance that the contents are ur- free fall from much geater heights th•n likely to be released during either normal 30-ftet. have either remained undamaged Sor continued to contain their contents. For or accident conditions of transport or. example. a number of packages which pan 

if the container is not designed to with- the NRC qualification teste have also been stand accidents, that Its contents are so tested under extra severe conditions such 

limited In quantity as to preclude, a As a 250-foot free fail onto an essentially 

significant radiation safety problem if- unyielding surface. Packages currently ap

released. rhese safety standards are ap- proved for bulk shipmetit of plutonium oxide 

plicable to packages used In anl models and nitrate will survive such test conditions of transport and were deieloped with The ettra severe testa provide added as. teobjectiveof tasotn d were i aeope w l surance, that containers In much the same the objective of providing an acceptable "nsr as aircraft flight rcorders, could 

level of safety for transport of radioac- survive seere air accidents A description of 

tive material by any mode.! With respect these tfte is set forth In SC-DR-72 0587 

to air shipments. It was considered that, (Sept. 1972). -Special Tests for Plutonium 

taking Into account the high integrity Shipping Conteiners 6i11 5P6795, and 1-1O'. 

of the packaging I and the low accident a- copy of which Is available fat public in

probability p for fo ~t air ,d tansort~on(n transportation (no- opeetton -nt noo. at the 717 Commission's If Street Xw, Public Washngto. Docu. 

more than one accident per 100 miUion m1.n 

miles. the risk of an air accident result- , A Type B package is required for quan

Ing in a release of radioactive material Uies in excess of a few millicurles and up to 

from a package was mall. - 20.000-60.000 curies, depending upon the rs - - dionuclide. Such packages am required to be 'In contrast to the safety standards de- deseiged to withstand accident conditions as 

scribed above. NRC's requirements for the well a normal conditions of transpor.

23769 

and large quantity Packages. The DOT 

develops safety standards governing 

handling and storage of all radioactive 

material packages while In possession of a common, contract or private carrier. as well as standards for Type A Pack

ages,' DOT requires AEC (now NRC) 

approval prior to use of all Type B. f1s ails and large quantity package designs. 

DOT is the National Competent Author

ity with respect to foreign shipments 

under the LAKA transport standards. 

IAFA Certificates of Competent Author

ity are issued by DOT with technical as sistance provided by NRC as requested. 

Re-evaluatiox ot.present regulations. 

Consistent with the considerations ex premed in the first paragraph of this no tice. the NRC has decided that Its regu

lations governing air transportation of 

radioactive material, including packag

ing. should be re-evaluated from the 

standpoint of radiological health safety 

and prevention of diversion and sabo

tage as well. In connection with this re evaluation, the NRC has Instructed its 

staff to. commence preparation of a generic environmental impact statement on the air transportation of radioactive 

materials, including packaging and re lated ground transportation. The state ment will be directed at air transporta

tion. However other transportation modes-land and water transport-will 

be considered in light of the requirement 

of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) that the relative costs end benefits of alternatives to cer tain proposed Federal actions be fully 

considered. It is anticipated that the 

draft generic environmental impact statement wIll be available by the time 

that any proposed changes to the regu

lations eventuating from this rule mak

ing proceeding are published for comment in the Fr.DgsAL RZiCISRs. While 

the generic impact statement is In prep

aration. impact statements or impact 

appraisals for inditidual NRC licensing actions related to the transportation of 

radioactive materials, such as import 11 censes for significant quantities of plu

tonlum and other special nuclear mate rial. will be prepared as required by 

NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51. 

In order to aid the NRC in this re evaluation of existing regulations per taining to radioactive material trans ported by air. interested persons are In

vited to submit Information, comments and suggestions with respect to those as pects of the above-referenced NRC 

regulations. The NRC is particularly in

terested in receiving views on the follow

ing: 

1. Whether radioactive materials 

should continue to be transported by air, considering the need for. and the 

benefits derived from such transporta. 

tion, the risks to public health and safe

ty and the common defense and security 

associated with such transportation, and 

the relative risks and benefits of other 

modes of transport. 

* A Type A package Is required for lea th" 

TypeB quantities of radioactive material and In required to be designed to withstend normal conditions of transport OlY.

F5N5AL KtS[fI0[. VOL 40. NO. 10&.-MONDAY. JUd 2, 197S
23770 

2. Assuming a Justifiable need for air r 

transportation of radioactive materials 

to what extent should safety require- s 

menta be basedon: o 

,a) Aocident probabiltles; (b) Packaging; 

(c) Procedural controls: 

(d) Combinations of the above? t 

2. What As the relative risk of trans- I 

port of radioactive material by air com- I 

Pared to other modes of transport, and 

to other hasards faced by the public 

which may or may not be the subject of I 

regulation? 

4. Are improvements In applica I 

regulations necessary, and If so, what 

Improvements should be considered? 

Documentation supporting the views 

expressed by interested persons would be 

helpful to the NRC in r-evaluation of 

its regulations relating to air transporta

tion of radioactive materials and con

slderation of poss1bl changes to such 

regulations 

It should be noted that there are some 

related issues which will be. or are pree

ently, the subject of consideration In 

other rule making proceedings and. 

therefore, will not be Included In this 

proceeding They are: 

1. Physical security protection re

quirements for strategic quantities of 

special nuclear material that would ap

ply to all modes of transport (39 PR 

40055). 

2. Requirements for advance notice of 

shipments of strategic quantities of spe

cial nuclear material (40 Fi 150i8). 

3 Quality assurance requirements for 

packages for all special nuclear material 

(38 FR 35150). 

4 Radiation levels from radioactive 

material transported In passenger air

craft. 

If It subsequently appears that addi

Uonal isrues should more properly be 

treated In A separate proceeding, or pro

ceedings. appropriate notices to that ef

fect wil be published In the ?nssA 

Intereted persons should send com

ments an suggestions, with supporting 

documentation, to the Secretary of the 

CommIsIo, U.S Nuclear Regulatory 

C mssoWashington. D.C. 20555. 

Attentio•n: Docketing and Service Sec

tion by August 1. 1975. Copie of Col

ments received may be examined In the 

NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H 

B et NW, Washingtan. D.C. 

After comments have been received 

and considered. the NRC will publish Its 

views " to NRc rules Pertaining to air 

transportation of radio•ctive material 

In the FzD5Ai Rz•s•c- When the 

aforementloned draft environmental im

pact statement is prepared, notice of Its 

availability will be published In the FXD

znA Jumurrza and opportunity for pub

lic comment afforded pursuant to NRC 

reltions implementing the National 

cnvironmental Policy Act of IM9 (10 

CPR Part 51). In Addition. background 

information on the subject of regulation 

of transportation of radioactive mate

srals has bee placed In the NRC Pub

kic Dcment Room at 1717 H Street 

NW. and at Its local public document

PROPOSED RULES 

coas throughout the nation. Coplie Of 

uch background Information are avail

hble upon request In writing to the OmCe 

df Standards Development. U.S. Nuclea 

uegulatory Commission. Washington. 

3.C. 20555. 

fat eri evaluafton. Recently there 

have been several requests that air ahip

nenta of plutonium and other special 

iuclear materials (and related ground 

ssnsportation of special nuclear mate

siUs incidental thereto) be suspended 

,endlng reexamination of presently ap

lcable regulations In amessing the aP

proprlateness of such action at this time. 

he NRC has considered the following: 

1. In more than 25 years Of shipping 

special nuclear material. Including plu

tonlum, In civilian aircraft, there have 

been no air accidents Involving the ma

terial 

2 The experience In shipping thou

sands of packages per year of all forms 

of radioactive materials by anl modes Of 

transport under existing NRC. DOT. and 

rAA regulations has been very favorable. 

3 The requests that have been received 

do not set forth any significant new In

formation which would indicate that 

present package or security requirements 

are Inadequate. 

4. In view of the physical security 

measures now required by 10 CPR Part 

73. the protection provided against Se

vere accidents by the high Integrity 

packaging required by N=R. DOT. and 

FAA regulations (summarized supra). 

the Consitency of these requirements 

with International standards, the low ac

cident probability (supra), and the fa

vomble experience to date, the risk in 

volved In the transportation of radioac

tive material under currently effective 

regulations is believed to be smalL 

Accordingly, It is presently the view of 

the NRC. subject to consideration of 

comments to be received, that its cur

rently effective regulations can continue 

to be applicable during the period In 

which this rule making proceeding is In 

progress. More particularly. In light of 

present Information as to the safety and 

security of air shipments of Tadioactive 

material, the commission finds no sound 

basis for the reasons stated above. f 

requiring the suspension of such ship

ments. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, In viev 

of the concerns exprmeI and the fao 

that requests have been received for tl 

=uspension of air ship-mts of plot

and other special nuclear materials. com. 

ment, ar specifically Invited on the mnat. 

ter of whether asupension or other Unit 

tationa cc the air transportation a 

plutonium and other special nuclear MA 

terlala are justified during the perloi 

that the subject rule making proceedbN 

Is being conducted. Views on this Par 

ticulsr matter, together with the sup 

portiM basis for these views, should b 

submitted to the Secretary of the Corn 

misseon. U.S. Regulatory Commisslor 

Washington, DC. 20555. Attention 

Docketnug and Service Section by July I 

1975. The NRXC wil decie, After evslu 

aUng the views and comments recelve" 

whether a different course should t

pursued making during the pendency of this rule proceeding and publish its con

chusons In the zrwsxAL Ruouxsrr Cur

rently effective regulatlons'wil continue 

to be applied until a decision on this mat

ter Is made. 

As Indicated above, related specific is

sues will be, or are presently, the subject 

of consideration in other rule making 

proceedings, and the NRC will continue 

to take appropriate action, as Justified by 

the circumstances. to Assure that the 

risk associated with the transportation 

of radioactive materials remains small 

Dated at Washington. D C. this 29th 

day of May 1975. 

F'or the Nuclear Regulatory Commis

sion. SAXUE J CHULK, 

Secretary o1 the Commission 

IR Doc 75-14510 riled 5-•0-76.8-"4 aml

FORM IGIST5 VOL 40. NO 104..MOMOAY. ju 2. 1975
NUREG-0170 

VOL. 1 

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT

ON THE

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE 

MATERIAL BY AIR AND OTHER MODES 

Docket No. PR 71,73 (40 FR 23768) 

Manuscript Completed: December 1977 

Date Published: December 1977 

Office of Standards Development 

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
SU?*MARY' AND CONC'LUSI'ONS 

This Final Environmental Statement was prepared by the 'staff of the Office of Standards 

Development of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Washington, D.C. 20555." Mr."" 

Donald R. Hopkins is the NRC Task<Leader for this statement (telephone: 301-443-6910) . 

1. This action is administrative. 

2. This Final Environmental Statement has been prepared in connection with NRC reevalua

tion of-*its present regulations governing. air transportation of radioactive'materials in order 

to provide sufficient analysis for determining the'effectiveness 'of 'the present rules and of 

possible alternatives to these rules. " This 'sta tement is not associated with any ipecific rule 

change'at'this time' but will 'be used as a partial basis for determining thei adequacy of'the" . 

present transportation regulations. If a'rule change results from consideration o'f this',state

ment, a separate or supplementary environmental statement will be issued with respect to that 

action.' 

When NRC was beginning work on this environmental statement,' consideration was given' 

to covering all aspects of the environmental impact resulting from the transport of radioactive 

mterial by air. At the Federal'level, both the NRC and the'Departaent of Transportation, 

particularly the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), are involved in regulating the safety 

of such transport. Therefore, NRC proposed to the FAA that the statement be6 cosponsored by 

both agencies and'that both the shipper-packa-ging aspects and the carriir-transport aspects be' 

covered. In a meeting in early 1975, the FAA declined to actively support the development of 

such a statement. As a result, the scope of thl 'statement was' liaite~d to the shipperýpackaging 

aspects. The statement deals with the'cariier-transport area 'only to'the extent neces"s'ary to'-' 

determine the influence of the conditions of transport on the shipper-packaging area, e.g., 

exposures of personnel from packages of radioactive' materiais"under normil and accident 

conditions. " " - ation o transpor of.radi6ictivie 

lDevelopment of the statement began with o•ns..... ti.... f ot . " r act.. 

materials by air. Howenver in order toeamine th6eevitontln impact of alternativesTother 

"modes of transport'were examined, again primarily' from the standpoint'of the effect s'uch trans--" 

port would have on packaging as related to exposure of people under both normal and'accident 

conditio'ns._ During the development 'f the'statement, special interest arose in the alternative 

of transporting irradiated nuclear fuel by special trains" Se detail was added in the' sec

tion or special trains but the statement scope was not< sufficiently broad to deil-thoroughly 

with this subject. A separate statement on the use 'of special trains for transporting4 irradi": 

ated nuclear, fuel has been issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) with NRC coopera

tion, Some of the same methodology used 'In this generic statement is used in the ICC study.

*111
As a result of the limitations on the scope of this generic statement, only limited 

study of the conditions of transport, carrier controls, and routing has bee.i u'.Jertaken. For 

example, no evaluation has been made of safety aspects of the vehicles or of items related to 

carrier controls other than those directly affecting the shipper-packaging area. 

Except. as noted, this statement does not specifically consider facets unique to the 

urban environment such as highr population densities, diurnal variation in population, con

vergence of transportation routes, shielding effects of buildings, or the effect of local 

meteorology on accident consequences. A separate study specific to such considerations is 

being conducted and will result in a separate environmental statement specific to such an urban 

environment. 

This statement was started in May 1975 and was completed prior Ito President Carter's 

April 7, 1977, message on nuclear power policy regarding deferral of comercial reprocessing and' 

recycling of plutonium. -Therefore, the 1985 projection of numbers and types of nuclear fuelcycle shipments and their environmental -impact that has been used in this study reflects the 

potential development of, plutonium recycle to the extent described in the NRC's generic environ

mental, statement on mixed oxide, fuel (GESMO). S•nce the analysis on non-fuel-cycle shipments 

remains valid, as does the analysis of all 1975 radioactive material shipments, this statement 

is issued with the caveat that it does not reflect changes in national energy policy origi

nating with the President's April 7, 1977, message. - , 

Although this statement. has not been modified to reflect the President's policy 

message, it, is the NRC staff'sjudgment, based on related analyses, that the results presented 

as realistic in this statement would continue to be realistic and the conclusions 'reached would 

be essentially the same if changes were made in accordance with the President's message. J- " nal 

3. The environmental impact of radioactive material shalnts modes of transport 

under the regulations in effect as of June 30, 1975, is sumarized al follows: 

a. Radiation exposure of transport workers and of members of the general public 

along the transportation route occurs from the normal permissible radiation emitted from pack--' 

ages in transport. More than half of the 9800 person-rem exposure resulting from 1975 shipments 

was received by transport workers associated with the shipments. The remaining 4200 person-reis 

was divided among, approximately ten percent of the U.S. population. None of -these exposures 

would produce short-term fatalities. On a statistical basis, expected values for health effects 

that may result from this exposure are 1.7 genetic effects per year and 1.2 latent cancer 

fatalities distributpd'over the 30 yeas. falllowing each year of transporting radioactive material 

in the United States at 1975 levels (Chapter 4, Section 4.9). More than half of this effect, 

results from the shipment of medical-use radioactive'umaerials where the corresponding benifit' 

is generally accepted (Chaper 1, Table 1-2). , 

b., Transportation accidents involving packages of radioactive material present io* 

tential for radiological exposure to transport workers aind: to members of the general public. 

The expected values of the annual radiological imtat from such potential exposure are very 

small, estimated to be about one latent cancer fatality and one genetic effect for two hundred

iv
years of shipping at 1975 rates (Chapter 5, Section 5.9). More than two-thirds of that impact 

is attributable to nuclear fuel cycle and other industrial shipments (Chapter 1, Table 1-2). 

c. Radiological impacts from export and import shipments were evaluated separately 

and were determined to be negligible compared to impacts from domestic shipments (Chapter 5, 

Section 5.7).' 

d. The principal nonradiological impacts from the use of resources for packaging 

materials'and from the use of, and accidents involving, a relatively small numberof dedicated 

transport vehicles were found to be two injuries per year and less than one accidental death 

per four years (Chapter 5, Section 5.8). 

e. Examination of the consequences of a major accident and assumed subsequent 

release of radioactive material indicates that the potential consequences are not severe for 

most shipments of radioactive material (Chapter 5, Section 5.6). The consequences are limited 

by one or more parameters: short half-life, nondispersible form, low radiotoxicity. However, 

in the unlikely event of a major release of plutonium or polonium in a densely populated area, 

a few individuals could suffer severe radiological consequences. One early fatality would be 

expected,; and as many as 60 persons would be exposed to radiation dose levels sufficient to 

produce cardiopulmonary -insufficiency and fatalities in some cases. The-latent cancer fatal

ities associated statistically with such a major release are estimated to be as many as 150 

over a 30-year. period (Chapter 5, Section-5.6).; Costs for land reclamation ,associated with 

such an unlikely accident could range from 250 million to 800 million dollars ,for.1975 ship

ments and up to 1.2 billion dollars for 1985 shipments. The probability of such an event is 

estimated to be no greater than 3 x 10"9 per year for 1975 shipping rates (Chapter 5, Section 

5.6).; It should be noted that, to obtain the oabove result, all 'of the following conditions 

would have to occur: .' . 

"(1) A low-probability, extra severe accident would have to involve a vehicle 

carrying a bulk shipment of plutonium or polonium in an extreme-population-density urban area. 

There are presently about 20 large-quantity shipments of polonium per year and one of plutonium' 

(Chapter 5,Section 5.2.2); -) . 

.-(2), One or more of. the packages of plutonium or polonium that are designed to 

withstand severe accident conditions would have to be subjected to the highest of the forces 

developed in the accident so as to cause gross failure of the package and subsequent release of 

a significant fraction of the radioactive contents from thea package (Chapte 5, Section 5.2.3); 

.,(3)_ The accident would have to create conditions in -which 'plutonium or polonium 

released from the relase package pckge frm would oul te escape esapefrw from the ... vehicle in which it was being transported, and .. •" "•:":iabl • fo (Appndi A, 

a significant amount of material would have to become airborne in respirble form (Appendix A, 

Section A.4); 

J 4) The meteorological conditions at the time would have to be such that the 

plutonium or polonium remains airborne and is dispersed in a way that significant numersi of' 

people would breathe the air containing the material in high concentrations (Chapter 5, Section 

5.3); 4nd 

V
(5) Mitigating actions such as evacuation of persons from the area are not 

taken. 

4. Principal alternatives considered are the following: 

a. Transportation mode shifts for various components of the industry (Chapter 6, 

Section 6.2). 

b. Operational constraints on transport vehicles to minimize accidents (Chapter 6, 

Section 6.3). 

c. Changes in packaging requirements to minimize release of radioactive materials 

in an accident (Chapter 6, Section 6.4). 

d. Changes in the physical properties of radioactive materials to minimize conse

quences in the event of a release (Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1). 

Preliminary analyses were made of a number of alternatives to the present regulations 

and methods of transport. A few of the' alternatives examined were found to be cost effective. 

However, the cost-effective alternatives dealing with changes in mode, of transport did not 

significantly reduce the radiological impact; the others must be analyzed further to determine, 

whether their adoption would reduce the radiological impact-and achieve an impact level as low 

as is reasonably achievable (Chapter 6). 

The alternative of reducing the' amount of radioactive"material-transported, either 

generally or selectively, was' not'considered on the assumption that the benefits associated 

with the use of presently transported materials outweigh the small risk of their transportation. 

While future rureinaking'may depend in part for its-justification on the analysis and 

conclusions of this statement, no-rulemaking is'proposed with its'-present issuance. The pri--'. 

mary function of this statement is to6' etablish the NRC staff view of the environmental impact 

of present transportation of radioactive material and of the projected impact'in'1985. This 

statement provides an overview of a number of alternatives to present transportation require

ments and of the changes in impact produced by those alternatives.' While this overview serves 

to limit the number of alternatives worthy' of further consideration, any detailed study of 

alternatives in support of rulemaking activities will b4 considered separately. 

The alternatives considered in this statement are limited to those possible with 

isttg transportationisysteis. "Whie i igh, t bie possible to conceptualize new transpor

tation systems that might reduce environmental impact, it Is'considered unlikely that any could 

be justified •n a cost-benefit basis because of the present low risk. ''' 

5. The following Federal, .State, and local agencies commented on the Draft Environmental 

Statement (NUREG-0034) made available in March"1976.'- Their corinents, along with those from 

other parties. are in Appendix J.

vi
a. Tennessee Valley Authority 

b. -Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 

1c. Environmental Protection Agency 

- d. Department of theInterior 

e.. Federal Energy Administration 

f. - Energy Research and Development Administration 

g. Department of Transportation . , 

- h. State of New Mexico 

- i., State of New York 

j. - State of Georgia 

'.-k.,, Cityof New York . - . 

6. A draft of this Final Environmental Statement was made available to the public in 

February 1977 at the NRC Public Document Room in Washington, D.C., and at NRC's field offices 

in King of-,Prussia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Glen Ellyn, Illinois; Arlington, Teias; and 

Walnut Creek, California... Public comments received on that draft are contained in Appendix K. 

7. This Final Environmental Statement was made-available to the public, to'the Council 

on Environmental Quality, and to the above specified agencies in December 1977. 

8. On the basis of the analysis-and evaluation set'forth in ,this statement and after, 

weighing the small adverse environmental impact resulting from transportation of radioactive 

materials and the costs and benefits of the alternatives available for reducing or avoiding the 

adverse environmental effects, the staff concludes that: - -

a. Maximum radiation exposure of individuals from normal transportation is generally 

within recommended limits for members of the general public (Chapter-3, Section 3.5). -There 

are transportation operations at a few locations where some transport workers receive.radiation, 

exposuresin -excess of the recommended limits established -for members of the general public. 

In most cases, these operations employ radiation safety~personnel to establish safe procedures 

and to train and monitor, transport workers as though they were radiation workers. 

b. The average radiation dose-to the population at risk from normal transportation 

is a small fraction of the limits recommended .for members of the general public from all sources 

of radiation-other-than natural and medical,,sources-(Chapter,3, -Section,3.5) and is a small 

fraction of natural background dose (Chapter.3, Section 3.3). . 

-c..The radiological .risk from accidents in transportation is small, amounting to, 

about one-half percent of,.the normal transportation risk on an. annual basis (Chapter.4, Section

.,9 ) * 5. . , 

-jd. For the types and~numbers of radioactive material shipments now being made or 

projected for 1985,,there is no substantial difference in environmental impact from airtrans

port as opposed to that of,other transport modes (Chapter,,4, Tables.4-15 and 4-17 andAppendix I, 

Table 1-9).

vii
e. Based on the above conclusions, the NRC staff has determined that the environ

mental impacts of normal transportation of radioactive'materialo and the risks attendant to 

accidents involving radioactive material shipments are sufficiently small to allow continued 

shipments by all modes. Because transportation conducted under present regulations provides 

adequate safety to the public, the staff concludes that no'immediate changes to the regulations 

are needed at this time. The staff has already upgraded its regulations on transportation 

quality assurance while this environmental statement was being prepared and has-begun studies 

of transportation through urban areas and of emergency response to transportation accidents and 

incidents. In addition, the staff is continuing to study other aspects of transportation, such 

as the accident resistance of packages and the physical/chemical form of'the radioactive con

tents, to maintain the present high level of safety.and to determine the cost-effectiveness of 

changes that could further reduce transportation risk. 

9. Based'on considerations' related to security and safeguards for strategic special 

nuclear materials'(uranium enriched to*20% or more in the U-235 isotope, U-233, and plutonium), 

spent fuel, and other radioactive materials in transit, the staff concludes that: 

a. ' Existing'physical- security requirement's-ari'adequate to protect at a minimum 

against theft or sabotage of'significant quantities of strategic special nuclear materials in 

transit by a postulated threat consisting of an internal threat of one employee occupying any 

position and an external threat' of a determined violent assault by several well-armed, 

well-trained persons'who might possess inside knowledge or assistance. 

b. The level of protection provided by'these requirements reasonably ensures that 

transportation of strategic special nuclear material does not endanger the public health and 

safety'or common'defense'and' security."' However,'-prudence-dictates that' safeguards policy be 

subject to close and' continuing review. 'Thus, the'NRC' is conducting a public rulemaking pro

ceeding to consider upgraded' intirim 'requirements and' longer-term upgrading actions. The 

objective 'of 'the -forthcomfig iue-1makind proceeding Is to c6nsider additional safeguards 

measures to counter the hypothetical-threats of 'internal conspiradies among licensee employees'," 

and determined violent iaaultsithat viuld be'moreosevere than those postulated in evaluating 

the adequacy of current safeguards. 

"c. The use If thi' ERDA (now the Departmen of 'Eniy (DOE)) 'transport system Is 

not, at this time, considered to be 'neciissary for' the protection of significant quantities of 

privately owned strategic special nuclear material becauie the- present level of transport'

protection provided by the licensed industry is considered to be comparable to that presently 

required by ERDA (DOE): Similarly, the'use of'Departmentfof Defense escorts' is not presently 

needed -to protect domestiicshipiint, ajaihnst the postulated threat because the physical pro- • 

tection deemed necessary to defeat this threat can and is being provided by the private sector. L 

d.- Shipments of' radioactive materialsnot'now covered by NRC' physical protection 

requirements,- such as"spent'ftuel:containtni'ffsion prroductst an-'irradiated special 'nuclear' 

materials) 'and jae-sou enonfissile" raditoiotopesdo nt'i6nstitutý'a threat to the public'

viii
health and safety either because of their limited potential for misuse (due in part to the 

hazardous radiation levels that preclude direct handling) or because of the protection afforded 

by safety provisions, e.g., shipping containers. 

Based on the above conclusions, the NRC staff has determined that the risks of suc

cessful theft of a significant quantity of strategic special nuclear material or sabotage of 

radioactive materials in transit resulting in a significant radiological release are suffi

ciently small to constitute no major adverse impact on the environment. 

10. The validity of the risk assessment has been seriously challenged within the NRC 

staff. The challenge is with respect to the assessment of the overall level of accident risk 

and the relative levels of risk of the various types of shipments on which the total accident 

risk is based. The challenge results from the acknowledged conservative assumptions used in 

the accident assessment where valid data are not available to support more realistic values for 

certain parameters. Principal among these are package release fractions (Chapter 5, Table 

5-8), particle size (Appendix A, Table A-7), fraction of released materials becoming airborne 

(Appendix A, Table A-7), and areas contained within dose isopleths (Chapter 5, Figure 5-7). 

These assumptions are not applied uniformly in the accident analysis over the various types of 

shipments (e.g., more data is available on plutonium shipment behavior in an accident situation 

than is available for polonium shipments; therefore, more conservative assumptions were applied 

to the polonium accident assessment). The resulting challenge is that the assessment is exces

sively conservative and shows the total accident risk to be greater than a more realistic 

assessment would show and that the values of risk assessed for different types of shipments may 

incorrectly show that certain types of shipments are more hazardous than others. However, 

since the conclusion drawn from the accident assessment is simply that the total accident risk 

is small compared to the normal transportation risk, the assessment is considered to support 

that limited conclusion and therefore to be adequate for that purpose, at this time. Nonethe

less, further studies to develop additional data and refine the assessments are planned for the 

future; some are already underway in connection with the generic study on Transport of Radio

nuclides In Urban Environs and other detailed accident studies. Furthermore, rulemaking 

actions to reduce the risk in specific areas will not be taken until a more realistic risk 

assessment has been completed and the specific costs and the benefits have been evaluated.

ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

VOLUME 1 

,SUMIMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.... ............. ... 

-TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . .. . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LIST OF FIGURES ............. ...... ... ....................... . xiv 

LIST OF TABLES .................................. .XV 

DETAILED SUMMARY ..... ................... . .. . . . . . . ..... xxi 

Introduction ........... ....................... . ..... xx 

Description of the Environmental Impact of Existing Activities ..... ... xxii 

Relationship of Proposed Activities to Other Government Activities.. xxiii 

Probable Impact of Proposed Actions on the Environment .............. xxiii 

Alternatives to Existing Activities ........ ...... ..... xxiii 

Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Effects ...... . ...... xxiv 

Short-Term Use of the Environment Versus Long-Term Positive Effects . xxiv 

Irreversible'Commitment of Resources,., xxv 

CHAPIER 1 INTRODUCTION.-.': "................. .' . 11 

>" 1.1 Purpose and Scope of this Environmental Statement. '. . .. 1-1 

1.2 Background .... .-- ......... .... -: . 1

1.3 Accident Experience in the Transportation of Radioactive 

Materials. ................... ............ .. . 1-2 

"1.4 An Overview of Radioisotope Uses. .... ..... ............ 1-3 

1.5 Standard Shipments ..... ............ ......-..... - 1-9 

1.6 Method Used to Determine the Impact ....... ................ 1-10 

"1.7 The Contents of Other Chapters of the Document ....... .... 1-19 

- References for Chapter I . ". . .1-21 

"CHAPTER 2 REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVEMATERIALS" 2-1 

2.1 Introduction ........... ......... ............ 2-1 

- 2.2 Regulatory Agencies. ........ ..... ... ..... ... 2-2 

2.3 Regulations Designed to Ensure Adequate Containment-,.-'.'•' . . " 2-4 

2.4 Radiation Control - The Transport Index. .............. 2-11 

2.5 Special Considerations for Fissile Material .... .x.,. . .. 2-13 

2.6 Procedures to be Followed by the Receiver.-.' .'-. u *...... 2-15 

' 2.7 Labeling of Packages .. -......... . . ..... 2-17 

2.8 Requirements Pertaining to the Carrier - Vehicle Placarding and 

"Stowage.-............................ .',-;. . . 2-17 

"2.9 Reporting oT Incidents and Suspected Contamination. .' . .-... 2-18 

'2:10 Requirements for Safeguarding of Certain Special Nuclear ,

Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19 

References for Chapter 2 .............. ... ..... .. .-. •.2-23 

CHAPTER 3 RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS ........ ....................... . 3

3.1 Radiation ......... . ........- . . '-...3-1 

3.2 Dose ..................... .... 

3.3 Background Sources of Exposure ..... .................. ... 3-3 

3.4 Hazards from Radiation ....... ...................... ... 3-6

-xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) 

PAGE 

3.5 Radiation Standards ....... ........................ ... 3-9 

3.6 Cost-Benefit ............................. 3-11 

3.7 Health-Effects Model . ............................... . . 3-11 

References for Chapter 3 .......... ..................... 3-18 

CHAPTER 4 TRANSPORT IMPACTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS ............... .... 4-1 

4.1 Introduction ....................... ...... 4-1 

4.2 Radiological Impacts Other Than Those Directly on Man ........ 4-1 

4.3 Direct Radiological Impact on Man ..................... . .. 4-3 

4.4 Exposure of Handlers ......... .. . .. ....... ............... - 4-29 

4.5 Nonradiological Impacts on the Environment ............... .... 4-29 

4.6 Abnormal Transport Occurrences .......... ..... ..... ... ... 4-31 

4.7 Shipment by Freight Forwarders .... ....................... 4-34 

4.8 Export and Import Shipments ...... .................... 4-34 

4.9 Summary of Environmental Impacts for Normal Transport ........ 4-37 

References.for Chapter 4 ..... .......................... .. 4-50 

CHAPTER 5 IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS ....... .. .......... ... 5-1 

5.1 Introduction ...... ......... ... ....... ............ 5-1 

5.2 Detailed Analysis .......... .-.... . ..... .. .. 5-1 

5.3 Dispersion/Exposure Model ..... . . . ... . .. 5-26 

5.4 Application of the. Model to 1975 and 1985 Standard Shipments . . . 5-30 

5.5 Consequences of Contamination from Accidents .. .. '. . .5-33 

5.6 Severe Accidents in Very High Population Density Urban Areas . . 5-38 

5.7 Export and Import Shipments. . . . . .... ... ... 5-49 

5.8 Nonradiological Risks in Transportation Accidents ..... ......... 5-51 

5.9 Summary of Results ......... ..... ..... 5-52 

References for Chapter 5 ........................ . .. 5-54 

CHAPTER 6 ALTERNATIVES. . ....... ..... ..... ... . .. 6-1 

6.1 Introduction . ...... .. .-. . .. 6 

6.2 Transport Mode Shifts ...... ............ . ............. 6-2 

6.3 Operational Constraints on Transport 6-11 

6.4 Restrictions on Material Form, Quantity Shipped, or Packaging. 6-20 

6.5- 'Sumary of Cost-Effective Alternatives L.: .: -. .•t, . 6-25 

References for Chapter 6 ..... ............. .... .. . 6-27 

CHAPTER 7 SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS ....... .......... ...... ...... . .. 7-1 

7.1 Introduction ........... 

7.2 Radioactive Materials - Potential for Misuse ... . ... . 7-1 

7.3 Safeguards Objectives and Program..... 7-............... 57

7.4' Physical Protection of Highly Enriched.Uranium and Plutonium 

During Transit .......... ... ..... ....... ...... ....... 7-7 

7.5 Alternatives '.. .. . .. 7-10 

7.6 Conclusions. ........ , .......... ............. 7-12 

References for Chapter 7 ........ .............. ..... 7-14 

APPENDIX A STANDARD SHIPMENTS MODEL ....................... A-1 

A.1 Introduction A-1 

A.2 Compilation of Standard Shipments List A-2 

A.3 Simplification of Standard Shipments List ........ . ..... o. A-IO

4x11
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

A.4 Dosimetric Parameters for Standard Shipments 

A.5 1985 Standard Shipments ............... 

A.6 Export-Import Model .............. .... 

References for Appendix A............ 

APPENDIX B EXCERPTS FROM CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS. 

" B.1 Nuclear'Regulatory Commission Regulations. 

B.2 Department of Transportation Regulations 

nftB rTOTV jI ft i liflj

^'IrrjIULA G PLU M .LX~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

C.1 Historical Background....... 

C.2 Chemistry and Metallurgy .. .. ................. 

C.3 Nuclear Properties ...... .. .. ............ .. 

C.4 Physiological Aspects ........... .. ........ 

C.5 'Biological Effects .. . ..... 

C.6 Plutonium Toxicity .... .. . . . ... ........... 

References for Appendix C. .. .......... 

APPENDIX D POPULATION DOSE FORMULAS FOR NORM, AL TRANSPORT ......

D.1- Dose to Persons Surrounding the Transport Link While the 

S- Shipment is Moving............ ........... 

D.2 Dose to Population During Shipment Stops .. . '. " ........ .

D.3 Dose to Warehouse Personnel While Package is in Storage ....... 

D.4 Dose to Crewmen. ................. 

D.5 Dose to Persons in Vehicles Sharing the Transport Link'with the 

Shipment ....... ..... ............................ 

References for Appendix D ...... ...................... 

APPENDIX E DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL ........ ........................

Introduction ....... .............................. 

Urbanized Areas .......... ......................... 

Other Urban Areas ....... ......................... 

Rural Areas. ....... ............................... 

Extreme-Density Urban Areas ...... .................... 

Sumary and Conclusions ...... ......................

E. I 

E.2 

E.3 

E.4 

E.5 

E.6

References for Appendix E ...... ...................... 

APPENDIX F INCIDENTS REPORTED TO DOT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE KATERIAL FROM 

1971 THROUGH 1974 ....... ....................... 

APPENDIX G CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS .............. 

G.1 Computation of Annual Early Fatality Probability ......... 

G.2 Computation of Latent Cancer Fatalities due to Airborne Releases 

from Accidents........................... 

G.3 Computation of Latent Cancer Fatalities from External Exposure 

Sourco. ......... ... .............................. 

References for Appendix G ...... ...................... 

APPENDIX H METHOD FOR DERATING ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES ............ 

References for Appendix H ...... ......................

xiii

PAGE 

A-12 

A-20 

A-23 

A-26 

B-1

S. . .. . B-1 ... ... B-15 

C-1 

S. . .. . C-i .. . .. . C-1 

S. . .. . C-2 

C-2 

C-10 

S. . .. . C-1I 

S. . .. . C-14 

S. . .. . D-1

D-1 D-7 

D-7 

D-8 

D-8 

D-14 

E-1 

E-1 

E-1 

E-1 

E-2 

E-2 

E-2 

E-5 

F-1 

G-1 

G-1 

G-6 

G-9 

G-I0 

H-1 

H-S

. . . . . . . . . . . 

... . .. .• . . . . 

. . . .• . . . . .. •
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

APPENDIX I SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ................................ 

1.1 Introduction ...................... ......... 

1.2 Sensitivity of Analysis to Fundamental Parameters.... ....... 

1.3 Sensitivity of the Accident Analysis to General Parameters . 

1.4 Sensitivity of the Accident Analysis to the Shipment Parameters. 

1.5 Sensitivity of the Normal Dose Calculation to Various Parameters 

VOLUME 2 

CHAPTER 8 COMMENTS ON NUREG-0034 AND MAJOR CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE 

NUREG-0034 WAS ISSUED ...... ... ...................... 

8.1 Introduction .............................. .......... 

8.2 Major Changes Since NUREG-0034 was Issued.. ................ 

8.3 Major Changes which have Resulted in Changes in Conclusions/

Analysis Since NUREG-0034 ....... ...... ....... ......... 

8.4 Discussion of Comments Received During Public Response Period... 

8.5 Discussion of Comments Received on the Draft Final Environmental 

Statement Dated February 1977 ...... .................. 

APPENDIX J COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ............. 

APPENDIX K COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT'DATED 

FEBRUARY I977.( . .

- -. 

.t. I - -

'Jr 

-' ,-'II., f -

- .

xiv

PAGE 

I-1 

I-i 

I-I 

1-2 

1-10 

1-12

8-1 

8-1 

8-1 

8-6 

8-9 

8-113 

J-1 

K-1
LIST OF FIGURES

1-1 -Nuclear'Fuel Cycle... ...... . ............. .................. 

3-1 Variation of Galactic Radiation Dose Rates with Altitude of Geomagnetic 

-Latitude of 550 . . .

3-2 Estimated Dose Response Curves for Mortality within 60 Days from Whole

Body Exposure to External Penetrating Radiation .................. 

3-3 Dose-Response Curves for Mortality due to Acute Pulmonary Effects from 

Radiation ........... .................................. 

4-1 Possible Transport Paths .......... .......................... 

5-1 Flow Diagram for Accident Analysis ........ ..................... 

5-2 Accident Severity Category Classification Scheme - Aircraft ............ 

5-3 Accident Severity Category Classification Scheme - Motor Trucks ......... 

5-4 Accident Severity Category Classification Scheme - Trains .............. 

5-5 Release Fraction Model for Exposure-Type Sources Shipped in Casks ....... 

5-6 Possible Routes to Man from Radionuclide Release .... ............... 

5-7 Downwind Dilution Factor as a Function of Area ...... ............... 

5-8 Flow Chart for Latent Cancer Fatality Calculations ..... ............. 

5-9 Flow Chart for Early Fatility Calculation ........................ 

5-10 Cumulative Annual Early Fatality Probability - 1975, 1985 - Model II .... 

5-11 Cumulative Annual Early Fatality Probability - 1975, 1985 - Model I ...... 

5-12 Area Contaminated to a Level of 0.65 pci/m2 for a Given Release ......... 

5-13 Decontamination Costs for Releases of Long-Lived Isotopes .............. 

5-14 Decontamination Costs for Releases of Short-Lived Isotopes ............

6-1 Variation in Plutonium Dioxide Particle Size Distribution for a Range of 

Calcining Temperatures Between 8000C and 1200*C ................... 

C-1 Biological Pathways for Inhaled Material ...... ................... 

C-2 Deposition Model .......... ... .............................. 

C-3 Translocation of.Pulmonary-Deposited Pu-239 in Beagle Dogs ............ 

D-1 Dose Received by an Individual as a Shipment Passes ................. 

D-2 Dose to Population Living Along the Transport Link .................. 

D-3 Dose to Persons in Vehicles Sharing the Transportation Link with the 

Shipment ........ ..... ..................................

XV

PAGE 

1-8 

3-5 

3-15 

3-16

4-2 

5-2 

5-6 

5-10 

5-14 

5-25 

5-27 

5-29 

5-31 

5-32 

5-35 

5-37 

5-43 

5-44 

5-45

6-21 

C-7 

C-8 

C-9 

D-2 

D-3 

D-9
LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)

F-i Hazardous Materials Incident Report ...... ...................... 

G_. 6-1 Flow Chart for Early Fatality Calculation ..... ................... 

G-2 Early Fatality Computation Flow Diagram for External Penetrating Radiation 

Sources ......... ... .................................. 

G-3 Flow Chart for Latent Cancer Fatality Calculation........ ............

2'

A?

"I '' i-

* 4' 

- - - r 

" 1⁄4

- - *-t.*;

L

- - -'ri.*

xvi

PAGE 

F-4 

G-2 

G-5 

G-7

I I v

. "5 ,
LIST OF TABLES

PAGE 

1-1 Standard Shipments List - 1975 and 1985 Projections. . ...... ........ 1-11 

1-2 Summary of Radioactive Material Shipping and Its Major Radiological 

Impacts . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-18 

2-1 Quantity Limits for the Seven Transport Groups and Special Form ........... 2-5 

2-2 Type B Packagings Permitted by DOT for Transport by 49 CFR 173.394 and 49CR1339 ...... .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 2-8 49 CFR 173.395 .. . . . .- •:;--- • _8 2- 

2-3 Limits for Limited Quantities, LSA Materials, and Manufactured Articles. .. 2-10 

2-4 Package Dose Rate Limits ........ ..... ..... ............. .......... 2-12 

2-5 Type A and Type B Quantity Limits in Grams for'Certaen Fissile Materials . 2-16 

3-1 Quality, Factors for Various Types of Radiation .......... . .. ...... . 3-2 

3-2 Approximate Radiosensitivity of Various Life Forms to External Radiation . 3-4 

3-3 Estimates of Annual Whole-Body Doses in the United States.. .3-............. 37 

3-4 Dose-Effect Relationships in Man for Acute Whole-Body Gamma Irradiation. .. 3-8 

3-5 Effects of Cancers in the United States ........... ... . . .. 3-10 

3-6 NCRP Dose-Limiting Recommendations.. ......... . . . . . . .. " 3-12 

3-7 Cost in Days of Life Associated with Various Activities... .... ...... 3-13 

3-8 Expected Latent'Cancer Fatalities per 106 'Person-Rem Dose to the 

Population ...... ............... ........... . ... .... .. . . 3-14 

3-9 Genetic Effects'Coefficients'per 106 Person-Rem Gonadal Dose . . . . ... •. 3-17 

4-1 Shipment Parameters for Calculation ofPopulation and Individual Dose for 

the Passenger Air Shipment Mode. - '- --- -. 4-5 

4-2 Annual Doses from Transport of Radioacti e Material (RAM) in Passenger 

Aircraft and Corresponding Cosmic Radistion Doses--1975........ ...- : 4-9 

4-3 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for the Air Cargo 

Shipment Mode . -...... ..' .. .'- . . . .... . ' ". 4-10 

4-4 Annual Doses from Transport of Radioactive Material in Cargo Aircraft and 

Corresponding Cosmic Radiation Doses - 1975. .............. . 4-12 

4-5' "Dose Resulting frcm Radioactive Material Shipment by Helicopters and' , 

Corporate Aircraft - 1975 . . . . . . .. . . 4-14 

4-6 Shipwent Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose forthe Truck * 

Transport Mode - ... . . . . .. . . . .... - • 4-16 

4-7 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for the Delivery 

Vehicle Transport Mode .,, .- . 4-20 

4-8 Dose Resulting from.Truck and Van Transport of Radioactive Materials 

_1975 .. . .. .- 4-21

xvii
LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

PAGE 

4-9 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for the Rail Mode. .. 4-23 

4-10 Doses from Rail Transport of Radioactive Material - 1975 ..... ........... 4-26 

4-11 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for Waterborne 

Transport Modes ........... .... .......... .... . ........ . .... 4-27 

4-12 Dose Resulting from Ship Transport of Radioactive Material - 1975 .... ...... 4-28 

4-13 Environmental Impact of Normal Export Shipments (By Mode) .............. .4-35 

4-14 Environmental Impact of Normal Export Shipments (By'Isotope)... . .... . .. 4-36 

4-15 Annual Normal Populaton Doses (Person-Rem) for 1975, Shipments by 

Population Group and Transport Mode ...... . . . ; . .. .. .... ........ 4-38 

4-16 Annual Normal Population Doses (Person-Rem) for 1975; Shipments by 

Population Group.and Material .............. .......... ....... ... 4-39 

4-17 AnnualNormal Population Doses (Person-Rem) for 1985. Shipments by 

Population Group and Transport Mode ............... ..... ........... 4-43 

4-18 Annual'Normal Population Doses (Person-Rem) for'1985, Shipments by 

Population Group and Material . . ........ ... .... ....... ....... ... 4-44 

4-19 Summary of Maximum Annual Individual Doses from Radioactive Material 

Transport . ......... ..... ... ..... ..... ...... ...... . . .... . 4-48 

4-20 Results - Normal Transport of Radioactive Materials ... .... ............ 4-49 

5-1 Accident Rates ............ .. ... . . . . ...... .. ..... 5-5 

5-2 Fractional Occurrences for Aircraft Accidents by Accident Severity Category 

and Population Density Zone ...................... ............... 5-8 

5-3 Fractional Occurrences for Truck Accidents by Accident Severity Category 

and Population Density Zone ........... ...... . . . . ........... 5-11 

5-4 Fractional Occurrences for Delivery Van Accidents by Accident Severity 

Category and Population Density Zone......... . . . ....... ........ 5-13 5" Frac t a -o Oc u r n e . f,! ' Tr i ' 1 " 1

5-5 Fracticnal Occurrences for Train' Accidents-by Accident.Severity Category 

and Population Density Zone .......... .. ........ . ....... 5-15 

5-6 Fractional Occurrences for Helicopter Accidents by Accident Severity 

Category and Population Density Zone ..... . . . . . . ........ . ... .. 5-17 

5-7 Fractional Occurrences for Ship and Barge Accidents by Severity Category and 

Population Density Zone ........ ................. ... ...... 5-19 

5-8 Release Fractions .................... ..... 5-22 

5-9 Accident Risk 49alysis Results - Expected Latent Cancer Fatalities - 1975 

and 1985 - Mo#el II Release Fractions . .. 5-34 

5-10 Accident Risk Analysis Results,-,1975, 1985,- Model I Release Fractions . . . 5-36 

5-11 Estimated Decontamination Costs for 600 Curie Release of Vari'ous Materials.. 5-39 

5-12 Integrated Population Dose and Expected Latent Cancers from Certain, 

Class VIII Accidents in High-Density Urban Areas. .". "..'.. ..... 5-46 

5-13 Number of People Receiving Doses Greater Than or Equal tOi ViriousiSpecified 

Acute Doses of Interest in Certain Class VIII Accidents in High-Density 

Urban Areas .......... ....... ................................ 5-47 

xviii
LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd) 

PAGE 

5- 14 Expected Early Fatalities and Decontamination Costs for Certain Class VIII 

Accidents in High-Density Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 5-48 

5-15 Annual Expected Latent Cancer Fatalities from Accidents Involving Export 

Shipments of Radioactive Materials - 1975 Export Shipments Model 5-50 

-5-16 Individual Risk :f Early Fatality by Various Causes.... ..... ...... 5-53 

6-1 Radiological Impactsfor the Baseline Case - 1985 Standard Shipments with 

Model II Release Fractions . .... ... .. . ..... . ..... I ... ..... 6-1 

-672- Economics of Rail-Truck Mode Shift for Spent Fuel ..................... 6-8 

.6-3 Costs of Representative Shipping Casks . . . . . . . . . . .. . 6-8 

6-4 Estimated Frequencies of Occurrence and Decontamination Costs for Railcar 

Accidents Involving Irradiated Fuel Shipments by.Regular Train Service -

in 1985 ............ ..... .................................. 6-18 

6-5 Summary of Cost-Effective Alternatives ...... ................... .... 6-26 

A-1 Total Packages Extrapolated from Detailed Questionnaire (Non-Uranium). . .. A-3 

A-2 Uranium Shipments Used in the Standard Shipments ....... .............. A-6 

A-3 Compilation of Total Packages Shipped per Year ....... ............... A-7 

A-4 Package Totals for Standard Shipments - 1975 ........ ................ A-11 

A-5 Shipment Parameters for Standard Shipments .... .................... A-13 

A-6 Rem-per-Curie (Inhaled) Values for Standard Shipments ..... ............ A-15 

A-7 Additional Dosimetric Factors .......... ........................ A-19 

A-8 Standard Shipments - 1985 ............ .......................... A-21 

A-9 1975 Standard Shipments Model for Export Shipments ....... ............. A-24 

C-1 Specific Activity and Dose Commitmnent from Some Isotopes of Plutonium, 

Americium, and Curium ............ ........................... C-3 

C-2 Isotopic Content and Dosimetric Impact of Various Mixtures of Plutonium 

Associated with Light Water Reactors .......... ................... C-4 

C-3 Acute Toxicity of Some Substances .......... ...................... C-13 

E-1 Tabular Summary of Demographic Model .......... .................... E-4 

F-1 Incidents Reported to DOT Involving Radioactive Materials ..... .......... F-2 

H-1 Calculated Probabilities and Characteristics of Surfaces Under Flight Paths 

Between Major U.S. Air Hubs ....... ........................ ... H-3 

H-2 Detailed Derating Scheme ........ ..... .......................... H-4 

1-1 Percent Changes in Normal and Accident Risks for a 10 Percent Increase in 

Population Density ........ ....... ............................ I-1 

1-2 Product of Accident Rate, Release Fraction, Fraction of Accidents in a 

Given Population Zone, and Population Density for Type A Packages by 

Truck ............ ................................... 1-3 

1-3 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Truck .................. . ... 1-4

xix
LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

1-4 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Aircraft .......... 

I-5 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Rail. ... . . . ........... 

1-6 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Waterborne Modes and Various 

Package Types ....... ..................... . ........... 

1-7 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Secondary Modes and Various 

Package Types ............. ............................... 

1-8 Hazard Factor Ss s . . . .... ................... . ... 

1-9 Overall Risk Contribution from Accidents for 1975 Standard Shipments .... 

1-10 Principal Contributors to the Normal Risk .......................

A -

A * A A. - *-

A A * A A A 

* "r-; AAAA 4 AA A 

L - *AA A 

-A I4 J A

xx

PAGE 

1-5 

1-6 

I-7 

1-8 

'-9 

1-11 

1-13

. :!q"* . ., -
DETAILED SUlMARY

INTRODUCTION 

This document is an assessment of the environmental impact from transportation of ship

ments of radioactive material into, within, and out of the United States. Itis intended to 

serve as background material for a review by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) ofregulations dealing with transportation of radioactive materials. The impetus for 

such'a review results not ,only from a general need to-examine regulations to ensure their 

continuing consistency with the goal of limiting radiological -impact to a level that is aslow 

as reasonably achievable. but also from a need to respond to current national discussions of 

the safety and security'aspects of nuclear fuel cycle materials. 

The report consists of eight chapters and related appendices. The structure of the 

report and its content are indicated in the following outline of its chapters:

I.' Introduction, -'The background of the study, uses,of radioactive materials, and 

shipping'activities in various major segments of the nuclear industry are discussed. -

2. The Regulations Governing the Transportation of Radioactive Materials - The regula

tions are reviewed together with' supporting -information indicating the intent and basis for 

many of the transportation safety regulations., . -

3. '. Radiological Effects -'The mechanism for radiological impact, the appropriate pro

tection guidelines, and the health effects model used in this assessment are discussed. 

,4.-- Transport Impacts Under Normal Conditions - The environmental impacts, both radiolog

ical and nonradiological, -that result from normal transportation are assessed in-terms of a 

standard shipments modael designed to represent current transport conditions. 

5. - Impacts' of Transportation Accidents - .The radiological and nonradiological impacts 

that -result from -accidents involving vehicles carrying radioactive material •shipments ,are 

discussed. - * ' -. 

6. " Alternatives - Assessment is made-of -differences in radiological impact that would 

result from modifying the transport mode of certain shipments, adding operational constraints, 

chafgig 'form and quantity restrictions, and raising packaging standards. Cost-benefit trade!7,

offs are discussed.,' " "' "' ' ' . r 

7. Security and Safeguards - The need for 'security of certain radioactive material 

shipments is discussed together with an assessment of the present physical security require

ments applied to various modes of transport; " - -

Ixxi

I
8. Comments on NUREG-0034 and Major Changes That Have Occurred Since NUREG-0034 was 

Issued - Major changes from the draft assessment (NUREG-0034) are identified. 

DESCRIPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF EXISTING ACTIVITIES 

The environmental impact of radioactive material transport can be described in threedistinct parts: the radiological impact from normal transport, the risk of radiological 

effects from accidents involving vehicles carrying radioactive material shipments, and all 

nonradiological impacts. 

Radiological impacts 'in normal transport occur continuously as a result of radiation 

emitted from packages both aboard vehicles.in transport and in associated storage. The radia

tion exposure of'specific population groups such as crew, passengers, flight attendants, and 

bystanders is calculated in the report using a computer model that considers, for the principal 

radionuclides shipped, radiation exposure rates, shipment information, traffic data, and 

transport mode splits. Using this computer model, it was estimated that the total annual 

population exposure- resulting from normal, transport is about 9790 person-rem. The largest 

percentage of this population'exposure (some 52%),results from.the shipment of medical-use 

radionuclides. The remaining portion results from industrial shipments (about 24%), nuclear 

fuel cycle shipments'(8X),- and waste shipments (155). - Shipments by truck produce the largest 

population exposure, resulting from relatively long exposure times at low radiation levels of 

truck crew and large numbers of people surrounding transport links. 

The'individual radiation exposures in all.modes are generally at,low radiation levels and 

in most cases take on the character of a slight increase in background radiation. .,The analysis 

shows that radiation exposure from normal transportation, averaged over the persons exposed, 

amounts to 0.5 millirem pe~r year -compared-to the average natural background exposure of about 

100 millirem per year. Babed on the conservative linear radiation-dose hypothesis, this would 

result in a total of 1.2 latent cancers distributed statistically over the 30 years following 

each year of transporting radioactive material-in the United States at 1975 levels. This can 

be compared to the existing rate of more-than 300,000 cancer fatalities per year from all1 

causes. " .. 1';.: C 

In the' accident'-casei- risk to the population fromaccidents involving vehicles. carrying 

radioactive materials was estimated-in terms of the number of latent cancer fatalities and 

early deaths that might occur on annual and single-accident bases. The analysis resulted.in :. 

estimates of annual societal risk oY 5.4 x 10"3 latent cancer fatalities and 5 x 10-4 early 

fatalities for'each year: of' shipments at- 1975' levels.-: These values can be compared to the 

1100 (in 1969) early- fatalities from electrocution each.year; i-The latent cancer fatalities -•, 

from transport accidents are related principally to industrial and fuel-cycle shipments rather.,-, 

than to medical shipments, which are the dominant causes of latent cancer fatalities related 

to normal transport. This results principally from the larger quantities of more toxic mate

rials associated with-inidustrial-and fuel cycle shipments. .... :, ....

In spite of their low annual risk, specific accidents- occurring in very-high-density 

urban population zones can produce as many as one early fatality, 150 latent cancer fatalities,

xxiI
and decontamination costs" estimated to range from 250 million to 800 million dollars for 1975 

shipments and from 250 million to 1.2 billion dollars for 1985 shipments (1975 dollars). 

Although such accidents are possible, their probability of occurrence is very small (estimated 

to be :no greater than 3 x 10-9 per year based on 1975 shipping rates).' 

Nonradiological impacts on safety were estimated to be two injuries per year and one fa

tality every five years from accidents involving vehicles used for the exclusive-use transport 

of nuclear materials. Accidents involving vehicles carrying radioactive materials in conjunc

tion'with carriage of other goods are not considered to'be chiargeable as radioactive material 

shipments since the total number of radioactive material package s transported 'annually is less 

than 1o0 of all goods transported annually in this manner. 

RELATIONSHIP OF PROPOSED ACTIVITIES TO OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES 

Safety and safeguarding of radioactive materlal shipping is regulated by the NRC and the 

Department of Transportation in conjunction with cooperating State agencies. -The-interaction 

of these agencies is gove-ned by either an agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding that 

defines the coordination of their activities. " 

PROBAB'LE IMPACT OF PROPOSED ACTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT-' - ' 

Any rule changes pro~posed :as ý'result of this environmental assessment will be proposed

in a future action. The impact on the environment of those rule changes will'be considered 

separately with that action. 

ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING ACTIVITIES 

"Alternatives to the .existing-practices in'the-shipment-of'radioactive material are dis

cussed in Chapter 6. Mode shifts', opeirati6nal'6onstraints;-and package standards revisions 

were found to produce only-small changes in the population exposure associated with normal 

transportation:°.Although largq percenthge decreases in'the-existing risk from'transportation 

accidents result from some of these alternatives, the "significance-of these decreases is, 

lessened by the following considerations: 

-1. Because the existing risk (annual early deaths plus latent-cancer fatalities)-from 

transportation accidents is a small percentage of the risk from normal transportation, large 

decreas•e's 6acncident risk result 'in inr;ignificant changes in the total-(accident plus normal) 

risk; and - .- -- - "- .. / - , . y; " :. 

2. Because the existing risk from transportation accidents is so small, large relative 

decreases are actually -small 'absolute decreases' in effects (e.g.,' ;reddction in 'numbers of 

deaths or illnesses).- " 

Where the cost-benefit ratio for an alternative is adverse, i.e., where the social and ' 

economic costs outweigh the decreases in environmental impact, better alternatives should be 

sought. It has been found, for example, that risk from an accident involving plutonium or

xxiii
polonlua-210.is reduced by changing the physical form of these materials.. This technique may 

be capable of producing a decrease in accident risk of 0.005 latent cancer fatalities per year, 

(a 30% reduction) for large shipments of highly toxic materials. Detailed information on the 

feasibility of this alternative is not yet adequate to permit the determination of its associ-" 

ated costs. 

UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONNENTAL EFFECTS 

The principal unavoidable environmental effect was found to be the population exposure 

resulting from normal transport of radioactive materials. Since the electromagnetic radiation 

emitted from a package cannot be reduced to zero by any finite quantity- of shielding, the 

transport of radioactive materials will always result in some population exposure. 

The much smaller unavoidable risk from accidents that hav-i'thpetential for releasing 

radioactive material from packages will always be present but such accidents have a very small 

probability of occurrence.

The unavoidable nonradiological impact resulting from transport of radioactive material 

in exclusive-use vehicles amounts to about two injuries and one fatality every five years, 

mostly from accidents involving transportation of7 fuel and waste to and from nuclear, power 

plants. This is because exclusive-use vehicles are predominiantly -dfor'sich-shipments. 

Other nonradiological impacts such as the use of, vehicle fuel and other resources were found 

to be insignfficant., . . 

SHORT-TERM USE OF THE ENVIRONMENT VERSUS LONG-TERM POSITIVE EFFECTS 

The most obvious and important short-term effect is the population radiation exposure 

from normal transport,, which statistically, amountsto 1.2 latent cancer fatalities per year. 

An additional short-term effect is the small annual accident risk.,,,- .. 

,Balanced against these risks, are long-term positive results from the shipment of radio

active material in such areas as:, .~i -,- ,. 

1. National Health - The use of radfopharmaceuticals in the diagnosis and treatment of 

illnesses provides a benefit-in lives saved. ,... 

2. 011 Exploration 7-Ther use of radloactive material in wel.1, logging and flow tracing,. 

provides technology for intelligent exploitation of our oil resources and aids in optimizing 

the use of this valuable national energyresource. 

3. - Quality Control'- The use of radlonuclides-for gauging the thicknesses of metal and-, 

paper, measuring product density, and locating levels of contents in small packages and in 

large holding tanks provides a capability to minimize waste of resources and optimize quality 

in finished goods; '-. . - - . r-, ' * -

xxiv,
4. Electricity Generation - The use of nuclear fuels in reactors allows production of 

electricity for society with lower fuel costs and lower levels of chemical pollutants to the 

environment than is possible by more conventional methods of generating electricity. 

5. Industry - Radionuclides are used in many manufactured devices and consumer products 

ranging from home smoke detectors to antistatic devices. 

IRREVERSIBLE COM4ITMENT OF RESOURCES 

The only irreversible commitment of resources determined in this assessment was that 

resulting from use of fuels to operate the transportation network. To the extent that the 

resources are committed to the transportation of radioactive materials alone, the quantity of 

fuels used is an infinitesimal quantity, since transportation of radioactive material normally 

occurs incidental to the movement of general goods in commerce. Only those portions of the 

fuel and other resources attributable to sole-use shipments are committed directly, and that 

activity is less than 10-5 of the nation's total transportation activity, making this irre

versible commitment of resources negligibly small.

xxv
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 

The purpose of this environmental statement is to assess the impact• upon the environment 

resulting from the transportation of radioactive materials within the United States and from 

export and import shipments of such materials. 'The radiologicil impacts of transportation 

accidents involving radioactive materials are evaluated from a risk point'of view,-although the 

consequences of certain "worst-case" accidents are also evaluated. The data base for this 

assessment is the 1975 Survey (Ref. 1-1) of radioactive material shipments in the United States. 

All shipments exclusive of weapons, weapon components, and shipments in military vehicles are 

considered.-.Fuel cycle shipments, shipments of medical- and industrial-use isotopes' and waste 

shipments are specifically included. The expected'radiological impacts in 1985 are also evalu

ated in terms-of projections of the i975 shipment data under certain growth assumptions. 

1.2 BACKGROUND, 

Chapters 1 through 6 of this document are the result of a'study begun in Hay 1975 by 

Sandia Laboratories under contract with th.e Nuclear Regulatýry omission'(NRC). NRC, organized 

under-the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has the responsibility of ensuring'the safe' use of 

radioactive materials through licensing and regulation. Soon after its inception, NRC'stated: 

that it intended to review those regulations and procedures originally set up~ by the Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC) pertaining to the licensing and regulation of nuclear facilities and 

materials to determine what changes, if any, should be'made. This environmental statement Is, 

in part, an attempt to provide the technical data necessary for NRC to reevaluate the rules 

governing the transportation of radioactive materials. 

In addition, ther' has been some expression of concern by members of Congress and the" 

public about the safety and security of air shipments of plutonium and other'special nuclear: 

material (SNM) in the, vicinity, of populated areas. For example, the NRC authorization bill 

enacted into law on August -9; 1975,i-ncluaes -an amendment by Congressman Scheuer that states: 

:•: 'The Nucleai Regulatory Comission shall notlicense any shipments by air 

transport of plutonium in any form, whether, exports,,imports or domestic 

shipments; provided, however, that any plutonium in any form contained in a 

medical devTie-designed for-individual'-human-application is~not~subject to 

-,this restriction.-,This restriction shall be-In.force until •the Nuclear 

Regulatory Cominsiton has certified to the Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy 

of the Congress that a safe container has been developed and tested which 

will not rupture under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and 

explosion of a high-flying aircraft.

. i
Pending satisfaction of this Congressional restriction, NRC has ordered the cessation of plutonium 

air shipments by its licensees. 

The NRC announced its initiation of a rule-making proceeding concerning the air transporta

tion of radioactive materials, including packaging, and invited comments by the public on the 

existing regulations (Ref. 1-2). Of particular interest were views and comments on: 

1. Whether or not radioactive materials should continue to be transported by air; 

2. The extent to which safety requirements should be based on accident probabilities, 

packaging, procedural controls, or combinations of these; 

3. The relative risk of transport of radioactive materials by air compared to other modes 

of transport; and 

4. What improvements, if any, in the applicable regulations should be considered. 

In order to-determine the quantities and typies of 'shipments of radioactive materials cur

rently being transported, NRC contracted with Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories in Richland-, 

Washington, to conduct a survey (Ref. 1-1) of the transportation of radi6acilve materials. Ques

tionnaires requesting data on the numbers and characteristics (e-g., quantty and external ra'dia-' 

tion level per package) of radioactive materials shipment's were Sent to about 2,300 of the approx

imately 18,000 licensees. Detailed questionnaires were mailed to special nuclear material (SNM) 

licensees who shipped 1 gram or more of SNH between March 1, 1974, and February 28, 1975, and to 

approximately 150 "major shippers," i.e.., licensees who were known to have shipped large numbers 

of packages or large quantities of radioactive raterial. Questionnaires requesting'only summary 

information were sent to a sampling of the licensees selected from lists supplied by NRC and by 

the agreement states (listed in Chapter 2)., Data derivedI from that survey were used I forI thfs 

assessment, as explain in Appendix A. 

Section 1.3 of this chapter contains a brief discussion of accident experience in the trans

portation of radioactive materials. Section 1.4 is an overview of the current industrial and 

medical uses of radioisotopes and their respective transportation requirements. Section 1.5 

identifies the standard-shipments model on which the environmental assessment is based. Sec-ý 

tion,1.6 is a general discussion of the approach taken in the impact assessment. Finally, Sec

tion 1.7 contains an outline of the contents of each of the remaining chapters.. 

1.3 ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS'(Ref. 1-3) 

There are approximately 500- billion packages of all commodities shipped each year in the 

United States: About 100 millton'of these involve hazardo'us materials, including flamables, 

explosives, poisons, corrosives, and radioactive materials. There were ove'r two million packages 

of radioactive materials transported, in' 1975.: Thui about`2percent of hazardous material ship

ments involve radioactive materials.", Z . V 

Radioactive materials transportation has an excellent record of safety. Of tie more than 

32,000 hazardous materials transport incidents reported to the DOT during 1971-1975, only 144, or 

0 45 percent, were noted to involve radioactive materials. Incidents invol'hing flammable

1-2
liquids, on the other hand, resulted in over 16,000 reports to the DOT. In only 36 of the 144 

reported radioactive materials incidents was there any indication of release of contents or 

,excessive radiation levels. In-most cases, the releases involved only minor contamination from 

packages containing only small q antities of radioactive material. 

Seventy-four of the 144 reported* radioactive materials transportation incidents involved 

air carriers and forwarders, 65 involved highway carriers, and 5 involved rail carriers: About 

40 percent of the reported aircraft incidents occurred during handling and typically involved a 

package falling from a cargo-handling cart and then being run over and crushed by a vehicle. 

About .13 percent of the highway incident' reports resulted from'vehicular accidents in 

which packages were burned, thrown from moving vehicles, or rolled on by vehicles., Only one of 

these reports indicated a release of contents. Five reports were submitted by rail carriers in 

the same .five-year period: Two of these involved derailments'of flat cars carrying large 

packagings, but neither incident involved a release. 

1.4 AN OVERVIEW OF RADIOISOTOPE USES 

Radionuclides used in the practice of nucleari medicine constitute the largest fraction of 

the packages of radioactive material transported annually in the United States. Other radio

isotopes are .finding extensive applications in well-logging, 'in industrial 'radiography,' as 

large-curie teletherapy and irradiator sources; in some consumer 'products,' and 'in 'the manu

facture of certain types of gauges. Some fissile materials', such as U-235, are used as nuci.iar 

reactor 1uel'; others, such as Pu-239, are produced as byproductfmaterial'in nuclear reactors. 

These, together with relatively small amounts of radioactive material used in research, consti

tute the primary applications of radioisotopes. 

1.4.1 MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 

During the past.25 years, clinical applications of "radioactive materials have become a 

major branch of medicine (Ref. 1-4). In particular, gamma-ray-emitting isotopes are now com

monly used for the purpose of imaging specific areas or organs in the body. The normal'tech

nique used in a scanning procedure is to give the patient an injection of the isotope In the 

,,appropriate chemical form to localize " it in the desired organ or system, and collect the emitted 

gamma radiation on an imaging device. 

In 1972, some 6,355,000 procedures were performed in 3,300 hospitals' in 1,500 cities in 

the United States using radiopharmaceuticals (Refs. 1-5 and 1-6). 'Radioisotopes of iodine' were 

among the first such materials used. Their use in the study of thyroid physiology and in the 

diagnosis and treatment of thyroid disorders (300,000 to 540,000 administrations/year (Ref. 1-6)) 

still make them an Important part of the current practice of nuclear medicine., 

An example .of,, the. -rapid-growth of the use, of organ-imagingg .techniques is, the increased 

application of Tc-99m, an unstable daughter of Mo-99. Tc-99m is not, in itself, a natural 

Radioactive material incident reports are required by Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regu

lations (see Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 of this environmental statement). 

1-3
component of any biological system, but its desirable properties (a six-hour half-life and 140-kev 

gamma ray which is well-matched to existing monitoring instruments) make it ideal for imaging. 

Because of these properties, relatively large amounts of Tc-99m can be administered with little 

radiation dose. As a result, there has been extensive research to incorporate this isotope into 

medically useful forms that provide the necessary imaging and then are excreted. It is estimated 

that nearly 5.5 million examinations were performed in 1972 using technetium. At present, one of 

the most useful forms, is a pertechnetate used for brain scanning (1,000,000 administrations/year 

in 1972 (Rei. 1-6)). 

A major source for hospital administration of Tc-99m is the Mo-99 generator or "cow," which 

consists of an alumina column on which the Mo-99 -is adsorbed. The daughter product, Tc-99m, may 

be eluted, i.e., "milked," by flushing the column with a sterile saline solution (Ref. 1-4). 

Many other isotopesare now, used in scanning procedures: Au-198 or 1-131 for the liver 

(380,000 administrations/year in 1972 (Ref. 1-6)), 1-131 for the lungs (246,000 administrations/ 

year in 1972 (Ref. 1-6)), Hg-203 for the kidneys (67,000 in 1972 (Ref'. i-6)), etc. 

Isotopes with more energetic emissions, such as Co-60 and Cs-137, are used in therapeutic 

situations where the radiation is used to destroy localized malignancies. 

Because the Tc-99m generators last about a week and because of the way physicians who prac

tice nuclear medicine schedule their patients, hospitals: and pharmacies prefer to receive a fresh 

generator on Monday mornings. Thus, significantly more radiopharmaceutical shipments tend to 

occur over the weekend than during the week. Radiopharmaceutical packages are frequently picked 

up at the airport and delivered to the hospital by taxi, person automobile, or courie-r service. 

In some cases, a freight forwarder is used. 

Radiopharmaceutical packages shipped to hospitals or nuclear pharmacies contain at most a few 

curies of the radioactive material and usually much less. The packaging usually consists of 

several cardboard boxes, one inside another, with a "pig," i.e., lead-shielded enclosure, inside 

the' innermost box." Thc radiopharmaceutica, usually a liquld, is contained in a glass or plastic 

vial inside the pig. The vial is surrounded by absorbent material to contain the liquid if the 

vial should break. 

Radiopharmaceutical companies receive the raw materials used to p..r.duceadioiphrmaceuticals. 

These materials are often shipped by cargo aircraft in large containers approved for up to thou

sands of curies. .!ome companies have plants at more than one location and require transport of 

large curie quantities of materials between locations.' -.... r 

Most radiopharmaceuticals are produced 'in, New Brunswlck,-St.' Loufs. Bcoston', Chicigo, and San 

Francisco. Because of their short half-lives," they are often flown to their destination'on'regu

larly scheduled'passenger'ffl ihts, although'one' large manufacturer now ships m'oii than !W 'percent 

of his packages by a courier service, using fixed-bed trucks. Because of new applications that ar. being discovered and because of the increased use of established techniques, " 

1-4
the number of' packages shipped'is growing at a rate of approximately 10 -percent per year, 

(Ref. 1-7). 

1.4.2 THE WELL-LOGGING INDUSTRY 

" Well-logging fifis use radioisotopes in down-hole measurements 'to provide information on 

,the undergrounid strata and to assess a well's capability for secondary and tertiary recovery. 

In a typical logging operation, a neutron source and a gamma source are placed in an:instrumen

tationpackage and lowered by means of a cable to the-bottom of the bore hole. The package is 

then withdrawn slowly while the instrumentation detects the neutrons and gamma-rays backscattered 

from the surrounding strata, and the detected signals-are displayed on a chart recorder. The 

-results yield information about the properties of rock formations as a function of depth., 

Typicasly, an americium-beryllium neutron source of 5 to 20 curies and a Cs-137 gamma-ray 

source of several curies are used. Each source is enclosed inside two small, stainless-steel 

cylinders, one inside the other, with welded end caps. Sources are fabricated in a hot cell by 

a service company, which purchases the radioisotopes from a company having access to a produc

tion reactor. Well-logging firms transport the sources to remote well sites (and often to 

off-shore locations) both in the United States and in foreign countries, including, for, example, 

Canada, England (North Sea), Germany, Brazil, Venezuela, and Iran. -

Many well-logging sources werb shipped by passenger aircraft prior to the Federal Aviation 

"Administration '(FAA)'rule change implementing provisions of the Transportation Safety Act of 

1974. -That Act prohibited the shipment on passenger aircraft of any radioactive materials other 

than those intended for research or medical use. Deliveries of sources to sites within approxi

mately a 1000-mile radius of the logging firm are generally made by truck, while deliveries to 

off-shore well locations are frequently made by helicopter..,-Exports -of sources to foreign 

coufitries, as well as long-distance shipments within the United States (e.g., to Alaska), are 

sent by ship'or cargo aircraft. , .

SSome logging firms and some oil companies also ,use radioactive tracers, usually.1-131, 

Kr-85,'or tritlated water, that are injected into a well to monitor its flow properties.- These 

'materials are typically shipped in a glass-serum vial careTully packaged in a metal can inside a 

'_lead-shielded container.- Surrounding this container is enough absorbent material to absorb the 

-liquid contents in case of.breakage.--. .-. . -- - ,, 

1.4.3 THE RADIOGRAPHY INDUSTRY ,, 

- -z Radiography sources are made primarily from one of two isotopes, Ir-192 or Co-60, both of 

. which emit relatively high energy gamma-rays. The radiation is used to examine the structural 

-integrity of. welded Joints, principally in large pipes, .franes, and pressure vessels, 6or-o 

,determinethe thickness of a material.. The source Is enclosed by two small, welded, stainless

-steel capsules and is positioned at the end of a short flexible steel cable to facilitate han

d~ling nr the radiography "camera." Thegaina rays emitted by the source pass through the

1-5
welded joint and-expose a piece of photographic film. Voids show up as dark spots on the devel

oped negative. 

Only a few companies manufacture these sources (obtaining the raw materials from production 

reactors), but there are numerous radiographers who use them. Unlike the radiopharmaceutical 

industry, the radiography industry requires individual shipments of sizeable quantities of radio

isotopes in both directions between manufacturer and user. A fresh source, typically 100 curies, 

is sent to a radiographer for use in his camera. When it has decayed, to about 30 curies, the 

source is returned to the manufacturer in exchange for a replacement. The new source is returned 

in the same shielded container in which it is shipped and stored. 

Radiography'cameras are also used for field work (e.g. -at pipeline installations), which 

results in the need for transport from field offices to remote sites. The units are fairly port

able and are-usually transported by small truck or van. However, the majority of radiography is 

done at fabrication' plants'and requires no transport except to and from the supplier. 

1.4.4- LARGE CURIE SOURCES 

Teletherapy sources containing large quantities of Co-60 (up to 10,000 curies) are fabricated 

and shipped to cancer treatment centers both in the United States and abroad. Overseas exports 

are transported by ship, while domestic shipments go by truck or rail. Irradiator sources, usu

ally Co-60 or Cs-137, are -used for research or in large-scale food sterilization operations and 

contain hundreds of thousands of curies. These sources are returned to the manufacturer after 

decaying to abouzt3Opercent-of-their initial activity.T They are shipped in large casks which, 

because of their weight, are transported by surface modes., r .

1.4.5 RADIOACTIVE GAUGING SOURCES' .' -. 

A number of different gauging techniques use radioactive materials fabricatedin sealed

source form. Material thickness is measured by detecting the variation in beta or gamma radiation 

that is'transmitied through the material." Examples are thickness measurements of paper,-rubber, 

plastic sheet, metal foil , and pipe wallU The material level of solids or liquids is measured by 

detecting a change'in transmittedirdiatio'n through tanksT bins, boxes; bottles, cans, or other 

containers. Fluid densities and bulk densities of solids'are measured by detecting-transmitted 

radiation. Coating thicknesses of adhesives, paints, or anticorrosives are measured by detecting 

transmitted or backscattered radiation. Moisture content is measured by detecting the degree of 

neutron thermalization. )' 

A number of different isotopes, usually in'sealed source form and including Ra-226; Cs-137, 

Co-60, Kr-85, S-90, Am-241, Pm-147, and Th-204, are-u sed in the-individual sources, which contain 

from a few mIl'icuries up to several curies of activity.': The'radioactlve materials used by the 

source manufacture'rs are lobtainedfro'm suppliers of byproduct material-, Bulk'shipments'(up to 

several hundred curies per shipment) are generally transported in* shielded packages by motor 

freight. IThe gauging equipment may be shipped with' the sourie-intact, or the- source may be 

shipped separately and installed at the site.

1-6
1.4.6 THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY

The basic nuclear fuel cycle associated with the production of electrical energy from fission 

is shown schematically in Figure 1-1. The part of the cycle that supplies new fuel for power 

production is referred to as the "front end" and involves U-233, U-235, U-238, Th-232, and Pu-239. 

The majority of currently operational power reactors are of the light-water reactor (LWR) variety, 

which has two princip-al types: pressiurized water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR). 

Both types use slightly enriched uranium (approximately 97 percent U-238, 3 percent U-235) as 

fuel. 

The material flow in the front end of the fuel cycle is approximately as follows: Ores 

containing 0.1 to 0.5 percent uranium (which has an'isotopic content of 99.29 percent U-238 and 

0.71 percent U-235) are concentrated as U3 08 (yellowcake) near the mine'and shipped to a con

version plant. At the conversion plant, the U308 is converted to UF6 , which is shipped to a 

uranium enrichment plant to be enriched in the fissile isotope U-235. Thle'enriched UF6 is sent to 

a fuel fabrication facility, where it is converted to UO2 and pressed into pellets. The pellets 

are fabricated into fuel rod assemblies, and completed fuel assemblies are sent to reactors. 

After a fraction of the U-235 fuel has been consumed by fission, the reactor is shut down, 

and the irradiated fuel elements are removed and sent to a reprocessing plant. This procedure is 

part of the "back end" of the fuel cycle. At the reprocessing plant, the irradiated fuel is 

separated from the cladding and is processed in a bath of hot nitric acid. The principal compo

nents of irradiated fuel are-long-lived fission products (such as Cs-137 and Sr-90), unfissioned 

fuel (U-233, U-235), and transuranic isotopes (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241,,Pu-242, Am-241, 

Cm-244, etc.). After non-fuel materials are chemically separated, the recovered uranium is con

verted to UF6 and returned to the enrichment plant, while the transuranic wastes are stored in 

liquid form. The high-level fissioin product'wastes are required to be solidified within five 

years-of generation (Ref. 1-9) and 'subsequently buried in a federal waste repository. Recovered 

plutonium is converted to PuO2 and stored or shipped to fuel fabricaton plants as required. 

No commercial reprocessing plants were in operation in 1975, although at least one was under 

construction. In the interim, Irradiated fuel assemblies were stored on site at the various power 

reactors._ Several ,plans for disposal of-intermediate and high-level wastes are currently being 

evaluated,t but the final selection of the method of disposal and the repository site has not yet 

been made.-.- -

The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) uses the Th-232/U-233 portion of the fuel 

cycle shown in Figure 1-1. The unique aspect of the front end of the HTGR fuel cycle is the fuel 

element construction. The UO2 and ThO2 are converted to carbides, coated with graphite, blended, 

formed into cylinders, and inserted into graphite blocks. The mixed fuel is then sent to the 

HTGR, which uses helium gas as a heat transfer medium. During operation of the reactor, some of 

the thorium is converted to U-233. The spent fuel, after at least a 90-day cooling-off period at 

the reactor site, is sent to a reprocessing plant. The recovered U-235, now at reduced enrichment 

level, is returned for re-enrichment to 93 percent. The U-233 is shipped to a conversion plant,

1-7
.FIGURE 1-1. NUJCLEA. •FUEL CYtCL-E (Ref.f1-8). "..

1-8

- 4

It ,t

I-
where it is converted to a carbide to be used as acreplacement fuel for U-235 in the reactor. 

Currently only one HTGR is licensed In the United States. 

To conserve uranium resources and utilize the plutonium produced in the reactors, an alter

native procedure has been evaluated in which-plutonium oxide is mixed with uranium oxide. This 

oxide mixture is-then "burned" in'the reactor.L Although an environmental impact assessment for 

mixed oxide fuels' has been Issued '(Ref. 1-10), there 'is currently no recycling of plutonium

except in a few experimental reactors. 

Another reactor type is the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) (Ref. 1-11),,in 

which plutonium is produced in'the reactor from U-23-8 and subsequently used to fuel other

reactors. This 'reactor 'can, in principle, produce more plutonium fuel than the U-235 fuel it 

consumes, thus co)nserving uranium resources. 

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program uses highly enriched uranium (>90 percent U-235).in a 

PWR system. Like other reactor types, uranium is enriched as UF6 'by gaseous diffusion for 

fabrication into fuel elements. Because very ttle U-238 is present in the fuel, only very 

small quantities of plutonium are produced by neutron irradiation in the reactor. The reco,.-red 

U-235 is re-enriched for reapplication to the fuel cycle. 

"Because of the large size of virtually all fuel cycle shipments, they are normally shipped 

in large containers that preclude modes of transport other than truck,,rail, barge, or ship.. 

Certain quantities of'"special nuclear materials" (SNM), such as plutonium,-U-23 3 , and 

U-235, or uranium enriched in these isotopes to a level of 20 percent or more, require physical 

protection against theft and sabotage during transport because it is conceivable that they_ 

could be made into a nuclear explosive device. The regulations that prescribe the safeguards 

for these materials' are given in 10 CFR 70 and 10 CFR 73 and will be discussed in Chapter 2. 

The types of shipments requiring safeguarding*include most plutonium shipments and all ship

ments of highly enriched uranium such as those involved in the HTGR and Naval Reactor Programs. 

Spent LiWR fuel contains'sizeable quantities of plutonium; however, the plutonium is not readily 

separable from the other radioactive material, and the radioactivity of the Irradiated fuel 

material is sufficiently-high that it is exempted from transportation safeguards requirements. 

MucWh' nirradiated SNM is'transported in cargo aircraft~and, prior to the previously men

tioned DOT restrictions, some was transported by passenger aircraft. ,,The other principal mode 

of transport-is- truck. ~ -'-. .. 

1:5 STANDARD SHIPMENTS V - t - i " .. ,- - * .... " 

'An assessment'of:the environmental ,impact of radioactive materials transportation requires 

a detailed knowledge of the package types, the principal transport modes,,.the number.of packages 

transported per year, the average quantity of material per package, the average "transport 

index" or "TI" (a measure of the external radiation .level),-and the average distance traveled 

1-9
per shipment; for:each type of radioactive material. being shipped. To make this problem tract

able, a list of "standard shipments" was compiled.from, the data obtained in the 1975 Survey 

(Ref. 1-1). This list is shown in Table 1-1, in which the total number of packages shipped per

year in 1975 and the 1985 extrapolations are given for various isotope, package type, and 

transport mode combinations. The list is by no means complete, but the materials listed account 

for'the vast majority of packages,. curies, and TI reported in the 1975 Survey. A detailed 

discussion of the methods used-to generate, this list from the survey data is given in 

Appendix A. 

Table 1-2 is a summary of radioactive material shipping activity both in 1975 and pro

jected to 1985, listed by isotope use categories. Thf table-lists the annual number of packages 

and curies,- as well as the total TIs and shipment distances, for each category, as determined 

from the 1975 Survey data. Also shown are the contributions of, each category to the annual" 

expected latent cancer fatalities (LCF) resulting from normal transport and from transportation 

accidenti. Detailed discussions of the methods used to obtain these results are presented in 

Chapters 4 and 5 and in related appendices. 

1.6 METHOD USED TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT - . 

Three circumstances under which impacts may be produced were considered: (1) normal 

transport conditions, (2) accidents involving the transport vehicle, and (3) theft or sabotage. 

The radiological impacts 'produced under each of these circumstances relate directly to the 

radiation emitted by the material. However, economic, legal, or social impacts may also occur. 

These impacts are more difficult to quantify than the radiological- impacts.-, 

1.6.1 NORMAL TRANSPORT CONDITIONS '-'.•- ',' : :' *• 

Under normal' transport conditions the' radiological impact arises from routine exposure to 

freight handlers, aircraft' passengers:and crew, truck, drivers,.on-route. bystanders, etc., re

sultiig' from the 'radiation- emitted by .the- contained material or radioactive contamination of 

the'package surface." Package shielding reduces but never completely eliminates this impact. 

The' radiological impacts are evaluated- in'terns of annual expected additional latent cancer 

fatalities, assuming a proportionality between population dose and numbers of additional latent 

cancer fatalities (see Chapter 3);' The dose resulting-from a given shipment is,proportional to 

the total "transport'index," or "TI" (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4), of all packages, included in the 

shipment. Estimates of the total population dose are made by modeling the path of each package 

from the time it is presented for transport until it arrives at its ultimate destination. The 

population dose is computed for each standard shipient in Table 1-1 by using the average TI, the 

average distance traveled, and the total packages per year. The methods of computing the dose 

depend on the transport 'mode:. The total expected annual dose. due to normal •transport is given 

by the sum of the doses resulting fr6m each standard shipment. ,. . ,. 

1.6.2 ACCIDENTS INVOLVING TRANSPORTVEHICLE'. ., 3⁄4 - ", , 

In the accident case, one considers the additional impact that could result from an accident 

Involving a vehicle transporting one or more packages of radioactive material. Three possible 

1-10
TABLE 1-1 

STANDARD SHIPMENTS LIST - 1975 AND 1985 PROJECTIONS

Package Type 

Limited++ 

.A

A 

A 

A 

B

Transport Mode** 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P, A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

T 

T

Packages per Year (1975) 

1.72 x 104 

2.95 x 105 

3.91 x 105 

521 

4170 

2.04 x 164 

7 

55 

116 

25 

1820 

2410 

267 

9860 

6180 

1.77,x 104 

1460

Packages per Year (1985) 

4.47 x 104 

7.67 x 105 

1.02 x 10 6 

1.22 x 10( 

0 

5.3 x 104 

161 

0 

302 

25 

1820' 

2410 

694 

2.56 x,1 

1.61,x, 4 

4.6 x io4 

3800

For details of package terminology, see Chapter 2. 

SAF - all-cargo aircraft; P A/C - passenger aircraft; T - truck; R - rail; S - ship; 

"ICY - Integrated Container Vehicle. 

*Modeled as 1-131. 

+Terminology recently applied by DOT to packages formerly referred to as "exempt."

Isotope 

Various+ 

Am-241

-I

Au-198 

Co-57 

Co- 60
, I TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Isotope 

- P ackage-Type 

Co-60 " LQ1* 

LQ2A 

LSA

C-14 

Cs-137

I .

A 

A B

Ga-67

H-3 ,7

A

Transport 

Mode ... 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P. A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C T

Packages per 

Year (197.U 

•, , ,.'-101 

4 

45 

509, 

5540 

1080 

1.94 x 104 

6660 

41 

1080 

3.1 x 104 

5 

69 

175 

7030 

1.29 x 104, 

1300 

2.6 x 104 

1.1 x 104

Packages per 

-Year (1985) 

262 

10 

1440 

0 

1.44 x 10 

2810 

4.97 x 104 

1.73 x 10 4 

2920 

0 

8.06 x 104 

13 

179 

455 

5.18 x 104 

,0 

3380 

6.76 x 1"0 4, 

2.86 x 104

-I N
TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Package Type 

B 

LSA 

A 

B 

A 

B A

Transport 

Mode 

AF 

P A/c 

T 

AF 

P A/c 

T 

AF 

P A/c 

T 

AP 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

AF 

P A/c 

T 

AF 

P A/C

Packages per 

Year (1975) 

18 

364 

151 

2 

45 

18 

346 

2540 

1920 

1590 

1.17 x 104 

1.37 x 10 4 

4720, 

2.93 x 105 

1.08 x'10 5 

13 

310 

292 

136 

1530

Packages Per 

Year (1985) 

47 

946 

393 

5 

117 

47 

7500 

6 

4990 

3.45 x 104 

6 

3.56 x 104 

4720, 

2.93 x i05 

1.08'x 105 

13 

310 

292 

354 

3980

Isotope 

H-3

Ir-192

I,, 

-a

1-131

Kr-85
TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Package Type 

LQ

A 

A B

A 

A 

A 

B 

LSA A

Transport Mode 

AP 

P A/C 

T 

R 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

T 

A? 

P A/c 

T 

AP 

P A/c 

T 

P A/C 

T 

T, 

T 

T 

AP 

P A/c T

Packages per 

Year (1975) 

1 

11 

7 

,1 

268 

.7940 

3820 

2.6 x 1041 

39 

401 

2620 

1280 

3.01 x 104 

2.09 x 105 

0 

0 

1.31 x 105 

821 

2.03 x 104 

875 

1.22 x 104 

1.29 x 10 

4

Packages per Year (1985) 

32 

0 

18 

3 

697 

2.06 x i0 4 

9930 

2.6 x 104 

440 

0 

2620 

3330 

7.83 x 104 

5.43 x 105 

7500 

4.25 x 10 

3.41 x 105 

2130 

5.28 x 104 

2280 

3.17 x 104 

3.35 x 104

Isotope 

Po-210

P-32 

Ra-224

-I

Tc-99M 

TI-20i 

Waste 

Xe-133
"TABLE I-I (continued)

Isotope , Package Type 

Kr-85 A B

MF+MC 

Mo-99 

Po-210

A 

B 

LSA 

A 

B A

Transport Mode 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

T 

T 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

S 

AF 

P A/C 

T R

Packages per Year (1975) 

3500 

297 

30 

336 

634 

2.15 x 104 

5000 

'12 

3.33 x 104 

3260 

7.97 x 10 4 

5.49 x'104 

109 

2720 

1880 

16 

113 

81 

110

Packages .per Year (1985) 

9100 

772 

78 

874 

1650 

8.9 x 10 

2.07 x 104 

50 

1.38 x 105 

8326 

2.07 x' 105 

1.43 x1 105 

283 

7070 

4890 

336 

0 

211 

260

*Mixed corrosion products and mixed fission products.

-a
TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Isotope 

Mixed* 

Pu-238

Pu-239

U-Pu Mixture

Package Type 

A 

B 

LSA 

A

Transport Mode 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

P A/C 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

P A/C 

T 

AF 

AF 

P A/C

B 

B

LB

Packages per Year (1975) 

115 

2260 

2.7 x 104 

8 

101 

26 

513 

5830 

34 

1980 

3250 

2 

109 

179 

17 

165 

4030 

1 

8 

58

Packages per Year (1985) 

299, 

5880 

7.02 x 104 

21 

263 

68 

1330 

1.52 x 104 

88 

5150 

8450 

288 

0 

465 

182 

0 

4030 

1 

33 

240

*Treated as 1-131 for purposes of radtobiologlcal modeling.

T"
Isotope 

U-Pu Mixture 

" .. Spent fuel 

U3 08 ,jl,

UF6 (natural)

Package T' 

B 

Cask 

LSA

A

7r6 (enriched) B 

UO2 (enriched) B 1' *

U02 fuel 

Recycle 

,,Plutonium:,

B 

B

TABLE 1-1 (continued) 

Transport 

Mode 

T 

R 

T 

R 

T 

R 

T 

S 

T 

S, 

T 

s

ICV

Packages per Year (1975) 

330 

254 

17 

5.4 x 10 4 

6.6 x 10 

2050 

2500 

485 

106 

9690 

2130 

1280 

282 

t 

0

Packages per Year (1985) 

1370 

1530 

652 

2.24 x'105 

2.73 x 105 

8440 

1.04 x 104 

2000 

439 

4.01 x 104 

8820 

5300 

1170 

41

I' * * I

-J

a
TABLE 1-2 

SUM4ARY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPPING AND ITS MAJOR RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS

Shipment 

Type 

Limited 

Medical 

Industrial 

Fuel cycle 

- Waste 

TOTAL

Packages 

per Year 

7.03 x 105 

9.10 x 105 

2.15'x 105 

2.04 x 105 

1.52 x 105 

2.19 x 106

1.83 x 106 

1.71 x 106 

5.63 x 105 

8.36 x'106 

6.27 x 105 

5.57 x 106

Curies 

per Year 

2.11 x 103 

5.78 x 106 

9.39 x 106 

5.32 x 108 

2.68 x 105 

5.48 x 108

TI per Year 

7.74 x 103 

6.43 x 105 

3.43 x 105 

5.69 x 105 

2.98 x 106 

4.54 x 106

5.50 x 103 2.02 x 104 3.11 x 109 

1.50 x 107 1.20 x 106 1.92 x 109 

2.47 x 107 8.79 x 105 8.84 x 108 

8.41 x 109 2.46 x 106 7.16 x 107 

1.11 x 106 1.23 x 107 1.33 x 107 

8.45 x 109 1.68 x 107 5.97 x 109

1975 

Kilometers 

per Year 

1.19 x 109 

1.12 x 109 

3.01 x 108 

2.09 x 107 

3.22 x 106

2.64 x 109

LCF (normal) 

per Year 

0.0077 

0.616 

0.281 

0.104 

0.182

1.19

Percent 

0.6 

52 

24 

9 

15

100

LCF (acc) 

per Year 

5.78 x 10-5 

6.11 x 10-4 

1.60 x 10-3 

1.85 x l0-3 

6.17 x 10-4

%4.73 x 10-3

Percent 

1 

13 

34 

39 

13

100

1985

Limited 

Medical 

Industrial 

Fuel cycle 

Waste 

TOTAL

0.020 

1.17 

0.676 

0.469 

0.752

3.08

0.7 

38 

22 

15 

24

100

1.51 x 10-4 

1.51 x 10.3 

4.49 x 10-3 

7.88 x 10.3 

2.54 x 10.3

1 

9 

27 

48 

15

1.66 x 10-2 100
hazardous'conditions may arise in such an accident: 

1. - A loss of shielding efficiency of the package, 

2. A loss of containment and subsequent dispersal of the radioactive material, and 

3. Accidental assembly of a critical mass (in fissile material shipments). 

The first condition could result in persons near the accident being directly exposed to 

radiation. The second could ultimately result in direct exposure and intake of the radioactive 

material into humans by inhalation or ingestion of the dispersed material. The third case could 

result in neutron irradiation of persons in the vicinity of the accident at the time it occurs. 

Accident risk is defined as the product of the probability of an accident and its conse

quences. The risk calculations incorporate accident rates and package release fraction estimates, 

both of which are functions of accident severity. Dispersible materials are assumed to be aero

solized in severe accidents, and the aerosol cloud is assumed to drift downwind according to a 

Gaussian diffusion model. Inhalation of the aerosolized debris by persons downwind from the 

accident produces doses to various internal organs. Nondispersible materials are assumed to 

undergo a partial loss of shielding and create a direct exposure hazard. The contributions of 

each standard shipment to the accident risk are summed to obtain the total risk. Radiological 

accident risks are expressed in terms of annual expected latent cancer fatalities and early fa

tality probabilities. 

The consequences of postulated accidents involving certain large quantity shipments are -.Isn 

evaluated. The results are presented in terms of the number of persons receiving greater than 

specific doses of interest and in terms of the area that is contaminated to greater than a given 

level. 

1.6.3 THEFT OR SABOTAGE 

Certain quantities of SNM, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, are possible targets 

for theft, since they might be used to make a nuclear explosive device. Other radionuclides in 

large quantities may also become targets for theft or sabotage. The need for security of certain 

radioactive material shipments is discussed in Chapter 7, together with an assessment of the 

present physical security requirements applied to various modes of transport. 

1.7 THE CONTENTS OF OTHER CHAPTERS OF THIS DOCUMENT 

Chapter 2 discusses the federal regulations that apply to the transport of radioactive mate

rials and the safeguarding of SNM. It is the environmental impact resulting from the transpor

tation of radioactive materials under these regulations that is the subject of this report. 

Chapter 3 is a general discussion of the biological effects of radiation exposure. It Includes a 

summary of the health effects model used in this assessment. The case of normal transport of 

radioisotopes and the associated environmental impact is discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the 

impact due to accidents is discussed. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of alternatives to present 

shipping practice, including transport mode shifts, and their effect on the environmental impact.

1-19
The diversion of SNM and an evaluation of the steps taken to avoid such diversion are discussed in 

Chapter 7. Chapter 8 contains responses to comments received concerning the draft versions of 

this document. Specific subjects such as the standard shipments model, plutonium, etc., are 

addressed in the appendices.-

- \r -

4. 4 

4 '4' ->

1-20

4 .-

I

. -1 1

Z f

•t

1 .1
REFERENCES 

1-1. Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Survey of Radioactive Material Shipments in 

the United States, BNWL-1972, April 1976. 

1-2. Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 206, June 2, 1975, p. 23768. 

1-3. A. W. Grella, "A Review of 5 Years Accident Experience in the U.S.A. Involving Nuclear 

Transportation (1971-1975)," paper presented at the Seminar on the Design, Copstruction, 

and Testing of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, IAEA, Vienna, 

Austria, August 23-27, 1976. 

1-4. H. N. Wagner, Nuclear Medicine, New York, N.Y.: H. P. Publishers, 1974. 

1-5. J. Calvin Brantley, "Industry's Role in Transportation of Radiopharmaceutlcals," 

Society of Nuclear Medicine, Annual Meeting, San Diego, Calif., June 12, 1974. 

1-6. "The American College of Radiology Survey on Regionalization in Nuclear Medicine," 

March 1975. 

1-7. J. Calvin Brantley and Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Remarks presented at Conference 

on Transportation of Hazardous Materials in Air Commerce, October 2-3, 1974. 

1-8. S. Golan and R. Salmon, "Nuclear Fuel Logistics," Nuclear News, February 1973. 

1-9. Appendix F, "Policy Relating to the Siting of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Related 

Waste Management Facilities," to 10 CFR 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities." 

1-10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Statement on the 

Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Reactors, NUREG-0002, 

August 1976. 

1-U. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program,. 

WASH-1535, December 1974.

1-21
CHAPTER 2 

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADiOACTIVE MATERIALS 

2.1 INTRODUCTION 

The objective of this chapter is to summarize the federal regulations pertaining to the 

transportation of radioactive *materials. For complete details of transportati6n regulations, 

the interested reader is referred to' the-appropriate sections in the Code'of Federal Regu-. 

lations (some of which are provided in Appendix B to this 'document). 

Thre e: basicI safety requirements that must be met when_transporting radioactive'materials 

are: 

I: Adequate containment of the radioactive material; 

2. Adequate control of the radiation emitted by the material; and 

3. Prevention of nuclear criticality, i.e., prevention of the accumulation of enough 

fissile material 'in one location under conditions that'could result in a nuclear chain reaction. 

" In'addition, "certain strategic quantities' a'n d types of spec'ilal nuclear material (SNM) 

require physical protection against theft and sabot age during transit.'" 

The purpose of 'the'regulations is to 'ensure that these requirements are Imet.-' 'In the 

subsequent sections of this chapter, the regulatioýns relating to ea'ch of these safety require

ments are discussed. 

"NRC regulations provide the standards that must'be met rather than attempting'to specify 

how they are to be met. An'example of the application of this-baslc concept is the -fact'that 

the regulations do not prohibit the shipment of any specific radioisotope,* as long as the 

basic safety standards are met.' 

Section 2.2 of this chapter is Ia discussion of th6e various'regulatory a'gencies and their 

respective regulations. Section 2.3 discussis theriegulatlons and'standards designed to ensure 

the . containment of radioactive mateial during' transport, inicluding the classification 'of 

radioactive materials for shipment, Type A packaging'standards, 'Type'B p~ckaging standards; and 

packaging for large quantities, limited items, limited quantities, and low specific activity 

(LSA) materials. Section'2.4 discusses the standards for radlation' control during transport 

and introduces the concept of the transpqrt Index. '. 

'The special regulations applicable to fissile materials for :critlcality control are dis

cussed in Section' 2.5. 'Section 2.6 outlines the responsibilities of a -licensee who receives a 

shipment'of radioactive material and discusses procedures for picking up, receiving, and opening 

Plutonium air shipments are presently prohibited by NRC order in compliance with Public 

Law 94-79 (Scheuer Amendment). ' ' 

2-1
packages. The labeling requirements for packages are covered in Section 2.7. In Section 2.8 

the responsibilities of the carrier, including vehicle placarding and stowage, are discussed. 

Section 2.9 covers the requirements for the reporting of incidents and decontamination proce

dures. Finally, in, Section-2.10 the requirements- for the safeguarding of special nuclear 

material in transit are discussed. 

2.2 REGULATORY AGENCIES 

The transportation of radioactive byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials within 

the United States- is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Department of 

Transportation (DOT) reglilates all radioactive mater.ials in interstate commerce.- International 

shipments, in most cases, are consistent with the standards of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), with the DOT serving as the USA "competent authority." Certain "limited" (for

merly called "exempt") quantities may be shipped by mail, and such shipments are regulated by 

the U.S. Postal Service. Shipments that are neither in interstate or foreign commerce nor in 

air transportation, as defined in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, are controlled by NRC and 

by various state agencips. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established by. the Energy Reorganization Act of 

1974, which went into effect on January 19, 1975. This act also created the Energy Research 

and Development Administration (ERDA) and abolished the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).- The 

licensing and related regulatory authority held by the AEC under the Atomic Energy Act 'of 1954, 

as amended, was transferred to the NRC. The authority of the AEC operating divisions to approve 

the use of radioactive material packages by their, prime contractors was_assumed by ERDA in this 

reorganization. Later, Section 301(a), of Public Law 95-91, enacted August 4, 1977, transferred 

all functions of ERDA to the Secretary of Energy. The special package approval authority is 

being phased out as NRC is able to review the large number of packages in use by prime contrac

tors, and it is expected to expire in 1978. Approvals were issued only In accordance with the 

same package standards used by the AEC regulatory staff, and now by NRC. 

Chapter I of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains, the rules and regu

lations of the NRC, including rules and definitions relating to the issuance of general and 

specific licenses for receiving, acquiring, owing, possessing, using, and transferring bypro

duct material, source material, and special, nuclear material. A transfer of a nonlimrited 

quantity of these materials can.take place only between persons who are licensed either by the 

NRC or by certain "agreement states,* a term to be explained later in this section. 

- The parts of, Title 10, Chapter I that most-directly pertain to radioactive material trans

portation are Parts 26, 70, 71, and 73, which deal with "Standards for Protection Against' 

Radiation," "Special Nuclear Matertalr" *Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and 

Transportation of Radioactive Material, under, Certain Conditions," and "Physical Protection of 

Plants and Materials", .respectively.. . In referring to these, and other regulations in the Code 

of Federal Regulations, an abbreviated form will be used: lO CFR 71. 35(a)," meaning "Paragraph 

(a) of Section 71.35 of Part 71 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal Regulations." 

The AEC, through formal agreements with certain "agreement states," transferred to those 

states the regulatory authority over byproduct material. source material, and subcritical 

2-2
quantities of special 'nuclear material. These agreement states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 

California, Colorado, Florida, Ge6rgla, 'Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missis

sippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New'Hampshire, New Mexico;,.New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 

Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. -These states have adopted a uniform 

set of rules requiring an intrastate "shipper of radioactive materials to conform to the DOT 

requirements for packaging, labeling, and marking. 

DOT, under the De-drtment of Transportation Act of 1966, the Transportation of Explosives 

Act, the Dangerous Cargo Act,'the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and the Transportation Safety 

Act of 1974, has regulatory responsibility for safety in transportation. The organizational 

unit of DOT concerned specifically with safety in the transport of radioactive and other hazard

ous materials is the Office of Hazardous Materials Operations within the Materials Transporta

tion Bureau. 

The DOT regulations governing carriage of radioactive mate'rials' by rail 'and by common, 

contract, or private carriers by public highway (e.g.', truck) -are found in 49 CFR 171-179, 

which make up Subchapter'C, "Hazardous Materials Regulations." The DOT regulations regarding 

packaging of radioactive-materials are found'in 49 CFR 173, "Shippers -- General Requirements 

for Shipments and Packagings," and' 178, "Shipping Container S~ecifications"'; they are con

sistent with the NRC guidelines in 10 CFR 71. The DOT regulations governing the carriage of 

radioactive materials by air are in 49 CFR 175,-"Carriage by Aircraft."- The DOT regulations in 

49 CFR 176, "Carriage •by Vessel," .apply to the carriage of radioactive and other hazardous 

materials by barge or shlp.-' :.'s' . :. 

Certain "limited"-quantities-of radioactive-material, may be~shipped through the mail.,-The_ 

regulations of the U.S. Postal Service, found in 39 CFR 123-125, pertain to such shipments. 

The criteria used to determine how much radioactive material can qualify as "limited",are 

discussed later in this chapter.. . , ,.,- .: .- , ,. '1

-In order-to -carry out'their respective tregulatory funrtions ,for the safe transport of 

radioactive materials with as little duplicationofeffortas possible, the Interstate Coanerce

Commisslon"(ICC)'and-the AEC (now the NRC) signed a "'memorandum of understanding" An 1966. It 

has been superseded by a revised memorandum of understanding ,between DOT and AEC -signed- on 

March 22, 1973. 

According to, thememorandum, -the DOT regulations,(49 CFR 171-179)* concerning packaging,. 

marking, and labeling apply to shippers, and the-regulations concerning vehicle placarding, 

loading, storage, monitoring, and accident reporting apply to carriers. All packagings for 

shipment of fissile material or forType B orjlarge quantities of radioactive material ,requlre 

.approval -by'the NRC. .,In case of a transportation accident, incident, .or suspected -leakage from 

a package of radioactive material discovered while in.transit. the DOT investigates the occur-.. 

rence and prepares an investigation report. If, however, an accident or incident occurs, or 

As of April 15, 1976, the DOT Regulations for Transport'of Hazardous Materials, 'formerly 

located in-49 CFR 170-189, 14 CFR 103 (air shipments), and 46-CFR,146 (water shipments) 

,were consolidated into 49 CFR. - - -, -. - , .. --

2-3
suspected leakage is'discovered other than during~transit, the occurrence is~investigated by 

the NRC. The DOT is recognized as, the "national competent authority" with respect to the 

administrative requirements" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the safe 

transport of radioactive materials. The two agencies (NRC and DOT) have agreed to cooperate 

via exchange of information in the development and enforcement of the regulations. 

2.3 REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CONTAINMENT 

The regulations to be discussed in this section provide standards.for packaging and define 

limits for the package contents. The terms "package" and "packaging" are defined in 10 CFR 

71.4, "Definitions," as follows: 

(k) "Package" means packaging and its radioactfve 

contents; 

"Packaging" means S(1) one or. more receptacles and 

wrappers and their contents, excluding fissile material' 

and other radioactive material, but including absorbent, 

material;- spacing structures, thermal insulation, 

radiation shielding, devices for cooling and for absorb

ing mechanical shock, external fittings, neutron modera

tors, nonfissible neutron absorbers, and other supple

mentary equipment. 

In defining the packaging' standards and the package content limits,-the consequences of,, 

loss of containment must be' considered."- In' the event that some of the radioactive contents 

escape from the package, a potential hazard to transport workers and to. the general public, 

exists resulting from the external radiation emitted from the exposed radionuclide and from the 

often more serious problem'of intake into the body, particularly through inhalation. 

Since the radiotoxicity of radlonuclides varies over eight orders of magnitude (Ref. 2-1), 

a realistic set of standards should take into account which isotope is being transported. For, 

this reason each radioisotope is classified, for transport purposes, into one of seven transport 

groups, labeled by Roman'numerals I through VII according to their relative toxicity and poten

tial hazard: iA list of the-radionuclides'andtheir'respective transport groups may be found in 

Appendix C, "Tran~spor Grouping of Radionuclides,": to -10 CFR 71 (shownin Appendix B to this,-. 

environmental statement) and ir49 CFR,173-390,' "Transport Groups of Radionuclides." 

Another approach is used in the 1973 revised regulations of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, in which eachý'radionucilde "Is 'assigned a value accordlng to its individual radlotoxicity. 

In this approach the transport groups become unnecessary.t- , . ,. .. ' 

"Rad~tisotop'e 'antities• in each' transport group are classified-in order of increasing,, 

quantity, as "limited,"o"Type A," 'Type B," and "large"' quantity.- The reason for this classifi

cation'will become apparent -inthe next'section." The'limits for these quantity groupings are 

shown in Table'2-1. ' ~ '* ~. J 

Certain physical forms of a radioactive material of any of the seven transport groups are

classified as "special form"- and are subjectto the'quantity limts'shown in the line in Table 

2-1 entitled "Special Form." A special-form material is essentially nondispersibleýin water,

2-4
TABLE 2-1 

QUANTITY LIMITS FOR THE SEVEN TRANSPORT GROUPS AND SPECIAL FORM 

'Limited' Type A Type B Large 

Transport Quantity* Quantity*" , Quantity** Quantity* 

Group Cur es (Curies) ) (Curies)

- 'I (, :10 10-5 to 10-J 10-3 to 20 >20 

II 0lo 0- to- 5 x 10- 2 5 x 10-2 to 20 >20 

"" -'Sb0 3 10-3 to 3 3 to 200 >200 

IV 10, -3 10-3 to 20 20 to 200 >200 

-'V ' lO-" .- "0-3 t6 20 - 20 to 5 x 103 >5 x 10 

V ~ .~ 2 -'31't 4 -: i 10-3 to10 03 to 5 x 10 >5x10 

.VII S25 n 25 5to 103 03 to 5 x 10 4 k 10 

special Form -30 16-3 to 20 20 to 5 x 10 3 >5 x 10 

*49 CPR 173.391. 

%10 CFR 71,4,and 49 CFR 173.389.' 

Note: ',The regulations actually prescribe only, the upper limits for Limited, 

* Type Aj and Type B quantities. The symbol S means "less than or equal 

to," and',> means "greater than."

4 

3.

55 

55

v 

tn

%

. I
in a fire, or under severe impact conditions. The complete definition is found in 10 CFR 

71.4(o) (Appendix B to this document) and in 49 CFR 173.389, "Radioactive Materials: Defini

tions." The usefulness of the special-form concept is that more radioactive material may be 

shipped in a Type A package (one that does not resist severe accidents) because of the greatly 

reduced dispersibility of special-form material. 

Any radioactive material that does not qualify as a special-form material is considered 

"normal form" and is categorized according to Its transport group. While a special-form material 

could, in the event of a severe accident, present an external radiation exposure hazard, it is 

apparent from its definition that the chance of any significant amount of the contents being 

released into the air, groundwater, etc., and being, ingested by a human is extremely remote. 

Examples of special-form materials are sealed radiography and teletherapy sources and, in some 

cases, unirradiated reactor fuel rods. 

2.3.1 TYPE A PACKAGE 

To be qualified for transport, any packaging used to contain radioactive material must 

meet the general requirements of 49-CFR 173.393, "General Packaging and Shipment Requirements" 

(Appendix 8 to this document). These requirements state, among other things, that the packaging 

must be adequate to prevent loss of dispersal of the radioactive contents and maintain the 

radiation shielding properties for the normal conditions encountered during transport. Tests 

to simulate normal transport conditions are outlined in 49 CFR 173.398(b), "Standards for Type 

A Packaging," and in Appendix A, "Normal Conditions of Transport," to 10 CFR 71 (see Appendix B 

to this document). 

The seven transport'groupings and the Type A quantity limits have their origin in the IAEA 

regulations. The Type A limits were determined in the following way (Ref. 2-2): It was recog

nized that the chance of a rail accident of such severity as to cause loss of the package 

contents was very small.' Exlperimental work had indicated that a release of 0.1 percent of the 

package contents would bea reasonable assumption for the vast majority of possible accidents. 

Furthermore, on the basis of general handling experience, it was assumed that the actual intake 

of radioactive material into'the body by, a person coming 'into contact with air or surfaces 

contaminated by such a release was unlikely toexceed 0.1 percent of the amount released from 

the package. Thus, itwould-be unlikely that any one person would ingest more than one

millionth of the actual package contents in the event of an accidental release. Therefore, the 

Type A package limits were established on the basis that neither: 

1. An intake of 106 of the maximam aowediJ *package contents would result in a radiation 

dose to any organ in the body exceeding internationally accepted limits, assuming a 50-year 

life expectancy after the intake; nor 

2. The external radiation from the unshielded contents'would exceed 1 rem/hour at 10 

feet (3 meters). 

In 49 CFR 178 there are descriptions of various DOT-approved containers for Type A pack

aging, including carboys, fiberboard boxes, steel drums, etc., that may be used without specific

2-6
,egulatory approval. However, in a recent ruiemaKing (Ref. 2-3) DOT eliminated the various 

"hardwam-oriented" specifications for the Type A package containers listed in 49 CFR 173.394, 

"Radioactive Material in Special Form," and 49 CFR 173.395, "Radioactive Material in Normal 

Form," and ruled that each Type A package presented for shipment must be certified according to 

the Type A "Specificatioo 7A" design with a supporting safety analysis. The requirements for 

this design are specified in 49 CFR 178.350, "Specification 7A; Genera.l Packaging, Type A." 

The use of existing Specification B5 (as described in the former 49 CFR 178.250) containers is 

also authorized for Type A shipments, but the construction of additional Specification 55 

containers after March 31, 1975, has been prohibited. Foreign-made packagings, properly labeled 

as "Type A," are also acceptable by DOT for use in domestic transport (see 49 CFR 173.394(a)(4) 

and 173.395(a)(4)). 

2.3.2 TYPE B AND LARGE QUANTITY PACKAGING 

Quantities of radioactive material greater than the Type A limits can be transported only 

in Type B packaging. A Type B packaging is designed to more stringent standards and hence is 

considerably more .accideit resistant than a Type A packaging. In addition to meeting the stand

ards for a Type A package, a Type B package must also be able to~survive certain hypothetical 

accident conditions with essentially no loss of containment and limited loss of shielding capa

bility. The NRC packaging standards are given in Subpart C, "Package'Standards," of 10 CFR 71, 

and the tests to simulate accident conditions are found in Appendix B, "Hypothetical Accident 

Conditions," to 10 CFR 71. A Type B packaging design requires the approval of the NRC before it 

can be used for hhipping radioactive material. . ' 

The Typ'e B quantity-limitsire somewhat artificial in -that-the tegulatlons permit ship

ments of quantities greater than these limits as "large quantity" shipments in Type B con

tainers. Like the Type A limits,-Type B limits have their origin In the earlier IAEA regula

tions. In the 19i3 revision of the IAEA regulations, tihe upper Type B limits were'discontinued. 

The types of packaging acceptable to DOT for Type B quantitiei, listed in '49 CFR 173.394 

and 49 CFR 173.395, are "summarized in Table 2-2, whlch-includes the recent HM-111 rule changes 

(Ref. 2-3). , r.,-. 

Certain types of sources, particularly Irradiated reactor fuel elements, irradiator and 

teletherapy sources, and most plutonium shipments contain quantities of radioactive materials 

in excess of the Type B limits. Packaging for large sources is subject to the requirements for 

Type B packaging plus additional requirements related primarily to decay heat dissipation (49 

CFR 173.393(e)). The DOT packaging requirements for large quantities of normal-form material 

are stated in the following exerpt from 49 CFR 173.395(c): 

Large quantities of radioactive materials in normal 

form must be packaged as follows: (1) Specification 6M 

(§178.104 of this chapter) metal packaging. Authorized 

only for solid or gaseous radioactive materials which 

will not decompose at temperatures up to 250 0 F. Radio

active thermal decay energy must not exceed 10 watts. 

(2) Any other Type B packaging for large quantities of 

radioactive materials which meets the pertinent require

ments in the regulations of the U.S. Atomic Energy 

Commission (10 CFR 71) and is approved by the U.S.

2-1
TABLE 2-2 

TYPE B PACKAGINGS PERMITTED BY DOT

FOR TRANSPORT BY 49 CFR 173.394 AND 49 CFR 173.395

Special Form 

1. Spec 55 (300 Ci Max.) 

(49 CFR 178.250) 

2. Spec 6M (49 CFP 178.104) 

3. NRC (AEC) approved per 

10 CPR 71. 

4. Type B packaging meeting 

1967 IAEA regulations for 

which foreign competent 

authority certificate has 

been revalidated by DOT. 

5. Spec 20WC (49 CFR,178.194) 

outer jacket with snug fitting Spec 7A (49 CFR 

178.350) or existing Spec 

55 inner container. 

6. Spec 21WC overpack with 

single inner Spec 2R (49 CFR 

178.34) or existing Spec 55 

inner package securely 

positioned and centered.

Normal Form 

1. Spec 6M (for solid or' 

gas only which does-not 

decompose up to 2500 F). 

2. NPC (AEC) approved per - 1 10 CFR 71. 

3. Type B packaging meeting 

1967 IAEA regulations. for which foreign 

competent authority 

certificate- has been 

revalidated by DOT. 

4. Spec 20WC jacket with 

snug-fitting inner 

Spec 2R-or existing Spec 55 inner package. 

For liquid, 173.393(g) mustalso be met for 

the inner package.

It

JI

2-8
Atomic Energy Commission. (3) Any other Type B pack

aging which meets the pertinent requirements for large 

quantities of radioactive materials in the 1967 regu

lations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and 

for which the foreign competent authority certificate 

has been revalidated by the Department. 

The packaging requirements for large quantities of special-form material are located in 49 

CFR 173.394(c) and are substantially the same as for normal form except that, for special form, 

provision is also made for the use of existing Specification 55 containers with a 20WC overpack; 

that is: 

-Specification 20WC (§178.194 of this subchapter) wooden 

,outer protective jacket, with a single, snug-fitting 

-specification 55 inner packaging., Only use of existing 

-specification 55 container authorized; construction not 

authorized after March 31,'1975. Radioactive thermal 

decay energy must not exceed 100 watts. 

2.3.3 RADIOACTIVE DEVICES AND LIMITED QUANTITIES 

Certain small quantities of radioactive materials are exempt from specification packaging, 

marking, and labeling' requirements and from the general packaging requirements of 49 CFR 

173.393, as are certain manufactured articles, such as clocks and electronic tubes, that contain 

radioactive materials in a nondispersible form. These exemptions are covered in 49 CFR 

173.391, "Limited Quantities of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Devices" (Appendix B to 

this document).. 

The "limited" quantity limits and the maximum allowable radioactivity content for exempt 

manufactured articles -or the-seven transport groupi and for special form are given in Table 

2-3. The limited quantity limits are also given in Table 2-1. These limits were chosen in 

such a way that the release of up to 100 percent of the contents in an accident would still 

represent a very low potential radiological hazard (Ref. 2-2). 

2.3.4 LOW SPECIFIC -ACTIVITY MATERIALS 

To meet the need for bulk transportationi 'of radioactive, ores, slag, or residues from 

processing, the DOT regulations in 49 CFR 173.392, "Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material," 

provide exemptions from°4the requirements of 49 CFR 173.393(a) through (e) and (g) in the case 

of "low specific activity"- (LSA) materials. However, LSA materials must be packed in accord

ance with the requirements of 49-CFR 173.395 and must be marked and labeled as required in 49 

CFR 172.300, "General Marking Requirements," and 172.400, "General Labeling Requirements." LSA 

materials are defined in 10 CFR 71.4(g) (Appendix-B to this'document) and include uranium and 

thorium ores, ore-concentrates, -materials not exceeding the specific activity limits in Table 

2-3, certain contaminated-noniadioactive materials, certain solutions of tritium oxide, unir

radiated natural or depleted uranium, and unirradiated natural thorium. 

In defining the activity limits for LSA materials, the IAEA introduced the concept that, 

from a radiotoxicity point of view, LSA materials should be "inherently safe"; i.e., it is 

inconceivable that, under any circumstances arising in transport, a person could ingest enough

2-9
TABLE 2-3 

LIMITS FOR LIMITED QUANTITIES, LSA MATERIALS, AND MANUFACTURED ARTICLES

Transport 

Group

"Small or 

Limited Quantity 

Limit (mCi)

I . .01 

II V1 

"IV 1 

Vi 1 - VI - 1 

VII 25000 

Special Form

LSA Materials, 

'Limits (mCi/gm) 

..0001 

.005 

0.3 0.3

Maximum Radioactivity 

Content for Manufactured 

Articles (Curies)* 

Per Device Per Package 

.0001 .001 

.001 .05 

.01 3 

.05 3

1 1 

25 

.05

1 

200 

211

49 CPR 173.391 - exempt from specification packaging, marking, and labeling requirements and from the general, packaging requirements of 49 CFR 173.393. 

10 CFR 71.4(g) and 49 CFR 173.392 -'for material in which activity is 

uniformly distributed; exempt from 49 CFR 173.393(a) though (e) and (g), but must'be packed in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 173.395 

and must be marked and labeled as required in 49 CFR 173.401 and 173.402. 

LSA limits are not defined for transport groups V. VI, VII, and special form.

C 

aD

C,

I J
material to give rise to a significant radiation hazard (Ref. 2-2). Thus, for LSA materials, 

it is-the limited activity within each segment of the material itself rather than the packaging 

that permits shipments to meet the basic safety requirements. Nevertheless, both NRC and DOT 

place packaging requirements on shipments of LSA materials that are not transported on 

exclusive-use vehicles. NRC also has packaging requirements for Type B quantities of radio

active material transported on exclusive-use vehicles. 

2.4 RADIATION CONTROL--- THE TRANSPORT INDEX 

The second safety requirement that must be met when transporting radioactive material is 

the provisioh for adequate control of the radiation emitted from the material. This radiation 

is only partially absorbed by the containment and.shielding systems. Some passes through the 

packaging and exposes freight handlers and others who come into close proximity with the package. 

In order to meet the radiation control-limits, the shipper mus-tprovide the necessary shielding 

to reduce the radiation level outside the package to within the allowable limits. The regula

tions prescribe limits that are chosen to protect, not only persons but also animals and film. 

In fact, the radiation control surface dose rate limit of 0.5 mrem/hour for packages reqiring 

no control was chosen to prevent fogging of sensitive x-ray film that might be transported over 

a 24-hour period in close proximity to the package containing the radioactive material (Ref. 

2-2). 

For-purposes of radiation control, packages of radioactive material are placed in one of 

three categories. Packages designated as "Category I,- White" (which display a white label) 

may be transported with no special handling or.,segregatlon.from other packages and must be, 

within the 0.5 mrrem/hour surface dose- rate limit.,.If a transport worker were to handle such 

packages close.to .his body.for 30 minutes per.week,.he would receive an average dose rate of 10 

mrem/year, which isa factor of 10 less than the average.dose rate (100 mrem/year),received'by 

an individual from natural- background radiation -(Ref. .2-2). The •regulations ,(in 49 CFR, 

173.393(c)) also prescribe a minimum package dimension of 10 cm (4 inches) so that a person 

cannot put the package in his. or, her pocket., The 0.5 mrem/hour surface dose rate .,limit also 

applies to "limited" packages, although the minimum package dimension requirement does not. 

Except when carried on exclusive-use vehicles,,where packages are handled only~by~shipper. 

and receiver-, packages designated as,,-"Category, IIYellow"' can have a surface dose rate no 

greater than 200 mrem/hour and a dose rate at 3 feet from any external surface no greater than 

10 mrem/hour (the latter criterion is controlling for larger packages). -This limit was chosen 

to prevent fogging of undeveloped x-ray film during a 24-hour period withar5aieters (15 feet) 

separation, 5 meters being'chosen as the U.S. Railway Express .Company's 1947 conventional 

separation distance between parcels containing'radium and parcels'containingundeveloped x-ray 

film. A package giving out-lO mrem/hour at'l meteriproducesl1.5 mrem in 24 hours at 5 meters 

The 200 mrem/hour surface dose "rate limit wasi chosen on the basis that a transport worker 

carrying such packages held against his or her body~for 30 minutes per day-would not receive a 

dose exceeding 100 mrem per 8-hour working day, which was considered acceptable' in 1947. Based 

on current national radiological exposure guidelines, the 200 mrem/hour surface dose rate limit

2-I1
is acceptable as long as the associated handling time is such that individual doses of handlers

not treated as"'occupationaliy'exposed" are le'ss'than the currently accepted limit of 500 mrem/ 

year (Ref.2-4). 

An intermediate package "category,' "Category II - Yellow," inicludes packages with a surface 

dose rate not exceeding 50 mrem/hour and a dose rate at 3 feet from any external surface not 

exceeding 1.0 mrem/hour. Such packages require special handling but do not present the poten

tial hazard of a Category III package. If a highway or rail vehicle carries a Category III 

package, it must placarded. A summary of the dose rate limits for each package category is 

given in Table 2-4. 

TABLE 2-4 

PACKAGE DOSE RATE LIMITS:" 

MAXIMUM ALLOWED DOSE RATE (MREM/HR)* 

Category Package Surface 3 Feet from Surface (TI)" 

I - White 0.5 

II - Yellow 50 1.0 

III - Yellow 200 10 

A 

49 CFR 173.393(1) 

Since a number of packagei of'radioactive material are often loaded onto a single trans

port vehicle that may'also carry passengers (e.g', a passenger aircraft), a simple system had 

to be devised to 'enabie-transport workers to'determlne'qulckly how' many packages could be 

loaded and how to segregate the packages from passengers and film.- For this"purpose,ý the 

radiation transport'Index- (TI)' was devised." This index was defined as the highest radiation 

dose rate in mremlhour at 3 feet from any accessible external surface'of the package, rounded" 

up to the next highest tenth (see 49 CFR 173.389(i)(l)). For example,'if the highest measured 

dose rate at 1 meter were 2.61'mrem/hour, the'TI foi that package would be' 2.7. From Table 2-4 

it would appear that'no package'with a TIfgreate'r than 10 may be transported. 

However, the regulations (see 49 CFR 173.393(j)) do provide for transport of packages with 

dose rates exceeding those in Table'2-4 in a transport vehicle (excefpt aircraft) that has been 

consigned as exclusive use, provided the following dose limits are not exceeded: 

(I) l00'millirem per hour at 3 feet from the external surface 

of the package (closed transport vehicle only); . 

(2) 200 millirem per hour atany point on.the external surface 

of the car or vehicle (closed transport vehicle only); 

(3) lOmillirem per hour at-any point 2 meters (six feet) from 

the vertical planes projected by the outer lateral surface of the car or vehicle; or if the load is transported in an open transport vehicle, at any point 2 meters (six feet) from the vertical 

planes projected from the outer edges of the vehicle. 

(4) 2 millirem per hour in any normally occupied position,|n the - . 

carror vehicle, except, that this provision does not apply to 

private motor carriers. s no a to

2-12
When more than one package of radioactive material is loaded onto a transport vehicle, a 

total index for the shipment is obtained by.sunming the TIs for each individual package, a 

process requiring only the simple addition of numbers. The total TI for packages loaded onto a 

single transport vehicle may not exceed 50 (see 49 CFR 174.700(b), 49 CFR 175.75(a)(3), and 49 

CFR 177.842(a)). There-are two exceptions to this rule. One is for vehicles (other than 

aircraft) consigned for exclusive use (49 CFR 173.393(j)). The other is for transport by ship; 

in this case a total TI-of 200 is permitted with the packages in single groups each having a 

total TI not greater than 50, and each such group located at least 20 feet (6.1 meters) from any 

other- group (49 CFR 176.700). At least two cargo airlines are presently operating under special 

DOT permit to carry up to 200 TI, but all other aircraft are limited to 50 TI. 

The regulations also provide tables of safe separation distances that must be maintained 

between stowed packages of radioactive material and persons or undeveloped film for various 

types of transport (see 49 CFR 174.700. "Special Handling Requirements for Radioactive Materi

als," for rail freight; 49 CFR 175.700, "Special Requirements for Radioactive Materials," for 

aircraft; 49 CFR 176.700, "General Stowage Requirements," for ships; and 49 CFR 177.842(b) for 

truck and other common, contract, or private carriers by public highway). It will be noticed 

from Table 2-4 that these requirements apply only to Categories II- and III-Yellow packages. 

Category I packages are not assigned a transport index. 

* All packages are expected to retain their shielding effectiveness during normal transport 

conditions. "The external dose rate,,or TI, measured by the shipper and written on,the package 

label must not increase during transport, e.g., as a result of faulty shielding. ,Afterbeing 

subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions. listed in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 71, any 

reduction of shielding caused by damage to a Type B package must not increase the external dose 

rate-to more-than 1000 mrem per hour at 3 feet from the external surface of the package (seeO10 

CFR 71.36(a)(1)). - ., • 

2.5 SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR FISSILE MATERIAL - - 'A ' . 

The .third basic safety requirement for transporting radioactive materials is the pre- . 

vention of nuclear criticality for fissile materials. -These are defined in 10 CFR 71.4(e) as 

U-233, U-235, Pu-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241. 

"-The criticality standards for fissile material packages are.found in 10 CFR-71.33, which 

states, In effect. that a package used to;ship fissile material is to be so designed and con

structed and'the contents so. limited that the package would be subcritical if water were to 

leak into the package or if any liquid contents of the package were to leak out. However, a 

sufficient number of certain types of packages of fissile material,.even though each package is 

subcritical, could conceivably be grouped in such a way, that the assambly becomes crittcal. 

The number of such packages that may be transported together is limited and depends on the 

package design and contents.- - - . 

There are, however, some quantities, forms, or, concentrations of fissile nuclides that 

cannot be made critical underany credibletransport conditions..,These are specified in 10 CFR

2-13
71.9, "Exemption for Fissile Material," and are exempted from the special requirements for. 

fissile material shipments. They include, for example, packages containing natural thorium or 

natural uranium or less than 15-grams of fissile material. 

The regulations prescribe three package classes called'Fissile Class I, II, and III for, 

shipments of fissile materials that do not qualify for exemption as' defined above. Fissile 

Class I packages'are considered safe from nuclear criticality by virtue of the package design 

and contents and may therefore be transported in unlimited numbers and in any arrangement so 

long as the total1radiation'TI limit is not exceeded' Each such packaging must be so designed 

that it is a net absorber of neutrons in both normal and accident environments. The specific 

standards for Fissile Class I packages are given in 10 CFR 71.38. 

If a limited 'number of-packages would be subcritical in any arrangement and in'any foresee

able transport circumstances, they are in Fissile Class II. For purposes of nuclear criticality safety control, a special fissile transport index is assigned to such packages as follows: 

fissile TI = 50/N (2-1) 

where N is the number of similar packages that may be transported together as determined under, 

the limitations of 10 CFR 71.39(a). This transport index caninot be less than 0.1 nor more than' o 

10. Thus, a shipment of N packages would not result in an aggregate fissile transport index 

greater than 50. The actual transport index assigned to any fissile material package is always 

the greater of the fissile 1I or the previously defined radiation TI (see 49 CFR 173.389(i)). 

Aside from the limit on the number of packages per shipment,'Fissile Class II packages (like 

Fissile Class I) require no nuclear criticality safety control by the shipper. 

Fissile Class III includes all packages of nonlimited fissile material that do not comply 

with the requirements of either Class I or Class II packages. Fissile Class III packages are 

those considered to be precluded from criticality under all foreseeable circumstances of trans

port by reason of special precautions or special administrative'or-opeiatiohal controls imposed' 

on the transport of the consignment (Ref. 2-2). Special arrangements between the shipper and 

the carrier are required to provide 6uclear' criticality safety. The specific standards for 

such shipments are' given in 10 CFR 71.40. International shipments of Fissile Class III packages 

require multilateral competent authority approval (Ref. 2-2). 

Because of plutonium's'toxicity, special additional requirements'are imposed on its ship

ments. There is currently'a ban on shipments of plutonium by aircraft (Ref. 2-5). The require-, 

ments of 10 CFR 71..42 apply to plutonium shipments after June 17, 1978, and stipulate that 

plutonium in excess of 20 curies per package must'be shipped.asa, solid and must be packaged in 

a separate inner container.' Exempted from this requirement is solid plutonium in the form of 

reactor fuel elements, ietal,*'and metal'alloy. . 

DOT packaging requirements for the shipment of fissile materials are given in 49 CFR, o 

173.396, "Fissile Radioactive Material." This section specifies certain existing approved 

packagings for fissile materials and-the authorized'contents for each. .Any other packaging 

design that is approved by NRC is accepted by DOT for fissile material shipments (see 49 CFR

2-14
173.396(b)(4) and 49 CFR 173.396(c)(3)). Since fissile material quantities are usually given 

in grams or kilograms, one cannot use Table 2-1 directly to determine which quantity classifi

cation applies to a given amount of a particular fissile isotope. The quantity limits in grams 

for Type A and Type B packages of some of the more important fissile materials are listed in 

Table 2-5. These were calculated from the data in Table 2-1 and the respective specific activ

ities, taking into account the transport group assigned to each isotope. It is apparent from 

the table that a package containing, for example, only 2 grams of Pu-238 would be classified as 

a "large quantity," i.e., greater than the Type B limit, whereas a package containing 100 kg of 

3 percent enriched uranium would be classified as a Type A quantity, because of the amount of 

radioactivity in each case. 

2.6 PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE RECEIVER 

The standards discussed so far have been applicable to the shipper of radioisotopes and 

pertain primarily to packaging of the material in such a way that the transport occurs safely. 

The NRC standards of 10 CFR 20.205, "Procedures for Picking Up, Receiving, and Opening Packages" 

(Appendix B to this document),"outline the-procedures for picking up, receiving, and opening 

the packages and apply to the licensee who is to receive the package. These standards point 

out the responsibility of the receiver to: 

1. Make arrangements with the carrier to receive the package or to receive notification 

of the arrival of the package at the carrier's terminal (in the latter case, the receiver is to 

pick up the package expeditiously from the terminal). 

2. Monitor the external surfaces of thel)-ackage for radioactive contamination caused by 

possible leakageof the radioactive contents and monitor'the radiation'levels on and at. 3 feet 

from the external package surfaces. This monitoring iust be performed no later than three 

hours after receipt of the package if received during'normal working hours, or in any case, 

within eighteen hours. 

3. Notify, by telephone and telegraph, both the final delivering carrier and the appro

priate NRC Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office if the monitoring reveals: 

a. Removable radioactive contamination in excess of 0.01 microcuries per 100 square 

centimeters of package surface; " 

b. Radiation levels on'the external package'surface in excess of 200 millirems per 

hour; or .

c. Radiation levels at 3 feet from an external 'package surface in excess of 10 

millirems per hour. 

4. Establish and maintain procedures for safely opening packages in which licensed 

material is received, and ensure that those procedures are followed, giving due consideration 

to special instructions for the type of package being opened. Exemptions from the requirements 

for monitoring external surfaces for contamination are provided in 10 CFR 20.205(b) for special2-15
TYPE A AND TYPE B

TABLE 2-5 

QUANTITY LIMITS IN GRAMS FOR CERTAIN FISSILE MATERIALS -- '4 

14 

..4, ZI 

4; 

'.4 

4

44 

fl 4-; 

-I 

.4 

4, t 

4. 

444 '4 

* 4.4 

* '4- 4

Transport 

Group 

III 

III 

III 

II 

I 

I 

* I 

* I 

"I 

: I

Maximum Content (grams)* 

Type A Type B 

1.4 x 106 9.5 x 107

9.1 x10 6 _1 

7.8 x 106 

8.7 x 106 

5.3 

5.7 x 10-5 

1.6 x 10-2 

4.3 x 10-3 

8.9 x 10- 6 

.0.26 

3.1 x 10-4 

5.3 x 10-3 

1.9 x 0

6.1 x 

5.2 x

108 

10 8

5.8 x 108. 

2100 

1.1 

ý26 

86 

0.18 

5200 

6.2 

106 

.038

*Greater quantities must be shipped in packages approved for large quantities.

I Specific Activity 

. Element - •(Ci/gmJ]6] 

U-235 2.1 x 10 " 

U-238 (or 

depleted uranium) ' 3.3 x 10

Uranium (average enrich-, , 

ment- 3% U-235) , 3.86 x 10.. ' 

Uranium (natural 

".711% U7235) 3.45x 10- 7 

U-233 9.5 x 10-3 

Pu-238 17.4 

Pu-239 6.1 ' x j0f 2 

Pu-240 - ,' .23 

Pu-241 (+-.daughters) 2 112 

Pu-242 3.9 x 10-, 

Am-241 (+ Np-237) - 3.24 

Am-243 (+ daughters) . .19 

Cf-252 . . 536

.4 

4.. 

4,

4'. ,. 

-4

N I
form materials and gases, Type A packages containing only radioactive material in other than 

liquid form, packages containing only radionuclides with half-lives of less than 30 days and a 

total quantity of no more than 100 millicuries, all packages containing only limited quantities," 

and packages containing no more than 10 millicuries of radioactive material consisting solely 

of tritium, C-14, S-35, or 1-125. 

2.7 LABELING OF.PACKAGES 

Each package containing more~than limited quantities of radioactive material must be 

labeled on two opposite sides with one of three warning labels as described in 49 CFR 172.436, 

"Radioactive White - I Label"; 172.438, "Radioactive Yellow - II Labels"; and 172.440; "Radio

active Yellow - III Label." The labeling requirements are given in 49 CFR'172.403, "Radio

active Material." 

All three labelotypes contain the distinctive trefoil symbol and either one, two, or three 

vertical stripes. The one-striped label has a white background and is'placed on a Category I 

White package. A label with a bright yellow upper half and a white lower half is marked with 

either two or three vertical stripes and indicates a 'significant radiation level outside the 

package. The two-stripe label is placed on a Category II_- Yellow package, and the three-stripe 

label is placed on a Category III - Yeilow package. The radioactive White-- I'label~may notb'be 

used for Fissile Class II packages (49 CFR 172.403(b)(1)). Each Fissile Class III package, 

each package containing a "large quantity" of radioactive material, and certain other types of 

packages must bear a Radioactive - Yellow III label (49CFR 172.403(d)) The label must show 

the isotope contained in the package, the number of curies, and the transport index' (except for 

the White - I label). In addition, each package weighing more than 50 kg (110 pounds) must 

have its gross weight marked on the outside of the package (49 CFR 172.310(a)(1)). Type'A or 

Type B packaging must be plainly marked with the words "Type A" or' "Type B," respectively. 

Packages destined for export shipment must also be marked "USA" (49 CFR 172.310(a)(3)). 

2.8 REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO THE CARRIER - VEHICLE PLACARDING AND-STOWAGE -J 

DOT imposes certain regulations on the carrier for radioactive materials-transport-i.These 

include vehicle placarding, examination of shipper certification papers and packages for proper 

marking and labeling, and proper loading and stowage of thepackages 'aboard the transport 

vehicle. Appropriate placards must be displayed on the front and rear and on each side of rail 

or highway vehicles carrying packages bearing the Radioactive - Yellow - III label. Theregu-. 

lations regarding placarding are given in 49 CFR 172.504, "General Placarding Requirements." 

In addition to placarding his vehicle as required, the'carrier has the responsibility of 

ensuring that the articles offered for transport hive-been certified by the shipper to be 

properly classified, described, packaged, marked,'labeled, and in proper condition for transpor

tation. 

For normal-form materials, the shipping papers must include the transport' group or groups 

of the radionuclides, the'names of the radi onuclldes in. the material; and a desciiptionlof 

their physical and.chemical form. For all radioactive material, the activity of the material2-17
in curies and the ,typeof radioactive label applied must also be listed. In addition, for 

fissile materials, the fissile class must be given with an additional warning statement as 

described in 49 CFR 172.203(d). 

For shipments by aircraft, the operator of the aircraft (e.g., an airline official) must 

inform the pilot-in-command of the name, classification, and location of the radioactive mater

ial on the aircraft per 49 CFR 175.33, "Notification of Pilot-In-Command." In addition,' for 

passenger-carrying aircraft there must be a clear and visible statement accompanying the ship

ment, signed or stamped by the shipper or his agent, stating that the shipment contains radio

active materials intended for use in, or incident to, research, medical diagnosis, or medical' 

treatment (49 CFR 172.204(c)(4)). 

The carrier is also required to make sure that the maximum allowable TI is not exceeded 

and that the packages are not transported or stored in groups having a total TI greater than 

50. He must also ensure that such groups of yellow-labeled packages are separated by the 

required distances from areas continually occupied by persons, from film, and from shipments of 

animals. Further, he, must ensure that a Fissile Class III shipment is not transported on'the 

same vehicle with other fissile material and is segregated by at least 20 feet (6.1 meters) 

from other radioactive material packages in storage. The'pertinent regulations are found in 49 

CFR 174.700(d), 175.7f0, 176.700(d), and 177.842(f). 

There are special requirements for stowage of packages of radioactive material bearing 

Radioactive - Yellow -II or Yellow - III labels aboard vehicles. For a vehicle loaded with 

the maximum allowable radioactive package load of 50 TI, a minimum distance'of 2.1 meters must 

be maintained between the package and a space continuously occupied by people. In practice, 

radioactive packages are usually placed as far to the rear of the aft cargo hold as possible in 

passenger aircraft. 

2.9 REPORTING OF INCIDENTS AND SUSPECTED CONTAMINATION 

If death, injury,,fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected radioactive contamination occurs 

as a direct result of hazardous materials transportation, the'regulations (49 CFR 171.15; 

"Immediate Notice of Certain Hazardous Materials Incidents") require immediate notification to 

DOT and the shipper. The, carrier _must submit dithin 15 days of the date of discovery of' such

an occurrence a "detailed hazardous materials incident report''(49 CFR 171.16, "Oetaled Haz

ardous Materials Incident Reports"). Thevehicles,,buildings, areas, or equipment in which a 

spillage of radioactive materials has occurred may not be used again until the radiation'dose 

rate at any accessible surface is less than 0.5 arem/hour and there is no significant removable 

surface contaminatioý. The carrier can obtain technical assistance in radiation monitoring 

following an incident or accident by calilfng one of the ERDA or NRC Regional Offices for radio:-' .. 

logical assistance. 

The level above, which removable radioactive contamination is considered "significant" 

depends on the contaminating nuclide and is specified in 49 CFR'173.397(a)Y Thfs sectto~nalso 

prescribes a method for' assessing the surface contamination of a'package. For radioactive 

material packages consigned for shipment on exclusive-use vehicles (49 CFR 173.389(o)), the'

2-18
"significant" levels of surface contamination are 10 times as great as for packages transported 

on non-exclusive-use vehicles (49 CFR 173.397(b)). Eiclusive-use transport ýehicles must be' 

surveyed with appropriate radiation detection instruments after each use and may not be returned 

to service until the radiation dose rate at any accessible surface is 0.5 mrem/hour or less and 

there Is no significant removable radioactive surface co6tamination (49 CFR 173.397(c)). 

2.10 REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFEGUARDING OF CERTAIN SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 

Certain strategic quantities and types of'special nuclear materiai (SNM) require-physical 

protection against theft and sabotage both at fixed 'sites and during transit because of their 

potential for use in a nuclear explosive device. The NRC standards for physical protection of 

materials whili in transit are found in 10 CFR 73.30 - 10 CFR 73.36, which make up a subchapter 

entitled,Il"Physical Protectio n of Special Nuclear Material in Transit." They apply to any 

person licensed pursuant to the regulations in 10 CFR 70 who imports; exports, transports,-'-,^,. 

delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or takes delivery of a single shipment 

free-on board (f.o.b.) at the point where it is delivered to a carrier, any one of the fol

lowing: 

1. 5000 grams or more of U-235 contained in uranium enriched in the U-235 isotope to 20 

percent of more, 

2. 2000 grams or more of U-233, 

3. 2000 grams or more of plutonium, or 

4. Any combination of these materials in the amount of 5000 grams'or more computed by 

the formula: 

grams = (grams contained U-235) 

+ 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). 

The standards also apply to air shipments of SNM in quantities exceeding: 

1. _20 grams or 20 curies (whichever is less) of plutonium or U-233 or 

2. 350 grams of U-235 (contained in uranium enriched to'20 percent or more in the U-235 

isotope). 

Quantities and types of SW that require safeguarding-are often referred to as ,"strategic 

special Inuclear material," or "SSNI." A licens~eýis exempt-from these 'requirements for ship

ments of (see 10" CFR 73.6, "Exemptions for Certain" Quantities and Kinds of -Special Nuclear' 

Material"): 

1. "", Urnr ,n. h- to l ta n 

1. U ,ranIum enriched to less than 2_0 per"cent in the U-235 isotope.- ' --

2-19
2. SNM that-ls not readily separable from other radioactive material and that has a 

total external-radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from 

any accessible surface without intervening shielding'(e.g., irradiated fuel), and 

3. SNM in a quantity-not exceeding 350 grams of U-235, U-233, plutonium, or a combination 

thereof, possessed in any analytical research, quality control, metallurgical, or electronic 

laboratory. 

The general requirements for physical protection of SSNM while in transit are found in 10 

CFR 73.30, "General Requirements" (Appendix B to this document), and are concerned with the 

following: 

1. The necessity for the shipper to make prior arrangements with the carrier for physical 

protection of the SSNM, including exchange of hand-to-hand receipts at origin, destination1 and 

transfer points. 

2. The minimizing of transit time and avoidance of areas of natural disaster or civil 

disorder (does not apply to the air shipments described earlier). 

3. The required use of tamper-indicating type seals and locking of containers for speci

fied contents. No container weighing 500 pounds or less can be shipped in open trucks, railroad 

flat cars, or box cars and ships. 

4. The use and qualification of guards. 

5. The outlining of procedures to be followed by thelicensee. 

6. The provision for approval of special procedures not found in the standards. 

Specific standards for safeguarding shipments of SSNM by road are given in 10 CFR 73.31, 

"Shipment by Road." The basic requirements of this paragraph are as follows: 

1. No scheduled intermediate stops are allowed. 

2. Vehicles used to transport SSNM are to be equipped with radlotelephones, and contact 

with the licensee or agent is to be made, in most cases, every two hours. 

3. Two people are to accompany the shipment in the vehicle containing the shipment. In 

addition, either an armed escort consisting of at least two guards in a separate vehicle shall 

accompany the shipment (in this case only one driver is required in the vehicle containiný the 

SS11 for shipments -lasting less than one hour) or a specially designed truck or trailer that 

reduces the vulnerability to diversion shall be used. 

4. The vehicles are to be marked on top with identifying letters, to permit identifi

cation in daylight and clear weather at 1000 feet above ground level, and also on the sides and 

rear of the vehicle.

2-20
Standards for safeguarding shipments of SSNM by air are discussed in 10 CFR 73.32, "Ship

ment by'Air": 

.• 'Shipments bypassenger aircraft* of plutonium or U-233 inquantities exceeding 20 

curies or 20 grams (whichever is less) or 350 grams of U-235 contained in uranium enriched to-. 

20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope must be specifically approved by the NRC. 

2. Transfers are te be minimized.

3. -Export ;shipmentsare to be escorted by an unarmed authorized individual from the last 

terminal inthe United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal. 

The regulations of 10 CFR 73.33, "Shipment by Rail," provide that, for safeguarding ship

ments by rail,- an-escort by two guards is required (guards are, by definition, uniformed and 

armed - see 10 CFR -73.2(c)).- The guards ride either in the shipment car, or in an escort car 

from which they can keep the shipment car under observation. Radiotelephone contact with the 

licensee or his agent is to be made at-specific:intervals. 

The regulations for safeguarding shipments of SSNM by sea, given in 10 CFR 73.34, "Ship

ment-by Sea," provide that: .... " - - ," . 

1. ,'Shipments shall be made on vessels making minimum ports of call andwith no scheduled 

transfers to other ships. -.. 

2. j The shipment is to be placed in a secure compartment that is locked and sealed. 

3. Export shipments shall be escorted by an unarmed authorized individual from the last 

port in the United States until.the shipment is unloaded at a:foreign port. 

4. Ship-to-shore contact is to be made every 24 hours, and the information regarding 

position and -status of the shipment is to be.sent-to the~licensee or.his agentwho arranges for 

the protection of the shipment.,,-, ~ Ic"~ 'I~* " 

The necessary-transfers of-,SSNM during a ,shipuent must be monitored by a ,guard. Thesii', 

monitoring procedures are outlined in 10 CFR 73.35, "Transfer of Special Nuclear Material": 

1. At a scheduled intermediate stop where-the'SSNM is not to be unloaded, the guard is 

to observe the opening of the cargo compartment, maintaining continuous visual surveillance of 

it until the vehicle departs. Then the guard must immediately notify the licensee or his agent 

of the latest status. 

2. At points where SSNM transfers occur, the guard is to keep the shipment under contin

uous visual surveillance, observe the opening of the cargo compartment for an incoming vehicle, 

N Note that 49 CFR 175 prohibits these shipments unless the materials are intended for medical 

or research use, and Public Law 94-79 prohibits NRC approval of shipments by air in uncer

tified packages of any licensed plutonium other than that contained in specified medical 

devices.

2-21
and ensure that the shipment is complete by checking locks and/or seals. Continuous visual 

surveillance is also to be maintained when the shipment is in the terminal or in storage. 

Immediately after a vehicle carrying'SSNM has departed, the guard must notify the licensee or 

his agent of the latest'status. " " 

3. The guard is to report immediately to the carrier and the licensee who arranged for 

the protection of the SSNM any deviations or attempted interference: 

Finally, 10 CFR 73.36, "Miscellaneous Requirements," contains miscellaneous safeguarding 

requirements for licensees who"'sfip,-riceive, export, or import SSNM. The basic features of 

these requirements are as follows: 

1. If a licensee agrees to take delivery of'an f.o.b. shipment of SSNM, the licensee, 

rather than the shipper, arranges for the protection of the shipment while it is in transit. 

2. A licensee who imports SSNtM must ensure that the-shipment is not diverted in transit 

between the first point of arrival in the United States and delivery to the licensee. 

3. The licensee who delivers SSNI. to a carrier for transport must, at the time of departure of the shipment, notify the consignee of the methods of transportation, the names of the 

carriers, and the estimated arrival'time. The licensee must also arrange to be notified by the 

consignee immediately upon arrival of the shipment. 

4. The licensee who' e'ports SSNM must comply with this regulation for transport to the 

first point outside the United States at which the shipment is removed from the vehicle. 

5. A licensee who receives a shipment'of SSNM is to notify the shipper immedlately upon 

arrival of the shipment at its destination. 

6. If 'a shipment of SSNMW is lost ore'unaicounted-for after the' estimated arrival time, 

the licensee who arranged for safeguarding the shipment shall immediately conduct a trace 

investigation and file a report with the NRC as specified in 10 CFR 73.71, "Reports of Unac

counted For Shipments, Suspected Theft, Unlawful Diversion,'or Industrial Sabotage." . 

The application of the above requirements and additional measures required as license 

'conditions (10 CFR 70.32(b)) are discussed'in Chapter 7. •' '' '-.... . 2' 

*I. ~i'

2-22
REFERENCES 

2-1. International Atomic Energy Agency, A Basic Toxicity Classification of Radionuclides, 

Technical Report Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna, 1963. 

2-2. A. Fairbairn, The Development of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radio

active Materials, Atomic Energy Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, IAEA, Vienna, 1973. 

2-3. Docket No. HM-ll, Federal Register, Vol. 39, No. 252, December 31, 1974. 

2-4. International Commission on Radiological Protection, "Recommendations of the Inter

national Commission on Radiological Protection," ICRP Publication 9, Pergammon Press, 

Oxford, 1966. 

2-5. Public Law 94-79 (S.1716).

2-23
CHAPTER 3 

RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS 

3.1 RADIATION 

Radiation is emitted as a result of radioactive nuclides undergoing spontaneous decay. 

During the decay process, these nuclides emit characteristic particles'or electromagnetic-radia

tion and are thereby transformed into either completely different nuclei or more stable forms of, 

the same nuclei. The nuclide that'results from this emission may alsobe radioactive, depending 

on the relative stability achieved by the nucleus via decay (Ref. -3-1).. From a radiological 

health viewpoint, three of the most important types of radiation are charged particles, neutrons, 

and electromagnetic radiation. 

3.1.1 CHARGED PARTICLES 

"Charged'particles such as beta and alpha particles undergo strong Coulomb interactions with 

matter. These 'interactions rapidly diminish the energy of the charged particles and therefore 

limit their travel toshort distances.' An alpha particle with 5 million electron volts (HeV) of 

energy, for example, will travel about 3.1 cm in dry air and 0.004 cm in tissue (Refs. 3-2 and 

3-3). 

3.1.2 NEUTRONS 

Radiation dose from neutrons is a strong function of particle energy. Fast neutrons inter

act with matter primarily through scattering-collisions with nuclei. About one-half the neutrons 

with energies near 1 MeV are absorbed after passage through 9.25 cm of water (Ref. 3-3). 

"Thermal" or low-energy neutrons have a higher probability of absorption by matter. ,They are 

captured by some nuclei in a process that is often accompanied by subsequent radiation or fission. 

3.1.3 ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION 

X-rays and gamma rays lose energy as a result of the photoelectric effect, Compton scatter

ing, and pair production. Since these processes are less probable than the Coulomb'interactions 

characteristic of charged particles, the range of electromagnetic radiation is much greater than 

that of alpha or beta particles of comparable energy. One-MeV gamma radiation will travel about 

7 cm in water before half of the initial incident photons are absorbed (Ref. 3-3): 

3.2 DOSE - -,.

Radiation exposure may be measured In terms of its ionizing effect or in terms of the 

energy absorbed per unit mass of exposed material. Historically, radiation exposure for x- and 

gamma radiation was measured in units of roentgens (the amount of radiation required to produce 

one electrostatic unit (esu) of charge from either part of an ion pair in 1 cm of dry air). It

3-1
can be shown that 1 roentgen is equivalent to energy deposition of 88 ergs in 1 gram of dry air 

(Ref. 3-4). A modern and more useful method for quantifying radiation interaction is in terms 

of the energy absorbed per unit mass. One radiation absorbed dose (rad) unit equals 100 ergs 

per gram of absorbing material. 

Since biological effects of radiation have been found to depend on both the energy depos

ited and the spatial distribution of the deposition, it was found convenient to define the 

relative biological effectiveness (RBE) as 

RBE = Dose of 220-250 keV x-rays for a given effect 

Dose of the radiation in question for the same effect 

where a particular biological effect is considered (Ref. 3-5). In an attempt to devise a unit 

that would provide a better criterion of biological injury when applied to different radiations, 

a biological dose unit, the Rdentgen Equivalent Man (rem), is defined by 

Dose equivalent in rem = RBE x absorbed dose in rad (3-2) 

Since RBE will depend on effect studied, dose, dose rate, physiological condition, and other 

factors, the quality factor (QF) is defined to be the upper limitjfor the most important effect 

due to the radiation in question. The biological effect of 1 rem of radiation will be equiva

lent for all types and energies of radiations; radiation doses in rem are thus additive, inde

pendent of radiation nature. Table 3-1 lists QFs for various types of radiation. 

TABLE 3-1 

QUALITY FACTORS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF RADIATION 

(Refs. 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8) 

Radiation Range of Quality Factor Typical Value 

x-ray, y-ray 1.0 - 1 

Beta particles, '1.0 - 1.7 1 

electrons 

Fast neutrons 5.0 - 11.0 10 

Slow (thermal) 2.0 - 5.0 3 

neutrons 

Alpha particles 1.0 - 20.0 10 

Protons 1.0 - 10.0 10 

Heavy ions, - 20.0 20 

fission fragments . - ,.- 

Radiation from sources external to the body is usually only harmful to humans when in the 

form of neutrons, x-rays, or gamma rays, since alpha and beta particles are typically stopped by 

the skin.* However, any source of radiation incorporated into the body is potentially hazardous. 

The large QF assigned to alpha particles, for example, indicates that they may be especially 

Extremely energetic.beta'radiation can penetrate the outer layers of skin and damage the more 

sensitive inner layers. -

3-2
hazardous internally where they can deposit a large quantity of energy in a small amount of 

potentially more sensitive internal body tissue. 

rhe radiosensitivities of different life forms differ considerably. In general, higher 

life forms are more sensitive to radiation than lower forms, although in some specific cases 

this is not true (Ref. 3-5). Table 3-2 shows the dose response for a range of life forms. 

Throughout this report, the radiological impact to man will be the only one quantitatively 

evaluated. This perspective is taken because of the generally higher sensitivity of man to 

radiation and because the societal impacts of doses to human beings are generally considered to 

be more significant than the impact due to irradiation of lower life forms. 

3.3 BACKGROUND SOURCES OF EXPOSURE'" 

Natural background radiation, originating primarily from cosmic rays and terrestrial gamma 

emitters, constitutes the most significant source of radiation exposure to the general popula

tion. The dose from background sources will vairj;ith altitude, latitude, and differences in 

the radioactive material content of the soil; building materials, etc. The variation in cosmic 

radiation with altitude, for example, is shown in Figure 3-1. At low altitudes, the charged 

particle component (both solar and galactic) is essentially constant with latitude. However, 

depending on the altitude of the recipient, the neutron component varies as much as a factor of 

3 from 41ON to 90ON (Ref. 3-9). Consequently, the individual dose from these sources will vary 

considerably with location. For example, a person in Louisiana or Texas will receive about 

one-half the annual dose received by a person in Colorado or Wyoming (Ref. 3-10). 

Both internal and external exposure to all persons results from the presence of naturally 

occurring.radloactlve material in the soil, -air, water, vegetation, and even the human body. 

The doses received by various organs from these sources can differ widely depending on the type 

of soil, house construction material, diet, etc.- An -average annual individual whole-body equiv

alent dose* of 102 mrem is received from natural background exposure (cosmic rays and internal 

and external terrestrial sources) (Ref.'3-1O)., Since the U.S. population was about 220 x 106 

persons in 1975, the total annual natural background population dose is 22.4 x 106 person-rem. 

Radiation exposure to the public also occurs in medical and dental applications of radiation 

sources. A large component of this dose results from diagnostic use of medical and dental 

x-rays (15.8 person-rem).., A smaller, but increasing, population dose yresults -from the use of 

radiopharmaceuticals (0.2 person-rem). 

Fallout from atmospheric weapon testing by the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., China, and France is 

estimated to result in an average annual individual dose of 4 mrem (Ref. 3-10), contributing 9 x 

105 person-rem in 1975. 

Nuclear power, including fuel reprocessing and power reactor operation, is expected to 

result in an average annual dose of approximately 0.4 mrem to individuals in the general popula

tion in the year 2000 (Ref. 3-11), corresponding to an annual population dose of 9 x 104 person

rem. 

"Whole-body dose is defined in paragraph 20.101(b)(3) of 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protec

tion Against Radiation," as dose to the whole body, gonads, active blood-forming organs, head 

and trunk, or lens of the eye. "3-3 -
TABLE 3-2 

APPROXIMATE RADIOSENSITIVITY OF VARIOUS LIFE 

FORMS TO EXTERNAL RADIATION (Ref. 3-5)* -

Life Form Biological Effects Necessary Dose 

Plant Life Growth Impairments, 2,000 - 70,600 R 

Arthropods Death 1,000 - 100,000 R 

Insect Pupae and 

Larvae Death 200 - 2,000 R 

Fish, Amphibia, 

Reptiles Death 1,000 - 2,000 R 

Mammals (general)', :• Death (LD 50/30)* 300 - 800 R 

Hamsters 'Death (LD 50/30)* " 800 R

Mouse Death (LD 50/30)* 600 R-, 

Man Death (LD 50/30)* 300 - 600 R 

*Lethal dose to 50 percent'of the'exposed populaton 'within 30 days.-

* 4. * -' .4 

-: 

3-4
• f • YKu I U~b 

102 = •"'NEUTRONS 

"cc 10 

L:J 

C,, S • PIONSý, 

10-1 k 550 

0 5 10 15 20'- "1'25' 30'" . 

I- ALTITUDE, KM ... ,. 

FIGURE 3-1. VARIATION OF GALACTICRADIATION DOSE RATES WITH ALTITUDE 

. AT GEOMAGNETIC LATITUDE (X) OF 55° (Ref. 3-9). 

*Galactic radiation is primarily energetic alpha particles, protons, and 

some heavy nuclei derived from sources other than the sun. Solar radiation 

consists mainly of protons and heavier nuclei emitted from solar flares 

and also associated with sunspots (Ref. 3-9).

3-5
The occupational dose received by Federal radiation workers, naval nuclear propulsion pro

gram personnel, power reactor employees, nuclear fuel cycle service personnel, etc., accounts 

for an accumulated annual dose of 2 x 105 person-rem, for an average per capita dose of 0.8 mrem 

(Ref. 3-10). --

Additional exposure results from color television sets, commercial air travel, and various 

consumer products using radium or other radioactive materials. The estimated annual individual 

5 

dose from these causes is approximately 2 mrem for an accumulated dose of 4 x 10 person-rem. 

Background radiation doses and the integrated population doses are summarized in Table 3-3. 

3.4 HAZARDS FROM RADIATION 

The effects of radiation upon the body are a manifestation-of the localized deposition of 

electromagnetic or kinetic energy in the atoms along the path traveled by the radiation. The 

ionizations and excitations caused by this deposition can directly orlindirectly alter both the 

chemical composition and the chemical equilibrium within the cells along the path (Ref. 3-5). 

The effects of the radiation may be undetectable, or they may manifest themselves as acute 

physiological changes, carcinogenesis, or genetic effects, depending on the amount and type of 

incident radiation, the type of cells irradiated, and the time span over which irradiation 

occurs. Each of these effects will be discussed briefly below. 

3.4.1 ACUTE PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES 

Acute physiological changes are normally associated with relatively large absorbed doses 

received over a short period of time. Data on these effects in man are derived largely from 

Japanese atomic bomb casualties, some radiation therapy patients, and a few recipients of high 

acute doses from Industrial accidents In the early daysofý theiýuclear weapon development pro

grams. Table 3-4 summarizes acute whole-body radiation effects in man. 

If the acute irradiation is localized'in aspecific region of the body, the effects can 

vary widely because of variations in cell sensitivity to radiation. The reproductive organs are 

among the more sensitive. Radiation doses to males beginning above 10 rads and extending to 600 

rads produce a decrease In, or absence of, sperm beginning 6 to 7 weeks after exposure and 

continuing for a "few months to -several" years',after whIch'time there is full recovery. The 

extent of sperm count decrease and the rate of recovery are related to the magnitude of the dose 

(Ref. 3-13). On the other hand, organs such as kidneys, lungs, stomach, bladder, and rectum may 

be able to withstand acute doses of several thousand rads before substantial damage occurs 

(Ref. 3-7). "" , , •, - . . 

3.4.2 CARCINOGENESIS ;v. .• ... 

Fatal cancers account for approximately 20 percent of all deaths in the U.S. (Ref. 3-14). 

These cancers are divided into three broad grapps: carcinomas, sarcomas, and leukemias or 

lymphomas. Within these groups, there are 100 ol so distincp varieties of disease based on the

3-6
TABLE 3-3 

ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL WHOLE-BODY DOSES 

IN THE UNITED STATES 

(Refs. 3-10. 3-11, a6d 3-12)

Average Annual Dose* 

(mrem) 

44

Inte Popu 

(10

40 .18

Fallout 4 

Nuclear Power 0. 4***ý 

Medical/Dental 

Diagnostic x-rays 721 

Radi opharmaceuti cal s 1 

Occupational 0.8 

Miscellaneous 2 

Total , 

The numbers shown are average values only. For given segments-of 

siderably greater than these may be experienced. 

Based on U.S. population of 220 x 106. 

Estimate for the year 2000. 

lBased on the abdominal dose.

grated Annual lation Dose" 

6 person-rem) 

9.7 

8.8 

4.0 

0.9 

.09 

15.8 

0.2 

0.2 

0.4 

40 

the population, doses con3-7

Source 

Cosmic rays 

Terrestrial Radiation 

External 

Internal
TABLE 3-4 

DOSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS-IN MAN FOR

ACUTE WHOLE-BODY GAIMA IRRADIATION 

(Refs. 3-7 and 3-13) 

Nature of Effect 

Ninimuti detectable'dose by chromosome 

analysis or other specialized tests. 

Minimum acute dose readily detectable 

in a specific individual. 

Minimum acute dose likely to produce 

vomiting in about 10 percent of people 

so exposed. 

Acute dose likely to produce transient 

disability and obvious blood changes in 

a majority of people exposed. 

Median lethal dose for single short 

exposure with no medical treatment 

(Ref. 3-13). 

Median lethal dose for single short 

exposure with supportive medical treat

ment (barrier nursing, antibiotics, 

transfusions) (Ref. 3-13). 

Median lethal dose for single short 

exposure with heroic medical treatment 

(bone marrow transplants, etc.) (Ref. 3-13).

3-8

Dose (rads) 

5-25 

50-75 

75-125 

150-200 

"340 

"-510 

"-1050
original site of the malignancy. The specific fatality and man-year losses in the United States 

due to the principal types of cancer are shown in Table 3-5. 

There are many theories of carcinogenesis, but most researchers acknowledge that a statis

tical correlation can be established between certain environmental factors and cancer induction. 

Examples of these correlations include the correlation of smoking to lung cancer and that of 

radiation dose to leukemia among atomic bomb survivors. The correlation between exposure to 

radiation and cancer induction has been qualitatively established for animal exposures and is 

widely accepted for human exposures (Ref. 3-15), although the physiological mechanisms involved 

are not well understood. Statistical analysis, of 1arbe'numbers'of exposed persons such as 

Japanese atomic bomb survivors, uranium miners, fluorspar miners, radium dial painters (Ref. 3-11) 

permits rough predictions of latent cancer fatalities per million person-rem of population dose. 

These values, modified to account for the distribution of ages within the general population 

(Ref. 3-13), are used in the health-effects model for this assessment (discussed in Section 3.7 

of this chapter).. 

3.4.3 GENETIC EFFECTS 

The genetic material (DNA) is organized into linear sequences (chromosomes) of large numbers 

of protein groupings i(genes). Changing the chemical"nature or location of one or-more of the 

protein molecules within a gene will change the genetic information carried by the chromosome 

and, hence, the genetic information used to "construct" cells in any offspring. Changes that 

result from such modifications of the genetic coding are *called gene mutation '1n extreme 

cases where there are-gross-changes in the number or overall composition of entire chromosomes, 

the mutations are called chromosomal aberrations (Ref. 3-13)., 

Whatever their origin, mutations are frequently'detrimental, and every individual appears 

to carry a "load" of defective genes which collectively itends to reduce his overall fitness to 

some degree (Ref. 3-7).; During the evolutionary past. an equilibrium between mutation. rates and 

natural selection against detrimental genes~and in favor of favorable genes has been established 

for each-species (Ref. 3-7). Concern has arisen because.of the laboratory work that has shown 

radiation to be mutagenic in lower life forms such as Drosophila (fruit flies) and various 

species of mice. These data have been extrapolated to dose-effect relationships (Refs. 3-3, 

3-7, and 3-11) in man, although this extrapolation is a tenuous and possibly inaccurate procedure. 

There is positive evidence of induction of chromosomal aberrations by radiation in human lympho

cytes. However, several detailed investigations of children of Japanese atomic bomb survivors 

have not shown significant increase in mutation incidence (Ref. 3-17). 

3.5 RADIATION STANDARDS 

As a result of early injuries and deaths from exposure to various sources of radiation, 

international efforts were organized during the early 1920's to establish standards for radiation 

protection. In 1928, the International Committee (now Commission) on Radiation Protection 

(ICRP) was created. In the United States, the Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection, 

later to become the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), was organ

ized in 1929. More recently the Federal Government entered the field of radiation protection 

3-9
TABLE 3-5 

EFFECTS OF CANCERS IN THE UNITED STATES 

(Refs. 3-14 and 3-16)

Type of Cancer Annual Deaths (C)

Annual Man-years of 

working life lost' '4(%)-&

lung 

large intestine 

breast,-' 

pancreas 

Sprostate 

stomach, 

leukemia 

brain,, .. 

iymphoma -' 

other cancers 

TO.TAL -

*- - ;-* - 'I 

- a'-''

65,000 19 287,000 

- 46,000 .14 141,000 

30,000 9': , -,":,. 208,000 

"18,000 5'' "' unknown 

17,000 5 unknown 

16,000 unknown. 

14,000 4 . .. - 1 76,000 

6,000 2 117,000 

11,000 3 .114,000 ,- . 

113,000 34"'' 1` 70f,000 

336,000z " 100 " " 1,74'4.-.n 0 -n -

16 

8 

12.-

"10 

7 

7.7, 

100 "

"-- .- ;- , ',. 

3-10
through the Federal Radiation Council (FRC), whose functions were transferred to the Environmen

tal Protect.ion Agency (EPA) in 1970. The dose limits proposed by NCRP, recommended as guidance 

for Federal agencies by FRC, and adopted for that purpose by the President of the United States 

on May 13. 1960, are tabulated in Table 3-6. It can be noted from this table that the recom

mended population dose limitation, for example, is 0.17 rem average whole-body dose per person 

per year. This value represents exposure from all sources except natural background radiation 

and medical procedures. Ta, addition, the EPA in the Federal Register has proposed standards for 

exposure during normal dranium fuel cycle operations (see 40 FR 23420). 

A maximum permissible concentration (MPC) in-air or water may often be stated for a given 

radionuclide. This is the maximum concentration in air or drinking water to which a person 

might be chronically exposed internally without exceeding the recommended dose limitations to a 

specified critical organ. It should be noted that the levels in Table 3-6 -were-suggested as 

upper limits, with the understanding that radiation exposure is to be kept as low as is reason

ably achievable.--The recommended limiting levels (given in 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 FR 23420) are 

substantially below the level where harmful effects have been observed in humans. 

3.6 COST-BENEFIT 

There is a certain amountof statistical risk involved with any level of exposure to radia

tion. In line with other activities and'needs of society, one must compare the benefits gained 

from the use of radioactive substances with the possible risks entailed. For example, people 

continue to use medical x-raysý'and radiopharmaceuticals that may help -discover a developing 

tumor in spite of the potential for other cell damage produced by the radiation (Ref. 3-18). 

Similarly, few.people are'likely to-'change their location to reduce background dose; although 

this background can differ between certain states by as muchas 100 orem per year. In short, 

benefits outweighing'the pr'ospective costs rare usually expected fr6m certain uses of radioactive 

substances, just as from many other hazardous materials. In Table 3-7, the risk of fatal cancer 

or life-span shortening from radiation is compared to estimates of other risks commonly accepted 

in our society. 

3.7 HEALTH-EFFECTS MODEL - . 

The health-effects model used in this assessment is based on the more detailed model devel

oped in Appendix VI to WASH-1400 (Ref. -3-13), although the complete methodology was not used. 

The simplifications discussed below were used to make the more detailed reactor accident analysis 

applicable to the transportation situation. 

Potential dosage sources were first subdivided into external penetrating radiation sources 

(principally from normal transport as discussed in Chapter 4) and Internal radiation sources 

(principally from inhalation following accidents as discussed in Chapter 5). 

External penetrating radiation presents a whole-body exposure problem from photons and 

neutrons with each organ receiving similar dosages. Internal dose effects are dependent on the 

biological pathway taken by the specific radionuclide' in the body. In order to specify this 

pathway, the chemical nature of the material, in particular whether It is soluble or Insoluble, 

3-11
TABLE 3-6 

NCRP DOSE-LIMITING RECOMMENDATiONS 

(Ref. 3-7)

Combined Whole-Body 

Occupational Exposure 

Prospective annual limit 

Retrospective annual limit 

Long-term accumulation to 

age N years 

Skin 

Forearms' 

Other organs, tissues,-and 

organsystems,, 

Pregnant women (with'res;

pect. to fetus) 

Dose Limits foi the Public or 

Occasionally Exposed Individuals 

Populatio'n Dose Limits' 

Genetic 

Somatic 

Emergency Dose Limits - Life 

Saving 

individual (older than 

45 yrs., if:possible) 

Hands and forearms5 rem in any one year 

(3/quarter) 

10-15 rem in any one year 

(N-18) x 5 rem 

15 rem in any one year 

30 rem in any oneyear 

(10/quarter) 

15-rem'in.any one year 

(5/quar ter) 

0.5 rem in gestation period 

0.5 rem in any one year 

0.17 rem average/year 

0.17 rem average/year

'.100 rem , 

200 rem, additional 

(300 rem, total)

-~ 'I

Emergency Dose Limits - Less 

"Urgent -'-" -; 

I Iendividuals ' 

Hands and forearms

- 25 rem ~2'~~ ' 

100o rem, total '" t- 4.

-- 9

tr ~ ~ -- :~-

3-12

-. - 2C2. 
TABLE 3-7 

COST IN DAYS OF LIFE ASSOCIATED WITH 

VARIOUS ACTIVITIES (Ref. 3-19) 

Activity Cost in Days of Life 

Living in city (rather than in 1800 

country) 

Remaining unmarried 1800 

Smoking 1 pack of cigarettes- . 3000 

per day 

Being 4.5 kg overweight 500 

Using automobiles 240 

170 mrem/year of radiation dose 10 

Transportation of radioactive 0.030 

material* . 

Calculation based on an average of 0.5 mrem per year to an average exposed individual (see 

Chapter 4). 

must be specified. Additionally, for insoluble materials, the mechanism by which the material 

enters the body (i.e., ingestion or inhalation) must be specified. Ingestion is considered a 

pathway only for long-term low-level activity present in the diet (Ref. 3-13). An examination 

of the materials in the transportation analysis eliminates this pathway because the types and 

amounts of materials involved in accidents preclude significant food-chain buildup. Inhalation 

is therefore left as the only significant internal dose mechanism. Solubility or insolubility 

is determined from chemical forms suggested in Reference 3-13. Dosimetric parameters for each 

of the standard shipments evaluated are discussed in Appendix A. 

In order to compare annual risk resulting from exposure during accidents involving various 

materials with annual risk from exposure to external penetrating radiation resulting from normal 

transportation of radioactive materials, a common basis for comparison must be established. For 

the purpose of this assessment, the expected number of additional latent cancer fatalities 

(LCFs) occurring during the lifetime of exposed individuals was chosen.- Values for LCFs 

reflecting the consequences of exposure to various organs are tabulate'd in Table 3-8, which 

assumes a linear dose-effect relationship. .- Also from Table 3-8, the LCF-coefficient of 121.6 

deaths per million person-rem (less thyroid), for whole-Iody'exposures; is used in the model. 

Neither of these values-reflects the possible mitigation-of effect due to low dose rates, as 

reflected in the calculations performed in Reference 3-13. 

In addition to LCFs. the question of early fatalities due to large acute doses must be 

addressed. The two organs of particular interest for early fatalities in this analysis are the 

bone marrow (the fatality probability versus dose curve used is shown in Figure 3-2, curve B) 

and the lungs (the fatality probability versus dose curve is shown in Figure 3-3). The only 

incidences of early bone marrow fatalities (within the constraints of this model) would occur 

from large dosages from external penetrating radiation sources. Isotopes capable of causing 

early lung fatalities would include any inhaled material providing a sufficient dose to the 

lungs such as plutonium dioxide. The LD 50/365 (lethal dose to 50 percent of exposed people 

3-13
TABLE 3-8 

EXPECTED LATENT CANCER FATALITIES PER 106 

PERSON-REM DOSE TO THE POPULATION (Ref. 3-13)

Organ Exposed 

Blood Forming Organs 

-(leukemia)

Expected Deaths** 

6 

per 10 Person-Rem 

28.4

Lung 22.2 

Stomach' 10.2 

Alimentary Canal 3.4 

Pancreas- 3.4 

Breast 25.6 

Bone 6.9 

All Others 21.6 

Whole Body 121.6 

Thyroid*** 13.4 

*Adjusted for.age distribution within the population. 

**BEIR-coefficients (Ref. 3-13) for a 75-year lifetime of potential 

cancer development are used. 

*For assumed average individual doses of greater than 1500 rem.

C * -

3-14

-S 

- -. ..
99.97 

99.9 

99.8

:CD 

cr 

'I

>-

.J 

I

'U

-- ,

5 

A. 

.5 

.2 

05 

.01 tO 200,:400 600; 800-O 10 1200,1400,ý- in>- .. t g: 

-I- 'JJ~ht-KP4JJ~~ 2J.

- - FIGURE 3-2; ESTIMATED DOSE-RESPONSE CURVES FOR MORTALITY WITHIN 60 . - t-',- I, 

DAYS FROM WHOLE-BODY EXPOSURE TO EXTERNAL PENETRATING - - i--: 'r 

RADIATION: WITH MINIMAL TREATMENT (CURVE A). SUPPORTIVE 

,- " .TREATMENT .(CURVE B), 'AND-HEROIC-TREATMENT (CURVE C)s:;,:, 

CURVE'B REPRESENTS'THE MOST LIKELY LEVEL OF 'TREATMENTAVAILABLE FOR MOST ACCIDENT VICTIMS (Ref. 3-13); IT IS 

THEREFORE USED IN THIS ASSESSMENT TO ESTIMATE EARLY 

FATALITIES FROM WHOLE-BODY EXPOSURE TO EXTERNAL 

PENETRATING RADIATION.

- - .- --. I - - V. 

-. - : - :*v 3r'z

3-15
Y•TRIUM-• A 

z 

0.01-- 

"o B 

IL C 

0 

rTERION 

IUM-91 0 

0.10 i r?. to'-4, 

olop W4 

LUNG DOSE (rem) 

A - Yttrium-90 and -91 were' the isotopesised""i obtain this curve. It is equally valid for 

other short-half-life beta- or gamma-emitting isotopes that deliver approximately the same 

dose rate. This curve is used for all short-half-life materials potentially encountered 

In transportation accidents (Source: Ref. 3-13). 

B - This curve is based on data from-Sr-90/Y-90 inhalation by beagles and is used for long-half

I fe, low-linear-energy-transfer radiation (Source: _:Ref. 3-20):" 

C - This curve is based on data from Pu-239.inhalation by beaglesýand is used for long-half life, high-linear-energy-transfer radiation (Sourco: Ref. 3-20);. 

FIGURE 3-3. DOSE-RESPONSE CURVES FOR MORTALITY DUE TO 

ACUTE PULMONARY EFFECTS FROM RADIATION.

3-16
within 365 days) for long-lived alpha emitters is the basis for the curve identified as line C 

plotted on Figure 3-3 (Ref. 3-20). This aspect of the radioactive material shipment hazard is 

addressed in Chapter 5 of this assessment. 

The number of genetic effects is based on the radiation dose received by the gonads. If 

the integrated gonadal dose is known, estimates can bemade of the number of various types of 

genetic effects that might be expected to occur in all subsequent generations as a result of 

that dose. Values for the four types of genetic effectsconsidered are shown on Table 3-9 

(Ref. 3-13). 

For the most part, the radioactive materials transported are relatively short half-life

species. However, there are a few exceptions such as Pu-239 (discussed in Appendix C), Cs-137, 

and Co-60. Because these isotopes have the potential for i long residence time in the body, two 

doses must be considered. The early dose is based on the rem/curie value for a 60-day exposure 

for bone marrow or a 1-year period for lung. This early dose is used to compute early fatal

ities by using probabilities from Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The long-lived dose is based on the 

rem/curie vaiue for a 50-year period. This long-term dose is used to predict LCFs for long 

half-life species.

GENETIC EFFECTS

TABLE 3-9 

COEFFICIENTS PER 

GONADAL DOSE 

(Ref. 3-13)

106 PERSON-REM

Genetic Effect 

Single-gene disorders 

Multifactorial disorders

Expected Genetic Effects 

Per 106 Person-Rem 

42 

84*

Congenital disorders 

Spontaneous abortions 42 

Total Genetic Effects. ., 174.4_ . - - -. 

Upper range of 8.4-84. " - .- -

3-17
REFERENCES 

3-1. I. Kaplan, Nuclear Physics; (2nd edition), Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1963. 

3-2. Friedlander, Kennedy, and Miller, Nuclear and Radiochemistry, New York, London, Sydney: 

John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966. 

3-3. Shapiro, Radiation Protection, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. 

3-4. C. B. Braestrup and H. 0. Wyckoff, Radiation Protection, Thomas Books, 1958. 

3-5. J. F. Fabrikant, Radiobiology, Chicago, IL: Year BookMedical Publishers, Inc., 1972. 

3-6. A. R. Foster and R. L. Wright, Jr., Basic Nuclear Engineering, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 

1969. 

3-7. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), "Basic Radiation Pro

tection Criteria," Report No.- 34, 1971. 

3-8. U. S. Department of Health, Educa,'.n, and Welfare, Public Health Service, "Radiological 

Health Handbook," 1970. 

3-9. A. C. Upton et al., "Radiobiological Aspects of the Supersonic Transport," Health Physics 

Journal, Vol. 12, 1966. 

3-10. M. Etsenbud, Environmental Radioactivity, (2nd edition), New York and London: Academic 

Press, 1973. 

3-11. Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR), National Academy 

of Science, National Research Council, "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low 

Levels of Ionizing Radiation," Washington, DC, November 1972. 

3-12. D. J. Beninson, A. Bouville, B. J. Obrien, J. 0. Sniks, "Dosimetric Implications of the 

Exposure to the Natural Sources of Irradiation," CEA-CONF-3113, International Symposium on 

Areas of High Natural Radioactivity, Pocos de Caldas, Brazil, June 1975. 

3-13. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, October 1975. 

3-14. J. Cairns, "The Cancer Problem," Scientific Ausrican, Vol. 233, No. 5, November 1975, 

p. 64.

3-18

j ,
3-15. W. V. Maynford and R. H. Clark, "Carcinogenesis and Radiation Risk," British Journal of 

RadioloMy, Supplement 12, 1975. 

3-16. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, "Third National 

Cancer Survey: Incidence Data," March 1975. 

3-17. ICRP Publication 18, "The RBE for High LET Radiation with Respect to Mutagenesis," Pergammon 

Press, May 1972. 

3-18. P. C..Johnson, "Benefits and Risks in Nuclear Medicine," American Journal of Public Health, 

Vol. 62, No. 10, October 1972, p. 1568. 

3-19. B. L. Cohen, Nuclear Science and Society, New York: Anchor Press, 1974, p. 67. 

3-20. M. Goldman, "An Estimate of Early Mortality and Morbidity Following Acute Inhalation of 

Plutonium," University of California (Davis), October 1976. Available in NRC Public 

Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee.

3-19
CHAPTER 4 

TRANSPORT IMPACTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS 

4.1 INTRODUCTION 

Normal transport of a radioactive material involves a wide range of events that can have 

environmental consequences. To make the source of these consequences clear, the sequence of 

events in a radioactive material shipment must be considered. First, for most'shipments, the 

material is placed in a package meeting regulatory standards, the radiation,exposure levels are 

noted, the package is labeled with the appropriate information, a shipping bill is prepared, 

and the package is put aside until the transportation process begins. -Once the package begins 

moving toward its destination, it becomes a part of the subject of this assessment. 

As shown schematically in Figure 4-1, the transportation process may take one of several 

paths. The package might be loaded onto a vehicle that will take it directly to its ultimate 

destination. However, most packages undergo a secondary mode of transport, e.g., a truck or 

light duty vehicle, which takes the package to a terminal where it is assigned to a primary 

vehicle along with other parcels. The primary vehicle'takes it to a terminal near its destina

tion where it is again loaded ontola secondary-mode vehicle that takes it to its ultimate 

destination. 

In some other instances packages are picked up by or delivered to a freight forwarder and 

are consolidated with other packages into a single shipment. This shipment may consist of a 

large number 6f packages obtained from a number of different shippers.-- When the shipment 

arrives at its destination, It is separated'into Individual packages that are delivered to the 

consignees. 

When transport occurs without unusual delay, loss of or damage to the package, or an acci

dent involving the transporting vehicle, it is called "normal" transport. Radiological impacts 

occurring during this phase of transport are considered inSections 4.2, 4.3,• and 4.4 of this 

chapter. Cases do occur, although infrequently, in which-the shipment is not timely, the 

package is damaged, or the contents are lost or destroyed without being involved in a vehicular 

accident. These abnormal occurrences are considered in Section 4.6. 

4.2 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY ON MAN 

The principal emphasis of this study,is the direct'impact on man-and hisenvironment from 

the transport of radioactive material. However, there are impacts, on flora ýand fauna and on 

inanimate objects, as well as indi rect- impacts on man that also must be-considered. As con

cluded in Chapter 3, these effects are judged to be very small in comparison to the direct 

radiological impact to man in the normal transport case. Indirect radiological impacts on man 

are negligible by comparison to the direct radiological impacts, since no credible mechanism

4-1
1⁄4

*4

.~S 

.S -

P

S = SECONDARY

FIGURE 4-1. POSSIBLE TRANSPORT PATHS

- S 

4 44 

I - 4.

P = PRIMARY

,",r
exists for an indirect radiological effect, except through the food chain and by activation 

mechanisms. However, the food chain avenue is foreclosed in the normal case by package con

tainment, and radiation outside packages is sufficiently low and of such type that activaticn' 

of structures surrounding man is negligible. Exposures to casually exposed life fores are 

equal to or less than those to man and therefore present no significant impact. In addition, 

packaging and transport regulations are, in part, designed to minimize dosage to animals ship

ped in the same vehicle as radioactive material packages (see Chapter 2). 

The principal radiological impact on objects isto undeveloped photographic film. The 

regulations for spacing between radioactive material packages and film are designed to minimize 

this problem (see Chapter 2).. 

4.3 DIRECT RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ON MAN 

The principal environmental impact during normal transport is direct radiation exposure to 

nearby persons,from the radioactive material in the package. The impact is quantified in terms 

of annual population dose, in person-rem and in terms of the annual latent cancer fatalities 

expected from this population dose. The radiological effects from normal transport result from 

radiation that escapes from the unbreached package. Shielding from buildings, -terrain, or 

vehicles is not considered in this report. However, the maximum distance over which the.average 

population dose is computed is limited as discussed in Appendix D. 

Radiation dose rates decrease rapidly with distance from the package...Thus people who 

handle the package directly (such as loaders, 'dock workers,"and baggage handlers) are° e-xIposeId 

to' the highest dose rates, although these exposures are usually for very short periods of time. 

The dose to handlers in all transport modes is addressed in Section--4.4 of this chapter. - - " 

Those who work in the vicinity of the package (but do not actually handle i't) or who are -.. 

transported with it (e.g., aircraft passengers),are subjected to lower dose rates than handlers 

but generally 'for longer periods of time., Bystanders'and persons Iiving along a travelroute 

generally are subjected to even lower dose rates, but the small doses delivered 'to smo'any' 

people make the total population dose comparable to other group population doses. 

For the purposes of computing the direct radiological, impact in ,the normal tcase, the most 

important characteristic of a'package containing .radioactive material is the transport index , 

(TI), defined in Chapter 2 'as the radiation dose rate In mrem per hour at a distance of, one 

meter from the package surface, The' adlonuclide .and the;characteristics of the packaging are '7 

of little importance In evaluaiting the" 1pact In the' noimal' case.' However; these factors may -' 

govern whether'the material can be- shipped by a given'transport mode and may limit the total 

number of packages on a given veh~cle, " " " I 

The evaluation of the radiological lqppct of normal transport.makes use of the standard, 

shipments model developed in Appendix A. Various tables In that appendix list the package 

type, average TI, per package, primary and secondary transport modes, 'and average distances for

4-3
each standard shipment. The methodology for the normal transport annual population dose calcu

lation is presented in detail in*Appendix 0. This appendix shows thefactors considered in 

each calculation and the specific relationships used to compute the population dose. 

Different transport modes have different characteristics such as mean velocity, location 

of bystanders, and carriage of passengers, all of which'affect population dose. For that 

reason, each primary mode is considered separately when assessing environmental impact. As 

previously mentioned, a secondary transport mode is frequently used to transport the package 

from the shipper to the primary mode terminal and from the end point terminal to the receiver. 

The radiological impacts associated with secondary mode transport are consideredýexplicitly in. 

Section 4.3.2.2. For each primary and secondary mode analyzed, both the accumulated annual 

person-rem and the maximum individual dose received by~persons as a result' of transport by that

mode are evaluated. These results are summarized in the tables at the end of the chapter. 

4.3.1 TRANSPORT BY AIR 

The radiological impacts'of normal transport of radioactive materials by aircraft are the 

direct radiation doses to passengers, attendants, crew, cargo handlers, and persons in the -, 

vicinity of the aircraft while it is stopped. Doses to persons on the ground below the flight 

path are considered negligible because of the large 'separation' distances and high velocities. 

The discussion Iof the environmental impact of transport of radioactive material by air is 

divided into three sections according to the principal -transport mode: ' commercial air pas

senger service, commercial air cargo service, and other air modes (including air taxi and 

corporate aircraft, helicopter, and lighter-than-air craft). 

4.3.1.1 Transport by Passenger Aircraft 

4.3.1.1.1 Passenger Dose 

The materials shipped by passenger aircraft' are included in Appendix A. 'Other shipment.-, 

parameters used in the calculation of p assIenger dose are shown'in Table'4-1. The annual popula

tion dose received by passengers aboard aircraft carrying radioactive material is' computed as 

follows:' , (Annual Total Passenger verage Average Average Number pulation Doe/ = (Aircraft YearCarin YerCryigRt.J Flights RM per Dose Rate (vFlight uration of per Passengers Flight 4-1) )C - )',. \,(,. ,< . /0. 

The average dose rate is given by the average TI.per flight (TI per packa ge x nýmbe'r of packages 

pqr flight) times the TI-dose rate conversion factor K (f passengers, , • 

mrem/hour/T!, Ref. 4-3).. The average flight duration is the average distance per flight'divided 

by the mean speed. This calculation is performed for each standard shipment. The sum' of the 

doses computed for each standardshipment results in a total annual population dose to passen

gers of 2330 person-rem., . ... , -. 

The average annual dose received by an indi0vidual airline passenger depends on the number: 

of flights taken, the fraction of those flights carrying radioactive materi'al (radioactive"" '"

4-4
" TABLE 4-1 

'SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION AND 

INDIVIDUAL DOSE FOR THE PASSENGER AIR SHIPMENT MODE'

Transport Parameters: 

ý-Mean Speed (km/hr) 

Passengers/Flight 

Cabin Attendants/Flight 

'Crew/Flight 

KD/TI' (mrem/hr/TI) (passengers), 

KD/T, (mrem/hr/TI) (cabin attendants) 

Average Flight Duration (hours) 

"Average Distance-from 'Cockpit 

to Radiation Source (W) 

Stop Time (hr) 

Population Density at Stops 

(people/km)2 ) 

Passenger Flights per Year 

Passenger Flights per Year that 

Carry Radioactive Material 

(RTF = 1/30)

682 (Ref. 4-1) 

78 (Ref. 4-2) 

4 

3

= 0.030 

= "0.028 

= 2

(Ref. 4-3) 

(Ref. 4-3)

= 15.2 

*• =720 - : 

= 2.68'x 106 (Ref. 4-2)

= 8.95 x 104

.Total TI shipped/year = 4.33 x 0s. 5- , 

Aveýage'TI per radioactive materiai (RAM)Wflight = 4.8 

.(4.33 x 1O0.TI/8g95 X 104 RAM flights/year)

3,. 

* - 3¶. *, 

¶3 '. 3- -

4-5

I-' -
traffic factor - RTF), the number of TI on the flight, and the duration of those flights. 

According to the Civil Aeronautics Board there were about 210 million revenue passengers en

planed on scheduled domestic and international flights between March 1975 and March 1976. 

Using an average RTF of 1/30, the total number of passengers enplaned on flights carrying 

radioactive material should have been about 7 million. Each passenger makes, on the average, 

about 5 flights per year (Refs. 4-3, 4-4), but it is unlikely that any individual would fly on 

more than one radioactive material.flight per year. Distributing the,2330 person-rem among 7 

million exposed passengers results in an annual average individual dose of 0.34 mrem. The 

cosmic radiation background dose rate to which these same passengers are exposed is 0.23 mrem/ 

per hour at an altitude of 9 km. 

Assuming that 75 percent of the flight time is spent at 9 km, for 5 flights per year and 

an average of 2 hours per flight, the annual average cosmic radiation background dose per 

individual was 1.7 mrem (Refs. 4-5, 4-6). Multiplying this average individual dose by 7 x 106 

passengers results in an annual population dose of 1.2 x 10 person-rem to these passengers 

from cosmic radiation. Thus the average individual dose from radioactive materials on board is 

considerably less' thanithe cosmic-ray background dose received by the same-indivlduals. Pas

sengers who receive a greater radiation dose from the cargo because they travel more than the 

average also receive a proportionally higher cosmic radiation dose. 

It has been pointed out, in another study (Ref. 4-4) that, a select group of individuals 

flying 500 hours per year between airports with RTF's of 1/4 and 1/10' (e.g., Knoxville, 

Tennessee, and St. Louis, Missouri) would each receive, on the average, 108 mrem per year, 

assuming an average dose rate at seat level of 1.3 mrem/per hour (fully loaded conditions). 

These same individuals would receive 86 mrem per year from cosmic radiation (500 hours per year 

x 0.23 mrem per hour x 0.75). 

4.3.1.1.2 Dose to Cabin Attendants 

The dose to cabin attendants was calculated in the same manner as the dose to passengers. 

The average number of attendants per flight was estimated to be four, and the dose conversion 

factor used was 0.028 orem per hour per TI (Ref.,4-3). The.latter factor is an average over 

the cabin length and acknowledges the fact that the attendant moves throughout the cabin during 

the flight. The total population dose to attendants in 1975- was calculated to be 112 

person-rem. Assuming that this dose was delivered to 20,000 attendants [one-half of the total 

attendant population (Ref. 4-4)], the average dose received by each would have been about 6 

urer. 

Experiments in Oklahoma City apd Boston indicate that the maximum dose rate to an attend

ant in the tourist section of an aircraft carrying the maximum allowable load of radioactive 

material is between 0.6 and 0.8 urem per hour (Refs. 4-3, 4-4), while the dose to an attendant 

in the first class section is essentially zero (under current practice, radioactive packages 

are usually carried in the aft cargo hold). If 1000 hours per year of flight time is assumed 

with an RTF of 1/10 (corresponding to an attendant who works only out of airports serving major 

radiopharmaceutical centers) and the average load Is assumed to be 4.8 TI, the tourist class 

attendant may receive up to 13 ores per year (1000 hours per year x 1/10 x 0.028 mrem per hour

4-6
per TI x 4.8 TI). This compares with a dose of 173 mrem per year (1000 hours per year x 0.23 

mrem per hour x 0.75) from cosmic radiation assuming that three quarters of the flying time is 

spent at 9 km altitude. -Multiplying this average individual dose by the 20,000 attendants 

results in an annual population dose to these attendants of 3500 person-rem. 

4.3.1.1.3 Dose to Crew 

Crew members on passenger aircraft are usually located away from radioactive materials 

packages. The common practice of storing packages in the rear baggage'holds results in a 

cockpit dose rate that is very small. The positive'effects of this practice are pointed out byý 

Barker, et aL (Ref. 4-3) based on measurements of rýdiation exposure to flight crews. In most 

cases radiation was undetectable in the cockpit when radioactive materials were stowedin the 

aft baggage compartment some 15 meters away. 

The annual population dose to crew members is computed i'n the'same way as the doses.to 

passengers and attendants just discussed except that, instead of determining the dose rate by 

an empirical TI-Dose rate conversion factor, the dose rate is computed analyticaily-using the 

dose-rate formula given in Appendix D, Equation (D-1). The dose-rate factor'K'is proportional 

to-the TI, as discussed in Section D.1 of Appendix D."Using an average source-to-cockpit

distance of 15 meters together with the assumption of three crew members per flight, an estimate'

of 16 person-rem to the crew is obtained by summing the contributions of all standard shipments. 

Distributed over approximately 30,000 flight crew members, th•is amounts to an annual average 

individual dose of 0.53 mrem. 

In a survey at Boston's Logan Airport• (Refs. 4-3, 4-4), only 2 of 42 flights known to'be 

carrying radioactive material had detectable radiation levels in the cockpit area and in both 

cases the level was~only 0.1 mrem per hour.'A similar-survey in'Chicago"found none of the 100" 

flights surveyed had detectable radiation levels in the cockpit.l Assuming an RTF'of/IO, the 

maximum annual dose received by a ight crew member flying 1000 hiours per year would be 2.5 mrem, 

for an average load of 4.8 TI. These same crew members'would receive about 173 mrem per year... 

from cosmic radiation, assuming that three-quarters of tJeir 1000 hours per year are spent at 

an altitude of 9 kin, for a total annual population dose from cosmic radiation of 5200 person-rem. 

4.3.1.1.4 Dose to BystandersDuring Stops 

During aircraft stops, the population-surrounding the aircraft both wthin and outside the 

terminal building is exposed to radiation from any radioactive cargo carried by the aircraft. 

A general expression for the integrated population dose receIvea d6rin'g shipment"stops'is . 

derived in Section D.2 of Appendix . All stops are assumed to occur In areas with an~average, 

population density of about 720 per km 2 .A -total stop time of fho'urs'assumed for 'each- ' 

shipment. ,The total annual population dose to bystanders during stops, summing over all stand-,' 

ard shipments, is 11 person-rem.

4-7
The maximum annual dose to an individual during aircraft stops is likely to be received by 

a member of the ground crew who is refueling, loading, or unloading the plane. If this indi

vidual spends 10 minutes per flight 4 times an hour at a distance of 3 meters from an average 

cargo, his annual dose is estimated' to be 85 mrem, using the dose rate formula given in 

Appendix D, Equation (D-i•, and assuming the RTF = 1/10, the'average TI = 4.8 (Type A packages), 

a 40-hour work week, and 50 wbrk weeks per year. 

4.3.1.1.5 Summary 

The radiation doses resulting from passenger aircraft transport of radioactive materials 

in 1975 (exclusive of secondary-mode contributions and doses received by' freight handlers) are 

sumarized in Table 4-2. The total annual population dose of 2470 person-rem resulting from" 

radioactive material on board passenger aircraft is considerably less than that received'by the 

same individuals from cosmic radiation. 

4.3.1.2 Transport by All-Cargo Aircraft 

There were 31,400 all-cargo aircraft departures in 1975 (Ref. 4-7). Because'of the rela-' 

tively small number of all-cargof lights and because of the limited number of airports served' 

by all-cargo aircraft, most of the radioactive materials transported by air go by passenger 

aircraft.- . . 

Theprincipal. radiological, impact, from normal transport of radioactive materials by 

all-cargo aircraft is the dose to the crew and to bystanders. Radioactive materials in cargo* 

aircraft are usually stowed as far from the crew compartment as possible. 'A 6-meter distance' 

between crew and radioactive cargo was assumed for this assessment. 

At the time of this report, two cargo carriers were operating under a Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA),waiver, that permitted, carriage of up to 200 TI per aircraft-on specific 

routes and for a specific-time period. .This increase" in the allo'able TI has the potential fo-r" 

increasing the radiation exposure to individual members 'of the'crew, but precautions are re

quired by the FAA to minimize these exposures. 

4.3.1.2.1 Dose to Crew 

Table 4-3 lists the shipment parameters for the air cargo i Bodeused to compute the doses. 

The crew dose was, computed Cin the same way as the dose to passenger aircraft crew using 

Equation (0-1) in Appendix D. An average:of three crew members per flight wias assumed. 'The 

annual dose obtained by, summing over all shipments by all-cargo aircraft is 4.1 person-rem..The 

total crew population exposed to ,this population dose is estimated to be approximately 356 by" 

applyingthe ratio of the cargo to passenger air flights to the total- number of passenger air-,'' 

craft crew. As a result, the average annual individual dose is estimated to 'be 12 mrer.' Thei'. 

average annual individual cosmic ray dose would be similar to that forcrews on passengerI -' 

aircraft (173 orem), for an annual population dose of 60 person-rem. I I "

4-8
TABLE 4-2

ANNUAL 

IN PASSENGER

DOSES FROM TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (RAM) 

AIRCRAFT AND CORRESPONDING COSMIC RADIATION DOSES - 1975

Population 

Subgroup 

Passengers 

Attendants 

Crew 

Ground Crew 

(including 

bystanders) 

TOTALS

Total 

Exposed 

Persons 

7 x 106 

2 x 104 

3 x 104 

(720/km2)

Annual Population Dose 

RAM Q (person - rem) or m 

S smic Radiation 

2330 1.2 x 104 

112 3500 

16 , 5200 

11 hot evaluated 

2470 2.1 x 104

Annual Individual Dose 

(mrem) VARAM Cosmic Rad~aioa ona 

0.34 (avg) 1.7 (avg) 

108 (max) 86 (max)

6 (avg) 13 (max) 

0.53 (avg) 

2.5 (max) 

85 (max)b

173

173 

4 4c

aDose is in addition to an average annual individual dose 

on the ground from natural background exposure. 

bApplies only to the most exposed member of ground'crew. 

cSee Table 3-3.

of 102 mrem received by persons

IN PASSENGER

4• ! 

LO
TABLE 4-3 

SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULA11qN 

DOSE FOR THE AIR CARGO SHIPMENT MODE

Transport Parameters: 

Mean speed (km/hr) 

Crew per flight 

Average distance from cockpit 

to radiation source (m) 

Stop time (hr) 

Population density at stops 

(people/km2 ) 

Estimated total all-cargo flights 

per year 

All-cargo flights per year 

carrying radioactive material 

(RTF = .042 (Ref. 4-8) 

Flight duration (hr)

682 

3 

6 

1 

720 

31,400 (Ref. 4-7) 

1,320 

2•

Total TI shipped/yr = 1.61 x 104 

Average TI per RAM flight = 12

4-10
The maximum annual dose likely to be received by an individual crew member was estimated 

by assuming 1000 hours total flight time, with one-eighth of the time spent on flights carrying 

radioactive material. If each of those flights carried the average (12 TI) amount of radio

active material at a separation distance of 6 meters, the annual individual dose received, 

computed by using the dose-rate formula in Appendix D, Equation (D-1), would be 61 mrem. 

Measurements conducted on typical flights of the two carriers licensed for up to 200 TI 

per flight indicated that the crew received an average of,0.41 mrem per TI carried with an 

average load of 44.7 TI and an average annual dose of 364 mrem (Ref. 4-9). Crew exposure for 

these flights are monitored carefully according to restrictions in the FAA waiver which requires, 

among other things, that a health physicist supervise the handling and stowage of radioactive 

material to ensure that radiation exposures are as low as reasonably achievable. 

4.3.1.2.2 Dose to Bystanders During Stops 

Bystanders are exposed to radioactive material packages during the time required to unload 

or add cargo to the freighter aircraft. Because freight operations usually occur in areas away 

from the main terminals the population density may be lower than that for the passenger air 

2 1 

case; nevertheless, the same population density (720 persons per km ) was assumed. Using the 

same computational technique, the annual dose to bystanders was estimated to be 0.4 person-rem. 

The maximum dose delivered to a ground crew member is estimated using the same values as 

for passenger aircraft, except that the average RTF is 1/24 and-the average TI'is 12. This 

gives a maximum anticipated annual individual dose of 106 mrem. 

4.3.1.2.3 Summary 

The annual population doses resulting from all-cargo aircraft transport of radioactive 

material in 1975 are summarized in Table 4-4. The total annual population dose is about 5 

person-rem. 

4.3.1.3 Transport by Other Air Modes 

4.3.1.3.1 Transport by Other Fixed-Wing Modes 

The assessment of radiological impact from transportof radioactive materials by other 

fixed-wing modes such as corporate aircraft was performed in a way similar to that for 

all-cargo aircraft. An informal survey suggests that some radioactlve materials are trans

ported by this mode, particularly in the'oil-well-logging i.ndustry. The radiological impacts 

are determined in essentially the same way as in the all-cargu mode except that the aircraft 

are usually physically smaller than the typical cargo aircraft and therefore do not permit as 

much spacing between the crew and radioactive packages. 

The total TI transported by other fixed-wing modes is estimated to Oe no more than one 

percent of that transported by all-cargo aircraft, i.e., 160 TI per year maximum. The dose 

rates experienced by the two crew members are estimated using Equation (D-1) in Appendix 0,

4-11
TABLE 4-4 

ANNUAL DOSES FROM TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN 

CARGO AIRCRAFT AND CORRESPONDING COSMIC RADIATION DOSES - 1975

Population 

Subgroup 

Crew

Total Exposed 

Persons 

350

Bystanders/2 

Ground Crew 720/km2 

aee Table 3-3.

Annual Population Dose 

(person-rem) 

RAM Cosmic Radiation

4.1

0.4

61

"not evaluated

Annual Individual Dose (mrero) 

RAM Cosmic Radiation

12 (avg) 61 (max) 

106 (max)

173

N
assuming a separation distance of 3 meters. The estimated total annual population dose from 

this mode is 0.04 person-rem, assuming an average flight time of 1 hour. This dose is neglig

ible by comparison to the values calculated for transport by passenger and all-cargo aircraft. 

4.3.1.3.2 Transport by Helicopters 

Helicopters are not widely used for transporting radioactive material. They are used to 

transfer well-logging sources to off-shore drilling-rigs. The actual extent of such transfers 

is not known, but a thousand 'such transfers'per year-is estimated. For'a two-man crew, a 

1-hour flight time, a separation distance of-3 meters,-and a load of 2 TI, the possible dose is 

about 0.5 person-rem. This result is obtained using Equation (D-1) in Appendix D for the dose 

rate with d = 3 meters and taking Ko typical~of Type-A packages. Apopulation exposure of 0.5 

person-rem is a negligible fraction of the total population dose for air transport. 

4.3.1.3.3 Transport by Lighter-Than-Air Vehicles 

There is no known current use of lighter-than-air vehicles (LTAV) in radioactive material 

transport. But contemplated use for special nuclear material shipmints 'with a flight crew of 

three and a separation distance of 15 meters would result inca 'population dose of 0.04 

person-rem, assuming 1000 such shipments per year of plutonium in Type-B packages, and an 

average of 2 hours per flight. The average dose rate was determined using Equation (D-i) in 

Appendix D, with d = 15 meters. 

4.3.1.3.4 Bystander Doses from Other Air Modes 

The total annual TI transported by air modes other than passenger and cargo aircraft 

considered in thepreceeding calculations is 3140 TI peryear. A total of 16,000 TI per year 

was transported by all-cargo aircraft. Since the doses received by persons while stopped is 

proportional to the total TI, the doses while stopped for all air modes other than passenger 

and all-cargo aircraft should be that for all-cargo aircraft times 3140 TI per 16,000 TI or 

0.08 person-rem. 

Individual doses to ground crew (including bystanders) were computed assuming that a 

single Individual will service a maximum of one-third of the flights per year at a distance of 

1.5 meters for a helicopter or corporate aircraft. The exposure time was estimated to be 10 

minutes per flight for the individual. The results are presented in Table 4-5. 

4.3.1.3.5 Summary 

The integrated and individual doses estimated for shipments by other air modes are summa

rized in Table 4-5. Because Tlight altitudes for these air modes are generally lower than for 

commercial air modes, the cosmic ray dose rate is substantially lower (approximately 0.01 mrem 

per hour at 3 km). Based on the numbers of crewmen listed, the cosmic ray dose rate is esti

mated to be 0.05 person-rem. This was computed by summing the contributions of each 

"other-air" mode, assuming 0.75 of the flight time is spent at an altitude of 3 km using the 

appropriate flight time, numbers of crewmen, and flights per year.

4-13
TABLE 4-5 

DOSE RESULTING FROM RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT BY 

HELICOPTERS AND CORPORATE AIRCRAFT - 1975

Annual Individual 

Dose (mrem)*

5

60 

4 

0.6

Annual Population Dose 

(person-rem) 

5

see all-modes 

dose 

0.04 

see all-modes 

dose 

0.08 o1o

0.62

Flight crew doses are computed assuming 20 one-hour flights per yiar by the same individual. 

2 TI per flight is assumed for helicopter and 1.6 TI per'flight is-assumed for corporate 

aircraft. I I . - .. - 4- o., !, .

4*e... - -

'1 - 4' 

I-..

I- z' if 

4,

* -' -

.5. - - .4 

* 1-.s 

- . * .. r

* V' .;rS.rP 4 -

4-14

Mode 

Helicopter

Corporate 

Aircraft

"Population 

Subgroup 

Flight crew 

Bystanders/ 

Ground crew 

Flight crew 

Bystanders/ 

Ground crew 

Bystanders/ 

Ground crew All Modes 

Shown Above

TOTAL

I
4.3.1.4 Storage Associated with the Air Transport Mode

The radioactive material package may be considered to be in storage between the time it Is 

offered for shipment and the time it is placed aboard an aircraft and again after removal from 

the aircraft but before transfer to a secondary-mode vehicle for delivery to its final desti

nation. Storage areas are typically on or near the airport grounds and are part of the airline 

freight handling facilities. Terminals visited during the course of this~study had a specific 

location set aside for radioactive material packages, but the area was not isolated from the 

general work area. If a storage area occupies approximately 1I,000 m2 (120,000 ft 2 ) and has 10 

employees per shift, the average population density is approximately 900 persons per km2 . In 

the case of aircraft transport, this dose is charged to the secondary mode vehicles and hence 

is dibcussed in Section 4.3.2.2. 

4.3.2 SURFACE TRANSPORT BY MOTOR VEHICLE 

An estimated 1.2 million radioactive material shipments are transported each year by 

truck. In addition, most land and air shipments involve a secondary ground link that is also 

by truck or light duty vehicle. While a number of truck shipments areradiopharmaceuticals, a 

substantial traction of those radioactive materials requiring massive shielding are also ship

ped by truck because of the capability to carry heavy cargo. These latter shipments are rela

tively few in number and are associated with large fuel-cycle shipments, irradiator sources, 

and other large-quantity sources. 

4.3.2.1 Transport in Trucks 

The principal radio-logical impacts from truck transport of radioactive materials are the 

direct radiation dose to handlers, crew, and bystanders. In contrast to the passenger aircraft 

case, there are'no passengers exposed to radiation; however, persons along the transport route 

are exposed during passage of the vehicle. In most cases, exposures are for a 'relatively short 

duration, but the number of persons who can be exposed may become very large during a trip of 

considerable distance. Additional doses result .from stops, for meals, crew rest, _repair, and 

refueling. Because access to the area aroundthei'-vehicle-during stops is not limited as in the 

case of air shipment, the potential for exposurpis higher. The parameters used to evaluate 

the normal dose resulting from truck transport are summarized in Table 4-6. 

4.3.2.1.1 Dose to Truck Crew 

The calculation of the annual :population dose received by truck crew is similar to that 

for the dose to;aircraft crew. The average dose -rate inrýthe cab is computed using Equation 

(D-1) in Appendix D with d = 3 meters and.with K =_Kox TI. 'If the computed dose rate exceeds 

2.0 mrem per hour, it is assumed that shielding is introduced to limit the dose to 2 mrem per 

hour as required by the regulations for exclusive-use vehicles and as a practical limit for all 

shipments. Two crew members per vehicle are assumed. The crew is assumed to be in the cab 

only during periods of actual travel. Thus, the duration of exposure to the crew is appro

ximately the same as the distance traveled divided by the average speed while moving. The 

total annual crew dose summed over all standard shipments is computed to be about 2580 

person-rem. 

4-15
TABLE 4-6 

SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION' 

- ~ ' "-DOSE FOR THE TRUCK TRANSPORT MODE 

High-Population Medium-Population Low-Population, 

.Transport Parameters Areas Areas' Areas 

',Average Speed (km/hr). 2 40 88 

- Fraction of Travel, Distance 0.05 0.05 0.9 

., Population Density (persons/km2) 3,861 719 6 

SDuration of Stops (hr) " 5 2 

- . Traffic Distribution"3 

.. Fraction in Rush Hour 00.08 

. - • Fraction in Non-Rush Hour. 0.92 1 1 

"TruckTraffic Distribution 

Fraction on City Streets' 0.05 0 0 

Fraction on 4 Lane •, 0.10 0 0 

- Fraction , on Freeway 0.85 1 1 

One-Way Traffic Count per Hour' 

(normal traffic)*, :, - 2,800 780 470 

"Total TI shipped.- 3.8 x 106 (3,.36 x 106 in exclusive-use trucks) 

*Based upon a recent traffic survey in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
The maximum individual dose is likely to be received by a crew member transporting irra

diated fuel. Although the maximum allowable radiation dose rate in the cab of an exclusive-use 

truck carrying radioactive material is 2 mrem per hour, experience indicates that dose rates 

are usually less than 0.2 mrem per hour (Ref. 4-10) because of the distance from the cask and 

shielding by intervening material. Dose rates at 2 meters from an irradiated 'fuel cask are at most 

10 mrem per hour, (about 33 mrem per hour at 1 meter) but are more likely to b4 about 25 

mrem/hour at I meterfrom the vehicle surface (Ref. 4-10). Assuming that i crew member spends 

20 hours per trip in the cab and a total of one hour at a distance of 1 meter from the cask, 

his maximum possible dose per trip is 73 mrem (2 mrem per hour i 20 hours + 33 mrem per hour x 

I hour).. If the same crew member made,30 such trips a year, his annual dose would be 2.2 rem. 

In practice, however, a 0.2-mrem-per-hour radiation level in the cab-and a 25-mtrero-per-hour 

level at 1 meter are more likely, and the accumulated dose is about '29 mrem per trip for a 

maximum annual-individual dose of about 870 mrem. 

4.3.2.1.1 Dose to Population Surrounding the Moving Vehicle 

The population dose received while the vehicleI is4 in motion is composed of two principal 

components: that resulting from the exposure of persons in other vehicles occupying the trans

port link (on-link) and that received by persons along the transport link (off-link). 

The off-link population dose calculation is 'disiussed in detail in 'Section 0.1 of 

Appendix D. Equation (D-1) in Appendix D was used to compute this dose' for' each 0standard

shipment involving truck transport, and the results were summed to obtain'thei-total annuai 

off-link-dose. The transport parameters used in .the calculation are listed in Table 4-6. The 

resulting total annual off-link population dose is 348 person-rem. 

The on-link population dose calculation is 'discussed in Appendix D, Section D.5 and Is 

composed of two components: 

1. The dose to'persons traveling in'the direction opposite to the 'shipment and ' 

2. The dose to persons traveling in the same direction as the shipment. ' " ' 

The "opposite direction" dose is obtained using Equation (D-17) of Appendix D;'the "same direc

tion" dose, Equation (D-22). Both calculations are made for each standard shipment using the 

transport parameters listed in Table 4-6, and the result• are s _uoed over all standard shipments.-' 

The resulting total annual on-link population dose is about 172 person-rem. 

The maximum-dose tosan individual haring the transport link with the vehicle would'lrob

ably be,received by a person in a vehicqe following the-shipment from its point of 6rigin't(' 

its destination. If a truck driver followed an irradiated fuel shipment at a distance of 30 

meters during a 20-hour trip once per week, 50 weeks p'er"year,'he would receive 94 mrem per 

year (Equation (0-1), Appendix 0, with d = '30 meters)' 4.• ver'it- is hghly'ulikely t.ha.t 

this particular set of circumstances would occur for'the same driver each week.- A mo6re reason

able assumption might be that a specific driver's annual accumulated time at 30 meters behind''

4-17
irradiated fuel shipments might be equivalent to one 20-hour trip. Under these circumstances, 

that driver would receive an annual dose of 1.9 mrem. 

The maximum dose received by a person living along a transport route would probably be' 

received by an individual living adjacent to a highway where radioactive material was frequently" 

shipped. Using Equation_(D-2). in Appendix D, the annual dose received by a person living 30 

meters from a roadway on which standard irradiated fuel shipments (K 1000 mrem-ft 2 per hour) 

pass 250 times per year at an average speed of 48 km per hour is 0. 009 mrem. 

Neither the off-link nor the on-link calculations explicitly take into account the effects

of shielding outside the packaging that might act to absorb radiation and therefore mitigate 

the population dose. This is likely to be most effective in cities where buildings are con

structed from relatively good radiation absorbers such as concrete and steel and in hilly 

terrain where topographic features may provide shielding. 

4.3.2.1.3 Dose to Population While Vehicle is Stopped 

The computation of the population dose that occurs as a result of' shipment stops is dis

cussed in Section D.2 of Appendix D. Equation (D-10) in Appendix D was used to compute this 

dose for each standard shipment using the stop duration and population density values listed in 

Table 4-6. The assumptions shown in Table 4-6 regarding the lengthierfstops in each of the three opulai6nregardweengalength he of 

three population zones wereimade' fromthe observation that fuel stops and rest areas are more 

often located in suburban areas or in areas that have population densities higher than the 

rural average. When the results are summed over all standard shipments involving truck trans

port, a total annual dose of 1000 person-rem is obtained. Again, the effects of shielding by 

buildings and terrain would probably reduce this value. 

Although vehicles carrying large amounts of radioactive material are placarded, bystanders 

may get close enough to receive a small dose from a shipment. If a bystander spends 3 minutes 

in an area 1 meter from an irradiated fuel cask, he would receive a dose of 1.3 mrem, assuming 

a 25 mrem per hour radiation lever at that distance (Ref. 4-10). Unless the same person "inves

tigated" several such shipments per year, this is expected to be the maximum annual dose 

received by an individual while the shipment is stopped.. 

4.3.2.1.4 Dose Resulting from Intransit Storage 

At the beginning and end of the transport cycle and at intermediate terminals, radioactive 

material packages m~y be stored_ temporarily while awaiting atruck that is proceeding to the 

final destination. The potential therefore exists for irradiation of truck terminal employees 

and surrounding population during these ,periods of temporary storage. - The calculation is 

identical to that for storage involved with air transport, and the same average population 

density (900 persons per klin2 ) 'in the warehouse Is "assumed. fhe "resulting annual population' 

dose for an average intransit storage time of 2 hours per shipment is computed to'be 261" 

person-rem.

4-18
4.3.2.2 Truck, Light Truck, and Delivery Vehicles 

This transport mode includes all secondary transport. All radioactive materials that are 

shipped by air and almost all that are transported by truck, rail, ship, or barge are taken 

from the shipper to the shipping terminal and from the receiving terminal to the receiver by 

trucks, vans, or automobiles. Freight terminals are usually located in or near cities; thus 

the population densities are relatively high, and the speeds are relatively low. 

Using the same calculation procedure as used for the truck mode with the material and 

transport parameters shown in Table 4-7, the following estimates of population dose to the 

indicated groups are predicted: 

1. Annual dose to crew (1 person per shipment) = 53'person-rem. -

2. Annual dose to surrounding population (on-link) = 216 person-rem. 

"dos--to surrounding p opulation (off-link) = 51 person-remn. 

4. Annual dose to surrounding pQpulation (stopped) = 79 person-rem. 

5. Annual dose to surrounding population (intransit storage) = 310 person-rem. 

The annual total population dose from secondary modes is 709 person-rem. 

Assuming that a van driver carries a shipment with the maximum TI carried by-van noted in 

the standard shipments (3.8 TI "mixed" - Type B) once perworking day.(250 working days per 

year) over a distance of 40 km at a speed of 40 km per hour, he would receive 352 mrem per year 

(using the same computational procedure as in other cieirdose calculations,and a separation 

distance of 2 meters). Recent studies by a number of State health agenciesin-cooperation with 

NRC and DOT revealed few instances where these assumptions might'bervalid. A more likely 

scenario would be a courier-service driver who makes a single radiopharmaceutical pickup and 

delivery per week (50 weeks per year). Assuming a total of 3.8 TI (2 Mo-99 generators), the 

driver would receive 70 mrem per year-'(1/5_x352)7- Y '•'-""

The likelihood of the same person following or investigating a van loaded with radioactive 

material in a city on a regular basis is considered remote. Hence, the maximum annual on-link 

and bystanders doses are considered negligible. The annual maximum off-link dose is assumed to 

be the same as that for truck, namely 0.009 trem. 

4.3.2.3 Summary of Truck Transport 

The annual doses resulting from truck and van transportation of r#dioactive material 

(exclusive of freight handler dose) are summarized in Table 4-8; the total is 5070 person-rem.

4-19

I
TABLE 4-7 

SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION 

DOSE FOR THE DELIVERY VEHICLE TRANSPORT MODE 

High-Population Medium-Population 

Areas Areas 

Transport Parameters 

Average Speed (km/hr) 24 40 

Distribution of Travel Distance 0.4 0.6 

Population Density (persons/km2) 3,861 719 

Stop Duration (hr)' 0.5 0 

Traffic Distribution 

Fraction in Non-Rush Hour Tt" .. 0.92 0.92 

Fraction in Rush Hour .0.08 0.08 

Roadway Distribution 0.65 0. 

Fractionon:City Streets . 0.65 0.65' 

Fraction on 2-Lane 0.05, 0.05 

Fraction on 4-Lane 0.05 0.05 

Fraction on Freeway .., 0.25 0.25 

Total TI Shipped - 1.18 x 10 6

A-20
TABLE 4,8 

DOSES RESULTING FROM TRUCK AND VAN TRANSPORT 

OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS - 1975 

(EXCLUSIVE-OF FREIGHTIHANDLERS)* 

Population Annual Population Dose 

Mode Subgroup - (person-rem) I

Truck Crew 

On-link 

• .- . Off-linkWhile stopped 

Storage 

Van Crew 

On-link 

Off-link 

While stopped. 

S-'- Storage 

TOTAL 

See discussion of freight handlers in Si

* .2- -V. 

2'2

Maximum ' - - Annual Individual 

Dose (mrem)

2580 870 

172 

348 ., - 0.( 

1000 

261 .500* 

53 " 70 

216 negl 

51 0.1 

_791 .. ,;,. negl 

* 310 ' -500* 

5070 

ectton 4.4. --. ' i. - -

D09 

igible 

009 

igible

- - ~'71

* *' - .. .L' 

it .'..3 '2,,. '2 

#. - S -n 2(2.' .. 

±..*. 1 * . . I' 'd-... .*2 

'''i' 2 . 

........................ 

C. ..- 22.. 222. . 2 $. 

th.*, .. 22' 4"& .. i S ' .

1 .--.- 2..--..:. 22 . 2 *j **

4-21
4.3.3 RAIL TRANSPORT

The methods used for calculating the impact of transport by rail are similar to those used 

for truck transport because of similarities in route structure and service areas. The major 

differences between truck and train are in the speed of transport (train is generally slower) 

and the proximity of population exposed on the rail link: Although the speed of a freight 

train while moving through the countryside is reasonably fast, the need to enter sidings occa

sionally to allow faster trains to pass and to pick up and drop off cars reduces the mean speed 

considerably. This results in a longer time for exposure of the public to radiation. Where 

passenger trains pass or are passed, a population dose is incurred in a manner analogous to 

that received by other vehicles using the highway in the truck mode. Shipment, parameters used 

to compute population dose for rail transport are shown In Table 4-9. 

4.3.3.1 Transport by Freight Trains 

Because of the length of time required for a shipment and special capability for handling 

massive loads, the principal radioactive materials shipped by rail are those with long 

half-lives or those that require special shielding. An example of a shipment of this sort 

would be a large irradiated fuel cask. The only material shipped by passenger train is a 

negligible amount of "limited" postal shipments. 

4.3.3.1.1 Exposure of Train Crew 

An average freight train is composed of approximately 70 cars. As a result, the proximity 

of the train crew to a cir carrying radioactive material is difficult to quantify except on a 

statistical basis. While the train is in motion, the brakeman or conductor in the caboose may 

he as close as 3 meters or as far as a few thousand meters from a radioactive shipment. If the 

latter condition occurs, a great deal of Intervening cargo acts to shield the crew car. Similar 

arguments can be made for the engine crew so long as there is only one shipment per train. If 

there is only a single cargo car making up the train, the engine crew and caboose crew experi

ence similar dose rates. 

The dose received by the crew is calculated in a manner similar to that for trucks. The 

dose-rate formula (Equation (D-1), Appendix 1) is used with d = 152 meters, and the average 

exposure time is given by the average shipment distance divided by the average speed. A total 

of five crew members is assumed. The computation is performed for each standard shipment 

involving rail transport, and the results are summed to obtain an annual population dose to 

crew members of 0.9 person-rem. 

The maximum annual individual dose to a member of a train crew is estimated for 50 irra

diated fuel shipments per year, an average separation distance of 152 meters, and an average 

crew time of 8 hours. This combination gives a maximum annual dose of 1.2 mrem. 

4.3.3.1.2 Exposure of On-link and Off-link Population 

Those persons exposed on the transport link are passengers on trains or freight train 

crews who pass or who are passed by a train carrying radioactive materials. This calculation

4-22
TABLE 4-9 

SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION DOSE FOR THE RAIL MODE

.4

Transport Parameters 

Average Speed (km/hr) 4

- Distribution of Travel 

Distance. 

Population Density 

(people/km 

Stop Duration (hr) 

- Passenger Trains 

(trains/day),I,

Number of Crew 

(engineer, fireman, 

conductor, and 2

'High-Population Areas 

24 

0.05 

3,861 

0 

5; 

.5

Medium-Population Areas 

40 

0.05 

719 

0

Low-Population 

Areas 

64 , , 

0.9 

6 

24

4'5 

.5

$

"-. brakemen) , ,' 152 

Average Separation 152. 15215 

Distance Between 

:Crewand Radioactive. 

Material' (n) - - :4 

Total TI shipped - 1.8 x 10 

*A TI of 111 is assignedj.tO spent fuel shipments to correspond to the regulatory 

limit of 10:mrem/hr. at a distance of, 6 feet from the surface of the vehicle.

44 4 

4444 

4 4

T,

$-

U 

.4'
is similar to that for truck transport, assuming one freight train per hour and a 10-foot 

mimimum separation between passing trains. Because of the very small number of passenger 

trains and the small number of freight train crew members, the on-link annual dose is only 

0.012 person-rem. The maximum annual individual on-link dose is negligible owing to the small 

number of passing trains. 

Using the data given in Table 4-9, and summing over the population zones, an annual value 

of 23 person-rem to the surrounding off-link population is obtained. The maximum off-link dose 

is similar to that received by a railway station employee who works at a railway'station near a 

spent fuel reprocessing site. If 17 trains per year carrying irradiated fuel pass that station 

at an average distance of 30 meters and an average speed of 8 km per hour, and if that same 

station employee is working when each of them pass, he will receive 0.017 mrem according to 

Equation (0-2) in Appendix D, with K = 1000 mrem-ft 2 per hour. 

4.3.3.1.3 Exposure to Population During Stops 

As indicated earlier, freight trains frequently stop at rail sidings in order to let other 

trains pass or to pick up additional cars. In addition, crew change and fuel stops occur at 

4-to-6-hour intervals throughout the trip. If it is assumed that the train is stopped a total 

of 24 hours per trip and those stops occur predominately in low population density zones, a 

total annual population dose while stopped of 0.9 person-rem is computed using the general 

expression for population dose during shipment stops derived in Section 0.2 of Appendix D for 

each standard shipment and summing the results. 

An example of the maximum dose to an individual while the train is stopped is that received 

by a railroad employee who serviced the train while-it was stopped. If it is postulated that 

the employee works'at a station near an irradiated fuel reprocessing center that handles 100 

iercent of the annual rail shipments and that this employee spends an average of 15 minutes at 

an average distance of 15 meters from each shipment, his annual dose would be 1.65 mrem. This 

value was obtained using the dose-rate formula in Appendix 0, Equation (0-1) with d = 15 meters 

and assuming 17 shipments per year and a K of 1000 Iremr-ft 2 per hour. 

4.3.3.2 Storage Associated with Rail Transport 

Very little storage is likely to be associated with rail transport of radioactive materials. 

A spent fuel shipmentthat occupies a single car might spend 24 hours in rail yards waiting to 

be Included in a' train to take it toward its destination. In such a location, the average 

exposable population density is estimated to be 25 people per l•2,'corresponding to 20 employees, 

in a railyard 1.6 kilometers long and 0.5 kilometer wide. Again,fusing the formula for dose 

while stopped, given in Section 0.2 of Appendix 0, an annual population dose of 0.7 person-rem 

is obtained. 

An example of the maximum individual dose during rail shipment storage is that delivered 

to a railroad employee assigned to service or check the railcars carrying irradiated fuel in 

the yard prior to final coupling to the parent train. If such a person checks 17 such trains 

per year at an average distance of 8 meters, and if such a check takes 1 hour, he would receive

4-24
an annual dose of 25 mrem. This number was obtained by using Equation (D-1) of Appendix D for 

the dose rate and assuming a K value of 1000 mrem-ft 2 per hour for each shipment, as in the 

standard shipment model. 

4.3.3.3 Summary 

The annual doses resulting from rail transport of radioactive material are summarized in 

Table 4-10; the total is 26 person-rem (exclusive of freight handler dosage). 

4.3.4 TRANSPORT BY WATER 

Historically, water transport modes have been used for shipments of material that are 

massive or bulky or that do not require exceptionally fast travel. Shipments of irradiated 

fuel and fresh fuel would therefore qualify for water transport. A considerable number of 

export shipments of enriched uranium and long-half-life isotopes by ship were reported to have 

occurred in 1975 (see Appendix A). 

4.3.4.1 Transport by Barge 

It is anticipated that barge may be a feasible method for transporting fresh fuel'to 

reactors and irradiated fuel to reprocessors located on appropriate waterways. No such ship

ments were reported'in the 1975 shipper survey. However, at least one shipment occurred in 

early 1976. With relatively few people exposed during movement and a few exposed at each 

terminal, population exposure is expected to be negligible. The transport of irradiated fuel 

by barge is considered as an alternative in Chapter 6 of this report. 

4.3.4.2 Transport by Ship 

For the overseas export-import trade in radioactive materials, there are only two transport 

modes available: air and ship. Generally, relatively light-weight packages (less than a few 

tonnes) of short-half-life materials are transported by aircraft. The 1975 survey revealed a 

total of 3747 TI transported by ship, principally enriched uranium, fresh reactor fuel, and 

Kr-85. The total annual population dose from these shipments was calculated to be 8.1 

person-rem using the transport parameters in Table 4-11 and the same computational techniques 

as used for other transport modes. The-esults are summarized in Table 4-12. 

An example of the maximum dose is that received by a crewman whose assigned watch station 

includes the cargo area in which an enriched uranium shipment is stowed. If that person stands 

8 hours of watch every day and makes normal hourly rounds, he probably spends 5 minutes per 

hour at an average distance of 3 meters from the shipment. If his vessel carries a single 

shipment per year and the trip lasts 10 days, his annual dose would be 3.7 mrem. Individual 

exposures of the other population subgroups were not evaluated because the actual numbers of 

people and their yearly exposures were not known.

4-25
TABLE 4-10 

DOSES FROM RAIL TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVF MATERIAL

Population Subgroup

Crew

Annual 

Population Dose, 

(person-rem)

0.9

Maximum 

Annual Individual 

Dose (mrem) 

1.2

Surrounding population

On-link 

Off-link

0.012

23

Bystanders/Railway Workers

Storage

TOTAL

not evaluated 

0.017

0.9 1.65 

25 0.7 

26

C.

.4'-

4-26

- 1975 - 1975
TABLE 4-11 

SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF 

POPULATION DOSE FOR WATERBORNE TRANSPORT MODES 

Ship Barge 

Number of Crewmen 10 5 

Mean Velocity (kr'L' 14 5 

Distance from Source 

to Crew Wm) 61 46 

Fraction of Travel 

High population zones 0.001 0.01 

Medium population zones 0.009 0.09 

Low population zones 0.99 0.90 

Total Stop Time (hr) 

(Medium population zone) 10 10 

Total TI Shipped 3747

4-27
TABLE 4-12

DOSE RESULTING FROM SHIP TRANSPORT 

OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL - 1975

Population 

Subgroup

Annual 

Population Dose 

(person-rem)

Crew

Bystanders/stevedores 

during stops 

Persons in port 

area (off-link) 

Persons in vicinity 

of storage area

TOTAL

5.7

1.1

0.9 

0.4 

8.1

-Maximum 

Annual Individual 

Dose (mrem)

3.7

not evaluated

not evaluated 

not evaluated

4-28
4.4 EXPOSURE OF HANDLERS 

Handlers of radioactive material packages are generally exposed to the highest dose rates 

of any population group; however, because they handle the packages for relatively short times, 

relatively small doses are received. Handling, as defined in this report, occurs whenever a 

package is transferred from one mode to another, irrespective of the number of people and . 

physical movements that take place. A recent study (Ref. 4-11) indicated that the average 

population dose received by handlers at airports was 2.5 x 10"4 person-rem per TI for small 

packages. This population dose conversion factorwas used for each handling considered in this 

report. Thus the dose computed for handlers js likely to be conservative because the number of 

people involved in airport handling is likely to be the largest andthe time spent-in handling 

the most prolonged throughout the shipping industry. . . 

In this document, the handler dose iscomputed by multiplying this average dose conversion 

factor by the average TI per-package, the number of packagesper shipment, the number of ship-. 

ments per year, and an estimated number of handlings per package. This calculation is repeated 

for each standard shipment, and the total handler dose is obtained by summing all standard 

shipments.' The total annual handler dose was calculated tobe 1740 person-rem. 

* , -'• I _ " . , -" 

Irradiated fuel casks and irradiator sources, because of their large sizes, are not handledin the same ways as smaller packages. Two handlers are assumed to spend 15 minutes at both the 

shipping end and the receiving end attaching and detaching rigging equipment for loading and

unloading the cask in an average radiation field of 200 mrem per hour-(1 meter from thecask) 

(Ref.,4-10). This results in a population dose.of O.lperson-1

rem(2 persons x 200.mrem per, 

hour x 1/4 hour) at each end,,for a total of 0.2 person-rem per shipment., Multiplication by, 

the number of-shipments per year gives theannual population dose in person-rem. A total of.54 

person-rem to handlers may result from the handling oflarge casks. -Much of this exposure is 

not expected to be within the transport industry but rather to employees of the shippers and 

consignees. 

Individual doses to handlers have been evaluated for those employed in airport terminals 

(Ref. 4-11).,-Results of those studies -indicate-that.no workers would receive annual doses in 

excess of 500 mrem and most workers who participatedin the survey would have .received annual 

doses smaller than 100 mrem as a result of handling radioactive material shipments. It is 

expected that the individual doses to airport handlers are the largest of any similar group. 

4.5 NONRADIOLOGICAL" IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT _ - - " . - -" -

The two principal nonradiological impacts that may arise from.the normal transport of 

radioactive material are area denial and resource use. 

4.5.1 ,AREA DENIAL-. 

There:is'notsignificant area denialbresulting from normal .transport of radioactive material 

packages., Most-packages are shipped along with other freight,and are stored in the same termi

nals as other freight awaiting shipment. Although radioactive material packages are usually

4-29
isolated in designated areas of freight terminals, it is doubtful that significantly smaller 

total floor areas would be required if there were no transport of radioactive materials. 

Exclusive-use shipments require no storage, since they proceed directly from shipper to 

consignee. 

4.5.2 RESOURCE USE 

The primary resourceuses associated with radioactive material transport include the com

mitment of shielding material for construction of packages anrId the use of energy to move the 

transport vehicles. The shipment of radioactive material requires shielding of individual 

packages to reduce exposuire to people 'and photographic materials during transport. Construc

tion of these packages requires commitment of natural resources in a manner that may or may not; 

permit recycling and reuse. The principal materials used for shielding are lead and depleted 

uranium. quantities committed at any one time to use as shielding in transportation packaging; 

are only a small percentage of-the total amounts of these materials used for all other purposes.

Reuse of lead shielding material by return of used packages to the shipper is accomplished, 

(according to an intervew' with a major radiopharmaceutical shipper) about 50 percent of the 

time. In the remaining cases, the disposition of the material is unknown, but it is assumed 

that a significant recycling effort takes place. This assumption is based largely on the fact 

that the radioactive mterfal packages are received by people who are licensed to possess 

radioactive materials and who appreciate the value of reusing the shielding material either 

directly or by recasting'it Into a'usable form.' In addition,' Industrial- and commercial users 'o, 

often have an active salvage operation for metals of all kinds. Thus,.one might well expect no 

more than 20 percent loss in lead shielding material per year.' A significant fraction of this 

material is sent to refuse disposal areas. The environmental impacts of this loss are the 

energy and resources necessary to replace the unreturned material and the presence of lead in 

an uncontrolled environment. " 

Depleted uranium is typically used as shielding in large casks such as those used to ship 

"irradiated' fuel orliarge Irradiator sources.- Since these casksare quite costly, the uranium. 

resources involved are carefully controlled and'fully recycled.-I Depleted uranium used to 

construct shields Is obtained from enrichment tailings and, at present, has few alternative 

uses. 

Other materials such as wood, steel, fiberboard, and plastic are also used in the con

struction of packaging used to transport radioactive materlals. 'Sinceradioactive materials, 

constitute only a very small percentage of the total amount of goods transported in similar 

packages, the use of these-resources for their transport is considered negligible. 

The second area of resource use is in the operation of the transportation Industry itself. 

The transport of material requires the comitment of personnel, money, and resources. Since 

radioactive material packages account for only 2 x 106 of the 500 x 109 packages transported 

annually, and asince; for the -HmOt pairt they ire transported'incidentally to other freight,,

virtually no savings in resources would be realized if they were'removed from the transport -. 

process.

4-30
Certain radioactive material shipments, however, cannot be handled routinely along with 

other freight. Because of excessive bulk, radioactivity, or massive shielding, certain ship

ments'are'handled as theexclusive cargo for transport between two locations. Examples of-. 

these kinds of shipments-are irradiated fuel from military and civilian reactors and large 

irradiator sources. Natural and enriched uranium'are'usually carried on exclusive-use vehicles 

because of their bulk rather than their radioactive properties. The resource use and environ

mental impact committed to such shipments can be identified with and charged to the transpor

tation of radioactive materials. Such environmental impact items as fuel use, noise, pollution, 

and accidental injuries and deaths can be associated with such-activities.. A considerable 

amount of-material is transported by exclusive-use vehicles, but only about 7,500 such ship

ments ý-consisting of nuclear fuel, waste, large quantity source, and some radiopharmaceuticals 

are made per Pear. 'These shipments are a negligible,fractlon of the total number of shipments 

of all materials and therefore account for only a small fraction of these nonradiological 

transportation'Impacts:--: - -

4.6 ABNORMAL TRANSPORT'OCCURRENCES 

"In 'each mode of-transport there is a class of incidents that occur infrequently and that 

cause-additional radiation'exposure and radioactivecontamination. These -incidents are con

sidered here as a component of normal transportation because they do not involve accidents that 

cause damage to the shipping vehicle. Included are such events as dropping of packages by 

material handlers, packages being run over and crushed by a vehicle, and skewering of packages 

by a forklift, any of which may compromise package integrity. Other occurrences relate to 

packaging procedures and include failure to pack the ;radioactive materials properly, labeling 

packages with an incorrect TI rating (either too large or, too small), failure to close seals 

properly; use of defective fittings, or-failure to provideadequate shielding.,- Package loss is 

yet another in the class of abnormal occurrences, any of;which may result in excess radiation 

exposure to handlers or to the general public. , .. - - . 

- The'DOT received 144 hazardous material incident.(HMI) reports .involving radioactive 

materials during the 5-year period 1971-1975 (Ref. 4-12). Releases were indicated in only36 -, 

of these reports. About half of these releases occurred in,Z1975 (20 incidents), indicating 

that fewer than one out of every 100,000 packages were involved in incidents leading to a 

release. Air carriers (including air freight forwarders) accounted for about half the total 

number of reports submitted. Highway carriers accounted for about 45 percent, and the remainder 

were filed by rail carriers., Over 60 percent of:the releases were noted by highway carriers. 

Most-of the air shipment incidents involved Type A or limited packages of radiopharmaceuticals. 

Appendix F.includes 98 of these incidents in alist of hazardous material incident reports 

obtained -from.DOT. - .-- .-- ,- -

Five of the twelve reported releases-in the air mode involved packages dropped in handling, 

typically-falling off a cargo handling cart and then being run over anct crushed by a vehicle. 

Other releases forJthe air mode resulted from damage by other freight, 4ewternal puncture, loose 

fittings-or closures, or other improper packaging. .. - . . - , .

4-31
The' reported highway incidents, included Type A radiopharmaceutical packages, drummed 

low-specific-activity wastes,"large casks; and radiography- sources.. Twelve of the reported 

incidents (only one of which involved a release of radioactivity) were caused by vehicular 

accidents and are therefore the subject of Chapter 5. Defective or improper packaging was 

responsible for over half the incidents that involved a release. 

A principal impact produced by a damaged package is radiation exposure of inaividuals 

handling the package and others who are near the. package for- a period- of time, especially.., 

before the damage is detected. Other impacts are associated with the resulting radioactive 

contamination, including the doses received by cleanup crews and the cleanup costs. For most 

Packages (e.g.. radiopharmaceuticals or small industrial sources), this is a small effect. 

As an example of the radiation levels to which persons might be exposed, a 30-curie Ir-192

source with complete loss of shielding resulting from a packaging error could produce a dose rate 

of as much as 25 rem per hour at 1 meter from the center of the package., A single incident in 

which shielding was lost on one side of such a package is known to have occurred. Although the 

exposed individuals exhibited no detectable acute health effects (indicating a dose of less 

than 25-50 rem), it is clear that the potential exists for large individual doses under these. 

circumstances. 

Most radioactive materials' are shipped in Type A packages, which are designed to withstand 

only normal conditions of-transportation. The quantities of, material released in package-dam

aging Incidents are expected t6 be on the order of 10-3 of the package content. With this 

release fraction for Type'A quantities of a radionuclide and' assuming that 10-3 of the material,

released is inhaled, ingested, or absorbed, an average individual dose rate about 0.5 rem per--. 

year is expected. (This dose rate'and release, fraction are derived from the basis of the IAEA

Type A quantity specification for each material.) Since most handling accidents are likely to 

occur in terminal areas, fewer than 10 people are likely to be exposed and the population 

exposure received per incident is u'nl1kelyito be greater than 5 person-rem.. For the current 20 

incidents involving a'release per year, the expected annual population dose rate is expected to 

be less than 100'person-rem from this source. -. 

4.6.1 IMPROPER LABELING OF PACKAGES 

Estimates of the annual 'radiological impacts resulting from abnormal occurrences'are 

difficult at best, Isince incidents involving release or partial loss of shielding are so di--, 

verse, and the numbers of persons exposed are usually not know. ' Some of the shipments reported.

in the 1975 Survey (Ref. 4-13, described in Chapter 1) may have included packages with incor-i 

rectly assigned transport indexes. If the total reported TI were too low, the annual normal 

dose is higher than that calculated Jn this'chaptei.' On the other'hand;'if-the total -reported 

TI were too high,the annual dose would be lower than anticipated.'L However, assigning.aTI1 

higher than that' warrakted'by the radiation level could cause shipments to'be -unnecessarily:-, 

delayed because of restrictions on the maximum TI allowed on a transport vehicle.! Improper;r, ! 

labeling of packages usually occurs for one of the following reasons: (a) premature release of 

the package for shipment or (b) an error in measuring the radiation level at 3 feet from the 

package surface to determine the TI.

4-32
Premature .release of a package for shipment is'a particular problem with short-half-life 

materials because the decay that occurs between labeling and actual commencement of shipping is 

factored into the labeling process. If the time lag is underestimated consistently, an extra 

hazard may be incurred by the public and the industry. " 

Measurements of package TIs in 1973 showed a significant number had more TIs than stated 

on the label (Ref. 4-14). To combat this problem and that resulting from improper shieldin"g 

FAA has proposed that every package offered to the airlines be monitored before it is accepted 

for shipment. This procedure might catch shipping errors before the consequences could affect 

a large number of people. 

4.6.2 IMPACT RESULTING FROM LOSS OF CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGESThe principal impact resulting from loss of control of a package'is irradiation of people 

in-the vicinityof. the package who are unaware of its presence or contents. Loss of control 

might-result when a package is separated from its radioactive labels' i'f it is 'dripped during 

transport.. Either scenario is potentially more serious if shielding or'package 'Integrity is 

lost, especially if a long-half-life nuclide is Involved. 

A typical population dose may be computed by using Equation (D-9) of Appendix D, 'where'

allowance is made for the change of the TI with time due to radioactive decay: 

D(T) = 7-19-93I(x,d)P(T)o -t) e (4-2) 

where I(x,d) 27, f e-r B(r)dr .

t-t '" = half-life of isotope - ,, • -- , .s-. ' .. -, 

"(TI) intit'ial c e ' L- ' . " . ...... .. --. 

PD = population density 

'T - tir during which package is'lost!-'-*'' . - " 

K - TI to dose rate constant conversion factor 

ASuburban population density'of '719 persons per km2 (6.68 x'1O"- persons per ft ) and 

a 1.0-TI Type-A "package _oi'I-131'with' 'h~aif-life of 8 days, the populationidose received is 

about "7-x i0 3person-rern, assuming the 'pickagl'Is-lost indefinitely.- -The population dose 

associated with a lost package in an area of higher populationdensity would be proportionall 

higher, but is unlikely to reach a significant level. 

The average time to recover a lost package is -approximately 14 days (based on incidents 

reported 'during :1976).-- A high dose 'rate'makefs'-a -package -easier-,to -locate 'using radiation 

survey equipment. Using the 14-day value' iii the above•calculation,ýthe population-dose for,.an 

1-131 package loss is of the order of 0.005 person-rem. Records indicate an average'of5 5"

4-33
losses per year over the last 9 years. Assuming all lost packages to be like the 1-131 package 

just considered, an average annual population dose of 0.025 person-rem might be expected. 

4.7 SHIPMENT BY FREIGHT FORWARDERS 

The previously mentioned State surveillance studies (Ref. 4-15) examined four freight 

forwarder locations where, consolidation of radiopharmaceutical packages is carried out." The 

average annual population exposure associated with these operations was found to be 4 person-rem 

per location. It is estimated that there are no more than 10 such locations throughout the 

country, resulting in a maximum annual population exposure of 40 person-rem. 

4.8 EXPORT AND IMPORT SHIPMENTS 

,Export risks are considered to occur from the time the material leaves the shipper until 

it enters the country of its destination. This includes the secondary mode link from the 

shipper to the U.S. port of departure and the primary mode link to the first port of entry into 

the destination country, but not the secondary mode link to the ultimate destination within the 

foreign country. Import risks are considered to occur from the time the shipment first arrives 

in the U.S. until it reaches its ultimate U.S. destination. Thus, import'risks are associated' 

primarily with the secondary mode transport of the material from the U.S. port of entry to its 

destination. 

4.8.1 EXPORT SHIPMENTS 

The export normal risks were evaluated in ways completely analogous to the total normal 

risk evaluation using the export standard shipments model discussed in Appendix A, Section 

A.6.1. Secondary mode mileages were half of their counterparts in the total risk calculation, 

since the secondary mode link on the receiving end was not considered and the number of han

dlings were adjusted accordingly. The results are given in Tables'4-13 and 4-14 by transport 

mode and material, respectively. The total annual normal population dose resulting from export 

shipments is 61 person-rem, or 0.6 percent of the total 1975 normal risk. 

The maximum individual dose due to export shipments is unlikely to be greater than that 

delivered to an airline passenger who happens to fly on a number of passenger aircraft flights 

carrying radioactive materials. The data indicated about 600 TIwere'exported by passenger 

aircraft. If these,600 TIwere transported on 50 flights each carrying 12 TI and if an,.-Ind"i

vidual happened to fly on ooe-fourth ofall flights with radioactive 'aterials and experience 

the average 0.36 urea per hour dose rate (0.030 mrem per hour TI x 12 TI) for an average of 8 

hours per flight, his total dose would be 36 urem. .- - . 

4.8.2 IMPORT SHIPMENTS 

I -, , ? 1 - i , . I , - I - I 

Since imports reported in the 1975 Survey accounted for only an estimated 40 TI and the 

total-TI transported annually is 4.5 x 106, the contribution of these to the total normal dose 

is considered negligible. *,- .

4-34
I I . 4' -I ,

TABLE 4-13

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT'OF NORMAL EXPORT SHIPMENTS (BY MODE) 

-, SIumATTON W. nrOUP POPULATION EXPSURF TO RIOIATION IN PFP.SON RF" A SA 

WEUTOF TRANSPORT Of WBPvflUIR&OTOACTtVE "ATERIALS 81 VIRIOUS IRANSI'OWY 4ODES UNDVR NORMAL C0407TIONS

!!MFNVN PASSENGERS 

T. AIR 1.002E#Qt 

GO AIR I./' 

TRUCKC 1:., "4 our$ 0. 

RAIL to. 

OTHEW I.'-# 

TOTALS 1.0ilrtW

444 *44 44 

44 4. 

CRVMNfN I 44 44 4 44 t44 

6. S3SE7 -

S.320E'Cft 



7.055E#OO 

a. 

7.665f#flfl 44 4',44 

14 

2.IISE'flt 

4414*444 f4444

4,4'

, 1 4 4.

TIMM~t4S HANOLFRS ,)Fl LINK 

i -4 " v, h.vqMe-ui4 6.1qTE-aI 0 a. 444 *44 63AIE0cfee 

4.4 

a. ~Ssal.sa ,col-v 

1 44~* 4 4

Rpouot4oiN POPULATION 

OVTNG 

44 ISt2F-U 0.' - I.211-S1 

?.ISIE-02 ''.723E-01 

I..ffl6*0S 9.274E-01

a,. 

34 

SI 

.4

.osac.a3.A6VI900 ; 

4 4 4 * 44

STORAGE TO TALS, 

44 .633EM0 

,alef-12 .I.863E*01 

*7SqE*Dg 2.283E'SI 

;srelfua 6.469ce#S

4 444* 44

44 *4? f444 4 4 44444 44 4' 4 44 ,44 444444 4.44444 44 

4)44444 44 4 4'4 f44,4444444 

4 444444444444444444444444444 4 

)4 44 4

¶ 4 .4 44 *4' It 

44,441 444 7 -

4 --

"NOat eir SR 

WAS 

SEC.

wt * 4 L 4

i¶ , .4 ý

, I

I I I , ,
TABLE 4-14 

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF NORMAL EXPORT SHIPMENTS (BY ISOTOPE) 

SUMMATION OF GQ'OIIP POPULATION EXPOSURE TO RADIATION IN PrOSflN RFhq AS A 

RESULT Of TRANSPnRT OF VARIOUS RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS UNOFR "flRIIAL CONDITIONS 

GROUPS

CRENNFN ATTENDANTS I4ANOLFRS

SURRV3UNnING POPULATION 

W'411P MOVING 

qFF LINKI ON LINKC STOPS STORRGF

6.743E-Ot 2.1I3r-o1 

1.099E-02 4.994E-03 

0. 4.8S'SE-93 

3.592E-02 3e27.E-fl3 

0. 12.751E-03 

I* t.272E-o1 

2.7ZSE000 Z.52'.E-o1 

U. 1.202E-01 

9.62.E-U ~ .U'eE-0t, 

s5*711E-03 '..2?2E-04 

4.124.E#00 6.959E-01 

s.5?Uf-o1u 7.176E-U2.., 

1.0042E-01 G.AW6-13 

Go 1*702E-02 

1.,2S2E-01,, 8.369F-02 

1.69ZE-02 1.?i6E-U02 

go 7.'162E#00 

2.78SE-01 t.Lt3E**Ot 

a., l.33'3E*G0

3.227E-62 

I .676E-U 3 

0. 

4,.606F-0 2 

2.73#sF-1'. 

t.97'.e-ot 

4.*078F-02 

4..98 6E-03 

U..A06F-03 

To 

5*992E-13 

9. OSSE-016 

fie 

I& 

1,333E-02 

Qs.

1. 672E-0 1 

4i.20DE-03 

9.008F-03 

1. 500UE-02 

3. 00 GE-U 3 

1. 95 GE-U 

404U61.E-01 

,1.500 F-U2 

?.2OtaE-6 I 

1.6?'.E-01 

2. IGGE-03 

1.U7U.E*00 

8. 10GE-U 2 

fl.&816E-OZý 

1.176E-021. 

2.4WIUE-gz 

5*06ZE-02 

.l.512E!-Q2 

2.673E-02 

7.42C0E.U6 

3.Z5IE*UU 

1.07IEU00

6.2?7E-03 t.133F-02 

1.28SF-D0e 5.4.IIIE-UU. 

2.1.90F-U' too51E-03 

2.386E-8'. 1.9071?03 

G.301-05 3.5017I-fU. 

3.331.7-0S -2.44.6E-03 

6.234.E-03 3.'.75E-02 

4..ISE-Uh., 1.757F-U'! 

7.29SE-31l 3.079F-02 

4..632E-03 1*955E-UP 

1.733E-U'! 7.5157-631 

3.1137-05 ,1.314E7-04. 

2.191E-02 19.2'.9E-U2 

1.8547-01l T7.WUE-0.3 

3*IZ3E-I'. 1.31AF-03' 

1.71.3E-U'., 7.3S7E-Il. 

5.2977-03 5.374.F-03 

4..371E-04' 1.64.5F-03' 

9.1117-03 8.8627-0'q 

6.5757-01 z.2qlEtaa 

t.1.IlE000 1.353E*00 

3.53BE-92 1.4.93'E-01

TDOTALS ,1.882E*81 2.169E#81 '..79'.E-o1 1. 423E+31I 2.177E*UI f#.vURoE.U 3*467E.0 .03o0 6.670

ISOTOPE SHIPMENT PASSENGERS

9147'1-A 

AU198 

C 057 

C061I-x 

C 050-8 

C-14 

tR192-k 

IR192-9 

"NF*I4C% 

Ti131-A 

W ITEO-A 

"wn99-A 

P32-W 

KE 133-A 

04726-A 

"PU238-9 

tPS-E-LG 

VOZ-RX

TOT ALS

2.090F-0 2 

3.015E-04. 

5.4.1E -04 

9. 0 18 E-U'.4 

1.804Fv-04 

U..6E0 

2. 684F.-02 

9.0 lAF-Ul 

1.585F-02 

1. 006ET02 

E*9?6E-03 

1.762E-U04 

8. IZ5E-02 

5.811.7-03 

10086F.-03 

7. 713F-U0. 

1.4413E-03 

6.25 67-03 

1.3 16E-03 

7.639E-03 

1.998E*UU 

1.198E.00 

7.688E-02

2.1!15F-0l? 

4.444F.8-94U 

I. 330E-03 

2.66 1E-04. 

6.195F-03 

3.959F-OZ 

1.130V-al 

2. 334F!-02 

1.'.85E-02 

1.022E-OZ 

1.462F-04 

1.146F-01 

8. 57A8r-al 

1.602E-03 

1.117F-01 

2.128F-01 

8.7217-03 

1.86 87-23 

1.0307-02 

Z.S5867.00 

1.628E.00 

1.131.7-01

1.15'.E.00 

2.213E-02 

1961.8F-02 

5 .FIU5E-02 

6.661F-03 

1. 64.0E-01 

3.663E*00 

3.1144F-02 

4. 183E-0 1 

3.35SE-Il 

1. 1607 #0 

8.9A3E-03 

6.1.017100 

1.loflM#08 

1.381.F-01 

1.2377-01 

4.6* 06E-02 

2.91.3E-Ot 

5. 756E-02 

1.3607-01 

2.232E*01 

2. 526E*Ot 

2. 78E0S 0

4.603c*oo 6.069E+lt
4.9 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FOR NORMAL TRANSPORT 

In this summary only the radiological impacts from normal transport of radioactive materials 

are discussed in detail, since they are the predominant ones. Other impacts, e.g., area denial 

and resource use, are secondary. Because radioactive materials are carried most often on 

Vehicles whose prime purpose is-to carry passengers or other freight, these secondary impacts 

would occur regardless of the presence of the" radioactive material package. The impacts pre

dicted for 1985 are based on the scaled-up standard shipments model presented in Appendix A. 

The radiological impact in terms of annual population doses is given in Table 4-15 for 

various population subgroups-and modes of shipment. Table 4-16 shows similar information clas

sified by isotope shipment rather than by mode of shipment. Tables 4-17 and 4-18 show the 

projected values for 1985. Table 4-19 summarizes the maximum individual annual dose values. 

From the data contained in these five tables, the following observations can be made: 

1. Shipments of waste material account for 15 percent of the 1975 dose and 24 percent of 

the 1985 dose. These shipments are numerous and have large TI values. Shipment of isotopes 

for medical use accounts for approximately 52 percent of the total 1975 dose and 38 percent of 

the 1985 dose. While each such shipment emits radiation at,relatively low intensity, the 

number of such shipments is very large. Shipments of isotopes for industrial use account for 

24 percent of the 1975 dose and 22 percent of the 1985 dose. Nuclear fuel -cycle shipments 

account for 9 percent of.the 1975 dose and 15 percent of the 1985 dose. Limited shipments 

contribute 0.6 percent of the 1975 dose and 0.7 percent of the 1985 dose. 

2. The highway transport modes (truck and delivery van)' contribute 69 percent of the 

total 1975 dose. Passenger air transport accounts for 30 percent of the total'1975 dose. 

3. On the basis of person-rem per TI carried; the passenger air mode causes the largest 

radiological effect for the material carried. Values for each mode are shown below: 

Mode Person-rem perWTI carried 

Passenger air 0.0067 

Ship 0.00265 

Secondary modes - 0.00198 

All-cargo air , . . 0.00128 

Truck " I 0.00116 

Rail 0.00065 

When the mean person-rem per TI for secondary transport modes is added o that for each primary 

transport mode, the ranking is as follows: - - -. -

- - 1' - -

4-37
TABLE 4-15 

ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PERSON-REM) FOR 1975 

SHIPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND TRANSPORT MODE

Passengers 

2330.0 

0 

0 

0 

0,

Secondary 

Modes 0

Crew Attendant 

16.000 111 I

4.090 

2580.000 

0.893 

5.710 

534.000

0 

0 

0 

0

-Population Group 

"Surrounding Population 

as Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage

433.00 

16.10 

51.60 

92.50 

1.87

0 1143.00

0

0 

347.000 

22.500 

0.878 

51.200

0, 

0 

172.000 

0.012 

0

10.800, 

0.413 

999.000% 

0.879 

1.080

0

0 

261.000 

0.666 

0.392

% of 

Totals Total

2902.00 30

20.60 

4406.00 

117.00 

9.93

216.000 79.200 310.000 2333.00

45 

1 

24

31404000 112 1740.00

32 1 18

422.000 388.000 1090.000

4 4 11

572.000 9790.0Q 

6

Transport 

Mode 

Passenger 

Aircraft 

Cargo 

Aircraft 

.. Truck 

Rail 

Other

TOTALS 

% OF 

TOTAL

2330.0 

24

I

b %

!
TABLE 4-16 

ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PERSON-REM) FOR 1975 

SHIPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND MATERIAL

Surrounding Population

material 

Am-241 A 

Am-241 B 

Au-198 

C-1 4 

Co-57 

Co-60 LSA 

Co-60 A 

Co-60 B 

Co-60 LQ1 

Co-60 L02 

Cs-137 A 

Cs-137 B 

Ga-67 

H-3 LSA 

H-3 A

Passengers 

18.90o 

.413 

15.500 

2.790 

6.500 

7.490 

0 

0 

0, 

0. 

; 3:346a 

0 

31.360' 

0.321 

0.314

crew 

1,15.000 

1.loo1 

25.200 

1.2 30 

4.590 

110.000 

433.000 

10.900 

0.110 

0.627-1 

138.000 

0..6o0 

7.940 

0.213 

0.169

Attendants 

0.905 

0.020 

0.740 

0.134 

0.311 

0.358 

0'* 

0 

0.165 

0 

0.161 

0.015-

0.015

Handlers 

79.000 

0.240 

16.600 

0.805 

1.960 

43 :900 

122.000 

3.290: 

0' 

0.800, 

130.000 

0.222 

6.030 

"-0.253 

0.115

Off-Link 

4.380 

0.032 

0.938 

0.046 

0.150 

3.720, 

13.000 

0.265 

0.003 

0.075 

5.300 

0.02 

0.312 

0;010 

0.006

On-Link 

10.500 

0.047 

2.180 

0.109 

0.279 

7.280 

19.000 

0.131 

0.001 

0.038 

16.300 

0.039 

0.781 

0.032

stops 

14.600 

0.046 

2.440 

0.079 

0.231 

10.400 

26.100 

0.864 

0.004 

0.076 

27.100 

0.054 

0.955ý 

0.026

0.015 0.012

Storage 

18.400 

0.059 

3.140 

0.107 

0.305 

13.100 

32.500 

1.04 

0.001 

0.020 

33.800 

0.067 

1.22 

0.035 

0.016

Totals I . Total % of' 

262.000 

1.950 

66.700 

5.300 

14.300 

197.000 

645.000 

16.400 

0.120 

1.640 

355.000 

1.010 

20.800 

0.906

3.0 

1.0 

2.0 

7.0 

4.0

0.663 -

T,

3T
Material Passengers

1-131 A 

1-131 B 

Ir-192 A 

Ir-192 'B 

Kr-85 A 

Kr-85 B 

Limited 

MF+MC LSA 

MF+MC A 

MF+MC B 

MF+MC LO 

Mixed LSA 

Mixed A 

Mixed B 

Mo-99 A 

Mo-99 B 

P-32 

Po-210 

A

1000.000 

0.848 

20.500 

170.000 

10.100 

0.092 

17.800 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1.250 

1.680 

0 

873.000 

144.000 

10.900 

0.019

Crew 

504.000 

1.140 

'18.400 

265.000 

25.100 

0.224 

26.600 

22.500 

18.600 

1.080 

0.326 

19.000 

25.000 

1.500 

715.000 

127.000 

6.630 

0.018

Attendants 

48.000 

0.o041 

0.981 

8.140 

0.483 

0.004 

0.853 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0.060 

0.080 

0 

41.800 

6.890 

0.522 

0.0009

TABLE 4-16 (continued) 

Sof 

Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total

426.00 

0.554 

9.370 

85.000 

6.440 

0.060 

11.600 

0 

0 

0 

0 

6.970 

17.600 

0.576 

393.000 

31.100 

4.510 

0.013

20.500 

0.041 

0.638 

8.500 

0.816 

0.007 

0.878 

3.470 

8.940 

0.026 

0.008 

0.626 

0.956 

0.050 

25.100 

3.810 

0.250 

0.0007

54.600 

0.090 

.. 1.350 

15.300 

1.170 

.011 

1.660 

1.710 

4.410 

0.013 

0.004 

1.170 

2.300 

0.096 

53.800 

5.800 

0.599 

0.002

43.000 

0.088 

1.140 

14.000 

1.090 

0.011 

1.690 

16.100 

32.200 

0.106 

0.011 

1.670 

3.540 

0.147 

47.600 

4.500 

0.491 

0.002

57.900 

0.114 

1.500 

18.100 

1.400 

0.014 

2.170 

4.210 

8.440 

0.028 

0.003 

2.090 

4.440 

0.183 

62.600 

5.920 

0.654 

0.002

2160.000 

2.420 

53.800 

584.000 

46.600 

0.424 

63.300 

47.900 

72.700 

1.250 

0.351 

32.800 

55.700 

2.550 

2210.000 

329.000 

24.600 

0.056

22.0 

6.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

23.0 

3.0

03
TABLE 4-16 (continued)

Material Passengers

Po-210 LO 

Pu-238 A 

Pu-238 B 

Pu-239 B 

Pu-239 LO 

Ra-226 A 

Ra-226 B 

Spent fuel 

rail 

Spent fuel 

truck 

Tc-99 

UF6-nat 

UF6-enr 

U02-enr 

U02-Rx 

U308 

U-Pu 

Waste LSA

0.171 

0.080 

0.589 

0.915 

0 

0 

0.104 0

0 

3.440 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1.840 0

Crew 

0.150 

0.179 

1.250 

27.900 

0.003 

58.700 

1.330 

0.068

31.300 

42.200 

17.200 

3.140 

19.500 

12.500 

113.000 

12.700 

17.400

Attendants 

0.008 

0.004 

0.028 

0.044 

0 

0 

0.005 

0 

0 

0.165 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0.088 0

Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops

0.058 

0.158 

0.357 

6.190 

0.003 

27.300 

1.380 

6.800

50.800 

57.700 

6.500 

0.147 

2.970 

0.395 

172.000 

1.960 

0- -,

0.005 

0.007 

0.038 

0.825 

0.0002 

1.97 

0.065 

0.175

3.8 

2.160 

1.030 

0.118 

2.830 

0.443 

47.000 

0.356 

3.450

0.010 

0.020 

0.063 

1.170 

0.0008 

3.790 

0.204

0.008 

0.024 

0.066 

1.530 

0.0002 

5.820 

0.314

0.222 0.089

1.880 

7.050 

1.310 

0.135 

3.250 

0.465 

"38.900 

"0.422 

1.700

4.820 

11.200 

1.810 

0.218 

5.210 

0.689 

'47.800 

0.439 

12.600

% of 

Storage Totals Total

0.011 

0.07, 

0.084 

1.910 

0.0003 

7.260 

0.396 

0.427

1.260 

14.000 

2.540 

0.107 

2.570 

0.341 

67'.100 

0.553 

3.290

0.421 

0.505 

2.480 

40.500 

0.008 

105.000 

3.800

1.0

7.780

93.800 

138.000 

30.400 

3.870 

36.300 

15.000 

485.000 

18.400 

38.400

1.0 

1.0 

5.0

t
TABLE 4-16 (continued)

Haterials 

Waste A 

Waste B 

Xe-133 

TOTAL 

PERCENT

"- rT ""I. • ,J r

3' 

r; 

43 

I,.' ,I,

Passengers Crew 

0 139.000 

0 0.565 

10.8 12.800 

2330,000 3140.000 

24 32 '4 7 ° nel

Attendants 

0 

0 

0.516 

112.000 

1 

()

Handlers 

0 

0 

5.460 

1740.000 

18

Off-Link 

254.000 

0.357 

0.421 

422.000 

4

On-Link 

125.000 

0.176 

0.789

Stops 

746.000 

1 .580 

0.743

Storage 

195.000 

0.413 

0.964

Totals 

1460.000 

3.090 

32.500

388.000 1090.000 572.000 9790.000

4 11 6

a

'Iii

'4 '$* 

4 -! -

I'

% of 

Total 

15.0

.r

I I

- I

y
Transp 

Mode 

Passen 

Aircr 

Cargo 

v Aircr 

Truck 

Rail 

Other 

Second 

Modes 

TO0 

TOJ

TABLE 4-17 

ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PEASON-REM) FOR 1985 

SHIPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND TRANSPORT MODE 

Population Group 

surrounding Population or~ % of 

Passengers Crew Attendants Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stop Storage Totals Total 

ger 

aft 4010 ' 27.30 192 702.00 17.30 4948.0 19 

aft 0 37.80 0 '146.00 0 0 3.96 0 188.0 '1 

0 6649.00 0 308.00 1340.00 662.000 3870.00 1010.00 13840.0 54 

0 "3.86 ' 0 499.00 97.40 0.052 3.85- 2.92 607.0 2 

" 0 29.60 0 7.60 3.86 0 4.37 1.59 47. 0 

lary19.0 840 5720 3 

0 :1220.00 0 2820.00 132.00 557.000 195.00 814.00 5732.0 23 

rALS 4010 7970.00 192 4480.00 1580.00 1220.000 4090.00 1830.00 25400.0 

)F 18 6 5 16

rAL

4.)

Io Q
TABLE 4-18 

ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PERSON-REM) FOR 1985

•HTPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND MATERIAL

Surrounding Population

Material 

Am-241 A 

Am-241 'B 

Au-198 

C-14, '

Co-57 

Co-60 LSA 

Co-60 A 

Co-60 B 

Co-60 L1; 

Co-60 CQ 2 

Cs-137 A 

Cs-137 B 

Ga-67 

H-3 LSA 

H-3 A

'-Passengers Crew 

0 313.000 

0 2.980 

15.500 25.200 

7.260 3.200 

16.900 11.300 

0 292.000 

0 1130.000 

0 28.300 

0 .286 

0 1.570 

0 363.000 

0 1.570 

24.800 5.490 

0.836 .555 

0.817 .440

Attendants 

0 

0 

0.740 

0.348 

0.808 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1.180 

0.04 

0.039

Handlers 

205.000 

0.625 

16.600 

2.090 

3.160 

114.000 

317.000 

4.550 

0 

2.000 

338.000 

0.576 

15.700 

0.659 

0.299

Off-Link 

12.300 

0.908 

0.938 

0.119 

0.336 

9.990 

33.700 

0.691 

0.007 

0.131 

15.700 

0.063 

0.438 

0.027 

0.017

On-Link 

31.200 

0.149 

2.180 

.283 

.500 

20.200 

49.400 

.341 

.003 

.094 

43.800 

.102 

1.850 

.083 

.040

Stops 

37.900 

0.119 

2.44 

0.205 

0.517 

27.100 

67.700 

2.180 

0.011 

0.190 

70.300 

0.140 

0.942 

0.068 

0.031

% of 

Storage - Totals Total

47.800 

0.152 

3.14 

0.278 

0.366 

34.000 

84.400 

2.720 

0.003 

0.050 

87.900 

0.175 

1.390 

0.091 

0.042

648.000 

4.110 

66.700 

13.800 

33,900 

497.000 

1680.000 

42.700 

0.311 

4.090 

918.000 

2.610 

51.700 

2.360 

1.720

3.0 

2.0 

7.0

4.0

SH PM NS . BY.. . .. .. . . .

41
TABLE 4-18 (continued)

Mat.• ial 

f I - i 

1-131 A 

1-131 B 

Ir-192 A 

Ir-192 B 

kr-85 A 

Kr-85 A 

Limited 

.b. MF+MCt-LSA 

," . MF+C A 

MF+MC B 

MF*MC LQ 

Mixed LSA 

Mix ed' 

Mixed B 

4o-99 A 

Mo-99 B 

P-32 

Po-210 A

Passengers 

1000.000 

0.848 

0 

0 

26.200 

o.2iA6 

46.300 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3.25o 

4.370 

2270.000 

374.000 

28.300 

0

Crew ,,At 

504.000 

1.140 

54.000O• 

745:100'" 

65.2'00 

6.582 

93.100 

77.100 

4.460' 

1.366 

49.566 

65.1•0 

3.890 

1860.000 

331.600 

17.2 00 

0.059

ttendants Handlers 

48.000 426."000' 

0.041 0.553 ," 

0 24.400",' 

0 221.000 

1.260" 16.700' 

0.011 ' 0.156 • 

2.220 30.200 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0' 

0.i56 18.2006 

0.M09 45.800': 

0 1.5001, 

109.oo000 1020.000 

17.900 80.800 

1.350 11.700' 

O' 0.043

Off-Link. 

20.500 ": 

0.041' 

2.010 

25.200, 

2.120, 

0.018, 

2.290 

14.400 

37.000 

0.109 

0.033 

1.630l 

2.480,, 

.130 

65.300 

9.910

0.648 

0.004

On-Link 

54.600 

0.090 

5.010 

53.(000 

3.050 

0.029 

4.320 

7.100 

18.300 

0.054 

0.016

3.050 

5.970 

0.249 

140.000 

15.100 

1.550 

".008

Stops Storage Totals 

43.000' 57.900 2160.000 

0.088, , 0.114 2.920 

2.950 3.890 92.200 

36.400 47.100 1130.000 

2.830 3.630 121.000 

0.029 0.038 1.100 

4.390 5.670 165.000 

66.700 17.400 199.000 

134.000 34.900 301.000 

0.440': 0.115 5.170 

0.046 * 0.012 . 1.460 

4.350 5.450 85.600 

9.210, 11.500 145.000 

0.382 0.476 6.6301 

124.000 163.000 5750.000 

11.700 15.400, 856.000 

1.270 1.700, 63.700 

0.005 0.009 0.127

% of

Total 

9.0

4.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0

23.0 

3.0

1.0
Material 

Po-210 LO 

Pu-238 A 

Pu-238 B 

Pu-239 B 

Pu-239 LQ 

Pu-recycle 

Ra-226 A 

Ra-226 B 

Spent fuel 

*rail,: 

Spent fuel 

truck 

Tc-99 

TI-201 

U308 

UF6-nat 

UF6-enr 

U 02-enr 

U02-Rx

Passengers 

0 

0.209 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 0 

0 

8.950 

144.000 

U 

0 

0 

* 0" 0

Crew Attendants 

0.443 

0

0.466 

"3.450 

28.000 

0.003 

6.650 

58.700 

1.410 

2.600 

188.000 

110.000 

"- 34.500 

467.000 

S71:o000 

13.000 

80.700 

51.600

0.010 

0' 

0 

0 

0 

0 00

0" 

0. 426 

"6.900 

0 

"0 

0' 

0 0

TABLE 4-18 (continued) 

Handlers Off-Link 

0.152 0.017 

0.411 0.019 

0.926 0.112 

6.190 .0.833 

0.003 0.0002 

0.041 0.333 

27.300 1.970 

1.380 0.071

261.000 

,306.000 

150.000 

27.800 

710'.000 

26.900 

"0.609 

12.300 

1.640

6.690 

22.900 

5.610 

1.360 

195.000 

4.240 

0.489 

11.700 

1.840

% of 

On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total

0.039 

0.052 

0.213 

1.210 

0.0008 

0 

3.790 

0.229

0.021 

0.063 

0.171 

1.530 

0.0002 

0.006 

5.820 

0.314

0.029 

0.081 

0.219 

1.910 

0.0003 

0 

7.260 

0.396

8.530 3.440 16.400

11.300 

18.300 

3.530 

161.000 

5.410 

.560 

13.400 

1.930

29.000 

29.000 

2.310 

198.000 

7.480 

0.904 

21.500 

.2.860

7.600 

36.400 

3.200 

278.000 

10.500 

0.444 

10.600 

1.410

0.700 

S1.310 

5.090 

39.700 

0.007 

7.030 

105.000 

3.800 

298.000 

565.000 

358.000 

224.000 

2010.000 

126.000 

16.000 

150.000 

61.300

1.0 

2.0 

1.0 

1.0 

8.0 

1.0

I 

,b 

o•
Material 

U-PU 

Waste LSA 

Waste A 

Waste B 

Xe-133

TOTALS 

% OF 

TOTAL

Passengers 

7.610 

0 

0 

0 

28.000

Crew 

52.800 

71.900 

574.000 

2.330 

33.400

Attendants 

0.364 

0 

0 

0 

1.340

4010.000 7970.000 192.000

16 31 1

TABLE 4-18 (continued) 

Handlers Off-Link 

8.130 1.480 

0 14.300 

0 1050.000 

0 1.470 

14.200 1.090 

4480.000 1580.000

18 6

On-Link 

1.750 

7.040 

516.000 

0.726 

2.050

Stops 

1.820 

52.000 

3080.000 

6.510 

1.930

1220.000 4090.000

5 16

Storage 

2.300 

13.600 

805.000 

1.700 

2.510

Totals 

76.300 

159.000 

6010.000 

12.700 

84.500

1830.000 25400.000 

7

% Total of 

1.0 

24.0

.4b,

4
TABLE 4-19 

SUMMARY OF MAXIMUM ANNUAL INDIVIDUAL DOSES 

FROM RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TRANSPORT 

Population 1975 Max. (Avg.) Probable 

Subgroup Dose (mrem) 

Airline Passengers 108 ( 0.34) 

Cabin Attendants 13 ( 2.9) 

Passenger Aircraft Flight Crew 2.5 ( 0.53) 

All-Cargo Aircraft Flight Crew 61 (12) 

Air Crew (other air modes) 5 

Truck Crew 870 

Van Crew 70 

Train Crew 1.2 

Ship Crew 3.7 

Freight Handlers 500 

Bystanders (pass. air) 85 

Bystanders (cargo air) 106 

Bystanders (other air modes) 60 

Bystanders (truck) 1.3 

Bystanders (rail) 1.65 

Off-link (truck/van) 0.009 

Off-link (rail) 0.017 

On-link (truck/van) 1.9 

Storage (rail) 25

4-48
Mode (includina secondary link) Person-rem per TI carried

Nonexclusive trucks 0.00889 

Passenger air 0.00814 

Ship 0.00524 

All-cargo air 0.0035 

Rail 0. 00183 

Exclusive-use trucks 

(no secondary link) 0.00058 

4. The estimated total annual population dose is 9,790 person-rem 'in 1975 and 25,400 

person-rem in 1985. This dose has the same general characteristics as other chronic exposures 

to radiation such' as natural background: The predicted result of public exposure to this 

radiation is' approximately '1.19 -latent cancer'fatalities and 1.7 gehetic effects-in 1975 and 

3.08 latent cancer'fatalities and 4.4 genetic defects in 1985. While thWe value of -9,790 

person-rem may seem large, it is small when compared with the 4 x 10 7person-rem received by 

the total U.S. population in the form of natural background radiation (see Chapter 3). The 

total population it risk for-radioactive ýaiterlal transport ii estimated to be about 20 x 106 

people (1975), based on estimates of n'umbers of aircraft'passengers, persons in air terminals, 

and persons living within 0.5 mile of truck and van routes. -Thus, the average"annual individual 

dose is approximately 0.5 mrem, which is a factor of 300 below the average individual dose from 

bac'kg~round id;riation. 'These resuits a e~shown in'Table'4-'20. ' 

5. Exports and imports of radioactive materials make only a very small contribution to 

the overall normal'risk.-- - ' 

S " . . .. TABLEt 20 .'.0 

RESULTS - NORMAL TRANSPORT OF: .. 

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 

, - : :, .. .: •:- • •,•.; •;: •.' ' ,. "197_. 55 ' -•,,- ,, 198_ 5

Total Annual

Population Dose 9,790 -25,400 

(Person-rem) 

Expected-AnnualLCFs' , .• - , -; 1.2. -3.1 , 

Expected Annual 

Genetic Effects .t . -,; ,1.7- .; . , ,.' 4.4 

:.'1975 Average= 9 9790" r=,-0. m .- •• I_ " -. x > : 

Individual Dose •\T' , ., ,.•&Ž. -' , ..2 

Annual Normal Dose 

Attributable -to.. ,- ~ .. 

Export and Import'' 61 Person-Rem 

Shipments in 1975 - . . "': 

4-4 r 

,4-49

S..... I J m •
REFERENCES 

4-1. Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1975. 

4-2. "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics", Civil Aeronautics 'Board, U.S. Department of Trans

portation, March 1976. 

4-3. R. F. Barker, D. R. Hopkins, A. N. Tse, IAEA-§M-184/15, "Radiation Dose to Population 

(Crew and Passengers) Resulting from the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Pas

senger Aircraft in the United States of America," Population Dose Evaluation and 

Standards for Man and His Environment, IAEA, Vienqa, 1974. 

4-4. "Assessment of the Environmental Impact of the FAA Proposed Rulemaking Affecting the 

Conditions of Transport of Radioactive Materials on Aircraft," Sponsored by the Federal 

Aviation Administration, May 7, 1975. 

4-5. A. C. Upton, et al. "Radiobiological Aspects of thdSupersonic Transport," Health Phsics, 

Vol. 12, p. 209. 

4-6. D. J. Beninson, A. Bonville, UNSCEAR. 1975. Dosimetric Implications of the Exposure 

to the Natural Sources of Irradiation. 

4-7. 'Airport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Carriers", Civil Aeronautics Board, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, June 1975. 

4-8. "Survey to Determinethe Percent of Passenger Aircraft Departures Carrying Hazardous 

Materials," Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Standards Service Informal Survey, 

June 20, 1974. J 

4-9. Letter from R. P. Skully (Federal Aviation Administration) to H. H. Brown (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) dated April 7, 1975 with enclosures. Available in NRC Public Document 

Room for inspection and copying for a fee. 

4-10. Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Material to and from Nuclear Power 

Plants, WASH-1238, USAEC, December 1972. 

4-11. J. Shapiro, "Exposure of Airport Workers to Radiation from Shipments of Radioactive 

Materials," NUREG-0154, USNRC, January 1977. ". 

4-12. A. W. Grella, "A Review of Five Years Accident Experience in the U.S.A. Involving Nuclear 

Transportation"; IACA-SR-10/5. Presented at Seminar on the Design, Construction, and 

Teating of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, 

August 1976. 

4-50
4-13. J. L. Simmons, et al., Survey of Radioactive Material Shipments in the United States 

BNWL-1972, Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, April 1976. 

4-14. J. Shapiro, "Determination of Exposure Rates to Occupants of Passenger Aircraft Used to 

Transport Radioactive Materials," Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by 

the Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, June 20, 1973. 

4-15. "Survey of the Transportation of Radioactive Materials in the State of New Jersey," New 

Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Environmental Quality, 

Bureau of Radiation Protection, June 1974.

4-51
CHAPTER 5 

IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS 

5.1 INTRODUCTION 

Two factors are considered in evaluating the impact of accidents that involve vehicles 

carrying radioactive shipments: probability and consequence. The probability that an acci

dent releasing'-radioactive material will occur can be described in terms of the expected 

number of accidents (of given severity) per-year for each transport mode,-together with the 

package response to~those accidents and the dispersal that is expected. The consequence of an 

accident is expressed in terms of the potential effects of the release of a specified quantity 

of dispersible radioactive material to the envihonment or the exposure resulting from damaged 

package shielding. -* 

The prouC oprobability and consequence is called the "annual radiological risk" and 

is-expressed in terms of the expected radiological consequences per year. This risk can be 

quantified for each shipment type. Summing the risks over all shipments gives the total annual 

risk resulting from all shipments. Since this method does not distinguish high probability-low 

consequence risks from low-probability/large-consequence -risks, sh'ipments with potentially 

severe consequences are, in addition, considered separately from the risk calculations. 

The actual method by which risk is calculated is outlinedIn Appendix G and detailed in 

Refer ence 5-1. Figure 5-1 outlines the informational flow used in the calculation of impacts 

due to transportation accidents. It also-shows theý additional impacts that add to the annual 

risk discussed above. -, .

.This chapter.is divided into eight additional1:sections. Section" 5.2, which follows this 

introduction,'ificludes discussions--of accidelnt rates for various rtansport modes and severnties 

and of package release fractions. S6Eti&" 5.3 discusse-ithe dispersion/exposure model and the 

inhere~nt ;assumptions used in the meteorological calculation. The results of the risk calcula

tions 'using the 1975 standard shipments and their 1985 proJections (see Appendix A),are pre

sented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the potential effects and cleanup costs of the 

radioactive..contamination from a transportation accident. In Section 5.6 the "worst-caseu 

• shipment scenarios are considered, i.e., those that have the potential for very severe conse

quences but have a"very low occurrence probability.' Section 5.7'discusses the impact due-to 

eixport/im'port, shipments>• Section 5.8 discusses the nonradiological impacts of transportation" 

accidents, and Section 5.9 summarlzes the results of the acr Ident risk~and consequence calcu

lations. A sensitivity analysis for the risk computation is performed in Appendix I. 

52 DETfAILED ANALYSIS" .. - • 

i Direct-radiological im~acts on man are considered to be the mo-st'Important component of 

'the'environmental impact. Direct impact to man may result from tnsportaton by any mode-or

5-1l
AcJ 

Seve 

eClae 

S(by 

*See 

n

standard "• 

I Shipments,.' I " 

SModel :' R'J x~ected Num-ber 

i• i i •ot Accidents 

r per; Year in Each S' , " : , ' -- Population Zone 

ident '0 

erity 

sslfication ••Accidentý'ad 9 '" " , for each ModsRt 

!- • and Severity 

-•o ~Category , 

,dent . 

rity D a ta 

mode) ..

"FIGURE 5-1. 'FLOW DIAGRAN FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS"

-7I, 

otes on following page.

VI N
FIGURE 5-1 (continued) 

Notes: 

a. Shipment mode. 

,b. Type of ,packaging. 

.c. -Type of radionuclide; chemical and physical form. 

d.' Amount of dispersible material released or amount-of unshielded, 

material. 

e. Dosimetric data for radionuclide. 

f. Overall accident rate for each mode. 

g. Accident rate 'for each mode-severity~combination. 

h Amount of di spersible material iinhaled or external exposure' 

-from unshielded material.. .... 

i. Number of shipments per year; average distance per shipment. ' 

j. Fractions of accidents expected in each population zone. 

"k. Population densities. - . - . , - 4 . 

1. -Biological effects of exposure.' 

m. Average number of accidents per year of each severity. 

n. Summation over all severities. 

o. Summation over all scenarios. 

''.44.44~.2 4 1:~~ 

-~t 7.. ' * .. . 44

5-3
submode. The probability that a transport vehicle of a particular mode will be involved in an 

accident of a specific severity depends on the accident rate per vehicle-kilometer, the number 

of shipments per year by that mode, and the distance traveled by each shipment transported by 

that mode. The "consequences" of an accident involving a specific mode depend on the quantity 

and type of radioactive material carried, the fraction of the material that is released in the 

accident, the population density in the area where the release occurs, the local meteorology 

at the time of the accident, and the biological effect of the material Ln the environment. 

5.2.1 ACCIDENT RATES 

In order to compute the probability of an accident, it is first necessary to know the 

accident rate for the mode under consideration. The accident rates used in this assessment 

are specified per vehicle-kilometer and are summarized in Table 5-1, which also lists the 

sources for the information. 

5.2.2 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTAL SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION 

The amount of radioactive material released to the environment in an accident depends 

upon the severity of the accident and the package capabilities. .gery_,severe accidents might 

be expected to release a considerable amount of the radioactive material carried, while minor 

accidents are unlikely to cause, any release. Thus, in addition to the overall accident rate 

for each mode, the distributions of accidents according to severity must be determined. In 

this section, the aicident severity classification scheme used in this assessment is discds

sed, and the distributions of accidents according to severity are determined for air,. truck, 

rail, and waterborne transport modes. In addition, estimates of the relative occurrences of 

accidents of each severity, in each population zone, and for each transport mode are discussed. 

5.2.2.1 Aircraft Accidents 

The classification scheme devised for aircraft accidents follows that of Clarke, et al. 

(Ref. 5-2) and is illustrated in Figure 5-2. The ordinate is the speed of impact onto an 

unyielding surface, and the abscissa is the duration of a 1300OK fire. The results of Clarke 

et al. indicate that impact speed and fire duration are the most significant parameters with 

which to categorize aircraft accidents and that crush, puncture, and immersion are lower-order 

effects (Ref. 5-3). Unyielding surface rather than real surface impacts were chosen in order 

to make use of the data of Clarke et al. and to facilitate comparison with the regulatory 

standards. A derating model is introduced into the analysis later to account for the prob

ability of impact on real surfaces rather than on unyielding targets. 

The first two scale divisions for impact speed were chosen to correspond to standards for 

Type A and Type B packagings, respectively. Thus, Category I accidents (with no fire), equiv

alent to a drop from 4 feet (1.2 n) or less onto an unyielding surface, should not produce a 

loss of containment or shielding in a Type A package. A 30 foot (9.1 m) equivalent drop was 

chosen as the division between Category II and Category III impact accidents, corresponding 

to the Type B container test specification. The remaining Impact category divisions were

5-4
TABLE 5-1 

ACCIDENT RATES

Mode

Aircraft 

Truck, Delivery 

van

Accident -Rate" 

(per vehicle-kilometer) 

1.44 x 10-8 

1.06 x 10-6

ICV .46 x 10-6 5-5, 57 

Train .93 x 10- 5-2, 5-7, 

Helicopter .63 x 106 5-9-. 

Ship, Barge 6.06;x 10- 6 ! 15-I0 

- Also -see -K.-A -.Soloman, -2-Estite.of,Athe-.Probability that an 

Aircraft Will Impact the PVNGS," NUS-1416, June 1975. 

Rail accidents aregiven as railcar accidents per railcar

kilometer.

3.- 7 7 7;

5-5

Reference

5-2

5-2, 5-5 '

0
VII

VI

i i

V

VII

VI

U I.

IV V

VIII

VII

VI VII

Isis4.

III IV V VI

II - III IV 

E III 

IV

0.5 1 1.5 2

1300°Kelvin Fire Duration !ours) 

FIGURE 5-2. ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION 

SCHEME - AIRCRAFT 

5-6

600 

304

224 

I192

fin

-u n 

uJ 

Lx 

U

0D 

c/

17.6 

0

I

.fLU

6

0
chosen more or less arbitrarily from the aircraft accident data compiled by Clarke et al. 

(Ref. 5-3) in such a way that 

1. 95% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category VII or.less, 

2. 85% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category VI or less, 

3. 80% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category V or less. 

4. 70% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category IV or less, and 

5. 60% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category III or less. 

The fire duration category divisions were chosen in such a way that, with the exception of 

certain Category IV accidents, increasing the fire duration'by' 30 minutes is equivalent to in

creasing the impact to the next higher level. Impacts at less than 48 kilometers per hour 

would not be sufficient to in accident of severity Category V or greater regardless of 

how long the fire burned. The fire temperature was chosen as 1300°K'to facilitate comparison 

with previous data (Ref. 5-2) and to correspond roughly to the temperature of a jet fuel fire. 

Note that Category I accidents can involve a fire of as much as 15 minutes' duration. A 

Type A package invoived in a Category I accident in which a fire occurs'would not be required 

by the regulations to survive the accident without loss of shielding or containment. 

The fractions of aircraft accidents expected-in each of the :eight aircraft accident 

severity categories are given in'Table 5-2. The numbers under the column heading "Unyielding 

Surface" were taken from the accident severity data of Clarke et al. (Ref. 5-3) and were adapted 

to the accident severity classification scheme used in this study. 

The fractional occurrences listed unaer the heading "Real Surfaces" account for the fact 

that most aircraft accidents involve impact onto surfaces that yield or deform to provide at 

least some cushioning effect and result in impact-forces that are lessjsevere than would occur 

on an unyielding surface. The'e fractional occurrences are obtained by derating those for un

yielding surfaces,' based upon occurrence statistics for surfaces of varying hardness. The 

details and rationale for this procedure are discussed in Appendix H. The derating of acci

dent severnties was made beginning with Category VIII and working back as far as Category III. 

No real surface derating is expected for Categories I and II, since these low-severity acci

dents are expected to occur while the aircraft is on the ground at the airport. 

A subclassification within each severity category was made to estimate the fraction of 

those accidents that occur in a given population density zone. Three zones were used in this 

assessment: low, medium, and high, characterized by average population densities of 6, 719, 

and 3861 persons/km 2, respectively (the derivation of these values is discussed in Appendix 

E). Since accident reports do not generally include the population density of the surrounding 

areas, the data to determine the accident occurrence fractions in various population zones do

5-7
TABLE 5-2 * 

FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BYACCIDENT 

SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE

Fractional Occurrences f, 

Unyielding Real 

Surface 'Surface 

5.447 

.16 .447 

'.09 .0434 

.05 .0107 

.03 .0279 

.03 .0194 

-. 04 .0046 

.03 .0003 

1.00 1.00

Fractional Occurrences 'According 

.to Population Density Zones 

Low Medium High 

.05 .9 .05 

.05 .9 .05 

.1 .8 .1 

.1 .8 .1 

.3 .6 .1 

.3 .6 .1 

.98 .01 .01 

.98 .01 .01

Overall Acident Rate - 1.44 x 10-8 accidents/kilometer for commnercial aircraft 

(K. A. Solomnan, "Estimate of the Probability that an Aircraft Will Impact the 

PVNGS," NUS-1416, June 1975.)

U'

Accident' 

Severity 

Category 

I 

II 

III 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

VIII 

TOTALI
not exist. Thus, estimates were based on the following assumptions relating severity to 

accident locations: 

1. Accidents of severities I and II are assumed to occur at airports. Since most 

airports are in suburban (or medium) population density zones, 90% of all class I and II 

accidents were estimated to occur in medium density zones, with 5% each in low- and high-den

sity zones. 

2. Accident Categories III-VI were expected to be mainly takeoff and landing accidents 

and thus were expected to occur near airports. 

3. The fractional occurrence of accidents in 1-ow-population-density zones was assumed 

to increase somewhat with accident severity, since a greater percentage of Categories V and VI 

accidents occur at higher speeds, which implies greater distaý6nce from the airport. 

4. Accidents of severity Categories VII'or VIII are mainly in-flight accidents and are 

expected to occur at random along the flight path: They are very strongly weighted toward the 

rural, or low density, areas since about- 9ilof the land area of the United States is consid

ered rural (Ref. 5-4). The remainder Is estimated to be' split between medium population 

density (1.9% of the total land area) and high population' density (0.1% of the total land 

area). 

The accident rate'for U.S. certified route carriers used in this assessment isl.44 x 10"8 

per kilometer. This accident rate represents an average over.all aircraft types forthe years 

.1967-1972, but within those years the range was 1.13 x 108 to 2.0 x 16-8 per kilomreter. The 

accident rate' for eah -severity leveliwsobt ained by multiplyihg the overall accident rate by 

the fractional occurrence for real surfaces for that severity class. For each scenario in the 

standard shipments model, three risks are computed, assuming the shipments occur entirely in 

a low-, medium-, or high-population density zone. The actual risk is obtained by forming 

the sum of these three ris;k•lues-, wihtda by the' fractional -adident occurrence in each 

population density zone for that scenario. This same computational technique is used for all 

transport modes. 

5.2.2.2 Truck Accidents .. .

The severity classification scheme for truck accidents is shown in Figure 5-3. In this 

case the ordinate is crush force rather than impact. Foley etta1. (Ref. 5-5) have shown that, 

in the case of accidenhtsinvolVingbiiotor carrieis,"the-dominant'factors 'in the determination of 

accident severity are crush force, fire duration, and puncture. The crush force may result 

from either an inertial load (e.g., container crushed upon impact by other containers in load) 

or static load (e.g., container crushed beneath vehicle)., . 

The fractional occurrences of truck accidents in each of the eight severity categories 

are listed in Table 53.' Sitnce the dominiait 'ffect:is A crush rather than "impact, no real

surface derating is involved. The fractional Occurrences were taken from the data of Foley et 

al. (Ref. 5-5). Note that the values for Categories VII and VIII are much lower than for

-5-9
S2220

0_ &.1,U 

CD, S. IV V VI . VII 

8 9 

". III' ~ IV V ~ VIf 

-22 

SII III IV~ 

6.7 

"0.5 115 12 

13000 Kelvin Pire Duration (Hours) 

S:c• FIGURE 5-3. ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION 

SCHEME - MOTOR TRUCKS 

5-10

-1
.5

TABLE 5-3 

FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR TRUCK ACCIDENTS BY ACCIDENT

77 

* 7.7 

7

'7!. 

':7

*. .' SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE 

'Accident " Frac~tional Occurrences According 

,Severity Fractional. , to Population Density Zones "ACategory Occurrences f- -Low Medium High 

I 7 .55 .1 1 .8 

S II ., .. .36 .1 .1 .8 

.07 .3 .4 .3 

IV . " ; . .016 ' - '.3 .4 . .3 

. V ' ,, .0028 .5 .3 ,, .2 

.1 .7 .2 '".1 

VII 8.5 xi0 .8 8 .1 • 

"Vi VI "ll 1.5 x 10 .9 .05 .05 

SOverall Accident Rate"(Ref1 5-5) 1 "06 'X 1f0 ,acctdenti/ktlometer (0.46.x 10"6

U' 

-ae
aircraft accidents. The overall accident rate for motor carriers transporting hazardous 

materials used for this assessment is 1.06 x I0"6 accidents/kilometer. 

The estimated fractions of truck accidents in each severity category occurring in each 

population density zone are also shown in Table 5-3. The very low severity accidents are 

expected to occur mainly in urban areas. The table reflects a gradual shift of accidents to 

rural areas with Increasing severity as average velocity increases. 

Current plans are to require shipment of plutonium in 1985 by Integrated Container Vehi

cles (ICV) (Ref. 5-6). These are trucks with large vault-like cylinders designed to withstand 

accident forces and attempted penetration by thieves or saboteurs. Using ERDA nuclear weapons 

shipment data, the accident rate (which includes the effects of a reduced speed limit, freeway 

travel, no weekend driving, etc.) is expected to be 0.46 x 10-6 accidents/kilometer (Ref. 5-7). 

The fraction of accidents within each severity category and the fraction of accidents in each 

population zone are expected to be the same for ICVs as for other trucks. 

5.2.2.3 Delivery-Van Accidents 

The accident severity classification scheme for delivery vans is the same as that for 

trucks, as shown In Figure 5-3. Fractional occurrences by severity and the overall accident 

rate are shown in Table 5-4 and were taken to be the same as for trucks. The fractional 

occurrences in the three population zones, however, are different. In the standard shipments 

model, delivery vans are used only as a secondary transport mode. There is practically no 

rural travel since most of the radioactive materials transport in delivery vans is to and from 

airports, truck terminals, and railroad depots. There are expected to be more low-severity 

accidents in high-population-density zones and more severe accidents on freeways in medium

population density zones as a result of the higher freeway speeds. 

5.2.2.4 Train Accidents 

Figure 5-4 illustrates the accident severity classification scheme used for train acci

dents. The ordinate in this case is impact velocity, taking into account the effects of 

puncture. In their analysis of train accidents, Larson et al. (Ref. 5-8) considered crush to 

be an important factor. However, they were concerned with containers shipped in carload lots 

and with the crush forces resulting from interaction with other cargo in the rail car. Since 

the principal rail shipment considered is spent fuel, which is not shipped on the same car as 

other cargo, crush as a severity criterion is not of prime importance. 

Table 5-5 lists the fractional occurrences for train accidents by severity class and by 

population density zone. The f 1-values were taken from the data of Larson et al. (Ref. 5-8). 

As with truck accidents, no real-surface derating of the fractional occurrences is required, 

since the predominant mode of damage in severe accidents is puncture. The overall accident 

rate is 0.93 x 10-6 railcar accidents/railcar-kilometer, assuming an average train length of 

70 cars and an average of 10 cars involved in each accident (Refs. 5-7 and 5-8). As in the 

case of motor trucks, the more severe accidents are assumed to occur in lower-population

density zones where velocities are higher.

5-12
TABLE 5-4 

FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR DELIVERY VAN ACCIDENTS BY

ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE

Accident 

Severity 

Category 

IV III '

IV 

vrt 

VII 

viii 

*Ovirall Acci

Fractional 

Occurrences'f 

.55 

.36 1

.07 

016 

.0028 

. 0011 

8.5 x 101 

1.5-x 10"•

dent Rate - 1.06 x 10"6 Iaccidents/ki'lo'r

AA ...A 

LA 

'A. 

i-A 

A'

A.A.A I 

-l y

'--A '.*,. 

AS

WA

go

Fractional Occurrences According 

to Population Density Zones 

Low Medium High 

.01 6 .39 .60 

.01 .39 .60 

.01 .39 .60, 

.01 I .50 .49 

.01 .50 .48 

.O01 .50 .49 

.01 .60 .39 

.01 .60 • .39 

iter

I

11 . ., . 4
160 

130

64

Vill-

" 40 

, = III IV V VI 

- 24 

8.0 

S.2III IV 

01 

0.5 1 1.5 

(1300OKELVIN) FIRE DURATION HOURS;

FIGURE 5-4. ACCIDENI SEVERITY CATEGORY 

CLASSIFICATION SCHEME - TRAIN

IV

-2

5-14 _

I
"* .: ,TABLE 545 

"7 •,FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR TRAIN ACCIDENTS BY 

ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE 

Accident . . Fractional Occurrences According 

severi ity," Fiactional to Population Density Zones 

,- • Category a r , 'Occurrences S... Low Med1ium H , 7• --,, 7' 1, -. 1 0. .1 . 

7, - .3 

" .. .. .4 ,, • : • T, '' "•' "•' .0018 . . 

.. : . .3 .1.3klO": 

' - ViX " ; - 6.0 x 18. . 

-4 .05 

"1 6.0 xV 10 8 

7 cdent *Overal Rate4-0.93 xO"6 -aiicar acctdents'ratlcaý-ktloreter. 

7 7- 4

in

#
5.2.2.5 Helicopter Accidents 

Helicopter accidents are classified in a manner similar to aircraft accidents (Figure 5-2). 

The overall accident rate is 0.63 x 10-6 accidents/kilometer (Ref. 5-9), and the fractional 

occurrences, shown in Table 5-6, are taken to be the same as for aircraft impacting on real 

surfaces. However, the fractional occurrences in the three population density zones are 

different since helicopters are used principally as a secondary transport mode to and from 

airports. 

Accidents represented by the first two severity categories occur while the helicopter is 

on the ground either at the airport or at a pickup or delivery point, all of which would be 

located primarily in medium- and low-population density zones. It is 'anticipated that helicop

ter flights, particularly those carrying extremely hazardous material, would be routed to 

avoid flying over high-population-density zones whenever possible. Thus, the takeoff and 

landing accidents (severity Categories III-VI), as well as the in-flight accidents (Categories 

VII-VIII), are expected to be concentrated in the medium- and low-population-density zones. 

Category VII and VIII accidents involving helicopters are considered to be midair collisions 

and would be expected to occur mainly in the immediate vicinity of an airport; thus most of 

these accidents should occur in medium-population-density zones. 

5.2.2.6 Ship And Barge Accidents (Ref. 5-10) 

Records for calendar year 1973 for domestic waterborne traffic show a total of 6.67 x lOll 

ton-miles. Precise data are~not available to indicate what fraction of those ton-miles was 

barge traffic; however, a reasonable estimate seems to be 1.73 x l0ol tori;-miles of barge 

traffic. According to the Coast Guard's annual statistics of casualties, there were an esti

mated 1395 barge accidents in 1973, of which about 60% involved cargo barges. 

The available data cannot be analyzed'in the same way as the data for rail or truck 

transport. On the basis of discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard, it is estimated that the 

average net cargo weight of a typical barge is about 1200 tons. The total number of barge 

miles would then be about 1.44 x 108. This yields an accident rate of about 6.0 accidents per 

million barge kilometers. 

Very little data are available on the severity of accidents involving barges. Since 

barges travel only a few miles per hour, the velocity of impacts in accidents is small. 

However, because of the large mass of the vehicle and cargo, large forces could be encountered 

by packages, for instance, spent fuel casks aboard barges. A forward barge could impact on a 

bridge pier and suffer crushing forces as other barges are pushed into it. A coastal or river 

ship could knife into a barge. Fires could result in either case. An extreme accident, i.e., 

an extreme impact plus a long fire, is considered to be of such low probability that it is not 

considered a design-basis accident. The likelihood of a long fire in barge accidents is small 

because of the availability of water at all times. Also, since casks could be kept cool by 

sprays or submergence in water, there is compensation for loss of mechanical cooling.

5-16
".' ', 4i' 

a 7. 

4 -,. - ' 

.'- '.4 4* 

4, , '4

"7'. 

ACC 

Accident 

2 SeVerity 

Category 

V, 

"• I I 

Oea ,denA c 

- ( .* , .1 .. . 

"44'" *vr] Acidn

. TABLE 5-6 . 

RACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS BY 

:IDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE

Fractional 2 Fractional Occurrences According 

Occurrences, - to Population Density Zones 

(Real Surfaces) . ' Low , , Medium High 

.447 .35, .60 .05, 

447 '" .35 .60 .05 

.0434 .45, .45 .10 

".0j,7' .45 - . .45 .10 

.0279' " .45. ' .45 -, .10 

.0194 ;45. .45 ..10 4 0194 7 , 

._0046 ,• ..19 .80 .01 

.0003 - .19 .80 .01 

-- 4'.000 7:,: 19 .

Rate 0.63x 1iO-6 accidents/kilometer 

. ;,.,4,

}

I

L
The likelihood of cargo damage occurring in barge accidents is much less than in the case 

of rail accidents. The accident severity breakdown for ship and barge is shown in Table 5-7. 

If a cask were accidentally dropped into water during barge transport, it is unlikely 

that it would be adversely affected unless the water was very deep. Most fuel is loaded into 

casks under water, so immersion would have no immediate effects. The water would remove the 

heat, so overheating would not occur. Each cask is required by NRC regulations (10 CFR 

§ 71.32(b)) to be designed to withstand an external pressure equal to the water pressure at a 

depth of 15 m (50 ft), and most designs will withstand external pressure at much greater 

depths. If a cask seal were to fail due to excessive pressure in deep water, only the small 

amount of radioactivity in the cask coolant and gases from perforated elements in the cask 

cavity would be likely to be released. Even if the cask shielding were ruptured as a result of 

excessive pressure, the direct radiation would be shielded by the water. About 10 m of water, 

which is the depth of most storage Oools, would be ample shielding for radiation, even from 

fully exposed fuel elements. 

In a recent study (Ref. 5-11) it was concluded that the pressure seals on a spent fuel 

cask that is dropped into the ocean might begin to fail at a depth of 200 meters, a typical 

depth at the edge of the continental shelf, and release contaminated coolant. The fuel elements, 

which contain most of the radioactive material, provide excellent containment. In an operating 

reactor, the fuel elements are under tater at' elevated temperatures and at-pressures on the 

order of 1000 to 2000 psi. Thus exposure to water pressures at depths of 600 to 1200 m should 

have no substantial -effect on the fuel elements themselves. The study concluded that they 

would not fail until they reached a depth of approximately 3000 meters. Once they failed, the 

fuel pins would release fission products into the ocean, but these would be dispersed into 

such a large volume of the ocean that the concentrations would be very small. Certain nuclides 

such as cesium and plutonium could be reconcentrated through the food chain to fish and inver

tebrates that could be eaten by man; but, as pointed out in the study, the possibilities of a 

single person consuming large quantities of seafood, all of which was harvested from the 

immediate vicinity ')f the release, is very remote, especially' since most seafood is harvested 

in areas over the continental shelves. 

In virtually all cases, except those in which the cask was submerged to extreme depths, 

recovery would be possible with normal salvage equipment. If the cask and elements could not 

be recovered, corrosion could open limited numbers of weld areas within about 2000 years 

(Ref. 5-11), with possible localized failures occurring sooner. However, by that time most of 

the radioactivity would have decayed. Subsequent release would-be gradual, and the total 

amount of radioactivity released at any one time and over the total period would be relatively 

small. Considering the extremely low probability of occurrence, the major reduction in radio

activity due to radioactive decay, and the dilution that would be available, there would be 

little environmental impact from single events of this kind. 

Should a shipment be accidentally dropped during transfer to a barge, the main effect 

will likely be limited to that of rather severe damage to the barge. It is possible that a 

fuel cask could penetrate the barge decks and fall into the relatively shallow water of the 

breakwater basin. As previously discussed, there would be at most only minor radiological

5-18
TABLE 5-7 

-- .• -, "• FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR SHIP AND BARGE ACCIDENTS 

BY SEVERITY CATEGORY'AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE 

S-' - Accident Fractional 'Fractional Occurrences According 

Mccident'Sever ty .'Fractional Severity •' Occurrences to population density zone 

t- Category** Occurrences Category (this assessment) Low Medium High 

inor-2 7 I - .897 0 .5 5, 

ninor .0794,, II .0798 0 .5 .5 

moderati-2 .001449 

.,,• moderate-3. .00113; III .00113. 

~o r' .. .0... 1 013 .9 . 

moderate-4'-, .0186'- IV - .0186 0 .9 

"severe-2 .0000052 V .0000052 .1 .9 0 

" seere-3 ' .000072 VI .000072, .1 .9 

severe-4 ,, .000195', VII .000195- 1 .9 0 

, xtra.severe-'l, - .00013 VIII .000013 .1 .9 0 

"*Overall 3cident rate - 0.06,0 accldents/kilometer' '. , 

,Iroý Oef.'5- .
consequences, since the cask (or drums) could be recovered easily and rather quickly. The 

environmental impact resulting from damage to the barge (including its sinking) would also be 

minor, since salvage could readily be started. The most significant effect would be the 

economic loss from recovery operations. 

Waterborne traffic spends a very small fraction of its travel in high-population-density 

regions. The highest traffic density will probably occur in the port- areas and, as a result, 

be associated with lower speed. Categories VI, VII, and VIII accidents probably require 

relatively large forces, a long-term fire, or an explosion, which are more likely to occur in 

open water. Categories III through V are more likely to be the result of a lower speed colli

sion in a dock area, either with another vessel or a pier. The population density of dock 

areas of most cities was considered to be representative of a medium-population zone. Hence, 

Class III-V accidents are assumed to occur in a medium-population zone. Categories I and II 

accidents are not likely to involve another vessel, since they are very minor in nature. 

Hence, they are considered to occur either in open waters or while securely moored. These 

assumptions are reflected in Table 5-7. 

5.2.3 RELEASE FRACTIONS 

In order to assess the risk of a transportation accident, one must be able to predict the 

package response to an accident of given severity. In particular, one needs to know the 

fraction of the total package contents that would be released for an accident of given severity. 

The actual releases for a given package type would not necessarily bethe same'for a number of 

accidents of the same severity class. In some cases there may be no release, while in others 

there may be, for example, a 10% release. Indeed, in a given accident involving a number of 

radioactive material packages. transported together, some of the packages may release part of 

their contents while others have no release at all. The approach taken in this.assessment is 

to derive a point estimate for the average release fraction for each severity' category and 

package type and assume a1_1 such packages, including each package in a multipackage shipment, 

respond to such an accident In the same way without regard to the type or form of the contents. 

The paucity of data on package responses to severe accidents makes it difficult to predict 

even the average release fraction, much less a distribution. Since the packaging standards do 

not require tests to failure there has been, until recently, little information relating the 

response of packages to accident environments. 

Recently, a series of severe impact tests was carried out at Sandia Laboratories using 

several types of containers commonly used to ship plutonium (Refs. 5-12 and 5-13). All con

tainer types survived tests with no structural damage to the Inner container after Impacts 

onto unyielding targets occurred at speeds up to those typical of a Category V impact accident. 

Several containers exhibited some minor structural damages and cracking in Category VI Impacts, 

but no verified release occurred. Tests of containersVtyplcal of those in commerce resulted 

in failure of a nonspecification cast iron plug and allowed material-loss and also compromised 

the overall integrity of the inner containers., In one test a-container lost 6% of its contents 

(magnesium oxide powder) in a Category VII impact; others survived Category VIII Impacts with 

no loss of contents. Although none of the containers in this test series was subjected to

5-20
fire, others of the same type survived less severe impacts followed by a 1300 0K environment 

lasting for a half-hour with no release. Using this test information or assuming that pack

agings begin to fail at severities just above those that they are required to survive, the 

responses of packages are estimated by the methods detailed below. The release fraction 

estimates for all packagings evaluated are shown in Table 5-8. 

Two specific release fraction models are considered. Model I specifies total release of 

package contents for all dccident severities exceeding that specified by Federal regulations. 

This somewhat unrealistic model assumes that zero release occurs up to the regulatory test 

level and that the packaging fails catastrophically in all environments that exceed that 

level. Clearly, packagings do not behave in this fashion, but this approach does present a 

simplistic evaluation of present regulations. Model II Is considered to be a more realistic 

model, although it too has inherent conservatism as is discussed later. Models I and II are 

used for the 1975 and 1985 risk assessment, and Model II is used for consideration of transpor

tation alternatives in Chapter 6. 

5.2.3.1 Release Fractions For Plutonium Shipping Containers 

Two sets of release fractions for Type B plutonium shipping containers are listed for 

Model II; both are derived from the container impact test data described earlier (Refs. 5-12 

and 5-13). Those release fractions listed under the heading 1975 Pu show a small release (13) 

in a Category VI accident. This accounts for the possibility that small amounts of material 

might be forced through the cracks observed in the inner container. The 5% release in Category 

VII reflects the results of the one test in which a measurable amount of material escaped. 

The Category VIII release fraction' of 10% is an estimate of the upper limit to the release 

fraction based upon analysis of all test data. 

The 1985 Pu release fractions acknowledge that in the interim period from 1975-to 1985, 

package development programs currently underway are likely to produce packages that will have 

higher integrity. As a result only a 1% release is expected in Category VII and 10% in Cate

gory VIII. Even lower release fractions are likely to be justifiable for containers currently 

under development, but no lower values were shown without complete test data and assurance 

that older containers will be out of use. 

The Integrated Container-Vehicle (ICV) .s currently being discussed as the principal 

transport vehicle for plutonium shipments in 1985 and is expected to change the release frac

tions associated with plutonium shipments appreciably. The massive vault-like containers 

will be highly accident resistant. The release fractions assumed for these containers are 

also shown in Table 5-8. . -

5.2.3.2. Other Type B Containers 

Federal regulations require that Type 8 packagings be able to withstand tests designed to 

simulate certain accident conditions (Ref. 5-14). In the absence of test data on safety 

margins for Type B packages, the assumption is made that most containers begin to fail just 

beyond the accident conditions at which they were tested, although not in the catastrophic

5-21
TABLE 5-8 

RELEASE FRACTIONS 

Model I

Severity 

Category 

I 

II 

III 

IV 

V 

VI 

Vii 

VIII

j 

I 

4*) . 

54

LSA 

Drums 

10 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

"1.0 

i.0 

1.0 

"1.0

-Ty pe A 

10 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0

Cask 

(Exposure) 

0' 

0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0

N 

m

'C

j 

-t *

Cask 

(Release) 

0 

0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0

47

Type B 

0 

0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0
fABLE 5-8 (continued)', 

RELEASE FRACTIONS 

Model 'II

33

Severity, 

Category 

.3 .., II 

IV 

* IV 

VI 

VII 

S . ' ,VIII 

33 ,3 

'4 3 VII

.LSA 

Drum Type 

1 0 0 

:01 

".01" .01 

1 .0 .. 1 .0 

1 .•0 1.0 

S.o" 1.0 

1.0 0 1.0 

4

Type B 1975 1985 

SNo Pu 'Pu Pu 

0 0. 0 

30 0 0 

.01 0 0 

.1 0 0 

- 1.0 0 0 

'1.0 .01 0 

"1.0 .5 6 .01 

1.0 .1 .

Cask (exposure) 

0 

.0 

0 

0'O 

•'0 

3.18x10-7 

3.18x10- 5 

3.12x10-3

3 7 3

33

4 3

CA

Cask (release) 

0 

0 

.01 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0

ICV 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0
manner assumed with Model I. Above the threshold test at which release occurs, the release 

fractions are assumed to increase with increasing accident severity as assumed for plutonium 

containers. Note that catastrophic failure (i.e., complete release) is assumed for accident 

severity categories above IV. This is a conservative assumption in the absence of tests to 

failure. 

5.2.3.3. Type A And Low Specific Activity Containers 

The same rationale used for Type B containers is used for Type A containers. A small re

lease is assumed for Category II with progressively greater releases with increasing severity 

in the same way as for Type B containers. An independent test carried out at Sandia Laborato

ries on a single Type A (Mo-99 generator) container under Category IV impact conditions re

sulted in extensive packaging damage but zero release. Thus, the release fractions assumed 

for this type of packaging are believed to be conservative. 

5.2.3.4 Casks 

Large casks are used for shipments of large irradiator or teletherapy sources, irradiated 

fuel, and high-level fuel.cycle waste. In analyzing release fractions, therefore, two types 

of releases must be considered:ý direct release of contents to the environment and exposure of 

the surrounding environment to neutron or gamma radiation through a breach in shielding. 

These two problems must be addressed separately. 

Spent fuel can be thought of as a combination of two components: gaseous and volatile 

materials in the coolant, plenums, and void spaces in fuel rods and non-volatile fission pro

ducts and activated material held in the matrix of the fuel pellets. Since packagings for 

large-quantity shipments such as spent fuel must meet Type B standards, the Type B packaging 

release fractions discussed previously are used to evaluate-the release of available gaseous 

and volatile materials (Ref. 5-14). Drop tests using spent fuel shipping containers were 

conducted at Sandia Laboratories (Ref. 5-15). There were no releases at impact velocities up 

to 394 kilometers per hour onto hard soil. 

The effect of loss of shielding is modeled =by assuming that a circumferential crack is 

produced in the cask by the accident forces (see Figure 5-5). Using probabilities and descrip

tions of breaches suggested in Reference 5-16, a Category VI accident was considered the 

minimum accident with forces sufficient to cause a crack through the entire cask. This was 

modeled as a circumferential crack 0.1 cm wide around the entiie cask. In a Category VII 

accident this crack is assumed to be 1 cm in width; in a Category VIII accident, it is 

assumed to be 10 cm in width..: 

The "release fraction" for the loss of shielding case is not really a release fraction at 

all, but is the product of the fraction (W/L) of the source length that is exposing the sur

rounding population and the fraction [1 - 2/n tan-i(TNW)] of the surrounding area that lies 

within the sector being exposed (see Figure 5-5). The computation of the integrated popu

lation dose is then carried out assuming a fictitious point source whose strength is the total

5-24
SECTOR IN WHICH PEOPLE ARE' EXPOSED 

,, (EQUAL SECTOR ON OPPOSITE SIDE)

CENTERLINE 

OF CASK " 

* . ; r. ,- , 

C-'"

FRACI 

POP

4,4444 

'"I

- 4 4,

SHIELDING 

PROVIDED 

BY CASK

-IRRADIATED 

FUEL

iw 

- - . - W = WIDTH OF CRACK 

""T -TIICKNESS -OF 'CASKSHIELDING 

ION OF SURROUNDING 7" 

~ULATION EXPOSED I- TAN -WI

* 4 4" 4." z-. ,4'..j' T 7 , .. I'.b ,•

t .C7 74 . 4 -44 

FIGURE 5-5.' RELEASE FRACTION MODEL FOR EXPOSURE-TYPE-'- -- ' , 

SOURCES'SHIPPED IN CASKS, , 

Z-- -

4 , , , , ' --.- -., 

5-25 "

/ 

I m I I I 4 - I I 

- - - - - - - N - N - N --

i

ll_ý
number of curies contained multiplied by the "release fraction," with the Integration extending 

over the entire area. The values in Table 5-8 were determined for a cask length, L, of 2.54 

meters and a shielding thickness, T, of 0.4 meter. 

5.2.4 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS 

The shipment parameters that contribute to the accident impact calculation include the 

number of curies per package, the number of packages per shipment, the physical/chemical form 

of the material, the dosimetric aspects of the material, the number of shipments per year by 

each mode, and the distance traveled by each shipment. These data are presented in Appendix A. 

5.3 DISPERSION/EXPOSURE MODEL 

Once a release has occurred, the released material is assumed to drift downwind and 

disperse according'to a Gaussian diffusion model and can produce such environmental effects as 

internal and external radiation doses, contamination, or buildup in the food chain. If the 

accident involves a material in special form, only external radiation exposure is assumed to 

occur. •. .. . . . . . . 

Environmental iaacts resuelt both from a-release-to the atmosphere'and from external 

radiation exposure from a large source whose shielding has been damaged in an accident... 

Atmospheric transport and diffusion can disperse released material over large areas, but the

degree of dispersion is determinedby-atmospheric turbulence, which is a function of the season 

of the year, time of day, amount of cloud cover, surface characteristics, and other meteoro

logical parameters. The deposition of radionuclides--assoitedi thi-thft-passage of a cloud of 

released material can have a very complex lenviro'nmatal impact. Some possible ways in which 

the dispersed material can produce a dose to man are summarized in Figure 5-6. Direct external 

or internal dose to man is the principal effect from gamma emitters. Material that emits 

alpha or beta radiation produces the largest radiological consequence when aerosolized and 

inhaled by man. Figure 5-6 shows that'deposited'radionuclides can also be taken into the food 

chain. They can be transferred from-soil. to- vegetation to animals and eventually to man. 

However, radiation doses to man through the food-chain pathway are usually more significant 

(relative to doses through Inhalation, for example) if there exists a continuous source of 

release to the environment. 

5.3.1 ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION MODEL ..... 

The dispersion model is based on Gaussian diffusion, a technique widely used in analysis 

of atmospheric transport and diffusion. Accidents that involve a release of dispersible 

material are assumed to produce a cloud of aerosolized debris instantaneously at the accident 

site. The initial distributionrof aerosol mass, with heightis assumed. to be a line source 

extending from the ground to a height of' 10 meters.'-, The• iitial concentration increases with 

height in a manner consistent with data obtained in experimental detonations of simulated 

weapons (Ref. 5-17). The use of such an initial distribution is justified for accidents in 

which fires or residual energy provide an aerosol cloud to be released from the accident site. 

Since the dose from a 10-meter-high line source is indistinguishable from that of a point

5-26
Fa

': ,' .... ' '• ' ,' °. •;GROUND * GST 

", FISH OR;, ANIMAL DO 

SEAFOOD, FLESH 

.... PR6ODUCTS 

" FIGURE 5-6. POSSIBLE.ROUTES'TO MAN FROM RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE

(A 

1% 

"-,J

* 1'

I, 3 

-l 

2' 

-.4 

I.

(4 I,
source at downwind distances greater than about 100 meters, the initial distribution with 

height is unimportant. Doses calculated using this model are conservative, since most poten

tial accidents involve energy releases that may carry aerosolized materials to heights greater 

than 10 meters. The degree of conservatism increases as the height of release increases and 

is especially conservative for elevated sources such as a release that might result from 

midair aircraft collisons. 

Transport and diffusion of the aerosol cloud (composed 6f particles so small that gravita

tional settling is minimal) occur symmetrically about the mean wind velocity vector. This 

process is described using climatological distributions of horizontaland vertical components 

of turbulence intensities and wind speed. The aerosolized material is allowed to diffuse 

horizontally without constraint and vertically to an altitude of 1400 meters (Ref. 5-18). 

A year or more of meteorological data recorded at sites near-,White Sands, New Mexico, 

and Aiken, South Carolina,-is used-in the model. These data are used to generate values for 

the lateral and vertical dimensions of the aerosol cloud, which are expressed in terms of the 

measured lateral and vertical turbulence intensities (Ref. 5-19). These values are calculated 

for various downwind locations to provide'estimates of the dilution that has occurred as a 

function of the downwinddistance and the amount of aerosolized material involved. The results 

obtained for each of the meteorological data sets are examined to, determine the area within 

which a given dilution factor is not exceeded (this is an area in which a given concentration 

is exceeded). A curve of area exceeded in only 5% of all meterol1gical- conditions versus 

dilution factor not exceeded within the area is shown in Figure 5-7. This area is taken as a 

credible upper limit in which a given dilution factor will not be exceeded. 

In order to make a full analysis of actual inhalation hazard, the phenomena of deposition 

and resuspension must be considered' As the cloud of aerosolized material is transported by the 

wind, material is scavenged from the cloud by dry deposition processes and deposited on the 

ground. Wet deposition, i.e., deposition by rain and snowfall, is not considered in this model; 

the neglect of wet deposition will mean that this calculation overestimates the population dose 

in areas where precipitation can interact with the aerosol cloud. Dry deposition occurs con

tinuously, and its effect- is-stimated by depleting-the-total quantity of material that would 

contribute to inhalation dose by the amount of material deposited between the source release 

point and a point of interest. The amount of material deposited at any point is calculated 

using a deposition velocity, Vd (m/sec), which, when multiplied by the time-integrated concen

tration (Ci-sec/m ), yields the amount deposited, 0 (Ci/m2). A value of 0.01 m/sec is used for 

Vd based on a previous analysis (Ref. 5-20) and for consistency with the resuspension model 

used in this document. Dry deposition removes material from the cloud and reduces the downwind 

concentration, as shown in the lower curve on Figure 5-7. 

Resuspension occurs when deposited particle material on a surface is made airborne as a 

result of mechanical forces (walking, vehicle traffic, plowing, etc.) and wind stress on the 

deposition surface (as in sandstorms or blowing snow). The resuspended material becomes 

available for inhalation by people in the contaminated area and can cause an additional com

ponent of body burden and radiation dose accumulating with time. Methods used to calculate

5-28
-10-7

10- 8 

'10-10 

10-11

S I

.-12 L, , "A A L A 

10J ,' I '~ 

-104A..A .105 r,' 10

A.1' .10 ,A.08 AAAA1 ]

-~~~~AE -(mX- . .. > 

FIUR 5-7 DONWN 'A DIUTO F ACTOR 

FIGURE 57.DOWNIND ITION OFACTOR

'A. 

A.At-AAAAAAtAAAA**A 

A A' AAA .A.A'A..' A

* A AAAAAA A A **A . r A .AA A.,A .frAAAA A A'A 

AAAA AA AAA-AA' AAAALA AAA',A' A'A A. *A,A A'' .'ASA ' A-A' A AIAAAAAAA A.... 'A 

5-29_

NO DEPOSITION 

A DEPOSITION INCLUDEDV) 

Lii 

Lii 

u

CD

4 6 I I I i
resuspension involve an empirical "resuspension factor," K/m, which is the ratio of the ahi 

concentration at a point to the surface concentration just below that point in the contami

nated area. An initial value of 10"5/m decreasing exponentially with a 50-day half-life to a 

constant value of 10"9/m is used in this study to evaluate the dose contributed by resus

pension (Ref. 5-20). Because of radioactive decay, short-half-life materials such as Tc-99m 

provide little resuspension dose, whereas long-half-life nuclides such as Pu-239 increase the 

initial dose by a factor of up to 1.6 over the dose received during actual cloud passage. 

Two effects can be calculated once the actual downwind concentration and deposition pat

terns are known. The first and most important effect is the fnhalation dose received by 

persons in the downwind area. The calculation of this dose is discussed in Appendix G,, and 

the results are presented later in this chapter. The'second effect,,which can be determined 

from the deposition pattern, is the level of surface contamination.- Contamination on surfaces 

has two principal effects: the material can be resuspended and.inhaled (as previously discus

sed), and affected land or crops can be quarantined or condemned if the contamination level is 

sufficient. The latter effect is discussed in Section 5.5: 

5.3.2 EXTERNAL EXPOSURE MODEL 

If the postulated accident results in shielding damage to a package containing a nondis

persible material, e.g., one of the special-form shipments such as CQ-60 or Ir-192, or an 

irradiated fuel cask, direct external exposure results from the gamma or neutron radiation 

emitted by the material. This assessment assumes that after an accident the source remains at 

the accident site for 1 hour with no evacuation and no introduction of temporary shielding 

The area in which people are exposed is assumed to extend for a distance of 0.8 kilometer 

radially from the location of the source. This calculation is discussed in Appendix G. 

5.3.3 DOSE CALCULATION 

Two doses are computed in the consequence calculation, ind the computation of each is 

discussed in Appendix G. A more detailed discussion is available in Reference 5-1. 'The first 

calculation is of the annual integrated population dose (in person-rems) for either special 

form exposure materials, or atmospherically dispersed materials. This computation is shown 

schematically in Figure 5-8. The results can be expres-d eithier as person-reins delivered to 

particular organs or'as annual 'additional 'expected latent cancer fatalities using conversion 

factors from Chapter 3. 

The second calculation is annual early fatality probability. If an isotope can give a 

sufficient dose to cause an early fatality, either from external exposure or excessive pulmon

ary exposure, the annual probability of this occurrence is computed as shown in Figure 5-9. 

5.4 APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO 1975 AND 1985 STANDARD SHIPMENTS 

The annual population dose calculations were carried out for the standard shipment scenar

ios discussed in Appendix A using the methods discussed previously. The results are presented

5-30
Combine over Severitiei. Modes.' Zones. 

Nuclides

rMaterial a 

*-:-'nput. Information :

Combine over all 

7 organs

s,-'FIGURE 5-8. FLOW CHART FOR *: LATENT CANCER 

FATALITY 

CALCULATION

1"it.

5-31
(4)

(5) 

(7) 

(13) 

(14)

(10)'

5-32
in Table 5-9 for both 1975 and 1985 standard shipments. The annual probability of more than a 

given number of early fatalities is plotted on Figure 5-10 for 1975 and 1985. Note that a 

total of 5.37 x lO"3 latent cancer fatalities were expected to result in 1975 from all radio

active material shipments, with the principal contributor being the 144-curie Po-210 shipment 

scenario with 24% of the 1975 LCFs.* The mixed fission product/corrosion product shipments 

taken together are of similar importance to Po-210, and the shipments of uranium-plutonium 

mixtures are third, representing 10.7% of the total LCFs in 1975. 

The picture in 1985 is similar, except that the plutonium shipments become much less 

important. This results from the expected improvement in packaging -release fractions in 

plutonium containers. 

The data plotted in Figure 5-10 indicate an annual probability of one or more early 

fatalities (within 1 year of an accident) of approximately 3.5 x 10", while the probability 

of 10 or more is 2.5 x 10-6. This implies that an accident serious enough to kill one person 

from acute radiological effects would occur only once in 2000 years at 1975 shipping levels. 

Results using Model'ILrelease-fractions >for 1975 and '1985 data are presented in Table 5-10 

and Figure 5-11. The results shown in Table 5-10 show clearly the impact of the Model I 

release fractions, which imply that the containment capability of the 'containersis no better 

than the regulations require. The most important shipments in this analysis'are those with 

the large quantities of very hazardous materials. The expected LCFs in this case 'are 9.8 per 

year in 1975, more thanlO00 times that forModel II. The data plotted in FigureS5-11 for the 

probability of early fatalities-using Model 1I release fractIons are also ver different from 

the Model II results. They indicate a probability of less than 0.1 -of having one or more 

early fatalities per year for 1975 using this unrealistic, but legally possible, release 

fraction model. 

5.5 CONSEQUENCES OF CONTAMINATION FROM ACCIDENTS " 

In additlon to direct -radiological Jmpacts to man, can accideýnt involving radioactive 

material may result ine- vir6riental contamination leading'to loss of crops or contamination 

of buildings and necessitating evacuation of residents. Analysis of-these impacts has been 

addressed in some detail for the case of a reactor accident in Reference 5-20, and a similar 

methodology has been adopted for this report. 

The potential contamination consequences of..a transportation accident Involving radio

active materials are, in general, several orders of magnitude.smaller than those for a reactor 

accident. The potential for Ingestion of radioactive iaterialsis reduced considerably by the 

"There are many factors that can modlfy~the.risks-identlfied In -Table 5-9. One of these factors 

is the accident resistanceof the package-used to ship particular-radionuclides. Not included 

in this analytical model, and thus not reflected-in the results, is the fact that all large

quantity shipments of polonium were made in the same accident-resistant packages used to ship 

plutonium. If considered, this would result in much smaller releases in many of the accident 

severity categories, and in a smaller total risk attributed to polonium.

5-33 -" -"
S'TABLE 5-9 

ACCIDENT RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS 

- EXPECTED LATENT CANCER FATALITIES

'2"

Standard Shii 

i-PO-210 (144 

MF+MC (LSA) U-•Pu Mix,, 

"MF+MC (A) 

Waste (A) U• .(natural 

"Wahte (B) 

Co-60 (40,004 

'Pu-239 (B) 

"Mixed (A) 

UO 

MX+AC (392 'c 

"2 -Mo-99 (A) 

UFP (enriched 

Ligited 

'Mo-99 (B) 

*Co-60 (LSA) 

I-131 (A) "-Mixed (B) 

Spent fuel-' 

"All'others, "TOTAL 

'4...

'A,,, 

1⁄4

2." F'2

S1975 AND 1985 

- MODEL II RELEASE FRACTIONS 

-Expected Latent Percent * Expected Cancer Fatalities .of Total Cancer Fa 

?ment 1975 Risk, 19 

:1) 

- 00131 24.4 .003 

4* .000709 13.2 .002 

*".000514 10.7 .000 

-:.000478 ' 8.9 .001 

*.000388 7.2 .001 

), t ', :.000328 6.1 .001 

.000182 3.4 .000 

O'cL) .00013 2.4 .000 

.000129 2.4 .000 

.00011i 2.1 .000 

T .0000817 5 .000 

jL -,'.0000800 1-.5 .000 

S , ;.0000708 1.3 

. .000 

d) "- .0000594 1.1 .000 

, ... , 0000579 1.1 

- .000 

ý ,:.0000573 1.1 .000 

".0000478 0.9. .000 

, p .0000384 0.7 .000 

".0000383 0.7 .000 

'.0000356 0.7 .000 

-. 000482 9.0 .001

wp

Latent 

talitiei 

85 

73 

94 

22 

98 

60 

35 

752 

336' 

0122 

286 

338 

334 

184, 

246 

151 

149 

126', 

0384 

0997 

422 

36 

r6

Percent of Total 

Pisk' 

22.4 

17.7 

1.3 

11.9 

9.6 

8.2 

4.5 

2.0 

0.0 

%1.7 

2.0 

2.0 

1.1 

1.5, 

0.9 

0.9 

0.8 

0.2 

0.6 

2.5 

8.2

00•o531,' 7016

.1
10- 3

10-4_ 

10-5 - 1985 K 

"Li 1975 

I- 0-6 

Al 

10-8 

- 5 0 -10 

NUMBER OF EARLY FATALITIES (N) 

FIGURE 5-10. CUMULATIVE ANNUAL EARLY FATALITY 

PROBABILITY - 1975, 1985 - MODEL II

5-35

_J 

15
TABLE 5-10 

ACCIDENT RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS -1975, 1985 - MODEL I RELEASE FRACTIONS

- Standard "-:Sh ipment 

U-Pu Mixture 

Pu-239 (1169 ci)

Recycle 

plutonium 

Spent fuel 

(rail) 

Spent fuel 

(truck) 

All others

Expected 

Latent Cancer 

Fatalities -1975 

7.9 

1.78

0.021 

0.047 

0.11 

9.86

Percent of 

Total Risk 

80.21 

18.0

0.2 

0.5 

1.1 

100

Expected 

Latent Cancer 

Fatalities - 1985 

32.8 

1.78 

1.83

0.8

0.29

0.038 

37.9

Percent of 

Total Fisk 

86.6 

4.7 

4.8

2.1 

0.8

0.1 

100

vs 

C"

I I
aa- LC-S

flaaa 

-a-aZ!a aaaa a a-a 4 

a a tat. 4 Caat

a aaa; ,,> aat'aaa,' 

- asaa a1aa aaTLaa miajta a 4 

ANNUAL PROBABILITY OF Ž N EARLY FATALITIES a -. 

ta)aaa a JOaaTZClsa$s$¶j a.aJ aa Z a- a a. a-aa

ilNaaaaa'a I)4) aS' a aflaa-a u a; I-A 

o 0 0 0 o I I I I I I-' 

taJla., 7 aa a a a *aa-V4a a-, a-a NJa a a Ia- at a

a!a.[

-n 

o C 

!aaaf Zat Wa ' 

32- a3a2 ' 

-arn a 

a n a '.4a..

a a a aa

4 a- 1

2.$taj2 C.etaE , 4 - aaaI h aa - .aaa .) a-U 

,aaa a.a )a.aa 'at -' aIa aa aa.a.a .,a.t a S 

4. .1 >1¶:2U x-A'u - :a.,r' a.a 

*at- J4aaJ ,a. 

a$aaaL!tt1 :a.'::;m'14.a 'a Iaaa2? 

- - *- a-rta-. 

aJj otaq t a-taj ,) 

a. 14' 1'3Z a-ri; a.>u5- aja a - a acj

- a-a' a *-a-

aaaa.a.aaa, A a aa -, 

a - aa.j -

Z;.: at a, - aa-'a- ij 

-, a 'a,

4 

-. *'a-aq, , 4 ,a 

aaS a 1⁄2.. *Sat 5 a aa5 aaa aaaa-a- a-a 

Va ta UTa-:i 2 a . a a a a 

- 'a a 

a. a at at-a a a-a-a 'ta a 

tj;'2 alaa:;aa, a-: aaa a a,4a -a-ai

<a, a a

B 

$ .4

a'

1 1, : 4, ý " ,
fact that contaminated areas are smaller and could be cordoned off. Contaminated crops, milk, 

and possibly even animals might have to be condemned and destroyed. 

A detailed analysis of decontamination costs for four land-use situations for contami

nation by both a long-lived and a short-lived isotope is presented in this Section. A cleanup 

level of 0.65 pCi/a2 was used, based on the Palomares, Spain, nuclear weapons incident (Ref. 

5-21). The assumptions and results are shown in Table 5-11. Values associated with Table 5-11 

were extracted from Reference 5-20. 

The analysis of decontamination costs involves many'assumptions and, of necessity, repre

sents only order-of-magnitude accuracy. More accurate analysis requires very specific infor

mation about land use near the accident site,-the nature of the accident, the weather at the 

time of the accident, etc. However, the cost of decontamination may be approximated as being 

directly proportional to the area contaminated and the population density. Figure 5-12 shows 

the area contaminated versus curies released using the atmospheric dispersion model discussed 

in Section 5.3. Figures 5-13 and 5-14 were plotted using the 600-curie release as a benchmark. 

These figures show the ipproximate decontamination costs resulting from an accident involving 

a given size shipment of long- and short-half-life material. 

5.6 SEVERE ACCIDENTS INWVERY HIGH POPULATION DENSITY URBAN AREAS 

If an accident involving certain large-quantity shipments or certain shipments of highly 

toxic or highly radioactive materials were to occur in an urban area of very high population 

density (i.e.,>lO 401km2)' such as New York City or Chicago, the consequences could be more 

serious than any considered in the risk analysis. Although such an accident is very unlikely, 

its potentially severe consequences merit separate attention. For the purposes of this anal

ysis, the average urbani'density of New York City (as determined in the' 1970 census) is used: 

15,444 people/km2 . The`dispersion calculation and the values for percent of released material 

aerosolized and the percent respirable are the same as those used for the analysis described 

in Section 5.3.,, Tables 5-12, 5-13, and 5-14 list the results of the calculations for certain 

shipments of Co-60, Po-210, Pu-239, spent fuel, and recycle plutonium 'for a Category VIII 

accident. Table 5-12 lists the integrated population doses and corresponding LCFs expected to 

result from these accidents. The probabilities associated with these accidents are estimated 

by assuming that urban areas of extremely high population density comprise 1% of the total 

urban area in the country. 

Table 5-13 shows the number of persons receiving doses greater thaA' a given value for 

each accident considered. The reason for choosing 5, 15, 50, 340, 510, 3,000, 10,000, 20,000 

and 70,000 reins as dose values 'is thit these correspond to0certain benchmark values: 

15 rems to lungs - NCRP-recommended limit for annual routine 

exposure of radiation workers (Ref. 5-22) 

3000 rems to lungs - threshold for pulmonary morbidity from 

short-lived gamma and beta emitters (Ref. 5-20)

5-38.,
TABLE 5-11 

ESTIMATED DECONTAMINATION COST FOR 600 CURIE RELEASE OF VARIOUS MATERIALS [a)

Population Zone 

Rural 

(6 person/km

2 )

Land Use 

undeveloped/ 

uninhabited

Long-Lived Contaminant 

Decont. Estimated 

Technique Cost 

(1) DF<20

bury by deep 5 

plowing (c) 7.8x0S 

(2) DF > 20

scrape and 

bury [d), 3.04x105 

Total = 

"$i.08xlO6

Short-Lived Contaminant [b) Decont. Estimated 

Technique Cost ($) 

(1) cordon 

off for 

60 days [e] $29,000

Total $ 

$29,000

1' 

f .1'1

I' \'

d/ (1) DF < 20 

nd bury by deep 

plowing k ý 

(2) DF > 20 

scrape and 

bury

(3) decon.,., homes/barns 

a.,,DF<20 [f] 

b. DF>20[(gi 

(4)'270 

evacuees (h]

(1) cordon . 105 off for 

7. 8x 05 60 days 

(2) 270 

evacuees 

3.04xi05 for 60 days

6.22x10 5

' 

7.42xi0 4 

3.65xi0 4

$29,000 

3.65x10 4

(3) purchase & dispose of 

crops, forage, 5 

milk [k] 9.77x10

(5) purchase &'dispose of 

crops, forage, 6 

and milk '[i] 1.15x10 [j] 

"Total'

.. $2.97xl06

Total 

1.04x106

See notes at end of table.

Y, ¶fl

farmlan dairyla

11

S.... . P •
Population Zone 

Suburban 

(719 persons/km2

U'

Land Use 

98.5% single 

family 

dwell ings 

0.8% public 

areas 

(schools, 

etc.) 

0.4% com

mercial & 

industrial 

areas 

0.3% parks, 

cemeteries, 

etc.

TABLE 5-11 (continued) 

Long-Lived Contaminant 

Decont. Estimated 

Technique Cost ($) 

(1) Decon " 

homes 

a.'DF'< 20(11 56.lxI06 

b. DF >20(m] 12.lxlO0 

(2) 3.24x104 

evacuees 4.4x10

(3), Decon.' 

public areas 

a. DF <20(n] 

b. DFz20[o) 

(4) Decon. 

commercial & 

industrial 

areas 

a. DF< 20[p] 

b. 'DP-& 20[q] 

(5) Decon. 

parks by 

replacing 

lawn (r) 

(6) indiv. 

and corporate 

income loss[s]

1.83xi0 5 

1.0xlO

5

Short-Lived Contaminant (b) Decont. Estimated 

Technique Cost M$} 

(1) cordon 

off all 

residential 

areas with 

DF a20 It) 7.2x10

4

(2) Decon. homes DF>20 12. 3x10

6

(3) cordon off all 

parks NuJ 2.84x10 5 

(4) Decon. 5 

public areas 2.84xl1

9.15x0:4 commercial (5) Decon. 

9.77x10 4 & industrial, 

areas 1.89xi0

5

(6) 2035 

evacuees 

for 60 days. 

30,320 

evacuees for 

10 days 

7.33x10 6 (7) income 

loss

Total 

$8

2 xi 06

5.74xi06 

9.64xi06 

Total 

-

$28.5x10

6
K': >'',i TABLE t-11 (c6ntlnued) 

' - Long-Lived Cont'aminant ýS 

Lad~Decont. Estimated 

'Popula~tion zone ______ (vi 'Technique, Cst' 

Urbanit ,;:y, apartment'I~ 

(36 eisonP (3ý1 n (6,story' buildingsk),,, apts)' [cc)2 6 1"DFc20 [x] 1.7xl06 

b. DFz20[yl' 1.061106 

"ýj.,,fam.; residiccl, 2).Decofl'., 

20%"publid si1 efan~ 

" ~ ~ 1lfd 11 r4.'l;' eoneca .6-:()Dcn 

-I'' 'j i"' a. DF<20 4.110 

10 nee. b. DFz20[m 2.i5xl06 

Cocmmecia 

b- f 1 % pajý z. &ubindu'rald 

f -. ",I ;...: -a.iDF<20 4 4 6xl 6 

* ~ ~ o vacant b. DFt21' 491 

f" land '' (4) Decon 6 

'r vacant area s 

*f ý,abury)0 4.83x10 

loars',, 3 'i 21 06 , 

f" r$94 .6 x1

hort-Lived Contaminant 

Decont. Estimated 

Techi,!Lie Cost_($) 

1)cordon 

off resid;. 

areas with, 

MtH2 'It) 7.2x104 

(2),cordon

off all piriks 

and vacant 

areas - 3.2xl106

(3) Decon. 

resid. with 

DF z 20 

"(4) Dec'on. 

commercial 

& industrial 

areas 

(5) 10,900

3. Sxl0 6 

9.5X10 6

60 daysi 

l.63x10 for6 

10 days , 30.81106 

(6) Decon. 

public, 

areas 7.lx106

(7) 'income 

loss 51.8x1106

Total 

$106110 6 [aa,vJ

U'

I , $98.6xlO6 . , 1, 1
Notes for Table 5-11

a. 4.5 x 10 7 m2 (1.11 x 104 acres) require deiontaminatiog; 2.82 x 106 m2 

(698 acres) require a DF Ž 20. 400 cpm/m (.65 pci/m ). 

b. 1-131 is used as an exampTe/tj/ 2 - 8 days/i x t 1 / 2 60 days. 

c. $75 per acre. ' I 

d. $435 per acre - includes costs of reburial. 

e. $5 per hour per guard/4 guards per ehift (based on conversations with 

private security agencies) This could be reduced if National Guard or 

active duty military were esed. ' 

f. $4915 per building/2 buildings per 4-person family (home and barn). 

g. $8725 per building/2 buildings per'4-person family (home and barn). 

h. $13.5 per day per evacuee; 10 day evacuation required. 

i. $104 per acre (based on 48-state average - less Alaska and Hawaii). 

j. If orchards are involved, the cost could be considerably higher (up to 

$5000 per acre) to account for the loss of crops in subsequent years. 

k. The entire year's crops are purchased/60-days of milk products are 

purchased/the average dairy yield per acre is $16 per year. 

1. 5 house& per acre/$1095 per house,(includes street cleanup). 

m. 5 houses per acre/$3510 per house ,(icludes street cleanup). 

n. $2200 per acre. 

o. $18,000 per acre. . 

p. $2200 per acre. 

q. $35,000 per Icre. 

r. $0.13 per ft to replace lawns/0.61lacres of parks per 100 persons. 

s. $1100 per capita per~quarter - individual/$940 per capita per quarter 

corporate/10 days of lostvincome..

t. 10 guards on patrol'pershift. 

u. 1 guard per 5 acre park per shift .. .. 

v. If total evacuation for*6O days with,no decontamination were us§d, the 

ppproximate cost would-be,$261 x 10 for'suburban and $1.4 x 10 for urban. 

However, this approach would probably not be socially acceptable. 

w. Based on approximate, values for an average U.S. city (New York City Planning 

Commission, "Plan for New York City - Volume 1 (initial issue)," 1969)-streets 

are included with appropriate categories. I 

x. $15 per occupant for 6-story 'apartment building / all residents assumed to 

y. $140,per occupant for-6-story apartment building Y live in multi-story buildings 

z. 20 guards, on patrol per'shift. 

aa. Clearly, the method used to deal with a spill of this sort would be the 

least expensive method - probably outright cleanup rather than long-term 

evacuation. 

bb. Single family units. 

cc. The single family units are assumed to have 4 persons per unit, 5 units 

per acre. The remaining people are assumed to live in multi-story 

buildings.

cUn
, i0L

Curies Released

FIGURE 5-12. AREA CONTAMINATED TO A LEVEL 1,,F 

0.65 uCt/m2 FOR A GIVEN RELEASE

.*j 4*

5-43 -

1.4 

t3 

-J 

9d 

E 

2.4 

0 

U

.2
LL_ 

CD, 

-LJ

1 o-i" 170 100. i 3 io i

CURIES RELEASED

FIGURE 5-13. DECONTAMINATION COSTS FOR RELEASES 

OF LONG-LIVED ISOTOPES

5-44
104

c/) 

-. J 

L__ 

_1_ 

C

I,

C-) 

ICJ

2+ 1 "ll 06l 103 104 105 

10 .- 0 l -" 

+÷ . '-- CURIES RELEASEDC i

FIGURE 5-14. DECONTAMINATION COSTS FOR RELEASES 

OF SHORT-LIVED ISOTOPES

5-45 .

RURAL (UNDEVELOPED) 

'FARMLAND! DAIRYLAflD 

;,:7
TABLE 5-12 

"I NTEGRATED POPULATION DOSE AND EXPECTED LATENT CANCERS FROM CERTAIN

Standard Shipment. 

Co-60 (315,000 ci)W 

Po-210'.(144 Ci) 

Plutonium 

(1.23,x 1o6 Ci)

CLASS VIII ACCIDE 

Population Doe 

Commitment" 

(person-rem) 

"• \28 

,/ 5.27x106 

3.15x106 / 

1.llxlO 

7

'4 

-4 

a 

'A 

4,, 

-4

Io/ 

1O4 

iS/ 

106 

1O6

IN HIGH-nENSITY

Organ 

whole body

URBAN AREAS

LCF 

_•0 

1975 

Probability 

1.02x10-1 0

lunq / 117 2.57x10- 1 0

lung/ 

bone 

"whole body/ 

"- lung 

whole body/ 

lung 

lung/ 

bone

147 1.06xl1-1 1 

1 1.8x10-10

1985 

Probability 

2.55x10"1 0 

8.2x10- 1 0 

1.06xlO-II 

.1 -9 

6.91xl0

0 2.99x10- 9 1.8x10- 8

74* 0.0 2.24x10-10

0

Spent fuel 14C 

(rail cask) 2.85x 

Spent fuel " 23 

(truck cask) . 441 

Recycle plutonium* 1.59x 

(6.19 x 106 :ci) 5.6x 

*1985 only.

U'

IN HIGH-DENSITY URBAN AREAS
TABLE 5-13 

NUMBER OF PEOPLE RECEIVING DOSES GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO VARIOUS 

SPECIFIED ACUTE DOSES (IN REMS) OF INTEREST IN CERTAIN

- CLASS VIII ACCIDENTS

Time Period 

Organ for Dose

Co-60 

(315,000 Ci)., Whole Body 1 hr

IN HIGH-DENSITY URBAN AREAS

5 15 50 340 510 3000 10,000 20,000

75 - 12 0 0

Po-210 

(144 Ci) Lung

Plutoniu? 

(1.23x10 Ci) Lung 

Spent Fuel Whole Body 

(truck cask). Lung 

Spent Fuel , Whole Body 

(rail cask)' Lung 

Recycle Pu 

(6.19x10 6 Ci) Lung

1 yr 

1 hr 

1 yr 

1 hr 

1 yr' 

l yr

- 3.423lO3 - - - 59 $ 2 -

- 2337 - - - 0

61 

440

-0

- 8 0 0 - - -

0 -0 0- 

- 40 7 0 -

48 - - - 0 0

- 2475 -0 0

Shipment

U'

70,000
Isotope 

Co-60 

Po-210 

Plutonium C' 

Recycle Pu 

(1985 only) 

Spent fuel 

Spent fuel

TABLE 5-14 

EARLY FATALITIES AND DECONTAMINATION COSTS 

CLASS VIII ACCIDENTS - EXTREME DENSITY URBAN AREAS 

Total Percent' Percent Early 

Curies Released Aerosolized Fatalities 

315,000 0 0 0 

144 100 100 1 

1.2 x 106 10 5 0 

6.2 x 106 10 5 0 

9.1 x 106 100** 100* 

1.4 x 106 100** 100 0

Decontamination 

Cost* 

NA 

$300 x 106 

$800 x 106 

$1200 x 106 

$400 x 106 

1200 x 106

Adjusted for 

density. 

Of available

Increased evacuation and income loss costs resulting from higher population 

gaseous and volatile fission products only.
10,000 rems to lungs 

20,000 rems to lungs*

- threshold for pulmonary morbidity from long

lived alpha emitters when received as an 

acute dose (Refs. 5-20 and 5-23) 

- produces early fatality from pulmonary morbidity 

resulting from short-lived beta-gamma emitters when 

received as an acute dose (Ref. 5-23)

70,000 rims to lungs* - produces early 

resulting from 

received as an

fatality from pulmonary morbidity 

long-lived'alpha emitters when 

acute dos. (Ref. 5-23)

5 rems to whole body 

50 rems to whole body 

340 reins to whole body** 

510 rems to whole body**

- NCRP-recommended limit for annual whole-body 

radiation for radiation workers (Ref. 5-22) 

- threshold for noticeable' physiological effects 

from acute exposure to whole-body radiation 

(Ref. 5-22) 

- produces early fatality from bone marrow 

destruction from acute exposure with minimal 

medical treatment (Ref. 5-20) 

- produces early fatality from bone marrow destruc

tion from acute exposure with supportive medical 

treatment (Ref. 5-20)

5.7 EXPORT AND IMPORT SHIPMENTS.. 

The annual radiological 'risk- calculation for accidents involving' 'import and export 

shipments was donef in the same way 'as for the 1975 and 1985 tsatindard'tshipments models. A 

separate standard shipments model was devised for 1975 export shipments only and is.discussed 

in Appendix A. - - -. 

The total annual radiological risk computed for export'shipments in 1975 is 1.57 x 10.5 

LCF per year, or 0.3% of -the total accident risk. Tablel5-15,'shows a breakdown of the 

annual accident risk by material and major Itransport modes.' Over half of the risk results 

from enriched uranium shipments because this is the' dominant exported material. Since 

most exported enriched uranium shipments are transported by ship, these dominate the risk; 

shipments by aircraft and truck are of lesser importance. It is not anticipated that 

export shipments would contribute a significantly greater percentage of the annual risk in 

1985 than they did in 1975. A detailed analysis of the environmental effects of U.S. 

nuclear power export activities is given in Reference 5-24. 

LD 50/360 value (lethal dose within 360 days for 50% of a population so exposed). 

LD 50/30 value (lethal dose within 30 days for 50% of a population so exposed).

5-49
TABLE 5-15 

ANNUAL EXPECTED LATENT CANCER FATALITIES RESULTING FROM 

ACCIDENTS INVOLVING EXPORT SHIPMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 

1975 EXPORT SHIPMENTS MODEL

-' ( Material 

SEnr iched UO2

Enriched UP6 

MF,+MC - Type 

Co-60 

.TypeB 

Enr iched UP6

A Mo-99 ; - A• -Types AB 

"All Other 

Exports

"Major 

Transport 

Mode(s) 

Ship

Ship 

Cargo Air

I 

A',

Truck 

Cargo Air 

.Truck

Annual Expected 

Latent Cancer Fatalities 

5.5 x 10

4.4,x,10 

-6 3.3 x 10 

1.41x 10-6 Al

Pass Air, 

-Cargo Air 

Ship, Truck 

Pass. Air, 

Cargo Air

7.5 x 10-7 

1.4 x 107 

1.9 x 10-7 

1.57x 10- 5

Percent of 

Total Export 

Shipment Risk 

35.1% 

28.1% 

21.1% 

8.91

4.6% 

0.91

1.3%

"A

us 4, 

U' 

0

-,)

TOTAL 100t

,o
According to the 1975_Survey (see Appendix A), virtually all of the curies imported in. 

1975 were contained in four Type B Co-60 shipments, each containing only one package with an 

average of 1.8 x 105 curies per package. The average distance per shipment was 670 kmn, and 

the shipments were all transported by truck. One of the scenarios considered in the 1975 

standard- shipments model, Co-60-LQ2, involved four Co-60 shipments by truck, 3.2 x 1O5 

curies per shipment and 3200 km per shipment. Jhese four shipments result in an annual risk 

of 1.2 x 1010 LCF per year. The risk for the four import shipments can be determined from 

this figure, reduced in proportion to the curies transported and the shipment distance. The 

result is 1.4 x 10-11 LCF per year. 

5.8 NONRADIOLOGICAL RISKS IN TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS 

Most radioactive materials are shipped incidental to other freight shipments, i.e., the 

shipment would take place whether or not the radioactive material were on board. For these 

shipments the only impacts chargeable to the radioactive material are the nomalpopulation 

dose discussed in Chapter 4 and the radiological accident risk discussed earlier in this 

chapter. 

However, for exclusive-use shipments, i.e., those that require the exclusive use of the 

transport vehicle, there are certain nonradiological risks that-must also be considered, e.g.,

the risk that the driver of a exclusive-use vehicle will be injured or killed in an accident, 

not from radiological causes, but from the accident itself. In addition to fatalities, nonra

diological-injuries and property damage must be considered as part of the environmental impact 

of radioactive materials transport along with the radiological effects. 

It has been estimated (Ref. 5-25) that transport of cold fuel to nuclear power plants and 

shipments of- irradiated fuel and solid wastes from the plants by exclusive-use vehicles could 

result in 0.03 injuries and 0.003 fatalities per reactor year if all fuel and solid :waste 

transport were by truck and irradiated fuel transport were by rail or barge. For the approx

imately 60 power reactors in operation in 1975, this translates into 2 injuries and 0.2 fatal

ities per year. - .

Probably the greatest use of exclusive-use trucks for other than fuel cycle materials is 

in the 'transport of radiopharmaceuticals, primarily No-99/Tc-99m generators.. If it is esti

mated that 10% of the generators that were transported by truck in the 1975 standard shipments 

model are transported by exclusive-use trucks, In.average aggregate quantities of 80 TI per 

shipment, about 130 such shipments per year would be expected. For an average shipment dis: 

tance of 960 kilometers, the total distance traveled would be 1.25 x 10 kilometers per year. 

Utilizing the accident statistics anciinjury and fatality data that were used to estimate the 

nonradiological -impact for shipments to and from power plants -(Ref. 5-25), the transport of 

Mo-99/Tc-99m generators by exclusive-use trucks would produce about 0.07 injuries and about 

0.004 fatalities per year. . 

Finally, certain all-cargo airlines make.routine flights exclusively for shipment of 

radioactive materials, primarily Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. It is estimated that these flights 

cover 320,000 kilometers per year. Using the commercial aircraft accident rates of

5-51
1.44 x 10-8 accidents per kilometer, these flights would be expected to result in about 0.005 

accidents per year.' Assuming that a crew of two would be killed in each accident, aa average 

of 0.01 fatalities per year would be expected. 

Thus, the estimated nonradiological impacts resulting from transport in vehicles used 

exclusively for radioactive material shipments is 2.05 injuries and 0.213 fatalities per year. 

The major contribution is made by transport of cold and spent fuel to and from nuclear power 

plants. 

5.9 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 

The results of the calculations of the risk resulting from potential transportation 

accidents involving radioactive materials shipments may be summarized as follows: 

1. The accident'risk for the 1975 level of shipping activity, as determined from 

the 1975 shipping survey, is very small: roughly 0.005 additional LCF per year, or one addi

tional LCF every 200 years, plus an equal number of genetic effects. This number of LCFs is' 

onl.y 0.3% of those resulting from normal transport population exposures. 

2. Over 70% of the accident risk is attributable to shipments of Po-210, plutonium, 

waste, mixed fission and corrosion prQducts, and UF6 (Table 5-9). 

3. The projected accident 'risk in 1985 is 0.0166 LCF per year, or about 3.5 

times the 1975 risk, but is still -very small in comparison to the LCFs resulting from normal

transport. Even though the 1985 calculation takes into account a modest amount of plutonium 

recycle, the risk from plutonium (U-Pu mix) is 1.3% of the total risk. 

4. Using Model 1I release fractions, the annual probability of one or more early fatal-, 

ities from radiological causes in a tran'sportation accident is about 5 x 10- in 1975 and 

about 10-3 in 1985. 

' 

5. Costs of decontamination following a transportation accident involving a 600-curie 

release can be as much as 100 x 106 dollars in an urban population zone. 

6. In spite of their low annual-risk, specific accidents occurring in very-high-density 

urban populatjonSzones can produce' as manyais'llearly fatality,- 150 LCFs, and large decontami

nation costs. Although- such accidents are possible,'their probability of occurrence is very-,.. 

smal l. 

7. The contribution to the annVal accident risk from export rnd import shipments is:. 

less than 0.01 times the domestfc transport risk and is likely to remain so in 1985. 

8. The principal nonradfological impacts are those injuries and fatalities resulting 

from accidents involving vehicles used exclusively for the transport of radioactive materials. 

The number of expected annual nonradiological fatalities is almost'50 times greater than the

5-52
expected number of additional LCFs resulting from radiological causes but is less than one 

fatality every five years. 

The annual individual probability of an early (radiological) fatality resulting from a 

transportation accident involving a radioactive materials shipment is presented in Table 5-16 

together with annual individual probabilities of an early fatality from other types of acci

dents. The numbers listed in the table are based on the assumptions that all accidents occur 

randomlj'throughout-the ,opulation' and that'the number of persons at risk for-early fatalities 

resultingfrom radiological 'auses following a-transportation accident is 75.x 106 (estimating 

that approximately one-third of the population lives along major transport routes). The table 

shows, for example, that an individual is 105 times as likely to be killed as a result of 

being struck by lightning as he is to die from radiological ýauses within'one year following 

a transportation accident involving a shipment of radioactive materials.ý The table shows that 

there are many commonly accepted accident risks that are very much greater than the accident 

risk of transporting radioactive materials. 

TABLE 5-16 

,--INDIVIDUAL RISK OF EARLY FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSES (Ref. 5-20) 

Accident Type Number per Year Individual Risk per Year 

Motor-'Vehicle 5.5 x 104 , 1 in 4,000 

Falls-' . ,- , 1.8 x 104 ",. 1 tin-10;000 

,Fires'# i - - 7.5 3 103 t ,-. ',l-,In 25,000 , • 

Drowning 6.2 x 103 1 oin-30,000, 

Air Travel 1.8 x 10 3 1 in 100,000 

Falfling Objects . -1 .3'x 10 3 " . .: 1 'in 160,000,, 

Electrocution:': ... -' 1;1 -x 103o f,- U.'-.in 160,000 z' 

Lightning 160 1 in 2,000,000• •': 

Tornadoes 91 1 in 2,500,000 

Hurricanes- - r ", ,93 ` 3 fle 'l in.2,;500o 000o.oo 

100 Nuclear: Re~actors ".- '3'tx - Z c10- r ,l ,in'5,00000,O00-,O 

Transportation of 

_Radioactive Material - hn, 7 

(f r o m R a d i o a c t i v e - * -1 i 0: . " , O - : 

causes)","' -- ' 3.5"x 10-4** ' ,rt11 in,'200;000,000O00** 

**Statistical estimate for 1975. 

:***Usinga population at- risk of 751million* people. r t•-: -

5-53 -
REFERENCES 

5-1. J. M. Taylor and'S: L. Daniel,*."Radtan - A Computer Code to Analyze Transportation of 

Radioactive Material,", SAND 76-0243. Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., April 

1977. 

5-2. R. K. Clarke, J.-T. Foley, W. F. Hartaan, and D. W. :Larson, "Severities of Transportation 

Accidents, Volume I -: Summary," SAND 74-0001. Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., 

July 1975. ", 

5-3. R. K. Clarke, J. T. Foley, W. F. Hartman, and D. W. Larson, "Quantitative Characterization 

of the Environment Experienced by Cargo in Aircraft Accidents," Proceedings of the 4th 

International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Miami 

Beach, Fla., September 22-27, 1974. 

5-4. U.S. Dept. of Commerce,-'Statistical Albstracts "_t ' nited States 1974, 95th Edition, 

Social and Economic Statistics Administration, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 

5-5. J. T. Foley, W., F.,Hartman, D. W. Larson, and R. K. Clarke, "Quantitative Characteriza

tion of the Environment.Experienced by Cargo in MotorCarrier Accidents," Proceedings of 

the 4th International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, 

Miami Beach, Fla.,, September 22-27, 1974. 

5-6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comfission, "Final Generic Environmental Statement on the: Use of 

Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Cooled Reactors," NUREG-O002, 

August 1976.,' c .,,i : . , 

5-7. J. 0. Harrison and C.[E. Olson, "Estimation of Accident Likelihood in AEC Weapon-Trans-, 

portation," SAND 74-0174, Sandia Laboratorieo. Albuquerque, N.M., April,1975. 

5-8. D. W. Larson, R. K. Clarke, J. T. Foley, and V. F. Hartman, "Seiverities of Transportation 

Accidents, ,VolumeaIV .-_ Train," SLA-74-OOi,-USandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., 

September 1975. 

5-9. J. T. Foley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M.,,',Accfdent Rates for Various Modes-of 

Transport," Memorandum to R. E.-: Luna, rAugust 7, 1975. Ava.ilable• in NRC Public Document 

Room for inspection and copying for a fee. 

5-10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "The Final Environmental Statement Related to Manu

facture of Floating Nuclear Power Plants by Off Shore Power Systems," NUREG-0056, 

September 1976.

5-54
5-11. S. W. Heaberlin, D. A. Baker, C. E. Beyer, S. 'Mandel, and P. L. Peterson, "Evaluation of 

the Consequences of LWR Spent Fuel and PlutoniumShipping Packages Lost at Sea,". Paper 

No. IAEA-SR-10/14, IAEA Seminar on the Design, Construction, and Testing of Packaging for 

the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, August 23-27, 1976. 

5-12. L. L. Bonzon and M. McWhirter, "Special Tests of Plutonium Shipping Containers," Paper 

No. IAEA-SR-lO/22, IAEA Seminar on the Design, Construction, and Testing of Packaging 

for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, August 23-27, 1976. 

5-13. L. L. Bonzon and J. T. Schamaun, "Container Damage Correlation with Impact Velocity and 

Target Hardness," Paper No. IAEA-SR-10/21, IAEA Seminar on the Design, Construction, and 

Testing of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, 

August 23-27, 1976. 

5-14. 10 CFR 71, Appendices A and B. 

5-15. I. G. Waddoups, "Air Drop Test of Shielded Radioactive Material Containers," SAND 75-0276, 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., September 1975. 

5-16. W. A. Brobst, "Transportation Accidents: How Probable?", Nuclear News, May 1973. 

5-17. H. W. Church, R. E. Luna, and S. H. Hilly, "Operation Roller Coaster: Near Ground Level 

Air Sampler Measurements," SC-RR-69-788, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., February 

1970. 

5-18. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Mixing Heights, Wind Speeds and Potential for 

Urban Air Pollution Throughout the Contiguous United States," Office of Air Programs, 

January 1972. 

5-19. F. B. Smith and J. S. Hay, "The Expansion of Clusters of Particles in the Atmosphere," 

Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, Volume 87, pp. 82-101, 1961. 

5-20. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, October 1975. 

5-21. F. Lewis, One of Our H Bombs is Missing, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1967. 

5-22. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible 

Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure," National 

Bureau of Standards Handbook 69, August 1963. 

5-23. M. Goldman, "An Estimate of Early Mortality and Morbidity Following Acute Inhalation of 

Plutonium," University of California (Davis), October 1976. Available in NRC Public 

Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee. 

5-24. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, "Final Environmental Statement, U.S. 

Nuclear Power Export Activities," EROA-1542, two volumes, April 1976.

5-55
5-25. U.S. Atomic' Energy- Commission, "Environmental Survey of, Transportation of Radioactive 

Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1238., December 1972. 

"- ' "e .' ) . . . . ._ . .2. . . . 

-P * *s 

-, - oI ,P

5-56