A popular Government, 

without popular information or the mea

acquirfng it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Trage

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignora

And a people who mean to be their o

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power w

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
A Regional Model f

Overseas Operation

WILLIAM W. MENDEL 

and 

DAVID G. BRADFORD 

McNair Paper 37 

March 1995 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC S

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
[] , y 

[] Editor for this volume: Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Secretary: Laura Hall [] Circulation Manager: Myrna Morga

INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and inform d

issues of U.S. national security in the post--Cold Wax era. These 

present current topics related to national security strategy and po

resource management, international affairs, civil-militaxy relati

technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, ar

authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Clea

release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted wi

permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studi

ton, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews and teaxsheets would be ap

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 2

ISSN 1071-7552 
The authors owe a debt of gratitude to Colonel Jay C

Senior Analyst at the Institute for National Strategic S

Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey B. Demarest, Latin Amer

analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, for 

useful suggestions in developing this study. The figu

this study were produced by Mr. Stew Stewman, Forei

Studies Office. 
gy g 

The Noriega Contingency ................. 

2. GUIDELINES FOR INTERAGENCY 

OPERATIONS ......................... 

National Direction ....................... 

The Joint Doctrine ....................... 

Service Doctrine ........................ 

Conclusions ........................... 

. STRATEGY AND PLANNING ............. 

The Strategy Framework ................. 

Operational Planning .................... 

Nation Assistance ...................... 

Promote Democracy Programs ............. 

Military Roles Campaign ................. 

Counterdrug Campaign .................. 

Military Resources ...................... 

Conclusions ........................... 

. UNIFIED OBJECTIVES FOR MULTIPLE 

AGENCIES ............................ 

Interagency Coordination in the Theater ....

TDPG Steering Committee ................. 

TDPG Products ......................... 

The Country Roadmap Computer System ...

Conclusion ............................ 
Future Games .......................... 

Results ............................... 

Conclusions ........................... 

. DECISION AIDS FOR THEATER STRATEG

RSSIA Method ......................... 

The Factors ........................... 

The Third Axis: The Commander's Assessme

The Complete Regional Assessment ......... 

Other Regions .......................... 

Conclusions ........................... 

. A MODEL FOR PEACETIME INTERAGENC

COOPERATION ........................ 

A Model for Regional Cooperation ........... 

Directive Authority and Institutional Cultures 

Application. ........................... 

APPENDIX: Acronyms and Abbreviations .......

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................... 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ...................... 

vi 
Overseas Operations 

INTRODUCTION 

This case study describes methods used to encourage a

multiagency cooperation. Drawing upon the experie

U.S. Southem Command in the early 1990s, it suggest

can assist civilian and military leadership to integrat

and capabilities of the many U.S. Government ag

operate in an overseas region. These methods describ

that can be important to civilian and military officials 

with regional policy and strategy because it has proven 

resolving issues of interagency coordination in the 

Region. Its methods can be applied in other areas as 

A NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

For half a century our warfighting strategies focu

Soviet threat and the possibility of nuclear war. The 

Soviet Empire has greatly diminished that specter. N

unified commanders rethink their regional stra

appreciation of threats to U.S. interests includes con

for major regional contingencies (Balkans, Korea, I

with instabilities prompted by arms proliferation, narc

insurgency, warlordism, militant religious fundamental

conflict, and civil war. 

By varying degrees, these issues require regional i

effort. But not all govemment organizations sense th

(or see a problem) integrating interagency capabiliti

U.S. Government organizations work effectively withi
From the perspective of the unified command

strategic environment has made it critical that the mil

to work effectively with multiple U.S. Govemment a

overcome regional instability and to counter the threat 

war. Requisite for the military commander's strategi

a concept for integrating interagency resources in c

planning as well as a concept for supporting other a

govemment for their planning and operations. Ne

there is little national guidance for the unified co

conceming interagency cooperation and integration. 

The existing literature discusses the National Secur

(NSC) staff system and possibilities for improving g

from that level. Yet, the NSC facilitates policy an

development; it does not to execute policy in the f

Joint Staff publications and the service doctrine do n

specific guidelines or techniques for building i

teamwork and integrating capabilities. The regional 

framework described in this paper, however, may b

help. 

THE CASE STUDY EXPERIENCE 

The method described in the case study is a set of i

plans, processes, exercises, and computer decision 

approach that evolved at U.S. Southem 

(SOUTHCOM) in the early 1990s included these step

• Provide Regional Vision: Theater Strategy and P

• Integrate Capabilities: Theater Deployment Proc

• Educate and Facilitate: Modeling and Simulatio

• Support Planning and Operations: Computer Dec

• Contribute Leadership: Command Interest and In

No one of these elements has been sufficient to get the 

but when combined, the mix has proven an effecti
important means of informing other govemment ag

military intentions, capabilities, and needs for support. 

Integration. Strategies and plans are backed by a 

system for deploying U.S. service personnel into th

Called the Theater Deployment Planning Group system

integrates SOUTHCOM mission essential training with 

and objectives of the U.S. Ambassadors and the needs o

nations. 

Education. The Southern Command developed a 

military game called the Counterdrug Modeling and S

System to aid in integrating counterdrug efforts in 

American region, but the CMASS educational proc

promise for other functional requirements in other re

similar game could help integrate efforts for peac

countering terrorism, professionalizing foreign armed fo

providing humanitarian a~sistance. 

Decision aids. Computer simulations such as the 

Security Strategy Implementation Analysis (RSSIA) 

Regional Development Simulation System-Single Nati

(RDSS-SNM) have proven useful for regional 

development and to assist in decisionmaking and adj

decisions in the CMASS game. These computer prog

help civilian and military planners to analyze a nation's 

programmed resources (security assistance, JCS 

humanitarian and civic assistance, and counterdrug sup

immediate needs caused by changes in stabi

socioeconomic factors. 

Leadership. The regional leadership provided b

commanders-in-chief has been a catalyst for coo

multiagency capabilities to achieve unity of effort. Ye

enthusiastic coordinating visits to civilian leaders in W

and to ambassadors throughout the Southem Region, th
gpgy p

Southern Command and some civilian agencies for 

interagency operations in the Southern Region, but 

solve all the problems of interagency coordination, c

and integration. The big issues lie outside the dom

unified command structure and the Department o

These include establishing lead agencies, providin

authority over interagency task forces, resourcin

interagency efforts, aligning country teams on a reg

to solve functional problems, and appointing region

integrate strategies and operations. 

By his willingness to take the initiative to help in 

of education, coordination, and integration, 

commander-in-chief can be seen as driving the proces

areas where he has no clear mandate. Yet, the 

currently the only U.S. Government officials 

wherewithal to help foreign policy officials pull tog

interagency actions regionally. As such, the CINCs ca

to provide regional leadership--even while in a supp

The approach to integrating interagency resource

in this case study deserves consideration as th

Commands deal with foreign militaries and foreign go

in the new world disorder. In this context, operating s

within the interagency framework will be vital for 

unified operations. 
PLANNING PROCESS 

If we [civilian and miliary officials] are going to be succ

in the region, we need to understand interagency roles

come together in the effort. 1 

Colonel Ronald Oates, U.S. Ma

The problem of interagency cooperation can be a vexin

this end, a unified commander-in-chief (CINC) needs 

• Encourage regional cooperation while suppor

Department officials who have the principal regional an

responsibilities. 

• Coordinate with the U.S. Government agencies 

in the area of responsibility in assisting to achieve 

objectives. 

• Integrate military resources with the efforts o

agencies in support of their objectives. 

Regional planning and operations involve all the el

national power and, by extension, the many ag

government that are outside the military chain of com

the post-Soviet military era, unified commanders 

operate in a peacetime environment where large-scale 

the traditional theater of war does not apply. This i

agency environment, where cooperation is essential, bu

defined by competition for recognition and resources. 

Command Authorities (President and Secretary of 

deputized altemates or successors) increasingly task unif

to conduct a variety of operations in support of o

Government or international agencies needing help. Sit

the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Somalia are current 

examples. 
U.S. commando forces that were looking for warlord M

Farah Aideed working for the U.N. military comman

they conducting U.S. unilateral special operatio

admixture of intemational military, civilian, and nong

organizations in Somalia, each with differing view

operating methods, may have contributed to the m

made manifest by the deaths in Somalia of 26 U.S. 

through October 1993. 4 The uncertainty of object

degraded intelligence and operational planning. 5 

"We didn't expect it to be that difficulL" said a U

military official after the 3 October 1993 Ranger raid 

Aideed in Mogadishu. 6 But the Commander-in-Ch

Central Command, Marine General Joseph Hoar (resp

U.S. military in Somalia), had been unable to drive 

concems about "the ramifications of the change of mi

to a manhunt for Aided. ''7 Even as U.N. envoy 

Jonathan T. Howe, assisted by State Department politi

April Glaspie, continued to seek a military solution, p

envoy Robert Oakley was trying to arrange a 

settlement. 8 Meanwhile, the President of the United 

determined to withdraw his troops from Somalia by 

1994; and the United Nations was sticking to its age

Somalis form a legislative assembly and hold nationa

in a nation of clans and warlords. 9 

The Somalia initiative illustrates the difficulty of o

a multiagency environment made even more comp

intemational dimensions. Strategic objectives were 

clear, and they changed while events unfolded. It su

mastering interagency cooperation is fundamental to 

military operations. 

Another example of the challenge of multiagency c

is found in the diverse military missions assigned to 
is typical, but there are other tasks with military asp

suggest regional treatment---controlling weapons prol

counter-terrorism and insurgency, security assistanc

enforcement, shows of force and attacks and raids. Su

these missions demands the synchronized application of 

and resources of many agencies in addition to military f

dealing regionally with a wide range of U.S. Governm

intemational agencies, our commanders often must 

support within foreign policy guidelines, but without th

of the specific command relationships that normally 

theater of war. 

The unified commander has no authority over t

government agencies that operate throughout his 

responsibility in peacetime. While the National C

Authorities apportion areas and forces for planning in 

war, the CINC is not granted any control over other ag

peacetime. The experience of U.S. Southern Command 

Heights, Panama, in establishing a process to institu

interagency cooperation regionally suggests an appro

might be useful in other theaters. 

INTERAGENCY SETTING 

Former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command 

Paul David Miller writes that future military forces 

capable of operating in the interagency policy process: 

In a growing number of... tasks, the military must 

support of, and in concert with, other agencies. Interag

cooperation is therefore essential to smooth p

implementation? ° 

Miller's work, The lnteragency Process (addressed in ch
Staff, expert in security issues, has no authority to 

policy. The NSC system of committees and co

subgroups seeks policy consensus, but the CINC is no

be invited to participate in these fora. The Secretary 

and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, must inte

staffs between the CINC and the NSC in order to 

integrity of the operational chain of command. 

Still a more problematic issue for unified comman

beyond the Department of Defense, few govemmen

enjoy a system of strategic planning with whic

commands could correlate their efforts. The Join

Planning System of DOD knows no counterpart in t

agencies, where 1-year planning horizons are typical, lz 

global operating areas of the Deparlments of Defense 

the Agency for International Development (AID), t

Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Information Serv

precisely coincide. In the theaters, the CINCs find th

Ambassadors' country teams are not aligned to op

regional basis, making regional coordination difficult. 

for working effectively with civilian agencies of the g

became evident during the Noriega crisis of 1989. 

THE NORIEGA CONTINGENCY 

Operation Just Cause was the SOUTHCOM c

operation for bringing Panamanian strongman Manuel 

justice. Although the Just Cause objectives (includin

the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty and 

democracy to Panama) required interdisciplinary c

within the U.S. Govemment, the Federal Govemme

establish a routine for coordinating interagency effo

Panama. The task of reactivating an effective P

Government was daunting. Restoration suggested th
proved troublesome for coordinating the plan (nam

Logic, later becaming Operation Promote Liberty) for 

the Panamanian Govemment. As General Frederick Wo

SOUTHCOM CINC from 1987 to 1989 said: "The r

could not develop that [Blind Logic plan] past a certain 

because I was not permitted to enter into plans 

Department of State, for security reasons. ''13 In the r

phase of the Panama contingency, the civil-military o

headquarters did not have civilian agencies represen

staff, and at the same time, some civilian agencies 

overcome narrow interests to cooperate with military e

The difficulties experienced by USSOUTHCOM d

Just Cause restoration phase are well recorded, and th

are instructive. 15 Success in this type of low-intensity 

requires the artful blending of military and civilian 

skills, and directive authority. Because a desired condi

end of operations was a return to civil control of our 

with Panama (under a U.S. ambassador), it seems sen

that the agencies of civil government should have parti

the planning process along the way. But even so, wi

agencies still lacking a strategic planning system, it co

fall upon the military to take the lead in planning. 

As Operation Just Cause and its follow-on Promo

achieved their objectives, they faded from prominenc

routine of SOUTHCOM activities. USSOUTHCOM fa

cycle of strategic planning with the experience of the d

interagency planning leamed in Just Cause. Need

planning process that could accommodate to the in

environment. This was important challenge because 

SOUTHCOM Strategy would establish military supp

drug war as its top priority, and it would serve as a s

agency) 6 Success here would depend upon in
Notes 

1. Ronald Oates, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Vic

Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate, J5, interview by auth

Field, FL, 27 April 1992. Colonel Oates has served as Ga

for the series of US SOLrI~COM Counterdrug Modeling and 

System exercises. The goals for these games have be

interagency understanding and cooperation, integrate actions 

and foster a regional view for solutions to counterdrug 

assistance efforts. 

2. Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve i

Parameters XXIII, no. 4 (Carlisle, PA: Winter 1993-9

Professor Clarke was Deputy Director, U.S. Liaison 

Mogadishu, Somalia from March to June 1993. He st

mandate of the U.S.-led UNITAF was to secure food stora

to open lines of communication through Mogadishu into th

that humanitarian relief organizations could distribute food t

and provide medical care to the sick." Professor Clarke 

"The strongest criticism leveled at the UNITAF intervention 

is not that it do so much, but that it did so little. UNIT

disarm the warlords or establish law and order .... A

UNITAF left, the warlords sharply increased their bullying a

of fellow Somalis and international assistance agencies." 

3. Clarke, 44-45. "In authorizing UNOSOM II, U

Council Resolution 814 greatly expanded the number, v

specificity of the tasks assigned to UNOSOM II and its atta

creating what was in effect a mandate for an extended perio

building' in Somalia. Both Security Council Resolu

[UNITAF mission to secure humanitarian relief] and 814--s

the crucial issue of forcibly disarming the warring Soma

This default, combined with the lack of a clear political 

Somalia, greatly reduced the likelihood that UNOSOM II 

have attained its political and nation-building objectives." 
5. F.M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," 

XXIII, no. 4 (Carlisle, PA: Winter 1993-94), 37. Colonel 

Marine Corps, was the Staff Judge Advocate and senior 

for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. He offers this insi

limitations inherent in UN operations made the tran

UNITAF to UNOSOM II] difficult. United Nations decis

divided between the military and civilian leadership, and it 

not clear who is in charge. In late March [1993], [Lieuten

[Cevic] Bit [UNOSOM II Commander] stated he would 

conduct the turnover on or about 1 May 1993, a date prop

by the Secretary General sometime earlier. Neverth

Admiral] Jonathan Howe, the new UN envoy, refused to 

date. This was despite the fact that all the humanitarian r

including Mogadishu, had been successfully turned over 

forces by the United States, and the UN military command

that he was ready to assume command .... Another inher

of UN forces was the lack of logistical and intelligence 

United States agreed to leave about 3000 US troops i

support role, as well as additional intelligence personnel 

II Headquarters. Yet in July and August 1993, UNOSOM 

were reportedly hampered by an inadequate intelligence c

6. "Rangers waited hours for rescue," New York Ti

in The Kansas City Star, October 6, 1993, A-6. 

7. Harry Summers, "Poetic justice for this president 

for the nation," The Kansas City Star, 19 October 1993, 

8. Clarence Page, "Troubles with Aided have eerie 

Kansas City Star, October 12, 1993, p. B-5; also "Somalis 

for peace'," The Kansas City Star, October 12, 1993, p

pilot is released," Washington Post article in Kansas City 

15, 1993, p. 1. 

9. "Aided faction boycotts Somalian councils," Asso

Kansas City Star, October 30, 1993, A-10. 
South American Regional Plan, etc.). These strategies, and 

operational objectives in such projects as Cadence in Central 

and Snowcap in South America, have provided a general fram

SOUTHCOM planners to program military support. 

12. David Ignatius, "Panama: This Mop-Up Could Take 

Washington Post, December 24, 1989, C1. 

13. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, 

Just Cause (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 25, 51

Woemer, well regarded as a strategist and Latin America expe

of favor with the Bush Administration, and in July 1989, A

of Staff Carl Vuono advised Woerner "that his honorable opt

resign rather than be removed." Woerner agreed to resign. 

14. As one former military liaison officer assigned to 

Department explained in note to author, the situation was as 

military's fault as the civilians; the military did not actively 

Department expertise and help, and State did not actively se

15. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Exe

Restoration of Panama (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategi

Institute, April 15, 1992). Dr. Fishel provides an excellent 

the problems of interagency coordination experienced d

restoration phase which followed Operation Just Cause. 

16. By 1994, strategic priorities for U.S. Southern Com

changed; top interest was in strengthening military-t

relationships and contributing toward host nation professiona

military forces. 
INTERAGENCY OPERATIO

When the United States undertakes military operat

U.S. Armed Forces are only one component of a natio

effort involving the various instruments of nationa

economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. 

unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a co

endeavor involving a variety of Federal departm

agencies) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Warfare of the U.S. A

Today's national security environment finds even ou

leaders thrust into the multiagency arena. U.S. milita

routinely committed to operations which are inte

nature. Yet, top-down guidance as well as informati

techniques and processes for interagency coord

integration seem slim. Where does the unified com

his staff find the guidance for planning such ope

working with other agencies of government? 

This chapter recalls the policy development and 

process of the NSC, briefly reviews a new proposa

facilitate strategic direction to operational elem

discusses the available military doctrine. It begins w

process. 

NATIONAL DIRECTION 

Guidance and procedures for coordinating and int

efforts of govemment agencies seemingly could bran

NSC system that has evolved since the National Sec

1947. Conceived to coordinate policy issues, the N
Aside from the variation in its role in national policy

the NSC process and staff organization are not de

execute policy decisions in the sense of coordinating in

operations afield. Figure 1 shows the NSC organized 

the leadership style and needs of President Clinton. (

under the NSC are committees and other interagency g

By the process that has evolved in recent yea

interagency groups constitute the principal mecha

developing policy advice and recommendations for Pr

consideration. These groups formulate, recommend, co

and monitor the implementation of national security p

strategy. Often a govemment department such as Depa

State or Defense will take the lead or chair of an in

group. If not, the group will be chaired by a member of 

staff. Typically, these are organized in a hierarchy th

flexibility and invites several tiers of the national leade

their staffs to participate in the consensus process. 

After the NSC is a Principals Committee (the NSC 

the President or Vice President) chaired by the Nationa

Advisor to the President and convened for only 

important matters. Next is a Deputies Commit

participation at the undersecretary level, chaired by th

National Security Advisor or an undersecretary. It con

routine business of the NSC system and it serves as 

management cell. Additional subordinate level group

Interagency Working Groups, are manned at the sta

officer level to investigate specific fields of interest. 

It has been observed that traditional functions of the 

its staff are concemed with administration, crisis man

and policy in all its aspects: coordination, in

supervision, adjudication, formulation and advocacy: 3 
* O~tB~AD~80~8: Ol~ 

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Figure 1 

Source: Robert D. Walz, "U.S. National Security Process," 

Lesson II, Appendix 1 (Draft) to Advance Sheet (Fort Lea

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May, 1
represents the problem of confusing the supervising 

with implementing it, and frustration with the diff

integrating policy decisions among multiple agencies 

Congressional intent. If it is not appropriate for the NS

to place policy into operation, then where should that 

reside when numerous agencies are involved? A new 

to supplement the NSC with an implementing organiz

been suggested. 

In his book The lnteragency Process, former U.S

Command Commander-in-Chief Admiral Paul Davi

suggests that Interagency Action Groups should be estab

manage the execution of policy. 5 The IAGs (figure 

integrate effort under the aegis of policy councils, su

NSC, Economic Council, and Domestic Council. Estab

presidential decision, an lAG would be sponsored b

agency (supported agency in joint terms), have an In

Director (deparlment deputy or third tier appointee 

Force Commander"), and have a steering committee and 

level agency representatives, lAGs would implement pr

policy decisions in such areas as nation assistance, hum

assistance, disaster assistance, and countering illicit dru

Until this or a similar proposal to supplement 

system is adopted, military commanders must recogniz

integration of multiagency capabilities for field oper

unlikely to be done by interagency groups in Washi

elsewhere. For now, CINCs will operate within forei

and defense guidelines using the available doctrine. 

THE JOINT DOCTRINE 

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces is 

important manual in the Joint Publications series becaus
STEERING 

COMMITTEE 

KEY AGENCY 

REPRESENTATIVES 

COORDINATION 

ADJUDICATION 

USAID, USDP/GLOBAL, OSAA 

APPROPRIATE REGIONAL BU

POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAU

CORE [ 

COMPENTENCI_ ES[ 

WORKING LEVEl. 

[ REPRESENTATIVES [ ACTION 

IMPLEMENTATION 

AMBASSADOR, USCINCLANT

COUNTRY TEAM, MILITARY S

JOINT TASK FORCE, OTHER A

Figure 2 

Source: Based on diagram by Paul David Miller, The Interag

(Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), 

strategic warfighting philosophy of the Chairman 

Chiefs of Staff. As initially written, it was Chairm

Powell's message that joint warfare is team war

Chairman's views on interagency teamwork are 

National-Level Considerations, which describe unity 

the national level. Pub 1 says, 

The combatant commands play key roles in cooperat

other Federal and Defense agencies within their theate

is one reason why the term "unified operations' is 

description for the broad, continuing activities of the co

commands. 6 

Beyond Pub 1, the subordinate Joint Publicati

capitalize on the strong tone of the Chairman's view

role of the combatant commands in the interagency 

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, th

document for joint operations, provides "the doctrin
along a range of theoretical options between annihilatio

(battle of decision; dramatic turning point in war) and 

warfare (political decision with no dramatic tuming 

combat). Many of the operations other than war reside 

continuum within a domain often irffluenced by social

and economic concerns, and therefore their mu

dimensions are not well addressed in military pub

Examples are foreign intemal defense, combatting 

nation assistance, peace operations, and counterdrug o

Joint Pub 3 assigns the issue of interagency coord

the section concerning military operations other than w

we are told, "For operations other than war, the 

instrument is typically tasked to support the d

instrument, working with the economic and info

instruments. ''8 It misses the point that all military o

large and small, seek to achieve the objectives of 

(political) policy as these objectives are transla

departmental terms. Further, interagency-intemational 

with agencies such as USAID, the Red Cross, the United 

and the Department of Justice is an essential part of l

combat as well as a part of the little operations other t

A look at subordinate manuals in the Joint Pub 3

where the details of all this are anticipated, falls to tu

useful guidance for planning and operating in the in

arena. Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operation

Intensity Conflict reminds that "Interagency actions to ac

campaign planning in a LIC environment are critical. '

on to say that government agencies such as the Depa

State have important roles, but it provides no insight 

a joint force commander can prompt the cooperation 

critical govemment players. 

Only Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Doctrine and Join
AFSC PUB 2, Service Warfighting Philosop

Synchronization of Joint Forces, fail to give the joint sta

any insight about synchronizing joint forces with in

capabilities. 

To develop guidance for interagency activities, the J

has assigned the Navy (Doctrine Command) as lead age

development of a new Joint Publication 3-08, Int

Coordination During Joint Operations. The Strategy 

Policy Directorate (J5) is the Joint Staff doctrine sponso

technical review authority is the Office, Assistant Sec

Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conf

publication is to outline doctrinal guidance and 

involved to achieve interagency coordination during un

joint operations. The date of publication is expect

February 1996.1° 

SERVICE DOCTRINE 

The Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States A

Air force Manual 1-1, Volumes 1 and 2, our best conc

written service manual, summarizes aerospace doctrine i

1, then follows in the second volume with an excellent 

essays on aspects of war and military activities shor

Surprisingly, no where is the issue of interagency synchr

or coordination drawn out for the reader. 

Naval Warfare Publication 11, Naval Operational 

describes in detail a generic military planning process. 

that "crises often involve concurrent planning by t

combatant commanders, and by other[s]," but it does no

interagency planning. H The Navy White Paper, From 

describes a reorientation in Navy doctrine: "Away fr

ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operatio~ts 

sea. ''lz It suggest a greater Navy involvement in 
addresses interagency issues, but in FMFM 1-2, 

"Service with Other Military Forces," guidelines are 

for working with other services and nations and 

framework that could be used for conducting 

endeavors: 

• Authority should be assigned only to comm

[and civilian leaders] possessing the wherewi

influence the action. 

• Authority should be assigned to those 

responsibility for the outcome. 

• Responsibility for planning an operation sho

vested in the commander [civilian] responsible 

execution. 

• In general, command organization should 

centralized direction, decentralized execution

common doctrine. 13 

Though we are lacking a common doctrine for i

coordination, these guidelines could make a good sta

for structuring interagency activities. 

The Army's keystone field manual is FM 100-5, O

It describes "The Strategic Army" as "competent in m

such as nation assistance, counterdrug operation

assistance .... and stability operations, that can com

other elements of national power to achieve strate

favorable to U.S. interests." It says little of how it w

"full dimensional operations" in coordination w

agencies. 14 In a chapter on "Operations Other Than 

100-5 simply advises that commanders may have t

atmosphere of cooperation rather than command a

achieve objectives by unity of effort. ''~5 The manu

emphasis on decisive, offensive warfighting, is wed

dogma of the battle of annihilation" and the t
movement, establishing protected zones, and forcibly s

belligerents. Because "Much of the interagency coordin

planning will be conducted by a joint headquarters," the 

provided to Army commanders is that "Interagency opera

important" and they "facilitate unity of effort" by prov

vital link uniting Department of Defense (DOD) a

governmental department and agency efforts." Altho

100-23 notes that Army personnel will be coordinating w

Government agencies, the manual provides no insight 

scope of involvement or guidance or how to proceed. 17 

FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operat

a good job of defining military relationships with fede

and local civil organizations. Though its focus is on 

support to civil authority in domestic situations, it is th

manual that would be useful if applied to military planni

the operational continuum in a CINC's area of respons

CONCLUSIONS 

Instilling unity of effort at the national level is a nece

elusive goal. Beyond the policy formulation role of the 

interagency organizing structure is not available for ov

integrated operations in the field. Until a national int

system (e.g., Miller's IAG) and process is considered 

and put in place, the function of multiagency integ

support regional objectives will reside in the good offic

separate government organizations: the State Depamne

lead for foreign policy overall; Drug Enforcement Admin

for a specific counterdrug operation; the unified comma

military contingency; and so on. 

As yet, there is little doctrinal guidance for joint an

commanders to explain their roles and responsibilitie

process of interagency integration. This lack of specific 
planning and integration alongside the necessary 

facilitate military operations. 

Notes 

1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Wa

U.S. Armed Forces (Washington: November 11, 1991), 39

2. The NSC forum consists of the President, Vic

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Statutory Adviso

of Central Intelligence, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff)

invited advisors, such as the Director of Arms Control and D

or the Director of U.S. Information Agency. President 

added non-statutory members to his NSC: the U.S. Un

Representative to emphasize the role of the U.N. in natio

policy; the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to t

for Economic Policy to underscore the role of economics. 

3. Christopher C. Shoemaker, Structure, Function a

Staff: An Officers' Guide to the National Security Counc

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1989), 28. 

4. Ibid., 41. 

5. Paul David Miller, Admiral, U.S. Navy, The 

Process (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Anal

6. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Fo

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctri

Operations (Washington, September 9, 1993), V-1. 

8. Ibid., V-2. 

9. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Doctr

Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test) (Washington: 

1990), VI-2. 

10. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff message, 021800ZM

Joint Staff J7 JDD, Washington, Subject: Program Direct

PUb 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Opera

message states that "The objective of this project is to fd

void by developing a single source joint publication which 
Wasgto: Septebe99, 3. s s a Wte ap

describes Navy doctrine to support emerging National Militar

and a move toward jointness and interoperability. 

13. U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Ma

in the National Defense (Washington: Department of 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 21, 1991), 6-4. 

14. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Hea

Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), 1-4. 

15. FM 100-5, Operations, 13-4. 

16. Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of An

The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Imp

German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: G

Press, 1986), 103. Wallach describes the disaster caus

doctrinal fLxation upon the battle of annihilation as the on

German solution to Germany's strategic problems. Herein he 

an aborted 1912 attempt to conduct "a grand-scale [interag

game, embracing army, navy, Reichskanzler, Foreign Office

Office, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Reichsba

be directed by the Kaiser in order to investigate the over-al

of a future war." 

17. U.S. Army, Draft Field Manual 100-23, Peace Opera

Monroe, Virginia: Version 5, Training and Doctrine Comman

A] November 12, 1993), 4-4 & 5. 
Can we look regionally? How can we focus assets by 

targeting the whole [interagency and international] 

structure.., and try to develop the underpinnings for 

a relationship for a region? 1 

General George A. Joulw

A fundamental issue in conducting coordination 

government agencies is that each agency must first under

own objectives, concepts for operating, and the resourc

available. To this end, the military sector of govemm

done a good job developing a framework of strategic p

programming of resources, and campaign planning. This 

describes the evolution of U.S. Southem Command's 

framework from the late 1980s through 1993, a strategy 

been the foundation for coordinating with other age

govemment. 

The unified commands have a continuing need to co

regional strategies to ensure that concepts and resou

integrated within the overlapping domains of numerous a

The union of multidisciplinary skills and capabilitie

critical to success for peacetime strategies as for any 

effort. Yet in peacetime, when the military compo

national strategy is not the locus of government policy in

achieving interagency teamwork among the military and 

bureaucracies can be difficult. If the CINC carries the a

of combatant command in a theater of war, then during p

he represents only one of many govemment agencies o

throughout his area. 2 Getting cooperation from other dep

to support regional military strategies remains a diffic

This is especially critical for Southern Command beca

area of responsibility remains near the bottom of U.S. 
interagency arena. 

THE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK 

The basis of unified planning effort is the Join

Planning System, explained in detail in a Chairman, J

of Staff, Memorandum of Policy (MOP 7) an

publications. Inherent in MOP 7 is the underlying 

that coordination throughout the interagency 

(especially via the NSC interagency groups) will be m

Department of Defense and Joint Staffs so that plan

the current national military strategy (and especiall

Strategic Capabilities Plan--JSCP) will proceed sm

does not recognize that a CINC may have a need 

participate in interagency coordination at the nation

that some planning initiatives can extend beyond the J

This is especially true in Southem Command, w

military effort is expended supporting foreign polic

concerning nation assistance. Indeed, the past sever

Command CINCs spent considerable time in W

coordinating regional plans with government leader

bureaucracies. As one USCINCSOUTH observed

planning is a hoax--so its up to the regional CINC 

planning. ''6 Another CINCSOUTH said, "We're n

we're in a proactive mode. We have a strategy whi

the ambassadors in the region. [The issue is]...w

players and can they cooperate. "7 

The broad scope of theater planning is illustra

established arrangement of Southern Command st

plans. 8 The Southem Theater Strategy first began to 

in June 1987 through the development of a strategic 

General Fred Woerner, then the newly appointed C

analysis, called "Missions, Tasks, and Responsibilitie
subregions Central America, Andean Ridge, and South

Thurman made an effort to talk with and understand ke

leaders in Washington and the U.S. ambassadors in h

He conducted subregion planning meetings with his 

Assistance Group commanders to ensure that milit

reflected support for the ambassadors' country plans. 

even included a marketing plan as a way of infor

interagency leadership about the strategy and gain

support. Figure 3 reflects the planning process in 19

that the country plans were an integral part of th

formulation process. 

The maturing of the strategy was briefly interrupte

by Operation Just Cause, but was brought to curren

General George Joulwan. Five years in develop

Southem Theater Strategy is the compass for SOUT

operational planning. Figure 4 illustrates the c

framework of strategy and plans that resulted from th

and is discussed below. 

The Southem Theater Strategy has been de

"encourage and sustain cooperation among our allies, fr

new parmers" throughout Latin America---directly supp

President's National Security Strategy. 1° Its principal o

concept draws from the National Military Strategy re

for forward-presence operations: exercises, deploym

visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance

terrorism, protecting U.S. citizens, humanitarian assis

helping to counter illicit drugs. 1~ None of these can b

isolation, and that most missions require intensive in

coordination is recognized in the strategy: 
~y ASSISTAN~E~CE 

I 

US POLICY 

& STRATEGY 

NATIONAL 

MILITARY 

/ .,ss

TASK

I I "ES

]/@ 

("*s='~-°.;~'~.,~r [.=t -" ~'f .......... ~ STRATEGY 

~ - ~ 

T T _ CORRE~T,ONS J 

| \ / I O

' cou.TRV I /'"----------K/ s / / 

/ T °'"O

CONPLANS / ,e" I CACAMPLANS II - USSO

I COUNTRY ! - AN=DEAN RIDGE I -US~O

PLANS t - CEN ,~r,n I ¢ . USSO

, . . souT.E., CO,E . co:co.

Figure 3 

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy and Plans Dire

Quarry Heights, Panama, March 1990. 

It is easy to understand why interagency cooperation i

SOUTHCOM's strategy and planning when given 

missions: enhancing the roles of professional militar

democratic societies; promoting peace and stability t

economic development and the growth of democr

region; supporting counterdrug efforts; and implem

Panama Canal treaties./3 
PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS P

PROMOTE 

DEMOCRACY 

PROGRAMS 

COUNTER 

DRUG 

CAMPAIGN 

MILITARY 

ROLES 

CAMPAIGN 

N

ASS

PR

Figure 4 

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy and Plans Dire

Quarry Heights, Panama, April 1993. 

To engender cooperation within the Southem 

Theater Strategy goes to every ambassador, to e

military strategic objectives are in line with the Am

annual Goals and Objectives statement as well as ho

national plans. The objectives of U.S. agencies opera

Theater are considered in order to set the stage for syn

interagency operations. TM Sound operational plannin

achieve the policy objectives of the Federal departmen

ambassadors overseas is another way to encourage m

participation and support. 

OPERATIONAL PLANNING 

Putting the Southem Theater Strategy into op

accomplished by USCINCSOUTH Peacetime En

OPLAN 6001-95, which guides, in turn, four s

SOUTHCOM programs: the nation assistance and 
countering illicit drugs, disaster relief, assisting host n

their national plans, noncombatant evacuation in time

counter-terrorism, providing support to counter in

humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations

tasks that must be accomplished in a peacetime envi

well as during war, and they involve many agencies 

and foreign governments. The four subordinate 

focussing effort in support of the Peacetime Engageme

demand a variety of multidisciplinary and interagency 

NATION ASSISTANCE 

The Nation Assistance Program has established P

Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru as 

nations. The intent is end up with self-sustaining capa

institutions for continued development in host nations

objectives are to develop the capabilities of h

institutions and infrastructures, contribute toward inc

legitimacy of govemments, assist in fulfilling 

expectations about their emerging democratic govern

provide support to strengthen these democratic govem

Concepts for achieving these objectives include: 

• Conducting combined exercises with host na

• Deploying U.S. forces for training in the 

Theater and sending mobile training teams to assist 

people and units 

• Facilitating Foreign Military Financing fo

resources and the Intemational Military Education an

Program; facilitating Humanitarian and Civic Assist

10 USC, Sec. 401) 

• Conducting psychological operations 

• Conducting medical and dental readines

exercises as well as engineering exercises 
Program. 

PROMOTE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM 

The Promote Democracy Programs give priority to Per

Nicaragua, Guatemala, Venezuela, and E1 Salvador; 

nations also receive assistance. The intent is to help 

an environment in host nations where change and de

can occur without violence. Its objectives are t

protecting the developing democracies, increase their 

and credibility, and enhance the capabilities and rol

militaries to support democratic societies. In additio

Assistance, concepts for promoting democracy inclu

host nation civil and military organizations establish s

procedures for command, control, communicat

intelligence. Staff assistance visits are provided for t

to work out procedures. Funding is provided for 

informal professional exchanges on an individual to 

basis. 

MILITARY ROLES CAMPAIGN 

The campaign for enhancing military roles in d

establishes a priority effort for Peru, Guatemala, 

Colombia, El Salvador and Chile. The intent is to he

or enhance host nation military ethics that support dem

protect and promote human rights and still allow 

defend themselves against intemal and extem

Objectives are to improve military capabilities, assist p

development, and advocate a professional ethic that is 

of democratic society. U.S. SOUTHCOM does this 

concepts of operation described above, plus a strong e

education. In turn, U.S. ambassadors send selec
gg p

and transit areas. The intent of the Counterdrug Cam

reduce the flow of illicit drags to the United Stat

support to U.S. Ambassadors and U.S. drug law e

agencies. Its objectives are to support the developm

nation political will to fight narcotrafficking, assist in 

host nation counterdrug capabilities, and to en

continuous counterdrug effort on a cooperative, regi

A series of programs named Support Justice have st

host nation efforts by giving support to regional, inter

international com~terdrug operations. 

The first Support Justice program started in 19

bilateral (U.S.-Colombia) counterdrug operation; sub

the program matured to include U.S. support to m

operations. The Support Justice program (renamed 

Steady State in 1994) has helped to integrate multip

from the United States, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and 

fight the illicit drug trade. As a result of the Suppo

Steady State operations, "Host nations realized the 

mutual cooperation and began to address the probl

regional perspective," according to the SOUTHCOM 

Also, cooperation between host nation militaries and th

law enforcement agencies has been facilitated by SOU

operational support. 

This support includes small Operations Planni

(operations), Planning Assistance Teams (plans), an

Analysis Teams (intelligence) to help in coordinating i

and intemational counterdrug actions within host nat

personnel committed to support these operations ar

men and women of all services who repair and operat

fixed installations, install communications equipmen

information sharing, and help host nation law enforc

military units coordinate counterdrug support. 
invites political criticism by those wishing to exploit s

issues. Witness complaints by politicians about Supp

counterdrug efforts in Bolivia, or humanitarian 

assistance in Guyana as a threat to Brazil's sover

engineering assistance in Colombia as a threat to th

sovereignty. Fortunately, there are a number of 

resources that can support the SOUTHCOM strategy. 

Funding for defense assistance is handled by the D

of Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) thr

Southern Command and in-country Security 

Organizations with the Foreign Military Sales and G

International Military Education and Training progra

American Cooperation Funds are appropriated to th

departments and administered by the services; this prov

for cooperative exchanges and professional visits. 

Information Agency and U.S. Information Service (U

provide funding for contact programs with essentially n

audiences. 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) fund

primary means to support nation assistance plans. It 

according to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 401 th

Department of Defense. It serves the interests of both 

States and host nation by addressing economic and so

medical, dental and veterinary care; transportation 

sanitation facilities and wells; and construction 

facilities. HCA provided over $6 million for me

engineering support in 14 Southem Theater nations du

year 1993. ~9 

The complete resourcing picture includes m

considerations besides HCA. Figure 5 provides an ov

considerations for building the SOUTHCOM budget

research conceming host nations' humanitarian and c
host nations. Engineering activities in SOUTHCOM 

project design, contract construction, disaster 

environmental support, joint exercises and deploy

training) are funded by a variety of sources and are typ

complex manner in which the command funds its ope

24 MOS 18 MOS 12 MOS 9 MOS 6 MO

I I I I 

L JOINT 

:, TASK FORCES 

• ~ USSOUTHCOM 

I H SURGEON 

c 

S IUSSOUTHCOM 

ENG,NEEB 

iv I ~ __ 

COUNTRY L CINC ] 

TEAM PRIORITIES APPROVAL 

• AMBASSADOR 

--~ DCM 

DAD 

MILGP 

POLIECON 

USAID 

r ~ BUDGET 

! LEGAL 

CONCERNS PROGRAM 

L~ TROOPS T 

! AVAILABLE 

DO

R

AP

p 

DE

UNF

B

RE

Figure 5 

Source: "Building the Budget," USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, 

Plans Directorate, J5, Quarry Heights, Panama: 1993. 

Engineer support funds devolve from an amazin

sources. These funding sources include exerci

construction, foreign military financing program, inf
reasonable way to maximize limited funding su

SOUTHCOM operations. The SOUTHCOM pro

process does this. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The Southem Theater Strategy and the Peacetime E

Operations Plan are focused on military operations 

war. These kinds of operations place a premiu

cooperative efforts of other USG agencies alongside 

forces to ensure success. This can be seen in th

operation plans and programs developed by SOU

Nation assistance, promoting democracy, profes

military roles in democratic societies, and countering 

trafficking are tasks that require multiagency partic

success. Further, U.S. Southem Command opera

economy of force theater where resources will cont

limited. This makes the blending of the objectives, co

operating, and scarce resources of multiple U.S. G

agencies a necessary prerequisite for successfully 

strategic goals in the region. 

Of course, having a cogent plan is not an end, but 

to inform subordinates and to coordinate with c

organizations. The potential for SOUTHCOM strategi

to contribute toward integrating multiagency capa

diminished by the dearth of planning systems 

counterpart organizations. Typically, U.S. G

organizations operate on an annual basis, without the 

a process akin to the military's Joint Strategic Plannin

One exception is the Drug Enforcement Administration 

started a Strategic Management Stystem in recent yea

facilitating interagency coordination. To the extent th

are beginning to develop strategies and plans to explai
Department of the Treasury, USAID, Department of Justice

Department, Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Trade Rep

DOD stove pipes (example DIA), CIA, FBI, Dep

Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. OAS Rep

Department of Labor, and DEA. 

3. After CONUS defense, the United States strategy 

War II has been "Europe First," with other regions fall

generally Pacific Rim, Middle East, Latin America, then 

lack of interest in its own hemisphere has been evidenced 

priority for resources (especially foreign aid) given Latin 

the United States. Prioritization of strategic interests is ne

such strategic decisions are one reality to which USS

planning must accommodate. 

4. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan contains gui

commanders of unified and specified commands and the c

Services for the accomplishment of military tasks in the 

period (two years). These assignments are based on the ca

available forces. The JSCP directs the development of plan

national ,security objectives by assigning tasks and apportio

combat forces to the commanders of unified and specified 

The JSCP apportions "above the line" or combat forces for 

planning; the necessary support forces are then provided to 

by the Services as they deem appropriate. See AFSC Pub 

Staff Officer's Guide (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff Co

5-15. 

5. The Chairman, Joint Staff needs to insure that h

consistency in policy coordination with other Federal depa

cannot have the various CINCs running afield throughout W

Because the Joint Community must speak with one voice

likely to observe the CINC or his staff represented at 

meetings. Conversely, the unified commands have a ne

coordination at the highest levels of government to supp

planning efforts. 
yy

supports these national security objectives: global an

stability for peaceful change and progress; open democrat

systems; open international economic system; U.S. lea

collective responses to crises. The strategy supports thes

military objectives: deter/defeat aggression in concert w

ensure global access and influence; promote regional st

cooperation; stem the flow of illegal drugs; and combat ter

turn, the SOUTHCOM theater strategy objectives are: 

democratic institutions; assist host nations in eliminating 

national and regional security; support continued economic 

progress; assist host nations in defeating drug produ

trafficking; ensure an open and neutral Panama Canal; enhan

of professional military forces in the region. The major 

operation plan, Peacetime Engagement Operations, direc

programs to achieve these objectives. 

9. John T. Fishel, "The US Military and Securit

America in the Clinton Era," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U

Command and General Staff College, 1993), 7. 

10. U.S. Government, National Security Strategy of 

States (The White House, Washington: January 1993), 13-

11. Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Th

Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: Januar

14-5. 

12. U.S. Southern Command, Southern Theater Strate

Heights, Panama, July 1, 1992, 2. 

13. General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, Commander in 

Southern Command, statement before the Senate Arme

Committee, 2 March 1994, 15. Another priority was quality 

U.S. forces and their families. 

14. Lieutenant Colonel Leon H. Rios, USA, Chief, 

Strategy Division, J5, U.S. Southern Command, interview 

Quarry Heights, Panama, 19 October 1993. 
identifying goals and missions, and working a balance betw

support rendered. Civil Affairs is a link to the local popula

local health, public works, and leadership officials and to n

officials in civil and military agencies of government. 

SOUTHCOM Southern Theater Strategy, Appendix 2

Assistance," Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993, 21-2. 

17. McCaffrey, 20. U.S. Southern Command started 

Justice program in April 1991 with the initial objective 

bilateral cooperation with the Andean Countries. The p

developed so that host nations would have the politic

necessary capability to carry out effective counterdrug opera

Support Justice (SJ) I, SJ II (June-October, 1991), III (Nov

April 1992), and IV (September 1992-October 1993

operations to include synchronized land, air and riverine 

intelligence sharing, and regional cooperation among And

Now, Southern Command has written Operation "Steady Sta

1993 to present) which continues the SJ programs on a recu

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark Richardson, U

Counterdrug Plans Division, Counterdrug Directorate, U.

Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 20 October 1993. 

18. One systemic problem for unified commands i

peacetime engagement strategies is that the Joint Strateg

System was largely developed to support mid or high inten

by mission taskings and the apportionment of major c

(above the line forces) to the CINCs for war planning. 

assumed (perhaps incorrectly) that the services would prope

and provide adequate service support units (non-combat, 

line" units) to the CINCs based on the combat units in the

However, strategies for peacetime engagement requi

engineer, communications, civil affairs, and like units. Th

Staff would not apportion below the line (non-combat) Com

and Service Support units to USCINCSOUTH Operation P

suggests continued problems for the U.S. military in effectin

other than war. The Joint Strategic Planning System w
Coordination Conference, Quarry Heights, Panama, 10 June 

"Engineer Support Funds." 
MULTIPLE AGENCIES 

The problem is how to align the country teams region

Brigadier General Richard Potter, U

Since its initiation in fiscal year 1993, U.S. Southem C

system for planning and monitoring the movement o

personnel into the theater has become a means to 

interagency efforts regionally. The Theater Deployme

Group (TDPG) merges SOUTHCOM's strategic obj

priorities with the ambassadors' country plans. ~ It i

in fiscal year 1994, the 1,082 deployments into 

American nations involved over 60,000 U.S. activ

reserve component personnel. 3 In this process, SOUT

consider the objectives of the many USG agencies rep

a country team as the command develops concepts an

for training and assistance. The process is designe

duplicating host nation support provided by other US

and to ensure that U.S.-sponsored activities are not 

cross-purposes. 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN 

THEATER 

The deployment planning program provides a widely 

way to support the CINC's strategy objectives for 

General Barry R. McCaffrey, current CINCSO

explained that as SOUTHCOM executes its strategy, 

with and in support of other U.S. Government agenc

U.S. objectives are not accomplished unilaterally 

Government entity. They are accomplished by the coo
nations' and ambassadors' country plans as it ide

develops midrange training opportunities for U.S. 

recognizes country team and host nation needs for sub

Expert Exchanges, Humanitarian and Civic Assistanc

aspects of nation assistance (i.e., engineering, me

affairs), training assistance, and the like. By coord

future fiscal years (a 5-year program), SO

programmers have time to arrange funding in the budg

activities, and they reinforce the training management 

U.S.-based units. 

TDPG STEERING COMMITTEE 

A Theater Deployment Planning Group steering comm

to establish program priorities by subregion and co

regard to the CINC's strategy and his Annual Training 

Decisions are based on information provided by t

teams, SOUTHCOM staff, and service compone

SOUTHCOM J3 Operations Directorate, Deputy D

Exercises provides staff members to oversee the pro

program has two major elements: a Deployment Plan

to guide the MILGROUPS in preparing their input to 

process, and on-site TDPG assistance visits. 

Planning Guide 

The Deployment Planning Guide is a handbook that c

by the country team (MILGROUP) to help in 

forecasting and managing troop deployments into 

country. It consolidates Deployment Program infor

contains the out-year deployment plans. It also in

CINC's training guidance and SOUTHCOM regulat

apply to the program. 
Team Visits 

The steering committee schedules TDPG team v

countries to provide country team members direct a

SOUTHCOM staff. The visits afford the staff on-site 

and impressions that are helpful in building the pr

point of contact on the ambassadors' country teams 

the Military Group (MILGROUP). Procedures f

include these steps: a country clearance request 30 d

the proposed staff visit; an advance party arrives 

country several days ahead of the staff meetings 

administrative requirements and itinerary; then 

meetings are held with the country team and 

representatives to jointly identify requirements that 

country plan and the CINC's strategyJ 

The Operations Directorate of SOUTHCOM tailo

visiting team to the needs of the host country; it cou

officers from many staff functions, such as 

operations, plans, programming, engineers, medical

operations. The specific goal is to match military 

operations to the needs identified in the ambassad

plans. 

TDPG PRODUCTS 

Products of the TDPG process include the Thea

Deployment Plan (TI'DP) and theTheater Training O

Plan (TTOP). 

The Theater Training Deployment Plan: Prov

forthcoming Fiscai Year a forecast of the expected 

listed by type (Overseas Deployment Training or Dep

Training), quarter of year, number of days, mili
Guide, and historical data. It looks much the sam

Deployment Plan, and provides a proposed set of deplo

simplify planning and programming. After the s

Theater Deployment Management and Coordination C

attended by joint and service staff officers and cou

members (MILGROUP) to coordinate the Deployment 

the Deputy Director for Exercises of SOUTHCOM's O

Directorate produces a prioritized TTOP. It becomes a 

the following year's Deployment Plan. 6 

THE COUNTRY ROADMAP COMPUT

SYSTEM 

The Country Roadmap Computer System (CRCS) 

establish priorities for theater deployments (figure 

SOUTHCOM programming tool takes elements 

ambassadors country plans and organizes them in a fo

eases decisionmaking about the application of 

SOUTHCOM resources. For budget preparation, the 

vehicle through which the country team projects 

assistance requirements is the Annual Integrated Asses

Security Assistance (AIASA). The AIASA is one p

SOUTHCOM country roadmap that includes other res

The Country Roadmap Computer System takes 

resource inputs (such as security assistance, Humanit

Civic Assistance, training exercises) and relates 

functional areas of support and services (agriculture, ci

commerce, communications, education, health, housin

military, and transportation) (figure 7). The roadmap 

these potential needs in categories such as the ambassad

and objectives, and SOUTHCOM objectives, prog

requirements. The output is a "capability package" tha
T 

! COUNTRY ~CRCS 

AGENCIES I 

CONGRESS S.o 

A "COUNTRY PLAN" IS THE 

AURAS SAOOR'S LONG 

RANGE CONCEPT FOR 

PURSUING U.S. INTERESTS 

IN HIS HOST COUNTRY. THE 

PLAN INCORPORATES U.S. 

AND HOST NATION 

ECONOMJG, SOCIAL, 

POLITICAL, AND MILITARY 

ISSUES. 

THE "COU

COMPUT

TOOL TH

COUNTR

STRUCT

RESOUR

PACKAG

STRATEG

PROGRA

Figure 6 

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Programs and Resources Dir

Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993. 

prioritization process overseen by the Programs and 

Directorate, SCJ8 (figure 8). The CRCS is one mea

the development of a master requirements list for the 

It establishes increments within programs and ne

appropriation elements. This affords a systematic 

requirements for the Theater Deployment Program an

intemal change7 

CONCLUSIONS 

In the overview of the process for theater deployme

and programming (figure 9), the TDPG visit serv

elements of the ambassadors' country plan with t

SOUTHCOM Strategy. Computer models are u

process. The Regional Development Simulation Sys

Nation Model helps determine courses of action; it i

in detail in chapter 6. The Country Roadmap Comp
EXERCISES 

HUMANITARIAN 

~ROOnAMS X X X 

INTERNATIONAL I 

COOP PROGRAM X X X X 

OTHER COOP I ! I. 

pnooJ~us X X 

COUNTERNARCOTICS 

DISASTER 

RILIkF 

i 

X iX X X X 

X X X X X X 

I 

i x x 

i X j X X X X X X X X 

X X X X ! X j X X X X X 

Figure 7 

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Programs and Resources Direc

Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993. 

ROADMAP REPORT EXAMPLE 

(FIVE YEAR RESOURCE PLAN) 

FROM THE PL

STRATEGY: ESTABLISH HN COUNTERNARCOTICS CAPABILITY 

AMBASSADOR'S GOAL: MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILI

AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 

OBJECTIVE 5: IMPROVE FIXED WING AIRLIFT 

PROGRAM #1 : SUSTAIN C-130 CAPABILITY 

RESOURCE STRUCTUR

FY93 FY94 

COST 

REQUIREMENT QTY COST QTY ITEM SRCE ($K) ITEM SRCE ($K) 

1) FLT HRS 3000 FH FMFP 3600 4200 FH FMFP 5040 

2) AC MAINT 1 PARTS FMFP 3658 1 PARTS FMFP 4896 

3) MECH TNS 3 SCHL IMET 20 6 SCHL IMET 40 

4) CNTNG 12 OJT INM 30 15 OJT INM 3S 

S) LOG SPT TNO 1 MTT OEA 8 1 MTT DEA 10 

S) SMEE 2 6XCH COOP 14 2 EXCH COOP 16 

Figure 8 

Source: USSOUTI-ICOM, Programs and Resources Direc

Quarry Heights, Panama: 1993. 
from the SOUTHCOM staff indicate that it is perfo

A more important determinant of TDPG success will 

term usefulness to the country teams as a way that 

command's strategy and plans are aligned with c

goals and missions. 

AMSASSAOOR Jl __, SOUT.COM COUNTRY T+ li S

COUNTRY PLAN i--~-~1 TDPG VISITS I i DENTIFICATION I -k PRI

FOR HN HOST NATION j i l °FNNR°MTs /I 'T

: ; ........... i ""E"~'¢"°,,, ""%"?, ,%,'."" : + 

~! SOUTHCOM 'I----t 

PROGRAM RESOURCES 

eusuI, N T.~TUR C

T*A,...O outov ...A~* Hrcov C

piAN ITTDItl ¢MIITNTI IUIMIT MGAt T AND CO+ : 

re.At,no ~o,~ co..E..cu 

• umu.. r,~:TI. R

Tmmo o~O~TUNrrv pI~X (TTOPI 

PR

~II~-~11.*II l.¢V~ily ll,ll.l~ Impkml,llll.n An@y~l 

~+lNm-*llllo~l ~lspm~t ~mUllllll lyllll 

Ul~L..UO,,I~ I...,..D T.k tl.l 

~R--T.,., o' R.,°~. 

Figure 9 

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy, and Plans Direc

Heights, Panama: October 1993. 

The TDPG represents a systematic and or

approach to facilitating interagency cooperation, bu

tackle the human aspects of tile issue. The next chap

a political-military exercise called CMASS that 
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, interview by au

Leavenworth, KS, 25 February 1994. As former Comman

Operations Command Europe, General Potter deployed hi

Turkey providing combat search and rescue during the 1990

Storm fight against Iraq. After the war, he gained co

interagency experience as leader of the first elements on t

coordinating relief efforts for Kurd refugees during Operati

Comfort. 

2. Major Miguel I. Becerril, USA, Manager, Theater D

Program, "FACT SI-I~.P.T, USSOUTHCOM'S Theater D

Planning Group (TDPG)," Exercise Division (SCJ3-DD

Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 19 October 

3. U.S. Southern Command briefing, "FY 94 "Iq'DP O

Exercise Division (SCJ3-DDX), US Southem Comman

Heights, Panama, 11 June 1993, slide "FY 94 TI'DP Overv

CJCS Exercise)." FY 94 Theater Deployments (Total P

included: CJCS exercises, 19; unit training (DFT, ODT), 1,15

and Technical Assistance (Mobile Training Teams), 275; r

Jungle Operations Training course, 18; operations and supp

for a total of 4,112 deployments involving 63,600 personnel

these deployments are small numbers of personnel in tra

assistance teams, which accounts for the large number of dep

4. General Barry 1L McCaffrey, USA, Commander in C

Southern Command, Statement before the Senate Arme

Committee, Washington, 2 March 1994, 14. 

5. Becerril. 

6. Colonel Norman R. Flemens, USA, Force, Deputy D

Joint Exercises and Training, "Memorandum, Proposed FY9

Training Opportunities Plan," U.S. Southern Command, S

Quarry Heights, Panama, 15 May 1993. 

7. U.S. Southern Command briefing, "LATAM Cou

Resource Planning," Programs and Resources Directorate

Quarry Heights, Panama, 10 June 1993, slide "Master Re

List." 
LEARNING COOPERATION 

It became clear that we often have the same goals but d

processes for arriving at those goals. 

Game process was very good in highlighting the 

and set a good stage for further discussion in rea

agency settings. 

Rarely can we meet under a single roof with all th

who contribute to the effort. 

The agencies had a difficult time communicatin

though they were all in the same building. 

Player Comments, CMA

"How do you develop mutual trust and confidence? 

we ran exercises to demonstrate trust and confidence,

former CINCSOUTHJ In trying to develop the under

effective working relationships in his area of respon

CINC encouraged a process for education and coop

April 1991, he directed the development of the C

Modeling and Simulation System (CMASS) to e

gaming system that could address counterdrug issues a

unity of effort among the agencies involved in t

drugs. ''2 This was an important decision because the c

effort was one facet of an operations plan for 

engagement that also included concepts for nation ass

promoting regional stability. Establishing a 

interagency coordination in the counterdrug effort w

immediate overlap into other aspects of the SO

strategy. Inherent in the project design was the deve

analytical computer models to support SOUTHCOM

operations and periodic exercises. 
agencies and other government agencies, plus respond

policy goals of Washington-based agencies, was a dau

The CMASS would prove to be a big contributio

interagency cooperation at the policy level in Washi

among operators in the field. 

OBJECTIVES 

USSOUTHCOM designed CMASS to provide a 

environment for analyzing the complex problem

counterdrug effort, looking at courses of action, and 

agreement about cooperative interagency efforts. 3 

objectives of the series of CMASS games have been t

• Enhance the effectiveness of U.S. interagency o

• Help the USSOUTHCOM and component co

and staffs understand the support required by U.S. cou

and agencies. 

• Improve regional coordination to increase host 

law enforcement capabilities. 

• Contribute to an understanding of the narco

threat to U.S. interests. 

• Aid in the synchronization of resources; and en

planning and operations of interagency players, th

teams, and the host nations. 4 

CMASS ORGANIZATION 

Within the setting of a nearly real-world scenario, 

seminar groups explore concepts for programs and oper

would put into action national drug policy and strateg

game, assumptions are kept to a minimum. The c

modify the actual situation on the ground only to 

necessary to drive the objectives of the game. Thus gam
officials have participated in some seminar games, co

to the realism and importance of game interaction. 

shows the typical organization. 

Ir GREEN "~ ........ 

/,j MULT,P'E N 

,*T=.r,At I TEAMS 

• v N 

RED I,'"'*~l""t'*" ) ~CALp ' " I~HOST NATIO POLITICAL o~TANB/~TLY ~'i'ABILITY J MUI_..

DlmlIONI D|ClSJONI 

BIYUA~ ~ UpDIy| 

WHITE 1 

CONTROL '11' 

, ADJUDICATION I~ 

Figure 10 

Source: Game Book (Quarry Heights, Panama: USS

Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System, Simulation 

1993), 4. 

Blue Team seminars are manned by go

representatives from the Washington interagency are

represent high-level policy positions in such organizati

National Security Council, the Office of National Dru

Policy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S

Service, the Department of Defense, the Department of 

so on. This team is the Washington Interagency Grou

game purposes, represents a National Security Coun
p

When sensitive or classified information is at the 

contention, then knowledgeable U.S. personnel play 

host nation officials. The CMASS game director w

composite country team when it is impractical to b

country teams together simultaneously. Such was 

CMASS IV, held by tile National Defense Un

Washington, DC, where the composite country team 

up of MILGROUP and embassy officials from Brazi

and Venezuela. 

The white team is the control team, headed b

SOUTHCOM officer as the Game Director. The co

depicts organizations not represented by players at th

it keeps the play in line with game objectives. It p

function of adjudication of the decisions (or moves) o

A Red Team simulates the way narcotraffickers, 

and terrorists operate and provides that response to 

Green Team players. The USSOUTHCOM Vice 

Intelligence is head of the Red Team. Members of the 

can include contractor personnel and analysts 

embassies, DEA, the Treasury Department's Financ

Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Defense Intelligen

Los Alamos National Laboratories, and SOUTHC

officers. Often, the Red Team has functional cells t

separate types of threats (e.g., narcotraffickers and in

encourage realistic and independent response to the 

Blue groups' initiatives. 

HOW THE GAME WORKS 

A typical game would have the Washington Interage

review emerging counterdrug strategy or policy and d

appropriate guidance to U.S. military and civilia
with other teams, these groups then develop courses of 

carry out the new counterdrug guidance. The Red Tea

is really a player (not a controller cell), reacts to the mov

White, Blue, and Green Teams. 

At the end of the day, all teams assemble and di

rationale for their decisions and raise issues to discuss 

group at large. An interesting aspect of this is the Red 

discussion of the impact of White, Blue and Green Team 

and the reasons for its Red Team reactions. 

The game continues for three or four moves, taki

four days to conduct a CMASS exercise. The contro

uses several computer models for adjudication of team 

and to provide accurate responses to other teams. 

COMPUTER MODELS AND SIMULAT

Macro Models--Regional Developme

Simulation System 

The CMASS computer models, which provide feedback 

players based on game moves, can serve as pred

anticipated courses of action: In many cases, the 

models are not apparent to the game players; at othe

team may choose to make use of the models to help the

upon a course of action. The general term used for t

models used is the Regional Development Simulatio

(RDSS). 

RDSS is a group of three macro computer mo

support regional planning and strategy development

models are called the Regional Development S

System---Single Nation Model (RDSS-SNM), which sim

socio-political, economic, and military processes in a de

nation; the Regional Counter Drug Model (RCDM)
country team members set priorities deployment, t

support requirements for host nations (figure 9). It is 

for educating planners about the complex relations

political, social, and economic factors in a developin

Inputs to the model run include initial conditions 

internal policy decisions (courses of action), and exte

affecting the development of a nation. RDSS-SNM p

variables so that internal and extemal actions can b

helping teams optimize courses of action. Because 

SNM compresses time and space, analysts can inv

long range affects of their policy decisions. During 

game, RDSS-SNM supports seminar interaction, co

the dynamics of scenario development, and helps the 

adjudicate game moves. 

RCDM: "Designed to aid analysts in underst

examining the regional narcoindustry and in assessin

of alternative courses of action directed a

narcoindustry. "6 The model simulates extemal fact

affect the drug industry along with intemal comp

represent the decisionmaking of the drug industry. It 

the assumption that the cocaine industry behaves a

industry, making decisions about raw materials, 

manufacturing, form of the finished product, moving 

to market, collecting revenues, and returning reve

corporate structure. The model presents a re

industrywide view of four specific functions: co

transporting, refining, and distributing. RCDM giv

and receives inputs from RDSS-SNM. 

RSSIA: Looks regionally at levels of political s

socio-economic potential of nations throughout 

Because RSSIA supports several aspects of theater p

it is not central to CMASS games, it is discussed s
pjpy

The Transport of lllicit Product Scheduler (TIPS): M

flow of coca paste and base from growing areas to la

locations where paste is converted into cocaine hydrochl

helps the analyst understand transportation routes, sched

costs and gives an estimate of capacity, location of coca 

and laboratories. The model helps to support decisio

courses of action for the Red, Green and Blue Teams. 

the model can include growing areas, laboratory locati

material source preferences, cocaine hydrochloride pr

factors, transportation network descriptions, transportati

and characteristics, and sensors and interceptors. A

driven program, TIPS reacts to drug traffickers' prefer

order to satisfy decisions for raw materials and processin

and minimize loss and travel time. 

The Counterdrug Surveillance Intercept Coverage (

A tactical decision aid developed by the U.S. Navy 

during Desert Storm. It shows the surveillance covera

arid ground based radar sensors, thus giving an idea of 

and possible intercepts. It is useful in developing co

action for intercepting drug trafficking aircraft and po

radar systems. 

The Counterdrug Modeling and Analysis Capability (

A means for simulating the interaction between detec

monitoring assets and the narcotraffickers. It can disp

detection zones, cities, national boundaries, and top

information along with the flights of narcotrafficker 

aircraft and host nation interceptors. Outcomes of dete

interception are provided to team players at the end 

move, to include rates of detection and interception al

flight aborts. 

Computer models such as TIPS, CDSIC, and CM

focused at the tactical level and are of greatest use to 
GAMING EVOLUTION 

USSOUTHCOM has sponsored seven CMASS ex

conducted an initial developmental simulation for 

December 1991 in Panama. Its purpose was to v

CMASS concept. The six games which followed we

to facilitate interagency cooperation for U.S. Govemm

in Latin America. 

In April 1992 SOUTHCOM held the second CM

at the Joint Warfighting Center, Hurlburt Field, F

contributed to country team counterdmg and nation 

initiatives in Bolivia. Objectives were to "s

development of courses of action to increase the effe

[Operation] Ghost Zone and to gain insights into nar

responses to the operation. ''7 The Bolivia Country Tea

that the simulation significantly contributed to thei

Operation Ghost Zone. 8 

In August 1992, SOUTHCOM conducted a CMAS

the last day of a 3-day Support Justice planning conf

was the only game specifically designed to suppo

planning with the host nation. The exercise was co

Panama, which allowed participation of host nati

officer police and military representatives from Colo

and Venezuela. Objectives were to foster the integra

and host nation operations and help integration of 

operations regionally. This game allowed U.S. 

players to work directly with host nation personnel. 

this effort were realized throughout 1993 as And

nations integrated some aspects of their counterdrug in

a regional basis. 1° 

In a fourth simulation in November 1992 a

Warfighting Center, Huflburt Field, FL, the CMASS 

used the current situation in the Support Justice pr
planning and coordination process . . particularly 

Washington Interagency arena. ''u It made sense that 

iteration of CMASS should involve policymakers in key 

in Washington. 

THE WASHINGTON GAME 

The May 1993 simulation at the National Defense Un

Fort McNair, Washington, DC, addressed national cou

policy. It was a strategic level game "conducted to p

forum for the senior leadership of the counterdrug comm

discuss the impact of policy on our ongoing and fu

operations in the region. ''~2 For 2 months prior to th

SOUTHCOM worked to encourage key Washington le

to attend; even so, key civilian leaders had difficulty de

2 or 3 days of their schedule to participate. 

During this time DEA made the decision to beco

engaged in the game. In the event, they became 

involved, providing good support and using the game ef

to educate the interagency community about DEA 

objectives. 13 The simulation used actual guidance from 

Presidential Review Directive conceming counterdrug p

overseas areas and the DEA's South American Region

Objectives were to build interagency teamwork, f'md 

improve interagency and combined (with host nations) 

processes, and provide an understanding of evolvi

counterdrug strategies. Figure 11 illustrates the Wa

game's organization. 

This iteration was especially useful in provi

opportunity for senior-level policymakers to discuss issue

themselves and to work with the officials who impleme

in the field. There developed a general agreement 

enforcement and military actions against illicit drug ac
BLUE TEAMS 

STRATEGIC LEVEL I ~AB"'NGTO"'u"'ERAGENCY~ 

I . ;o.,~,,. ,,v.:.,~.l~,.vl" 

..... -I- .... 'c 

I OPERATIONALREGIONALLEVEL ~ 

i I CO SUPPORTIUSSOUTHCOM TEAM K 

\,, ll' 

q COMMUNICATION ~ I I 

~ACTION/REACTION" 

GREEN TEAMS 

CBOMPOSITE COUNTRY TEA

RAZIL, ECUADOR, & VENEZU

HOST NATION TEAM 

BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, ECU

PERU, ~ VENEZUELA) 

\X // 

CONTROL/ADJUDICATI

/ 

~s ~A 

RED TEAM 

NARCO INDUSTRY "~._~f NARCO

CELL J \ C

Figure 11 

Source: After Action Report (Quarry Heights, Panama: USS

Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System, Simulation IV

Integration, July 1993), 16. 

based economic, political, and social development. 

a chart developed by CMASS players during the co

Washington game describing their consensus on 
~L RESOURCE S ~ :,MEDIA 

- I~ FmMr RESOURCES 

TR

NATIONAL LEVEL SELI~C~IO~I CRITIRIA " SIIZ~I

~Ea,~ .-Ar~O~ ~,~,-~,-~-L~,~L l ............... • ..... ] ............ 

• HUMAN moH'rs • ~l.ce 

. c~vltt~N CO~TIIOL • ~tow 

• ~souscl ~A~AII~ * DIM~R

• At, II~

NIAR.TIIIM AC/IONII I 

INTII~OICTION 

~I~ • Mo.rromNa 

IITEL COtl.eC~O~tANALYSlII 

I~OICATtON 

TAR~ MO~Y L~N~mNO / 

T*a~¢~ r I~ecunloR 

CHIMICALI j 

LoMa.TIRU ~'~C.MI 

• .IUOICJAL M~C,,nU 

• LIOIIt,'mON ACTIO~I 

• UUTUAL TmJ~r Axo 

~ CONFIDEN ~ IUI~ING 

• M. na~r 

• SUPPORT ~Nma~ou* 

mSTIT UTIOmS 

j_o_,:;=_, 

Figure 12 

Source: After Action Report (Quarry Heights, Panama: USSO

Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System, Simulation IV, 

Integration, July 1993), 7. 

THE ECUADOR GAME 

In September 1993, SOUTHCOM held a regiona

simulation at the Ecuadorian War College in Quito

The exercise was conducted at the request of the A

(prompted by the MILGROUP) to build cooperatio

police and military organizations of Ecuador and Colom
critical areas. 

• Optimize the uses of available resources, and 

skills of host nation authorities in planning, decisiom

conducting joint and combined counterdrug actions. 

This game was especially noteworthy because of the i

participation: 

Participants in the [Quito, Ecuador] simulation inclu

commander of the Ecuadorian Joint Staff, the C

Ecuadorian Intelligence, the head of the Ecuadorian Po

Inspector General of the Colombian Military, senior Co

police officials, senior U.S. Embassy officials from C

and Ecuador, and the Director for Ope

USSOUTHCOM. Bolivia and Venezuela had 

counterdrug personnel present as observers. The simu

objectives were developed by a joint panel of Ecuado

Colombian military and police officers; the simulat

conducted in Spanish (no English translations), and 

Ecuadorian and Colombian officers acted as sim

directors. TM 

The result of the Quito simulation was a recogn

need for regional cooperation, especially in the borde

participants agreed to work on coordinating operation

intelligence, and improving conmitmications links 

agreements on common equipment, frequencies, and p

Countries exchanged liaison officers and it was agree

a possible joint intelligence center in common borde

In a seventh exercise in November 1993, 

Warfighting Center at Huflburt Field again hosted the 

a followup to the May simulation in Washington. C

to the policy guidelines developed in the previous M

(take a regional approach, and integrate international c
and LinearKingpin objectives 

• Develop future counterdrug courses of actio

Andean region 

• Provide a basis for out-year programming of re

support counterdrug operations 

• Find ways to better integrate computer m

exercise play. 15 

This game was successful as an educating and co

vehicle, but the perceived lack of national-level in

direction in counterdrug strategy at the time of the gam

the development of specific and forward-looking co

strategies and operations. 

Now, after seven iterations, SOUTHCOM has 

ability to engender understanding, cooperation, and o

consensus through its Counterdrug Modeling and S

System. More than exercises in doctrine and theory

has directly supported current operations in the thea

politico-military exercise CMASS has done a good job 

current situations in Washington and in Latin America 

participants can work together on nation assist

counterdrug issues in a nonthreatening, non

environment. 

FUTURE GAMES 

Future games will emphasize coordination with cou

and host nations in the region. More in-country gam

conducted, as in the Ecuadorian example above, and th

name will likely be dropped because of its narrow 

counterdrug efforts. In the near term, SOUTHC

concentrate its modeling and simulation effort with 

nations in small, workshop-type games to support 

engagement activities. The gaming concept is being e
involving Ecuadorian and Colombian officials. It 

cross-border problems of lawlessness in the Putumayo 

(border between Colombia and Ecuador) and explore

for combined operations. The game was linked to 

Unidas command-post exercise. 

La Paz, Bolivia, was the site of another semin

September 1994. Bolivians used the game to advance 

method for controlling smuggling (precursor and 

chemicals used to make cocaine hydrochloride, au

cigarettes). A goal for this game was to en

interoperability of police and military operations

integrating games, as that held at Fort McNair in W

will not be held (at least through fiscal year 1995) be

lack of funding. 

RESULTS 

By USCINCSOUTH's measure, the CMASS game 

successful because of its power for "integration and co

in a diverse interagency environment. Because the 

structured as a counterdrug exercise, it contr

"understanding . . . the operational capabilities an

environment of the narco industry. ''16 The CMA

provided players an opportunity to investigate act

documents such as the SOUTHCOM Strategy, the D

American Regional Plan, and the Presidential Review 

conceming overseas counterdrug strategy. Pla

SOUTHCOM, DEA, State Department, Customs, etc

their objectives and plans had commonalities that c

mutual interests. This gave players "a chance to 'b

how the new guidance might be carried out under con

would not have been possible in day to day circum

CMASS games brought to the forefront the pro
initiatives would have to be regional and interdisc

nature if they were going to have a positive impact 

the host countries and disrupting the drug industry

through the Quito, Ecuador, exercise, the CMASS 

intemational cooperation in police and military opera

Peter A. Lupsha observed, "Through CMASS, host nat

could and did, air problems, concems, recognized com

of constraint, and forged methods for overcoming the

that could never have happened elsewhere. ''is CIN

explained: 

They sought solutions to common problems including

immigration; insurgent intimidation of their citizens; sm

of illegal arms, munitions, and explosives across c

borders; and narcotrafficking in border regions. Part

agreed that the conference strengthened relationships b

two countries and improved cooperation between the m

and police forces in both countries. 19 

This saw real results on the ground as the Ecuad

Colombians exchanged liaison officers and coordinate

operations. 

Finally, the establishment of a professional Red Te

game series to simulate the actions of the drug 

leadership provided realistic game play and insigh

behavior of the drug threat. It allowed the interagency 

"breakthrough the traditional and too common, enem

Blue paradigm to recognize that narco-Red was 

multidimensional BUSINESS and POLITICAL phen

some simple direct extension of military war gaming, 

importantly, could not be responded to by tradition

FORCE and MASS warfighting. ''2° 
p pyg

using real or near-real scenarios, it is difficult for t

director to get a solid commitment to attend the 

ambassadors, country team members, and key bur

Washington. Parochial concerns can dissuade some, 

may be too busy to attend. 

Also, it is incumbent on the exercise director t

other agencies of government that they have a st

common effort and its outcome. Scenarios must illus

and important issues but must not make key leaders po

bureaucratically vulnerable during game play. Third

are costly in terms of time away from the job, travel 

money to run the game. Finally, there is this dang

enthusiasm to promote a political-military game 

important policy issues, a military officer could b

stepping beyond a line between contributing lead

seizing the lead. Even with these problems, the CM

of games has already demonstrated a payoff in 

interagency networking, coordination, and teamwork

Teamwork will be critical if we are to successful

objectives of peacetime engagement strategies: 

aggression; strengthening free market democracies; an

new democracies and market economies. Although SO

developed CMASS for the counterdrug part of i

strategy, the game can be applied to other security con

as nation assistance and civil-military cooperation. It 

potential for fostering cooperation in other areas such 

counterproliferation, peacekeeping, and peace enforc
4. The country team, in essence is the Ambassador's 

together for functional purposes. When it assembles to 

counternarcotics actions, it is usually chaired by the Depu

Mission. Principal players with counterdrug interests c

officers from the Narcotics Assistance Section, Security 

Office (SAO), Chief of Station, the DEA Narcotics Attach

Attach6, the Customs Attach6, the FBI Legal Attach6, U.S. 

International Development (USAID), U.S. Information Serv

the Defense Attach& Some country team members maintain 

communications with parent organizations located stateside 

directive authority for teams they may have operating with

country. For example, the Narcotics Attach6 maintains a link 

in Arlington, VA, while he also directs actions of DEA te

field. The same stovepipe effect is true of the Legal Att

Security Assistance Officer (Defense Security Assistance A

Unified Command), Defense Attach6 (Defense Intelligenc

Public Affairs/USIS Officer (U.S. Information Agency

Narcotics Assistance Section Chief (State Department, In

Narcotics Matters). This heterogeneous assemblage demand

attention of the Ambassador and his Deputy Chief of Missio

their coordinated action within the host country. The existe

a system makes evident the need for close cooperation in c

regionally. 

5. A description of the CMASS computer models 

"Tab A, Computer Models and Simulations," Simulation B

and in Larry B. Hamby, "The Regional Security Analysis 

New Tools for a Changing Environment" (Weston, MO: 

& Hamilton, Inc., December 15, 1993). 

6. Hamby, 6. 

7. U.S. Southern Command, "Counterdrug Mod

Simulation System (CMASS) Simulation IV, Interagency In

After Action Report (Quarry Heights, Panama: Booz-Allen & 

Inc., July 1993), 12. 
airfields. Phase II began 28 March with intensive operati

land, sea and air lines of communications from the g

processing areas to the Colombian traffickers; to dismantle 

organizations via raids, arrests, and seizures; and to enhance 

efforts of the Government of Bolivia. Phase III started 

sustain Phase II operations in order to keep the press

narcotraffickers for a significant period of time to make th

in lowering coca profits. The same concept continues today 

pace (because of a lack of funding), helped by the Supp

program. The sophisticated counterdrug operation involve

Bolivian counterdrug personnel under a Special Antinarc

(FELCN), Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), other 

service participants. They were supported by about 35 Ame

the Army, Coast Guard, and Customs, with the Drug E

Administration as the lead agency. A full description of G

found in "Illusive Victory," Military Review, December 19

9. Support Justice is a USSOU'I~COM program th

joint-combined counterdrug operations. The concept is t

governments work together and with supporting U.S. 

agencies to disrupt narcotrafficking organizations throughout 

region. After Support Justice (SJ) I in 1991, SJ II, 

expanded operations to include synchronized land, air a

interdiction, intelligence sharing, and regional cooperat

Andean nations. Now, Southern Command has written a "

OPORD," which continues the SJ programs for logistics, m

intelligence, and planning support and standardizes its 

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark Richardson, US

Counterdrug Plans Division, Counterdrug Directorate, U.

Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 20 October 1993. 

10. Larry B. Hamby, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., i

author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 1994. Mr. Ham

of the creators of the CMASS. 

11. After Action Report, 13. 

12. Ibid. 
16. USCINCSO Quarry Heights PM//SCJ//, 132130

unclassified message to Military Groups and American Em

17. After Action Report, 3. 

18. Peter A. Lupsha, Professor, University of New 

consultant to USCINCSOUTH, "Some Thoughts on the Role 

Activities on Drug Policy and Policymakers," priv

Department of Political Science, Univ. of N.M., Las Cruces

1993, 3. 

19. General Barry R. McC~frey, USA, Commander in 

Southern Command, statement before the Senate Arme

Committee, Washington: 2 March 1994, 16-17. 

20. Peter A. Lupsha, 1. 
THEATER STRATEGY 

With many calculations one can win; with few, one m

How much less the chances for victory for one who 

none at all. 

Sun Tzu, The 

The Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analys

is one of the analytical tools that strategists use to ev

socioeconomic and stability indicators, examine cond

make significant impact on a region, and see the 

resources can have on its future growth. It is one tool 

to maintain some degree of objectivity during the 

strategy, plans, and exercises and has strong potenti

with interagency planning efforts. 1 

RSSIA began as an effort to assess the effect

Southern Command Regional Strategy. It allowe

plarmers to compare the relative levels of political st

socioeconomic potential throughout the region over 

helps to identify the region's needs for long-term pr

resources and short-term immediate support req

RSSIA gathers subjective and objective information 

fields. This results in spread sheets that reflect where 

in comparison to other nations within the region. 

RSSIA METHOD 

Once RSSIA provides a survey of the region and de

appropriate indicators, the model then displays th

positions of countries in the region. By adding and 

input factors the analyst can compare nations' re

economic and political stimuli. The intent of the mo
It provides four sets of interrelated data bases: 

• An events database that tracks significant 

military and economic events 

• A subject matter expert database that stores s

• A theory database that stores existing theory f

disciplines 

• A statistical database that holds data over tim

RASP allows the strategist to reassess RSSIA analysi

new data and tailor information (text, lists, graphs) to 

of the decisionmaker. 2 The various data bases contri

factors that the RSSIA model analyses. 

THE FACTORS 

To arrive at a plot like the example in figure 13, 28 

currently used; as the model continues to mature, 

factors are added. Following are some major factor

used in the RSSIA model: 

Communications infrastructure. Number of telep

capita is used because it directly reflects intemal commu

Also, programmers are building into the system the 

capture cellular systems, satellite usage, and internatio

data. The ability of industry in developing n

communicate intemationally is used for analysis. 

Transportation infrastructure. Kilometers of rail, 

and waterways are totaled and entered into the model. 

reflects the ease of internal movement, but does n

reflect the capacity of the infrastructure to support 

economic strategy. Potential refinements that can be 

into this factor include freight costs from secondary 

interior cities, tonnage of traffic per border point and 

Important aspects are how well the host nation is main

transportation network, the age and materials of roadbe
I " ECUADOR • 

T * BOLIVIA • EL SALVADOR 

Y • G UYANA 

• COLO

• SURINAME • GU

• NICARAGUA 

~., • PERU 

SOCIO-ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 

Source: Authors 

Figure 13 

appropriateness of the infrastructure to support nascen

Access to energy. This factor includes kilowat

capita's consumption, direct measurement of price p

hour for industry, number of hours of interrupted pow

industrial areas, and the number of major producer

primarily on private sources of power. For a develop

this factor, when examined from the total viewpoint

for socioeconomic development. Additional informa

collected about these factors is reliability of the nati

supply of the nation, its vulnerability to sabotage or d

dependence of the power sector on imported oil. 

Diversity of economy. The indicator used for this f

ratio of agriculture to industry to labor to the service s

collecting the information to load into the data field 

further analysis of this factor should indicate if 

technology present to support industrialization and if 

agroindustry capable of feeding the population. 

Access to credit and capital. The indicator is debt 

While this is seemingly an objectively collectable 
Availability of trained labor. The literacy rate is an 

In most nations, analysts measure the literacy rate in te

predominant colonial language (Spanish, Portuguese

This does not directly measure aptitude for specific indu

may require more tradecraft or high technology skill

improvements to this factor will include the number o

and trade school graduates, percentage of students 

abroad that return home, and per capita graduates 

science and engineering schools. 

Petroleum and mineral reserves. The barrels of 

cubic feet of proven reserves per capita are used. 

Economic policy and strategy. These data are 

subject matter expert advice rather than objective da

judgment as to a government's ability to carry 

economic policy. Model programmers factor into the 

a concept for economic austerity because of the l

impact on the nation's economic development. 

Responsiveness of economy to governmental in

Factors used examine how well the economic stru

nation responds to governmental intervention to susta

monetary and fiscal policies (taxes, interest rates, mone

The rationale for using this subject matter expert fac

many developing economic structures depend on gov

intervention to sustain growth. Monetary and fisca

assume that the government can influence the econom

taxes, interest rates, money supply, and bond prices. 

question is how well does a nation's economic structu

to these tools? 

Competitiveness of the nation in the international 

Nations need access to world markets and a sound pos

which to compete. Politics, geography, and the nat

market for goods and services affect this factor. It c
and the dominant Europeans (or other historical for

culture) are also used to decide the relevance of 

Research into this factor was bome out during the rec

in Chiapas, Mexico, where the Zapatistas considered M

the foreign ethnic culture. 

Vulnerability of economy. This factor uses the pe

exports based on a single product plus percentage of 

dependent on one market. A second part of this f

percentage of the economy that is dependent on fore

Potential for labor-based unrest. A key fa

percentage of the labor force that is unionized plus the 

of unemployment. The factor does not include undere

and this must be considered. Also, many nations' 

unemployment are very questionable. Programmers a

this factor so it can differentiate between government 

sector labor. Government unions may well respond 

price and wage controls and to unemployment. 

Military intervention in government. The percen

Gross National Product spent on armed forces, whi

paramilitary forces, border guards, and police forc

under the control or supervision of the military. This 

be expanded to include the percentage of active du

officers serving in an elected, civilian govemment ca

than the Ministry of Defense). 

Dependency on external support. The ratio of 

revenue to foreign aid is a key indicator. The fa

intended to reflect govemments that are sustained i

foreign troops, or the threat of foreign intervention

versions of the model, this factor will reflect har

reserves compared to foreign aid dollars. 

Confidence in the political system. The current 

is the net migration from a nation per year. Some 
social conditions. This is a subject matter expert 

objective information is available from organization

Gallup Intemational that gather data from their extensi

Adaptability and responsiveness of institutions. T

military, and govemment are key institutions conside

model. A judgment is made conceming their l

responsiveness to the demands of the population

changing political environment. 

Political culture and tradition. This factor is subj

expert based and is a historical examination that est

sense of how a nation confronts adversity. Some natio

history of violent change; others weather their probl

stoically. While this factor is very subjective, most ex

regional analysts have a feel for how nations confront 

This factor quantifies those feelings. 

THE THIRD AXIS: THE COMMANDER

ASSESSMENT 

Programmers designed RSSIA to allow a third ax

integration of other decisionmaking considerations 

strategic priorities. Strategic priorities can be prov

military commander or other interagency leaders, an in

working group, or by strategists and analysts on le

staffs. The following recounts the 1991 experience 

SOUTHCOM strategy assessment process. 

In the SOUTHCOM case, after about a year on th

CINC provided his regional assessment. He deter

"strategic interest" factors and gave a subjective weig

ranking (on a scale of one to five) how he judged ea

was doing in a particular area compared with th

Strategy; the results are seen in figure 14. USCINCSO
/ ,co 

s \ ....... ~ - VE.EZUELA I 

T \ ...... ~ " COSTA RICA 

A I 

' \ - URUGUA* \- ARGE.T,.A 

,~ \ -----7~.AOO~\-P..A=A 

T " GUYANA ~ " BOLIVIA "EL SALVADOR / 

y " SURINA.~.~_ " C O::~:'I,LA 

| SOCIO-ECONOMIC POTENTIAL / \ 

~ _ " GUYANA I/ \ 

~ " SURINAME ° BELIZE if \\ " ""U°UA: PA.ACUAY \ 

\ \ - COST, R,CA 

' \ -.,C.RAOOA ""ONDORAS \ 

\ \ * PERU .... VIA ECUADOR " GUATEM

~ .... * 6u_~, =___. o EL_ SALVADO R 

\ \ "A.GE,,T,NA 

~ ° COLOMBIA 

.~ \ -.A.A

~\ " .EX,~

Source: Authors 

Figure 14 

Established or emerging democracy. Wha

democracies are the nations in the Southern Theater

with three or more elections that put a civilian i

considered an "established" democracy. A nation th

fit this characteristic is "emerging. ''3 

Drug activity. Drug production, trafficking, 

laundering touches every nation in the region. T
nations close attention because of their ability to 

regional issues of concern. 

U.S. prestige. This factor allows the CINC to give 

nations on which he must concentrate to ensure U.S. p

the region. The implementation of the Panama Canal 

one example. Every nation in the Southern Theater is 

intently to see if the United States will carry out the m

the treaties. 

Resources. The United States has increased its ex

imports from the region greatly in the past 4 years. T

recognizes which nations are our most important trading 

Lines of communications. Sea lines of communic

air lines of communication are critical to movement of 

into and out of a region. The model subjective

information about a nation's ability to close or k

regional lines of communications. 

Basing and access. Basing and access for US Forc

important to the mission of a command. In the SOU

area, Honduras and Panama permit basing and overfli

variety of administrative and operational purposes. 

given preferential ranking for their cooperation. 

Host nation power. This is a very subjective score 

the CINC as a general score about nations based on 

visits, contacts and negotiations with the nations. Th

also based on the elements of national power the 

possesses to include political-diplomatic, military, e

demo-geographic, psychosocial, teclmo-industrial, ideolo

informational factors. 

Arms control. The production and sophisti

conventional arms are weighted. Many nations 

weaponry to reduce their reliance on outside purchase

it can amount to control. Also, these same nations mus
14. The assessment procedure is significant because 

in part, the process for developing a regional strateg

how these considerations are entwined with the 

interests of other U.S. Govemment agencies and the 

in the region. 

THE COMPLETE REGIONAL ASSES

To arrive at the complete regional assessment, t

subjective analysis on the Z axis is juxtaposed with t

axes. The information in figure 14 describes t

preferences from low to high degree of interest for 

resources throughout the theater. 

One of the most important aspects of the RSSIA 

that it is a tool for making decisions, but it does 

deciding. The RSSIA model's objective analysis h

subjective analysis by reminding decisionmakers of 

nation is in relation to its political stability and soc

abilities. An example concerning Peru is illustrative

According to the objective theater analysis of 1

in figure 13), Peru was in chaos. Its political stabili

vulnerable and its socioeconomic potential was shak

of massive destruction of its infrastructure system. 

RSSIA model run told the command was that it sho

the U.S. Govemment's resources on triage type pr

AID, medical deployments, food shipments, water d

shelter construction. However, the CINC's subjective 

gave Peru enough "points" to move it into the second 

Z axis. This told the resource planners to put both 

resources plus self-sustaining programs into Peru. Pe

importance to U.S. national security interests, the dr

Peru's fight against anarchy were important enough t

that it overrode the objective analysis that RSSIA dis
pg

reflect the CINC's views and to review how much ch

occurred within the nations of the region. 

The RSSIA methodology assists the strategist in 

better reasoning about the theater as a whole in a c

logical and balanced manner to achieve regional o

RSSIA's analyses can determine priorities, but it does n

giving equal resources to all nations. It does not imp

for nations at the lower left of the spread sheet (Fi

RSSIA demonstrates where nations need immediate 

programs, as well as where long range, long pay

programs (such as the Intemational Military Education 

should be applied. 

RSSIA gives the planner a valuable tool to husband 

resources that have been allocated. RSSIA provides 

strategic thinking, and long-range analysis for: 

• Decisions made during the program 

memorandum (POM) (the military process for prog

resources according to national military strategy) and t

integrated assessment of security assistance (AIASA) req

• The distribution of excess defense articles. 

Significantly, the RSSIA model has application fo

agencies that must apportion scarce resources. 

OTHER REGIONS 

RSSIA capabilities are assisting planners in other region

programmers are tailoring RSSIA to the needs of the 

theater, placing new demands on the model. Conce

emergence in Eastem Europe of newly independent na

capitalism, information available in the 1980s can be d

compare with data from the post-Soviet world. Strate

and resource availability change from theater to theater. 
and data bases can be loaded into it. With the advan

computer memory and Windows applications, 

calculations can be added into the model. The 

Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Ass

(PMAD), manages RSSIA and related computer 

facilitate its use by the unified commands. 

CONCLUSIONS 

RSSIA has demonstrated its usefulness to p

determining how and where they can apply limited 

support U.S. interests in a region. It helps to 

military resources can be integrated with those of og

and it introduces a degree of objectivity into 

process. 

Critics of RSSIA believe there are too many ca

the model, and some strategists believe that they sh

computer models to make theater-level strategic 

RSSIA is only a decision aid, and one open to 

information. If the calculations are imperfect, then 

less the chances for victory for one who makes n

Perhaps Sun Tzu has a point. 

Notes 

1. Except where noted, this chapter is based on a 

RSSIA provided by Lieutenant Colonel David G. Bradfo

regional strategist for the Strategy, Policy, and Plans D

U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, duri

1991-93, he was author of the RSSIA model, and contrib

models under the Regional Development Simulation Sys

2. Larry B. Hamby, "The Regional Security Analys

New Tools for a Changing Environment," Weston, MO

& Hamilton, Inc., December 15, 1993, p. 8. 

INTERAGENCY COOPERATI

It is essential to apreciate the strength of what 

bureaucratic faultlines----policy areas where agenci

overlapping responsibilities and very distinctive insti

interests and perspectives. The most important faultlin

sort occcurs at the intersection of political and military 

•.. What is required is not coordination in an admin

or technical sense but the integration of diverge

sometimes mutually antagonistic) perspectives thro

active exercise of strategic thought) 

All Unified Commands have been dealing with th

working with multiple agencies of government, but 

the cold war the primary concern of most command

warfighting strategies to counter the Soviets. SOUT

been the exception. The Unified Command Plan a

Area of Responsibility to SOUTHCOM that has been 

by threats and conditions suggesting military opera

than war for their resolution. These operations place 

on integrating different perspectives and capabi

establishing interagency teamwork. Military operati

combatting terrorism, nation assistance (foreign intem

security assistance), support to insurgencies, peace 

and civil support thrust SOUTHCOM into a multiag

from its beginning in 1947. 2 

Today, the Unified Commands find themselves o

regions containing vast "grey areas" where some g

cannot control their cities, regions, or the fundamenta
assistance in deteriorating situations, environment d

assistance, disease control and disaster relief, famine relie

drug-conlrol assistance. In essence, the demand is f

international community to substitute for local governm

deliver the basic goods of government to societies where 

most of the attributes of governance have failed or falle

disrepute? 

As the CINCs renew their regional strategies, an appre

the threat will have to consider the "consequences of 

that range from terrorism, insurgency, and illegal drug t

to warlordism, militant fundamentalism, ethnic cleans

war, and regional wars. ''4 The environment at the tu

century will make necessary the artful combination 

elements of our national power if we are to overcome th

of transnational threats and intemal disorder. Put 

interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any 

vision of peacetime engagement. 

A MODEL FOR REGIONAL COOPERA

Cooperative efforts can foster integration of mu

capabilities, but making this happen often becomes pro

Ideal solutions such as one inspired by Marine Corp

FMFM 1-2 (discussed in chapter 2) proffer straigh

guidelines for attacking functional problems on a regio

• Designate an interagency leader and give 

wherewithal to get the job done. 

• Assign to one leader the operating authority, 

responsibility, and responsibility for the outcome. 

82 
Another approach is one that has been eff

USSOUTHCOM to encourage and support i

cooperation within currently established structures. It 

interrelated plans, processes, exercises, and compute

aids: 

• Provide Regional Vision: Theater Strategy a

• Integrate Capabilities: Theater Deployment P

• Educate and Facilitate: Modeling and 

Systems 

• Support Planning and Operations: Compute

Aids 

• Contribute Leadership: Command Int

Involvement 

No one of these elements has been sufficient to get the 

but when combined, the mix has proven to be an eff

for the CINC to integrate his regionwide mission and c

with those of different agencies and governments. 

SOUTHCOM's strategy and plans provide the fram

coordinating military capabilities with other govemmen

The mature series of plans and programs identify 

concepts, and resources. They serve as a start point f

with other U.S. Government agencies, and they 

SOUTHCOM as a key supporter of U.S. foreign po

region: 

• The Theater Deployment Planning Group 

program is an effective integrator of missions and c

On the one hand, it ensures that U.S. Southern Comma

annual deployments of service personnel into the 

Theater serve the CINC's strategy and training prioritie

as important, it is a means to integrate host nation, cou

and unified command objectives and capabilities. Th

affords the command a rationale for programming 
pg g

established vehicle for regional cooperation among ho

The CMASS has an integrative potential for a wid

multiagency functional areas such as peacekeeping, 

terrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass 

and nation assistance. 

• Computer models such as the Regional Securi

Implementation Analysis (RSSIA) and the Regional De

Simulation System-Single Nation Model (RDSS-SNM

decisionmaking. They are helpful for allocating res

nation assistance, deciding where to place infrastructur

choosing a foreign source for raw materials or g

determining which nations to approach as preferred a

models can assist the planner in analyzing a nation

programmed resources such as security assistance, hu

and civic assistance, and counterdrug support. Ho

computer models are subject to error because of the h

of subjective input. For example, figure 13 was plo

Mexico's Zapatista uprising and the assassination of P

candidate Colosio; now, the new perception of Mexic

might not allow top ratings for stability. This obviou

tends to place doubt on the relative positions of other 

well, and diminishes the predictive confidence of the 

program. 

The SOUTHCOM model is not a solution to the i

friction that plagues U.S. endeavors. It is not an attem

the lead in the region; that responsibility rests with o

policy officials in the State Department and elsewh

approach is one of facilitating integration through 

offices of a staff already extant in the region, and by 

the skills and resources which normally attend 

Command. 
suggestion for an Interagency Action Group, the appoi

a regional coordinator for strategic functions, or the d

of a Lead Agency with directive authority over othe

will remain Presidential prerogatives. 

The problem of "who's in charge?" still vexes in

efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead a

not carry with it the operational authority to enjoin co

The executive and legislative branches have not s

routinely provide interagency leadership with direct co

the resources necessary for interagency operations. 

For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198

Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, some 

over the level of funding and the content of agenc

requests, but until now, he has seemed to lack m

authority and wherewithal to integrate counterdrug ac

there any hope that interagency leaders will be 

authority needed for integrating tasks and capabilities? 

to the 1993 Presidential Decision Directive for Counte

the recently appointed Director, ONDCP said: 

The President's Directive identifies the interagency pro

to consist of developing, coordinating and implem

intemational counternarcotics policies, strategies, and pro

My role in overseeing counternarcotics policy developm

coordination will be greater than that given my predec

State will chair an interagency working grou

counternarcotics. I will oversee the activities of this w

group and will have the authority I need to m

interagency disputes, manage the implementation 

strategy, appoint an interdiction coordinator [a re

coordinator] who will report to me, and make appr

budget recommendations to the President fo

implementation of the international strategy. 7 
U.S. anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge ha

substantially undermined by a failure on the part of co

agencies--e.g., the Defense (DoD) and State Depar

DEA, and those responsible for intelligence collect

analysis--to adequately cooperate with one anoth

coordinate their respective drug-related activities. For t

part, the reasons for this can be traced to legitimate diff

in their respective institutional missions, attitude

operational approaches, which seem to prompt almost 

conflicts between and among them. 8 

Consider: 

• The Department of State is the lead agenc

assistance funds for counterdrug programs 

• U.S. AID is the lead for sustainable assistan

nations 

• The Department of Defense is the lead for de

monitoring and communications infrastructure 

• The Department of Justice (DEA) is the 

investigations 

• The Treasury Department (Customs) is the lea

smuggling and detection and monitoring aircraft 

• The Transportation Department is lead a

maritime interception 

• The intelligence community (National Drug I

Center, El Paso Intelligence Center, CIA, NSA, DIA

intelligence 

So then how will their efforts be drawn together 

synergism? 

Exacerbating the problems surrounding issues o

and resourcing is the lack of an agreed interagenc

process that might synchronize interagency effort. De
model into State Department hands. The most practic

is the regional game. With scenarios focused on functio

needing interagency integration, government leaders an

Washington and the region could address problems in a 

nonthreatening environment under the aegis of 

Department. The promulgation of Presidential 

Directives such as PDD 25, Multilateral Peace Operati

be followed by regional games to educate players to n

establish personal relationships among multiagenc

(including host nations), and shed light on gr

procedures that will implement lofty policy statement

long as the CINCs are the only U.S. Government off

the wherewithal to pull together U.S. interagency ac

regional basis, they will need to continue to pr

leadership--even while in a supporting role. 

APPLICATION 

In Europe the model has potential to help as military 

are reformed, new security relationships emerge, and t

parmership for peace determines which nations join the 

East European states and some former Soviet Repu

demand the same types of nation assistance ou

SOUTHCOM's Peacetime Engagement OPLAN. A

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin advised: 

Ultimately what we're looking at is developing capa

jointly between NATO the organization and these ind

countries through joint exercises, joint planning, joint tr

and.., interoperability of equipment and methods of op

between NATO and the partner state. What we're do

is expanding NATO's capability by bringing in more as

do the kinds of things that NATO is going to be doing 
gg

are opportunities to improve our sense of strategic 

ways of integrating the capabilities of our govemmen

As we look toward the troubled environment of the 21

a model for regional cooperation is available to help 

bureaucratic faultlines. 

Notes 

1. Cames Lord, "Strategy and Organization at Th

Level," Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process, e

Gaston (Washington: NDU Press, 1992), 143-4. 

2. Southern Command traces its origins to 1903, w

arrived in Panama to protect the canal. In 1916, HQ U

Panama Canal Zone occupied Quarry Heights, the curre

SOU'I~COM. When reestablished as Caribbean Defense C

1941, it became a "joint" command with other servic

Officially designated a joint command in 1947, it was re

Southern Command in 1963. "USSOUTHCOM History, F

Information Booklet, Public Affairs Office, Quarry Heigh

January 1989. 

3. William J. Olson, "The New World Disorder: G

andDevelopment," Gray Area Phenomena, Confronting the 

Disorder, ed. Max G. Manwaring, (Bolder, CO: West

1993), 22. 

4. Max G. Manwaring, "Beyond the Cold War: 

Theory of Engagement to Confront the Gray Area Phenome

Area Phenomena, Confronting the New Worm Disorder, 6

5. Edwin Corr, discussions at Strategic Outreac

Roundtable on Operations Other Than War, "The Relations

Theory, Strategy, Doctrine, and Practice" ( Fort Leavenwor

Army Command and General Staff College, June 2, 1994)
agency's drug budget request. Once the budgets are certifie

cannot reprogram monies from the drug program witho

approval. In fact, this has given ONDCP little contro

implementation of counterdrug strategies in the field. 

7. U.S. Congress, House, Lee P. Brown, "Statement 

the Interim National Drug Control Strategy] to the Hou

Atfairs Committee," 3 November 1993. 

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcom

Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Repo

United States Government Anti-Narcotics Activities in 

Region of South America, Washington, 6 February (leg

January 23), 1990, 10. 

9. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Department of De

Conference, Travamuende, Germany, 21 October 1993. 
AFSC 

AIASA 

ASST/EP 

CAIVlPLAN 

CDSIC 

CIA 

CINC 

CJCS 

CMAC 

CMASS 

CONPLAN 

CRCS 

CT 

DAO 

DCI 

DCM 

DDCI 

DEA 

DFT 

DIA 

DOD 

DNSA 

DSAA 

FBI 

Armed Forces Staff College 

Annual Integrated Assessment for Se

Assistance 

Assistant to the President for Econom

Campaign Plan 

Counterdrug Surveillance Intercept C

Central Intelligence Agency 

Commander-in-Chief 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Counterdrug Modeling and Analysis 

Counterdrug Modeling and Simulatio

Concept Plan 

Country Roadmap Computer System 

Country Team 

Defense Attache Office 

Director, Central Intelligence 

Deputy Chief of Mission 

Deputy Director, Central Intelligence 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Deployment for Training 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Department of Defense 

Deputy, National Security Advisor 

Defense Security Assistance Agency 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 
HN 

lAG 

IMET 

INM 

J5 

J7 

J8 

JCS 

JDD 

JSCP 

LIC 

METL 

MILGROUP 

NCA 

NDU 

NSA 

NSC 

Host Nation 

Interagency Action Group 

International Military Education and T

Program 

Intemational Narcotics Matters, Burea

Deparmaent of State 

Joint Staff Directorate for Policy, Plan

Strategy 

Joint Staff Directorate for Operational 

and Interoperability 

Joint Staff Directorate for Force Struct

Resources and Assessment 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Doctrine Division of Joint Staff 

Directorate 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan---curr

military strategy based upon currently 

resources 

Low Intensity Conflict 

Mission Essential Task List 

Military Group 

National Command Authorities--Presi

the Secretary of Defense, or their duly 

deputized altemates or successors 

National Defense University 

National Security Advisor 

National Security Council 
OPORD 

PDD 

POM 

RCDM 

RDSS-SNM 

RSSIA 

SJ 

SOUTHCOM 

TDPG 

TTDP 

TTOP 

UMOPAR 

UN 

UNITAF 

UNOSOM 

USAID 

USC 

USG 

USIA/USIS 

VPNSA 

Operation Order 

Presidential Decision Directive 

Program Objective Memorandum 

Regional Counterdmg Model 

Regional Development Simulation Sy

Single Nation Model 

Regional Security Strategy Implemen

Analysis 

Support Justice--U.S. Southern Com

program to support counterdmg effor

America 

United States Southern Command 

Theater Deployment Planning Group 

Theater Training Deployment Plan 

Theater Training Opportunities Plan 

Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (Boliv

United Nations 

Unified Task Force 

United Nations Operation in Somalia 

United States Agency for Internation

Development 

United States Code 

United States Govemment 

United States Information Agency/Se

Vice President's National Security A
Parameters XXIII, mo. 4 (Winter 1993-4), 42-58

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. 

Just Cause. New York: Lexington Books, 19

Fishel, John T. The Fog of Peace: Planning and Ex

Restoration of Panama. Carlisle, PA: Strate

Institute, April 15, 1992. 

Liberation, Occupation, and Resc

Termination and Desert Storm. Carlisle, PA: 

Studies Institute, August 31, 1992. 

"Taking Responsibility for Our 

Establishing Order and Stability in Panama." 

Review, (April 1992), 66-78. 

Lorenz, F.M. "Law and Anarchy in Somalia." 

XXIII, no. 4 (Winter 1993-4), 27-41. 

Miller, Paul David. The Interagency Process. Camb

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993. 

Sabrosky, Alan Ned and Robert L. Sloane. The R

War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrin

Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 198

Shoemaker, Christopher C. Structure, Function an

Staff." An Officers' Guide to the National Secur

Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA: 1989. 
U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5, O

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Waslaingto

1993. 

U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps

19, FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support O

Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Mar

Washington: July 1, 1993. 

U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-

Operations, Version 5, Draft. Headquarters, Tra

Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia: Nov

1993. 

U.S. Department of the Army. NSC Case Study: Ir

Affair. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Department of the Army. TRADOC Pam 525-56, 

Guide for Military Operations Other Th

Headquarters, United States Army Training and 

Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia: September 1, 

U.S. Depa,buent of Defense. AFSC PUB 1, The J

Officer's Guide 1991. National Defense Universi

Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA: 1991. 

U.S. Department of Defense. AFSC PUB 2, Service W

Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces. 

Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College

VA: August 1992. 
U.S. Department of the Navy. Headquarters, Un

Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, W

Washington: March 6, 1989. 

U.S. Department of the Navy. Headquarters, Un

Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force Ma

Campaigning. Washington: January 25, 1990. 

U.S. Deparlment of the Navy. Headquarters, Un

Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, T

the Marine Corps in the National Defense. W

June 21, 1991. 

U.S. Department of the Navy. Office of the Secre

Navy .... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Serv

21st Century. Washington: September 1992. 

U.S. Govemment. National Security Strategy of 

States. The White House, Washington: Januar

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman, Joint Chie

Memorandum of Policy 7, The Joint Strategic 

System. Washington: Jna:uary 30, 1990. 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare 

Armed Forces. Washington, November 11, 1991

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine f

Operations. Washington: September9, 1993. 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07.4, Joint Doc

JTTP for Counterdrug Operations (Initial 

Washington: August 15, 1992. 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 5-00.1, JTTP for 

Planning (Revised Initial Draft). Washington: Aug

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strate

United States. Washington: January 1992. 

Wallach, Jehuda L. The Dogma of the Battle of Ann

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986. 
Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Before 

from active duty as a U.S. Army colonel, he served in 

general staff assignments in the United States, Korea, 

Germany. Mr. Mendel is coauthor of Campaign Plannin

Campaign Planning and the Drug War (1991). He ha

published in Military Review, The Americas, and Param

Mr. Mendel is a graduate of the Virginia Military Ins

Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.

College. He earned a Master's degree at the University 

was graduated from Harvard's Kennedy School Progra

Officials in National Security. 

§§§§§ 

David G. Bradford is a lieutenant colonel in the A

currently the Director of Joint Matters and Treaty Impl

the Panama-based U.S. Southern Command Air Fo

(SOUTHAF) staff. He previously served as the politica

economic strategic planner in the U.S. Southern Com

Bradford is the author of The Southern Theater 

Counterdrug Campaign Plan, both of which support the 

nation/interagency war on drugs throughout Latin A

writings have appeared in Infantry Journal, The Washing

The Friday Review of Defense Literature, Military R

Strategic Review. He most recently assisted Robert Aspr

his work, War in the Shadows---The Guerilla in History. 

LtCol Bradford received his BA from Southwes

University and an MA from the University of Northern 

is also a graduate of the Air War College, the U.S. Army 

General Staff College, the Air Command and Staff 

Squadron Officer's School. 
The following is a complete listing of published M

For information on availability of specific titles, contact th

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, F

McNair, Washington, DC 30219-6000 (telephone: comme

1913; DSN 335-1913). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, F

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or 

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, Novemb

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes h~ustries Strategic, No

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in S

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet D

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strate

lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense I

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in L

March 1992 
y, y 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the Unite

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffr

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, 

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technolo

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Faili

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold Wa

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Ca

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assess

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 19

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm an

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Cen

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

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