OMAHA 

BEACHHEAD 

(6 June-13 June 1944) 

American Forces in Action Series 

Historical Division 

WAR DEPARTMENT 
Facsimile Reprint, 1984, 1989, 1994 

CMH Pub 100-11 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington. D.C. 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents. Mail Stop: ssoP, W8.!Ihington, DC 20402-9328 
FOREWORD 

In the thick of battle, the soldier is bttsy doing his job. He has the knowledge 

and confidence that his job is part of a unified plan to defeat the enemy, but 

he does not have time to survey a campaign from a fox hole. If he should 

be wounded and removed behind the lines, he may have even less opportunity 

to learn what place he and his unit had in the larger fight . 

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION is a series prepared by the War 

Department especially for the information of wounded men. It will show 

these soldiers, who have served their country so well, the part they and their 

comrades played in achievements which do honor to the record of the United 

States Army. 

111 

G. C. MARSHALL, 

Chief of Staff· 
WAR DEPARTMENT 

Historical Division 

Washington 25, D. C. 

20 September 1945 

Omaha Beachhead, seventh of a series called American Forces In Action, is the 

first of a number of narratives dealing with U. S. military operations in 

France. Utah Beach to Cherbourg, planned for later publication, will round 

out the account of the invasion at corps level and below. Larger phases of 

the NEPTUNE operation, including high-level planning, naval operations, 

and the action of British units, are treated here only in outline. 

Omaha Beachhead was prepared in the field by the 2d Information and 

Historical Service, attached to First Army, and by the Historical Section, 

European Theater of Operations. Although as published this book contains no documentation, the original manuscript, fully documented, is on 

file in the War Department. It is based on complete unit reports and 

records, on interviews, and on available enemy records. Some unit records 

for the period concerned are inadequate, and despite all care used in research and assembly of the materials, it i$ recognized that the information 

is not complete in all details and may involve minor errors of fact . Before 

a final official history of the campaign in France is prepared, the gaps 

should be filled and the errors corrected. This can be done only if individuals who possess additional information will furnish it to the War 

Department. Readers are therefore urged to send directly to the Historical Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. c., all comments, criticisms, and additional data which may help in the preparation of a complete 

and definitive history of this operation. 

PHOTOGRAPHS. Sources of photographs are as follows: Acme Newspictures, Inc. ( pp. 26, 45, 51, 55, 68,118, 

137.152); Associated Press (pp_ 107 and 108); Life (p. 109); the U. S. Navy (pp. 12, 13, 36, 39, 90. 94, 105, 131, 

131); the U. S. Coast Guard (pp. 15, 24,37,40,44); the U. S. Army Air Forces (pp. 11, 15, 27, 59, 64, 66, 72, 84, 

86,102,124)' All o ther photographs acc by the U. S. Army Signal Corps, except eight from official War Department sources (pp_ 23. 67. 69. 104, 105. 142, 146, 160). Photographs from Acme Newspictures, Inc., Associated 

Press, and Life may Dot be reproduced without the approval of Ihe War Deparrment. 

FAA-7 

IV 
CONTENTS 

P4&' 

OPERA nON NEPTUNE ....... . ...•....... , ........ , . , .... , . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 1 

Navy and Air Forces . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 

21 Army Group."" .................... ........ .. . ............ 3 

V Corps Planning . . , . ... . ... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 6 

ASSAULT PLAN . " ....... ...... . 

Terrain. . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 

E'lemy DejmseJ. . .......... . 

Pre-Assault Bombardmmt Plans . 

Plan of Assat"t Landings . ........ . 

Plan for Movement to Inland Objectives . 

D DAY: THE LANDINGS .................. . ......... . ... .... ... ..... . .. .. 

Approach to the Beach . . ..................... . ... . .. .... .. . . 

The Initial Assault Wave . ......................... . , .... . .... . .. . .... ... . 

Th, Later Assault Waves: 116th RCT . ...................... ,., ............ , 

Th, Lat" Assault Waves: 16th RCT .. ................. , ............... .. . ,' 

Conditions on th, B,ach: 0730-(}800 . .. . ...•...•..............•..•.. . • ..... .• , 

ASSAULT OF THE BLUFFS ......... . 

Th, Advance from Dog Whit, . ............ . 

Th, Advanc< b,tween D-3 and E-l Draws .. 

Th, Adva1lce from Easy Red . .. 

The Adva'lce from Fox Grem . 

Other Assault Actions . ........... . 

The B,ach: 0800-1200 . . ......•. .. , . 

Landing oj RtinJorcemmts on Easy Red . ...... . ... .. .. . 

The Rangers at Poillte du Hoe . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .... . ..... . 

ADV ANCE INLAND ..................................... .. .... ..... . ..... . 

Vierville Area . .. . .... . .. . ..... . .. .... .. . . . . ..... .. .. .. .. .... . . .. . 

St-Laurent Area . ............ . ..... ... . ...... . .. .. . .. . . .. .... . ....... . ... . 

Col/,vil/, Ar'a ....................... . . ......... . ... . ............ .. .. . . . 

Afternoon on the Beach . ........ . . .. ... . .... . 

At th, End of D Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 

Th, En,my Sid, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 

ATTAINMENT OF D-DAY OBJECTIVES (7-8 Juno). ......... . 

Trlvieres-Tour-en-Beuin (lst Division) . .................. . 

Grandcamy--lsigny Ar,a (29th Division). . . . . . ........... . 

Improvement at the Beach . ........... . 

Th, Enemy Sid, . ...... ........................................... . 

THE ATTACK OF 9--11 JUNE ............ . 

Adva11ce to Cerisy Forest (lst and 2d Divisions). 

Acro.I! the Lower Aure ( 29th Division) . .. . 

The Elltm] Sid,. . . . . . .. .. ...... . 

THE ATTACK OF 12-13 JUNE ........... . .. . ... . .. , . ...... . ... .. ......... . 

Advance to Caumont. . ................ . 

Crouing the EUe River. . . ....... . ............. . 

Action West of the Vire . . . . . . . . . ...... . 

Th, Enemy Sid, . .. . ....... . 

8 

10 

20 

28 

30 

33 

35 

38 

42 

49 

53 

54 

58 

59 

63 

65 

73 

75 

79 

82 

87 

92 

93 

97 

98 

101 

107 

112 

116 

116 

122 

131 

134 

136 

138 

143 

147 

150 

151 

153 

157 

159 

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. 163 

ANNEX NO. 1: Unit Citations......... . ... .. ... . .. .. .. . ..... .. .... .... 164 

ANNEX NO. 2: Abbreviations. ....................... . .. . .. .... .... .. " 165 

v 
Illustrations 

U . S . Commanders . ......... . ...... ... ..... .... .. ...................... . 

Unit Comtnanders . .................. . ... . .. . . . . .. . . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. . . . ... . 

Th, Cwetnt Curv, of Omaha B,ach . . ... . .......•........ . . • . 

Th, Gent!. Sloping Tidal Flat . .......•...•.......... • .. . . . 

Th, Shingle Embankment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. .. •.. . .... 

Th, B,ach Flat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . 

Atth, Westtm End of Omaha . . ....... . . . . . . .. . 

Marshes Alon~ th, B,ach Flat . . ...... . 

Along Easy R,d Sector. .... ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . ... . ..... .. ........ . . . ... . 

E-1 Draw ..... . .... . .. . . . . . .. . . . . ... .. . . . . . .. .. ... .. . ... . . .. . . ... . .. . . . 

Hedgerows . ... . 

Sunkm Roads . ......... . 

T,tvieres . 

Underwater ObstacLes . . . . ... ..... .. .. .. ...... . .. . .. . .... . ... . . . .. . . . ... . 

Pillbox near Vier.iII, Draw CD-1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... . ... . 

GU,J Emplacement Ovtrlooking Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 

Trwches Along th, Bluff Edg'. . ..... .. ........ ... ....... .. . .. . .. .. 

Emmy Short De/enses . . . ............ .. . .... .. .. . ... .. . . ... . . .. . ...... . . 

German Mortar Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . .... . 

Landing Diagram, Omaha Beach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 

Loading LST' J for the Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 

Th, Lane of Ships. . . . . .• . . . . . . . . . . . ................•. 

Landillg Craft. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . ....... .... ....... ..... .. . 

Mist and Smok, Obscured Landmarks . . ........ ... . .... .. .......... . 

Assault lAnding . .... . . 

Smoke From Grass Fires . 

Men From Wreck,d lAllding Craft . 

Th, Obstacles Wer, Used as Shelter . . . ..... . ..... . .. . . •. . ... .. 

Artillery Fire Cotlcentrated on Larger Craft . ............ . ....... . 

Noon of D Day, Dog White . . . .................. . .......... . ...•. 

Penetration Area, 116th Infantry . .... .. ..... . . . . .. . . . . ..... . . . 

Profile Vi,w of Bluffs, Dog Whitt . ........ . ............... . . . 

Easy Green. ......... . ..... ... ....... . 

Easy R,d. . . . ....... . . . . ........... . 

E-1 StrongpOitlt . . . . . . .......... . . ... . . . . . 

Path Through Mimfields . . ................. . 

Ad.allet from Easy R,d . .... .. ................. . 

Roc~. L,dges . . . . . . . . . . . . ...•... .... .. .. . . . .. 

Beach Sector Charlie . 

The !lFortified" House. 

Th, Bluffs on Dog Gmll . 

Vehicles are Held on the Tidal Flat . .... . .. . .. . . . . .. . . 

High-Tid, Landings . 

A Crowd,d B,ach . 

PII&' 

VILt 

8 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

14 

15 

15 

17 

18 

18 

21 

23 

24 

26 

27 

28 

31 

36 

37 

39 

40 

44 

45 

46 

51 

55 

59 

60 

61 

63 

67 

68 

69 

70 

74 

76 

76 

78 

81 

83 

84 

Th, Tip of Point, du Ho, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . . 89 

Th, Cliffs at Point, du Hot . . . •. . . . . . . . . . 90 

The Viert!ille Draw Under Fire . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . ' . . . .. . 94 

H,ad of D-J Draw . . . .. ............................. . ........ .. .. ..... .. .. ... 96 

Entrance t~ Colleville from West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 

VI 
p,,&, 

Landings Were Delay,d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . 102 

Breaches itt the Shingle Emhankment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 

The E-1 Exit Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . 105 

Roadblocks Were Demolished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . 105 

Wreckage on Easy R,d . .........•. . .....•..... , . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . 107 

D,btis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .• . . . • . . .• . . . . . . • . . . •. . . . . . • . . .•. . . . . 108 

Wreckage Littered the Beaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 109 

A Pillbox Used as H,adquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . • . . . . . . . • . . •. . . •. ..• . .• . . . . . . . . . 115 

Tanks Roll Through Coli, viII,. . . . . . • • . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 

Observation Was Difficult . . . . . . . . . .. . . .• . . .. . . .• . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . 120 

T.,pical Norman Orchard . . . . . . .•. . . . . ... . .•. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . .• .. .•. . . •. ... . 125 

Damag' in Isigny . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 

Organizing th, B,ach .. ......... .. •..••. . . .. . •. .. .. .. •• . •.. .. .......•..••. .•.. 131 

Landing Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . • • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . 132 

The 2d Division Starts Inland. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •.. • . . 137 

The Approach to Trtvieres . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 

The Aure Rivrr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . . •• . • . . . •• . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .. . 142 

eerisy Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . 146 

Caumont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . 152 

A German 88-MM. . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . 160 

I,1Jignia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . .. ... . . . . . . .. . . . . 162 

LCI 91. . . . . .. . .... . . .. .•. . . . . . .... .. . .•..••. . •.. ... . .. .. .. . . ... . •. .. . . . . ... 167 

Maps 

N •. 

1 Disposition of German Forces in the West, 6 JlIne 1944 .. ... . ..... . ....... .... .. . 

2 Emmy D'fenses at D-3 Draw (Its Moulins) . ...............•.. .. ..•. ..•.. .... 

3 The Advance hetwem D-3 and E-1 Draws . .......... . . ......... . . . .......... . 

4 

5 

6 

Advance from Easy Red . ................... . .......•...... . ...... . ••. .... 

The Penetration at Fox Green . ........ ......... ............... . . ..... .. ... . 

7 

The 2d Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoe, 6 June . ............ .... . .....•... .. . 

Th, Relief of Pointe d" Hoe, 7-8 fum. . ..................•...•...•..... 

8 Action a! Gralldcamp, 8 June . . . . . . . . . . . ........................ . ........ . 

9 Caret/lan- Isigny Area, 12-13 June . . ........................... .. . .. ... .. . 

Maps I - XVI are in attached envelope 

I Invasion Area 

II Omaha Beach Te"ain 

III Terraill IlIlalld from Omaha B,ach 

W D-Day Obj,ctives, V Corps 

V First Wave Lalldings (Illfantry) 

VI Later Auault Landings (Infalllry) 

VII Vierville-St-Laurent Area (To Noon 6 fum) 

VIIf St-Laurtllt-Col/,vi/l, Ar,a ( To Noon 6 fum) 

IX Evening of D Day 

X The D-Day B,achh,ads 

XI 1st Division, 7-8 June 

XII 29th Division, 7-8 june 

XIII Enem,'Y Rein/orcemmts, 6-8 June 

XW V Corps Attack, 9-11 j um 

XV V Corps Attack, 12-13 jun, 

XV I Development 0/ the Beachheads 

Vll 

p,,&, 

4 

22 

64 

66 

72 

86 

124 

129 

156 
U. S. COMMANDERS IN THE OMAHA BEACHHEAD OPERATIONS 

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, General Dwight 

D. Eisenhower (Ranks as of June 1944; Photograph taken July 1944) 

V1l1 
OPERATION NEPTUNE 

Two YEARS of planning and preparation led up to the Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944. British and American staffs had to work out every foreseeable 

detail for an undertaking that would involve 

the major military resources of the two 

Allied powers; immense stocks of shipping, 

aircraft, and supplies were assembled in the 

British Isles in an effort that taxed the war 

industries of both countries; before D Day 

the Allied air forces had carried out several 

months of bombing operations which were 

an integral part of the invasion itself. 

The first decisions were strategic in the 

broadest sense, since the opening of a front 

in Western Europe had to be considered in 

reference to over-all Allied plans for offensive operations against Germany, as well as 

the developments of the war in Russia and 

of the war against Japan . In May 1943 the 

Anglo-American conference in Washington 

concluded this stage of strategiC planning; 

Prime Minister Churchill and President 

Roosevelt together with their highest military advisers decided to launch an offensive 

in 1944 against Hitler's Atlantic Wall. 

Allied planners, after weighing all the 

possibilities, finally selected SO miles of 

coast in western Normandy, from the Vire 

Estuary to the Orne, as the assault area for 

securing a lodgement. This area was near 

good, relatively undamaged ports in southern and southwestern England, and was in 

range of fighter planes operating from English bases; the major French ports of Cher1 

bourg and Ie Havre were within striking 

distance; and air attacks on railways and 

river bridges might be able to isolate the 

region behind the assault area from the main 

enemy centers of supply and reinforcement 

to the east, In comparison with the stretch 

of coast northeast of the Seine (Pas-deCalais), along the narrowest part of the 

English Channel, western Normandy was 

somewhat further from English bases but 

was not as heavily fortified. At the Quebec 

Conference in August 1943 Allied leaders 

approved the choice of -chis battleground 

for invasion. 

The staffs of ground forces, air forces, and 

navies had now entered the second stage of 

planning for the largest amphibious operation in military history. The tactical difficulties to be faced were only one part of a 

problem that required complete coordination and teamwork, not merely between the 

military forces of two nations but also between all arms of those forces. Planning 

necessarily included preparation for operations over an extended period of time, and 

had to cover far more than the initial task 

of securing beachheads. In some respects 

the critical factor was the Allies' ability to 

reinforce and supply the assault rapidly 

enough both to meet enemy counterattacks 

and to prepare for a larger Allied offensive 

beyond the landing area . The Allied navies 

and services of supply had to solve logistical 

problems on which would depend the fate 

of the whole undertaking. 
In this phase of planning, as main policies 

were worked out in ever more complex detail by staffs of subordinate commands, the 

work was coordinated under the Chief of 

Staff, Supreme Allied Command, Lt. Gen. Sir 

Frederick E. Morgan. In his organization, 

Bri tish and American officers of all the services worked side by side in shaping their 

joint enterprise. The fusion of Allied planning staffs under a single command involved 

a principle which was carried into the command organization for the operation itself. 

On 21 January 1944 Gen . Dwight D. Eisenhower, called from the North African Theater 

of Operations, had his first meeting with the 

high Allied planning staff in England . He 

took formal command at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, on 

13 February. 

Planning now approached the final stage. 

The approximate target date (Y Day) had 

been set as 31 May, after earlier designation 

as 1 May; the postponement was made in 

order to obtain a larger supply of assault 

craft and to give more time for the preliminary air operations to produce their desired 

effect. By February, the staffs of higher 

commands had finished their plans, which 

would determine the major outline of the 

assault, and the plans of lower echelons 

were nearing completion . What remained 

was the difficult task of shaping last 

details, with due regard to ever increasing 

intelligence of enemy defenses and to the 

experience gained in training exercises. 

Final loading plans, among the mosr complex features of the whole operation, were 

subject to change as' late as May because 

of uncertainties as to the number of ships 

and craft available. 

Services of Supply, commanded by Lt. 

Gen. John C. H . Lee, was completing its 

program of mounting the supplies for an 

operation which has been described as "an 

assault of materiel, operated by man." 

2 

Planning for this aspect of the invasion had 

begun in April 1942, and along with it went 

the work of preparing facilities and assembling stores, work which was interrupted 

by the need to furnish 50,000 tons of cargo 

for the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. By June 1944 the number of 

United States troops in the United Kingdom 

had risen to 1,526,965, half of them arriving 

after the end of 1943. The stock pile for 

invasion-over and above basic loads and 

eq uipment-was 2,500,000 tons. In the 

process of mounting the assaults, 1,200 

troop concentration camps and 100 marshalling camps had to be set up and operated, and 144,000 tons of supplies were 

preloaded, waiting for D Day. 

Navy and Air Forces 

Allied na val forces in the NEPTUNE 

operation, commanded by Admiral Sir Bertram H . Ramsay, faced a task of primary 

importance. They had to convey the ground 

forces to the area for assault on a hostile 

and defended shore, assist their landings by 

gunfire support, protect their lines of communication against en em y surface and underwater attack, and insure the flow of supplies 

for an indefinite period of future operations. 

Some 4,100 ships and craft of all types were 

involved in the assault, including major 

units of both British and American fleets. 

The Allied air forces, under command of 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L. LeighMallory, were assigned a complex role both 

defensi ve and offensive in character. They 

would protect the huge assault convoy at 

every stage on its approach to Normandy 

and throughout the battle for the beaches. 

Offensively, they had the mission of assisting 

the operation by landings of airborne troops, 

by air born bardment of coastal defenses, and 

by attacks on enemy lines of reinforcement 

and supply. 
In a very real sense, the invasion began 

with air force operations that had commenced 

long before D Day. From the summer of 

1943 to the following spring, the U. S. 

Eighth Air Force had concentrated its 

atracks on German aircraft industries and 

airfields, with the primary purpose of preventing the enemy from increasing his 

strength in the air. Both by destruction of 

factories and of enemy planes met in combat 

this program was successful, and its success 

counted in the invasion. In addition to 

losing between 5,000 and 6,000 planes in the 

period, the enemy was unable to enlarge his 

first-line force in preparation for the expected assault. 

In April and May 1944, while continuing 

atracks on Germany often enough to force 

concentration of enemy air strength in that 

area, the heavy bombers entered on a phase 

of operations directly related to the impending assault. This was a series of heavy 

attacks on marshalling yards and airfields 

in France, the Low Countries, and western 

Germany, over an area large enough to 

preclude any indication of the precise invasion area. The attack on marshalling 

yards was designed to paralyze repair and 

maintenance facilities, thus wearing down 

the capacity of railways for movement of 

troops and supplies and forcing the enemy to 

maximum use of road transport. During 

May the range of air attacks was gradually 

narrowed, coming to a climax in the three 

days preceding D Day. However, even in 

this period of final blows against rail junctions and airfields a majority of the targets 

were along the Channel coast east of the 

Seine. 

Ninth Air Force medium bombers and 

fighter-bombers had also shared in the preparatory phases of the campaign. Beginning 

in April and continuing with increased vigor 

in May, they delivered attacks on enemy 

airfields in northern France, with the aim 

3 

of ultimately neutralizing all fields within 

130 miles of the assault beaches. During 

May, 36 airfields from Brittany to Holland 

received one or more attacks. Marshalling 

yards were also a target of medium bombers; 

between 1 March and 5 June, 36 yards in 

Belgium and northern France were hit in a 

total of 139 atracks. Results were excellent. 

The important yard at Creil, near Paris, was 

estimated as 60 percent out of commission 

on 24 May. Late in that month, rail bridges 

on the Seine and the Meuse Rivers were given 

first priority. By 4 June, all rail bridges (10) 

between Rouen and Conflans, inclusi ve, were 

knocked out, and all but 1 of the 14 road 

bridges. Fighter-bomber attacks on enemy 

rolling stock during May inflicted considerable damage. On 21 May, in the most active day for this type of work, 500 aircraft 

claimed results of 46 locomotives destroyed 

and 32 damaged, and damage to 30 trains. 

The Ninth Air Force was also busy on reconnaissance missions, which included heavy 

acti vi ty north of the Somme River as well 

as in the invasion area. 

Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force 

switched the main effort of its attacks during May from Germany to France and the 

Low Countries. Of 37,250 tons dropped 

during the month, 28,703 were directed at 

targets which were chosen as part of the 

"softening-up" program leading to the invaSIOn. 

21 Army Grollp 

The ground forces in the Normandy operation were led by Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commanding 21 Army Group. His 

troops would assault in three main areas 

(Map No.1),' with initial strength of six 

reinforced infantry divisions landing from 

the sea and of three airborne divisions. 

I Map. numbered in roman are bound in Icqucnce on the inside of the back 

cover. 
DISPOSITION OF GERMAN 

IN THE WEST 

FORCES 

... 8 

8 

MAP NO.1 

o 

!81 

o 

@ 

6 JUNE 1944 

LIMITED EMPLOYMENT DIVISION 

G 

I"ELO DIVISION 

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On the left the Second British Army 

would attack with three divisions (two of I 

Corps, one of XXX Corps) on three landing 

beaches. A brigade of the 6 British Airborne Division was to be dropped behind 

the beach defenses to secure vital bridges 

over the Orne River, between Caen and the 

sea. The objectives for D Day of the Second 

British Army included Bayeux, Caen, and 

Cabourg. 

The First U. S. Army, commanded by 

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradlev, was responsible 

for the other two assault areas. VII Corps 

(Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding) 

would land one division just north of the 

Vire Estuary (Beach "Utah"). In the early 

morning hours of 0 Day, four to five hours 

before the assault from sea, the S2d and 

101st Airborne Divisions were scheduled to 

be dropped in the area southeast and west 

of Ste-Mere-Eglise, where their mission was 

to capture the crossings of the Merderet 

River, secure the line of the Douve River as 

a barrier to the south, and assist the landings 

at Utah Beach. At the end of D Day, VII 

Corps should control the area east of the 

Merderet from just south of Montebourg to 

the Douve. 

Between the other assault areas, V Corps, 

commanded by Maj. Gen . Leonard T. Gerow 

planned its attack on a 7,OOO-yard stretch of 

beach to be known as "Omaha. '" The 

scheme and objectives of this assault will be 

described later in detail. 

General Montgomery' s intention after the 

initial beachheads were secured, was to hold 

in the area south and east of Caen while-the 

First U. S. Army meantime maneuvered to 

cut off the Cotentin peninsula and capture 

Cherbourg. This port, to be opened as a 

major supply channel for further operations, 

was to be taken by D+ 15. The First Army , 

reinforced to a strength of three corps, was 

then to attack south toward Coutances and 

J From "0" Force, ;luigllcd to the area. 

5 

the base of the Brittany peninsula. Tentati ve phase lines allowed for capture of the 

Cerisy Forest area by D+5 or 6; St-L6 and 

Caumont by D+9. These phase lines were 

set with the most favorable possible development of the operation in mind. They 

insured readiness for maximum progress but 

represented neither a hard-and-fast schedule 

nor an optimistic forecast. 

Enemy strength in France and the Low 

Countries (Map No.1) was estimated at 

60 divisions, having been built up from 53 

since February 1944. Of these, 17 were infantry divisions, 26 were characterized as 

"limited employment" units (coastal defense units of limited mobility), 7 were 

training units, and 10 were panzer or panzer 

grenadier divisions. The armored divisions 

were located at inland points whence they 

could be moved as striking forces into a 

threatened coastal area. As a possible indication of where the German high command expected the assault, no fewer than 

22 divisions guarded the region from the 

Seine to Holland. 

The sector in which the blow was actually 

to fall came under the German Seventh Army, 

commanded by Col. Gen. Friedrich Dallmann with headquarters at Ie Mans in 

Normandy. LXXXIV Corps was responsible 

for the defense of the French coast from the 

Orne River to the northeast corner of Brittany. At the end of the winter the enemy 

force in or very near the assault area was 

estimated at only five infantry divisions, 

plus minor ground force elements. During 

Ma y, Allied intelligence found evidence of 

reinforcement by two infantry divisions and 

(just south of Caen) the 21st Panzer Division. 

As a mobile reserve, two panzer divisions 

had come into the Alen~on-Evreux region, 

from which they could reach the assault 

area quickly. A number of the enemy units 

in Brittany would also be available as reinforcement within a few days, and (depend-
ing on the success of Allied air attacks) divisions from north of the Seine and south of 

the Loire could be brought to Normandy. 

Allied estimates of enemy build-up, assuming no interference to his road and rail 

movement, fixed his maximum possible 

strength in the assault area at 18 to 20 

divisions, including 8 armored, by D+3. 

At this same date, Allied forces ashore 

were scheduled to number 13 divisions, including elements of 2 armored divisions.' 

The success of the invasion would depend in 

considera ble measure on the au tcome of a 

race between Allied build-up and enemy 

reinforcement, in which it was hoped that 

the operations of the Allied air forces against 

rail and road communications would impose 

a decisive handicap on the Germans. 

v Corps Planning 

As the highest U. S. Army field-force 

headquarters then in Britain, V Corps Headquarters began in July 1943 to share in the 

early planning for employment of American 

forces in assault on the continent. On 12 

September, by directive of the Chief of Staff, 

Supreme Allied Headquarters, V Corps' work 

was focused on the specific problem of an 

assault landing in Normandy. By October 

the headquarters of First U. S. Army and 

U. S. 1st Army Group were established in 

Britain. Since the decisions taken at higher 

levels determined the mission and objectives 

of subordinate units, the work had to be 

done concurrently and with constant inter:.-

change of views between the different levels 

of command and between the different services. The final plans for ground forces were 

produced in a series from January to May, 

beginning with 21 Army Group. First 

Army NEPTUNE Plan was issued on 25 

February, V Corps' plan on 26 March, and 

that of the 1st Infantry Division on 16 April. 

I AIIO leveral Briti.h and U. S. tank unitt attached to infantry divi,iou. or employed oil corp. troop •. 

6 

No final decisions on troop lists and loading 

were possible until even later dates, and 

revisions of detail in many parts of the plans 

were necessary as late as the end of May. 

A special planning group, headed by Col. 

Benjamin B. Talley, had been put in charge 

of shaping the V Corps NEPTUNE Plan. 

As the First Army and V Corps planning 

groups proceeded in their work, they felt 

the necessity of practical experiment with 

the problems involved in an amphibious 

operation on the scale proposed, particularly 

those of mounting and loading assault 

troops. A training center at I1fracombe, 

northwest Devonshire, for study of assault 

techniques had been in use since 1942, and 

experiments on methods of loading and 

landing had been conducted near Dartmouth 

since September 1943 with cooperation of 

the British Navy. In December a stretch of 

coast at Slapton Sands (South Devonshire) 

was provided by the British Government as 

an assault training area for American forces. 

Here the conditions of tide, beach, and terrain were roughly similar to those on the 

Normandy coast, and the area was large 

enough to permit large-scale exercises and 

the use of live fire including naval and air 

bombardment. From January On, this training ground was used for every type of experiment and for exercises involving naval, air 

force, and service force units as well as the 

assault infantry and tanks. 

In addition to its training value, the work 

done here was of direct influence on the 

planning, particularly in the case of exercises conducted on a scale large enough to 

embrace major units. Exercise "Duck," 

held in January, involved a division plus 

corps troops and took in all the stages of 

assault from concentration and marshalling 

to a landing after air born bardmen t and 

naval fire . From this exercise it was learned 

that three divisions could be mounted from 

the Plymouth - Portland - Falmouth - Dart-
mouth port areas, instead of one as previously supposed. In March, Exercise "Fox" 

was staged at corps level and involved two 

divisions. From 3 to 8 May, "Fabius I" 

concluded the series of larger exercises with 

what amounted to a dress rehearsal for the 

NEPTUNE operation. The troops used a 

scheme of maneuver closely similar to that 

of the NEPTUNE plans, and the concentration and embarkation took place in areas 

7 

soon to be used for NEPTUNE mounting. 

Throughout these months, training and 

planning went hand in hand, and the Planning Group used lessons learned at Slapton 

Sands in its final adjustments and revision 

of details. V Corps NEPTUNE Plan, consisting of an operations plan proper and 22 

annexes ( practically all of these completed 

by revisions in April or May), totalled 326 

legal-size pages with 23 maps and charts. 
UNIT COMMANDERS 

(Ranks as of June 1944) 

~lA . GEN . CLARENCE R. HUEBNER 

CommQnding Ctntra/, J Jt DioiJion 

ASSAULT PLAN 

THE MISSION OF V CORPS was to secure a beachhead in the area between POrten-Bessin and the Vire River, from which 

they would push southward toward Caumont and St-L6, conforming with the advance of the British Second Army. The 

Corps would arrive at the beachhead in four 

stages. The initial assault force (Force 

"0") consisted of the 1st Division, reinforced to include four infantry regiments 

with strong attachments of artillery, armor, 

and engineers, as well as attachments of 

engineer and service units for movement to 

the beach . Chief components of the 1st 

Division were its own 16th and 18th Regi8 

mental Combat Teams, the 116th Regimental Combat Team and the 115th Infantry 

attached from the 29th Division, and the 

Provisional Ranger Force of twO battalions 

(2d and 5th). Force "0" numbered 34,142 

men and 3,306 vehicles. 

The follow-up force (Force "B") was 

scheduled to arrive off the assault beach after 

nOOll on D Day and numbered 25,117 men 

and 4,429 vehicles. It included the 29th 

Division, consisting of the 175th Infantry 

and (attached from the 1st Division) the 

26th RCT. Scheduled to arrive on D + l 

and D+ 2, the preloaded build-up contingent 

had as main component the 2d Division and 
MAJ. GEN. CHARLES H. GERHARDT 

Commanding CLural, 291h DiviJion 

totalled some 17,500 men and 2,300 vehicles. 

Schedules for the later build-up completing the transfer of V Corps to Normandy, 

called for the arrival between D + 2 and 

D+15 of 27 residual groups involving 

32,000 troops and 9,446 vehicI~s. All of 

these totals i ncI uded a large n urn ber of 

units attached to V Corps for movement 

only. 

The loading plans of Force "0" and Force 

"B" were designed to fit an operation which 

would develop from an assault by one reinforced division into attack by two divisions abreast. Unity of command in the 

critical first stages would thus be assured. 

Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commanding the 1st Division, would conduct the 

initial assault with a force that included 

twO units of the 29th Division, and plans 

for the landings and for movement inland 

9 

MAJ. GEN. WALTER M. ROBERTSON 

Commanding Genual, 2d Di:liJio'l 

BRIG. GEN. WILLIA~I ~1. HOGE 

Commanding Ceneral. Proouionaf EPI,inur Spuial Brigade Croup 

/ 
THE CRESCENT CURVE OF OMAHA BEACH shows from 

the high ground at the F-1 Jtrongpoint above the eastern end of Omaha . 

Right foreground, Germa11 75-mm gun emplacement; far background, 

the cliffs near Pointe de la Percee. (Photo takelt February 1945.) 

were made so as to permit the early assignment of divisional zones to the 1st and 

29th Divisions. These zones would go into 

effect on corps order, when Maj. Gen. 

Charles H. Gerhardt would assume command of the 29th Division with its normal 

components. In the meantime, in order to 

pave the way for this step, Brig. Gen . 

Norman D. Cota, assistant divisional commander of the 29th, was to land with the 

116th RCT and assist General Hllebner in 

handling the 29th Division units until they 

reverted . 

10 

The 1st Division was a veteran unit which 

had served through the campaigns of North 

Africa and Sicily. The 29th and 2d Divisions 

would experience their first action in Normandy. 

Terraill 

The coast of Normandy offers only a few 

areas favorable for large-scale landing operations in the zone assigned to V Corps 

(Maps Nos. II and III). Cliffs, reefs, and 

the wide tidal ranges combine to present 
natural difficulties. The estuary at the 

mouth of the Vire River is marked by extensive shallows, exposed at low tide, and 

flanked on the east by reefs that extend to 

Grandcamp. Beyond that seaside village 

cliffs averaging 100 feet in height tower 

above a narrow beach as far as Pointe de la 

Percee. Five miles further east, cliffs 

reappear at the shore line, and the beach is 

spoiled by rock ledges which continue as 

far as Port-en-Bessin . 

It was on this five-mile, cliffless interval 

that V Corps planned its assault landings, 

designating the sector as "Omaha" Beach. 

That part of the stretch regarded as suitable 

for landing operations was about 7,000 

yards long, on a shore which curves landward in a very slight crescent and is backed 

with bluffs which merge into the cliffs at 

ei ther end of the sector. 

The beach slopes very gently below highwater mark. With a tidal range of 18 feet 

expected at the period of the assault, low 

tide would expose a stretch of firm sand 

averaging about 300 yards in distance from 

low-water ma"rk to high. The enemy had 

placed' 'underwater" obstacles on this tidal 

flat. At high tide, men and vehicles wading 

THE GENTLY SLOPING TIDAL FLAT offmd no cover for the 

attacking forus. This reconllaissanu photograph taken 19 May 

1944 shows the sands at low tide in front of E- I draw. A pillbox 

is sun just to the right of the house, and a strongpoint on the bluff 

shoulder ltft of tht draw. Work is in prog1'us on obstacieJ, including hedgehogs and Jome mined posu. French labor was uud. 

11 
THE SHINGLE EMBANKMENT was charact"istic of tht wholt 

lmgth of Omaha Btach. It was impassablt at most placn for Vthida, but aifordrd some cover for the assault troopI. This Itction 

is in front of D- 3 draw, by tht houIt which Maj. Bingham occupid 

early in tht GUQuit. German trenches war JUIt beyond the wirt 

on tht top of tht shinglt. Tht ernt lint of tht bluff bartly shows. 

up the beach could expect trouble with 

irregular runnels parallel to the shore, 

scoured out by the tidal current and two and 

one-half to four feet deep. 

At the high-water mark, the tidal flat 

terminated' in a bank of coarse shingle, 

sloping up rather steeply to a height of some 

8 feet. In places it was as much as 15 yards 

4 A. a re.ult of dden.ivl: preparation by the Germans, the effects of the uuuh 

bombardment, 1Ind (above 1.11) the work don .. by engineer. to clen the b.!.Ich for 

. upply opera tion. after the upull. many future. o f the ~.ach at the time o f 

the uuuh were b rgdy dClitm}'cd. The IU wan and shingle embankment ""crc 

completely removed. and many o f the beach villill were razed or reduced to 

rubble. The road .y.u:m ...... entirely changed. 

12 

wide, and the stones averaged 3 inches in 

diameter. On the eastern two-thirds of the 

beach, the shingle lay against a low sand 

embankment or dune line and constiruted a 

barrier which was impassable for vehicles. 

On the western part of the beach the shingle 

piled against a sea wall, first (near the Vierville exit, D-l) of stone masonry sloping 

seaward, then of wood. The wall varied in 

height from 4 to 12 feet and was broken by 

a gap several hundred yards wide where the 

tidal flat ended in shingle and embankment. 

Immediately behind the sea wall a paved, 
promenade beach road ran from Exic D-l co 

Exic D-3, chen became a rough crack going 

as far as Exic E-3. 

Becween che dune line (or sea wall) and 

che bluffs lay che beach flac. Very narrow 

ac either end of the main landing zone, this 

level shelf of sand widened co more chan 200 

yards near the cencer of che screcch. Excepc 

ac the Vierville end, the flac had large 

pacches of marsh and high grass, usually 

near the edge of che bluffs. Toward Exic 

D-l, a number of summer villas lined che 

shelf behind the promenade road, and ac 

Exit D-3 lay a small village, les Monlins, 

wich buildings cluscered on che road running 

back inland from che beach. Many of these 

had been razed by the Germans to improve 

fields of defensive fires. East of les Moulins 

there were only a few scactered houses. 

Bluffs 100 co 170feec in heighc rise sharply 

from che flac and dominace che whole beach 

area. The slopes are generally sceep, but 

in varying degree. They are mosc abrupc 

becween Exit D-l and Exic D-3; farcher easc, 

the rise is easier but reaches higher elevations (150 co 165 feec) fairly close co che 

beach fiac. The grass-covered slopes are 

more uneven than chey appear when viewed 

from only a shorc distance. Many small 

folds or irregularities provide opporcunity 

for cover from flanking fires, and from Exit 

E-l eastward the bluff sides are pardy 

covered with low scrub and brush. Along 

most of the screcch, the bluff ends in a clearcut crest line as it reaches the edge of the 

inland plateau; coward the eastern end, 

where the slopes are longer and more 

gradual, the edge is not sharply defined. 

THE BEACH FLAT, looking east from western shoulder of E-1 

draw. Taken a few days afur the invasion, the photograph shows 

the antitank ditch proucting the draw. Trucks are already using 

a new exit road leading straight up the bluff off Easy Red (right). 
AT THE WESTERN END OF OMAHA the bluffs merge into a 

cliff line. Takm from a point 150 yards west of D-l draw, this 

view shows tht cliffs toward Pointt de La PUC;t and the narrowing 

beach flat along sector Charlie. A pillbox sited to fire east along 

beach is on the sand (right). Othtr gun tmplau11unts wert built 

into cliff sides ,,,ar th, Point. (Photograph takm j une 1945.) 

MARSHES ALONG THE BEACH FLAT wer, fo und at the foot 

of the bluff and were oftm mined. This photograph, taken j une 

1945, shows the beach from Easy Gran, looking west past D- 3 draw. 

The (xit Toad over tht bluff (unleT) was con.strucud by beach engillurs. 
ALONG EASY RED SECfOR th, bluff has mOT( gradual slop", 

markrd by patch" of brush. This brach is b,twun E- J and E-3 

draws, facing a main p~n~tration aua oj tht 16th Infantry. Taktn 

just afur D Day, th, photograph shows wf(ckag' ntar shinglt tmbankmtnt, including a bulldour and LeI 553. Obstacl" have bun 

cleartd, and gaps optnrd through tht tmbankmmt to tht blOch flat. 

E- I DRAW !tads off th, blOch to tht flat plain bthind tht bluff. 

To tht right, tht [ulds toward St-Laurtnt havt unusually ftw 

hrdgtrows. This atrial obliqut was takm in June 1943, whtn 

littlt work had bun done on fortifications along Omaha Blach. 
At four points along Omaha Beach small 

wooded valleys slope back inland and provide natural corridors for exit from the 

beach flat. A paved road led off the coast 

at Exit D-l; the other draws had unimproved 

roads. These corridors were, inevitably, 

key areas both in the plan of attack and in 

the arrangement of defenses. The advance 

inland of assaulting units would depend on 

opening exit roads for traffic and supply from 

the beach, and armor used in the attack could 

only get up to the high ground through the 

draws. Near the eastern end of the beach 

a very shallow and fairly steep draw, followed by a rough trail leading inland, was 

marked for development as a fifth exit 

route (F-l). 

Once up the steep slopes bordering the 

beach, attacking troops would get the impression of coming out on a gently rolling 

plain. Actually, there is a gradual rise to 

a height of land which parallels the coast 

about 2,000 yards inland and reaches over 

250 feet in altitude south of Colleville. 

There is no marked "ridge" line whatever, 

and except for unusually open fields near the 

bluff between Exits D-l and E-l, observation in the whole area is severely limited by 

the numerous hedgerows, orchards, and 

patches of trees. Three villages, Vierville, 

St-Laurent, and Colleville,' 500 to 1,000 

yards inland, were so situated near the heads 

of draws and along the coastal highway as 

ro figure inevitably in the defense of main 

exit routes. These were farming villages, 

with a certain amount of activity in summer 

as modest beach resorts. Their stone houses 

were clustered on or near the coastal highway that connected them with Grandcamp 

and Bayeux. 

South of the tableland lies the valley of 

the Aure River, running from east to west, 

• All three have compound namn, with the ending ..... ur-Mer... For convenience. and .• ;nce then: i. no danger o f confulion lI'ilh other localitiel, thue 

ending. arc omitted. 

16 

about two miles behind the beach at Porten-Bess in and five miles south of it at Pointe 

de la Percee (Map No. III) . West of 

Trevieres the valley plain had been flooded 

to form a barrier over a mile wide. Above 

Trevieres the Aure was fordable by infantry. 

Onl y on the northern side of the valley are 

the slopes at all pronounced; at twO points 

(just north of Trevieres and at Mount 

Cauvin) the ground close to the river on the 

north is 150 to 200 feet above the stream, 

giving good observation into the valley 

and its main approaches from the south. 

South of the Aure the ground rises again, 

at first very gradually, toward the height of 

land crowned by Cerisy Forest , 12 miles 

south of the coast and nearly 400 feet above 

sea level. Several small streams flowing 

north toward the Aure divide this rising 

ground into a series of low north-south 

ridges. In V Corps' estimates for the operation the Cerisy Forest figured as an important 

tactical objective, necessary to hold if the 

beachhead was to be secure. It not only 

included commanding ground, within medium artillery range of the coast, but 

offered cover for assembly of enemy forces. 

The region west and southwest of Omaha 

Beach figured prominently in D-Day plans, 

for early junction with VII Corps depended 

on progress in that direction . The flooding 

of the lower Aure Valley had nearly made a 

peninsula, 10 miles long and 5 miles wide, 

comprising the low tableland stretching from 

Formigny- Trevieres west to the Vire Estuary. In it lay some of the strongest German 

fortifications, controlling the sea approaches 

to Carentan, and through it from east to 

west ran the principal highway from Paris 

(Caen) to Cherbourg and the Cotentin . 

The town of Isigny, where the highway 

crossed the Aure, would be a key point in 

any effort to link the beachheads of V and 

VII Corps; all east- west communications 

near the coast funneled through Isigny, and 
from it V Corps could debouch on the lowlands near Carent,an, 

The road net south and west of Omaha is 

characterized by the absence of main northsouth routes; the few major highways in the 

corps zone would be laterals rather than 

axials. The most important artery is the 

Carentan- Isigny- Bayeux road just noted. 

Another highway, well paved for two-way 

traffic, links Bayeux with the junction point 

of St-L6, crossing the Cerisy Forest. From 

Port-en-Bessin to Grandcamp runs a 15-foot, 

hard-surface road paralleling the coast about 

a mile inland. North- south roads in the 

region, at best secondary, are winding and 

usuall y narrow; they were expected to 

present difficulties in the form of steep 

should ers and narrow bridges. Local communications are served by many smail lanes 

and tracks, designed for the needs of farmers, 

but regarded as unsuitable for military use 

except by infantry. Any advance inland 

would require, for the supporting vehicular 

craffic, a great deal of engineering work to 

develop small roads into suitable northsouth axials. Deployment from any of the 

roads was estimated as likely to be difficult 

because of the ever present hedges, often 

combined with embankments. The doubletrack railroad from Paris CCaen) to Cherbourg runs from east to west across the 

high ground a few miles south of the Aure. 

Cutting this line at Bayeux and Caen, and 

denying its use to the enemy, was a primary 

objective in the D-Day attack of the British 

Second Arm y. 

HEDGEROWS mark,d th l bOllndar y of most fields in Normandy. 

This OIU gro~vs out of a low embankmcnt and in the background is 

double, ':.()ith a dup ditch hetU'u1l. the embankments. The field shown 

was part of the po.sitioll occupied by unilJ of the 2d Ranga Battalion 

on the 1l1'ghl of 6 june, whe1/. they weT( attacked by a 11l pen:or German fo ra llea r Pointe du Hoe . (Photograph taknt J UIU, 19-15.) 

17 
SUN KEN ROADS were oJun Jormed by the high hedgerow embankments, which had occasional openings into adjaunt fields. This 

road, leading up E-3 draw toward Colleville, indicaus the difficultin Jor heavy traffic Jrom the beaches. (Photo taken june, 19+5.) 

TREVIERES, an important road anUr behind Omaha, is the 

largest village clost to the beach. This view looks across it to tk( 

north, Ihowing bluffs that overlook the small AUTe River. Damage to the tow I! is ruult of naval alld artillery fire before 10 June. 
American troops who fought in Normandy 

will always connect the name with hedgerow fighting. They were to begin it as soon 

as they left the bluffs above Omaha Beach. 

Stock raising and fruit growing are the main 

rural acti vi ties in this part of Normand y, and 

the field system is characterized by a patchwork layout of irregular fields varying from 

narrow ribbon-like strips to shapes more 

nearly square. These range in size from 10 

or 15 to a 100 acres or more, with the greater 

number probably averaging between 50 and 

7'5 acres. Some contain orchards of lowgrowing apple trees, more are used for pasture, and there are occasional patches of 

grain, though the main wheat-growing area 

of western Normandy is in the Orne Valley. 

Boundaries between fields tend to follow 

NNE-SSW and WNW-ESE axes in the Omaha 

region, but local variations are numerous, 

and the boundaries could never be counted 

on ro provide a safe direction-line for keeping 

to an axis of advance. Hedgerows form the 

universal substitute for fences in this country 

and vary in character almost as much as do 

the shapes of the fields. Some are · low 

bushes, five to six feet high, growing ftom 

the ground level of the field and not hard 

to break through. Others are thick, densely 

matted walls of tough and briery hedge, 

running up to 10 feet in height and interspersed with large and small trees. In many 

regions (not so often in the area just behind 

Omaha Beach) the hedges grow out of banks 

or dikes of earth, forming natural ramparts 

sometimes six feet high and adding immensel y to the strength of the barrier. 

Many hedge embankments are not passable 

for tanks. Drainage ditches are often found 

skirting the hedge or its embankment, and 

provide good sites for shelters and fox holes. 

Communication between fields is usually 

limited to small openings at the corners. 

Occasional narrow trails or sunken roads, 

running between parallel hedgerows (and 

not always shown on maps) give access to 

fields far off the regular road net. 

Fighting in country of this sort presents 

serious difficulties to attacking forces. Each 

hedgerow across the axis of advance might 

conceal a nest of enemy resistance, in which 

good positions for flat-trajectory weapons 

could be quickly organized, with short but 

usually excellent fields of fire across the 

nearest fields. Axial hedgerows could be 

utilized by defenders for delivering flanking 

fire. Observation would be extremely difficult for the attackers (see illustration, p. 

120), and this might hinder the quick use of 

supporting heavy weapons and artillery fire . 

In contrast, a defending force could use prearranged fires of mortars and automatic 

weapons sited to cover the hedgerows leading toward any prepared positions. Split up 

by hedgerow walls, attacking forces were 

often to find difficulty in maintaining communications on their flanks and in coordinating the attack of units larger than a company. Fighting in this country would put 

a premium on initiative and aggrefsive 

leadership in small units, and armor could 

have only limited use. 

19 

Trevieres, largest village in the area close 

to Omaha Beach, had a prewar population 

of about SOO, and the total population of 

the region shown on Map No. III (excluding Bayeux) was probably under 10,000. 

Following practices that go back to Celtic 

settlement of the land, farmers in this part 

of Normandy tend to group in small straggling villages and hamlets, with houses of 

stone and rubble-mortar construction. If 

located on important roads or high ground, 

these villages were often destined to become 

centers of local resistance and to suffer accordingly. In terrain so lacking in hills, 

church towers were inevitably regarded as 

possible observation posts, and their ruins 

testify to the results of neutralizing artillery 

fire. The occasional isolated farms usually 
consisted of fairly substantial buildings 

grouped around a court yard; many farms of 

this type became strongpoints in the battles 

through hedgerow country. 

Enemy Defenses 

In the years which followed the fall of 

France, the Germans publicized the building 

of an "Atlantic Wall"' against any invasion 

attempts on the part of the Allies. In his 

speech announcing declaration of war on the 

United States, Hitler said (11 December 

1941): "A belt of strongpoints and gigantic 

fortifications runs from Kirkenes (Norway) 

to the Pyrenees .... It is my unshakable 

decision ro make this front impregnable 

against every enemy." Commando forays 

on the coast of France, aerial reconnaissance, 

and reports from the French Resistance and 

secret agents helped Allied Headquarters to 

amass detailed information on the enemy's 

progress in strengthening his fortifications 

in the west. On the basis of this intelligence 

Allied plans were checked and revised up to 

the middle of May. The estimates were 

later found to be substantially correct regarding enemy fire power, the underwater and 

beach obstacles, the plans for use of terrain 

in defense, and the strength of defensive 

emplacements. 

German coastal defenses in the V Corps 

zone were distributed in accordance with 

the degree of opportunity offered by different 

sectors for a landing assault (Maps Nos. II 

and IV) Thirty-two fortified areas or 

strongpoints were located between the Vire 

River and Port-en-Bessin . The Vire Estuary, Grandcamp, and Port-en-Bessin were 

strongly defended. On the long stretches 

of coast enjoying natural protection by 

reefs and cliffs, the strongpoints were widely 

spaced. The enemy had recognized that 

the Omaha sector was more favorable for 

attack from the sea, and 12 strongpoints 

20 

were so placed as to be able to bring direct 

fire on the beach. 

The enemy's tactical plan for meeting 

assault was suggested by the disposition of 

his coastal defenses, which were concentrated at the beaches and were not developed 

in any depth . Every evidence pointed to the 

conclusion that the Germans intended a 

maximum effort on the coast, seeking either 

to smash the attack at the water's edge or, 

at worst, ro hold the assaulting forces near 

the beach until mobile reserves could arrive 

to finish them off. The beach defenses were 

designed to stop the attacking force by 

obstacles and mines, both on the tidal flat 

and the beach shelf, while it was annihilated 

with concentrated fires from every type of 

defensive weapon. 

In 1944, at all main beaches practicable 

for massive landings, the Germans had 

begun to construct an elaborate system of 

obstacles along the tidal flat between the 

high- and low-water marks. These obstacles, designed to wreck or block off 

landing craft, had begun to appear in the 

Omaha sector early in April, and work on 

them was still in progress by D Day. 

The first band of obstructions consisted 

of a series of Element' 'C," gate-like structures of reinforced iron frames with iron 

supports, on rollers, about 250 yards out 

from the high-water line. The main support 

girders were 10 feet high, and waterproofed 

Teller mines were lashed to the uprights. 

The second band, 20 to 25 yards landward , 

was composed of heavy logs dri yen into the 

sand at such an angle that the mine-tipped 

ends pointed seaward, or of log ramps, reinforced and mined. This belt was found to be 

more formidable than had been anticipated. 

One hundred and thirty yards from shore, 

the final row of obstructions included hedgehogs, about five and one-half feet high and 

made of three or more steel rails or angles, 

crossed at the centers and so strongly set 
.... 

'-

UNDERWATER OBSTACLES: Upper /tfl, a mined pOll; upper 

right, hedgehog; below, Element lie" (with (xpiosiv(J attached for 

demolition by U . S. engineers who cleared the beaches). A fourth 

type found on Omaha, the log ramp, is sun in other illustrations. 

21 
n n 

n n 

n n n n n n nn 

x 

n n 

n 

n n n 

n n 

nnn"nnnn 

n n n n n n n n 

n n n 

MAP NO.2 E,zemy D,/enses at D-J Draw (les M oulins) 

22 

n 

n 

.. 

n x x x x .. n .. 

..J'1..I1..I1.I FIAE TRENCH 

r-\ GuN EMPLACEMENT 

\ 

o CONCRETE SHELTER OR PILLBOX 

6 A A A 6 ANTITANK DITCH 

n n n n n MINEFIELD 

XXXXX WIRE 

Q ________ ~IQ~~~~ QO~ . ______ ~'OO 

YAROS 
that the ends would stave in the bottoms 

of landi ng craft. None of these bands were 

continuous, the elements being staggered at 

irregular intervals. There were no mines in 

the tidal sands. Shortly after work began 

on these obstacles, Allied intelligence learned 

of the new development, and Allied planning 

staffs were preparing measures to meet this 

new and serious complication in the assault 

problem. 

If the attacking ttoOpS reached the bank 

of shingle at th e edge of the tidal sands, 

they would still have to cross the narrow 

shelf of beach flat to reach the bluffs. The 

Germans made liberal use of wire and mines 

to slow up movement beyond the shingle . 

Along most of the beach, a row of concertina wire was placed just to landward of 

the shingle; at the western end, the wire was 

on top of the sea wall. Irregularly placed 

minefields, usually posted with warning 

signs, lay in the flat ground behind the wire 

and on the bluff slope. In addi tion to the 

ordinary types, there were rock fougasses 

(charges of TNT covered by rock and set off 

by trip wire, sometimes in the concertina), 

ordinary trip-wire mines, French "buttercup" mines, and mustard POts. Some dummy minefields consisted of scrap iron planted 

below the ground surface, but most of the 

fields were real. 

Enemy firing positions were laid out to 

cover the tidal flat and beach shelf with 

direct fire, both plunging and grazing, from 

all types of weapons. Observation on [he 

whole Omaha area, and flanking fire from 

cliff positions a[ either end, were aided by 

[he crescent curve of [he shore line. The 

emplacements between VierviIJe and Pointe 

de la Petcee were particularly dangerous because of [heir ability to deliver enfilade fire 

on a large stretch of the landing area. Each 

s[rongpoint was a complex system made up 

of elements including pillboxes, gun casemates, open positions for light guns, and 

firing trenches, surrounded by minefields and 

wire (Map No.2)' The elements were connec[ed with each other and with underPILLBOX NEAR VIERVILLE DRAW (0- 1). Placrd on tht 

beach flat, this gun was able to deliCt! fire eastward acrOSl the mouth 

of the draw and down the length of Dog Gran toward iu Jl1oulillI. A 

sidewall Jcruned the gun's muzzle blast from obstTvatioll from uaward. 

g.round quarters and magazines by deep 

trenches or by tunnels. Most of the strongpoints protecting Omaha were situated near 

the entrance to the draws, which were 

further protected by anti tank di tches and 

road blocks. In some cases the elements of 

a strongpoint were echeloned from the north 

edge of the beach flat to the top of the bluff, 

wi th weapons si ted for both grazing and 

plunging fire on every yard of approach to 

the draw. In June the Germans were still 

in process of completing or strengthening 

several strongpoints, including those guarding E- I draw. 

While machine guns were the basic weapons in all emplacements, there were over 60 

light artillery pieces of various types. Eight 

concrete casemates and four open field positions were designed for guns of caliber from 

75-mm to 88-mm; 35 pill boxes were occupied 

by lighter guns; and there were about 18 

antitank guns (37-mm to 75-mm) . The 

heavier guns were sited to give lateral fire 

along the beach, with traverse limited by 

thick concrete wing-walls which concealed 

the fla sh of these guns and made them hard 

to spOt from the sea. Mortar positions were 

sometimes included in the strongpoints but 

were more frequently placed behind the 

bluffs. About 40 rocket pits were later 

found , located several hundred yards inland 

on the high ground and each fitted to fire 

four 32-cm rockets. 

The considerable areas between the strongpoints were supposed to be protected by their 

flanking fires, by minefields scattered on the 

beach flat and the slopes of the bluff, and by 

occasional trenches, rifle pits, and machinegun emplacements along the crest. While 

the line of defense was not continuous, no 

areas of beach were left uncovered in the 

pattern of defensive fires. Nea rly aJl weapons, mach ine guns as well as artillery pieces, 

were sited primarily to give lateral fires 

down the length of the beach , and the 

defense of a given sector usually depended as 

much on the flanking fire from neighboring 

positions as on the emplacements in the 

sector itself. 

The Omaha sector was not strongly defended by coastal batteri es of heavier guns. 

Bur at Pointe du Hoe, some 5,000 yards to 

the west, there was a battery believed to 

consist of six 155-mm howitzers ( French 

make), mounted partly in casemates. This 

posi tion was regarded as the most dangerous in the American zone, for guns of that 

cali ber could cover nOt only the V and VII 

Corps landing beaches but also both transport areas. Further west, at M aisy, was a 

battery estimated at four I5S-mm howitzers 

and near Ge£osse-Fontenay were four 105-mm 

field gun-howitzers. Both of these batteries 

were later found to consist of mobile field 

guns. Just beyond the First Army boundary, 

in the British zone, the strong defenses of 

Port-en-Bessin included guns that might be 

used against the landing area at Omaha. 

All main enemy defenses in the Omaha 

sector were on the beach or just behind it; 

there was no evidence that the Germans had 

prepared positions inland for a defense in 

depth. There were known to be a few minefields in the fields just south of the bluffs, 

and some scattered emplacements at bivouac 

areas and assembly points. Defense beyond 

the beach would depend largely on the use 

of local reserves in counterattack. 

GUN EMPLACEMENT OVERLOOKING BEACH. Thil 

76-mm howitUT (Runion) was in the strongpoint JUJt east of E- l 

draw, a1ld was Jiud jar jlmtki'1lg fire on the approachn. Open tmplaumenU WUf fJui1urable to naval gunfire . (Pho tograph taknl j 1I11t, / 9.J4.) 

25 
• 

TRENCHES ALONG THE BLUFF EDGE were the mail! Germal! 

defensn bttWU11 .strongpoint.s guarding draws. These tunches, leading from dugouts to firing positions, overlooked Easy Red Beach Wtst 

oj J draw. Such systems usually included machine-gun positions. 

Omaha Beach lay in the 53-mile sector 

reportedly held by the 716th Infantry Division, extending from the Orne River to the 

Vire Estuary (Map No. I). This was a 

defensive division, estimated at twO regiments, two or three artillery battalions, and 

other small divisional units. Non-German 

elements in the division were estimated to 

be as high as 50 percent, mostly Poles or 

Russians, and morale was thought to be 

poor. The 726th Infantry Regime1lt was responsible for the coast defenses ftom west 

of Grandcamp to a point three miles east 

of Pon-en-Bessin . According to the intelligence available, defending troops in 

the Omaha Beach strongpoints amounted to 

about a reinforced battalion, some 800 to 

1,000 troops, most of them needed to man 

26 

the beach defenses. Local reserves of the 

716th Divisi"" were estimated at three battalions, twO of these near enough to the 

Omaha assault area to reach it in twO or 

three hours. Counterattacks by these units 

were not regarded as likely to be effective 

against penetrations of the beach defenses, 

and major counterattacks would depend on 

the arrival of mobile reserves. The nearest 

of these to the Omaha area, and the most 

likely to be committed there was the J52d 

InfalZtry Division, reponed as stationed in 

the St-L6-Caumont area some 20 miles inland. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Heinz Hellmich, this was an offensive division of good 

quality, with a core of veterans experienced 

in fighting on the Russian front, and was 

expected to furnish most of the opposition 
to V Corps. It was at full strength, with 

three infantry regiments and normal artillery 

of three battalions of lOS-mm and one 

battalion of IS0-mm howitzers. By commandeering loeal transportation, the enemy 

was believed able to get one regimental 

combat team of this division into the 

Omaha area by afternoon of D Day. In 

addition, the three small battalions of the 

30th Mobile Brigade, headquarters at Coutanees, might be used for early counterattack. These battalions, consisting of 

three companies each, were provided with 

adequate transport for quick movement. 

Other enemy mobile reserves, including his 

available armored divisions, were located 

nearer the Caen- Bayeux area in the British 

zone. V Corps units were warned to guard 

against possible armored counterattack on 

this flank by late on D Day. The three 

German divisions in the Cotentin peninsula 

were expected to be completely occupied by 

VII Corps' attack 6 and by the need for defending the Cherbourg area against possible 

further landings. 

It was thought that the German air force 

would make a supreme effort against the 

Allied convoy and landing operations. Despite his heavy air losses during the winter, 

the enemy was believed capable of making 

1,500 sorties on D Day, mainly of fighters 

and fighter-bombers. In view of the overwhelming Allied naval strength, there was 

little fear of enemy surface action against the 

assault convoy. Enemy capabilities would 

• The 2451" l .. jart.fry Dillin'on_ believed to bcguarding the coast from Coutancu 

to Avranchu (ICC Map No. I). WaJ found in July to have been in the Dicppc 

region at the time of the invasion. 

ENEMY SHORE DEFENSES wer, bring strtngthtn,d and tnlarged in the months preading the invasion. Compare this picture of 

Easy R,d sector (E-1 strongpoint at /'ft, E-3 at right), tak", On 31 

May 1944 with the photograph used for Map No.4, taken in February. 
GERMAN MORTAR POSITION, in tht Itrongpoint on tht bluff 

jUJt wut of f?ierville draw, looking inland. The gunner.! had oilpainted panoramic skttchu of ground jeaturn neaT the position, 

with Tangn and deflations for hitting mOTe important taTget areas. 

be limited to harassing raids by E-Boats on 

the flanks of the convoy lane, and underwater attack by U-Boats from bases in 

western France. 

Pre-Assault Bombardment Plans 

The assault landings on Omaha Beach 

were to be preceded by intensive air and 

naval bombardment in the half-hour before 

touchdown, designed to neutralize all known 

gun positions and to demoralize enemy 

troops in the beach defenses. For the period 

28 

just previous to D Day air attacks were 

planned against coastal batteries in the 

NEPTUNE area, but only as part of a widespread program which put its heaviest attacks on the French coast north of the Seine. 

The Pointe du Hoe position, one of the 

priority targets in this pre-D-Day bombing 

had been hit on 15 April, 22 May, and 4 

June. The RAF was to conclude the effort 

against coastal batteries with a concentrated attack between midnight and dawn 

of D Day; the coastal batteries from the 

mouth of the Seine to Cherbourg were the 
target of 1,333 heavy bombers dropping 

5,316 tons of bombs. 

From H- 30 to H-5 minutes heavy bombers 

of the Eighth Air Force would strike enemy 

beach defenses in the assault area between 

the Vire and the Orne. In the V Corps' 

zone 480 B-24' s were to attack 13 target 

areas with 1,285 tons of bombs. Of these 

targets, 11 were between Pointe de la Percee 

and the eastern end of the Omaha landing 

zone, including every strongpoint in the 

system of beach defenses. The loading consisted for the most part of l00-pound fragmentation and high-explosive bombs, with 

some 500-pound high-explosive bombs for 

certain strongpoints. All loads were fitted 

wi th instantaneous fuze in order to prevent 

cratering of the beach and consequent delay 

in movement of traffic across it. West of 

Omaha, the battery positions at Pointe du 

Hoe would receive a final attack by 18 

medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force, 

delivered between H-20 and H- 5 minutes. 

In the same period, mediums would deliver 

a blow of equal weight at Maisy, aad the 

gun positions there and at Gefosse-Fontenay 

were the targets of two squadrons of fighterbombers. 

Naval gunfire would commence at H- 40 

minutes and continue to H-3 minutes. The 

battleships Texas and Arkansas (mounting a 

total of ten 14-inch, twelve 12-inch, and 

twelve 5-inch guns) would fire from 18,000 

yards off shore, About 600 rounds of their 

hea viest shells would be aimed at the enemy 

coastal battery at Pointe du Hoe and at the 

enemy strongpoints defending Exit 0-3. 

Three cruisers, with 6-inch or 152-mm guns, 

had as targets for 950 rounds the enemy 

defenses near Port-en-Bessin and the strongpoints near 0-3 and E-l draws. Firing at 

1,800 yards from swept lanes on the flanks 

of the landing-craft approach area, eight 

destroyers (4- and 5-inch guns) were to put 

2,000 rounds on the beach strongpoints. 

29 

In addition to the ships, a large number of 

fire-support craft were to place area fire on 

the beach defenses, and point fire on Certain 

other targets. Five LCG (L)'s with two 

47-mm guns each, accompanying the leading 

assault wave, were scheduled to fire 630 

rounds on selected strongpoints beginning 

at H- 20 minutes. Sixteen LCT (A and 

HE)'s, carrying tanks to land in the first 

wave, were each fitted so that two M-4 's 

could fire over the ramp, beginning from a 

range of3,OOO yards at about H-15 minutes; 

each gun had an allowance of 150 rounds. 

Ten LCT (5)'s carried the 36 105-mm howitzers (self-propelled) of the 58th and 62d 

Armored Field Artillery Battalions, due to 

land in the third hour of the assault. 

These howitzers were mounted to fire from 

the LCT's, opening at a range of 8,000 

yards about H - 30 and closing at a range of 

3,700 yards by H-5 minutes. Their allowance was 100 rounds per gun. Finally, 9 

LCT (R)'s stationed in positions 3,000 yards 

off shore were to fire 1,000 HE rockets each 

when the leading assault wave was 300 yards 

from the beach. 

Analysis of the combined plans shows that 

the great weight of air and naval bombardment would fall on the immediate beach 

defenses in the Omaha area , including positions which could put flanking fire on the 

beach. All the main enemy strongpoints, 

and the Pointe du Hoe coastal battery, were 

targets for attack both from air and sea . 

Beginning at H Hour naval fires would 

shift to inland targets such as possible 

assembly areas, or wait for direction by 

naval shore fire control parties. There were 

24 of these, permitting an allotment of one 

to each battalion (including the Ranger 

Battalions) in the two assault divisions, excepting the regiment in corps reserve. Highperformance spotting aircraft would be available up to H+5 hours. For purposes of 

supporting the attack inland, Fire Support 
Group I, consisting of a battleship, cruiser, 

and four destroyers, would be on call for the 

29th Division units and Fire Support Group 

II, a battleship, two cruisers, and four destroyers, for the 1st Division. 

Plan of Assault La1Jdings 

Air and naval bombardment was designed 

to soften up the beach defenses; the main job 

of red ucing them and breaking through 

inland would have to be done by the assault 

landing teams. These had been built up to 

include every type of specialized technique 

and weapon needed in the fight at the beach. 

Every unit, down to the smallest, had been 

trained to carry out a particular task in a 

definite area (Maps Nos. II, IV, V, VI). 

For purposes of the landing operations, 

the whole Omaha area had been di vided into 

beach sectors and subsectors, with six subsectors falling in the main zone of landings. 

The 1st Division planned an attack by two 

regiments abreast. On the two easterly 

subsectors (Easy Red and Fox Green), 

totalling about 3,000 yards, the 16th RCT 

would assault with twO battalion landing 

teams abreast, one on each subsector; the 

support BL T would touchdown on Easy Red 

at H+ 70 minutes. On the four western 

subsectors (Dog Green, Dog White, Dog 

Red, and Easy Green), totalling about 3,000 

yards, the 116th RCT wonld likewise assault 

with twO BLTs abreast, the suppOrt battalion coming in on the three eastern subsectors. 

The Provisional Ranger Force of twO battalions (six companies each), attached to 

the 116th RCT, had special missions on the 

right flank. Three companies of the 2d 

Ranger Battalion were to scale the cliffs at 

Pointe du Hoe, three miles west of the main 

landings, and take the fortified battery positions. One company of the same unit would 

land just west of the 116th near Exit D-1 

30 

and assault the enemy positions at Pointe 

de la Percee. If the assault at Pointe du 

Hoe was successful by H+ 30 minutes, the 

5th Ranger Battalion and the remaining 

companies of the 2d Battalion would land 

there; if not, they would come in on Dog 

Green at H+ 70 and proceed overland for 

attack on Pointe du Hoe. 

Further break-down of the assault tactics 

can best be followed in terms of the landing 

schedule, which brought the BLTs and 

their specialized supporting attachments 

ashore in a pattern to conform to the expected needs and development of the battle. 

The schedule for the 116th RCT may be 

taken as representative. (See Landing Diagram, 116th RCT, and Maps Nos. V, VI.) 

H Hour would be fixed so as to bring in 

the first landing waves as soon after dawn 

as possible, and under conditions of tide 

low enough to expose fully the underwater 

beach obstacles. This timing was an essential feature of the assault plans. It meant 

that the first waves would have to cross 

several hundred yards of open ground on the 

tidal flat, but it would allow an engineer 

task force to clear lanes through the obstacles before the arrival of larger forces and 

supplies at high water. 

At H- 5 minutes Companies Band C (DD 

tanks) of the 743d Tank Battalion would 

make the first touchdown on Dog White 

and Dog Green. These tanks, fitted to 

navigate on water or land, were to be 

launched from 6,000 yards out, swim ashore, 

and take up firing positions at the water's 

edge to cover the first phase of the assault. 

Their fire was to be placed on the main 

enemy fortifications, particularly those west 

of Exit D-1 which could bring flanking fire 

on Dog Beach. Moving up through the 

obstacles as the tide rose, the tanks would 

suppOrt the main assault and then clear the 

beach through Exit D-3. At H Hour eight 

LCTs would land Company A of the 743d 
EASY GREEN 

H-5 

HHOUR 8 8 8 8 Co A 143 Tk 8n 

0 0 0 0 0 0 Co E 116 Inf 

g g g •• 6 EnO' CT 

o 0 0 0 0 I CoH , HOCoE COH 1 AAAW8tr, L-1I6Inl-----l MAy/Birr 

H+4Q g 112 En9' 8n 

H*SO o 0 0 000 0 Co L 116 Inf 

Q 149 Enll' eeoen 8n 

H·'OO 

~~~€ ~~~Hl ~~~!l!l nl FA 8n !) 811Y'1 In DUI\WS) 

H"120 G) G) G) r AT Co 116'nl 1 ~67 AAAW 8n 467 AAAW Bn 

LANDING DIAGRAM, OMAHA BEACH 

(SECTOR OF !16th RCT) 

DOG REO DOG WHITE 

\ 

DOG GREEN 

0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 

Co ... 143 Tk 8n 

Co F 116 Inl 

g g g 146 Enllf <:T o.l'I'IoI;lio'" Control 8001 

HQ HO HO Co 

00 0 0 0 00 0 2d 8n CoH Cof CoH 2d 8n I 

U6 1",-----' AAAW81ry 

000 0 Co 0 81 Cml WI'''' 8n 

000 @@ @@ Co I 116 Inl 

@00(.10000(.1 

HDCo3dBn Leo M 1l61n':::::.....J 

o 8 888 112 En9' 

'" 

112 Enll' Bn 

~~~ ~!l8~ AT PhU2.dBn ATPIO"dBn ' 

2.9SIg 8n 

G) 8 8 G) G) I 467 AAAW Bn ~9 Engr 

AT Co!l6 Inl B,o(h 8n 

Co C tOOl 143 n 8ft 

Co G 116 Inl 

g 146 EnO' CT 

(.1 0 0 0 0 T COtt HOCoG CqH r AMY/aIr)' L-1I6Inl---.J MAW airy 

@ @ @ @ @ @ Co K 116 Inf 

@ HQ • HQ Co 118 ,,,, 

Q All HO 8 140 Co 116 Inl 

~8 FA 8n A'n'ld 

Sih Eng. Sp 8rlg 

G) G) 461 AAAW 8n 

Q 

Co 8 (001 743 Tk 8n 

Co A U6 Inl 

g g g o 0 I'U~ EnO' CT 2d A~~Qc.r 8n 

000 0 0000 0 c~~grn~~8 MAWJI', 

.Q 

0000 

I., Bn 116 I 149 a ... chlh 

g 000000 , Co 0 116,", 121 Eng. 

g @@@@@@@ 121 Etlo. Co C 116 Inf 

'" 

o 0 0 0 Co 8 81 CIII' 'liP'" 8n 

8-8 8 0 0 0 0 0 Itlhora" GoA. a 2d Ron"". 8n 

o 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~Ih Rono" 8n 

g 8 G 00000000 121 En9' 8n ~rh Rang" 8n 

~!l!l ~~!l!l!l!l!l AT Piol Cn Co 116 !nf 

lsi 8n 

G) G) 461 AAAW 8n 

,..----DD Tonts ~ HO Co 116 1M 

----t---------------------~-----G)----G)-------~,I----~------~'Q~·~··~· ·~"--------+---------------------~ 

., 

H"215 

~!l~~!l!l~!l!l~!l!l!l!l!l!l!l!l 461 Amph Trk Co 

!l!l!l!l!l!l!l!l~~!l~ 461 Amph!bioll' T'"tk Co 

gLCN 

G)LCT 

31 

Gl LeA 

@LCYP 

o DO Tank 

~OUI(W 

~ PIon tIS of II Moy 
Battalion on Easy Green and Dog Red. 

This unit had a mission similar to that of 

the other tank companies. With Company 

A were landed eight tank dozers, towing 

trailers of explosive and scheduled for use 

by engineers in demolition work on obstacles. All three companies were attached 

to the battalion landing teams to insure 

closest coordination with the infantry assault. 

At H + 1 minute the first infantry assault 

wave would touch down: four companies, 

each loaded in six LCVP's and correspondingly organized in boat sections rather than 

platoons. Company A would land on Dog 

Green, spearheading the 1st BLT's attack 

on the important Exit D-l. Companies E, 

F, and G were on the three su bsectors to the 

east. This primary assault force was to 

cross the tidal flat through the obstacles 

and make its attack immediately on the 

German defenses. The boat sections were 

to operate as tactical units, each carrying 

out a carefully planned assault mission in 

a well-defined sector. The sections would 

assist each other in the work of reducing 

the beach defenses, but no attempt was to 

be made to organize for action as companies 

until an inland assembly point had been 

reached. The infantry attack, together with 

the fire of the tanks, would occupy the 

attention of the German strongpoints and 

cover the work on demolition of beach 

obstacles by the Special Engineer Task 

Force. 

That Force was ro come in at H+ 3 ro H +8 

minutes in 13 LCM·s. Army personnel (for 

this section of the beach) was composed of 

the 146th Engineer Combat Battalion, organized in eight assault and four support 

teams, and a control section.' Averaging 

41 men each, 11 of the teams included a 

Naval Combat Demolition Unit of an officer 

; In the 16th RCT's seClOr. the 299th Engineer Comb31 Battalion furnished 

the Army contingen l for this force. 

32 

and l2 men. They had a vital mISSIOn to 

perform: landing when the tide was below 

the obstacles, to clear and mark lanes 

through the beach obstacles so that craft 

could reach the upper sands at flood stage of 

the tide. In the 116th's half of the beach, 

they were to prepare eight 50-yard gaps 

through all obstacles (two gaps per subsecror). The eight tank dozers would be used 

to push, break, and tow off obstacles at the 

lower edge of the beach. Demolitions would 

be used on other obstacles, and mine crews 

would take care of the mines on obstacles 

and (if found) in the sand. 

A 3O-minute interval would be allowed 

for the work of the Engineer Special Task 

Force. Beginning at H + 30 minutes, the 

second and larger group of assault waves 

would come to shore in a sequence of 5 landings, spaced over 30 minutes. These would 

bring in the remaining units of the two assault BLT's and ( behind the 2d BLl) the 

supporting 3d BLT. Also included were 

battalion and regimental headquarters, two 

companies of the 81st Chemical Weapons 

Battalion, and elements of the ll2th and 

l21st Engineer Combat Battalions. This 

second contingent of engineers had the 

mission of assisting the assault infantry 

through minefields and obstacles on their 

route of advance, and of opening the beach 

exits for passage of vehicles by H+ 3 hours. 

They would then move inland wi th the 116th 

RCT, one of their first tasks being to open 

the transit vehicle areas. 

Advance elements of still a third engineer 

force were due in with the second series of 

landings. This force comprised the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, 

commanded by Brig. Gen. William M. Hoge 

and organized in two brigades of three battalions each. They would aid in clearing 

the beach area of mines and obstacles and in 

opening exits; then, when the engineers attached to 116th ReT went inland, the 
Brigade Group engineers would take over 

organization, operation, and maintenance ot 

the beach installations up to the beachhead 

maintenance line. 

Between H + 90 and H + 120 minutes the 

first artillery units would come in, led by the 

58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 

which had taken part in the preparatory 

bombardment by fire from LCT's. Dukws 

would bring in the Illth Field Artillery 

Battalion, the 467th AAA A W Battalion, 

and the antitank and cannon companies of 

the ll6th RCT. Some vehicles had been 

included in the second wave; however, the 

real influx of vehicles and supply would 

come from H+180 minutes on, in steadily 

mounting proportion. By H+240 minutes 

there would be cranes, tank-recovery vehicles, half tracks, and trucks of all types on 

shore. From that time on, rhino-ferries and 

dukws were to playa large part in transport 

of vehicles and supply. 

On Easy Red and Fox Green , the 16th 

RCT (with attachments) was to land by a 

very similar plan. The differences in respect 

to infantry landings can be seen on Maps 

Nos. V and VI. Of the three companies of 

the 741st Tank Battalion, B and C (DD's) 

were to land on Easy Red and Fox Green 

respectively, with Company A astride the 

boundary of these sectors. The employment of engineer units was similar for both 

parts of Omaha Beach,' and artillery and 

supply elements would come in at about the 

same rhythm. 

The larger suppOrt elements of the assault 

force were to Start landings on Omaha at 

H + 195 minutes, when the 18th RCT would 

reach Easy Red. The infantry elements of 

the ll5th RCT were to touch down behind 

the ll6th on orders of the commanding 

general, V Corps, and to operate initially 

under 1st Di vision COntrol. 

' Tht demc1ition (earnS had the: minion of ~arin8 lix gap. on ElIIY Red and 

I wo on f"ox Green. 

33 

Plan for Movement to [uland Objectives 

As the landing schedule clearly shows, the 

two assault regimental combat teams were 

expected to break through the beach defenses within the first twO hours after 

touchdown. The enemy strongpoints protecting the exit draws were to be neutralized 

early enough to permit their opening for 

traffic off the beach by H + 3 hours. After 

reducing beach defenses in their allotted 

zones, the companies in the assault battalion 

landing teams were to make their way to 

battalion assembly areas, ordinarily about 

a thousand yards inland. From there on, the 

battalions would operate toward assigned 

missions inland (Map No. IV). 

In the 16th RCT zone, the 2d BLT had the 

mission of seizing Colleville, then fanning 

out beyond and holding the high ground 

just south of that village so as to cover later 

landings against possible enemy counterattack from Trevieres or Bayeux. The 3d 

BL T, once on the plateau, was to turn east 

and reduce the enemy defenses along the 

bluff as far as Ste-Honorine-des-Pertes; then, 

to cover the eastern flank of the division, 

along the army boundary , by occupying the 

high ground as far as Mount Cauvin . The 

1st BLT, in suppOrt during the beach assault, 

would move through the 2d Battalion , 

capture Formigny on the main highway, 

occupy the high ground overlooking Trevieres and the Aure Valley near that village, 

and secure the river bridges near Trevieres. 

Positions for all-around defense against possible enemy counterattack were ro be secured 

and organized by all battalions. 

Of the other 1st Division units, the 18th 

RCT, assembling under cover of the advance 

made by the 16th RCT, would move across 

the Aure southeast of Colleville and occupy 

the high ground east of Trevieres, patrolling 

ro the D-Day phase line. The 26th RCT, 

loaded in Force "B" and landing when 
ordered by corps, would revert on landing 

to the 1st Division . Its mission was to 

seize and organize for defense the area south 

and southeast of Tour-en-Bessin, in contact 

toward Bayeux with 50 (British) Division. 

On the western flank of the beachhead, 

29th Division units had the mission of 

occupying the important area between the 

flooded Aure Valley and the sea. After 

capturing Vierviile the 1st BLT would move 

west along the coastal highway, and together with the Rangers clear out enemy 

defenses from the beachhead to the Vire 

Estuary. It would be teady to seize Isigny 

and the important bridge there and ro rna ke 

COntaCt with VII Corps to the west. The 2d 

BLT had St-Laurent as its first objective and 

then the higher ground southwest of that 

point. The 3d BLT landing in support was 

to move through Longueville, occupy the 

high ground 2,500 yards to the west, and 

prepare for ad vance toward Isigny. The 

115th Infantry, landing in attachment to the 

1st Division, would assist if necessary in 

mopping up the beach defenses in the zone 

of either of the assault regimental combat 

34 

teams. It would be prepared to move 

through Longueville to the la Cambe area, 

Outpost the high ground south of the Aure, 

and patrol considerably to the south of the 

Outposts. The 175th Infantry, in Force ·'B" 

and designated as corps reserve, was scheduled to land on D+ l. 

Artillery suppOrt would be given by five 

battalions of 105-mm howitzers landing in 

attachment to the regiments of the 1st Division, two each to the assault RCT's. These 

battalions were to move inland with the 

advance. Additional fire suppOrt would be 

rendered by the heavier guns of the Navy, 

directed by the fire control parties with the 

infantry battalions. 

If successful, this plan put V Corps in 

position to advance on D+ l south beyond 

the Aure toward the key high ground in rhe 

Cerisy Forest area, and west through Isigny 

toward a junction with VII Corps. Corps 

plans did not contemplate movement in 

force beyond the Vire, as it was hoped that 

the southward advance would compel an 

early enemy retreat from the area between the 

Vire and Carentan. 
D DAY: THE LANDINGS 

THE SELECTION OF D DAY was governed by several factors, complicated by the 

need of satisfying Allied requirements in 

five different landing areas, each with its 

own problems. It was desirable that D Day 

fall during a period when the days were 

long, for maximum use of Allied air power; 

when the moon was near the full, for better 

maneuver of ships and for easier night landings of airborne troops; and when tides were 

strong, so that beach obstacles would be 

fully exposed at low water and the landing 

craft could be f10a ted far up the beach 

for convenient unloading at high water. 

Further, D Day must be selected with reference to certain requirements for H Hour, 

the moment when the first assault units 

touched down on the beaches. These were: 

that there be an hour of daylight before 

H Hour so that the preliminary bombardment would be as accurate as possible, and 

landing craft could be more easily organized 

into formation for the assault; that the tide 

should be near half-flood, so that obstacles 

would still be exposed, but rock ledges near 

the shore in the British zone would not be 

dangerous; and that the tide be rising at 

H Hour, insuring two high tides during 

daylight to facilitate maximum unloading 

of supplies. Certain groups of days carne 

nearest to satisfying all these requirements: 

21-22-23 May, 5-6-7 June, and 19-20-21 June 

were closest to the target date of 1 June. 

On 8 May, D Day was fixed at 5 June. 

V Corps units had been alerted on 23 

March to be ready for movement to marshal35 

ling areas on short notice. Actually, movement began 7 May and was completed by 11 

May for elements of the assault and followup forces ("0" and "B"). The pre-embarkment handling of 65,000 men and 7,600 

vehicles was accomplished by the XVIII 

and XIX Districts of the Southern Base Section, Services of Supply. Once in the marshalling areas, troops were "sealed" in their 

camps, given final items of equipment, and 

thoroughly briefed on all phases of their 

assignments. During the last few days of 

May, they were moved from the marshalling 

points to the ports and "hards"· for embarkation, their places being immediately 

taken by units designated to follow across 

the Channel in build-up schedules. By 3 

June all troops of Force "0" had been 

loaded, and some of them had been aboard 

several days. Portland , Weymouth, and 

Poole were the embarkation areas. On the 

night of 27 May, a small enemy air attack 

on the Weymouth area caused some losses 

of a few smaller craft by mines. Aside from 

this raid, the loadings suffered no interference from enemy action, and German air 

reconnaissance up to D Day was on a routine 

scale. 

The story of the Navy's share in operation 

NEPTUNE must be told elsewhere. Western Task Force, commanded by Rear Adm . 

Alan G. Kirk, was responsible for the embarkation and landing of First U. S. Army 

'Beach areu given a hard surface by wire mau. concrete blocb, or other 

treatment 110 aI to permit direct loading of vchicles from land to ,hip', 
forces. Rear Adm. J. L. Hall, Jr., commanded Force "0," which would carry the 

assault against Omaha Beach. The magnitude and complexity of the movement 

may be suggested by figures. To lift and 

land this initial assault force of 34,CXlO men 

and 3,300 vehicles required 7 transports, 8 

LSI's, 24 LST's, 33 LCI (L}s, 36 LCM (3)'s, 

147 LCT's, and 33 other craft, while the 

escort, gunfire support, and bombardment 

missions employed 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 

12 destroyers, and 105 other ships. Force 

"0" also included 33 mine-sweepers and 585 

vessels used in service work. 

The 16th RCT, including 3,502 men and 

295 vehicles attached only for movement to 

the beach , numbered 9,828 personnel, 919 

vehicles, and 48 tanks. To handle this one 

unit required 2 transports, 6 LST's, 53 

LCT's (of various types), and 5 LCI (L)'s; 

small craft, to be launched from the larger 

ships in the transport area, included 81 

LCVP's, 18 LCA's (British), 13 other landing craft, and about 64 dukws. 

The assault of this armada was dependent 

on the weather, which could so easily influence both naval and air operations. At 

the last minute, with all assault forces 

loaded and waiting for the signal to start, 

Operation NEPTUNE was threatened with 

checkmate. On 3 June, his meteorological 

staff gave General Eisenhower an unfa vorable forecast for D Day, predicting overcast 

skies and strong winds. At 0415 on 4 June 

he decided to postpone D Day 24 hours. 

One of the divisions of the assault convoy 

had already started out to sea, according to 

schedule, and had to be recalled . 

LOADING LST'S FOR THE INVASION. Southern POTts of 

England were cTowdfd with ships and craft in the wuks pTatding D 

Day; the vehicles shown art "Weasels" (cargo carrier M-29) towing 

loaded trailers. Enemy air was unable to inttrJu( with this activity. 

36 
-

THE LANE OF SH I PS from sOllthem Ell gland to the assail It area 

was protected by a screen of naval unsels aud c01l1illuOUS air cover. 

fIere, a number oj LeI's (manned by personnel of the U. S. Coast 

Guard) each with its ba'rrage balloon are under way toward France . 

Weather forecasts on 4 June held out hopes 

for a slight bur temporary improvement. 

Beginning on 5 June and lasting about 24 

hours, there would be an interval of better 

sky conditions, with broken clouds at a 

ceiling not lower than 3,000 feet. Seas 

were expected to moderate. Following this 

break, the prospects were for renewed cloud 

and stronger winds. Postponement to 7 

June would therefore risk a deterioration of 

weather conditions, as well as fueling difficulties for some of the ships in convoys 

already at sea; further postponement would 

mean a delay until 19 June before tide and 

moon conditions were again suitable. General Eisenhower decided at 0415 on 5 June to 

accept the risks involved in making the 

assault under the conditions of sea and sky 

37 

expected for the next day. H Hour for 

Omaha Beach was set at 063010 Low tide 

would occur at 0525 and the first high water 

llOO. Sunrise was at 0558 and sunset 2207. 

The main convoy of Force "0" cleared 

Portland Harbor on the afternoon of 5 June; 

movement across 100 miles of channel to 

the assault area was uneventful. The operation met no interference from act ion by 

enemy naval or air forces. Continuous air 

cover was provided for the shipping lane 

and for the Allied assault beaches. Spitfires protected the convoys at low altitudes; 

patrols of four squadrons of P-47's from the 

Ninth and Eighth Air Forces were over the 

shipping lane and its flanks at all times. 

10 Th., Allied assault forces u~J four different 1-lllou r', to meet the dii'fer;nfl; 

condition. vf tide ~n d b.;,tI,'111 on the m;l;n unuh buchu. The hour wu 0630 

at Omaha ~nJ l 'hh, while the Britilh bnding. urn., hetween 0700 .. nd 0730. 

-
The assa ult beach zones were to receive continuous cover by fighters, the Ninth Air 

Force detailing five groups for high cover, 

with the task of maintaining three squadrons over the Allied beaches at all times 

during daylight. Low cover was a British 

commitment. One of the most important 

contributions to the whole operation was 

performed by the sweepers of Western Task 

Force, which made possible the passage of 

the convoys to the assault beaches without 

loss from mines. The Ancon, headquarters 

shi p for Admiral Hall and General Gerow, 

anchored at 0251 on D Day in the transport 

area, 23,000 yards off Omaha Beach. 

In spite of some improvement over th'e 

previous period, weather conditions were 

far from ideal for the assault operations. 

Visibility was 10 miles, but there was a 

partial overcast to hamper bombing. The 

wind was still strong, coming from the 

northwest and therefore producing its full 

effects on the coastal waters off the Omaha 

sector. A wind force of 10 to 18 knots 

caused waves averaging 3 to 4 feet high in 

the transport area, with occasional waves 

up to 6 feet. On the beach, breakers were 

3 to 4 feet. This condition of the sea persisted well into D+ 1 before the wind moderated. The effect on the landing plans 

was to be felt throughout D Day. 

Approach to the Beach 

The movement from transport area to 

shore proceeded according to a complex 

schedule, involving hundreds of craft and 

requiring the nicest timing to get the assault 

elements to the shore in their appointed 

order. One of the first steps was the loading 

of tile assault infantry units from their 

transports into the small LCVP's and LCA's, 

which were launched from the larger mother 

ships. The process began three to four 

hours before H Hour and was rendered 

38 

difficult by the choppy seas, which caused 

some minor delays. Carrying the early 

wa ves of 116th assaul t troops, the transport 

Thomas Jefferson was able to unload alJ its 

craft in 66 minutes, aided by the fact that 

25 of the 33 craft could be "rail-loaded" 

and then swung overside. The Thomas 

Jefferson's craft left the rendezvous area at 

0430, 25 minutes ahead of schedule, since 

control officers feared the condi tions of sea 

would delay the approach run. 

More serious effects of the rough seas were 

fel t as the smaller craft moved in through 

the rendezvous area to the line of departure, 

The LCVP's and LCA's were drenched with 

spra y from the start, and most of them began to ship enough water to demand full 

use of the pumps, In a good many craft 

the pumps would not carry the load, and the 

assault troops had to bail with their helmets. 

Craft having pump troubles were likely to 

be slowed down, and any attempt to raise 

the speed and catch up resulted in shipping 

more water than before. Only a small 

minority of the craft were in serious difficulties. Out of 180 to 200 craft used for the 

two assault RCT's, 10 carrying infantry 

are definitely known to have swamped, 

some almost at the start and others near the 

beach, Nearly all personnel from the 

swamped craft were rescued by naval craft 

or passIng ships, often after hours in the 

water. 

In most of the craft the soldiers were 

drenched from the outset by the cold spray, 

and seasickness overcame a great majority, 

Boat teams in the same formations, carrying 

men who had eaten the same breakfast and 

had the same training, were very unevenly 

affected, the "casualty" rates ranging all the 

way from zero to 100 percent. Men who 

had been chilled by their wetting, cramped 

by immobility in the small and fully loaded 

craft, and weakened by seasickness were not 

in the best condition for strenuous action on 
LANDING CRAFT we" launched from transports 10 miles from 

tht beaches. ThtS( craft, bucking rough uas, art passing by tht 

cruiser Augusta, flagship of Western Task Force. The LCYP's in 

foreground would carry something mort than a company of infantry . 

landing. Similar handicaps, however, had 

been met and overcome at training exercises, 

and many men, even among the seasick , 

were keyed up by the occasion . One officer 

remembered his trOOps chatting about' 'What 

a shambles the beach would be from the 

bombs and ships' guns," although his own 

impression was: "It looked like another big 

tactical scheme off Slapton Sands, and I 

couldn't get the feeling out of my head that 

it was going to be another miserable two-day 

job with a hot shower at the end." 

As the landing craft carrying the 16th 

RCT units came within a few miles of shore 

they passed men struggling in life preservers 

and on rafts. These were personnel from 

foundered DO tanks, the first casualties of 

the rough seas. According to plan, Companies Band C of the 741st Tank Battalion 

were launched at H- 50 minutes, 6,000 

yards off shore, to lead in the first assault 

wa ve on the eastern beach sectors. In very 

short order the ~O's began to suffer crippling 

39 

damage in broken struts, torn canvas, and 

engine trouble from water flooding the 

englOe compartment. Of the 32 tanks, 2 

swam in and 3 others were beached from an 

LCT which could not launch its DO's 

because of a damaged ramp. In the 116th 

RCT zone, the officers in charge of the tankloaded LCT's had decided not to risk the 

conditions of sea, and the 32 ~O's of the 

743d Tank Battalion were carried in to the 

beach. 

In terms of ultimate effects, all these difficulties were minor by comparison with 

those of navigation. The plan called for 

landing each assault unit in a relatively 

small, defined area where it had a specific 

task to perform in reducing enemy defenses, 

opening gaps in obstacles, or clearing a section of the flat. Quick success on the beach 

was dependent on carrying out a large number of such small tasks, which were often 

correlated to lead to some major result such 

as the opening of an exit. 
MIST AND Sl\lOKE OBSCURED LANDl\IARKS even as latc as 

0730, when tht support BL T's wert landing . This Coast Guard photograph shows LC f/ P's,jrom the transport Samuel Chase, landing troops 

of the 1st BLT, 16th I nfantry on their aSJigned beach sector, Easy Red. 

Despite all the intensive study put on conditions cf current and wind for this part of 

the coast, all the visual aids for spotting 

beach marks by panoramic photographs, and 

all the experience wi th similar difficulties in 

training exercises, a great many landing 

craft of the first waves came in away from 

their target sectors. Smoke and dust along 

th e beach from naval fire and a slight early 

morning mist made it hard to recognize landmarks as the shore was neared. One of the 

control vessels for Dog Beach drifted off its 

station, which may explain some of the later 

troubles of approach in that sector. The 

fact that practically all the mislanded craft 

were east of their targets points to the tidal 

current as a contributing factor. It was 

known that with a rising tide (low tide on 6 

June was at 0525), a strong current ran laterally eastward along Omaha Beach, reaching 

40 

maximum velocity of nea rly 2.7 knots at 5 

miles off shore; strong winds might increase 

its average velocity. That the current was 

very strong on 0 Day is indicated by the 

report of the destroyer Satterlee, which 

found it necessary to steer 20 to 30 degrees 

. 'up current" in order to maintain position 

in the firing lane. 

Whatever the cause, a majority of landing 

craft during the first hour came in east of 

their appointed beach sector, and this majority included craft bearing engineers as well 

as infantry (Maps Nos. V, VI). Sometimes 

the margin of error was as much as a thousand yards or more; one company (E) of the 

116th, destined for Easy Green , came in, 

boat sections scattered, on the 16th beaches 

as far east as Fox Green . More often, the 

error was in the order of a few hundred 

yards, but this could be enough to undo the 
assignments for taking Out a key strongpoint or opening an exit. It mi ght also be 

enough to completely "Iose" units which 

landed below an unfam iliar stretch of bl uff, 

were consequently unable to identify the 

terrain , and so could not make a proper 

estimate of the enemy defenses with which 

they must deal. The resulting difficulti es 

of the boa t teams were heigh tened by the 

frequent separation of secti ons of the same 

company. Wh ether because of delays suffered by individual craft, straggling on the 

way in , or disagreement between coxswains 

in recognition of landmarks, some unit formations of landing craft were broken up 

enough to result in widely scattered landings. 

Under conditions prevailing at the beach, 

separation of craft by as little as 200 yards 

could easily bring about the complete isolation of a section . This would deny elements 

of a mislanded company the advantages of 

combining in order to improvise their assault 

if they came to shore in strange territory. 

Sections which suffered heavy casualties in 

leaders migh t be particularly affected by 

separa [[on. 

The landing craft came in under the comforting thunder of the t"remendous fire support from na val guns, as well as the tan k 

and artillery pieces firing from LCT's.u Up 

to within a few hundred yards of the water's 

edge, there was every reason to hope that 

the enemy shore defenses might have been 

neutralized . Then, many of the leading 

craft began to come under fire from automatic weapons and artillery, which increased 

in volume as they approached touchdown. 

It was evident at H Hour that the enemy 

fortifica tions had not been knocked out. 

Just how much had been accomplished by 

the preliminary bombardment can only be 

li The onl> ruction from enem )' cO~lIal batteries c:'irnt tarlier. and from nlt-

.. ard; at 05~7 gun. near ron -,m-Busin put 10 rounds do.", to the destroyer 

l:mmonJ ~nd brackCH:d the Ari""Hu. .o\n5wcring fir~ including 20 rounda of 

12·inch and 110 rou nds of 5-inch shells, promptly silenced the enemy gunl , but 

mc><" countcrbattu), work had to he done on this area latcr in the morning. 

determined later from enemy sources. Many 

gun positions and strongpoints certainly survived the early fire. The well-concealed 

emplacements were hard enough to locate 

later in the day, with better visibility and 

chances for observa tion . The tanks and 

artillery operating from LCT's in rough 

water were handicapped by conditions making accurate fire difficult. The rockets, 

according to most reports from the assault 

troops, made a heartening display but tailed 

to hit defensive positions-an opinion which 

cannot be accepted as final and which runs 

counter to naval reports. The total bombardment had certainly had effect, and it 

may have been more considerable than the 

infantry could realize . Enemy guns had 

been sited to cover every part of the beach ; 

nevertheless, there were sectors where units 

landed without meeting any artillery fire 

whatever. Furthermore, of the nearly 200 

craft carrying the assault infantry to shore 

in the first 2 hours, only about 10 are known 

to have been hit by artillery before debarking their troops, none was sunk by this 

fire, and in only a few cases were the casualties serious. Larger craft, particularly LCI's, 

may have been a favored target for both 

shore and inland guns, and may have suffered 

relatively more . 

The assault troops experi enced their worst 

disappointment of the day when they found 

the beach unscarred by air bombardment ; 

they were correct in concluding that the air 

bombardment had had little effect on the 

beach defenses. Overcast conditions forced 

the use of Pathfinder instruments by the 

Eighth Air Force Liberators. With that 

technique, the range of possible error in the 

drop would be so increased as to endanger 

the approaching waves of landing craft. A 

bombing plan had already been made to 

cover this eventual i ty , by delaying the time 

of bomb release enough to push the center 

of the estimated drop patterns well inland, 

41 
thus ensuring the safety of the craft. Varying inversely with the distance in time from 

H Hour, the delay ranged to as much as 30 

seconds. The decision to use this alternate 

plan had to be made on the night preceding 

D Day and was apptoved by Supreme Headquarters. It meant that the impact of the 

bomb weight fell from a few hundred yards 

to three miles inland, and the main effect, 

difficult to evaluate without enemy records, 

was probably to disrupt enemy communications and rear assembly areas. Of 446 Liberators dispatched, 329 attacked, dropping 

over 13,000 bombs. Their attack had taken 

place between 0555 and 0614. 

The ll1itial Assault IV ave 

Ninety-six tanks, the Special Engineer 

Task Force, and eight companies of assault 

infantry (1,450 men), landing just before and 

after 0630, were to carry out the first assault 

missions (Map No. V). 

On the right, the 743d Tank Battalion 

brought in all its tanks on LCT's. Company B, coming in directly in face of the 

Vierville draw, suffered from enemy artillery 

fire. The LCT carrying the company commander was sunk just off shore, and four 

other officers were killed or wounded, leaving one lieutenant in Company B. Eight of 

that company's 16 tanks landed and started 

to fire from the water's edge on enemy positions. The tanks of Companies C and A 

touched down to the east at well-spaced 

intervals and without initial losses. In the 

16th RCT zone, only 5 of the 32 DD tanks 

(741st Tank Battalion) made shore; of Company A's 16 standard tanks, 2 were lost far 

off shore by an explosion of undetermined 

cause, and 3 were hit and put out of action 

very shortly after beaching. The surviving 

third of the battalion landed between E-l 

and E-3 draws and went into action at once 

against enemy emplacements. 

42 

The Army-Navy Special Engineer Task 

Force had one of the most important and 

difficult missions of the landing. Their 

chances of clearing gaps through the obstacles in the half-hour allotted were lessened 

by accidents on the approach to the beach. 

Delays in loading from LCT's to LCM's and 

in finding their way to the beaches resulted 

in half of the 16 assault teams reaching shore 

10 minutes or more late. Only five teams 

hit their appointed sector, most of them 

being carried eastward with the result that 

Dog Beach (the 116th RCT zone) received 

much less than the effort scheduled. As a 

further effect of mislandings, at least three 

teams came in where no infantry or tanks 

were presen t ro gi ve protecti ve fire . 

Men burdened with equipment and explosives were excellent targets for enemy 

fire as they unloaded in water often several 

feet deep. Of 16 dozers only 6 got to the 

beach in working condition, and 3 of these 

were immediately disabled by artillery hits. 

Much equipment, including nearly all buoys 

and poles for marking lanes, was lost or 

destroyed before it could be used. Eight 

navy personnel of Team 11 were dragging the 

preloaded rubber boat off their LCM when 

an artillery shell burst just above the load of 

explosives and set off the primacord. One 

of the eight survived. Another shell hit 

the LCM of Team 14, detonating explosives 

on the deck and killing all navy personnel. 

Team 15 was pulling in its rubber boat 

through the surf when a mortar scored a 

direct hit and touched off the explosives, 

killing three men and wounding four. Support Team F came in about 0700. A first 

shell hit the ramp, throwing three men into 

the water. As the vessel drifted off out of 

control, another hit squarely on the bow, 

killing 15 of the team. Only five army 

personnel from this craft reached shore. 

Despite such disasters and under continued 

incense fire, the engineers gOt to work on 
obstacles wherever they landed and with 

whatever equipment and explosives they 

could salvage. Some of the teams arriving 

a few minutes late found the rapidly advancing tide already into the lower obstacles. 

Infantry units landing behind schedule or 

dela yed in starting up the beach carne 

through the demolition parties as they 

worked, and thereby impeded their progress. 

One of the three dozers left in operation was 

prevented from maneuvering freely by riflemen who tried to find shelter behind it from 

the intense fire. As a final handicap, there 

were instances where teams had fixed their 

charges, were ready to blow their lane, and 

were prevented by the fact that infantry 

were passing through or were taking cover 

in the obstacles. When Team 7 was set to 

fire, an LCVP carne crashing into the obstacles, smashed through the timbers, and 

set off seven mines; the charge could not be 

blown. In another case, vehicles passed 

through the prepared area and caused misfire by cutting the primacord fuze linking 

the charges. A naval officer, about to pull 

the twin-junction igniters to explode his 

charge, was hit by a piece of shrapnel that 

cu t off his finger and the two fuzes. The 

charge laid by Team 12 went off but at heavy 

cost. Their preparations completed for a 

30-yard gap, the team was just leaving the 

area to take cover when a mortar shell struck 

the primacord . The premature explosion 

killed and wounded 19 engineers and some 

infantry nearby. 

In net result, the demolition task force 

blew six complete gaps through all bands of 

obstacles, and three partial gaps. Of the 

six, only two were in the 116th's half of the 

beach, and four were on Easy Red (Map 

No. V), a fact which may have influenced 

later landing chances. Owing to the loss of 

equipment, only one of the gaps could be 

marked, and this diminished their value under high-water conditions. Their first effort 

43 

made, the demolition teams joined the other 

assault forces on the shingle or sea wall and 

waited for the next low tide to resume their 

work. Casualties for the Special Engineer 

Task Force, including navy personnel, ran 

to 41 percent for D Day, most of them suffered in the first halI-hour. 

The infantry companies in the first wave 

carne in by boat sections, six to a company, 

with a headquarters section due in the next 

wave (0700). Each LCVP carried an average of 31 men and an officer. The 116th 

assault craft were loaded so that the first to 

land would be a section leader and 5 riflemen armed with M-l's and carrying 96 rounds 

of ammunition. Following was a wirecutting team of 4 men, armed with rifles; 2 

carried large "search-nose" cutters, and 2 a 

smaller type. Behind these in tbe craft, 

loaded so as to land in proper order were : 

2 BAR teams of 2 men each, carrying 900 

rounds per gun; 2 bazooka teams, totalling 

4 men , the assistants armed with carbines; a 

mortar team of 4 men, with a 60-mm mortar 

and IS to 20 rounds; a flamethrower crew of 

2 men; and, finally,S demolition men with 

pole and pack charges of TNT. A medic 

and the assistant section leader sat at the 

stern. Everybody wore assault jackets, with 

large pockets and built-in packs on the back; 

each man carried, in addition to personal 

weapons and special equipment, a gas mask, 

5 grenades (the riflemen and wirecutters 

also had 4 smoke grenades), a half-pound 

block of TNT with primacord fuze, and 6 

one-third ra tions (3 K' sand 3 D's). All 

clothing was impregnated against gas. The 

men wore life preservers (2 per man in 16th 

Infantry units), and equipment and weapons 

of the 16th were fastened to life preservers so 

that they could be floated in. 

As expected, few of the LCVP's and LCA's 

carrying assault infantry were able to make 

dry landings. Most of them grounded on 

sandbars SO to 100 yards out, and in some 
cases the water was neck deep. Under fire 

as they came within a quarter-mile of the 

shore, the infantry met their worst experiences of the day and suffered their heaviest 

casualties just after touchdown. Smallarms fire, mortars, and artillery concentrated 

on the landing area, but the worst hazard 

was produced by converging fires from automatic weapons. Survivors from some craft 

report hearing the fire bea t on the ramps 

before they were lowered, and then seeing 

the hail of bullets whip the surf just in front 

of the lowered ramps. Some men dove under 

wa ter or went over the sides to escape the 

beaten zone of the machine guns. Stiff, 

wea kened from seasickness, and often hea vily loaded, the debarking troops had little 

chance of moving fast in water that was 

knee deep or higher, and their progress was 

made more difficult by uneven footing in 

the runnels crossing the tidal flat. Many 

men were exhausted before they reached 

shore, where they faced 200 yards or more 

of open sand to cross before reaching cover 

at the sea wall or shingle bank. Most men 

who reached that cover made it by walking, 

and under increasing enemy fire . Troops 

who stopped to organize, rest, or take shelter 

behind obstacles or tanks merely prolonged 

their difficulties and suffered heavier losses. 

ASSAULT LANDING. This LCPP has groulIded some distan" 

out, and the men are wading toward the long stretch oj open sands. 

A tank (No.9, Jrom Company A, 741st Tallk Battalion) is on the 

edge oj the tidal jlat just ahead, on beach sector Easy Red. These 

troops are believed to be me11lbuJ of the J st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

landing about 0730, when the tide was through the lower obItac/n. 

-

44 
SMOKE FROM GRASS FIRES obJcurd tht bluffJ on Itotral 

uclars, notably Dog Red, shown hut. Tht smoke is still visible 

when thiJ picturt waJ taktn, about J 600. LeT 207, carrying tht 

ItIJ-proptlltd gunJ oj 58th Armored Fitld Artillery Battalion, waJ 

finally ablt to makt Jhore aJter an atttmpt at 0800 had Jailed. 

Obstaries on this part of Omaha wert still intact that afttrnoon. 

There were fortunate exceptions to this 

general picture. Several hundred yards of 

bluff west of les Moulins draw were obscured 

in heavy smoke from grass fires, apparently 

started by naval shells or rockets. Blanketed by this smoke, enemy guns and emplacements were unable to deliver effective fire 

on that end of Dog Beach, and units landing 

there were comparatively unscathed. At 

other places, what would seem to be an 

occasional .. blind spot" in the enemy fire 

pattern let a craft get men ashore with few 

losses. In the main, the first wave was hard 

hit. 

Perhaps the worst area on the beach was 

Dog Green, directly in front of strongpoints 

guarding the VierviIJe draw and under 

heavy flanking fire from emplacements to the 

west, near Pointe de la Perc<!e. Company A 

of the 116th was due to land on this sectOr 

with Company C of the 2d Rangers on Its 

45 

right flank, and both units came in on their 

targets. One of the six LCA·s carrying 

Company A foundered about a thousand 

yards off shore, and passing Rangers saw men 

jumping overboard and being dragged down 

by their loads. At H+6 minutes the remaining craft grounded in water 4 to 6 feet 

deep, about 30 yards short of the outward 

band of obstacles. Starting off the craft in 

three files, center file first and the /lank files 

peeling right and left, the men were enveloped in accurate and intense fire from 

automatic weapons. Order was quickly 

lost as the troops attempted to dive under 

water or dropped over the sides intO surf over 

their heads. Mortar fire scored four direct 

hi ts on one LCA, which "disintegrated." 

Casualties were suffered all the way to the 

sand, but when the survivors gOt there, some 

found they could not hold and came back 

into the water for cover, while others rook 
-

.. • 

MEN FROM \\"RECKED LAND ING CRAFT art bti"g rescued 

b)' hJe lintI carried out to them from tilt beach. Medical corps pnsonne/ pnfor11led many acts of heroiJ1n, working under fire to bring 

up the wounded 11Inl left on the tidal flat mId threatnud by riling tide. 

46 
refuge behind the nearest obstacles. Remnants of one boat team on the right flank 

organized a small firing line on the first 

yards of sand, in full exposure to the enemy. 

In short order every officer of the company, 

including Capt. Taylor N. Fellers, was a 

casualty, and most of the sergeants were 

killed or wounded . The leaderless men gave 

up any attempt to move forward and confined their efforts to saving the wounded, 

many of whom drowned in the rising tide. 

Some troops were later able to make the sea 

wall by staying in the edge of the water and 

going up the beach with the tide. Fifteen 

minutes after landing, Company A was out 

of action for the day. Estimates of its 

casualties range as high as two-thirds. 

The smaller Ranger company (64 men), 

carried in twO LCA's, came in at H + 15 

minutes to the right of Vier ville draw. 

Shells from an antitank gun bracketed Capt. 

Ralph E. Goranson's craft, killing a dozen 

men and shaking up others. An enemy 

machine gun ranged in on the ramps of the 

second LCA and hit 15 Rangers as they debarked. Without waiting ro organize, survivors of the boat sections set Out immedia tel y across 250 yards of sand toward the 

base of the cliff. Too tired to run, the men 

tOok three or four minutes to get there, and 

more casual ties resulted from machine guns 

and mortars. Wounded men crawled behind them, and a few made it. When the 

Rangers got to shelter at the base of the 

cliff, they had lost 35 men. 

An unscheduled gap of more than a thousand yards separated Company A from the 

next unit of the 116th RCT. Instead of 

coming in on Dog White, Company G 

landed in scareered groups eastward from 

the edges of Dog Red. The three or four 

boat sections nearest Dog Red, where smoke 

from grass fires shrouded the bluff, had an 

easy passage across the tidal flat. Most of 

47 

the men were halfway up the flat before 

they became aware of sporadic and inaccurate fire, and only a few losses were suffered. 

In 10 to 15 minutes after touchdown this 

part of the company was behind the shingle 

bank, in good condition. Officers, knowing 

they were left of their landing area, were 

uncertain as to their course of action, and 

this hesitation prevented any chance of immediate assault action. Further east on 

Easy Green, the other sections of Company 

G met much heavier fire as they landed, one 

boat team losing 14 men before it reached 

the embankment. 

Company F came into the beach almost 

on its scheduled target, touching down in 

front of the strongly fortified les Moulins 

draw (D-3). The 3 sections to the east, 

unprotected by the smoke, came under concentrated fire and took 45 minutes to get 

across the exposed stretch of sand. By this 

time half their number were casualties; the 

remnants reached cover in no state for assault 

action. The other sections had better forrune, but had lost their officers when they 

reached the shingle bank and were more or 

less disorganized. 

This completes the story of the first 

assault wave on half of Omaha Beach, for 

the fourth company (E) of the 116th, supposed to land on Easy Green, veered a mile 

eastward from that sector. The three companies in the 116th' s zone were in poor condition for carrying out their assault missions. 

By 0700 Company A had been cut to pieces 

at the water's edge, Company F was disorganized by heavy losses, and of the scattered sections of Company G, those in best 

shape were preparing to move west along 

the beach to find their assigned sector. 

To the east, in the 16th RCT's area, the 

picture differed only in detail. Easy Red 

Beach, over a mile long and fronting E-1 

draw, was assigned to the 2d BLT, with 

Companies E and F landing in the first wave. 
The bulk of both companIes landed far to 

the east. The only infantry to come in on 

Easy Red in the first wave were twO lost 

boat sections of Company E, 116th RCT, 

and one section each of Companies E and F, 

16th RCT. All of them were between E-1 

and E-3 draws. Men from two of the craft 

were put out in waist-deep water, but hit a 

deep runnel as they waded in and had to 

swim through surf and a strong tidal current pulling them eastward. Flamethrowers, mortars, bazookas, and many personal 

weapons were dropped in the struggle. The 

twO 116th sections lost only two men from 

enemy fire up to the shingle--an experience 

suggesting the ill-fortune of the first wave 

in that so few landings were made on Easy 

Red. A little to their left, the 1st Section 

of Company F came into the belt of heavy 

enemy fire that apparently extended from 

there on eastward to E-3 draw; of the 31 

men unloading in neck-deep water, only 14 

reached the shingle. Except for these four 

sections-about a hundred men- the only 

assault elements on Easy Red Beach for the 

first half hour were four DD tanks, one 

already disabled. 

Very different was the record of the landings on Fox Beach. Whereas four scattered 

sections of infantry came into Easy Red 

without many casualties, the bulk of four 

companies (three of them scheduled for more 

westerly beaches) landed on Fox against 

every possible handicap of mislandings, delays, and enemy opposition. 

Less the one section already accounted for 

(on Easy Red), Company E of the 16th RCT 

touched down on the western part of Fox 

Green, the craft badly scattered over a front 

of nearly 800 yards. The final run-in was 

not costly, but crossing bands of automatic 

fire caught most of the craft as the ramps 

were lowered, and from there on losses were 

heavy. Most of them were incurred in the 

water, and among men who stopped to drag 

48 

the wounded ashore. So exhausted and 

shaken were the assault troops that when 

they reached the sand, 300 yards from the 

shingle bank, most of them stopped there 

and crawled in just ahead of the tide. The 

greater number of the company's 105 casualties for D Day were suffered on the beach , in 

the first stage of assault. 

Four boat sections of Company E, 116th 

RCT, came in on the same beach sector and 

had much the same experience. From 3 of 

the sections, a total of 60 men reached the 

shingle bank. The company commander, 

Capt. Laurence A. Madill, already wounded 

crossing the beach , was hit twice by machine-gun bullets as he returned to salvage 

mortar ammumtion. His last words were, 

"Senior non-com, take the men off the 

beach." The company's sections were separated, and it was some time before any contact was made between them. 

Five sections of Company F, 16th RCT, 

landed on Fox Green scattered all the way 

from E-3 draw to a point a thousand yards 

further east. Two sections landed close 

together in front of the strongpoints defending E-3 draw. Mortars as well as machinegun fire got about one-third of the personnel 

before they made the shingle. Further east, 

the other three parties fared as badly, only 

seven men from one craft getting through 

the fire to the shingle. Two officers survived among Company F's widely separated 

sections. 

The two units scheduled to land on Fox 

Green, Companies I and L of the 16th RCT, 

were so delayed in the approach that they 

hardly figured in the first assault wave. 

Both, moreover, suffered from the eastward 

trend of all landings. Company 1's craft, 

less two that swamped, headed almost as 

far east as Port-en-Bessin before the error 

was realized. An hour and a half was lost 

by this mishap. Company L touched down 

about 30 minutes late; supposed to land in 
front of E-3, it came intO the beach beyond 

the eastern end of Fox Green. One craft 

had foundered two miles off shore, losing 

eight men. Artillery fire came close as the 

remaining craft touched down, causing some 

casualties and destroying one craft just after 

the troops had debarked. Machine-gun fire 

caused heavier losses as the sections crossed 

200 yards of beach to get to the shingle. 

The 3d Section, keeping extremely well 

spread out in movement, lost not a single 

man; the other sections had a total of 34 

casualties. As a result of landing at the 

edge of Fox Green, the company was in a 

sector where the tidal flat almost reaches 

the bluff, and where the first rise of the bluff 

is cliff-like in steepness. In the defilade 

this afforded, the sections organized and 

started to move to the right where they 

could assault the bluff. Company L, reduced to 125 men, was the only one of the 

8 companies in the first assault infantry 

which was ready to operate as a unit after 

crossing the lower beach. 

The misfortunes of the first wave were 

bound to condi tion the further course of the 

assault. Landing schedules on many sectors 

would be affected by the failure to clear 

obstacles. Fire support ftom the tanks 

would be much less than planned on the 

eastern part of the beach. Mislandings of 

the infantry units had produced bad gaps 

in the assault line along the sea wall and 

shingle, leaving certain areas, notably Dog 

White and Easy Red , almost bare of assault 

troops. Above all, stiff enemy resistance 

and the disorganization caused by mislandings and heavy casualties had combined to 

prevent infantry units in this wave from 

carrying our their mission of immediate assault. All the more credit is due those elements, most of them facing unfamiliar terrain and enemy defenses, which surmounted 

the shock of the worst period on the beach 

and shared in the first advances inland . 

49 

The Later Assault Waves: 116th ReT 

Beginning at 0700, the second group of 

assault waves touched down in a series of 

landings that lasted for 40 minutes, ending 

with the support battalions of the twO regimental combat teams (Map No. VI). The 

later waves did not come in under the conditions planned for their arrival. The tide, 

flowing into the obstacle belt by 0700, was 

through it an hour later, rising eight feet 

in that period; but the obstacles were gapped 

at only a few places. The enemy fire which 

had decimated the first waves was nOt neutralized when the larger landings commenced. 

No advances had been made beyond the 

shingle, and neither the tanks nor the scattered pockets of infantry already ashore 

were able to give much covering fire. Consequently, much of the record of this period 

is a repetition of what had happened earlier. 

Casualties continued to be heavy on some 

sectOrs of the narrowing tidal flat, though 

unit experiences differed widely and enemy 

fire, diverted or neutralized by the troops 

and tanks already along the embankment, 

was not often as concentrated as earlier in 

the assault. Mislandings continued to be a 

disrupting factor, not merely in scattering 

the infantry units but also in preventing 

engineers from carrying out special assignments and in separating headquarters elements from their units, thus hindering 

reorgaOlzatlOn. 

Rifle companies in the later assault waves 

of the 116th Infantry were organized somewhat differently from those in the first 

landings. Two sections in each company 

were designated as "assault" units and carried the special weapons and equipment 

characteristic of the first wave. The assault sections had the mission of mopping 

up enemy emplacements bypassed by the 

first wave. The other four boat sections 

had the ordinary equipment of rifle units. 
On the assumption that the first penetrations would already be made, support units 

were under orders CO proceed as quickly as 

possible inland, by boat sections, coward 

battalion assembly areas. In the 16th Infantry, the support battalion (lst) was organized in assault sections exactly like those 

of the first wave; this arrangement may 

have reflected the experience of that regiment in its previous landings in Africa and 

Sicily, where plans had never worked out 

according to schedule. 

In the 116th zone three companies of the 

1st BLT were scheduled to land in reinforcement of Company A on Dog Green, facing 

the Vierville exit. In all, only two or three 

boat sections from these units landed on Dog 

Green. 

Company B was due in at 0700. Its 

craft failed to pick up landmarks, scattered 

badl y, and beached on a front of nearly a 

mile to both sides of the target area. Only 

three scattered sections on the flanks were 

co play much part in the later battle. The 

craft which touched down on or near Dog 

Green came under the same destructive fire 

which had wrecked Company A, and the 

remnants of the boat sections mingled with 

those of Company A in an effort for survival 

at the water's edge. 

Company C came in at 0710 a thousand 

yards east of the Vierville exit, on Dog 

White, in a mislanding that was to work 

out to ultimate advantage. One of its 6 

craft ran into a mined obstacle, and was 

delayed 20 minutes in maneuvers to get 

free without setting off the mines. The 

others came in fairly close together, suffering only one mishap when a craft thrown 

by the surf against a ramp turned over on 

its side, spilling men and equipment into 

water four to five feet deep. This boat 

section had been equipped for mopping-up 

work at the Vierville draw, and all its 

flamethrowers, demolition charges, banga50 

lores, and mortars were lost. Enemy fire 

was surprisingly light, possibly because 

Company C was near the western end of the 

belt of smoke coming from grass fires on 

the bluff slopes. Only five or six casualties 

were suffered in disembarking and getting 

across the open sand. No other troops 

were near them; only four or five tanks 

were in sight. Bunched together on a front 

of about a hundred yards, Company C's 

men took shelter behind the four-foot timber sea wall and reorganized . Most of their 

equipment was intact, their sections were 

well together, and they were in relatively 

better shape for action than any unit so far 

landed in the 116th' s zone. 

Company D was nOt so fortunate. Three 

of its craft were in serious trouble as a result 

of shi pping water; one of these was abandoned far out, and the section got in after 

noon. Another craft was sunk by a mine 

or an artillery hit 400 yards from shore, 

forcing the men to swim in under a barrage 

of mortar shells and machine-gun bullets. 

Half the personnel reached the sands. A 

third section was debarked 150 yards from 

the water's edge, saw riflemen ahead of them 

staying in the water, and followed their example, hiding behind obstacles. It was 

nearly two hours before the scattered survivors got to shore, with one mortar and no 

ammUnItion. The second platoon arrived 

on the beach with only two machine guns, 

one mortar and a small amount of ammunition. The first platoon got one machine gun 

and one mortar ashore during the morning. 

The heavy weapons of the 1st BL T were to 

take little part in the beach assault. 

To complete the picture of misfortune for 

the 1st BL T, the three craft carrying the 

Headquarters Company, the command 

group, and the Beachmaster's party for Dog 

Green were brought in several hundred yards 

west of that sector and under the cliffs. 

Headquarters Company lost heavily among 
-

THE OBSTACLES WERE USED AS SHELTER by GHGul, 

troops facing the task of crossing the tidal jiat U11dtr full exposure to 

enemy fire, but the dday oJten !nulted in heQVUT IOHn . Landing 

craft in the background art having trouble in the DuitT obliae/n. 

officers and noncommissioned officers, including the commanding officer of the 58th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion . The 

crossing of the tidal flat to the cliff against 

concentrated small-arms fire cost one-half 

to two-thirds of the group. The survivors, 

reaching the base of the cliffs, took refuge in 

niches in the rock. Not only was the command group separated from all other battalion units, but the members of the group were 

so scattered that they had to use radio for 

inter-communication. Sniper fire from the 

cliffs was to pin the group here for most of 

the day. 

Three companies of the 2d BLT had landed 

in the first wave. Completing the BLT, 

Company H gOt in at 0700, but in condition 

to furnish very little supporting fire for the 

rifle units. The 1st Machine-Gun Platoon 

and two mortar sections beached on Easy 

Red, where they helped the 18th RCT later 

in the morning. Other elements, landing 

on Dog Red and Easy Green, suffered heavy 

51 

losses, one boat section getting only six men 

to the shingle . Battalion Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company came in on Dog Red 

at 0700. When the ramps went down, fire 

was so heavy that many men took refuge 

behind some tanks at the water's edge, only 

to find them favorite targets for artillery fire. 

Maj. Sidney V. Bingham, Jr., Battalion 

Commander, was among the first to reach 

the shingle, where he set to work trying to 

revive leaderless sections of Company F. 

For nearly an hour he had no radio working 

to contact the widely scattered elements of 

his battalion. During this period, the only 

part of the 2d BLT which had arrived at the 

embankment in good condition, four sections 

of Company G, set out to reach their planned 

assault sector on Dog White. To do so 

meant a lateral movement of several hundred 

yards behind the now crowded shingle bank 

and under small-arms fire . Starting out together and working slowly west, the four 

sectIOns gradually lost all cohesion. One 
after another, individuals or small groups 

stopped to take cover, and sections became 

mixed or separated. Only remnants were to 

reach Dog White, about 0830, after the main 

action on that sector was over. 

Major Bingham's attempts to organize an 

assault at les Moulins were unsuccessful. He 

managed to get about 50 men of Company F 

across the shingle near the prominent threestory house at the mouth of the draw (see 

illustra tion, p. 12); a good system of trenches 

had been dug near the house and gave cover 

for the group. But their rifles, clogged with 

sand, failed to function well enough to build 

up any volume of fire. Although Bingham 

led a group of 10 men nearly to the top of the 

bluff just east of D-3 draw, they were unable 

to knock out an enemy machine-gun nest and 

had to return to the house. 

The 3d BL T of the 116th was scheduled 

to land at 0720-0730 behind the 2d BLT, on 

Dog White, Dog Red, and Easy Green. 

Five to ten minutes late, the entire battalion 

came in to the east of les Moulins, with 

some elements on the edge of Easy Red. 12 

Only a handful of assault troops from the 

first wave had come in between D-3 and E-l 

draws: two or three scattered sections of G 

and the headquarters boat of Company E, 

which touched down at 0700 right on the 

target to find no trace of the E assault sections. Now, in COntrast, this thousandyard stretch was comparatively crowded , 

although there were gaps enough to give 

many boat teams the impression of being 

isolated . The craft of Companies K and I 

came in well bunched on the right wing. 

Enemy small-arms fire was light; K had no 

losses crossing the tidal flat to the shingle, 

and I took only a few casualties. Nevertheless, the men tended to become immobilized 

after reaching shelter, and reorganization 

IIln th~ casc of one company. ac«>rding to Navy reporu, the company commander save order. which were relpon,ible for the landing eanward. 

52 

of the boat teams was delayed by the fact 

that sections of different units had landed on 

top of each other. 

Company L came in midway between the 

draws, its craft rather scattered, and enemy 

fire was so light and ineffective that some of 

the troops had been several minutes on the 

open sand before they became aware of 

machine-gun fire. Company M's boat sections were still further east, on Easy Red, 

one craft arriving in sinking condition from 

a mine explosion which wounded three 

men. The troops were tired and cramped 

by the trip in, and found their loads of 

weapons and ammunition heavy to get 

across the sand. As one of them put it: 

"The burdens we ordinarily carried, we had 

to drag." Enemy fire was more intense on 

this stretch of beach, near the E-1 strongpoints, and the sections hesitated near the 

water's edge, taking shelter behind obstacles. Machine-gun bullets were kicking 

up the sand ahead; some of the men, after 

studying the beaten zones, decided that the 

enemy guns were delivering fixed fire and 

figured Out routes for avoiding the zones. 

When the tide began to push them forward, 

the company made the move to the embankment as a body. Only a few were hit; said 

one survivor, "The company learned with 

surprise how much small-arms fire a man 

can run through without getting hit." 

Eighteen LCA's, carrying the 5th Ranger 

Battalion and Companies A and B of the 2d 

Rangers, had been waiting in the assembly 

area for word of the assault on Pointe du 

Hoe. One LCA had already been swamped 

further OUt, its men transferring to a passing 

LCT. After delaying 15 minutes beyond 

the time limit (0700), the Rangers still had 

no word and were forced to conclude tha t 

the assault had not succeeded. According 

to plan, they started in toward Dog Green to 

land behind the 1st Battalion of the 116th 

and go inland through the Vierville exit. 
Approaching shore, Lt. Col. Max F. Schneider got a clear impression of the conditions 

on Dog Green and ordered the flotilla to 

swing east. Even so, Companies A and B of 

the 2d Rangers, on the right flank, came in 

on the edge of Dog Green and experienced 

what the 1st BLT of the 116th had already 

been through. One of their 5 craft was 

sunk by a mine in the outer obstacles, and 

the 34 men had to swim in under fire. Smallarms and mortar fire caught the other craft 

as they touched down. The small Ranger 

companies numbered about 65 officers and 

men each; some 35 in Company A and 27 in 

Company B got to the sea wall. Only a few 

hundred yards further east, on the favored 

section of Dog White, 13 out of the 14 

craft carrying the 5th Battalion touched 

down close together, in two waves. LCI 

91 was struck and set afire while the Rangers 

were passing through the obstacles beside 

it, but none of their craft was hit. The 450 

men of the battalion got across the beach 

and up to the sea wall with a loss of only 5 

or 6 men to scattered small-arms fire . They 

found the sea-wall shelter already fully occupied by 116th troops, and crowded in behind them. 

By and large, the later waves of assault 

infantry on the western beaches had fared 

much better than in the first landings. Five 

of the eight companies of the 116th RCT had 

landed with sections well together and losses 

relatively light. Some had been shielded 

by the smoke of burning grass, but the better fortune was probably due also to the fact 

that, as landings increased in volume, enemy 

positions still in action were not able to concentrate on the many targets offered. By 

0730, in contrast to the earlier situation, assault units were lined along the whole beach 

front in the 116th's zone. The weakest 

area was in front of Exit D-1; Dog Green, 

the zone of the 1st BL T, had almost no assault elements on it capable of further action. 

53 

Beginning at 0730, regimental command 

parties began to arrive. The main command group of the 116th RCT included Col. 

Charles D. W. Canham and General Cota. 

LCVP 71 came in on Dog White, bumping 

an obstacle and nudging the Teller mine until 

it dropped off, without exploding. Landing in three feet of water, the party lost one 

officer in getting across the exposed area. 

From the standpoint of influencing further 

operations, they could not have hit a better 

point in the 116th zone. To their right 

and left, Company C and some 2d Battalion 

elements were crowded against the embankment on a front of a few hundred yards, the 

main Ranger force was about to come into 

the same area, and enemy fire from the 

bluffs just ahead was masked by smoke and 

ineffective. The command group was well 

located to playa major role in the next phase 

of action. 

The Later Assault Waves: 16th ReT 

The first-wave landings of this combat 

team had veered so consistently eastward 

that Easy Red, longest of the beach sectors, 

had only a handful of assa ul t infan tryon it 

at 0700. The situation was largely corrected in the next 45 minutes by landings 

that concentrated between exit draws E-l 

and E-3 (Map No. VI), where most of the 

surviving 741st tanks were available for 

support. 

Compa.lY G beached on its target area 

at 0700, all craft together except for one 

delayed by shipping water. Some artillery 

shells hit near as they came close to touchdown, but there were no casualties before 

debarking. The craft were handled well; 

one of them hit a sandbar several hundred 

yards out, but the coxswain bumped his 

way through and made shallow water. 

Engineers were still at work on the obstacles 

as Company G passed through, and three 
DD tanks on the sand were already disabled 

by enemy fire. The short passage from ramps 

to shingle bank was costly for the company; 

most of its 63 casualties for D Day came 

here, from small-arms and mortar fire. 

There was no way to avoid these losses; 

the men were cramped by the trip in, were 

heavily loaded, and had to make the distance 

at a walking pace. Nevertheless, the sections were well together and reached the 

shingle without being disorganized. In 15 

minutes the supporting weapons were set up 

and were engaging enemy emplacements as 

soon as these could be spotted by their fire 

on later landings. Company G's men had 

come in almost on top of three sections left 

on the beach by the first wave, one from 

Company E and two from Company E of 

the 116th RCT. 

Company H, due in on the same beach at 

0710, was delayed in contacting the Navy 

control boat. Landing 20 minutes late a 

few hundred yards left of Company G, it 

lost a good deal of equipment including all 

radios in getting to the embankment, There, 

on a stretch facing E-3 draw where few 

troops had landed and enemy fire was heavy, 

the company was immobilized for the next 

few hours. 

The 1st BLT, scheduled to reinforce and 

support the first assault units, came in on 

time about 0740 to 0800, between E-l 

and E-3 draws, with Companies A and B 

on the right. Company D was boated so 

that its machine-gun sections came in attached to the rifle companies, and the heavy 

mortars with battalion headquarters. As 

far as incomplete evidence shows, casualties 

were much less heavy than in earlier 

landings. 

Fox Green Beach already had elements 

of five companies, sections separated and 

scrambled (except for Company L) as a resnlt 

of first-wave landings. Company K, arriving at 0700, added further to the mixture 

54 

with sections bunching in two main groups 

that were not in contact until some hours 

later. That company took most of its 53 

casualties for the day on the beach, including 

4 officers. Company M's craft came in 

scattered, from 0730 to 0800. One capsized 

some distance from shore; the others, unloading in deep water and under fire, nevertheless got enough of their equipment 

ashore in time to be ready for effective support to the rifle units. 

Company I, scheduled in the first assault 

wave, had gone off course to the east, lost 

two boats swamped, and finally came in to 

Fox Green about 0800. The four craft suffered heavily in the last yards of their approach. The command party craft struck a 

mine and was set afire by machine-gun bullets, two others received artillery hits ( or 

struck mines), and the fourth was hung up 

on an obstacle, under machine-gun fire. 

Casualties were heavy. Captain Richmond, 

on landing safely, found himself senior 

officer on Fox Green and in charge of the 

intermingled elements of the 3d BLT on 

that beach. The command party of the 

battalion had been mislanded, this time to 

the west, and was unable to rejoin for hours. 

ConditiollS 011 the Beach: 0730-0800 

Infantry units were not the only assault 

elements to corne ashore in the period from 

0700 to 0800. The 81st Chemical Weapons 

Battalion, combat engineer battalions, advance elements of the Provisional Engineer 

Special Brigade Group, naval shore fire 

control parties, advance elements of artillery 

units, medical detachments, and antiaircraft 

units were included in the landings before 

0800, and -artillery was due to start landing 

during the next hour. Mislandings of these 

elements operated, as they had with the 

infantry, to snarl the assault plans. Engineer units with special assignments to carry 
out in clearing exits or marking beaches 

found themselves hundreds or even thousands 

of yards away from the targets, sometimes 

separated from their equipment or losing it 

in the debarkment. An engineer unit with 

panels for marking Dog Red Beach landed on 

Easy Red, over a mile away; they set up their 

panels anyway. About 0830 an officer on 

Dog White noticed two engineers making 

slow progress as they lugged a heavy box of 

explosives along the open beach behind the 

sea wall. As they stopped to rest, one of 

them wiped the sweat off his face and asked, 

"Where are we? We are supposed to blow 

something up down toward Vierville ." 

They picked up the box and moved along 

toward the hottest section of the beach. 

Navigational difficulties in landing increased as the tide advanced into and past 

the obstacles. On most of the beaches no 

gaps had been cleared . Landing craft, including now the larger LCI's and LST's, had 

to find a way through and a void the mines 

affixed to the timbers. Some craft bumped 

on sandbars in the middle of obstacles and 

hurried to drop their ramps in deep water; 

others maneuvered somehow through the 

surf and got all the way in . There are not 

many recorded instances of craft sunk by the 

obstacles before getting their troops off, 

though on LeA 853 half of the 116th's boat 

team was killed by a mine explosion. However, crippling damage was inflicted on many 

craft, often in their efforts to retract after 

touchdown, or as a result of enemy artillery 

and mortar hits while the craft were delayed 

in the obstacles. Only a few were destroyed 

by this fire, but enough to make a vivid and 

discouraging impression on the men watching from the shelter of the embankment, 

One of the spectacular disasters of the day 

was suffered by LeI 91, approaching Dog 

White about 0740 and carrying the alternate 

headquarters of the 116th ReT. Handled 

ARTILLERY FIRE CONCENTRATED ON LARGER CRAFT. 

Smoke is Jrom burnillg LeI's (91 and 92) 011 Dog Red and Dog Whit(. 

lIit about 0800, they were still burning at 1600 whm LST 80 came in, 

a(ter a dr/ay oj seven hours, with elemmts oj 467th A A A AW Bn. 

55 
by a veteran crew with experience at Sicily 

and Salerno, the LCI was struck by artillery 

fire as it made a first attempt to get through 

the obstacles. Backing Out, the craft came 

in again for a second try. Element "C" was 

barely showing above the rising tide, and 

the LCI could nOt get past. The ramps were 

dropped in six feet of water. As some officers 

led the way off, an artillery shell (or rocket) 

hit the crowded forward deck and sent up a 

sheet of flame. Clothes burning, men jumped 

or fell off into the sea and tried ro swim in 

under continued artillery fire . It is estimated that no personnel escaped from No.1 

compartment of the craft out of the 25 

carried there l ' A few minutes later LCI 

92 carne inro the same sector and suffered 

almost the same fate, an underwater explosion setting off the fuel tanks. The two 

craft burned for hours. Much of the artillery fire at this end of the beach was coming 

from the enemy gun positions toward Pointe 

de la Percee. The tan ks had been gi ven 

those flank positions as a priority target, but 

they found themselves fully occupied by 

enemy strongpoints in front of the landings. 

At the other end of the beach, LCI 85 came 

in to Fox Green with Company A of the 1st 

Medical Battalion, attached to the 16th 

RCT. The craft slid over the pilings of 

Element "C," then stuck, and was. at once 

hi t forward by artillery fire. The crew decided the water was too deep for unloading, 

backed the craft off the piling, and pulled 

out for another try. Number 3 hold was 

burning, and the craft was listing from a hit 

below the water line . On the second attempt only a few men had got off when the 

ramps were shot away, and fire broke out in 

the two forward holds. Practically rendered a hospital ship for medical personnel, 

LCI 85 backed off again, put out the fires, 

11 The report of LeI 91 auribute. the explO1lon and damage to mine. on the 

obnaclea. The evidence I UggCl tI that there may have been both mine upio. 

.ion. and artillery (or' rocket) hiu.. 

56 

and managed to transfer its many casualties 

to another ship. 

Conditions could hardly have been worse 

for the landing of vehicles, now beginning 

to arrive. If the half tracks, jeeps, and 

trucks survived the difficulties of getting 

close e!)ollgh in to avoid deep water, and of 

unloading in surf under artillery fire, they 

found themselves on a narrowing strip of 

sand without any exits opened through the 

impassable shingle embankment. Wherever 

vehicles landed close together, a few were 

liable to be immobilized by engine trouble 

or artillery hits, and the others were then 

caught in a hopeless traffic jam. Enemy 

artillery and mOrtars had easy targets. 

Losses in equipment ran high during the 

first landings, affecting all types of materiel. 

Engineer supplies, necessary for clearing the 

beaches, were seriously reduced. The 397th 

AAA A W Battalion lost 28 of its 36 machine 

guns disembarking, and infantry units experienced great difficulty in getting their 

heavy weapons ashore. All weapons were 

likely to be temporarily put Out of action 

by the effects of wa ter and sand; the first 

thing some units did on reaching cover was 

to strip and clean their rifles. Though much 

special equipment, such as bangalore torpedoes, ammunition, and heavy weapons, had 

been jettisoned when men were debarked in 

deep water, much more was saved at the 

cost of casualties to the men who were 

slowed down in carrying it. Losses in radio 

equipment were particularly heavy, and 

water damaged many sets that reached the 

beach. Colonel Canham reported that threefourths of the 116th RCT's radios were 

destroyed or rendered useless in the landings. 

This loss was to hamper control of the assault 

infantry, both on the beach and throughout 

the day. 

As headquarters groups arrived from 0730 

on, they found much the same picture at 

whatever sector they landed. Along 6,000 
yards of beach, behind sea wall or shingle 

embankment, elements of the assault force 

were immobilized in what might well appear 

to be hopeless confusion. As a result of 

mislandings, many companies were so scattered that they could not be organized as 

tactical units. At some places, notably in 

ftont of the German strongpoints guarding 

dra ws, losses in officers and noncommissioned 

officers were so high that remnants of units 

were practically leaderless. Bunching of 

landings had intermingled sections of several companies on crowded sectors like Dog 

White, Easy Green, and Fox Green. Engineers, navy personnel from wrecked craft, 

naval shore [1fe control parties, and elements 

of other support units were mixed in with 

the infantry. In some areas, later arrivals 

found it impossible to find room behind the 

shingle and had to lie on the open sands behind. Disorganization was inevitable, and 

dealing with it was rendered difficult by the 

lack of communications and the mislanding 

of command groups. However, even landing at the best point, a command party could 

only influence a narrow sector of beach. It 

was a situation which put it up to small 

units, sometimes only a remnant of single 

boat sections, to solve their own problems 

of organization and morale. 

There was, definitely, a problem of morale. 

The survivors of the beach crossing, many of 

whom were experiencing their first enemy 

fire, had seen heavy losses among their comrades or in neighboring units. No action 

could be fought in circumstances more calculated to heighten the moral effects of such 

losses. Behind them, the tide was drowning wounded men who had been cut down 

on the sands and was carrying bodies ashore 

57 

just below the shingle. Disasters to the 

later landing waves were still occurring, to 

remind of the potency of enemy fire. Stunned 

and shaken by what they had experienced, 

men could easily find the sea wall and shingle 

bank all too welcome a cover. It was not 

much protection from artillery or mortar 

shells, but it did give defilade from sniper 

and machine-gun fire. Ahead of them, with 

wire and minefields to get through, was the 

beach flat, fully exposed to enemy fire; beyond that the bare and steep bluffs, with 

enemy strongpoints still in action. That the 

enemy fire was probably weakening and in 

many sectors was light would be hard for the 

troops behind the shingle to appreciate . 

What they could see was what they had 

suffered already and what they had to cross 

to get at the German emplacements. Except 

for supporting fire of tanks on some sectors, 

they could count on little but their own 

weapons. Naval gunfire had practically 

ceased when the infantry reached the beach; 

the ships were under orders not to fire, unless 

exceptionally definite targets offered, until 

liaison was established with fire control 

parties. Lacking this liaison, the destroyers 

did not dare bring fire on the strongpoints 

through which infantry might be advancing 

on the smoke-obscured bluffs. 

At 0800, German observers on the bluff 

sizing up the grim picture below them might 

well have felt that the invasion was stopped 

at the edge of the water" Actually, at 

three or four places on the four-mile beachfront, U. S. troops were already breaking 

through the shallow cruSt of enemy defenses. 

II Sec the '''port lhal JClUaHy carne to the Gennan S~~tnlh A',,")I "ven later in 

Ihe mo rninx; p. 113. 
ASSAULT OF THE BLUFFS 

THE OUTSTANDING FACT about these 

first two hours of action is that despite heavy 

casualties, loss of equipment, disorganization, and all the other discouraging features of the landings, the assault troops did 

nOt stay pinned down behind the sea wall 

and embankment. At half-a-dozen or more 

points on the long stretch, they found the 

necessary drive to leave rheir cover and move 

outoverthe open beach flar toward the bluffs. 

Prevented by circumsrance of mislandings 

from using carefully rehearsed tactics, they 

improvised assault methods to deal with 

what defenses they found before them. In 

nearly every case where advance was attempted, it carried through rhe enemy beach 

defenses. Some penetrations were made by 

units of company srrengrh; some were made 

by intermingled secrions of different companies; some were accomplished by groups 

of 20 or 30 men, unaware rhat any orher 

assaults were under way. Even on such 

rerrain as Omaha Beach, the phenomenon of 

bartlefield "isolation" was a common occurrence, and units ofren failed to see what 

was going on 200 yards to their flanks on rhe 

open beach. 

Various factors, some of them difficulr to 

eva luate, played a parr in rhe success of 

these advances. Chance was certainly one; 

some units happened to be at points where 

rhe enemy defenses were weak, where smoke 

from grass fires gave concealment, or where 

dangerous strongpoints had been partly neurralized by naval fire or by rhe tanks. Ar one 

58 

or two areas of penetration, notably Fox 

Green, destroyers' guns and tanks were 

called on for support during the assault and 

rendered good service. Combat engineers 

blew many of rhe gaps through enemy wire, 

helped ger across minefields, and took parr 

as infantry in some of the fighting on and 

past the bluffs. 

But rhe decisive factor was leadership. 

Wherever an advance was made, it depended 

on the presence of some few individuals, 

officers and noncommissioned officers, who 

inspired, encouraged, or bullied their men 

forward, often by making the first forward 

moves. On Easy Red a lieutenant and a 

wounded sergeant of divisional engineers 

stood up under fire and walked over to inspect the wire obstacles JUSt beyond the 

embankment. The lieutenant came back 

and, hands on hips, looked down disgustedly 

at the men lying behind the shingle bank. 

"Are you going to lay there and get killed, 

or get up and do somerhing about it?" Nobody stirred, so the sergeant and the officer 

got the materials and blew the wire. On 

the same sector, where a group advancing 

across rhe flat was held up by a marshy area 

suspected of being mined, it was a li eutenant 

of engineers who crawled ahead through the 

mud on his belly, probing for mines with a 

hunting knife in the absence of other equipment. When remnants of an isolated boat 

section of Company B, 116th Infantry, were 

stopped by fire from a well-concealed emplacement, the lieutenant in charge went 
afrer ir single-handed. In rrying ro grenade 

rhe rifle pit he was hir by three rifle bullets 

and eight grenade fragments, including some 

from his own grenade. He turned his map 

and compass over ro a sergeant and ordered 

his group ro press on inland. 

One characteristic of these early penetrations was ro influence the rest of the acrion 

on D Day at Omaha: the penetrations were 

made not at the draws bur in areas berween 

them, by advances up the bluffs. Mislandings may have had something ro do with 

rhis, but the chief facror seems ro have been 

the survival of the enemy strongpoints protecting the draws, for units which landed 

directly in front of them, especially ar D-l, 

D-3, and E-3, had suffered crippling losses 

and were unable ro press the assault. The 

first advances were effected in the intervals 

between strongpoints, where the enemy 

defenses were thin. The routes planned as 

exits for movement of tanks and vehicles 

from the beach were not cleared. 

The Adva/lce From Dog White 

The most important penetration on the 

western beaches (Map No . VII) was made 

by Company C, 116th Infantry, and by the 

5th Ranger Battalion, which had landed 

partly on rop of Company C. Both units 

were in relatively good condition after the 

landings and had suffered only minor losses, 

but the men were crowded shoulder ro 

shoulder, sometimes several rows deep, along 

the shingle at the base of the timber sea wall. 

NOON OF D DAY, DOG WHITE. This aerilll, at 3,000 fut, 

snows the penetration area of Company C, 116th Infantry, and the 

5th Ranger Battalion (/eft half of picture). The bluff is flattened 

out in this view, but the top edge can be followed along the euds 

of the fields, pocked with the craters of many shells and rockets. 

A wrecked craft (LeI 92) and the edge of les M Olllins at right. 
PENETRATION AREA, 116TH INFANTRY, on Dog W hite. 

A nother view, facing the bluff, near the edge of Dog White. Th is 

photograph, taken 25 J une 1944, shows the bluff slope denuded by 

grass fires that occurred on D D ay. A military cemetery givu a 

background for religious servias. The small building at top is near 

the left hand edge of the last illustration, .showing the same area 

Intermingled with these troops were one or 

twO boat sections from other units of the 

116th, and some engineer elements. Reorganization for assault was spurred by the 

presence of General Cota and the command 

group of the 116th Infantry, who had landed 

in this area about 0730. Exposed to enemy 

fire, which wounded Colonel Canham in .the 

wrist, they walked up and down behind the 

crowded sea wall, urging officers and noncoms to "jar men loose" and get moving. 

The sector was relatively favorable for an 

advance across the beach flat and up the 

blufF. The nearest enemy strongpoints were 

several hundred yards off to either flank, and 

60 

no concentrated fire was hitting the area congested with assault troops. In front of 

them, heavy smoke from grass fires on the 

bluff was drifting eastward along the face of 

the slope. From sea wall to the foot of the 

rise was only 150 yards, but the flat ground , 

with patches of marsh near the hill, was 

nearly devoid of cover. Along the whole 

stretch between D-l and D-3 draws the bluff 

is steep and bare, but men climbing the slope 

would find small folds and depressions for 

defilade against small-arms fire. German defenses at this part of Dog White consisted of 

lightly manned rifle pits connected by deep 

trenches and placed just at the crest of the 
bluff, with a few machine-gun emplacements 

sited for flanking fires on other stretches of 

beach rather than for dealing with troops 

coming directly from below. 

Company C's movement began about 

0750. Across the promenade road that 

edged the sea wall was a double-apron wire 

entanglement. Pvt. Ingram E. Lambert 

jumped over the wall, crossed the road, and 

set a bangalore torpedo. When he pulled 

the friction igniter, it failed to act and 

Lambert was killed by a machine-gun bullet. 

The platoon leader, 2d Lt. Stanley M. 

Schwartz, went over and fixed the igniter. 

The explosive blew a large gap. The first 

man to try it was shot down; others followed and took shelter in some empty 

trenches just beyond the road, where they 

were joined by another group that had got 

through the barrier by cutting the wire. 

After a delay of 5 to 10 minutes, while more 

troops crossed the road to the trenches, they 

started again toward the bluff, finding minor 

concealment from light enemy fire in the tall 

grass and occasional bushes. Once they 

were on the hillside, the defilade and smoke 

gave good protection, but progress was 

slowed by fear of mines. The men went up 

PROFILE VIEW OF BLUFFS, DOG WHITE, in the area 

where Company C, 116th, and the 5th Ranger Battalion assaulted 

the bluff. The pictuTe was taken in june 1945 when vegetation had 

grown up heavily. Fiew is toward east; beach flat shOWJ in left rear. 
in a narrow column, searching the ground 

before them as they climbed and angling west 

to take advantage of a faint path. No 

enemy were found in trenches along the 

crest. The column went a couple of hundred 

yards into flat, open fields and stopped as it 

met scattered fire from machine guns at some 

distance to the flanks. This was the only 

sign of enemy resistance, and Company C 

had taken only half-a-dozen casualties after 

leaving the sea wall. Capt. Berthier B. 

Hawks, who had suffered a crushed foot in 

debarking, got to the top with his men. 

The 5th Ranger Battalion joined the advance very soon after it started, and some of 

the Rangers were intermingled with Company C as they went forward. The battalion 

had reached the sea wall just before 0800, 

in platoon formations. Hasty preparations 

were made for assault, and Colonel Schneider 

passed the word . ·Tallyho" to his officers, 

this being the order for each platoon to make 

its own way beyond the bluffs to the assembly area south of Vierville. About 0810 the 

Rangers began to cross the road; what with 

the confusion at the beach and the smoke 

ahead, few of them realized that Company C 

was already on the move in the same zone. 

Four gaps were blown in the wire with 

bangalores and the men went across the 

beach flat at the double, then slowed to a 

crawl on the steep hillside. Heavy smoke 

covered them on the c1im b, forcing some men 

to put on gas masks. By the time the crest 

was reached, platoon formations were disorganized and contacts lost. Just over the 

bluff top, German warning signs enabled the 

Rangers to avoid a minefield from which 

engineers later took 150 mines. The first 

groups up, a platoon of Company A and some 

men of Company E, went straight on inland 

and disappeared. The other platoons were 

on top by 0830 and stopped to reorganize. 

On the left flank of the battalion, Company 

D·s platoons had to clean out a few Germans 

62 

from a trench system along the bluff edge, 

knocking out a machine gun sited just below 

the crest and firing along the beach. The 

battalion had lost only eight men, to smallarms fire that became more ineffective as the 

movement progressed across the beach flat. 

The advance from Dog White Beach had 

ta ken place on a narrow front of less than 

300 yards. By 0830 the last groups were 

lea ving the sea wall, and the command party 

established itself temporarily halfway up the 

bluff. Unsuccessful efforts were made to 

reach 1st Division units by SCR 300. Fire 

from enemy mortars began to range in on the 

slope for the first time, killing two men 

standing near General Cota and knocking 

down the General and his aide. The headquarters party moved on up to the top, 

joined by some elements of Company G and 

a machine-gun platoon of Company H, which 

had reached Dog White after moving laterally along the sea wall from D-3 draw. The 

command party found work to do on the 

high ground. Company C, the 5th Ranger 

Battalion, and small elements of other units 

were intermingled in the fields just beyond 

the bluff, disordered by the advance and not 

sure of the next move. Scattered smallarms fire was keeping men down, and some 

shells began to hit in the vicinity. 

Just east of Dog White, the penetration 

area was widened before 0900 by the action 

of small parties from Companies F and B. 

Remnants of three boat sections of Company 

F crossed the beach flat and got up the bluff; 

a short distance behind them came an isolated section of B. Neither group had to 

contend with enemy resistance at the crest. 

The Company F sections drifted right and 

eventually joined the 5th Rangers. The 

Company B party of a dozen men started left, 

toward les Moulins, and was stopped by a 

machine gun. 1st Lt. William B. Williams 

assaulted it single-handed, was wounded, 

and ordered his men to move to Vierville. 
The Advauce Between D-3 and E-1 Draws 

The 3d BL T of the 116th had come in on 

a half-mile stretch of beach including most 

of Easy Green and the western end of Easy 

Red. All units were facing unfamiliar 

ground, east of their appointed landing 

sectors, in some cases as much as 1,200 yards. 

Losses had not been heavy in crossing the 

tidal flat. The boat sections of Companies 

K and I were fairly well rogether on Easy 

Green; Land M, more scattered, were to the 

east (Map No . VI). Since each boat team 

was supposed to make its own way past the 

bluffs to a battalion assembly area about a 

mile inland , no attempt was made to organize the companies for assault, and forward 

movement was undertaken by many small 

groups starting at different times, acting independently, and only gradually coming 

together as they got inland by different 

routes and with different rates of progress. 

By 0900, elements of all three rifle companies 

were past the bluff (Map No . 3, page 64). 

Company I was nearest the strongpoints 

defending les Moulins draw, but was receiving little fire from that direction. Each of 

the twO assault sections made breaches in 

the wire along the embankment, needing 

four sections of a bangalore in one case but 

only wire cutters in the other. The assault 

sections moved out onto the flat, followed 

a little later by the other sections as they 

found their way to the gaps. Not all of the 

men who had landed moved out from the 

embankment; control was difficult. One 

section leader of Company I moved a hundred 

yards west, found a gap in the wire, and 

came back for his men. Under the impression that they were following, he went 

through the gap and was OUt on the flat 

before he realized that he had only 10 soldiers with him. A sergeant who went back 

could not find the others, and the section 

Ieadet did not see them again for two days. 

EASY GREEN, rnnvd from just tast of Its Moulins, was tht 

penttration aTta of tht 3d Battalion, 116th .lnfantry. The bluff on 

this sector was bare and had a "double" slope, with a terraa or 

bench halfway liP (lIpptr right). (Photograph tak", in J unt, 1945.) 
MAP NO.3 The Advllnce hetween D-3 dud £-1 Draws 

64 
The beach flat was open, with some 

swamp and brush near the foot of the bluff, 

and there was little cover on the sharp slopes 

of the bluff. Fortunately, enemy smallarms fire was light and sca ttering, and there 

was no shelling. Minefields, encountered 

on the flat and on the bluffs, caused delays 

while the troops found a safe way around. 

Here as elsewhere on D Day, movement off 

the beach was not made by '·charges.·· 

Each section of 20 to 30 men tended to advance in an irregular column, sometimes a 

single file, and was often checked by a burst 

of enemy fire or the discovery of mines. It 

took half an hour for leading elements to 

reach the bluff top, and much longer for some 

of the sections which started later. No 

enemy resistance was met at the edge of the 

high ground, where the troops came out in 

the open fields stretching toward St-Laurent. 

Elements of three or four sections came together soon after reaching the top, and took 

shelter behind an east- west hedgerow about 

200 yards from the bluff. Few of the men 

knew where they were (afterwards, some 

described their position as being west ofD-3), 

and there was no sign of enemy or friendly 

troops. 

Company K' s seCtions, close by I on the 

beach, were slow in getting started and had 

more trouble getting ro the top. Sporadic 

machine-gun fire hit a few men on the beach, 

and mines, thickly sown, caused difficulty 

on the bluff slope. Although naval gunfire 

and rockets had torn up the slopes so much 

as to expose many mines, guides had to be 

placed ro mark safe routes. K had lost IS 

to 20 men when the sections got to the top, 

shortly after 0900. A stray group of Company G was JUSt ahead of them. K's sections 

had begun to bunch rogether as they met on 

the climb or at the top, though there was 

no intention of organizing as a company. 

This was characteristic of the fighting that 

day; as one soldier described It, any small 

65 

party seeing a bigger one "wanted company" 

and joined up, sometimes with units of a 

different company or battalion. K's sections 

made a couple of hundred yards beyond the 

bluff, then were pinned to the ground in 

open fields by scattered machine-gun fire and 

some shelling. 

Company L's boat teams were somewhat 

more separated and so rook longer in drawing together; otherwise, their story is much 

like K and 1. Each boat team made its own 

way from the embankment to the high 

ground against ineffective enemy fire and 

with very few losses. Once on top the sections began ro work to the southwest, knowing they had come in to the left of their 

target area. As they pushed inland, the 

teams began to meet resistance from small 

enemy pockets in prepared positions. 

Company M's sections, most of them 

landed together, were near enough the E-l 

strongpoints to be met by heavy fire as soon 

as they attempted to cross the beach flat. 

They managed to reach a gully which gave 

some defilade, and here they set up four 

machine guns and twO heavy mortars. With 

these, they engaged the enemy emplacements 

near E-l, and snipers along the bluff. Six 

men were shot in attempts to find a route 

beyond the gully to reach the hill. The 

larger part of Company M was held here 

until later in the morning, when the arrival 

of massive reinforcements in front of E-l 

broke the stalemate. 

The Advance From Easy Red 

Elements of three companies shared in the 

assault on the bluffs between E-l and E-3 

draws (Maps Nos. 4 and VIII). At this part 

of Easy Red, the beach shelf above the shingle 

embankment is more than a hundred yards 

wide, with areas of swamp along the inland 

edge of the flat. One hundred and thirty 

feet high on this sector, the bluff is reached 
MAP NO.4 Advance frolll Easy Red Pbolo~raph of 15 February 1944) 

66 
• 

by 200 yards of moderate slope, patched with 

heavy bush . Five hundred yards west ofE-3, 

a small draw led up at a slight angle to the 

west, forming a possible corridor for advance 

to the bluff crest. Below the draw on the 

flat was a ruined house. 

The 1st Section of Company E, 16th Infantry , and two of the sca ttered sections of 

E, 116th , had come to shore here in the first 

wave. The 16th's unit, led by 2d Lt. John M. 

Spalding, blew a gap in the wire above the 

shingle, made its way past the house, and 

then was held up by mincfields in the marshy 

ground at the foot of the slopes. Intense 

small-arms fire carne from an emplacement 

to the left, in the E-3 strongpoint. Spalding 's men found a way past the mines and 

were beginning to work up the slope, using 

the defilade afforded by the small draw. To 

the west, and out of contact, the two sections from the 116th had cut the wire and 

dashed across the flat, but mines stopped 

them near the start of the hillside and they 

took shelter in a ditch . A soldier who went 

ahead to clear a path by use of a bangalore 

was killed by an antipersonnel mine. 

Meanwhile Company G of the 16th RCT 

had landed (0700) and had reached the embankment in good order. The company's 

machine guns, set up behind the shingle, 

found no targets until LCVP's of the 1st 

Battalion, coming toward the beach ( about 

0730), drew enemy fire from 8 or 10 small 

emplacements along the half mile of bluff. 

While the hea vy weapons built up a volume 

of supporting fire, a few men from each section blew gaps in the extensive double-apron 

and concertina wire beyond the shingle . 

Their work was made more difficult by antipersonnel mines set to detonate by trip wires. 

EASY RED, between E- 1 and E- 3 draws, was the area where the 

2d Battalion, 16th I nfantry "ached the bl"./Js. Company G made 

• 

'.-

. 

• , . 

the penetration hert, from ruins in foreground. Photo takn, shortly 

afur D Day shows beach road already improved by U. S. Engin"rs. 
E-l STRONGPOINT, to the west of the draw, was neutralized by 

a boat team of Company E, 16th I nfantry, which came on it from 

the woods to the rear. The photograph above, taken a day later, 

shows beach obstacles and wreckage along the top of the tidal flat. 

Four bangalores were required to cut one 

lane. Engineers of Company A, 1st Engineer Combat Battalion and Company C, 

37th Engineer Combat Battalion helped in 

gapping and marking the lanes. When G's 

men reached the slopes they came in contact 

with Lieutenant Spalding's section of E and 

the twO sections of the 116th. In an effort 

to coordinate the advance, an arrangement 

was made with these units to operate on 

Company G's right. 

The mined areas, in which a part of the 

mines were faked, slowed up every unit 

that crossed the beach, then and for some 

time. Company G found one route through 

the mines by going over the dead bodies of 

two soldiers who had been caught there 

earlier. While the company was making 

68 

its way across the fiat, bothered more by 

the minefields than enemy fire, Capt. Joseph 

T. Dawson and one man went on ahead. 

When they were halfway up the hill, an 

enemy machine gun at the head of the small 

draw forced Dawson into cover. He sent 

his companion back to bring up the company 

and crawled on from one patch of brush to 

another. By the time he was 7S yards from 

the gun, the enemy lost sight of him. 

Circling to his left, he came to the military 

crest a little beyond the machine gun, and 

got within 30 feet before the Germans 

spotted him and swung their weapon around. 

Dawson threw a fragmentation grenade 

which killed the crew. This action opened 

the way up the little draw, but it took some 

tIme to get the company up as a result of 
disorganization suffered in crossing the beach 

lIat. The 5th Section, first to arrive, 

knocked our two more machine guns and 

took a prisoner. On the whole, enemy 

opposition had not been heavy, and cover 

on the slopes allowed Company G to make 

the crest with few casualties. Their movement forward, from embankment to the 

bluff top, had taken place between 0730 

and 0830. Enemy fire died away as the 

troops emerged on the fields of the upland, 

reorganized, and started south in column 

of sections. Their principal concern was 

with the frequent indications of mined 

areas iust beyond the bluff top. 

To their right Lieutenant Spalding's section of Company E, 16th RCT, was getting 

up about the same time, helped by covering 

fire from Company G, and effecting a useful 

extension of the front of penetration. The 

section now numbered 23 men, having lost 

3 at the beach and 3 more getting past an 

enemy machine gun on the bluff side. 

The gun was operated by a lone soldier 

PATH THROUGH MINEFIELDS, marked by engin"rJ alld 

followed by the aHaulting units of the 16th Infantry from Easy Red. 

ri~w taken from the foot of the slopes, looks directly up route taken 

D Day morning by "nits of the i6th infantry (2d alld 1st Battalions). 
• 

ADVANCE FROM EASY RED is under way up the slopes in 

background, aJ 1st Division reinjoruments (probably 18th I nfantry) 

lmld late in the morning. Note the shingle, which confined vekiclts to 

a narrow ,sand Jtrip just ahove high tide. Two dukws have made Jhore. 

who was captured and found to be Polish. 

He informed Spalding that there were 16 

enemy in trenches to his rear. The Company E section got to the trenches, sprayed 

them with fire and found the Germans had 

withdrawn. Spalding tlirned west along 

the bluff crest, losing contact with Company 

G as that unit headed south . Moving 

70 

through hedgerowed field s and wooded 

areas, the Company E group came up on the 

rear of the strongpoint guarding E-1 draw. 

The Germans were manning trenches overlooking the beach, and attack from the 

high ground caught them by surprise . 

In two hours of confused fighting, Spalding's 

men got through the outworks of this 
-

• 

-

... 

---

--

strongpoint and overcame opposItIon by 

close-in work with grenades and rifles. 

Naval fire, hitting in the parts of the strongpoint below the bluff top, helped to demoralize the resistance. Twenty-one prisoners were taken, and several enemy killed, 

without loss to the attackers. Although 

the fortified area was too extensi ve to be 

71 

thoroughly cleaned out by Spalding 's small 

force, the strongpoint east of E-l had been 

effectively neutralized by midmorning, just 

when important reinforcements for the assault were beginning to land in front of the 

draw, About llOO Spalding's section was 

joined by some other elements of Company 

E, which had come up from further east. 

They brought word from battalion to head 

south for Colleville. 

The area opened up by Company G became a funnel for movement off the beach 

during the rest of the morning, The 

command group of the 16th RCT had landed 

in two sections; the first, coming in at 0720, 

lost the executive officer and 35 men on the 

tidal flat. Col. George A. Taylor arrived 

in the second section at 0815 and found 

plenty to do on the beach. Men were 

still hugging the embankment, disorganized, and suffering casualties from mortar 

and artillery fire. Colonel Taylor summed 

up the situation in terse phrase: "Two kinds 

of people are staying on this beach, the dead 

and those who are going to die-now let's 

get the hell out of here ." Small groups of 

men were collected without regard to units, 

put under charge of the nearest noncommissioned officer, and sent on through the 

wire and across the flat, while engineers 

worked hard to widen gaps in the wire and 

to mark lanes through the minefields. Confusion prevailed all the way along the route 

to the bluff top, with enough scattered 

enemy fire from the flanks and mortar fire 

falling on the bluff slope to cause more 

delay and to give late-comers the impression that they were leading the assault. 

A traffic jam threatened to clog the 

trail through the little draw, as leaderless groups stopped to rest just below the 

shelter of the crest; one such group was 

picked up by an engineer platoon going 

inland as a security patrol and went on 

with them. Colonel Taylor's command 
MAP NO. 5{ ( Be/ow) The Pmetration at Fox Green. Aerial photo (above ), 

taken 31 May 1944, shows approximately sa11UJ area as the map. 

LEGEND 

~ Enlm~ ,Ironl/points 

- Stnp ri ... Rocky 

tI'mTI Shingl' 

Secondory rood. 

Troctl Dnd poths 

, '" ." '" 

72 
post was set up just below the bluff crest, 

and regimental and battalion officers concentrated on getting men forward. Despite 

all difficulties, troops were brought up 

from both flanks of the penetration area 

and sent inland. During the morning a 

few scattered sections of Companies E, F, 

and H moved laterally along the beach from 

the east and took Company G's route; 

the 1st Battalion, 16th RCT, came over 

from the west. 

The 1st BL T of the 16th landed between 

0730-0800, with Company A just east of 

E-1, and Band C near the area where 2d 

BLT troops were then starting up the bluff. 

Company A moved across the flat and had 

serious difficulties after passing the antitank 

ditch below the E-1 strongpoint; mines 

and small-arms fire inflicted 48 casualties, 

including 3 officers. Reaching the bluff 

slope, Company A found more mines and 

to avoid them took a path that led eaStward along the lower slope. Movement 

was slow, as the men went along the path 

in single file and had to cross areas exposed 

to enemy fire, and further difficulty was 

caused by meeting a party of 116th men 

going in the opposite direction. The other 

units of the 1st BLT gOt to the bluff crest 

about 0930, in the area where Company G 

had already passed inland . 

The Advance From Fox Green 

Fox Green fronted two exi t rou tes: the 

fairly large valley (E-3) winding a mile 

inland toward Colleville and, 600 yards to 

the east, an area (F-1) where the bluff 

front was only slightly interrupted by a 

shallow and steep draw. Two main enemy 

strongpoints, one just east of F-1 and the 

other near the Colleville draw, commanded 

the narrowing beach flat (Map No.5). 

As a result of the eastward trend of landing approaches, elements of seven assault 

73 

companies had come in on Fox Green by 

0800. Behind the shingle embankment 

scattered sections from Company E, 116th 

RCT, and Companies E and F, 16th RCT, 

were intermingled with units of the 3d 

BLT of the 16th. The 3d Battalion command group had come in west at another 

sector. Most of the landings had been 

costly, and nowhere would discouragi11g conditions seem to have had better opportunity 

for checking assault. Nevertheless, by 0800, 

an assault was under way. Its main power 

came from Company L, which landed fairly 

well together, kept its organization, and 

led off the attack. But elements of Companies I, K, and E (1l6th) shared in the 

advance; the heavy weapons of Company 

M were used ro support it; and both tanks 

and destroyers gave noteworthy assistance. 

Under most difficult circumstances, enough 

coordination was somehow achieved to 

make possible a successful advance. 

Four sections of Company L had landed 

and reorganized on the western end of Fox 

Red sector, where the bluff, merging here 

into a partial cliff just beyond the highwater shingle, afforded good cover. The 

company commander was killed as he exposed himself to direct the fire of some nearby 

tanks, and 1st Lt. Robert R. Cutler, Jr., 

took command. The sections were moved 

west, out of the shelter of the cliff and to a 

position where they were JUSt below the 

strongpoint commanding F-1 draw. Two 

tanks were called on for fire support. As a 

scheme of maneuver, Lieutenant Cutler sent 

three sections and headquarters, 2d and 3d 

Sections leading, up the draw a little to the 

west of the strongpoint. There were no 

hostile prepared positions at the head or the 

west side of the draw. The heavy brush gave 

good cover from enemy small-arms fire, 

and the 2d and 3d Sections worked ro the 

top in squad columns without serious losses, 

despite crossing enemy minefields. Here the 
ROCK Y LEDGES' outcrop on the beach at Fox Red, where the foot 

of the bluff is cliff-like. Troops, carrying heavy weapons equipment, are coming in at the sector where Com.pany L, 16th Infantry, found shdter before moving right to aHmdt the F- / strongpoint. 

74 
2d Section moved left and gOt in position to 

take the strongpoint from behind; a little 

to the right, the 3d and 5th Sections moved 

a short distance inland and organized a 

hasty defensive position. The three sections 

kept in contact with each other and with 

the beach . 

Other units were meantime starting up the 

slopes to assist Company L. The 1st Section 

of Company L, reduced to 12 men by early 

losses and separated from the rest of the 

company, had landed nearer E-3 and attempted to engage the enemy strongpoint 

on tha t side of the assault area, which had 

been Company L's original objective . Finding the fire tOO heavy, 1st. Lt. Kenneth J. 

Klenk moved his handful of men east along 

the beach , picked up some sections of Company E, 116th, and prepared to assault the 

F-l strongpoint. Capt. Kimball R. Richmond of Company I, who had just reached 

Fox Green to find himself the senior officer 

present of the battalion, started to organize 

the follow-up of Company L's advance. 

Two sections of Company K, a handful from 

Company I, and Lieutenant Klenk's mixed 

detachment were involved in this second 

assault wave, which went straight up toward the strongpoint. Machine guns and 

mortars of Company M, the tanks, and naval 

guns combined to cover the advance, and 

enemy fire was light. The Company L 

sections already on the hill sprayed the 

strongpoint with BAR fire and helped to 

keep the Germans down. 

A destroyer's fire, helpful in the first 

stages of the assault, now caused a halt. 

The 2d Section of Company L, from on top of 

the hill, telephoned the beach that it was 

ready to close on the strongpoint if naval 

fire could be lifted; the second assault wave 

was stopped short of the enemy positions by 

the same fire. When it lifted, the strongpoint 

was immediately stormed by the troops 

coming at it from below. Enemy resistance 

75 

was broken; grenades and satchel charges 

cleaned out the trenches and emplacements, 

and 31 prisoners were taken, 15 of them 

wounded. About 0900 the battalion was 

informed that the strongpoint had been 

subdued, the action having required little 

more than ari hour. Led by Company L, 

the 3d BLT at once started south for inland 

objectives. 

Other Assault Actions 

The penetrations described thus far opened 

the way for progress inland on an important 

scale, but they do not tell the whole story 

of the assault. At several parts of the beach 

lesser groups fought their way off the flat in 

isolated battles, often without knowing 

what was happening elsewhere. Stray boat 

sections of assault infantry, scratch parties 

of engineers, advance elements of artillery 

units, stranded Navy men, and other personnel took part in small actions which 

helped in weakening and disorganizing 

enemy resistance along the beaches. Few 

of these actions got into the records, and 

some cannot be located accurately in place 

and time. Two, involving Ranger units, 

can be taken as exam pies. 

Company C, 2d Ranger Battalion, was 

probably the first assault unit to reach the 

high ground (beach sector Charlie) and did 

so in an area where cliffs begin to border the 

western beach (Map No. VII). Landing in 

the opening assault wave, about 30 men 

survived the ordeal of crossing the sands 

and found shelter at the base of a 9O-foot 

cliff, impossi ble to climb except at a few 

points. Three men went off immediately 

to the west, looking for a spot to go up. 

Three hundred yards away they tried a 

crevice in the slope and made it by using 

bayonets for successive hand holds, pulling 

each other along. 1st Lt. William D. 

Moody, in charge of the party, brought along 

4 roggle ropes and attached them ro stakes 

in a minefield 15 feet below the crest. 

Enemy small-arms fire opened up from the 

left, near a supposedly fortified house. 

Moody and one Ranger went along the cliff 

edge roward the house, reached a point 

above Company C, and shouted down 

directions. The unit displaced ro the ropes 

and monkey-walked them ro the rop; all 

men were up by 0730. While the movement 

was in progress, Capt. Ralph E. Goranson 

saw an LCVP landing troops (a section of 

Company B, 116th RCT) just below on the 

beach and sent a man back ro guide them 

ro the ropes. 

Captain Goranson decided ro go left roward the fortified house and knock out any 

enemy positions there which would cause 

trouble on Dog Beach; then, ro proceed on 

his mission roward Pointe de la Percee. 

When the house was reached, the Rangers 

found that just beyond it lay a German 

strongpoint consisting of a maze of dugouts 

and trenches, including machine-gun emplacements and a mortar position. Captain 

Goranson put men in an abandoned trench 

just west of the house and started ro 

feel out the enemy positions on the other 

side. This began a series of small attacks 

which continued for hours without any 

decisive result. The boat section of Company B, 116th RCT, came up early and 

joined in, but even with this reinforcement 

Captain Goranson's party was roo small 

ro knock out the enemy position. Three 

of four times, attacking parties got around 

the house and inro the German positions, 

destroying the mortar post and inflicting 

hea vy losses. Enemy reinforcements kept 

coming up along communication trenches 

from the Vierville draw, and the Ranger 

parties were nOt quite able ro clean out the 

system of trenches and dugouts. Finally, 

roward the end of the afternoon, the Rangers 

and the Company B section succeeded in 

occupying the strongpoint and ending resistance. They had suffered onl y 2 casualties; 

a Quartermaster burial party later reported 

69 enemy dead in the position. This action 

had tied up one of the main German firing 

positions protecting the Vierville draw. 

Small elements of the 2d Ranger Battalion 

also fought their own way off Dog White, 

just west of the main penetration area. 

Less than half of Companies A and B had 

reached the shelter of the sea wall, about 

0740. Some tanks, firing at enemy emplacements, were scattered along the beach, 

but the Rangers saw no other troops and 

had the impression of being alone on the 

beach; less than a quarter mile ro their left, 

the 5th Ranger Battalion was rouching down 

on a beach already crowded with assault 

infantry. Within a few minutes of reaching 

the wall, the survivors of Companies A and 

B dashed over the promenade road beyond 

BEACH SECfOR CHARLIE, west of Viervillt draw, Iaw the 

aJJault by Company C, 2d RangerI. They 10It ntarly half of their 

?nen wktn landing in tAt middle of the stretch shown here; then 

moved west, Jcaling the cliff to reach the Ufortified" house on the top. 

THE "FORTIFIED" HOUSE, above Charlit Btach, although 

not actually fortified, was on the edge of a strongpoint (foreground) 

overlooking Viert·ille draw and connected with the draw by a mau 

of communications tr(neAn. (Photograph taken in February, 1945.) 

77 
THE BLUFFS ON DOG GREEN, east of the Vieroill, draw, 

what Compan'/:u A and B, 2d Ranger Battalion, made their assault. 

The beach villas WfTC wTuked by naval fire. Le Hamel strongpoint 

was on the bluff above the villas. (Photo takm in j une, / 9./5.) 

rhe sea wall and gar into the cover of 

shrubbery surrounding the wrecked villas 

that line this sttetch of rhe beach flat. 

Eighteen Rangers of Company B rurned 

right and, hugging rhe foot of rhe slope, 

went several hundred yards toward the 

Vierville draw, intending to go up rhat 

exir in accordance with original plans. 

Nearing the draw and facing heavy fire on 

an open srrerch of rhe flat, the group rerraced its steps. Meantime, Company A's 

men and a few from B, afrer crossing the 

road in several scarrered groups led by noncommissioned officers, had worked rhrough 

the villas and were rrying rhe bluff at different points. They were joined by a machinegun secrion of Company D, 116rh RCT, and 

three DD tanks helped by silencing enemy 

posirions on rhe flanks which had been 

giving troubl e. Two Rangers of Company A 

reached rhe top above and found enemy 

rrenches, can raining rwo or three machinegun emplacements, in plain sight jusr beyond 

78 

rhe military crest. In a few minutes another 

group of six Rangers joined up, and they 

started out to investigate the apparently 

empty trenches. Machine-gun fire opened 

from two points as Germans came out of 

dugouts and manned their positions. They 

had waited too long. The leading Rangers 

were within 20 yards, and more small 

parties were coming up behind them. 

Working in twos and threes, they mopped 

up the enemy emplacements, taking six 

prisoners and killing as many more. Only 

three of th e arracking force were casualties. 

Company B now came up, having gOt back 

from its try toward the Vier ville exit, and 

the 5th Ranger Battalion was in sight on 

the bluff top to the left. The 2d Battalion 

men joined them for the move inland. This 

action took place between 0800 and 0830, 

widened the area of penetration on Dog 

White, and probably aided in the success of 

the larger advance to the easr by covering 

its right flank. 
The Beach: 0800-1200 

The assault had gone forward, but not 

according to plan (Maps Nos. VII and VIII). 

Penetrations had been made where enemy 

defenses were thin and lightly held, on the 

long stretches of bluff between the draws 

scheduled for use as exits. The F-1 strongpoint was knocked out, but the exit route 

here was so steep that no plans had been 

made for its early use, and there were no 

engineer parties at hand. In the case of the 

main draws, only at E-l was a strongpoint 

(on the east side) being reduced by flanking 

action of a force which turned aside for this 

purpose after getting up the bluff; elsewhere, the small and often scattered assault 

groups were fighting inland toward their 

assembly areas. As a result, nearly all the 

eneiny strongpoints defending the vital draws 

were still in action, especially at E-3 and 

D-3 which were sched uled for use by the 

first movement of traffic off the beach. On 

large stretches of the beach there was still 

enough fire to make landings costly and to 

stop all movement in front of the draws. 

The engineers, hampered by landing on 

wrong beaches and by loss of equipment, 

were unable to start on their main job of 

opening the beach for traffic. At 0800, there 

were no gaps anywhere in the shingle embankment to permit movement OntO the 

beach flat . 

As a result, the penetrations made in the 

next twO hours could not be followed up 

proper! y . Vehicles were beginning to arrive, but they found only a narrow strip of 

sand to occupy and nowhere to move even 

for shelter from enemy fire. This fire and 

the difficulties with obstacles in the higher 

water led many craft to come in on Easy 

Green and Easy Red instead of other sectors, 

thereby threatening to clog that beach with 

vehicles under destructi ve artillery fire from 

the flanks. Consequently, the commander 

79 

of the 7th Naval Beach Battalion radioed an 

order (a bout 0830) suspending all landings of 

vehicles. During the next few hours scores 

of craft, including dukws and rhino-ferries, 

were milling about off the Easy Green and 

Easy Red sectors, waiting for a chance to 

come in. The dukws had particular difficulty in the rough seas, in which they had 

to run at least at half throttle to maintain 

steerage way. The consum ption this entailed would exhaust a fuel tank in 10 to 

12 hours, leaving the craft in danger of 

foundering. 

The tie-up affected the heavier weapons 

scheduled to support the attack off the 

beach and inland. The Antitank Company 

of the 116th RCT landed one gun platoon of 

three 57-mm' s, but they had to remain under 

fire for hours before they could move off the 

sand. Only two antiaircraft guns of the 

16th RCT were landed out of two batteries, 

the others being sunk in the effort to unload. 

The Cannon Company of the 16th RCT got 

its half tracks ashore at 0830 after two attempts, but they could not move more than 

50 yards through the litter of disabled 

vehicles. Its 6 howitzers were loaded on 

dukws, which were swamped one by one in 

the heavy seas with a loss of 20 personnel. 

Artillery uni ts of the regimental com bat 

teams were having a hard time getting toward shore, where they were scheduled to 

land between 0800 and 0900. The ll1th Field 

Artillery Battalion of the 116th RCT suffered 

complete disaster. The forward parties, including observers, liaison and reconnaissance 

sections, and the command group, landed between 0730 and 0830 in front of les Moulins. 

Remnants of the 2d BLT were immobilized 

there in front of the draw, and the artillery 

personnel suffered as hea viI y as had the 

infantry in getting from their craft to the 

shingle. They quickly decided that the 

guns could not land there, but their radio 

had been disabled by sea water and no radio 
on the beach was working. Lt. Col. Thornton L. Mullins, commander of the battalion, 

said, "To hell with our artillery mission. 

We've got to be infantrymen now." Although already wounded twice, Colonel 

Mullins went to work organizing little 

groups of infantry. Leading a tank forward, 

he directed its fire against an emplacement 

and as he started toward another tank across 

an open stretch, was killed by a sniper. 

The howitzers of the battalion were corning in on 13 dukws, each carrying 14 men, 

50 rounds of 105-mm ammunition, sandbags, 

and all essential equipment for set-up and 

maIntenance. This load made the dukws 

hard to maneuver from the start, especially 

for inexperienced crews. Five dukws were 

swamped within half a mile after lea ving the 

LCT's. Four more were lost while circling 

in the rendezvous area. One turned turtle 

as they started for the beach; another got 

within 500 yards of shore, stopped because 

of engine trouble, and was sunk by machinegun bullets. The last two dukws went on 

and about 0900 were close enough to see that 

there was no place to land on the beach. 

When they drew together and stopped to 

talk things over, one was disabled by 

machine-gun fire and then set ablaze by an 

artillery hit. Eight men swam ashore or 

to another craft. The surviving dukw had 

some near misses from artillery shells, turned 

away from the shore, and tried to find OUt 

from both shore and Navy where to go in. 

Shore gave contradictory advice; Navy had 

no ideas at all. The dukw pulled alongside 

a rhino-ferry to wait, but in a short time the 

crew realized the craft was in a sinking condition. Determined to save. the howitzer, 

twO or three men stayed on. They managed 

to move the dukw as far as another rhino 

with a crane aboard, and unloaded the howi tzer on this craft. The one gun of the III th 

got ashore that afternoon in charge of the 

7th Field Artillery Battalion. 

80 

Several other artillery units fared almost 

as badly. The 7th Field Artillery Battalion 

(l6th RCT) lost six of its lOS's on dukws that 

swamped en route to shore; the others 

could not land. The 58th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion had taken part in the 

fire support of the first landings, firing 

from LCT's. The commanding officer and 

reconnaissance officer were casualties soon 

after landing at 0730. At 1030, three of its 

LCT's attempted to land and struck mines; 

one capsized, one sank in seven feet of water, 

and a howitzer on the third was jettisoned 

to keep the craft afloat. The 62d Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion, likewise involved 

in the preliminary bombardment, attempted 

no landings in the morning. Elements of 

two self-propelled antiaircraft battalions 

(the 197th and 467th) began to land after 

0830. Losses in personnel and half tracks 

were considerable, but the guns were used 

in close support of infantry for fire on German emplacements. 

Conditions on the beach improved in the 

later morning. Fire from the main enemy 

strongpoints was gradually reduced, as one 

gun emplacement after another was knocked 

out, often by tanks. Fighting both the 

enemy and the tide, the tanks were leading a 

hard life, caught on the sand between high 

water and the embankment, unable to get 

past the shingle to the beach flat, and an 

open target for enemy guns. Unit control was 

almost impossible, with tanks scattered 

over long stretches of beach and hampered 

in maneuver. The commander of the 741st 

Tank Battalion came ashore at 0820 with a 

509 radio, but the radio was damaged by 

salt water and failed to function. The small 

command group had to contact individual 

tanks up and down the beach in an effort to 

control operations, losing three of its five 

members in the process. At the other end 

of the beach, Lr. Col. John S. Upham, Jr. , 

commanding the 743d, was shot down as he 
walked over to a tank for better direction of 

its fire. Nevertheless, the tanks kept on 

firing: one of them, disabled, until the rising 

tide drowned out the guns, others while the 

crew worked on dismounted tracks. Their 

achievement cannot be summed up in statistics; the best testimony in their favor is the 

casual mention in the records of many units, 

from all parts of the beach, of emplacements 

neutralized by the supporting fire of tanks. 

In an interview shortly after the battle, the 

commander of the 2d Battalion, 116th Infantry, who saw some of the worst fighting 

on the beach at les Moulins, expressed as his 

opinion that the tanks "saved the day. 

They shot the hell out of the Germans, and 

got the hell shot out of them." 

The destroyer Carmick, by what was described as "silent cooperation," did her 

best to help some tanks on Dog Green which 

had managed to get up on the promenade 

road and were trying to fight west toward 

the Vierville draw. The destroyer's observers watched for the tanks' fire to show 

targets on the bluff edge, and then used the 

bursts as a point of aim for the Carmick' s 

guns. 

Support from naval units, necessarily 

limited during the first landings, began to 

count heavily later on. Some of the landing 

craft had tried to support the debarking 

troops with the fire from their light guns. 

When Company G was landing near les 

Moulins, the infantry saw a patrol craft 

stand off directly in front of the enemy 

strongpoint to the east of the draw and 

pump shell after shell into it. German 

artillery gOt the craft's range and forced it 

VEHICLES ARE HELD ON THE TIDAL FLAT, "nable to get 

beyond the shingle, which was reached by high tide abo"t J 100, D 

Day. This sector is on Easy Red, and E-3 draw, still strongly defended by the German forces, is about a q"arter mile to the east (left). 

81 
ashore, still firing; it continued in action 

until a shell made a direct hit, setting the 

craft ablaze. Later in the morning, two 

landing craft made a conspicuous, fighting 

arrival in front of E-3 draw. LCT 30 drove 

at full speed through the obstacles, all 

weapons firing, and continued the fire on an 

enemy emplacement after touchdown. At 

the same time LCI (L) 544 rammed through 

the obstacles, firing on machine-gun nests in 

a fortified house. These exploits also helped 

demonstrate that the obstacles could be 

breached by larger craft, which had been 

hesitating at the approaches. 

Naval gunfire became a major factor as 

communications improved between shore 

and ships. At first, targets were still hard 

to find ; Gunfire Support Craft Group reported at 0915 that danger to friendly troops 

hampered fire on targets of opportunity; 

an NSFCP in contact with ships was told by 

General Cota ( about 08(0) that it was 

"unwise to designate a target." Between 

1000 and 1100 two destroyers closed to 

within a thousand yards to put the strongpoints from les Moulins eastward under 

heavy, effective fire. All along the beach, 

infantry pinned at the sea wall and engineers 

trying to get at the draws to carry out their 

mission were heartened by this intervention. One result may have beeo the decision 

to try to get some tanks through E-3 draw. 

At 1100, Colonel Taylor ordered all tanks 

available to go into action at that exit 

route. Of the several tanks that were 

able to move along the beach to the rallying 

point, only three arrived, and two of these 

were knocked out as they tried to go up 

the draw. 

One of the participants in this effort was 

Capt. W. M. King, who had been ordered 

to round up all the tanks and get them to 

E-3 draw. Captain King ran along the beach 

to the west, notifying each tank as he came 

to It. When he reached the last tank, he 

82 

found the commander wounded and took 

over. Backing away from the shingle, 

King drove east, weaving in and out of the 

wreckage along the beach. He made 200 

yards, then circled toward the water to 

avoid a tangle of vehicles and wounded men. 

A Teller mine, probably washed off a beach 

obstacle, blew the center bogie assembly off 

and broke the track . King and the crew 

proceeded on foot to E-3 1 ' 

The decisive improvement along the beach 

came at E-1 draw. The strongpoint on the 

east side had been neutralized by flanking 

action of the platoon from Company E, 

16th Infantry, after it reached the bluff top. 

The unfinished strongpoint on the other 

side was still partly in action, but was being 

contained by fire from Company M, 116th 

Infantry. Engineers of the 37th Engineer 

Combat Battalion were able to bulldoze their 

first gap through the dune line, just east of 

this draw, about 1000. Company C of the 

149th Engineer Combat Battalion made 

another gap to the west. The destroyers' 

intervention speeded up the progress; in 

the next two hours the antitank ditch was 

filled , mines were cleared, and the approach 

to the draw was made ready for vehicles. 

During the same period major infantry reinforcements were landing in front of E-1, 

and the last remnants of enemy resistance 

at that draw were about to be overpowered. 

Landing of Reinforcements 01/ Easy Red 

The 18th RCT had been scheduled to land 

on Easy Red in column of battalions, beginning about 0930 . Mter passing the line 

of departure, the first wa ve (LCVP' sand 

LCM's) ran into difficulties in maintaining 

formation and steering a straight course; 

there was much congestion of traffic toward 

I) In the ilIultruion on p. 107. K;n11'5 tank. No. 90' Company A. 74 1st Tank Battalion. can be lecn at Ihr spot where it was left. diu.bled. It is bdic\ed that this lame u nk. No.9, ;. the one shown in the .... aull lanJing on p. 44. 
HIGH-TIDE LANDINGS wae hindaed by Ihe btach obstaclu. 

LCI (L) 83, carrying combal enginars, approached Fox Green al 

0830, was unable 10 gel in, and debarked 72 m(1l on LCYP's. An 

artill~ry hit on the port bulwarks caused 16 cQsualtin . Finally 

beaching at 1 J 16, the craft was further damaged on one side by a mine 

bill all personnel debarked and Ihe LCI was floated off ,hal nighl. 

shore, with craft of all descriptions maneuvering in every direction . The 2d Battalion began landing just west of E-1 shortly 

after 1000. As they neared shore, troops of 

the 18th had no impression that any progress 

had been made from the beach: "The beach 

shingle was full of tractors, tanks, vehicles, 

bulldozers, and troops- the high ground was 

still held by Germans who had all troops 

on the beach pinned down- the beach was 

still under heavy fire from enemy small arms, 

mortars, and artillery." The underwater 

obstacles caused great difficulties, even 

though a narrow gap had been cleared near 

E-1; the Navy report for the transport group 

carrying the 18th Infantry lists 22 LCVP's, 

2 LCI eLY sand 4 LCT" s as lost a t the beach, 

83 

nearly all from being staved in by log ramps 

or hitting mines. Nevertheless, personnel 

losses in the 18th Infantry were light. 

On the right of E-1, the 2d Battalion 

found an enemy pillbox still in action. 

Fire from a tank supported the infantry in a 

first attempt, but the attack was stalled 

until naval fire was laid on. The NSFCP 

contacted a destroyer about 1,000 yards off 

shore and coordinated its action with the 

infantry assault. The affair was very nicely 

timed; the destroyers' guns, firing only a 

few yards over the crowded beach, got on 

the target at about the fourth round and the 

pillbox surrendered. Twenty Germans were 

taken prisoners. Thus, at about 1130, the 

last enemy defenses in front of E-1 draw 
A CROWDED BEACH remlted from landing of two infantry regiments (18th and 115th) in front of E-1 draw. This picture, taken 

at noon from 3,000 jut, .fhows the swarm of men, vehicles, and craft 

along 510 yards of shingle. The antitank ditch protects E-1 draw. 

were reduced. Within half an hour, engineers of the 16th RCT were clearing mines 

in the draw, and the Engineer Special 

Brigade Group units were working dozers 

on the western slope to push through an 

eXit. E-1 became the main funnel for movement off the beach, beginning with troops. 

The troop movement inland, however, 

was slowed up by congested landings at this 

84 

one area . Shortly after the first units of the 

18th RCT had landed, the LCI (L)"s of the 

1I5th Infantry began to touch down on top 

of them. The 1I5th, in reserve in Force 

"0," was scheduled by last-minute plans 

of V Corps to land at 1030 on Dog Red and 

Easy Green beaches. The LCI's were unable 

to find the control vessel for these seCtors 

and came in very much to the east, on Easy 
Red , where the 18th Infantry had started 

landing." The result was further congestion 

and confusion off that sector, and considerable delays for both regiments, both in making shore and in getting off the beach. 

Instead of getting in between 1030 and 1130, 

the 3d and 1st Battalions of the 18th Infan-

.t Le i M3 beached almost as faf east as the E-3 draw, where It was db· 

ahled by mines. (See illustration, p. IS). 

85 

try did not land until about 1300. Meantime, all the battalions of the 115th had 

come in together instead of at intervals, 

and the result was a partial scrambling of 

units on the beach. The 2d Battalion of the 

18th got off before noon; it was nearly 1400 

before the 115th had started inland, along 

with tne remainder of the 18th. Reorganization and movement were complicated by 

enemy fire on the beach area and by the 

difficlllties of getting through minefields on 

the narrow cleared paths. Fortunately, 

enemy mortar fire was apparently unobserved 

and ineffective, and artillery fil·e, now coming from inland, was directed at the landing 

craft. These suffered some hits, but casualties among the troops were light. Movement 

off the crowded beach took place on both 

sides of the draw rather than through it, 

since there were minefields and enemy emplacements up the draw inland. As the 2d 

Battalion of the 18th Infantry moved out, 

orders were received from Brig. Gen. Willard 

G. Wyman, assistant division commander of 

the 1st Division, to take over the mission of 

the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry. The 18th 

Infantry unit therefore moved left down Easy 

Red to the penetration route of the 16th 

and followed it toward Colleville. The 

battalions of the 115th pushed off toward 

assembly points southeast of St-Laurent, 

where they planned to reorganize; Col. 

Eugene N. Slappey, commanding, found 

General Wyman on the beach and received 

orders to carry out his primary mission in 

the Longueville area. However, before 

Colonel Slappey left to follow his battalions, 

General Cota arrived with news from the 

116th zone. On consultation with General 

Wyman, it was decided that one battalion 

of the 115th would be used to clean up 

St-Laurent. Radios were not working, and 

Colonel Slappey had heard nothing from 

his battalions when he started inland about 

1600 to find them. 
MAP NO. 6 The 2d Rallger BatlaliOIl at Poillte dll Hoe. 6 jlllle ( Photograph 15 jum 1944) 

86 
News of the movement inland from Easy 

Red reached the higher command, and was 

doubly welcome because V Corps Headquarters had been sweating through the 

first hours of the assault with very little 

information on what was really happening 

ashore. Back on the Ancon direct messages 

from the beach were almost entirely lacking, and Headquarters depended on what 

it picked up from reports of the Navy and 

from its Forward Information Detachment 

under Colonel Talley. This detachment 

tried to get to shore early on two dukws, 

but decided that radio equipment would 

probably be lost under the conditions of 

landing. Therefore, the dukws were kept 

cruising up and down the beach a few 

hundred yards off shore. Unfortunately, 

information both from this source and the 

Navy were limited by the difficulties of 

observation, and delays in transmittal; 

early news at V Corps Headquarters was 

fragmentary and not encouraging. Messages brought word of craft sunk, of heavy 

enemy artillery fire, of dukws swamping, 

and of troops pinned down. The first 

penetrations were made by small units on 

slopes often obscured by smoke or brush, 

and apparenrly escaped all notice from seaward observers. Main attention was narurally focused on the exits, where no progress 

was being made. At 0945, V Corps made 

its first report to First Army: "Obstacles 

mined, progress slow. 1st Battalion, 116th, 

reported 0748 being held up by machine-gun 

fire- two LCTs knocked our by artillery 

fire. DD tanks for Fox Green swamped." 

At 1155 Corps was still so far behind the 

situation that its next report to Army reads 

"situation beach exits Easy Fox and Dog 

still critical at 1100. 352d Infantry Division (German) identified- 115th Infantry 

directed to clea r high ground southwest of 

Easy Red at 1131- 16th and 116th ashore, 

fighting continuous on beaches, vehicles 

87 

coming ashore slowly. Reported that some 

Germans surrendering Easy Green." From 

1055 on, Colonel Talley had sent in 50me 

scraps of better news: "infiltration approximately platoon up draw midway between 

exits E-1 and Easy 3"; and "Men advancing up slope behind Easy Red , men 

believed ours on skyline." But these messages did not corne into Corps Headquarters 

until 1225- 1243. Not until 1309 could V 

Corps make its fust favorable report to 

Army: "Troops formerly pinned down on 

beaches Easy Red, Easy Green, Fox Red 

advancing up heights behind beaches." 

From that time on the Headquarters begins 

to catch up more closely with the situation, 

and the further information becomes more 

reassurtng. 

Another example of the difficulties of shipto-shore communications, and of the limited 

observation from seaward , is furnished by 

the report of a naval officer in the fire-support 

group. Shortly after noon, he came in 

close to shore, under fire from enemy guns. 

"Troops were plainly visible on the beach 

lying in the sand. So were the dead. 

Heavy machine-gun fire was coming from 

enemy positions halfway up the hill. Troops 

were unable to advance." Anxious to aid 

in breaking what seemed to be a stalemate, 

the officer requested permission from higher 

headquarters to lay down a rocket barrage. 

The request was denied because of the danger 

to assaulting troops "who may have filtered 

through. " 

The Rangers at Pointe du Hoe 

While the main assault was proceeding on 

Omaha beaches, three companies (D, E, and 

F) of the 2d Ranger Battalion were engaged 

in an isolated action three miles to the west 

(Map No.6). Led by Lt. Col. James E. 

Rudder, commander of the Provisional Ranger Force, about 200 men came in at Pointe 
du Hoe. Their primary mission was to seize 

that fortified position and neutralize its 

battery of six ISS-mm howitzers, which 

could put fire on the whole Omaha approaches, from the craft assembly area in to 

the beaches. 

The mission presented special difficulties. 

The beach at the Point was a 25-yard strip, 

surmounted by sheer cliff 85 to 100 feet high. 

The Rangers had been training for several 

months on English cliffs of similar character, 

and, as a result of experiment aided by the 

experiences of Bri tish Commandos, they had 

developed special equipment for their task. 

Each of the 10 LCA's was fitted with 3 pairs 

of rocket guns, firing grapnels which pulled 

up (by pairs) %-inch plain ropes, toggle 

ropes, and rope ladders. In addition, each 

craft carried a pair of small hand-projectortype rockets, which could be easily carried 

ashore and fired small ropes. Each craft 

also carried tu bular-steel extension ladders 

made up of light, four-foot sections suitable 

for quick assembly . Four dukws mounted 

a l00-foot extension ladder, fire-department 

type . Personnel of the assault parties carried 

minimum loads, with heavier weapons 

amounting to four BAR's and two 60-mm 

mortars per company. Two supply craft 

brought in packs, rations, demolitions, and 

extra ammunition for the three companies. 

Their assault plan provided for landing at 

H Hour, Companies E and F on the east side 

of the Point, Company D to the west. Unfortunately, one of the accidents of misdirection befell the Rangers; they headed 

eastward so far that, when the mistake was 

corrected, they had to approach the Point 

from that quarter on a course close to and 

almost paralleling the shore. Under fire 

from strongpoints along the cliffs, the 

flotilla came in 40 minutes late. This delay 

meant that the eight other companies of 

Rangers (A and B of the 2d Battalion, and 

the entire 5th Battalion), waiting off shore 

88 

for word of the assault, did not follow in to 

Pointe du Hoe but went toward Vierville. 

One LCA had been swamped, going down 

soon after lea ving the transport area; one of 

the supply boats sank IS minutes after the 

start, and the other jettisoned all packs 

aboard in order to stay afloat; one dukw was 

hit and sunk by 20-mm fire from a cliff 

position near the Point. The 9 surviving 

LCA's came in on a 400-yard front on the 

east side of the Point. Naval fire had been 

lifted since H Hour, and the enemy had been 

given time to recover and to man the trenches 

above the cliff. The destroyer Satterlee 

observed their movement and swept the 

cliff top with fire from all guns; nevertheless, 

scattered small-arms fire and automatic fire 

from a flanking machine-gun position beat 

around the LCA's, causing about IS casualties 

as the Rangers debarked on the heavily 

cratered strip of beach. The rockets had 

been fired immediately on touchdown. Some 

of the water-soaked ropes failed to carry 

over the cliff, but only one craft failed to get 

at least one grapnel to the edge. In one or 

twO cases, the demountable extension ladders were used. The dukws came in but 

could not get across the cratered beach, 

and from the water's edge their extension 

ladders would not reach the top of the cliff. 

Germans appeared on the cliff edge and 

started to harass the Rangers directly below 

them wi th rifle fire and grenades. This 

show of enemy resistance was promptly discouraged; BAR men picked off the riflemen 

as they exposed themselves, and the destroyer Satterlee, corning in at close range, 

swept the cliff top with a few minutes of 

concentra ted fires from all her guns. The 

escalade was not delayed. In less than five 

minutes from time of touchdown, the first 

Rangers, by one type of rope or another, 

were getting to the cliff tOp. Some, covered 

with mud from having fallen into deep 

crater-pools on the beach, had trouble in 
TH E TIP Of POI NT E DU HO E was ra,'aged by bombs and 

1Iaf'al firt . LCA 861 oj Company E, 2d Rallgers landed just below. 

o,u of iu rope ladders, attached to a grapnel carried ova the cliff 

by a TOCkf!, was Itill in piau wllell photo was taken in j une, / 9./.5. 

climbing. A few ropes had been cut by the 

enemy or had slipped from the anchorage. 

The first men up waited no longer than it 

too k for three or four to assemble, then 

moved out on prearranged missions toward 

the gun positi ons. They found themselves 

in a no-man's land of incredible destruction, 

all landmarks gone, and the ground so 

89 

cratered that if men got 15 feet apart they 

were immediately Out of contact. Only a 

few enemy were seen, and th ese were quickly 

driven to cover in a network of ruined 

trench es connecting deep dugouts and emplacements. One after another, the small 

ad vance parties reached their appointed gun 

emplacements, only to find them empty. 
THE CLIFFS AT POINTE DU HOE were assaulted undeT difficult conditions. Hert, a section of cliff smashed off by bombardment made a mound from which Rangas worked to the top by TOPts. 

Photo was taken afur the first assault partin had captured the Point. 

The gun positions, three of them casemated, 

were partly wrecked; the guns had been 

removed . Without hesitation, the Ranger 

parties started inland on their next mission: 

to reach the coastal highway, set up a 

defensive position cutting that main route 

between Vierville and Grandcamp, and 

await the arrival of the 116th Infantry from 

Omaha Beach. 

90 

They were still proceeding by small parties 

which joined up gradually as they moved 

inland. Three hundred yards from the fortified area they came under small-arms fire and 

artillery fire from the south. Fifteen men 

were killed or wounded as they pushed 

straight on, wiping out two small nests of 

resistance. About 36 men from Companies 

D and E reached the highway shortly after 
0800; farther west, a dozen or so from Company F came out on the blacktop at the 

same time and joined up. The force took 

up a defensive position in fields juSt beyond 

the road, putting one group in position to 

block the highway toward Grandcamp. 

A few enemy parties had been met and driven 

off with losses during the speedy advance. 

Patrolling was started at once. About 

0900, two Rangers went down a lane 200 

yards off the main road and found the 

missing ba ttery of 5 guns. Cleverly camouflaged, they were sited for fire on either 

Omaha or Utah Beach and large ammunition 

stocks were ready at hand, but there were 

no enemy in or near the position. The 

patrol put two guns out of commission with 

incendiary grenades and went back for more 

grenades. While they were gone, a second 

patrol finished the job of disabling the guns 

and set fire to the powder. Word was sent 

back to the Point that the main objective 

had thus been accomplished. 

There was mounting evidence that the 

enemy on or near the Point was recovering 

from his confusion. East of the fortified 

area a machine-gun emplacement which had 

caused most of the losses on the beach was 

assaulted by some men of Company F. They 

were unable to reach it, and the position 

remained in action until the whole cliff 

edge was blown into the sea by naval fire 

late in the morning. Just west of the Point 

an antiaircraft emplacement near the cliff 

edge began to sweep the Point with fire. 

By 0740 all the Ranger boat teams were up, 

and a dozen men of the late-comers were 

di verted from going inland and sent to 

attack this antiaircraft position. As they 

worked toward it through craters, artillery 

and mortar fire stopped them and the party 

scattered. A few minutes later a German 

counterattack, emerging from tunnels or 

nearby trenches, overwhelmed and captured 

all but one man. So torn up was the ground 

91 

that the command post group, in a crater 

only a hundred yards away, was unaware of 

what had happened until the survivor 

returned. Another assault was hastily improvised, consisting of a dozen riflemen and 

a mortar section. They got halfway to the 

strongpoint and were caught by artillery fire, 

which killed or wounded nearly every man 

in the party. 

For the rest of the day the small force on 

the Point was in a state approaching siege. 

Enemy snipers appeared in the fortified area, 

and despite several attempts, the Rangers 

could never clean out the maze of wrecked 

pOSltlOns. Three or four Germans still held 

out on the tip of the Point in an undamaged 

concrete observation post. During the 

afternoon two enemy counterattacks coming 

from the direction of St-Pierre-du-Mont were 

stopped, the most dangerous one by accurate 

and rapid fire from the Rangers' only remalfl1ng mortar. The antiaircraft position 

was still very much in action, and destroyer 

fire could not quite reach it. Communication with the advance party on the highway 

was intermittent, depending chiefly on 

patrols that occasionally .had to fight their 

way through. 

The command post on the Point was out 

of communication with the assault forces 

on the main beaches, but was able to 

contact naval support ships with blinker 

and (later) radio. Naval Shore Fire Control Party No.1 waS able to establish communications as early as 0728 with the 

Satterlee, which stayed on hand for the 

rest of D Day and gave extremely useful fire 

support. In the afternoon a message from 

the Point came through to V Corps via the 

Navy, "Located Pointe du Hoe-mission 

accomplished-need ammunition and reinforcement-many casualties." This, the 

only word received on D Day from Colonel 

Rudder's force, left considerable doubt and 

anxiety at headquarters. 
ADVANCE INLAND 

THE PENETRA TrONS of the beach defenses made between 0800-0900 represen ted a 

definite success, achieved by determined action in the face of great difficulties. Nevertheless, the success was limited in certain 

respects that handicapped all later efforts 

to exploit the breakthroughs and attain 

D-Day objectives. Only fractions of the 

assault BL T's got up the bluffs in the morning, at first in scattered groups that were 

rarely of more than company strength and 

were sometimes only one or two boat sections. They had few heavy weapons, no 

tanks, and no supporting artillery, and it 

took time to establish communications well 

enough to make effective use of naval fire 

support beyond the bluffs. As a result of 

the loss of equipment, communications within and between units were to be very limited 

all through the day. Intermingling of units 

was common in the larger groups that 

reached the high ground, and the time 

spent in overcoming this difficulty was increased by the loss of officers, the scattering 

of headquarters groups, and the lack of 

commUnlcatlons. The fact that all the exits 

were still blocked and that the beach was 

still under fire prevented early reinforcement 

of the advance groups. Some elements of 

the assault waves were still behind the sea 

wall, mentally' 'pinned down," and it took 

time and effort to get them forward, often 

after lateral movement to reach the penetration areas. The reserve regiments, delayed 

by confusion that resulted from landing intermingled on a narrow sector, did not play 

92 

much part until midafternoon. Even then, 

their strength was not fully used. 

Enemy opposition was aided by these 

weaknesses in the assault and by terrain 

favorable for delaying action. Again and 

again, the advancing groups ran into small 

pockets of resistance in prepared positions, 

usually built around machine guns dug in 

along hedgerows and having good fields of 

fire. Locating these positions was difficult 

because of the confusion caused by many 

snipers in the area, and it took time to reduce 

the resistance with weapons available. Bypassing often resulted in the splitting up of 

assault groups and in progressive loss of 

control as movement proceeded inland. The 

difficulties of fighting in hedgerow country 

were not easy to solve under any circumstances, much less those of their first experience. Though the Germans were concentrated in as much as company strength 

at only one or two points, such as Colleville, 

they were able to stop the V Corps ad vance 

far short of D-Day objectives. 

The battle inland can best be followed in 

terms of three areas, centering around the 

three villages on the coastal highway which 

were preliminary objectives in the advance. 

In two of these, Colleville and St-Laurent, 

main points of enemy resistance were encountered. In all three areas, the story is 

that of a number of assault units, usually in 

less than battalion strength, fighting more 

or less uncoordinated and separate actions 

(Maps Nos. VII and VIII for the morning 

period; Map No. IX for afternoon)' 
Vierville Area 

In the period OB()()-{)900, upwards of 600 

men went off Dog White Beach (Map No. 

VII) . Besides Company C, which led the 

way, the advance included most of the main 

Ranger force (eight companies), 116th Headquarters, some engineer troops of the 121st 

Engineer Combat Battalion, and fragments 

of Companies B, F, G, and H . Reaching 

the top in small groups, the troops tended 

to stop and bunch in the first fields near the 

edge of the bluff. What little order they 

had was lost as they became intermingled 

with units arriving later, and reorganization was a slow process. Though there 

were no enemy positions in action near by, 

snipers, harassing long-range fire from a 

few machine guns, and a brief period of 

shelling from BB-mm guns contributed to the 

confusion, and it was two hours before much 

progress was made. One small group had 

long since gone inland by itself. A platoon 

of 5th Battalion Rangers, 1st Lt. Charles 

H . Parker, Jr., commanding, on reaching 

the bluff crest had seen no other troops, and 

immediately started southwest to get around 

Vierville and reach the battalion assembly 

area. After making a half-mile without 

meeting opposition, the platoon was stopped 

by enemy fire from hedgerows near the 

Chateau de Vaumicel, just south of Vier ville. 

They spent the rest of the morning working 

past this fire toward the chateau grounds. 

When the CP group of the 116th RCT 

came over the bluff after 0900 they found 

Rangers and 116th elements scattered all 

through the fields ahead , with leading 

elements near the coastal highway. The 

communications section of headquarters had 

landed on another beach; the only working 

radio belonged to the liaison officer of the 

743d Tank Battalion. Completely out of 

touch with division, Colonel Canham had 

no contacts with any of his battalion headquarters, did not know what was happening 

at the exits in the 116th zone, and could 

onl y assume that the rest of the assault 

battalions were on their way to assembly 

areas. 

93 

Movement finally began between 1000-

1100, with General Cota assisting in getting 

units started . The 5th Ranger Battalion 

planned to push across the coastal highway 

and go around Vierville to the south, while 

the 116th elements went toward the village. 

The Rangers' advance in column was stopped 

when the first elements reached the highway 

and an enemy machine gun opened up from 

the hedgerow one field to the south. The 

column halted while a platoon went after 

the machine gun by working down an axial 

hedgerow. In the course of this action, 

another enemy machine gun opened up to 

the left of the first. Another Ranger platoon 

attacked this gun , and once again uncovered 

new enemy fire positions along the hedgerows still farther east. A third outflanking 

attack was started, ran into additional 

machine-gun fire, and was called back pending an attempt to get artillery support. 

The 5Bth Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

had just put some guns ashore, but the 

forward observer reported that their fire at 

this range was impossible because of the 

mask presented by the bluff. About four 

hours had been consumed in these efforts. 

At 1400 the Rangers gave up the attempt to 

move south from the highway and instead, 

followed the coastal highway into Vierville. 

Tha t rou te had al read y been taken several 

hours before. Company C and small elements of other 116th companies, some of 

them moving in isolated groups, had gone 

that way; so had Company B of the 5th 

Rangers, which headed down the Vierville 

highway under the mistaken impression 

that the Ranger battalion column was following just behind. With General Cota close 

behind the leading elements, Vierville was 
THE VIERV1LLE DRAW UNDER FIRE. Th, tim' of th, 

action pictured abovt is U11urtain, hut this may hav( bu n thf bombardmmt be/wan 1200 and 1300 that knockrd out th, Jlrongpoi7lts. Th, 

Yitrville 1luple, in the background, was lattr dtmolishtd by naval firt . 

entered before llOO. Except for scattered 

fire from the outskirts when the advance . . was starting, no enemy resistance was encountered. A platoon of Company B, 116th 

Infantry, went through Vierville out of 

contact with the rest and turned south toward the chateau. On the way, they encountered a German resistance nest, assaulted 

it, and took 14 prisoner~. A licrle beyond 

the chateau, the platoon was attacked by 

Germans who had just deployed from three 

trucks coming up from the south . The 

Company B unit, reduced to 25 men and 

lacking automatic weapons, withdrew to 

the chateau and stopped the enemy acrack 

with well-aimed rifle fire. Here they were 

joined about noon by Parker's platoon from 

Company A, 5th Rangers, which had been 

coming toward the chateau across country. 

N ei ther party knew there were any other 

friendly forces near Vierville. 

94 

Company B of the 5th Rangers and Company C, 116th Infantry, passed through 

Vierville before noon ancl started west on 

the coastal highway toward Pointe du Hoe. 

About 500 yards out of Vierville they were 

stopped by fire from prepared emplacements 

along hedgerows which ran at right angles 

to the highway. During the next few 

hours, the Rangers and Company C worked 

together in efforts to outflank or neutralize 

this position. Enemy machine-gun positions were well camouflaged and hard to 

locate; every time a move was started across 

open fields, it was checked by fire from 

German rifles and automatic weapons at 

ranges of two to three hundred yards. At 

1700 the main Ranger force came up and 

plans for an acrack were started, then called 

off later in the evening. Colonel Canham 

decided nOt to press the effort along the 

coastal highway toward Pointe du Hoe, 
since the 5th Rangers constituted the larger 

part of his forces for defense of Vierville. 

The: command group of the 116th RCT 

had come through Vierville about noon on 

its way to the prearranged CP location, a 

little southwest of the village. When the 

small party reached that spot, sniped at all 

the way, they found themselves out of 

contact with any friendly units and uncomfortably isolated. A platoon of Company B, 5th Rangers, came by on a flanking 

maneuver and was impressed as a guard for 

the CPo Patrols sent towards Louvieres to 

find the 2d Battalion fought their way for 

a thousand yards south through scattered 

opposition and returned without having 

seen any friendly forces. Small skirmishes 

took place near the CP all afternoon, and 15 

Germans were killed in the immediate vicini ty. At 1830, the commander of the 1st 

Battalion reported in, having got up from 

Charlie Beach, and Colonel Canham found 

out for the first time what had happened on 

the beaches in front of Vierville exit. 

Toward midnigh t, he learned that the 2d 

and 3d Battalions were near St-Laurent. 

At nightfall the Vierville area was the 

weakest part of the beachhead. The 5th 

Ranger Battalion, remnants of the 1st Battalion, 116th, and a few small elements of 

engineer units and of the 2d and 3d Battalions (a group from Company K arrived in 

the evening and was used for headquarters 

security) were holding defensive positions 

west and southwest of the village. Separated during the day, these units were 

finally brought into contact, but no other 

friendly forces in any strength were nearer 

than St-Laurent. No reinforcements had 

landed in the Vierville sector, and the exit 

from the beach was only beginning to open 

for traffic by dark. 

Yet, had there been any force on hand to 

use for the purpose, the Vier ville draw 

could have been cleaned up any time during 

9S 

the afternoon. Between 1200 and 1300, 

heavy naval fire, directed by shore observers 

with the 116th and including the main 

batteries of the Texas, was put on the strongpoint guarding D-l dra w. After the first four 

salvos of four rounds each, the destroyer 

McCook radioed shore that Germans were 

leaving concrete emplacements to surrender, 

30 prisoners being taken by engineers on the 

beach. Further fire completed the neutralization of the heavily fortified area . Shortly 

after the naval guns stopped firing, General 

Cota went down the exit road to the beach 

to find out why no traffic had yet come 

through. Accompanied by four or five men, 

he got all the way down, past the strongpoints and the antitank wall and out onto 

the beach flat, without drawing more than 

scattered small-arms fire. Five Germans, 

taken prisoner from holes in the cliff-side 

along the way, led the party through a 

minefield at the entrance. The general saw 

little activity on the beach flat at D-l. The 

onl y infantry nearby were the exhausted 

remnants of Company A, 116th, and the 

tanks were further east along the flat . 

General Cota walked along the promenade 

road to investigate conditions at les Moulins, 

after finding that engineer troops were 

about to start work on the obstacles in the 

Vierville draw. 

The 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, 

responsible for the D-l exit, had experienced 

the usual troubles in landing; its units were 

scattered as far as les Moulins, 75 percent of 

its equipment had been lost in landing, and 

personnel losses had run high. The battalion officers had spent several hours collecting their men, and salvaging explosives 

and equipment along the beach. The work 

of reorganization was made difficult by 

scattered fire from snipers along the bluff, 

and small combat patrols were used in an 

attempt to clean out bluff positions. One 

of the patrols entered the Hamel-an-Pretre 
HEAD OF D-3 DRAW, on the edge oj St-Lallrent. The GermanI 

held prepared positions on tke high ground to the right, and the 3d 

Battah·on, 116th lnja'tliry, was unable to make much progroJ beyond 

here on the aJternoon oj D Day. (Photograph taken June, 1945.) 

strongpoint and found it wrecked by naval 

lire and almost abandoned. However, here 

and at the Vierville draw, long connecting 

tunnels, some of them going as far inland 

as the village, afforded a shelter for the 

enemy and made a quick clean-up of the 

fortilications impossible. 

One 5th Ranger platoon (Company A) 

managed to get all the way to Pointe du 

Hoe, four miles through enemy-infested 

country. At 1430, Lieutenant Parker left 

the chateau south of Vierville and started 

for the 5th Rangers' assembly area. On 

the wa.y, they encounter~d a small enemy 

strongpoint and overwhelmed it, killing 2 

Germans and capturing 12. The 24 Rangers 

reached their assembly area, found no one 

there, concluded the 5th Battalion had gone 

on toward Pointe du Hoe, and decided to 

96 

follow. Taking the prisoners with them 

and moving on secondary roads south of the 

coastal highway, the platoon gOt through 

Engles'lueville and on to a point almost 

south of their goal before they were stopped 

by lire from prepared enemy positions. 

Trying again to "bull through" the opposition, the Rangers found themselves outflanked and near! y surrounded; they had to 

light their way out and make a short withdrawal. They then left the roads, struck 

north across country, and about 2100 joined 

the inland group of 2d Battalion Rangers, 

in their defensive positions just south of the 

Grandcamp-Vierville highway. The Company A platoon had not seen the 5th Battalion since leaving the beach, but still 

believed it must be close behind and so 

informed Colonel Rudder at the Point. 
SI-Laurent Area 

Except for Company M , pinned 0!1 the 

beach flat near E-1 draw, most of the 3d 

Battalion, 116th Infantry, had reached high 

ground by 1000 and were starting to push 

south. As a result of enemy resistance in 

and near St-Laurent, they were to make only 

a half mile of progress during the rest of 

the day. 

No clear picture can be drawn of the confused fighting that took place during the 

morning, as a dozen or more groups, varying from one to four or five boat teams in 

size, worked south from the bluff tOward 

St-Laurent, with the aim of reaching a battalion assembly area west of the village 

(Maps Nos. 3 and VII). The fields between 

St-Laurent and the bluffs are cut by unusually few hedgerows, and the open ground 

made the ad vancing troops more conscious 

of hostile fire, even when it was wild. Here 

and there, small enemy detachments with 

machine guns offered resistance from prepared and well dug-in positions, and a number of skirmishes were fought by sections of 

Company Land 1. By noon most of Company L and several sections of I were at the 

edge of St-Laurene, on the northwest, where 

the road from les Moulins comes into the 

village at the head of the draw. An enemy 

rocket battery in this area had been disposed of by Company 1"s mortar fire and a 

naval shell. Company K was nearby, and 

the battalion command group was endeavoring to bring the units together and effect 

a preliminary reorganization . Major Bingham had worked east on the beach from les 

Moulins with a handful of men from F, H, 

and Headquarters of the 2d Battalion, and 

this group had now come inland. 

Enemy resistance was stiffening. Snipers 

were in the straggling village, but the main 

trouble came from the western end of StLaurent. Here, dug in on the high ground 

97 

commanding the upper end of the draw, 

Germans estimated at a company in strength 

controlled the approaches to the main crossroad, and their machine guns had good fields 

of fire on all the upper draw. Two boat 

teams of K and a few men of I, trying to 

bypass the enemy resistance to the north, 

cut across the draw about halfway down 

toward les Moulins. Making their way 

across country, this group found its way to 

the coastal highway, sighted the 5th Rangers ahead, and tailed them into Vierville . 

On the way, the Company K group was 

attacked by a small enemy party from the 

flank and lost several men to surprise machine-gun fire. Eventually, the K group 

reached regimental headquarte.s and was 

used as its security detachment for that 

night. 

The rest of the ba ttalion was held at the 

crossroad all afternoon. Several attempts to 

advance were stopped by machine-gun fire , 

from positions which the men were unable 

to locate. Company L suffered most of its 

casualties for the day in these actions. At 

dark, the greater part of the 3d Battalion 

was still at the head of the draw, Company 

M having come up during the afternoon 

from E-l. Nearby, the command group of 

the 2d Battalion had a handful of men from 

G and F; the rest of that battalion was 

scattered all the way from Colleville to 

Vierville, and a few troops were still held 

on the beach at les Moulins. 

St-Laurent had also proved a sturn bling 

block for the 115th Infanery , com ing at it 

from the northeast. That regimene, landing 

in frone of E-1 draw just before noon, took 

three or four hours to clear the beach, going 

up mostly to the east of the draw. Somewhat disorganized by ineermingling with 

the 18th RCT, the battalions were attempting to reach assembly poines a thousand 

yards inland, and southwest of St-Laurent. 

The 115th's transportation was not due in 
on D Day, so the men were carrying as 

heavy loads as possible; the heavy weapons 

sections were particularly burdened, with 

guns, mortars, and extra ammunition to 

hand-carry. Scattered harassing fire from 

snipers and occasional machine guns also 

slowed down the movement. The 2d Battalion reached St-Laurent, met opposition 

in the village, and spent tbe afternoon trying 

to clean out a small enemy force , estimated 

at not more than a company in strength. 

Once again, the main difficulty for the inexperienced troops was to locate enemy fire 

positions in terrain affording so much cover. 

Toward dusk when the attack was finally 

well started, naval gunfire hit in the village, 

caused a number of casualties in the 2d 

Battalion, and stopped the effort. The battalion was drawn south of St-Laurent for 

the night, where it joined the 1st Battalion. 

This unit had reached a position near the 

Formigny road a few hundred yards sourh 

of St-Laurent, making slow progress against 

snipers and some mortar fire. The 3d Battalion had not reached the St-LaurentColleville road by dark . 

Elements of five battalions had spent the 

afternoon and evening of D Day fighting 

through an area of about a square mile 

which contained only scattered pockets of 

enemy resistance. The effectiveness of the 

attacking forces had been reduced by a 

number of factors, including lack of communications, difficulties of control, and the 

absence of artillery and armored suppOrt. 

Collevitle Area 

When Company G got past the bluff and 

started inland, about 0900, they were 

bothered only by light sniping and occasional 

signs of minefields and made rapid progress 

for a thousand yards to the south. They 

were advancing in their designated zone 

and according to plan (Maps Nos. 4, p. 66, 

98 

and VIll). The first objective was a German 

bivouac area a quarter-mile west of Colleville; from there the company would turn 

into Colleville. Company G approached 

the bivouac area a bou t 0930 and received 

heavy fire from automatic weapons and 

mortars on both flanks of its advance. A 

two-hour action followed, with house-tohouse fighting before the enemy was driven 

out of the area. The company suffered 12 

casualties. Remnants of a Company F section and small elements of H, and two sections of Company E, 116th, had followed 

G's route from the beach and joined up 

during the morning, giving a strength of 

about 150 men for the attack on Colleville. 

A little after noon, a section of G started 

into the western edge of the village, but 

was unable to progress against strong resistance after seizing the first few buildings. 

The rest of the company was extended to 

the west, and the section farthest out on 

that wing lost contact. By some misunderstanding, the two 116th sections withdrew 

toward the bivouac area. Small groups of 

enemy filtered through the gaps, a pillbox 

near the head of E-3 draw was still in 

action, and fire came from flanks and rear, 

giving the impression of encirclement. For the 

next two hours, Company G fought on thedefensive, inflicting 18 casualties on the enemy. 

This action marked the nearest approach on 

D Day to a German counterattack made 

in any strength. At about 1500, the situation was relieved by the arrival of the 2d 

Battalion, 18th Infantry, which came up 

from E-l draw with orders to take over the 

2d Battalion, 16th Infantry's mission. But 

Company G was unable to get farther into 

Colleville, and suffered eight casualties when 

supporting naval fire hit the houses in the 

village. Enemy resistance was unshaken 

by the bombardment. 

Company G had felt itself isolated during 

this period, an impression which was char-
ENTRANCE TO COLLEVILLE FROM WEST. Aft" advance 

from EaJY Rd Blach, Company G, 16th Infantry, fought into thiJ 

village just afur noon, then was held the r(Jt of the day by bittu enemy 

fnistance in hOUJtJ JUJt bryond chuTch. (Photo taken j une, 1945.) 

99 
acteristic of most of the inland fighting on 

D Day. Actually, the advance from Easy 

Red had been followed up by a number of 

other units which by noon were not far from 

Colleville . Between Colleville and Easy 

Red Beach, battalion and regimental command groups were working hard to organize 

the scattered assault forces and build up 

support. However, contacts were irregular, 

the hedgerows cut off observation, and small 

enemy groups held on tenaciously in bypassed positions, from which they opened 

with harassing fire on the flanks or rear of 

advancing units and drew them into a mopping-up action that might consume two or 

three hours. Other enemy groups, trying 

to get back from the bluff positions, added to 

the confusion by appearing in areas supposedly cleared up. In this fashion, small 

separate battles were developing throughout 

the day almost anywhere between E-l and 

E-3 draws and south beyond the highway. 

Advance under these conditions was more or 

less blind, and coordinated action by the 

assault forces became almost impossible. 

Lt. Col. Herbert C. Hicks, Jr., commanding the 2d Battalion of the 16th RCT, had 

followed Company G toward Colleville and 

was endeavoring to get other units of his 

battalion toward that area. The only sizable group he could find during the morning 

was made up of about SO men of Company E, 

including Lieutenant Spalding' s section from 

the E-l strongpoint. This party reached the 

coastal highway about noon and pushed 

several hundred yards beyond to cover the 

right flank of G. Moving with a section of 

G, the group came under sniper fire from the 

rear and lost contact with fri endly units. 

Later in the afternoon, deciding that they 

were in danger of being Cut off, the Company 

E detachment withdrew toward Colleville. 

Meantime, elements of the 1st Battalion 

were reaching the same general area. Companies Band C reached the highway by 1300, 

100 

near the bivouac area through which G had 

already fought . They spent several hours 

cleaning snipers Out of the woods in the 

vicinity, and made about 300 yards progress 

southward by dark. Company A, slowed in 

getting up the bluff, spent the morning and 

early afternoon fighting a machine-gun nest 

in the woods at the edge of E-l draw, halfway to the highway. It rejoined the battalion late in the day. 

The 18th Infantry had landed in front of 

E-l draw from 1100 to 1400. One after 

another, as the battalions started inland, 

General Wyman turned them from their 

original missions to take over those of the 

16th Infantry. The 2d Battalion of the 18th 

pushed toward Colle ville to he! P the 2d 

Battalion of the 16th. Enemy groups were 

still scattered along the route of advance, 

inflicting casualties by rifle and machine-gun 

fire that seemed to be sited for covering the 

gates and hedgerow openings. By 1500, the 

battalion was passing west of Company G, 

16th Infantry; at dark it was on the edge of 

the high ground 500 yards south and southeast of Colleville, with nOt much resistance 

to its front but a good deal of fire coming 

from the rear. The 1st Battalion ran into 

two platoons of Germans holding trenches 

near the head of E-1 draw, and was busy 

until late in the afternoon cleaning out that 

area and dealing with enemy parties who 

attempted to escape up the draw from bypassed positions. The 3d Battalion, moving 

in reserve, received orders at 1615 to take 

over the objectives of the 1st Battalion, 16th 

Infantry: capture of Formigny and Surrain . 

At 1800, the 3d Battalion, bothered by 

snipers, was still north of the coastal highwa y and received the more modest mission 

of reaching the high ground south of the 

highway and filling the gap between the 1st 

and 29th Division units. At midnight the 

3d Battalion was still short of the highway. 

The 1st Battalion, having finished enemy 
resistance near the head of the draw, was 

ordered to attack toward Surrain. By midnight, it was reportedly near the St-LaurentColleville highway. 

A mile to the east of Colleville, the 3d 

Battalion of the 16th Infantry had been 

fighting all day on its own, out of contact 

with the rest of the regiment. Mter taking 

the bluff strongpoint at F-l draw, the intermingled units of the battalion were reorganized on the high ground behind the 

bluffs. The advance off the beach had been 

made by elements of six companies (including Company F of the 16th and Company E 

of the 116th), but the force that now moved 

inland numbered little over 100 men . Patrols 

were sent ahead, but the three men sent to 

Cabourg ran into a German strongpoint and 

were captured. Enemy groups were still 

to the rear near the bluffs and even attempted 

a counterattack in platoon strength. In 

the afternoon , the battalion moved lflto Ie 

Grand-Hameau. With the enemy holding 

Cabourg in some strength, there could be no 

question of further advance. During the 

evening, other elements got off the beach, 

some 17 tanks came up, and the 3d Battalion 

occupied defensive positions blocking the 

coastal highway at Ie Grand-Hameau. 

The 26rh Infantry, loaded in Force "B," 

arrived in the transport area at 1300 and was 

ordered to land at 1800 near E-3 exit. The 

regiment was ashore by 2100 and received 

orders to put the 3d Battalion in a defensive 

position on the road south from St-Laurent 

to Formigny, with the 2d Battalion close 

behind it ready to attack through the 3d 

Battalion in the morning. The battalions 

were moving toward their objectives during 

the night. The 1st Battalion went up 

east ofE-3 exit to protect the left flank of the 

16th Infantry. 

General Huebner and the command group, 

1st Division, landed on Easy Red at 1900 

and joined General Wyman at the division 

101 

command post, located in the entrance of 

E-l draw. General Gerow and the advance 

headquarters of V Corps left the Ancon for 

shore at 2030. 

Afternoon on the Beach 

In the early afternoon, destroyers continued their work of knocking out enemy 

gun emplacements along the beach front. 

The strongpoint guarding the Vierville draw 

was silenced by 1300; somewhat later, the 

dangerous flanking positions near Pointe de 

la Percee were literally blown off the face 

of the cliff. These actions greatly helped 

the situation on the beach, but by no means 

ended all enemy opposition. Though the 

most dangerous enemy guns were now neutralized and some emplacements were surrendered without a fight, there was still 

enough resistance to block three of the main 

exits. The Vierville draw, as General 

Cota's trip through it showed, was ready 

for opening, but there was not enough force 

at hand for systematic mopping-up of the 

weakened positions. Resistance at the D-3 

and E-3 draws was still strong enough to 

block any movement through those exit 

routes. There and elsewhere, Germans made 

use of the maze of communications trenches 

and tunnels by emerging from dugouts to 

reoccupy emplacements believed neutralized. 

Snipers reappeared along the bluffs in areas 

where penetrations had been made. Above 

all, artillery from inland positions kept up 

sporadic harassing fire on the beach flat. 

Directed by observers in the remaining 

strongpoints, this shelling was most severe 

from Easy 'Green eastward and reached its 

height in the late afternoon. Hits were 

still occasionally made on landing craft, 

sinking or setting them afire; vehicles were 

struck as they jammed the approaches to 

the exits or tried to move laterally along 

the beach. Not heavy enough to inflict 
rna jar losses or [0 s[OP progress, this fire 

could still hamper and delay the effort [0 

bring order into the confusion on the beach 

flat. Neither inland observers nor reconnaissance planes located the enemy batteries, 

and Navy guns could not intervene effectively. Throughout D Day, naval fire on 

inland targets relied mainly on observation 

by spotter planes. The destroyer Carmick, 

in contact with an NSFCP at 1720, made 

several attempts [0 locate the enemy battery 

firing on E-l draw, but the observers' 

party finally gave up, admitting it was 

guessing as [0 location of the German guns. 

Nevertheless, the engineers were able [0 

make steady progress in their vital task of 

clearing and organizing the beach for movement inland. As the tide lowered, the remnants of the demolition teams went [0 work 

again on the exposed obstacles, although 

four parties had [0 interrupt their work [0 

deal with harassing fire from enemy snipers 

on the bluff. They completed three gaps 

partially opened in the morning, made four 

new ones, and widened some of the others. 

By evening, 13 gaps were fully opened and 

102 
LANDINGS WERE DELAYED and in tht afttrnoon the approach 

to th~ b~ach was crowd~d with craft wat"ting to come in as the reuding 

tide unco fJ t'red obstada. A rhino-ferry, with crant's aboard, hal 

come in near some drowned-out trucks. Ln M oulin! (D-3) at right. 

marked, and an estimated 35 percent of the 

obstacles on the beach had been cleared. 

Along the beach flat, units of the Engineer 

Special Brigade Group were making gaps in 

the embankment, clearing minefields, and 

doing what they could to get at the exits. 

More of their units and equipment were 

getting ashore, though mislandings still occurred to upset assignments. Fox Beach 

was ready for development, but the 336th 

Battalion , scheduled to land there, was 

brought in at the opposite end of Omaha 

Beach, 4,()()() yards away. About 1500 the 

103 

unit began a difficult journey to reach F-1 

exit. Enemy artillery fire harassed it all the 

way, especially in front of D-3 and E-3 

draws. At E-3 shelling was so heavy that 

men were sent across the exposed area in pairs. 

When about half had crossed, a dozer at 

work near the shingle was hit and burned, 

sending up clouds of smoke which covered 

the remainder of the movement. The 336th 

Engineers reached F-1 exit at 1700, with a 

loss of six men . A trailer loaded with explosi ves and towed by a tractor had made 

the tri p unsca thed . 
The primary condition for improvement 

on the beach was to get vehicles started 

inland, thus relieving congestion and permitting further landings. This became possi ble after the fire of destroyers and the 

advance of the 18th Infantry had cleared up 

the last enemy resistance at E-l draw. Gaps 

had already been cut through rhe embankment, and the engineers of the 1st, 37rh, and 

149rh Battalions were ready to exploir rhe 

advantage. Between l200 and 1300, dozers 

under fire from snipers cut a road up the 

western slope of rhe draw toward St-Laurenr, 

and the movement of vehicles began almost 

at once. Landings were resumed on Easy 

Red and Easy Green, the first group of preloaded dukws coming in by 1400. Enemy 

artillery lacked observation on the E-l draw, 

fortunately for the heavy traffic now starting. By 1500 new trouble loomed; the vehicles coming up on the plateau found themselves unable to get far toward St-Laurent 

because of continued enemy resistance in 

that village. For a time all movement 

was stopped. Vehicles jammed bumper to 

bumper all the way up the exit road, but by 

1600, engineers had pushed a branch road 

south off the planned roure toward the 

coastal highway. Vehicles were hastily 

shunted off this track into the adjoining 

fields, and movement continued for rhe rest 

of the day. Ar l700, all remaining tanks of 

the 741sr Tank Battalion were ordered inland 

via rhis exir, and four of them later took 

part in the unsuccessful attempr to clean our 

St-Laurent before dark. 

BREACHES IN THE SHINGLE EMBANKMENT wm opmtd 

by bulldourJ in th~ aJurnoon, p~Tmitting f)~hicl(S to r~ach th~ jiat. 

This SCtnt (Easy Rtd) takm somt days lattT, shows ships unloading 

at tht high-wattT lint, wheT( they Wtrt floattd off at ntxt high tidt. 

104 
- - ---

THE E-l EXIT ROAD was opmed on D 'Day by 1300, th, mginUTS working under fire from JniperJ . This photo, looking down E-l 

draw, was take?! laur in the wuk. A tape to mark mint-cleared 

areas was Jtill nuded, sinu this draw had bun heavily mined. 

ROADBLOCKS WERE DEJ\IOLiSHED at th, mouth of D-l 

draw by tnginurs of the 121.51 Enginur Combat Battalion. Afur the 

draw was open for traffic to Vieroille by 1700, fire from 'h, artilltry 

i1!/and demolished hOUJU along the road, impeding its UJe until dark. 

105 
Efforts co get other exits working were 

not successful until late in the day. At the 

Vierville draw, 0-1 exit was cleared during 

the afternoon by the 121st Engineer Combat 

Battalion, but movement was impeded by 

artillery fire which blocked the road with 

fresh debris. By nightfall traffic was going 

up inco the village, the 121st had partly 

opened a transit area, and the 743d Tank 

Battalion bivouacked near Vierville. Les 

Moulins draw (0-3) was still barred by 

enemy resistance in the weakening strongpoints. Work at E-3 exit was carried on in 

the intervals of considerable artillery and 

mortar fire. When this slackened at dark , 

the engineers developed the exit sufficiently 

for tanks co go up after midnight. After 

traversing the beach from the Vierville 

draw, the 336ch Engineers went co work at 

F-1 exit, clearing mines and pushing a new 

road, 12 feet wide and one-third of a mile 

long, up the moderate slope of the bluff. 

Landing schedules were revised co take advantage of this exit. Company B of the 

745th Tank Battalion landed on Fox Green 

at 1630 and was up on the high ground by 

2000, losing three tanks disa bled by mines. 

In most of their work during the afternoon, 

the engineers were harassed by small-arms 

lire and had to make full use of their security 

detachments for mopping up snipers and 

small bypassed emplacements. 

Artillery, held off shore by the unfa vorable 

condi tions of the morning, began co land 

after noon in the E-1 area . Hea vy losses 

had been sustained by some units before they 

were able to debark. The one remaining 

howitzer of the 11lth Field Artillery Battalion came ashore attached co the 7th Field 

Artillery Battalion, which itself had lost 

six pieces on dukws that swamped in the 

rough seas. Landing after 1300, the other 

six howitzers of the battalion were tied in 

cogether CO facilitate control, and fired their 

first mission from the beach at 1615 on an 

enemy machine-gun nest near Colleville. 

Because of difficult observation inland, this 

was their only mission of the day. The 

62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (selfpropelled), firing from LCT's in support of 

the assault, was unable co unload its guns 

in the morning. From 1500 co 1830, six 

M-7 howitzers got ashore, two others having been lost. They were moved co firing 

positions 200 yards inland but lired no 

mISSIOns. The rest of the battalion (eight 

howitzers) landed on Fox Green at dark and 

moved coward Colleville. The 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (self-propelled) had lost five howitzers as a result of 

mishaps co the LCT's trying co land in the 

mornlllg. The remainder of the battalion 

gOt ashore from noon onward, and one 

battery moved inland at 1800 to support the 

115th Infantry near St-Laurent. The 32d 

Field Artillery Battalion landed in the 

evening and cook positions northeast of 

St-Laurent. This unit lost 2 guns in the 

surf and 25 vehicles during the landing (some 

were later recovered), and had 28 casualties. 

By night there were elements of 5 artillery 

battalions ashore, but their combined losses 

had been 26 guns and a grea t deal of eq ui pment. Except for the one mission fired by 

the 7th Battalion, they had played no part in 

the inland lighting. As for the two antiaircraft gun battalions scheduled to land, 

these uni ts were forced co wai t for the nex t 

daylight. 

In general, only a start had been made in 

clearing and organizing the beaches. The 

main transit area in use, northeast of StLaurent, was jammed with vehicles and 

equipment of all types. The beach flat near 

E-1 exit was crowded as a result of heavy 

landings late in the day; there and elsewhere, 

much of the disorder produced in the morning remained co be straightened out. Medical units had been unable to set up stations 

inland, supplies were waiting for the or 

106 
ganization of dumps, and "lost" elements of 

assault infantry, reinforcements, and service 

troops were trying to find their units. Men 

dug in for the night wherever they could, 

some in the sand or on the bluff slopes. All 

through the shallow beachhead , along the 

bluffs, in the transit area, and around command posts, sniper fire caused alarms and 

started outbursts of firing. There were no 

"rear areas" on the night of D Day. 

At the E11d of D Day 

The assault on Omaha Beach had succeeded, but the going had been harder than 

expected. Penetrations made in the morning 

by relatively weak assault groups had lacked 

the force to carry far inland. Delay in reducing the strongpoints at the draws had 

slowed landings of reinforcements, artillery, 

and supplies. Stubborn enemy reSIstance, 

WRECKAGE ON EASY RED includn landing craft (right), 

trucks, and tank No.9, Company A, 741 st Tank Battalion, which had 

bun d1'sabl~d hu~ in the morning. Much mat!n'~l was salvaged du,.-

ing the clean-up of the beach by the Engineer Special Brigade Group. 

107 
borh ar srrongpoinrs and inland , had held 

rhe advance [0 a srrip of ground hardly more 

rhan a mile-and-a-half deep in rhe Colleville 

area, and considerably less rhan rhar wesr 

of Sr-Laurenr. Barely large enough [0 be 

called a foorhold, rhis srrip was well inside 

rhe planned beachhead mainrenance area. 

Behind U. S. forward posirions, cur-olf enemy 

groups were srill resisring . The whole landi ng area conrinued under enemy artillery fire 

from inland. 

Infanrry assaulr rroops had been landed, 

despire all difficulries, on rhe scale inrended; 

mosr of rhe e1emenrs of five regimenrs were 

ashore by dark. Wirh respecr [0 artillery, 

vehicles, and supplies of all sores, schedules 

were far behind. Lirrle more rhan 100 [Ons 

had been gor ashore insread of rhe 2,400 

[Ons planned for D Day. The ammunirion 

supply siruarion was crirical and would 

ha ve been even worse excepr for rhe facr 

rhar 90 of rhe no pre-loaded dukws in 

Force "0" had made rhe shore successfully. 

Only rhe firsr sreps had been raken [0 organize rhe beach for handling rhe expecred 

volume of rraffic, and ir was obvious rhar 

further delay in un loadings would be inevirable. 

Unir records for D Day are necessarily incomplere or fragmenrary, and losses in men 

and mareriel cannor be esrablished in accurare derail. Firsr esrimares of casualries 

DEBRIS of tht landing assault on Dog Btach, with discardtd lift 

prUtTVtrS most prominent. Boxu of demolitions in foregrou.nd. 
--

\YRECKAGE LITTERED THE BEACI IES, al the end of D Day , 

0 11 Dog Gra n Beach. On the right, a tank. The LCA carried ill a boat 

team of Company B, 11 6th Infantry . Element "G" obstacles (left) 

show i 1l waltr. Sh ips off tke beach are ready 10 POUT in materials. 

were high, with an inflated percentage of 

"missing" as a result of the number of assault sections which were separated from 

their companies, sometimes for two or 

three days. On the basis of later, corrected 

rerurns, casualties for V Corps were in the 

neighborhood of 3,000 killed, wounded , and 

mlsslllg. The two assaulting regimental 

combat teams (l6th and 116th) lost about 

1,000 men each. The highest proportionate 

losses were taken by units which landed in 

the first few hours, including eng1l1eers, 

tank troops, and artillery. 

109 

Whether by swamping at sea or by action 

a t the beach , ma terie! losses were considerable, including 26 artillery pieces and over 

SO tanks. No satisfactory over-all figures 

are available for vehicles and suppli es; one 

unit, the 4042d Quartermaster Truck Company, got ashore only 13 out of 35 trucks 

)~ ton) , but this loss was much higher 

than the average. On the Navy side, a 

tentative estimate gives a total of about SO 

landing craft and 10 larger vessels lost, with 

a much larger number of all types damaged. 

The principal cause for the difficulti es of 
V Corps on D Day was the unexpected 

strength of the enemy at the assault beaches. 

By the middle of the morning prisoners had 

been taken not only from the 726th Regimmt 

but from all three regiments of the 352d 

Division (the 914th, 915th, and 916th Reginents)' During May, when the 91st Division 

was brought into the Cotentin peninsula 

and the 21st Panzer Division to the Caen area, 

the German Seventh Army had also strengthened the beach garrisons between the Vire 

and Orne rivers. The 352d Division, moving 

from the St-L/) area, had taken over the 

sector from Isigny to a point several miles 

east of Bayeux. Apparently units of the 

726th Regiment already holding the coastal 

strongpoints remained there but were reinforced by 352d units. This meant that all 

strongpoints were completely manned, that 

reserve teams were available for some of the 

weapons positions, and also that there were 

uni ts close behind Omaha Beach in support 

of the main defenses. How much of the 

352d Division was actually at Omaha is not 

yet known; certainly not the whole unit, for 

elements of it were encountered in the 

Bayeux area by the British, and the 915th 

Regiment was ordered on D Day to guard the 

Caren tan area. Nevertheless, the Omaha 

sector had been so strengthened as to account 

for the tough opposition both on the beaches 

and inland. Much of the heavy artillery 

fire during the afternoon was probably due 

co the 352d Divisional Artillery, which included four battalions, one of medium guns. 

In view of the German strength near the 

beaches, a surprising feature of the D-Day 

battle was the enemy's failure to stage any 

effecti ve countera ttack . The reason may 

have been that the 352d Division units were 

coo scattered; it may also reflect disorganization of the division and loss of control as 

a result of the inland air bombardment and 

the naval gunfire. Whatever the answer, 

not a single enemy attack in real strength 

no 

had been met by the assaulting forces as 

they pushed south from the beach. Particularly in the morning, when the first penetrations were being made by small units without support of armor or artillery, determined 

counterblows of battalion strength in the 

Colleville or Vierville areas might have 

pushed the battle back to the beach. Enemy 

power had been frittered away in stubborn 

defensive action by small groups, which 

were nowhere able to do more than delay 

our advances. There is enough evidence to 

suggest that the 352d units were committed 

piecemeal, in battalion strength or less, and 

that companies and battalions of different 

regiments were intermingled. Elements of 

the 915th Regiment, for example, were identified east of Ba yeux, in the Omaha sector, 

and near Isigny. Such disposition would 

not lend itself to coordinated attack in sizable force. 

In any event,. there were few indications 

of the aggressive defense called for by German tactical doctrine. All this was the 

more significant since the 352d Division represented an offensive unit which the enemy 

had been expected to use for counterattack 

by the second day. Employed instead in 

close-up defense of the beach, it had made 

the initial assault phase harder but had not 

achieved a defensive success. In that respect, 

V Corps had surmounted a severe crisis, and 

the success of its hard fight should be measured in other terms than the size of the 

beachhead. To the extent that the 352d 

Division had been used up on D Day, the 

enemy had lost in a vaila ble strength for 

effective early countermeasures. If his local 

striking force, committed at the start of the 

invasion, had not been able to gain a decisive advantage, it was by that very commitment less likely to be as dangerous later on. 

The next few days would show whether the 

352d Division had been wisely used. It had 

delayed the whole assaul t sched ule at Omaha, 
but unless enemy reserves were available in 

time, this delay might mean Ii ttle for the 

eventual outcome. 

The Omaha assault was only one of several 

Allied landings, and the fortunes of each 

were important to the others. On the 

whole, the Allied operation had achieved 

a good measure of success in each main area 

CMap No. X). In the Cotentin, VII Corps' 

landing from the sea had been relatively 

easy, and part of the 4th Division was six 

miles inland near the Carentan-Cherbourg 

highway. The airborne divisions, however, 

had been hampered by scattered drops, and 

some of their vital objectives had not 

been attained, notably at the Merderet 

River crossings. Ste-Mere-Eglise was held, 

but only partial contacts had been made by 

the airborne units with each other and with 

the 4th Division. Losses had been severe 

in a score of separate battles waged by small 

units, and control had nOt yet been established over the large area involved in the 

air and sea landings. 

To the east, British Second Army landings had scored impressive early succe$ses. 

The airborne units had seized the Orne 

crossings north of Caen, and a wide breakthrough was made in coastal defenses by 

the assault troops landed from sea. Nevertheless, the 716th Division, perhaps strengthened by the shortening of its sector, had 

held out tenaciously in some of the bypassed 

strongpoints. In the later afternoon, elements of the 21st Panz.er Division counterattacked in the Caen area and were checked 

after some initial success. Stopped short of 

their main objectives, Caen and Bayeux, 

the British Second Army was nevertheless 

inland at some points as far as six m.iles and 

had cut the Bayeux--Caen highway. Four 

of its divisions were in action and another 

was scheduled to start landing on D+ l. 

The complete absence of enemy air from 

111 

the assault area of V Corps was an outstanding feature of the day·s action. It is easy 

to imagine what the intervention of enemy 

figh ters and fighter-born bers would have 

meant in the critical morning hours, when the 

assault forces were crowded on the narrow 

beach flat. Allied air supremacy on D Day 

had been absolute. Only three FW-190's 

had been sighted and chased off by the U. S. 

patrols covering the shipping area, and 

enemy air efforts to get near the battle zone 

had been negligible. Not until nightfall 

was there any German air activity near 

Omaha; then 22 enemy planes attacked 

shipping without causing any serious damage, though one bomb from a JU-88 landed 

only 35 yards from the battleship Arkansas. 

Intense antiaircraft fire shot down three 

planes. 

In contrast, Allied air forces had carried 

through a day of heavy and far-ranging 

offensive activity, initiating the program, 

ro be carried on for days to come, of isolating 

the battle area and hampering the movement 

of enemy troops and supplies in or near it. 

Eighth Air Force bombers carried out three 

major missions after the opening assault 

bombing. On two of these, involving 1,264 

hea vies, choke points for traffic behind the 

assault area were hit from Brittany. to the 

Seine; among them were St-La, Vire, and 

Coutances. On similar missions, the 

Bomber Command of the Ninth Air Force 

dispatched 1,Oll aircraft on D Day, many 

crews flying 2 missions. Two thousand and 

sixty-five fighter-bombers of the Ninth 

attacked, including among their missions II 

flown on request for air-ground cooperation 

by ground forces. Their efforts included 

attempts to deal with enemy batteries between Isigny and Bayeux, and with the guns 

near Maisy and Gefosse-Fontenay. British 

planes in the tactical air force CA. E. A. F.) 

flew 2,489 sorties on D Day. 
The ElIemy Side 17 

The enemy had been aware of impmdi1lg Allied 

invtlsio1l sillce the late wi"ter. The Germa" 

High Comma"d believed that the most likely 

area for the blow was the Pas-de-Calais coast. 

Hitler, on the other hand, regarded Brittany 

and the Cotentin area of Norma1ldy as more 

likely targets. As a result of his views, reinforcements were brought to that area in May. 

The 91st Division was placed in the Cotmtin. 

The 2d Paratroop Division was ordered from the 

erutern fro1lt, but o1lly the 6th Regimmt had 

arrived by June , to he stationed tlear Carel1ta11. 

By M ay, intelligel1ce had revealed the movem."t 

of troops i1lto southern E1lgla1ld, a1ld other 

preparations for the assault. Rommel's Army 

Group "B" was put in a state of readiness by 

the ."d of May, and Rommel himself expressed 

his complete satisfaction with the preparations 

for defmse . The arrival of reinforcemmts had 

permitted him to plan for tactics which he had 

long advocated: that of ma.king a "more tactical 

defense" of the coast, with reserves as close as 

possible to the more vult/erahle areas. The 

keynote of his defmsive plans was stmck in a 

letter of 22 April 1944 to commanders of coastal 

""its: "We must stop the assaulting forces in 

the water, not only delaying, but destroying all 

enemy equipment while still ajlMt.·· On 6 

June Rommel was absent from Fra1lce on a visit 

to Hitler's headquarters, alld had stopped ill 

Stuttgart 011 his wery back, to celebrate his wife's 

birthday. 

Plalls for tue of the Germem air force in the 

event of an invasion had been embarrassed by a 

number of ffJCtors. Goering wetS afraid of shifting 

fighters to France before the last mommt, since 

this move would expose them to attack by mperior 

I" Capo" td 1.I)(II,"'II,r alld PIr inlrroil"U' f p/Uo.riy yirfd mlldl i,,/o,mtJli<J 1I 011 

fAt CU mtln ,nut,,,,, , 10 ,10, Alli,tI auawll. !Jar/ie,,"I,ly 0.1 Army IlTtl. WIr Ol 

QIff}~' ;1 II ''' ,"mary "I III( 1Ie/;olt/ram /Iu lrIN11y poi", 0/ (Jino tHld of oil imporlllni 

,",p ,u,,, loltno by tlu utmy ,0,""'<I"d a/ Irirlr.a /~h. Tlu u r,"mory mlul i"cilld, 

flrl wlt~/1 !I'a, manor ,ulQu/, II' UJ. for fro m '''1 $ltlndpoiltl 0/ bo," Sn"",1! Army 

<mJ L X X X /I' Cor p. tI., Oma~aUI"r "'0.- o .. fy 0 ... • parI /)j a co mpfnr d~j~" i~( 

"rQhl~m . From D Day 0,.. "'~m y uaaio ... '" II., sutor jaclII( P Corpr ~a .. 0 .. 1)1 

bt li"dtrslOOd '" " /,,t"(( 10 lIlt lafl tr pfohl"" jaad hy Ilu Ci ,ma,. ((Imma,.d. 

Allied air power. Furthermore , Allied attacks 

on airfields in France had wrecked so ma,'Y installations that the Luftwaffe would have great 

trouble in finding bases for operatio" close to the 

coast. Fillally, it was difficult to plall on weakming the fighter defense of Germany against 

Allied airblows. As a remIt of these considerations, German air strength in France ill early 

Jttne was weak. 

According to a statemmt made in 1945 by a 

high German staff officer, radio intercepts had 

yielded the German High Command information 

on the afternoon of 5 June that led them to expect 

an invasion the next morning. Col. Gen. Alfred 

JodI, Chief of the Armed Forces Operatims Staff, 

did not deem it necessary to inform the local commallders in France, since their state of readiness 

was regarded as Jufficient without further notice; 

furthermore, there had been several false alarms 

earlier. 

At 0130 on 6 J,me the German Seventh Army 

received word from LXXXIV Corps that la/,dings 

from the air were u"deY way from Cam to the 

1lorthem Cotentin. Despite many eelTly reports of 

an erromous nature, and despite the wide distribution of the la1ldings, by 0230 Army felt able to 

designate the focal areas as the Orne River mouth, 

and the Ste-Mere-Eglise sector. In contrast to 

Seventh Army's views thelt the Allies were fJtttlcking to Cftt off the Cotentin peni'ISltla, Army Group 

and Westem Command ( Field M ClTshal Gerd VOII 

Rtmdstedt) were of the opinioll that a major 

enemy action was flOt in progress. By 0250 

coelstal stations were reporting movement at sea 

east of Cherbourg a/zd north of Caen, but no detailed appreczations reelChed Corps then or later. 

112 

Despite further reports of parachute landings 

at inland points all through western Normandy , 

at 0400 Gen. Erich M arcks (LXXXIV Corps) 

cOl1firmed the first impression that the focal points 

were the Cam sector and around Ste-Mere-Eglise. He reported that the 915th Inf,mtry, corps 

reserve, had been ordered to occupy the Carelltan 

area with the mission of maintaining communications through that point. Army Group alerted 
the 21st Panzer Division, attached it to Seventh 

Army, and ordered it to attack in the Caen area 

with maill e ftort east of the Orne. Measures 

were taken to deal with the air landings in the 

CotUltin by cormterattack, and the 30th Mobile 

Brigade waS set in march toward Periers. At 

0515, Seventh Army reaffirmed its earlier view to 

Army Group: a major 0 ftensive was in progress 

with landings by sea expected. The 21st Panzer Division had begun movemUlt northward for 

immediate counterattack east of the Orne River. 

At 0600 Corps reported heavy naval gunfire from 

Grandcamp to the Orne,' at 0645 Army told 

Army Group that the Allied intentions were still 

not clear and expressed an opinion that the naval 

gunfire might be part of it diversionary attack, 

to be followed hy the main eftort in some other 

area. German air and sea reconnaissance, active since daylight, had furnished no new information. Not until 0900 did Army hear from 

LXXXIV Corps that heavy landings from the 

sea had taken place from 0715 on,' the sectors 

reported were from the Orne to IlOrtheast of BayettX and at Grandcamp. The number of ships 

involved was uncertain,' some 60 were indicated 

at Grandcamp. At 0925, Corps reported the 

situation as very threatening north of Caen, with 

Allied armor reaching artillery positions, and 

asked for a mohile reserve to he constituted at 

once west of Caen. Penetrations in the forward 

positions of the 352d Infantry Division were 

reported at this time hut were not regarded as 

dangerous. At 1040 the naval command reported enemy ship movements at the mouth of the 

Vire Estuary. 

Corps reported at 1145 an Allied hridgehead 16 

miles wide and over 3 miles deep north and northwest of Caen,' no information was on hand from 

the 352d Division, and communicatiolls were out 

with the eastern Cotentin area. Both Army and 

Corps were convillced that the Caen landillgs 

presetlted the main threat,' the 21st Panzer Division was headed fol' the beachhead hoth east alld 

west of the OrlZe, and the 30th Mobile Brigade 

was ordered to come up to support the 716th 

Division . Army endeavored to get Army Group' s 

approval of a plan whereby the 711 th Divisioll 

would take care of the east batik of the Orne and the 

nth S5 Panzer Division would he committed ill 

the Caell sector. At noon, Corps stated that attempted sea landings from the Vire to the coast 

northea.rt of Bayeux had been completely smashed 

and the only critical area was that near Caen . 

113 

The 352d Division advised Army at 1335 that 

the Allied assault had heell hurled back illtO the 

sea,' ollly at Colleville was fighting still under 

way, with the Germans cou'lterattacking. This 

reassuring view was sent on to Army Group. 

At 1500 Army Group decided to put I 55 

Panzer Corps ill charge of the Caen area"8 It 

would include the 716th Divisioll, the 21st 

P allzer Division, alld the 12th 5 5 Panzer DiviSiOIl, to which would be added the Panzer Lehr 

Division. Its missioll was to attack and wipe 

out the Allied beachhead on both sides of the Orne. 

The 12th 55 Pallzer would move at once from the 

AletlfOIl area toward Caen,' P allzer Lehr was to 

come behilld it. The 21st Pallzer Divisioll had 

elements Ilorth of Caen by 1600 and was expected 

to enter the battle at any moment. 

At 1620 Army gave Army Group a general 

estimate of the situation: the situation in the 

Cotentill was Iloted as reassuring, and German 

forces Oil hand there were regarded as adequate; 

Army expressed its surprise that 110 lalldings by 

sea had supported the airborne troops, and 

hazarded the view that the Allied operation in 

this sector was diversio'lary . Twenty mi,lutes 

later, this conclusioll was upset hy word from 

Corps that sea landings had takm place ill the 

Madeleine area, just llOrth of the Vire mouth. 19 

At 1800 more bad news came from the 352d Division: Allied forces had illfiltrated through the 

stroflgpoints, and advance elemUlts with armor had 

reached the line Colleville- Louvieres-AJ1Iieres,' 2. 

the objective of this attack was believed to be 

\I For ''I''''' rri"/orttm,"' 1'1""1, Jt( Mpp XI/I. 

II I. t" U,ah bltuUrad. 

JII rilla" OIU' mil, "'III gf Lcwflitr". 
Bayeux. At the same time the right wing of the 

352d Division waJ threatened by advance of 

Allied troops toward Bayeux from the northeast. 

Ryes had been taken, and the 352d was mounting 

a. counterattack to recover it. This effort came 

to nought,· at 2100 Corps reported a heavy Allied 

penetration toward the Bayeux-Caen highway at 

the expense of the 915th Regiment. As for the 

",ening attack of the 21st Panzer Division, that 

unit had at first made progress and nearly reached 

the coast,' it then met heavy resistance and was 

forced to yield ground. 

Army Group at 1700 had transmitted von 

Rundstedt' s demand that the Allied bridgehead 

be wiped out that evenint,-' also, the order of 

General j odl that all available forces be thrown 

into the battle. Army replied' that it was impossible to clean up the penetration area on 6 

june, but that all measures were set for a counterattack at the earliest moment. 

By midnight Seventh Army and Army Group 

had made plans for a heavy armored counterattack on 7 june against the British landing 

area by I SS Panzer Corps, with the 716th 

Division attached. The 21st Panzer Division 

would attack east of Caen; 12th SS Pan:{er and 

Patlzer Lehr west of Caen. Steps had been 

taken during the day for setting in motion other 

units to reinforce the battle area (Map No. 

XIII). Battle groups ( Kampfgruppen ") 

from the 266th and 77th Divisions were pttt in 

a state of readiness, and those from the 275th 

and 265th Divisiotls were started by r(lil transport as reinforcemmt for LXXXIV Corps. All 

these ttllits were in Britrmny, (lnd some hesitation 

was felt by Army Grottp in taking too mttch 

strmgth from that (lrea before Allied intentions 

were fttlly clarified. 

Corps (lnd Army had already received prelimi1!ary explanations from the 716th Division on 

reasons for the sttccess of the Allied assattlt. 

IJ U"iu of irutu/ar w mpos;/ion and Umpo,ary in r/wracUr. (rtalnJ f or Q spuial 

mission or in oiroJ of an (muc,ney. [ .. rAis caH. ,h, bat/It l rOW!JI probably ..011 _ 

, ;Ir,d of a" mor, mobil, ,hmrnlS of (A, dif1iJionJ conuTlud. and Iht but firM ;", 

troopJ. A "ballit , rowp" lUll no prJ siu, and Iht", U no i"dull/Wn as 10 W},I>I 

l>'OpOrl;O" 0/ flit dioisiQns n'l(lIliontd Mrt WaJ indud~ 

114 

(This report may have related only to the British 

zone.) P articttlar stress was laid on the devastating effects of the naval gtttljire; in addition, 

it was claimed that "special bombs" had set 

off German minejields, and that the assattlt 

troops had used new tactics in bypassing strongpoints with strong armored ttnits and then attacking the coastal defenses from the rear. German efforts to cottnterattack had been stopped 

with high losses, mainly by the action of Allied 

air and the naval jire. In a fttrther report, 

made abottt a week later for sttbmission to Hitler 

himself, the same ttnit went into more detail. 

It was fully alert,d on 6 jttne , and there was no 

qttestion of being cattght unprepared or by Sttrprise. German reconnaissance by sea and air 

failed completely to prodttce any information. 

Defensive obstacles, not yet completed, were not 

effective, and the mine fields had been partly 

detonated by gtttljire and air bombardment. 

Smoke screens hindered the coastal gttns from 

aimed fire on the ships, and German artillery 

was put out of action at an early stage by bombing and na.val gunfire. The loss of two antitank companies as a resttlt of the air bombardment was keenly felt when it came to meeting 

armored attack. According to this report, the 

Allies obviously knew every weak point in the 

German defensive positions and had made good 

use of this intelligettce in the assault. Becattse 

of the lack of a second defettsive line, fortified in 

depth, penetrations were extended rapidly to the 

proportions of a breakthrough, and air and naval 

gunfire had greatly hindered the bringing up of 

operative reserves for cottnterattack. 

At the end of D Day the German Seventh Army 

had decided that the landings near the Orne constitttted the main threat, and had taken steps to 

commit its strongest and most readily available 

reserves in that sector. The situation in the 

Cotentin was not cattsing particular worry. Information as to the Omaha Beach sector had been 

scanty throttghout the day, and both Corps and 

Army tettded to pay little attention to develop-
ments thm, even after th, evening news of Allied 

penetrations. The evidence suggests that both 

Corps and Army regarded the auault in this area 

as a mere adjunct of the main effort directed at 

Caen and Bayettx. Communications were evidently poor in the 352d Division's sector, and no 

inkJillg had come back to Corps of the scale of 

lalldillgs in progreu at Omaha. 

When Hitler, on 6 June, received word of the 

invasion he was about to appear at a reception 

near Salzburg of the new Hungarian prime minister. Hitler came in to the meeting with a radiant face and announced "It's begun at last." 

He was confident that all measures were being 

taken to meet the crisis, and that by 13 June 

counterattacks would wipe out any beachheads. 

A PILLBOX USED AS HEADQUARTERS. This emplactmtnt 

(now a battl~ monum~nt) which protected E-l draw (wut Jidt), was 

rmploytd umporarily as CP for thr Engin"r Sprcial Brigadr Group. 

This unit opcraud Omaha Beach as a port of supply until Drctmbrr. 

ll5 
ATTAINMENT OF D-DAY 

OBJECTIVES (7-8 JUNE) 

THE OUTCOME of the assault on Omaha 

Beach was not clear at the end of D Day. 

A shallow lodgement had been secured, 1,500 

to 2,000 yards deep in the area of furthest 

advance near Colleville. Weak enemy forces 

were still holding out in remnants of the 

beach defenses, and artillery fire could still 

harass any section of the landing area. Unloadings of vehicles and supplies had fallen 

far short of the D-Day schedule. Artillery 

and tank support for the infantry ashore was 

reduced by severe losses of materiel. Enemy 

troops had shown plenty of determination 

and fighting spirit; if the Germans could 

muster sufficient force to counterattack this 

beginning of a beachhead, they might imperil its existence. 

Therefore, the action of the next few days 

would be decisive. For success, two things 

were essential: advance inland far enough to 

put the beach area out of artillery range and 

to secure maneuver room for further progress; 

and organization of the beach for maximum 

landings of supply and reinforcement. The 

first phase of the effort was to carry forward 

the original plan and reach D-Day objectives. 

Trevieres-Tour-en-Besshz 

Certain readjustments had to be made in 

the 1st Division's plan for attaining its 

objectives (Map No. XI). The 16th Infantry 

had been badly used up in the assault and 

116 

needed time to get its scattered units reassembled; therefore, its assignments were 

turned over in part to units of the 26th 

RCT. The 1st Battalion of the 26th was 

attached to the 16th, and at 1100 on 7 June 

received the mission of taking the high 

ground west and southwest of Port-enBessin, including Mount Cauvin, and linking up with British XXX Corps. The 3d 

Battalion of the 26th had moved during the 

night to a position south of St-Laurent on 

the flank of the 18th Infantry, Attached 

to the 18th, the battalion was ordered to 

take Formigny and cover the right flank of 

the 18th's attack south, This attack, the 

main effort of the day, was aimed at the 

original objectives of the 18th RCT: the 

high ground just north of Trevieres, and 

the Mandeville-Mosles area south of the 

Aure, Elements of the 7th, 32d, and 62d 

Field Artillery Battalions were ashore and 

available for support, and the 5th Field 

Artillery Battalion landed during the day 

and went into action. Only five tanks of 

the 741st Tank Battalion were ready for 

action on 7 June, but the 745th. had landed 

during the night and was attached to units 

of the attacking infantry, mainly the 18th. 

Mopping up of the ground occupied on D 

Day was a time-consuming process. All 

during the night, small enemy groups had 

been trying to escape from the area north of 

the Colleville-St-Laurent highway, filtering 
through the 16th Infantry's scattered units 

and starting sporadic fire fights. In the 

early morning, as drivers of the 1st Battalion 

Headquarters were getting ready to move 

toward a new motor park, they found and 

ca ptured 30 Germans in the field next to 

their night position. Back at the beach, 

enemy snipers were so troublesome to the 

gunners of the 7th Field Artillery Battalion 

that they were forced to organize an attack 

on the bluff with artillery personnel. These 

were typical of many small incidents that 

prolonged the confusion in rear areas. The 

major job was the pocket of resistance at 

Colleville, which was dealt with during the 

morning of the 7th by the 2d Battalion of 

the 16th. Company G was through the 

village by 1000, and found enemy resistance 

weak. Some 52 Germans of the 726th Infantry 

gave up without a fight; the Company L 

patrol, captured at Cabourg the day before, 

had talked the enemy into a receptive mood 

for surrendering. The main damage to German forces in Colleville was inflicted by the 

2d Battalion of the 18th Infantry, posted 

south and southeast on the escape route from 

the village. During the night and morning, 

160 Germans were captured and 50 killed in 

this area. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 

16th Infantry spent all of the da yin moppingup work, moving short distances south and 

southeast from Colleville behind the advancing 18th Infantry. At dark, they were 

still encountering scattered machine-gun and 

sni per fire. 

The ad vance eastward toward Port-enBessin was accomplished without meeting 

enemy resistance in any strength. The 3d 

Battalion of the 16th, supported by Company B of the 745th Tank Battalion, went 

straight down the coastal highway and 

occupied Huppain for the night. Supporting this advance, the 62d Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion fired five missions, expending 683 rounds, and reported the de117 

structlon of an enemy battery of medium 

artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 26th 

went south to Russy (reached at 1705), and 

then east to a position about 1,000 yards 

from Mount Cauvin. British commando 

units were reported on the edge of Port-enBessin, and by evening a juncture between 

V Corps and the British 50 Division was 

in sight. 

The attack of the 18th Infantry was slow 

in getting started but made good progress 

during the afternoon. The 1st Battalion met 

only small and isolated groups of enemy 

resistance and was effectively aided in dealing 

with these by the five tanks of the 741st Tank 

Battalion. The battalion crossed the Bayeux- Isigny high wa y shortly after noon and 

ambushed some cyclists from reconnaissance 

units of the 352d Division. The tanks 

reached the vicinity of Engranville at 1400 

and shelled the village. Enemy resistance 

lasted until evening, when Company C attacked and forced an enemy platOon across 

the river. The Germans had 15 casualties. 

The battalion then occupied a defensive 

position on ground which dominated the approaches to the Aure. The situation on its 

right flank was somewhat unsatisfactory, as 

the enemy still held Formigny. The 3d 

Battalion of the 26th Infantry, advancing 

down the St-Laurent road, had been stopped 

a half-mile short of Formigny by strong 

resistance from machine-gun nests and made 

no progress for the rest of the day. This left 

the 18th at Engranville exposed to attack 

from its rear. 

The 3d Battalion of the 18th Infantry kept 

pace with the 1st Battalion, going through 

Surra in at 1215 and reaching the Bayeux 

highway just north of the Aure at 1700. The 

river crossing was made without meeting 

effective resistance, and by 2400 the battalion was in defensive positions southeast 

of Mandeville, on the flank of the important 

enemy base at Trevieres. Casualties of the 
TANKS ROLL THROUGH COLLEVILLE. This road, just beyond th~ chuTch shown in an ear/itr photograph, is the coastal highway 

leading toward Cabourg. Enemy ruistance was cleared up in this 

part of Coll,ville on the morning of D+I by troops of the 16th Infantry. 

battalion in the day's advance were 4 killed 

and 27 wounded . 

Still further east, a second crossing of the 

Aure was effected by the 2d Battalion of the 

18th Infantry. Supported by a platoon of 

tanks ftom Company C, 745th Tank Battalion, the battalion left the Colleville area 

at 1000 in two columns and reached the Aure 

at 1440. No resistance was met until Company G in the western column reached 

118 

Houtteville, where enemy mortar and machine-gun fire from across the river forced 

deployment. The second column, however, 

reaching the river south of Bellefontaine, 

rushed a pia toon across the 300 yards of 

causeway and bridge before meeting enemy 

fire. Tanks went across to support the 

platoon, the rest of the company followed, 

and Company G side-slipped east to take the 

same route. Driving the enemy out of their 
defensive posltlons, Companies F and G 

moved on promptly toward Mosles, leaving 

Company E to clean up bypassed pockets of 

resistance. Mosles, the objective, was entered at 1700. Thirty enemy dead were 

found after the sharp action at the crossing, 

which cost the 2d Battalion only a few men 

and one tank. A patrol sent down the 

Bayeux road reported enemy in Tour-enBessin. 

By nightfall on 7 June, a part of the D-Day 

objectives had been reached. Even more 

encouraging were the indications of badly 

disorganized enemy resistance. Not only 

had the Germans failed to develop any 

counterattack, but they had shown little 

strength in opposing an advance made on a 

broad front by widely separated battalions. 

This advance had cut the main highway for 

lateral communications near the beachhead 

and had accomplished two crossings of the 

Aure. Only in the Formigny- Trevieres area 

was the enemy in force sufficient to check 

the 1st Division's progress. Intelligence 

estimates put the 1st Battalion of the 726th 

Infantry south of Port-en-Bessin, elements of 

the 916th south of the Aure from Tour-enBessin to Trevieres, and elements of the 

915th at Formigny. Enemy artillery fire 

had been light, though the beaches were still 

under harassing fire . 

In response to a request by V Corps, the 

Ninth Air Force flew 35 missions of squadron strength on 7 June in the zone from 

Bayeux west along the Aure valley, with 

one squadron always over the target area. 

Enemy gun positions were priority targets 

in these missions, but were difficult to locate . 

Highway and rail targets, as well as enemy 

concentration areas in Cerisy Forest, received most of the weight of attacks by 467 

planes, using I,OOO-pound general-purpose 

bombs and fragmentation clusters. 

The situation at Formigny was cleared up 

during the early morning hours of 8 June. 

About midnight Company B of the 18th, 

helped by tanks of Company B, 745th Tank 

Battalion, attacked from the southeast and 

drove out a small enemy force, which lost 

10 killed and 15 prisoners. North of the 

village. enemy machine-gun positIOns continued to block the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, until late in the morning. In part, 

the delay at Formigny was due to lack of 

contact between the two battalions attacking from different sides of the village . 

A counterattack "scare" developed early 

in the morning of 8 June at Mandeville. At 

0200 a large combat patrol infiltrated the 

defensive positions of the 3d Battalion, 18th 

Infantry. Some personnel in the rear command post and motor park were temporarily 

captured, but after daylight the patrol was 

overpowered and driven out with enemy 

losses of 25, killed and prisoners. In the 

confusion, the 18th Infantry Command Post 

near Surrain received reports of German 

tanks in "severe attack." With every staff 

briefed to expect counterattacks, this news 

caused a severe flurry back through corps 

headquarters; between 0600 and 0800, V 

Corps Headquarters was taking acti ve measures to assemble tanks, antitank guns, and 

tank destroyer units for meeting a possible 

emergency south of the Aure . By 0850, the 

situation was cleared up and orders were 

issued to resume normal missions. For the 

rest of 8 June, the 1st and 3d Battalions held 

their positions north and east of Trevieres, 

patrolling to the outskirts of that town. 

Trevieres was shelled by naval guns in the 

afternoon, and there were indications that 

only minor enemy forces remained there. 

119 

On D+2, main action in the 1st Division 

zone shifted to the left flank, where the 26th 

RCT went after its D-Day objectives in the 

Tour-en-Bessin area. The movement had 

begun late on 7 June, when the 2d Battalion 

of the 26th Infantry, released at 1745 from 

division reserve, was ordered to seize the 
high ground at the crossroads between 

Mosles and Tour-en-Bessin. The battalion 

moved sourheast along the front of the 16th 

Infantry, crossed the Aure at midnight a 

little west of Erreham, and reached its objective abour 0530 on 8 June. 

Enem y artillery and infan try were reported 

in some strength at Tour-en-Bessin, and the 

26th Infantry at 0800 requested an air mission. Division notified the regiment that 

adequate fire support from artillery and naval 

guns would be available if the air mission 

failed. The air attack was made by fighterbombers shortly before 0900; an armored 

patrol gOt into Tour-en-Bessin by 1140, 

reporting the town "empty and flat." The 

2d Battalion, reinforced by a company of 

the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion and 

Company C of the 745th Tank Battalion, 

waited on the advance of the rest of the 

regiment before moving into the town. 

The other two ba ttalions of the 26th were 

slow in reaching the scene. The 1st Battalion, its objective the ground northeast of 

Tour-en-Bessin, pushed patrols through 

Etreham about noon, encountering only 

snipers; then, determined resistance from 

prepared positions stopped the battalion at 

the river crossing. The rest of the day was 

spent in efforts to get across, wi th artillery 

support made difficult by the presence of 2d 

Battalion units not far to the southwest. 

By evening only one company of the 1st 

Battalion was across the Aure. The 3d 

Battalion was held up north of Formigny 

all morning, pending arrival of a battalion 

of the 115th Infantry which was countermarching from Louvieres to Formigny for 

OBSERVATION WAS DIFFICULT in a country of hedgerows and 

orchards. This picture is ~n 1uar Etreham, looking south acrOH 

the A UT! River. The 1st Battalt"on, 26th Infantry, encountered heavy 

enemy rnistance here in its effort to reach Tour-en-BeHin on 8 June. 

120 
the purpose of strengthening the sector 

north of Trevieres. Released to the 26th 

Regiment at 1340, the 3d Battalion started 

down the Bayeux highway toward its 

objective, Ste-Auue, just beyond Tour-euBessin. Ie reached the 2d Battalion position 

at 1800 and was ordered to jump off at 2040 

for attack straight through Tour-en-Bessin, 

supported by Company C of the 745th Tank 

Battalion. The force went through the 

town abour midnight, the infantry moving 

in two files on either side of the road, with 

six tanks betweeu the files at the head of 

the column. Directed by the battalion 

commander, the tanks sprayed sniper positions and suspected strongpoints. Light 

enemy resistance was brushed aside, and the 

column reached Ste-Anne about 0130, 10 

Contact with enemy patrols retreating to 

the east. 

The enemy-held corridor north of Touren-Bessin was now in great danger of being 

cut. At the end of 7 June the Germans still 

held Port-en-Bessin and souch of it the high 

ground along the Drame Valley. During 8 

June this salient was steadily reduced. The 

British 47 Commandos entered Port-en-Bessin about 0800 and fought through the day 

to clear the area south from the port to the 

Aure River, while the 3d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, blocked enemy escape to the west. 

Further south the British had entered Bayeux 

on 7 June, and were approaching the Drame 

crossings at Vaucelles and Sully by late 

afternoon of the 8th. The narrowing enemy 

pocket was held by remnants of the 1st 

Battalion, 726th Infantry, reinforced on 7- 8 

June by some elements of the 517th Battalion, 

30th Mobile Brigade, rushed up from reserve 

positions near Coucances and St-La. By 

evening of the 8th there was a chance that 

much of this force might be trapped by an 

ad vance of the 26th Infantry. The plan 

was checkmated. Very determined enemy 

resistance held off the 26th at Etreham and 

stopped the British efforts to get past the 

Drame. A violent action at Ste-Anne, in the 

early hours of 9 June, kept the base of the 

corridor open. 

The 3d Battalion of the 26th Infantry had 

dug in hastily at Ste-Anne to meet an 

expected counterattack, with Company L 

just north of the village, Company I facing 

east, and Company K to the south. A light 

rain began to fall and visibility was bad. 

About 0300 Company L's position was overrun by a strong German column including 

ammunition trucks, bicycles, and other vehicles, the presence of which suggested that 

the enemy was withdrawing from the north 

and had blundered into the American lines. 

What followed was a wild fire-fight, at 

close range, with both sides hampered by 

surprise and confusion . The 2d Battalion 

held on in the village; tanks were of little use 

in the darkness, but effective aid was rendered by area fire from six battalions of 

artillery and naval guns, directed northeast 

and east of the village. Casualties in Company L were severe, due mainly to shells 

hitting two trucks loaded with men temporarily captured by the Germans. By 

0630, the 3d Battalion had restored its 

positions, taking 125 prisoners who testified 

to the effectiveness of the artillery fire. 

121 

Although the enemy had lost heavily in 

men and vehicles in this action, the corridor 

stayed open, and Vaucelles, a mile east of 

Ste-Anne, was retaken from the British in 

the same period. During the night and 

early morning, the enemy managed to withdraw most of his force from the salient, at 

the cost of considera ble losses and further 

disorganization. When the 1st Battalion of 

the 26th resumed its attack souch of Etreham on the morning of 9 June, only light 

resistance was met from the· remnants of 

enemy forces north of the highway. 

With the 26th Infantry beyond Tour-enBessin, the 1st Division had reached its 
D-Day objectives. This mission had been 

largely accomplished by two regiments, with 

all battalions committed and moving on a 

front so wide that intervals between batta'lions were as much as 3,000 yards. No 

enemy counterattack had developed, though 

it was known from intercepted messages 

that attack was ordered for 8 June. There 

was further evidence of disorganization 

among the regiments of the 352d D;viJion, 

strung out on a front of some 25 miles between Isigny and Bayeux. Elements of the 

915th, 916th, and 726th Infantry were in the 

sector Trevieres-Bayeux. On 7 June they 

received their first reinforcement in the 517th 

Belttalion of the 30th Mobile Brigade, rushed 

north from Courances in time to be badly 

mauled in the Port-en-Bessin salient. The 

other twO battalions of this brigade were 

identified the next day in the Tour-en-Bessin 

and Bayeux areas, where they were unable 

to restore the situation. 

Intelligence reports by 9 June warned of 

possible concentration of reinforcements, including armor, in Cerisy Forest. However, 

barring arrival of reinforcements, all evidence indicated that the Germans had now 

lost wha tever chance they once had of passing to the offensive on the 1st Division front. 

They had continued their policy of the first 

day in offering dogged resistance at tactically 

important points, often from prepared positions. In hedgerow country, this had slowed 

down the 1st Division's progress, and the 

delay was increased by the willingness of 

small enemy groups and individuals to fight 

on in bypassed positions. Nevertheless, 

these tactics could not stop the advance, and 

they steadily wore down enemy strength . 

Most troops of the bypassed groups never 

got back; a major proportion were killed, 

and by 9 June the 1st Division had taken over 

600 prisoners. Enemy artillery, so effective 

on D Day, was less and less in evidence thereafter. In contrast, by 8 June five battalions 

of artillery were in support of the 1st Division and adding to the powerful fire of the 

naval guns. 

Grandca1llp-Isigny Area 

General Gerhardt, ~ommanding the 29th 

Division, had landed on the evening of D 

Day and set up his command post near the 

Vierville exit, waiting for orders to take 

over command of the 29th Division. General Cota made several tri ps from his headquarters in St-Laurent to 1st Division and 

V Corps Headquarters during the night and 

early morning and saw General Gerhardt 

twice to keep him informed of plans. These 

could be formed only gradually, in view of 

the uncertain situation around Vierville and 

St-Laurent and of continued difficulties in 

communications. When Co!. Canham carne 

to St-Laurent at 0930 to see General Cota and 

find his 2d and 3d Battalions, the road between Vierville and St-Laurent was still 

under enemy fire and he was forced to make 

the trip along the beach to D-3 exit. 

Plans for D+ 1 had to be adj usted to meet 

a number of limiting circumstances (Map 

No. XII). Of the twO regiments ashore, 

the 116th had been severely used and most 

of its units were still badly scattered; the 

1st Battalion started the day with about 

250 men. Two artillery battalions (58th 

and l1lth) were ashore, but with less than 

half their guns. The 175th Infantry was 

still afloat, scheduled to begin landing at 

1030. A number of pressing tasks faced 

these units as a preliminary to moving 

against D-Day objectives. The enemy still 

held a strongpoint at the western edge of 

St-Laurent. Small parties of riflemen, with 

occasional support from machine guns and 

mortars, were reappearing at points along 

the bluffs to harass the beaches. D-3 exit 

was nOt yet fully opened. That the enemy 

was still close to Vierville, on the south, 

122 
was proved early (0530) on 7 June when an 

attack forced Company B of the l21st Engineers out of the Chateau de Vaumicel and 

back into the village. At Pointe du Hoe, 

three companies of the 2d Rangers were 

known to be isolated, weakened by heavy 

casualties and in need of ammunition. 

Measures to deal with these initial problems were taken by early morning. The 

1st Battalion of the 116th, the 5th Ranger 

Battalion, and Companies A, B, and C of 

the 2d Rangers, supported by tanks, were 

ordered to drive west on the highway toward 

Pointe du Hoe. The 2d and 3d Battalions 

of the 116th were to mop up remnants of 

enemy resistance along the bluffs, while the 

3d Battalion, 115th Infantry, cleaned out 

St-Laurent and then moved to Vierville for 

any similar work needed there. The rest of 

the 115th would push on toward Longueville, its objective on the Isigny highway. 

The mopping-up work consumed most of 

the day. After a heavy naval bombardment, the 3d Battalion of the 115th moved 

on the enemy strongpoint blocking the 

St-Laurent crossroad and encountered opposition only from snipers. By 0900 St-Laurent 

was cleared and the 3d Ba ttalion moved 

toward Vierville, followed by the 1st. 

Nearing Vierville and receiving word that 

they were not needed there, they turned 

south toward Longueville. The enemy 

counterattack at Vierville had not been in 

strength, and the situation had been restored 

by keeping four companies of Rangers and 

some tanks to protect the village. The 3d 

Battalion of the 116th, only partly assembled, went after the remnants of enemy 

resistance along the bluff west from D-3, 

finding a few machine-gun positions still in 

action and taking some prisoners. The 2d 

Battalion went into Vierville and then 

started south with the 3d toward Louvieres. 

Enemy resistance was encountered, and at 

1700 the 2d and 3d Battalions were pulled 

back for the night to form a perimeter 

defense at ViervilJe. After 2000, Vierville 

was heavily shelled by medium artillery 

from the Trevieres area, and considerable 

d<tmage was inflicted on the heavy traffic 

moving up through the exit road. Some 

ammunition trucks were exploded and three 

antiaircraft guns destroyed. In the HOth 

Field Artillery Battalion, which had just 

landed to support the 115th Infantry, Battery B lost 2 howitzers and 17 men from the 

enemy shelling. Immediately following the 

shelling the Germans made a final attack in 

company strength from the south. It 

carried past the chateau before being stopped 

by mortar and rifle fire. 

South of Vier ville the 115th Infantry was 

able to make only slow progress toward 

Longueville. Communications worked badly, 

and the battalions were out of contact with 

each other most of the day. The 2d Battalion moved cross-country on a broad front, 

hoping that this would prove an effective 

way of brushing off light opposition. At 

Vacqueville a small enemy force used the 

stone farm buildings as strongpoints and 

held up the battalion with small-arms fire 

until late afternoon. One battery (C) of the 

HOth Field Artillery Battalion was a va ila ble 

for support; firing two unobserved missions 

from positions near St-Laurent, it aided the 

2d Battalion to clear the hamlet. At 1930 

the battalion resumed its advance, which 

was continued through the night to reach 

Montigny at 0300. This had been a strongly 

prepared defensive area, including wired-in 

trench systems, but the enemy had withdrawn. The 1st and 3d Battalions had been 

stopped east of Louvieres by small-scale 

enemy opposition and were Out of contact 

with the 2d Battalion until the morning of 

8 June. Still without transport, and handcarrying ammunition and heavy weapons, 

the 115th had been chiefly handicapped by 

difficulties of communication and control. 

123 
MAP NO.7 The Relief of Pointe du Hoe. 7-8 June 
The force which starred west on the 

Grandcamr road ro relieve Pointe du Hoe 

was stopped just shorr of its goal on 7 June. 

As a result of the enemy's early morning 

thrust at Vierville, four companies of the 

5th Ranger Battalion had been left to guard 

the village, where they spent the day in 

mopping-up operations. The remainder of 

the relief force, amounting to about 500 men, 

began its march about 0800, headed by 

Companies A, B, and C of the 2d Rangers 

moving in a dou ble file on each side of the 

highway . Ten tanks of Company B, 743d 

Tank Battalion, followed close behind the 

point, ready to move up or down the column 

as needed. Many small enemy posItions 

were passed, some almost at the edge of the 

road, but they were not allowed to hold up 

the advance. The tanks sprayed them with 

heavy fire to cover the infantry, which was 

never forced to deploy and did not Stop to 

clean up bypassed enemy groups. Good 

progress was made with this system, and at 

1100 the column reached St-Pierre-du-Mont, 

only a thousand yards from Pointe du Hoe. 

Conditions at the Point had become more 

critical over night (Map No.7). When the 

platoon of Company A, 5th Rangers, reached 

the Point at dusk of D Day, they believed 

the rest of the 5th Rangers were just behind. 

TYPICAL NORMAN ORCHARD. This on, was on Ih, south 

tdgt oj tht 2d Rangtr'l pOJition, thi night of 6 Junt, ntar thi coaJtal 

highway. GtrmanJ approaching thi position through thi orchard wtre 

abl, to g,t clOI< b<jor< th,y wu, spo"d. (Photo takm jun" 1945.) 

125 
Colonel Rudder therefore decided to leave 

his ad vance party where it was for the night, 

south of the coastal highway and reinforced 

by the 5th Ranger platoon. Amounting to 

about 85 men , this force was hit by a counterattack after dark. The Rangers were dug 

in on an L-shaped position, sides about 300 

yards long, behind hedgerows overlooking 

slopes toward the southwest. The Germans 

made two preliminary probing attacks, 

beginning at 2330, to draw the Rangers' fire 

and locate their positions. Despite partial 

moonlight, the enemy were able to crawl up 

in the orchard grass to within 25 yards of 

the Ranger lines before being observed. At 

about 0300 a final assault was made at the 

angle of the Rangers' position. The enemy 

force, more than a company in strength, 

used at least six machine guns and some 

mortar fire, but the action was largelyelosein fighting with much use of grenades. 

The angle was overrun and 25 Rangers were 

killed or captured . In the confusion of a 

night action, coordinated defense was difficuI t; the rest of the line crum bled and less 

than 50 men found their way back to the 

Point in small groups. Fourteen Rangers 

sta yed in their original fox holes under a 

dense hedge, where they were able to avoid 

enemy notice. They were to spend the 

next 36 hours in these hide-outs. 

At morning of 7 June, the force on the 

Point numbered 90 to 100 men available for 

action, many of them with light wounds. 

They had no food, their ammunition supply 

was short, they had brought no machiHe 

guns in their landings, and only two mortars 

were left. They were pinned on a strip 

about 200 yards deep and 500 yards wide, 

ineluding in it the wrecked enemy fortifications. Snipers were still appearing inside 

this area, and enemy movements indicating 

preparation for attack could be seen close 

by. Naval fire support, rendered at different times by the destroyers Barton, Thompson, 

Harding, and O'Brien, was the Rangers' main 

defense and was called on heavily to shell 

suspected assembly areas. With this aid 

and maximum use of their two mortars, 

which fired 300 rounds during the day , 

enemy attack was held off. 

Their communications still limited to 

occasional contact with passing naval vessels, the Rangers on the Point were unaware 

through most of the day that a relief force 

was very near and was battling to reach 

them. After reaching St-Pierre-du-Mont before noon, the relief column planned to push 

along the coastal highway to the junction 

of the exit road from Pointe du Hoe. Company A of the 2d Rangers, forming the 

column's point, got to a hamlet within 200 

yards of the exit road, when heavy interdictory fire from medium howitzers fell on 

the highway behind them, forcing the tanks 

to withdraw. Reforming at St-Pierre, the 

column tried again . This time the tanks 

got past the exit road, but the 1st Battalion 

of the 116th was caught by well-directed 

artillery fire which blanketed a quarter-mile 

stretch of the highway, and lost 30 or 40 

men. This forced another withdrawal. The 

58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and 

na val guns endeavored to loca te the en em y 

batteries, somewhere to the southwest. Efforts were made to organize a third attack, 

again along the highway, but the afternoon 

ended with the relieving force still in StPierre-du-Mont. Its advance had undoubtedly taken some of the pressure off the Point, 

and patrols made COntact that night with 

the beleaguered force. During the afternoon, two LCVP's landed at the Point with 

food, water, ammunition, and about 30 reinforcements picked up at Omaha Beach. 

The worst of the situation was over. 

126 

The 175th Infantry landed east of D-3 between 1230 and 1630, losing several craft 

to mines and encountering occasional machine-gun fire at the beach and on the march 
inland through Vierville to Gruchy, which 

was reached at 2000. Elements of the 224th 

and 227th 'Field Artillery Battalions also 

landed during the afternoon, giving the 

29th Divisio'n a total of 29 howitzers from 

5 battalions ashore and ready for fire. 

Anticipating these reinforcements, V 

Corps issued Field Order No.1, at 2100, 

7 June, covering the next phase of operations 

for the 29th Division. The division's chief 

objective was Isigny, an important road 

center for enemy communications and the 

key to eventual junction with VII Corps. 

Released from corps reserve to the 29th 

Division, the 175th Infantry, with two 

companies of the 747th Tank Battalion 

attached, was ordered to move via Englesqueville-Ia Cambe and capture the town. 

The 115th Infantry had the mission of protecting the flank of this advance by seizing 

the high ground north of the Aure from 

Longueville to Normanville. The 116th 

and Rangers were ordered to continue westward on the axis of the coastal highway, 

clearing out enemy resistance from Grandcamp to Isigny. The 9th Infantry of the 2d 

Division, just starting t6 land, was given 

the mission of further mopping-up in the 

Vierville-St-Laurent area. 

General Gerhardt, assuming command of 

the 29th Division at 1700, implemented the 

corps order wi th 29th Di vision Field Order 

No.3, issued at 2330. In this, the 115th 

Infantry was directed to move one battalion 

north of Formigny for protection of the 

the division flank near the boundary with 

the 1st Division. Enemy forces in the 29th 

Division zone were estimated as including 

elements of the 914th, 916th, and 726th 

Infantry. An important aspect of the next 

day's operation was the prospect of clearing 

out enemy artillery positions in the Grandcamp-Maisy area, for despite all efforts of 

naval fire, enemy batteries in this "rea were 

still active on 7 June . 

The 175th Infantry and the attached tanks 

started their march from Gruchy at 2130 and 

reached their objective within 36 hours, an 

advance of some 12 miles. Turning off the 

cOi!-stal highway beyond Gruchy, the regiment reached Englesqueville at 0200 on 8 

June, brushing aside light resistance. Staying on the roads, with tanks leading the 

column of battalions, the force pushed south 

to hit the Isigny- Bayeux highway west of 

Longueville. The advance echelon of tanks 

reached la Cambe at 0300, but an attempt to 

enter the village at 0530 was held up by 

antitank guns. The 747th Tank Battalion 

knocked out five of these for the loss of one 

tank, and during the morning the infantrytank team succeeded in capturing la Cam be. 

Aircraft bearing friendly insignia strafed 

the column as it passed through the village 

and inflicted 20 casualties. 

127 

Enemy resistance stiffened west of la 

Cam be, and artillery fire from 88-mm guns 

disabled six tanks of Company C of the 747th 

Tank Battalion. A small enemy force supported by a few mobile 88's held the StGermain-du-Pert area. On the other flank 

an enemy strongpoint protected the radar 

station at Cardon ville. At Osman ville, enemy strength estimated at a company and 

disposing of antitank guns blocked the main 

highway. Too separated to give each other 

support, none of these enemy positions was 

able to cause more than temporary delay. 

The 3d Ba ttalion of the 175th drove the 

enemy from St-Germain across the Aure by 

1600. Aided by naval fire from the British 

cruiser Glasgow, the 2d Battalion captured 

Cardon ville late in the evening. Resuming 

its advance after nightfall and encountering 

only weak enemy parties, at 0200 the 3d 

Battalion was within half a mile of Isigny, 

and leading tanks entered the town during 

the next hour. As a result of hea vy naval 

bombardment, Isigny was in flames. The 

bridge over the Aure was intact, and no 
DAMAGE IN ISIGNY inflicted by a naval bombardmmt jUJt b.-

fo" th. 175th Il1fantry wmt through th. town in th •• arly morning 

of 9 june, Though they offered little orgalliud ruistatlu here, 

German rijle11ltn wert ftill sniping from ho'Usu later in the day. 

organized resistance was met in the tOwn . 

By 0500, infantry and tanks were cleaning 

the houses of snipers; a weak enemy counterattack about 0800 was stOpped by rifle fire. 

Some 200 prisoners taken in the tOwn 

included naval, marine, and air force personnel. While the tanks starred south toward Lison, Com pan y K of the 17Sth pushed 

on a mile to the Vire River crossing and 

found that the bridge had been burned. 

128 

To strengthen the drive of the 116th 

Infantry along the coastal highway, the 

2d and 3d Battalions, the remainder of the 

5th Rangers, and twO com panies of the 

743d Tank Battalion moved up from Vierville early in the morning of 8 June. At 

about 1CXXl a coordinated attack was starred 

toward Pointe du Hoe; the 5th Rangers and 

the 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry, struck 

across country from St-Pierre-du-Mont; the 
3d Battalion and five tanks attacked from 

south and southwest of the Point; and the 

destroyer Ellyson put 140 rounds on the 

German cliff positions. The right wing of 

the maneuver reached the Point without 

opposition; unfortunately, the tanks and the 

3d Battalion in their outflanking approach 

became confused as to the location of friendly 

positions and started firing on the Point as 

well as on the enemy emplacements just 

west of it. The fact that the 2d Rangers 

were firing captured German machine guns 

at the enemy west of the Point may have 

contributed to the mix-up. Communications failed to function well, and some 

casualties were suffered before the situation 

was cleared up. Three tanks were disabled 

by mines in the effort to reach the Point. 

Enemy resistance had faded quickly and 

Pointe du Hoe was cleared by noon. 

MAP NO. 8 

' . 

Movement toward Grandcamp started at 

once. Taking that small resort town promised to be difficult, since the approach by 

the coastal highway led across a small valley 

with flooded areas on both sides of the road, 

and the enemy strongpoints west of the 

valley had extensive fields of fire from higher 

ground (Map No.8). The enemy had 

failed to destroy the bridge, but the 5th 

Rangers were checked at this crossing by 

machine-gun and mortar fire, and lacked 

heavy weapons to deal with the enemy 

resistance. The British cruiser Glasgow rendered assistance by fire on the German 

strongpoints near Grandcamp, expending 113 

rounds between 1455 and 1600. Late in the 

afternoon the 3d Battalion of the 116th 

took over the job. Tanks of Company C, 

743d Tank Battalion, led across the bridge, 

losing one vehicle to a mine; then Companies 

129 

----

ACTION AT GRANDCAMP 

B JUNE 

0) M&III '"'11, IIUIUAIIG' 

® A,," IIUtlllD n I Co 

(j) Nit'" '0'1'1011 3110 ell. U6U1 1",,..lIu, 

o 100 100 )00 400 100 

JUDt 
K and L of the 3d Battalion worked over to 

the west bank and attacked abreast on 

either side of the road, under covering fire 

by machine guns and BAR's which displaced rapidly , Enemy emplacements north 

of the highway had to be taken by close-in 

fighting, and snipers in the tOwn continued 

to resist. Company I came up after the 

others had entered the tOwn; one platOon of 

I, led by 2d Lt. Norvin Nathan, drove all 

the way through to the west end of Grandcamp and forced the surrender of a pill box 

at the edge of the beach. Organized resistance was over by dark. In the action, 

which some soldiers of the 5th Rangers and 

3d Battalion, 116th, described as more severe than their D-Day fighting, tbe Germans 

had lost one of their strongest coastal positions in the V Corps zone. 

During this attack along the coastal highway, the 1st Battalion of the 116th was 

making a wide sweep to the south, not only 

outflanking Grandcamp but aiming at 

Maisy. Paced by Company A of the 743d 

Tank Battalion, they moved south to Jucoville and then swung west through an area 

wbich was practically undefended. Heavy 

na val guns had tOrn Maisy to pieces, and 

the tanks were able to deal easily with 

resistance from enemy machine guns. Just 

west of the village an en em y strongpoint 

blocked the Isigny road and was supported 

by mortar and 88-mm fire, including interdictOry fire behind Maisy which prevented 

reinforcement of the leading infantry elements. Since the tanks were running short 

of fuel, advance was halted for the night. 

Supporting the 116th on 8 June, tbe 58th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion fired 123 

rounds from positions north of Longueville . 

On 9 June, the 116th and Rangers cleaned up 

the last enelPy resistance around Grandcamp, Maisy, and Gefosse-Fontenay. 

The 115th accomplished its mission on 8 

June without much difficulty. Longueville, 

a bandoned by the enemy, was reached at 

1100 by the 2d Battalion which tOok up 

defensive positions west of the village. 

The 1st Battalion followed to the same area, 

approached the Aure Valley at Ecrammeville, and began to patrol in preparation for 

crossing the flooded lowlands. The 3d 

Battalion, ordered tOward Formigny in the 

morning to guard against possible enemy 

attack from Trevieres, reached Formigny 

at noon and at 1630 was moved west again 

to Deux-Jumeaux. It arrived there at 1900, 

only to be sent south to Canchy, with orders 

to reconnoi ter the inundated area for crossings that night. The tired battalion, which 

had received no rations that day, got to 

Canchy at midnight. Regimental transport 

for the 115th was reaching the battalions 

that evening. The 110th Field Artillery 

Battalion fired 178 rounds in support of the 

regiment on 8 June . 

A document captured by the 175th Infantry laid down a German defensive policy 

which had been illustrated by enemy action 

against the advance of the 29th Division: 

130 

"Do not," it advised, "become engaged in a 

positioned defense." The Germans had 

tried to stOp the U. S. columns by use of 

small parties, well equipped with autOmatic 

weapons, supported by a few self-propelled 

guns, and ready to retire under strong pressure. These tactics, intended to delay by 

forcing repeated deployments, worked well 

enough up to 8 June, but then failed against 

the gathering momentum of the 29th Division 's attack . On that day, enemy defenses 

in the whole area north of the inundated 

Aure Valley, from Isigny to Trevieres, were 

collapsed by the rapid 12-mile advance of 

the 175th Infantry on a route which may 

have taken the Germans by surprise. At 

nightfall, the enemy forces still in this area 

were scattered and disorganized , and in one 

case prisoners accused their officers of lea ving 

the men to shift for themselves in an effort 
to get south and west of the Aure. Several 

hundred enemy were captured north of the 

Aure in mopping-up operations during the 

next twO days. Elements of the 914th, 915th, 

and 726th Regiments had been involved in the 

vain effort to check the 29th Division. 

Enemy losses in artillery had been considerable, including two horse-drawn batteries 

of lOS-mm guns found deserted near Osmanville on 9 June. One of the most important 

results of the advance was to deprive the 

enemy of the coastal defenses and artillery 

positions between Grandcamp and lsigny, 

from which tire had been harassing both 

Omaha and Utah beachheads. 

In contrast to the loss of enemy fire power, 

the artillery support of the 29th Division 

continued to build up on 8 June. By nightfall, six barcalions of artillery, including 

three of ISS-mm howitzers (twO attached 

from Corps Artillery), were available. Use 

of artillery on 8 June had still been relati vely 

light, but the difficulties in getting observed 

fire were being overcome as communications 

improved. The first aircraft used for artillery observation was flown that afternoon, 

and several more planes were ready by 9 

June. 

Improvement at the Beach 

Tactical advance and the arrival of supplies were mutually dependent conditions 

of success for the operation. Until the 

ad vance pushed far enough to free the beaches 

for normal operation, the supply and reinforcement necessary for sustained attack 

could not be unloaded. Deepening of the 

beachhead on 7-8 June was reflected in the 

progress made at the landing beaches. 

ORGANIZING THE BEACH involved ci<aring mines and debris, 

salvage jobs, and building roads. Supplies had to be kept moving 

whil~ all the other work was being carried on. Sun! in front of E- J 

draw, an exit much photographed in the early days of tht illvaJion. 
On D+l, the Engineer Special Brigade 

Group was still operating under great difficulties, and all beach work was far behind 

schedule. The engineer units were short of 

equipment, were handicapped by the wreckage and the congestion on the beach, and 

had to improvise new methods of dealing 

with the complex problems of unloading 

and routing men and materiel. Carefully 

arranged priority schedules for discharging 

cargo broke down under the difficulties of 

communicating information as to arrival of 

ships and contents of cargoes. Enemyartillery kept up harassing fire, and snipers along 

the bluffs were not entirely cleaned out for 

two or three days. With the larger part of 

the beach-maintenance area still held by the 

enemy, emergency dumps were opened on 

the beach and in nearby fields. Nevertheless, all exit roads were opened and working 

LANDING SUPPLIES from ships at tht tdgt of tht blach flat . 

Ammunition was particularly 1Lud~d in th~ first days. Remnants 

of the shingle stiLL show; laur the embankment was entirely removed 

by beach engineers organizing Omaha as a port of entry for suppliu . 

". , . 

• 
by noon, and vitally needed materiel, particularly artillery and ammunition, was 

landed in sufficient quantity for immediate 

needs. A great deal of effective work was 

done to salvage materiel left on the beach 

from D-Day landings. Priority of unloading was given throughont these first days to 

ammunition, in which the supply situation 

was serious until 10 June. Only on 8 June 

did ammunition begin to reach shore on 

craft other than the pre-loaded dukws. 

The reserves of rations and gasoline, which 

had been provided to the uni ts making the 

landings, had helped tide over the critical 

initial stages in these classes. Each organization had brought in five days' rations and 

extra gas supplies on each vehicle. 

On 8 June, as a result of the ad vance inland , of the engineers' work, and of a 

moderating sea, conditions were measurably 

better. . Enemy batteries were no longer 

firing on the landing area; the beach was nearly 

clear of debris and mines; a lateral road, 

running the length of the beach, was being 

rapidly constructed for two-way traffic; and 

many access roads had been built from the 

tidal flat to the lateral for facilitating discharge of craft. Transit areas were beginning to function as planned. An emergency 

landing strip, prepared on the high ground 

near E-1 exit, was operational by 1800 on 

8 June, and wounded were evacuated by air 

from this field as early as 10 June.. Communication facilities, essential for managing 

flow of traffic on the beach, were partly installed. Tonnage moved for the day was 

only 1,429, a small figure in view of needs 

but the start of rapid expansion to a level of 

7,OCXJ tons by D+S. The situation was 

under control, and a major supply channel 

for the coming months of operations began 

to take organized shape . 

133 

During these twO days, Allied air forces 

continued their offensi ve against enemy communications. The Eighth Air Force and 

RAF began to work on the Loire River 

bridges, while the Ninth Air Force went 

after the railroad bridges between the Seine 

and the Loire (Map No. XIlI). Marshalling 

yards and traffic centers from Brittany to 

Paris received attacks, and choke points 

were bombed up to points as near the beachhead as St-L6, Lison,Carentan, and Ie Molay. 

Fighter-bombers carried on the task of interdieting rail and road movement west of the 
Seine and north of the Loire. Taking 8 

June as a sample of the range and intensi ty 

of Allied air effort in the period following 

D Day, 262 B-26's and A-20's engaged in 

close cooperation with ground forces, drop-. 

ping 442 tons on tactical targets in the battle 

zone; 735 Eighth Air Force heavies hit 

bridges and traffic centers from Brittany to 

Orleans with 2,000 tons; 129 Ninth Air 

Force mediums put 245 tons on railway yards 

and bridges near the invasion area and along 

the Seine; 492 RAF heavies dropped 1,851 

tons in a night attack on communications 

centers such as Rennes and Alen<;on; 1,335 

fighters and fighter-bombers of the Eighth 

and Ninth Air Forces and 1,797 planes of the 

Second Tactical Air Force (British) made 

sorties against communications near the 

battle line and against tactical targets. 

Seven bridges in the Carentan area were 

attacked by fighter-bombers of the Ninth Air 

Force on 7-8 June, with three reported 

gapped. Two groups of Ninth Air Force 

medium bombers attacked Isigny on 8 June 

with the aim of blocking the highway; on 

the same day, the marshalling yard at St-L6 

was destroyed and all rail connections cut 

at that junction. Fighter-bombers stopped 

all rail movement through Lison on 7- 8 

June. Enemy air activity showed only 

slight increase, the Eighth Air Force reporting 130 German sorties on 8 June in the 

vicinity of the beachheads. 

The Ene"!y Side 

On 7 - 8 June , the Germall command was still 

chie jly concerned about the Caen and Cotentin 

sectors, and lIeither Army nor Army Group 

showed much interest in the area between Bayeux 

and Isigny. Comparatively few references were 

made in Seventh Army estimates and situation 

reports as to what was happening near the Omaha 

sector. In part, this may have been due to scanty 

iriformation from lower units, but it may also 

134 

be a result of conc/usions which Seventh Army 

had drawn on D Day as to the relative strength 

of the Allied beachheads. 

The counterattack planned for 7 June in the 

Caen sector did not come off. By that morning 

forward .elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division 

were between Villers-Bocage and Caen, while 

Panzer Lehr was beginning to reach ThuryHarcourt. But the columns were delayed by 

air attacks both on the march alld in the assembly 

area, and the counteroffensive was postponed to 

8 J U1l8. Meantime, the 711 th Division east of 

the Orne, and 21st Panzer <llld 12th SS Panzer 

(elements) north of Caen, stopped further British 

advance. On 8 June, there was little change in 

the Caen area, and, with Panzer Leh, still 

ullable to get into the battle ZOlle, there was again 

no start of the expected counterattack. . Allied 

pressure northeast of Bayeux increased, and, 

despite all efforts of the 352d Division, that town 

fell to the British by the night of 7- 8 June. 

In the Cotenlin, information of 7 June indicated Allied reinforcement by air and by sea. On 

the next day, he,Jvy Allied pressure was exerted 

from the Ste-Mere-Eglise area in attacks north 

toward Valognes and south toward Carentan. 

German units which had been attempting to 

organize counterattacks against the Utah beachhead were thrown on the defensive and began to 

lose ground. Growing concern was felt at Army 

over this situation, particularly after studying a 

(U. S.) VII Corps operations order, washed in 

on the beach on 8 June, which made it clear that 

Cherbourg was a main Allied objective. 

Seventh Army had little news on 7 June from 

the Colleville-Vierville area, though it W(IS aware 

that Allied landings had strengthened the forces 

ashore there. A good deal of misinformation 

came from this sector; at 1740 Army informed von 

Rundstedt that Grandcamp had been recaptured. 

In the situation report to Army Group at 0810 on 

8 June, Seventh Army reported that Allied paratroopers had been landing in the CollevilleRussy-Surrain area, and were pushing westward. 

Meantime, Seventh AmO' had decided from the 
captured operations order of VII Corps that the 

landings east of the Vire were by the British V 

Corps, including five British and two United 

States divisions, and that one of their objectives 

was to reach contact with VII Corps at Carentan. 

The Allied push south from Colleville was interpreted as an effort toward Carentan, designed to 

roll up Germa" coastal defenses by passing to 

rearward of them. It was recogllized that a 

, 'wide hole had bem torn between Bayeux and 

St-Lo." Although no particular anxiety about 

that sector was yet expressed, plans for commitment of the reinforcements under way from Brittany were somewhat modified ( Map No. XIII). 

Part of thue reinforcements were under II 

Paratroop Corps: the 3d Paratroop Division, the 

77th Division , and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier 

Division. Rommel decided on the morning of 

7 june that Brittany was not in danger of early 

attack and started these offensive units on the way 

to Normandy, the 17th SS to come from positions 

south of the Loire River. Plans for use of II 

Paratroop Corps were reshaped during the next few 

days i" view of changing appreciation of the 

battle. At first, because of reported paratroop 

landings in the Coutances area, the corps was 

rdered to that regidn to guard against any Allied 

attempt to cut off the Cotentin peninsula. Such 

an attempt was feared by Rommel himself. 

On 8 june Seventh Army notified Army Group 

of its intentiolls as follows: to annihilate the 

Allied beachhead north of Caen mId then turn 

t~ ward Bayeux; to hold the VII (U. S .) Corps 

attack toward Cherbourg by means of the units 

already in the Cotenti,,; and to bring II Paratroop Corps up to the St-Lo regioll, where it could 

help I SS Panzer Corps in the attack on Bayeux, 

or if "ot ""ded there, smash the Allied bridgehead "orth of Carentan. Rommel approved this 

plan, but by eveni"g of 8 june the i"creasing 

Allied preJmre toward Motlfebourg was already 

causing Arm..y to think in terms of usi,lg II 

Paratroop Corps to protect the Cotentin. 

Seventh Army plans were i'lcreasingly affected 

~n 7- 8 june by difficulties encountered in moving 

its reinforcmmlts toward the battle fronts. In 

part this was due to shortage of transportation 

facilities, particularly for the troops coming from 

Brittany. In even grulter measure, however, 

Allied air power was hindering movement by 

attacks on columns, on bridges and railroads, 

and on important communications Ctnters. As t1 

result, I SS Pmlzer Corps had so far failed to 

mou"t its counterattack. Movement of II Paratroop Corps was " greatly delayed by air bombing 

and sabotage of communications." Army Chief 

of Staff urgently requested Army Group for 

strong air protection of moving columns, but was 

told that all available air strength was already 

being used. The Luftwaffe was in process of 

trans/erring units from east to west) to assist the 

battle, but was having its own delays. 

135 

One result of the Allied air effort on 8 j U/le 

was so bad a breakdown of communications as 

to hinder all command functions. For hours 

Army had "0 contact with I SS Panzer Corps or 

with II Paratroop Corps, and was unable to 

de((rmine their positions. Particular trouble was 

caused by bombing attacks at Avranches, bottleneck on main routes leading from Britta"y to 

Normandy. By attacks 0" the evening of 7 ju"e, 

Allied air had severed communications across the 

lower Loire River, where the 17th SS Panzer 

Grenadier had just brought forward elemmts 

across at Angers. By evening of 8 JUIle, apparently none of the reinforcements coming from 

Brittany had yet reached the Avranches area. 22 

Last-mi"ute reports of that night brought disturbing news from the Bayeux- Tr<v;eres sector. 

Allied units pressing southwest from Bayeux, 

and also south of the Bayeux--Isig,'Y highway, 

were making "rapid progress westward toward 

Trevieres and to the northwest of Trevieres." 

Parts of the 916th and 726th Infantry had been 

cut off and received orders to fight their way back. 

Seventh Army's attention was about to be drawn 

more thall before to the Omaha area. 

" Tht tOOl/W" of 11., 27511, Balli, Group il 11 <>1 €I",> f,om Iltl ,teQrd, . (J"d I~ .. , .... i, 

may 110.11 ti,u.,d A""u,rlUJ. 
THE ATTACK OF 9-11 JUNE 

AT 1700 ON 8 JUNE, warning orders were 

issued by V Corps; the second phase of the 

beachhead operations was to begin the next 

day. The delay of two days in reaching the 

initial objectives gave urgency to the situation. German resistance was weakening, 

but reinforcements could change the whole 

picture. The beachhead was still far short 

of its desired depth, and the landing area 

could still be reached by enemy artillery fire 

from the Trevieres positions. V Corps had 

reckoned with enemy capabilities of attack 

by three divisions, including armor, by evening of8June . So far previsions of counterattack had not been realized, a tribute to 

the effective work of the Allied air forces 

on enemy communications. . However, V 

Corps intelligence noted enemy troop movements 70 miles south of the battle front, and 

the 12th SS Panzer and the SS Hitler Jugend 

Divisions were believed moving from the 

east, with possibility of reaching the battle 

front on 9 June. In the corps zone, Cerisy 

Forest was suspected of being an area of 

assembly for enemy forces, including armor. 

The 30th Mobile Brigade, which had just 

begun to make an appearance in the fighting, 

represented the last known local reserves at 

the enemy's disposal. 

There was, of course, no assurance that 

reinforcements coming from a distance would 

be used against V Corps, for the Germans had 

a much wider front to consider in committing their available strength (Map No. 

XVI). To the east, British Second Army 

was six to eight miles inland on a considerable front, had crossed the Caen- Ba yeux 

highway, and was within two miles ofCaen. 

That city was of vital importance to the 

enemy, and north of it the Germans were 

offering strong resistance based on the 21st 

Panzer Division, with evidence of other 

armored reinforcement coming up. To the 

west, VII Corps was still fighting to consolidate the assigned beachhead area, was 

short of its original objectives, and was 

opposed by elements of a t least three di visions. Carentan was still in enemy hands. 

Although build-up had been affected by 

the delay in all landing schedules during 

the first days, V Corps disposed of considerable increase in strength for attack beyond 

D-Day objectives. Four battalions of 155-

mm howitzers (corps artillery) were getting 

ashore on 8 June. The 2d Division, originally due by D+2, was estimated far enough 

along in landing to be operational by the 

next day. The 9th Infantry had landed the 

evening of 7 June, and used two battalions 

on 8 June in clearing Out snipers behind the 

beach between St-Laurent and Vierville. The 

38th Infantry had two battalions ashore by 

evening of the 8th, and the 23d had started 

landing. Two batteries of divisional artillery were arriving. Behind the 2d Division, 

the 2d Armored was ready to bring in its first 

elements on 9 June. 

136 

In V Corps Field Order No.2, issued at 

2115 on 8 June, General Gerow directed an 

attack at noon the next day by three divisions abreast (Map No. XIV). The 2d 

Division, taking over a 5,OOO-yard front 
THE 2D DIVISION STARTS INLAND frolll ,h. beach infra", of 

E- / draw. At the curt't' of the column, the troops arr paJJi'1lg pillbox 

uud OJ headquarters by the enginurs. The 2d Division, landing 7- 8 

J II lie, had to be used in ?1l0ppil1g up enemy resistance near the beach. 

north of Trevieres, was to capture the key 

high ground at Cerisy Forest. The 1st 

Division was to put its main effort on the 

right, thus assisting the 2d Division, and to 

protect the east f1an k of V Corps along the 

Drame River. The 1st Di vision's objectives lay along the high gtound west of the 

Drame River between Cerisy Forest and the 

Army boundary. On the right wing, covering the drive south to Cerisy Forest, the 

29th Division would cross the Aure and 

reach the edge of the Elle River valley; at the 

137 

same time, it was to capture Isigny and 

establish COntaCt with VII Corps toward 

Carentan. Enemy counterattack was still 

regarded as highly possible, and each attacking division was ordered to be ready for 

defense of D- Day positions in its sector with 

one to three battalions ( one in the 2d Division sector)' these units to remain in D-Day 

positions until relieved by Corps order. 

This attack plan was designed to continue 

forward movements already under way, with 

a minimum of delay. In twO cases, verbal 
orders of the Corps Commander had anticipated Field Order No.2; the 29th Division 

had been ordered to cross the Aure on the 

night of 8- 9 June, and the 1st Division to 

seize high ground southwest of Tour-enBessin as a preliminary to the jump-off on 9 

June. There was thus no sharp dividing 

line, in time, between the completion of the 

operation toward D- Day objectives and the 

start of the new phase. 

Adva1lce 10 Ceris)! Forest 

Mter receiving warning orders at 1700 on 

8 June, the 1st Division units had a considerable task of preparation in order to 

attack at noon next day. They were somewhat short of the assigned line of departure: 

Moulagny- Courtela y- Grivilly- Cussy. On 

the afternoon of the 8th, the 2d Battalion 

received orders to occupy high ground a mile 

southwest of Mosles, in what would be the 

assembly area for the 18th Infantry. The 

battalion met determined resistance near 

Moulagny and dug in for the night a little 

north of its objective. The other battalions 

of the 18th had to wait for relief by the 2d 

Division. This took place on the morning 

of the 9th, delayed by the fact that the 3d 

Battalion was engaged in a fire fight at the 

time of relief; furthermore, both 1st and 3d 

Battalions then had to cover some distance 

co reach their assembly area. As for the 26th 

Infantry, D-Day objectives were just being 

reached on the morning of 9 June; the 3d 

Ba ttalion had been in a severe action wi th 

the enemy at Ste-Anne early that day, while 

the 1st Battalion was still slowed by light 

enemy resistance north of Tour-en-Bessin 

during the morning. As a result, the jumpoff on the 1st Di vision front was delayed one 

to two hours. By Field Order No. 36, the 

1st Division planned its attack with twO 

regiments abreast. The 18th RCT, with 

Company C, 745th Tank Battalion, Battery 

A of the 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and Company B, 635th Tank Destroyer 

Battahon, attached, and the 32d Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, was to 

advance on a front of about 4,000 yards, with 

Vaubadon and la Commune as objectives, on 

the Bayeux- St-L6 highway The 26th RCT, 

with equivalent attachments and the 33d 

Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, 

was aimed at Dodigny and Agy, on the same 

highway. Two battalions of the 16th, with 

the 7th Field Artillery Battalion in direct 

suppOrt, had the mission of clearing enemy 

resistance up to the Arm)' boundary from 

Port-en-Bessin to Vaucelles, maintaining 

contacts with the British on that Hank, and 

organizing defensive positions in the Touren-Bessin area . The 2d Battalion of the 16th 

was held in division reserve. Four battalions 

of artillery (three of them 155-mm howitzers 

or guns) were in general suppOrt, two of 

them reinforcing the fires of the 32d and 33d 

Battalions. 

Due co make the main effort with Cerisy 

Forest as its objective, the 2d Division was 

hampered by lack of weapons and equipment 

as the hour of jump-off approached. The 

9th and 38th Infantry, scheduled to attack 

abreast in the Trevieres area, had no transportation by the morning of 9 June and most 

of the battalions lacked heavier automatic 

weapons, mortars, and communications 

equIpment. Only two battalions (l5th and 

38th) of the divisional artillery were ready 

and in position: medical, signal, engineer, 

and reconnaissance units were only partially 

ashore. The 23d Infantry, designated as 

division reserve, had just landed the evening 

before and was assembling near St-Laurent 

by noon. Attachments to the 2d Division 

for the attack included a company each from 

the 747th Tank Battalion and the 635th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion. 

138 

Delayed in starting, the attack made slow 

progress during the afternoon of 9 June; 
then ga thered momentum as it was pressed 

during the short night (twilight lasted 

until 2300). The enemy at first offered 

stubborn resistance from a number of organized positions, but these were widely separated, not held in strength, and given only 

weak artillery suppOrt. Once they were 

bypassed or overwhelmed, little further 

opposition was encountered. Enemy weakness was indicated by identification of the 

replacement battalion of the 915th Regimmt, 

the reserve battalion of the 916th, and the 

reconnaissance battalion of the 352d Division, as well as remnants of the 517th Mobile 

Battalio". Evidently, with no fresh troops 

at hand, the Germans were throwing in 

their last resources in a fashion that spelled 

disorganization. 

Along the front of four regiments, advance was progressively slower from the left 

to the right flank. By the end of the afternoon, resistance began to fold in front of the 

26th Infantry, attacking with the 2d and 3d 

Battalions abreast. At 2140 the 3d Battalion had reached its objective, Agy; the 2d 

gOt to Dodigny at 0150. The 18th Infantry was held up by a strongpoint near the 

line of departure; this had to be bypassed 

and cleaned up by the reserve battalion 

(2d), which took 30 prisoners and counted 

20 enemy dead. By 2100 the 1st and 3d 

Battal ions of the 18th were two miles behind 

the 26th Infantry units on their left, and 

Corps gave permission for the 16th RCT to 

move from reserve to a position where it 

could guard the open flank and help the 

18th Infantry if necessary. The 18th, however, made better progress as night fell, and 

kept on pressing against diminishing opposition. By daylight it was abreast of the 

26th. Its objectives on the St-L6- Bayeux 

highway were reached at 1000 and 16000n 

10 June. The 3d Battalion, on the edge of 

Cerisy Forest, met signs of increased resistance near its objectives. In an advance of 

139 

6 miles, losses had been slight; the 18th 

Infantry reported 50 casualties for 9 June. 

Enemy prisoners stressed the effecti veness of 

artillery suppOrt given the advance; fires had 

been concentrated on strongpoints, assembly 

areas, and road movements. The 7th, 32d, 

and 33d Field Artillery Battalions fired 22 

missions on 9 June for a total of 976 rounds. 

The batteries of the 62d Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion (self-propelled 105-mm 

howitzers) had been divided between the 1st 

Di vision regiments, to be used for direct 

fire in close support against enemy strongpoints. As a result of the character of the 

opposition, however, these batteries wer~ 

nOt needed. The three artillery battalions 

used in general support still found observation a problem and delivered for the most 

part unobserved fires. Naval fire, using 6-

inch guns of the cruisers, was again very 

helpful, one of the targets being a battery 

south of the 26th Infantry's objective. According to enemy prisoners, many field 

pieces of the 352d Division's artillery had 

been destroyed and all their gun positions 

had been abandoned. Enemy artillery action on the corps front was limi ted to 

occasional fire by single guns. 

The 2d Division, led by Maj. Gen. Walter 

M. Robertson, went into its first action of 

the war under serious handicaps. Its initial 

objective was Trevieres, a key position if the 

enemy planned to hold along his present line. 

While the 38th Infantry attacked from the 

north and west, the 9th Infantry would Outflank Trevieres by seizing Rubercy, to the 

southeast. 

The 9th Infantry had relieved the 18th at 

Engranville and Mandeville that morning 

and had planned an attack by the 2d and 3d 

Battalions abreast, 2d to the west. The 

attack order did nOt reach the 2d Batralion 

at Engranville until 1100, and that unit was 

far short of its line of departure, the Trevieres- Mandeville road. When the battalion 
THE APPROACH TO TREVIERES from th. high ground just 

north of th ~ Aur~ Rirur was strongly defended by the Gnmans until 

10 J UJle, wht1L the 2d D ivision outflanked and captured the town. 

This marked collapst oj the lnlmy resistance north of Ctrisy Forest. 

crossed the Aure, it came under heavy flanking fire of automatic weapons from the 

strong German defenses east of Trevieres. 

Supporting tanks, held up by the steep banks 

of the Aure, were unable ro get into position 

to help, and the 2d Battalion immediately 

felt the lack of its mortars and machine guns. 

The right wing of the advance was pinned 

down for most of the afternoon but managed 

to disengage and reach the line of departure 

about dark. Company E had suffered 20 

casualties in the fight. When the battalion 

was ordered to resume the attack at 2200, 

preliminary artillery fire was misdirected, 

the first rounds falling into the CP area and 

inflicting 17 casualties. Recovering from 

this incident, the battalion pushed on and 

reached the Rubercy-Trevieres road at midnight. Heavy weapons were now beginning 

to arrive, but the unit was still without 

communications and out of contact with the 

3d Battalion on its left. 

140 
The 3d Baccalion, starting its accack from 

the area Mandeville-Moulagny, was fortunate in having most of its heavy weapons 

and equipment. Companies K and L attacked abreast on the Mandeville-Rubercy 

road, but K lost its direction and sideslipped to the east, forcing the use of I to fill 

a wide gap in the front. At the village of 

Haut-Hameau, enemy small-arms fire stopped 

Company L for several hours. When four 

tanks came up to deal with the resistance, 

the Germans put in an unusually heavy concentration of artillery fire, with eight guns 

reported as firing from the south and southwest. A tank was knocked out; Company L 

lost 20 men and was disorganized. Contacts with K and I were made and a coordinated attack by Companies I and L was prepared for 1900, preceded by support fires from 

a 4.2-inch mortar platoon , the Cannon 

Company, a baccery of the 15th Field Artillery Baccalion , and several destroyers. When 

L advanced after this fire, German resistance 

was slight. Fifteen enemy dead were found, 

and two machine guns and a few prisoners 

taken. The baccalion was near Rubercy by 

dark, out of contact with the 1st Division 

on its left. The 9th Infantry lost 10 killed 

and 80 wounded for the day's action. 

To the west of this advance, the 38th 

Infantry had made slow progress against 

Trevieres, where the enemy resisted stubbornly from well dug-in positions. The 2d 

Battalion, attacking from the north, was 

fighting into the village by nightfall. Two 

machine guns and some bazookas borrowed 

from an engineer unit were put to use, and 

the heavy mortars of Company C, 81st 

Chemical Weapons Battalion, helped to 

neutralize enemy strong points at the edge of 

the village. The 3d Battalion crossed the 

Aure southwest of Trevieres, accempting to 

outflank the village on that side. During 

the day, the 15th and 38th Field Artillery 

Battalions had been called on very heavily 

141 

for supporting fires, mostly against Trevieres, 

and had used 3,652 tounds up to midnight. 

By 10 June the 2d Division had received 

much of its missing equipment and transportation, and the attack was renewed in greater 

strength. A prisoner captured on the evening before had stated that the 916th Regimmt 

was withdrawing ftom the Trevieres area 

to the Cerisy Forest, and the lack of enemy 

resistance on 10 June confirmed this statement. The advances east and west of 

Trevieres had left the enemy there in an 

untenable salient. After a heavy artillery 

concentration fired before 0700, the village 

was cleared out by 0845, and the 2d Division went forward with no opposition except 

from isolated snipers and an occasional 

machine gun holding a delaying position. 

The result was the most extensive advance 

of the operation. The 9th Infantry got 

through Cerisy Forest after skirmishes with 

enemy scout cars, and bivouacked southwest of Balleroy with losses for the day of 

six wounded. The 38th Infantry reached 

the village of Cerisy-Ia-Foret, and at 2100 

the 1st Battalion was pushing on with 

orders to seize Haute-Litee at the southwest 

corner of the woods. Only in this area 

was there any sign of organized enemy 

opposition, offered by the Engineer Battalion, 

352d Division. Prisoners for the day numbered 90, and their reports indicated considerable disintegration of enemy means of 

resistance: remnants of units were intermingled , supplies were lacking, and some 

prisoners had no know ledge of the whereabouts of their units and commanders. 

German artillery delivered no fires on frontline troops and engaged in no counterbattery on 10 June . Only enemy weakness 

could explain the fact that Cerisy Forest 

had been practically undefended. Possession of the area by U. S. forces denied the 

enemy commanding ground from which to 

mount counteraccack against the beach-
head; furthermore, it lay athwart the best 

direct route between St-L6 and the German 

forc es defending south of Bayeux. 

On 11 June, the 1st and 2d Divisions 

organized the ground won in their rapid 

advance. On most parts of the front there 

was no contact with the enemy, and patrols 

which pushed several miles southward found 

no opposition in any force. Despite the 

reports on previous days of the approach 

of armored units, these were still not in 

evidence. Enemy artillery fire was almost 

nonexistent, being reported only twice on 

the 2d Division front . 

The only serious fighting of the day took 

place on the right flank, where the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry was completing 

its attempt to secure the crossroads at HauteLitee. This area was stoutly defended all 

day by Germans holding prepared positions. 

When the crossroads were passed at noon, 

the enemy still resisted in the forest fringes 

to south and west, holding up further advance by mortar fire. Heavy con centra tions 

by the 38th and 12th Field Artillery Battalions neutralized the mortars and allowed 

the 1st Battalion to reach objectives west 

and south of the ctossroads. The 38th 

THE AURE RIVER though small was enough of an obstacle to hold 

up tQ1tks in the attack on Trevihu. North oj the town, ajurwards, 

the 246th Enginur Combat Battalion put OVtr this double-single 

Bailey bridge, important in a major north-sou.th supply chaund. 

./ . . / - , • 

• 

142 
Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,015 rounds 

during this action. By nightfall, the 23d 

Infantry had moved up to join the division; 

its vehicles and equipment were expected to 

arrive in a matter of hours. 

On the 1st Division front, preparations 

were made on the afternoon of 11 June for 

the corps attack the next day. Balleroy, 

found held by an enemy patrol in the morning, was occupied in the afternoon without 

resistance . The division was strengthened 

by the arrival of the 1st Reconnaissance 

Troop and the 102d Cavalry Battalion, 

which were immediately put into use for 

reconnaissance mISSIOns. During the evening, the 18th and 26th Infantry Regiments 

moved across the Dr6me to the line Planqueray-Ia Butte, without encountering oppOSlt1on. At 2030 some alarm was caused 

by reports of a German countera ttack wi th 

armor in the British area, headed west for 

the left flank and rear of the 1st Division. 

The report turned Out to be unfounded. 

Bri tish ad vance south and southeast of 

Bayeux was, however, being slowed by 

heavy resistance. On 10 June, the main 

effort, led by the 7 Armoured Division, 

reached the area Tilly-sur-Seulles- Lingevres 

and began to encounter enemy armor. On 

the First Army's flank, elements of the 

British 231 Brigade reached la Belle-Epine 

on the 11th and were momentarily checked 

there by the enemy counterattack which 

occasioned concern for V Corps' flank. 

British XXX Corps had been, so far, abreast 

of V Corps' advance, but there were indications that further progress might be uneven 

in the twO zones. 

Across the Lower Aure (29th Divisio'l) 

V Corps Field Order No.2, directing a 

general attack at noon on 9 June, included 

as preliminary to the attack certain movements already under way by the 29th DiviSlon. One was the capture of Isigny; the 

other was the crossing of the flooded part 

of the Aure Valley by the 115th Infantry, 

to be accomplished during the night of 

8- 9 June. 

According to advance intelligence, the 

lowland between Isigny and Trevieres had 

been inundated to a depth of two to three 

feet, over a width varyin'g from a half mile 

to twO miles. When the Aure Valley was 

reached, conditions were found not as bad 

as had been reported, since the wa ters had 

receded. However, large patches of shallow 

water remained, the mud was deep everywhere, and the close network of drainage 

ditches between the twO main streams 

(Esque and Aure) would hamper movement, 

even though the ditches were not wide. 

The four bridges along the causewa y between 

la Cambe and Douet had been destroyed. 

Patrols were sent out on the evening of the 

8th to reconnoiter for crossings, and heavy 

artillery and na val fire was laid on the south 

bank of the flood plain, particularly near 

Bricqueville, Colombieres, and Calette 

Wood. This preparatOry fire included 150 

rounds from destroyers' guns and 208 rounds 

of the 110th Field Artillery Battalion. 

2d Lt. Kermit C. Miller took a combat 

patrol of platOon strength from Company 

E, 115th Infantry, crossed the valley south 

of Canchy after dark, and went into Colombieres. Already hit hard by artillery concentrations, the enemy force there was disorganized; the patrol took it completely by 

surprise, ambushed enemy reinforcements, 

and inflicted more than 40 casualties before 

withdrawing with 11 prisoners. The 3d 

Battalion also sent out small reconnaissance 

patrols of two or three men, who reported 

getting across at several points but were 

dubious about being able to guide the 

battalion. 

143 

About first light on 9 June, the 3d Battalion started out over the flats south from 
Canchy, with the Cannon Company of the 

115th as near as possible to the valley for 

close suppOrt. Visibility was good, and 

enemy Opposltlon in any strength could 

easily have made the advance very costly. 

Halfway across, the battalion reached a 

stream toO deep to ford, and stopped while 

Company A of the 121st Engineer Combat 

Battalion rigged 10 improvised foot bridges, 

using assault-raft equipment, pneuma tic 

floats, and bridge timbers. "Weasels" 

(M-29)23 were used to get the materials forward . These bridges gOt the troops over 

the deeper streams and di tches, but the 

smaller ones still caused plenty of delay, twO 

hours being required to put the battalion 

across the exposed flats. Fortunately, the 

area was practically undefended. No artillery fire was encountered and only scattered 

rifle fire . The 2d Battalion followed the 

3d, and both were over by 1100. 

Further east, the 1st Battalion tried to 

find a passage across the narrower part of 

the Aure Valley, south of Ecrammeville, 

but the enemy holding the Trevieres area 

repulsed this effort with machine-gun and 

rifle fire. The 1st Battalion then marched 

to Canchy and followed the route taken by 

the rest of the regiment. Along the causewa y, four short tread wa y bridges were 

started by the 254th Engineer Combat Battalion and were ready for vehicles that night. 

By Field Order No . 4 of the 29th Division, 

initial objectives assigned to the 115th were 

Bricqueville, Colombieres, and the Calette 

Wood; these were supposed to be occupied 

by noon as bases for the next phase of the 

attack . The 1st Battalion marched to Bricqueville, repulsed a weak enemy attack with 

the aid of close-support fire by the regimental 

cannon company, and organized defensive 

posltlons. The 3d Battalion arrived at 

Colombieres by 1020, encountering no oppo-

%$ If Jutf-fr~rlt. li,ht (ar,o carrur with I,ZOO-pound capacity. 

sitton. The ba ttalion did not move out on 

the attack until 1700 and reached its next 

objective, la Folie, at 2300. Its position 

that night was to be somewhat exposed, 

since the enemy still held Trevieres, and on 

the right the 2d Battalion had met disaster. 

That battalion had a hard day's work. 

After crossing the Aure Valley, it turned 

west toward Calette Wood, from which 

enemy harassing fire was holding up the 

bridging work at the causeway. En route, 

the battalion met considerable opposition 

near Vouilly, from riflemen and bicycle 

troops armed with machine pistols. Only 

scattered resistance was met at Calette Wood, 

which had received two concentrations of 

fire from the division artillery. The battalion spent th ree hours in beating the thick 

brush for snipers, and cleared out the woods 

enough so that the bridges could be completed. About 1900 the 2d Battalion returned to Vouilly, where enemy snipers were 

still active, and started south for its next 

objective, Ie Carrefour, six miles south. A 

wrong turn took the unit off the route and 

added three miles to the march . It was 0230 

before the exhausted troops reached their 

objective and began to move off the road 

for a brief rest. 

The night was overcast and very dark, 

making it difficult to reconnoiter the ground 

for temporary defensive positions. The twO 

leading companies were ordered to take 

positions to the east and west sides of a large 

orchard , and it was planned for Company E 

and Headq uarters Company to complete a 

perimeter defense. These units were still 

haIred on the road, waiting to move intO 

the field, when officers standing near the 

rear of the column (where two quarter-ton 

trucks had just brought up some rations 

from Bricqueville) heard a slight noise of 

traffic about 40 yards north. They believed 

it was the 3d Battalion coming up. Almost 

immediately a column of enemy infantry, 

144 
with some type of armored vehicles in it, 

appeared around a bend in the road and a 

machine-pisro! was fired. When U. S. 

troops fired a few shots in return, they heard 

an uproar of voices and the sound of many 

vehicles shifting gears. The enemy immediately swept the road with machine-gun 

fire and then sent armored vehicles dowll it, 

firing 88-mm guns inro the hedgerows and 

adjacent fields. Company E scattered off 

the road into the fields; the companies 

already in the orchard were caught completely by surprise and had no chance ro 

organize for effective defense. Most of the 

men had thrown themselves on the ground 

and had gone to sleep as they dtopped; 

wakened by artillery and machine-gun fire 

at point-blank range, they were confused 

and stupelied. First efforts at resistance 

only gave away their positions to the 

German guns, and some groups were caught 

in wild rifle fire from friendly units. Heavy 

weapons were not in position to be used. 

The battalion commander was killed, control was never established, and men began 

to drift OUt of the orchard in all directions. 

In a short time the battalion was dispersed 

into scattered groups, making rheir way 

back north and wesr rhrough rhe nighr. 

Losses were 11 officers and 139 enlisted men. 

It was afrerwards estimared rhar rhe 2d 

Battalion had been hir by a German column 

retrearing from rhe Aure Valley and bent on 

escape ro rhe sourh. By all evidence, .rhe 

encounter was a surprise for rhe Germans 

as well, bur circumstances favored the enemy. 

In march formation, wirh armored vehicles 

leading (probably about eighr self-propelled 

88-mm guns), rhey were able to use rhe 

heavy and demoralizing fire of rhese guns 

in the firsr, decisive minutes. The Germans 

suffered casualties, and two armored vehicles 

were knocked our by bazookas. 

Fortunarely, rhe enemy had no resources 

on this front to take advantage of his local 

success. On 10 June, rhe 2d Battalion was 

reorganized, received 110 replacements, and 

moved back into line in rhe afrernoon. No 

enemy resisrance was met, and rhe 115rh 

Infantry reached its final objecrives during 

the afternoon: rhe 2d Battalion near SreMargueri re-d ·Elle; rhe 3d east of it along 

rhe river; and rhe Isr ar Epinay-Tesson. 

That nighr, the 2d Ba ttalion ourposts were 

attacked by small German forces which 

crossed the Elle River, and skirmishing 

lasred all night. 

To rhe west of rhe 115rh, the 175th Infanrry Regiment had secured rhe corps' flank 

along rhe Vire River. Afrer Isigny was 

taken on the morning of 9 June, rhe regiment turned sourh toward the objective area, 

Lison- la Fotdaie, moving in column of 

barralions, with rhe 747rh Tank Barralion 

arrached. Resisrance was mer sourh of la 

Herennerie, where elements of rhe 352d 

Divisiollo1 Artillery, acring as infantry, were 

swept aside with an esrimared loss of 125 

killed. Forward elements of rhe armored 

unirs reached Lison ar noon bur were temporarily checked by artillery fire. Although 

Lison was rhen bombed and srrafed by Allied 

planes, an enemy force of abour company 

srrengrh delayed rhe advance for a few hours. 

Borh Lison and la Forelaie were occupied 

by nighrfall. 

Wesr of Isigny, Company K had been sent 

toward rhe bridge over rhe Vire River ar 

Auville-sur-le-Vey, wirh orders to seize rhe 

crossing as a means for COntact with VII 

Corps. The bridge had been burned, and 

the enemy held machine-gun emplacements 

on rhe other bank. On rhe morning of 10 

June intense mortar and machine-gun fire 

stopped rhe first effort to cross the srream. 

Company K was reinforced by a platoon of 

ranks, a platoon of Company E, and rhe 

29rh Reconnaissance Squadron. Ar 1800, 

under covering fire of rhe mortars and automatIC weapons of rhe 29th Reconnaissance 

145 
Squadron, the reinforced company forded the 

40-foot stream at low tide and ad vanced inro 

Auville-sur-le-Vey, which it held that night 

ro cover bridging operations by Company 

C of the 254th Engineer Combat Barralion. 

Company K suffered about a dozen casualries 

in the crossing. Despite vigorous German 

resistance 500 yards ro the west, a patrol of 

the 29th Reconnaissance Squadron made 

first conracr with patrols of the lOlst 

Airborne Division that afternoon (1500) 

near Catz. The lOlst was still fighting 

roward Carenran from the north but had 

put small forces across the Dou ve Estuary 

east of Careman . On 11 June, the siruation 

on this flank was strengthened by the arrival 

of a battalion of armored infantry from 

Combat Command A of the 2d Armored 

Division, which rook over the bridgehead 

west of the Vireo 

The 116th Infantry, with the Ranger Force 

attached, engaged in mopping-up operations 

between Grandcamp and Isigny on 9 June, 

overcoming final enemy opposition at Maisy 

and Gefosse-Fonrenay; thereafter, it wenr 

into division reserve, moving south of the 

Aure on the afternoon of 11 June. 

As on the rest of the corps from, enemy 

resistance in the 29th Division's zone had 

shown less and less strength as the arrack 

progressed, Evidences of disorganization 

mounted, particularly with respect ro intermingling of units. Elemenrs of the 915th 

Illfantry were idenrified west of the Vire as 

well as on the 1st Division from; according 

ro prisoners, the 915th and 916th Illfalltry 

CERISY fOREST, lying on high ground within artillery range of 

the beachhead, was a key objectir1( in ~ Corps operations. This 

crossroad is 1ua, tke northeastern edge of the jorest. The l'1umy 

failure to defend this important area was a surprise development . 

146 
were being merged. Enemy artillery was 

little in evidence. 

Except for harassing night raids against 

Allied shipping off the beachheads, German 

planes were still unable to intervene effectively in the battle zone. All air activity 

was restricted by weather on 9 June. On 

10-11 June, Allied air forces resumed their 

work of bombing airfields, cutting communications, and carrying out tactical missions against supply dumps, road junctions, 

and assembly areas close to the front . By 

11 June, bombers of the Royal Air Force 

had set a new record for weight of bombs 

dropped in a week: 17,268 tOns, of which 

only 1,444 tOns had been directed against 

targets in Germany. The best testimony 

on the effectiveness of the Allied air action, 

and the major results it was beginning to 

achieve, comes from the complaints of high 

German commanders in Normandy on their 

situation in respect to supply, transportation, and reinforcements. 

The Euemy Side 

These three days, 9- 11 June, marked a period 

of disillttSionmmt for the German commatld. 

On 8 June, they had still been looking forward to 

the imminent coul1teroffensive which was to 

destroy the Allied beachheads, beginning at 

Cam. In the mcceedillg days, these hopes had 

to be given up, and Sevellth Army cOllcentrated 011 

eftorts to bring enough sttength into NormmJdy 

to prevent further loss of vital ground. The 

delays i" a"ival of German reinforcements were 

a cause of increasing difficulty and anxiety 

(Map No . XVI). 

On the morning of 9 June the sector south of 

Omaha Beach loomed i"to prominmce for the 

first time at Swmth Army Headquarters. At 

1035 General Marcks reported from LXXXIV 

CorPJ: Isigny had been taken by a surprise 

attack; tanks were reported on the Lison- St-La 

road, so that the commanding general of Seventh 

Army was advised ,Jot to make a trip to St-La as 

plamud; Allied illtentions were probably to 

cross the Vire and link up with the westem 

bridgehead, and LXXXIV Corps had no available force to stop them, the 352d Division havillg 

bem reduced to "small groups" and the 726th 

Infa1ltry having practicalty disappeared. Gmeral 

Marcks wanted to withdraw behind the Vire 

and assemble 1I Paratroop Corps for later counterattack, with olle of its divisions (77th Infcl1Jtry) 

to go to the Valogms area. He also asked that 

LXXXIV Corps be freed of responsibility for 

action east of the Cotmtin, mggestitlg that II 

P arc/troop Corps be put under ISS P an'i(er Corps 

and take over the sector east of Carentan . Arm)' 

disagreed with all these proposals except that of 

using the 77th Divisio" to meet the growing 

press,.,. of Allied attack toward Montebourg . 

Army was aware that the" hole between Isig"y mJd 

Bayeux had "Ow been widened,' . but stilt 

plamJed to assemble II Paratroop Corps at 

Balleroy for a co,mteroftensive toward Bayeux. 

It was beginning to doubt, however, whether this 

would be practicc,ble, since the corps was so 

stmtlg out on the road that its units would not 

a"ive in fashion to permit concentration of 

o ftmsive e ftort. 

At 1730, Gmeral Marcks reported again. This 

time he was more reassured about the Carmtall 

area, for the Allies showed "0 tmdmcy to push 

beyolld Isigny. The 352d Division believed it 

might be able to hold the attack ill progress at 

Trevieres, but a" Allied breakthrough threatmed 

at Mo"tebourg. 

147 

This was the background for an appearance of 

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel at Seventh Army 

Headquarters. Briefed 011 the situatio", the 

Army Group Commander stressed two points: 

The Allies must not be allowed to get Cherbourg; 

and every e ftort must be made to prevent their 

linking up bridgeheads west of the Vire . He 

agreed with the Sevmth Army viewpoint that 

counterattack by II Paratroop Corps had better 

be postponed until the corps was fully assembled 

and its actio" could be coordinated with that of 
I SS Panzer Corps. Rommel expresud his 

C0l1victi01'l that this counteroffensive, when staged, 

would be successful. Von Rundstedt, he reported, believed the Allies were about to make a 

",ajor assault 011 the Pas-de-Calais coast. 

Following this conference, Army ordered II 

Paratroop Corps to change its direction of advance 

trom Balleroy toward the Isig1lY area, while the 

77th Division was to go to Valog1les. Rommel 

emphasized that the problem at the moment was 

to prevent linking of the bridgeheads, however 

serious the situation at Montebourg. That 

eveni1lg, nevertheless, saw II Paratroop Corps 

still far from the threatened area, despite urgent 

orders to make all possible speed. The 77th 

Division was .uar Avranches; one regiment of the 

3d Paratroop Division was neari1lg St-Lo, but 

the rest of the division was still in Brittany. 

Advance elemmts of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division were approaching Balleroy, with 

main units near Avranches and Laval and location of its half tracks and heavy equipment 

(coming by rail) unknown. All theu movements 

were hampered by shortage of fuel, as well as air 

attacks and sabotage along the line of march. 

In the Caen a,.a, I SS Panzer Corps was still 

""able to start its attack, and the 21st Panzer 

and part of the 12th SS Panzer lost some ground 

north and west of Caen in defensive fighting. 

The 346th Division had been ordered (8 June) to 

move to the assistance of the 711th Divisioll east 

of the Orne River, with the aim of freeing elements 

of 21st Panzer in that sector. 

General Marcks had expressed the conviction 

that 10 Jlme would be the day of crisis in the 

battle on the approaches to Cherbourg. Rommel 

on that moming expressed a change of view with 

regard to the mission of the oncoming II Paratroop Corps; his main concern now was not so 

much to prevent ti1Zking of the bridgeheads as to 

forestall any Allied effort to cut off the Cotmti1Z 

peninsula by pushing westward. Army ordered 

the 17th SS Pa1Zzer Grerzadier Division to move to 

a position just southwest of Care1Ztan, while the 

3d Paratroop Division assembled on St-Lo. 

At the end of the day, Seventh Army felt that 

things had not gone as badly as had bem feared. 

The German units had ma1Zaged to hold 01Z at 

M01ltebottrg i1Z heavy fighting; the Allies had 

crossed the Vire mar Isigny but were 1Zot pressing 

ill that area. I SS Panzer Corps' attack in the 

Caen area still failed to materialiZe,' Allied 

pressure ;" that sector kept the German troops on 

the defetZsive a1Zd mdicated preparations for a 

majol attack on Caen. Reinforcemetlts were 1Z0W 

in sight of the threatened areas. Advance elements of the 77th Division were nearing Vatognes, 

though the rest was strung out all the way to 

Avranches,' 3d Paratroop Division had some units 

at Berigny and the main body had cleared the 

Avranches corner, coming out of Brittany,' elements of the 17th SS Panzer Gretladier Division 

were betweetl Balleroy and Coutances. In addition, the 2d Panzer Division (from northern 

Fra1Zce) had been ordered to Seventh Army [when 

the order had been issued is not stated], and its 

half track elements were at Alm,on. 

Army Command West was making further 

efforts to rei1Zforce the Norma1Zdy battle. The 

XXXXVII Panzer Corps Headquarters had bun 

ordered to the Seventh Army, and the 353d Division was now order<d from Brittany to join II 

Paratroop Corps. A number of artillery and 

antiaircraft tt1zits were also on their way. 

148 

With this strength coming up, Army's appreciation of the situatio1Z showed moderate confidet/ce: the armored divisions, once ready, would 

be able to wipe out tve Allied lodgemmt in the 

Caen-Bayettx area,' tve forces in the Cotentin, 

though not strong wough for counterattack, would 

sujJice to hold Cherbourg. Army indicated to 

Army Group its need for mobile artillery, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft. The overwhelming importa1Zce of havi"g more fuel, both 

for operation of armored units a1Zd for faster 

movement of reinforcements, is stressed several 

times during the day's commlmications from 

Sevmth Army to higher headquarters. One of the 

dijJiwlties underlined by Sevmth Army is that 

reinforummts were havi11g so many delays that 
units arrived in driblets and had to be committed 

piecemeal. 011 10 Jrau, the advance elements of 

the 17th SS Pa1lzer Grenadier Division bogt,ed 

down at St-LO for lack of fuel, and a1l enginm 

battalion had to be rushed to the Carentall area. 

The 352d lIlfantry Division Oil this day (10 

Jum) adviJed Army that it was "not probable 

that much reJistallce was still being offered in 

the coastal defenJes." 

The Allied progress 011 10 June in the Cerisy 

ForeJt- Balleroy area was not known to Seventh 

Army until the moming of the 11th . Then 

LXXXW Corps reported (0530-0630) that the 

situation on its right flank was serious. The 

fighting value of the 352d Division was now very 

slight, and the hole between it and its right-hand 

neighbor (I SS Panzer Corps) was larger. The 

reaction at Seventh Army was that reinforcements 

on the way would take care of this hole in time, 

although Allied armored reconnaissatlce activity 

itldicated their intention to exploit the gap. At 

the end of 11 June, Army reported that Allied 

forceJ were regrouping a1ld that they had made no 

significant gains during the day, though Carentan 

was threatened. Army's intentiotl was to hold 

the Vire-Elle line atld Carentan. LXXXIV 

Corps had the · mission of blocking the road to 

Cherbourg and, with II Paratroop Corps under its 

commalld, of preventing any drive to sever the 

Cotentin peninmla. Its right wing was to push 

toward Balleroy and seek contact by reconnaissance elements with I SS Panzer Corps southeast 

of Bayeux. By the cloJe of the day, main elements of the 3d Paratroop Division were northeast 

of St-Lo,· the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division 

was reaching assembly areas so",hweJt of Carenta1l, ready to attack to east or north,· and battle 

groups of the 265th and 275th Divisions 10m 

arriving westward of St-LO. The 266th Division 

( battle group) was released for ultimate commitment in the St-Lo area. III the Caen area, the 

plan of early attack against the Allied bridgehead 

was finally abandomd, Army deciding that the 

Allied strength in that area was too great. The 

Panzer Lehr Division had arrived in the Tillymr-SeulleJ area, but Army's itltmtion for the 

time being was to assume the defensive itl this 

sector. Mobile elements, particttlarly tanks, were 

to be withdrawn as soon as possible from the 

battle and assembled i1l preparation for a later 

countera ffensive. 

The Seventh Army War Diary for 11 J1me 

devotes much space to a lengthy review of the 

effects of enemy air attacks, particularly on lims 

of commu1lication. By 9 June retil transport 

anywhere near the battle zone had been rendered 

impossible. Elements of the 265th and 275th 

Divisions coming from Brittany had been forced 

to unload from trains after gettitlg only a quarter 

of the way to the front. The 17th SS Panzer 

Grenadier Divisio1l had also been forced to 1",10ad 

before it reached Seventh Army's rear boundary. 

The remIt put a heavy strai1l Otl motor transport, 

and this strain was increased by. Allied air 

attacks which took heavy toll of vehicleJ. The 

res1tits showed in delays and in loss of supplies, 

itlcluding fuel, which in tum seriously crippled 

the fightitlg ability of the armored units as they 

arrived. All time scheduleJ for arrival of reinforcements had been thrown off,· movement by 

motor tratlsport was possible only at night, and 

even marches conducted at night could be hhldered 

~1 bombitlg of communications centers. Allied 

air observatio1l also preclude" movement by day 

near the battle from a1ld led to attack 011 assembly 

areas, sometimes from the air. Army cotlcluded 

this review with the demand that the Germa1l air 

forces intervene, by both day and night, to break 

this "unbearable" mperiority of Allied air. 111 

the meantime, Army was undertaki1lg drastic 

measures to reorganiZe controt of roads (/nd transport in its rear areas and was tryitlg to get Army 

Group to take over respo1lsibility for a larger area 

in bri1lgi1lg up supply, so that Seventh Army's 

overtaxed tr(",sportation could be used only for 

the immediate needs of the battle zom. The 

fuel shortage was stressed, and Army stated the 

"outcome of the battle for the coast" depended on 

speedy supply of fuel to give arriving armored 

units the mobility necessary for an offmsiv •. 

149 
THE ATTACK OF 12-13 JUN E 

BY 11 JUNE, V Corps had won the ground 

essential for security of its beachhead. The 

advance had carried over 12 miles inland and 

had conquered the dominating terrain at 

Cerisy Forest, while the right wing rested 

securely on the Vire-Elle river line and was 

ready to link up with VII Corps. But the 

attack was to continue without pause; on 

11 June preparations for a new effort were 

under way, directed by Field Order No.3 

issued at 1700 (Map No. XV) . 

The principal objective in this next phase 

was the Caumont area, assigned to the 1st 

Division with, in addition to previous 

attachments, the 102d Cavalry Squadron 

and three battalions of tanks .. To the right 

of the main effort, the 2d and 29th Di visions 

were ordered to take objectives south of 

Cerisy Forest and the Elle River. In general 

effect, the advance would be echeloned from 

east to west, with Caumont at the apex of a 

salient. The 2d Armored Division, as corps 

reserve, would be held in readiness to use if 

necessary as a counterattacking force. 

V Corps' attack was closely related to 

plans of the British XXX Corps for 12 June. 

In hard fighting on the 11th, the British had 

been unable to dislodge the Panzer Lehr 

Division from positions between Lingevres 

and Tilly-sur-Seulles. This effort was to be 

renewed on the 12th, with the aim of flanking the whole German defense of the Caen 

area. V Corps' advance in the adjoining 

zone would materially aid XXX Corps by 

threatening the enemy flank southwest of 

Tilly-sur-Seulles. 

150 

Furthermore, the attack of 12 June was 

designed to assist in the development of VII 

Corps' offensive toward Cherbourg. Enemy 

attention and reinforcement might be diverted from that area if V Corps exploited 

the enemy weakness now apparent in its 

zone. The remnants of the 352d Division, 

showing signs of increased disorganization 

every day, were still the only .important 

German force on a front of more than 25 

miles. They were short of ammunition, 

and they had almost no artillery suppOrt. 

What small reinforcement they had received, mainly the three battalions of the 

30th Mobile Brigade, had been wholly insufficient to remedy the situation. Enemy 

morale, according to evidence of prisoners, 

was steadily declining. According to the 

same source, to a certain extent supported 

by reports of troop movement south of the 

battle front, enemy armored units were on 

their way toward this front. They were 

believed to be the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier 

Division; some prisoners had been taken 

from its reconnaissance battalion in Cerisy 

Forest. 

Apart from the wider considerations 

governing this attack, the objectives of V 

Corps represented valuable tactical goals. 

A road junction of some importance, Caumont lies on a hill mass more than 750 feet 

above sea level, overlooking the Cerisy 

Forest and controlling the upper Dr6me 

Valley. Its capture would make V Corps' 

hold on the beachhead doubly secure; as a 

base for further offensive operations into 
the hilly country to the south, possession 

of Caumont would threaten the enemy's 

main lateral communications from Caen to 

the St-La- Vire-Avranches region. In the 

zones of the 2d and 29th Divisions the most 

important objecti ve was Hill 192. This 

dominating height afforded observation over 

the whole area between the Elle and Vire 

Rivers, and was key terrain for any offensive 

operations aimed at St-La. 

Advtlllce to Cal/mont 

By Field Order No. 37, issued at 2400 on 

11 .J (lne, General Huebner planned the 1st 

Division's attack in essentially the same 

formation used before: the 18th and 26th 

RCT's abreast on fronts of about 3,000 yards, 

with the 16th RCT in reserve, ready to assist 

either attacking regiment and to protect the 

flanks. The left flank was to be guarded by 

the 1st Reconnaissance Troop, and two 

troops of the lO2d Cavalry Squadron were 

to patrol in advance of the attacking units. 

Each regimental combat team included a 

tank battalion; the 18th and 26th had each 

a company of tank destroyers from the 63Sth 

Tank Destroyer Battalion. Six battalions 

of artillery were in direct or general suppOrt. 

Movement toward the line of departure 

(Ie Planqueray- la Butte) had begun during 

the evening of 11 June, but the 26th Infantry 

experienced road difficulties which caused a 

two-hour delay in the jump-off, scheduled 

for 0600. 

On the right, the 18th Infantry had a comparatively easy advance, led by rhe Isf and 

2d Battalions abreast. No prepared enemy 

defenses were encountered, and opposition 

was offered only by light mobile screening 

forces, operating in patrols supported by 

armored cars and an occasional tank. This 

opposi tion was handled in well-organized 

fashion, pulling back on what appeared to 

be a prearranged schedule. The 74Sth Tank 

151 

Battalion, attached to the 18th Infantry, 

reported a minimum of contact with enemy 

during the day. By evening, the 18th had 

made a four-mile advance to the CaumontSt-La highway and was ordered to stop there 

and patrol, particularly on the right flank. 

Here, the 18th was two miles farther south 

than the objectives assigned co the 2d Division. Troop B of the lO2d Cavalry Squadron 

established a screen co protect this flank 

along the Drame River and made cOntact 

with the 2d Division. 

On the left, the 26th Infantry met much 

the same type of light, delaying resistance, 

built around reconnaissance cars and a few 

tanks. By dusk the 2d Battalion was on the 

edge of Caumont. Patrols, probing into the 

village. found it held by the enemy in small 

force. During the night the battalion endeavored co capture the village but was held 

off by determined resistance estimated at two 

companies, supported by five or six tanks or 

self-propelled guns. Company F penetrated 

into Caumont but was then forced back. 

With elements of the 743d Tank Battalion 

leading, the infantry cleaned out the village 

by 0900, in house-co-house fighting . The 

enemy lost several vehicles and an 88-mm 

gun in attempts to stop the tanks. Artillery observers, entering Caumont with the 

advance, reported that they had excellent 

observation into enemy positions for the 

first time since D Day. 

The 18th and 26th Infantry spent 13 June 

in organizing their positions for all-around 

defense and in patrolling forward and to the 

flanks of the salient created by their advance. 

By afternoon, strong enemy patrols were 

taking offensive action all along the 1st 

Division front, probing vigorously to find 

its positions and in some cases infiltrating 

well beyond the outposts. Patrol activity 

was so Ii vel y as to give the impression of 

counterattacks, and supporting artillery was 

called on much more frequently than during 
CAUMONT lay 0" high ground, looking toward hilly count ry to the 

south . Enemy artillery fire is hitling American forward positions 

just below the viI/age. Cermml plans for recapturing this village 

in a cDltllteroflnlSit·c after 13 J un! were 1l(VtT put into operation. 

the previous da y. The 33d Field Artillery 

Battalion, attached to the 26th Infantry , 

fired 895 rounds as against 39 on 12 June, 

most of it about 1500 when a "counterattack" was signaled . Enemy artillery 

showed signs of revival , putting some accurate fire into Caumont. Although no real 

counterattack developed, it was clea r that 

the enemy was sensitive to the advance into 

Caumont and that a new quality of resistance 

was beginning to show. Elements believed 

to be from the 3d and 4th Companies of the 2d 

Rec01l11tlissclI1ce Battalion, 2d Panzer Division, 

were identified. In fact , the bulk of th at 

division was moving across the 1st Division 

front during the day, from west to east, 

and was being committed ju;t east of Cau152 

mont in an action that was criti cal for the 

whole Allied front. 

The British, on 12 June, had begun a 

maneuver closely related to the 1st Division's 

attack on Caumont. Finding the Pa"Zer 

Lehr Division holding strongly on the line 

Tilly-sur-Seulles- Ia Senaudiere, XXX Corps 

planned to slip the 7 Armoured Division 

south along the Army boundary, with 

Villers-Docage as objective. This move 

would put them on the A vranches- Caen 

highway and threaten to outflank not merely 

the Tilly positions but the enemy lines as 

far as Caen . Protec ted on the west flank by 

the 1st Division 's progress to Caumont, this 

maneuver began on th e afternoon of 12 June, 

aided by arrangements for using one road 
that lay in First Army's zone. By dark, 

leading elements of the 7 Armoured Division 

were two miles northeast of Caumont, and 

prospects seemed good for a decisi ve envelopment. 

These hopes were dashed on 13 June. The 

50 Division , renewing the attack from the 

north, made no progress at Tilly-sur-Seulles. 

The 2d Panzer Division, arriving at the last 

minute on the highway from the southwest, 

was thrown at Villers-Bocage just after the 

advance elements of 7 Armoured Division 

reached the village. The enemy attack was 

repelled in heavy fighting, but the British 

could not both hold this position and continue their thrust to envelop the Panzer Lehr 

Divisi01l at Tilly-sur-Seulles. The 7 Armoured 

Division was withdrawn and occupied 

defensive positions twO miles northeast of 

Caumont. The timely arrival of the 2d 

Panzer enabled the enemy to retain an area 

which they evidently regarded as having 

major importance. Both Tilly-sur-Seulles 

and Villers-Bocage remained, until the great 

Allied offensive in late July, as the western 

bastions for German defense of the CaenOrne Valley sector. 

On the 2d Division front, the 9th Infantry 

attacked south on an axis parallel to the 

Caumont thrust. The 9th's objective was 

the Littcau ridge, which was close to the 

Cerisy Forest and detached from the hills to 

the south and east. Nearly 500 feet above 

sea level, its position made the ridge important both for observation and for protecting 

the flank of the Caumont salient. The 2d 

and 3d Battalions of the 9th Infa<1try 

advanced two miles to their obje'ctive by 

0940, 12 June. Enemy opposition had been 

very light, but by afternoon vigorous offensive patrolling was initiated by elements 

identified as belonging to the 3d Paratroop 

Division. This activity continued through 

13 June, especially against Company C, 

which had moved to an advance position on 

dominating ground at Montrabot Hill. Supporting the 9th Infantry, the 15th Field 

Artillery Battalion fired 828 rounds on the 

12th and 1,320 the next day. Enemyartillery action was light; no counterbattery 

fire was reported. 

Crossil1g the Elle River 

As it worked out, the attack of V Corps 

on 12-13 June shows marked contrast between developments on the right and left 

wings. The main effort toward Caumont, 

involving the 1st Division and the 9th 

Infantry of the 2d Division, reached its 

objectives with only slight difficulty. To 

the west, the 29th Division and the 38th 

Infantry of the 2d Di vision met a type of 

enemy resistance which spelled the end of 

the rapid advances made since 7 June. The 

Germans defended the approaches to Hill 

192 with a vigor proving the importance 

they attached to St-L(I, committing in this 

area the first considerable reinforcements to 

be used against V Corps. Although the 

Elle River was a small, fordable stream, its 

crossing involved a number of bitterly 

contested actions. 

On the 2d Division's right, the 23d Infantry had the mission of passing throu/th 

the positions of the 38th, attacking across 

the Elle, and occupying the Berigny-Hill 

192 area. As planned, the attack was to be 

made in rather separated thrusts by two 

battalions of the 23d: the 1st would cross 

the Elle southwest of Cerisy-la-Foret and 

move south toward the hill; nearly three 

miles away, on the far side of Cerisy Forest, 

the 2d Battalion was to strike west across 

the Elle on the St-L6 highway, through 

Berigny. The attack jumped off at 0600 

after a 20-minute artillery preparation by 

the 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions. 

The 1st Battalion gOt across the small stream 

but was not far past the line of departure 

153 
when it began to meet effective resistance. 

Helped by patches of woodland which concealed their movements, enemy infantry 

counterattacked the 1st Battalion on its 

western flank and threatened its rear. The 

battalion fell back a mile, staying south of 

the river. The 2d Battalion, coming out of 

Cerisy Forest on the Berigny highway , was 

stopped practically at the line of departure 

by heavy machine-gun and mortar fire from 

the west bank of the Elle. The 3d Battalion 

was then moved through Cerisy Forest to 

attack between the other twO; its advance 

got as far as the Elle by early afternoon and 

was stopped there on the east bank. 

The enemy was benefiting greatly by observation from Hill 192, and an air mission 

of fighter-bombers was directed against that 

height before dark. Supporting artillery 

was very active during the day, the 37th and 

38th Field Artillery Battalions firing over 

2,600 rounds. The artillery effort was increased late in the day as a result of requests 

for fire to stop local enemy counterattacks, 

which amounted to aggressive thrusts by 

small units. The enemy kept the initiative 

through the night, alarming tile 2d Battalion 

at 0151 with a heavy burst of small-arms 

fire, and probing at other points along the 

line. Enemy artillery, though light, 

showed increased activity. Identifications 

of prisoners revealed that elements of the 

352d Division were north of Hill 192, but that 

units of the 8th Paratroop Regiment, 3d Paratroop Division, were in the Berigny area. 

This division was regarded as a first-class 

unit of very high fighting quality. 

General Robertson planned to resume the 

attack on 13 June, with two battalions of 

the 38th Infantry moving on Hill 192 from 

the north. Starting at 0800, these units 

passed through the 1st Battalion of the 23d 

Infantry and made good progress for two 

miles south of the Elle. They were hitting 

stronger opposition when the attack was 

stopped in the afternoon by division order; 

the 38th and 23d Infantry Regiments were to 

prepare their present posi tions for defense 

against possible enemy attack. Artillery 

support of this action had been heavy and 

effective; the 12th Field Artillery Battalion 

(ISS-mm howitzers) fired 1,445 rounds, the 

37th Field Artillery Battalion 4,400 rounds, 

and the 38th Field Artillery Battalion 841 

rounds. The 2d Division had made some 

progress on 13 June, but was still two miles 

north of Hill 192 and had not succeeded in 

getting possession of the Berigny- StGeorges-d 'Elle area. Losses reflected the 

heavier fighting on these two days, the 23d 

Infantry reporting 211 casualties and the 2d 

Di vision totals being 540. In the same 

period the 1st Division lost 92 men. 

To the northwest of Berigny, the 29th 

Division encountered similar difficulties in 

crossing the Elle River. In the attack plan 

for 12 June, the division's main effort was 

to be made by the 11Sth Infantry, with the 

17Sth in defensive positions on the west 

flank of V Corps and the 116th in reserve. 

The 747th Tank Battalion was held in 

division reserve to be in readiness for counterattack. Three (plus) battalions of division 

artillery were to render close support for 

the 115th Infantry. That unit was ordered 

to attack across the Elle at 0500, its objectives St-Clair-sur-Elle and Couvains, in an 

operation which would protect the right 

flank of the 2d Division as it advanced on 

Hill 192. 

154 

Because of the opposition offered by the 

Germans, the Elle Ri ver crossing was to be 

more difficult than those of the Aure and 

Vire, much larger streams, The Elle itself 

was only 10 feet wide, but the very steep and 

wooded southern bank gave good ground 

for well-concealed emplacements. During 

the night, 29th Division artillery placed 

interdictory fire once an hour on St-Clairsur-Elle, St-Jean-de-Savigny, and Couvains. 
The 1I5th Infantry attacked with 2 battalions abreast, after 20 minures of heavy 

preparatory fires by 4 artillery battalions. 

Company K, leading the 3d Battalion, was 

disorganized and suffered 32 casualties from 

shells which it believed to be "shorts" 

from friendly guns; this belief was later disproved , but by timing their own fire with 

the U. S. artillery preparation the Germans 

had affected the morale of the assault force. 

Despite these difficulties, Company I and a 

platoon of Company K got across the stream 

east of the north- south road to St-Jean-deSavigny; the rest of the battalion followed 

and by 0830 was 1,200 yards south of the 

crossIng. However, to the right the 1st 

Battalion was stopped at the stream by 

heavy and accurate small-arms fire, with 

some support from mortars and anti tank 

guns. This situation left the 3d Battalion 

advancing with open flanks south of StJean-de-Savigny, where it was stopped by 

machine-gun fire from hedgerow positions 

that could not be located . An enemy 

column, including some armored vehicles, 

came north on the road from Couvains and 

deployed in the hedgerows to east and west. 

By the end of the morning the 3d Battalion 

was fighting on the defensive to avoid being 

cut off from the rest of the division, was 

short of ammunition, and was suffering from 

accurate mortar fire and close-up shelling 

from antitank or self-propelled guns. In 

the early afternoon, K and I Companies 

withdrew to the starting positions; other 

elements failed to receive the withdrawal 

orders and came back two hours later in 

some disorder. The battalion's losses had 

been severe. 

Division had begun by noon to take measures for rebuilding the attack. Two platoons of the 747th Tank Battalion were sent 

forward; attempting to spearhead the 1st 

Battalion of the 1I5th, the tanks were 

stopped by skillful use of antitank guns, 

three vehicles being knocked out, with nine 

casualties. Alerted at 1630, the 1I6th Infantry took over the attack in the evening. 

At 2200 it had two battalions across the Elle, 

and the 3d Battalion of the 1I5th (now 

attached to the 1I6th) had recrossed the 

rIver. By daylight of 13 June the attack 

had neared its objectives. That morning, 

coordinating its efforts with the 2d Division's attack just to the east, the 1I6th 

managed to fight into St-Clair-sur-Elle and 

Couvains. Division artillery continued to 

deliver heavy fires in support of the attack; 

its 6 (plus) battalions (of which one was 

supporting the 175th Infantry) fired 125 

missions during the 2 days, and rounds expended after 1000, 12 June, included 2,736 

high explosive and 400 white phosphorus. 

Of the units involved, the 58th Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,952 rounds 

on 12 June, and the 1I0th Field Artillery 

Battalion 1,053 founds in the same period. 

No fresh endny forces had appeared in 

this area despite continued reports on 12-13 

June indicating the approach of armor, believed to be the 17th S S Panzer Grenadier 

Division. Elements of several units of the 

352d Division and of the 30th Mobile Brigade 

had rallied after their earlier reverses and 

were putting up determined resistance. 

North of St-Clair-sur-Elle, the Germans had 

made maximum use of prepared positions, 

with well-placed fields for automatic fire. 

In the St-Jean-de-Savigny area, the enemy 

had employed mobile tactics, involving infiltration and counterattack by small units 

on the flanks of advancing U. S. forces. 

German artillery support was still weak, 

with some self-propelled guns in use. It was 

clear that the enemy was prepared to hold 

Hill 192 with every means at his disposal. 

The engagement at the Elle on 12-13 June 

was, in fact, a foretaste of the bitter fighting 

to come in this sector. Most of the 29th 

Division's 547 casualties for the 2 days were 

155 
CARENTAN-ISIGNY AREA 

(12-13 JUNE) 

~ NO\'OIII:IfT 0' _ .. " co ........ , ",," to ~ ..-I0Il. IS ....... 

LU..I.J.U.I P'OeIno.t ___ ~ 011 13 JuIII 

1::: ::1 TtMLn.AT 

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<D a...0TI'II: Of' _CO ... AI ......... '_IS,ITS", ",_Til" 

@ EOO_., It _0 .... 0 

@ £00II"'"" IIAU'" _. ""'"'0'" CIIIOD,I!: ....... 1 

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'''' • - MAP NO.9 

Not( : 

156 

1)« "(;J(JIN'$ _"" .... :5" SNlFrED till fJ! ,NIfL. __ 

7NC (Jourc-TAUIT UIK ro " UMe _111_ $(}(IrN Au.. PIC 

1'/« "' KUW A"",ac _ THEIII wrsr 111£"" rIlE ""'LIItIAlI 

"' rile r.urc . 
suffered in their first battle for the approaches 

to St-L6. Five miles from that town on 13 

June, the 29th Division entered it on 18 

July, while Hill 192 was captured by the 

2d Division on 11 July only after costly 

fighting for every hedgerow on its slopes. 

Action West of the Vire 

The Allied invasion began with three 

separate beachheads; these had to be welded 

into one before the first phase of operations 

could be considered accomplished. V Corps 

and the British Second Army had met at 

their boundary on 8 June in the Port-enBessin area, but four days later, solid junction with VII Corps was still to be achieved. 

The main obstacle was enemy resistance at 

Carentan, defended by the 6th Paratroop 

Regiment. From 10 to 12 June, the 101st 

Airborne Division was attempting to capture 

Carenran and reach the neck of land between 

the Douve and Vire rivers. On 10 June the 

327th Glider Infantry had crossed the Douve 

between Carentan and the sea, contacting V 

Corps' bridgehead at the Vire, but this link 

was slender (Map No. XIV). 

On the next two days the 327th was putting its main effort west toward the town, 

and V Corps units were called on for some 

assistance in protecting its flank. The small 

bridgehead at Auville-sur-Ie-Vey, established by the 17Sth Infantry on 10 June, was 

strengthened at 1700 the next day by arrival 

of the 3d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry 

(2d Armored Division). On 11 June, the 

29th Division was ordered to send a rifle 

company over the Vire south of the railway 

crossing, with missions of reconnoitering 

the area near Moncmartin-en-Graignes and 

capturing two highway bridges southwest of 

it on the canal connecting the Vire and Taute 

Rivers (Map No.9). By holding these two 

bridges, First Army would be more secure 

against the threat of an armored attack from 

St-L6 into the thin area of link-up between 

V Corps and VII Corps. This small operation, ordered to be carried out on 12 June, 

turned out to be much more than a routine 

reconnaissance in force. 

The area of Montmartin had not been 

adequately patrolled, so the 17Sth Infantry 

decided to send a task force of two companies, E and C, each reinforced by a section 

of heavy mortars and one of heavy machine 

guns; Company C of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion was to provide the equipment 

for crossing the stream at two selected sites. 

As a result of various delays in assembling 

and getting started, the units did not reach 

the river in time to make the crossing under 

cover of darkness, as planned. Engineer 

trucks, carrying assault boats, got to the 

Vire about 0700. This tidal stream, about 

ISO yards wide in the area, flows between 

lO-foot dikes bordering flat expanses of 

marshland on both sides. With four assault 

boats to a company, each carrying about ten 

riflemen, the crossing had to be effected in a 

series of waves. Not until the first started 

was there any sign of the enemy, who then 

opened up with ineffective machine-gun fire 

at long range. The enemy evidently had 

outposts along the edges of the marsh flats 

some SOO yards to the west, but their few 

machine guns could not reach the level of 

the river below the dikes. Company E, 

accompanied by General Cota and by Col. 

Paul R. Goode, commanding the 17Sth 

Infantry, got across without losses. Enemy 

rifle fire began to build up as the attacking 

troops started across the marshes, making 

short zigzag dashes and using cover afforded 

by the many drainage ditches. The German 

machine guns were not sited for grazing fire 

on the flat, and casualties were only six or 

seven men. The enemy fire died out as the 

company reached the edge of the higher 

ground. A quarter mile to the south, Company C crossed against similar resistance, but 

IS7 
radio communications were not working 

between the units as they ad vanced to rna ke 

a prearranged junction in Montmartin. 

General Cota decided to continue with 

Company E. 

Company E got near Montmartin about 

0800 and started to work around it to the 

north. Enemy fire reopened from the west, 

at about 300 yards range, and again stopped 

as Company E pushed against it. It was 

decided not to wait for Company C, but to 

go after the objective at the canal bridge. 

In approach-march formation, Company E 

started south down a road banked with deep 

hedgerows, planning to turn west just 

beyond the village. Before they had gone 

a hundred yards, heavy enemy fire from 

machine-pistols and rifles came out of the 

hedges on both sides of the sunken road. 

Caught in an ambush of a type easily set in 

hedgerow country, Company E was cut up 

and bad I y sca nered. It wi thdrew to reorganize, north of Montmartin, but some of 

the troops went all the way back to the ri ver 

and recrossed. The remnants of Company 

E were joined at 1040 by a part of Company 

C, which had experienced somewhat similar 

opposition as it neared the village. At UOO 

the group started south to try to get past 

Montmartin on the river side. About 400 

yards southeast of the village they were 

brought under machine-gun fire from prepared emplacements, ahead and to the west. 

Several concentrations by the 224th Field 

Artillery Battalion were called for, but 

failed to neutralize the enemy positions. 

The terrain lacked cover affording an 

approach to the enemy position, so the task 

force decided to withdraw and try once 

again to pass the village on the north. At 

1600 they were back where the morning 

fight had taken place; once again enemy 

machine guns and rifles stalled advance 

westward. A brisk fire fight was heard to 

the north, and word reached the task force 

that units of the 327th Glider Infantry were 

fighting south from the railroad. But no 

contact was made other than by patrols, 

and toward nightfall the 175th's task force 

was reduced to about 150 men and was 

running short of ammunition, water, and 

food. General Cota ordered them into the 

village. Light enemy resistance, of a type 

which had often managed to impose considerable delay, was quickly disposed of by 

combining movement with the fire of every 

available small-arms weapon. Later in the 

evening General Cota decided the village 

was undesirable for purposes of a night 

defense and moved to a slight rise, covered by 

an orchard, just southeast of Montmartin. 

Considerable anxiety concerning the VireTaute area was felt at higher headquarters 

that night. Carentan had been entered 

from the north, but German troops were 

reported counterattacking into the town. 

There were indications of a possible. enemy 

counterattack by armor from south of Carentan, and even reports of enemy patrols infiltrating into the Isigny area. At midnight 

of the 12th, First Army telephoned General 

Gerow of the possiblity that the enemy 

might launch a strong counterattack between 

Carentan and Isigny next morning, and directed him to send a battalion of tanks and 

one of armored infantry to that area from the 

2d Armored Division. Their mission was to 

assist the 327th Glider Infantry and the 

175th Infantry in defense of the thinly held 

corridor connecting V and VII Corps. This 

order was carried Out by Combat Command 

A, 2d Armored Division, which sent the 2d 

Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment to 

join the armored infantry already west of 

Isigny; by 0630 this force was ready to move 

south to meet the presumed German armor. 

Before Combat Command A could launch an 

attack planned to strike south from Auville, 

its mission was changed by orders from 

First Army. Joined by a second battalion of 

158 
tanks, the combat command went to assist 

the 100st Airborne Division in securing 

Carentan. The 327th Glider Infantry, after 

nearly reaching Montmartin on 12 June, 

withdrew next day to its former line protecting the highway. 

Meantime the 175th Infantry had made 

an attempt to relieve the remnants of the 

task force near Montmartin-en-Graignes. 

Colonel Goode himself took Company G, 

reinforced with heavy weapons, across the 

river at midnight on the 12th. The company moved south close to the river and past 

General Cota's night position. About a 

mile south of Montmartin they ran into a 

German bivouac and inflicted many casualties in a surprise encounter. Rallying, the 

Germans came back and surrounded Company G, which fought on until its ammunition ran low. Scattered groups made their 

way back in the morning; Colonel Goode 

was taken prisoner. 

These developments left General Cota' s 

group in dangerous isolation, nearly surrounded and still short of ammunition and 

food . Division ordered it to withdraw and 

had supplies dropped from planes. Fighting 

their way back to the Vire, 110 men rejoined 

the 175th Regiment at midnight of 13 June. 

In the action at Montmartin, the reconnaissance force had been engaged with 

elements of a mobile uni t (estimated at a 

company) which had operated according to 

prearranged defensive plans. These involved 

a thin screen of outposts along the river, to 

observe and delay a crossing. Main defensive forces, using bicycles, were then rushed 

up from rear posts to the threatened area 

and used for counterattack. Armed with a 

high proportion of machine pistols and machine guns, the German units made maximum use of the defensive possibilities offered 

by hedgerows, supplemented by prepared 

emplacements, echeloned in depth, at points 

offering good fields of fire along the roads. 

While part of the defenders used these positions for delaying action, other groups would 

make probing attacks on the flank and rear 

of an advancing column, attempting to surround and cut it off. Depending on aggressive maneuver by very small units, these tactics were particularly effective against a 

force like the reconnaissance groups of the 

I75th Infantry, which lacked the numerical 

strength and fire power to "bull through" 

and disorganize the enemy screen. 

159 

The check at Montmartin was not important in the perspective of the main action 

on I3June. While the I75th Infantry's task 

force was fighting for survival at Montmartin, Combat Command A and the lOlst 

Airborne Division had settled the main 

issue: possession of Carentan. Their coordinated attack had carried two miles 

southwest of the town and insured its cap-

[Ure. No enemy counterattack from the 

south had developed to split the link between the corps, and Army now had resources sufficient to enlarge the corridor of 

communication between Isigny and Carentan. That mission was assigned on 13 June 

to XIX Corps, which became operational at 

noon the next day. 

The Enemy Side 

At the opening of the period, Seventh Army 

learned that Carentan had fallen on 11 June and 

that there were clear indications of Allied preparation for attack in the Caen- Bayeux sector 

( Map No. XVI). 

During the morning of 12 June, Army received 

word that weak Allied reconnaissance elements 

had pushed close to Caumont. General Marcks, 

commanding LXXXIV Corps, was killed in a 

strajing attack. Army informed his successor 

that the 2d Panzer Division was on the way to 

jill the hole between the 352d and Panzer Lehr, 

with reconnaissance elem",ts already 'tear Cattmont. According to Army's views at the ma-
A GERMAN 88-MM in a favoriu pOJi,ion, "(ar a bmd in road 

and well hiddnt from oburvation. Prim( mavu and uTviu vthicllS 

waf acrOJJ the road. Countubatury by U. S. arli/ltry of un farad 

tntmy to shift the guns to new positions aJuT firing a JtW rounds. 

mmt, the ilt/; SS Panzer Grenadier Division was 

1101 likely to be used in a coullterattack to retake 

Carentan; instead, it must be held in readiness to 

keep open the corridor north of la Haye-du-Puits 

in the western Cotentin. Army was apprehensive 

of a new Allied landing operation in the Cherbourg area, in which air landings might be combined with assault from sea west of the port. 

Higher headquarters, on the other hand, showed 

more concern over the Allied advance in the 

Caumollt area, and Army Group sent orders that 

all possible measures be taken to plug the gap on 

the right of the 352d Division . Army informed 

VOII Rundstedt that recomlaissance elementJ' of 

the Panzer Lehr and 2d Panzer Divisions had 

been put into that area, as well as some elements 

of the 3d Paratroop Division. Half track elements of 2d Panzer were expected to a"ive by 14 

June, and first elements of the 2d SS Panzer on 

the 15th,' the latter unit was on its way from the 

mountains of central Fra'ICe, where it had been 

dealing with French Resista'ICe groups. In 

Army's view, there was now 110 reason for alarm 

with regard to the gap. 

The principal fighting of 12 June took place 

between the Elle and Tilly-sur-Seulles. As 

Seventh Army viewed it, the Allies were makillg 

a main effort to exploit the gap. They had 

160 
managed to reach Caumoll', and the flank of 

Panzer Lehr was exposed. In the Elle sector, 

local attacks were regarded as checked, although 

LXXXW Corps warned that the Allies evidently plantzed a drive to seiZe St-Lo. 

Orders from Hitler came that evming to 

Sevmth Army: the Allied hridgehead hetween the 

Orne and Vire Rivers must he attacked and destroyed piecemeal, heginning with the area east 

of Cam. Hitler also stressed that in fMure any 

Germall units cut off or sttrrounded must he 

prept".d to fight where they stood, to the last 

man tmd the last hullet. No orders for withdrawal would he tolerated. 

Seventh Army's intelltions for 13 JUlie were: 

attack east of the Orne hy the 21st Panzer Division; preparations Jar an attack hy 2e1 Panzer 

Division in the Caumortt area,' and use oj parts 

oj the 17th SS Pm,Zer Grelladier Division Jar 

recapture of Carmtan. 

From Sevmth Army' s viewpoint, 13 lulU was 

characterized hy a deJensive sttccess which ended 

its worries over the gap ill the Caumollt- VillersBocage ema. Elemmts oj the 2d Panzer Division 

had arriv<d to fill the hole,' admittedly jrut itl 

time. With the 2d SS Panzer Divison coming up 

to the same area emd expected shortly, Army 

tlOW mvisaged atl attack northward toward 

Balleroy to shorten the line_It, the Elle sector, 

some penetrations had heen made hy Allied units 

in what is descrihed as hitter fighting, hut the 3d 

Paratroop Division was in position to deJend that 

area. The German attempt to retake Carmtan 

had Jailed. Allied gains had heen made west 

and tlorth oj Ste-Mere-Eglise, and this area was 

now Sevmth Army's maill concern. 

A curious report Jrom LXXXW Corps -inJormed Army that the U. S. 1 st Division was 

"tlewly idttltified" ill the fightillg northeast of 

St-La, and that the U. S. 29th Division, 

exhausted, was reported to have left the litle. 

all 13 June, the ttlemy forces ill the sector hetwem the Vire and the Taute comprised a hattlegroup ("Heintz") made up of elements of hath 

the 17th SS PatlZtr Grenadier Division and the 

352d Division, attached to the 17th SS for operatiolls hut rmder the 352d for administratiotl. 

The hattle group included two illfantry he/ttalions 

(one 1UWkJ' arrived) , elements of two tllghuer 

hattalions, and some remllants of the 352d 

Divisiollal Artillery ( 4th Battalion) . Their 

mission was to hold the ground from Montmartitlen-Graignes to the westem md oj the Vire- Taute 

Canal, against" contitluous" Allied attacks "itl 

hattaliOiI strmgth," Sttpported hy tanks. 

The status oj the reinforcing columns at the end 

oj 13 lit'" WtlS as Jollows: wheeled vehicles of the 

2d SS Panzer were at Tours; wheeled vehicles of 

the 2d Panzer were at Caumont, hut tracked 

vehicles still at Paris, whe/'e they had detrained 

Jar march hy road; the hattie group oj the 265th 

Divisiotl had reached Coutemcts,' that oj the 

266th was still in the Brittany area; the 353d 

Division was tlear Remus. All small mohile 

units of the divisions and corps still itl Brittarry 

were to he organized illto battali07u and made 

re,dy Jar departure to the Normandy hattie. 

161 

all 14 lulU, Corps reported that the 352d DiviSiOiI was completely used up mid should he tak", 

out of line. On accoutlt of delays in reaching the 

hattl, area, the 2d Pallzer Division was still 

lackillg its heavier alltitank gUtlS, armored artillery, and heavy tanks. So far, it had hem 

operating with its armored itlJatltry units, which 

had takm heavy losses. In Army's opini01l, the 

e ffectivmess of the other elemmts oj the division 

was likely to he reduced hy the Jact that they were 

heing Jorced to make a long overland nlarch to 

reach the hattle area; ill particular, it was noted 

that the average liJe oj the motor in Panther 

tanks was estimated at 500 miles. Allied air 

attacks were still causing major complicatiotls, 

includillg command prohlems. Not only had 

Gmeral Marcks (LXXXIV Corps) hem killed 

hy strafitlg planes, hut homhitlg of a Panzer 

Corps headqttarters (British zotle) had Jorced a 

tra'lSfer oj commatld to a new headqttarters. As 

for Germem air, Army was itlformed that it cottld 

not interv",e in the hattie hecattse oj the distanCi 

from its (usahle) hoses, 
INSIGNIA OF DIVISIONS TAKING PART 

IN OMAHA BEACHHEAD OPERATION 

1st Division 

2d Armored Division 

*This SholllJ" palch is worn by all Army perJollne/ aJJigned 10 amphihian unil!. 

162 

2d Division 

Provisional Engineer 

Special Brigade Group· 
CONCLUSION 

AT 0125 ON 13 JUNE, V Corps received 

instructions from First Army, immediately 

communicated to subordinate units, which 

had the effect of marking the end of the 

Omaha beachhead operation (Map No. 

XVI). For the time being V Corps was 

to hold in its present positions, employing 

aggressive action by strong patrols to keep 

the enemy uncertain of our intentions. The 

First Army's offensive effort was concentrated on the right flank, where VII Corps 

continued its drive toward Cherbourg. XIX 

Corps was to become operational at noon, 

14 June; consisting of the 30th and 29th 

Divisions, its mission was to secure and enlarge the Carentan- Isigny corridor. First 

Army 's instructions were confirmed by V 

Corps Field Order No . 5, published at 2100 

on 13 June. The operations already under 

way on 13June, in the Caumont and Hill 192 

sectors, had been allowed to proceed during 

the day; the effect of Field Order No.5 was 

to stop the effort toward Hill 192 at the 

positions reached that evening. 

Starting from the smallest of footholds on 

D Day, V Corps had in one week driven inland 15 to 20 miles on a broad front. Junction had been firmly established with Allied 

forces on both flanks. The crisis of the 

whole operation had come at the very start, 

when unexpected enemy strength was met 

at the beach and the American troops had 

been called on for their utmost effort. Thereafter, the task of V Corps became progressively easier; the German 352d Division was 

pushed south at increasing speed and given 

no time to organize a defense. V Corps' 

advance was halted by decision of the 

higher command in view of overall tactical 

considerations. Its mission of capturing an 

adequate beachhead had been achieved. 

163 

In the course of a week' s fighting casualties 

had mounted to 5,846 of which 1,225 were 

killed in action; more than half of these 

casualties came in the first day. Heaviest 

losses had fallen to the 29th Division, with 

2,440 for the period; the 1st Division had 

1,744 casualties, and the 2d Division 855. 

Enemy prisoners amounted to about 2,500, 

and casualties of the 352d Division had 

reduced that offensive unit to a shadow of its 

former strength. 

Weeks of hard fighting were ahead, but 

the foundation for the final success of the 

Allied campaign in France had been firmly 

set. Scene of one of the hardest assault 

landings in military history, Omaha Beach 

was now part of a solid base for offensive 

operations which three months later reached 

the borders of Germany. 
ANNEX NO.1 

Omaha Beachhead Unit Citations 

( Published in War Department General Orders up co 15 Sep[~rnber 1945) 

1st Engineer Combat Battalion 

1st Platoon, 30th Chemical Decontamination Company 

1st Platoon, Company A, 203d Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion 

2d Ranger Infantry Battalion 

5th Ranger Infantry Battalion 

16th Infantry Regiment 

18th Infantry Regiment 

20th Engineer Combat Battalion 

37th Engineer Combat Battalion 

81st Chemical Battalion, Motorized 

112th Engineer Combat Battalion 

115th Infantry Regiment 

116th Infantry Regiment 

146th Engineer Combat Battalion 

147th Engineer Combat Battalion 

149th Engineer Combat Battalion 

1st Battalion Team, 293d Joint Assault Signal Company 

1st Platoon, 31st Chemical Decontamination Company 

2d Platoon, 634th Medical Clearing Company 

2d Squad, 1st Medical Depot Company 

3d Battalion Team, 293d Joint Assault Signal Company 

3d Platoon, 607th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company 

27th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad 

88th Quartermaster Railhead Company 

214th Military Police Company 

293d Joint Assault Signal Company (3 Battalion Teams) 

461st Amphibious Truck Company 

500th Medical Collecting Company 

618th Ordnance Ammunition Company 

967th Quartermaster Service Company 

3205th Quartermaster Service Company 

3704th Quartermaster Truck Company 

3820th Quartermaster Gas Supply Company 

Company B, 7th Naval Beach Battalion 

Company C, 7th Naval Beach Battalion 

Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 6th Engineer Special Brigade 

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 95th Quartermaster Battalion 

Reconnaissance Platoon, 3565th Ordnance MAM Company 

164 
Surgical Teams, 3d Auxiliary Surgical Group 

299th Engineer Combat Battalion 

397th Antiaircraft Artillery Provisional Machine Gun Battalion of the 49th Antiaircraft 

Artillery Brigade 

741st Tank Battalion 

743d Tank Battalion, Medium 

834th Engineer Aviation Battalion 

ANNEX NO.2 

A. E. A. F. 

LCA 

LCI 

LCI (L) 

LCG (L) 

LCM 

LCM (3) 

LCT 

LCT (A) 

LCT(HE) 

LCT (5) 

LCT (R) 

LCVP 

LSI 

LST 

NSFCP 

RCT 

BLT 

A bbreviatiotl s 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force 

Landing Craft, Assault 

Landing Craft, Infantry 

Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) 

Landing Craft, Gun (Large) 

Landing Craft, Mechanized 

Landing Craft, Mechanized (Mark 3) 

Landing Craft, Tank 

Landing Craft, Tank (Armored)* 

Landing Craft, Tank (Modified)* 

Landing Craft, Tank (Mark 5) 

Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) 

Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel 

Landing Ship, Infantry 

Landing Ship, Tank 

Naval Shore Fire Control Party 

Regimental Combat Team 

Battalion Landing Team 

-LCT (A) ;lnd LeT (HE) are modification. of the LCT ulCd for clow-in fire IUPport. 

165 
LeI 91, victim of a spectacular disaster about 0800 on D Day, as it 

looked in February 1945 when supply landings at Omaha had ceased. 

166 
167 'tl 

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