STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War

College and is the strategic level study agent for the Deputy Chiefof

Staff for Operations and Plans, Department ofthe Army.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning and policy forjoint and combined

employment ofmilitary forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature ofland warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army's future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory ofstrategy; and

• Other issues ofimportance to the leadership ofthe Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics

having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of

special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of

conferences and topically-orientated roundtables, expanded trip

reports, and quick reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army

participation in national security policy formulation.
CHAIRMEN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S

LEADERSHIP USING THE JOINT STRATEGIC

PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE 1990s:

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

Colonel Richard M. Meinhart

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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Distribution Unlimited

June 2003
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

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release; distribution is unlimited.

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ISBN 1-58487-127-X

11
FOREWORD

The Joint Strategic Planning System has been considered the

primary formal means by which the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

executed his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title

10 of the U.S. Code. Yet little has been written about this strategic

planning systemitself, although some ofits productssuch asthe varied

National Military Strategies and Joint Visions have been thoroughly

reviewed. One can gain great insight into the Chairman's formal

leadership since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act by tmderstanding

how this system evolved, reviewing its processes, and examiriing all

of its products.

Colonel Richard Meinhart examines how the three ChairmenGenerals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton—adapted and used

strategic plarming to provide direction and shape the military in the

rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. He identifies

five broad recommendations relevant to future leaders on how to use

a strategic planning system to transform their organizations. These

historic-based recommendations evolve around enduring strategic

leadership competencies such as revolutionary versus evolutionary

change, vision, flexibility versus bureaucracy, interpersonal

relationships, and moral courage.

This research is timely for the Department of Defense and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff are reviewing their processes related to the Planning,

Programming and Budgeting System and the Joint Strategic Planning

System. The author's research and recommendations are relevant for

seruor leaders of large and complex organizations, which use or try to

use strategic planning. Learning from how three Chairmen of diverse

leadership styles and when faced with varied external environment

challenges used strategic planning to manage change will give needed

iiisight to future leaders when developing plaiming systems.

Colonel Meinhart's research into the strategic planning system

was aided by a research grant from the Strategic Studies Institute,

which provided the time and travel funds to conduct interviews and

perform archival research of documents.

D0UGLA8 C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

111
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RICHARD M. MEINHART, Colonel USAF, is the Director of

Strategic Management Systems in the Department of Command

Leadership and Management at the Army War College and has held

the General Brehon Burke Somervell Chair of Management since

December 2000. He develops core curriculum, teaches, and performs

research on broad strategic leadership and management topics and

specific issues related to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His previous

staff assignments include working on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Army General Staff, and the Air Staff. His operational assignments

include Deputy Group Commander and Chief of Supply at the 52nd

Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base Germany, where his Group

received the General Gerrity Award for Logistics Excellence, and his

squadron earned best in United States Air Forces Europe. He holds

a B.S. in chemistry from Lehigh University, a M.A. in management

from Central Michigan University, a M.A in national security and

strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and is working

on his doctorate dissertation in higher education administration at

The George Washington Uruversity. He is also a graduate of the Air

Command and Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and

the Naval War College with highest distinction.

IV
SUMMARY

This monograph examines how the three Chairmen of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff adapted and used the Joint Strategic Plaiming System

from 1990 to 2000 to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and

to the President. This strategic plaiming system is the primary formal

means by which the Chairman executes his statutory responsibilities

specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Understanding this

strategic planning system's evolution, reviewing its processes, and

examining its products gives one great insight into how the three

Chairmen provided direction that shaped the military to respond

to the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. Senior

leaders can learn from this comprehensive strategic planning and

leadership review to enable them to better use a strategic planning

system to transform their organizations for the future.

The monograph begins by reviewing the events leading to and

the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorgaiuzation Act of 1986, which expanded the Chairman's

responsibilities. The legislation's discussion illustrates the challenges

and expectations that a Chairman, using a strategic planning system,

must meet in advising civilian leaders and executing decisions. The

author then examines the four major revisions of this strategic

planning system, as it changes from being rigid and focused on

the Cold War to being more flexible, vision oriented, and resource

focused by the decade's end. The major strategic planning products

are analyzed from both a content and process perspective to identify

their formal advice and the Chairman's leadership in developing

them. These products, which cover subjects such as strategy, vision,

resources, plans, and assessments, correspond to many of the

Chairman's formal statuary responsibilities.

The monograph then summarizes each Chairman's strategic

planning legacies. Based on these legacies, the author provides

five broad recommendations for future senior leaders to enable

them to better use a strategic planning system to transform their

organizations. These recommendations center around the following:

(1) Use of a strategic planning system for revolutionary change;

(2) Use of a strategic planning system for evolutionary change; (3)

Need for a senior leader's vision to lead organizations; (4) Need for
flexibility and bureaucracy balance for success in strategic planning;

(5) Need for senior leader's energy and moral courage to execute

fundamental change.

VI
CHAIRMEN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S

LEADERSHIP USING THE JOINT

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE 1990s:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

INTRODUCTION

This monograph examines how the three Chairmen of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) adapted and used the Joint Strategic Planning

System (JSPS) from 1990 to 2000 to provide advice to the Secretary of

Defense and to the President. Although little has been written about

this strategic planning system in the defense literature, it has been

considered the "primary formal means''^ by which the CJCS executes

his statutory responsibilities identified by Congress in Title 10 U.S

Code. Therefore, understanding this strategic planning system's

evolution, reviewing its processes, and examining its products will

give one great insight into how the CJCS provided direction and

shaped the military to respond to the rapidly changing strategic

environment of the 1990s while faced with diminishing resources

and increased operations.

To examine the JSPS and the Chairman's use ofit during the 1990s,

this monograph first discusses the need to reform the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS), which culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (referred to as GNA). The

GNA significantly changed the responsibiUties of the CJCS in

providing advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President,

as well as making other sigruficant changes in defense policy and

organizations. The GNA's basic provisions, while undergoing some

modification as legislation has been continually revised since 1986,

have kept the same fundamental focus in the 1990s. However as

this decade progressed, the JSPS significantly evolved in process

and content, which enabled the Chairman to execute more fully the

major provisions specified in the GNA.

After describing the JSPS's evolution, this monograph more

closely examines its products, as they changed from being somewhat

rigid and focused on Cold War bureaucratic planning in 1990 to

being more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused through
the 1990s. This planning system produced a series of interconnected,

classified and unclassified, documents in a time-phased manner

related to the following subjects: strategic environment, vision,

strategy, plans, assessments, and resources. These subjects generally

correspond to many of the Chairman's GNA responsibilities. The

author will then more closely examine how the three Chairmen in

the 1990s—Generals Powell, Shalikashvili and Shelton—adapted

and used this strategic planning system to accomplish their formal

leadership responsibilities in providing advice, in consultation

with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant

Commanders, to our nation's civilian leaders. Finally, the author

provides recommendations for strategic leaders on how to best use

a strategic planning system to transform their organizations to meet

future challenges.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

REORGANIZATION ACT (GNA)

The Call for Reform.

The 1986 GNA has been considered to be the most significant

piece of defense legislation that fundamentally changed the

responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the National Security

Defense Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense

after World War 11.^ This legislation was the result of almost 4 years of

somewhat contentious study, dialogue, and debate among Congress,

military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan

administration on how fundamentally to best organize the military

to advise civilian leaders and better execute in the field to respond

to complex and fast-moving national security challenges. These

Congressional, military leaders', defense intellectual community,

and Reagan administration's views will now be covered, for they

illustrate challenges and expectations that a Chairman, using a

strategic planning system, must meet in advising civilian leaders

and implementing decisions.

Many underlying reasons underpinned Congressional interest to

create military reform legislation. There were some long-held views

in Congress of inadequate advice from military leaders during the
Vietnam War, partially because of the weak authority that existed

in the CJCS. Another reason that underpinned the need for military

reform was prevention of the defense command and organization

problems which surfaced in the aborted 1990 Iran hostage rescue

attempt.^ This broad Congressional interest for military reform was

illustrated by the 1981 founding of the Military Reform Caucus.

The caucus was unique, because of its bicameral and bipartisan

membership of approximately 50 members of both liberal and

conservative persuasion, and its stated and somewhat ambiguous

objective of simply fostering consensus on defense issues.* What tied

the members uniquely together was a sense that, no matter what a

person's political views, some type of military reform was necessary

or the nation would not be properly served.

Further fueling this early 1980s Congressional interest for

military reform was the cumbersome military chain of command

problems later realized in the tragic 1983 Marine barracks explosion

in Lebanon, and reinforced by the interoperability and cooperation

problems that surfaced among various military units in the

successful 1983 hostage rescue in Grenada.^ While uiisuccessful

military operations typically result in Congressional hearings and

often serve as a catalyst event for major change, this reform call went

much deeper than just Congressional interest to fix responsibility

after failure.

Senior leaders within the Defense Department also were

interested in changing the military structure and the Chairman's

responsibilities. For example, in 1982, close to the end of his tenure

as CJCS, General Jones publicly favored many leadership reforms to

include making the Chairman the principal advisor to the civilian

leaders vice the corporate Joint Chiefs and giving the Chairman

oversight of the unified and specified commands.^ In 1982, Army

Chief of Staff General Meyer, who was about 3 years into his 4-year

Service Chief tenure, provided views on military reform more radical

than General Jones. He advocated abolishing the JCS and replacing

it with an entirely new senior military advisory body called the

National Military Advisory Council, to preclude Service Chiefs from

performing dual roles as members of the Joint Chiefs and as Service

Chiefs.^ In addition, consensus grew for defense acquisition reform

as people knowledgeable of the acquisition process, including
former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, criticized the military

service procurement focus driven by parochial views, weak Joint

Chiefs' collective positions on cross-service tradeoffs, and the lack of

influence of field commanders on weapon systems.*

A group categorized as the defense intellectual community

also called for defense reform. While there is no one definition or

organization that represents the defense intellectual community,

this monograph loosely defines them as individuals who regularly

wrote or talked about military affairs from either an academic

research perspective, news reporter focus, or as a retired diplomat

or military officer. Members of numerous "think tank" institutions,

many of which were Washington-based such as the Heritage

Foundation and The Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS), regularly held defense-related conferences, published on

military affairs, and testified before Congress. For example, the

1984 Heritage Foundation sponsored book. Mandate For Leadership

II, focused on reforming many government organizations and called

for JCS reform centered around not orily strengthening the role of

the Chairman, but also strengthening the Joint Staff by advocating

it work for the Chairman vice the corporate JCS.' CSIS' thoughtful

study of defense organizations, begun in 1983 and culminating in

the 1985 report. Toward a More Effective Defense, provided additional

impetusforJCS reform. Mostsignificantly, the CSIS report advocated

designating the Chairman as the nation's principal military advisor

replacing the corporate JCS; giving the Chairman the needed staff

to execute these broadened responsibilities; and giving unified and

specified commanders stronger institutional resources and authority

over their component commanders.^" Important about this report

was that its reform recommendations, while being less controversial

than others, were endorsed by six former Secretaries of Defense.

In addition, the 50 distinguished people who contributed to the

CSIS study had great influence to develop needed Congressional

momentum to create consensus and pass legislation.

While this monograph earlier described different views of two

sitting military leaders in 1982 who openly advocated major CJCS

reform, most of the existing service and defense leaders in 1985 were

not in favor of major reform. While reasons varied, reform proposals

calling for expanding advisory and resource responsibilities of the
CJCS and the unified and specified commanders would reduce the

influence of service chiefs, service secretaries, or defense department

officials. Hence, this created a natural institutional resistance to

change by those whose influence would be diminished. More

specifically, both Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force clearly were

against the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as well as the Marine Corps

Comniandant.^^

In essence, the call for defense reform generally centered around

three main themes: (1) the need to improve the military advice

provided to civilian leadership; (2) the need for a clearer command

structure and joint interoperability; (3) and the need to provide

for more efficient procurement methods in the "what" and "how"

weapon systems were acquired. Leading up to 1985, the question

was not whether reform would happen, but what direction it would

take.

To gain control of the reform movement, and perhaps stave

off more significant reforms that included dissolving the JCS as

a formal body, incremental improvements were made by CJCS

General Vessey prior to 1985 to strengthen the joint system and

increase field commanders' influence.^^ These improvements were at

the margin rather than fundamental in substance, and they did not

satisfy those who desired major reform. In 1985 President Reagan

established a Blue Ribbon Commission on defense management

to gain the administration's initiative on overall defense reform.

This commission, led by noted industrialist David Packard, was

more focused on acquisition and overall management, but also

included a review of JCS responsibilities. In 1985 the Senate Armed

Services Committee published a report. Defense Organization: The

Needfor Change, which included among its 91 recommendations the

abolition of the JCS and replacement with a joint military advisory

council,!^ not unlike that advocated in 1982 by General Meyers. The

CSIS report identified earlier succinctly identified the mood for

major change when it stated: "There is a growing consensus in the

Congress, in the community of defense officials and specialists, and

among the American people on the need for substantial efforts to

revitalize and reform the defense establishment."^^

The fact that it took almost 4 years to gain the overwhelming

consensus within Congress, generate tacit acceptance in the
Administration and the military, and broadly satisfy the defense

intellectual community for this legislation spoke volumes about the

conservative nature and reluctance to change the military. While

members of Congress routinely make ever-increasing incursions

into military procurement decisions and take district-focused

positions on specific defense budget items, as a legislative body they

very infrequently get involved with fundamental military structure

or organizational change. For example, in the 15 years after GNA

very little change in its fundamental thrust has been made, although

numerous defense-related articles and Congressmen have called

for additional reform or expressed frush-ation concerning the need

for more progress in the area of military joinhiess.^^ In addition, in

the 1990s the military in the field generally executed its growing

missions with distinction, which did not give potential reformers a

needed catalytic event to create an environment and generate broad

support for more military reform.

Provisions.

This sweeping national security legislation finally was passed in

1986 with almost universal consensus by both Houses of Congress

and without significant adminish-ation opposition. Congress'

intent in passing this, the GNA, is best described by the following

paragraph that appeared in Section 3 of the Conference Report:^^

(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian

authority in the Department of Defense;

(2) to improve military advice to the President, the National Security

Council, and the Secretary of Defense;

(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified

and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of

missions assigned to those commands;

(4) to ensure that the authority of the unified and specified

commanders is fully commensurate with the responsibility of

those commanders for the accomplishment of those missions

assigned to their commands;

(5) to increase attention in the formulation ofstrategy and contingency
planning;

(6) to provide for the most efficient use of defense resources;

(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and

(8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and

improve the management and administration of the Department

of Defense.

In examining Congress' intent of this Act, it goes much deeper

than just affecting the CJCS. In implementing intent (1), many

functions were transferred from Service Chiefs to Service Secretaries,

to include acquisition, comptroller, and inspector general. In

implementing intent (3) and (4), additional responsibilities and

more authority were given to unified and specified commanders to

identify requirements, develop operational plans, and control forces.

As shown by intent (5), the Act recognized that strategic planning

processes had to be fundamentally improved. It is important to note

that former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,

in testimony before Congress leading up to the GNA, roimdly

criticized the military's strategic planning system for producing

incoherent products.^'' Finally, as evidenced by intent (8), the Act

clearly expected better execution in the field and use of resources.

When the 1986 GNA was compared with the 2001 U.S. Code, the

major functions and the wording describing the contents of these

functions related to the CJCS fundamentally have not changed. This

illustrates the wisdom of the people who authored the Act, along

with the conservative nature of military reform. However, current

law does require additional reports that the CJCS must provide to

the Secretary of Defense or Congress either independently or first

through the Secretary of Defense, and they are summarized as

foUows:^^ (1) a report to the Secretary of Defense, which will then

be forwarded to Congress, of the CJCS's assessment of the strategic

and military risks in executing the National Military Strategy, and

(2) an annual report to the Congress of the integrated requirements

and readiness deficiencies of the combatant commanders, the

Chairman's views on these requirements, and how the budget or

future year's defense program addresses these requirements or fixes
the deficiencies. Some of the more important provisions related to

the Chairman are found in Chapter 5, Sections 151 through 154, of

Title 10 U.S. Code and will be described under the following two

general headings: Military Advice and Chairman's Functions.

Military Advice.

Chapter 5 Section 151 (b) states: "The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President,

the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."^^

This simple sentence in the GNA fundamentally increased the

responsibilities of the CJCS, for prior to that all members of the Joint

Chiefs were considered principal military advisors. Hence this Act

could have created a problem of concentrating advice and ultimately

too much power in one position.

To counteract a perceived concern of too much power in one

position, the Act provided specific guidance as to how and when

other members of the Joint Chiefs should provide their advice if

it differed from the Chairman's. The Act required that "... the

Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member [other

JCS] at the same time he presents his own advice to the President,

the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the

case may be."2o In formulating this advice. Section 151 also generally

identified meetings of the Joint Chiefs; how the Chairman consults

with others to include the otherJoint Chiefs and unified and specified

commanders; and how recommendations should be provided to

Congress. Finally, the strategic planning system itself, through its

coordination processes and its products, as we will later examine,

also help prevent power from being concentrated in one position.

Chairman's Functions.

Six major functions in the planning advice and policy

formulation section of the GNA have remained consistent through

the years and are fundamental to understanding the Chairman's

formal responsibilities. These are identified in Section 153 under the

following major subheadings: (1) Sta-ategic direction, (2) Sti-ategic

planning, (3) Contingency planning; preparedness, (4) Advice on
requirements, programs and budget, (5) Doctrine, training, and

education, and (6) Other matters.^^ Within these six sub headings,

the law identified a total of 18 specific tasks, along with the last

all-encompassing task of: "Performing such other duties as may be

prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense."^

The strategic planning, training, and education functions

identified above, although worded somewhat differently in

legislation prior to the GNA, were requirements executed by the

corporate Joint Chiefs, primarily by their own service staffs, vice

a Joint Staff directly supporting the Chairman. For example, the

National Security Act Amendments of 1949 required that the

Joint Chiefs prepare strategic plans and provision for the strategic

direction of the military forces.^^ Each service staff crafted its own

War Mobilization Plans, as war planning was accomplished more by

the service staffs in the Pentagon than the staffs of the commanders

in the field. Similarly, training and education were directed by the

services with little joint influence, as the Joint Chief's focus was more

on service competencies developed in their dual roles as Service

Chiefs. In addition to these responsibilities being executed within

the service staffs prior to the GNA, the quality people to do these

tasks were more resident in service staffs than the Joint Staff. An

assignment on the Joint Staff was generally not as valued as a service

staff assignment, so the quality ofJoint Staff work naturally suffered.

The GNA recognized these problems and created joint promotion

and assignment rules that continue today, so that a tour on the Joint

Staff would be valued and had the potential to advance promotion.

Hence this positively affected the quality of strategic plarming in the

1990s.

The one function notspecified as a responsibility ofthe Joint Chiefs

in the past was to provide advice on requirements, programs, and

budgets. This was essentially a new responsibility of the Chairman

and included such specificity as: advising on the requirements of the

unified and specified commands; submitting alternative program

and budget proposals to conform to the priorities in strategic

plans and of the unified and specified commanders; advising on

how manpower conforms to stiategic plans; and assessing defense

acquisition programs.^* These major resource responsibilities would

require considerable effort to execute fully, and this directly affected
the strategic planning system as it slowly evolved to meet them.

In the 1990s, the JSPS directly enabled the Chairman to respond

to the first four major GNA functions by producing a variety of

documents, both classified and unclassified, under processes

that can be described as both collaborative and consensus. The

manner by which these functions were performed in the 1990s

fundamentally evolved in process and content, as strategic planning

became more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused. This

decade's evolution will now be examined for it is fundamental

to understanding how the Chairman fulfilled his formal advice

responsibilities and the importance of this strategic planning system.

Where appropriate, this examination will identify major factors that

directly influenced the change such as the different leadership

styles of the three Chairmen; the new challenges of the global

security environment; and the increasing fiscal pressures on defense

programs caused by the declining budgets during the 1990s.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)

Processes,

The primary formal way the Chairman executed planning and

policy responsibilities specified in Title 10 U.S. Code was to use

the JSPS's processes and products. Two important adjectives in the

above sentence—"primary" and "formal"—have appeared in the

beginning of all Joint Staff guidance that explained this planning

system's products and processes during the 1990s. The processes

and products were also key to understanding the role of officers on

the Joint Staff in meeting the needs of the Chairman and how these

officers helped influence the military.

The word "primary" emphasized the importance of this system

within the daily internal workings of the Joint Staff. One of the

implicit changes of the GNA was to make the Joint Staff more

responsive to the Chairman, rather to the other Joint Chiefs as was

the case before GNA. Since four of the six major statutory advice

and policy functions of the Chairman were directly related to this

strategic planning system's outputs, the work associated with

developing or executing its processes or products became a primary

10
focus for many Joint Staff officers.

The word "formal" was emphasized for the guidance that the

earlier Meniorandum of Policies (MOPs) and then later Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSIs) clearly laid out: the

documents produced by this system; the general tim,eframesin which

they must be produced; and the overall internal staff assignments to

execute these responsibilities. In addition, the formal process also

described the conditions of how the Joint Staff interacted with the

staffs of others, such as the Office of Secretary of Defense, Service

Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders, which can be either

coordination or collaboration.

Coordination was the formal process that produced most

strategic plarming products and generally started with staffing a

draft of the intended product at the lowest level. The lowest level

was considered the action officer, who was assigned to a particular

division within a joint staff directorate. Many times, however, the

general thrust or focus of the document being developed received

the "top down guidance" of a general officer prior to starting the

coordination cycle. During the formal coordination cycle, which

typically had specific directions as to the types of comments and

timeframes, the action officer incorporated the comments of the

varied offices as the document was continually coordinated and

re-coordinated from action officer to Division Chief to Director to

Chairnian. The Chairman approved all JSPS products.

The coordination objective was generally to gain consensus with

a "concur" from all offices involved, and if concur was not achieved,

procedures were identified to deal with nonconcurs. However,

nonconcurs were the exception rather than the rule, as extraordinary

efforts were made by all involved (action officer through flag

officers) to wordsmith documents or create needed ambiguity to

gain a concur before finally elevating the issue to the next level to

resolve.^ General Jones, in 1982 testimony before the House Armed

Services Committee, stated that: "... each Service action officer may

have as many as 100 recommended changes. They quickly learn the

art of compromise—each agreeing to support the balance of changes

proposed by the other.. ."^^ This formal coordination process to gain

consensus took time, was bureaucratic in nature, and could have led

to suboptimize the final product; however, it also ensured the drafter

11
did not get an issue totally wrong. The process that produced the

Joint Visions will be discussed later to illustrate formal coordination

and the role of senior leaders in the process.

Collaboration, or vetting as some call it, was another formal

way, although not as common as coordination, to produce strategic

planning products. Collaboration meant that input on the subject

was solicited and received by the action officer responsible for the

product from other offices inside or outside the Joint Staff.^^ But those

from whom input was solicited did not review the wording of the

final product for concurrence. This could happen for several reasons.

First, the general views of those the document will affect (e.g.. Office

of Secretary of Defense or Combatant Commander) were solicited to

ensure the advice was along certain directions. This ensured there

were no surprises in the final document. Second, the product was

personal correspondence between the Chairman and someone else

(e.g.. Secretary of Defense). In this case, while inputs were solicited

to enable the Chairman to understand varied viewpoints, the final

comments were left to the Chairman alone to approve. The strategic

planning collaboration documents of the Chairman's Program

Recommendation and Chairman's Program Assessment will be

discussed later to illustrate the formal collaboration process and the

role of seruor leaders in this process.

The word "formal" was also emphasized in another contextual

way, for the Chairman carried out his leadership tasks in both a

formal and informal manner. The informal manner of leadership

primarily revolved around the interpersonal relationships the

Chairman had with the nation's civilian and military leaders in

executing his responsibilities. At times, these were more important

than the formal manner, which involved using the considerable

resources of his staff to develop and execute the processes that

created the products to directly advise or assist the Secretary of

Defense and the President or respond to Congress. As we will now

see, some Chairmen used the strategic plarming system to a greater

degree than others or significantly changed its focus, depending

on their leadership style and the magnitude of strategic change

needed.

12
Overall Evolution.

The JSPS was not a static planning system for it was revised four

times in the 1990s. These revisions occurred in 1990,1993,1997, and

1999, as it evolved from a somewhat rigid and Cold War focused

system described by the Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 84

dated January 24,1989, to a significantly more vision and resource

focused system described by the CJCSl 3100.01A dated September 1,

1999. Each Chairman modified and adapted it to meet the demands

of the external environment and to accommodate his leadership

style, which in the aggregate can be considered a legacy to their

overall strategic leadership. In addition, as the influence of the Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff steadily increased in the 1990s

in expanding the focus of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

(JROC), the use and importance of this strategic planning system to

influence defense resource decisions correspondingly increased.

Prior to 1990, there was a clear realization that the strategic

planning system, as defined in the January 1989 MOP No. 84, was

not accomplishing its purpose in enabling the Chairman to fully

execute his expanded GNA responsibilities. This memorandum,

the 17th revision of the strategic planning system since 1952, was

described as "unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic and produced

no less than 10 major documents every 2-year planning cycle."^^

Congress and others criticized the overall strategic planning system

during hearings related to the GNA for its failure to provide useful

strategic advice and to formulate military strategy.^^ The inadequacy

of this strategic planning system was also fully realized within the

Joint Staff, for in the first section of the memorandum the Director of

Strategy and Plarming was tasked to ". . . undertake an end-to-end

evaluation of the products which are created by the Joint Strategic

Planning System.... to seek opportunities for further improvement

in the cogency and timeliness of the process and products."^" This

overhaul included surveying users and authors of the primary

documents to determine their efficiency and effectiveness and

focused on the linkage between the strategic planning products

that link together the guidance in the national security strategy,

the operational planning system and the Planning, Programming

and Budgeting System (PPBS).^^ It is unusual to have such a tasking

13
within a memorandum, but it served to provide notice that another

revision was not being considered, and the intent was a complete

overhaul.

1990 Revision.

The outcome of this complete overhaul culminated in

Memorandum of Policy No. 7, dated January 30, 1990. This

overhaul's intent was to streamline the system by a combination of

front-end Chairman's guidance, while at the same time eliminating

or combining many other documents into concise products. The

front-end guidance part was started with a formal Joint Strategy

Review 0SR) to initiate the strategic planning cycle for "gathering

information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of

strategy, operational planning and program assessments"^^ and

culminated in the publishing of its first formal strategic plaiming

product—Chairman's Guidance. This concise document (6-10 pages),

which looked out to the timeframe 1994 to 1999, was scheduled to

be published every 2 years starting in December 1990 to provide

the principal initial guidance and support for developing the

National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), the second strategic

planning document.^^ The other two remaining formal strategic

planning documents—Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and

the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)—followed later in the

sequential planning cycle.

This revision was important for its effort to simplify the process

and make it more responsive to the Chairman. The simplification

was evident in that ten separate documents were combined into

the four identified above of lesser size. It formally required that the

security environment be assessed to identify changes that directly

affected the NMSD, rather than developing other documents

without first gaining consensus on the security environment. Finally,

it was designed to make the rest of the planning be responsive to the

"top down" direction of the Chairman by publishing Chairman's

Guidance. This formally established the thrust where the Chairman

directly focused the suljsequent work of the Joint Staff, rather than

the Joint Staff working issues of the other Joint Chiefs.

The three remaining documents (NSMD, JSCP, and CPA) were

14
designed to form the cornerstone of the formal part of strategic

planning during Chairman Powell's tenure. First, the NMSD was

to provide the encompassing advice of the Chairman "... as to the

recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained

force structure required to support the attainment of national

security objectives during the defense planning period covered by the

next Defense Plarming Guidance."^ The scope of this core strategy

document, now formally limited to 100 pages, was rather broad

and included the following: a National Military Strategy (which

was formally sent to the President for approval); recommended

national military objectives; updated intelligence assessments; and

military force options along with risk assessments. In addition,

many annexes from A to G ranged from 5 to 65 pages each on the

following subjects: intelligence; nuclear; C3 systems; research and

development; mapping, charting and geodesy; manpower and

personnel; and long-range planning guidance. These page limits

were important for the streamlining intent. This strategy document

would serve as the core in executing the Chairman's GNA strategy

responsibilities. The JSCP, now limited to 200 pages without annexes,

was a direct holdover from the old plaiming system, as it tasked the

Combatant Commanders to develop global and regional plans,

while apportioning forces to execute those plans. It served to fulfill

the Chairman's GNA plarming responsibilities. Finally, the CPA,

limited to 175 pages, was designed to accomplish the Chairman's

GNA resource advice responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense

after reviewing of the Services Program Objective Memorandums,

risks with the current force structure, and requirements identified by

combatant commanders.^^

While this strategic plarming overhaul was substantially

simplified from the earlier process, it was not implemented. The

first part of the process of conducting a Joint Strategy Review was

never accompUshed, which then had a cascading effect on the other

three planning documents, which depended on this review.^^ While

it is hard to identify the exact reason why this was not done, the

rapidly changing world environment (e.g., Berlin Wall falling, the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, Americans clamoring for the peace

dividend) put pressure on the need to quickly react. The streamlined

strategic plarming system, while still essentially a bureaucratic

15
system with extensive delineated responsibilities and somewhat

rigid coordination time schedules, simply could not keep up with

the pace the rapidly changing security environment demanded.^^

Consequently, in lieu of a formal strategy review conducted within

the Joint Staff to result in Chairman's Guidance for the later strategy

and war plans documents as the top-down directed planning system

specified, the Chairman achieved a general consensus of the world

environment at an annual 1990 Combatant Commanders conference.

After consultation with the Service Chiefs, he used a message to

summarize this conference that would suffice as formal Chairman's

Guidance.^^ Further, in lieu of the extensive classified National

Military Strategy Document specified by MOP No. 7, General Powell

replaced it with a short unclassified National Military Strategy

(NMS) in 1992. These were examples of Chairman Powell's direct

leadership style of not being tied to a formal strategic planning

process and outputs, even if it was his own system, when the world

situation so dictated and speed in formal guidance was needed.

1993 Revision.

The next major revision to the JSPS in March 1993 essentially

served to codify the strategic planning processes that occurred in

the few years prior to 1993 rather than desigiung a new system. This

revision, considered "significant" and "more responsive" asreported

in that memorandum's summary of changes, separated the strategy

from the calendar-driven resource and plaiming documents and had

the following major changes:^' formally replaced the voluminous

classified NMSD with the concise unclassified NMS; established a

classified Joint Plarming Document QPD) to provide resource advice

to the Secretary of Defense; specified that the JSCP would be revised

only when needed but reviewed at least biermially; and clarified

that the Chairman's Guidance could be published through a formal

endorsement of the JSR or anytime the strategic environment so

demanded.

In making these changes, the strategic planning system

emphasized flexibility in planning and strategic thinking in

developing strategy, while it also recogruzed the needed bureaucratic

discipline and time phasing required for resources and operational

16
planning. As an example of the greater focus on flexibility, the

complex administrative instruction for the JSR, which identified

inputs, outputs, suspenses, timelines and formats with multiple

sections, was eliminated.*" As an example of needed bureaucracy,

the Services and Combatant Commanders, while they may have felt

somewhat disenfranchised by the fast paced and top-down directed

strategic planning that occurred during General Powell's tenure,

insisted on bureaucratic processes with regularly published strategic

planning documents to ensure their influence would continue to be

formally stated.*^ Further, as with the previous change in 1990, the

JSCP, which tasked Combatant Commanders to develop the various

types of plans to implement the NMS and Secretary of Defense

Guidance, remained a constant strategic planning requirement. In

summary, this 1993 change reflected the formal planning influence

of General Powell who desired strategic flexibility vice bureaucracy,

but recognized the need for certain structure.

1997 Revision.

The next major JSPS revision formally occurred 4 years later

in September 1997 and was codified in CJCSI 3100.01 vice a

Memorandum of Policy. This revision was started in March 1996

with the creation of a Process Action Team to formally review the

strategic planning system. At this time, the Joint Staff was engaged

in implementing total quality management principles and created

multifunctional teams to assess many processes.^ The strategic

planning team, composed of members of all Joint Staff Directorates

and Service planners, was tasked to produce a strategic planning

instruction that not only reflected what had been done but also to

identify what should be done. The formal strategic planning team's

charter recognized that committees, processes and documents had

changed since the last strategic planning revision, most importantly

those that included an expanded Joint Requirements Oversight

Council (JROC); the newly established Joint Warfighting Capability

Assessment (JWCA) process; and a new Chairman's Program

Reconunendation (CPA) to further iiifluence defense resources.*^

Finally, there was a realization that the programmatic influence

of the Chairman needed better structured processes to formally

17
respond to the significant resource constraints and better execute his

GNA's resource responsibilities.

The September 1997 CJCSI 3001.01, The Joint Strategic Planning

System, was substantially different in style and substance from

what it replaced. In style, this instruction clearly identified the

sections of Title 10 that specified the Chairman's responsibilities, as

it divided guidance into four chapters: Strategic Direction, Strategic

Plans, Programming Advice, and Strategic Assessments.** This

clear structure, along with identifying the key relationships of the

Chairman's documents with those that provide guidance from the

President, Secretary of Defense, Services, and Unified Combatant

Commanders, provided much needed clarity to the system, its

interfaces, and subsequent products.*^

In substance, this strategic planning revision was more vision

and resource focused and linked to higher guidance. For example,

a Joint Vision, in addition to the NMS, was now part of the formal

strategic plaiming system to better enable the Chairman to fulfill his

GNA responsibilities for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces.

Resource advice was expanded as the CPR was formally added

to influence more directly defense resource planning, in addition

to the resource advice provided by the JPD and CPA. Its biggest

resource achievement was to fully synchronize these three resource

documents and the expanded work of the JROC and the JWCAs,

which actually began in 1994, with the Secretary of Defense's

PPBS. In the strategic plans area, the JSCP that tasked Combatant

Commanders to develop operational, concept, and functional plans

was a holdover from earlier guidance, but it added a major new

requirement for them to submit theater engagement plans. This

was an example of the stronger linkage to higher guidance, as

theater engagement plans responded to the peacetime engagement

component of the President's National Security Strategy and the

shape component of the Chairman's National Military Strategy.

This strategic planning system revision retained the needed

flexibility that was built into the process by the earlier memorandum.

For example, it kept the concept of Chairman's Guidance, not as a

separate document, but as overarching strategic direction from the

Chairman to the Joint Staff. From one who worked on the Joint Staff

during this time period, the directions from the Chairman were

18
clear. In the area of assessments, it described a Joint Net Assessment

process that integrated other work of Joint Staff, Services, and

Combatant Commanders, rather than producing a separate

document. Finally, the Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), which provided

a conceptual template for future capabilities, was broad and flexible

rather that narrow and restrictive. These formal changes were a

reflection of General Shalikashvili's consensus style of leadership.

He built upon General Powell's flexibility in strategy, but added

more future and consensus focus through his use of the Joint Vision

to shape the service's programs and his use of the JROC and JWCAs

to respond to the resource constrained realities of the mid-1990s. It

was clear from working on the Joint Staff that one needed to link

warfighting initiatives with the guidance provided by the strategic

plarming documents and have the analytical rigor to pass the JROC's

scrutiny for a program to be considered.

1999 Revision.

The final change to the strategic planning system occurred in

September 1999 with the formal updating of the 1997 instruction.

This change was minor in its impact. It did not add or subtract

any documents, but provided expanded guidance on Combatant

Commanders' theater engagement plans and further defined the

relationship between the strategic planning system and that of the

JROC and JWCAs.** In addition. General Shelton built upon the

consensus and disciplined style of leadership of his predecessor

in using the strategic planning process through 2000 to formally

manage change. By this time, the JSPS matured in its execution, as

it gained greater specificity in resource and operational planning

decisions.

JSPS Review.

The JSPS significantly changed from being rigid and Cold War

focused to more flexible, vision oriented, and resourced focused, as it

went through four revisions under the leadership of three Chairmen.

As discussed, the first revision in 1990 brought the Joint Staff out of

the Cold War planning mode and simplified what strategic planning

19
should be, while the second revision in 1993 emphasized flexibility

and described what had occurred in strategic planning during the

previous 3 years. The third revision in 1997 emphasized resources

and vision, while it maintained the earlier flexibility. The fourth

revision in 1999 was minor and process oriented. Now that the intent

of the strategic planning system's products and processes have been

described, this monograph will examine more closely the content and

influence of its products. These products helped the three Chairmen

shape the military in the 1990s in a time of declining resources

and increased operations tempo, while maintairung excellence in

responding to the global military missions across the spectrum of

the conflict. This success is what the GNA authors envisioned when

they created this legislation, and the strategic plarining system

directly contributed to that success.

PRODUCTS: JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

The strategic planning system's products will be examined by

the way they helped the Chairman respond to four of his six major

functions identified in the GNA Section 153. These functions are

Strategic Direction; Contingency Planning and Preparedness; Advice

on Requirements, Programs and Budget; and Strategic Planning.

Strategic Direction.

At the beginning of 1990, the formal manner by which the

Chairman advised the President and the Secretary of Defense on

the strategic direction of the Armed Forces was via a classified and

rather voluminous National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) and

a shorter classified National Military Strategy. Admiral Crowe (CJCS

1985-89) published these in 1989 for the timeframe 1992 to 1997.

In 1992, General Powell replaced these with an unclassified and

concise National Military Strategy (NMS) with no formal time period.

The unclassified NMS has remained the primary strategic direction

document of the Chairman. General Shalikashvili published

two NMSs in 1995 and 1997, and General Shelton kept the 1997

sti-ategy as his formal sh-ategic direction during his entire tenure as

Chairman. General Shalikashvili provided for longer-range strategic

20
direction focused more on the operational capabilities needed by the

military vice overall strategy when he published JV 2010 in 1996.

General Shelton updated this in 2000 when he published JV 2020.

These documents (NMSD, three NMSs, JV2010, and JV2020) will be

examined for their strategic direction during this decade.

1989 National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The overall

strategy direction document in 1990 was the NMSD 92-97, published

August 1989 by Admiral Crowe under a 2-year planning cycle. This

document included chapters dedicated to subjects such as: national

military strategy, appraisal of U.S. defense policy, national military

objectives, intelligence appraisal, fiscally constrained force levels,

net assessment options and risk evaluation.*^ In addition to the basic

NMSD, there were seven separate classified annexes on functional

subjects that supported the strategy such as intelligence; research

and development; and command, control, and commurucations;

among others. The size of some annexes (one annex alone had 11

chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs) exceeded the contents of the basic

document. Describing these documents as voluminous, somewhat

stove-piped, and highly bureaucratic would be an understatement,

but this was indicative of strategic plarming products produced in

the late 1980s.*^ The Senate Armed Services Committee called this

style of strategic plarming ineffective, and the former Chief of Naval

Operations, in remarking on a strategic planning document, stated

it was "... as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. ... a

synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they

gave was minimal."*^

A significant part of this formal strategic direction was a separate

classified document called the National Military Strategy. This was

essentially a summary of the NMSD and both were forwarded to

the Secretary of Defense for review. The Secretary of Defense then

forwarded the classified National Military Strategy to the President

for his approval, before it was routed back for later use in Defense

Planning Guidance.^" The guidance given in the 1989 strategy was

focused on the Cold War, which broadly was described as a strategy

of forward defense with many forces stationed forward backed up

by rapid reinforcement, along with the overarching strategic nuclear

deterrent.^^

2992 National Military Strategy (NMS). The 1992 NMS, which was

21
unclassified and only 27 pages long, was a complete change from the

previous NMSD just described in its clarity and strategic direction.

While this strategy was published in January 1992, its roots can be

traced to the President's 1990 August speech to the Aspen Institute

Symposium and his 1991 National Security Strategy, the Secretary

of Defense's Annual Report to the President and the Congress, and

General Powell's development of the Base Force.^^ This document

articulated a strategy that represented a ". . . shift from containing

the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more

diverse, flexible strategy that is regionally oriented and capable of

responding to the challenges of this decade."^^ In essence, this was

the most fundamental change in the U.S. military strategy since the

global war and containment strategy of the 1950s, as the military's

primary focus was now on deterring and fighting regional wars.

This strategy was based on the United States providing leadership

to promote global peace and security and built on four foundations

of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis

Response, and Reconstitution.^ It also identified eight strategic

principles that reinforced those four foundations, described how

forces would be employed, and finally specified the broad military

force structure, called the "Base Force," to implement the strategy.

The Base Force's composition was determined in earlier work by

General Powell, which was done somewhat outside of the formal

strategic planning process and was more strongly influenced by his

strategic thinking rather than that of the corporate Joint Chiefs.^^ The

simplicity of this strategy clearly conveyed to the American people,

one of the main target audiences if not the most important audience,

why they needed a military and in what size. The American people

and Congress were clamoring for a large peace dividend as the Cold

War ending sank in and the euphoria of the 1991 DESERT STORM

victory ended.

This document's coordination was different than the bureaucratic

coordination of other strategic planning documents on the Joint

Staff, which illustrated the flexibility in strategic planning General

Powell achieved. A Joint Staff Officer Harry Rothman, who was part

of the process, gave credit to General Powell's personal relationships

and strategic vision of the world that broke down the impediments

resident in formal planning processes.^ General Powell's strategic

22
vision was not a formal written and coordinated vision, as other

Chairmen have later done, but was continually articulated in

private conversations and public speeches. The strategy, which had

undergone many variations and was interrupted by operational

necessity (Gulf War, Soviet turmoil) from its conceptual beginnings

in 1990 to the end of 1991, was extensively worked by the J-5 Strategy

Division within the Joint Staff.^^ The Chairman finally published

it in January 1992. In Rothman's analysis of the entire process of

developing the 1992 NMS, he further concluded that: "... people

and not the process were more important in the forging of the new

strategy,"^^ as General Powell spent considerable energy convincing

and converting others to his views at his senior level, rather than the

broad coordination by others to influence the document at junior or

mid levels.

One other sigruficant aspect about this strategy was the foreword

of the document, which illustrated General Powell's leadership style.

The foreword stated that it was his advice, in consultation with other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders of unified and

specified commands, and by the GNA it was his responsibility to

provide this advice. The foreword also stated that in determining

this strategy he listened to his civilian leadership, as the strategy

implemented the President's security strategy and Secretary of

Defense policies. Another significant difference was that this NMS

was not formally approved by the President, as was done previously.

Clearly, as the first Chairman totally under the new GNA, General

Powell created a legacy in leadership, both in style and substance.

As described by Lorna Jaffe in her 50-page detailed examination of

the development of the Base Force (a key part of the strategy), she

concluded that Powell fully used the enhanced authority of the GNA

when she stated:^^

While he hoped to win the Services to his point of view, he did not

aim for either bureaucratic consensus through staff work or corporate

consensus through JCS meetings. He never asked the Service Chiefs to

vote on either the Base Force or recommending to the Secretary and the

President adoption of a new strategy [NMS]. Rather, he thought it was

more important to win the Secretary's approval.

1995 National Military Strategy (NMS). The 1995 NMS was one

23
of two produced by General Shalikashvili during his tenure as

Chairman and looked very similar to General Powell's in style, but its

substance was different in a few key areas. In this strategy of flexible

and selective engagement, the military was expected to become

more engaged in conflict prevention to include missions such as

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation assistance—missions

not mentioned in the 1992 strategy.^ In essence, the military now

had three formal strategy components defined as: (1) peacetime

engagement component, which was the broad range of noncombat

activities to promote democracy, relieve suffering and enhance

overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict prevention

component, which ranged from the high end of conflict represented

by nuclear deterrence to the low end of conflict represented by peace

enforcement to restore stability, security and international law; and,

(3) the fight and win component, which was defined as the primary

mission of the military.^^

The military forces to execute this strategy were also defined in

the document, but again determined outside its formal development

by earlier work by the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review.

While the military missions were growing in noncombat areas,

the force structure was decreasing from the 1992 Base Force, as the

active Army divisions were two less, active Air Force fighter wings

were two less and Navy combatant ships went from 450 to 346.*^

In addition, reconstitution (defined in the 1992 strategy as forming,

trairung, and fielding new fighting units, to include activating the

industrial base)^^ dropped out of the 1995 strategy altogether. Hence,

maintaining readiness became ever more important as the force

became smaller and was used more frequently.

The development of this document was significantly different

than 1992 strategy, as it followed the process and overall structure

outlined in the 1993 MOP. The strategy included information that

was summarized from another strategic planning product, the JSR;

and the conceptual outline of what a strategy should include as

defined in the memorandum was reflected in the final document."

This illustrated that process as well as people drove this strategy's

development. This perhaps also reflected a leadership style of

General Shalikashvili that could be characterized as valuing

consensus and using strategic planning processes to achieve that

24
consensus. In addition, since this strategy was similar in style to

the previous one, a strategic planning process could more easily

produce an evolutionary vice revolutionary product.

1997 National Military Strategy. The 1997 NMS was the last

strategy document produced by a Chairman during the decade of

the 1990s and was known by its three words of "shape, respond, and

prepare." These words were used within the context of: "... Shape

the strategic environment and Respond to the full spectrum of crisis

while Preparing our Armed forces now for an uncertain future."^

This strategy built upon the work of the previous one, but was

different in four main areas. First, it focused more specifically on

the threats from the strategic environment, which were broadly

categorized asregional dangers, asymmetric challenges,transnational

dangers, and wild cards. Second, it integrated guidance from the

President's 1997 National Security Strategy and the 1997 Secretary of

Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review, and strongly made the case for

why the military needed to be involvedwith shapingthe international

environment. While doing so, it emphasized a two major theater

war capability and clearly stated that: "Our Armed Forces' foremost

task is to fight and win our Nation's wars,"^^ a phrase that has been

used countless times since. Third, it identified the force structure

to execute the strategy in greater specificity than the previous one.

For example, the numbers of Army Corps, cavalry regiments and

National Guard enhanced brigades were now specified, along

with numbers of civilians and special operations forces. Fourth, in

preparing for the future, it established the foundation for the current

defense transformation, as it identified the need for an investment

program in robust modernization that exploited the Revolution in

Military Affairs and Revolution in Business Affairs.^^

This NMS was also developed within the strategic planning

process, as it relied on two other 1996 strategic planning documents.

The strategy's strategic enviroiraient assessment was influenced by

the Joint Strategy Review, and the section that covered preparing for

the future leveraged the concepts identified in JV 2010. Finally, this

document came out in September, a short time after the President's

May National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense's

Quadrennial Defense Review, which emphasized the interconnectivity

and strong collaboration among the military and civilian leadership

25
in the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

1996 Joint Vision (JV) 2010. JV 2010 was the first time a Chairman

formally published a vision to provide long-term strategic direction

for the military, as he further executed his GNA responsibilities.

While the NMS focused on more of a near-term strategy. Joint Vision

focused on the operational capabilities needed by the military for the

next 15 years. This 36-page vision went far beyond its logo of a joint

force: "America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow: Quality People

Trained, Equipped, and Ready for Joint Operations-Persuasive

in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict."^

It identified four broad joint operational concepts to serve as

the conceptual template to provide a common direction for the

Services to develop capabilities. These concepts to achieve full

spectrum dominance, the key characteristic of the future military,

were identified as: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full

dimensional protection, and focused logistics.^^ }V 2010 was used by

the Services to update or craft their visions and by the Department of

Defense to provide guidance to the services to resource the vision's

operational capabilities.^"

The manner in which this vision was developed, under a mixed

method of coordination and collaboration, helped create tremendous

institutional acceptance by the Services, Combatant Commanders,

and the Secretary ofDefense. The process was different than the broad

consensus and coordination of other strategic planning documents

under General Shalikashvili. Instead of action officer drafts then

making their way through the coordination cycle with comments

integrated along the hierarchy, the Chairman took a personal interest

and provided specific direction in crafting this vision. After the first

broad draft was developed from a briefing concept and vetted by a

General Officer Steering Group, General Shalikashvili sent personal

notes to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs soliciting

their comments on the final drafts, with the express desire that their

comments be focused on joint vice service oriented operations.

While he looked for consensus, he did not require it, as his focus

was described as "I want your input and I will listen to it, though I

do not promise to use it."''^ There were many sessions between the

Chairman, a few action officers responsible for the product, the J-5

26
Director and the Director of the Joiiit Staff, as they collectively went

over every recommended change. The Chairman used many of the

Service Chiefs and Combatant Commander ideas, as he personally

approved all changes to the draft, which took a significant amount of

senior leader time and direction/^

A lesson for strategic leaders from examining JV lOlffs

development was that if a major change was made to a strategic

planning system, as the crafting of this first vision was, then

direct senior leader involvement was needed for its success. This

involvement used the informal component of strategic leadership

within a formal system, which was determined by the interpersonal

relationshipstheChairmanhadwith the nation's otherseniormilitary

and civilian leaders. This also followed a style used by General

Powell, when he spent great energy and personal involvement on

the first National Military Strategy. A major difference, however,

was that General Shalikashvili spent more time gaining a "buy in"

of Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders. Clearly, from Joint

Vision's broad acceptance, it was owned by the joint force rather

than one person.

2000 Joint Vision (JV) 2020. JV 2020, produced 4 years after its

predecessor, was fully coordinated within the strategic planning

system, as it went from initial action officer draft through Division

Chief to Director to Chairman. JV 2020, because it built upon

the earlier vision, did not have or need the Chairman's direct

involvement as JV 2010 demanded. However, the Chairman

provided his direction by formally approving the update process.'^

This update process was described in a CJCS Notice, which identified

time frames, working groups, general officer steering committee and

the responsibilities of all members from the Services, Combatant

Commanders, and Joint Staff Directorates.^* The 2000 revision,

now called JV 2020, kept the earlier vision's same four operational

concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused

logistics and full dimensional protection, but also emphasized

information superiority, irmovation, and interagency operations.

While the vision's slogan retained the same: "persuasive in peace,

decisive in war and preeminent in any form of corvflict" part, the

words preceding that were changed to: "Dedicated individuals and

innovative organizations transforming the joint force for the 21st

27
Century to achieve full spectrum dominance."^^ This beginning

was more inclusive than the previous one. It now recognized

individuals rather than just military, emphasized the team concept of

organizations, and reflected the growing importance of transforming

to a specific end state capability.

The lesson learned from the successful publishing of JV 2020 was

that a strategic planning system could update effectively an existing

product without a great amount of direct senior involvement.

JV 2020 obtained the same Service and Combatant Commander

acceptance by using the strategic planning process. It went one step

further, for it included a section on vision implementation that had

matured under General Shelton's leadership. General Shelton had

placed great emphasis on implementing the joint vision throughout

his tenure. For example, in his first article in Joint Forces Quarterly

since taking over as Chairman, General Shelton stated: "The next

task is to operationalize JV 203 0-transforming its concepts of joint

warfighting into reality."^^

Contingency Planning and Preparedness.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP was the one

constant among all the sh-ategic planning changes in the 1990s.

It continued to have the same purpose—to provide strategic war

plaiming guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Service

Chiefs based on resourced military capabilities.^^ More specifically,

it identified the various types of plans that Combatant Commanders'

must develop, as the document integrated higher-level guidance

from the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and

Contingency Planning Guidance into detailed, executable plans.

In tasking the Combatant Commanders, it apportioned forces to

them based on completed budgets. Hence the plans were resource

constrained, but realistic. The JSCP also had numerous functional

annexes to amplify the general guidance on subjects such as

intelligence, logistics, nuclear, mobility, etc.

The JSCP underwent some modification in the 1990s as the types

of plans it tasked changed in response to the changing threats and

the different military strategies.^^ For example, in 1990 it specified

global (Cold War focused) and regional plans, and they were

28
replaced in 1993 with Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans

(CONPLANs), and concept summaries for global and regional

contingencies. In 1997, the CONPLANS and OPLANS remained

constant, but functional plans for contingencies and deterrence

replaced concept summaries, as the transition to a regional focus

was completed. Most significantly, in 1997 Theater Engagement

Plans were first required to implement the shape component of the

military strategy. No changesto the types of plans were made in 1999,

but greater specificity was provided concerning theater engagement.

Throughout the decade the various annexes have remained fairly

constant in both type and focus. The JSCP was formally reviewed

for currency within an overall 2-year planning cycle, as it either

was formally extended for an additional year, revised, or amended

within this 2-year cycle.

The JSCP's developmental process and use were examples of

both bureaucratic consistency (its greatest attribute) and flexibility

(lesser extent) of this document within the strategic planning system.

This bureaucratic consistency was evident when it disciplined and

focused the work of the hundreds of planners in the Joint Staff and

Combatant Commanders to develop over 50 realistic and fully

integrated plans. This flexibility was evident in decisions made to

extend or modify its direction from the specified 2-year planning

cycle, and it identified plans that did not need the Chairman's

review.

Advice on Requirements, Programs, and Budget.

The ability of the Chairman to provide resource advice to

the Secretary of Defense on Service programs and Combatant

Commander needs remained one of the most difficult and

contentious responsibilities to execute in the 1990s. The manner in

which this was done, or not done fully, continued to draw criticism

of the Chairman. Defense analysts, such as Thomas Davis, have

been critical of the JROC's, and by extension the Chairman's, lack

of influence on service programs in the mid-1990s, because resource

advice was categorized as being at margins of programs rather than

at the heart of them.^^ Members of the 1997 Senate Armed Services

Committee in hearings criticized the military for its slowness in

29
building a true joint force.^ The Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs ofStaff, in

testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee in April

2000, recognized that the JROC needed to "do more 'heavy lifting' at

the strategic level"^^ to better affect the overall requirements process

and improve joint operations.

On the other hand, however, resource advice throughout the

1990s expanded, as processes were developed to identify resource

or system tradeoffs, and key Chairman resource documents were

refocused to gain more influence and increase specificity.®^ For

example, from a Joint Staff perspective, the expanded Chairman's

Program Assessment (CPA) in October 1995 argued for shifting

significant funds and different approaches for recapitalization, that

if accepted, would readjust up to 12 percent of the defense budget.®^

These primary Chairman resource focused documents—/omf

Planning Document (JPD), Chairman Program Recommendation (CPR),

and Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)—will now be discussed.

This discussion will be broad in nature for their specific content, as

well as the defense documents they influenced, are classified.

Before covering these three documents, an important point needs

to be made that the greatest Chairman's resource influence in the

1990s resided in the three National Military Strategies. Each one of

these strategies, and in greater detail as they progressed in the 1990s,

identified the specific force structure needed to execute the strategy

in numbers of Army and Marine Corps divisions. Navy combatant

ships. Air Force wings and other elements of combat power.

Providing resources to sustain this force structure (operations and

maintenance, military pay, housing, and medical care) comprised

by far the greatest portion of the defense budget. These four broad

categories of expenditures have conservatively consumed from 65

to 70 percent of the defense budget during this decade, with the

two other main resource categories—procurement; and research,

development, testing, and evaluation—consuming the remainder.^

Joint Planning Document (JPD). The JPD first appeared within the

strategic planning system in 1993, as a biennial product to replace

the annexes and other components of the now defunct National

Military Strategy Document to satisfy the Chairman's GNA resource

responsibilities. The JPD was actually seven separate volumes on

the following subjects: Intelligence; Nuclear; C4 Systems; Future

30
Capabilities; Mapping, Charting and Geodesy; Manpower and

Personnel; and Logistics.^^ The head of a Joint Staff Directorate or

appropriate Combat Support Agency (e.g.. Defense Intelligence

Agency or Defense Mapping Agency) took the lead to coordinate

with the Services and Combatant Commanders to produce their

volumes biennially to influence the Defense Planning Guidance;

however, very little overall integration existed among the volumes.

In 1997 the JPD changed in focus and process, as it went from seven

different volumes to one document with eight chapters, using the

work of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments QWCAs) to

provide much of the analytical rigor to the chapters' contents. In

addition, with the publishing of JV 2010 in 1996 and the decision to

focus the JPD on the strategic objectives in the military strategy and

war plans, it now represented the coordinated Chairman's advice

rather than stove-piped volumes submitted separately. The JPD was

scheduled for completion 6 months prior to the publishing of the

Defense Planning Guidance. This direction remained constant since

1997, although the chapters have changed slightly in title.

The unanswered question was: How effective was this broad

Chairman's resource document in influencing the Defense Planning

Guidance (DPG), the Secretary of Defense's primary resource

document it was so designed to influence? The answer remains

mixed, because it was difficult to compare and contrast information

in both documents for their style and substance differs, as they

were written by different organizations for different purposes. For

example, while the JPD provided the Chairman's broad advice on

planning and programming and to a great degree it represented

the Combatant Commander's needs, the DPG had to provide much

greater specificity to properly advise the Services and Defense

Agencies what programs or capabilities to resource when they built

their voluminous Program Objective Memorandums.^^ Individuals

who worked on the DPG have commented they did not use it

as a guide when developing their document, and the Joint Staff

considered eliminating the JPD during the 1997 CJCSI update.*^

Others who worked in the resource arena in the Pentagon say the

process, which produced the JPD, educated people who later made

decisions on defense and service programs, so its value was in the

process of shaping ideas and sharing concepts and not the actual

31
product.^

Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program

Recommendation (CPR). Both of these strategic planning products will

be considered together, because they represented the personal advice

of the Chairman in fulfilling his GNA resource responsibilities to the

Secretary of Defense. Because these two documents were considered

personal correspondence, they were kept close hold in addition to

their classified nature caused by their recommendations of military

programs and capabilities. As such, they did not get the widespread

review within the Joint Staff or the Office of Secretary of Defense as

other strategic planning products, but they were considered by key

senior leaders who ultimately made resource tradeoff decisions or

provided broad direction.

The CPA will be considered first, since it had been a formal part

of the strategic planning system since 1990. The CPR, although first

submitted in 1995, did not became a formal part of the strategic

planning system until 1997. Since 1994, these two products were

also sequenced and heavily influenced by the expanded Joint

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessment (JWCA) processes. By sequencing, the

program recommendation came out prior to the Defense Planning

Guidance to advise the Secretary of Defense on programs important

to the Chairman, so they would then be reflected in defense

guidance. The program assessment was submitted about 6 months

later to evaluate formally the programs the Services proposed to the

Secretary of Defense in response to that same resource guidance. In

this way, the Chairman influenced the processes that converted the

Service's Program Objective Memorandum to the Defense Future

Years Defense Programs (FYDP).

The CPA was a new product in the 1990 revision of the strategic

plaiming system to evaluate the Service programs and fulfill the

Chairman's GNA resource responsibilities. While this assessment

existed since 1990, it changed significantly in content and influence

during this decade. In 1990, the strategic planning memorandum

specified that this assessment was scheduled on a biermial basis

to assess the Service's Program Objective Memorandums 45 days

after they were submitted to the Secretary of Defense, and its length

was not to exceed 175 pages.^' This evaluation, as with many other

32
strategic planning documents required by the 1990 MOP alreadydiscussed, was not produced as specified in the planning directive,

as it was just a short memorandum. The 1993 MOP, to reflect the

practice that occurred, required this assessment to be a one or

two-page memorandum with enclosures to further explain the

Chairman's views or identify alternative programs.^ Prior to 1994,

most of the CPAs, while the Chairman had the authority by the GNA

to submit alternative programs, simply acknowledged or endorsed

the military service's programs by these short memoranda.^^ While

an elaborate process was identified to produce a Chairman's

assessment, a review of that Joint Staff process revealed no body

existed to meet and deliberate on contentious issues.^^

The 1994 CPA submission would follow a different process than

existed earlier. It started with the expansion of the JROC, which

was chaired by the Vice Chairman and included the Service Vice

Chiefs. Under the direction of Vice Chairman Admiral Owens in

April 1994, this council went from validating military requirements

and acquisition programs to providing programmatic advice on

joint warfighting issues to influencing directly the defense resource

system. Because of this expanded focus, the time spent in the

council's meetings increased ten-fold from 1994 to 1995.^^

With the expansion of this joint council's focus, ten Joint

Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs), under a Joint Staff

Director, were also established in 1994 to examine programs

horizontally and jointly. The JWCAs, whose members came

from the Joint Staff, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Combatant Commanders, Defense Agencies and others to provide

a synergistic approach to resolve issues, were organized across the

following areas: Strike; Land and Littoral Warfare; Command and

Control; Strategic Mobility and Sustainability; Sea Air and Space

Superiority; Information Warfare; Deterrence/Counter Proliferation

of WMD; Intelhgence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Regional

Engagement/Presence; and Joint Readiness.^^ Including this diverse

service and defense membership in the JWCAs directly improved the

interface with the various Pentagon resource processes and boards.

In addition, the JROC visited the Combatant Commanders on these

same warfighting issues to gain their perspectives and needed buyin on proposed recommendations. In essence, the JWCAs provided

33
the analytical rigor in briefs to the JROC members, who would gain

Combatant Commander input, then deliberate, and finally provide

recommendations to the Chairman. The Chairman ultimately

would decide what to include in his program recommendation or

assessment.

The CPA's recommendations were designed to ". . . enhance

joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and more

adequately reflect strategic and CINC priorities."^^ jj^g October

1994 assessment, the first document submitted from the process

described above, challenged some programs submitted by the

Services, called for about $8 billion in additional funding over the

entire defense program, and argued for shifts in $4 billion more.*

While this may have been just a very small percentage of the overall

defense resources, it established the precedent that the Chairman

would not just endorse service programs. In a declining resource

environment, shifting of funds becomes ever more important and

difficult as resource flexibility can be lessened significantly.

The next year (1995) would start the annual sequencing of

submitting a recommendation in the spring and an assessment in

the fall. This process first influences the Defense Planning Guidance

and then assesses Service programs in response to that guidance

to achieve the full integration of Chairman's guidance within

the annual Pentagon resource cycle. The Chairman's Program

Recommendations, similar to his assessments, were focused to

"... enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training,

and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements."^^ In 1995, a CPR

was submitted in April and a CPA was submitted in October. The

October 1995 assessment was much broader in scope than the 1994

one in that:

It specifically called for shifting significant sums of money over the

FYDP period from some programs to others, and recommended

reducing some redundant capabilities across military services. It also

argued for a very different approach both to recapitalization and to the

revolution in military affairs—steps that, taken together, could require

an adjustment of up to 12 percent of the projected defense budget over

the FYDP period. Very little of this was associated with any additional

funding.**

34
The process of using the JROC and JWCA to help craft a

Chairman's Program Recommendation and Assessment continued

to mature in the later part of this decade. Some refinements occurred

in the JWCA process as some areas were added and others were

dropped, and by 2000 the JWCAs were tasked to take a more

strategic focus. In 1997, the JROC added a formal review board,

chaired by a lieutenant general Joint Staff Director and with Service

representatives at the major general level, to assist this council in

reviewing issues and providing oversight of the JWCAs.^ Formal

links were later established between the JROC and Joint Forces

Command in joint experimentation to operationalize JV 2010 and

later JV 2020, and the other Combatant Commanders had an open

invitation to attend this council's meetings.^"" The intent of these

JROC andJWCA changes wasto provide more front-end and strategic

influence on requirements and enhance joint warfighting. The

formal outputs of much of this work continued to be the Chairman's

Program Recommendations and Assessments. In the last part of the

decade (1998 to 2000), the recommendation was submitted either in

March or February and the assessment was completed by August,^"^

which allowed more time for these documents to have an impact on

defense planning, programming, and budgeting.

The success of the CPR and CPA, as mentioned, remains mixed

depending on one's perspective. The quote above from a Joint Staff

promoted book, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, was very

positive about the CPA's effect, as it identified a potential 12 percent

impact. The article, "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?," by

defense analyst M. Thomas Davis was more critical of this same

October 1995 CPA. It identified the lack of specific recommendations

proportionate to the proposals; criticized the late submission of the

document in the summer review cycle; and commented on the small

dollar value of changes made to defense budgets the CPA was

designed to affect.^"^ As mentioned, the timeliness of submissions

improved as the process matured later in the decade. In addition,

success should not be measured only by the amount of fxmds

that were moved within the programs. The extensive JROC and

JWCA work led to informed discussions that resulted in changes

to programs by the Services or Defense Combat Support Agencies

before they needed to appear in the Chairman's recommendation

35
or assessment. A real measure of success was whether the Secretary

of Defense used the advice provided by the Chairman to then make

important changes in defense programs that resulted in improved

joint operational capabilities, and the overwhelming evidence is that

he did.^o^

Strategic Planning.

Integration. The fourth directed GNA function of strategic

plaiming was mainly covered in the discussion of the JSPS's evolution

and on the documents identified under the strategic direction, plans,

and resources sections of this monograph. However, the fact that

it was a specific major GNA function in itself reflected Congress'

intent to improve strategic planning overall and encourage better

coordination and collaboration between the Chairman and the

nation's other senior military and civilian leaders. Consequently,

the JSPS's guidance and subsequence processes made great strides

to ensure inter-connectivity of its products with: the President

{National Security Strategy and Budget); Secretary of Defense (Defense

Planning Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, Contingency Planning

Guidance), Combatant Commanders (Integrated Priority Lists, JSCP

directed plans) and the Services (Program Objective Memorandums).

This planning system tied all of these together as it accomplished the

GNA strategic planning responsibilities.

In addition, this system directly affected other processes

or boards in the Pentagon and the Joint Staff. For example, the

Chairman's readiness assessment system, called the Joint Monthly

Readiness Review that began in 1994, frequently identified readiness

deficiencies that were later analyzed by JWCAs, briefed to the JROC

for recommendations, and ended up in either the Chairman's

Program Assessment or Recommendation. Issues identified in the

CPA influenced the Defense Department's summer program review,

which resulted in Program Decision Memorandums to change the

Service programs or in later Program Budget Decisions to change

proposed Service budgets.^o* This was just two of many ways this

strategic planning system integrated and influenced other processes

and decisions.

Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The one stiategic planning classified

36
document not covered in any detail as yet is the JSR, for it did not

truly fit into any of the GNA categories identified earlier. This review

annually assessed the strategic envirorunent to identify threats,

opportunities, challenges, issues and any other significant topics

that would ultimately affect other strategic planning products, such

as the military strategy, vision, or plans.^"^ In essence it served as

an intellectual foundation or common thread upon which to later

develop changes to strategy, capabilities, or resources. As expected,

it looked to the future and made heavy use of intelligence, but

the working groups included representatives from the Services,

Joint Staff Directors, Combatant Commands and other defense

orgaruzations as needed. This product (formal reports were issued),

or process as some described it, remained a constant in the strategic

planning system in the 1990s. While a formal JSR was not completed

in the early 1990s, starting in 1993 and thereafter it was completed in

different ways and with different focuses. At times a separate report

wasissued (1993,1994,1997,1998,1999) while othertimesthe strategy

review process was used to help produce a Joint Vision or National

Military Strategy.^°^ The Joint Strategy Review, started in 1996 and

signed in January 1997, also assisted with the Joint Staff input to the

Defense Department during work on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense

Review,^°'^ which was indicative of its broad influence.

The JSR also illustrated the combination of flexibility and

bureaucracy that a strategic planning system needed. For example,

instead of completing a formal JSR report, as mentioned, a Joint

Vision or the National Military Strategy was the output that used

the same intellectual capital of action officers on the Joint Staff,

Services, Combatant Commands and select others. An example of

the bureaucracy was that the detailed process, responsibilities, and

coordination to complete a strategy review were identified in Joint

Staff Memorandum or Notices. Senior leaders provided guidance to

the action officers as to what focus or product the strategy review

would take. This guidance reflected their level of involvement in the

strategy review's products or process, which varied from light to

heavy depending on the review's focus.

STRATEGIC PLANNING LEGACY OF CJCS

When covering the strategic planning system and its products,

37
this monograph identified changes each Chairman made to the

process or products. The leadership influence of the three Chairmen

in using the strategic planning system will be briefly summarized,

for it serves to educate future senior leaders on how to use a formal

strategic planning system to manage change and transform complex

organizations.

General Powell, 1989-93.

As the first Chairman to serve entirely under the GoldwaterNichols Act, he exercised direct leadership within the Joint Strategic

Planning System. This was evident as he simplified strategic

planning by significantiy reducing the number of products from 10

to 4 and increasing the system's flexibility to respond to his direction.

He also short-circuited its processes, as he did not wait for a formal

Joint Strategy Review to be completed before issuing Chairman's

Guidance, but used the results of a Commander's meeting to issue

the guidance in a message.^"* He did not wait for the sh-ategic

planning's bureaucratic process and countiess coordinations to

produce another voluminous National Military Strategy Document

with hundreds of pages of annexes, but published a 27-page

National Military Sh-ategy under his signature when he believed

the strategy was right. The coordination of this strategy was more a

result of his interpersonal skills than of a formal planning process.^*^

In the resource area, while his plaiming system identified a detailed

Chairman's Program Assessment of Service programs not to exceed

175 pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum. While

some could criticize such a short assessment, a detailed program

assessment may not have been needed or desired for the much

smaller force sta^cture documented in the last chapter of the National

Military Sti-ategy was essentially the greatest resource influence of

any Chairman in the 1990s.

While General Powell may have eliminated too much bureaucracy

associated with producing some detailed annexes in the National

Military Strategy Document or a more comprehensive program

assessment, which provided officers on the Joint Staff with direction

and also gained additional input from the Services and Combatant

Commanders, he kept the bureaucratic processes associated with

38
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This formal direction enabled

military planners to grind out those needed plans to execute the

President's and Secretary of Defense's planning guidance and kept

the military in the field operationally focused.

General Powell also had a strategic planning legacy for when

he did not use his strategic planning system. For example, when

he developed the Base Force, the most revolutionary military force

structure change since the Vietnam draw down during the 1970s, he

generally bypassed the existing formal strategic planning system.

Using the existing process would have involved developing a

National Military Strategy Document with all the annexes, risk

analyses, and bureaucratic coordination before submitting it to the

Secretary of Defense and President. Instead, he used key people on

the Joint Staff to develop the concepts, discussed it with the Joint

Chiefs and Combatant Commanders, and presented an overall force

structure reduction to civilian leaders before the final structure was

agreed to and fully coordinated with the Joint Chiefs."° In all that he

accomplished, he did not always use existing Joint Staff systems or

processes, but used the additiorial responsibilities in the GoldwaterNichols Act to provide urmiatched leadership during this time of

rapid global change.

General Shalikashvili, 1993-97.

General Shalikashvili's legacy in using the strategic planning

systemto execute his Goldwater-Nichols Actstrategic responsibilities

was markedly different than General Powell's, but very successful

in substance. He kept the flexibility and simplicity General Powell

established by limiting the number and complexity of strategic

planning products, but emphasized and expanded the strategic

planning processes. The 1995 and 1997 National Military Strategies

were coordinated fully within the formal strategic planning process,

used other strategic plarming products in their development, and

maintained a straightforward unclassified focus. He used the

bureaucracy in providing direction to produce the variety of plans

in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and tasked the development

39
of theater engagement plans to more fully implement the shape

component of the National Military Strategy.

Hewentone step furtherin providinglong-termstrategic direction

to the military when he published JV 2010 in 1996 and later included

this document formally within the strategic planning system. Like

General Powell, he used considerable interpersonal skills to develop

JV 2010, rather than relying fully on the bureaucratic coordination

process. He made this vision a truly joint effort rather than accepting

service equities."^ He then used this same strategic planning system

to begin an implementing process for JV 2010. General Shalikashvili

also fostered a very close relationship with defense officials using

the strategic planning system and products. JV 2010 gained wide

acceptance within the leadership of the Department of Defense, and

his Joint Strategy Review helped focus the initial work of the 1997

Quadrennial Defense Review}^^

General Shalikashvili expanded the strategic planning

process in the resource areas as he added the Chairman's

Program Recommendation. Most importantly, he supported his

Vice Chairman Admiral Owens in greatly expanding the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council into warfighting areas and directly

integrating its work with the budget process. By 1995, this council

was spending 10 times the hoursthey spent prior to 1994, as they also

established a formal assessment structure to provide the analytical

rigor for their truly joint deliberations."^ Using outputs from these

deliberations. General Shalikashvili's personal correspondence to

the Secretary of Defense in the resource area grew in content and

influence. His Chairman's Program Assessment argued for $12B of

additional or changes in funding in 1994, and in 1995 he identified

more significant shifts in funding that could result in adjustments

of up to 12 percent of future defense budgets."" He kept the needed

senior leader balance between bureaucracy and flexibility within a

formal strategic planning process. This bureaucracy was critically

important to providing clear direction to the hundreds of mid- and

lower-level people within the Joint Staff to execute his guidance and

shape the military. This flexibility was demonstrated in how he was

open to additional processes, gave expanded responsibility to action

officers in crafting products, and developed consensus on tough

issues through his considerable interpersonal leadership skills. He

40
provided visionary leadership within the formal strategic planning

system, which was accepted by the other senior military and civilian

leaders of his day.

General Shelton, 1997-2001.

General Shelton's legacy in using the strategic planning system

can be described as "staying the course." No substantive changes

were made to the strategic planning process overall, but his focus

was on using the existing system to continue evolutionary changes

to the military and providing tough resource recommendations. He

kept the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and processes relatively

untouched, but more fully integrated the theater engagement plans

within the overall strategic planning processes and the defense

leadership. He focused on defining a process to implement JV 2010

by identifying 21st century challenges and their associated desired

operating capabilities, while providing direction to Joint Forces

Command to conduct experiments to operationalize that vision."^

At the later part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning

process to formally update the vision in 2000 to incorporate more

fully information, innovation, and interagency in joint operations.

General Shelton improved the process and timeliness of the

Chairman's Program Assessments and Recommendations in

providing specific resource advice to civilian leaders. He elevated

the work of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the

associated Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments to be more

strategic in nature. He used his resource and leadership influence

to support "people" programs actively, such as improved health

care, substantial pay increases, and retirement reform, all of which

occurred during his tenure in a tight fiscal environment.

In assessing his strategic planning influence, it is also important

to identify what he did not do. Most significantly, he did not

produce an update to the National Military Strategy, even though

some argued that it needed to be done. His leadership was more

process-oriented than that of his predecessors, as he used existing

processes rather than making changes to the strategic planning

system itself. He continued to develop a consensus between the

civilian and military leaders to make needed evolutionary changes

41
and investments in joint capabilities and people programs, which

significantly improved future warfighting capabilities.

STRATEGIC LEADER RECOMMENDATIONS

Five broad recommendations for military or defense strategic

leaders on how to use a formal strategic planning system to

transform their organizations have come from this examination of

the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s.

1. If revolutionary change is needed in the military, the strategic

leader should not use an existing strategic planning system. This

recommendation is based on General Powell's nonuse of the existing

strategic planning process in developing the Base Force and his

boldness in crafting the 1992 National Military Strategy that was vastly

different from what the formal strategic plarming system required.

This new strategy and the associated force structure were considered

revolutionary in this timeframe. This leadership boldness prevented

concepts or strategies from being diluted, which could occur when

extensive coordination takes place within a formal plarming system

to gain consensus and preclude revolutionary change.

2. When evolutionary change is needed in the military, the

strategic leader should use a formal strategic planning system.

This recommendation is based on the very successful evolutionary

changes General Shalikashvili and General Shelton made to

improve military capabilities by using the Joint Strategic Plarming

System during an environment of declining resources and increased

operations. These evolutionary changes used a strategic planning

system that resulted in publishing JV 2010 and JV 2020; developing

a formal vision implementation process; publishing two National

Military Strategies; expanding the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council to a warfighting focus and creating joint analytical

assessment processes to add analytical rigor to that warfighting

focus; and making specific and sometimes contentious resource

and weapon system recommendations in their Chairmen's Program

Recommendations and Assessments.

42
3. Strategic leaders must clearly articulate a vision to manage

long-term change effectively, whether that change is revolutionary

or evolutionary. This recommendation is supported by the three

Chairmen's use of vision in different ways. General Powell's strategic

vision of the future security environment, while not formally a part

of the strategic planning process, was a driving force when crafting

the revolutionary unclassified National Military Strategy in 1992.

General Shalikashvili's formal ]V 2010 was greatly accepted by

Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders and the Department of

Defense, as it influenced Service visions, provided broad direction

for operational capabilities, and shaped resource decisions. General

Shelton focused his early effort on implementing JV 2010 by

developing formal implementation and experimentation processes

and later updated the vision in 2000 to take greater advantage of

information, innovation, and interagency in joint operations.

4. Strategic leaders must ensure a formal strategic planning

system has the right amount of flexibility to provide the

intellectual energy for new concepts and the discipline to provide

the bureaucratic direction to manage change effectively in complex

organizations. This recommendation is based on the much-needed

simplicity and flexibility General Powell put into the overall strategic

planning system, while he kept the needed bureaucracy in the plans

area. General Shalikashvili augmented that flexibility in refining

and disciplining the processes without being too bureaucratic, as he

used the planning processes to develop the strategy and resource

documents, but kept flexibility in crafting the first vision. General

Shelton built upon General Shalikashvili's legacy in further refining

the Joint Strategic Planning System's processes to manage change.

5. Strategic leaders must be prepared to spend the energy

to cultivate interpersonal relationships to gain needed support

and to exercise moral courage for significant changes to strategic

planning processes or products. This reconmiendation is based

on the interpersonal relationships and extensive commimication

skills General Powell used in developing the first unclassified 1992

National Military Strategy, General Shalikashvili used in developing

the first (1996) Joint Vision, and General Shelton used in promoting

43
benefit increases. They spent extraordinary energy and personal

capital on these major initiatives that were crafted more by personal

interactions than institutional processes. In addition, they exhibited

moral courage in providing and expanding their influence in the

strategic directions of the unclassified National Military Strategy

and first Joint Vision, and in using the Chairman's position to

advocate for military benefits. These directions were not always selfevident and were subject to criticism by some within and external to

the military and Defense Department.

In total, these five broad recommendations provide today's leaders with the historic context of what can be learned from how

three Chairmen of diverse leadership styles used a strategic

plarming system to respond to the challenges of the 1990s. These

recommendations are applicable to today's senior leaders, as they

continue to be faced with the tremendous challenges to make the

right decisions to transform our nation's military to respond to

the complex global security environment of the next decade and

beyond.

ENDNOTES

1. The phrase "primary formal means" has appeared in all of the Joint Strategic

Planning System Memorandum or Instructions that described the overall process

and products in the 1990s.

2. Robert H. Cole, et al., The Chairmanship ofthe joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington

DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995,

p. 30.

3. Theodore J. Crackel, "Defense Assessment," in Stuart M Butler eds., et al,

Mandate For Leadership 11, Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1984, p. 432.

4. James W. Reed, "Congress and the Politics of Defense Reform," in Asa

A. Clark IV, et al, eds.. The Defense Reform Debate, Baltimore: The John Hopkins

University Press, 1984, pp. 242-244.

5. Cole, p. 29.

6. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

7. Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly, No.

44
2, Autumn 1993, pp. 71-72.

8. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JROC Planning in a

Revolutionary Era, Washington DC: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996,

pp. 4-5.

9. Crackel, p. 443.

10. Philip A. Odeen, Andrew J. Goodpaster, and Melvin R. Laird, Toward A

More Effective Defense, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, 1985, pp. 1-5.

11. Paul B. Davis, Military Culture at a Crossroads: A Grounded Theory ofStrategic

Planning Within the Department of Defense, Dissertation, Walden University, 2000,

p. 160.

12. Cole, pp. 27-29.

13. Jbid., pp. 29-30.

14. Odeen, Goodpaster, and Laird, p. 4.

15. Dan Coats, "Joint Experimentation—Unlocking the Promise of the Future,"

]oint Forces Quarterly, No. 17, Autumn/Winter 1997-1998, pp. 13-20; and the

thrust of some Congressional concerns during testimony the author attended on

Joint Requirements, Capabilities, and Experimentation before the Senate Armed

Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 4,2000.

16. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report (99-824), 99th Congress, 2nd

session, Washington, DC: September 12,1986, section 3.

17. Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, U.S. Department of

Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, 1995, endnote 43, pp. 36-37.

18. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Title 10 Armed Forces As Amended

through December 31, 2000, Preparedfor the Committee on Armed Services ofthe House

ofRepresentatives, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2001,

section 153 (c) and (d).

19. Cole, p. 206, quoting Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986. Goldwater-Nichols

Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986, section 151(b)(1).

20. Ibid., p. 206. Quoting Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986. Goldwater-Nichols

Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986, section 151(d)(1).

45
21. Review of current and past legislation revealed no changes in this section

of the law, so the GNA has remained consistent in these functions required of the

CJCS. References: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Title 10 Armed Forces

As Amended through December 31, 2000, Preparedfor the Committee on Armed Services

ofthe House ofRepresentatives, Chapter 5; and Cole, pp. 207-209, quoting Public Law

99-433.

22. Title 10 Armed Forces As Amended through December 31, 2000, Preparedfor the

Committee on Armed Services ofthe House ofRepresentatives, section 153 (a)(6)(B).

23. Cole, p. 203, quoting: Extracts ofPublic Law 81-216,10 August 1949, National

Security Act Amendments of 1949, Section 211.

24. Cole, pp. 208-209, quoting: Extracts of Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986,

Goldwater-Nichols Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986.

25. This "concur" process is based on my experience working many documents

during my tour on the Joint Staff, 1994-97, and discussion with action officers who

have worked on the Joint Staff since 1997.

26. Crackel, p. 439. While this was pre-GNA, it clearly illustrated what action

officers go through to get a "concur."

27. Discussion on collaboration is based on my experience while assigned to

the Joint Staff 1994-97 and numerous discussions with action officers who have

worked on the Joint Staff since 1997.

28. Lovelace and Young, p. 11.

29. Jbid., p. 11, and explanatory endnote 43, pp. 36-37.

30. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, C]CS Memorandum of Policy No.

84 (CJCS MOP 84), Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC, January 30,

1989, p. 3.

31. Ibid., p. 3.

32. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum ofPolicy No.7

(CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington DC, January 30,1990,

p. 20.

33. Ibid., Figure 2, p. 12, and pp. 30-31.

34. Ibid., p. 32.

46
35. The discussions of the contents of the JSPS in this paragraph are drawn

from material in CJCS MOP 7.

36. Lovelace and Young, p. 13, and endnotes 45 and 52, pp. 37-38.

37. Harry E. Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy In A Post

Cold War World: A Perspective From The Joint Staff, Ceirlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, 1996, pp. 12-13.

38. Lovelace and Young, p. 37. See endnote 45 which discussed this situation

in detail and identified publishing this message, summarized the annual CINC's

conference, and served to be the point where the formal JSPS, as designed in 1990,

began to fall apart.

39. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum of Policy

No.7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington DC, 1st Revision,

March 17,1993, pp. 1-2.

40. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Notice 3102 Cancellation ofMCM111-90, Washington DC, November 30,1993.

41. Lovelace and Young, p. 13, and endnote 52, p.38.

42. The author served on the Joint Staff from 1994 to 1997 and took quality

management training, a requirement of all officers on the Joint Staff involved

with Process Action Teams (PATs), although he was not directly involved on this

particular PAT.

43. Office of the Vice Director Joint Staff Memorandum, DJSM-247-96, Joint

Staff JSPS Process Action Team, Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, March 18,1996, with attached Joint Strategic Planning System Process Action

Team, March 15,1996.

44. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction 3000.01, Joint Strategic Planning System (CJCSI 3000.01), Washington,

DC, September 1,1997, p. v.

45. This assessment comes from comparing the content of two documents

(MOP 7 vs. CJCSI 3100.01); working on the Joint Chiefs for Staff from 1994 to 1997

on issues associated with the Joint Strategic Plarming System; and listening to a

number of speakers, both general officer and colonel, who described the processes

and products of the JSPS in various lectures at the U.S. Army War College in a

nonattribution marmer from 1997 to 2002.

46. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction 3000.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System (CJCSI 3000.01A), Washington,

47
DC, Summary of Changes, Para. (7).

47. CJCS MOP 7, pp. 30-39.

48. Author's assessment from reading the NMSD and many of the annexes.

49. Lovelace and Young, endnote 43, p. 37, referencing U.S. Congress,

Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, pp.

495-498.

50. MOP 7, January 30,1990, pp. 32-33.

51. Rothman, p. 4.

52. Ibid., p. 1; and Colin Powell, National Military Strategy of The United States,

January 1992 (NMS1992), Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrinHng Office, 1992,

foreword, no page number.

53. Powell, NMS 1992, p. 1.

54. Ibid., p. 6.

55. Loma S. Jaffe, The Development ofthe Base Force 1989-1992, Washington, DC:

Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993, pp.

28-37,

56. Rothman, pp. 16-17.

57. Jaffe's book. The Development ofthe Base Force 1989-1992, weaved a detailed

discussion of the close hold dialogue and debate of various strategy perspecHves

among Powell, Defense officials, service chiefs, and combatant commanders.

58. Rothman, p. 1.

59. Jaffe, p. 50.

60. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National

Military Strategy of The United States, 1995 (NMS 1995), Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, pp. 8-10.

61. Ibid., pp. 8-17.

62. Comparison in gross force structure between the 1992 vs. 1995 strategies.

63. Powell, NMS 1992, pp. 7-8.

48
64. Comparing the six sections in MOP 7 vs. the sections in the NMS indicated

a nice conceptual fit.

65. John M. ShaUkashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National

Military Strategy of The United States, 1997 (NMS 1997), Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, p. 30.

66. Ibid., p. 5.

67. Author's assessment critically comparing the 1997 vice 1995 NMSs.

68. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JV 2010,

Washington, DC: U.S. Goverrmient Printing Office, JV 2010, inside cover, no page

number.

69. Ibid., pp 1-5.

70. Author's assessment from reading sections of Defense Planning Guidance,

which provide direction to the Services on resourcing the operational concepts of

JV2010, and reading how the Service Chiefs embraced /V 2010.

71. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, JV 2010 Case Analysis, Strategic

Leadership 5050, Lesson 22, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002,

p.6.

72. The substance of this paragraph was based on a May 9, 2002, interview

with a former Joint Staff Action Officer who worked on the vision in 1995-96 and

reading the Case Study on JV 2010 by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

73. Interview with Joint Staff Action Officer on May 9, 2002, who worked on

this document in 2000.

74. Chairman of tiie Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 3116,2000 Joint Strategy Review

(Phase II Instructions), Washington, DC, September 10,1999. While the title of this

notice was on JSR instructions, the output of the 2000 JRS was the Joint Vision

update.

75. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of tiie Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000, inside cover, no p.

number.

76. Henry H. Shelton, "A Word from the New Chairman," Joint Forces

Quarterly, No. 17, Auhimn-Winter, 1997-98, p. 6.

77. These words describing the JSCFs purpose have remained fundamentally

the same from the MOP 7 to CJCSI 3100.01A.

49
78. The types of plans in the following paragraph come from comparing MOP

7 1990 to MOP 7 1993 to CJCSI 3001.01 1997 to CJCSI 3001. OlA 1999, as well as

conversations with individuals who have worked directly with or taught this

subject at the U.S. Army War College.

79. M. Thomas Davis, "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?" National

Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 9-15. While VCJCS normally chaired

the JROC, Title 10 USC Section 181 identified the CJCS as Chairman of the JROC

and specified this leadership can only be delegated to the Vice Chairman.

80. Ibid., p. 8.

81. Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate

Armed Services Corrvmittee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee,

Opening Statement, April 4, 2000.

82. Author's assessment from listening to many lectures on these documents

and processes from different nonattribution speakers at the U.S. Army War

College from 1997-2000, and reading some of these documents.

83. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary

Era, p. 23.

84. Percentage calculated from comparing the Military Personnel, O&M,

Military Construction and Family Housing budget authority versus the total

budget authority FY 1992 to FY 1999 in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report

to the President and Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1998, Appendix B, p. B-1. In addition, the percentage related to force structure

is essentially greater, because much of the procurement and some of the RDT&E

expenditures (the two major other categories) are also influenced by the force

structure size in modernizing it.

85. CJCS MOP 71993, pp. IV-1 to IV-4.

86. Comparison was made between the 1999 JPD for the FY 2002-07 and

the 2000 DPG for the FY 2002-07 period. The thrust of these documents and

specificity differed, but in general they were complementary in some of the overall

capabilities.

87. Nonattribution comments from people who have worked on the DPG and

spoke at the U.S. Army War College and interview with a former Joint Staff J-5

action officer on May 9, 2002, who worked on the 1997 revision to the JSPS.

88. Author's assessment based on numerous conversations with people who

worked within the resource area either on the Joint Staff or Service Staffs in the

50
mid- to late-1990s.

89. MOP 71990, pp. 51-52.

90. MOP 71993, pp. VIII10-11.

91. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, pp. 11-

12.

92. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Notice 3100, Assessment Plan For Developing The Chairman's Program Assessment FY

1996-2001, Washington, DC, February 25, 1994. Author's analysis of this notice

revealed that the process was directorate specific and coordinated with no overall

senior board review.

93. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, pp. 10-

12.

94. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction 3137.01, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process (CJCSI3137.01),

Washington, DC, February 2,1996, p. A-1.

95. Ibid., p. 3.

96. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, pp. 12,

22-23.

97. CJCSI 3137.01, February 2,1996, p. 3.

98. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, p. 23.

99. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction CJCSI 5123.01 Charter of The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (CJCSI

5123.01), Washington, DC, May 2,1997, Enclosure A.

100. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman ofJoint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction CJCSI 5123.01A, Charter of The Joint Requirements Oversight Council

(CJCSI 5123.01A), Washington, DC, March 8,2001, Enclosure A.

101. Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Course 3, AY 2003, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle PA: Briefing Slides, Lesson 16.

102. Davis, pp. 14-15.

103. Author's assessment based on numerous lectures given at the Army War

College on the JROC and JWCA, interviewing action officers who worked within

51
the process in May 2002, and personal experience within the Joint Staff from 1994

to 1997.

104. Author worked on readiness issues that were directly involved in this

process from 1994 to 1997. In addition, this resource integration was constantly

identified in CJCSIs on readiness, JROC, and JWCAs.

105. Description of the purpose and content from the 1993 MOP 7 to 1999

CJCSI show a common focus.

106. Author read many of the classified JSR reports, associated correspondence

documenting the JSR process, and interviews with Joint Staff Action Officers who

worked on Joint Vision and National Military Strategy.

107. John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger A. Brown, Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) Analysis, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 19.

108. Lovelace and Young, endnote 45, p. 37.

109. Rothman, p. 16; and Jaffe pp. 48-50.

110. Jaffee, pp. 15-40. These pages provide a comprehensive discussion of the

development of the Base Force and the efforts of CJCS in the summer of 1990 to win

over the Service Chiefs on the cuts, although a 25 percent force structure cut was

already announced as part of August 2,1990, speech by President Bush at Aspen.

The key would be how that force structure cut would be taken among the services

and how quickly it would be accomplished. While General Powell focused on this

in the summer of 1990, the Gulf War would also occupy considerable energies.

111. Interview with former Joint Staff Action Officer directly involved with

coordinating JV 2010 on May 9, 2002, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces,

Case Study on JV 2010.

112. Schrader, Lewis, and Brown, p. 19; and author's review of Defense

Planning Guidance.

113. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JROC Planning in

a Revolutionary Era, p. 10.

114. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

115. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction 3010.02, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, Washington, DC,

December, 9, 1998; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan,

52
Washington, DC, August 29,2000.

53
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Colonel Richard M. Meinhart

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Composition

Ms. Gretchen S. Smith