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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In re Estate of JOYCE GAIL BLOHM.

KATHY BLOHM and PAMELA BLOHM and HUNTINGTON BANK, Co-Personal Representative,

Petitioners-Appellees, UNPUBLISHED December 2, 2014

v No. 315400 Oceana Probate Court ANGELA L. ERDMAN, Co-Personal Representative, LC No. 11-000055-DE

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: F ITZGERALD , P.J., and S AWYER and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. The trial court granted petitioner’s cro ss-motion for summary disposition. Respondent now appeals and we reverse.

In November 2012, the Oceana County proba te court entered an order granting petitioners’ cross-motion for su mmary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denying respondent’s motion. Decedent had executed three sepa rate wills, all of whic h dictated that the remainder of her estate be divided into three equal shares for her daughters; this includes her most recent will executed in May 2006. Before her death, decedent purchased four annuities through Huntington Bank, naming respondent as so le beneficiary of all four. When decedent named only respondent as a bene ficiary, Kelsey Smith, who work ed at the bank, asked why she wanted respondent to be the so le beneficiary, and decedent re sponded, “Angela knows what I want done with it.” Smith also stated in her de position that decedent had made comments to her about decedent’s daughters’ lack of knowledge on handling money and that decedent was afraid they would spend all the money too quickly. Th eresa Mouw was a Huntington financial advisor who worked with decedent as well and disc ussed the adverse tax imp lications of a single beneficiary with decedent.

At the close of discovery, all parties filed motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Respondent argued that decede nt’s will was plain and unambiguous, and by-2- its plain terms the will did not consider the annuity benefits as being included in the residue of the estate. Therefore, a resort to extrinsic evidence to prove otherwise was unnecessary. Petitioners wanted the extrinsic evidence admitted to clarify decedent’s intentions, which were that the parties were to share the annuity benefits equally.

The court held the decedent intended the annuities to be shared equally between the parties. “It is clear to me that [the decedent] intended for her will to provide equally for her daughters and that the provisions of Section IV were intended to accomplish that purpose.” The trial court thus denied respondent’s moti on and granted petitioners’ motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree.

On appeal, respondent argues that the trial cour t erred when it held th at a latent ambiguity existed in the will and in allowing extrinsic eviden ce to be used to determine what this ambiguity meant. We agree.

This Court reviews summary disposition rulings de novo. Walsh v Taylor, 236 Mich App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). “Summary dispositi on is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any mate rial fact and the movi ng party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). The role of the probate cour t in will cases is to determine and give effect to the intent of the testator. In re Bair Estate, 128 Mich App 713, 716; 341 NW2d 188 (1983).

Throughout decedent’s life, she establishe d several joint banking accounts with respondent, which she stated were “for my conven ience only,” and her will directed that these accounts be included in the residue of the estate:

“I hereby acknowledge that during my life time I have established certain jointly owned money market, checking, and lim ited liability company bank accounts with my daughter, Angela L. Erdma n. I state that these joint account arrangements were made by me for my convenience only, and it was not intended by me that the net balance remaining in each of said accounts at the time of my death would be a gift to my said daughter . Instead, I specifica lly direct my CoPersonal Representatives that the net bala nce of each account sh all be included in the residue of my estate hereunder.”

It is clear that decedent differe ntiated between bank accounts and her other forms of investments. But an annuity is not a bank account; it is a c ontract which provides payments at a certain interest rate. Annuities are a fo rm of insurance product, almost the exact opposite of life insurance; they provide financia l protection against a very long life by giving a constant stream of income. We agree with res pondent that, unlike the other ba nk accounts which were jointly owned, the annuities were wholly owned by decedent who named respondent as the sole beneficiary, which implies that decedent intended to leave these annuities directly to respondent alone.

There is no ambiguity in the will. Rath er, decedent purchased the annuities after executing her last will; as such, the assets that we re used to purchase the annuity contracts are no-3- longer part of the estate. These annuities have an assigned beneficiary (respondent) and, as such, this money belongs directly and solely to he r and are not part of the estate in probate.

In light of our conclusion that there was no ambiguity in the will and, therefore, the annuities are not part of the estate, we need not address respondent’s re maining issues on appeal.

Reversed. Respondent may tax costs.

/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald /s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro