Filed 3/29/22 P. v. Taylor CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOE ALFRED TAYLOR III, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 B306960

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. LA084120)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

California. Richard J. Kirschner, Judge. Affirmed.

Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Allison 

H. Chung, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Joe Alfred Taylor III appeals from 

the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of multiple 

sex offenses and first-degree robbery. On appeal, Taylor argues: 

(1) the trial court improperly imposed a 25-year-to-life term on 

count 10 because the District Attorney did not allege a three 

strike enhancement on count 10; and (2) he had a right to have 

the jury determine whether his act of sexual penetration by a 

foreign object and acts of forcible sodomy (counts 1 through 4) 

took place “on separate occasions.” We reject his contentions and 

affirm the judgment. 

BACKGROUND1

The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a third 

amended information charging Taylor with sexual penetration by 

a foreign object (Pen. Code,2 § 289, subd. (a)(1); count 1), forcible 

sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 2-4), and first-degree 

residential robbery (§ 211; counts 6-10). As to counts 1 through 4, 

it was further alleged Taylor was armed with a firearm 

(§ 12022.3, subd. (b)), was engaged in first-degree burglary 

(§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (e)), and personally used a deadly weapon 

(a pellet gun) (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)). As to counts 6 through 

10, it was further alleged Taylor personally used a deadly and 

dangerous weapon (a pellet gun) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). 

1 Because Taylor appeals only sentencing and pleading 

errors, we limit our recitation of the facts.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
3

As to counts 1 through 9, it was further alleged Taylor 

suffered two prior strike convictions for robbery. (§§ 667, subds. 

(b)-(j) and 1170.12, subd. (b).

As to counts 1 through 10, it was further alleged Taylor served 

three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, 

subdivision (b). As to counts 6, 7, 8, and 10, it was further alleged 

Taylor served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 

667.5, subdivision (b).

A jury convicted Taylor on all counts and found the special 

allegations to be true. The District Attorney filed a sentencing 

memorandum recommending the maximum sentence of 483 years 

to life in prison, including a third strike sentence of 25 years to 

life, plus one year for the weapon enhancement, on count 10. 

After a bench trial on the prior conviction allegations, the trial 

court found them to be true. On July 16, 2019, the trial court 

sentenced Taylor to a total term of 425 years to life in prison. 

Specifically, the trial court imposed a third-strike term of 25 

years to life on count 10. As to the sex offenses in counts 1 

through 4, the trial court noted at the sentencing hearing that it 

was required to impose full, separate, and consecutive terms 

pursuant to section 667.6 if the crimes involved the same victim 

on separate occasions. The trial court found Taylor “had ample 

time between each of the sexual assaults to contemplate and 

reflect upon his actions.” The trial court stated its findings were 

based on the victim’s testimony that Taylor held her at gunpoint, 

forced her onto the bed, digitally penetrated her rectum,

sodomized her several times, and moved her and repositioned her 

for each of the separate acts of sodomy. On July 25, 2019, the 

trial court modified the sentence to a total term of 425 years to 

life, plus a consecutive eight-year term. After this court filed an 
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order granting Taylor’s application for relief from default for 

failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment, Taylor

filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Properly Imposed a 25-Year-to-Life 

Term on Count 10 

1. Applicable Legal Principles

“The purpose of the Three Strikes law is ‘to ensure longer 

prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a 

felony and have been previously convicted of one or more serious 

or violent felony offenses.’ (§ 667, subd. (b).) By its own terms, it 

applies ‘in every case in which a defendant has one or more prior 

serious or violent felony convictions . . . .’ (Id., subd. (f)(1), italics 

added; see also § 1170.12, subd. (d)(1).) Indeed, despite the 

‘general rule’ that ‘the selection of criminal charges is a matter 

subject to prosecutorial discretion,’ ‘the Three Strikes law limits 

that discretion and requires the prosecutor to plead and prove 

each prior serious felony conviction.’ (People v. Roman (2001) 92 

Cal.App.4th 141, 145 (Roman); see § 667, subd. (f)(1) [‘The 

prosecuting attorney shall plead and prove each prior serious or 

violent felony conviction . . . .’ (italics added)]; see also § 1170.12, 

subd. (d)(1).) The prosecution may move the court to dismiss the 

prior conviction allegation for insufficient evidence or ‘in the 

furtherance of justice’ (§§ 667, subd. (f)(2), 1170.12, subd. (d)(2)), 

but may not ‘unilaterally strike’ the allegation (Roman, at p. 

145).” (People v. Laanui (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 803, 815.)

“Because application of the Three Strikes law is based on ‘a 

defendant’s prior conviction status,’ a status that ‘does not 

change from one count to another,’ our Supreme Court has
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described the Three Strikes law as ‘a single comprehensive and 

indivisible sentencing scheme that either does or does not apply.’ 

(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 502 (Garcia).) 

Accordingly, ‘it is appropriate to allege [defendant’s prior 

conviction] status only once as to all current counts . . . .’ (Garcia, 

at p. 502.)” (People v. Laanui, supra, at p. 815.)

The pleading requirement of the Three Strikes law is found in 

section 1170.12, subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2)(A), as follows: “If a 

defendant has one prior serious or violent felony 

conviction . . . that has been pled and proved, the determinate 

term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice 

the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony 

conviction”; and, “if a defendant has two or more prior serious or 

violent felony convictions . . . that have been pled and proved, the 

term for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate 

term of life imprisonment with a minimum term . . . .” (See also 

§ 667, subds. (e)(1) & (e)(2)(A).) Under the plain language of the 

statute, the only express pleading requirement in the Three 

Strikes law is that the defendant have one or more prior felony 

convictions which will subject him to the provisions of the 

statute. Thus, the express pleading requirement under the Three

Strikes statute does not require the qualifying felony convictions 

to be alleged as to each count.

2. Analysis

As noted above, Taylor contends the trial court erred in 

imposing a third-strike sentence on count 10 because the prior 

strike allegations were only pleaded as to counts 1 through 9. The 

Attorney General argues Taylor forfeited this challenge by not 

objecting below. On the merits, the Attorney General argues that 
6

so long as the information alleges a prior strike conviction, it 

need not be pleaded on a count-by-count basis. We conclude 

defendant’s argument fails on the merits and do not reach the 

forfeiture question.

For the same reasons discussed in Laanui, we find the trial 

court in this case did not err in imposing a third-strike sentence 

on count 10. “The [third amended] information in the instant case

expressly invoked the Three Strikes law, and the plain language 

of that law provided adequate notice that it must apply to all 

eligible offenses unless the trial court exercised its discretion to 

strike the strike[s].” (Laanui, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 817.) 

“Citation to the Three Strikes law, along with an allegation of 

[the prior strikes], was sufficient to place [appellant] on notice 

that all eligible offenses would be subject to the Three Strikes 

sentencing scheme.” (Id. at p. 821.)

Here, the information set forth the possible enhancements 

for each count, and cited section 1170.12. Specifically, the face 

sheet of the third amended information filed in this case entitled 

“Information Summary” expressly notified Taylor that his 

sentence as to all counts—counts 1 through 4 and counts 6 

through 10—was subject to sentencing under the Three Strikes 

law because it cited the corresponding section as “PC 1170.12” in 

the “Allegation” column as to each count. Additionally, the body 

of all four charging documents filed in this case alleged two prior 

strike convictions within the meaning of section 1170.12. Thus,

Taylor was given sufficient notice through both the information 

summary, and the allegations contained in the body of all four 

charging documents3, that the Three Strikes law sentencing 

3 The original information was filed on December 27, 2016, 

an amended information was filed on October 22, 2018, a second 
7

scheme applied to count 10. We, therefore, conclude the trial 

court properly doubled the sentence on count 10 under the Three 

Strikes law. 

Moreover, Taylor’s reliance on People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 

Cal.4th 735 is unavailing for the same reasons addressed in

Laanui. “Mancebo addressed the notice required when the 

prosecution makes a discretionary charging decision concerning 

enhancements based on the circumstances of the underlying 

offense.” (Laanui, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 820.) 

“Mancebo, . . . does not apply to the instant case, in which the 

information clearly alleged a sentencing regime that on its face is 

both nondiscretionary and based on defendant’s criminal history 

rather than the circumstance of his offenses. Citation to the 

Three Strikes law, along with an allegation of a prior strike, was 

sufficient to place defendant on notice that all eligible offenses 

would be subject to the Three Strikes sentencing scheme. 

(Laanui, at p. 821.)

B. The Trial Court determined Taylor’s act of forcible 

oral copulation and acts of forcible sodomy took 

place “on separate occasions” under governing law

Taylor contends he was entitled to have the jury decide 

whether his act of forcible oral copulation and acts of forcible 

sodomy (counts 1 through 4) took place “on separate occasions”

within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (i). Taylor 

acknowledges the United States Supreme Court has held “the 

Sixth Amendment does not inhibit states from assigning to 

judges, rather than to juries, the finding of facts necessary to the 

amended information filed on November 6, 2018, and a third 

amended information was filed November 13, 2018. 
8

imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for 

multiple offenses.” (See Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160, 168-

172; see also People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1018, 

fn. 9 [“It is also now clear that Apprendi [v. New Jersey (2000) 

530 U.S. 466] does not require a jury determination of facts 

bearing on whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 

sentences for separate offenses.”].) Taylor argues the dissenting 

opinion in Oregon v. Ice, supra, 555 U.S. 160 “is better reasoned,”

however, and he “invites” us “to record [our] disagreement with 

[the majority] opinion.” We decline Taylor’s invitation.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

COLLINS, J.