J-S73005-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JASON HOOVER SENSENIG 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 939 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 8, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0000071-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2020

Appellant, Jason Hoover Sensenig, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his conviction of indecent assault of a person less 

than thirteen years of age.1 We affirm in part and vacate in part.

The trial court set forth the relevant history of this case as follows:

The underlying facts, as acknowledged by [Appellant], are 

that between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011, 

[Appellant], who was between the ages of fifteen (15) and 

seventeen (17), touched the vagina of the victim, who was 

between the ages of ten (10) and twelve (12).1 The victim did not 

disclose the sexual assault until 2016 and charges were not filed 

until [Appellant] was over the age of twenty-one (21).2 On May 

23, 2017, [Appellant] pled guilty to indecent assault of a person 

less than thirteen (13) years of age.3 Sentencing was deferred 

pending an assessment by the Sexual Offender’s Assessment 

Board, which determined that [Appellant] was not a sexually 

violent predator.4 Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, 

[Appellant] was sentenced on September 14, 2017 to a split-

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).
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sentence of six (6) to twenty-three (23) months of house arrest 

and a consecutive three (3) years of probation.5 [Appellant] was 

initially directed to comply with the lifetime reporting 

requirements applicable pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration 

and Notification Act (“SORNA”).6 Following the filing of a postsentence motion, [Appellant] was resentenced on November 30, 

2017 to a ten (10) year registration period, which was the 

registration period applicable at the time he committed the 

offense, and the reporting requirements applicable pursuant to 

Megan’s Law II.7

1 N.T. Guilty Plea, 05/23/17, p. 6; N.T. Re-Sentencing, 

11/30/17, p. 2.

2 See, Brief in Opp. To Def.’s Mot. to Order No 

Registration Pursuant to 42 PA.C.S. § 97.9910 ET. 

SEQ., 06/14/17, § I.

3 N.T. Guilty Plea, 05/23/17, p. 3.

4 N.T. Guilty Plea, 05/23/17, p. 2; N.T. Sentencing, 

09/14/17, p. 2.

5 N.T. Sentencing, 09/14/17, pp. 4-5.

6 N.T. Sentencing, 09/14/17, pp. 5-8.

7 N.T. Re-Sentencing, 11/30/17, pp. 2-3; Opinion, 

10/30/17, pp. 2-3.

[Appellant] filed a direct appeal. On October 22, 2018, the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the imposition of Megan’s 

Law III registration and reporting requirements, despite 

[Appellant] never having been sentenced to such, and remanded 

for a determination as to what, if any, registration provisions apply 

in this case.8 Therefore, on May 8, 2019, [Appellant] was again 

resentenced and directed to comply with the sex offender 

registration and reporting requirements currently applicable to 

[Appellant] pursuant to [SORNA II,] the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 

1952, No. 29 (now codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.70).9

8 See, Memorandum, 141 MDA 2018, 10/22/18.

9 N.T. 5/8/19, pp. 10, 13.

[Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion on May 10, 2019, 

which was denied by Order dated June 4, 2019. [Appellant] filed 

the instant notice of appeal on June 7, 2019.
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Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/19, at 1-3. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We observe that the Commonwealth declined 

to file a brief in this matter.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF THE TEN YEAR REPORTING AND 

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9799.51 UPON 

THIS DEFENDANT WHO COMMITTED THE PREDICATE OFFENSE 

WHEN HE WAS LESS THAN 18 YEARS OF AGE WAS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS 

RIGHTS BY RELYING ON AN IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION?

B. WHETHER REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO REPORT AND 

REGISTER PURSUANT TO 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.51 WHEN HE WOULD 

NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO REPORT AND REGISTER IF 

ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT ESTABLISHED A CLASSIFICATION 

WHICH IS UNREASONABLE AND DENIES HIM THE EQUAL 

PROTECTION OF THE LAWS UNDER BOTH THE PENNSYLVANIA 

AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS?

C. WHETHER REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO REPORT AND 

REGISTER PURSUANT TO 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9799.51 IS AN ILLEGAL 

AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL EX POST FACTO LAW?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (verbatim).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the reporting and registration 

requirements of SORNA II were unconstitutionally imposed upon him. 

Appellant’s Brief at 12-15. Appellant contends that application of the SORNA 

II registration requirements violates his due-process rights because, although 

he was charged and convicted when he was an adult, he committed his crimes 

while he was a juvenile. Id. We are constrained to agree.

We note that “application of a statute is a question of law ... our 

standard of review is plenary, [and] our standard of review is limited to a 
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determination of whether the trial court committed an error of law.” 

Commonwealth v. Baird, 856 A.2d 114, 115 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Thus, our review is non-deferential. Commonwealth v. LutzMorrison, 143 A.3d 891, 894 (Pa. 2016).

Pennsylvania precedent establishes that a defendant cannot be required 

to register as a sex offender if he was a juvenile at the time he committed his 

offenses. Commonwealth v. Haines, 222 A.3d 756 (Pa. Super. 2019). In 

Haines, the defendant was in her mid-twenties when she pled guilty to two 

counts of indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age. Id. 

Those charges related to incidents that occurred when the defendant was 

between the ages of fourteen and fifteen. Id. The victim did not disclose the 

assaults until the defendant was over the age of twenty-one. Id. Prior to

sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to bar the applicable registration 

requirements, which the trial court denied. Id. at 756-757. The court then 

imposed an aggregate ten-year probationary term and required the defendant 

to register “under a previous, unspecified version of Megan’s Law.” Id. at 

757.

On appeal, the defendant asserted that requiring her to register as a 

sex offender for offenses she committed as a juvenile constituted cruel and 

unusual punishment and, therefore, violated the due process clauses of both 

the state and federal constitutions. Haines, 222 A.3d at 757. We agreed and 

addressed the issue as follows:
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In In re J.B., 630 Pa. 408, 107 A.3d 1 (2014), our Supreme 

Court addressed the issue of whether the imposition of lifetime 

registration requirements pursuant to SORNA on juvenile 

offenders adjudicated delinquent of certain crimes constituted a 

violation of juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the use 

of an irrebuttable presumption—the risk of reoffending. Id. at 14. 

We recognize that J.B. was decided before [Commonwealth v. 

Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)], which clearly holds that 

application of SORNA to sex offenders who committed their crimes 

prior to SORNA’s enactment constitutes an ex post facto violation. 

Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223. The issue we now consider is whether 

J.B. applies to criminal defendants who committed their crimes as 

juveniles, but were convicted as adults. We hold that it does.

Haines, 222 A.3d at 757-758.

The Haines Court then cited our Supreme Court’s conclusion in J.B., 

and explained why that rationale applied to the defendant:

[In J.B., our Supreme Court] then went on to conclude that 

with respect to juveniles, “SORNA’s registration requirements 

improperly brand all juvenile offenders’ reputations with an 

indelible mark of a dangerous recidivist, even though the 

irrebuttable presumption linking adjudication of specified offenses

with a high likelihood of recidivating is not ‘universally true.’” 

[J.B., 107 A.3d at 19] (citation omitted).

Returning to the instant case, [the defendant] was 14 years 

of age at the time she committed the sexual offenses. Clearly, 

under J.B., had she been adjudicated delinquent at that time, no 

registration requirement would apply to her. [The defendant’s] 

subsequent conviction of the sexual offenses when she was an 

adult does not diminish the fact that she was a juvenile at the time 

of their commission, and because of that, she should not be held 

to an irrebuttable presumption of reoffending at age 26. J.B.

requires us to analyze [the defendant’s] behavior at the time the 

offenses were committed. For these reasons, we find that the J.B.

court’s holding should apply with equal weight to juvenile 

adjudications as well as to defendants convicted as adults for 

crimes committed as juveniles.

Haines, 222 A.3d at 759 (footnote omitted).
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Here, Appellant was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen when he

committed the offense for which he was convicted. As the defendant in 

Haines, had Appellant been adjudicated delinquent at that time, no 

registration requirements would have applied to him. Also like the defendant 

in Haines, Appellant’s subsequent conviction of the sexual offense when he 

was an adult does not diminish the fact that he was a juvenile when he 

committed the offenses and, consequently, that he should not be held to an 

irrebuttable presumption of reoffending as an adult. Thus, we affirm 

Appellant’s sentence of confinement and probation, and we vacate the portion 

of Appellant’s judgment of sentence that required him to register as a sex 

offender.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2020

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2

In light of our disposition granting Appellant relief pursuant to his first issue, 

we need not address his remaining issues.