Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 57 

41Such justification may include, for example, an 

explanation of why the element contains subject 

matter that, per se, invokes eligibility concerns 

similar to those expressed by the Supreme Court 

with regard to the judicial exceptions. See supra 

note 5. 

42Similarly, in the rare circumstance in which a 

panel of administrative patent judges (or panel 

majority) believes that a claim reciting a tentative 

abstract idea should be treated as reciting an 

abstract idea, the matter should be brought to the 

attention of the PTAB leadership by a written 

request for clearance. 

43See MPEP 2103 et seq. and 2106(III). 

1Section 4 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 

Act (AIA) designated pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ ¶ 1 

through 6, as 35 U.S.C. 112(a) through (f), effective 

as to applications filed on or after September 16, 

2012. See Public Law 112–29, 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 

296 (2011). AIA 35 U.S.C. 112(a) and pre-AIA 35 

U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1 are collectively referred to in this 

notice as 35 U.S.C. 112(a); AIA 35 U.S.C. 112(b) and 

pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 2 are collectively referred 

to in this notice as 35 U.S.C. 112(b); and AIA 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) and pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 6 are 

collectively referred to in this notice as 35 U.S.C. 

112(f). 

nonetheless be treated as reciting an 

abstract idea (‘‘tentative abstract idea’’), 

the examiner should evaluate whether 

the claim as a whole integrates the 

recited tentative abstract idea into a 

practical application as explained in 

Section III.A.2. If the claim as a whole 

integrates the recited tentative abstract 

idea into a practical application, the 

claim is not directed to a judicial 

exception (Step 2A: NO) and is eligible 

(thus concluding the eligibility 

analysis). If the claim as a whole does 

not integrate the recited tentative 

abstract idea into a practical 

application, then the examiner should 

evaluate the additional elements 

individually and in combination to 

determine whether they provide an 

inventive concept as explained in 

Section III.B. If an additional element or 

combination of additional elements 

provides an inventive concept as 

explained in Section III.B (Step 2B: 

YES), the claim is eligible (thus 

concluding the eligibility analysis). If 

the additional element or combination 

of additional elements does not provide 

an inventive concept as explained in 

Section III.B (Step 2B: NO), the 

examiner should bring the application 

to the attention of the Technology 

Center Director. Any rejection in which 

a claim limitation, which does not fall 

within the enumerated abstract ideas 

(tentative abstract idea), is nonetheless 

treated as reciting an abstract idea must 

be approved by the Technology Center 

Director (which approval will be 

indicated in the file record of the 

application), and must provide a 

justification 41 for why such claim 

limitation is being treated as reciting an 

abstract idea.42

D. Compact Prosecution 

Regardless of whether a rejection 

under 35 U.S.C. 101 is made, a complete 

examination should be made for every 

claim under each of the other 

patentability requirements: 35 U.S.C. 

102, 103, 112, and 101 (utility, 

inventorship and double patenting) and 

non-statutory double patenting.43

Compact prosecution, however, does 

not mandate that the patentability 

requirements be analyzed in any 

particular order. 

Dated: December 20, 2018. 

Andrei Iancu, 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 

Property and Director of the United States 

Patent and Trademark Office. 

[FR Doc. 2018–28282 Filed 1–4–19; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–16–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

United States Patent and Trademark 

Office 

[Docket No. PTO–P–2018–0059] 

Examining Computer-Implemented 

Functional Claim Limitations for 

Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 

AGENCY: United States Patent and 

Trademark Office, Commerce. 

ACTION: Examination guidance; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: This guidance will assist 

United States Patent and Trademark 

Office (USPTO) personnel in the 

examination of claims in patent 

applications that contain functional 

language, particularly patent 

applications where functional language 

is used to claim computer-implemented 

inventions. Part I of this guidance 

addresses issues related to the 

examination of computer-implemented 

functional claims having means-plusfunction limitations. Part II of this 

guidance addresses written description 

and enablement issues related to the 

examination of computer-implemented 

functional claims that recite only the 

idea of a solution or outcome to a 

problem but fail to recite details of how 

the solution or outcome is 

accomplished. 

DATES:

Applicable Date: The ComputerImplemented Functional Claim 

Limitations Guidance is effective on 

January 7, 2019. The ComputerImplemented Functional Claim 

Limitations Guidance applies to all 

applications, and to all patents resulting 

from applications, filed before, on or 

after January 7, 2019. 

Comment Deadline Date: Written 

comments must be received on or before 

March 8, 2019. 

ADDRESSES: Comments must be sent by 

electronic mail message over the 

internet addressed to: 

112Guidance2019@uspto.gov. 

Electronic comments submitted in 

plain text are preferred, but also may be 

submitted in ADOBE® portable 

document format or MICROSOFT 

WORD® format. Comments not 

submitted electronically should be 

submitted on paper in a format that 

facilitates convenient digital scanning 

into ADOBE® portable document 

format. The comments will be available 

for viewing via the USPTO’s internet 

website (http://www.uspto.gov). Because 

comments will be made available for 

public inspection, information that the 

submitter does not desire to make 

public, such as an address or phone 

number, should not be included in the 

comments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nicole D. Haines, Senior Legal Advisor, 

at 571–272–7717 or Jeffrey R. West, 

Senior Legal Advisor, at 571–272–2226, 

both with the Office of Patent Legal 

Administration. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The patent 

examination process must ensure that: 

(1) The claims of an application have 

proper written description and 

enablement support under 35 U.S.C. 

112(a) 1 in the disclosure of the 

application, and (2) functional 

limitations (i.e., claim limitations that 

define an element in terms of the 

function it performs without reciting the 

structure, materials, or acts that perform 

the function) are properly treated as 

means (or step) plus function 

limitations under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), and 

are sufficiently definite under 35 U.S.C. 

112(b), as appropriate. These 

requirements are particularly relevant to 

computer-implemented functional 

claims. 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit (‘‘Federal Circuit’’) has 

recognized a problem with broad 

functional claiming without adequate 

structural support in the specification. 

Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 

F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en 

banc) (overruling the Federal Circuit’s 

previous application of a ‘‘strong’’ 

presumption that claim limitations 

lacking the word ‘‘means’’ are not 

subject to § 112(f) to address the 

resulting ‘‘proliferation of functional 

claiming untethered to [§ 112(f)] and 

free of the strictures set forth in the 

statute’’); Function Media, LLC v. 

Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013) (‘‘ ‘Section [112(f)] is intended 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
58 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 

2As is existing practice, examiners may also issue 

‘‘Requirements for Information’’ pursuant to 37 CFR 

1.105. This notice does not affect current practice 

regarding ‘‘Requirements for Information,’’ which 

remains a tool examiners can use to help resolve, 

among other things, issues regarding compliance 

with § 112 during examination. See, e.g., MPEP 

704.10–14. For example, an examiner may request 

information about written description support, 

continuation in part support, issues related to 

§ 112(f), or enablement issues, among other things. 

See, e.g., MPEP 704.11(a)(K), (R), (S)(2)–(3). 

3The full text reads as follows: ‘‘[E]xaminers will 

apply 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 

sixth paragraph to a claim limitation if it meets the 

following 3-prong analysis: (A) the claim limitation 

uses the term ‘means’ or ‘step’ or a term used as 

a substitute for ‘means’ that is a generic placeholder 

(also called a nonce term or a non-structural term 

having no specific structural meaning) for 

performing the claimed function; (B) the term 

‘means’ or ‘step’ or the generic placeholder is 

modified by functional language, typically, but not 

always linked by the transition word ‘for’ (e.g., 

‘means for’) or another linking word or phrase, such 

as ‘configured to’ or ‘so that’; and (C) the term 

‘means’ or ‘step’ or the generic placeholder is not 

modified by sufficient structure, material, or acts for 

performing the claimed function.’’ MPEP 2181, 

subsection I. 

to prevent . . . pure functional 

claiming.’ ’’ (citing Aristocrat Techs. 

Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 

521 F.3d 1238, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008))); 

Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 

598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 

banc) (discussing the problem of 

functional claims defining a genus that 

‘‘simply claim a desired result . . . 

without describing species that achieve 

that result’’). In the context of another 

statutory requirement, 35 U.S.C. 101, 

the Federal Circuit has also criticized 

improper functional claiming. Elec. 

Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 

F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(observing that ‘‘the claims do not go 

beyond requiring the collection, 

analysis, and display of available 

information in a particular field, stating 

those functions in general terms, 

without limiting them to technical 

means for performing the functions that 

are arguably an advance over 

conventional computer and network 

technology’’); see also Intellectual 

Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 

F.3d 1307, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, 

J., concurring) (stating, ‘‘[s]oftware 

patents typically . . . describe, in 

intentionally vague and broad language, 

a particular goal or objective [of the 

software]’’). Problems with functional 

claiming, i.e., when a claim is purely 

functional in nature rather than reciting 

with any specificity how the claimed 

function is achieved, can be effectively 

addressed using long-standing, wellunderstood principles under 35 U.S.C. 

112. Thus, the USPTO is providing 

further guidance on the application of 

35 U.S.C. 112 requirements during 

examination. 

Part I of this guidance focuses on 

claim interpretation under 35 U.S.C. 

112(f) and compliance with the 

definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. 

112(b), for example as discussed in the 

Federal Circuit decisions in Williamson, 

792 F.3d 1339, and Aristocrat, 521 F.3d 

1328. Part II of this guidance focuses on 

the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) 

relative to written description and 

enablement, for example as discussed in 

the Federal Circuit decision in 

Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. 

MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015). 2

I. Review of Issues under 35 U.S.C. 

112(f) and 112(b) Related to 

Examination of Computer-Implemented 

Functional Claim Limitations: In its en 

banc decision in the Williamson case, 

the Federal Circuit recognized that some 

of its prior opinions established a 

heightened bar to overcoming the 

presumption that a limitation expressed 

in functional language without using the 

word ‘‘means’’ is not subject to 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) and concluded that such a 

heightened burden is unjustified. 

Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 

(explaining that characterizing the 

presumption as strong ‘‘has shifted the 

balance struck by Congress in passing 

[35 U.S.C. 112(f)] and has resulted in a 

proliferation of functional claiming 

untethered to [§ 112(f)] and free of the 

strictures set forth in the statute’’). 

Instead, 

[t]he standard is whether the words of the 

claim are understood by persons of ordinary 

skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite 

meaning as the name for structure. When a 

claim term lacks the word ‘‘means,’’ the 

presumption [that 35 U.S.C. 112(f) does not 

apply] can be overcome and [§ 112(f)] will 

apply if the challenger demonstrates that the 

claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite 

structure or else recites function without 

reciting sufficient structure for performing 

that function. The converse presumption 

remains unaffected: use of the word ‘‘means’’ 

creates a presumption that § 112[f] applies. 

Id. (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

A. Claim Interpretation: One of the 

first steps in examining claims is 

determining the broadest reasonable 

interpretation (BRI) of the claim. In 

determining the BRI, examiners should 

establish the meaning of each claim 

term consistent with the specification as 

it would be interpreted by one of 

ordinary skill in the art, including 

identifying and construing functional 

claim limitations. If a claim limitation 

recites a term and associated functional 

language, the examiner should 

determine whether the claim limitation 

invokes 35 U.S.C. 112(f). Application of 

35 U.S.C. 112(f) is driven by the claim 

language, not by applicant’s intent or 

mere statements to the contrary 

included in the specification or made 

during prosecution. Examiners will 

apply 35 U.S.C. 112(f) to a claim 

limitation if it meets the 3-prong 

analysis set forth in the Manual of 

Patent Examining Procedure (9th ed. 

Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018) (referred to 

herein as ‘‘MPEP’’), § 2181, subsection I. 

At a high level, the 3-prong analysis 

includes evaluating whether: The claim 

limitation uses the term ‘‘means’’ (or 

‘‘step’’) or a generic placeholder, the 

term is modified by functional language, 

and the term is not modified by 

sufficient structure, material or acts for 

performing the function.3

A claim limitation is presumed to 

invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) when it 

explicitly uses the term ‘‘means’’ and 

includes functional language. The 

presumption that 35 U.S.C. 112(f) 

applies is overcome when the limitation 

further includes the structure necessary 

to perform the recited function. See 

MPEP § 2181, subsection I. By contrast, 

a claim limitation that does not use the 

term ‘‘means’’ will trigger the 

presumption that 35 U.S.C. 112(f) does 

not apply. Even in the face of this 

presumption, the examiner should 

nonetheless consider whether the 

presumption is overcome. 

The USPTO’s examination practice 

regarding the presumption that 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) does not apply to a claim 

limitation that does not use the term 

‘‘means’’ is based on the Federal 

Circuit’s standard set forth in 

Williamson. The presumption that 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) does not apply is overcome 

when ‘‘the claim term fails to ‘recite 

sufficiently definite structure’ or else 

recites ‘function without reciting 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 59 

sufficient structure for performing that 

function.’’’ MPEP § 2181, subsection I 

(quoting Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348). 

Instead of using ‘‘means’’ in such cases, 

a substitute term can act as a generic 

placeholder for the term ‘‘means’’ where 

that term would not be recognized by 

one of ordinary skill in the art as being 

sufficiently definite structure for 

performing the claimed function. The 

following are examples of non-structural 

generic placeholders that may invoke 35 

U.S.C. 112(f): ‘‘mechanism for,’’ 

‘‘module for,’’ ‘‘device for,’’ ‘‘unit for,’’ 

‘‘component for,’’ ‘‘element for,’’ 

‘‘member for,’’ ‘‘apparatus for,’’ 

‘‘machine for,’’ or ‘‘system for.’’ See, 

e.g., MPEP § 2181, subsection I.A; 

Welker Bearing Co., v. Ph.D., Inc., 550 

F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Mass. 

Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 

F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 

Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 704 

(Fed. Cir. 1998); Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. 

LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1214–15 

(Fed. Cir. 1998). This list is not 

exhaustive, and similar generic 

placeholders may invoke 35 U.S.C. 

112(f). Note that there is no fixed list of 

generic placeholders that always result 

in 35 U.S.C. 112(f) interpretation, and 

likewise there is no fixed list of words 

that always avoid 35 U.S.C. 112(f) 

interpretation. Every case will turn on 

its own unique set of facts. 

Even when a claim limitation uses the 

term ‘‘means’’ or a generic placeholder 

for the term ‘‘means,’’ a limitation will 

not invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) if there is a 

structural modifier that further 

describes the term ‘‘means’’ or the 

generic placeholder. Compare 

Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 

91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 

(concluding that the term ‘‘detent 

mechanism’’ did not invoke pre-AIA 35 

U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph because the 

modifier ‘‘detent’’ denotes a type of 

structural device with a generally 

understood meaning in the mechanical 

arts), with Mass. Inst. of Tech., 462 F.3d 

at 1354 (concluding that the term 

‘‘colorant selection mechanism’’ did 

invoke pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth 

paragraph because the modifier 

‘‘colorant selection’’ does not connote 

sufficient structure to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art). To determine 

whether a word, term, or phrase 

coupled with a function denotes 

structure, examiners should check 

whether: (1) The specification provides 

a description sufficient to inform one of 

ordinary skill in the art that the term 

denotes structure; (2) general and 

subject matter specific dictionaries 

provide evidence that the term has 

achieved recognition as a noun denoting 

structure; and (3) the prior art provides 

evidence that the term has an artrecognized structure to perform the 

claimed function. See MPEP § 2181, 

subsection I, for more guidance on 

generic placeholders. 

At issue in Williamson was whether a 

‘‘distributed learning control module’’ 

limitation in claims directed to a 

distributed learning system should be 

interpreted as a means-plus-function 

limitation. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 

1347. The Federal Circuit concluded 

that ‘‘the ‘distributed learning control 

module’ limitation fails to recite 

sufficiently definite structure and that 

the presumption against means-plusfunction claiming is rebutted.’’ Id. at 

1351. In support, the Federal Circuit 

determined that: ‘‘the word ‘module’ 

does not provide any indication of 

structure because it sets forth the same 

black box recitation of structure for 

providing the same specified function as 

if the term ‘means’ had been used’’; 

‘‘[t]he prefix ‘distributed learning 

control’ does not impart structure into 

the term ‘module’ ’’; and ‘‘the written 

description fails to impart any structural 

significance to the term.’’ Id. at 1350–51. 

In view of Williamson, examiners 

should apply the applicable 

presumption and the 3-prong analysis to 

interpret a computer-implemented 

functional claim limitation in 

accordance with 35 U.S.C. 112(f) as 

appropriate, including determining if 

the claim sets forth sufficient structure 

for performing the recited function. A 

determination that a claim is being 

interpreted according to 35 U.S.C. 112(f) 

should be expressly stated in the 

examiner’s Office action. In response to 

the Office action, if applicant does not 

want to have the claim limitation 

interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), 

applicant may: (1) Present a sufficient 

showing to establish that the claim 

limitation recites sufficient structure to 

perform the claimed function so as to 

avoid interpretation under 35 U.S.C. 

112(f); or (2) amend the claim limitation 

in a way that avoids interpretation 

under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) (e.g., by reciting 

sufficient structure to perform the 

claimed function). 

The BRI of a claim limitation that is 

subject to 35 U.S.C. 112(f), ‘‘is the 

structure, material or act described in 

the specification as performing the 

entire claimed function and equivalents 

to the disclosed structure, material or 

act.’’ MPEP § 2181. Thus, if the claim 

limitation is being interpreted under 35 

U.S.C. 112(f), the specification must be 

consulted to determine the 

corresponding structure, material, or act 

for performing the claimed function. See 

MPEP § 2181, subsection I, for more 

guidance on interpreting claim 

limitations that are subject to 35 U.S.C. 

112(f). Generally, the BRI given to a 

claim term that is not subject to 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) is its plain meaning unless 

limited by a special definition or 

disavowal of claim scope set forth in the 

specification which must be clear and 

unmistakable (note that changing the 

plain meaning of a claim term by setting 

forth a special definition or disavowal of 

claim scope is uncommon). MPEP 

§ 2111.01, subsections I, IV. The plain 

meaning is the ordinary and customary 

meaning given to the term by those of 

ordinary skill in the art at the time of 

the effective filing date, evidenced by, 

for example, the words of the claims 

themselves, the specification, drawings, 

and prior art. Id. See, MPEP 2111, et. 

seq., for detailed guidance on the 

application of the BRI during 

examination. 

B. Indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. 

112(b): For a computer-implemented 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) claim limitation, the 

specification must disclose an algorithm 

for performing the claimed specific 

computer function, or else the claim is 

indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). See 

Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 

F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In 

cases ‘‘involving a special purpose 

computer-implemented means-plusfunction limitation, ‘[the Federal 

Circuit] has consistently required that 

the structure disclosed in the 

specification be more than simply a 

general purpose computer or 

microprocessor’ and that the 

specification must disclose an algorithm 

for performing the claimed function.’’ 

Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 

1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333). Thus, the 

corresponding structure for performing 

the specific computer function is not 

simply a general purpose computer by 

itself but a special purpose computer as 

programmed to perform the disclosed 

algorithm. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 

1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (‘‘[W]hen the 

disclosed structure is a computer 

programmed to carry out an algorithm, 

‘the disclosed structure is not the 

general purpose computer, but rather 

that special purpose computer 

programmed to perform the disclosed 

algorithm.’ ’’ (quoting WMS Gaming, 

Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). An algorithm is 

defined, for example, as ‘‘a finite 

sequence of steps for solving a logical or 

mathematical problem or performing a 

task.’’ Microsoft Computer Dictionary 

(5th ed., 2002). Applicant may ‘‘express 

that algorithm in any understandable 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
60 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 

terms including as a mathematical 

formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or 

in any other manner that provides 

sufficient structure.’’ Finisar Corp. v. 

DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citation 

omitted). 

Special purpose computerimplemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim 

limitations will be indefinite under 35 

U.S.C. 112(b) when the specification 

fails to disclose an algorithm to perform 

the claimed function. For example, in 

Advanced Ground Information Systems, 

Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016), the Federal Circuit 

determined that the term ‘‘symbol 

generator’’ is a computer-implemented 

means-plus-function limitation and that 

‘‘[t]he specifications of the patents-insuit do not disclose an operative 

algorithm for the claim elements 

reciting ‘symbol generator.’ ’’ Id. at 

1348–49. The Federal Circuit upheld the 

district court’s determination that the 

term ‘‘symbol generator’’ is indefinite, 

observing that ‘‘although the district 

court recognized that the specification 

describes, in general terms, that symbols 

are generated based on the latitude and 

longitude of the participants, it 

nonetheless determined that the 

specification fails to disclose an 

algorithm or description as to how those 

symbols are actually generated.’’ Id. at 

1349 (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). See also, 

Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 

574 F.3d 1371, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(concluding that the description of a 

server computer’s ‘‘access control 

manager’’ software feature was 

insufficient disclosure of corresponding 

structure to support the computerimplemented ‘‘means for assigning’’ 

limitation because ‘‘what the patent 

calls the ‘access control manager’ is 

simply an abstraction that describes the 

function of controlling access to course 

materials . . . [b]ut how it does so is left 

undisclosed.’’); Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 

1334–35 (explaining that ‘‘the [patent’s] 

description of the embodiments is 

simply a description of the outcome of 

the claimed functions, not a description 

of the structure, i.e., the computer 

programmed to execute a particular 

algorithm’’). 

Moreover, the requirement for the 

disclosure of an algorithm cannot be 

avoided by arguing that one of ordinary 

skill in the art is capable of writing 

software to convert a general purpose 

computer to a special purpose computer 

to perform the claimed function. See 

EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T 

Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (disagreeing ‘‘that a 

microprocessor can serve as sufficient 

structure for a software function if a 

person of ordinary skill in the art could 

implement the software function[,]’’ 

noting that ‘‘we have repeatedly and 

unequivocally rejected this argument: a 

person of ordinary skill in the art plays 

no role whatsoever in determining 

whether an algorithm must be disclosed 

as structure for a functional claim 

element’’); Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385 

(explaining that ‘‘[t]he fact that an 

ordinarily skilled artisan might be able 

to design a program to create an access 

control list based on the system users’ 

predetermined roles goes to 

enablement[,]’’ whereas ‘‘[t]he question 

before us is whether the specification 

contains a sufficiently precise 

description of the ‘corresponding 

structure’ to satisfy [pre-AIA] section 

112, paragraph 6, not whether a person 

of skill in the art could devise some 

means to carry out the recited 

function’’). 

Special purpose computerimplemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim 

limitations are also indefinite under 35 

U.S.C. 112(b) when the specification 

discloses an algorithm but the algorithm 

is not sufficient to perform the entire 

claimed function(s). See Noah, 675 F.3d 

at 1319 (holding that ‘‘[c]omputerimplemented means-plus-function 

claims are indefinite unless the 

specification discloses an algorithm to 

perform the function associated with the 

limitation[,]’’ and that ‘‘[w]hen the 

specification discloses an algorithm that 

only accomplishes one of multiple 

identifiable functions performed by a 

means-plus-function limitation, the 

specification is treated as if it disclosed 

no algorithm.’’). The sufficiency of the 

algorithm is determined in view of what 

one of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand as sufficient to define the 

structure and make the boundaries of 

the claim understandable. For example, 

in Williamson, the Federal Circuit found 

that the term ‘‘distributed learning 

control module’’ is a means-plusfunction limitation that performs three 

specialized functions (i.e., ‘‘receiving,’’, 

‘‘relaying,’’ and ‘‘coordinating’’), which 

‘‘must be implemented in a special 

purpose computer.’’ Williamson, 792 

F.3d at 1351–52. The Federal Circuit 

explained that ‘‘[w]here there are 

multiple claimed functions, as we have 

here, the [specification] must disclose 

adequate corresponding structure to 

perform all of the claimed functions.’’ 

Id. Yet the Federal Circuit determined 

that the specification ‘‘fails to disclose 

any structure corresponding to the 

‘coordinating’ function.’’ Id. at 1354. 

Specifically, the Federal Circuit found 

no ‘‘disclosure of an algorithm 

corresponding to the claimed 

‘coordinating’ function,’’ concluding 

that the figures in the specification 

relied upon by patentee as disclosing 

the required algorithm, instead describe 

‘‘a presenter display interface’’ and not 

an algorithm corresponding to the 

claimed ‘‘coordinating’’ function. Id. at 

1353–54. Accordingly, the Federal 

Circuit affirmed the district court’s 

judgment that claims containing the 

‘‘distributed learning control module’’ 

limitation are invalid for indefiniteness 

under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). Id. at 1354. 

Similarly, in Media Rights 

Technologies, Inc. v. Capital One 

Financial Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1374 

(Fed. Cir. 2015), the Federal Circuit 

determined that the term ‘‘compliance 

mechanism’’ is a means-plus-function 

limitation that performs four computerimplemented functions (i.e., 

‘‘controlling data output by diverting a 

data pathway; monitoring the controlled 

data pathway; managing an output path 

by diverting a data pathway; and 

stopping the play of media content’’). 

The Federal Circuit determined ‘‘that 

the specification fails to adequately 

disclose the structure to perform all four 

of [the ‘compliance mechanism’s’] 

functions’’ and affirmed the district 

court’s decision that the ‘‘compliance 

mechanism’’ limitation is indefinite. Id. 

at 1375. Specifically, the Federal Circuit 

found that ‘‘the specification fails to 

disclose an operative algorithm for both 

the ‘controlling data output’ and 

‘managing output path’ functions[,]’’ 

which ‘‘both require diverting a data 

pathway[,]’’ because the recited C++ 

source code in the specification ‘‘only 

returns various error messages’’ and 

‘‘does not, accordingly, explain how to 

perform the diverting function[.]’’ Id. at 

1374–75. ‘‘Additionally, the 

specification does not disclose sufficient 

structure for the ‘monitoring’ 

function[,]’’ because the disclosed ‘‘set 

of rules . . . which the ‘copyright 

compliance mechanism’ applies to 

monitor the data pathway to ensure 

there is no unauthorized recording of 

electronic media . . . provides no detail 

about the rules themselves or how the 

‘copyright compliance mechanism’ 

determines whether the rules are being 

enforced.’’ Id. at 1375. See MPEP § 2181, 

subsection II(B), for additional guidance 

on evaluating description necessary to 

support computer-implemented 35 

U.S.C. 112(f) claim limitations. 

A computer-implemented functional 

claim may also be indefinite when the 

3-prong analysis for determining 

whether the claim limitation should be 

interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is 

inconclusive because of ambiguous 

words in the claim. After taking into 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 61 

consideration the language in the 

claims, the specification, and how those 

of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand the language in the claims 

in light of the disclosure, the examiner 

should make a determination regarding 

whether the words in the claim recite 

sufficiently definite structure that 

performs the claimed function. If the 

applicant disagrees with the examiner’s 

interpretation of the claim limitation, 

the applicant has the opportunity 

during the application process to 

present arguments, and amend the claim 

if needed, to clarify whether § 112(f) 

applies. 

When a claim containing a computerimplemented 35 U.S.C. 112(f) claim 

limitation is found to be indefinite 

under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) for failure to 

disclose sufficient corresponding 

structure (e.g., the computer and the 

algorithm) in the specification that 

performs the entire claimed function, it 

will also lack written description under 

35 U.S.C. 112(a). See MPEP § 2163.03, 

subsection VI. Examiners should further 

consider whether the disclosure 

contains sufficient information 

regarding the subject matter of the 

claims as to enable one skilled in the 

pertinent art to make and use the full 

scope of the claimed invention in 

compliance with the enablement 

requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112(a). See 

MPEP § 2161.01, subsection III and 

MPEP § 2164.08. 

II. Review of Issues under 35 U.S.C. 

112(a) Related to Examination of 

Computer-Implemented Functional 

Claim Limitations: Even if a claim is not 

construed as a means-plus-function 

limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), 

computer-implemented functional claim 

language must still be evaluated for 

sufficient disclosure under the written 

description and enablement 

requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112(a). As 

explained in further detail below, a 

specification must describe the claimed 

invention in sufficient detail (e.g., by 

disclosure of an algorithm) to establish 

that the applicant had possession of the 

claimed invention as of the application 

filing date. Additionally, any analysis of 

whether a particular claim is supported 

by the disclosure in an application 

requires a determination of whether that 

disclosure, when filed, contained 

sufficient information regarding the 

subject matter of the claims as to enable 

one skilled in the pertinent art to make 

and use the claimed invention. This 

enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 

112(a) is separate and distinct from the 

written description requirement, Ariad, 

598 F.3d at 1341, and serves the 

purpose of ‘‘ensur[ing] that the 

invention is communicated to the 

interested public in a meaningful way,’’ 

MPEP § 2164. 

A. Written Description Requirement of 

35 U.S.C. 112(a): At issue in Vasudevan 

was whether the patent specification 

provided sufficient written description 

support for a limitation of the asserted 

claims. Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 681–83. 

The Federal Circuit explained that 

‘‘[t]he test for the sufficiency of the 

written description ‘is whether the 

disclosure of the application relied 

upon reasonably conveys to those 

skilled in the art that the inventor had 

possession of the claimed subject matter 

as of the filing date.’ ’’ Id. at 682 

(quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351). The 

Federal Circuit emphasized that ‘‘[t]he 

written description requirement is not 

met if the specification merely describes 

a ‘desired result.’ ’’ Vasudevan, 782 F.3d 

at 682 (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349). 

Thus, in applying this standard to the 

computer-implemented functional claim 

at issue, the Federal Circuit stated that 

‘‘[t]he more telling question is whether 

the specification shows possession by 

the inventor of how [the claimed 

function] is achieved.’’ Vasudevan, 782 

F.3d at 683. 

In order to satisfy the written 

description requirement set forth in 35 

U.S.C. 112(a), the specification must 

describe the claimed invention in 

sufficient detail such that one skilled in 

the art can reasonably conclude that the 

inventor had possession of the claimed 

invention at the time of filing. For 

instance, the specification must provide 

a sufficient description of an invention, 

not an indication of a result that one 

might achieve. The level of detail 

required to satisfy the written 

description requirement varies 

depending on the nature and scope of 

the claims and on the complexity and 

predictability of the relevant 

technology. Information that is well 

known in the art need not be described 

in detail in the specification. However, 

sufficient information must be provided 

to show that the inventor had 

possession of the invention as claimed. 

See MPEP § 2163, subsection II(A)(2). 

The analysis of whether the 

specification complies with the written 

description requirement calls for the 

examiner to compare the scope of the 

claim with the scope of the description 

to determine whether applicant has 

demonstrated possession of the claimed 

invention. Id.; see also Reiffin v. 

Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (‘‘The purpose of [the 

written description requirement] is to 

ensure that the scope of the right to 

exclude, as set forth in the claims, does 

not overreach the scope of the inventor’s 

contribution to the field of art as 

described in the patent specification’’); 

LizardTech Inc. v. Earth Resource 

Mapping Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (‘‘Whether the flaw in the 

specification is regarded as a failure to 

demonstrate that the applicant 

possessed the full scope of the invention 

recited in [the claim] or a failure to 

enable the full breadth of that claim, the 

specification provides inadequate 

support for the claim under [§ 112(a)]’’); 

cf. id. (‘‘A claim will not be invalidated 

on [§ ] 112 grounds simply because the 

embodiments of the specification do not 

contain examples explicitly covering the 

full scope of the claim language.’’). 

While ‘‘[t]here is no special rule for 

supporting a genus by the disclosure of 

a species,’’ the Federal Circuit has stated 

that ‘‘[w]hether the genus is supported 

vel non depends upon the state of the 

art and the nature and breadth of the 

genus.’’ Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. 

Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011); id. (further explaining that 

‘‘so long as disclosure of the species is 

sufficient to convey to one skilled in the 

art that the inventor possessed the 

subject matter of the genus, the genus 

will be supported by an adequate 

written description.’’). See also Rivera v. 

Int’l Trade Comm’n, 857 F.3d 1315, 

1319–21 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming the 

Commission’s findings that ‘‘the 

specification did not provide the 

necessary written description support 

for the full breadth of the asserted 

claims,’’ where the claims were broadly 

drawn to a ‘‘container . . . adapted to 

hold brewing material’’ while the 

specification disclosed only a ‘‘pod 

adapter assembly’’ or ‘‘receptacle’’ 

designed to hold a ‘‘pod’’). 

Computer-implemented inventions 

are at times disclosed and claimed in 

terms of their functionality. For 

computer-implemented functional 

claims, the determination of the 

sufficiency of the disclosure will require 

an inquiry into the sufficiency of both 

the disclosed hardware and the 

disclosed software (i.e., ‘‘how [the 

claimed function] is achieved,’’ 

Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 683), due to the 

interrelationship and interdependence 

of computer hardware and software. 

When examining computerimplemented, software-related claims, 

examiners should determine whether 

the specification discloses the computer 

and the algorithm(s) that achieve the 

claimed function in sufficient detail that 

one of ordinary skill in the art can 

reasonably conclude that the inventor 

possessed the claimed subject matter at 

the time of filing. An algorithm is 

defined, for example, as ‘‘a finite 

sequence of steps for solving a logical or 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
62 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 

mathematical problem or performing a 

task.’’ Microsoft Computer Dictionary 

(5th ed., 2002). Applicant may ‘‘express 

that algorithm in any understandable 

terms including as a mathematical 

formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or 

in any other manner that provides 

sufficient structure.’’ Finisar, 523 F.3d 

at 1340 (internal citation omitted). It is 

not enough that one skilled in the art 

could theoretically write a program to 

achieve the claimed function, rather the 

specification itself must explain how 

the claimed function is achieved to 

demonstrate that the applicant had 

possession of it. See, e.g., Vasudevan, 

782 F.3d at 682–83. If the specification 

does not provide a disclosure of the 

computer and algorithm(s) in sufficient 

detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary 

skill in the art that the inventor 

possessed the invention that achieves 

the claimed result, a rejection under 35 

U.S.C. 112(a) for lack of written 

description must be made. See MPEP 

§ 2161.01, subsection I. 

For example, in Vasudevan, the 

Federal Circuit evaluated ‘‘whether the 

specification shows possession by the 

inventor of how accessing disparate 

databases is achieved.’’ Vasudevan, 782 

F.3d at 683. The defendant in district 

court argued that ‘‘the specification does 

not show that the inventor had 

possession of the ability to access 

‘disparate databases’ ’’ because ‘‘the 

specification describes a result, but does 

not show how to achieve the result.’’ Id. 

at 682. On appeal, however, the Federal 

Circuit found that expert testimony 

given in the district court raises ‘‘a 

genuine issue of material fact on 

whether the specification shows how to 

achieve the functionality of accessing 

disparate databases.’’ Id. at 683. The 

expert had opined that specific portions 

of the specification explain ‘‘that 

serialized files can be used to correlate 

parameters from two databases,’’ and 

that ‘‘those correlation parameters can 

be used to identify data in one database 

that is correlated to data in another.’’ Id. 

The Federal Circuit ruled that this 

expert opinion raises a genuine issue of 

fact as to whether the inventor has 

possession of an invention that achieved 

the claimed result. Id. MPEP § 2161.01, 

subsection I and MPEP § 2163 contain 

additional information on determining 

whether there is adequate written 

description support for computerimplemented functional claim 

limitations. 

B. Enablement Requirement of 35 

U.S.C. 112(a): At issue in Vasudevan 

was also whether the patent 

specification enabled a person of skill in 

the art to make and use the claimed 

invention. Vasudevan, 782 F.3d at 683– 

85. The Federal Circuit explained that 

‘‘[a] claim is sufficiently enabled even if 

‘a considerable amount of 

experimentation’ is necessary, so long as 

the experimentation ‘is merely routine, 

or if the specification in question 

provides a reasonable amount of 

guidance with respect to the direction in 

which the experimentation should 

proceed.’ ’’ Id. at 684 (quoting In re 

Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 

1988)). ‘‘On the other hand, if ‘undue 

experimentation’ is needed, the claims 

are invalid.’’ Id. ‘‘In determining 

whether experimentation is undue, 

Wands lists a number of factors to 

consider: ‘They include (1) the quantity 

of experimentation necessary, (2) the 

amount of direction or guidance 

presented, (3) the presence or absence of 

working examples, (4) the nature of the 

invention, (5) the state of the prior art, 

(6) the relative skill of those in the art, 

(7) the predictability or unpredictability 

of the art, and (8) the breadth of the 

claims.’ ’’ Id. 

To satisfy the enablement requirement 

of 35 U.S.C. 112(a), the specification 

must teach those skilled in the art how 

to make and use the full scope of the 

claimed invention without undue 

experimentation. All questions of 

enablement under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) are 

evaluated against the claimed subject 

matter with the focus of the examination 

inquiry being whether everything 

within the scope of the claim is enabled. 

Accordingly, examiners should 

determine what each claim recites and 

what subject matter is encompassed by 

the claim when the claim is considered 

as a whole, not when its parts are 

analyzed individually. See MPEP 

§ 2161.01, subsection III, and MPEP 

§ 2164.08. 

Not everything necessary to practice 

the invention need be disclosed. Trs. of 

Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., LTD., 

896 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(explaining that while ‘‘the specification 

must enable the full scope of the 

claimed invention[,]’’ ‘‘[t]his is not to 

say that the specification must expressly 

spell out every possible iteration of 

every claim.’’). For instance, ‘‘ ‘a 

specification need not disclose what is 

well known in the art.’ ’’ Id. (quoting 

Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 

108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); 

see also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & 

Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). This is of particular importance 

with respect to computer-implemented 

inventions due to the high level of skill 

in the art and the similarly high level of 

predictability in generating programs to 

achieve an intended result without 

undue experimentation. However, 

applicant cannot rely on the knowledge 

of one skilled in the art to supply 

information that is required to enable 

the novel aspect of the claimed 

invention when the enabling knowledge 

is in fact not known in the art. See 

MPEP § 2161.01, subsection III, and 

MPEP § 2164.08. 

The Federal Circuit has repeatedly 

held that the specification must teach 

those skilled in the art how to make and 

use the full scope of the claimed 

invention without undue 

experimentation. See Trs. of Bos. Univ., 

896 F.3d at 1364 (‘‘ ‘The scope of 

enablement . . . is that which is 

disclosed in the specification plus the 

scope of what would be known to one 

of ordinary skill in the art without 

undue experimentation.’ ’’ (quoting 

Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic 

Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 

1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). For example, in 

Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 

993 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the claims at issue 

were directed to ‘‘integrating’’ or 

‘‘substituting’’ a user’s audio signal or 

visual image into a pre-existing video 

game or movie. Id. at 995–97. While the 

claims covered both video games and 

movies, the specification only taught the 

skilled artisan how to substitute and 

integrate user images into video games. 

Id. at 1000. The Federal Circuit held 

that the specification ‘‘did not enable 

the full scope of the asserted claims’’ 

because ‘‘one skilled in the art could not 

take the disclosure in the specification 

with respect to substitution or 

integration of user images in video 

games and substitute a user image for a 

pre-existing character image in movies 

without undue experimentation.’’ Id. 

With respect to the breadth of a claim, 

the relevant concern is whether the 

scope of enablement provided to one 

skilled in the art by the disclosure is 

commensurate with the scope of 

protection sought by the claims. In 

making this determination, examiners 

should consider (1) how broad the claim 

is with respect to the disclosure and (2) 

whether one skilled in the art could 

make and use the entire scope of the 

claimed invention without undue 

experimentation. See MPEP § 2161.01, 

subsection III, and MPEP § 2164.08. A 

rejection for lack of enablement must be 

made when the specification does not 

enable the full scope of the claim. For 

more information regarding the 

enablement requirement, see MPEP 

§§ 2164.01 through 2164.08. 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 4 / Monday, January 7, 2019 / Notices 63 

Dated: December 20, 2018. 

Andrei Iancu, 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 

Property and Director of the United States 

Patent and Trademark Office. 

[FR Doc. 2018–28283 Filed 1–4–19; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–16–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. ER19–665–000] 

Supplemental Notice That Initial 

Market-Based Rate Filing Includes 

Request for Blanket Section 204 

Authorization: FirstLight CT 

Housatonic LLC 

This is a supplemental notice in the 

above-referenced proceeding of 

FirstLight CT Housatonic LLC’s 

application for market-based rate 

authority, with an accompanying rate 

tariff, noting that such application 

includes a request for blanket 

authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of 

future issuances of securities and 

assumptions of liability. 

Any person desiring to intervene or to 

protest should file with the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, 

in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 

of the Commission’s Rules of Practice 

and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 

385.214). Anyone filing a motion to 

intervene or protest must serve a copy 

of that document on the Applicant. 

Notice is hereby given that the 

deadline for filing protests with regard 

to the applicant’s request for blanket 

authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of 

future issuances of securities and 

assumptions of liability, is January 15, 

2019. 

The Commission encourages 

electronic submission of protests and 

interventions in lieu of paper, using the 

FERC Online links at http://

www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic 

service, persons with internet access 

who will eFile a document and/or be 

listed as a contact for an intervenor 

must create and validate an 

eRegistration account using the 

eRegistration link. Select the eFiling 

link to log on and submit the 

intervention or protests. 

Persons unable to file electronically 

should submit an original and 5 copies 

of the intervention or protest to the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 

20426. 

The filings in the above-referenced 

proceeding are accessible in the 

Commission’s eLibrary system by 

clicking on the appropriate link in the 

above list. They are also available for 

electronic review in the Commission’s 

Public Reference Room in Washington, 

DC. There is an eSubscription link on 

the website that enables subscribers to 

receive email notification when a 

document is added to a subscribed 

docket(s). For assistance with any FERC 

Online service, please email 

FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov. or call 

(866) 208–3676 (toll free). For TTY, call 

(202) 502–8659. 

Dated: December 26, 2018. 

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2018–28482 Filed 1–4–19; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. ER19–667–000] 

Supplemental Notice That Initial 

Market-Based Rate Filing Includes 

Request for Blanket Section 204 

Authorization: FirstLight MA Hydro 

LLC 

This is a supplemental notice in the 

above-referenced proceeding of 

FirstLight MA Hydro LLC’s application 

for market-based rate authority, with an 

accompanying rate tariff, noting that 

such application includes a request for 

blanket authorization, under 18 CFR 

part 34, of future issuances of securities 

and assumptions of liability. 

Any person desiring to intervene or to 

protest should file with the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, 

in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 

of the Commission’s Rules of Practice 

and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 

385.214). Anyone filing a motion to 

intervene or protest must serve a copy 

of that document on the Applicant. 

Notice is hereby given that the 

deadline for filing protests with regard 

to the applicant’s request for blanket 

authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of 

future issuances of securities and 

assumptions of liability, is January 15, 

2019. 

The Commission encourages 

electronic submission of protests and 

interventions in lieu of paper, using the 

FERC Online links at http://

www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic 

service, persons with internet access 

who will eFile a document and/or be 

listed as a contact for an intervenor 

must create and validate an 

eRegistration account using the 

eRegistration link. Select the eFiling 

link to log on and submit the 

intervention or protests. 

Persons unable to file electronically 

should submit an original and 5 copies 

of the intervention or protest to the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 

20426. 

The filings in the above-referenced 

proceeding are accessible in the 

Commission’s eLibrary system by 

clicking on the appropriate link in the 

above list. They are also available for 

electronic review in the Commission’s 

Public Reference Room in Washington, 

DC. There is an eSubscription link on 

the website that enables subscribers to 

receive email notification when a 

document is added to a subscribed 

docket(s). For assistance with any FERC 

Online service, please email 

FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov. or call 

(866) 208–3676 (toll free). For TTY, call 

(202) 502–8659. 

Dated: December 26, 2018. 

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2018–28473 Filed 1–4–19; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. ER19–666–000] 

Supplemental Notice That Initial 

Market-Based Rate Filing Includes 

Request for Blanket Section 204 

Authorization: FirstLight CT Hydro LLC 

This is a supplemental notice in the 

above-referenced proceeding of 

FirstLight CT Hydro LLC’s application 

for market-based rate authority, with an 

accompanying rate tariff, noting that 

such application includes a request for 

blanket authorization, under 18 CFR 

part 34, of future issuances of securities 

and assumptions of liability. 

Any person desiring to intervene or to 

protest should file with the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 

First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, 

in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 

of the Commission’s Rules of Practice 

and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 

385.214). Anyone filing a motion to 

intervene or protest must serve a copy 

of that document on the Applicant. 

Notice is hereby given that the 

deadline for filing protests with regard 

to the applicant’s request for blanket 

authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of 

future issuances of securities and 


khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES