1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BROWN v . UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22–6389. Argued November 27, 2023—Decided May 23, 2024*
These cases concern the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act to state drug convictions that occurred before recent technical amend

ments to the federal drug schedu les. ACCA imposes a 15-year manda

tory minimum sentence on defendan ts who are convicted for the illegal possession of a firearm and who have a criminal history thought to demonstrate a propensity for violence . As relevant here, a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a serious drug offense” qualifies for ACCA’s enhanced sentencing. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). For a state crime to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” it must carry a maximum sentence of at least 10 years’ impris onment, and it must “involv[e] . . . a controlled substance . . . as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act.” §§924(e)(1), (2)(A)(ii).

Under the categorical approach, a state drug offense counts as an ACCA predicate only if the State’s defi nition of the drug in question “matche[s]” the definition under federal law. Shular v. United States

, 589 U. S. 154, 158. The question presented is whether a state crime constitutes a “serious drug offense” if it involved a drug that was on the federal schedules when the defend ant possessed or trafficked in it but was later removed. Petitioners Justin Rashaad Br own and Eugene Jackson were sepa

rately convicted of the federal crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of §922( g)(1). In both cases, an ACCA en

hancement was recommended based on prior state felony drug convic

tions. And both defendants argued that their prior convictions did not qualify as “serious drug offense[ s].”

——————

* Together with No. 22–6640, Jackson v. United States , on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus
Brown’s presentence report identified several Pennsylvania drug convictions, including four convic tions for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. At the time of Brown’s marijuan a convictions, the federal and Pennsylvania law definiti ons of marijuana matched. But while Brown’s federal §922(g)(1) charge was pending, Congress modi

fied the federal definition of mariju ana. Because the federal and state definitions did not fully match when Brown was sentenced, Brown ar

gued that his marijuana convictions no longer qualified as “serious drug offense[s]” for purposes of the ACCA sentencing enhancement.

Jackson’s presentence report iden tified several prior Florida convic

tions, including convictions in 1998 and 2004 for possession and distri

bution of cocaine. In 2015, the Federal Government amended the fed

eral definition of cocaine, so th e federal and Florida definitions no longer matched when Jackson committed his §922(g)(1) offense. Like Brown, Jackson argued th at these prior conviction s no longer qualified as “serious drug offense[s].” In both cases, the District Courts disa

greed and sentenced petitioners to enhanced sentences, and the re

spective appellate courts ultimately affirmed.
Held : A state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved

a drug on the federal schedules at th e time of that offense. Pp. 4– 19.

(a) The parties propose three different answers to the question whether the federal and state defini tions of a drug must match when the state crime is committed or at so me later point in time. The Gov

ernment argues that a prior state dr ug conviction qualifies if the fed

eral and state definitions of the re levant drug matched when the de

fendant committed the state crime. Jackson argues instead that thedefinitions must match when the defendant violates the federal felonin-possession statute. Finally, Br own contends that the definitions must match when the defendant is sentenced for the federal felon-in

possession offense. Pp. 4–7. (b) Precedent and statutory cont ext support the Government’s inter

pretation. ACCA gauges what a defendant’s “history of criminal activ

ity” says about his or her “cul pability and da ngerousness.” McNeill v. United States , 563 U. S. 816, 823. In pr evious cases, the Court has held that ACCA requires sentencing courts to examine the law as it was when the defendant violated it . This “backward-looking” ap

proach, id., at 820, supports the Government’s interpretation. And the plain language of the statute points to the same conclusion. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(i), which immediately precedes the provision at issue, de

fines a “serious drug offense” to include, among other things, “of

fense[s] under the Controlled Substances Act.” A later change in a federal drug schedule does not change the fact that an offense “under3 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Syllabus

the [CSA]” is a “serious drug offense.” The Government’s interpreta

tion would treat state offenses “invol ving . . . a controlled substance (as defined in [the CSA])” like those fe deral offenses “under the [CSA].” Petitioners’ interpretations, by co ntrast, would treat those federal and state offenses differently, i.e., the federal offense would remain an ACCA predicate, but the state o ffense would not. Pp. 7–9. (c) The Government’s interpretati on also best fulfills ACCA’s statu

tory objectives. In Congress’s view , defendants who have repeatedly committed ACCA predicate offenses ar e “especially likely to inflict grave harm when in possession of a firearm,” so ACCA imposes a higher punishment when they do so. Wooden v. United States , 595 U. S. 360, 375. Because a defendant’s “history of criminal activity” does not “cease to exist” merely because the crime was later redefined, McNeill , 563 U. S., at 823, it makes sense to ask whether a prior of

fense met ACCA’s definition of seriou sness at the time it was commit

ted. Brown’s and Jackson’s contrary arguments misunderstand the theory on which ACCA is based. A prio r drug conviction for an offense punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment augurs a risk of future danger

ousness even if the drug is no longer considered dangerous. Indeed, in McNeill , the Court found “absurd” petitioner’s argument that a later reduction in the maximum sentence for his offense reflected a legisla

tive judgment that his prior offense was less serious than previously thought. Id., at 822. The “subsequent chang[e] in state law” did not “erase [the] earlier conviction.” Id ., at 823. And it was the fact of that earlier conviction—not the legisl ature’s subsequent judgment—that ACCA was concerned with, because that fact “demonstrate[d]” the de

fendant’s “culpability and dangerousness.” Ibid. Pp. 9–12. (d) Petitioners various other ar guments are unpersuasive. Pp. 12– 19. (1) Relying on the so-called re ference canon, Jackson claims that ACCA “incorporates [the] schedules . . . ‘as [they] exis[t] whenever a question under [ACCA] arises.’ ” Brief of Petitioner Jackson 32. The reference canon provides that a statutory reference to a “ general sub

ject” incorporates “the law on that subject as it exists whenever a ques

tion under the statute arises.” Jam v. International Finance Corp.

, 586 U. S. 199, 209 (emphasis added). But a reference “to another stat

ute by specific title or section number”—such as ACCA’s reference to 21 U. S. C. §802—“in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted.” Ibid. Even assum

ing that there may be contexts in wh ich references to specific statutory provisions may be considered general, it is hard to see the phrase “as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” as anything but a specific reference. Jackson’s alternative argument—that his reading is required by the “settled legal principle” that “the law that4 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus
sets the penalty for a federal crime is the law in place when the crime was committed”—simply begs the question what §924(e)(2)(a)(ii) means. Pp. 12–14. (2) Brown suggests that pres ent-tense language in ACCA’s defini

tion of a “serious drug crime”—language such as “involving” and “as defined in”—indicates a present-day fo cus requiring courts to look to the drug schedules in effect at th e time of federal sentencing. The Court rejected that approach in McNeill , holding that ACCA requires a historical inquiry into the state law at the time of that prior offense and that “[u]se of the present tense . . . did not suggest otherwise.” 563 U. S., at 820

. Brown also claims that his reading is required by United States v. Schooner Peggy , 1 Cranch 103, 110, which says that when the law changes while a case is in progress, the case must be decided under the new law. But §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) has not changed at any point in the litigation. Pp. 15–17. (3) Petitioners’ additional arguments do not persuade. Petitioners assert that this Court’s interpretation is underinclusive because it would preclude ACCA enhancements fo r state offenses involving drugs added to the federal lists only after the state crimes were committed. But none of the parties’ interpreta tions captures all cases involving career criminals. Petitioners next suggest that the Government’s in

terpretation is absurd because it would exclude all state drug convic

tions before the CSA’s enactment in 1970. But there are reasons Con

gress might have chosen not to court either federal or state drug convictions that occurred before 1970. Petitioners also argue that the Government’s interpretation would unduly burden courts and defend

ants by requiring them to undertake the laborious task of digging up old federal drug schedules and comparing those to the state laws the defendants violated, but petitioner s overstate the difficulty of this task. Finally, petitioners contend th at the rule of lenity counsels in favor of their interpretations. But lenity applies only if a statute re

mains grievously ambiguous, and here context, precedent, and statu

tory design adequately show “ ‘what Congress intended.’ ” United States v. Castleman , 572 U. S. 157, 173. Pp 17–19. No. 22–6389, 47 F. 4th 147, and No. 22–6640, 55 F. 4th 846, affirmed.

A LITO , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and T HOMAS , S OTOMAYOR , K AVANAUGH , and B ARRETT , JJ., joined. J ACK

SON , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which K AGAN , J., joined, and in which G ORSUCH , J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the Unit ed States, Washingt on, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov , of any typographical or other formal errors. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 22–6389 and 22–6640

JUSTIN RASHAAD BROWN, PETITIONER 22–6389 v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

EUGENE JACKSON, PETITIONER 22–6640 v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May 23, 2024]

J USTICE A LITO delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases concern the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to stat e drug convictions that oc

curred before recent technica l amendments to the federal drug schedules. ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory mini

mum sentence on defendants who are convicted for the ille

gal possession of a firearm and have a criminal history that is thought to demonstrate a propensity for violence. These defendants are subject to ACCA’s enhanced penalty if, among other things, they have “three previous convictions” for “a serious drug offense.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). For a state crime to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” it must carry a maximum sentence of at least 10 years’ imprison

ment, and it must “involv[e] . . . a controlled substance . . . as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act”2 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court (CSA). §§924(e)(1), (2)(A)(ii). The CSA, in turn, includes five schedules of controlled substances and provides that these schedules must be updated each year by the Attorney General. 84 Stat. 1245, 1247, 21 U. S. C. §§811, 812. The two cases now before us present the question whether a state crime constitutes a “serious drug offense” if it involved a drug that was on the federal schedules when the defendant possessed or trafficked in it but was later re

moved. We hold that such an offense qualifies.

I A In 2016, Justin Rashaad Brown sold cocaine to police of

ficers in a series of controlle d buys. The officers conducted two warrant-authorized searches of Brown’s home, where they discovered cocaine and a loaded .38-caliber revolver. In 2018, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charg

ing Brown with several drug offenses, as well as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). Brown pleaded guilty in 2019 and was sen

tenced two years later. At sentencing, the probation office recommended that Brown receive ACCA’s mandat ory minimum sentence be

cause he had four prior Pennsylvania convictions for pos

sessing marijuana with intent to distribute between 2009 and 2014, as well as one Pennsylvania conviction for dis

tributing cocaine in 2008. Brown disputed this interpreta

tion of ACCA and argued that his marijuana convictions did not “involv[e] . . . a controlled substance . . . as defined in [the CSA].” §924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

A state drug offense counts as an ACCA predicate only if the State’s definition of the drug in question “matche[s]” the definition under federal law. Shular v. United States , 589 U. S. 154, 158 (2020). When Brown was convicted for pos

sessing marijuana, both federal and Pennsylvania law de

fined marijuana to include “all parts of the plant Cannabis3 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
sativa L.,” so the definitions were a categorical match. 21 U. S. C. §802(16) (2006 ed.); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, §780– 102(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 2012) (defining marijuana to in

clude “all forms, species and/or varieties of the genus Can

nabis sativa L.”). But while Brown’s federal charge was pending, Congress enacted the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, which exempted some hemp, a variety of Can

nabis sativa L., from the federal definition of marijuana. Pub. L. 115–334, §12619(a)(2), 132 Stat. 5018. 1 Because the federal and state definitions did not fully match when Brown was sentenced, he argued that his marijuana convic

tions no longer qualified as “serious drug offense[s].” The District Court disagreed and sentenced him under ACCA, and the Third Circuit affirmed. It concluded that the 2018 amendment did not appl y retroactively to federal offenses committed before its effective date. Under the Third Circuit’s view, Brown was “properly subject to . . . ACCA’s enhanced penalties” because he violated §922(g) when the federal and state definitions of marijuana were a categorical match. 47 F. 4th 147, 153, 155 (2022).

B In 2017, Eugene Jackson noti ced a police car arriving at the Sparkle Food Market to execute an unrelated search warrant, and he responded by fleeing and discarding a loaded .45-caliber pistol. O fficers eventually identified Jackson as the gun’s owner, and in 2019, he was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced in 2021. Jackson’s presentence report identified several prior Florida convictions as ACCA pr edicates, including convic

tions in 1998 and 2004 for possession and distribution of

——————

1 Hemp is exempted if it contains less than 0.3% THC (tetrahydrocan

nabinol), the main psychoactive constituent of cannabis. See 7 U. S. C. §1639 o ; 21 U. S. C. §802(16).4 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court
cocaine. But Jackson, like Brown, claimed that these con

victions were not for “serious dr ug offense[s].” When those crimes were committed, the Fe deral Government and Flor

ida defined cocaine the same way. 21 U. S. C. §812(c), Schedule II, (a)(4); Fla. Stat. §§893.03(2)(a)(4), 893.13(1) (1998). But in 2015, the Federal Government legalized a radioactive cocaine derivative called [ 123 I]ioflupane that is the active pharmaceutical ingred ient in a drug used to di

agnose patients who are suspected to have Parkinson’s dis

ease. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Removal of [ 123 I]Ioflupane From Schedule II of the Controlled Sub

stances Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 54717. So when Jackson commit

ted his federal offense, the federal and Florida definitions were no longer a categorical match. The District Court found that Jackson’s prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses and sentenced him to ACCA’s mandatory minimum. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit initially disagreed and vacated Jackson’s sentence. 36 F. 4th 1294, 1306 (2022). But a few months later, the panel sua sponte vacated its opinion, ordered supplemental briefing, and in a new opinion affirmed the District Court. 55 F. 4th 846, 862 (2022). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a prior drug conviction is an ACCA predicate if the state and federal definitions of the drug matched when the defendant committed the state offense. Id ., at 854. We granted Brown’s and Jackson’s petitions for a writ of certiorari and consolidated the two cases. 598 U. S. ___ (2023). We now affirm.

II A These cases ask what 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2) means when it refers to a prior state drug offense “involving . . . a con

trolled substance . . . as defined in section 102 of the [CSA],” and specifically, whether the federal and state definitions of a drug must match when the state crime is committed or5 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court at some later point in time. The parties propose three dif

ferent answers. The Government argues that a prior state drug conviction qualifies if the federal and state definitions of the relevant drug matched when the defendant committed the state crime. Therefore, even if the federal and state definitions are different when a defendant violates the federal felon-in

possession law or is sentenced under that law, earlier state convictions that occurred duri ng the period when the fed

eral and state definitions were the same nevertheless qual

ify as “serious drug offense[s].” Jackson, by contrast, argues that the federal and state definitions must match when the defendant violates the federal felon-in-possession statute. In his view, it does not matter whether the federal and state laws both criminal

ized the relevant drug when a defendant possessed or traf

ficked in it. If the Federal Government later narrows its definition of that drug, no state conviction under the broader definition counts against a defendant who later commits the federal firearm offense. This interpretation would mean that Jackson’s two co

caine convictions are no longer “serious drug offense[s]” be

cause, years later, the Fede ral Government narrowed the definition of cocaine in the federal schedules to legalize a Parkinson’s drug derived from cocaine. In fact, under Jack

son’s and the dissent’s interpretation, no Florida cocaine convictions obtained before July 1, 2017, when Florida also legalized the derivative, would count. See 2017 Fla. Laws ch. 2017–110. That would be true even for convictions in

volving the possession or distribution of huge shipments of cocaine base. 2 And as other courts have noted, cocaine con

victions under the laws of many other States would likewise

——————

2 See, e

. g ., E. Johnson, A Sarasota Drug Sting Brings Results 10 Arrests, and a Million-Dollar Supply of Cocaine Taken Off, Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.heraldtri bune.com/story/news/2014/02/05/a

sarasota-drug-sting-brings-results-10-arrests-and-a-million-dollar-supply6 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court
be affected. See, e

. g ., United States v. Perez , 46 F. 4th 691, 698–701 (CA8 2022) (excluding an Iowa conviction under Jackson’s theory); United States v. Myrick , 2023 WL 2351693, *2 (ED Pa., Mar. 2, 2023) (excluding a Pennsylva

nia conviction). These cocaine convictions would be excluded even though it is highly unlikely that any were based on the possession or sale of the Parkinson’s drug. That derivative is radioac

tive, so it can be produced only through a “highly technical and complex synthetic route,” and the drug in which it ap

pears can be stored for no more than 24 hours. Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admi n., Office of Diversion Con

trol, Schedule of Controlled Substances: Removal of [ 123 I]Io

flupane From Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act: Background, Data, and Analysis 5–6 (2015). Furthermore, anyone attempting to become intoxicated by using the drug would need to inject “nearly 6,000 vials,” or “15 liters of fluid, a volume likely to cause death if administered intra

venously.” Id ., at 2. Unsurprisingly, the Federal Govern

ment has identified “no case reports” involving individuals who misused that drug, or any other [ 123 I]ioflupane-contain

ing product. Id ., at 6. Brown offers a third option. He contends that the federal and state definitions must match when the defendant is sentenced for the federal firearm offense. Under his inter

pretation, it does not matter whether the two definitions matched when a defendant previously violated state law or even when he or she committed the federal firearm offense. As he sees it, if the federal authorities narrow the definition of a drug at any point before sentencing, the prior state con

victions no longer count as ACCA predicates. This interpretation would produce strange results in

—————— -of-cocaine-taken-off/29227445007; see also Verdict in State v. Gomez

, No. 2014CF001404–004NC (12th Jud. C. C. Sarasota Cty., Fla., May 1, 2014).7 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court cases involving long criminal investigations or prosecu

tions. In this case, for example, Congress adopted the par

tial exemption of hemp nearly nine months after Brown was indicted, and more than two years after he violated §922(g). Under his proposed interpretation, he is exempt from ACCA’s mandatory minimum only because his prosecution did not move more quickly. Indeed, Brown’s interpretation could result in very differ

ent sentences for co-defendants who committed the same state marijuana offense on the same days and likewise com

mitted the felon-in-possession offense at the same time. But see 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(6) (instructing sentencing courts to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). Under Brown’s interpretation, if one co-defendant was sentenced on December 19, 2018, one day before the Agriculture Improvement Act was signed into law, and the other was senten ced on December 21, the day after enactment, ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum would apply to the first but not the second.

B We must decide which of these three proposed interpre

tations is correct. Standing alone, the operative phrase “in

volving . . . a controlled substanc e (as defined in [the CSA])” does not definitively answer that question, but precedent and statutory context show that the Government’s interpre

tation is correct. ACCA is a recidivist statute that gauges what a defend

ant’s “history of criminal activi ty” says about his or her “cul

pability and dangerousness.” McNeill v. United States , 563 U. S. 816, 823 (2011). It does this through a “backward

looking” examination, id ., at 820, of “previous convictions” that bear on dangerousness, §924(e)(1). Thus, as we ex

plained in McNeill , ACCA requires sentencing courts to ex

amine the law as it was when the defendant violated it,8 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court even if that law is subsequently amended. Id ., at 820–822 (listing cases examining the law at the time of the predicate offense). In McNeill , the question was whether a prior state drug conviction was for a crime that carried the maximum pen

alty needed to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” i.e. , im

prisonment for 10 years or more. To answer that question, we looked back to “the law under which the defendant was convicted” and concluded that a subsequent statutory amendment reducing the maximum penalty below the 10

- year threshold did not matter. Id ., at 820. This “backward

looking” approach supports the Government’s interpreta

tion here. The plain language of 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(i), the pro

vision that immediately precedes the provision at issue here, §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), points to the same conclusion. Sec

tion 924(e)(2)(A)(i) defines a “serious drug offense” to in

clude certain federal drug crimes, namely, “offense[s] under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. §801 et seq.)” or two other federal laws. (Emphasis added.) Any crime con

tained in the CSA is an offense “under the [CSA].” The standard “Judgment in a Criminal Case” used in federal courts indicates whether a defendant was convicted and sentenced for such an offense, 3 and a later change in a fed

eral drug schedule cannot change that fact. The Govern

ment’s interpretation would tre at state offenses “involving . . . a controlled substance (as defined in [the CSA])” like those federal offenses “under the [CSA].” §924(e)(2). Petitioners’ interpretation s, by contrast, would treat those federal and state offenses differently. Consider a de

fendant who was caught distributing cocaine on back-to

back days, was charged with a federal crime for the first day’s offense and an identical state crime for the second, and was convicted of both before the 2015 amendment that

——————

3 See https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao245b.pdf

.9 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court deleted the Parkinson’s drug from the definition of cocaine. Under petitioners’ interpreta tions, the federal offense would remain an ACCA predicate, but the state offense would not, even though the crimes and the statutes of con

viction were otherwise identical. That is a very strange reading of §§924(e)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). Both subsections refer to prior offenses relating to the CSA, and in §924(e)(2)(i) Congress clearly indicated that past conduct that violated the CSA is probative of a defendant’s “culpability and dangerousness,” McNeill , 563 U. S., at 823, even if the federal drug schedule is later amended. There is no reason to think Congress reached a different judgment as to petitioners’ conduct merely because they had been con

victed under a state, rather than federal, statute. Indeed, it would be unnatural to give back-to-back references to the CSA starkly different interpretations. See, e.g. , Brown v. Gardner , 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States , 510 U. S. 135, 143 (1994). 4

C The Government’s interpretation also best fulfills ACCA’s statutory objectives. Congress’s “general ap

proach” in ACCA was to single out “offenses of a certain level of seriousness that involve violence or an inherent risk

——————

4 Jackson argues that reading 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2) to refer to the past would be inconsistent with other statutory references to the CSA that “must incorporate the CSA schedules at the time of the federal offense.” Brief for Petitioner Jackson 14. For example, he points to §924(g)(3), which criminalizes cross-bo rder travel to obtain a firearm intended for use in a state offense “relating to an y controlled substance (as defined in [the CSA]),” and §342, which prohibits the operator of a common carrier from operating under the influence of “any controlled substance (as de

fined in [the CSA]).” But those stat utes focus entirely on present-day conduct, while ACCA refers to “previou s convictions.” §924(e)(1). Be

cause ACCA is concerned with recidivism , it is not inconsistent to read it differently.10 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court thereof, and that are likely to be committed by career of

fenders.” Taylor v. United States , 495 U. S. 575, 590 (1990). Because defendants who have repeatedly committed ACCA predicate offenses are “espec ially likely to inflict grave harm when in possession of a firearm,” ACCA imposes a higher punishment when they do so. Wooden v. United States , 595 U. S. 360, 375 (2022); United States v. Rodri

quez , 553 U. S. 377, 385 (2008) (“[A] second or subsequent offense is often regarded as more serious because it por

tends greater future danger and therefore warrants an in

creased sentence for purposes of deterrence and incapacita

tion”). A defendant’s “history of criminal activity” does not “cease to exist” merely becaus e the crime was later rede

fined. McNeill , 563 U. S., at 823. It therefore makes sense to ask, as the Government d oes, whether a prior offense met ACCA’s definition of seriousness—and thus suggested fu

ture danger—at the time it was committed. Petitioners and the dissent disagree. As Brown puts it, when the Federal Government “changes the federal drug schedules,” it “necessar ily conclude[s]” that the de-scheduled substance “does not implicate the culpability or harm that federal law previous ly attributed to it.” Reply Brief for Petitioner Brown 1 (e mphasis deleted). Of course, Brown and Jackson were themselves convicted of crimes in

volving substances that are still on the federal schedules, marijuana and cocaine, not hemp or [ 123 I]ioflupane. 5 But even setting that aside, their argument misunderstands the theory on which ACCA is based. A prior drug conviction for an offense punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment augurs a risk of future dangerousness

——————

5 Latching onto this sentence, the di ssent spends three pages accusing us of departing from the categorical approach. Post , at 11–14 (opinion of J ACKSON , J.). The dissent attacks a strawman. We agree that our prec

edents require us to ask whether a defendant’s prior conviction matches ACCA’s requirements. Post , at 11–12. The question here is what ACCA requires.11 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court even if the drug is no longer considered dangerous. That is because the conviction reveals that the defendant previ

ously engaged in illegal conduct that created a dangerous risk of violence, either with law enforcement or with others operating in the same illegal field. If left at large, such de

fendants present a serious risk to public safety. That risk “does not cease to exist” if the law under which the defendant was convicted is later amended or elimi

nated. McNeill , 563 U. S., at 823. For example, consider a person who distributed alcohol during Prohibition. The later legalization of alcohol did not by any means ensure that these bootleggers would ta ke up legitimate jobs. In

stead, after the end of Prohibition, many of them simply shifted to other illegal enterprises. See S. Morison, The Ox

ford History of the American People 901 (1965) (Prohibition led to “the building up of a criminal class that turned to gambling and drugs” after the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed). Likewise, Brown’s and Jackson’s multiple con

victions for serious drug crimes are evidence that they may continue to “ ‘commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood’ ” in the future. Wooden , 595 U. S., at 375 (quoting Taylor , 495 U. S., at 587). And that risk remains true despite the technical changes to the fed

eral drug schedules on which their arguments hang. For this reason, the Court has previously rejected similar arguments about ACCA’s rational e. Like petitioners here, the petitioner in McNeill argued that a later reduction in the maximum sentence for his o ffense reflected a legislative judgment that his prior offense was less serious than previ

ously thought. Brief for Petitioner in No. 10–5258 (CA4), pp. 15, 35. And this, he suggested, meant that the offense should no longer be treated as “serious” under ACCA. We termed that argument “absurd.” McNeill , 563 U. S., at 822. The “subsequent chang[e] in state law” did not “erase [the] earlier conviction.” Id ., at 823. And it was the fact of that12 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court earlier conviction—not the legislature’s subsequent judg

ment—that ACCA was concerned with, because that fact “demonstrate[d]” the defendant’s “culpability and danger

ousness.” Ibid.

III Petitioners and the dissent make various other argu

ments, but none is persuasive.

A 1 Jackson mainly relies on two interpretive tools. He be

gins with the so-called referenc e canon. Brief for Petitioner Jackson 31. This canon, he claims, means that ACCA “in

corporates [the] schedules . . . ‘as [they] exis[t] whenever a question under [ACCA] arises.’ ” Id ., at 32 (quoting Jam v. International Finance Corp ., 586 U. S. 199, 209 (2019)). “And,” he says, “the first time a ‘question arises’ under ACCA is when a person commits [a] federal firearm of

fense.” Brief for Petitioner Jackson 32. The reference canon can be a helpful tool, but Jackson misuses it. That canon provid es that a statutory reference to a “ general subject” incorporates “the law on that subject as it exists whenever a questio n under the statute arises.” Jam , 586 U. S., at 209 (emphasis added). But a reference “to another statute by specific title or section number”— such as ACCA’s reference to 21 U. S. C. §802—“in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments .” 586 U. S., at 209–210 (emphasis added). That part of the reference canon undermines Jackson’s po

sition. Jackson attempts to rescue his argument by asserting that ACCA’s mention of the CSA is actually a “general ref

erence.” Reply Brief for Petitioner Jackson 15. To support this argument, he cites cases that treat statutes as adopting13 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court “the general law on [a] subject,” even though the statutes “referred to” that general law “in terms of the sections of the statutes in which it is to be found.” George Williams College v. Williams Bay , 242 Wis. 311, 316, 317, 7 N. W. 2d 891, 894 (1943). But even if we assume that there may be contexts in which references to specific statutory provisions may be considered “general,” see, e.g ., Matter of Commit

ment of Edward S ., 118 N. J. 118, 134, n. 9, 570 A. 2d 917, 925, n. 9 (1990), it is hard to see the phrase “as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” as anything but a specific reference. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). And for reasons already set out, the “context” here does not help Jackson. As we have explained, his reading would treat a state offense involving a “controlled substance . . . defined in [the CSA]” differently from a federal offense “un

der the [CSA],” even though both phrases make reference to the same Act. Supra , at 8–9. That approach would give defendants with prior state offenses the benefit of subse

quent amendments to the CSA but would ignore those same amendments for prior federal offenses. In that context, Jackson’s reliance on the reference canon is clearly unper

suasive. Alternatively, Jackson says that his reading is required by the “settled legal principle” that “the law that sets the penalty for a federal crime is the law in place when the crime was committed.” Brief for Petitioner Jackson 17 (cit

ing Dorsey v. United States , 567 U. S. 260, 272–273 (2012)). And to show that this principle supports his reading of §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), he offers a series of hypotheticals involving amendments to ACCA. Brief for Petitioner Jackson 18–20. Here is one. If Congress deleted drug possession from the list of “serious drug offense[s],” he argues, no one would think that someone who “commit[ted] a federal firearm of

fense after this change . . . wo uld be subject to ACCA based on a prior state conviction” for drug possession. Id ., at 18. Therefore, he maintains, the same should be true for14 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

amendments to the schedules. This argument begs the question that these cases pre

sent, which is whether §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) is amended with every change in the drug schedules. Jackson imagines a version of ACCA that plainly would not apply to a prior state offense because that version would no longer list drug possession as a “serious” offense, and he then reasons that the same result should obtain here. But in his hypothetical, §924(e) was amended. Here, only the federal drug sched

ules were changed. Jackson’s argument that a change in the federal drug schedules equates to a change in§924(e)(2)(A)(ii) is thus nothing more than his referencecanon argument dressed in diffe rent garb. And for the rea

sons we have explained, we are convinced that the canon does not work in the way he suggests. In all events, Jackson’s emphasis on “the law in place when the crime was committed” is a red herring. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) currently means that a prior state drug con

viction may constitute an ACCA predicate if the drugs on the federal and state schedules matched when the state drug offense was committed. Thus, contrary to Jackson’s suggestion, treating his prior convictions as ACCA predi

cates is entirely consistent with the “settled legal principle” that current law “sets the penalty for a federal crime.” Id

., at 17.

2 The dissent agrees with Jackson’s interpretation but for a different reason. It believes that all cross-references “plug [in] the referenced provision” as it exists “at the time of the statute’s interpretation.” Post , at 4–5 (opinion of J ACKSON , J.). Thus, ACCA’s reference to the CSA must in

corporate “the federal drug sche dules that are currently in effect for sentencing purposes— i

. e ., those that were effec

tive at the time of the federal offense.” Post , at 4. The problem for the dissent is that none of the cases it15 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court cites supports this proposition. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation , 594 U. S. 338, 344–348 (2021); Astrue v. Capato , 566 U. S. 541, 547–549 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder , 560 U. S. 563, 566–570 (2010); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project , 561 U. S. 1,8–9 (2010). For good reason: as we have explained, crossreferences sometimes refer to the law as it currently exists, but they may also incorporate a referenced statute as it ex

isted when the cross-reference was enacted. Supra , at 12. Indeed, many of the dissent’s cases stand for the unobjec

tionable proposition that courts must carefully consider the text and context of each statut e before adopting a one-size

fits-all approach to cross-references. See Herrmann v. Cen

com Cable Assoc., Inc. , 978 F. 2d 978, 983 (CA7 1992) (at

tempting to “do the least dama ge” to unravel “contradictory enactments”); United States v. Head , 552 F. 3d 640, 645 (CA7 2009) (rejecting a “catego rical rule” for “statutory cross-references”); United States v. Ho , 984 F. 3d 191, 202 (CA2 2020) (rejecting a reference-canon argument incon

sistent with plain language). Following the approach laid out by the dissent’s cases thus brings us back to the question with which we started: What is the best reading of ACCA’s cross-reference in light of context, precedent, and statutory purpose? Supra , at 7. For the reasons we have explained, it is that a prior state drug conviction constitutes an ACCA predicate if the drugs on the federal and state schedules matched when the state drug offense was committed.

B We turn next to Brown’s interpretation, which would re

quire the state and federal definitions to match when the defendant is sentenced for a fe deral firearm offense. Brown first argues that his interpretation is grounded in ACCA’s text because it focuses on the “here-and-now import” of “his

torical facts.” Brief for Petitioner Brown 8. Specifically,16 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Brown notes that ACCA uses the “ present participle of ‘in

volve,’ ” rather than “the past participle.” Reply Brief for Petitioner Brown 2–3. And he suggests that the phrase “ ‘as defined in’” is likewise in the present tense. Id ., at 3. Unfortunately for Brown, we have already rejected this textual argument. 6 The petitioner in McNeill likewise ar

gued that the present-tense language in ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense” indicated a present-day focus. 563 U. S., at 820. Citing that language, he asked the Court to require federal courts to “loo[ k] to the state law in effect at the time of the federal sentencing,” ibid ., but we declined to do so. Because “ACCA is co ncerned with convictions that have already occurred,” we held that it requires a historical inquiry into the state law at the time of that prior offense. Ibid. And the “[u]se of the present tense . . . d[id] not sug

gest otherwise.” Ibid. McNeill ’s conclusion makes sense. Use of the present tense, as opposed to the past , was likely a stylistic rather than a substantive choice. Around the time of ACCA’s en

actment, legislative drafters were instructed, “[w]henever possible,” to “use the present tense (rather than the past or future).” House Office of the Legislative Counsel, Style Manual; Drafting Suggestions for the Trained Drafter §102(c), p. 2 (1989); see also D. Hirsch, Drafting Federal Law §5.6, p. 45 (2d ed. 1989) (“Various commentators on drafting have tried, over the years, to persuade drafters to use the present tense . . . ”). So, at least in the instant con

text, we cannot place too much weight on the use of the pre

sent tense as opposed to the past. Brown also claims that his reading is required by United States v. Schooner Peggy , 1 Cranch 103 (1801), which says that when the law changes while a case is in progress, the

——————

6 The dissent makes a similar textual argument but does not grapple with our reasoning in McNeill v. United States , 563 U. S. 816 (2011). See post , at 6, and n. 2.17 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

case must be decided under the new law. 7 Id ., at 110. But that principle does nothing to advance Brown’s position. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) has not changed at any point in the litigation, from the time peti tioners committed their federal offenses until today. Then, as now, under §924 past state drug possession offenses may qualify as ACCA predicates if the federal and state schedules matched when the state crimes occurred.

C We conclude by addressing some additional arguments advanced by both petitioners. First, they assert that our interpretation should be rejected because it is underinclu

sive—specifically, because it would preclude ACCA en

hancements for state offenses involving drugs added to the federal lists only after the state crimes were committed. But none of the parties’ interpretations captures all cases involving career criminals. Indeed, Brown and Jackson are themselves asking to be exempted from ACCA’s reach even though they both have a history of dealing drugs that re

main prohibited by federal law. Second, petitioners suggest that the Government’s inter

pretation is absurd because it “would exclude from ACCA’s reach all state drug convictions from before 1970” when the CSA was enacted. Brief for Petitioner Jackson 33; accord, Brief for Petitioner Brown 16. But whether or not this con

sequence is desirable, it is not absurd. We can easily see a reason why Congress might have cho

sen not to count either federal or state drug convictions that

——————

7 Brown also likens his interpretation to the “ordinary practice” of ap

plying Guidelines sentencing enhancem ents as they exist at sentencing. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. But there is reas on to doubt that th e Guidelines prac

tice is relevant here. That is because Congress has expressly directed courts to apply the Guidelines “in effe ct on the date the defendant is sen

tenced.” 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). ACCA contains no similar in

struction.18 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

occurred before 1970. Before t hat time, “Congress ha[d] en

acted more than 50 pieces of legislation relating to . . . dan

gerous drugs,” and this had “g iven rise to a confusing and often duplicative approach to . . . enforcement.” H. R. Rep. No. 91–1444, pt. 1, p. 6 (1970). The CSA was designed to replace these scattered provisions “with a single compre

hensive statute.” Cong. Research Serv., L. Sacco, Drug En

forcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends 5 (2014). It was reasonable fo r Congress to peg ACCA’s pen

alties to that new comprehensive regulatory scheme rather than requiring courts to grapple with the welter of federal drug laws that previously existed. Petitioners argue that the Government’s interpretation would unduly burden courts and defendants by requiring them to undertake the laborious task of digging up old fed

eral drug schedules and comparing those to the state laws the defendants violated. But the difficulty of this task is overstated. Most drug convicti ons concern just a few drugs, and the federal and state definitions of those drugs do not often change. In the cases now before us, the courts below had no apparent difficulty finding the needed information. Finally, both petitioners contend that the rule of lenity counsels us to adopt their interpretations. It does not. Len

ity applies only if a statute remains grievously ambiguous after we have consulted “‘everything from which aid can be derived.’ ” Pugin v. Garland , 599 U. S. 600, 610 (2023) (quoting Ocasio v. United States , 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016)). As we have explained, however, context, precedent, and statutory design adequately show “ ‘what Congress in

tended.’ ” United States v. Castleman , 572 U. S. 157, 173 (2014) (quoting Barber v. Thomas , 560 U. S. 474, 488 (2010)). In any event, neither Jackson’s nor Brown’s interpreta

tion would be preferable for all defendants. Both interpre

tations could hurt defendants who committed or were sen

tenced for the felon-in-po ssession offense before the19 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court addition of a drug to the federal schedules. As petitioners’ own briefs highlight, States sometimes criminalize drugs before the Federal Government does so. See Brief for Peti

tioner Jackson 34–35; Brief for Petitioner Brown 17. For instance, Florida banned the stimulant known as bath salts 10 months earlier than the Federal Government. 8 And Utah criminalized the hallucinogen methoxetamine nearly a decade before the Federal Go vernment followed suit. See 2013 Utah Laws ch. 88; Schedules of Controlled Sub

stances: Placement of Methoxetamine (MXE) in Schedule I, 87 Fed. Reg. 34166 (2022). State convictions for those drugs that predate the federal amendments would not count as ACCA predicates under the Government’s interpretation but may under petitioners’ interpretations. It would be odd to use the rule of lenity to help petitioners but harm others.

* * * For these reasons, we hold that a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that offense. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeals.

It is so ordered

.

——————

8 Florida Bans ‘Bath Salt’ Drugs After Violent Outbursts, Sun Sentinel (Jan. 27, 2011), https://www.sun-sent inel.com/2011/01/27/ florida-bans

bath-salt-drugs-after-viole nt-outbursts; Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin ., Chemicals Used in “Bath Salts” Now Under Federal Control and Regulation (O ct. 21, 2011), https://www.dea.gov / press-releases/2011/10/21/chemicals -used-bath-salts-now-under-federal

control-and-regulation._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 22–6389 and 22–6640

JUSTIN RASHAAD BROWN, PETITIONER 22–6389 v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

EUGENE JACKSON, PETITIONER 22–6640 v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May 23, 2024]

J USTICE J ACKSON , with whom J USTICE K AGAN joins, and with whom J USTICE G ORSUCH joins as to Parts I, II, and III, dissenting. The Court maintains that, “[s]tanding alone,” the text of 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) “does not definitively answer” the question presented in these cases. Ante, at 7. Instead, says the majority, we must l ook beyond the text to prece

dent, statutory context, and purpose—which apparently converge to persuade the majori ty that §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) re

quires sentencing courts to apply the drug schedules in ef

fect at the time of a defendant’s prior state drug conviction when determining the applicability of the 15-year manda

tory minimum in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). But the relevant text does definitively answer the question presented here. And it establishes that courts should apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal fire

arms offense that triggers ACCA’s potential application. Nothing else—not precedent, context, or purpose—requires2 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting a different result. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I A As relevant here, ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum for defendants who commit a violation of §922(g) while having “three previous convictions . . . for . . . a seri

ous drug offense.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). Notably, Congress did not leave unanswered the question of which prior state convictions qualify as “a serious drug offense” for ACCA purposes. Rather, ACCA expressly defines the term “seri

ous drug offense” by direct reference to another federal law. To qualify as a “serious drug offense,” the prior state crime must be one “involving manufacturing, distributing, or pos

sessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con

trolled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Con

trolled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. [§]802)).” §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The dispute in these cases arises from the fact that the meaning of the term “controlled substance”—as defined by federal law—can, and frequently does, change. Under the Controlled Substances Act, a controlled substance is “a drug or other substance, or immedi ate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” 21 U. S. C. §802(6). Those five schedules, which are not contained in the statute itself, are lists of substances that are “updated and republished on an annual basis” by the Attorney General. §812(a). During this annual review, the Attorney General may add or re

move drugs from the schedules based on various considera

tions, such as a drug’s “actual or relative potential for abuse” or the “state of current scientific knowledge regard

ing the drug.” §811(c); see also, e

. g ., 21 CFR pt. 1308 (2023) (setting forth the most recent drug schedules). Congress itself can also categorically remove substances from the schedules. See, e

. g ., 21 U. S. C. §802(16)(B) (excluding hemp from the schedules).3 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting By directing that the term “controlled substance” in ACCA be determined on the basis of the Controlled Sub

stances Act’s definition—which itself references the federal drug schedules—Congress has opted to rely on a federal statute that contains its own cross-reference to a dynamic list of prohibited substances. ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition thus incorporates those oft-changing drug sched

ules by reference.

B The majority and I are in full agreement that, conse

quently, a sentencing court deciding whether to impose ACCA’s 15-year mandatory mi nimum for a violation of §922(g) must consult those external drug schedules to de

termine whether the drug “ ‘involv[ed]’ ” in a prior state of

fense is a controlled substance under federal law. See ante, at 1–2. Yet, somehow, the majority concludes that the per

tinent drug schedules for ACC A’s sentencing exercise are those that were in effect when the prior state drug crime occurred. In my view, a straightforward application of the aforementioned statutory text plainly establishes other

wise. First of all, ACCA expressl y defines “serious drug of

fense,” §924(e)(2)(A), and “[w]hen a statute includes an ex

plicit definition, we must follow that definition,” Burgess v. United States , 553 U. S. 124, 130 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress coul d have defined “serious drug offense” based solely on state law. It did not. Instead, Con

gress made clear that only st ate drug crimes that involve substances that qualify as “controlled substance[s]” under the Controlled Substances Act are sufficiently serious to warrant ACCA’s penalty. Second, the definition of “serious drug offense” that ap

pears in ACCA cross-references the highly mutable federal drug schedules—a drafting device that does particular4 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting work in the legislative context. Consistent with the opera

tion of cross-references elsewhere, the cross-reference in ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition necessarily directs sentencing courts to consult the current federal drug sched

ules— i.e., those in effect at the time of the federal offense for which the defendant is being sentenced—rather than some earlier version of those lists. That is, quite simply, how cross-references work. When it comes time to interpret a st atute, courts typically plug the referenced provision, as th ey find it, into the statutory text. They do not consider, much less account for, any amendments that might have taken place over the course of the referenced provision’s ex istence. Nor does it matter that the referenced statute is a separate pronouncement that has its own legislative hi story and course of develop

ment. Courts proceed in this straightforward plug-and-play manner with respect to statut ory cross-references because “the presumed temporal applicat ion of a statute” is when “the relevant activity that the [statute] regulates” occurs. Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U. S. 244, 291 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgments). That presumption ap

plies with full force to any provisions cross-referenced in a statute, because “incorporating one statute or system of statutes into another . . . serves to bring into the latter all that is fairly covered by the reference.” Panama R. Co. v. Johnson , 264 U. S. 375, 392 (1924). And what is fairly cov

ered is the referenced law as it exists when the statute’s application is required. See Landgraf , 511 U. S., at 291. Until today, that had been our consistent practice. See,

e

. g ., Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation

, 594 U. S. 338, 344–348 (2021) (applying the cross-refer

enced definition then in effect); Astrue v. Capato , 566 U. S. 541, 547–549 (2012) (same); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder

, 560 U. S. 563, 566–570 (2010) (same); Holder v. Humani

tarian Law Project , 561 U. S. 1, 8–9 (2010) (same). When a5 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting statute contains a cross-reference to another provision, we have always simply applied the version of the other provi

sion in effect at the time the cross-referenced provision was needed, even if Congress amen ded that provision at some point in the past.Of course, this way of interpreting statutes with crossreferences means that a change in the referenced provision has the effect of changing the statute that contains the cross-reference. But that is a feature, not a bug, of statu

tory cross-references. In fact, Congress often uses the crossreference device in a statute “ precisely because the [refer

enced provision] may be amended.” Herr-mann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc. , 978 F. 2d 978, 983 (CA7 1992) (Easter

brook, J.) (emphasis added). Far from being problematic,one useful feature of a statutory crossreference from the standpoint of the legislative drafter is that it “permits the effect of a change in one section to prop

agate to other, related, sections without rewriting all of those related sections.” Ibid

. That basic understanding of how cross-references work easily resolves these cases. ACCA mandates that, for the purpose of its “serious drug offense” definition, a “controlled substance” must be determined in accordance with the Con

trolled Substances Act, 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), and the Controlled Substances Act, in turn, looks to the substances on the drug schedules, 21 U. S. C. §802(6). Congress’s in

corporation of the drug schedules by cross-reference in this manner means that a sentencing court must plug in the drug schedules as it finds them based on when “the relevant activity that the [statute] regulates” occurs. Landgraf , 511 U. S., at 291. For ACCA, as with other federal criminal statutes, that means the court must apply the drug sched

ules in effect when the defendant “commits the underlying conduct that makes the offender liable.” Dorsey v. United6 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting

States , 567 U. S. 260, 272 (2012). 1 To be sure, one consequence of this approach is that, as the drug schedules change, so does the meaning of “con

trolled substance” under ACCA. See Herrmann , 978 F. 2d, at 983. But, again, Congress seems to have intended that result, insofar as the statute it wrote pegs ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition to lists of substances that the At

torney General is required to revisit on an annual basis. In

deed, Congress presumably chose to cross-reference those drug lists (rather than copy ing them directly into ACCA) precisely because of their dynamic nature. The fact that ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition uses the present tense, as the majority concedes, see ante, at 16, further bolsters the conclusion that Congress was consciously incorporating the annual updates that the fed

eral drug schedules embody. As we have previously recog

nized, “the present tense generally does not include the past.” Carr v. United States , 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010). If Congress had wanted to reference a past version of the drug schedules, it easily could have indicated as much in the text of ACCA. But Congress used the present tense instead, di

recting sentencing courts to look to the meaning of “con

trolled substance” in effect when a defendant commits the federal crime requiring ACCA’s application, not at some previous point in time. 2

——————

1 Brown argues that, as a sentencing statute, ACCA incorporates the drug schedules that are in effect when a District Court gives legal effect to its provisions— i

. e ., at the time of the federal sentencing. See ante , at 6. While Congress determined that the Sentencing Guidelines should follow that approach, see 18 U. S. C. §3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), we have recog

nized that the so-called federal saving statute, 1 U. S. C. §109, generally requires courts to apply the criminal statutes in effect at the time the defendant committed the federal crime, see Dorsey , 567 U. S., at 272. Only Jackson’s approach is consis tent with that precedent. See ante , at 5.

2 The majority attributes ACCA’s use of the present tense to a mere “stylistic” choice by Congress, rely ing primarily on a contemporaneous7 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting

II The Government rejects the foregoing description of how statutory cross-references operat e. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58 (ex

pressing “disagree[ment] that the background rule is that we always look to the contemporaneous referenced law”). The Government insists that, instead of merely calling for insertion of the referenced law, the appearance of a cross-ref

erence in a statute “raises a temporal question” that re

quires a court to determine “whi ch version of [the cross-ref

erenced provision] Congress intend[ed] to reference.” Id

.,at 56. As the Government sees it, every statutory crossreference can thus have “different temporal branches de

pending on context.” Id ., at 58; see also ante, at 15 (appear

ing to adopt this temporally flexible approach to cross-ref

erences). That cannot be right. We have never viewed statutory cross-references as a gateway to the multiverse. Cf. Clark

v. Martinez , 543 U. S. 371, 382 (2005) (rejecting an ap

proach that “would render ev ery statute a chameleon”). No case that I am aware of has ever asked whether some past version of the statute applies wh en the court is interpreting a provision that contains a cross-reference—and neither the

—————— legislative drafting manual as support for that conclusion. Ante , at 16. But the wholly speculative suggestio n that ACCA’s drafters actually re

lied on the cited manual’s tense-rela ted directives conveniently comes out of nowhere. Moreover, to the ex tent the majority now believes that verb tense is irrelevant when a cour t undertakes to interpret the text of a statute, it has taken a strange and unwarranted departure from this Court’s ordinary interpretive practices. Before today, we have consist

ently used all aspects of a statute’s text to ascertain its meaning, includ

ing the verbs that Congress chooses. See, e.g. , Barton v. Barr , 590 U. S. 222, 236 (2020); Carr v. United States , 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010); United States v. Wilson , 503 U. S. 329, 333 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.

v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. , 484 U. S. 49, 57 (1987). An objection to this approach has surfaced on ly once before, in dissent. See Carr , 560 U. S., at 462–464 (opinion of A LITO , J.) (relying on legislative drafting manuals to suggest that the tense of the verbs in a statute was not rele

vant to the provision’s interpretation).8 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting majority nor the Government cites any. In fact, our actual practices establish the contrary. Whenever we have ad

dressed a statutory cross-reference, we have always taken the same tried-and-true approach that we employ with re

spect to statutory definitions: We plug in the referenced provision as it exists at the moment the statute’s provisions become applicable. See Part I–B, supra

. Any other approach risks chaos. Again, Congress often uses cross-references in statutes “precisely because the [ref

erenced provision] may be amended,” thereby allowing that amendment “to propagate to other, related, sections with

out rewriting all of those related sections.” Herrmann , 978 F. 2d, at 983. The Government’s view would unsettle that longstanding drafting conven tion, injecting uncertaintyinto what Congress must do to amend statutes using crossreferences. What is more, if every cross-reference raised a question about which version of the referenced statute ap

plies—past or present—interpretation of federal statutes with cross-references would be come entirely unworkable.Cross-references are legion in the U. S. Code, and crossreferenced statutes are regula rly amended. Under the Gov

ernment’s approach, every one of those amendments would become a jump ball, inviting competing interpretations about which version of the referenced statute applies. The Government claims that this disordered way of ap

plying cross-references stems from the so-called reference canon, which sometimes directs courts to apply a past ver

sion of a referenced statute. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56, 58. 3

——————

3 The reference canon has two strains, general and specific. First, “[w]hen a statute refers to a general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject as it exis ts whenever a question und er the statute arises.” Jam v. International Finance Corp. , 586 U. S. 199, 209 (2019). Second, when there is “a statute that refers to another statute by specific title or section number,” that cross-reference “in effect cuts and pastes the ref

erenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments.” Id. , at 209–210; see also Hassett

v. Welch , 303 U. S. 303, 314 (1938). It is not clear that this latter, specific9 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting But even if the reference canon applies under these circum

stances, it seems to cut against the Government’s interpre

tation. The Government a sserts that, because ACCA refer

ences a specific section—“section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—the reference canon “would suggest that the ACCA incorporated the schedules as they existed in 1986, when the cross-reference was enacted.” Brief for United States 42. But conspicu

ously missing from this discussion (as well as the majority’s discussion of the reference canon, see ante , at 12–13) is the actual text of the cross-referenced provision at issue in these cases, which comes nowhere near incorporation of a static, historical list of substances. Instead, as explained above, ACCA’s “serious drug of

fense” definition cross-refere nces §102 of the Controlled Substances Act, see 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), and under that provision, a “controlled subs tance” is “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V ,” 21 U. S. C. §802(6) (emphasis added). This juxtaposition turns what appears to be a specific statutory reference into a more general on e, since it is impossible to determine which substances fall under the statutory defini

tion without knowing what the five schedules contain. And because those schedules are de signed to change over time, it is hard to view ACCA’s reference to the controlled sub

stances definition of the Controlled Substances Act as any

thing other than an instruction for courts to consult “an ex

ternal body of potentially evolving law” and “adop[t] the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the

—————— form of the canon even applies in th e absence of uncertainty about what,exactly, is being cross-referenced, such as “a facial defect with the crossreference or target statute being interpreted.” United States v. Head

, 552 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 2009) (collecting cases); see also United States

v. Ho , 984 F. 3d 191, 202 (CA2 2020) (forgoing “unnecessary resort to the reference canon” and instead interpreting the statute consistent with its plain language).10 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting

statute arises.” Jam v. International Finance Corp. , 586 U. S. 199, 209–210 (2019). The upshot is that proper application of the reference canon here leads to the same conclusion that I reached above. The cross-reference in ACCA incorporates drug schedules that are updated annually and does so in the pre

sent tense, thereby requiring sentencing courts to merely plug in the drug schedules in effect at the time of the de

fendant’s federal firearms offense— i.e., the relevant timeframe for the purpose of the court’s interpretation of ACCA’s “serious drug offense” language.

III In rejecting the typical, straightforward understanding of ACCA’s cross-reference, the majority pivots away from the text of the statute entirely , and purportedly bases the Court’s conclusion on “precedent and statutory context.” Ante, at 7. Neither our precedents nor the context of this statute actually compels a different conclusion than the text does, for the reasons explained below.

A To start, the majority misreads our precedent. In McNeill

v. United States , 563 U. S. 816 (2011), we considered how to determine whether a state drug crime involved “a maxi

mum term of imprisonment of ten years or more” under state law. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). McNeill instructed sentencing courts making this determi nation to undertake a “back

ward-looking” inquiry by “consult[ing]” “the law under which the defendant was convicted”—that is, “the version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of violating.” 563 U. S., at 820–821. The majority contends that this same “ ‘backward

looking’ ” approach should apply to the federal drug sched

ules. Ante, at 8 (quoting McNeill , 563 U. S., at 820). But the federal drug schedules are not “the law under which the11 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting

defendant was convicted.” Id. , at 820. And of course McNeill was “backward-looking”; any inquiry into a defend

ant’s statute of conviction is necessarily so. Here, both the Government and petitioners take as a given “the version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of vio

lating,” as McNeill instructs. Id ., at 821. The question pre

sented in these cases—on which the parties disagree—is how to evaluate whether that prior state-law conviction qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under federal law. In other words, McNeill asked what state crime the de

fendant committed, while toda y’s cases ask how ACCA as

sesses that conviction. The latter is an entirely distinct in

quiry. And for all the reasons discussed above, the federal benchmark that Congress has selected is not “backward

looking” in the least—it rationally incorporates the cur

rently applicable drug schedules, not ones from the past. See Part I, supra

. The majority’s opinion not only misconstrues McNeill , it also flatly contradicts other precedents from this Court out

lining how to determine whether a prior state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States , 579 U. S. 500, 504 (2016); Taylor v. United States

, 495 U. S. 575, 599–602 (1990). As the majority only scantly mentions, to determine whether a state crime is a “serious drug offense,” courts are not supposed to rely on the actual or alleged facts related to the prior state drug crime. Ra

ther, they ask “if the State’s definition of the drug in ques

tion ‘matche[s]’ the definition under federal law.” Ante, at 2 (quoting Shular v. United States , 589 U. S. 154, 158 (2020); alteration in original). We have referred to this matching process as the “ ‘categorical approach.’ ” Id. , at 157 (quoting Taylor , 495 U. S., at 600). Under that methodology, “[a] court must look only to the state offense’s elements, not the facts of the case or labels pinned to the state conviction.” Shular , 589 U. S., at 160. Thus, we do not ask how the St ate classified or categorized12 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting the prior offense. Nor does it matter what type of drug a defendant actually manufactured, possessed, or sold. Such facts are “extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements,” and “ACCA, as we have always understood it, cares not a whit about them.” Mathis , 579 U. S., at 504. Properly ap

plied, the categorical approach mandates that a court’s sole focus must be on identifying the state crime’s statutory ele

ments and determining whethe r they categorically match the ACCA predicate. By appearing to fixate on th e facts of petitioners’ prior state drug offenses, the majori ty’s opinion thus diverges from our precedents. For example, the majority puzzlingly suggests that our standard me thodology for assessing state crimes in relation to federal law provides a loophole for these petitioners, because “Brown and Jackson were them

selves convicted of crimes invo lving substances that are still on the federal schedules, marijuana and cocaine, not hemp or [ 123 I]ioflupane.” Ante , at 10. But, again, the entire point of the categorical approach is that courts may consider only the state crime’s elements, not the substances actually in

volved in that crime, when undertaking to determine whether the state crime matches the federal standard. This matters because ensuring adherence to the categor

ical approach, which the majority fails to do here, serves important objectives. We employ the categorical approach not only because Congress commanded it, see Taylor , 495 U. S., at 589, but also because it “avoids unfairness to de

fendants,” Mathis , 579 U. S., at 512, who may not have sought to have the state record s accurately reflected the de

tails of the crime they committed. Suppose, for example, that Brown—whose conviction was reportedly for marijuana—was, in fact, prosecuted by the State for conduct involving hemp , as some defendants were. See, e

. g ., Commonwealth v. Harrelson , 14 S. W. 3d 541, 544 (Ky. 2000); see also New Hampshire Hemp Council, Inc. v. Marshall , 203 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1 2000) (noting that “the threat13 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting of federal prosecution [was] realistic” when hemp was still on the federal schedules). The distinction between a con

viction for a drug crime involving marijuana versus one in

volving hemp could be a significant one for purposes of a future firearms prosecution that might trigger ACCA. But a defendant in Brown’s position would likely have “no in

centive to contest” that his conduct involved hemp, not an

other form of marijuana, during the state prosecution be

cause that fact did “not matter under the law” at that time. Mathis , 579 U. S., at 512. Indeed, he might well have been “precluded from doing so by the [state] court.” Ibid . It is highly unlikely that such a defendant could even contem

plate that his state conviction would be relevant to a future ACCA conviction, because most state crimes have “no sig

nificance under federal law for years to come.” Johnson v. United States , 544 U. S. 295, 305 (2005).

Unfairness arises without the categorical approach, be

cause such a defendant’s punishment would be significantly increased under ACCA for a prior state crime involving hemp simply due to his failure to anticipate, at the time of his state convictions, a future change in the federal drug schedules. The categorical approach responds to that un

fairness by relying exclusively on the elements of the state crime, rather than the underlying facts of the crime. So, as long as the drug substances expressly prohibited by state law differ from those that the federal law pro

scribes, then that state law is not a categorical match to ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition, and a conviction under that statute cannot be used as an ACCA predicate. Here, however, the majority suggests that the categorical mismatch is irrelevant becaus e, regardless, petitioners’ state crimes actually involved types of drugs that have re

mained on the federal schedules during all potentially per

tinent time periods. Ante , at 10. That reasoning not only fails to follow our well-established methodology, it also per

petuates the same unfairness that the categorical approach14 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting is designed to mitigate.

B The majority fares no better with statutory context. The majority’s opinion points to ACCA’s other definition of “se

rious drug offense,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(i), which clas

sifies certain federal crimes as “serious drug offenses.” That provision defines a “serious drug offense” as “an offense un

der the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. [§]801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U. S. C. [§]951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46 for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” §924(e)(2)(A)(i). As the major

ity notes, this definition turn s solely on “whether a defend

ant was convicted and sentenced for such an offense, and a later change in a federal drug schedule cannot change that fact.” Ante, at 8 (footnote omitted). In the majority’s view, we should avoid “treat[ing] . . . federal and state offenses differently,” so the applicabilit y of ACCA’s penalty to prior state crimes, too, must be based simply on whether the fed

eral drug schedules matched state law at the time of the defendant’s prior state conviction. Ibid

. Whatever the merits of treating federal and state offenses the same way might be, Congress did not draft ACCA to achieve that result. When this Court previously addressed these same two ACCA provisions in response to a similar argument, it recognized that “the divergent text of the two provisions of the serious-drug-offense definition . . . makes any divergence in their application unremarkable.” Shular

, 589 U. S., at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). Con

gress certainly could have used the same classification met

ric for federal and state priors —say, by classifying federal crimes as “serious drug offenses” based on the particular controlled substances involved, as it did with state crimes— but did not do so. And we generally “ ‘presume differences in language . . . convey differences in meaning,’ ” especially15 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting “when the same Congress passed both statutes to handle much the same task.” Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States , 585 U. S. 274, 279 (2018) (quoting Henson v. San

tander Consumer USA Inc. , 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017)). Con

gress’s choice to phrase the tw o “serious drug offense” defi

nitions in ACCA differently “requires respect, not disregard.” Wisconsin Central , 585 U. S., at 279. At any rate, unlike the first subsection of ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition, the second subsection involves classifying state crimes based on federal law —a circum

stance that, as I previously explained, requires the categor

ical approach. See supra , at 13–14. This means that some federal-state discrepancy as to the kinds of crimes that are deemed “serious drug offenses” is not at all surprising or unusual; it is par for the course. See Shular , 589 U. S., at 164. To see why, consider one example. The Controlled Sub

stances Act provides that “it shall be unlawful for any per

son knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distrib

ute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U. S. C. §841(a)(1). We have previously recognized that “the stat

ute’s word ‘knowingly’ . . . appl [ies] to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime” in this provision, meaning that the Government must prove that a defendant knew he was dealing with a controlled substance. Flores-Figueroa v. United States , 556 U. S. 646, 650 (2009). State law, by con

trast, does not always include such a knowledge require

ment. See United States v. Smith , 983 F. 3d 1213, 1223 (CA11 2020). We have nonetheless recognized that ACCA applies differently to state and federal drug crimes on this basis. See Shular , 589 U. S., at 164. Thus, the ultimate question is not whether ACCA re

quires consistency between the cl assification of federal and state crimes, as the majority suggests. Instead, given some inevitable inconsistency between state and federal law, our16 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting inquiry is “which form of consistency Congress intended.” Id ., at 165. Here, Congress’s use of an express cross-refer

ence to the Controlled Substance Act’s mutating drug schedules in the state-crime definition—coupled with its omission of such a cross-reference in the federal-crime def

inition—indicates that inconsistency based on drug type was not only anticipated but intended. In short, the presence of a differently worded §924(e)(2)(A)(i) does not overcome the plain meaning of §924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

IV Finally, the majority contends that its reading “best ful

fills ACCA’s statutory objectives.” Ante, at 9. But that as

sertion fails to appreciate ACC A’s actual goals. Congress has plainly designated serious drug offenses in a defend

ant’s criminal history as triggers for ACCA’s 15-year man

datory minimum for a reason—because the seriousness of the defendant’s prior drug-related history is indicative of that defendant’s future dangerousness, given the present firearms offense. The majority’s analysis falters because it does not, and frankly cannot, explain how future danger

ousness is best assessed by reference to outdated drug schedules. Congress indisputably enacted ACCA to incapacitate what it viewed to be a class of especially dangerous defend

ants—“the eponymous ‘armed career criminal.’ ” Wooden v. United States , 595 U. S. 360, 375 (2022). The 15-year man

datory minimum that ACCA imposes is among the harshest mandatory penalties in the Federal Criminal Code, and “the length of the mandatory minimum was set at 15 years” specifically “to incapacitate the armed career criminal for the rest of the normal time span of his career[,] which usu

ally starts at about age 15 and continues to about age 30.” S. Rep. No. 97–585, p. 7 (1982). This means that ACCA is not a simple recidivist statute that merely tallies up past17 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting offenses, as the majority suggests, see ante, at 10–11, thereby imposing a drastically increased penalty for illegal firearms possession based on a “once a criminal, always a criminal” perspective. Rather, Congress designed ACCA to help courts identify a certain category of defendants—those who, having a particular kind of criminal history and now unlawfully possessing a gun, pose such a distinct risk of fu

ture dangerousness that a lengthy term of incapacitation is warranted. 4 “In order to determine which offenders fall into this cate

gory,” ACCA directs a sentenci ng court to conduct a review of a defendant’s “past crimes” under state law, looking for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, “because . . . crim

inal history is relevant . . . to the kind or degree of danger the offender would pose were he to possess a gun.” Begay

v. United States , 553 U. S. 137, 146 (2008). But, im

portantly, ACCA does not deem every state crime a predi

cate for the 15-year mandatory minimum. Instead, the statute specifies certain cate gories of crimes that trigger application of the prescribed penalty, due to the “prior crime’s relevance to the possibility of future danger with a gun.” Ibid

. ACCA’s focus on incapacitating certain defendants based on their potential future dangerousness makes it entirely sensible that the statute directs courts to identify “serious drug offense[s]” (as well as “vio lent felon[ies]”) in a defend

ant’s background. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). What does not make sense is the majority’s suggestion that ACCA requires the extended incapacitation of defendants based on past criminal conduct that federal la w does not deem serious to

-

——————

4 “Of course, to say that Congress had reasons” to enact ACCA’s sen

tencing scheme “is not to en dorse those policy choices.” Consumer Fi

nancial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. , 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (J ACKSON , J., concurring) (slip op., at 3).18 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting day. In other words, if the point of ACCA is the incapacita

tion of certain defendants—those whose histories of serious criminality indicate a propensity to commit future danger

ous crimes in light of their unlawful possession of a weapon—how does a record that contains past crimes in

volving drugs that are no longer controlled substances help to identify especially dangerous defendants? It does not. In reality, that goal is achieved only by determining whether a defendant’s past crimes are considered serious by today’s standards. The federal drug schedules are spe

cifically updated to account for current views of dangerous

ness. See Part I–A, supra . And a drug’s removal from those schedules reflects a determination that the drug is no longer deemed dangerous based on criteria such as “[i]ts ac

tual or relative potential for abuse” and “[t]he state of cur

rent scientific knowledge regard ing the drug.” 21 U. S. C. §811(c). Accordingly, ACCA is best interpreted as referenc

ing the drug schedules that are effective as of the date of the commission of the gun crime that triggers ACCA’s ap

plicability, rather than those that would have signaled se

riousness at some prior time. “Indeed, it would be illogical to conclude that federal senten cing law attaches ‘culpability and dangerousness’ to an act that . . . Congress has con

cluded is not culpable and dangerous.” United States v. Bautista , 989 F. 3d 698, 703 (CA9 2021) (Fletcher, J.). Meanwhile, the majority’s view misses the mark that Congress set for ACCA’s sentencing scheme in another re

spect as well: It leaves out many defendants who do war

rant incapacitation for dangerousness—those who have prior convictions for trafficking drugs that were scheduled as controlled substances by the time their §922(g) offenses were committed but were not on the federal drug schedules when their prior state convicti ons occurred. The majority concedes that its interpretation would exclude from ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition state drug crimes that oc

cur when “States . . . criminalize drugs before the Federal19 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting

Government does so.” Ante, at 19. This happens not infre

quently, such as when a State criminalizes new, cuttingedge drugs. See, e.g., ibid . (discussing the criminalization of bath salts and methoxetamine by States before the Fed

eral Government); see also Brief for Petitioner Jackson 34– 35 (citing other examples); Brief for Petitioner Brown 17 (same). Under the majority’s approach, ACCA’s intended assess

ment of future dangerousness via the consideration of past state drug crimes would not apply to defendants if their prior state convictions took pl ace before the drugs they traf

ficked were federally scheduled. But under the statutory scheme Congress actually adopted, there is no reason a de

fendant’s early engagement with dangerous new drug sub

stances criminalized by state law should not qualify as ACCA predicates, especially since the federal drug sched

ules are frequently updated to account for precisely this sort of newfound danger, consistent with ACCA’s broader ap

proach. Ultimately, then, for all its talk of statutory goals, the majority’s opinion elides the true purpose of ACCA’s man

datory minimum scheme in multiple ways. It also down

plays the means Congress adopted to advance its incapaci

tation objectives, by essentially ignoring the link the statute draws between potential future dangerousness, as partially evidenced by the seriousness of a defendant’s past drug activity, and the need for lengthy incapacitation, which the statute provides. Breezing past these key nu

ances, the majority simply announces its own apparent view that “[a] prior drug conviction for an offense punisha

ble by 10 years’ imprisonment augurs a risk of future dan

gerousness even if the drug is no longer considered danger

ous.” Ante , at 11. 5

——————

5 The majority’s opinion offers no concrete evidence for this empirical20 BROWN v. UNITED STATES

J ACKSON , J., dissenting

* * * At bottom, the majority’s re asoning appears to reduce to a disagreement with Congress’s legislative judgment, em

bodied in the text of the Controlled Substances Act, that a change in the drug schedules is a change in the perceived dangerousness of a drug that should have a material impact on the determination whether incapacitation is warranted. See 21 U. S. C. §811(a). The Court’s ruling thus displaces Congress’s decision to base ACCA’s 15-year mandatory pen

alty on the evolving dangerousness determinations that the Controlled Substances Act incorporates rather than on static impressions about a defendant’s recidivist tendencies based solely on the fact that they have previously commit

ted crimes. The majority’s contrary hold ing seems to reflect its own policy view that “Brown’s and Jackson’s multiple convic

tions” pose a significant risk of future dangerousness “de

spite the technical changes to the federal drug schedules.” Ante, at 11. But the choice of how to assess and address dangerousness belongs first and foremost to Congress. And for the reasons I have explained, Congress designed ACCA to take a different approach—to measure future dangerous

ness by today’s drug schedules, not outdated ones from the past. See Part I, supra . One might harbor doubts that the

—————— assertion. And its strained analogy to bootleggers at the end of Prohibi

tion, who supposedly “shifted to other illegal enterprises,” ante , at 11, paints a woefully incomple te historical picture. Contrary to the major

ity’s contentions, the end of Prohibit ion allowed many of those previously involved in the illegal alcohol trade to transition into successful, legiti

mate careers. See, e.g. , D. Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohi

bition 359–360 (2010) (discussing Samuel Bronfman, a former bootlegger who turned his company Seagram’ s into one of the largest liquor-distribution corporations in the world). Regardless, there is simply no evidence in ACCA’s legislat ive history or otherwise that Con

gress drew the same historical lessons from Prohibition that the majority does, or that ACCA was motivated in an y respect by our Nation’s experi

ences during Prohibition.21 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., dissenting sentencing policy that Congress enacted is sensible, just, or effective. But it is the one that Congress wrote, and we re

main dutybound to apply the law as written. In my view, the majority has failed to do so here.