OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and

Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be

Addressed

April 30, 2010

SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

April 30, 2010

General David Petraeus, USA  

Commander, U.S. Central Command  

General Stanley A. McChrystal  

Commander, U.S. Forces‐Afghanistan, and  

  Commander, International Security Assistance Force  

Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp

U.S. Army Chief of Engineers and  

  Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV  

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/

  Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of a performance audit of two firm fixed‐price contracts currently

valued at $72.8 million for the construction of the Afghanistan National Army garrison in Kunduz

Province.  It includes two recommendations to the U.S. Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers to address construction issues observed at the site and one recommendation to improve

oversight.   

A summary of this report is on page ii.  This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110‐181

and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.  When preparing the final report, we considered

comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the NATO Training Mission‐

Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan (NTM‐A/CSTC‐A).  In their comments,

USACE concurred with the recommendations and NTM‐A/CSTC‐A concurred with the findings of the

report.  Copies of the comments are included in appendices II and III of this report.   

   

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General  

      for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page ii 

                                                                    Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction  

i

.

`

  

What SIGAR Reviewed

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training

and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Current plans call for the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) to

grow from 103,475, as of June 2009, to almost 172,000 by October 2011. As a result, additional facilities will be needed to

train, base, and house the Afghan forces.  The NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition

Command‐Afghanistan (NTM‐A/CSTC‐A), through the Afghanistan National Security Forces Fund, is providing $72.8 million

to establish an ANA garrison in Kunduz, located in Kunduz province on Afghanistan’s northern border. Large enough to

house 1,800 personnel, the garrison is being built in two phases by DynCorp International, LLC.  The U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE) Afghanistan Engineer District‐North (AED‐North) provides program management and oversight of

construction. This report addresses the contracts’ cost, schedule, and outcome; oversight; and the sustainment of the

Kunduz garrison. We examined criteria and guidance in the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) and the AED District

Level Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008.  We interviewed officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A

and AED‐North, as well as the prime contractor. We performed a site inspection of the garrison from January 26‐28, 2010.

We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from November 2009 to April 2010 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.  

                          SIGAR    Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found

Phases I and II of the Kunduz garrison are behind schedule. Both phases are scheduled to be completed by August 2010.  

The project increased in cost because AED‐North exercised 34 options in the original contract.  During our inspection, we

found several construction issues, including poor welds and rust that may weaken roof supports and lead to failure.  

However, the most serious issue we observed was severe settling of the soil, which has led to damaged structures.  This

condition is aggravated by inadequate grading that will contribute to pooling of water and flooding.

AED‐North did not meet certain USACE requirements for conducting oversight and maintaining contract files. Although

progress payments were documented properly, certain documents, such as quality assurance reports, were not in the files

as required. AED‐North’s quality assurance was initially lacking but improved over time due to new personnel.

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that they were unaware of any planning documents or justification for the garrison that

addressed the strategic deployment of troops, garrisons, locations, or operations. Planning reports we reviewed did not

address these matters. Without an updated strategy that reflects current ANSF requirements, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A runs the risk

of building facilities that do not meet ANA needs. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A is developing a process to determine if the requirements

for a garrison or other infrastructure are the same or have changed. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that the government of

Afghanistan does not have the financial or technical capacity to sustain ANSF facilities once they are completed. Current

plans call for all ANSF facilities to be turned over to the Afghanistan government by 2013 for operations and maintenance.  

SIGAR Audit‐10‐09                    April 2010

ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All

Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious

Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed

What SIGAR Recommends

SIGAR is making three recommendations to address construction issues and improve

oversight.  To ensure the structural integrity of the construction of the Kunduz garrison,

SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Commanding General, USACE, direct AED‐North to (1)

repair the welds and mitigate the rust on steel supports on the affected structures; and (2)

resolve the soil stability issue and determine what mitigation or corrective actions are

requried for DynCorp to complete, including ensuring that the site is properly graded.

Furthermore, to address contract oversight issues, SIGAR recommends that  the U.S.

Commanding General, USACE, direct AED‐North to (3) ensure the Kunduz’s garrison’s

contract files are maintained according to USACE guidance.

In response to a draft of this report, USACE concurred with SIGAR’s recommendations.

Photo: Guardhouse and wall on

soil that has settled at Kunduz

ANA garrison, Jan. 2010.

For more information contact: SIGAR Public affairs at (703) 602‐8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background                                                                                                                                                    2

Construction of the Kunduz Garrison Is Not Within the Original Schedule                                        4

                                        

Contract Management and Oversight Did Not Meet All U.S. and Contract Requirements           11

 

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A Lacks Overall Planning for ANSF Facilities but Is Developing a Process  

to Meet Changing Requirements and Provide for Sustainment              13

Conclusions 15

Recommendations 15

Comments 15

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology                                                                                                       17

  

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 19

Appendix III: Comments from NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/

             Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan                 24          

TABLES

Table 1: Completion Dates and Award Amounts for the Kunduz ANA Garrison                                               4

Table 2: Modifications to Contract W9PM‐08‐C‐0033, Phase I                                                                            5

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: Map of Provinces in Afghanistan                                                                                                               2

Figure 2: Master Plan of Kunduz ANA Garrison, Phase I                                                                                        3

Photo 1: Poor Quality Welds on Sway Bracing at Kunduz ANA Garrison                                                            6

Photo 2: Rust on Steel Supports at Kunduz ANA Garrison                                                                                    7

Photo 3: Guardhouse and Wall on Soil that Has Settled at Kunduz ANA Garrison                                           8

Photo 4: Soil with Underground Cavity at Kunduz ANA Garrison                                                                        8

Photo 5: Settling along the Embedded Training Team Compound Wall at Kunduz ANA Garrison                9

Photo 6:  Roadbed Showing Settling at Kunduz ANA Garrison                                                                           10

Photo 7: Lack of Grading that Contributed to Soil Settling at Kunduz ANA Garrison                                     11
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page iv 

ACRONYMS

AED‐North Afghanistan Engineer District‐North  

ANA Afghanistan National Army

COR Contracting Officer’s Representative  

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

MOD Ministry of Defense

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition

Command‐Afghanistan  

RE

SIGAR

Resident Engineer

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction  

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 1 

ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality Standards and Oversight

Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own

security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 1

  In 2001, the Bonn

Agreement initially set troop levels for the Afghan National Army (ANA) at 50,000.  New plans called for

the ANA to grow from 103,475, as of June 2009, to 171,600 by October 2011.  As a result of these

increases, additional facilities are needed to train, base, and house the Afghan forces.  Through fiscal

year 2009, about $25 billion has been appropriated for this purpose through the Afghanistan Security

Forces Fund, which provides the funding to train and equip the ANSF and build these facilities. The ANA

garrison, located in Kunduz Province, will house approximately 1,800 personnel.  The NATO Training

Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan (NTM‐A/CSTC‐A)2 is providing

$72.8 million to construct the garrison in two phases. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

Afghanistan Engineer District‐North (AED‐North)3 awarded two firm fixed‐price contracts for program

management and oversight of Phases I and II to DynCorp International LLC.

This report addresses (1) whether the Kunduz garrison was constructed within the terms of the contract,

including schedule and cost; 4 (2) whether USACE oversight of the Kunduz garrison construction was

conducted in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), USACE requirements, and

oversight provisions of the contract; and (3) what NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s overall justification for the garrison

was and what plans it has for sustainment of ANSF facilities.   

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed all contracts, statements of work, modifications, and

contract files for the Kunduz garrison.5

  We examined criteria and guidance in the FAR and the AED

                                                           

1 ANSF includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

  

2 NTM‐A/CSTC‐A was created in November 2009 and operates with a single commander for both the U.S.‐led CSTC‐

A and NATO. The mission provides training for the ANA, including defense colleges and academies, develops

doctrine, and trains and mentors the Afghan National Police.

3 AED officially divided into two sections on August 3, 2009. AED‐South handles construction in Regional

Commands South and West, and AED‐North handles construction in Regional Commands North and East.

4 Firm fixed‐price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s

cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full

responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. Firm fixed‐price contracts require the contractor to deliver

services within an agreed‐upon schedule and cost to the United States. Throughout this report, we refer to “cost”

as the cost to NTM‐A/CSTC‐A to provide this garrison.  

5 The FAR defines a contract modification as a minor change in the details of a provision or clause that is

specifically authorized by the FAR and does not alter the substance of the provision or clause.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 2 

District Level Quality Assurance Plan (DLQAP) for Construction, dated December 15, 2008.  We

interviewed officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, AED‐North, USACE, and DynCorp International LLC, and

conducted a site inspection of the Kunduz ANA garrison on January 26‐28, 2010. We conducted our

work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from November 2009 to April 2010 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Appendix I presents a more detailed discussion

of our scope and methodology. This report is one in a series of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction (SIGAR) performance audits that examine contract cost, schedule, and outcome;

oversight; and sustainment.   

BACKGROUND

NTM‐A/CTSC‐A, in partnership with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the

international community, plans and implements reforms of the ANSF to develop a stable Afghanistan,

strengthen rule of law, and defeat terrorism within its border. NTM‐A/CTSC‐A provides advisors,

mentors, and trainers to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A is

providing $72.8 million for the Kunduz ANA garrison.  See figure 1 for a map of the provinces in

Afghanistan.  

Figure 1: Map of Provinces in Afghanistan

Source: SIGAR, April 23, 2010.   

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

PAKISTAN

IRAN

CHINA

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 3 

The Kunduz ANA garrison will house approximately 1,800 personnel, as well as embedded trainers at the

garrison.  The project has been divided into two phases.   These phases include:  

 Phase I – barracks, storage facilities, dining facility, and embedded training team compound for

U.S. trainers.6

  

 Phase II – additional barracks, a medical clinic, and a detention facility.

Figure 2 provides the master plan for Phase 1.   

Figure 2: Master Plan of Kunduz ANA Garrison, Phase I

Source: USACE, January 2010.

                                                           

6 Current plans are that the embedded training team compound will house German soldiers to work with the ANA

battalions. According to USACE, the construction of this compound is not supposed to be funded through ASFF, as

the use of those funds is restricted for the training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghanistan National Security

Forces. During the course of this review, SIGAR requested clarification from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A on the source of funds

used to pay for the construction of the compound.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 4 

CONSTRUCTION OF THE KUNDUZ GARRISON IS NOT WITHIN THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE   

Phases I and II are both behind their original schedule but both phases are expected to be completed by

August 1, 2010. The cost of Phase I, awarded for more than $30 million, has increased by more than $19

million because AED‐North exercised 34 options7 in the original contract to upgrade and expand the

garrison. Phase II has not experienced any cost increases.  The project has significant quality assurance

issues, which include poor quality welds, rust on steel supports, and serious soil stability issues. Table 1

shows the status of the cost and schedule for the garrison’s two phases. The construction delays have

forced ANA to house troops in tents.

Table 1: Completion Dates and Award Amounts for the Kunduz ANA Garrison

Phase Original

Completion Date

Current

Completion Date

Original Award

Amount

Current Award

Amount

Percentage

Completea

I Jan. 10, 2009 Aug. 1, 2010 $30.3 million $49.5 millionb 77

II June 16, 2009 Aug. 1, 2010 $23.3 million $23.3 million 58

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

Notes:

a Percentages as of April 7 and 8, 2010. b The original award amount increased $19 million due to 34 options AED exercised.

Phase I Is Behind Schedule and Costs Have Increased Due to Exercising Options in the

Contract

Although Phase I was to be initially completed on January 10, 2009, and extended until March 1, 2009,

the current anticipated completion date is August 1, 2010, according to AED‐North documentation.  

AED‐North awarded Phase I of the Kunduz ANA garrison to DynCorp International LLC on February 28,

2008, for about $30.3 million.  AED‐North issued four modifications to the Phase I contract resulting in

cost increases of about $19.2 million.  The cost increase resulted from AED‐North exercising 34 options

listed in the original contract.  Table 2 summarizes the modifications to the contract.

                                                           

7 Options are line items identified in the original contract as additions that may be included in the contract at the

request of the contracting authority. The options are exercised by means of a contract modification.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 5 

Table 2: Modifications to Contract W9PM‐08‐C‐0033, Phase I

Modification Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

P00001 April 8, 2008 Exercised four options, including

solid waste collection point;

paints, oil, lubricants building;

vehicle re‐fueling point; access

road

Cost increased by more

than $1 million

P00003 May 24, 2008 Added a bread oven and

buildings to house the ovens

No change

A00001 May 25, 2008 Upgraded systems for water

supply,sewage treatment and

sewer, and power supply

Completion date extended

to March 1, 2009

P00002 June 15, 2008 Exercised 30 options including an

anti‐vehicle trench; battalion

headquarters and storage;

bachelor officer quarters;

bunkers; communications

building; garrison headquarters;

infantry barracks; motor pool;

and four toilet/shower/laundry/

ablution buildings

Cost increased by more

than $18 million

Source:  SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

According to AED‐North officials, as of April 7, 2010, Phase I was 77 percent complete.  Additionally,

AED‐North has made payments of more than $38 million toward the total contract cost of Phase I.  

Because DynCorp did not meet the terms of the contract’s schedule, certain monetary damages8 may be

assessed at the completion of Phase I.  At that point, AED‐North and DynCorp will determine the final

amount of damages that DynCorp will provide to AED‐North.

Phase II Is Behind Schedule with No Cost Increases

Although Phase II was to be completed by June 16, 2009, according to AED‐North documentation the

current anticipated completion date is August 1, 2010.  AED‐North awarded Phase II of the Kunduz ANA

garrison to DynCorp International LLC on July 6, 2008, for $23.3 million.  AED‐North has not issued any

modifications to the contract for Phase II.  According to AED‐North, as of April 8, 2010, Phase II is 58

percent complete. Additionally, AED‐North has made payments of more than $13 million toward the

total cost of Phase II. Because DynCorp did not meet the terms of the contract’s schedule, certain

                                                           

8 These damages, also called liquidated or ascertained damages, are the amount the parties designate during

contract negotiation that the injured party will collect as compensation if a breach in contract occurs, such as late

performance.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 6 

monetary damages may be assessed at the completion of Phase II.  At that point, AED‐North and

DynCorp will determine the final amount of damages that DynCorp will provide to AED‐North.  

Some Issues with Construction Quality Indicate a Lack of Quality Control and Oversight  

We conducted an inspection of the Kunduz garrison on January 26‐28, 2010, and identified quality

assurance issues with the construction.  We observed poor quality welds and rust forming on the steel

roof support beams.   According to quality assurance reports, the poor quality welds and rust were an

ongoing problem that AED‐North and DynCorp were addressing prior to our site inspection. At that time,

we noted that these issues still needed to be addressed. In addition, we observed serious soil stability

issues that led to damaged structures.  Finally, we observed improper grading at the site.  

Poor Quality Welds Indicate Lack of Quality Control and Quality Assurance Oversight

We observed that welds on sway bracing in barracks and other facilities on the garrison were not in

compliance with welding standards as specified in the contract by reference to the American Welding

Society code.9

  We visually inspected the welds and found them to be irregular, filled with holes, and

lacking the required continuity or section buildup. The cause appeared to be poor welding technique

likely due to inadequately trained welders and poor or non‐existent quality control and quality

assurance.  As a result, the deficient welds create a structural system that is incapable of providing

adequate support. A heavy load may cause the sway bracing to fail and the roof to sag or collapse. See

photo 1 for depiction of poor welds.

Photo 1: Poor Quality Welds on Sway Bracing at Kunduz ANA Garrison

Source: SIGAR, January 27, 2010.

                                                           

9 American Welding Society, 1998 Structural Welding Code.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 7 

Rust on Steel Supports

We observed that rust was breaking through the coat of primer that covered the sway bracing and the

roof purlins10 at various locations.  Oxidation or rust occurred because the primer coat had been applied

too thinly and moisture had formed on the exposed steel. As a result, rust will damage the structural

integrity of the steel. At some point, the roof may sag or collapse.  See photo 2 for an example of rust on

the structural steel.

             Photo 2: Rust on Steel Supports at Kunduz ANA Garrison

                 Source: SIGAR, January 27, 2010.

Serious Soil Stability Issues Have Affected Structures’ Integrity

The most serious quality control issue observed on our January 2010 site inspection was severe settling

of the soil under several structures following a rainfall in December 2009.  We observed several areas

where structures were damaged and unusable as a result of settling.  For instance, photo 3 shows the

structural failure of a guard tower and adjacent stone wall caused by the settling.  Furthermore, the

roadbed at the adjacent intersection had also settled, and we observed a large area that appeared to be

collapsing into a cavity under the roadbed at this intersection (see photo 4) and at other locations

throughout the construction site.  AED‐North officials at the site stated that a large pool of water had

been at the roadbed intersection where we saw the severe settlement. This area was at the low end of

the site and rough grading had directed the rain water to this area.   

                                                           

10 A purlin is a roof support member perpendicular to and spanning the main roof support trusses or beams.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 8 

Photo 3:  Guardhouse and Wall on Soil that Has Settled  

at Kunduz ANA Garrison

Source: SIGAR, January 27, 2010.

Photo 4: Soil with Underground Cavity at Kunduz ANA Garrison

Source: SIGAR, January 27, 2010.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 9 

In January 2010, the Resident Engineer (RE) for AED‐North stated that DynCorp had submitted a request

in December 2009, to modify the contract due to “differing site conditions” to cover the costs of

repairing the damages resulting from the settling. AED‐North denied the request but was investigating

the causes of the settling. Following our site inspection, we reviewed three AED‐North reports about the

Kunduz soil issues,11 which indicated that the probable cause for the severe settling is a lack of adequate

site preparation before constructing the buildings. According to these reports, the soil at the site

appears to have the characteristics of collapsible soil (see photos 5 and 6).12  One report noted that an

AED‐North official spoke with a German Provincial Reconstruction Team engineer who stated that the

Germans were aware of the special nature of the soil.  This report notes that the Germans conducted a

soil study in 2004 and found that the soil in Kunduz was a collapsible soil.    

Photo 5:  Settling along the Embedded Training Team Compound Wall

at Kunduz ANA Garrison

Source: AED‐North, December 2009.

                                                           

11 AED‐North, Trip Report for Kunduz Investigation of Soil Surface Depressions, Dec. 19, 2009; Second Trip Report

for Kunduz Investigation of Soil Subsidence–DynCorp’s engineering efforts for their defense of claims and an interim

site visit by QAB, Feb. 4, 2010; and AED‐North, Third Report for Kunduz Investigation of Soil Subsidence—Summary

of the German Soils Report, Feb. 12, 2010.

12 Collapsible soil consists of loose, dry, low‐density materials that collapse and compact if exposed to water, such

as pooling after a heavy rainfall.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 10 

Photo 6:  Roadbed Showing Settling at Kunduz ANA Garrison

Source: AED‐North, December 2009.

This problem is further exacerbated if the site grading or slope is not sufficient to carry away excess

water.  The December 2009 AED‐North report noted that the rainfall that month caused severe soil

settling at 42 locations on the Kunduz garrison construction site.  According to a December 2009 letter

addressed to AED‐North from DynCorp, as many as 48 sites in and around the garrison show signs of

collapsed soil.  In February 2010, we noted that the condition appears to be present throughout the

garrison site and future rainfall will likely cause the soil and additional areas to collapse, jeopardizing

other structures.  In April 2010, we had further discussions with DynCorp and AED‐North officials.  While

both AED‐North and DynCorp agree that the soil under the site is a collapsible soil, they have not agreed

on a course of corrective action.

Poor Grading May Result in Future Drainage Issues

The contract requires a site grading plan for drainage and that foundations must be at least 6 inches

higher than the surrounding terrain to ensure that rainwater will drain away from the structure.  

Because the Kunduz garrison construction site is relatively flat, proper soil grading is essential.  However,

we noted the grading at the site was inconsistent and would not enable rainwater to run off the site.  As

a result, the soil issues described above were likely exacerbated.  Photo 7 shows an area around a

building where the grading does not meet the contract requirement for drainage.  The photo also shows

an area where the collapsible soils have been exposed to rain water and collapsed approximately 6 to 12

inches below the sidewalk.  If left uncorrected, future rainfalls will further damage this structure.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 11 

Photo 7:  Lack of Grading that Contributed to Soil  

Settling at Kunduz ANA Garrison

Source: AED‐North, December 2009.

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT DID NOT MEET ALL U.S. AND CONTRACT

REQUIREMENTS

We found that contract management and oversight did not meet all U.S. and contract requirements.  

Although we found that progress payments were documented properly, quality assurance reports were

initially non‐existent.  AED‐North personnel lacked training certificates and contract files were not

maintained according to USACE guidance.  During Phase I, DynCorp was issued an interim unsatisfactory

rating for Phase I and AED‐North’s quality assurance was initially lacking but improved over time due to

new personnel.   

We found that progress payments made to the contractor for the two contracts were documented

properly. According to the FAR, the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) is responsible for

reviewing payment vouchers submitted by the contractor and for approving the payments.  For

example, AED‐North personnel meet monthly with the contractor to agree upon the percentage of

completed work that would be acceptable by the contractor and the COR for that month. The contractor

then submits the request for payment to the COR for processing.  The alternate contracting officer

reviews and approves the payment request. The contracting officer authorizes the final payment.  

We found that the lack of daily quality assurance reports indicated that the quality assurance process

was virtually non‐existent during the first 9 months of the project.  Because there were no reports, we

could not verify if materials were substituted or if foundations and other covered work were

constructed to contract requirements. According to AED‐North, security issues limited quality control

activities and prevented scheduled site visits.  According to USACE guidance, the Quality Assurance

Representative is to complete daily quality assurance reports, and each site visit must be documented

with a quality assurance report. These reports include information on the construction completed, tests

performed, security and safety issues, progress, and problems. Based on our review of these reports, we

found that the issues the Quality Assurance Representative identified were not adequately followed up
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 12 

on in subsequent reports.  However, once new personnel were assigned as COR and Quality Assurance

Representative, quality assurance reports were more frequent and more detailed.    

During our review, we were not provided training certificates of the AED‐North personnel assigned as

CORs and the RE to determine if they had received the required training. According to the USACE

guidance, AED personnel responsible for quality assurance—including area engineers, resident

engineers, and construction representatives—receive initial training at the USACE Deployment Center.

This training includes brief overviews of (1) AED organization and field office locations, (2) types of

construction undertaken in‐theater, and (3) Resident Management System software for construction

management.  Once in‐theater, AED construction personnel can take online COR training. However, we

could not determine whether they received this training because AED could not provide us with the

necessary documentation.  

Contract files were not organized according to USACE guidance or were nonexistent. According to

USACE guidance, contract files must be organized  to provide the history of the contract to in‐coming

personnel; this contributes to continuity of oversight of contractor performance. At the AED‐North

offices in Kunduz, we reviewed the contract files for Phase I and found that several key documents were

missing.  In addition, the Phase II contract files contained no documents. Adequate documentation of

contract management and contractor performance is essential to support actions taken toward the

contractor, as well as to support future decisions for corrective action on the contract. Incomplete

contract files hamper adequate monitoring and management of projects.

According to AED‐North, an interim unsatisfactory rating was issued to DynCorp on November 9, 2008,

for Phase I.  AED‐North identified issues with DynCorp’s lack of construction progress in September 2008

and requested that DynCorp submit a recovery plan and updated schedule for completing the contract

within the required contract time.  The rating identified DynCorp as behind schedule with no significant

improvement observed after 2 months into a recovery plan for the project.  Additionally, no significant

activities were observed on the ground to show DynCorp had increased its manpower in response to

concerns raised by AED‐North.  AED‐North also issued a Letter of Concern to DynCorp for delays in

Phase II of the project in July 2009.   

The interim unsatisfactory rating for Phase I did not include DynCorp’s formal response to the rating.

However, DynCorp officials cited two issues contributing to delays on the project. The initial sub‐

contractor hired did not satisfactorily perform work and was fired from the project. DynCorp

experienced problems obtaining construction materials through Afghanistan customs.

The RE and COR stated that significant improvements in construction productivity have occurred since

May 2009. The RE and COR attributed this to DynCorp’s hire of a new onsite project manager.  The

DynCorp program manager also has instituted weekly coordination meetings along with weekly

production meetings with the subcontractors. Additionally, AED‐North implemented an aggressive

schedule to ensure that DynCorp meets key project milestones.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 13 

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A LACKS OVERALL PLANNING FOR ANSF FACILITIES BUT IS DEVELOPING A

PROCESS TO MEET CHANGING REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDE FOR SUSTAINMENT  

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A was not aware of any planning documents or justification for the garrison that provided

information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops, garrison locations, or operations. As of

February 2010, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials told us that they are developing a process to capture changing

ANSF facility requirements.  In addition, because the government of Afghanistan does not have the

capacity to sustain the ANSF facilities, AED is in the process of awarding two new contracts to provide

operations and maintenance for them.  

Lack of Overall Planning for Facilities, but a Process Is Being Developed to Capture Changing

Requirements  

In February 2010, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that they were unaware of any planning documents or

justification for the garrison that provided information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops,

garrisons, locations, or operations. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided us with the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Fiscal Year 2008, Security Forces Fund Justification for Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) and

ASFF.  This funding document cited an ANA Master Plan for Facilities Development, October 2005.

However, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials were not aware of this document nor could they provide us with any

other planning documents that addressed this issue.13  

In addition, other documents we reviewed did not provide information on overall planning.  For

example, the June 2008 United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

provides details on how NTM‐A/CSTC‐A would work with MOD and Ministry of Interior  to increase

management and assessment procedures for the ANSF.  Additionally, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, in close

coordination with the government of Afghanistan, developed the Campaign Plan for the Development of

Afghan National Security Forces in September 2008.  The goals of the plan are to build and develop

ministerial institutional capability and to generate and develop the fielded forces.  However, neither of

these plans provides information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops, garrison locations, or

operations.  When we asked NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials for any overall planning or justification documents

used for the construction of the garrison, they stated that they were unaware of any overall plans or

justification documents.  An overall planning document or justification for the garrison is important for

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A and the MOD to ensure that, as requirements change, the initial scope can be adapted

as needed and resources can be prioritized and used effectively to achieve strategic goals.   

Without an updated strategy that reflects current ANSF requirements, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A runs the risk of

building facilities that do not meet ANA needs. For example, a senior NTM‐A/CSTC‐A official stated that

it may be possible that a garrison built based on 2006 plans and perceived needs would have different

                                                           

13 In April 2010, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided us a document referred to as a “Conceptual Master Plan for the ANA”

that was developed in the spring and summer of 2006.  The document addresses the mission and facility

requirements for a number of ANA command level organizations—including the Kabul Military Training Center, a

Ministry of Defense Compound, a Medical Command, an Acquisition Agency, and an Afghan National Army

Training Command.  The planning and analysis of these ANA facilities appears detailed and comprehensive.  

However, the plan provided to us does not address ANA garrisons, is not signed or dated, and is missing numerous

pages.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 14 

needs 5 years later. He stated that, to address these concerns, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A is creating a process to

capture the changing requirements of the garrisons as they move forward to help ensure that

adjustments can be made if requirements change from those originally envisioned.   

The Government of Afghanistan Does Not Have the Capacity to Sustain the ANSF Facilities,

but Goal of New Contracts Is to Provide for Sustainment of Facilities and Training of Afghans

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that the government of Afghanistan does not have the financial or

technical capacity to sustain Kunduz or other ANSF facilities once they are completed. Since 2002, the

United States and the international community have provided funding for sustainment of the ANA.  

According to the NTM‐A/CSTC‐A 2008 campaign plan, future costs of sustainment may continue through

2025.  In September 2006, AED awarded an operations and maintenance contract for $200 million to

Contrack International Inc. to provide for the sustainment of ANSF facilities. When the current contract

expired on October 15, 2009, AED exercised an option to extend the ANA contract with Contrack

International Inc. for 6 months. Currently, Contrack International Inc. is not conducting operations and

maintenance at Kunduz since the project is not complete.  

According to the AED program manager for operations and maintenance, two new contracts for

operations and maintenance for ANSF facilities will be awarded by May 21, 2010. These contracts will

cover ANA and ANP facilities in northern and southern Afghanistan for $450 million and $350 million,

respectively. According to the program manger, these contracts will be for 1 base year plus 4 optional

years. These contracts will be indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts14 with task orders for

operations and maintenance activities written against the contracts for specific locations.  According to

the program mangager for operations and maintenance, a total of 663 sites will be covered over the life

of these contracts.  However, not all sites are completed and will be added with task orders as

warranted.   

According to the AED official program manager for operations and maintenance, the new contracts will

require a training program for Afghan workers in all aspects of operations and maintenance.  The

program will be expanded with each additional year to include all regions in Afghanistan. According to

the program manager, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A plans to transfer responsibility for all operations and

maintenance for the ANSF facilites to the government of Afghanistan by 2013.  The contractor will train

Afghans to support these functions. The MOD will begin taking responsibility in selected locations

beginning in 2010 with all locations phased in over time.  The additional option years for the contract

would be included if all the ANSF facilities are not turned over by 2013.   

   

                                                           

14 Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact

times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 15 

CONCLUSIONS

The Kunduz ANA garrison is scheduled for completion in August 2010 at an increased cost of about

$19.2 million because AED‐North exercised certain contract options to upgrade and expand the garrison.

We found several construction issues, including poor welds and rust on roof supports that may cause

roofs to sag or collapse.  The most serious issue we observed, however, was the severe settling of the

soil around several structures that occurred after a rainfall in December 2009.  As a result, a guard

tower, wall, and road bed have been severely damaged, and since that time, additional damage has

occurred.  The soil condition is aggravated by inadequate grading at the site that contributes to pooling

of water and flooding, which further exacerbates the problem.  In addition, AED‐North did not meet

certain USACE requirements for conducting oversight and maintaining contract files.  The United States

has paid more than $51 million out of the current contracts’ value of $72.8 million to build this garrison

in support of ANA operations in Kunduz Province.  To protect U.S. investment in the garrison and

provide a functioning center for ANA troops currently housed in tents outside the garrison, the issues

we observed—most critically, the soil settling and site grading—need to be addressed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SIGAR is making three recommendations to address construction issues observed at the site and to

improve oversight.  

To ensure the structural integrity of the construction of the Kunduz garrison, SIGAR recommends that

the U.S. Commanding General, USACE, direct AED‐North to address the following construction issues:

1. Repair the welds and mitigate the rust on steel supports on the affected structures; and  

2. Resolve the soil stability issue and determine what mitigation or corrective actions are required

for DynCorp to complete the garrison,  including ensuring that the site is properly graded.

Furthermore, to address contract oversight issues, SIGAR recommends that  the U.S. Commanding

General, USACE, direct  AED‐North to:

1. Ensure the Kunduz garrison’s contract files are maintained according to USACE guidance.

COMMENTS

USACE and NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided written comments on a draft of this report.  The comments are

reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively.  We also met with DynCorp International officials and

discussed the draft report with them.   

In its response, USACE stated that it concurred with the report’s recommendations and has taken or is

taking corrective actions.  USACE specifically noted that corrective actions on the improper welds and

rust formation had been initiated by AED‐North and DynCorp prior to our site inspection in January

2010.  In addition, USACE provided a 14‐page technical fact sheet on the collapsible soils at Kunduz
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 16 

dated April 12, 2010.  The fact sheet was similar to other AED‐North documentation we reference in the

text of our report; therefore, we did not reproduce it as part of USACE’s comments.  However, USACE

noted that AED‐North and the contractor are pursuing an appropriate resolution to this problem.  It

specifically noted that DynCorp is revising its drainage plan and correcting the deficiencies caused by the

soil subsidence.  USACE also provided some technical comments that we incorporated into this report,

as appropriate.   

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A stated in its response that it concurred with the draft report.  It did not specifically

comment on the recommendations nor take issue with our description of current plans to provide for

the operations and maintenance of the facilities.  However, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A commented on our

observation that it could not locate any planning documents or justification for the garrison that

provided information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops, garrison locations, or operations.  

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A stated that we did not reflect the true state of NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s operational planning.  

We understand and appreciate NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s position, namely, that the rapid operational pace and

changing ANA requirements over the last few years cannot be understated.  We also did not question

the strategic positioning of the Kunduz garrison or whether the garrison requirements were given

proper scrutiny.  Rather, we questioned why the strategic and tactical requirements for Kunduz and

other ANA garrisons had not been more formally documented.  In its comments, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A noted

that this point is well taken and specifically noted that access to original documentation must be better

for both assessing the continued validity of the requirement and for audit purposes.  NTM‐A/CSTC‐A

also provided a number of technical comments and suggestions that we incorporated throughout the

report, as appropriate.    

Finally, in a meeting with DynCorp officials, they basically concurred with the information we presented.  

As did USACE, they noted that corrective action on the improper welds and rust spots had begun before

our site inspection in January.  Finally, DynCorp noted that its major concern is that the cause of the soil

collapse is not yet fully understood.  According to DynCorp, it has not reached a consensus with AED‐

North on the root cause of the soil anomalies.  As of April 21, 2010, DynCorp had a team of geological

and structural experts in Kunduz to further investigate the cause of the soil collapse.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 17 

APPENDIX I:  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction’s review of the CSTC‐A project to construct a garrison in Kunduz. This report addresses

(1) whether the Kunduz garrison was constructed within the terms of the contract, including schedule

and cost; (2) whether United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) oversight of the Kunduz garrison

construction was conducted in accordance with the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR), USACE

requirements, and oversight provisions of the contract; and (3) what NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s overall

justification for the garrison was and what plans it has for sustainment of ANSF facilities.       

To examine contract outcomes, including schedule and cost, we met with officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A,

AED‐North, USACE, and DynCorp international LLC. We reviewed the contracts, statements of work,

notices to proceed, and modifications for Phases I and II. We conducted a site inspection of the Kunduz

ANA garrison during January 26‐28, 2010, to observe the project and identify any quality assurance

issues that AED‐North would need to address. We used computer processed data from the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers’ Resident Management System to determine the progress and payments made to

date for each contract we reviewed. In addition, the Resident Management System provided

information on issues and challenges for each contract. We verified information in the system with hard‐

copy contract files. Though the Resident Management System had some minor errors, we determined

that these data were sufficient for the purposes of our review.

To examine the contracting process and oversight, we met with officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, AED‐

North, and DynCorp international LLC.  We reviewed criteria and guidance in the FAR and the AED

District Level Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008, to determine if the

contracting process and oversight of the contract met requirements.  Additionally, we reviewed AED

guidance to determine the roles and responsibilities for AED personnel. We reviewed contract award

documentation, solicitation paperwork, contract, statement of work, notices to proceed, and

modifications for the Kunduz garrison to determine if the contracting process met criteria established in

USACE guidance. We reviewed the contract files for Kunduz to determine if the contract files were

maintained according to USACE guidance.  We reviewed and analyzed a judgmental sample of the

quality assurance reports and the quality control plans for each contract to determine if the COR’s

oversight met USACE guidance. We reviewed the progress payments obtained from AED‐North to

determine if payments made on the contract were done so in accordance with the FAR and USACE

guidance.  We reviewed the unsatisfactory rating DynCorp received to determine the reasons for the

delays for Phase I. In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit

objectives regarding the administration and oversight of the project. Specifically, we identified and

reviewed internal and management control procedures required by the FAR and the AED District Level

Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008. We relied on available documents in

the contract files and analyzed these documents to determine if the internal controls for this project

were adequate. The specific results of our review are contained in the findings sections of the report.

To examine U.S. government efforts to transfer the project to the government of Afghanistan and

provide for its sustainment, we met with officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A and AED‐North to identify any

sustainment plans the government of Afghanistan has in place.  We reviewed the current operations

and maintenance contract to determine the total cost to sustain the ANSF facilities. We also reviewed
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 18 

CSTC‐A’s Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces and the June 2008

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces.

This report is one in a series of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction performance

audits that examines contract cost, schedule, and outcome; oversight; and sustainment.  We conducted

work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from November 2009 to April 2010 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was

conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the

authority of Public Law No. 110‐181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 19 

APPENDIX II:  COMMENTS FROM U.S. THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

See SIGAR

comment 1.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 20 

See SIGAR

comment 1.

See SIGAR

comment 2.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 21 

See SIGAR

comment 3.

See SIGAR

comment 4.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 22 

See SIGAR

comment 5.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 23 

The following are SIGAR’s comments on USACE’s letter dated April 26, 2010:

1. The 14‐page fact sheet was similar to other AED‐North documentation we reference in the text of

the report; therefore, we did not reproduce it as part of USACE’s comments.   

2. We commend AED‐North and DynCorp International for correcting the improper welds and rust

issues we observed.  At the time of our site inspection in January 2010, the Quality Assurance

Representative we spoke with did not state that corrective actions were under way.   In addition, QA

reports subsequent to our site inspection cited the SIGAR visit as a reason to take corrective action.  

We have modified the report accordingly.  

3. We do not have access to the Resident Management System or to USACE’s shared drive.  

Additionally, AED‐North informed us that the hard copy contract files are the official files for these

contracts.  We reviewed the files provided.   

4. As noted in the draft report, we received virtually no quality assurance reports from AED‐North

covering the first 9 months of the project.  In a meeting with us on April 7, 2010, AED‐North said

they had the missing reports and would provide them to us but did not.  We have modified the

report to note that security issues limited quality control activities and prevented scheduled site

visits.  

5. At the time of our site inspection, we relied on statements made by the RE and COR that the

“contract was written incorrectly” and the facilities were overpriced.  Based on subsequent

discussions with AED‐North and DynCorp, we agree that the nature of firm, fixed‐price contracts

does not give AED‐North a vehicle to reduce the contract line item value or recover funds once the

contract is entered into.  Therefore, we have deleted the discussion of the temporary structures

from the final report.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 24 

APPENDIX III:  COMMENTS FROM NATO TRAINING MISSION‐AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND‐AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 25 

See SIGAR

comment 1.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 26 

See SIGAR

comments 2

and 3.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 27 

See SIGAR

comment 5.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 6.

See SIGAR

comments 2

and 4.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 28 

See SIGAR

comments 7.  

See SIGAR

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 29 
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 30 

The following are SIGAR’s comments on NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s letter dated April 23, 2010:

1. Correction made.

2. We changed footnote 4, page 1, to better define a firm fixed‐price contract and define cost.  

Throughout the report, we use the term “cost” to refer to the eventual cost of the garrison to the

United States.  We understand that under the terms of a firm fixed‐price contract, a contractor’s

costs are normally not negotiable, and we are not referring to the contractor’s costs.  Rather, we are

referring to the costs of constructing the garrison as part of U.S. efforts to train and equip the ANA .   

3. As we noted in the text of the report, the ANA Master Facilities Plan dated October 2005 was

referred to in a budget justification document for fiscal year 2008 provided to us by NTM‐A/CSTC‐A.  

We asked NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials for a copy of this 2005 Master Plan and any updates to it.  NTM‐

A/CSTC‐A could not locate such a document, nor did they refer us to CJ7.  Additionally, we asked

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to help locate a copy.  After we submitted a draft of this report

for comment, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided us a document referred to as a “Conceptual Master Plan for

the ANA” that was developed in the spring and summer of 2006.  CENTCOM also provided some

additional information about this document, including some additional pages.  The document

addresses the mission and facility requirements for a number of ANA command level

organizations—including the Kabul Military Training Center, a Ministry of Defense Compound, a

Medical Command, an Acquisition Agency, and an Afghan National Army Training Command.  The

planning and analysis of these ANA facilities appears detailed and comprehensive.  However, the

plan provided to us does not address ANA garrisons, is not signed or dated, and is missing numerous

pages.

4. According to USACE’s Resource Management System and other AED‐North documentation and

officials from AED‐North and DynCorp International, Phases I and II are behind schedule.  We also

did not mean to imply that exercising contract options was an unexpected cost to the United States

and have made this clear throughout the report.    

5. We modified the report to indicate that the diagram shown in figure 2 does not show Phase II of the

Kunduz ANA garrison.  

6. We modified the report to indicate that current plans call for housing German soldiers at the

embedded training team compound.  

7. At the time of our site inspection, we relied on statements made by the RE and COR that the

“contract was written incorrectly” and the facilities were overpriced.  In subsequent discussions with

AED‐North and DynCorp, we agree that the nature of firm, fixed‐price contracts does not give AED‐

North a vehicle to reduce the contract line item value or recover funds once the contract is entered

into.  Therefore, we have deleted the discussion of the temporary structures from the final report.  

(This report was completed under the audit project code SIGAR‐015A).
SIGAR Audit‐10‐09 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 31 

_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission    The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of

taxpayer dollars and related funds.  SIGAR works to provide

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and

other decision‐makers to make informed oversight, policy, and

funding decisions to:

 improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy

and its component programs;

 improve management and accountability over funds

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their

contractors;

 improve contracting and contract management processes;

 prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

 advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

   

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR     To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to  

Reports and Testimonies    SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil).  SIGAR posts all released  

                                                                         reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and     To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting  

Abuse in Afghanistan       allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs    reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:          

 Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

 Email: hotline@sigar.mil

 Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700‐10‐7300

 Phone DSN Afghanistan 318‐237‐2575

 Phone International: +1‐866‐329‐8893

 Phone DSN International: 312‐664‐0378

 U.S. fax: +1‐703‐604‐0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

 Phone: 703‐602‐8742  

 Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil  

 Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202