COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LESLIE BOYD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1515-95-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 26, 1996 

HAROLD L. BOYD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

J. Peyton Farmer, Judge 

 Nicholas A. Pappas (Nicholas A. Pappas & Associates, 

 on briefs), for appellant. 

 John A. Nere, Jr. for appellee. 

 Leslie Boyd (wife) appeals the trial court's final decree of 

divorce, in which the court refused to make an equitable 

distribution award or reserve continuing jurisdiction over the 

matter. Wife contends that the trial court was required to rule 

on the issue of equitable distribution when she requested such in 

her bill of complaint and proposed decree. Because wife's 

argument is procedurally defaulted, we may not consider it on 

appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision. 

 Wife filed a bill of complaint for divorce from Harold Boyd 

(husband) on January 18, 1995, in the Circuit Court of 

Spotsylvania County. In her bill of complaint, wife requested 

equitable distribution of the couple's property pursuant to Code 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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§ 20-107.3. Husband also requested equitable distribution of the 

couple's property in his cross-bill. At a pendente lite hearing 

on March 6, 1995, the trial court noted that the parties had been 

separated for over one year and suggested that all remaining 

issues be resolved and a final decree of divorce be submitted to 

the trial court by June 5, 1995. On April 6, 1995, husband's 

attorney arranged for depositions of husband and his sister; the 

deponents offered information concerning the parties' marital 

property. 

 At a June 9, 1995 hearing, wife presented the trial court 

with a proposed decree (sketch order) containing a provision 

which (1) reserved for future adjudication and hearing the issue 

of equitable distribution and (2) reserved to the trial court 

continuing jurisdiction over this matter. At the same hearing, 

husband presented a proposed decree which made no mention of 

equitable distribution. While the trial court considered a 

number of issues at the hearing, neither party broached the issue 

of equitable distribution. After the trial court decided to 

adopt husband's proposed decree, wife did not object on the 

grounds that the trial court was required to equitably distribute 

the marital property. Wife now appeals the trial court's final 

order to this Court. 

 We hold that Rule 5A:18 procedurally bars this Court from 

considering wife's argument on appeal. See, e.g., Jacques v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991). 
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Furthermore, this case does not meet the "ends of justice 

exception" to Rule 5A:18. See, e.g., Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 

Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987). 

 The statement of facts in the record reveals that at the 

trial court's hearing, wife presented her proposed decree to the 

court but presented no evidence relating to property ownership. 

The trial court therefore lacked a basis to equitably distribute 

the property at the hearing. Wife did not request additional 

time to present such evidence, if such time were needed. 

Furthermore, wife did not make any specific argument concerning 

equitable distribution at the hearing or at any time during the 

pendency of the suit. The trial court, which considered a number 

of issues at the hearing, including child custody and support, 

may have validly assumed, in the absence of anything to indicate 

otherwise, that the parties had resolved all property issues and 

had dropped their original requests for equitable distribution. 

Again, we note that at no time did wife object to the entry of 

husband's proposed decree on the grounds that the trial court was 

required to make an equitable distribution of marital property. 

 In light of these factors, Rule 5A:18 limits our review of 

this issue, as wife did not "state the basis for an objection 

with sufficient specificity to enable the trial judge to consider 

the issue intelligently." Head v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 163, 

167, 348 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1986). As we have said, a trial court 

"is not required to search for objections which counsel have not 
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discovered." Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948, 952-53, 

408 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1991). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision. 

Affirmed.