OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan 

Security Force Assessments

June 29, 2010

SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capabilty Ratings
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

June 29, 2010

The Honorable Robert Gates 

Secretary of Defense

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

 Commander, International Security Assistance Force 

Lieutenant General David M. Rodriguez

Commander, International Security Assistance Force

 Joint Command

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV

Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, and

 Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of a performance audit of the assessment system used to evaluate the 

capabilities of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). It includes ten recommendations for 

ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and three for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) intended to improve the reliability of future ANSF 

assessments and to support U.S. and international efforts to develop ANSF capabilities.

A summary of this report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181

and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final report, we considered 

comments from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Copies of these 

comments are included in appendices II, III, IV, and V of this report.

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page ii

 SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-10-11 June 2010

Actions Needed to Improve the 

Reliability of Afghan Security Force 

Assessments

What SIGAR Reviewed 

The development of self-sufficient Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capable of independently providing 

internal and external security for Afghanistan is a key goal of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. For the last 5 years, 

the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system has been the primary metric for measuring the development of ANSF 

capabilities against end-state goals. In late 2009, responsibility for the management of ANSF capability

assessments moved from NTM-A/CSTC-A to IJC. This review—the first independent evaluation of the CM rating 

system since its creation in 2005—assesses (1) the reliability of the Capability Milestone rating system; (2) 

summary reports provided to decision-makers; (3) challenges to U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts; and (4) 

systemic ANSF deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop unit-level capabilities. To accomplish these 

objectives, we conducted interviews with responsible U.S., Coalition, and Afghan officials; reviewed ANSF 

assessment documents from IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A; and visited 18 Afghan army and police units. We conducted 

our work in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan from October 2009 to May 2010 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

What SIGAR Found 

As the United States and international community aim to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces, 

having a reliable system for monitoring progress toward that objective is critical. The CM rating system has not 

provided reliable or consistent assessments of ANSF capabilities. For example:

 Measurements used in the assessment system have overstated operational capabilities.

 Top-rated ANSF units have not indicated a capability to sustain independent operations. 

 The CM rating system has inadvertently created disincentives for ANSF development.

 ANSF capability reports have included outdated assessment data.

In addition to these weaknesses, serious challenges affect U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts, including security 

conditions, mentor shortages, and inadequate training. Further, systemic ANSF deficiencies have undermined 

efforts to develop unit capabilities. These include logistics problems, personnel attrition, inadequate personnel 

authorizations, infrastructure deficiencies, corruption, drug abuse, and illiteracy. In late April 2010, IJC replaced the 

CM rating system with a new unit-level assessment called the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). SIGAR 

has not yet assessed the CUAT system; however, the principles and recommendations in this report remain 

relevant to whatever system is in place for evaluating the operational effectiveness of fielded ANSF units.

What SIGAR Recommends 

To improve the reliability of ANSF capability assessments, SIGAR is making ten recommendations to IJC to improve 

the measurement, validation, and reporting of assessment results; to increase visibility into Afghan police 

capabilities; and to counteract perverse incentives that have accompanied the use of ANSF assessment systems. 

SIGAR is also making three recommendations to NTM-A/CSTC-A to improve compliance with ministerial logistics 

systems, help offset the effects of personnel attrition, and improve operational effectiveness by extending driver 

training.

IJC concurred or partially concurred with all ten recommendations. NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with all three 

recommendations. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 2

Capability Milestone Ratings Have Not Provided Reliable Assessments of ANSF Effectiveness 5

Summary Reports Included Outdated Data and Overstated ANSF Capabilities 12

U.S. And Coalition Assessment Efforts Have Faced Challenges 15

Systemic ANSF Deficiencies Have Undermined Efforts to Develop Unit Capabilities 17

Conclusions 21

Recommendations 21

Comments 23

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix II: Comments from ISAF Joint Command 26

Appendix III: Comments from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan 32

Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) 44

Appendix V: Comments from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) 46

Tables and Figures

Table 1: IJC’s Afghan Army CM Ratings as of March 29, 2010 2

Table 2: IJC’s Afghan Police CM Ratings as of March 29, 2010 2

Table 3: Varying Definitions for CM1 10

Table 4: Missing Police Assessments, September 2009 to February 2010 12

Figure 1: CM Assessment Procedures, as of March 2010 4
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page iv

ACRONYMS

ADAB ANSF Development Assistance Bureau

ANA Afghanistan National Army

ANCOP Afghanistan National Civil Order Police

ANP Afghanistan National Police 

ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces

AUP Afghanistan Uniform Police

AWOL Absent Without Leave

CE Capability Endorsement

CUAT Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool

DOD Department of Defense

FPDD Focused Police District Development

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

IDR In-District Reform

IJC ISAF Joint Command

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOI Ministry of Interior

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NTM-A/CSTC-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition 

 Command- Afghanistan

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

RC Regional Command

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

TRAT Training Readiness Assessment Tool

VTT Validation Transition Team
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 1

Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments

The development of self-sufficient Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capable of independently 

providing internal and external security for Afghanistan is a key goal of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. 

In the long term, a reliable system for monitoring progress toward that objective is critical, as the United 

States and international community aim to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces. In 

the short term, the development of ANSF capabilities is essential to the U.S. and Coalition 

counterinsurgency strategy, which calls for securing key population areas and relies on bolstering the 

Afghan people’s confidence in their government. For 5 years, the Capability Milestone (CM) rating 

system has been the primary system for measuring the development of ANSF capabilities against endstate goals. In late 2009, responsibility for the management of ANSF capability assessments moved from 

NTM-A/CSTC-A to IJC. The Department of Defense (DOD) has regularly reported CM rating summaries 

for the Afghan army and police to the President of the United States and Congress. 

This report assesses (1) the reliability of the CM rating system, (2) summary reports provided to 

decision-makers, (3) challenges to U.S. and Coalition ANSF assessment efforts, and (4) systemic ANSF 

deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop unit-level capabilities.

To accomplish these objectives, we conducted interviews with responsible U.S., Coalition, and Afghan 

officials; reviewed ANSF assessment documents from ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training 

Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A); and visited 

18 Afghan army and police units located in Regional Commands Capital, North, and East, where we 

interviewed mentors, partners, and Afghan officials. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and 

Afghanistan from October 2009 to May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. A discussion of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 2

BACKGROUND

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends on building that country’s capacity to provide for its own 

security by training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), 

collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since 2002, the United States has 

provided over $27 billion—over half of all reconstruction dollars—for ANSF training, equipping, and 

sustainment. Current ANSF force-generation goals, which were agreed to by the Afghan Government 

and the international community, call for 171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by October 2011.

Starting in 2005, the United States used the CM rating system to monitor and report on progress in 

developing fielded Afghan security forces, which consist of the Afghanistan National Army and 

Afghanistan National Police. The CM assessment system grades Afghan army and police unit capabilities 

on a 4-point scale in which a score of 1 is awarded to the most capable units and 4 to the least.1CM 

rating definitions generally designate CM1 units as capable of conducting their primary mission with 

limited Coalition support. That definition aligns with U.S. and international strategic goals; and in official 

statements, DOD and ISAF have said that, at the CM1 level, an Afghan army or police unit is expected to 

be capable of “independent operations.” 

As of March 29, 2010, IJC reported CM ratings for 150 Afghan army and 130 Afghan police units. As 

shown in Table 1 and 2, approximately 23 percent of those army units and 12 percent of police units 

received the highest rating, CM1.

Table 1: IJC’s Afghan Army CM Ratings as of March 29, 2010 

CM1 CM 2 CM 3 CM 4 Total

ANA Units 34 53 48 15 150

Percentage of 

Total

23% 35% 32% 10% 100%

Source: SIGAR analysis of IJC data.

Table 2: IJC’s Afghan Police CM Ratings as of March 29, 2010

CM1 CM 2 CM 3 CM 4 Total

ANP Units 15 38 52 25 130

Percentage of Total 12% 29% 40% 19%

Source: SIGAR analysis of IJC data.

Assessment methods for evaluating army and police units have differed. U.S. and Coalition military 

mentors and partners working with ANSF units have had responsibility for performing monthly CM 

rating assessments at the army kandak (battalion) level and the police district or precinct level.2 

Mentors guide and advise ANSF units. Partners do the same, but also share an area of responsibility 

 

1

The CM system has also been used by NTM-A/CSTC-A to rate the capacity of the Ministries of Defense and

Interior; however, this report focuses exclusively on the assessment of fielded forces.

2

As of April 2010, IJC moved to a 6-week assessment cycle.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 3

with their assigned ANSF units, frequently co-locating and jointly training, planning, and executing 

operations.3

Under the CM rating system, police mentors and partners use a structured evaluation form called the 

Capability Endorsement (CE) checklist. CM ratings for Afghan police units depended on assessment of 

the following factors:

 personnel (including payroll and personnel systems), 

 equipping (including maintenance, supply and property accountability systems), 

 facilities, 

 training, and 

 proficiencies in security sector functions (including command and control, intelligence, and force 

protection). 

By contrast, army mentors and partners conducted CM assessments using a less structured, more 

subjective approach submitted in various formats. CM ratings for Afghan army units were based on 

assessments of the following factors:

 personnel, 

 command and control, 

 training, 

 sustainment, 

 equipment on-hand, 

 equipment readiness, and 

 an overall assessment measure.

For both police and army units, after monthly assessment reports were completed at the unit level, they 

were gathered at the regional command level; results were then passed up to the ISAF Joint Command 

(IJC).4At IJC, the ANSF Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) had responsibility for performing quality 

control checks and for aggregating assessment data into a comprehensive briefing called the Transition 

Readiness Assessment Tool (TRAT). The TRAT included a final summary of CM results for each 

assessment cycle. (See figure 1 for CM assessment procedures.)

During the course of our review, changes were made to reshape the ANSF development program, 

including a realignment of ISAF’s command and control structure. To achieve greater unity of command 

and improve operational effectiveness, General McChrystal, Commander of ISAF, established IJC in 

October 2009 and NTM-A in November 2009. IJC achieved full operational capability in November 2009, 

while NTM-A did the same in February 2010. As of April 2010, DOD reported that IJC Headquarters was 

manned at 82.5 percent and NTM-A/CSTC-A at 52 percent.

 

3 Mentoring and partnering typically occurs after training, once Afghan army and police units have been fielded. 

4

The CM rating system was designed to be used at the army kandak (battalion) or police district/precinct level. For 

example, CM assessments of the abilities of army brigades or corps to operate effectively as a whole were not 

performed.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 4

Figure 1: CM Assessment Procedures, as of March 2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A information.

In late March 2010, IJC told us that plans were underway to replace the CM rating system completely. 

Since its creation in late 2009, IJC has had responsibility for the management of U.S. and Coalition 

mentors and partners for fielded ANSF forces, including the assessment of ANSF capabilities. As part of 

that responsibility, IJC introduced a new process by which Regional Commands report on governance, 

development, and security for priority areas of Afghanistan. As of February 2010, the new process still 

used CM rating results for measurements of unit-level ANSF capabilities. In late April 2010, IJC ordered 

the use of a new unit-level assessment system intended to replace the CM rating system called the 

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). 
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 5

CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS HAVE NOT PROVIDED RELIABLE ASSESSMENTS OF ANSF 

EFFECTIVENESS

CM ratings have not provided consistent and reliable measures of progress toward the goal of 

developing self-sustaining security forces for Afghanistan. Methods of measurement and validation 

used to generate ANSF capability ratings contributed to a lack of equivalence in CM rating results, in 

some cases obscuring accurate measures of operational effectiveness. 

The CM Rating System Has Yielded Inconsistent Measures of ANSF Capabilities and Has 

Created Disincentives for ANSF Improvement

The inability of top-rated units to sustain their capabilities over time calls into question the effectiveness 

of the CM rating system as a reliable measure of ANSF development progress. Furthermore, the CM 

rating system created unintended disincentives for ANSF units to attain top-rated capabilities. Finally, 

similarly rated ANSF units have not always manifested similar capabilities. 

Top CM Ratings May Not Indicate the Capability to Maintain Self-Sustaining Operations

Although the United States and ISAF have stated that the attainment of “self-sustaining operations” is a

goal for ANSF development, units obtaining the top rating in the CM system, CM1, may not have the 

capacity to sustain the gains they have made. Our analysis of CM-rating histories showed significant 

levels of regression, or backsliding, in the capability levels of fielded army and police units. We 

evaluated monthly ANSF CM ratings for a 12 month period (February 2009 through January 2010) and 

found that 38 percent of army units (52 of 137 units) and 66 percent of police districts (67 of 101 

districts) had regressed at least one level during that period. When we considered only those units that 

had received the top rating, CM1, we found that 39 percent of top-rated army units (20 of 51 kandaks) 

and 71 percent of top-rated police districts (22 of 31) had regressed at least one CM rating level. Of 

those units that lost their CM1 status, 11 army units (55 percent) and 4 police units (18 percent) had 

regained their CM1 status by the January 2010 rating cycle.

Police units, in particular, have had difficulty sustaining top-level capabilities. Officials from IJC, NTMA/CSTC-A, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and DynCorp 

expressed concern about this trend, stating that CM1-rated police units require significant post-CM1 

mentoring to sustain training results and stave off regression. Mentors and partners at police districts 

we visited reported similar concerns. For example, in February 2010, a Regional Command (RC) North 

mentor team, responding to written questions we provided, stated, “The ANP will simply stop doing 

what we asked them to do as soon as we leave the area. This is especially troublesome in areas of 

security and patrolling.” Police mentor and partner team assessment reports corroborated these 

concerns. For example, an October 2009 assessment report describing a CM1-rated police unit in Orgun, 

Paktika Province, stated that “The District has well trained ANP soldiers but this training needs constant 

reinforcement.”

Police districts have experienced regressions in their assessed capabilities, due to several factors, 

including attrition of personnel, reassignments, and a lack of sustained mentoring and partnering.

 Attrition: Heavy personnel losses have been a primary cause of capability regression in police 

units. Mentors, partners, and IJC officials stated that training has not been systematically 
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 6

provided to new recruits brought in to replenish units, causing a gradual loss of trained 

personnel. 

 Reassignments: Police mentors, partners, and Afghan commanders stated and assessment 

reports confirmed that reassignments of police personnel—often to provincial police 

headquarters—were commonplace and a significant factor in reducing police units’ 

effectiveness.

 Lack of sustained mentoring/partnering: A lack of sustained mentoring/partnering—a critical 

element in supporting the development of police units—has contributed to the regression of 

some units. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials we spoke to cited NATO restrictions on mentors, 

mentor shortages, and conflicting battle space priorities as having contributed to this pattern. 

The CM rating system itself has created disincentives for ANSF units to make progress toward a CM1 

rating and, thereafter, to become independent of Coalition support. Mentor/partner support for ANA 

units at the top rating level has been minimized to re-prioritize support for lower-rated units; in the case 

of ANP units, it is withdrawn entirely. Not surprisingly, ANSF units dislike the prospect of losing U.S. and 

Coalition mentors and partners who bring with them force protection, expertise, supplies, funding, and 

prestige. According to ANSF mentors and partners and IJC officials, the potential loss of U.S. and 

Coalition support has been a direct disincentive to improvement on the part of Afghan units. In addition, 

IJC’s Validation Transition Team (VTT), which provides independent validation of CM1 capabilities for the 

Afghan army, warned against decreasing the size of mentor teams immediately following validation. The 

team reported that CM1 units generally had residual deficiencies that a reduced mentor team was not

equipped to address, and that Afghan army units feared that attaining a CM1 rating would mean “you’re 

on your own.” For police units, full withdrawal of all mentors/partners has been programmatically 

intended, once a unit has held a CM1 rating through a period of monitoring. As of March 2010, only one 

police district—Baghlan-e Jadid in Baghlan Province—had graduated to that stage, with unfortunate 

results (see “Overstated Police Capabilities: The Case of Baghlan-e Jadid,” page 13). In February 2010, 

IJC Assessments officials stated that they recognized the CM system had inadvertently provided

disincentives to development.

ANSF Units with the Same CM Ratings May Not Have Equivalent Capabilities 

CM ratings for ANSF units have provided relative, not absolute, measures of unit-level capabilities. 

Based on interviews, observations, and reviews of assessment reports, we found that relative

differences in units receiving different CM ratings were readily apparent. Specifically, units rated CM1 

were generally more capable than those rated CM2, and so forth. However, we also found that similarlyrated units in different regions were not always comparable so that one could not assume that units 

with similar ratings would have similar capabilities. In particular, Afghan army units receiving similar 

ratings in different parts of the country exhibited disparities in actual capability. Variations were 

pronounced between army units being partnered compared with those mentored. We observed that 

the more intensive nature of partnering resulted in increased developmental benefits to Afghan units. 

Additionally, planning and executing joint operations through partnering allowed U.S. and Coalition 

forces to assess firsthand the effectiveness of Afghan army units during operations. Mentoring, by 

contrast, resulted in a different type of exposure, and NATO mentors were often restricted in their 
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 7

development and assessment activities due to national caveats and guidelines that limited the scope of 

their activities.5 

The Measurement and Validation of ANSF Capabilities May Have Resulted in Overstatement 

and Variability in Assessment Results

Measures used to determine CM ratings resulted in overstated operational capabilities and a lack of 

consistency in assessment results. Inconsistencies resulted from an emphasis on quantitative measures, 

biases in personnel inputs, variable rating definitions, weaknesses in assessment tools, and a lack of 

independent validation of police capabilities.

Emphasis on Quantitative Measures Has Sometimes Obscured the Assessment of Operational 

Effectiveness

CM assessments were biased by a dependence on quantitative inputs that in some cases obscured 

reliable assessments of operational effectiveness. Quantitative measures of readiness—such as levels of 

manning and equipping—can provide important gauges of progress toward force generation goals. 

However, CM ratings depended more heavily on the measurement of supplies and personnel available 

to a unit than on subjective evaluations of the unit’s ability to perform its mission effectively.

6

As a 

result, CM ratings did not consistently provide reliable assessments of ANSF readiness. For example, our 

discussions with army and police mentors and partners revealed that in some fully supplied units poor 

leadership, corruption, and other factors had significantly diminished operational effectiveness. 

Conversely, some units lacking all authorized supplies demonstrated successful operational abilities. 

Police CM ratings were based on results from a structured questionnaire, called the Capability

Endorsement (CE) checklist system. According to police mentors and partners we interviewed, CM 

ratings for some units had been inflated by the CE form’s overdependence on raw numbers of personnel 

and equipment on hand. As a result, CM ratings resulting from use of the CE Checklist were not always 

reliable in indicating a unit’s capability level.

7

In February 2010, a police mentor team leader in Kunduz 

Province, RC-North, responding to our questions, wrote, “The CM report spits out a rating that to me 

indicates a much higher level of competence than I am trying to report... The CM Rating does not 

provide an accurate assessment of the district. If your numbers are good, the form will spit out a high 

CM rating.”

 

5

National caveats are limits imposed on the operations of international partners’ troops, to ensure those troops 

are used in a manner consistent with their national laws and policies. DOD has noted that the resulting limits on 

the operations of international partner forces may limit the ISAF Commander’s ability to utilize his forces (see 

DOD’s April 28, 2010 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p.17).

6

Seventy percent of the measures listed on the CE Checklist, which until the end of 2009 was exclusively used for 

ANP assessments, are quantitative measures of manning, training, and equipping. The balance is an aggregate 

measure of answers to 156 YES/NO/NOT OBSERVED questions. Assessments of ANA units also have relied heavily 

on quantitative measures, which constituted 50 percent of the factors used in determining a CM rating. 

7

Commanders had the authority to upgrade or downgrade a unit after the generation of a CM rating using the CE 

Checklist.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 8

Most CM assessments for Afghan army units were not created using the CE Checklist; instead, they were 

conducted using a variety of methods that had the potential to include more subjectivity. As a result, 

ANA ratings may not have been subject to the same reliance on quantitative measures. Nevertheless, 

our analysis of ANA TRAT data for March 2010 showed that of 35 CM1-rated units, 6 (over 17 percent) 

had the lowest possible “Equipment on Hand” rating, CM4, corresponding to a level of under 50 percent 

of equipment authorized. Furthermore, a NATO mentor who had worked with Afghan army units in RCSouth stated that “the CM rating system as it was used in RC South in 2008-2009 was not a reliable 

predictor of Afghan army unit effectiveness. It had no relation to an Afghan unit’s ability to operate 

independently.”

One example of the effect of the CM system’s reliance on quantitative measures emerged during our 

field observations of Afghan army and police units. We found that army and police units, including 

those rated at the highest capability level, CM1, were fully supplied with vehicles but lacked a sufficient 

number of trained drivers.8For example, Bati Kot, a top-rated police district in Nangarhar Province, had 

10 vehicles on hand, but only 3 capable drivers, at the time of our visit in March 2010. CM assessments 

had taken into account only the number of vehicles on hand, but not the number of drivers available to 

operate the vehicles.

Officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A agreed that the CM system’s reliance on quantitative measures had 

sometimes created misleading results. IJC officials stated that they expected upcoming changes to the 

ANSF assessment system and TRAT process to help remedy the problem by emphasizing qualitative 

aspects of assessment.

Personnel Measurements Have Overstated Operational Capabilities

Measurements of personnel numbers have been key quantitative inputs used to generate CM ratings for 

ANSF units. Although personnel levels have been measured differently for Afghan army and police

ratings, both methods have resulted in overstatements of unit capabilities. For the army, personnel 

measurements constituted one of six input categories used to rate the capabilities of Afghan army units. 

However, personnel inputs used in ANA unit capability assessments did not reflect operational realities, 

as they were based on measurements of the number of personnel assigned to each unit, without also 

considering the actual number of soldiers present for duty. Due to substantial absences without leave 

(AWOL) and approved absence rates, this method of evaluation has falsely inflated measures of 

personnel readiness, contributing to an overstatement of ANA capabilities.

9

The effect of substantial AWOL rates and approved absences has been significant. According to an IJC

report, as of March 2010, only 74 percent of assigned personnel were present for duty in ANA-fielded 

combat units. The ANA’s manning shortage was confirmed in statements by VTT officials who reported 

 

8

German mentors for the Afghan army’s 2nd Brigade, 209th Corps in Kunduz Province stated that a lack of capable 

drivers was one of the most significant impediments to the development of operational effectiveness. 

9 MOD’s definition of AWOL includes those personnel absent from regular duty after 24 hours. MOD does not 

consider personnel late back from leave to be AWOL. Additionally, according to officials at NTM-A/CSTC-A, an 

MOD AWOL amnesty was in place for ANA personnel through the end of the last solar year, 1388. That amnesty 

allowed troops to return to the rolls without punishment.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 9

that “foxhole strength” is often low, potentially reducing kandak (battalions) to company size.

10 Our 

analysis of CM rating records showed that, as of March 2010, 99 of 150 ANA units (66 percent) received 

a top rating for personnel. However, even with a top rating for personnel, a unit may have a low 

number of personnel present for duty. For example, as of March 2010, the 1st kandak of the 3rd Brigade, 

205th Corps, was granted a CM1 rating for personnel, based on a fill rate of 99 percent. Specifically, this

kandak had 796 personnel authorized and 795 assigned. However, the same unit had only 469

personnel present for duty, giving it a present-for-duty rate of 59 percent, which would have 

corresponded to a CM3 personnel rating. 11

Police unit capabilities also have been overstated by personnel measurements, which are one of several 

quantitative inputs used to generate CM ratings. Personnel inputs for police unit assessments have 

incorporated measures of authorized, assigned, and available personnel levels. However, the number of 

“available” personnel does not correspond with those present for duty because it includes personnel 

detailed to other locations. According to statements by police mentor and partner teams and our 

review of police unit assessment records, reassignment has been a significant problem at the district

level, leaving numerous police units without sufficient personnel to operate effectively. This challenge 

has been exacerbated by heavy requirements for manning static checkpoints and outposts, leaving very 

few police available for patrols and other mobile operations.

Data on police personnel, which have not been validated, may not be reliable, according to police 

mentors and partners. They reported that there was “no accountability” for Afghan personnel, including

no way to verify personnel reports. Within each police district, personnel are often posted at 

widespread locations, making personnel monitoring particularly challenging in non-permissive security 

conditions. Officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A, IJC, Dyncorp, State/INL, as well as police mentors in RCCapital, RC-North and RC-East, stated that ongoing monthly reporting of police personnel levels were

not reliable. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A also reported that Ministry of Interior (MOI), with U.S. and 

Coalition support, had made progress in developing a snapshot inventory of police through an ongoing 

personnel inventory.

CM Rating Level Definitions Lacked Consistency

CM rating definitions have varied, inhibiting a common understanding of rating levels among ANSF 

mentors and partners conducting unit assessments. Rating definitions have changed as the assessment 

system evolved; however, we also identified contemporaneous differences in CM rating definitions. For 

instance, an IJC FRAGO (fragmentary order) dated November 30, 2009, regarding TRAT reporting 

contained full CM rating definitions for ANA ratings and references to CE form version 5.15, which 

contained a different set of definitions.12 Furthermore, an ANA unit assessment report, completed 

shortly after the IJC FRAGO was issued, contained another definition of CM1 (see Table 3). ANSF 

mentors and partners reported that they noticed a lack of consistency in CM level definitions and were 

concerned that this would result in a lack of equivalence between assessments.

 

10 The ANA is transitioning from three to four line companies per kandak.

11 Present-for-duty as a rate constitutes the ratio of present-for-duty personnel to assigned personnel.

12ISAF Joint Command, Transition Readiness Assessment Tool Reporting, HQ ISAF//FRAGO/42-2009, November 30, 

2009.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 10

Table 3: Varying Definitions for CM1

Source Date Document CM1 Definition

IJC Nov. 30, 2009 FRAGO 042-2009 “CM 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and 

sustaining counterinsurgency operations at Battalion 

Level with coalition support required in Close Air Support 

(CAS) / Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) / Indirect (ID) 

Fires only.”

NTM-A/CSTC-A Nov. 30, 2009 Capability

Endorsement 

checklist form 

version 5.15

“CM 1. (Full Operational Capability - FOC) The unit, 

agency, staff function, or installation is capable of 

conducting primary operational mission(s). Capability, in 

terms of DOTMLPF, is defined at >85%.”13

Regional 

Command West

Jan. 10, 2010 ANA kandak

assessment 

submission

“Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and 

sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations. 

Battalion Level.”

Source: SIGAR analysis of data provided by IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A.

Weaknesses in ANSF Evaluation Tools Yielded Inconsistent Assessment Results

According to ANSF mentors/partners, the CE checklist has weaknesses that have resulted in uncertainty

among assessors and inconsistent assessment results. Mentors and partners stated that they often did 

not have a clear understanding of what was intended by each CE assessment question and were 

concerned that this may have affected assessment results. They also noted that high levels of nonresponse within the assessment tool did not prevent the generation of a CM rating level and were not 

noted in summary reports. 

On November 30, 2009, IJC ordered all army and police mentors and partners to use the same 

assessment evaluation form: CE checklist version 5.15. Before that date, ANA mentors/partners used a 

less structured system of reporting, including more subjective narrative assessments. Even though the 

CE checklist, which was originally designed for use by police mentors/partners, was revised for use in 

ANA assessments, a number of questions inappropriate for ANA evaluation remained. For example, the 

form still stated “Is the unit aligned with the most current MoI approved payroll system and processes?” 

and “Does the ANP follow Afghan criminal law and crime procedure requirements for processing 

crime?” As of February 2010, according to IJC officials, very few ANA mentors/partners had adopted the 

CE checklist for use in assessing army units. 

Other sources of variation in measurement methods have contributed to concerns about equivalence 

between ANSF evaluations. Due to the less-structured requirements associated with the original ANA 

assessment process (prior to December 2009), army mentors and partners provided a considerable 

 

13U.S. military doctrine divides force development into domains: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 11

range of assessment submissions.14 Mentors and partners conducting ANP evaluations were using, at 

some points in time, entirely different versions of the CE checklist that assessed capabilities differently.

15

In addition, some ANP assessment submissions included valuable, subjective narrative evaluations 

written by mentors and partners; however those were not required elements of an evaluation and were 

not consistently completed. Further, in our review of CE checklist submissions for ANP assessments, we 

noticed a wide range in the number of unobserved items on each CE assessment form. Officials at NTMA/CSTC-A stated that, since the CE checklist’s introduction in 2005, no attempt had been made to 

evaluate its internal consistency or other aspects of its effectiveness.

Police Units Have Not Been Independently Validated

VTTs independently validate ANA units before their designation as a CM1-rated unit. Applying uniform 

capability standards through an independent validation was intended to help standardize the 

assessment process and to capture lessons learned regarding ANA units and their development. ANP 

units, by contrast, have not been subject to independent validations. As of February 2010, 4 of 7 ANAdedicated VTT teams had been reassigned to support the ANSF training mission. Thus, it was unclear 

whether sufficient resources would be available to extend the program to the ANP. 

 

14 ANA assessment submissions we reviewed from mentors and partners included various formats, such as 

narratives in Word documents, Mission Essential Task List evaluations in Excel spreadsheets, and PowerPoint slide 

compilations. 

15 For example, unlike version 5.x of the CE checklist, version 4.x did not assess ANP facilities.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 12

SUMMARY REPORTS INCLUDED OUTDATED DATA AND OVERSTATED ANSF CAPABILITIES

Decision makers hoping to gauge progress in U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop capable Afghan 

security forces depend on summary reports of CM rating results. However, these reports have included 

outdated assessment data without indicating them as such. A lack of quality control measures and 

resources at IJC also contributed to weaknesses in the analysis and reporting of ANSF assessment 

results.

ANSF Capability Rating Reports Included Outdated Assessment Data 

TRAT reports of ANSF capability ratings regularly included outdated assessment data due to missing 

submissions from ANSF mentors and partners, according to officials at IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and 

State/INL. Officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that monthly CM assessment submissions were 

typically missing due to: (1) a lack of mentors/partners to provide reporting; (2) turnover from one 

mentor/partner team to another; (3) technical problems in submitting reports from certain areas of the 

country; and (4) the reluctance of NATO police mentor teams to 

perform mentoring tasks, due to security concerns and national 

caveats. 

In our analysis of IJC records for the ANP, we found that, from 

September 2009 through February 2010, as many as 44 percent 

of police district reports had been missing in a single month (see 

Table 4). In some cases, we found ratings that had been carried 

over for as long as 4 months. We were unable to perform a 

parallel analysis for ANA assessment submissions during this 

time period, as IJC was not able to provide a full set of ANA 

assessment records.

IJC Performed Limited Quality Control over Assessment 

Data before Submitting Summary Reports

Although IJC/ADAB had copies of all submitted ANP assessment files, they did not have ANA 

assessments on file. This lack of access to the underlying assessment reports used to create TRAT 

summaries meant that IJC could perform only limited quality control and analysis of the assessment 

data. When we requested copies of all ANA unit assessments for October 2009 and January 2010, 

IJC/ADAB attempted to retrieve copies from the Regional Commands, but was unable to obtain a full set 

of files. 

IJC performed limited quality control or analysis of ANP assessment results. According to officials at 

IJC/ADAB responsible for aggregating ANP assessment files, the complex data included in the 

assessments had raised concerns because it appeared to be unduly consistent from 1 month to the next. 

However, IJC/ADAB did not conduct any analysis of or quality control over the data within assessment 

files, due to a lack of resources. 

Table 4: Missing Police Assessments, 

September 2009 to February 2010

Missing Police 

Assessments

SEP 09 12 of 63 (19%) 

OCT 09 33 of 108 (30%) 

NOV 09 23 of 108 (21%) 

DEC 09 32 of 72 (44%) 

JAN 10 7 of 89 (8%) 

FEB 10 23 of 126 (18%) 
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 13

Overstated Police Capabilities: The Case of Baghlan-e Jadid

IJC’s March 2010 TRAT report included a CM1 

rating for the Baghlan-e Jadid police district in the 

northern Afghan province of Baghlan. The district 

first reached a CM1 rating in August 2008 and, 

according to IJC, maintained that rating for 9 

months until it graduated from the Focused 

Police District Development (FPDD) program in 

June 2009. However, the Baghlan-e Jadid police 

received no direct capability assessments after

that period. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, 

full graduation signified that a police unit had 

reached a level of capability at which it was “able 

to function on its own” and would no longer be 

rated and monitored by U.S. or Coalition forces. 

At graduation, all U.S. and Coalition 

mentors/partners were removed. As of March 

2010, direct assessments of the police in that district had still not been conducted. 

Officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A and State Department civilian police advisers and contractors all 

stated that, in the absence of any direct assessment, they had grave concerns about assuming that 

Baghlan-e Jadid had sustained its top-level capabilities. Explaining their doubts, officials cited 

increasingly challenging security conditions and the widespread tendency for other police districts to 

regress due to the lack of continuous mentoring/partnering and heavy attrition. An NTM-A/CSTC-A 

official stated that two other ANP districts had progressed to the stage just before graduation, but 

regressed after their original police mentor teams were withdrawn. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials 

agreed that reporting on districts not receiving monitoring in parallel with actively evaluated districts 

was misleading.

In February 2010, our team requested support for a visit to the Baghlan-e Jadid police district. U.S. 

police mentors working in Regional Command North stated that they could not support our request

because the police district was “not secure.” We also consulted IJC officials who said that the district 

was “overrun with insurgents.” One IJC official commented, “Unfortunately, *FPDD+ graduation has 

become synonymous with CM1 (a super CM1 if you will) that doesn't exist at all in reality.” He added 

that in his opinion the Baghlan-e Jadid police force had “withered away to the point that it barely 

functions.” Another U.S. military official, operating from within RC-North said, “I doubt CM1. Most of 

their police officers do not even have uniforms, nor has the majority received basic training, either.”

In February 2010, IJC officials told us that Baghlan-e Jadid would be part of a new focus of intensive 

work to improve certain priority districts around the country.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 14

DOD Reported Capability Ratings for Afghan Police Units That Had Not Been Assessed by 

Mentors or Partners

Afghan police TRAT summary reports we reviewed only included CM ratings for police units that had 

been assessed by mentors or partners. However, in some reports to Congress, DOD reported capability 

ratings for more police units than had actually been assessed. Units that had not been assessed were 

reported by DOD at the CM-4 level. In biannual reports to Congress, prior to April 2010, Defense 

reported capability ratings for as many as 559 ANP units.16 However, as of March 2010, only 229 police 

units were being directly mentored or partnered and assessed using the CM system, according to IJC 

reports. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials agreed that the charts included in DOD’s June 2009 and 

October 2009 reports to Congress on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan included CM 

ratings for units that had not been assessed. Regarding this matter, OSD told us that the DOD reports 

had relied on data from CSTC-A which included CM-4 ratings for units that had been provided 

equipment or training, but had not been assessed by mentors or partners. According to IJC and NTMA/CSTC-A officials, a continued shortage of mentors had limited police development efforts to the 

subset of police districts identified as most important to achieve campaign plan goals and in which FPDD 

or In-District Reform (IDR) training had been provided and police mentors/partners were present. 

Because the system for ANSF assessment was under review, DOD did not include an ANP ratings chart in 

its April 28, 2010, report to Congress.

17

During our field work, we found that a number of police units were being mentored but not assessed. 

Mentors were assigned to these districts but no assessment reports had been filed because the ANP unit 

had not received FPDD or IDR training. IJC was unable to state how many police units were being 

mentored but not assessed, but officials at Regional Commands South and West identified at least 14 

police districts in which this was the case. 

The CM assessment system relies solely on the reports of military mentors/partners. However, civilian 

contractors have provided training and mentoring of police units in districts where military personnel 

are not assigned. According to an IJC official, in these districts, IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not track the 

development of police units. For instance, contractors have provided training and mentoring for 

specialized police units, including Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police, and 

Counter-Narcotics Police, none of which had been routinely assessed. 

 

16 The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the 

Afghan Border Police (ABP), as well as specialized units such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics police.

17 DOD is required to report to Congress every 180 days, in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 15

U.S. AND COALITION ASSESSMENT EFFORTS HAVE FACED CHALLENGES

A variety of factors affect U.S. and Coalition efforts to assess ANSF capabilities and the consistency and 

quality of assessments. Key challenges have included poor security conditions, shortages of police 

mentors, and inadequate training of mentors and partners in assessment methods.

Security Conditions Have Affected Mentor and Partner Assessment Efforts

According to IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and State/INL officials and Dyncorp civilian police advisers,

Afghanistan’s non-permissive security environment has been a significant challenge for ANP mentoring 

and assessment. Increased security demands in many areas of the country have required a heavy troop 

presence to provide effective mentoring or partnering after basic police training. Mentoring or 

partnering has been more risky for ANP than for ANA units, given IED (improvised explosive device) 

threats to ground movements and the greater dispersion of police units, which has required mentor 

teams to “commute” to work. Furthermore, since ANP units tend to be relatively small compared with 

ANA units, ANP mentor/partner teams have lacked the backup protection afforded to ANA 

mentors/partners by their co-location with large units of ANA personnel.

ANP mentoring and assessment has been significantly limited and sometimes ineffective in areas where 

enemy activity is intense. In some cases, force protection resources were insufficient to allow for 

movement; in others, mentoring and assessment duties were challenged by the conflicting priorities of

commanders. According to a July 2009 report by civilian police advisers in Wazi Zadran police district of 

Paktia Province, the mentor team’s movements were restricted due to diminished manning and

challenging security conditions. The report stated that mentors had not been able to visit the police unit 

for months, observing, “Mentoring ultimately turned into a few comments or statements put over the 

radio to the District Center.” Narratives within U.S. and Coalition police assessment reports also noted 

security concerns, citing security-related operational constraints as a challenge to mentoring and 

assessment. The October TRAT participants noted that mentors had experienced difficulties in gaining 

access to police posts, with some locations accessible only by air.

IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A officials said that mentor/partner performance had a significant effect on 

development and assessment practices. Anecdotal evidence pointed to variation in mentor/partner 

efforts, but IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not attempt to assess performance systematically, according to 

these officials. TRAT reports and officials at IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A raised specific concerns about 

variations in the quality and extent of the mentoring performed by NATO mentor/partner teams, citing 

national caveats and guidelines as constraining factors that had limited the efforts of some NATO teams.

Mentor and Partner Shortages Have Reduced the Effectiveness of Mentoring and Assessment

The ANSF training mission has been challenged by longstanding mentor/partner shortfalls, which are 

likely to remain an issue as ANSF growth continues. Shortfalls have been particularly severe with regard 

to the ANP development effort, constraining the expansion of police training programs as well as the 

effectiveness of police mentoring/partnering after basic training. As of March 29, 2010, IJC reported 

that, while all U.S. commitments for mentor/partner teams had been fulfilled, NATO had failed to 

deploy the 38 army mentor/partner teams and 163 police mentor/partner teams required to meet the 

demands of current force development goals. IJC officials told us they could not provide an estimate of 

these shortfalls in terms of actual numbers of personnel required, since no mandatory personnel size 
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 16

requirement had been defined for NATO mentor and partner teams. Nevertheless, according to an April 

2010 Department of Defense report, a typical NATO mentor/partner team consists of 40 personnel.18

That report also noted, “Without sufficient mentors and trainers, our ability to effectively grow and 

develop the ANSF is at risk.”

According to IJC officials, ANSF assessments had been submitted each month without any evaluation of 

the level of access mentors and partners had to their assigned units. Although they lacked systematic 

measurements, officials at IJC/ADAB and State/INL said they knew that CM ratings for some ANP units 

had been submitted without sufficient mentor or partner contact to support the assessment results. 

Mentor and partner teams we interviewed agreed, saying they were typically overstretched, responsible 

for mentoring/partnering with numerous ANSF units, and that they sometimes had to neglect certain 

ANSF units over others. An October 2009 police mentor report from Moqur, in Ghazni Province,

acknowledged that low mentor coverage at that district made the rating suspect and their ability to 

advise and assist problematic. In another example, one Kabul police mentor team that received an 

additional assignment to train a problematic ANA kandak, resorted to occasionally calling its police 

districts rather than observing them directly. The team had continued to submit CM assessments under 

these conditions but said that its ability to mentor and assess effectively had been seriously impaired. 

Mentors and Partners Lack Adequate Training 

Military personnel serving as ANSF mentors and partners lack adequate training to support their 

mission, according to mentor and partner teams and IJC/VTT officials. ANP mentors stated that they 

found that they were unprepared for their duties and unfamiliar with MOI regulations concerning ANP 

operations. Mentors/partners reported that insufficient guidance and training made it difficult to assess 

police districts’ compliance with MOI decrees and guidance, as required in numerous questions on the 

CE checklist. In response to our written questions, mentors in RC-North reported, “The fundamental lack 

of training of [police mentor teams] in essential MOI decrees, procedures, and common problems 

hampers the *police mentor team’s+ ability to provide meaningful information and the lack of a 

comparable standard creates a large degree of subjectivity from one team to the next.” According to 

IJC/VTT, army mentors have faced similar challenges, including the lack of training on ANA systems and 

Ministry of Defense (MOD) decrees and guidance.

To support ANSF assessors’ use of the CE checklist, NTM-A/CSTC-A produced a video training program 

and an instruction manual. However, the mentors/partners we interviewed criticized the video and 

other materials, stating that they were focused on technical aspects of completing the form, rather than 

on assessment practices. The assessors said that to improve the quality and consistency of their 

evaluations they needed additional guidelines to enhance their understanding of assessment criteria 

and best practices. 

 

18 DOD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2010, p. 17.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 17

SYSTEMIC ANSF DEFICIENCIES HAVE UNDERMINED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP UNIT CAPABILITIES

Systemic ANSF deficiencies have undermined progress toward developing independent Afghan security 

forces. These deficiencies include logistics problems, personnel attrition, inadequate personnel 

authorizations, infrastructure challenges, corruption, and drug abuse and illiteracy. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, NTM-A/CSTC-A stated it is aware of these deficiencies and is working to address 

them (see appendix III).

Severe Logistics Problems Challenge the Development of Self-Sustaining Operations

Deficiencies in ANSF logistics have challenged U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop independent army 

and police forces for Afghanistan. The CM assessment system has included measures designed to 

evaluate an army or police unit’s ability to carry out logistics functions crucial to self-sustainment. 

However, officials of IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, State/INL, ANSF partners and mentors, VTT teams, employees 

of DynCorp, and Afghan army and police commanders uniformly described above-unit-level problems 

with logistics support functions as significant impediments to the development of self-sufficient ANSF 

units. At every ANSF unit we visited, army and police alike—including top-rated CM1 units—we found 

logistics supply problems directly interfering with unit operations. Army and police mentors and 

partners for all 18 units we visited reported that logistics support was a severe problem and supplyrequest systems non-functional. Assessment reports we reviewed for other units echoed this concern. 

Mentors and partners reported vanishing supply requests, hoarding at provincial and Corps levels, and 

an inability to track supply-request forms through the ministerial supply chain systems.

Police mentors and partners told us that logistics failures were not only affecting operational 

effectiveness and life support, but also challenging efforts to develop ANSF confidence in ministerial 

leadership and draining ANSF morale. Police mentors in Kunduz Province wrote in a February 2010

statement, “The logistics system does not function to any acceptable level... *We+ would hesitate to 

state that a logistics system even exists.” In another example, an ANP mentor in RC-North noted, “I 

would think [the ANP] would be much more eager to be independent of coalition support if they 

thought their own system was functional at all. If their own chain of command is broken, what 

motivation is there to have us leave? Right now we are the source of all repairs and most other logistics 

support.”

ANA mentors and partners also reported severe deficiencies associated with the MOD supply system.

NATO mentors in Kunduz Province described the system as a “fill or kill” process in which requests are 

submitted, and then disappear. In other cases, they said supplies were pushed down from MOD, and 

thus were not responsive to the units’ needs. A November 2009 assessment report on a CM1-rated 

army unit, the 1st kandak 2

nd Brigade of the 203rd Corps, reported that the supply process was a failure. 

The kandak received no feedback on the status of its supply requests and was primarily dependent on 

U.S. soldiers to remedy supply issues. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A agreed that logistics challenges are of great concern and stated it has taken a variety of 

steps to address known shortcomings, including making plans to field and develop additional ANSF 

logistics enablers beginning in FY 2011.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 18

Heavy Personnel Attrition Diminishes Training Gains and Operational Effectiveness

Heavy attrition in the Afghan military and police forces has undermined developmental gains in many 

units, by reducing the number of trained personnel available for operations. As of March 2010, the 

ANA’s AWOL rate was 12 percent and, as of May 2010, the ANP had an overall attrition rate of over 17 

percent. Those losses, coupled with high levels of approved absence and frequent reassignments, have 

left many units with insufficient personnel to permit effective operations. For example, according to 

NTM-A/CSTC-A, as of February 2010, solar-year-to-date attrition in ANCOP—“the premier force in the 

ANP,” according to DOD—was about 73 percent. One ANCOP battalion in RC-West had an attrition rate 

of 140 percent over that period.

19 The attrition rate for Afghan Border Police over the same period was 

27.4 percent, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A. 

In many Afghan Uniformed Police units, attrition has drained a large proportion of those originally 

trained in the FPDD program. We found numerous examples of this within ANP assessment reports. In 

one instance, in July 2009, mentors reported that at Waza Zadran police district in Paktia Province there 

were only 6 ANP personnel in place, compared with the tashkil authorization of 53 officers. That district 

completed FPDD training in April 2008, when 23 students were trained, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A’s 

records. Mentors said this severe attrition was largely due to actions taken by powerful anti-coalition 

forces and disappointment over pay levels. NTM-A/CSTC-A documents we reviewed showed that Waza 

Zadran had attained a top-level capability rating and had even been slated for graduation from the FPDD 

program, as late as April 2009. However, by February 2010, the district had dropped to the lowest 

rating level, CM4.

Inadequate Personnel Authorizations Have Inhibited Effectiveness

The goals against which ANSF manning levels have been assessed may not represent end states 

adequate to permit independence. Under the CM rating system, an ANSF unit could earn a top CM1 

rating for personnel, if it had a full complement of personnel assigned, as compared with the ministerial 

tashkil authorization. However, according to mentors/partners and Afghan officials we interviewed, and

assessment reports, some ministerial personnel authorizations have been inadequate to support 

effective operations.20 For both army and police forces, the ability of units to support mobile operations, 

including patrols and quick reaction force operations has been limited by the number of personnel lost 

through attrition and reassignment and the number needed to man checkpoints and outposts. 

Infrastructure Challenges Affect ANSF Morale, Security, and Operational Effectiveness 

We identified widespread deficiencies in ANSF infrastructure, including problems directly affecting army 

and police operations. Facilities were often unable to support the basic needs of assigned personnel, 

lacking running water, electricity, and proper billeting and dining facilities. In many cases, police chiefs 

were choosing to use fuel to run generators, rather than conduct patrols. Facilities problems were 

directly affecting the morale and operational readiness of fielded units. We observed serious 

infrastructure issues at many units we visited, including those rated CM1. In addition to basic life 

 

19 DOD reported in April 2010 that NTM-A/CSTC-A, MoI, and EUPOL have established an ANCOP Working Group to 

examine how to reduce attrition and improve the ANCOP program.

20 Similar observations regarding insufficient police authorizations were recorded in the September 2009 DOD 

Inspector General report, SPO-2009-007, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and 

Field the Afghan National Security Forces, p. 112.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 19

support issues, infrastructure problems have raised security concerns. At police units we visited, 

including those rated CM1, we observed examples of inadequate security perimeters and unsecured

weapons storage areas. Mentor and partner reports frequently noted that facilities issues were holding 

back development and raised concern about units’ ability to operate independently, without long-term 

solutions to facilities maintenance issues. An October 2009 assessment report from Dand Patan police 

district in Paktia Province noted, “Facility maintenance is critical... MOI must create a long term solution 

for this issue however if ANP are ever to become truly autonomous.”

Mentors and partners acknowledged that widespread efforts have been under way by the United States 

and Coalition partners to help improve ANSF facilities. Nevertheless, they also reported pervasive 

delays in construction projects. Construction delays of over a year at the 2/209th brigade garrison 

project we visited in Kunduz Province had left four kandaks housed in temporary facilities, dramatically 

restricting training and operations. 21 During our February 2010 visit, we observed Afghan army 

personnel coping with deep mud, freezing conditions, unsanitary shower and bathroom facilities, 

inadequate dining facilities, medically unsafe food storage, and sewage being openly discharged on the 

surface of the compound. 

Corruption Has Undermined the Development of ANSF Independence

In addition to its corroding effect on public confidence in ANSF and thereby the Afghan government, 

corruption was cited by army and police mentors and partners as a key factor undermining 

developmental progress and morale at the unit level. ANP mentors and State/INL officials we 

interviewed expressed doubts about the validity of top ratings in certain police districts, due to the 

effects of corruption problems. Mentors and partners we interviewed and assessment reports we 

reviewed observed that ANSF corruption has affected the leadership of many units, disrupted supply 

chain operations, and diminished willingness to cooperate with mentoring/partnering efforts in some 

cases. For example, in a February 2010 TRAT report on ANP capabilities, RC-East commanders 

commented, “Corruption of Senior ANP Leaders continues to thwart all of our developmental efforts.” 

RC-West commanders also weighed in, reporting, “Corruption is continuing to plague the Western ANP, 

and this includes an increase of influence by the [insurgents’+ shadow government.”

Corruption has had direct negative effects on daily ANSF operations in the following areas:

 Supply chain: Police assessments prepared in October 2009 and January 2010 cited multiple 

instances of Afghan police officials selling ANP materials, taking money from transport trucks at 

checkpoints, skimming fuel, and pilfering supplies, including weapons.

 Fuel: Corruption has affected fuel availability and distribution within the ANSF, and thus the 

operational effectiveness of army and police units. Problems with fuel accountability, including 

siphoning and selling fuel, were widely reported in police unit assessments and detailed for us 

on our visits to army and police units around the country. An October 2009 report on a toprated police unit in Chaparhar, Nangarhar Province, stated that the lack of accountability for fuel 

 

21SIGAR conducted a separate audit of contract performance and oversight for the construction of the ANA 

garrison at Kunduz. See SIGAR, ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; 

Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed, 10-09, April 20, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 20

was the greatest issue in sending out patrols. A January 2010 report from Bala Boluk, Farah 

Province, described fuel-related corruption as a “perpetual problem.”

 Illegal checkpoints: Mentor/partner reports noted that in some places it was typical for Afghan 

police to “shake down” travelers for money in order to pass through districts. 

 Personnel: Misuse and diversion of police personnel were cited in numerous police assessments 

as challenges to effective operations, weakening the present-for-duty strength of many police 

units. 

 Pay and rank: Pay fraud and rank abuse were widely reported, although electronic fund transfer

programs were credited with reducing payroll abuse in some police units. Reports of ghost 

police were common and RC-North police mentors stated that paying for promotion was 

commonly accepted among the ANP. Mentors in Ghowrmach police district, Baghdis Province, 

reported in October 2009 that, even though electronic fund transfer was not available for the 

unit due to its remote location, pay continued for absent police, those whose loyalties were 

suspect, and officers who had never worked in the district. 

Corruption also has directly affected the ability of U.S. and Coalition forces to mentor and partner 

effectively with ANSF units. Mentors and partners we interviewed said corruption at the police chief or 

kandak commander level had undermined their efforts to develop ANSF units. NTM-A/CSTC-A stated 

that it has taken actions to combat corruption, including steps such as assisting MOI in conducting a 

Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) and implementing Electronic Funds Transfer for ANSF pay delivery.

Drug Abuse and Illiteracy Continue to Challenge Operational Effectiveness

Drug abuse continues to be a problem for the Afghan army and police. As of February 2010, results from 

drug tests during a personnel asset inventory of the Afghan police force overall showed positive results 

for drug use in 17 percent of police tested. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials who assisted MOI with the inventory 

said that this rate was likely understated, and the March TRAT report noted that the inventory results 

for Ghazni and Paktika Provinces were returning an average usage rate for controlled substances of at 

least 50 percent, with the highest rates in more remote areas. In addition, assessment reports and 

mentors and partners at many of the army and police units we visited cited instances of drug and 

alcohol abuse. According to several officials with responsibility for ANSF development, an extreme case 

of drug abuse had occurred at an ANCOP unit of about 100 personnel based at Nimla Gardens, 

Nangarhar Province. There, according to eye witness accounts from U.S. military personnel, ANCOP 

personnel were openly using marijuana and were unwilling to conduct operations or even leave their 

compound. 

Although steps have been taken to introduce literacy training for the Afghan army and police, high levels 

of illiteracy in both forces continue to hamper development. Army and police mentors/partners stated, 

and assessment reports corroborated, that illiteracy has constrained the development of support 

systems such as personnel management and logistics, including accountability for equipment and fuel. 

Widespread illiteracy was also cited as an impediment to the development of intelligence and navigation 

capabilities. In response to the problem of ANSF illiteracy, NTM-A/CSTC-A has made literacy training 

mandatory for all ANSF soldiers and police and continues to increase the number of literacy instructors.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 21

CONCLUSIONS

Weaknesses in design and implementation of the CM rating system have led to variable results and have 

impeded a clear understanding of the operational effectiveness of ANSF units. The Department of 

Defense and ISAF have expressed concerns about the risk of using an assessment system that provides 

an ineffective measure of performance. Acknowledging the risk such a system poses, DOD reported in 

late April 2010 that General McChrystal was considering alternatives to CM ratings. According to IJC 

officials, the CM rating is being replaced with a new unit-level assessment system. Moving forward, it is 

critical that whatever assessment system is used to evaluate ANSF units should provide consistent and 

reliable reporting of operational effectiveness. Without such measures, decision makers will not have a 

clear understanding of the extent to which progress is being made in developing Afghan security forces 

capable of independently conducting operations, and ultimately securing Afghanistan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We are including ten recommendations for ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and three for NATO Training 

Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) intended to 

improve the reliability of future ANSF assessments and to support U.S. and international efforts to 

develop ANSF capabilities.

Recommendations for IJC:

To improve measurement and validation techniques in order to obtain more reliable assessments of 

ANSF operational effectiveness, we recommend that IJC:

1. Place greater emphasis on subjective assessment of overall operational capability provided 

by mentor and partner team evaluators, including a requirement to complete narrative 

observations.

2. Support the completion of meaningful and consistent evaluations, by developing a manual 

for mentor and partner team assessors that incorporates real-world examples and best 

practices.

3. Work with NTM-A/CTSC-A to provide additional training and guidance to mentor and 

partner teams regarding the nature of MOI and MOD decrees and procedures. 

4. Encourage an equivalent understanding among raters of different ANSF units by ensuring 

rating-level definitions are consistent.

5. Incorporate present-for-duty figures as a percentage of assigned personnel into assessments 

for both police and army units. Note: Until reliable present-for-duty numbers are available 

for police units, we recommend that IJC incorporate a separate measurement for tracking 

“available” personnel who have been detailed to other locations (i.e., available, but not 

present).

6. Conduct independent validations of top-level Afghan police unit capabilities.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 22

To improve the transparency and accuracy of ANSF assessment reporting, we recommend that IJC:

7. Begin to systematically track the number of unit-level evaluations not submitted each 

month and the number of elements not observed within those assessments.

8. Add an additional overall rating level to represent units “not assessed” where no 

mentor/partners are assigned. 

To maximize visibility into Afghan police capabilities, we recommend that IJC:

9. Require all U.S. and Coalition military mentor and partner teams to submit unit assessments 

and that IJC begin requesting unit assessments from civilian advisers in those districts where 

military mentors/partners are not assigned.

To counteract perverse incentives resulting from the application of the ANSF assessment system, we 

recommend that IJC 

10. Evaluate, in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, MOI, and MOD, the creation of an incentive 

system to reward Afghan units for the development of validated, top-level operational 

capabilities.

Recommendations for NTM-A/CSTC-A:

To help develop compliance with ministerial logistics systems and increase the transparency of ANSF 

logistics operations, we recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A:

1. Work with MOI and MOD to implement functional tracking systems for monitoring supply 

requests.

To counterbalance the effects of attrition in FPDD units, we recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A:

2. Develop a program to systematically provide backfill training for new recruits assigned to 

previously-trained FPDD districts.

To facilitate the training of as many drivers as possible and improve operational effectiveness at the unit 

level, we recommend that NTM-A/CSTC-A:

3. Implement a train-the-trainer driving program to allow each ANSF unit (district or kandak)

to extend driver training using its own personnel. 
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COMMENTS

IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, OSD Policy, and OSD Personnel and Readiness provided written comments on a 

draft of this report. These comments are provided in appendix II, III, IV, and V, respectively, along with 

our response to the comments. 

In its response, IJC concurred or partially concurred with ten recommendations. As noted in our report, 

in April 2010, IJC adopted a new ANSF assessment system. IJC stated in its response to our report that it 

intended to address our recommendations as part of its implementation of that new system, the 

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). IJC disagreed with two recommendations, which we have 

removed from the final report because IJC’s responses fulfilled the spirit of our recommendations. In 

commenting on a draft of our report, IJC said our report should have great utility and described our 

work as accurate, well-informed, and comprehensive.

In its response, NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with our recommendations, but suggested that our report 

included information that was out of date. Our audit work was conducted from October 2009 through 

May 2010 and relied on interviews and information collected over that entire period, including field 

observations of 18 ANSF units made during February and March 2010 and detailed reviews of ANSF 

assessment documents dated through March 29, 2010. NTM-A/CSTC-A provided additional information 

regarding progress in ANSF development, including its 180 Day Internal Review and Way Forward, dated 

May 29, 2010. Lieutenant General Caldwell, Commander of NTM-A and CSTC-A, stated that the 

additional materials contain important information regarding NTM-A/CSTC-A’s efforts and challenges 

ahead. 

In its response, OSD Policy provided additional information, including clarification about the nature of 

DOD reports to Congress and comments regarding DOD’s concerns about the CM system. We included 

some of this information in our report. 

OSD Personnel and Readiness also commented on our report, and provided additional information 

regarding the history of efforts to improve ANSF assessments, including details on OSD’s involvement in 

attempting to address reliability and integrity problems with the CM rating system. We have included 

the additional information provided in appendix V of our report.
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APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review of the assessment system used to rate ANSF capabilities. 

To evaluate the reliability of the CM rating system, we reviewed documentation from and conducted 

interviews with responsible officials from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, State/INL, OSD/Policy, Embassy Kabul, 

CENTCOM, DynCorp, MPRI, Border Management Taskforce, Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz, 

Task Force Mountain Warrior, RC-East ANSF Development Section, Afghan army and police 

commanders. Additionally, to obtain firsthand evidence regarding the capabilities of fielded Afghan 

army and police units and the evaluation of those capabilities at the kandak and district/precinct level, 

we performed direct observations at 18 Afghan army and police units in the following locations: Afghan 

Uniformed Police Kabul Districts 1, 3, 7 and 11; Aliabad Police District, Kunduz Province; Kunduz City 

Precincts 2, 3, and 4 plus associated checkpoints and outposts; Kameh Police District, Nangarhar 

Province; Bati Kot Police District, Nangarhar Province; Provincial Police Headquarters Nangarhar 

Province; ANCOP 3rd Kandak Headquarters, Nangarhar Province; OCC-P Nangarhar Province; ANA 2nd

BDE, 209th Corps, including 3 infantry kandaks and one CSS kandak; and ANA 3rd BDE, 201st. At all 

locations, to understand challenges facing assessment efforts and concerns regarding the assessment 

system we interviewed mentors and partners—including U.S. and Coalition forces—assigned to work 

with the Afghan units. Our interviews with NATO mentors and partners included military personnel from 

Germany, Belgium, and Canada. At every army and police unit we visited, we also interviewed Afghan 

officials. To understand the role of civilian police advisers in ANP mentoring/partnering and evaluation, 

we met with officials of State/INL in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, as well as officials of DynCorp in 

Afghanistan. We also met with MPRI, to obtain information about that company’s role in supporting 

ANSF development, including systems.

To examine ANSF assessment procedures, including methods of analysis and reporting, we held several 

meetings each with officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ5 and IJC Assessments. We also met on several 

occasions with IJC’s ANSF Development Assistance Bureau to understand the system by which 

assessment reporting has been processed at IJC. We also met with the ANSF Development Section for 

RC-East, and the ANSF Coordinator for Taskforce Mountain Warrior in Nangarhar Province. To examine 

ANSF development efforts as they related to assessment practices, in Kabul, we met with NTM-A/CSTCA’s Command Training Advisory Group—Army and Command Training Advisory Group—Police, NTMA/CSTC-A CJ7 (Force Integration and Training), NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ5, NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ1, and the Border 

Management Task Force. We met with NTM-A/CSTC-A’s Office of Security Cooperation regarding efforts 

to improve weapons accountability. We also attended TRAT meetings at Camp Phoenix and IJC HQ, in

October 2009 and February 2010 and conducted 2 meetings with members of IJC’s Validation Transition 

Team, in October 2009 and February 2010. 

We performed documentary reviews of TRAT reports for both the Afghan army and police for each 

month from October 2009 through March 2010. We also reviewed, for qualitative and quantitative 

information, 87 CE Checklist file submissions for Afghan police districts or precincts as submitted in 

October 2009, and 113 such files as submitted in January 2010. We were unable to obtain a comparable 

set of Afghan army assessment submission files, but reviewed an incomplete sample of assessment 

submissions representing examples from October 2009, November 2009, and January 2010. Our review 

also included 96 narrative district reports regarding Afghan Uniformed Police units, prepared by 
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 25

DynCorp civilian advisors. To determine the extent of regression amongst ANSF units, we reviewed all 

available CM ratings for ANA and ANP units from February 2009 through January 2010. We counted the 

occurrence of rating-level regressions during this period, looking at declines from any level and also 

counting declines from the CM1 rating level. Since our analysis required at least two data points for 

comparison, we included only those ANA and ANP units that had at least two CM ratings during this 

period. 

To examine the effects of challenges on U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts and to examine systemic , 

ANSF deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop unit-level capabilities, we reviewed 

documentation from and conducted interviews with responsible officials from IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A, 

State/INL, DynCorp, Task Force Mountain Warrior, RC-East ANSF Development Section, U.S. and 

Coalition army and police mentors and partners, and Afghan army and police commanders. We also 

made observations while visiting the ANSF units listed above. We also performed detailed reviews of 

assessment records for both Afghan army and police units, as detailed above.

We conducted work in Afghanistan and Washington, D.C., from October 2009 through May 2010 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was 

conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the 

authority of Public Law No. 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
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APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM ISAF JOINT COMMAND
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See SIGAR 

comment 1.

See SIGAR 

comment 2.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 29
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The following are SIGAR’s comments on IJC’s letter dated June 15, 2010:

1. We removed this recommendation from our final report, as the actions IJC described in its 

response fulfilled the spirit of our recommendation.

2. We removed this recommendation from our final report, as IJC’s description of its intentions 

fulfilled the spirit of our recommendation.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 32

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

See SIGAR 

comment 1.

See SIGAR 

comment 2.

See SIGAR 

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 33

See SIGAR 

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings Page 34

See SIGAR 

comment 4.
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The following are SIGAR’s comments on NTM-A/CSTC-A’s letter dated June 10, 2010:

1. NTM-A/CSTC-A said our report relied on information that was out of date. Our audit work was 

conducted from October 2009 through May 2010 and relied on interviews and information 

collected over that entire period, including field observations of 18 ANSF units made during 

February and March 2010 and detailed reviews of ANSF assessment documents dated through 

March 29, 2010.

2. NTM-A/CSTC-A acknowledges it faced numerous problems in training ANSF units as recently as 

six months ago. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A said it has made much progress since May 2010, 

when our audit ended and believes our report does not reflect that progress. NTM-A/CSTC-A 

provided its May 29, 2010 report entitled NTM-A 180 Day Internal Assessment and Way 

Forward, as part of its official comments, indicating that its report provides more current 

information than the observations and information we developed during our work. Our audit 

work was conducted from October 2009 through May 2010, and our draft report was circulated 

for agency comment on May 27, 2010, two days prior to the issuance of the NTM-A/CSTC-A 

report. NTM-A/CSTC-A’s report recounts challenges faced in training and fielding ANSF forces, 

accomplishments achieved during NTM-A/CSTC-A’s first six months, and potential concerns for 

future operations; the report does not address ANSF capability assessments. We have included 

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s report on pages 37 through 41. 

3. In its comments, NTM-A/CSTC-A observes that it, along with DOD and IJC, had harbored 

concerns regarding the efficacy of the CM rating system since the fall of 2009. As such, NTMA/CSTC-A cited an October 2009 DOD report to Congress entitled Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan. That report, which expressed concern about the CM rating 

system was dated October 2009, but was not issued until the first week of April 2010, just weeks

after we shared our preliminary observations regarding the CM assessment at an out-brief for 

the Commanders of ISAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and IJC. The DOD report passage quoted by NTMA/CSTC-A contains an inaccurate characterization of the CM rating system, stating “CM ratings 

simply depict the manning, training, and equipment of a unit.” In fact, as our audit report 

describes, CM rating assessments evaluated a variety of other factors, such as facilities, 

sustainment, and command and control. NTM-A/CSTC-A also said that it and IJC began 

reforming the CM system in the fall of 2009. While we appreciate that concerns existed 

regarding shortcomings of the CM system during that timeframe, IJC and NTM-A were only 

established in October and November 2009, and were not fully operational until November 

2009 and February 2010 respectively, according to DOD’s April 28, 2010 report to Congress.

4. In our report, we discussed construction delays and resulting conditions at the Kunduz Garrison, 

but not cost issues. NTM-A/CSTC-A’s comments appear to address a prior SIGAR report, ANA 

Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues 

Need to Be Addressed, 10-09, April 20, 2010.
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APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
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APPENDIX V: COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL 

AND READINESS)
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(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-012A.)
_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

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