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The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-2993

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

John D. Behler,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

District of Nebraska.

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Submitted: April 23, 1999

 Filed: August 4, 1999

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Before BEAM and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and MOODY,1

 District Judge. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

This is Behler's third appeal of the sentence imposed upon him following his

1992 convictions on several drug trafficking charges. As a result of the most recent
2The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

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remand, the district court2 imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement after finding

that Behler possessed a firearm during the commission of his drug crimes. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (Oct. 1987). Behler argues that the

district court erred by applying this enhancement, by not reopening all sentencing

issues, and by ordering special conditions of supervised release. We affirm. 

I.

The facts underlying Behler's drug trafficking convictions are fully set forth in

our prior opinions. See United States v. Behler, 14 F.3d 1264, 1266-68 (8th Cir.)

(Behler I), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960 (1994); see also United States v. Behler, 100

F.3d 632, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1996) (Behler II), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 153 (1997). We

summarize only those facts necessary to the present appeal. Behler was involved in

substantial drug trafficking, typically acquiring methamphetamine in Colorado and

selling it to people in Nebraska and Iowa. At trial, Linda Wiegert, one of Behler's

former live-in girlfriends, testified that from 1984 to 1987, "Behler made numerous trips

to Colorado to purchase methamphetamine," and that "he always kept a .44 magnum

handgun with him at home and on the trips." Behler I, 14 F.3d at 1266. A subsequent

live-in girlfriend, Nora Houston, similarly testified that during 1987 and later, Behler

made many trips to Colorado to purchase methamphetamine and always carried a

handgun with him. Id. Both witnesses testified that he then would deliver the drugs

to a regular group of customers. Id. at 1270.

In May 1989, while monitoring his telephone calls, law enforcement officials

learned that Behler planned to engage in a methamphetamine transaction at his

residence. Law enforcement officers maintained surveillance of Behler's residence and

following the methamphetamine sale, they arrested Behler and searched the residence.
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Officers found, among other things, a loaded .44 magnum handgun and a small amount

of methamphetamine. Id. at 1266-67. A federal indictment charged Behler with

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine (count I), use of a firearm in relation to a

drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (count II), use of a telephone

in furtherance of a drug felony (count III), and distribution of methamphetamine (count

IV). A federal jury found Behler guilty on all four counts. Id. at 1267. 

In Behler's first appeal, we affirmed his convictions but remanded for

resentencing on three of the four counts due to an ex post facto violation in the district

court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See
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caution, however, the district court alternatively found that the originally imposed

enhancements still were appropriate. Behler appeals. 

II.

A.

Behler argues that the vacation of his section 924(c) conviction unbundled his

entire
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was unaffected by such enhancements, its vacation merely provided an opportunity to

consider a previously unavailable firearm enhancement to the sentence on the drug

counts. The district court had no basis for revisiting issues previously decided both by

it and by us regarding Behler's role in the offense or obstruction of justice. 

Additionally, our prior opinion limited the scope of the remand. We expressly

stated that we were provisionally vacating the drug convictions for one purpose: "so

that the district court may consider whether Behler's sentence on the drug counts should

be enhanced under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) (Oct. 1987)." Behler II, 100 F.3d at 640. The

district court correctly interpreted our prior opinion and properly limited the scope of

Behler's resentencing by considering only whether the drug counts should be enhanced

due to Behler's possession of a firearm. In light of the law of the case and the limited

language of our prior opinion, we decline to consider Behler's arguments relating to the

propriety of enhancements based on his role in the offense or obstruction of justice. 

B.

Behler argues that the district court erred in assessing a two-level sentencing

enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). Basically, Behler contends that the

government's witnesses were not credible and that the government failed to prove a

nexus between his possession of a firearm and his drug activities. The district court's

assessment of credibility, however, is virtually unreviewable, see United States v.

Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1057 (8th Cir. 1999), and we review for clear error the district

court's finding that a weapon was sufficiently connected to the offense for purposes of

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). See United States v. Belitz, 141 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 1998).

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) mandates a two-level increase to a defendant's base offense

level if the defendant possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the

commission of the offense. Sentencing courts are required to apply this adjustment if
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a weapon was present, "unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected

with the offense. For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant,

arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet." USSG §

2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3) (Oct. 1987). Thus, we will sustain an enhancement

pursuant to this specific offense characteristic if the government shows first "that the

weapon was present and second, that it was not clearly improbable that the weapon had

a nexus with the criminal activity." Brown v. United States, 169 F.3d 531, 532 (8th

Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).

Behler does not challenge the presence of a firearm, but he contends that it was

only used for hunting purposes as his witnesses testified at the resentencing hearing.

Although the district court credited the testimony of Behler's witnesses, their testimony

is inapposite because they admitted they were not involved in Behler's drug dealing

activities. Their testimony thus has no direct bearing on whether Behler carried a

firearm in connection with his drug offenses. The government presented F.B.I.

testimony of statements made by Behler's ex-wife, Joannie Behler Moore. She began

living with Behler sometime before their marriage in 1989 and remained married to him

until 1993. During their relationship, she traveled with Behler to Colorado on trips to

purchase methamphetamine. She told F.B.I. Special Agent Humphrey that Behler

carried a gun on those trips and usually kept it on the front seat of the car. The district

court considered the similar trial testimony of Linda Wiegert and Nora Houston,

Behler's prior live-in girlfriends, who said Behler always had a gun in the car on their

trips to Colorado to purchase drugs. The district court also noted that on the day of

Behler's arrest following a drug transaction at his residence, law enforcement officials

found a gun in Behler's bedroom. Based on all of this evidence, the district court found

that Behler had possessed a firearm during the commission of his crimes and imposed

the two-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).

Having reviewed the record and the district court's memorandum, we see no

reason to second-guess the district court's credibility assessments, and the district court
3As an aside, we note that the law of the case did not preclude the district court

from imposing new terms of supervised release on remand. The district court is free

to modify the terms of supervised release at any time after considering factors such as

the nature and circumstances of the offense or the history and characteristics of the

defendant. See United States v. Yankton, 168 F.3d 1096, 1098 n.6 (8th Cir. 1999)

(noting "that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) grants the district court flexibility to modify or

reduce the terms of the supervised release at any time prior to the expiration of the

period of supervised release").

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did not clearly err in finding that Behler possessed a firearm during the commission of

his drug trafficking offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 171 F.3d 1133, 1153 (8th

Cir. 1999) (holding that a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement was supported by a loaded gun

found in the closet of the defendant's bedroom); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507,

1547 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the enhancement was supported by a finding that the

defendant carried a weapon in his car while selling or transporting drugs), cert. denied,

517 U.S. 1149 and 518 U.S. 1026 (1996). It was not clearly improbable that the

firearm was connected with Behler's drug offenses.

C.

Behler argues that the district court abused its discretion in formulating special

conditions for his supervised release.3 Specifically, Behler challenges three special

terms: (1) the total prohibition on his purchase, use, or distribution of alcohol; (2) the

requirement that he attend and complete any diagnostic evaluation, treatment, or

counseling program for alcohol and/or controlled substances as directed by his

probation officer; and (3) the requirement that he provide his probation officer with

access to any requested financial information. 

We afford sentencing judges wide discretion when imposing terms of supervised

release. See United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1992).

The 1987 Guidelines state that in order to fulfill any authorized purpose of sentencing,
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a sentencing court may impose any condition that is "reasonably related to (1) the

nature and circumstances of the offense, and (2) the history and characteristics of the

defendant." USSG § 5D3.3(b) (Oct. 1987). In imposing any sentence, Congress

requires the district court to consider the need for adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the

defendant with needed training or treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. IV

1987); see also United States v. Prendergast, 979 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1992).

Finally, a special term of supervised release may not inflict a "greater deprivation of

liberty than is reasonably necessary" to accomplish the purposes and policies set forth

by Congress and the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), (3) (Supp. V

1988); accord Prendergast, 979 F.2d at 1293. 

First, Behler argues that the restriction on the purchase or use of alcohol is not

warranted because his offense did not involve alcohol, the record contains no evidence

that he has ever abused alcohol, and the sentencing recommendation suggests a mere

possibility of cross addiction. We have held that a sentencing court abuses its

discretion by imposing a total alcohol ban in circumstances where the record evidence

does not support such a restriction. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 121 F.3d 1218,

1223-24 (8th Cir. 1997); Prendergast, 979 F.2d at 1292-93. In Prendergast, we found

an abuse of discretion where the district court had imposed a total alcohol prohibition

as a special term of supervised release following the defendant's conviction of a wire

fraud offense. In that case, the record indicated that alcohol played no role in the

offense, the fraud proceeds had not been used for any type of drug activity, and there

was no evidence that Prendergast was in need of any substance abuse rehabilitation.

Prendergast, 979 F.2d at 1292-93. 

Relying on Prendergast, we also found an abuse of discretion where the district

court imposed a total alcohol prohibition on a defendant convicted of a drug trafficking

crime. See Bass, 121 F.3d at 1223-24. We noted that although the defendant had

"used marijuana on a somewhat regular basis," there was no evidence that the
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defendant was prone to alcohol abuse and the district court merely assumed that there

might be a problem of cross addiction (replacing the marijuana use with alcohol abuse).

Id. at 1224. We held that the district court abused its discretion by basing a total

alcohol prohibition on nothing more than assumptions. 

Behler's case presents a close question on this issue, but we believe his case is

ultimately distinguishable from those listed above. Behler's crimes involved substantial

drug trafficking of methamphetamine while possessing a firearm. His personal history

includes years of substance abuse (admittedly from 1968 to 1989), consisting largely

of methamphetamine abuse along with infrequent use of cocaine and LSD. Though he

describes his use of alcohol as moderate, the evidence before the district court in the

form of the probation officer's confidential sentencing recommendation, indicated that

any use of alcohol would limit Behler's ability to maintain a drug-free lifestyle. (See

Sent. Recommendation at 2, May 21, 1998) ("[A]ccording to the National Institute on

Drug Abuse (1994), the use of any intoxicants, including alcohol, limits a recovering

person's ability to maintain a drug-free lifestyle."). Additionally, the record indicates

that any use of alcohol is inconsistent with the treatment philosophy of most substance

abuse recovery programs nationwide. Thus, unlike the situation in Bass where we said

the district court's reasoning was based on nothing more than an assumption, the record

in the present case provided the necessary foundation for determining that any alcohol

use would hinder the defendant's rehabilitation process. 

To Behler's credit, we note that there is no indication that alcohol played any role

in his offense, and his probation officer indicated that "there is no direct evidence that

the defendant has ever abused alcohol." (Sent. Recomm. at 2, May 21, 1998.) He has

no family history of alcohol abuse, no prior offenses resulting from the use of alcohol,

and during his stay in prison since 1992, he has completed a substance abuse treatment

program. Nevertheless, the district court was entitled to rely on the evidence of record

indicating that an alcohol ban is necessary for Behler's total rehabilitation. This is

consistent with the statutory goals of deterrence and protecting the public from future
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offenses. Our prior case law limits the district court's discretion only insofar as the

court imposes limitations on the basis of pure speculation or assumptions unrelated to

the rehabilitative process. See Bass, 121 F.3d at 1224. Accordingly, we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a total ban on alcohol use as

a special condition of supervised release in this case. 

Second, Behler challenges the condition that he attend and pay for any diagnostic

evaluation, counseling, or treatment as directed by his probation officer. Behler asserts

that he has no ongoing substance abuse or alcohol problem to warrant this imposition

and that such programs have a religious component in which he cannot be forced to

participate. This special condition allows Behler's probation officer to seek evaluations

to indicate whether or not further substance abuse treatment is necessary, and it does

not specifically designate any particular treatment program (except by example). When

imposing this condition, the district court commented, "I don't expect any problem with

drinking or drugs by you, Mr. Behler, and I'm putting that in only in case some future

problem does develop." (Sent. Tr. at 143.) 

Participation in an approved substance abuse program is a discretionary

condition that may be imposed "[i]f the court has reason to believe that the defendant

is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled substances or alcohol." USSG §

5B1.4(b)(23) (Oct. 1987); accord United States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 587(8th Cir.

1999). A user of controlled substances is by definition an abuser, and treatment is

appropriate. See Cooper, 171 F.3d at 587. There is no question that Behler has been

a substance abuser of methamphetamine, the drug which was the subject of his illegal

distribution offenses. Because no specific treatment plan has yet been ordered for

Behler, he has no First Amendment claim at this point. We conclude that the district

court did not abuse its broad discretion by ordering evaluation and treatment as directed

by the probation officer. See id. 
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Third, Behler argues that because he was not ordered to pay restitution or a fine,

the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to provide his probation officer

with access to financial information. We disagree. The United States Sentencing

Guidelines provide a policy statement recommending that the district court impose a

special condition requiring access to requested financial information "[i]f the court

imposes an order of restitution, forfeiture, or notice to victims, or orders the defendant

to pay a fine." USSG § 5B1.4(b)(18) (Oct. 1987). This policy statement, however,

does not preclude the district court from requiring financial disclosure in otherwise

appropriate situations, for instance, when warranted by the nature and characteristics

of the offense and the need for deterrence and protection as articulated in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a). In this case, the district court understood that money and greed were at the

heart of Behler's drug distribution offenses and believed that monitoring Behler's

financial situation would aid in detecting any return to his former lifestyle of drug

distribution. We conclude that these findings are consistent with the statutory factors

and the Sentencing Commission's policy statements. 

D.

We have considered the arguments made in Behler's pro se brief and find them

to be without merit. Finally, we deny his motion to supplement the record and to

proceed under duress and protest. 
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III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.