U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555

ENFORCEMENT PROG

 ANNUAL REPORT

 Calendar Year 2010

RAM 
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Contents 

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... v

I. Program Overview ........................................................................................... 1

A. Mission and Authority ...................................................................................... 1

B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions ........................................... 4

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends .................................................................... 6

2. Civil Penalty Actions ..................................................................................... 7

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ................................................ 9

4. Alternative Dispute Resolution ................................................................. 10

II. Enforcement Case Work ................................................................................ 12

A. Significant Enforcement Cases ..................................................................... 12

B. Hearing Activities ........................................................................................... 16

C. Orders .............................................................................................................. 17

D. Cases Supported by the Office of Investigations ........................................ 17

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations .................. 18

F. Cases Involving Discrimination .................................................................... 18

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions ................................................................................. 18

1. Discretion Involving Enforcement Guidance ............................................ 19

2. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances ............................................ 19

3. Discretion Used in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty .............. 20

4. Notices of Enforcement Discretion ........................................................... 20

H. Withdrawn Actions ......................................................................................... 21

I. Demand for Information ................................................................................. 21

III. Ongoing Enforcement Program Activities ................................................... 23

A. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ... 23

B. Knowledge Management ............................................................................... 24

C. Regional Accomplishments .......................................................................... 26

 
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- TABLES – 

Table 1. Escalated Action Trends ....................................................................... 6 

Table 2. Civil Penalty Information ....................................................................... 7 

Table 3. CY 2010 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and 

 Program Office ..................................................................................... 27 

Table 4. CY 2010 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by 

 Type of Licensee, Nonlicensee, or Individual .................................... 28 

- FIGURES - 

Figure 1. How the NRC Regulates ....................................................................... 1 

Figure 2. Escalated Enforcement by Type .......................................................... 4 

Figure 3. Escalated Enforcement by Licensee ................................................... 5 

Figure 4. Escalated Action Trends (CY 2006 – CY 2010)..................................... 6

Figure 5. Comparison of Amount of Proposed Civil Penalties 

(in U.S. Dollars) by Licensee Type for CY 2006-2010 ......................... .8 

Figure 6. Percentage of Proposed Civil Penalties 

by Licensee Type for CY 2006-2010 ...................................................... 9 

Figure 7. ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued in CY 2005-2010 ........................... 10 

- APPENDICES - 

A. Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ................................................. A1 

B. Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ............ B1 

C. Summary of Orders ......................................................................................... C1

D. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Individuals ............... D1 

E. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Nonlicensees 

(Vendors, Contractors, and Certificate Holders) .......................................... E1 
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Executive Summary 

The staff concluded that it effectively implemented the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) Enforcement Policy and Program in calendar year (CY) 2010. The relevant NRC 

Headquarters and regional offices continued to focus on appropriate and consistent 

enforcement of the agency’s regulations. 

Escalated Enforcement Action Data 

In CY 2010, the agency issued 124 escalated enforcement actions, which included 23 proposed 

civil penalties totaling $673,700; 84 escalated notices of violation without civil penalties; and 17 

enforcement orders including prohibitions of individuals from involvement in NRC-licensed 

activities and an imposition of a civil penalty. Although the monetary amount of civil penalties in 

CY 2010 is an increase from CY 2009, the total number of escalated enforcement actions did 

not significantly deviate from the previous 5-year average. 

Noteworthy Program Accomplishments 

On September 30, 2010 the revised Enforcement Policy (75 FR 60485) became effective. In 

addition, significant improvements were made to the Alternative Dispute Resolution program. 

Significant Cases 

In CY 2010, the agency processed a number of significant cases, which required extensive 

coordination and cooperation between internal and external stakeholders. These significant 

cases included: (1) Severity Level II and Severity Level III violations and a civil penalty issued to 

the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs - Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, (2) 

notices of violation associated with yellow significance determination process findings issued to 

five separate reactor facilities (Browns Ferry, Fort Calhoun, St. Lucie, Catawba, and Oconee), 

(3) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Orders issued following successful settlement 

agreements reached during prehearing negotiations with two separate licensees (Mattingly 

Testing Services, Inc. and Babcock & Wilcox, Nuclear Operations Group), and (4) an 

Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order issued to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 

National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Near Term Focus Areas to Enhance Performance 

In CY 2011, the staff intends to continue focusing on knowledge management issues. OE will 

enhance the consistent application of the agency’s enforcement program among regions by 

conducting additional regional assessments and continue efforts to improve enforcement 

timeliness, particularly in investigation based cases. 
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OE Annual Report

1 

I. Program Overview 

A. Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates 

the civilian uses of nuclear 

materials in the United States 

to protect public health and 

safety, the environment, and 

the common defense and 

security. The agency 

accomplishes this mission 

through: licensing of nuclear 

facilities and the possession, 

use, and disposal of nuclear 

materials; the development 

and implementation of 

requirements governing 

licensed activities; and 

inspection and enforcement 

activities to ensure compliance 

with these requirements. 

The NRC conducts various types of inspections and investigations designed to ensure 

NRC-licensed activities and associated activities are conducted in strict compliance 

with the Commission’s regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The sources of the NRC’s enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005. These statutes provide the NRC with broad authority. The Energy 

Policy Act of 2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, placing additional 

byproduct material under the NRC’s jurisdiction, including both naturally occurring and 

accelerator produced radioactive materials (NARM). The agency implements its 

enforcement authority through Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 

Part 2, “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of 

Orders,” Subpart B, “Procedures for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for 

Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties.” 

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 provides the statutory framework 

for the Federal Government to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 

The NRC Enforcement Policy establishes the general principles governing the NRC’s 

Enforcement Program and provides a process for implementing the agency’s 

enforcement authority in response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement 

of policy is predicated on the NRC’s view that compliance with NRC requirements 

serves a key role in ensuring safety, maintaining security, and protecting the 

environment. The Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees, to various 

Figure 1: How the NRC Regulates 
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2 

categories of nonlicensees, and to individual employees of licensed and 

nonlicensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a 

deterrent, emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and 

encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. 

In addition, because violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of 

significance, the NRC Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Enforcement authority includes the use of notices of violation, civil penalties, demands 

for information, and orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. The NRC staff 

may exercise discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be 

taken. Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations and are 

normally assigned a severity level (SL) ranging from SLIV for those of more than minor 

concern to SLI for the most significant. 

For operating nuclear reactors, the enforcement process is supplemented by the 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). Under the ROP, violations are not normally 

assigned a SL and are instead assessed through the ROP and usually referred to as 

findings. Under this program, the risk significance of inspection findings is determined 

using the significance determination process (SDP), which assigns the colors of green, 

white, yellow, or red with increasing risk. Findings under the ROP may also include 

licensee failures to meet self-imposed standards. As such, an ROP finding may or 

may not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. While the ROP can process 

most violations at operating power reactors, aspects of some violations cannot be 

addressed through the ROP and require the use of the traditional enforcement 

process. These include violations that resulted in actual safety or security 

consequences, violations that may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its 

regulatory oversight function, and violations involving willfulness. Additionally, while 

ROP findings are not normally subject to civil penalties, civil penalties are considered 

for any violation that involves actual consequences. SLIV violations and violations 

associated with green ROP findings are normally dispositioned as noncited violations 

(NCV). Inspection reports or inspection records document NCVs and briefly describe 

the corrective action that the licensee has taken or plans to take, if known at the time 

the NCV is documented. Additional information about the ROP is available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) develops policies and programs for enforcement of 

NRC requirements. In addition, OE exercises oversight of NRC enforcement, 

providing programmatic and implementation direction to regional and Headquarters 

offices conducting or involved in enforcement activities, and ensures that regional and 

program office enforcement programs are consistently implemented. 

The Director of OE reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, 

Waste, Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is 

responsible for ensuring that DEDMRT is kept apprised of escalated actions. 

DEDMRT is consulted on any case involving novel issues, substantial legal, 

programmatic, or policy issues raised during the enforcement review process, or when 

the Director of OE believes that DEDMRT involvement is warranted. OE works in 

partnership with NRC Headquarters and regional offices to enforce the agency’s 

requirements. 
OE Annual Report

3 

The NRC’s enforcement Web site includes a variety of information such as the 

Enforcement Policy, the Enforcement Manual, and current temporary enforcement 

guidance contained in enforcement guidance memoranda (EMG). This Web site also 

contains information about significant enforcement actions issued to reactor and 

materials licensees, nonlicensees (vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and 

individuals. Consistent with NRC practices and policies, most security-related actions 

and activities are not included on the NRC’s public Web site. However, OE does 

include in its enforcement documents collection security orders that impose 

compensatory security requirements on various licensees. The enforcement Web site 

is located at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement.html. 

In addition to enforcement activities, OE oversight responsibilities also include, in part, 

the Allegations Program, Employee Protection/Discrimination, and the ADR Program 

(both early-ADR and post-investigation ADR). Additional information about the 

responsibilities of OE is available at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/organization/oefuncdesc.html on the NRC’s public Web site. 

 
OE Annual Report

B. Assessment of 

Escalated enforcement act

• notices of violatio

• NOVs associated

reactor facilities) 

• civil penalty action

• orders (including 

Figure 2:

Figure 2 above shows the 

calendar year (CY) 2010 b

throughout the year to all li

was an NOV without a civil

penalty in CY 2010. In acc

penalties may not be warra

prevent recurrence of an id

NOVs without civil penaltie

responding to escalated en

indicator that licensees are

were 23 actions involving a

issued in CY 2009 and slig

actions involving the issuan

issued in CY 2009 and is b

Civil Penalties

Orders

14% 

1

4 

Escalated Enforcement Actions

tions include the following: 

ns (NOVs) including SLI, II, or III violations 

d with red, yellow, or white SDP findings (for oper

ns 

confirmatory orders resulting from the ADR proce

: Escalated Enforcement by Type

distribution of escalated enforcement actions issu

y type of action. This includes the 124 total actio

censees. The most common escalated enforcem

l penalty. The agency issued 84 NOVs without a

cordance with the Enforcement Policy, Section 2.

anted if adequate corrective action is taken by a l

dentified SLIII violation. Generally, the large perc

es reflects a strong licensee program with regard 

nforcement action. The staff considers this a pos

e identifying and promptly correcting noncomplian

a proposed civil penalty, which is greater than the

ghtly greater than the 5-year average. There were

nce of an order, which is a decrease from the 31 

below the 5-year average. 

Escalated N

w/o CP

68%

8%

rating 

ess) 

ued in 

ons issued 

ment action 

a civil 

3.4, civil 

icensee to 

centage of 

to 

sitive 

nces. There 

e number 

e 17 

orders 

NOVs 

Ps
OE Annual Report

5 

Figure 3 below shows the distribution of enforcement actions based on the type of 

licensee to whom escalated enforcement actions were issued in CY 2010. For this 

chart, individual actions were included in the appropriate category and not counted 

separately. The following charts and the tables at the end of this report give further 

detail by identifying the region or program office that initiated the action, as well as the 

licensees, nonlicensees, and individuals involved. 

Figure 3: Escalated Enforcement by Licensee 

The larger number of escalated enforcement actions issued to materials licensees 

reflects the significantly larger number of materials licenses (more than 22,000) when 

compared to licenses for operating reactors (104) and fuel facilities (13). The majority 

of the materials escalated enforcement actions without civil penalties were issued to 

gauge users and hospitals, as indicated in Table 4 (see page 29). This is consistent 

with the distribution of escalated enforcement actions issued to materials licensees in 

past years and reflects the increased emphasis on inspections for security and control 

of licensed materials. The number of escalated enforcement actions associated with 

reactor facilities did not increase significantly from the past year. However, the NRC 

issued five yellow findings in CY 2010 when no yellow or red findings were issued in 

CY 2009 and CY 2008. The total number of escalated enforcement actions issued to 

fuel cycle facilities when compared to those issued to materials or reactor licensees is 

consistent with the relative number of licenses. However, civil penalties issued to fuel 

facilities increased both in number and monetary amount. 

31

4

49

1

4

18

4 4

9

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Reactor Fuel Facility Materials

Escalated NOVs (w/o Civil Penalty) Civil Penalty Orders
OE Annual Report

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1. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

During CY 2010, the agency issued 124 escalated enforcement actions. This number 

is approximately equal to the average number of escalated enforcement actions issued 

for the last 5 years. Table 1 provides information on the total number of escalated 

enforcement actions from CY 2006 to CY 2010. Figure 4 provides this information in 

graphical form. 

Table 1: Escalated Action Trends 

CY 2010 CY 2009 CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 Average 

Escalated NOVs 

(w/o CPs) 84 78 94 77 57 78 

CPs 23 17 28 18 15 20 

Orders 16 28 35 22 15 23 

Orders Imposing CPs 1 3 0 1 0 1 

Total 124 126 157 118 87 122 

Figure 4: Escalated Action Trends (CY 2006 – CY 2010)

57

77

94

78

84

15

18

28

17

23

15

23

35

31

17

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Escalated NOVs w/o CP Civil Penalties Orders
OE Annual Report

7 

As noted in Table 1, the total number of escalated enforcement actions issued in CY 

2010 is approximately equal to the 5-year average. However, the number of escalated 

NOVs not associated with a civil penalty increased from that issued in CY 2009 due, in 

part, to the increase in the non-civil penalty enforcement actions issued to fuel facility 

licensees. 

2. Civil Penalty Actions

During CY 2010, the agency processed 23 enforcement actions involving proposed 

civil penalties. Eight of these actions involved willfulness. Willfulness is defined as 

either deliberate misconduct or careless disregard. 

Information regarding willful violations is identified because such violations are of 

particular concern to the Commission. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on 

licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and 

communicating with candor; therefore, a violation involving willfulness may be 

considered more egregious than the underlying violation taken alone would have 

been, and the SL may be increased. 

Table 2: Civil Penalty Information 

 1

 The NRC issues an “order imposing civil monetary penalty” when a licensee chooses not to 

pay a proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty. 

CY 2010 CY 2009 CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 Average 

Number of Proposed 

Civil Penalties 23 17 28 18 15 20 

Number of Orders That 

Imposed Civil Penalties 1 3 0 1 0 1 

Number of Civil 

Penalties Paid 21 15 29 17 16 20 

Amount of Proposed 

Civil Penalties $673,700 $174,000 $1,185,900 $383,200 $332,350 $549,830 

Amount of Imposed 

Civil Penalties1 $32,500 $29,250 $0 $3,250 $0 $13,000 

Amount of Civil 

Penalties Paid $639,480 $279,750 $1,039,850 $446,500 $375,500 $556,216 
OE Annual Report

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Table 2 provides information comparing civil penalty assessments for the current 

calendar year to the previous 4 years. When reviewing the information in this table, it 

is important to note that an enforcement action may include more than one civil 

penalty or more than one violation. In addition, a civil penalty may be proposed in one 

year and paid or imposed in another year. Finally, the amount of a proposed civil 

penalty may be reduced, for example, as a result of exercising discretion as part of a 

settlement agreement developed during ADR. 

The total number of civil penalties proposed in CY 2010 increased from the number 

proposed in CY 2009 and is approximately equal to the average number issued over 

the last 5 years. However, the total amount of proposed civil penalties increased 

significantly in CY 2010 (by almost a factor of 4 over that from CY 2009) mainly as a 

result of the civil penalties issued to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs - 

Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center (PVAMC), Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS), 

and Florida Power and Light’s Turkey Point Plant. 

Figure 5: Comparison of Amount of Proposed 

Civil Penalties (in U.S. Dollar) by Licensee Type for CY 2006-2010 

Figures 5 and 6 show the amount of civil penalties proposed for reactor, materials, and 

fuel facility licensees in each of the past 5 years. The data show a significant increase 

in the percentage of the total civil penalty amount issued to fuel cycle and materials 

licensees in CY 2010 and a significant decrease in the percent attributed to reactor 

licensees since CY 2008. The largest peaks are frequently the result of a single civil 

penalty (NFS, PVAMC). Consequently, a single year does not indicate a trend, an 

important factor to consider in assessing possible trends. 

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

400000

Reactor Fuel Facility Materials

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

$988,000
OE Annual Report

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Figure 6: Percentage of Proposed Civil Penalties 

by Licensee Type for CY 2006-2010 

Appendix A to this report includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions 

for CY 2010. Security related issues involving NOVs with civil penalties are not 

addressed in Appendix A; however, the number of NOVs associated with security 

related issues is included in the data discussed in this report. 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

In accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty may not be 

warranted for escalated enforcement actions if certain criteria are met. For instance, 

(1) if the identified violation is the first nonwillful SLIII violation identified in the past 2 

years or two inspections at the licensee’s facility and the licensee took adequate 

corrective action to prevent recurrence, or (2) if this was not the first nonwillful SLIII 

violation identified in the past 2 years or two inspections, but the licensee selfidentified the violation and took adequate corrective action to prevent its recurrence. 

In addition, the agency may use enforcement discretion, when deemed appropriate, to 

refrain from proposing a civil penalty regardless of the normal civil penalty assessment 

process described above. 

During CY 2010, the NRC issued 84 escalated NOVs without civil penalties. Of these 

violations, 17 were associated with white SDP findings under the ROP. Five violations 

were associated with yellow SDP findings. No violations were associated with red 

SDP findings. Seven NOVs associated with green SDP findings were issued to 

licensees. NOVs associated with green SDP findings are not considered escalated 

enforcement actions. 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Reactor

Fuel Facility

Materials
OE Annual Report

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Appendix B to this report summarizes each of these NOVs without civil penalties 

issued to licensees, as well as the NOVs associated with SDP findings. Security 

related issues involving NOVs without civil penalties are not addressed in Appendix B; 

however, the number of NOVs associated with security related issues is included in 

the data discussed in this report. 

4. Alternative Dispute Resolution 

The term ''post-investigation ADR'' refers to the use of mediation after the NRC Office 

of Investigations (OI) has completed its investigation and an enforcement panel has 

concluded that pursuit of an enforcement action appears to be warranted. Under the 

NRC’s post-investigation ADR process, mediation may be offered at three points in the 

enforcement process for discrimination and other wrongdoing cases: (1) before a 

predecisional enforcement conference; (2) after an NOV is issued; or (3) when cases 

result in the issuance of an Order Imposing a Civil Penalty. Mediation is an informal 

and voluntary process in which a neutral mediator with no decision-making authority 

assists the parties in attempting to reach an agreement. The staff believes that for 

certain escalated enforcement actions mediation affords the staff the opportunity to 

institute broader or more comprehensive corrective actions that may work to better 

ensure public health and safety than outcomes typically achieved through the 

traditional enforcement process. 

As depicted in Figure 7 below, the number of confirmatory orders arising out of the 

post-investigation ADR program declined from the uncharacteristically high level 

issued in CY 2009, returning to the more typical levels of approximately 

10 confirmatory orders per year. 

Figure 7: ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued in CY 2005-2010 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

CY 2005 CY 2006 CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010
OE Annual Report

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During CY 2010, the NRC participated in 10 post-investigation ADR mediations where 

an agreement was reached (1 reactor licensee, 1 reactor licensee contractor, 

6 materials licensees, and 2 individuals). All agreements were negotiated before a 

predecisional enforcement conference was held. 

 
OE Annual Report

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II. Enforcement Case Work 

A. Significant Enforcement Cases 

During CY 2010, the agency was involved in several significant enforcement actions 

that required coordination among internal and external stakeholders beyond the typical 

enforcement case and were noteworthy in some aspects. 

U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs 

On March 17, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$227,500 was issued to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) for violations 

identified as a result of NRC investigation and inspection activities at the Philadelphia 

Veterans Affairs Medical Center (PVAMC). The violations included two SLII violations 

assessed civil penalties, an additional SLII violation not assessed a civil penalty, two 

SLIII violations and a SLIII problem associated with two additional violations assessed 

civil penalties, and two separate SLIV violations. The NRC exercised enforcement 

discretion to escalate the civil penalty amount derived from the normal civil penalty 

assessment process for SLII violations and applied a single maximum statutory daily 

civil penalty amount to each of the identified SLII violations. In addition, base civil 

penalties were applied to each of the two SLIII violations and the SLIII problem. Based 

on these investigation and inspection activities into the DVA’s reported 97 prostate 

brachytherapy medical events between January 2002 and May 2008, the NRC 

determined that a significant programmatic breakdown of the prostate brachytherapy 

program occurred. The NRC also determined that additional information was required 

from Dr. Gary Kao and Mr. Gregory Desobry, the physician and medical physicist 

respectively who were involved in a significant number of the reported events, to 

determine (1) whether there existed reasonable assurance of safety that these 

individuals could provide adequate protection without undue risk when using NRC 

licensed materials for the benefit of patients, and (2) if individual enforcement action 

was warranted. Subsequently, an order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed 

activities was issued to Dr. Kao on February 23, 2011, and, on the same date, an 

order was issued to Mr. Desobry requiring him to notify the NRC if he again began 

similar work, so that NRC could have an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the 

corrective actions that he had taken in response to a Demand for Information (DFI) 

(See Section II.I for additional information regarding these DFIs). The NRC conducted 

additional inspections at the other DVA medical facilities operating under Master 

Material License (MML) 03-23853-01VA to determine the extent of condition regarding 

compliance with requirements associated with active prostate brachytherapy 

programs. Subsequently, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $39,000 was issued to the DVA for several SLIII violations related to 

activities at (a) the VA Sierra Nevada Health Care System, Reno, NV; (b) the G.V. 

(Sonny) Montgomery VA Medical Center, Jackson, MI; (c) the VA Boston Healthcare 

System, Boston, MA; and (d) VA New York Harbor Health Care System, Brooklyn, NY. 

In addition, several SLIV violations were identified. During the conduct of inspection 

and enforcement activities, the NRC conducted open public meetings and participated 
OE Annual Report

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in congressional information sessions and responded to internal and external 

stakeholder questions regarding these matters. Additional violations were identified at 

DVA facilities unrelated to the above issues at PVAMC. An NOV and Proposed 

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $14,000 was issued to DVA for two SLIII 

violations identified as a result of a medical event that occurred at the San Diego 

Healthcare System facility. The medical event occurred when iodine-131 was injected 

into the wrong port of the gastrostomy feeding tube (g-tube) resulting in an underdose 

to the patient’s thyroid and an unintended dose to the patient’s stomach. Violations 

were also identified at four different DVA medical facilities and were dispositioned 

using enforcement discretion to not cite the licensee in accordance with the 

Enforcement Policy. In these cases, the NRC determined that the National Health 

Physics Program appropriately identified, and ensured corrective actions for the 

violations in accordance with the enforcement procedures described in 

MML 03-23853-01VA. 

U. S. Department of Commerce 

On March 1, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the 

U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST 

or licensee) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session 

held on January 5, 2010. In addition, on the same date, an Order Prohibiting 

Involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year was issued to 

Mr. Lawrence Grimm, a former Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for NIST. These 

enforcement actions were based on 10 apparent violations of NRC requirements at 

NIST’s facility in Boulder, CO, which were identified during NRC inspection and 

investigation activities conducted in response to a June 9, 2008 plutonium spill. The 

apparent violations involved the licensee’s failure to conduct the radiation safety 

program at NIST-Boulder in accordance with NRC requirements and the conditions of 

the NIST-Boulder license, and the deliberate failure of the former RSO to provide 

complete and accurate information to the NRC. In response to the June 9, 2008 

event, NIST implemented extensive corrective actions including: (1) decontaminating 

the NIST-Boulder facility, (2) designating new and additional managers with 

responsibility for oversight of the radiation and overall safety programs, (3) 

implementing a hazards analysis and control policy, and (4) undertaking efforts to 

evaluate and improve the safety culture at NIST. In addition, as part of the ADR 

settlement agreement, NIST agreed to take a number of other actions including: (1) 

hiring an independent consultant to evaluate the effectiveness of its radiation safety 

program, (2) submitting its annual audits to the NRC, (3) improving its new employee 

indoctrination program regarding radiation safety, (4) making specific improvements to 

its radiation safety training program, (5) submitting a license amendment to reduce the 

number of authorized radionuclides at the NIST-Boulder facility, (6) implementing a 

radiation hazards analysis process, (7) revising the Ionizing Radiation Safety 

Committee's charter to include additional oversight of communications with the NRC, 

and (8) paying a civil penalty in the amount of $10,000. In consideration of these 

commitments, and actions already completed by NIST, the NRC agreed not to pursue 

any additional enforcement actions for the apparent violations. Mr. Grimm participated 

in a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) on January 7, 2010, at his request, 

in lieu of ADR. At the PEC, Mr. Grimm acknowledged that the information he had 

provided the NRC in a license amendment request was not complete and accurate, 

but denied that he had deliberately violated NRC requirements. The staff considered 
OE Annual Report

14 

this information but determined that, in fact, a deliberate violation of NRC requirements 

did occur an issued the Order. Subsequently, Mr. Grimm requested ADR. However, 

an agreement could not be reached. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the Order 

Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year remained in 

effect. 

Violations Associated with Yellow Findings 

In CY 2010, the NRC issued NOVs associated with yellow SDP findings to five 

different reactor licensees. This is noteworthy because no violations associated with 

yellow findings were issued in CY 2009 or CY 2008. Short summaries of the nonsecurity related cases follow: 

• On April 19, 2010, the Tennessee Valley Authority was issued an NOV for two 

violations associated with yellow and white SDP findings at its Browns Ferry 

Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3. The yellow finding was associated with a violation 

for multiple examples, in all three units, of a failure to satisfy fire protection 

requirements for safe shutdown capability, which could have delayed proper 

operator response to a major disabling fire event. 

• On August 12, 2010, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, was issued an NOV for a 

violation associated with yellow and white SDP findings at its Oconee Nuclear 

Station, Units 1, 2 and 3. The yellow finding involved the failure to meet technical 

specification minimum flow requirements for the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) 

Reactor Coolant Makeup (RCM) system and the length of time that the system was 

inoperable. The licensee identified the cause of the reduced flow as a partially 

blocked filter, but failed to identify and correct a similar condition at Units 2 and 3 in 

a timely manner. 

• On October 6, 2010, the Omaha Public Power District was issued an NOV for a 

violation associated with a yellow SDP finding at its Fort Calhoun Station. This 

finding involved an inadequate licensee procedure for coping with external flooding 

events to protect vital facilities and equipment to the level described in the Updated 

Final Safety Analysis Report. This could have resulted in flooding with an impact 

multiple, redundant trains of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant. 

• On April 19, 2010, Florida Power & Light Company was issued an NOV for a 

violation associated with a yellow SDP finding at its St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. This 

finding involved the failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” In 2008, the licensee experienced an air inleakage event into the closed cooling water system which affected the system’s 

ability to supply adequate cooling to essential equipment. The licensee’s 

troubleshooting and corrective actions failed to identify the source of the air inleakage, which resulted in a similar event in 2009. 
OE Annual Report

15 

Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. 

On February 23, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in 

the amount of $32,500 was issued to Babcock & Wilcox, Nuclear Operations Group 

(B&W or the licensee). This action was based on a SLIII violation associated with the 

licensee’s failure to include instructions in a plant procedure addressing the proper 

method to use when neutralizing acid spills. The Notice concerned an event on April 

28, 2008 in which a process operator took inappropriate actions to neutralize a spill by 

adding sodium hydroxide, a strong base, to a spill of hydrogen fluoride acid. The acid 

and base combination reacted violently and resulted in the operator sustaining an 

ocular exposure which, the staff concluded, could have led to irreversible or other 

serious, long-lasting health effects. The letter dated February 23, 2010, transmitting 

this Notice also withdrew a SLIII violation and proposed civil penalty similarly related to 

the event on April 28, 2008. This violation had been previously issued on October 20, 

2008. The licensee did not agree with the staff’s characterization of the issues and, by 

letter dated March 31, 2010, denied that a violation had occurred. The NRC staff 

evaluated the licensee’s written response and concluded that a violation had occurred 

as stated. Accordingly, the agency issued an Order Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty 

in the amount of $32,500 on June 15, 2010. The licensee continued to disagree with 

the staff’s assessment of the regulatory issues and, in accordance with the order and 

10 CFR 2.205, “Civil Penalties,” on July 27, 2010, requested that the Atomic Safety 

and Licensing Board (ASLB or the Board) conduct a hearing into these matters. See 

Section II.B, “Hearing Activities” for further details. 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. 

On September 2, 2010, an Immediately Effective Order Revoking License was issued 

to Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. (MTS or the licensee) for multiple violations 

identified during an NRC inspection and investigation. On the same day, an 

Immediately Effective Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities for a 

period of 7 years was issued to Mr. Mark Ficek, president and owner of MTS. In part, 

these actions were based on (1) the licensee’s deliberate failure to implement 

specified actions required by Confirmatory Order (EA-08-271) which was issued on 

March 6, 2009, to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session; (2) the licensee’s deliberate failure to establish and maintain a prearranged 

response plan with the Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) in accordance with the 

requirements of the Increased Controls Order; (3) the deliberate failure by the 

licensee’s president to provide complete and accurate information to an NRC 

inspector, and under oath to an NRC investigator, regarding the licensee’s effort to 

establish a prearranged response plan with the LLEA; (4) the licensee’s failure to 

maintain a dependable means to detect, assess, and respond to unauthorized access 

to radioactive materials as required by the Increased Controls Order; (5) the 

licensee’s failure to properly secure a radiographic exposure device for transport that 

led to the device being temporarily lost; and, (6) the licensee’s willful failure to 

immediately notify the NRC about the lost radiographic exposure device. Mr. Ficek did 

not agree with the NRC characterization of the issues and, on September 22, 2010 

requested, in accordance with the order and 10 CFR 2.205, that the ASLB conduct a 

hearing into these matters. See Section II.B, “Hearing Activities” for further details. 
OE Annual Report

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B. Hearing Activities

During CY 2010, two requests were made for hearings before the ASLB relating to 

enforcement actions against (1) B&W Nuclear Operations Group, and (2) MTS and its 

former president and owner. Although the ASLB established review boards, each 

case was successfully closed before the conduct of any adjudicatory proceedings 

when the Board approved settlement agreements reached between the NRC and the 

affected parties. 

Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. 

On August 11, 2010, the ASLB granted a request by B&W, Nuclear Operations Group 

(B&W or licensee) for a hearing to resolve issues identified during a March 23 through 

June 21, 2008 inspection. On August 13, 2010, the licensee and the NRC jointly 

submitted a motion asking the Board to hold this administrative enforcement 

proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of proposed settlement negotiations. 

On October 12, 2010, the ASLB approved a Settlement Agreement successfully 

negotiated by the NRC and B&W. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement: (1) B&W 

will not challenge the existence of a violation of NRC requirements resulting from the 

chemical exposure event which occurred at the B&W Lynchburg facility on April 28, 

2008, and will seek dismissal of its Request for Hearing; (2) the NRC will recategorize 

the February 23, 2010 NOV from a SLIII violation to a violation with no assigned SL; 

(3) the NRC will withdraw the Order Imposing Civil Penalty dated June 15, 2010, within 

21 days of the Board Order approving the settlement agreement; (4) B&W will pay 

$32,500, in lieu of the withdrawn civil penalty, as a settlement payment, within 21 days 

of the Board Order and in accordance with NUREG/BR-0254; (5) B&W will perform 

one quarterly emergency drill with the Lynchburg General Hospital responding to a 

hydrofluoric acid-exposed worker within 12 months of the Board Order; and, (6) B&W 

will give a presentation at the 2011 Fuel Cycle Information Exchange addressing 

lessons learned from the chemical exposure event which occurred on April 28, 2008. 

The complete Board Order can be viewed from the NRC’s Agency-Wide Document 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) at ML102850179. For more information 

regarding this case, see the discussion in Section II.A of this report concerning B&W. 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. 

On October 6, 2010, the ASLB granted a request by Mr. Mark Ficek, president and 

owner of Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. (MTS), for a hearing to resolve issues 

associated with two orders issued by the NRC on September 2, 2010, associated with 

violations identified during an NRC investigation. These orders were: (1) an Order 

Revoking License to MTS; and, (2) an Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed 

Activities for a period of seven years to Mr. Ficek. On the same date, the ASLB denied 

a request by Ms. Dayna Thompson, an employee of MTS, to forgo the immediate 

effectiveness of the MTS Order. On November 4, 2010, the licensee and NRC jointly 

submitted a motion asking the Board to hold this administrative enforcement 

proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of proposed settlement negotiations. 

On February 22, 2011, the ASLB approved a Settlement Agreement successfully 

negotiated by the NRC and Mr. Ficek. The Board found that its terms reflected a fair 
OE Annual Report

17 

and reasonable settlement of these matters in keeping with the objectives of the 

NRC’s Enforcement Policy, and satisfied the requirements of 10CFR2.338(g) and (h). 

The Board Order stipulates, in part, that Mr. Ficek will not own a controlling share 

and/or interest of a NRC licensee, Mr. Ficek will refrain from engaging in NRC-licensed 

activities until September 2, 2017, the revoked MTS license will not be reinstated, and 

for a period of three years, Mr. Ficek will provide notice to the Director, Office of 

Enforcement 10 days prior to beginning employment involving certain specified NRClicensed activities. The complete Board Order can be viewed in ADAMS at 

ML110530327. For more information regarding this case, see the discussion in 

Section II.A of this report concerning Mattingly Testing Service, Inc. 

 

C. Orders

During CY 2010, the NRC issued 17 orders to licensees and to individuals. These 

included nine confirmatory orders that were issued to confirm commitments associated 

with ADR settlement agreements, four orders issued to individuals (three of which 

restricted their involvement in NRC licensed-activities), and one order imposing a civil 

penalty. 

Two of the four orders issued to individuals resulted from successful ADR mediation 

sessions. Orders issued to individuals restricting involvement in NRC licensed 

activities included: one individual being prohibited from involvement in NRC-licensed 

activities for 7 years; one individual being prohibited from involvement in NRC-licensed 

activities for 5 years; and one individual being prohibited from involvement in NRClicensed activities for 1 year. 

As seen in Table 1, the number of orders issued in CY 2010 decreased from CY 2009, 

partly because of a decrease in the number of cases involving ADR and a decrease in 

the number of cases involving individuals. 

 

Appendix C includes a brief description of the enforcement orders issued in CY 2010. 

 

D. Cases Supported by the Office of Investigations

In CY 2010, an OI Report supported 26 percent or 32 of the 124 escalated actions: 

• 8 of the 23 escalated NOV cases with civil penalties (35 percent) 

• 9 of the 84 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (10 percent) 

• 15 of the 17 enforcement orders (88 percent) 

The 32 cases supported by an OI investigation represent a 32 percent decrease from 

the 47 cases supported in CY 2009 and is a decrease in the average number of OI 

supported cases over previous years. The percentage of cases supported by OI 

investigations also decreased from CY 2009. 
OE Annual Report

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E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations

During CY 2010, the agency issued 11 escalated actions to licensed and unlicensed 

individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated enforcement 

actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in CY 2010. Appendix C provides 

summaries of the orders that were issued to individuals, including those orders 

prohibiting or limiting their participation in NRC-licensed activities. Appendix D 

summarizes the NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2010. 

The number of escalated actions issued to individuals in CY 2010 decreased from the 

17 escalated actions issued to individuals in CY 2009. 

The agency issued two escalated enforcement actions to nonlicensees in CY 2010. 

Appendix E provides a summary of these actions. 

F. Cases Involving Discrimination 

During CY 2010, one case involving an allegation of discrimination was resolved using 

post-investigation ADR. On September 10, 2010, a Confirmatory Order was issued to 

confirm commitments made as result of an ADR session, held on August 24, 2010, 

between Stone & Webster Construction, Inc., a Shaw Group company and the NRC. 

This Confirmatory Order arose out of the U.S. Department of Labor Administrative 

Review Board’s (ARB) September 4, 2009 Final Decision and Order of Remand (ARB 

Case No. 06-041), reversing a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge’s 

recommended Decision and Order concluding that Shaw had not retaliated against a 

former painter foreman at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions

The NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate 

enforcement sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement action within its 

statutory authority. The exercise of discretion allows the NRC to determine what 

actions should be taken in a particular case, notwithstanding the guidance contained in 

the Enforcement Policy. After considering the general tenets of the Enforcement 

Policy and the safety and security significance of a violation and its surrounding 

circumstances, the NRC may exercise judgment and discretion in determining the SLs 

of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. 

In CY 2010, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in 34 cases to address 

violations of NRC requirements. Below is a discussion of the more significant cases 

dispositioned with discretion in CY 2010. 
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1. Discretion Involving Enforcement Guidance 

The NRC exercised discretion in a number of cases involving the use of either the 

Interim Enforcement Policy guidance related to fire protection issues or Enforcement 

Guidance Memoranda (EGM). 

• The NRC continued to perform fire protection inspections at power reactor sites to 

verify compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Violations of 

these requirements which were identified at sites transitioning to the National Fire 

Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805) and met the criteria as stated in 

the Interim Enforcement Policy, “Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection 

Issues (10 CFR 50.48)” warranted enforcement discretion and notices of violation 

were not issued. There were three documented cases involving this type of 

discretion. Violations involving multiple fire induced circuit faults identified at sites 

who are not transitioning to NFPA 805 and meet the criteria as stated in 

EGM-09-002, “Enforcement Discretion For Certain Fire Induced Circuit Faults”, 

also warranted enforcement discretion. There was one documented case involving 

this type of discretion. However, discretion was not exercised in six instances 

where noncompliance with fire protection requirements was identified and the 

criteria for exercise of discretion as stated above were not satisfied. NOVs were 

issued in these cases. 

• The agency dispositioned 10 violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-09-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Naturally Occurring 

and Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) Requirements”, dated 

May 13, 2009. Enforcement discretion may be exercised for violations of the 

NARM requirements if certain criteria are met as described in EGM-09-004. 

2. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances 

Thirteen cases involved use of discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the 

Enforcement Policy (or Section VII.B.6 of the former policy). In each case, the staff 

determined that the facts supported issuance of a closeout letter to the licensee in lieu 

of an NOV. Below is a discussion of the more significant cases dispositioned in 

CY 2010. 

• Violations identified at four different DVA medical facilities were dispositioned using 

enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy. 

In each case, the staff determined that the National Health Physics Program staff 

had appropriately identified and ensured corrective actions for the violations in 

accordance with the enforcement procedures described in the MML and that the 

level of enforcement (SLIII) taken by the licensee against the permittee would not 

have been exceeded by the level of action that would have been taken by the 

NRC. 

• The NRC dispositioned violations involving small reactor coolant pressure 

boundary leakage (below detection thresholds) at three operating reactors in 

accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy. In each case, the staff 

concluded that, although any reactor coolant system leakage at power constitutes 

a violation and would normally be categorized at SLIV, the licensee’s actions did 
OE Annual Report

20 

not contribute to a degraded condition, and were reasonable to identify and 

address the matter. Furthermore, the staff concluded that the licensee’s quality 

assurance program or other control measures could not have been reasonably 

expected to detect the condition. 

3. Discretion Used in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty 

The staff exercised enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 3.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy, to escalate or mitigate the amount of a civil penalty in two 

separate cases to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflected the significance of 

the circumstances of the violation. The resultant proposed civil penalty differed from 

the amount determined by the normal civil penalty assessment process described in 

Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy. 

• In recognition of particularly poor performance by NFS and previous escalated 

enforcement history at its facility, the staff exercised enforcement discretion and 

doubled the $70,000 civil penalty derived from the normal civil penalty assessment 

process for a SLIII problem associated with an event which occurred on October 

13, 2009. A proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $140,000 was 

issued to NFS on September 2, 2010. (See Appendix A for further details). 

• The NRC concluded that enforcement discretion to forego proposing a civil penalty 

was appropriate in the case of a Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas, LLC (GNF-A) 

problem identified in an NRC letter dated June 9, 2010. The basis for the agency’s 

conclusion was that the staff had not previously found, during the integrated safety 

analysis (ISA) summary review and subsequent approval of a renewed license, 

that GNF-A was not meeting regulatory requirements, and GNF-A believed the 

NRC staff was aware of the manner in which it was implementing its ISA 

methodology. Normally, a base civil penalty would be proposed for a SLIII 

problem. (See Appendix B for further details). 

4. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances may arise where a power reactor licensee’s or gaseous 

diffusion plant certificate holder’s compliance with a technical specification or other 

license condition would require a plant transient or performance testing, inspection, or 

other system realignment that is of greater risk than the current specific plant 

conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may choose not to enforce the 

applicable requirement(s). The staff exercises this enforcement discretion, designated 

as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) in accordance with Section 3.7 of the 

Enforcement Policy, only if it is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with 

protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also issue NOEDs in cases 

involving severe weather or other natural phenomena, when it determines that 

exercising this discretion will not compromise safety. NOEDs require justification from 

a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis for the request and 

provides whatever other information the staff deems necessary to issue an NOED. 

The NRC issued two NOEDs during CY 2010. 
OE Annual Report

21 

• NOED 10-4-001, issued April 8, 2010, to Union Electric Company, (Callaway Plant, 

Unit 1), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the licensee to extend the 72-

hour completion time for Technical Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating,” 

Required Actions B.4., by 48 hours to restore a diesel generator or commence a 

plant shutdown. 

• NOED 10-02-002, issued May 6, 2010, to U.S. Enrichment Corporation, (Paducah 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the 

licensee to extend the 24-hour completion time for Technical Safety Requirements 

(TSR) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) 2.4.3.4, “Action A, Completion Time 

for the R-114 Coolant Overpressure Control System”, by 10 days in order to place 

the number of affected cells in “mode Cascade 1 with process motors deenergized” 

in a planned and safe manner. 

H. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons; for example, a 

licensee might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s 

application of the Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees 

may provide clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection, 

and this may affect the finding of a noncompliance. 

During CY 2010, the agency issued 124 escalated enforcement actions to reactors, 

materials, and fuel facility licensees of which two were disputed. The NRC withdrew 

both of these disputed actions. Specifically, on October 23, 2010, the NRC withdrew 

an NOV for a SLIII violation and a proposed imposition of civil penalty issued to B&W 

Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. (EA-08-204) based on additional review by the NRC 

staff. However, based on its review, the NRC issued a revised NOV and 

corresponding civil penalty to the licensee. (See Section II.A and Appendix C for 

further details). On May 3, 2010, the NRC withdrew an NOV for a SLIII violation 

involving inadequate control of a portable gauge and a proposed imposition of civil 

penalty issued to a licensee because of additional new information provided by the 

licensee that had previously not been available to the staff. 

During CY 2010, the agency issued approximately 1000 nonescalated enforcement 

actions to reactor, materials, and fuel facility licensees. Of these actions, 12 

nonescalated enforcement actions were disputed. In CY 2010, the NRC withdrew only 

one of these disputed actions. 

I. Demand for Information 

When the NRC concludes that additional information is necessary to determine 

whether an order or other enforcement action is warranted, the agency may issue a 

DFI (see 10 CFR 2.204, “Demand for Information”) to a licensee or other person 

subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. A DFI requires the licensee or other 

person to provide more information or a context for its action(s) so that the NRC is able 

to complete its assessment of the issue and make a final enforcement determination. 
OE Annual Report

22 

During CY 2010, the NRC issued three DFIs as follows: 

• Vermont Yankee (EA-10-034) – On March 1, 2010, a DFI was issued to Entergy 

Nuclear Operations to confirm that information provided to the NRC by certain 

Vermont Yankee employees was accurate and that the impact of recent personnel 

changes at the site had been assessed with regards to regulatory program 

performance and safety culture. This DFI was necessary to ensure public health 

and safety in light of inaccurate remarks made by some plant officials and staff to 

the State of Vermont related to underground piping at the facility. On March 31, 

2010, Entergy responded to the DFI and concluded that the information provided to 

the NRC by certain employees was complete and accurate. On June 17, 2010, the 

NRC issued Inspection Report 05000271/2010007 which provided the results of an 

NRC independent review of Entergy’s investigation and concluded that (1) the 

information considered material that Entergy provided to the NRC was complete 

and accurate; (2) as a result, no corrective actions were necessary for materiality 

deficiencies; (3) in light of organizational changes resulting from the Entergy 

investigation, Entergy provided for continued acceptable regulatory performance at 

Vermont Yankee; (4) the Entergy investigation and actions did not have a negative 

impact on the safety-conscious work environment; and, (5) Entergy made its 

investigation available to the NRC for review. On June 17, 2010, the NRC closed 

the DFI by sending a letter to Entergy in which the NRC concluded that Entergy 

had met the requirements of the DFI and that no further regulatory action 

concerning this matter was warranted. 

• Dr. Gary Kao (IA-09-035) – On May 24, 2010, a DFI was issued to a former 

physician at the DVA medical facility in Philadelphia, to determine whether 

reasonable assurance existed, that Dr. Kao could provide adequate protection 

when using NRC licensed materials for the benefit of patients without undue risk. 

Dr. Kao’s response to this DFI, dated June 1, 2010, supplemented a response to a 

prior DFI issued in 2009. The NRC staff assessed Dr. Kao’s response in light of 

his involvement in numerous medical events that occurred at the DVA facility in 

Philadelphia from January 2002 through May 2008, and determined that additional 

actions were necessary to ensure public health and safety. As a result, on 

February 23, 2011, the NRC issued an order prohibiting Dr. Kao from involvement 

in NRC-licensed activities. 

• Mr. Gregory Desobry (IA-09-279) – On May 24, 2010, a DFI was issued to a 

former medical physicist at the DVA medical facility in Philadelphia, to determine 

whether reasonable assurance existed, that Mr. Desobry could provide adequate 

protection when using NRC licensed materials for the benefit of patients without 

undue risk. Mr. Desobry’s response to this DFI, dated June 28, 2010, provided the 

NRC with the information it sought and indicated that Mr. Desobry had taken steps 

to ensure that he could safely use radioactive material in treatment of patients. 

After considering the information in his response, the NRC issued an order to 

Mr. Desobry on February 23, 2011, which required him to notify the NRC if he 

resumed similar work, so that the NRC could have an opportunity to assess the 

effectiveness of the corrective actions that he had taken. 
OE Annual Report

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III. Ongoing Enforcement Program Activities 

A. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance 

Memoranda 

The NRC Enforcement Policy is a living document and is periodically revised to reflect 

regulatory changes, experience, and stakeholder input. On January 25, 2007, the 

NRC published a notice in the Federal Register (72 FR 3429) announcing that the 

agency was undertaking a major revision of its Enforcement Policy. The purpose of 

the revision was to add new guidance based on changes in regulations, to add 

guidance on issues not directly addressed in the current policy, to clarify the use of 

terms, and to remove or revise outdated guidance. Notices published in the Federal 

Register on September 15, 2008, (73 FR 53286) and October 16, 2008, (73 FR 61442) 

announced that a draft of the proposed major revision to the Enforcement Policy was 

available and that the NRC was soliciting written comments from interested parties. 

The public comment period ended on November 14, 2008. 

During the 2008 public comment period the NRC staff received a wide range of 

comments on the proposed revised policy from external stakeholders. A summary of 

the comments and the NRC’s responses were made available at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room and in ADAMS (Accession No. ML091830260). 

Based on comments received during the 2008 comment period, the staff substantially 

revised the violation examples contained in the proposed revised policy. On June 8, 

2009, the NRC published a notice of the availability of the draft and a request for 

comments regarding the revised violation examples (74 FR 27191). The public 

comments on the revised violation examples and NRC responses to those comments 

were made available at the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room and in ADAMS 

(Accession No. ML092650309). 

In August 2009, the staff made publicly available a preliminary final draft of the 

proposed revised policy. This draft reflected changes the staff made to the proposed 

revised policy as a result of comments received during the 2008 public comment 

period. (Note: In August 2009 the staff was still evaluating comments on the violation 

examples received during the June 2009 public comment period; therefore, the 

violation examples contained in the August 2009 preliminary final draft were those that 

had been made publicly available for comment in 2008). The preliminary draft of the 

revised Policy was made available at the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room and via 

ADAMS (Accession No. ML092240160).

In November 2009, the staff made publicly available the latest draft of the proposed 

revised Enforcement Policy. This draft reflected changes the staff had made to the 

proposed revised Policy as a result of comments received on the revised violation 

examples, as well as other edits made since the previous draft was made publicly 

available in August 2009. The draft revised Policy was made available at NRC’s 

Electronic Reading Room and in ADAMS (Accession No. ML093430119). 
OE Annual Report

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On December 30, 2009, the staff forwarded the proposed revised Enforcement Policy 

to the Commission for review and approval (SECY-09-0190), “Major Revision to NRC 

Enforcement Policy.” On August 27, 2010, the Commission approved the revised 

Enforcement Policy (Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) -SECY-09-0190). This 

SRM also directed the NRC staff to evaluate specific topics for inclusion in a future 

Policy revision. Those topics included: (1) guidance for determining when daily civil 

penalties are appropriate; (2) providing credit to fuel cycle licensees with effective 

corrective action programs; and (3) re-evaluating the Enforcement Policy related to 

construction activities, including where discretion may be appropriate. 

The revised Policy became effective on September 30, 2010 (75 FR 60485). Some of 

the significant changes in the 2010 Policy included: (1) increasing from 8 to 14 the 

violation examples activity areas; (2) adding base civil penalties for Uranium 

Enrichment Facilities and a High Level Waste Repository; (3) increasing the base civil 

penalty for Uranium Conversion Facilities; and (4) adding a Glossary of enforcement 

terms. 

OE issues EGMs to provide guidance in the interpretation of specific provisions of the 

Enforcement Policy. A link to the full text of publicly available EGMs appear in 

Appendix A to the NRC Enforcement Manual. The office issued two EGMs in CY 

2010, which are summarized below: 

 June 1, 2010, EGM-10-001, "Dispositioning Violations of Inservice Examination 

and Testing Requirements for Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers)”. The purpose of 

this EGM is to provide guidance for the disposition of violations of NRC 

requirements for inservice examination and testing of dynamic restraints 

(snubbers). 

 June 14, 2010, EGM-10-002, “Guidance for Dispositioning Enforcement Issues 

Associated with Orders Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records 

Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material.” The 

staff will use this EGM in conjunction with EGM 06-003, “Guidance for 

Dispositioning Enforcement Issues Associated with Orders Imposing Controls for 

Licensees Authorized to Possess Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern,” 

dated September 28, 2006, for matters of enforcement related to increased control 

requirements. 

B. Knowledge Management 

In CY 2010, OE engaged in several knowledge management activities. Some of the 

ongoing activities being conducted to maintain an adequate knowledge base included 

supporting training, completing reviews and self assessments, developing additional 

internal office procedures, and conducting a counterpart meeting. 
OE Annual Report

25 

Enforcement Counterpart Meeting 

In March 2010, regional and Headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart 

meeting to discuss ways to improve the enforcement process and communications 

among staff. The meeting resulted in a number of ideas that are improving the 

handling of casework. Examples included: a decision to consider more efficient, yet as 

effective, outcomes for specific type cases; initiatives to improve timeliness, 

particularly those related to investigations; and specific Enforcement Manual updates 

that would improve the guidance in the future. 

Training

OE supported Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program members on 

rotational assignments to the office. The knowledge gained by those staff members 

will improve understanding of the Enforcement Program in the field. 

Headquarters and regional enforcement staff engaged in outreach opportunities to 

internal stakeholders on enforcement and ADR processes during the counterpart 

meeting and other office training sessions. Examples included multiple training 

sessions provided by OE in both Regions II and IV regarding the revised Enforcement 

Policy, a Region I winter seminar presentation by OE management, and various 

ADR-related outreach initiatives such as an improved internal Web page and support 

for mediator training. 

Reviews and Self Assessments 

During 2010, OE completed self assessments related to implementation of the 

Enforcement Program. Implementation of the new Enforcement Action Tracking 

System, investigation based case timeliness, and delegation of authority guidance 

were areas audited during the calendar year. In general, these assessments identified 

that the specific aspects of the Enforcement Program reviewed were being 

implemented satisfactorily; however, improvements could be made, particularly in the 

area of timeliness. As such, a working group was established and those results 

discussed elsewhere in this report. Improvement of this specific area was an ongoing 

effort during the year. 

Development of a much larger assessment of regional implementation of the 

enforcement program was conducted. With the overall goals of improving knowledge 

transfer between regions and reviewing the conduct of the regional enforcement 

programs, these assessments will provide significant programmatic knowledge 

management opportunities. OE procedures were developed in CY 2010 outlining 

these expectations. The first assessment was completed in February 2011 at 

Region III and plans were completed for a second regional assessment in CY 2011. 

Development of Office Specific Procedures 

OE continued developing and improving internal office procedures providing guidance 

on accomplishing specific tasks unique to Headquarters enforcement staff. Many of 

the procedures had been accomplished by on-the-job training and experience. 
OE Annual Report

26 

Procedures for enforcement specialist qualifications, including a specific employee 

protection qualification card were issued. The most significant example involved 

development of an electronic feedback form to document and track recommended 

changes, primarily for the Enforcement Manual, which provides policy implementation 

guidance. The electronic form and database will improve both efficiency and 

effectiveness in making improvements to the Enforcement Manual, contributing 

significantly to a high quality guidance document. 

C. Regional Accomplishments 

During CY 2010, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of 

the enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas; considered performance associated with development and issuance 

of both nonescalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that 

required a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders, such as OI. 

These assessments included the following reviews:

• reactor and materials program nonescalated enforcement actions 

• technical specification limiting conditions for operation (TS LCO) and fitness for 

duty (FFD) violations 

• regional instructions compared to guidance in the Enforcement Policy, 

Enforcement Manual, management directives, and inspection procedures 

Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing 

the Enforcement Program. However, the reviews did identify the need for improved 

enforcement guidance and instructions, especially in the area of TS LCO and FFD 

violations. 

In addition to assessments, the enforcement staff provided training to regional 

technical staff, in part, on the revised Enforcement Policy, recent EGMs, and proper 

enforcement documentation requirements for inspectors, and participated on inspector 

qualification review boards as necessary. 

Regional enforcement representatives also provided support for agency enforcement 

initiatives and activities including the following: 

• a Lean Six Sigma Post Investigation ADR project 

• an intermediate timeliness goal improvement project 

• the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission Program 

• the January 2010 Commission meeting on the revised Enforcement Policy, the 

Allegation Program, and the ADR Program 

• the public predecisional enforcement conference with the DVA related to the 

medical events at the DVA medical facility in Philadelphia 

 
OE Annual Report

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Table 3: CY 2010 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by 

Region and Program Office

Program Office 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalties Orders 

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Region I 20 3 3 0 26 

Region II 17 5 4 1 27 

Region III 24 12 2 0 38 

Region IV 17 3 5 0 25 

NRR 1 0 0 0 1 

NMSS 2 0 1 0 3 

NSIR 2 0 0 0 2 

OIP 1 0 0 0 1 

OE 0 0 1 0 1 

TOTAL 84 23 16 1 124 
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Table 4: CY 2010 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of 

Licensee, Nonlicensee, or Individual

Type of Licensee 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil Penalty Orders 

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Operating Reactor 27 1 2 0 30 

Gauge User 23 4 0 0 27 

Hospital 13 10 1 0 24 

Fuel Facility 3 4 3 1 11 

Radiographer 3 2 2 0 7 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Materials) 1 0 5 0 6 

Licensed Individual 

(Reactor) 3 0 1 0 4 

Irradiator 2 0 0 0 2 

Nonlicensee 1 0 1 0 2 

Well Logger 0 2 0 0 2 

Physician 1 0 0 0 1 

Research Reactor 1 0 0 0 1 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Fuel Facility ) 1 0 0 0 1 

Academic 0 0 0 0 0 

Materials Distributor 0 0 0 0 0 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiographer Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 0 0 0 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Reactor) 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Other 5 0 1 0 6 

TOTAL 84 23 16 1 124
OE Annual Report

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Appendix A: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties*

Civil Penalties Issued To Reactor Licensees

Florida Power and Light Company EA-10-037 

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Unit 3 

On June 21, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$70,000 was issued to Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) for two SLIII violations 

associated with a white finding as a result of inspections at the licensee’s Turkey Point 

Nuclear Plant Unit 3. The white finding involved the licensee’s failure to adequately address 

degradation of Boraflex, a fixed neutron absorber material used in the Turkey Point Unit 3 

spent fuel pool. Boraflex degradation resulted in a reduction in the Boron-10 areal density of 

the spent fuel storage racks such that, when considering the biases and uncertainties 

identified in Chapter 9 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the effective neutron 

multiplication factor would not have been maintained less than 1.0 if the spent fuel pool had 

been flooded with unborated water. The NRC identified that FP&L had violated 10 CFR 50, 

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” which requires that conditions adverse to 

quality be promptly identified and corrected, and Technical Specification 5.5.1.1.a, which 

requires that the spent fuel storage racks be maintained with an effective neutron 

multiplication factor less than 1.0 if flooded with unborated water, when considering the 

biases and uncertainties described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The SLIII 

Notice of Violation with a proposed $70,000 civil penalty involved the licensee’s failure to 

comply with 10 CFR 50.73, which requires, in part, that licensees report any condition 

prohibited by the plant’s Technical Specifications. As discussed, Boraflex degradation led to 

a condition prohibited by Turkey Point Unit 3 Technical Specifications, but this condition was 

not reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.73. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Material Licensees

Basin Electric Power Cooperative EA-09-258 

Wheatland, WY 

On August 26, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $24,700 was issued to Basin Electric Power Cooperative for (1) a SLII violation and (2) 

three SLIII violations. The SLII violation involved the failure of the licensee to limit radiation 

exposures to members of the public to less than 100 millirem in a year, as required by 10 

CFR 20.1301(a)(1). The SLIII violations involved the failure of the licensee to (1) 

conspicuously post caution signs in areas where nuclear gauges were in use as required by 

10 CFR 20.1902(e); (2) notify the NRC within 24 hours after the discovery of an unplanned 

fire on March 8, 2007, that damaged the integrity of a licensed device as required by10 CFR 

30.50(b)(4); and (3) close and lock the nuclear gauge shutters after plant operations had 

stopped and prior to allowing welders to begin work as required by License Condition 21 of 

Amendment 10 to NRC Materials License 33-18224-01. These violations resulted in 

welders being exposed to the direct radiation beam from nuclear gauges and six received 

doses in excess of 100 millirem. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

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Beta Gamma Nuclear Radiology, Inc. EA-09-147 

Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 

On January 21, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order containing an NOV for a 

SLIII violation and a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 was issued to Beta Gamma 

Nuclear Radiology, Inc., (BGNR) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR 

mediation session held on October 27, 2009. The SLIII violation involved the failure of the 

licensee to provide the NRC complete and accurate information as required by 10 CFR 

30.9. Specifically, on May 5, 2008, BGNR contested a previously identified SLIV violation 

and stated that three written directives, administered on September 14, 2005, and February 

19 and 26, 2008, were written prior to the administrations, when in fact, the written directives 

were signed and dated after the administrations. The written directives were required to be 

maintained by 10 CFR 35.40(a), and were therefore, material to the NRC. As a result of the 

ADR session, BGNR agreed to: (1) perform quarterly comprehensive radiation safety audits 

and (2) authorize a new RSO for a two year period. 

Superior Well Services, Ltd. EA-10-077 

Indiana, PA 

On October 21, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $34,000 was issued to the Superior Well Services, Ltd. (SWS), for two SLIII problems 

associated with five SLIII violations. The first problem involved three violations associated 

with the licensee’s failure to: (1) secure a shipment of radioactive materials on a public 

highway to prevent shifting during normal transportation conditions in accordance with 10 

CFR 71.5(a); (2) control and maintain constant surveillance of the licensed material in an 

unrestricted area as required by 10 CFR 20.1802; and (3) notify the NRC of the missing 

licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a). The second problem involved two 

violations associated with the licensee’s (1) failure to conduct required radiological surveys 

of vehicles before transporting licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 39.67; and 

(2) deliberate falsification of survey records for the vehicles. Specifically, on September 20, 

2008, while transporting licensed material on a public highway, SWS did not secure a 

shipment of radioactive materials, and failed to control and maintain constant surveillance of 

the licensed material for at least ninety minutes, until SWS located and retrieved the 

sources, and also failed to notify the NRC of the missing licensed material until July 23, 

2009, ten months after identifying the event. In addition, on an unspecified number of 

occasions prior to July 22, 2010, before transporting licensed materials, SWS did not make 

radiation surveys of the position occupied by each individual in the vehicle and of the 

exterior of the vehicle used to transport the licensed materials and recorded survey results 

that were obtained by copying from previous survey records. 

U. S. Department of Veteran Affairs EA-09-038 

Washington, DC 

On March 17, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$227,500 was issued to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs for violations related to 

activities at the Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center (PVAMC). The violations 

associated with civil penalties were: (1) a SLII violation of 10 CFR 35.41(a)(2) for failure to 

develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to provide high confidence that each 

administration is in accordance with the written directive, resulting in a total of 74 prostate 

brachytherapy treatments where the administered radiation dose was not in accordance with 
OE Annual Report

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the written directive; (2) a SLII violation of 10 CFR 35.41(b)(2) for failure to have procedures 

that addressed verifying that the administration was in accordance with the applicable 

treatment plan and written directive, resulting in the licensee administering at least 16 

prostate brachytherapy treatments without performing post-treatment verifications until a 

prolonged period of time had passed; (3) a separate SLIII violation of 10 CFR 35.41(b)(2) 

related to the licensee’s failure to identify that the treatment plan for a brachytherapy 

treatment differed from the written directive, resulting in the wrong seeds being ordered and 

administered; (4) a SLIII problem associated with two separate violations involving the 

failure of the licensee to instruct (a) two medical physicists on the requirements for 

identifying and reporting a medical event as required by 10 CFR 35.2 and 35.3045; and (b) 

an authorized medical user physician on his responsibility to report promptly to the licensee 

any condition which may lead to or cause a violation of NRC regulations as required by 10 

CFR 19.12(a)(4; and (5) a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 35.3045(c) for failure to report to the 

NRC Operations Center no later than the next calendar day when they had information that 

medical events occurred. A separate SLII violation of 10 CFR 35.41(a)(2) was issued but 

not assessed a civil penalty due to the statute of limitations having expired. In addition, two 

SLIV violations involving the licensee’s failure to; (1) include adequate information in a 

written directive; and (2) provide accurate and complete information to the NRC were issued 

not associated with a civil penalty. 

U. S. Department of Veteran Affairs EA-10-023 

North Little Rock, AR 

On June 2, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$14,000 was issued to the Department of Veterans Affairs for two SLIII violations identified 

as a result of a medical event that occurred at the San Diego Healthcare System facility. 

The medical event occurred when iodine-131 was injected into the wrong port of the 

gastrostomy feeding tube (g-tube) resulting in an underdose to the patient’s thyroid and an 

unintended dose to the patient’s stomach. The first violation involved the licensee’s failure 

to develop and maintain written procedures with directions for administering byproduct 

material through a g-tube to ensure that the administered dose was in accordance with the 

written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a)(2). Additionally, two nuclear medicine 

technologists had not been instructed on administering byproduct material through a g-tube 

prior to performing the administration in order to ensure that the administered dose was in 

accordance with the written directive. The second violation involved the licensee’s failure to 

notify the NRC Operations Center no later than the next calendar day after discovery of a 

medical event as required by 10 CFR 35.3045(c). 

U. S. Department of Veteran Affairs EA-10-081 

Washington, DC 

On August 23, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$39,000 was issued to the Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA) for violations related to 

activities at (1) the DVA Sierra Nevada Health Care System, Reno, Nevada; (2) the G.V. 

(Sonny) Montgomery DVA Medical Center, Jackson, Mississippi; and (3) the DVA Boston 

Healthcare System, Boston, Massachusetts. The violations associated with civil penalties 

were: (1) a SLIII violation involving the licensee’s failure to develop and implement written 

procedures that address verifying that an administration was conducted in accordance with 

the applicable treatment plan and written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a)(2) and 

10 CFR 35.41(b)(2); and (2) the failure to report a medical event as required by 10 CFR 
OE Annual Report

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35.3045(c). A separate SLIII violation of 10 CFR 35.41(a)(2) and 35.41(b)(2), related to 

activities involving five patients at the DVA Boston Healthcare System in 2005, was issued 

but not assessed a civil penalty due to the statute of limitations having expired. In addition, 

two SLIV violations were issued not associated with a civil penalty involving the licensee’s 

failure to include adequate information; (1) in a written report to the NRC as required by 10 

CFR 35.3045(d); and (2) in a written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.40(b)(6)(ii). 

Civil Penalties Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Babcock and Wilcox EA-09-263 

Lynchburg, VA 

On January 11, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$35,000 was issued to Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure of the licensee to declare an Alert in a timely manner as 

required by Appendix G to their Emergency Plan. Specifically, on July 15, 2009, the 

licensee failed to declare an Alert for more than 2 hours even though employees were 

cognizant that during that time, critically controls associated with a band saw reservoir did 

not exist and that the lost controls could not be immediately reestablished. Although the 

failure to declare an Alert in a timely manner did not result in any actual consequences in 

this case, the potential consequences of an untimely emergency declaration could have 

been significant under different circumstances. In addition, a SLIII problem associated with 

three procedural violations was identified as a result of this incident. The three violations 

involved the failure of the licensee (1) to ensure that the band saw’s built-in coolant reservoir 

was disabled and not usable prior to operation of the band saw, (2) to establish controls on 

the band saw cutting fluid reservoir to prevent process changes which would make a 

criticality accident possible such as accumulation of cutting fluid or fissile material in the 

reservoir, and (3) to evaluate an accident scenario or establish appropriate controls 

preventing the accumulation of high enriched uranium and moderator in the band saw 

cutting fluid reservoir, an unfavorable geometry vessel. In accordance with the Enforcement 

Policy, a civil penalty was not proposed for these violations. 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. EA-10-086 

Erwin, TN 

On September 2, 2010, an NOV, Exercise of Enforcement Discretion, and Proposed 

Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $140,000 was issued to Nuclear Fuel Services, 

Inc. (NFS) for a SLIII problem involving three violations associated with an event which 

occurred on October 13, 2009. The three violations involved; (1) the failure to have 

adequate engineered or administrative controls for operations of the bowl cleaning station in 

violation of 10 CFR 70.61(b); (2) the failure to comply with multiple facility operating 

procedures regarding the facility system change process; and (3) the failure to maintain 

records necessary to support NFS’s determination that specific facility changes did not 

require prior NRC approval in violation of 10 CFR 70.72. Specifically, during routine facility 

operations in the uranium-aluminum line of the Blended Low-enriched Uranium Preparation 

Facility, nitric acid was added into the bowl cleaning stations which contained small particles 

of high-enriched uranium scrap material, and the resultant solution produced an 

unexpectedly high exothermic chemical reaction deforming some of the process piping. The 

temperatures from the reaction created excess nitrogen compound gases which resulted in 

the evacuation of the building. Although the failure to have adequate engineered or 
OE Annual Report

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administrative controls for operations of the bowl cleaning station did not result in any actual 

personnel exposure consequences in this case, a more significant event could have 

resulted in a high consequence occupational exposure under different circumstances. In 

recognition of particularly poor licensee performance and previous escalated enforcement 

history, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion and doubled the $70,000 Civil Penalty 

derived from the normal civil penalty assessment process. 

Westinghouse Electric Company EA-10-124 

Columbia, SC 

On November 3, 2010, an NOV and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$17,500 was issued to Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division, 

for a SLIII problem involving two violations associated with a spill of uranium bearing 

ammoniated waste water inside the plant on January 25, 2010. Specifically, the violations 

involved (1) the failure to identify in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) that a spill in the 

quarantine tank system could lead to an intermediate consequence event as required by 

10CFR70.62(c)(1), and (2) the failure to designate items relied on for safety (IROFS) to limit 

the risk of an intermediate consequence event resulting from an overflow of the quarantine 

system as required by 10CFR70.61(e). In addition, two SLIV violations involving failure to 

follow license condition requirements, and a SLIV problem involving three violations 

associated with failure to follow Site Emergency Plan requirements were issued. 

 
OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Appendix B: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation 

Without Civil Penalties*

Notices Issued To Power Reactor Licensees

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC EA-10-080 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 

On August 3, 2010, an NOV was issued to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant for a 

violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, associated with a white SDP finding. 

Specifically, subsequent to the approval of Engineering Change Package No. 

ES200100067, issued in March 2001, the licensee did not replace the relays within the 

vendor recommended 10-year lifetime, nor establish a performance monitoring 

program. Consequently, on February 18, 2010, an Agastat E7000 series time delay 

relay that had a lifetime in excess of 10 years, used in the 2B emergency diesel 

generator (EDG) protective logic, timed out early and failed to support a demand fast 

start and run of the 2B EDG. This resulted in the EDG becoming inoperable with the 

resultant loss of alternating current to the 24 safeguards bus during the dual unit trip that 

occurred on February 18, 2010. 

Carolina Power & Light Company EA-10-192 

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 

On December 21, 2010, an NOV was issued to Carolina Power & Light Company for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) associated with a white SDP finding involving the failure to 

follow and maintain in effect Emergency Plans at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 

which required activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical Support 

Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) within 60 to 75 minutes 

following the declaration of an Alert or higher emergency classification. Specifically, on 

June 6, 2010, the licensee failed to activate the OSC, TSC, and EOF until approximately 

two and one-half hours after an Alert was declared. 

Carolina Power & Light Company EA-10-205 

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 

On December 7, 2010, an NOV was issued to Carolina Power and Light Company 

(doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas Inc (PEC)) for a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 

50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” and technical specifications 

associated with a white SDP as a result of inspections at the H.B. Robinson Steam 

Electric Plant Unit 2. The white finding involved the failure to identify and correct a 

problem associated with the “B” Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker in 

2008. Again in 2009, a similar malfunction caused the EDG to be declared inoperable 

for a period greater than Technical Specifications. The violation of 10 CFR 50.9 involved 

submitting materially inaccurate information that the breaker was tested in accordance 

with a maintenance procedure when, in fact, it had not. The NRC determined that they 

had not conducted full testing in accordance with the procedure, and only completed the 

instructions for returning the breaker to service. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

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Duke Energy Carolinas EA-10-094 

Oconee Nuclear Station 

On August 12, 2010, an NOV was issued to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. (Duke) for a 

SLIII violation associated with a yellow and a white SDP finding as a result of inspections 

at the Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3. The yellow finding involved the failure to 

ensure the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Reactor Coolant Makeup (RCM) 

subsystem for all three units remained operable as required by Technical Specifications. 

The white finding involved the failure to identify and correct Unit 2 and Unit 3 SSF RCM 

letdown line degradation in a timely manner after degradation was identified on Unit 1, 

as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” A 10 CFR 

50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” NOV for a SLIII violation was also 

assessed to Duke for submitting materially inaccurate information. Duke provided 

information which described an alternate flow path that could be used to control 

pressurizer level during an SSF event. However, it was discovered that this flow path 

was not available due to a closed manual valve inside containment. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-09-269 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

On January 20, 2010, an NOV was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a 

violation associated with a white SDP finding as a result of inspections at the Palisades 

Nuclear Plant. This white finding involved the licensee’s failure to meet the requirements 

of Technical Specification (TS) for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool. Specifically, the 

Region I spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorber had deteriorated over the life of 

the plant and was less than required by TS. Corrective actions are currently in place for 

additional controls of the spent fuel pool. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-09-018 

Waterford Steam Electric Station 

On January 14, 2010, an NOV was issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. for a violation of 

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, "Procedures and Programs," at Waterford Steam 

Electric Station Unit 3. The violation, which is associated with a white SDP finding, 

involved the failure to properly follow all procedural steps during replacement of the 

safety-related Train B 125 Vdc battery in May 2008. Specifically, following replacement 

of the battery, the licensee did not: (1) adequately torque all of the affected intercell 

connections, (2) obtain the required quality control inspector verification that all affected 

connections were properly tightened, (3) ensure that all the necessary intercell 

resistance checks were performed, and (4) obtain quality control verification that the 

intercell resistance checks met Technical Specification limits. As a result, an intercell 

connection on the battery loosened over time and on September 2, 2008, the battery 

was found to be inoperable during testing. 
OE Annual Report

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Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-09-259 

Braidwood Nuclear Power Station 

On February 25, 2010, an NOV was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, for a 

violation associated with a white SDP finding as a result of inspections at the Braidwood 

Nuclear Power Station. This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion III, “Design Control,” which requires, in part, that measures be established for 

the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and 

processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, 

and components. Specifically, on June 24, 2009, a safety-related valve failed to stroke 

full open during a surveillance testing procedure. Following the test failure, the licensee 

determined that water entered the valve actuator through conduit penetration and 

caused corrosion to the valve internals, which caused the valve not to fully open. 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-09-283 

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 

On February 25, 2010, an NOV was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 

for a violation associated with a white SDP finding as a result of inspections at the DavisBesse Nuclear Power Station. This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) 

which requires, in part, that a holder of an operating license shall follow emergency 

plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, 

that the licensee have a standard emergency classification and action level scheme in 

use. The Davis-Besse Emergency Plan requires, in part, that the Shift Manager shall 

verify the indication of an off-normal event and classify the situation. Specifically, on 

June 25, 2009, the Shift Manager failed to verify the indications of an off-normal event or 

reported sighting, assess the information available from valid indications or reports of an 

explosion, and classify the situation as an Alert in accordance with the Emergency 

Action Level Conditions during an actual event. 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company. EA-09-332 

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 

On April 30, 2010, an NOV was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a 

SLIII problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.71 “Maintenance of records, 

making of reports” and (2) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design control.” In July 

1999, the licensee submitted a license amendment request to eliminate as found testing 

criteria by using the past data for double O ring data and was approved by the NRC. 

However, the licensee staff did not update this fact in their updated final safety analysis 

report. The licensee also changed from the double O ring design to a flat gasket design 

which did not have the same reliable history as the double O ring and failed to translate 

this fact into the licensing basis at time of installation. 
OE Annual Report

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Florida Power and Light Company EA-09-321 

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 

On April 19, 2010, an NOV was issued to Florida Power & Light Company for a violation 

associated with a yellow SDP finding as a result of inspections at the St. Lucie Nuclear 

Plant. The yellow finding involved the licensee’s failure to meet the requirements of 10 

CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action.” In 2008, the licensee 

experienced an air in-leakage event into the closed cooling water (CCW) system which 

affected the system’s ability to supply adequate cooling to essential equipment. Their 

troubleshooting and corrective actions failed to identify the source of the air in-leakage, 

which resulted in a similar event in 2009. 

Omaha Public Power District EA-10-084 

Fort Calhoun Station 

On October 6, 2010, an NOV was issued to Omaha Public Power District for a violation 

of Technical Specification 5.8.1.a, “Procedures,” at Fort Calhoun Station. This violation, 

which is associated with a yellow SDP finding, involved the licensee’s failure to develop 

an adequate procedure for protecting vital facilities and equipment from external flooding 

events to the level described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Specifically, 

the inspectors identified that the licensee’s strategy of using sandbags stacked on top of 

floodgates would not be effective in protecting the auxiliary building, intake structure, and 

turbine building basement because the tops of the floodgates were too small to support 

the necessary number of sandbags. This could have resulted in flooding impacting 

multiple, redundant trains of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant. 

PPL Susquehanna, LLC EA-09-248 

Susquehanna Steam Electric Plant 

On January 28, 2010, an NOV for a SLIII violation was issued to PPL Susquehanna, 

LLC involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 55.21 which requires, in part, that the licensed 

operator receives a medical examination by a physician every two years and meets the 

requirements of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(1). Specifically, on three separate occasions in 2009, 

a PPL licensed operator did not meet a certain medical prerequisite for performing NRClicensed activities and performed duties, even though a change in his license condition 

existed, as found by a medical examination. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-10-009 

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 

On May 12, 2010, an NOV was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for 

a violation associated with a white SDP finding as a result of inspections at the Edwin I. 

Hatch Nuclear Plant. The white finding involved the licensee’s failure to meet Technical 

Specifications. From 1988 to 2009 the licensee failed to establish and perform 

preventative maintenance activities on components having a specific lifetime. This 

resulted in a capacitor failure on a circuit card, during a surveillance test of an 

emergency diesel generator (EDG) and caused the EDG to be declared inoperable. 
OE Annual Report

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Tennessee Valley Authority EA-09-307 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

On April 19, 2010, an NOV was issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for 

violations associated with yellow and white SDP findings as a result of inspections at the 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The yellow finding involved the licensee’s failure to meet 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G, fire protection of safe shutdown 

capability. There were multiple examples of the licensee not providing fire protection 

features capable of limiting fire damage and failing to ensure one train of systems or 

components was free of fire damage by approved methods. Compensatory measures 

are currently in place and long term corrective actions will be implemented. The white 

finding involved the licensee’s failure to meet the requirements of a Technical 

Specification. This involved the inappropriate revision to a procedure which could have 

delayed proper operator response to a major disabling fire event. The procedure has 

been revised to prevent such an issue from occurring. 

Notice Issued To Research Reactor Licensee

Kansas State University EA-10-234 

Research Reactor Facility 

On November 22, 2010, an NOV was issued to Kansas State University for a SLIII 

violation involving 10 CFR 20.1101(a). Specifically, on or prior to September 22, 2010, 

the licensee did not implement a radiation protection program commensurate with the 

scope and extent of licensed activities that was sufficient to ensure compliance with the 

provisions of the regulations in Part 20. Examples include: (1) On or prior to September 

22, 2010, the licensee did not make surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501 when the 

licensee failed to determine the magnitude and extent of radiation levels that would be 

caused by irradiating oil samples on September 21, 2010 that subsequently resulted, on 

September 22, 2010, in an unexpected high shallow-dose equivalent of 12.5 rem to the 

skin of the extremities (hands) of the operator handling the experiment and an 

unexpected change in the restricted area dose rates that exceeded 50 rem per hour on 

September 22, 2010; (2) On September 22, 2010, the licensee failed to supply and 

require the use of extremity monitoring devices to personnel who were likely to receive in 

1 year, from sources external to the body, a dose in excess of 10 percent of the limits in 

20.1201(a) in that, a person handling oil samples and a sample holder, which read in 

excess of 50 rem per hour, was not wearing, and had not been issued, extremity 

monitoring; (3) On or prior to September 22, 2010, the licensee did not have an 

adequate procedure as required by Technical Specification Section 6.3 to assure the 

safety of personnel within the Laboratory for conducting sample irradiations, in that, 

Experiment Procedure 1, “Isotope Production,” did not require extremity dosimetry – 

finger rings – for those handling samples, it did not have a maximum sample withdrawal 

rate, and it did not specify threshold exposure/dose rates (hold points) to clearly indicate 

at what dose rate a sample should not be withdrawn from the pool. 
OE Annual Report

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Notices Issued To Material Licensees

Allegiance Health EA-09-266 

Jackson, MI 

On January 6, 2010, an NOV was issued to Allegiance Health for a SLIII violation 

involving the failure to develop written procedures to provide high confidence that the 

administration was in accordance with the written directive as required by 10 CFR 

35.41. Specifically, on April 16, 2009, the licensee’s procedures did not contain any 

steps to ensure that no changes had occurred in the patients’ prostate volume between 

the time the treatment plan was prepared and the administration of the treatment and no 

other method was provided to ensure that the administration was in accordance with the 

written directive. 

Analytical Bio-Chemistry Laboratories, Inc. EA-10-135 

Columbia, MO 

On October 13, 2010, an NOV was issued to Analytical Bio-Chemistry Laboratories, Inc., 

for a SLIII problem involving two violations. The first violation involved the failure to 

notify the NRC in writing within 60 days of the decision to permanently cease principal 

activities in any separate building that contains residual radioactivity and is unsuitable for 

release as required by 10 CFR 30.36(d)(2). Specifically, as of February 2010, the 

licensee decided to permanently cease principal activities in two buildings that contained 

residual radioactivity, and the NRC was not notified until June 30, 2010, and July 14, 

2010. The second violation involved the failure to submit a decommissioning plan and 

receive NRC approval of procedures used in aggressive remediation activities as 

required by 10 CFR 30.36(g). Specifically, on June 22, 2010, the licensee demolished 

and removed contaminated countertops, floors, and fume hoods with associated 

ventilation ducts. These types of activities involved techniques not routinely applied 

during cleanup or maintenance operations such that there was the potential for health 

and safety impacts to the workers. 

Anthony and Edward Consultants EA-10-068 

Matawan, NJ 

On June 25, 2010, an NOV was issued to Anthony & Edwards Consultants (A&E) for a 

SLIII problem involving three violations. The first violation involved a failure to comply 

with the conditions of the NRC Order Revoking License, issued on July 28, 2009. 

Specifically, the licensee did not pay fees within 30 days or transfer the licensed material 

to an authorized recipient within 60 days from the date of the order. The second 

violation involved a failure to afford the NRC an opportunity to inspect the A&E facility, 

as required by 10 CFR 19.14(a). Specifically between February 18, 2009 and 

September 17, 2009, the NRC made several attempts to contact the licensee to visit the 

facility and to schedule an inspection of licensed activities, but the licensee did not 

respond to these requests. The third violation involved a failure to confine storage of 

licensed material to a location specified on the license, as required by 10 CFR 30.34(c). 

Specifically, from September 5, 2008 through at least September 30, 2009, the licensee 

stored the licensed material at a location not authorized by the license. 
OE Annual Report

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ArcelorMittal USA, Inc., EA-10-044 

East Chicago, IN 

On June 2, 2010, an NOV was issued to ArcelorMittal USA, Inc., for a SLIII violation 

involving the failure to ensure that only persons who have completed the licensee’s 

training program, the gauge manufacturer’s training course, or those persons specifically 

authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State remove gauges from service as 

required by license condition, Item 9. Specifically, on November 20, 2009, two 

individuals removed a gauge from service and neither individual had completed the 

licensee’s training program or the gauge manufacturer’s training course. In addition, on 

April 15, 2009, two other individuals removed a gauge from service, and one of those 

two individuals was not trained. None of the three individuals was authorized by the 

Commission or an Agreement State to remove gauges from service.

Bryan LGH Medical Center EA-10-066 

Lincoln, NE

On August 18, 2010, an NOV was issued to Bryan LGH Medical Center dba Bryan LGH 

Heart Institute (Bryan Heart), for a SLIII violation involving the failure to file NRC Form 

241 “Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States,” at least three days prior to 

engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20. 

Specifically, as of December 16, 2009, Bryan Heart, a holder of Nebraska State license, 

provided mobile nuclear medicine services at a temporary job site in the State of 

Missouri, a non-Agreement State, without filing a reciprocity submittal for calendar year 

2009 with the NRC. 

Chicago Testing Laboratory, Inc. EA-10-113 

Warrenville, IL 

On August 24, 2010, an NOV was issued to Chicago Testing Laboratory, Inc. (CTL), for 

a SLIII violation involving the failure to possess and use byproduct material with a 

specific or general license authorization. Specifically, on multiple occasions between 

July 6, 2006, and August 30, 2009, CTL, an Agreement State licensee, possessed and 

used devices containing sealed sources in a non-Agreement State, and was not 

authorized by either a specific or general license.

Christiana Care Health Services EA-10-141 

Newark, DE

On August 24, 2010, an NOV was issued to the Christiana Care Health Services 

(CCHS), for a SLIII violation involving the failure to develop and maintain written 

procedures to provide high confidence that each administration requiring a written 

directive was performed in accordance with the written directive as required by 10 CFR 

35.41. Specifically, CCHS’s written procedures for high dose rate remote afterloader 

(HDR) treatments did not: (i) include a quality assurance process to test and evaluate 

proper functioning of all measurement tools used to determine treatment parameters; 

and, (ii) specify how personnel should respond when unknown and questionable 

treatment distances were encountered during HDR simulation measurements. As a 

result of these inadequacies, a medical event occurred, in which the patient received a 

dose to unintended tissue and did not receive the prescribed dose to the intended tissue 

during an HDR treatment conducted between January 18 and January 22, 2010. 
OE Annual Report

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City of South Bend EA-10-014 

South Bend, IN 

On March 10, 2010, an NOV was issued to the City of South Bend for a SLIII violation 

involving the failure to comply with Condition 11.B of the facility's license which 

authorized a specifically named individual to fulfill the responsibilities of the Radiation 

Protection Officer. Specifically, as of January 19, 2010, the named individual was no 

longer employed by the company. The licensee failed to appoint a new Radiation 

Protection Officer and had not amended the license. 

CJW Medical Center-Johnston-Willis Campus EA-09-040 

Richmond, VA

On January 21, 2010, an NOV was issued to CJW Medical Center - Johnston-Willis 

Campus for a SLIII violation involving the failure to develop, implement, and maintain 

written procedures to provide high confidence that each administration is in accordance 

with written directives as required by 10 CFR 35.41(a)(2). Specifically, as of December 

16, 2008, the licensee's procedures did not require verification of the treatment site nor 

resolution of any inconsistencies in the written directive prior to administration of the 

dose. This resulted in a patient receiving treatment to the left trigeminal nerve instead of 

to the originally-intended site (right trigeminal nerve). 

Earth Engineering, Inc. EA-10-062 

Cheshire, CT

On June 28, 2010, an NOV was issued to Earth Engineering Inc. (EEI) for a SLIII 

problem involving two violations. The first violation involved a failure to comply with the 

conditions of the NRC Order Revoking License, issued on June 4, 2009. Specifically, 

the licensee did not pay fees within 30 days or transfer the licensed material to an 

authorized recipient within 60 days from the date of the Order. The second violation 

involved a failure to afford the NRC an opportunity to inspect the EEI facility, as required 

by 10 CFR 19.14(a). Specifically, on October 7, 2009, the licensee did not provide 

access to the nuclear portable gauge to inspect the condition of the gauge; and, 

between November 2, 2009 and January 27, 2010, the NRC made several attempts to 

contact the licensee, but the licensee did not provide access to the EEI facility. 

Gamma Knife Center of the Pacific EA-09-289 

Honolulu, HI

On February 23, 2010, an NOV was issued to Gamma Knife Center of the Pacific for a 

SLIII violation of 10 CFR 35.41(b). Specifically, as of July 2, 2009, the licensee failed to 

develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to provide high confidence that 

each medical administration is in accordance with the written directive in that the 

procedures did not require explicit verification that the administration was in accordance 

with the treatment plan and written directive. Consequently, the treatment plan and 

written directive were not followed to ensure that the collimator was used in the 

treatment of a patient. 
OE Annual Report

B9 

GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas EA-10-096 

Sunol, CA 

On December 16, 2010, an NOV was issued to GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas for 

two SLIII violations involving the failure to implement Special Nuclear License SNM-960, 

Condition S-9 and 10 CFR 20.1501. Specifically, on February 16, 2010, one worker 

identified contamination on his wrist at 240-260 corrected counts per minute, but failed to 

log the personnel contamination as required by licensee procedure; and on February 16, 

2010, the licensee did not make or cause to be made surveys that were reasonable 

under the circumstances to evaluate the concentrations or quantities of radioactive 

material. 

Great Falls Clinic EA-09-290 

Great Falls, MT

On January 21, 2010, an NOV was issued to Great Falls Clinic for a SLIII problem 

associated with two violations involving the failure to: (1) secure from unauthorized 

removal or access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas, 

as required by 10 CFR 20.1801 and (2) secure the unit, console, console keys and the 

treatment room when not in use or unattended, as required by 10 CFR 35.610 (a)(1). 

Specifically, the licensee stored a high dose-rate remote afterloader unit in a designated 

controlled area and did not secure the radioactive material from unauthorized removal or 

access. The console and unit were found in the unattended and not secured, 

designated controlled area. The console was found with its key inserted. 

Kanawha Scales and Systems, Inc. EA-09-312 

Columbus, OH 

On February 18, 2010, an NOV was issued to Kanawha Scales & Systems, Inc., a 

licensee of the State of Ohio, for a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 150.20. Specifically, on 

November 2, 2009, Kanawha Scales & Systems, Inc. used sealed sources in a nonagreement state without filing an NRC Form 241 at least three days prior to engaging in 

licensed activities in areas of exclusive Federal jurisdiction. 

Laboratory Testing Services, LLC EA-10-069 

Bridgeport, CT

On July 6, 2010, an NOV was issued to Laboratory Testing Services, LLC (LTS) for a 

SLIII problem involving three violations. The first violation involved a failure to confine 

possession and use of byproduct material to the location authorized by the license, as 

required by 10 CFR 30.34(c). Specifically, the licensee possessed and used portable 

gauges at a location not authorized by the license. The second violation involved a 

failure to have an individual named on the license as a Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), 

as required by the license. Specially, the RSO named in the license left the company in 

June 2008, and the licensee failed to have a replacement RSO approved by the NRC. 

The third violation involved a failure to obtain written consent from the NRC before 

transferring ownership of LTS to HAKS Material Testing Company (HAKS), as required 

by 10 CFR 30.34(b). Specifically, on January 14, 2010, LTS transferred ownership 

control of the license to HAKS without the Commission’s written consent. 
OE Annual Report

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Nanticoke Memorial Hospital EA-09-335 

Seaford, DE 

On February 2, 2010, an NOV was issued to Nanticoke Memorial Hospital for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to notify the NRC Operations Center by telephone no later 

than the next calendar day after discovery of the medical event as required by 10 CFR 

35.3045(c). Specifically, Nanticoke Memorial Hospital became aware that a medical 

event had occurred on June 26, 2009, but the NRC was not notified until July 15, 2009. 

St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center EA-10-171 

Hartford, CT 

On November 10, 2010, an NOV was issued to St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center 

(St. Francis) for a SLIII violation involving the failure to meet the physical presence 

requirements of 10 CFR 35.615(f)(2) during high dose radiation (HDR) treatments. 

Specifically, on July 1, 2010 and other occasions prior to that date, a St. Francis 

authorized medical physicist was not physically present during initiation and continuation 

of patient treatments involving the HDR unit. 

St. Louis Testing Laboratories, Inc. EA-10-085 

St. Louis, MO 

On August 31, 2010, an NOV was issued to St. Louis Testing Laboratories, Inc., for a 

SLIII violation involving the failure to ensure each individual who acts as a radiographer 

or a radiographer's assistant wears a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm rate 

meter, and a personal dosimeter at all times during radiographic operations as required 

by 10 CFR 34.47(a). Specifically, on October 22, 2009, a radiographer inadvertently left 

his personal dosimeter in a tool bag inside a permanent radiographic cell while 

performing radiographic shots. 

Southern Earth Sciences, Inc. EA-10-110 

Panama City, FL 

On July 19, 2010, an NOV was issued to Southern Earth Sciences, Inc (SES), for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed Activities in NonAgreement States,” at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC 

jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20. Specifically, between January 2008 and 

April 2009, SES, a holder of a Florida license, stored or used portable gauges in an area 

of exclusive federal jurisdiction without a specific license issued by the NRC, nor had 

SES filed a Form-241 with the NRC. 
OE Annual Report

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SSM St. Clare Health Center EA-10-025 

Fenton, MO

On April 19, 2010, an NOV was issued to SSM St. Clare Health Center for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to implement written procedures to provide high confidence 

that each administration was in accordance with the written directive as required by 10 

CFR 35.41. Specifically, between November 19, 2008, and September 23, 2009, the 

licensee failed to follow its procedures which required the preparation of final 

computerized treatment plans for two patients whose prostates had been implanted with 

radioactive seeds. The seeds were implanted on October 22, 2008, and their computed 

tomography studies were performed on November 19, 2008. However, the licensee still 

had not prepared the final treatment plans for these patients at the time of the 

inspection. 

Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. EA-09-082 

Research Triangle Park, NC

On March 9, 2010, an NOV was issued to Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc for a SLIII 

violation of 10 CFR 110.20(a)(2) and 10 CFR 110.41(a)(9). Specifically, on November 

21, 2008, Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc., failed to apply for a specific license and 

exported byproduct material listed in Appendix L (a moisture density gauge containing 

Am-241) to an embargoed country listed in 10 CFR 110.28 (Iraq). Further, this failure to 

apply for a specific export license prevented an Executive Branch review of the export 

activity as required by 10 CFR 110.41(a)(9). 

Universal Engineering Services, Inc. EA-10-138 

Orlando, FL

On August 27, 2010, an NOV was issued to Universal Engineering Sciences, Inc. (UES), 

for a SLIII violation involving the failure to file NRC Form 241 “Report of Proposed 

Activities in Non-Agreement States,” at least three days prior to engaging in licensed 

activities within NRC jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20. Specifically, UES used 

portable gauges containing sealed sources, at numerous areas of exclusive federal 

jurisdiction within the States of Florida and Georgia, without obtaining a specific license 

issued by the NRC or filing NRC Form-241 with the NRC, as required. 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center EA-10-140 

Washington, DC 

On October 25, 2010, an NOV was issued to the Walter Reed Army Medical Center 

(WRAMC), for a SLIII problem involving two violations. The first violation involved the 

licensee’s failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material in an 

unrestricted area as required by 10 CFR 20.1802. The second violation involved the 

licensee’s failure to conduct operations so that the dose in any unrestricted area from 

external sources did not exceed 0.002 rem (0.02 millisievert) in any one hour. 

Specifically, between May 1 and 3, 2010, WRAMC did not control and maintain constant 

surveillance of packages containing licensed radioactive materials, which were 

improperly stored by WRAMC personnel in an unrestricted area under a counter in the 

concierge workstation, resulting in a dose greater than 0.002 rem in any one hour within 

the first floor lobby of the WRAMC. 
OE Annual Report

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Yale-New Haven Hospital EA-10-063 

New Haven, CT 

On May 21, 2010, an NOV was issued to Yale-New Haven Hospital (YNHH) for a SLIII 

violation involving the failure to develop and maintain written procedures to provide high 

confidence that each administration requiring a written directive was performed in 

accordance with the written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41. Specifically, YNHH’s 

written procedures did not require a physical verification of the automatic position system 

coordinates against the electronic coordinates prior to initiation of gamma stereotactic 

radiosurgery (GSR) treatment and did not specify how hospital personnel should 

respond to unexpected GSR treatment console errors. These procedural inadequacies 

resulted in a medical event, when YNHH personnel did not verify that the automatic 

position system coordinates were in accordance with the written directive, during the 

treatment of a patient undergoing GSR on August 5, 2009. 

Notices Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas, LLC EA-09-268 

Wilmington, NC 

On June 9, 2010, an NOV and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion was issued to Global 

Nuclear Fuels – Americas, LLC (GNF-A). This action was based on a SLIII problem 

involving three violations of regulatory requirements. Specifically, the licensee failed to 

(1) identify credible accident scenarios as required by the license; (2) characterize 

criticality accident scenarios in the integrated safety analysis (ISA) as high consequence 

events as required by the license; and (3) designate engineered or administrative 

controls as items relied on for safety (IROFS) when necessary to comply with the 

performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(b) – (d), as required by 10 CFR 70.61(e). 

Because, in part, the NRC staff and the licensee did not share a common understanding 

of GNF-A’s application of its ISA methodology to scenario evaluation and IROFS 

identification during the ISA summary review and related inspection activities, the NRC 

concluded that enforcement discretion to forego proposing a civil penalty was 

appropriate in this case. No actual consequences resulted from these violations 

because there were no incidents and no existing safety controls were identified as 

degraded. 

 
OE Annual Report

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Appendix C: Summary of Orders* 

Orders Issued To Reactor Licensees

Duke Energy Carolinas EA-09-252 

William B. McGuire Nuclear Station 

On June 2, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Duke Energy 

Carolinas, LLC. (Duke Energy), to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR 

mediation session held on March 29, 2010. This enforcement action is based on two 

violations of NRC requirements at the McGuire Nuclear Station, which included a contract 

employee introducing and using marijuana inside the Protected Area and a contract 

employee failing to immediately report the event to Duke Energy management. Duke Energy 

agreed to take the following actions: (1) develop a summary of lessons learned from the 

facts and circumstances surrounding the apparent violations and communicate this summary 

to its fleet wide employees; (2) perform a self-assessment of the adequacy of the programs 

and processes in place to detect and deter the introduction of illegal drugs and alcohol into 

the Protected Area of Duke Energy’s nuclear stations and implement appropriate 

enhancements in accordance with Duke Energy’s corrective action program; and (3) prior to 

December 31, 2010, perform an effectiveness review of the corrective actions identified in (1) 

and (2) above. This is in addition to several other corrective actions already completed by 

Duke Energy. In consideration of these commitments, and the corrective actions already 

completed by Duke Energy, the NRC agreed that the non-compliances will be characterized 

as a violation of 10 CFR Part 26, with a significance of SLIV. 

Orders Issued To Material Licensees

CAN USA, Inc. EA-08-184 

Harvey, LA 

On April 16, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to CAN USA, 

Inc. to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session. The 

commitments were made by CAN USA, Inc. as part of a settlement agreement between 

CAN USA, Inc. and the NRC regarding apparent willful violations of NRC requirements by a 

radiographer and radiographer’s assistant. The agreement resolves the apparent violations 

involving the CAN USA failures, which were identified during NRC inspection and 

investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations, and include the following areas: (1) failure 

to have a radiographer and at least one other individual qualified pursuant to 34.43(c); (2) 

failure to have a radiographer supervise and maintain direct observation of the assistant 

during use of a radiographic device; and (3) failure to control and maintain constant 

surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and not in 

storage. CAN USA, Inc. agreed to a number of corrective actions, including the following: 

new and specific changes to operating procedures; activities related to training on new 

and/or revised operating procedures; interim training until the procedures are completed; 

unannounced audits; additional oversight of radiography crews; and specific written 

agreements with clients that address radiographic operations. In consideration of these 

commitments, the NRC agreed to limit the civil penalty amount to $7,000 and not to pursue 

any further enforcement action in connection with the inspection. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included.
OE Annual Report

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Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. EA-10-100 

Molt, MT 

On September 2, 2010, an Order Revoking License (Immediately Effective) was issued to 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc., for multiple violations of NRC requirements. Specifically, 

(1) on various dates beginning on May 3, 2009, the licensee, in part deliberately, failed to 

implement specified actions required by Confirmatory Order (EA-08-271) involving: (i) 

conducting an assessment of the radiation safety program, (ii) providing initial safety training 

to the licensee staff, (iii) ensuring that an independent consultant’s recommended program 

improvements were provided within 30 days of completing the required reviews, (iv) 

providing the independent consultant’s 2009 annual audit results to the NRC, (v) conducting 

the initial field audit of radiography operations by the independent consultant by May 3, 

2009, and (vi) submitting a required license amendment request by May 3, 2009; (2) from 

May 13, 2006 through September 9, 2009, the licensee deliberately failed to establish and 

maintain a prearranged response plan with the Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) in 

accordance with Increased Controls Order (EA-05-090), Attachment B, Section IC-2(b); (3) 

on March 6, 2007, the licensee president deliberately failed to provide complete and 

accurate information to an NRC inspector in accordance 10 CFR 30.9, regarding the 

licensee’s effort to establish a prearranged response plan with the LLEA; (4) on October 22, 

2009, while under oath, the licensee president deliberately failed to provide complete and 

accurate information to an NRC investigator in accordance with 10 CFR 30.9 regarding the 

licensee’s effort to establish a prearranged response plan with the LLEA; (5) on July 4, 16, 

and August 29-30, 2009, the licensee failed to maintain a dependable means to detect, 

assess, and respond to unauthorized access to radioactive materials in accordance with 

Increased Controls Order (EA-05-090) Appendix B, Section IC-2(c); (6) on June 22, 2009, 

the licensee failed to properly secure a radiographic exposure device for transport with 

proper blocking and bracing to prevent loss during transit in accordance with 10 CFR 

20.1802, 10 CFR 34.35(d), and 10 CFR 71.5 that led to the device being lost in the public 

domain; and, (7) on June 22, 2009, the licensee willfully failed to immediately notify the NRC 

about the lost radiographic exposure device in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology EA-09-142 

Gaithersburg, MD 

On March 1, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the U.S. 

Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST or 

licensee) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on 

January 5, 2010. This enforcement action is based on ten apparent violations of NRC 

requirements at NIST’s facility in Boulder, Colorado, which were identified during NRC 

inspection and investigation activities conducted in response to a June 9, 2008 plutonium 

spill. The apparent violations involved the licensee’s failure to conduct the radiation safety 

program at NIST-Boulder in accordance with NRC requirements and the conditions of the 

NIST-Boulder license. The licensee agreed to take the following actions: (1) complete an 

independent assessment of the radiation safety program at NIST-Boulder; (2) submit copies 

of the required annual radiation safety audit to the NRC; (3) develop and implement a 

procedure for training new employees on radiation safety policies and procedures; (4) 

upgrade initial and refresher training for employees who work with radioactive materials, 

including a review of lessons learned from the plutonium spill and the associated apparent 

violations; (5) submit a license amendment request for deletion of the radionuclides on the 

NIST-Boulder license that NIST no longer plans to use; (6) develop a formal radiation 
OE Annual Report

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hazards analysis process; (7) revise the NIST Ionizing Radiation Safety Committee charter 

to require additional review of NRC submittals; (8) revise the NIST radiation safety program 

policy to indicate that all individuals interacting with the NRC are required to provide 

complete and accurate information; (9) develop a clearly defined process for acquiring 

radioactive materials; and (10) pay a civil penalty of $10,000. In consideration of these 

commitments, and other actions already completed by NIST, the NRC agreed not to pursue 

any additional enforcement actions for the apparent violations or count this matter as 

previous enforcement for the purposes of assessing potential future enforcement actions in 

accordance with Section VI.C of the Enforcement Policy. 

Orders Issued To Fuel Cycle Licensees

 

AREVA NP, Inc. EA-10-041 

Richland, WA 

On December 2, 2010, an NOV and a Confirmatory Order were issued to AREVA NP, Inc., 

(AREVA) as a result of an ADR mediation session associated with a apparent violation of 

10 CFR 71.5(a) and 49 CFR 172.204(a) involving inaccurate transportation records for 

several export shipments of special nuclear material (SNM). Specifically, on December 9, 

2009, and March 11 and 18, 2009, an AREVA employee deliberately altered (falsified) the 

reference and date stamp on three documents entitled “Approval to Transit a UK [United 

Kingdom] Port” associated with the export of SNM from the United States to Germany by 

AREVA. 

AREVA NP, Inc. EA-09-272 

Aiken, SC

On April 26, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to AREVA NP – 

Richland, Inc. (AREVA) to formalize commitments reached as part of an ADR mediation 

session involving a violation of a facility procedure by an employee who willfully defeated the 

function of an Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) on April 21, 2009. Specifically, an 

electronic eye sensor known as the vacuum wand interlock was deliberately bypassed by an 

employee and made to work by using tape. As a result, IROFS 1111 was not available and 

reliable as required by 10 CFR 70.61(e). Although the vacuum wand interlock was disabled, 

sufficient system IROFS remained in service to perform the intended safety function for 

identified accident scenarios and protect the health and safety of the public. As part of the 

settlement agreement, AREVA agreed to take a number of actions in addition to those 

already completed. These additional actions include: (1) incorporating lessons learned from 

this incident, including enhanced safety conscious work environment training, into General 

Employee training for new employees and annual refresher training for all Richland 

employees; (2) implementing a management observation program for the purpose of 

reinforcing task performance standards and work practices; (3) performing a survey to 

determine the results of efforts to increase supervisor availability in the work area; and (4) 

developing a presentation on the incident and lessons learned with regard to work practices 

for a future industry forum. In recognition of these actions, the NRC agreed to refrain from 

proposing a civil penalty and issuing an NOV or other enforcement action. 
OE Annual Report

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Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. EA-10-076 

Erwin, TN 

On November 16, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order and an NOV (NOV) 

were issued to Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) to confirm commitments made as a result 

of an ADR mediation sessions held on October 4, 2010. This enforcement action is based 

on the failure of NFS to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC, as required 

by 10 CFR 70.9(a), on two occasions. Specifically, (1) on November 25, 2008, NFS 

submitted a response to a previously issued NOV stating that all fire dampers in Procedure 

NFS-GH-22 were inspected in September 2008 and all passed the inspection, when 12 of 

the fire dampers had not been inspected; and (2) in August 2009, during an inspection to 

verify the corrective actions as documented in the response to the previously issued NOV, a 

former NFS employee created and provided a document to an NRC inspector that indicated 

that all but one of the dampers had been fully inspected in 2008, when in fact more than one 

of the dampers had not been fully inspected. The NRC concluded that these actions were 

willful and associated with the same former employee. As a result of the ADR agreement, 

the licensee agreed to a number of actions, including: (1) issuance of a NOV as part of the 

Confirmatory Order; (2) conducting an effectiveness review within one year of each 

corrective action to the NOV; (3) performing an assessment of the effectiveness of its 

corrective actions by an independent group to assure adequacy and accuracy of information 

submitted to the NRC; (4) developing and implementing an appropriate safety culture 

improvement plan and conducting periodic integrated safety culture assessments; and (5) 

assessing its current corrective action program (CAP) against NQA-1-2008 and submitting a 

license amendment request within nine months incorporating the CAP into its license. In 

recognition of these actions, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty for this 

matter. 

Orders Issued To Individuals

Mark M. Ficek IA-10-028 

On September 2, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order Prohibiting 

Involvement in NRC Activities was issued to Mr. Mark M. Ficek for multiple deliberate 

violations of NRC requirements and a violation of Confirmatory Order (IA-08-055). The 

order specified that Mr. Ficek is prohibited involvement from all NRC-licensed activities for a 

period of 7 years, and that Mr. Ficek is required to notify the NRC upon initial involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities for an additional two years after the 7 year prohibition period 

expires. Specifically, the NRC found that Mr. Ficek, president of Mattingly Testing Services, 

Inc., (1) deliberately failed to implement the requirements of Confirmatory Order (EA-08-

271), which dispositioned a number of willful violations through alternative dispute resolution 

in 2009, including conducting an assessment of the licensee’s safety programs and 

providing safety training to the licensee’s staff; (2) deliberately failed to establish and 

maintain a prearranged response plan with the Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA), as 

required by Increased Controls Order (EA-05-090), Appendix B, Section IC-2(b); (3) 

deliberately provided material false information to an NRC inspector during a site visit on 

March 6, 2007, in violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(2), regarding the licensee’s effort to establish 

a prearranged response plan with the LLEA; (4) deliberately provided material false 

information to an NRC investigator while under oath on October 22, 2009, in violation of 10 

CFR 30.10(a)(2), regarding the licensee’s effort to establish a prearranged response plan 

with the LLEA; and, (5) violated the provisions of Confirmatory Order (IA-08-055) Section 
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V.1 which specified that Mr. Ficek was prohibited for 2 years from the date of the order 

(March 6, 2009) from engaging in NRC-licensed activities since during the 2 year period Mr. 

Ficek (i) directed the activities of an NRC-required independent consultant, (ii) assumed the 

duties of the Radiation Safety Officer to determine the reporting requirements of an event 

involving a lost radiographic exposure device, (iii) applied, on behalf of the licensee, for 

reciprocity to use radioactive materials in an Agreement State pursuant to Mattingly’s NRC 

license, and (iv) continued to answer employees’ questions about radiation safety issue and 

to purchase radiographic exposure devices. 

Mary K. Files IA-09-075 

On June 2, 2010, a Confirmatory Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC activities was issued 

to Ms. Mary K. Files, a contractor working at McGuire Nuclear Station, prohibiting her 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years. This enforcement action is 

based on Ms. Files’ deliberate failure to adhere to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, fitness-forduty requirements. Specifically, on October 20, 2008, Ms. Files introduced and used 

marijuana inside the Protected Area at McGuire Nuclear Station. 

Lawrence Grimm IA-09-068 

On March 1, 2010, a Confirmatory Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC activities was 

issued to Mr. Lawrence Grimm, a former radiation safety officer at the U.S. Department of 

Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology facility in Boulder, Colorado 

(NIST-Boulder), prohibiting his involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one 

year. This enforcement action is based on Mr. Grimm’s deliberate failure to provide 

complete and accurate information to the NRC in a February 15, 2007 license amendment 

application requesting authorization for NIST-Boulder to possess and use source and 

special nuclear material, including plutonium. Specifically, Mr. Grimm stated that the doors 

to the laboratory where the sources were to be stored were equipped with a key-card 

locking system when, in fact, the laboratory had no key-card locking system, was considered 

an open laboratory, and was typically not locked. Mr. Grimm also provided inaccurate 

information regarding internal monitoring of occupationally exposed workers and the use of 

dosimetry for frequent users of the laboratory, who didn't actually work with the material but 

who worked in the same laboratories where the materials were stored and used. This 

represents a violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(2), which, in part, prohibits licensee employees 

from deliberately submitting information to the NRC that the person knows to be incomplete 

or inaccurate in some material respect. 

Dr. Juan E. Perez Monte IA-09-041 

On January 21, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order and an NOV were 

issued to Dr. Perez Monté, former Radiation Safety Officer for Beta Gamma Nuclear 

Radiology, Inc., (BGNR) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 

session held on October 27, 2009. This enforcement action is based on an apparent 

deliberate violation of 10 CFR 30.10, which requires, in part, that an employee of a licensee 

may not deliberately submit to the NRC information that the person submitting the 

information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. 

Contrary to this requirement, Dr. Perez Monté submitted information known to be inaccurate 

in some respect material to the NRC, in violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(2); and as a result, 

caused BGNR to maintain inaccurate information contrary to 10 CFR 30.9, in violation of 10 
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CFR 30.10(a)(1). Dr. Perez Monté agreed to: (1) not serve as RSO at BGNR or other 

licensed facilities for at least two years and (2) provide outreach to the nuclear medicine 

community to help deter others from violating NRC regulations. In recognition of these 

commitments, the NRC agreed to not issue Dr. Perez Monté an order prohibiting 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities other than the two year restriction on serving as 

RSO, and also issued him an NOV containing a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 30.10. 

Orders Imposing a Civil Penalty

Babcock and Wilcox EA-08-204 

Lynchburg, VA 

On June 15, 2010, an Order Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty in the amount of $32,500 

was issued, to Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. (B&W) (formerly BWX 

Technologies (BWXT), Inc) for a SLIII violation (ML101580256). On July 27, 2010, in 

accordance with the order issued on June 15, 2010, and 10 CFR 2.205, B&W requested a 

hearing before the ASLB (ML102080611). See Section II.B and the discussion below for 

further details regarding this hearing request. In accordance with the order issued by the 

ASLB, this “Order Imposing a Civil Penalty” was withdrawn. 

Actions Involving the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Babcock and Wilcox 

Lynchburg, VA 

On August 11, 2010, the ASLB granted B&W its request for a hearing. On August 13, 2010, 

the licensee and the NRC staff jointly submitted a motion asking the ASLB to hold this 

administrative enforcement proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of proposed 

settlement negotiations. On October 12, 2010, the ASLB approved a settlement agreement 

successfully negotiated by the NRC staff and the licensee and issued an order stipulating a 

number of agreed to actions. In accordance with the Order, the NRC agreed (1) to withdraw 

the June 15, 2010, Order Imposing a Monetary Civil Penalty in the amount of $32,500; and, 

(2) to recategorize the violation issued on February 23, 2010, from a SLIII violation to a 

violation with no SL. In accordance with the Order, B&W agreed to (1) not challenge the 

existence of a violation of NRC requirements related to the hydrofluoric acid spill and will 

withdraw its request for hearing; (2) pay a settlement fee of $32,500 in lieu of the withdrawn 

civil penalty; (3) perform one quarterly emergency drill within a twelve-month period related 

to a chemical exposure event; and, (4) give a presentation addressing lessons learned at 

the 2011 Fuel Cycle Information Exchange. The complete order can be viewed in ADAMS 

at ML102850179. 

 
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Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against 

Individuals*

Orders

Four orders were issued to individuals during 2010 and are discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

Dusty Bolman IA-09-076 

On June 2, 2010, an NOV was issued to Mr. Dusty Bolman for a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 

50.5, “Deliberate Misconduct.” While working as a contract welder at the McGuire Nuclear 

Station, Mr. Bolman became aware of the potential use of marijuana inside the Protected 

Area, but deliberately failed to immediately report the event to management as required by 

station procedure. 

Robert B. Hilton IA-10-037 

On October 20, 2010, an NOV was issued to Mr. Robert B. Hilton, formerly a licensed 

operator at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, for a SLIII violation of 10 

CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, on July 19, 2010, Mr. Hilton participated in Southern Nuclear 

Operating Company’s random fitness for duty testing program and subsequently tested 

positive for marijuana. 

Richard Montgomery IA-10-026 

On December 2, 2010, an NOV was issued to Mr. Richard Montgomery, formerly a criticality 

engineer for AREVA NP, Inc., for a Severity Level III violation of10 CFR 71.8, “Deliberate 

Misconduct”, Section (b)(2). Specifically, on December 9, 2009, and March 11 and 18, 

2009, Mr. Richard Montgomery deliberately altered (falsified) three transportation 

documents entitled “Approval to Transit a UK [United Kingdom] Port, associated with an 

export shipment of special nuclear material from the United States to Germany by Areva NP, 

Inc.” 

Emery Plaza IA-10-035

On May 14, 2010, an NOV was issued to Mr. Emery Plaza, formerly a security officer at 

Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Station, for a SLIII violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1) and 10 

CFR 50.5(a)(2). Mr. Plaza deliberately submitted a substituted urine sample, which he 

certified to be his own, in an effort to subvert the fitness-for-duty test to avoid detection of 

illegal drug usage. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 

 
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Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against 

Nonlicensees

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)* 

Confirmatory Order

Stone and Webster Construction, Inc. EA-10-054 

Baton Rouge, LA 

On September 10, 2010, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Stone 

& Webster Construction, Inc. (S&W) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR 

mediation session held on August 24, 2010. By letter dated June 2, 2010, the NRC 

identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7 based on the United States Department of 

Labor (DOL) Administrative Review Board’s (ARB) September 24, 2009 Final Decision and 

Order of Remand (ARB Case No. 06-041). That ARB decision reversed a January 9, 2006 

DOL Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) recommended decision where the ALJ issued a 

Proposed Decision and Order (ALJ Case No. 2005-ERA-6), concluding that S&W had not 

retaliated against a former painter foreman at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. 

As part of the settlement agreement, S&W agreed to take a number of actions, including: (1) 

issuing a written communication from a senior S&W Power executive to reiterate, among 

others, the company’s policy on safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at all S&W 

nuclear construction and maintenance sites; (2) ensuring that an Executive Review Board 

reviews certain proposed adverse actions for compliance with applicable employee 

protection requirements and to assess and mitigate the potential chilling effect at all S&W 

nuclear maintenance sites; (3) revising the company’s SpeakUp program brochure to 

explicitly identify safety concerns as within the scope of the program; (4) conducting SCWE 

surveys of its employees, including craft, at all of its nuclear maintenance sites; (5) ensuring 

that SCWE training is provided to all of its nuclear maintenance supervisors and above; and 

(6) collecting, reviewing and assessing data collected through the company’s various 

programs for SCWE trends. In exchange for these actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue 

further action relating to this matter. 

Notice of Violation

McConnell Dowell (American Samoa), Ltd. EA-10-174 

Pago Pago, American Samoa 

On October 6, 2010, an NOV was issued to McConnell Dowell (American Samoa), Ltd., for a 

SLIII violation involving the receipt, possession, and usage of byproduct material without 

authorization from a specific or general license as required by 10 CFR 30.3(a). Specifically, 

as early as 2008 to July 25, 2010, the licensee received, possessed and used two portable 

nuclear gauges in American Samoa, an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction, without a 

specific license issued by the NRC.

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 

 
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