COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

SCOTTIE TYRONE BOOKER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0061-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 18, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY 

Kenneth M. Covington, Judge Designate 

 Joseph A. Sanzone (Joseph A. Sanzone 

Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Scottie Tyrone Booker (appellant) appeals his convictions of 

second degree murder and of using a firearm in the commission of 

murder. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it granted the Commonwealth's motion for a jury view of the 

nighttime lighting at the crime scene. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

 The facts relevant to the jury view are as follows. The 

victim suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head between 2:00 

and 2:30 a.m. on July 17, 1994 in a parking lot outside of a 

Farmville nightclub. During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, 

four witnesses testified about the lighting conditions at the 

parking lot. Shawn Collins, Lynwood Batts, and Russell Harris, 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Jr. testified that they were present in the parking lot at the 

time the murder occurred. Mr. Collins testified that the 

lighting in the parking lot was "real clear" and that the fog 

lights on Mr. Batts' car were operating from behind him. He also 

testified that the club had recently closed for the evening and 

that the parking lot was filled with cars waiting to exit. Mr. 

Batts testified that the lighting in the parking lot was "fair." 

 Mr. Harris testified that the lighting in the parking lot was 

sufficient to enable him to see the bullet hole in the victim's 

head from his position in a nearby car. He also testified that 

he observed the traffic in the parking lot. William Harding, the 

owner of the club, testified about the lighting equipment 

installed to illuminate the parking lot. Mr. Harding testified 

that a "high pressure sodium light" was mounted on the gate at 

the entrance of the parking lot. He also testified that eight 

poles in the parking lot were equipped with either 200 watt high 

pressure sodium lights or "dusk to dawn" lights. In addition, 

"quartz lights" were mounted in a row on the side of the club 

building and aimed toward the parking lot. Mr. Harding testified 

that all of these lights were on at the time of the murder. He 

also testified that the only change in the lighting equipment 

since the night of the murder was the addition of one new light 

on a ninth pole in the parking lot. 

 During a recess near the conclusion of its case-in-chief, 

the Commonwealth moved for a jury view of the lighting in the 
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parking lot at night. The record contains no transcript of 

either the parties' argument regarding the Commonwealth's motion 

or the trial court's ruling. At the end of the recess, the trial 

court informed the jury of the Commonwealth's motion and that it 

had granted the motion for the purpose of allowing the jury to 

observe the lighting conditions in the parking lot "after dark" 

at the location of the body. 

 At the conclusion of the trial while the jury was 

deliberating, appellant's counsel stated for the record the 

grounds for his objection to the jury view. Appellant's counsel 

argued that the jury view of the parking lot misrepresented the 

lighting conditions on the night of the murder because the 

headlights of the line of cars waiting to exit the parking lot 

that night were absent during the viewing. Appellant's counsel 

argued that the jury view distorted the jury's understanding of 

the actual lighting available to the witnesses who observed the 

murder and prevented the jurors from properly scrutinizing the 

eyewitnesses' testimony. The Commonwealth responded by arguing 

that the jury view did not misrepresent the conditions in the 

parking lot on the night of the murder. The Commonwealth's 

attorney asserted that the lighting of the parking lot during the 

jury view was the same as "the minimal lighting conditions that 

were present [on the night of the murder] without the addition of 

other vehicles who may have headlights on." 

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted 
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the Commonwealth's motion for a jury view of the crime scene. We 

disagree. 

 "A jury may view a crime scene upon the request of the 

Commonwealth or defendant 'when it shall appear to the court that 

such view is necessary to a just decision.' Code § 19.2-264.1. 

Whether such request should be granted lies within the discretion 

of the trial court." Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 

378, 402 S.E.2d 218, 227 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834, 112 

S. Ct. 113, 116 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991) (citation omitted). 

 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it permitted the jury to view the lighting conditions in the 

parking lot at night. The trial court was permitted to allow the 

jurors to view the lighting at the parking lot after dark to 

enable them to better understand and apply the testimony given 

during the trial. See Culpepper v. Neff, 204 Va. 800, 806, 134 

S.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1964) (citation omitted) (stating that the 

purpose of a jury view is to enable the jury to better understand 

and apply the evidence given in court). Prior to the 

Commonwealth's motion for the jury view, the eyewitnesses had 

described the lighting in the parking lot on the night of the 

murder in subjective terms such as "real clear" and "fair." The 

jury view of the lighting in the parking lot was proper to enable 

the jurors to better understand the eyewitnesses' description of 

the lighting on the night of the murder. 

 We disagree with appellant's argument that the evidence did 
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not establish that the lighting in the parking lot on the night 

of the jury view was substantially the same as the lighting on 

the night of the murder. See Quesinberry, 241 Va. at 379, 402 

S.E.2d at 227. Mr. Harding testified that on the night of the 

murder the parking lot was illuminated by eight lights mounted on 

poles at various locations in the parking lot and by lights 

mounted on the club building and on a gate at the club's 

entrance. He testified that the only change in the lighting 

since the murder was the installation of one new light on a ninth 

pole in the parking lot. Although the parking lot contained a 

line of cars waiting to exit at the time of the murder, and the 

jury observed the parking lot while it was empty, the record 

indicates that any light from these cars was irrelevant to the 

witnesses' view of the crime. None of the witnesses, including 

appellant himself, testified that light from the line of cars 

either helped or hindered his or her view of the crime. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of 

second degree murder and using a firearm in the commission of 

murder. 

Affirmed.