Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 65619

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Transportation Security Administration 

[Docket No. TSA–2004–19160] 

Notice of Final Order for Secure Flight 

Test Phase; Response to Public 

Comments on Proposed Order and 

Secure Flight Test Records

AGENCY: Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS).

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice responds to 

public comments received in response 

to three documents that the 

Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) published in the Federal Register

on September 24, 2004, related to 

testing of a new domestic passenger 

prescreening program known as Secure 

Flight. Secure Flight is an aviation 

passenger prescreening program that, 

once operational, would identify 

passengers known or reasonably 

suspected to be engaged in terrorist 

activity in order to allow action to be 

taken to prevent them from boarding a 

domestic flight or to ensure that 

appropriate additional security 

screening procedures are applied. Under 

the program, TSA would compare 

passenger reservation information for 

domestic flights, primarily in the form 

of passenger name records (PNRs), to 

information maintained by the Federal 

Government about individuals known 

or reasonably suspected to be engaged 

in terrorist activity. 

In preparation for testing the 

feasibility of the Secure Flight program, 

on September 24, 2004, TSA issued a 

Federal Register notice establishing a 

system of records under the Privacy Act 

for purposes of the Secure Flight 

program during the test phase. TSA also 

published a notice in the Federal 

Register that the agency had submitted 

to the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) a request for approval to collect 

PNRs from aircraft operators to test the 

Secure Flight program. That notice 

included the text of a proposed order to 

certain aircraft operators directing them 

to provide a limited set of historical 

PNRs to TSA. OMB subsequently has 

approved the information collection 

through March 31, 2005, and assigned 

OMB control number 1652–0025. In 

addition, TSA published a Privacy 

Impact Assessment for the testing phase 

of the Secure Flight program. 

This Federal Register notice that TSA 

publishes today addresses public 

comments received in response to the 

Federal Register notices published on 

September 24, 2004, and describes 

changes made to TSA’s proposed order, 

which TSA now is issuing in final form.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa 

Dean, Privacy Officer, Transportation 

Security Administration, 601 South 

12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202–4220; 

telephone (571) 227–3947; facsimile 

(571) 227–2594; e-mail 

lisa.dean@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On September 24, 2004, TSA 

published in the Federal Register three 

notices related to TSA’s plan to issue a 

final order to aircraft operators in order 

to obtain PNRs for testing of a new 

domestic passenger prescreening 

program known as Secure Flight (69 FR 

57342, 57345, and 57352). This Federal 

Register notice that TSA is publishing 

today responds to public comments 

received in response to the notices 

published on September 24, 2004, and 

provides public notice of the final order 

that TSA is issuing for purposes of 

testing the Secure Flight program. 

Secure Flight Program 

The Secure Flight program is an effort 

to move the existing passenger 

prescreening process into the Federal 

Government in order to make the 

process more effective, consistent, and 

efficient for the traveling public. By 

administering this screening process 

within the Federal Government, the 

Secure Flight program will allow for 

better protection of government 

watchlist information that currently is 

provided to aircraft operators. 

Secure Flight will involve the 

comparison of information in PNRs 

from domestic flights to names in the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) 

maintained by the Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC), including the expanded 

TSA No-Fly and Selectee Lists, in order 

to identify individuals known or 

reasonably suspected to be engaged in 

terrorist activity. TSA anticipates that it 

will also apply, within the Secure Flight 

system, a streamlined version of the 

existing passenger prescreening process, 

known as the Computer Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening System 

(CAPPS), which evaluates information 

in PNRs that passengers otherwise 

provide to aircraft operators in the 

normal course of business. 

Simple comparisons of PNR 

information against records maintained 

in the TSDB will not permit TSA to 

identify information provided by 

passengers that is incorrect or 

inaccurate, potentially rendering the 

comparisons less effective. Therefore, 

on a very limited basis, in addition to 

testing TSA’s ability to compare 

passenger information with data 

maintained by TSC, TSA will separately 

test the use of commercial data to 

determine if use of such data is effective 

in identifying passenger information 

that is incorrect or inaccurate and 

reducing the number of false positive 

matches of passenger information 

against TSDB records. This test will 

involve commercial data aggregators 

whose procedures will be governed by 

strict privacy and data security 

protections. TSA will not receive the 

commercially available data that would 

be used by commercial data aggregators. 

TSA will use this test of commercial 

data to determine whether such use: (1) 

Could identify when passengers’

information is inaccurate or incorrect 

and/or assist with the resolution of false 

positive matches; (2) would result in 

inappropriate differences in treatment of 

any protected category of persons; and 

(3) could be governed by data security 

safeguards and privacy protections that 

are sufficiently robust to ensure that 

commercial entities or other 

unauthorized entities do not gain access 

to passengers’ personal information and 

to ensure that the government does not 

gain inappropriate access to commercial 

information about individuals. TSA will 

defer any decision of whether 

commercial data will be used in its 

prescreening programs, such as Secure 

Flight, until a thorough assessment of 

test results is completed. If TSA decides 

to use commercial data for Secure 

Flight, it will not do so until the agency 

publishes a new System of Records 

Notice announcing how commercial 

data will be used and individuals’

privacy will be protected. 

TSA’s efforts to develop and test the 

Secure Flight program are fully 

consistent with the recommendation in 

the final report of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 

the United States (9/11 Commission), 

which states at page 392:

‘‘[I]mproved use of ‘‘no-fly’’ and 

‘‘automatic selectee’’ lists should not be 

delayed while the argument about a 

successor to CAPPS continues. This 

screening function should be performed by 

TSA and it should utilize the larger set of 

watch lists maintained by the Federal 

Government. Air carriers should be required 

to supply the information needed to test and 

implement this new system.’’

The expansion of these watchlists to 

include information not previously 

included for security reasons will be 

possible as integration and 

consolidation of the information related 

to individuals known or suspected to be 

engaged in terrorist activity maintained

65620 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 

by TSC is completed and the U.S. 

Government assumes the responsibility 

for administering the watchlist 

comparisons. Secure Flight will 

automate the vast majority of watchlist 

comparisons, will allow TSA to apply 

more consistent procedures where 

automated resolution of potential 

matches is not possible, and will allow 

for more consistent response procedures 

at airports for those passengers 

identified as potential matches. 

Secure Flight represents a significant 

step in securing domestic air travel and 

safeguarding terrorism-related national 

security information, namely, the 

watchlists. It will dramatically improve 

consistency and effectiveness of 

comparisons of passenger information 

with data now maintained by TSC and 

will reduce the long-term costs to air 

carriers and passengers associated with 

maintaining the present system, which 

is operated individually by each aircraft 

operator that flies in the United States. 

Prior Federal Register Notices 

In order to test the feasibility of the 

Secure Flight program, TSA must obtain 

a sample of passenger information for 

domestic flights. In preparation for 

obtaining this information for testing 

purposes, on September 24, 2004, TSA 

published three public notices in the 

Federal Register. First, TSA published a 

system of records notice in accordance 

with the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 

552a), including a list of the proposed 

routine uses of information in the 

system of records. (69 FR 57345). The 

system of records notice establishes a 

new system entitled ‘‘Secure Flight Test 

Records’’ (hereafter referred to as DHS/

TSA 017), which will govern the 

collection, maintenance, use, and 

disclosure of PNRs and other 

information obtained by TSA for 

purposes of testing the Secure Flight 

program. TSA requested public 

comment on the routine uses for DHS/

TSA 017 during a 30-day comment 

period ending on October 25, 2004. 

Second, TSA published in the Federal 

Register a notice that TSA had 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget in accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.) a request for 

emergency processing of OMB’s review 

and approval for TSA to collect PNRs 

from aircraft operators to test the Secure 

Flight program (PRA notice). (69 FR 

57342). That notice included the text of 

a proposed order to certain aircraft 

operators directing them to provide a 

limited set of historical PNRs to TSA 

that cover commercial scheduled 

domestic flights. Specifically, the 

proposed order covered PNRs with 

domestic flight segments flown during 

the month of June 2004 and excluded 

those PNRs with flight segments that 

occurred after June 30, 2004. The 

purpose of this limitation was to ensure 

that during the test phase, TSA does not 

obtain any information about future 

travel plans of passengers on domestic 

flights. The order also proposed to 

exclude PNR flight segments to or from 

the U.S. Although not required to do so, 

TSA requested public comment on the 

proposed order during a 30-day 

comment period ending on October 25, 

2004. OMB subsequently has approved 

the information collection through 

March 31, 2005, and assigned OMB 

control number 1652–0025. 

Third, TSA published in the Federal 

Register a Privacy Impact Assessment 

for the test phase of the Secure Flight 

program, which TSA prepared in 

accordance with the E-Government Act 

of 2002. (69 FR 57352). 

TSA received approximately 500 

public comments on the Privacy Act 

system of records notice for DHS/TSA 

017. Identical versions of most of those 

comments also were sent to OMB in 

response to TSA’s PRA notice. TSA has 

reviewed and considered the issues 

raised by the public comments 

submitted to TSA and OMB. This notice 

addresses those issues and describes 

changes made to TSA’s proposed order 

to aircraft operators, which, after 

carefully considering the comments, 

TSA now is issuing in final form. 

Public Comments 

Public comments on the Secure Flight 

system of records notice and PRA notice 

generally focused on one or more of the 

following categories of issues: (1) The 

program’s effect on individual privacy 

and civil liberties; (2) the routine uses 

established for the Secure Flight Test 

Records System (DHS/TSA 017); (3) 

passenger consent to the use of 

historical PNRs; (4) the absence of a 

redress process; (5) concerns with the 

use of commercial data; (6) the efficacy 

of the Secure Flight program; (7) TSA’s 

compliance with the Privacy Act, the 

PRA, and other laws; and (8) possible 

conflicts of laws involving European 

Union (EU) data privacy requirements. 

Effect on Individual Privacy and Civil 

Liberties 

A large majority of the commenters 

viewed the use of PNRs to prescreen 

passengers against government 

watchlists as an invasion of privacy and 

an infringement on their civil liberties, 

including individuals’ right to travel 

and exercise other Constitutional rights 

that might be related to travel, such as 

the freedom of assembly. The National 

Business Travel Association (NBTA), 

stated that TSA should balance the need 

to establish better security measures 

with policies and procedures that 

protect civil liberties and privacy. The 

NBTA also stated that TSA should not 

impose unnecessary costs on business 

travelers. 

TSA is aware of, and sensitive to, the 

need to preserve Americans’ freedoms 

while pursing better security. In 

implementing a new security measure 

that affects these interests, it is 

necessary to move deliberately and 

cautiously. It is for this very reason that 

TSA is testing the Secure Flight program 

before moving forward with an 

operational system. 

The prescreening of passengers 

against Government watchlists is a 

security measure that has been in place 

for several years, performed by aircraft 

operators, using watchlists provided by 

the Federal Government. Because the 

airlines have varying systems by which 

they implement passenger prescreening, 

the effectiveness, efficiency, and 

consistency in response for airline 

passengers of the current system is 

limited. The Secure Flight program is an 

effort to move this prescreening process 

into the Federal Government in order to 

make the process more effective, 

consistent, and efficient for the traveling 

public. This effort is consistent with a 

specific aviation security 

recommendation of the 9/11 

Commission. 

The Secure Flight program will not 

impose an unconstitutional burden on 

an individual’s right to travel or exercise 

other Constitutional rights. The Secure 

Flight program is a limited, reasonable 

security screening measure designed to 

further the Federal Government’s 

compelling interest in protecting 

aviation security. Except in cases where 

a passenger may authorize TSA to retain 

information about him or her for 

purposes of redress, TSA has no longterm need to retain the information and 

is seeking approval from the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA) to destroy passenger 

information shortly after completion of 

the passenger’s itinerary. Similarly, for 

purposes of the test phase of the 

program, TSA is seeking NARA 

approval to destroy PNRs used for the 

test after the test has been completed 

and the results have been evaluated. 

TSA’s purpose in obtaining PNRs is to 

test the program, not to maintain 

information on individuals’ travel.

TSA agrees with NBTA’s comments 

regarding the need to have policies and 

procedures that protect passengers’ civil 

liberties and privacy interests and to 

ensure the Secure Flight program is

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 65621

effective. TSA is in the process of 

developing redress procedures that will 

accomplish these goals, as discussed 

further below. 

The Electronic Privacy Information 

Center (EPIC) objected to TSA’s 

statement in the System of Records 

notice that the records created and 

maintained in the course of the Secure 

Flight test phase should be exempt from 

a number of the provisions of the 

Privacy Act, such as the provision 

allowing individuals to obtain access to 

certain records containing information 

about them. 

The Privacy Act specifically permits 

agencies to exempt from certain of its 

provisions investigatory materials 

compiled for law enforcement purposes, 

because allowing individuals access to 

law enforcement files could impair 

investigations, particularly those 

involving complex or continuing 

patterns of behavior. The intent of the 

exemption is to prevent access to law 

enforcement records if that access 

would alert subjects that their activities 

are being scrutinized and allow them to 

take countermeasures to escape 

detection and prosecution. 

In the Secure Flight system of records 

notice section entitled ‘‘Exemptions 

Claimed for the System’’, TSA stated 

that for portions of the system it would 

invoke exemptions to the Privacy Act’s 

requirements such as those that: (1) 

Permit individuals to obtain access to, 

and amend, information pertaining to 

them; and (2) require that information 

collected by the agency be relevant and 

necessary to the agency’s statutory 

purpose. (69 FR 57348). TSA is in the 

process of preparing a notice of 

proposed rulemaking to implement 

these exemptions, which will include a 

detailed explanation of the basis for 

invoking the exemptions and will offer 

the public an opportunity to comment 

further. 

At this point, it is unclear whether 

TSA will need to invoke these 

exemptions for the Secure Flight 

program in its operational stage. In 

order, however, to preserve its ability to 

protect classified and law enforcement 

investigatory information from public 

disclosure, TSA identified these 

exemptions in the system of records 

notice as exemptions it may invoke, if 

necessary. EPIC noted in its comment 

that certain information in the system of 

records, such as PNRs, may not be 

subject to the exemptions and therefore 

should be releasable to the affected 

individual under the Privacy Act. TSA 

agrees with this view. As stated in the 

system of records notice, TSA will give 

individuals access to records in the 

system pertaining to them to the greatest 

extent feasible, consistent with law 

enforcement and national security 

concerns. It should become clearer 

during the test phase whether the 

records in the system may be structured 

in such a way as to exclude any 

information that must be withheld from 

the public for the reasons discussed 

above. 

With regard to the requirement that 

information collected by the agency be 

‘‘relevant and necessary,’’ one of the 

objectives of the test phase is to confirm 

what information in a PNR is relevant 

and necessary to conduct an effective 

comparison of PNRs to information in 

the TSDB. The results of the test phase 

should enable TSA to determine more 

precisely what passenger information is 

relevant and necessary to the operation 

of the Secure Flight program and to 

limit its collection accordingly during 

the operational stage. 

A number of commenters expressed 

concern that the Secure Flight program 

could easily be expanded in the future 

beyond the scope outlined for the test 

phase. A number of other commenters 

anticipated that TSA would use 

passenger data to monitor where 

individuals travel and with whom they 

travel or whether they engage in other 

activities that could come within the 

First Amendment protection of freedom 

of assembly. These commenters have 

misconstrued the purpose of Secure 

Flight and the requirements that TSA 

has proposed for this test. 

TSA will neither use passenger 

information to monitor individuals’

movements within the country nor 

share such information with other 

agencies or third parties. In fact, for the 

operational phase of Secure Flight, TSA 

intends to seek approval from NARA to 

destroy passenger information shortly 

after completion of the passenger’s 

itinerary. This will preclude TSA from 

keeping any record of passenger 

movements around the country. TSA 

will not monitor the individuals with 

whom a particular passenger travels. 

If testing of the program indicates that 

it is a feasible and effective security 

measure, TSA will initiate a public 

rulemaking process in which it will 

provide an appropriate proposal for the 

workings of the system, as well as the 

redress process. This process, in 

conjunction with future publication of a 

Privacy Act system of records notice for 

the operational stage of the program will 

limit TSA’s activities under Secure 

Flight to those outlined in the notice 

and serve as the basis for the operation 

of the program. To the extent that there 

are any substantial changes to collection 

of use of information under the 

program, these will be subject to 

additional notice and opportunity for 

public comment. This transparency will 

serve to prevent so-called ‘‘mission 

creep.’’

One commenter asked whether Secure 

Flight would use race, color, gender, 

age, religion, national origin, political 

views, origin of a passenger’s name, 

disability, or other personal 

characteristics as the basis for screening 

decisions. One commenter suggested 

that TSA would use gun ownership as 

a basis for screening decisions. Several 

commenters stated that TSA should use 

ethnicity or national origin as a 

screening factor. 

With regard to the use of race, gender, 

national origin, or other factors listed 

above, Secure Flight will comply with 

the Constitution and other applicable 

law. TSA has adopted and complies 

with the ‘‘Guidance Regarding Use of 

Race by Federal Law Enforcement 

Agencies’’ issued by the United States 

Department of Justice in June 2003. 

Routine Uses 

TSA received several comments on 

TSA’s possible disclosure of personal 

data obtained for testing the Secure 

Flight program. Under the Privacy Act, 

TSA is required to list routine uses of 

the information it will maintain in the 

system of records created for testing the 

Secure Flight program. A routine use is 

a disclosure of a record outside the 

Department of Homeland Security for a 

purpose that is compatible with the 

purpose for which the information was 

collected. In its system of records notice 

for DHS/TSA 017, TSA listed the 

following routine uses for Secure Flight 

Test Records:

(1) To the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation where TSA becomes aware 

of information that may be related to an 

individual identified in the Terrorist 

Screening Database as known or 

reasonably suspected to be or having 

been engaged in conduct constituting, in 

preparation for, in aid of, or related to 

terrorism; 

(2) To contractors, grantees, experts, 

consultants, or other like persons when 

necessary to perform a function or 

service related to the Secure Flight 

program or the system of records for 

which they have been engaged. Such 

recipients are required to comply with 

the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, as 

amended; 

(3) To the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

or other Federal agency in the review, 

settlement, defense, and prosecution of 

claims, complaints, and lawsuits 

involving matters over which TSA 

exercises jurisdiction or when 

conducting litigation or in proceedings 

before any court, adjudicative or

65622 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 

administrative body, when: (a) TSA; or 

(b) any employee of TSA in his/her 

official capacity; or (c) any employee of 

TSA in his/her individual capacity, 

where DOJ or TSA has agreed to 

represent the employee; or (d) the 

United States or any agency thereof, is 

a party to the litigation or has an interest 

in such litigation, and TSA determines 

that the records are both relevant and 

necessary to the litigation and the use of 

such records is compatible with the 

purpose for which TSA collected the 

records; 

(4) To the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA) or 

other Federal agencies pursuant to 

records management inspections being 

conducted under the authority of 44 

U.S.C. 2904 and 2906; 

(5) To a Congressional office from the 

record of an individual in response to 

an inquiry from that congressional office 

made at the request of the individual; 

and 

(6) To an agency, organization, or 

individual for the purposes of 

performing authorized audit or 

oversight operations. 

Some commenters objected to the 

disclosure of information to other 

agencies whose missions are unrelated 

to counterterrorism or security and to 

foreign governments. TSA has 

established a very limited set of routine 

uses for the Secure Flight Test Records. 

Consistent with the commenters’ view, 

TSA will disclose information to the FBI 

in connection with its counterterrorism 

function where TSA becomes aware of 

information that may be related to an 

individual identified in the TSDB as 

known or reasonably suspected to be or 

having been engaged in conduct 

constituting, in preparation for, in aid 

of, or related to terrorism. The other 

routine uses applicable to DHS/TSA 017 

are necessary for the operation of the 

agency or the operation and oversight of 

the Secure Flight program. TSA will not 

provide any of the information related 

to the Secure Flight program to foreign 

governments. 

One commenter expressed concern 

with TSA’s plan to allow government 

contractors access to personal data and 

suggested that TSA ensure that strong 

contractual requirements are in place to 

deter weak data handling practices. TSA 

will put such contractual requirements 

in place. 

One commenter stated that TSA 

should ensure that if Secure Flight is 

used to screen actual passengers, any 

underlying information about the 

passenger used to make screening 

decisions should not be provided to the 

airlines or screeners. TSA agrees with 

this comment. One of the main purposes 

of Secure Flight is to bring within the 

Federal Government the watchlist 

comparison results that currently are in 

the hands of airlines. 

Passenger Consent 

Many commenters objected to the 

government’s collection of PNRs for 

testing purposes because they had not 

given consent to the collection. As 

discussed previously, aircraft operators 

currently use the information in PNRs to 

conduct passenger prescreening, 

including watchlists checks and the 

application of CAPPS. The existence of 

these prescreening measures has been 

public knowledge for many years. 

Therefore, when passengers provide 

information to aircraft operators in order 

to purchase air transportation, they have 

notice that their information will be 

used for prescreening purposes. In fact, 

the PNRs TSA will receive for testing 

Secure Flight already were already used 

for airline-implemented prescreening in 

June 2004. Therefore, TSA’s collection 

of the PNRs is consistent with the 

purposes for which the information in 

those PNRs originally was collected, 

and passengers who traveled by air in 

June 2004 had notice of those purposes. 

Redress Process 

Commenters noted that TSA has not 

yet established detailed redress 

procedures to handle cases where 

passengers believe they have been 

unfairly or inaccurately singled out for 

additional scrutiny as a result of the 

comparison of their PNRs to information 

in the TSDB. NBTA stated that TSA 

should develop a redress process to 

address inaccuracies in the databases 

TSA uses to prescreen passengers, 

including special procedures for 

corporate travelers to allow them to 

continue to fly while any security issue 

is resolved. 

TSA is in the process of developing a 

robust redress program and has begun 

hiring and is well into the process of 

developing redress procedures that will 

be refined during the Secure Flight test 

in November. For present purposes, 

however, TSA is only testing the Secure 

Flight concept. Because the data to be 

used concerns domestic flights that have 

already been completed during the 

month of June 2004 ‘‘meaning that 

passengers were already screened ‘‘and 

because the test results will not be used 

in an operational setting to conduct 

passenger screening, no passengers will 

need to avail themselves of the redress 

process during testing. With respect to 

special procedures for business 

travelers, TSA does not, at this point, 

believe that the Secure Flight program 

will cause delays that would warrant 

special treatment for any class of 

passengers. Information obtained 

through program testing, however, may 

be relevant to this issue, and TSA will 

consider it in developing the 

operational aspects of the Secure Flight 

program. 

Use of Commercial Data 

A number of commenters had 

questions and concerns regarding TSA’s 

plan to test the use of commercial data 

to identify passenger information that is 

incorrect or inaccurate. Commenters 

expressed concern that TSA’s access to 

commercial information would open the 

door to abuse of individuals’ privacy 

rights and possible theft of their 

personal information.

As discussed in detail in the Privacy 

Impact Assessment for the Secure Flight 

Test Phase (69 FR 57352), TSA’s testing 

of commercial data will be governed by 

stringent data security and privacy 

protections, including: contractual 

prohibitions on commercial entities’

maintenance or use of PNR information 

for any purposes other than testing 

under TSA parameters; strict firewalls 

between the government and 

commercial data providers; real-time 

auditing procedures to determine when 

data has been accessed and by whom; 

and strict rules prohibiting the access or 

use of commercially held personal data 

by TSA. TSA will not have access to or 

store the commercially available data 

that would be used by commercial data 

aggregators. 

One commenter questioned TSA’s 

need for passengers’ credit card 

information as part of Secure Flight and 

whether TSA would be using 

commercial data to check credit 

histories and other personal information 

unrelated to Secure Flight. Commenters 

also had questions about the types of 

commercial information that could lead 

TSA to apply enhanced screening or 

deny an individual access to an aircraft. 

One commenter suggested that TSA use 

only those sources of commercial data 

that are easily corrected by consumers 

so that if there are errors in 

commercially available data that lead to 

incorrect screening decisions by TSA, 

those errors can be resolved in a timely 

manner. 

These are all are key issues that TSA 

will be attempting to resolve during the 

testing phase. Once TSA has 

information about the feasibility and 

efficacy of using commercial data, such 

as credit card numbers, to gauge the 

accuracy of passenger information and 

reduce false positive matches to 

information in the TSDB, the agency 

will be in a position to provide specific 

answers to the types of questions raised

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 65623

by the commenters. TSA will not have 

access to individuals’ credit histories, 

medical records, or other personal 

records. 

A number of commenters expressed 

concern over access by data aggregators 

to passenger information during the 

testing. TSA will require the data 

aggregators with whom it works to abide 

by the requirements of the Privacy Act 

as well as to execute legally enforceable 

nondisclosure agreements prohibiting 

their use of information for any purpose 

other than for the testing of the 

effectiveness of the use of commercial 

data for Secure Flight. As a security 

mechanism, TSA has installed an 

auditing system as part of the platform 

on which the Secure Flight program will 

operate. The auditing mechanism will 

immediately detect any unauthorized 

access to the passenger data. Within 

TSA, individuals who are not 

conducting the test of the Secure Flight 

program will not have access to any 

passenger information. The real-time 

auditing mechanisms in place should 

prevent unauthorized access by 

individuals who are not part of the team 

conducting the test. TSA personnel with 

access to information for the testing 

phase will undergo specialized privacy 

training and will be required to hold 

appropriate security clearances and, 

therefore, will understand the 

sensitivity of the information to which 

they have access. 

Under section 552(d) of the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. 108–

334), TSA may not test the use of 

commercial data until the agency has 

developed measures to determine the 

impact of the use of commercial data on 

aviation security and the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) has 

reported on TSA’s evaluation measures. 

TSA currently is working with GAO to 

provide the information GAO needs to 

evaluate TSA’s measures. 

Efficacy of the Program 

Commenters questioned the potential 

effectiveness of the Secure Flight 

program because, they claim, the 

information in the TSDB regarding 

individuals known or suspected of 

being engaged in terrorist activity is 

inaccurate. A number of commenters 

stated that TSA should instead focus its 

resources and effort on improved 

physical security measures such as 

improved checkpoint screening, 

increased numbers of Federal Air 

Marshals and Federal Flight Deck 

Officers, and improved screening of 

baggage and cargo. NBTA stated that 

TSA should stress test the Secure Flight 

system and develop operational 

safeguards and oversight policies for the 

program. 

TSA agrees with those commenters 

who have stated that TSA should ensure 

that the Secure Flight program is 

effective before going forward with 

implementation and should have a 

quick and effective redress process to 

address situations in which passengers 

are mistakenly subjected to enhanced 

scrutiny or believe that they have 

wrongly been included on a watchlist. 

With respect to the suggested choice 

between developing Secure Flight or 

directing TSA’s resources towards other 

security measures, TSA approaches 

security as a layered process. TSA is 

committed to taking actions that will 

improve each layer of security and 

believes that such actions are not 

mutually exclusive. 

The American Civil Liberties Union 

(ACLU) commented that the continued 

expansion of government watchlists 

creates a risk of false positive matches 

of passengers on watchlists. Therefore, 

the ACLU stated, effective management 

of the watchlists will become even more 

important. Again, TSA agrees that the 

Secure Flight program must be shown to 

be effective in achieving its stated goals 

before it is implemented. In order to 

determine whether the program can be 

effective, however, TSA must test the 

system and is doing so while respecting 

the privacy and civil liberties of 

individuals. 

A number of commenters stated that 

Secure Flight would not be effective in 

identifying terrorists who may travel by 

air but are not currently known to the 

Federal Government and therefore are 

not included in the TSDB. Commenters 

also stated that even if an individual is 

included in the TSDB, Secure Flight 

will not detect that individual if he or 

she assumes the identity of a person not 

included in the TSDB, such as through 

identity theft. 

TSA agrees that checking passenger 

names against information in the TSDB 

will not identify unknown terrorists or 

those using a stolen identity. 

Commercial data may be useful in 

identifying instances where a passenger 

may have presented inaccurate or 

incorrect information. 

As discussed previously, however, 

Secure Flight will involve the use of a 

streamlined version of the existing 

CAPPS system that aircraft operators 

currently are using to prescreen 

passengers. That system evaluates 

information in PNRs that passengers 

otherwise provide to aircraft operators 

in the normal course of business. This 

element of Secure Flight will address 

the threat posed by an individual who 

may pose a threat but is not included in 

the TSDB or has assumed the identity of 

a person not included in the TSDB. 

A number of commenters stated that 

TSA should make public the results of 

the Secure Flight test phase. TSA will 

make the results available to the extent 

consistent with national security and 

homeland security.

Compliance With the Privacy Act, PRA, 

and Other Laws 

The EPIC stated that OMB should not 

approve the information collection until 

TSA provides more detailed information 

to the public about the Secure Flight 

program. 

The Secure Flight program is at a very 

early stage of development. The purpose 

of the test phase is to determine the 

technical feasibility of a consolidated 

system by which TSA may compare 

information in PNRs to information in 

the TSDB. At this point, therefore, TSA 

has provided as much detail as it can 

about the planned workings of the 

Secure Flight program. Once the test is 

completed and the results are analyzed, 

if the test phase indicates that the 

program is technically feasible, TSA 

will then be able to engage in a public 

rulemaking process that will involve a 

more detailed proposal for the Secure 

Flight program. This subsequent 

rulemaking will provide members of the 

public further opportunity to comment 

on operational and policy issues raised 

by the program. 

One commenter questioned whether 

TSA had a basis for receiving emergency 

processing from OMB of the information 

collection contained in the proposed 

order. TSA’s request for emergency 

processing was based on the need to 

move forward with a new passenger 

prescreening system as quickly as 

possible, consistent with the 9/11 

Commission’s recently issued 

recommendation that TSA take over 

from aircraft operators the function of 

passenger prescreening using 

government watchlists. 

The commenter also articulated a 

number of aspects of the Secure Flight 

program that he argued are contrary to 

the requirements of the Privacy Act or 

other laws. First, he argued that PNRs 

constitute information regarding an 

individual’s exercise of the First 

Amendment right of assembly because 

travel is a form of assembly. 

The Privacy Act imposes certain 

limits on an agency’s authority to collect 

records describing an individual’s 

exercise of First Amendment Rights. See 

5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7). TSA does not agree 

that PNRs contain information related to 

the exercise of First Amendment rights, 

including the right of assembly.

65624 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 

Second, the commenter argued that 

TSA’s proposed order to aircraft 

operators to submit PNRs is inconsistent 

with the requirement that an agency 

collect information to the maximum 

extent practical directly from an 

individual when the information may 

result in an adverse determination about 

an individual’s rights, benefits, or 

privileges. See 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2). The 

commenter stated that TSA has failed to 

show that it would be impractical for 

TSA staff to collect information about 

passengers from them directly at the 

airport prior to boarding. 

Collecting information from 

passengers at the airport for purposes of 

the Secure Flight test would impose a 

tremendous burden on the flying public 

in the form of additional time required 

for security screening. It also would not 

allow TSA to obtain and test the 

information in a PNR format, which is 

the form in which TSA would receive 

the information during the operational 

phase of the program. 

Third, the commenter, as well as 

others, stated that the proposed order is 

inconsistent with the Privacy Act 

because passengers whose information 

will be submitted to TSA under the 

order did not receive notice in 

accordance with section 552a(e)(3) of 

the Privacy Act, which requires a 

Federal agency to ‘‘inform each 

individual whom it asks to supply 

information’’ of: (1) The authority under 

which the request is made; (2) whether 

the disclosure of the information is 

mandatory or voluntary; (3) the 

principal purpose for which the 

information is intended to be used and 

the routine uses which may be made of 

the information; and (4) the effects on 

the individual if any, of not providing 

all or part of the information. 

The notice requirement under 5 

U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) does not apply to the 

collection of the PNRs described in the 

proposed order. OMB has interpreted 

the notice requirement in section 

552a(e)(3) to be inapplicable to 

situations in which an agency collects 

information about an individual from a 

third party. 

Fourth, the commenter argues that the 

system of records notice for Secure 

Flight fails to meet the requirement in 

5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(B) that it describe 

the categories of individuals on whom 

records are maintained in the system. 

The commenter notes that PNRs may 

contain the names of travel agents or 

other individuals who make, pay for, or 

process a passenger’s travel but who are 

not passengers. The commenter also 

noted that the proposed order covered 

PNRs with itineraries that were entirely 

cancelled, thereby capturing individuals 

who had not flown. 

It is our understanding that the 

inclusion in PNRs of names other than 

those of passengers is rare. In any case, 

for purposes of testing the Secure Flight 

concept, TSA will not retrieve 

information from PNRs using the names 

of travel agents or other non-passengers 

who may be included in a PNR, because 

the purpose of Secure Flight is to screen 

passengers. The purpose of listing 

‘‘Categories of individuals covered’’ in 

the system of records notice is to 

provide notice to those individuals 

whose records are subject to the Privacy 

Act because the records are retrieved by 

their name or personal identifier. The 

purpose is not to provide notice to every 

individual whose name may be 

incidentally mentioned in a record 

retrieved by the name of another 

individual. In addition, TSA has revised 

the final order to exclude from its scope 

any PNRs with itineraries that have 

been cancelled in whole, thereby 

avoiding collection of PNRs for 

individuals who have not actually 

completed any part of the itinerary in 

the PNR. For these reasons, the 

provision in the system of records 

notice meets the requirements of the 

Privacy Act. 

Fifth, the commenter argues that TSA 

has failed to meet certain requirements 

applicable to the promulgation of 

regulations under the Airline 

Deregulation Act, the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act, and the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 

1995, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 

Other commenters noted that TSA has 

not published a cost-benefit analysis for 

the Secure Flight program. 

As discussed previously, TSA is 

obtaining historical PNRs for the test 

phase of Secure Flight through the 

issuance of an order, not through 

rulemaking. Therefore, the foregoing 

statutes, as well as other statutes and 

Executive Orders that apply to agency 

rulemaking, do not apply in this 

instance. If testing of the program 

indicates that it is a feasible and 

effective security measure, TSA will 

initiate a public rulemaking process in 

which it will again fully comply with all 

applicable statutory requirements. 

Sixth, the commenter argued that TSA 

has no authority to establish a system of 

records for Secure Flight or order 

aircraft operators to provide PNRs to 

TSA.

TSA has ample authority to conduct 

the Secure Flight test. Under the 

Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act and authority delegated to the 

Assistant Secretary of Homeland 

Security (Transportation Security 

Administration) by the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, TSA is responsible 

for, among other things, the screening of 

passengers and property transported in 

air transportation and intrastate air 

transportation. Also under its delegated 

authority, TSA has broad authority 

under 49 U.S.C. 40113(a) to issue orders 

necessary to carry out its statutory 

duties, which expressly include 

providing for security screening, under 

49 U.S.C. 44901(a). TSA also is 

authorized to undertake research and 

development activities necessary to 

enhance transportation security under 

49 U.S.C. 114(f)(8) and create a 

successor system to the existing CAPPS 

under 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2). Under these 

authorities, TSA may order aircraft 

operators to provide PNRs to TSA to test 

the Secure Flight program. 

Implementation of the Secure Flight test 

also is in furtherance of Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive–6/

HSPD–6 of September 23, 2003 

(‘‘Integration and Use of Screening 

Information to Protect Against 

Terrorism’’), which, among other things, 

directs Federal agencies to conduct 

screening at all appropriate 

opportunities using consolidated 

terrorist information and intelligence 

about individuals known or 

appropriately suspected to be or have 

been engaged in conduct constituting, in 

preparation for, in aid of, or related to 

terrorism. 

Potential Conflict With EU Laws 

United Airlines and other 

commenters expressed concern that 

complying with the proposed order 

would expose U.S. airlines to liability 

for violating privacy laws of the Member 

States of the EU. United suggested that 

the U.S. government work closely with 

foreign governments to address any 

conflicts of laws that may arise. While 

TSA has clear statutory authority to 

require the submission of reservation 

information for use in prescreening 

passengers on domestic flight segments, 

TSA understands the sensitivity of 

aircraft operators to the possibility of 

conflicting legal obligations under U.S. 

law and the laws of EU Member States. 

Therefore, in the interest of 

implementing this test expeditiously, 

TSA has determined that for purposes of 

this test phase, aircraft operators may 

opt to exclude from PNRs submitted to 

TSA any PNR that includes a flight 

segment between the United States and 

the EU. 

TSA and Department officials briefed 

European Commission (EC) 

representatives on October 25 to provide 

further details on Secure Flight testing, 

including the parameters of data to be

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 65625

submitted for the test. TSA informed the 

EC that carriers may elect not to submit 

to TSA for use in testing any PNRs with 

a flight segment between the EU and the 

United States. The Department and EC 

representatives will continue regular 

discussions to keep the EU fully 

apprised of TSA’s progress regarding 

Secure Flight, and to receive EU 

feedback on Secure Flight issues. TSA, 

in conjunction with DHS, will continue 

to consult with the EU prior to and 

during Secure Flight implementation. 

Other Issues 

United Airlines stated in its comment 

the concern that the Secure Flight 

program might result in unnecessary 

costs to airlines if they are required to 

establish new systems to transmit 

passenger information to TSA, rather 

than relying on existing systems, such 

as those that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection has in place for receiving 

advance passenger information for 

international flights. In planning and 

developing the operational stage of the 

Secure Flight program, TSA will work 

to use existing communications links 

between the airlines and the Federal 

Government in order to avoid imposing 

duplicative requirements on the airlines 

to the greatest extent possible. 

Final Order 

The final order is largely unchanged 

from the proposed order, with the 

exception of the following provisions. 

First, in order to simplify and clarify 

compliance with the order, TSA 

changed the scope of PNRs that aircraft 

operators are required to provide and 

the description of the category of aircraft 

operators covered by the order. The 

proposed order would have required the 

submission of any PNRs with a flight 

segment completed during June 2004, so 

long as all the flight segments in the 

PNR had been completed by the end of 

June 2004. Thus, the proposed order 

covered PNRs with flight segments 

completed many months before June 

2004. The final order applies only to 

those PNRs with all flight segments 

(flights between two locations) 

completed in June 2004. 

The proposed order applied to PNRs 

for any passenger on ‘‘a scheduled flight 

within the United States, in operations 

subject to a full security program under 

49 CFR 1544.101(a).’’ This language was 

intended to cover any scheduled 

passenger or public charter operation 

conducted under a full security 

program. Because the proposed order 

did not specifically mention public 

charter operations and used the term 

‘‘scheduled flight,’’ there was some 

confusion as to whether TSA intended 

to cover any public charter operations. 

The final order clarifies this point by 

stating the following: ‘‘This order 

applies to aircraft operators that conduct 

scheduled passenger or public charter 

operations subject to a full security 

program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a).’’

The proposed order directed aircraft 

operators to exclude from the PNRs 

submitted to TSA any flight segment to 

or from the United States. TSA now 

understands, however, that deleting 

information related to flight segments 

from PNRs is difficult and could inhibit 

aircraft operators from complying with 

the order in a timely manner. After 

reviewing this issue and considering the 

issues discussed above related to 

possible conflicts of law with EU 

Member States, TSA revised the order to 

allow aircraft operators to exclude 

entirely from its submission PNRs that 

include flight segments between the 

United States and the EU.

TSA has modified the proposed order 

in response to questions about how the 

order applied to aircraft operators that 

use passenger manifests rather than 

PNRs. The final order provides that if an 

aircraft operator does not use PNRs, the 

order applies to the reservation data in 

whatever form the aircraft operators 

receive or maintain for operation of a 

flight, such as a passenger manifest. The 

final order also clarifies that with 

respect to codesharing operations, if an 

aircraft operator does not maintain 

PNRs or other passenger reservation 

information for the flights that it 

operates, the aircraft operator may 

comply with the order by stipulating in 

writing to TSA that the entity 

maintaining such PNRs or other 

passenger reservation information has 

agreed to provide the information to 

TSA on behalf of the aircraft operator. 

For example, a regional aircraft operator 

that relies on other aircraft operators to 

maintain PNRs for the regional 

operator’s flights must stipulate that the 

other aircraft operators will submit 

PNRs to TSA on the regional aircraft 

operator’s behalf. 

TSA also received questions about 

how to address situations where PNR 

history, which was excluded from the 

scope of the proposed order, includes 

completed flight segments, which were 

included in the scope of the proposed 

order. The final order clarifies that if the 

PNR history includes information on 

flight segments already flown, they must 

be included in the PNR submitted to 

TSA. In such cases, the aircraft operator 

may move information on flights flown 

out of the PNR history or include the 

entire PNR history in the information 

submitted to TSA, and TSA will extract 

the flown flight segments. The final 

order also clarifies that PNRs must 

include all data that would have been 

available to the aircraft operator prior to 

the completion of the itinerary (active 

fields), including any ‘‘remarks’’

sections, the reservation creation date, 

and CAPPS scores and codes. 

Finally, the final order provides 

additional information about how the 

PNRs are to be submitted, including a 

requirement that they be password 

protected. 

Based on the foregoing, TSA will 

issue the following final order to aircraft 

operators. The text of the final order is 

set forth below.

Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on November 

10, 2004. 

Lisa S. Dean, 

Privacy Officer.

OMB Control Number 1652–0025 

Expiration Date: March 31, 2005 

Transportation Security Administration 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as 

Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 

(Transportation Security Administration) 

(TSA) by delegation from the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, 49 U.S.C. 40113(a), and 

other authorities described below, I hereby 

direct each aircraft operator listed in 

Attachment A to this order to provide 

passenger name records (PNRs) to TSA in 

accordance with the terms of this order. 

Background and Authority 

1. The Secretary of Homeland Security has 

delegated to the Assistant Secretary of 

Homeland Security (TSA), subject to the 

Secretary’s guidance and control, the 

authority vested in the Secretary by section 

403(2) of the Homeland Security Act 

respecting TSA, including that related to 

civil aviation security under the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act. 

2. Under 49 U.S.C. 114(e)(1) and 44901(a), 

TSA is responsible for, among other things, 

providing for the screening of passengers 

traveling in air transportation and intrastate 

air transportation. 

3. One component of passenger screening 

is the Computer-Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening System (CAPPS), an automated 

screening system developed by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) in 

cooperation with U.S. aircraft operators. U.S. 

aircraft operators implemented CAPPS in 

1997. 

4. CAPPS evaluates information in PNRs 

that passengers otherwise provide to aircraft 

operators in the normal course of business to 

determine whether a passenger will be 

selected for a higher level of security 

screening prior to boarding. A PNR is a 

record that contains detailed information 

about an individual’s travel on a particular 

flight, including information provided by the 

individual when making the flight 

reservation. While the Federal Government 

established the CAPPS selection criteria, 

CAPPS is operated entirely by U.S. aircraft 

operators.

65626 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 

5. Passenger prescreening also involves the 

comparison of identifying information of 

airline passengers against lists of individuals 

known to pose or suspected of posing a threat 

to civil aviation or national security. Aircraft 

operators currently carry out this function, 

using lists provided by TSA. Because the lists 

are provided in an unclassified form, the 

amount of information they include is 

limited. For this reason, TSA will take over 

from aircraft operators the function of 

screening passengers against such lists and 

use a larger set of data maintained by the 

Federal Government for this purpose. This is 

consistent with the recommendation by the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 

related to the use of expanded ‘‘No-Fly’’ and 

‘‘Automatic Selectee’’ lists, and the 9/11 

Commission recommendation that aircraft 

operators be required to supply the 

information needed to test and implement 

such a system. 

6. In accordance with the authority in 49 

U.S.C. 44903(j)(2), TSA is in the process of 

developing a successor system to CAPPS that 

will be operated entirely by TSA and will 

incorporate the screening of passengers 

against data maintained by the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC) about individuals 

known or reasonably suspected to be or have 

been engaged in conduct constituting, in 

preparation for, in aid of, or related to 

terrorism. 

7. In order to test such a system, TSA must 

have access to information contained in the 

PNRs for domestic passenger flights. TSA 

also must have access to passenger 

information from aircraft operators that 

maintain the information in forms other than 

PNRs, such as passenger manifests. 

8. TSA has broad authority under 49 U.S.C. 

40113(a) to issue orders necessary to carry 

out its functions, including its responsibility 

to provide for the security screening of 

passengers under 49 U.S.C. 44901(a). TSA 

also has authority to identify and undertake 

research and development activities 

necessary to enhance transportation security 

under 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(8). 

Findings 

9. The security prescreening of passengers, 

as mandated by Congress, is vital to aviation 

security and national security. 

10. After a lengthy review of the initial 

plans for a successor system to CAPPS, and 

consistent with the recommendation of the 9/

11 Commission, the Department of Homeland 

Security is moving forward with a next 

generation system of domestic passenger 

prescreening that meets the following goals: 

(1) Identifying, in advance of flight, 

passengers known or suspected to be engaged 

in terrorist activity; (2) moving of passengers 

through airport screening more quickly and 

reducing the number of individuals 

unnecessarily selected for secondary 

screening; and (3) fully protecting 

passengers’ privacy and civil liberties. 

11. In the revised program, known as 

Secure Flight, TSA will compare information 

in airline PNRs or other passenger manifest 

formats for domestic flights to information in 

the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) 

maintained by TSC, including expanded TSA 

No-Fly and Selectee lists, in order to identify 

individuals known or reasonably suspected 

to be or having been engaged in conduct 

constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or 

related to terrorism. The Secure Flight 

program also will test operation of a 

streamlined version of the existing CAPPS 

evaluation criteria. TSA will use the PNRs 

obtained under this order to test these 

aspects of the program.

12. TSA also will test whether comparing 

passenger information to other commercially 

available data can enhance TSA’s ability to 

identify passenger information that is 

inaccurate or incorrect. 

13. In order to develop and test such a 

system, TSA must obtain passenger 

information in PNRs, or other passenger 

manifest formats where PNRs are not used, 

from aircraft operators. 

14. On September 24, 2004, TSA published 

in the Federal Register a proposed order 

requiring aircraft operators to provide PNRs 

for testing the Secure Flight program. After 

considering the public comments received 

and making modifications to the proposed 

order, where appropriate, TSA is issuing this 

final order to aircraft operators for purposes 

of obtaining PNRs to test the Secure Flight 

program. 

Action Ordered 

15. Scope:

a. Aircraft Operators:

This order applies to aircraft operators that 

conduct scheduled passenger or public 

charter operations subject to a full security 

program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a). 

b. Information:

This order applies to PNRs containing 

itineraries for domestic flights operated 

under a full security program and for which 

all flight segments in the itinerary were flown 

between June 1, 2004 and June 30, 2004, 

(after 2400 hours 31 May 2004 and before 

0001 hours 1 July 2004). This includes PNRs 

for non-revenue and space available 

passengers. 

For purposes of this order, ‘‘PNR’’ means 

the electronic record maintained by the 

aircraft operator detailing information about 

an individual’s travel on a particular flight 

and any other information contained in that 

record. 

For purposes of this order, ‘‘domestic 

flight’’ means a flight between two locations 

in the United States (to include the U.S. 

Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, Saipan, 

and American Samoa). 

This order does not apply to PNRs 

reflecting itineraries that were cancelled in 

whole. 

An aircraft operator may elect to exclude 

from the scope of the order any PNRs which 

include any flight segments between the EU 

and the United States. 

If an aircraft operator does not use PNRs, 

the order applies to the reservation data in 

whatever form aircraft operators receive or 

maintain for operation of a flight, such as a 

passenger manifest. 

c. Information in PNRs:

PNRs must include all data that would 

have been available to the aircraft operator in 

a displayed PNR prior to the completion of 

the itinerary (active fields), including any 

‘‘remarks’’ sections, the reservation creation 

date, and CAPPS scores and codes. 

PNRs may not include information related 

to changes in a PNR prior to completion of 

the flight itinerary (PNR history). If, however, 

the PNR history includes information on 

flight segments already flown, they must be 

included in the PNR. In such cases, the 

aircraft operator may move information on 

flights flown out of the PNR history or 

include the entire PNR history in the 

information submitted to TSA, and TSA will 

extract the flown flights segments (itinerary). 

PNRs may be submitted in archive format. 

16. Submission of PNRs:

The aircraft operator must submit to TSA 

all PNRs described in paragraph 15 so that 

the data is received by TSA no later than 5 

p.m. EST on November 23, 2004. 

Mail all information through overnight 

carrier to: Lisa Dean, Privacy Officer, 

Transportation Security Administration, 601 

S. 12th Street, TSA–9, Room E7–305N, 

Arlington, VA 22202, Phone: (571) 227–3947. 

17. Codesharing Operations:

If an aircraft operator does not maintain 

PNRs or other passenger reservation 

information for the flights that it operates, the 

aircraft operator may comply with this order 

by stipulating in writing to TSA that the 

entity maintaining such PNRs or other 

passenger reservation information has agreed 

to provide the information to TSA on behalf 

of the aircraft operator. For example, a 

regional aircraft operator that relies on other 

aircraft operators to maintain PNRs for the 

regional operator’s flights must stipulate the 

other aircraft operators will submit PNRs to 

TSA on the regional aircraft operator’s behalf. 

Letters of stipulation, described above, 

must be signed and on company letterhead. 

They may be delivered in one of the 

following three ways: 

U.S. Mail: TSA/ONRA, Attention: Airline 

Team, P.O. Box 597, Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

FAX: (240) 568–3528. 

E-mail (scanned copies): 

SecureFlight@DHS.gov.

18. The aircraft operator must provide to 

TSA information about the aircraft operator’s 

PNR data schema and layout, such as a PNR 

format book and a data dictionary that 

includes all acronyms and codes not 

standard to the International Air Transport 

Association. 

19. For purposes of the test, the aircraft 

operator must provide the PNRs to TSA on 

optical media in an unpacked or 

uncompressed form, in a structured data 

format or XML, if available. Information must 

be password-protected. The aircraft operator 

must supply TSA with the password via email at SecureFlight@DHS.gov.

Attachment A—Aircraft Operators 

1. Air Midwest Inc. 

2. Air Wisconsin Airline Corp 

3. AirTran Airways Inc. 

4. Alaska Airlines Inc. 

5. Allegiant Air 

6. Aloha Airlines Inc. 

7. America West Airlines Inc. 

8. American Airlines Inc. 

9. American Eagle 

10. American Trans Air Inc.

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2004 / Notices 65627

11. Atlantic Southeast Airlines (ASA) 

12. Big Sky Airlines 

13. Boston and Maine Airways 

14. Cape Air (Hyannis Air Service) 

15. Caribbean Air 

16. Casino Airlines 

17. Casino Express TEM Enterprises 

18. Champion Air (Grand Holdings) 

19. Chautauqua Airlines 

20. Chicago Express Airlines 

21. Colgan Air 

22. Comair, Inc. 

23. Commutair (Champlain Ent.) 

24. Continental Airlines Inc. 

25. Continental Micronesia Inc. 

26. Corporate Airlines 

27. Delta Air Lines Inc. 

28. Executive Airlines/American Eagle 

29. Expressjet Airlines (Cont. Express) 

30. Falcon Air Express 

31. Freedom Air 

32. Freedom Airlines 

33. Frontier Airlines 

34. Great Lakes Aviation Ltd. 

35. Gulfstream International Airlines 

36. Hawaii Island Air (Island Air) 

37. Hawaiian Airlines 

38. Horizon Air 

39. Independence Air (Atlantic Coast Airline) 

40. Jetblue Airways Corp. 

41. Kenmore (start-up) 

42. Mesa Airlines 

43. Mesaba Aviation Inc. 

44. Miami Air International 

45. Midwest Airlines Inc. 

46. North American Airlines 

47. Northwest Airlines Inc. 

48. Omni 

49. Pace/Hooters 

50. Pacific Island Aviation Inc. 

51. Pacific Wings 

52. Pan American Airways Corp. 

53. Piedmont Airlines 

54. Pinnacle Airlines (d/b/a Northwest 

Airlink) 

55. Planet Air 

56. Primaris Airlines, Inc. (Primaris) 

57. PSA Airlines 

58. Ryan International Airlines 

59. Shuttle America 

60. Sky King 

61. Sky West Airlines 

62. Skyway Airlines/Midwest Connect 

63. Southeast Airlines 

64. Southwest Airlines (U.S.A.) 

65. Spirit Airlines 

66. Sun Country Airlines Inc. 

67. Trans States Airlines 

68. Transmeridian Airlines 

69. United Airlines Inc. 

70. US Airways Inc. 

71. USA3000 

72. World Airways

[FR Doc. 04–25396 Filed 11–12–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 

URBAN DEVELOPMENT 

[Docket No. FR–4665–N–20] 

Meeting of the Manufactured Housing 

Consensus Committee

AGENCY: Office of the Assistant 

Secretary for Housing—Federal Housing 

Commissioner, HUD.

ACTION: Notice of upcoming meeting.

SUMMARY: This advises the public of an 

upcoming meeting of the Manufactured 

Housing Consensus Committee (the 

Committee) and publishes the schedule 

and proposed agenda for the meeting. 

The meeting is open to the public and 

the site is accessible to individuals with 

disabilities.

DATES: The Committee will meet on 

November 30, 2004 and December 1, 

2004, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and on 

December 2, 2004, from 8 a.m. to 12 

p.m.

ADDRESSES: The Committee will meet at 

the Marriott San Diego Hotel & Marina, 

333 West Harbor Drive, San Diego, 

California 92101, telephone (619) 234–

1500.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

William W. Matchneer III, 

Administrator, Manufactured Housing 

Program, Office of Consumer and 

Regulatory Affairs, Department of 

Housing and Urban Development, 451 

7th Street SW., Washington, DC 20410–

8000, telephone (202) 708–6409 (this is 

not a toll-free number). Persons with 

hearing- or speech-impairments may 

access this number through TTY by 

calling the toll-free Federal Information 

Relay Service at (800) 877–8339.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice of 

this meeting is provided in accordance 

with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 

App.2) and 41 CFR 102–3.150. The 

Manufactured Housing Consensus 

Committee was established under 

section 604(a)(3) of the National 

Manufactured Housing Construction 

and Safety Standards Act of 1974, as 

amended by the Manufacturer Housing 

Improvement Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 

4503(a)(3). The Consensus Committee is 

charged with providing 

recommendations to the Secretary to 

adopt, revise, and interpret 

manufactured housing construction and 

safety standards and procedural and 

enforcement regulations, and with 

developing proposed model installation 

standards. 

Tentative Agenda 

A. Welcome and Introductions 

B. Departmental Status Report 

C. Subpart I 

D. Construction and Safety Standards 

E. Installation Standards 

F. Accessibility—Universal Design—

Visitability 

G. Public Testimony 

H. Reports and Actions on Committee 

Work 

I. Adjourn

Dated: November 9, 2004. 

John C. Weicher, 

Assistant Secretary for Housing—Federal 

Housing Commissioner.

[FR Doc. 04–25389 Filed 11–10–04; 11:36 

am] 

BILLING CODE 4210–27–P

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION

Sunshine Act Meeting 

Agenda for Board of Directors’ Meeting, 

November 30, 2004; 9:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m. 

The meeting will be open except for 

the portion specified as a closed session 

as provided in 22 CFR 1004.4(f).

9:30 a.m. 

Call to Order—Approval of the 

Minutes of the October 1, 2004 

meeting 

Executive Session (Closed session to 

discuss personnel issues, as 

provided in 22 CFR Part 1004.4(f)). 

10:30 a.m. 

President’s Report 

The IAF Strategic Plan 

The IAF Corporate Outreach program 

12 p.m. 

Lunch 

12:30 p.m. 

Discussion on the Role of the 

Advisory Council 

Relations with OMB and Congress 

Other Business 

1:30 p.m. 

Adjournment

Carolyn Karr, 

Senior Vice President and General Counsel.

[FR Doc. 04–25372 Filed 11–10–04; 10:47 

am] 

BILLING CODE 7025–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Fish and Wildlife Service 

Information Collection Renewal to be 

Submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) for Approval Under 

the Paperwork Reduction Act; OMB 

Control Number 1018–0103, 

Conservation Order for Control of MidContinent Light Geese, 50 CFR 21.60

AGENCY: Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Interior.