UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

PIDY T. TIGER, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

SAM CLINE, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 23-3072 

(D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03088-JWL) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Pidy T. Tiger is a pro se Kansas inmate who seeks a certificate of appealability 

(COA) to challenge the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition). We deny a 

COA and dismiss this matter. 

I 

A Kansas jury convicted Mr. Tiger of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a 

child. His convictions were upheld on direct appeal, and his state post-conviction 

proceedings were unsuccessful. He then sought federal habeas relief on five claims, four 

*

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 23, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and one based on McGirt v. Oklahoma, 

140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). The district court denied the first claim on procedural grounds 

and the rest on the merits. The district court also denied a COA and two post-judgment 

motions for reconsideration. Mr. Tiger now seeks a COA from this court. 

II 

 To obtain a COA, Mr. Tiger “must make a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For those claims the 

district court denied on the merits, he must show “that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. But for 

the claim the district court denied on procedural grounds, he must go further and show 

both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. (emphasis 

added). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to 

invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the 

district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petition should be allowed to 

proceed further.” Id. If there is a procedural bar, the court should usually deny a COA 

on that basis, without reaching the constitutional issue. Id.

A. Claim One: Procedural Default 

We begin by considering whether reasonable jurists could debate that Mr. Tiger’s 

first claim was procedurally defaulted. Procedural default is a “corollary to the 

exhaustion requirement,” which mandates that “a state prisoner . . . exhaust available 

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state remedies before presenting his claim to a federal habeas court.” Davila v. Davis, 

582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A)). If a state prisoner failed to exhaust his state remedies and would now 

be barred by state law from doing so, “there is a procedural default for purposes of 

federal habeas regardless of the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner 

actually presented his claims.” Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “We have referred to this as an anticipatory 

procedural bar.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To overcome an anticipatory 

procedural bar, a prisoner must show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice, which requires a credible showing of actual innocence. Id.

Mr. Tiger claims his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by pursuing 

an issue on direct appeal that could not have resulted in relief—viz., he faults his 

appellate attorney for arguing that his trial attorney violated his speedy-trial rights by 

taking continuances outside his presence when state law would not have attributed such 

delays to the prosecution. But he did not raise this claim in the state courts. Rather, he 

pursued a distinct claim on direct appeal against his trial counsel, arguing she rendered 

ineffective assistance and “denied him a speedy trial by taking numerous continuances 

without his permission.” State v. Tiger, 2015 WL 1513955, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. 

Mar. 27, 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The latter claim did not 

exhaust the former because state claims of ineffective assistance “based . . . on different 

reasons than those expressed in [the federal] habeas petition” do not satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement. Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999). 

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Further, Mr. Tiger now faces an anticipatory procedural bar because his federal claim 

would be rejected in state court as successive and untimely. See Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 60-1507(c) (prohibiting successive postconviction motions); id. § 60-1507(f) (requiring 

that postconviction motions be filed within one year of termination of appellate 

jurisdiction on direct appeal, denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, or denial of 

postconviction relief and any appeal). Mr. Tiger makes no attempt to show cause and 

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and thus no reasonable jurist could 

debate the propriety of the district court’s decision. 

B. Resolution of Remaining Claims on the Merits 

Turning to Mr. Tiger’s remaining claims, all of which the district court denied on 

the merits, our assessment of whether a COA is warranted “requires an overview of the 

claims . . . and a general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336 (2003). We also account for the deferential treatment afforded state court decisions 

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Dockins v. Hines, 

374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief is prohibited on 

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision “was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “We look to the District Court’s application of 

AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was 

debatable amongst jurists of reason.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. 

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1. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Direct Appeal Counsel for Failing to 

Challenge a Voluntary Intoxication Instruction

Mr. Tiger contends his direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

Under Strickland v. Washington, he must show his counsel’s performance was both 

deficient and prejudicial. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). Although our review of 

counsel’s performance is always “highly deferential,” “[t]he challenge is even greater for 

a petitioner under § 2254, as our review in such circumstances is doubly deferential.” 

Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[W]e defer to the state court’s determination that counsel’s performance was 

not deficient and, further, defer to the attorney’s decision in how to best represent a 

client.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a petitioner challenges 

appellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue, the “petitioner must show both that 

(1) appellate counsel performed deficiently in failing to raise the particular issue on 

appeal and (2) but for appellate counsel’s deficient performance, there exists a reasonable 

probability the petitioner would have prevailed on appeal.” Davis v. Sharp, 943 F.3d 

1290, 1299 (10th Cir. 2019). We examine the merits of the omitted issue, and, if 

“meritless, its omission will not constitute deficient performance.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Mr. Tiger’s ineffective-assistance claim turns on a factual issue. “[W]e presume 

that the factual findings of the state court are correct unless the petitioner presents clear 

and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Frederick v. Quick, 79 F.4th 1090, 1099 

(10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The presumption of correctness 

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also applies to factual findings made by a state court of review based on the trial record.” 

Id. at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Tiger contends his direct appeal counsel should have challenged a voluntary 

intoxication instruction that he says interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to present 

his own defense. He requested the instruction but asked the trial court to delete the first 

sentence, which stated, “Pidy Tiger raises voluntary intoxication as a defense.” Tiger, 

2015 WL 1513955, at *14 (internal quotation marks omitted).1

 He explained to the trial 

court that although he wanted the instruction, “he oppose[d] . . . telling the jury that he’s 

raising voluntary intoxication . . . as a defense because he is not saying he did the actual 

crime.” R., vol. II at 1157. He emphasized to the trial court that he did not “want the 

jury to have . . . any impression that he’s agreeing that he committed the crime[s].” Id. 

The trial court refused to delete the first sentence of the instruction and asked Mr. Tiger, 

“with that position now from the Court, . . . does the defense still want to raise voluntary 

intoxication and instruct as such?” Id. at 1159. Mr. Tiger’s trial attorney replied, 

“Preserving our objection to how [the instruction] is worded, yes, we still want to be able 

to discuss the effects of alcohol and specific intent.” Id. His trial attorney later argued to 

the jury: 

What role does alcohol have to play in this. I want to talk about that for a 

minute. In no way is Mr. Tiger saying that he did these matters but he gets 

an out because he was drunk. But what the law tells you is that there is 

alcohol, you have the evidence of alcohol, consumption to excess. It’s 

1

 The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Tiger abandoned this issue by 

failing to brief it on appeal, though the court considered and rejected it in any event. See 

id. at *14-15. 

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there. So you as a juror get to decide how do we put this into this intent 

that he had to have to commit these crimes. 

 

Id. at 1201. 

Based on these proceedings, Mr. Tiger’s direct appeal counsel argued that “[w]hen 

the [trial] court gave the instruction without the requested modification against 

Mr. Tiger’s wishes, the [trial court] presented a guilt based defense on Mr. Tiger’s behalf. 

This was error.” R., vol. III at 61-62. The Kansas Court of Appeals (KCA) rejected that 

argument and concluded that Mr. “Tiger was raising the [voluntary-intoxication] 

defense,” and that “he requested the trial court to provide the instruction.” Tiger, 

2015 WL 1513955, at *14, 15. 

During state postconviction proceedings, Mr. Tiger raised his present claim, 

arguing appellate counsel should have contended the trial court sua sponte instructed the 

jury on voluntary intoxication, which violated his constitutional right to present his own 

defense because he did not concede that he committed the alleged acts. The state 

postconviction court rejected this claim, explaining: 

[Mr. Tiger] requested the voluntary intoxication instruction to undermine 

specific intent, but wanted to alter the [instruction’s] language. Instead of 

altering the [instruction’s] language, this court instructed the jury pursuant 

to [the instruction] and allowed Trial Counsel . . . to argue the matter to the 

jury. This court did not issue a sua sponte instruction on voluntary 

intoxication and did not interfere with [Mr. Tiger’s] right to make his 

defense. 

In the direct appeal, the [KCA] made an extensive ruling regarding this 

court’s decision to give the voluntary intoxication defense. The [KCA] 

ruled [that Mr. Tiger] requested the instruction and had the opportunity to 

explain and argue the impact of the instruction as it pertained to a voluntary 

intoxication defense. 

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[Mr. Tiger] fails to sufficiently prove that either prong of the test for 

ineffective assistance of counsel has been met. Appellate Counsel . . . was 

not unreasonable for failing to raise the issue and there has been no 

showing of prejudice. 

R., vol. IV at 112-13 (citation omitted). 

The KCA summarily affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, and on federal 

habeas review, the district court denied the claim, ruling that the KCA reasonably 

determined that Mr. Tiger requested the voluntary intoxication instruction. The KCA’s 

finding is presumptively correct, and Mr. Tiger offers nothing to suggest otherwise. It 

follows, then, that appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to raise an argument that 

had no factual basis—viz., that the trial court sua sponte instructed the jury on voluntary 

intoxication. The district court’s decision is not reasonably debatable. 

2. Claim Three: Ineffective Assistance of Substitute Counsel for Failing to Call 

Child Witnesses 

Mr. Tiger next claims substitute counsel, who represented him on a motion 

for a new trial, was ineffective in failing to call two witnesses at an evidentiary 

hearing to establish trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to call the 

witnesses. The witnesses were two children, HJ and NJ, who were in the bedroom 

when the crimes were committed. Mr. Tiger asserted the children would have 

testified that they did not see or hear anything inappropriate. The state 

postconviction court rejected this claim, ruling the children’s proffered testimony 

did not outweigh the trial evidence, so Mr. Tiger failed to establish either deficient 

performance or prejudice. The KCA affirmed, and the federal district court 

determined the KCA’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

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Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s decision. As the 

state postconviction court recognized, even accepting the children’s proffered 

testimony, it would have been outweighed by the trial evidence, including: (1) the 

victim’s conflicting testimony; (2) testimony from Crystal Johnson, who 

discovered Mr. Tiger in the room with the victim while the children were asleep; 

(3) physical evidence of the victim’s injury; and (4) DNA evidence. The state 

postconviction court also recognized the proffered testimony would have been 

inconsistent with Mr. Tiger’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that both 

children awoke when Crystal entered the room, after the assault would have 

occurred. Mr. Tiger asserts the children’s testimony would have created 

reasonable doubt of his guilt, but with nothing to substantiate his assertion, he 

cannot establish either deficient performance or prejudice. 

3. Claim Four: Ineffective Assistance of Substitute Counsel for Failing to Argue 

Trial Counsel’s Ineffectiveness 

Mr. Tiger also contends substitute counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to call an expert on proper interviewing techniques for 

child witnesses. The state postconviction court concluded that Mr. Tiger did not establish 

either deficient performance or prejudice because trial counsel was not per se ineffective 

in failing to call an expert, and Mr. Tiger was not convicted based primarily on the 

victim’s testimony, but also based on physical evidence, DNA evidence, and statements 

from Crystal Johnson. The state postconviction court observed that the victim’s 

description of the assault evolved during her trial testimony, but the court pointed out that 

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trial counsel highlighted the victim’s evolving testimony and argued at summation that it 

could have been caused by improper interviewing techniques. The KCA affirmed, and 

the federal district court concluded the KCA’s decision was not an unreasonable 

application of Strickland. 

Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion. Although 

Mr. Tiger contends an expert might have explained how improper interviewing 

techniques could solicit inculpatory statements from a child witness, he wholly ignores 

the other evidence underlying his convictions, including physical and DNA evidence and 

statements from Crystal Johnson. Given this evidence, Mr. Tiger cannot show deficient 

performance or prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to call an expert on child 

interviewing techniques. It follows then that he also cannot show substitute counsel was 

ineffective in failing to raise trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. 

4. Claim Five: McGirt 

Last, Mr. Tiger claims that under McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction because he is an Indian and his crimes were committed in 

Indian country. In McGirt, the Supreme Court held that tribal lands in Oklahoma 

comprising “the Creek Reservation had never been disestablished [by Congress] and that 

the land it encompassed remained Indian country for purposes of the Major Crimes Act.” 

Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233, 1239 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2672 (2023). 

Consequently, absent congressional passage of a law conferring jurisdiction on 

Oklahoma, McGirt held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for major 

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crimes committed in Indian country. 140 S. Ct. at 2478. Relying on McGirt, Mr. Tiger 

claims Kansas courts similarly lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him. 

The KCA rejected this claim, ruling that Congress expressly conferred criminal 

jurisdiction on Kansas. State v. Tiger, 2022 WL 4115573, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 

2022) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3243). The KCA also observed there was no indication the 

crimes here were committed in Indian country. See id. The federal district court denied 

relief because Mr. Tiger failed to identify any clearly established federal law extending 

McGirt to Kansas. See Andrew v. White, 62 F.4th 1299, 1310-11 (10th Cir. 2023) (“If—

and only if—the principle of federal law was clearly established, do we then . . . consider 

whether the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that 

clearly established federal law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Tiger still fails 

to cite any clearly established Federal law extending McGirt to Kansas, and as a result, 

reasonable jurists could not debate the propriety of the district court’s decision. 

III 

 Accordingly, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter. 

Entered for the Court 

Jerome A. Holmes 

Chief Judge 

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