United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1998 WEAPONS

ACQUISITIONS

Guided Weapon Plans

Need to Be Reassessed

GAO/NSIAD-99-32

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278306 

December 9, 1998

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military

 Research and Development

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

As you requested, this report addresses the affordability and cost-effectiveness of guided

weapons currently in development and production. We have concluded that the acquisition

plans for guided weapons are based on optimistic funding projections, guided weapon

requirements appear to be inflated, there is a proliferation of guided weapon capabilities and

acquisition programs, and oversight of guided weapon requirements and acquisition programs

needs improvement. The report makes a number of recommendations to the Secretary of

Defense, including one to reevaluate the planned deep attack weapon acquisition programs in

light of existing capabilities and the current budgetary and security environment.

We are sending copies of this report to the other defense committees and subcommittees; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine

Corps; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will

also make copies available to others upon request.

Please call me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose Over the next 10 years—from fiscal year 1998 to 2007—the Department of

Defense (DOD) plans to invest about $16.6 billion (then-year dollars) to

procure guided weapons that can be used for deep attack missions.1

Concerned about the affordability and cost-effectiveness of guided

weapons currently under development and in production, the Chairmen of

the National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations,

and of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, House

Committee on National Security, requested that GAO examine major guided

weapon programs. Specifically, the Chairmen requested that GAO

determine whether (1) the services’ plans for developing and/or procuring

guided weapons can be carried out as proposed within relatively fixed

defense budgets, (2) the number of guided weapons the services plan to

buy is consistent with projected threats and modernization needs, (3) the

current and planned guided weapon programs duplicate or overlap each

other, and (4) DOD is providing effective oversight in the development and

procurement of deep attack weapons.

Background Guided weapons can be delivered more accurately to a target than

unguided weapons because they have the capability for in-flight guidance

correction. The choice of a specific guided weapon depends on the type of

target, the target’s distance from the launching platform, and the target’s

location.

Following the Persian Gulf War, DOD identified a number of improvements

to its weapons that could increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces. These

improvements were needed to ensure target destruction and yet minimize

the number of missions and weapons used, unwanted collateral damage,

and exposure of friendly aircraft to enemy defenses. Thus, in the 1990s,

the services initiated several programs to upgrade existing weapons and

produce new guided weapons. The acquisition programs now underway

are expected to cost about $16.6 billion (then-year dollars) from fiscal

year 1998 to 2007. These programs would almost double the existing

inventory of guided weapons through the acquisition of 158,800 new

guided weapons. For about 127,000 of the new guided weapons to be

acquired, a guidance kit will be added to an existing unguided weapon.

In 1997, DOD released the results of a congressionally directed study on the

size and mix of its deep attack weapons and subsequently issued its

1

Deep attack missions are operations carried out beyond the areas where friendly ground forces

operate.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

Quadrennial Defense Review, which based its recommendations on the

study’s results.

Results in Brief DOD’s planned increase in procurement spending for guided weapons is

based on overly optimistic funding projections. To acquire all the guided

weapons now planned over the next 10 years, DOD plans to spend more

than twice as much as it has on average between fiscal year 1993 and 1997.

Without an increase in overall defense spending, increased resources may

not be available as expected.2

 In addition, for the past several years DOD

has been unable to increase its procurement budgets as planned, and other

programs, such as tactical aircraft, could more than absorb any available

increases.3

 Further, with rapid advances in weapons technology, more

capable weapons are expected to be available in the coming years and will

probably compete for the same resources. In the past, such resource

conflicts were resolved by stretching out planned production, thus

increasing unit costs and delaying deliveries.

While DOD has enough deep attack weapons (guided and unguided) in its

inventory today to meet current national objectives, the services plan to

add 158,800 additional guided weapons to the current inventory. Each of

the new weapons has been justified by the services on a case-by-case basis

and is projected to provide significant advantages in accuracy, lethality,

delivery vehicle safety, and/or control of unintended damage. However, it

is difficult to understand DOD’s rationale for doubling its inventory of

guided weapons in today’s budgetary and security environment. Further,

in calculating the number of weapons needed, the services use

assumptions that overstate the potential threat and target base. As a result,

the quantity requirements for guided weapons appear to be inflated,

particularly in today’s budgetary and security environment.

Most of the weapon types being developed or improved are unique to each

service. Further, when reviewing the services’ currently planned programs

in the aggregate, GAO found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of

guided weapon types and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being

procured for each target class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff4

and more accurate weapons when other options may be as effective and

2

Future Years Defense Program: DOD’s 1998 Plan Has Substantial Risks in Execution

(GAO/NSIAD-98-26, Oct. 23, 1997).

3

Aircraft Acquisition: Affordability of DOD’s Investment Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-88, Sept. 8, 1997).

4

Standoff range is the distance between the weapon launcher and the target.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

less costly. In contrast, DOD’s Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and

Quadrennial Defense Review suggested only minor changes in guided

weapon programs and did not address possible instances of duplication

and overlap. GAO believes that DOD does not yet have a sound basis to

ensure that it has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon

programs. While the Deep Attack Study was certainly a step in the right

direction, independent reviewers of the study both within and outside the

services have criticized its methodology and cite its reliance on computer

models that have significant shortcomings.

DOD’s oversight of the services’ guided weapons programs has not

prevented, among other things, inflated requirements or program overlap

and duplication. Lacking an analysis of overall deep attack capabilities,

including the incremental contribution of each new weapon, acquisition

programs have proliferated and quantities have been overstated. The

central oversight bodies and mechanisms already in place do not address

requirements and capabilities on an aggregate basis and have had a very

limited effect on guided weapon programs. No office is responsible for

reviewing the services’ aggregate needs and capabilities of guided

weapons programs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff currently examine programs on a case-by-case basis but

mostly defer to the services’ requirements processes. Therefore, each of

the services has justified unique weapons with relatively low production

rates, thus increasing acquisition and logistics costs and inhibiting

interoperability. Some DOD officials believe improved oversight is needed,

and a proposal is under consideration to expand the purview of the Joint

Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office to include the coordination of

air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs. Expanding the

Air-to-Air Office’s purview should, in GAO’s view, provide some assurance

that decisions in the deep attack area have been assessed from the

perspective of the services’ combined requirements, capabilities, and

acquisition plans.

Principal Findings

Acquisition Plans for

Guided Weapons Based on

Optimistic Funding

Projections

According to the fiscal year 1999 Future Years Defense Program and

longer term program plans, planned annual expenditures for guided

weapon procurement are slated to increase from about $775 million in

fiscal year 1998 to more than $2 billion in fiscal year 2003. From fiscal

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

year 1998 to 2007, planned annual expenditures for guided weapon

procurement will average about $1.7 billion. Such expenditures would be

more than twice the average annual expenditures for such weapons over

the past 5 fiscal years. GAO believes these cost projections are conservative

because historically, acquisition programs have typically experienced cost

growth of 20 percent or more.5

 At the same time, other proposed major

guided weapon procurement programs, if approved, could compete for the

same resources.

This increase in guided weapon procurement funding is planned as other

major procurement programs are also forecasting major increases.

However, the overall defense budget is expected to remain relatively

constant in real dollars, and DOD’s infrastructure reductions have not yet

generated the savings expected to fund the increased weapons

procurement. GAO believes there will be a major imbalance between the

funds needed and the funds likely to be available for DOD’s planned

procurement programs, including the guided weapon programs. In the

past, funding shortfalls have been dealt with by reducing annual

procurement quantities and stretching out programs. However, this has

significantly increased the unit cost of weapons and delayed deliveries. Of

particular concern is DOD’s possible inability to start procurement of

weapons with potentially revolutionary capabilities because of excessive

commitments to older weapon programs.

DOD Guided Weapon

Requirements Appear

Inflated

While DOD has enough deep attack weapons in its inventory today to meet

current national objectives, the services plan to add 158,800 guided

weapons to the inventory. Each program has been justified by the services

on a case-by-case basis, but in the aggregate, DOD has not demonstrated

the overall cost-effectiveness of almost doubling the total quantities of

guided weapons. In today’s budgetary and security environment, it is

difficult to understand the rationale for DOD’s guided weapon plans.

In a 1997 report, GAO discussed the use and effectiveness of guided and

unguided weapons and other aspects of the air campaign during the

Persian Gulf War.6

 Neither guided nor unguided weapons were as effective

as expected because, among other things (1) higher altitude deliveries

were used, (2) aircraft sensors had inherent limitations in identifying and

acquiring targets, (3) DOD failed to gather intelligence information on some

5

The services are attempting to manage cost growth through initiatives such as “cost as an

independent variable.” We have not evaluated the effectiveness of these initiatives.

6

Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign (GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 12, 1997).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

critical targets, and (4) DOD was unable to collect and disseminate timely

battle damage assessments. Since the War, DOD has undertaken initiatives

to address many of these problems, including the development of specific

design features of new guided weapons. However, the effectiveness of

these initiatives has not yet been fully demonstrated. Nevertheless, DOD

projects that its new guided weapons will significantly improve its

warfighting capability.

Further, the assumptions used by the services to estimate individual

weapon requirements, overstate the potential threat and target base, favor

long range and accurate guided weapons, and require large quantities of

reserve weapons. As a result, the quantity requirements for guided

weapons appear to be inflated, particularly in today’s budgetary and

security environment.

Proliferation of Guided

Weapon Capabilities and

Acquisition Programs

The services have substantial quantities of many different guided weapons

to attack most, if not all, targets. Taken individually, the services’

acquisition plans for guided weapons can be justified and are expected to

add significant capabilities. However, acquisition plans for most of these

weapon types are largely service-unique and the services have missed

several opportunities to consolidate the development and procurement of

deep attack capabilities and create more efficient acquisition programs.

For example, the Air Force and the Navy are developing the Joint

Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, while the Navy is developing the Standoff

Land Attack Missile—Expanded Response, even though either missile

could be used by both services.

When reviewing the services’ planned programs in the aggregate, GAO

found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types and

capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured for each target

class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and more accurate weapons

rather than for other options that may be as effective and less costly. For

example, the services plan to acquire four new types of standoff guided

weapons—at a cost of about $7.2 billion for over 12,000 weapons—to

attack fixed hard and soft targets. Each of these weapons has similar

capabilities, and a variety of weapons are already available to attack these

types of targets.

DOD’s 1997 Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study stopped short of recognizing

cases of overlap or duplication and did not recommend curtailing or

canceling any guided weapons programs. DOD’s Quadrennial Defense

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

Review, which based its recommendations on the study’s results,

determined that the current deep attack weapon acquisition plans could

continue with only minor adjustments. However, the Air Force, the Navy,

and two DOD-sponsored independent reviews all conclude that the

computer models used in the weapons mix study featured outdated

assumptions from the Cold War and did not accurately represent modern

warfare. In GAO’s view, while the study was certainly a step in the right

direction, DOD still does not have a sound basis to ensure that it has the

proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs. While

modeling has a role, the ultimate decisions on the best mix will require

sound military and business judgment. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of

Staff said that they plan to reassess deep attack weapons mix and

affordability issues in 1998.

Oversight of Guided

Weapon Requirements and

Acquisition Programs

Needs Improvement

DOD is not providing effective management oversight and coordination of

its deep attack capabilities and programs to contain development costs,

control logistics impacts, maximize warfighting flexibility, and avoid

production stretch-outs. Instead, the task of developing and procuring

weapons rests with the services. DOD’s oversight has not prevented

duplication of development, service-unique programs, and production

schedule stretch-outs.

DOD has no central oversight body or mechanism to examine guided

weapon programs in the aggregate and to assess how many weapons are

needed to meet national objectives or how many weapons DOD can afford.

The central oversight bodies and mechanisms already in place do not

address requirements and capabilities on an aggregate basis and have had

very limited effect on guided weapon programs. Some DOD officials believe

improved oversight is needed, and a proposal is under consideration to

expand the purview of the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office to

include the coordination of air-to-ground weapon requirements and

programs. The Air-to-Air Office has shown that the services can effectively

coordinate requirements and establish joint programs for the acquisition

of similar weapons. Expanding its purview to include guided weapons

should, in GAO’s view, provide some assurance that decisions in the deep

attack area have been assessed from the perspective of the services’

combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Army, the

Navy, and the Air Force,

• establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack capabilities;

• reevaluate the assumptions used in their guided weapon requirements

determination processes to reflect better and more cost-effectively the

new international situation, realistic target sets, enhanced weapon

effectiveness, proper weapon selection, and the use of advanced tactics;

and

• reevaluate the planned deep attack weapon acquisition programs in light

of existing capabilities and the current budgetary and security

environment to determine whether the procurement of all planned guided

weapon types and quantities (1) is necessary and cost-effective in the

aggregate and (2) can clearly be carried out as proposed within realistic,

long-term projections of procurement funding.

Further, as GAO recommended in 1996 in its combat air power reports, the

Secretary of Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

should develop an assessment process that yields more comprehensive

information on procurement requirements and aggregate capabilities in

key mission areas such as deep attack. GAO has pointed out that this can be

done by broadening the current joint warfare capabilities assessment

process or by developing an alternative mechanism. One such alternative

would be the establishment of a DOD-wide coordinating office, modeled

after the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office, to consider the services’

combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans for guided

weapons.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with

GAO’s recommendations, stating that the Joint Staff will conduct a

follow-up to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and that a coordinating

office will be established to assess joint weapon requirements. DOD stated

that the report does not recognize its significant efforts to improve its

requirements, acquisition, and oversight processes.

The follow-on study to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study that DOD is

conducting would be useful and GAO urges DOD to conclude the study with

decisions on which programs to cut back and which to end, in order to

ensure that its programs are fully executable within expected budgets.

Also, as a partial solution to the need for more comprehensive

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Executive Summary

assessments, DOD’s agreement to establish a body to review and deconflict

joint air-to-surface requirements should be helpful. Also important is the

agreement of DOD that a body such as this might better resolve issues

among the services, with less DOD intervention. GAO urges DOD to pursue

the establishment of such a body but believes the body should address all

deep attack requirements, not just air-to-surface requirements.

GAO has considered DOD’s efforts to improve its processes. In the recent

past, GAO has examined in considerable depth DOD’s requirements,

acquisition, and oversight processes.7

 While GAO acknowledges DOD’s

efforts and progress to date in improving those processes, the problems

discussed in this report of optimistic funding projections, inflated

requirements, overlapping and duplicative programs, and service-unique

programs continue. As GAO points out in the report, DOD needs to

reexamine the oversight process in ways aimed at providing more

discipline and fewer programs in order to be able to procure its

requirements in the most cost-effective manner.

DOD officials told GAO that, due to the mismatch between commitments and

resources, DOD plans to reduce fiscal year 2000 procurement quantities for

several guided weapon programs. GAO believes that reductions in annual

procurement quantities and stretch-outs in procurement schedules should

not be the inevitable solutions to the mismatch between its commitments

to programs and expected resources. It is important that every effort

should be made to avoid these “pay more for less” outcomes.

DOD’s comments on the draft report are included in their entirety in

appendix I with GAO’s responses.

7

High Risk Series: Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-97-6, Feb. 1997) and Combat Air

Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Background 14

Persian Gulf War, Lessons Learned 15

Recent Studies and Reports on Guided Weapon Issues 16

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Chapter 2 

Acquisition Plans for

Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic

Funding Projections

20

DOD’s Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons Are Ambitious 20

Availability of Funding Needed for Guided Weapon Procurement

Programs Is Uncertain

23

Optimistic Funding Projections Have Often Led to Schedule

Stretch-Outs and Higher Unit Costs

25

Chapter 3 

DOD Requirements

for Guided Weapons

Appear to Be Inflated

27

DOD’s Current Inventory Is Considered Adequate to Meet

Defense Needs

27

Modern Guided Weapons Have Been Justified as Significantly

More Effective

28

Increased Effectiveness of Weapons Is Expected to Permit the

Use of Advanced Tactics

31

Changing World Conditions Have Altered the Nature of Threats

to U.S. Interests

31

Services’ Requirements Systems Inflate Quantities of Individual

Weapons Needed

32

Chapter 4 

Proliferation of

Guided Weapon

Capabilities and

Acquisition Programs

36

DOD Plans to Add to Its Capabilities to Attack All Classes of

Targets

36

Services Favor Single-Service Versus Joint Programs for

Procurement of Guided Weapons

38

Questionable Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons 39

Multiple Weapon Types Raise Acquisition and Support

Expenditures

43

Weapons Mix Study and Quadrennial Defense Review

Recommend Little Change in Acquisition Programs

45

Independent Reviews Question Relevance of Computer Models

Used in Weapons Mix Study

46

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Contents

Joint Staff Plans Another Weapons Mix/Affordability Study 48

Chapter 5 

Oversight of Guided

Weapon Requirements

and Acquisition

Programs Needs

Improvement

49

Oversight of Services’ Guided Weapon Capabilities and Programs 49

Limited Recognition of the Need to Improve Oversight and

Coordination

52

Chapter 6 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

53

Conclusions 53

Recommendations 54

DOD Comments and Our Evaluation 55

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 58

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 64

Tables Table 2.1: Planned Guided Weapon Procurement Programs 21

Table 4.1: Guided Weapon Options by Target Class 37

Table 4.2: Capabilities Overlap in Guided Weapons 40

Figures Figure 2.1: Planned Guided Weapon Procurement Funding 22

Figure 2.2: DOD’s Planned Procurement Funding During Fiscal

Years 1998-2003

24

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Contents

Abbreviations

AGM Air-to-Ground Guided Missile

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

BAT Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition

BLU Bomb/Live Unit

CALCM Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile

CEM combined effects munition

CINC Commander in Chief

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

GAM GPS-Aided Munition

GBU Guided Bomb Unit

GPS Global Positioning System

HARM High Speed Antiradiation Missile

JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

SFW Sensor Fuzed Weapon

SLAM Standoff Land Attack Missile

SLAM-ER Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response

TASM Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

WCMD Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Following the Persian Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD)

identified a number of problems with its deep attack weapons and

suggested improvements designed to ensure target destruction with

minimum casualties, delivery sorties, weapons, and unwanted collateral

damage. In response, the services initiated a number of programs to

upgrade existing guided weapons and to acquire new ones. However,

because the defense budget, in accordance with the balanced budget

agreement, is likely to be relatively fixed for the foreseeable future,

Congress expressed concern about the need and affordability of all these

programs.

Background The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acknowledge that they are facing flat

budgets and increasingly expensive readiness and modernization and that

to retain effectiveness, the services must integrate their capabilities. The

JCS anticipate leveraging technological opportunities to reach new levels of

effectiveness in joint military operations.1

 The current military doctrine

also recognizes that new technologies are a key component in increasing

the effectiveness of military operations. Guided weapons play an

important role in implementing this doctrine.

Guided weapons are more accurate than unguided weapons because they

have the capability for in-flight guidance correction. They can be powered

or unpowered. The range from which they can be launched varies from a

few miles for the unpowered Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) series of weapons

to several hundred miles for the Tomahawk cruise missile and the

Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). Most guided weapons

are launched from aircraft or helicopters, but the Tomahawk is launched

from Navy surface ships and submarines; and the Army Tactical Missile

System (ATACMS) is launched from the Multiple Launch Rocket System.

They can be guided by the Global Positioning System (GPS), infrared

sensors, electro-optical sensors, or lasers. Some weapons have single

warheads, others carry many antipersonnel or antiarmor submunitions.

The specific guided weapon used depends on the type of target, the

defenses around the target, and whether areas adjacent to the target must

be avoided. Deep attack guided weapons are used for operations carried

out beyond the areas where friendly ground forces are operating. These

weapons can be released very close to the target or at standoff ranges

many miles from the target, either vertically or horizontally. “Standoff”

range is the distance between the weapon launcher and the target.

1

Joint Vision 2010, America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Persian Gulf War,

Lessons Learned

Guided weapons were first used in the Vietnam War to destroy targets that

previously required tons of unguided general purpose weapons. However,

guided weapons proved their value in the Persian Gulf War, when the

world watched them make precision attacks against targets in Iraq. Guided

weapons were subsequently recognized as having the potential to

revolutionize warfare.

Before the Gulf War, aircrew training focused on a potential Central

European conflict and emphasized low-altitude tactics using aircraft and

weapons designed for such missions. However, Iraqi air defenses included

large numbers of antiaircraft artillery that could put up a “wall of iron”

against low-flying aircraft. After several aircraft losses, and to avoid the

risk of losing a B-52H to antiaircraft artillery, pilots were ordered to drop

weapons from higher altitudes than anticipated. At these altitudes,

however, bombing with general purpose bombs was not accurate, and

wind forces became a factor. While guided weapons achieved better

results, a relatively small number of them were used, and their

effectiveness was often limited by weather, target location uncertainty,

and other factors.2

 As a consequence, bombing accuracy was poor, and

multiple weapons—in some cases multiple attacks—were used on each

target. Incomplete and delayed bomb damage assessments were also a

factor in the need for multiple attacks.

Following the Gulf War, several DOD studies identified a number of

changes that could improve the accuracy, standoff range, and lethality of

its guided weapons as well as target identification and damage assessment

capabilities. The aim of these improvements is to ensure target destruction

with the minimum number of delivery sorties and weapons and to avoid

unwanted collateral damage and minimize exposure of friendly aircraft to

enemy defenses.

In response, the services initiated a number of programs to upgrade

existing guided weapons—such as CALCM, the Tomahawk cruise missile,

the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), and Air-to-Ground Guided Missile

(AGM) 130—and to acquire new guided weapons, including the Joint Direct

Attack Munition (JDAM), the Wind-Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD),

the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff

Missile (JASSM). Still more guided weapon programs are planned.

To take full advantage of new and improved guided weapons, launch

aircraft capabilities are improving. More than nine times as many F-16s

2

Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign (GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 12, 1997).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 1 

Introduction

and many more F-15E fighters can employ guided weapons today than in

1991. All DOD combat aircraft will be able to use GPS by the end of fiscal

year 2000 (GPS allows precise positioning and navigation and permits

weapon release in all types of weather). Additionally, the number of

aircraft with night-fighting and target acquisition capabilities has increased

significantly since fiscal year 1991. Currently, more than 600 Air Force

fighters can use all or part of the Low-Altitude Navigation Targeting

Infrared for Night System, and hundreds of Navy F/A-18 aircraft have

forward-looking infrared pods for night vision.

Recent Studies and

Reports on Guided

Weapon Issues

DOD’s management of its guided weapon capabilities, requirements, and

acquisition programs has been of interest to Congress and others for many

years. In 1995, we reported that the services had bought or were

developing 33 types of guided weapons with over 300,000 individual

weapons to attack surface targets.3

 We also stated that the services had

initiated development programs both to increase the number of guided

weapons and to gain additional capability through technical improvements

to weapons in the inventory.

The 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces recommended an assessment of the services’ deep attack systems

to determine the appropriate force size and mix. The report questioned

whether DOD had the right mix, asserted that DOD may have greater

quantities of deep attack weapon systems than it needs, and recommended

a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study to determine the appropriate mix. The

report concluded that “only by approaching capabilities in the aggregate,

from the Commanders in Chiefs’ (CINC) perspective rather than the

services’, can this particular ‘who needs what’ question be answered.”

The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act4

 required DOD to report to

Congress on (1) the process for approving development of guided

weapons, (2) the feasibility of the services’ jointly developing weapons and

integrating them in multiple aircraft, and (3) the cost-effectiveness of

developing interim weapons or of procuring small quantities of weapons.

DOD was also asked to provide a quantitative analysis of deep attack

weapons mix options. In April 1996, the Secretary of Defense issued a

3

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development

(GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 23, 1995).

4

P.L. 104-106, sec. 261.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 1 

Introduction

report5 informing Congress of the steps DOD was taking to avoid duplicate

and redundant guided weapon programs and explaining how requirements

and inventory levels were being determined. DOD also responded to

congressional concerns regarding the economy and effectiveness of the

continued acquisition of smaller quantities of some guided weapons whose

unit costs had increased over 50 percent since December 1, 1991. DOD’s

report to Congress is discussed in chapter 5.

In May 1997, DOD issued its report on the Quadrennial Defense Review.6

The review was a comprehensive examination of America’s defense needs

from 1997 to 2015 and included military modernization programs and

strategy. It was intended to serve as DOD’s overall strategic planning

document and made several recommendations involving guided weapons

modernization programs. In November 1997, DOD reported on the results of

its Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study.7

 The results of this study and the

recommendations of the review are discussed in chapter 4.

In December 1997, the National Defense Panel reported on its

congressionally directed assessment of DOD’s Quadrennial Defense

Review. The Panel considered the review a significant step in the

adjustment of U.S. forces to reflect the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

However, the Panel differed over emphasis or priorities in a number of

areas. We discuss the Panel’s assessment in chapter 5.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

In response to the request of the Chairmen of the National Security

Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations, and of the

Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, House Committee

on National Security, we sought to determine whether

• the services’ plans for developing and/or procuring guided weapons can be

carried out as proposed within relatively fixed defense budgets,

• the number of guided weapons the services plan to buy are consistent with

projected threats and modernization requirements,

• the current and planned guided weapon programs duplicate or overlap

each other, and

5

Precision Guided Munitions Acquisitions Process Report, April 1996.

6

The review was required by the Military Force Structure Review Act (P.L. 104-201, sec. 923).

7

The results of the study were issued in November 1997 in two parts. Part 1 is the Weapons Mix

Analysis, which we discuss in this report. Part 2 is the B-2 Force Tradeoff Analysis, which was directed

by the President.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• DOD is providing effective oversight in the development and procurement

of deep attack weapons.

To determine whether the services’ plans for developing and/or procuring

guided weapons can be carried out as proposed within expected defense

budgets, we obtained program cost and schedule information from

weapon program offices and compared current weapon procurement

plans with previous procurement history. We discussed and obtained

copies of weapon program plans at the Aeronautical Systems Center, Eglin

Air Force Base, Florida; Ogden Air Logistic Center, Hill Air Force Base,

Utah; and Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu Naval Air Weapons

Station, California.

To determine whether the numbers of guided weapons the services plan to

buy are consistent with projected threats and modernization requirements,

we obtained information on DOD’s weapons inventories from the Office of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. We reviewed the Navy’s

nonnuclear ordnance requirement process and the Air Force’s nonnuclear

consumables annual analysis model with personnel from those offices in

Washington, D.C. Worldwide threat information was obtained from the

Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. We discussed targeting

procedures and weapon employment tactics with officials at the U.S.

Central Command and Navy Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base,

Florida, and the Air Force Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, South

Carolina. We also obtained and analyzed information from the

Commander of U.S. Forces Korea on guided weapon requirements,

capabilities, tactics, and operational plans. We visited the Office of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine its role in establishing weapon

requirements, and we discussed out-year threats with personnel from the

Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. We also had discussions

with DOD Inspector General personnel who were auditing the Navy and the

Air Force requirements models.

To determine whether current and planned guided weapon programs are

duplicative and/or overlapping, we compared weapon capabilities such as

range, potential target sets, and warhead types of similar weapons. In the

course of this examination, we visited the JASSM program office at Eglin Air

Force Base, Florida; the JSOW program office at Patuxent River Naval Air

Station, Maryland; and the Standoff Land Attack Missile—Expanded

Response (SLAM-ER) test site at Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu Naval

Air Weapons Station, California. We also discussed acquisition

responsibilities with personnel from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 1 

Introduction

and the Navy Aviation Requirements Branch, Washington, D.C., and the

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

To assess DOD’s oversight of the services’ deep attack weapon

requirements and acquisition programs, we evaluated oversight processes

and procedures in place and the extent to which guided weapon

requirements and programs were assessed in the aggregate. We discussed

the effectiveness of the current oversight processes—as well as alternative

processes—with officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology). We also

reviewed DOD’s Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and obtained documents

and interviewed officials from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office

of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer),

Program Analysis and Evaluation directorate; and the Institute for Defense

Analyses.

We conducted our audit work from July 1997 through October 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 2 

Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

To acquire the guided weapons now planned during fiscal years 1998-2007,

DOD plans to spend about $16.6 billion (then-year dollars) for 158,800

weapons—doubling its average yearly spending compared with fiscal

years 1993-97. The current investment strategy for guided weapons may

not be executable as proposed because of the potential imbalance

between funds likely to be available for actual procurement and projected

spending. The projected imbalance may be greater than it appears because

acquisition programs have traditionally cost more than originally

projected, and several other weapons programs are expected to be

approved for procurement. Furthermore, technology improvements will

likely offer better weapon investments in the years ahead, generating even

more programs to compete for the same resources.

In the past, when faced with similar funding shortfalls, DOD’s approach has

been to stretch out programs, delay procurement, and reduce annual

production quantities. These strategies increased unit production costs

and delayed deliveries. They could also limit DOD’s flexibility to shift

resources from older weapons to more innovative systems.

DOD’s Acquisition

Plans for Guided

Weapons Are

Ambitious

According to the fiscal year 1999-2003 Future Years Defense Program and

longer-term program plans, the services plan to continue procuring guided

weapon systems now in low-rate initial or full-rate production such as

WCMD, JDAM, the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW), SLAM-ER, the Baseline version

of JSOW, the ATACMS Block I, and the Longbow Hellfire missile. The services

also plan to begin production of several guided weapon systems now

under development. These include JASSM, the Brilliant Antiarmor (BAT)

submunition, the Bomb/Live Unit (BLU)-108 and Unitary versions of JSOW,

and the ATACMS Block II and IIA. For about 127,000 of the 158,800 guided

weapons to be acquired, a guidance kit will be added to an existing

unguided weapon. These weapons include JDAM and WCMD.

As shown in table 2.1, these programs range in dollar value from the

$26-million procurement of AGM-130s to the $3.3-billion procurement of the

ATACMS Block II and IIA, which includes the BAT submunition. Nine of these

programs are expected to cost over $1 billion each.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 2 

Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

Table 2.1: Planned Guided Weapon

Procurement Programs (fiscal years

1998-2007)

Dollars in millions (then-year)

Weapon systemsa

Planned

production

costs

Planned

production

quantity

ATACMS Block II/IIAb $3,335 1,806

JSOW/Unitary 1,692 3,194

Longbow Hellfire 1,643 11,497

JSOW/Baseline and BLU-108 (Navy) 1,639 6,536

JSOW/Baseline and BLU-108 (Air Force) 1,356 4,496

JDAM (Air Force) 1,336 61,063

Tomahawkc 1,278 1,253

JASSM 1,278 2,245

SFW 1,150 d

WCMD 508 40,000

JDAM (Navy) 641 25,496

ATACMS Block 1A 392 406

SLAM-ER 265 423

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) 54 100

GBU-28 36 255

AGM-130 26 30

Total $16,629 158,800

aThe Air Force plans to convert additional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles to a conventional attack

role, but the quantities and costs are classified.

bIncludes the estimated procurement cost of $1.8 billion for 19,700 BAT submunitions.

cReflects the Navy’s plan to acquire a new Tactical Tomahawk.

dSFW quantities (3,413 units) are included in the WCMD total.

According to their procurement plans, the services plan to spend an

average of $1.7 billion a year to procure guided weapons over the next 10

years—doubling the $848-million average yearly spending during fiscal

years 1993-97. Figure 2.1 shows the planned annual procurement funding

for guided weapons during fiscal years 1998-2007.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 2 

Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

Figure 2.1: Planned Guided Weapon Procurement Funding (fiscal years 1998-2007) 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500

1,750

2,000

2,250

2,500

775

1,178

1,523

1,824 1,759

2,087

2,230 2,158

1,827

1,472

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions (then-year)

Average: $1,683

Table 2.1 and figure 2.1 do not include all of the costs for the services’

planned modifications or upgrades to several existing guided weapons.

For example, the Air Force and the Navy plan to equip approximately 500

GBU-24s and 500 GBU-27s with GPS guidance (which guides the weapon

more accurately under all weather conditions). Additional quantities of

these weapons may be upgraded in the future.

Also, table 2.1 and figure 2.1 do not include funding requirements for

proposed guided weapon programs that have not yet been approved for

procurement. For example, DOD has potential requirements for the Small

Smart Bomb, Low Cost Autonomous Attack System, Unmanned Combat

Air Vehicles, Land Attack Standard Missile, and the Navy’s Vertical Gun.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 2 

Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

Further, rapidly evolving weapons technology could offer better weapon

investments in the years ahead, generating even more programs to

compete for the same resources.

Last, acquisition programs, including guided weapon programs, have

historically cost more than originally projected. Unanticipated cost growth

has averaged at least 20 percent over the life of acquisition programs.1

 Any

cost growth in DOD’s guided weapon programs will increase the amount of

funding needed to support them. (In the 1999 Future Years Defense

Program, DOD included an acquisition program stability reserve to address

unforeseeable cost growth that can result from technical risk and

uncertainty. We have not evaluated the program stability reserve or the

way DOD plans to implement it. However, the fund is budgeted at about

$2.4 billion for fiscal years 2000-2003 to address possible cost growth in all

defense programs. Further, the services are attempting to manage cost

growth through initiatives such as “cost as an independent variable.” We

have not evaluated the effectiveness of these initiatives.)

Availability of

Funding Needed for

Guided Weapon

Procurement

Programs Is Uncertain

DOD’s planned investment strategy for guided weapons is based on

projections of increased procurement funding, as shown in figure 2.2, even

though DOD’s overall budget is expected to remain relatively fixed. In the

balanced budget agreement, the President and Congress agreed that the

total national defense budget2

 will remain relatively fixed in real terms at

least through fiscal year 2002. While Congress has not discussed the

defense budget beyond fiscal year 2002, DOD officials said their long-term

planning now assumes no real growth in the defense budget.

Within a relatively fixed defense budget, any proposed increase in

spending for a particular account or project must be offset elsewhere.

However, DOD has not identified specific budget reductions to offset the

proposed increases in procurement funding for guided weapons.

Furthermore, DOD’s other procurement programs, such as aircraft,

shipbuilding, and missile defense, are also anticipating increases in

procurement funding.

1

CBO Papers: An Analysis of the Administration’s Future Years Defense Program for 1995-99

Congressional Budget Office, January 1995 and The Effects of Management Initiatives on the Cost and

Schedules of Defense Acquisition Programs, Institute for Defense Analyses, November 1992.

2

The national defense budget includes the military activities of DOD, the atomic energy defense

activities of the Department of Energy, and defense-related activities of other agencies.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 2 

Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

Figure 2.2: DOD’s Planned

Procurement Funding During Fiscal

Years 1998-2003

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

0

20

40

60

80

100

44.8

48.7

54.1

61.3 60.7 63.5

Fiscal year

Dollars in billions (then-year)

DOD expects to increase its overall procurement spending to about

$63.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 from the fiscal year 1998 level of about

$44.8 billion while keeping overall defense spending at current levels at

least through fiscal year 2003. This is an increase of about 42 percent.

DOD’s planned procurement spending for guided weapon programs is

projected to increase about 169 percent during the same period.

To increase procurement funding and keep overall defense spending

unchanged, DOD proposes to reduce personnel, make some modest

changes in force structure, achieve infrastructure savings through

fundamental reforms and base realignments/closures, and continue to

improve its business operations. However, we recently reported that by

2002, funding for military personnel, operations and maintenance, and

research, development, testing, and evaluation is projected to be higher

while procurement funding is projected to be lower than anticipated.3

 And

3

Future Years Defense Program: DOD’s 1998 Plan Has Substantial Risk in Execution

(GAO/NSIAD-98-26, Oct. 23, 1997).

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
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Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

for the fourth straight budget year, DOD in 1998 did not achieve the

procurement goals established in the previous Future Years Defense

Programs. DOD consistently projects increased procurement funding for

the latter years in each Future Years Defense Program but, as subsequent

Future Years Defense Programs are developed, significantly reduces those

projections in response to budget-year realities.

Savings from infrastructure reductions too often have not been as high as

anticipated and have been absorbed by unplanned or underestimated

expenses in day-to-day operations. According to DOD, the most common

underestimated expenses are for depot and real property maintenance,

military construction, and medical care. Because of unrealized savings,

weapons modernization plans have repeatedly been underfunded.

In its review of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense

Panel concluded that DOD’s modernization plan has more budget risk than

it acknowledges. The Panel considered DOD’s key assumptions for

maintaining a $60-billion annual procurement goal somewhat tenuous and

concluded that, collectively, the assumptions represent a budget risk that

could potentially undermine DOD’s entire strategy.

Optimistic Funding

Projections Have

Often Led to Schedule

Stretch-Outs and

Higher Unit Costs

Weapon programs have typically projected annual procurement quantities

and costs based on optimistic assumptions about funding availability. Our

work has shown that the funds actually made available for procurement

have often been much less than those projected when the program was

proposed. When faced with funding shortfalls, DOD’s traditional approach

has been to reduce annual procurement quantities and extend production

schedules, without eliminating programs. Such actions have usually

resulted in significantly higher average unit procurement costs and

delayed deliveries to operational units. For example, in 1997, we reported

that production costs for 17 of 22 weapon systems we reviewed had

increased by $10 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) above original estimates

through fiscal year 1996 because completion of the weapons’ production

had been extended an average of 8 years (170 percent) longer than

originally planned.4

 We found that actual production rates averaged less

than half the originally planned rates. These stretch-outs were caused

primarily by funding limitations.

4

Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition Funding Would Reduce Costs

(GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb. 13, 1997).

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Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons

Based on Optimistic Funding Projections

The services’ procurement of guided weapons between fiscal year 1993

and 1998 also had higher unit costs because of schedule slippage, reduced

procurement quantities, and cost growth. For example, the Air Force at

one time planned to procure about 4,000 AGM-130s but now plans to buy

only 711. As a result, the unit procurement cost is about $832,000 versus

earlier projections of under $300,000. Reductions in planned procurement

funding for the SFW have forced the program to reduce annual

procurement rates and stretch out the schedule. As a result, SFW unit costs

have increased from about $320,000 to over $358,000. The BAT program has

also been unstable, and its schedule has been extended by 5 years. BAT’s

procurement quantities have also dropped by 36 percent, while program

costs have increased by almost 8 percent.

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Chapter 3 

DOD Requirements for Guided Weapons

Appear to Be Inflated

The existing inventory of 1.3 million weapons, which could be used for

deep attack, contains many guided munitions and hundreds of thousands

of general purpose bombs. The current inventory is considered sufficient

to meet current national defense objectives. The deep attack weapons

used in the Gulf War would represent about 17 percent of the current

inventory. Yet DOD plans to add 158,800 guided weapons over the next 

10 years, almost doubling its existing inventory of guided weapons. DOD

expects the new weapons to enable warfighters to accomplish the same

objectives with fewer weapons and casualties and less unintended

collateral damage. We believe some new weapons may indeed be needed

to resolve specific performance problems and to replace those retired or

used in training. However, since DOD has not prepared an overall

requirements estimate for weapons capable of deep attack (see chs. 4 and

5), we question DOD’s rationale for nearly doubling its inventory of guided

weapons.

The higher projected effectiveness of these new systems—in terms of

accuracy, standoff range, and lethality—along with the employment of

advanced tactics is expected to allow wartime objectives to be

accomplished with fewer weapons. Further, changing world conditions

have altered, perhaps for many years, the nature of the threats to U.S.

interests. However, we believe the assumptions used by the services to

estimate individual weapon requirements are conservative, overstate the

potential threat and target base, favor long range and accurate guided

weapons, and require large quantities of reserve weapons. As a result, the

quantity requirements for guided weapons appear to be inflated,

particularly in today’s budgetary and security environments.

DOD’s Current

Inventory Is

Considered Adequate

to Meet Defense

Needs

DOD retains about 1.3 million weapons that could be used for deep attack

missions. They range from the accurate, long-range Tomahawk cruise

missiles to hundreds of thousands of relatively inexpensive general

purpose bombs. The total inventory of these weapons today is about

15 percent smaller than it was in 1992, soon after the end of the Cold War.

Guided weapons currently account for about 12 percent of the total

inventory of deep attack weapons. The guided weapons on hand or in

procurement totaled over 170,000 units as of the end of fiscal year 1997.

The current inventory includes AGM-130, AGM-142, CALCM, Harpoon, GBU-10,

GBU-12, GBU-15, GBU-24, GBU-27, GBU-28, Maverick, SFW, ATACMS Block I,

Hellfire II, High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), SLAM, Tomahawk

Anti-Ship Missile (TASM), and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). As

discussed in chapter 2, the services plan to add about 158,800 guided

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DOD Requirements for Guided Weapons

Appear to Be Inflated

weapons to the existing inventory through fiscal year 2007. Although some

weapons would be used for testing, training, and other purposes, planned

acquisitions would approximately double the current inventory.

To place the existing inventory in perspective, about 227,000 deep attack

weapons, or about 17 percent of the current inventory, were used in the

Persian Gulf air war. Of these weapons, 92 percent were unguided and

8 percent were guided. Of the guided weapons used, about half were

laser-guided (GBU-10, 12, and 24) and the remainder used other types of

guidance such as preprogrammed maps for the Tomahawk and an

electro-optical sensor for the Maverick.

According to two recent Defense studies and discussions with U.S. Central

Command officials, the current inventory of guided and unguided weapons

is sufficient to accomplish current defense objectives. The national

defense strategy directs the services to retain the capability to fight and

win two overlapping major theater wars. Two regions containing

significant military threats to U.S. interests are (1) East Asia and the

Pacific Rim with its increased strategic significance and (2) the Middle

East and South Asia where the United States has vital and enduring

interests.

We believe some new weapons may indeed be needed to resolve specific

performance problems and to replace those retired or used in training. The

services, however, justify each of their weapon acquisition programs on a

case-by-case basis, and DOD does not assess the DOD-wide capabilities and

programs on an aggregate basis. Moreover, an overall requirements

estimate for weapons capable of deep attack has not been established. As

a result, DOD has not specifically justified doubling its inventory of guided

weapons, as the services’ current acquisition plans would do.

Modern Guided

Weapons Have Been

Justified as

Significantly More

Effective

New and improved guided weapons are expected to enable warfighting

objectives to be accomplished with fewer weapons, lower aircraft

attrition, and less unintended damage. Major improvements are projected

in the areas of accuracy, standoff range, and lethality. A study by the

Center For Naval Analysis examined the potential impact of guided

weapons on the battlefield and concluded that substantially fewer

weapons would be required when guided weapons are used extensively.

The study estimated that guided weapons offer a 10 to 1 advantage over

unguided general purpose bombs for strategic targets such as airfields or

chemical storage facilities and about a 20 to 1 advantage for battlefield

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 3 

DOD Requirements for Guided Weapons

Appear to Be Inflated

targets such as armored vehicles and rocket launchers. Projecting these

efficiencies to the Gulf War, the study estimated that had guided weapons

been used extensively, the same damage levels could have been achieved

with 60 percent fewer weapons. Other recent studies have come to similar

conclusions. A Rand study, for example, found that for most targeting

situations, one guided weapon could achieve the same destruction as 35

unguided weapons.

In our 1997 report, we discussed the use and effectiveness of guided and

unguided weapons and other aspects of the air campaign during the Gulf

War. Both guided and unguided weapons were less effective than expected

because, among other things, (1) higher altitude deliveries were used to

avoid Iraqi air defenses, (2) aircraft sensors had inherent limitations in

identifying and acquiring targets, (3) DOD failed to gather intelligence

information on some critical targets, and (4) DOD was unable to collect and

disseminate timely battle damage assessments. DOD has undertaken

initiatives since the war to address many of these problems, including the

introduction of specific design features for new guided weapons.

However, the effectiveness of some of the new guided weapons has not

yet been fully demonstrated. Nevertheless, DOD projects that its new

guided weapons will significantly improve warfighting capability in the

areas of accuracy, standoff range, and lethality.

Accuracy Accuracy is an important element of a weapon’s effectiveness. A more

accurate weapon can be smaller and carry less explosive power and yet

still achieve desired damage levels. Since the Gulf War, the services have

been acquiring GPS-based guidance kits for existing weapons (such as

AGM-130, SLAM-ER, JDAM, and Tomahawk) and integrating this technology

into new weapons (such as JSOW and JASSM) to improve accuracy from

higher altitudes and greater distances and in bad weather. GPS is a global,

day-night, all-weather, space-based navigation system that can provide

highly accurate position, velocity, and time information to both civilian

and military users. For military users, GPS is accurate to 9 to 12 meters and

insensitive to weather or battlefield conditions. By using auxiliary systems

such as ground based locators, the accuracy of GPS-based guidance

systems can be further improved.

Under the JDAM program, GPS guidance systems are being added to over

86,000 unguided bombs. Some laser-guided bombs and long-range cruise

missiles like SLAM-ER, Tomahawk, and CALCM either have or are to receive

GPS guidance systems. (Once in the target area, some weapons—such as

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
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DOD Requirements for Guided Weapons

Appear to Be Inflated

SLAM-ER and Tomahawk—use other guidance systems to more precisely

attack their targets.) DOD also plans to acquire 7,800 new JSOW-unitary

guided weapons and 2,400 new JASSMs with GPS-aided guidance systems.

The services are also developing new weapons with submunition

dispensers that use GPS guidance to reach mobile armor and other targets.

These include ATACMS and JSOW. These systems carry submunitions that

autonomously identify and attack specific targets after they are released in

the battle area.

Standoff Range Standoff range, as used in this report, is the distance between the launch

vehicle and the target. Greater standoff range is important for the survival

of the launch vehicle when enemy defenses are active in the target area.

Some powered guided weapons such as CALCM and SLAM-ER have a standoff

range of well over 100 miles, providing a high degree of launch vehicle

safety. Launch vehicle safety is also enhanced by JSOW’s long glide range,

which enables launch aircraft to stand off outside the range of most

target-area surface-to-air threat systems. Some protection is also obtained

from antiaircraft guns and hand-held missile launchers through medium

altitude launches of unpowered weapons such as JDAM. Similarly, the Air

Force’s WCMD kit is expected to provide some protection for launch

aircraft from medium altitudes.

Lethality In addition to better accuracy and longer range, the services are increasing

the lethality of guided weapons by improving warhead cases and fuzes.

This is accomplished by designing warhead cases that can withstand

high-velocity impact and penetrate earth, reinforced concrete, and other

barriers to reach a protected target before exploding. Unitary and

submunition warheads are also being designed to maximize their blast

effects on or above the battlefield, and improved fuze technology is

expected to provide more control over warhead detonation. For example,

modern warheads and fuzes can destroy a command bunker or an aircraft

shelter by penetrating the protective structure and then exploding.

Similarly, a warhead can be detonated above the battlefield to destroy a

missile site, radar, or fuel cell. In addition, submunitions have been

developed that are expected to autonomously identify and attack separate

armored vehicles. Specially designed submunition dispensers and carriers

have been developed to carry and launch submunitions over the target

area. Such improvements to weapon lethality are expected to act as force

multipliers, allowing fewer weapons to achieve the results of many.

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DOD Requirements for Guided Weapons

Appear to Be Inflated

Increased

Effectiveness of

Weapons Is Expected

to Permit the Use of

Advanced Tactics

The improved accuracy and lethality of the new deep attack weapons are

expected to facilitate the use of advanced tactics, such as nodal targeting.

Nodal targeting can be defined as attacking critical infrastructure targets

that cripple an adversary’s capability to attack with its forces. Nodal

targets could include, for example, command centers, power plants, or

logistics choke points such as bridges. Such tactics are also expected to

reduce unwanted collateral damage and post-war reconstruction

hardships. For example, to destroy a power plant in Iraq during the Gulf

War, several 1-ton bombs were dropped over a 3-day period. The facility

was completely destroyed, causing significant hardship to the residents of

the neighboring town. Air Force officials told us they could have achieved

the same objectives using one accurate weapon, thus allowing the facility

to be repaired more quickly after the war. This strategy is possible only if

there is high confidence in the precise location of the targets and the

accuracy and the amount of damage that can be achieved from a given

weapon. With its modern guided weapons and better battlefield

information, DOD hopes to have this confidence in future conflicts.

Changing World

Conditions Have

Altered the Nature of

Threats to U.S.

Interests

Recent international trends, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA), argue against the likelihood of a large-scale regional war in the

foreseeable future. The most pressing current challenges (terrorism,

narcotics trafficking, and other criminal activity with national security

implications) and the biggest emerging threats (weapons of mass

destruction and missile proliferation) have limited use as the basis for

sizing and defining future force requirements. Instead, it is more probable

that U.S. involvement will occur along the lower end of the conflict

spectrum with military assistance, various peacekeeping contingencies, or

operations other than war. Limited local or regional conflicts may also

occur.

The DIA Director reported to Congress in February 1997 (and reiterated

again in January 1998) that the world is in the midst of an extended

post-Cold War transition that will last at least another decade. From a

national security standpoint, the threats facing the United States have

diminished by an order of magnitude, and the Director believes the United

States is unlikely to face a global military challenger on the scale of the

former Soviet Union for at least the next two decades. World expenditures

for military hardware are significantly less today than they were during the

height of the Cold War. Despite these developments, the Director views

this period of transition as complex and dangerous.

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According to DIA, Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely U.S.

opponents in a major theater conflict, with weapons of mass destruction

developing as an emerging threat.

• Iraq will remain a threat to U.S. regional policies and interests as long as

the current government remains in power. However, its military capability

continues to erode. There are significant weaknesses in leadership,

morale, readiness, logistics, and training that would limit Iraq’s

effectiveness in combat. Iraq has rebuilt some key installations destroyed

in the Gulf War, but their location, construction characteristics, and other

factors are well known.

• North Korea is characterized as a failing state, and the potential for

internal collapse, instability, and leadership change is rising. In the

meantime, its overall military readiness continues to erode in line with its

worsening economic situation.

• Some nations are building or acquiring weapons of mass destruction (i.e.,

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons). Many states view the

acquisition of these weapons as vital to countering U.S. conventional

warfighting superiority and to providing a measure of power, respect, and

deterrent value within a regional context. Chemical weapons are relatively

easy to develop, deploy, and conceal and are based on readily available

technology. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a

direct threat to U.S. interests worldwide.

Services’

Requirements

Systems Inflate

Quantities of

Individual Weapons

Needed

We believe the assumptions used by the services to estimate individual

weapon requirements are conservative, overstate the potential threat and

target base, favor long range and accurate guided weapons, and require

large quantities of them among reserve weapons. As a result, the quantity

requirements for each weapon appear to be inflated, particularly in today’s

budgetary and security environments.

The services use the capabilities-based munitions requirements process to

determine their requirements for weapons procurement. Each year, the

services analyze how many weapons and of what type are needed to fully

support the CINCs’ war plans and provide for post-war reserves, storage

requirements, and other needs. These weapon requirements become the

basis for the services’ weapon procurement programs and budget requests.

The services rely on DIA to identify specific military targets in those

regions specified in defense guidance for the period included in the Future

Years Defense Program. The resulting out-year threat report is used by the

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CINCs responsible for those regions to determine attack objectives for each

type of target and to assign responsibility for target destruction to the

services. Using this allocation of targets and destruction objectives, the

services simulate combat to estimate the number of weapons needed.

Each of the services uses its own battle simulation models and other tools

to determine the number of weapons needed to meet the CINCs war

objectives. The models receive performance information for each type of

weapon and delivery vehicle, as well as the construction characteristics of

each type of target. The models then determine how many weapons of a

specific type, delivered by a particular vehicle under various battle

conditions, are needed to damage each target to a particular level. The

factors influencing the modeling results include target lists and

characteristics, weapon effectiveness, choice of weapons, and reserve

requirements.

Target Lists Despite DIA’s projections on recent international trends, the sizable

inventory of capable weapons, and the current budgetary situation, the

services determine their weapons requirements and, in turn, the weapons

to be acquired each year using worst-case scenarios for each of the two

major theaters of war. Navy and Air Force requirements models include

nearly all the targets identified in the regions specified by defense

guidance. The target list includes thousands of mobile targets, including

ships, surface-to-air missile batteries, armored combat vehicles, tanks,

aircraft, artillery, trucks, and troops on the battlefield. It also includes

thousands of fixed targets such as airfields, bridges, buildings, port

facilities, radar sites, and power plants.

Central Command officials told us it is unlikely that all or even most of the

identified targets would be attacked in a potential war in Southwest Asia

(in the case of the Gulf War, the targets struck represented only a small

portion of all identified targets). DIA has prepared a smaller list of critical

targets with the highest military value, but the Central Command includes

nearly all of the identified targets in its most comprehensive war plans and

service allocations.

We believe the effects of including such a large target base are significant.

For example, the Air Force and the Navy estimate that the number of

guided weapons needed to damage and/or destroy all the potential targets

in the Central Command target base for Southwest Asia would be

significantly higher than the number of guided weapons used during the

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Gulf War. It should be noted, however, that only a small fraction of the

target base was attacked during the Gulf War. Central Command and

service officials explained that including nearly all targets in the service

models may inflate weapon requirements, but they do not want to risk

having insufficient weapons, should some unforeseen conflict require

them. After examining the CINCs’ target distribution in 1997, the DOD

Inspector General reported that more needs to be done to improve the

threat distribution input provided to the services for generating munitions

requirements. Specifically, the Inspector General recommended that the

CINCs establish procedures that (1) identify and include the capabilities of

emerging weapons, (2) identify post-major theater war missions,

(3) distribute threats to coalition forces, and (4) establish procedures that

document and coordinate the rationale for final threat distributions.

Following the Inspector General’s logic, we believe that using a smaller

target list would reduce the number of weapons the services’ models

identify as required.

Choice of Weapons The Air Force and Navy requirements models show a strong preference for

using guided weapons against most targets. The models place a premium

on avoiding any aircraft or aircrew losses or collateral damage. As a result,

the models select weapons that are most effective in meeting those

objectives. The weapons’ target destruction capabilities and costs are

secondary considerations.

The models tend to select the most accurate and longest standoff

weapons, even though these may not have the best target-killing

characteristics and may be much more costly than alternatives with better

target-killing characteristics. For example, the Navy’s model selects

Tomahawk missiles, costing about $1 million each, for many types of

targets, even against certain targets where its effectiveness is poor. While

the specific situation may dictate the use of a Tomahawk due to target

location or threat, other weapon choices could be more effective and less

costly, if other factors such as aircraft attrition do not overcome the

weapon’s cost advantage.

According to service officials, this outcome reflects the models’ tendency

to use standoff weapons versus direct attack weapons (thereby avoiding

enemy air defenses) and their preference for more accurate weapons. As a

result, the models fail to recognize the full impact of defense suppression

and may overstate the need for the more costly, highly precise standoff

guided weapons. While these types of weapons are more effective against

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some types of targets, direct attack guided weapons as well as unguided

weapons are quite adequate against other targets, particularly when enemy

defenses have been suppressed.

Reserve Requirements The services’ models also calculate the weapons needed by U.S. forces not

directly engaged in major theaters of war and those needed to ensure U.S.

forces are able to deter or, if necessary, fight a limited conflict following

two major theaters of war. While these reserves represent only a portion

of the total weapons requirement, they include several times more guided

weapons than were used in the entire Gulf War. We believe strategic

reserves of that magnitude are questionable in the current international

security environment and would likely be reduced significantly if the

models were revised to better reflect realistic target lists, weapon

effectiveness factors, and choices of weapons.

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DOD currently has substantial quantities of many different guided weapons

to attack most, if not all, targets. Taken individually, DOD’s acquisition

plans for guided weapons can be justified and are expected to add

significant capabilities. However, DOD reviews and justifies its deep attack

weapon acquisition programs on a case-by-case basis and does not assess

its existing and projected capabilities in this area on an aggregate basis.

Although they are good candidates for joint programs, most of these new

types of weapons are being integrated into only one service’s platforms.

When reviewing the services’ currently planned programs in the aggregate,

we found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types

and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured for each target

class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and more accurate weapons

rather than for other options that may be as effective and less costly. When

the services acquire multiple systems for similar purposes, they pay higher

costs to develop, integrate, procure, and maintain these systems.

DOD’s 1997 Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study was expected to critically

review overall deep attack capabilities and to provide an analytical basis

for recommendations about specific programs. However, the study

stopped short of recognizing overlap and duplication and did not

recommend curtailment or cancellation of any programs. DOD’s

Quadrennial Defense Review, which based its recommendations on the

study’s results, recommended that current acquisition plans for guided

weapons continue with only modest adjustments. The Air Force, the Navy,

and two DOD-sponsored independent reviews concluded that the computer

models used in the study were outdated and did not adequately represent

modern warfare. Accordingly, while we believe the study was certainly a

step in the right direction, DOD still does not have a sound basis to ensure

that it has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon

programs. While modeling plays a role, the ultimate decisions on that mix

will require sound military and business judgment.

DOD Plans to Add to

Its Capabilities to

Attack All Classes of

Targets

DOD categorizes ground and naval surface targets in five target classes.

Two classes are for mobile targets—one for heavily armored targets such

as tanks and artillery and a second for lightly armored or unprotected

trucks, vans, and personnel. Two classes are for fixed targets—one for

bridges and underground or heavily reinforced facilities and one for

general purpose buildings, manufacturing facilities, roads, and rail yards.

The fifth class is for maritime surface targets and includes ships at sea.1

1

There are also target classes for airborne aircraft, tactical missiles, and maritime subsurface targets

but they are not included in this review. DOD also has a target class for sites that emit radio frequency

signals. However, when not emitting, these are considered in either the fixed or mobile soft classes.

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DOD has several types of guided weapons in the inventory to attack each of

the five target classes. DOD also has additional types of guided weapons in

development and production to attack each of the five target classes.

Table 4.1 lists the guided weapons in inventory, production, and

development by target class. The list includes air-to-surface and

surface-to-surface weapons.

Table 4.1: Guided Weapon Options by Target Class

Target class In inventory In production In development

Mobile hard 

(includes tanks and artillery)

Maverick (AF/N)

GBU-10 (AF/N)

GBU-12 (AF/N)

GBU-24 (AF/N)

GBU-27 (AF)

Walleye (N)

GPS aided munition (AF)

SFW (AF)

Hellfire II (A)

SFW/WCMD (AF)

Gator/WCMD (AF)

JDAM (AF/N)

Hellfire II (A)

Longbow Hellfire (A)

ATACMS Block II/IIA /BAT

Submunition /Improved BAT

Submunition (A)

JSOW/BLU-108 (AF/N)

Mobile soft

(includes trucks, vans, and

personnel carriers)

Maverick (AF/N)

GBU-15 (AF)

GAM (AF)

TLAM (N)

AGM-142 (AF)

ATACMS Block I (A)

Hellfire II (A)

SFW /WCMD

Gator/WCMD

JSOW/Baseline (N/AF)

AGM-142 (AF)

SFW/WCMD (AF)

CEM/WCMD (AF)

TLAM (N)

JDAM (AF/N)

JSOW Baseline (AF/N)

ATACMS Block 1A (A)

Hellfire II (A)

Longbow Hellfire (A)

ATACMS Block II/IIA/BAT

Submunition /Improved BAT

Submunition (A)

JSOW/BLU-108 (AF/N)

Fixed hard

(includes bridges and

underground or heavily

reinforced facilities)

Maverick (AF/N)

GBU-10 (AF/N)

GBU-12 (AF/N)

GBU-15 (AF)

GBU-24 (AF/N)

GBU-27 (AF)

GBU-28 (AF)

Walleye (N)

GAM (AF)

AGM-130 (AF)

AGM-142 (AF)

TLAM (N)

SLAM (N)

AGM-130 (AF)

AGM-142 (AF)

GBU-28 (AF)

TLAM (N)

SLAM (N)

SLAM-ER (N)

JDAM (AF/N)

JSOW/Unitary (N)

Tactical Tomahawk (N)

SLAM-ER (N)

JASSM (AF)

(continued)

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Target class In inventory In production In development

Fixed soft

(includes general purpose

buildings, manufacturing

facilities, roads, and rail yards)

Maverick (AF/N)

CALCM (AF)

GBU-10 (AF/N)

GBU-12 (AF/N)

GBU-15 (AF)

GBU-24 (AF/N)

GBU-27 (AF)

HARM (AF/N)

Walleye (N)

GAM (AF)

AGM-130 (AF)

AGM-142 (AF)

TLAM (N)

SLAM (N)

ATACMS Block I (A) 

AGM-130 (AF)

ATACMS Block 1A (A)

AGM-142 (AF)

TLAM (N)

SLAM (N)

SLAM-ER (N)

JDAM (AF/N)

Gator/WCMD (AF)

SFW/WCMD (AF)

CEM/WCMD (AF)

JSOW Baseline (AF/N)

ATACMS Block II/IIA/BAT

Submunition/Improved BAT

Submunition (A)

JSOW/Unitary (N)

Tactical Tomahawk (N)

SLAM-ER (N)

JASSM (AF)

Maritime surface

(includes ships)

Maverick (AF/N)

Harpoon (AF/N)

Penguin (N)

TASM (N)

Walleye (N)

GAM (AF)

SLAM (N)

AGM-142 (AF)

AGM-142 (AF)

SLAM (N)

SLAM-ER (N)

JDAM (AF/N)

JSOW/Unitary (N)

Tactical Tomahawk (N)

SLAM-ER (N)

JASSM (AF)

Note: The service or services that use each of the weapons are indicated in parentheses.

A = Army, N = Navy, AF = Air Force, and CEM = Combined Effects Munition.

According to Air Force and Navy officials, none of the guided weapons in

the inventory will be retired in the foreseeable future.2

 The services are

producing more types of available guided weapons and plan to add even

more types when those currently under development transition to

production.

Services Favor

Single-Service Versus

Joint Programs for

Procurement of

Guided Weapons

Most of the guided weapon types in the inventory or in production and

development are expected to be used by only one service. While the JDAM,

the BLU-108 and Baseline versions of JSOW, and the Hellfire are expected to

be joint programs, all of the other development and production programs

listed in table 4.1 involve only one service. Guided weapons are good

candidates for joint programs because the services plan to use them for

similar purposes and in similar ways. In addition, most guided weapons

can be launched from several different platforms with relatively minor, if

any, modifications.

2

A small portion of the inventory of unguided weapons will be retired or converted to guided weapons.

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Each service is responsible for identifying its own deficiencies in meeting

the CINCs’ target destruction allocations and for developing and obtaining

approval of its mission need statements. If a service determines that a new

weapon is required, its requirements branch establishes the operational

requirements for the weapon. According to requirements personnel, both

mission need and operational requirement documents are reviewed by the

other services, making joint requirement plans possible. However, for

most guided weapons now in development and production, a joint

requirement either was not established or was not sustained.

For example, although the JASSM was designated as a joint program, Navy

requirements officials have stated that the Navy does not currently plan to

integrate the weapon in its aircraft and is not currently planning to buy

any. Similarly, the Air Force plans to procure two JSOW variants (Baseline

and BLU-108) but is not currently planning to integrate the Navy’s Unitary

variant of the JSOW in its aircraft and is not planning to buy any. Other

single-service guided weapons (such as the WCMD and the SLAM-ER) could be

modified and integrated for use with another service’s platforms. But the

services have not favored this option.

Questionable

Acquisition Plans for

Guided Weapons

DOD reviews and justifies its guided weapon acquisition programs on a

case-by-case basis and does not assess its existing and projected

capabilities in this area on an aggregate basis. When reviewing the

services’ currently planned programs from an aggregate perspective, we

found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types and

capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured for each target

class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and more accurate weapons

rather than for options that may be as effective and less costly. Table 4.2

provides details of quantities, status, and production costs for the guided

weapons planned to be acquired for use against four target classes.

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Table 4.2: Capabilities Overlap in Guided Weapons

Target class Munition Status

Planned

quantity

Unit production cost

($ in thousands)

Total estimated

production cost

($ in millions)

Fixed hard

Fixed soft

JSOW/Unitary (N) Development 7,800

$509.4 $3,973.1

JASSM (AF) Development 2,400 537.0 1,288.8

Tactical Tomahawk (N) Development 1,253 1,120.8 1,404.4

SLAM-ER (N) Production 700a 709.1 496.4

Total 12,153 $7,162.7

Mobile hard SFW/WCMD (AF) Production 5,000 377.4b 1,887.1

Gator/WCMD (AF) Production 5,000 19.2c 96.1

JSOW/BLU-108 (N/AF) Development 4,200 366.9 1,540.8

ATACMS Block II/BAT (A) 1,806 1,875.9 3,387.9

Total 16,006 $6,911.9

Fixed soft

Fixed hard (area)

Combined Effects Munition

CEM/WCMD (AF)

Production 30,000

19.2c 576.0

JSOW/Baseline (N/F) Production 11,800 225.3 2,658.0

ATACMS Block 1A (A) Production 652d 929.3 605.9

Total 42,452 $3,839.9

Note: The service or services that use each of the weapons are indicated in parentheses.

A = Army, N = Navy, and AF = Air Force.

aOf the 700 units, 135 SLAM-ER were procured prior to fiscal year 1998.

bIncludes Sensor Fuzed Weapon production costs.

cThe CEM and Gator mine submunitions are already in the inventory.

dOf the 652, 237 ATACMS Block 1A were procured prior to fiscal year 1998.

Guided Weapons to Attack

Fixed Targets

The total procurement cost for the Unitary version of the JSOW, JASSM,

Tactical Tomahawk, and SLAM-ER is projected to be about $7.2 billion for

12,153 weapons. These weapons do not constitute all of the weapons

potentially available against the fixed hard and soft target sets from a

standoff distance. As shown in table 4.1, additional weapons such as the

TLAM, AGM-130, AGM-142, and CALCM are also available.

Three weapons—SLAM-ER, Tactical Tomahawk, and JASSM—are designed to

attack targets from outside the range of long-range enemy air defenses. A

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fourth weapon, the Unitary variant of the JSOW, is a Navy-developed

weapon designed to attack targets outside mid-range enemy air defenses.

Each of these weapons will be used by a single service because only the

developing service is currently planning to buy or integrate the weapon on

its platforms.

Each of the weapons, considered alone, was justified by the services

within DOD’s system acquisition process as adding capability to the existing

force. But considered in the aggregate and in terms of economy and

efficiency, four new types of standoff guided weapons may not be needed

to attack this target set in addition to other standoff guided weapons that

are already available. The services also have several types of guided and

unguided direct attack weapons that could be effectively used in a reduced

threat environment against these targets. In addition, the Air Force has the

F-117 stealth fighter for delivery of direct attack guided weapons against

critical targets and has invested over $40 billion in the development and

procurement of the B-2 bomber to penetrate heavily defended areas to

attack high-value targets.

DOD’s key directive on defense acquisition matters encourages modifying a

current system to meet operational requirements before beginning

development of a new system.3

 It would thus have been reasonable and

technically feasible for the Navy to acquire additional SLAM-ERs in lieu of

beginning development and production of the Unitary version of JSOW.

Likewise, it would have been reasonable and technically feasible to modify

SLAM-ER for the Air Force requirement for a long-range standoff weapon

rather than develop and produce JASSM.

In addition, the need to add 12,153 new standoff guided weapons to those

already in the inventory for this target set is questionable, particularly

when the number of critical targets in defense guidance scenarios have

declined and are projected to continue to do so. DOD has many guided

weapons—mostly laser-guided bombs—in the inventory capable of

attacking critical fixed targets. In addition to the new standoff weapons

discussed above, DOD also plans to buy over 86,000 JDAMs (a direct attack

weapon) for possible use against this same target set.

While the long-range, highly accurate, and expensive standoff weapons

that DOD plans to procure are most effective in the early stages of a

conflict—when enemy air defenses are expected to be most potent—they

3

DOD Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition.

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may not be needed in large numbers throughout an entire conflict.4 As

enemy air defenses decline, less costly but still accurate and effective

direct attack weapons such as laser-guided bombs or JDAMs can be used.

Using this generally accepted strategy, DOD developed a mix of weapons.

However, the services plan to acquire both large numbers of new standoff

guided weapons (2,400 JASSMs and 7,800 Unitary versions of JSOW) and new

direct attack guided weapons (86,000 JDAMs and 40,000 WCMDs).

Furthermore, the services have not fully addressed the possibility of

improving the accuracy of less costly direct attack guided weapons so as

to reduce the number of more expensive standoff weapons. The Air Force

planned to increase the accuracy of the JDAM, but the program is not

currently funded. The Navy also expressed an interest in improving the

JDAM’s accuracy and has provided some funding for research. Both the Air

Force and the Navy are funding an effort to add GPS to a limited number of

GBU-24s and GBU-27s. The Air Force is buying some new GBU-28s with GPS

guidance capability. DOD acknowledges the potential benefits of improving

the accuracy of these guided weapons but has not assessed the potential

effect on the numbers of weapons needed.

Guided Weapons for

Attacking Area and

Multiple Armored Targets

The weapons planned for attacking area targets5 and multiple armored

targets from medium ranges present a similar case of duplicative

procurement plans when viewed in the aggregate. Together, the Army, the

Navy, and the Air Force plan to buy over 58,000 weapons to attack these

targets for an estimated cost of over $10.7 billion.

The Navy has begun production of the Baseline variant of JSOW, which can

be used to attack area targets (such as runways and motor pools), and

plans to start production in fiscal year 1999 of the BLU-108 variant, which

can be used to attack multiple armored targets (such as tanks and armored

personnel carriers). The Air Force and the Navy together plan to buy

16,000 of these two JSOW variants. However, since the JSOW variants were

developed, the Air Force has also developed the WCMD tail kit for higher

altitude release of weapons such as the SFW, the CEM, and the Gator mine

munition. Each of these weapons, with the WCMD tail kit, can be used to

attack the same target classes as the Baseline and BLU-108 versions of JSOW.

The Air Force plans to buy 40,000 tail kits.

4

A critical objective early in a conflict is to aggressively destroy and/or suppress the enemy’s air

defenses in order to minimize friendly aircraft losses. DOD plans to use highly accurate standoff

weapons as well as high-speed antiradiation missiles and electronic attack assets in this role.

5

An area target is a large parcel of ground on which there are many individual targets such as truck

parks.

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Also, the Army is buying 652 ATACMS Block IA missiles with antipersonnel,

antimateriel submunitions for attacking area targets, and it is developing

the BAT submunition to be carried in 1,806 ATACMS Block II/IIA missiles

against multiple armored targets. With unit costs of about $929,300 for

each ATACMS Block IA missile and $1.9 million for each ATACMS Block II/IIA

missile with the BAT submunitions, these weapons are the most expensive

of the three.

Each of these weapons has been justified as offering advantages, but when

assessed in the aggregate, their combined capabilities overlap and

duplicate each other and may be unnecessary, particularly when likely

threats are in decline. In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have many

Maverick missiles to attack individual armored targets after longer range

air defenses are suppressed. The Army and the Marine Corps have

procured over 13,000 Hellfire II missiles and plan to buy over 11,000

Longbow Hellfire missiles that could be used by attack helicopters against

individual armored targets. Furthermore, the Army has procured over

1,800 ATACMS Block 1 missiles to attack area targets.

The 40,000 WCMD-equipped weapons are planned to be integrated only with

Air Force aircraft. The Air Force configurations have several advantages

over the Navy-developed JSOW variants: the WCMD/CEM variant for area

targets costs less per unit6

 ($19,200 versus $225,300); the WCMD/SFW variant

costs slightly more ($377,400 versus $366,900) but holds more antiarmor

submunitions (40 versus 24); and more WCMD-equipped weapons can be

carried on the B-1 bomber (30 versus 12). These facts would appear to

make the Air Force variant more cost-effective and operationally efficient

than its Navy-developed counterpart and could reduce the number of JSOW

variants procured by the Air Force and the Navy together. The Navy,

however, is not planning to modify its aircraft to carry the WCMD-equipped

weapons.

Multiple Weapon

Types Raise

Acquisition and

Support Expenditures

Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs told us that having a

variety of weapons allows flexibility in countering threats. These officials

also acknowledged that the current deep attack capability is adequate to

meet the current objectives of defense guidance. However, in terms of

acquisition economy and efficiency, questions arise about duplicative

development costs, higher than necessary unit production costs, larger

6

The Air Force configuration uses CEM dispensers already in the inventory, while the Navy weapon

features an entirely new weapon dispenser.

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than necessary procurement quantities, higher than necessary logistics

costs, and reduced interoperability.

First, each of these weapons has a distinct development cost. The total

development cost for the weapons in production and development shown

in table 4.2 is estimated at $5.2 billion (then-year dollars). If even just two

or three development programs had been avoided, the savings could have

been substantial. Considered singly, each of these weapons offers

incrementally different capabilities, but considered in the aggregate, the

services have individually incurred development costs for substantially

similar capabilities. For example, each of the four weapons being acquired

to attack fixed hard and soft targets is projected (1) to be launched beyond

the range of at least mid-range if not long-range enemy air defenses, (2) to

have pinpoint accuracy, and (3) to have improved lethality over currently

available weapons. Moreover, there is a distinct cost to integrate each

weapon into the aircraft7

 that will deliver it to the target area.

Second, the services have bought some weapons in extremely small

quantities at high unit costs. For example, the Air Force procured 711

AGM-130s during fiscal years 1990-98 at an average unit cost of $832,000. It

had originally planned to buy as many as 600 a year at an average unit cost

of under $300,000, but it never bought more than 120 per year. In fiscal

year 1998, the Navy plans to buy only 45 SLAM-ERs, fewer than it bought in

fiscal year 1997. It also plans to buy an average of about 40 missiles per

year until fiscal year 2011 at an average unit cost of about $709,100. The

high average production unit cost is due at least in part to the low annual

procurement quantities, which in turn are a result of the proliferation of

individual systems being procured each year and the relatively fixed

defense budget situation described in chapter 2.

Third, associated logistics costs increase if more types of weapons must

be supported. For example, providing sufficient quantities of many

weapon types to major theaters of war increases the resources that must

be used in fuel and lift capacity.

Fourth, overall procurement quantities could be reduced with fewer

weapon types because not all of the production quantity is used to support

combat requirements. For example, for seven munitions cited in the Deep

Attack Weapons Mix Study, an average of about 36 percent of the

production units are expected to be used for reserves, training, and

7

The Tactical Tomahawk is not launched from aircraft.

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testing. With fewer types of weapons, quantities for testing and training

could be reduced.

Fifth, fewer types of weapons increase interoperability among the

services. By using the same weapon, the services have more opportunities

for common training, preparation of training, maintenance manuals, and

test equipment.

Weapons Mix Study

and Quadrennial

Defense Review

Recommend Little

Change in Acquisition

Programs

The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study was a significant undertaking by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff (with input from the

services) to assess the overall mix and affordability of existing and

planned weapons. The study based its analysis on wartime scenarios

defined by defense guidance and on threat levels and numbers of targets

established by DIA. The study used 2006 as a base year and also developed

results for conflicts in 1998 and 2014.

The study used two primary computer models: the tactical warfare model,

which simulates air and ground combat, and the weapons optimization

and resource requirements model, which provides an optimized weapons

mix using predetermined budget constraints, weather, range, altitude, and

the different phases of the war. (These models are used throughout DOD

for a variety of purposes, including the determination of weapons quantity

requirements.) The major variables used were weather, air defense threats,

target identification, and force levels at the start of a conflict. The

selection of weapons was limited to those in the inventory or in

production and new ones already in development. The number and type of

weapons bought were limited by a $10.5-billion ceiling for purchases from

fiscal year 2005 for the baseline case. Cost data were supplied by the

services.

The unclassified portions of the study’s analysis concluded that the

programmed weapon investment budget of about $10.5 billion was

sufficient to maintain a qualitative advantage over potential aggressors. It

recommended only modest adjustments to current programs and did not

recommend the termination of any guided weapon programs.

DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review based its recommendations on the

weapons mix study and determined that the current guided weapon

programs, with modest adjustments, would provide the capability to

defeat potential aggressors in the years ahead. Accordingly, the review

recommended no change in procurement plans for the WCMD with CEM and

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Proliferation of Guided Weapon Capabilities

and Acquisition Programs

SFW submunitions, the ATACMS with BAT and BAT improved submunitions,

and the Unitary version of the JSOW. The review said DOD would consider

decreasing procurement quantities of the Baseline and BLU-108 versions of

JSOW, increasing procurement quantities of JASSM and laser-guided bombs,

and changing the mix of JDAM variants. Finally, DOD stated that it would

continue procuring Hellfire II missiles while the Army analyzed the

appropriate mix of Hellfire II and Longbow Hellfire missiles.

We compared the review’s recommendations with DOD’s most current

plans in the fiscal year 1999 budget. We found little change in procurement

plans for guided weapons as compared to previous plans. For example, the

procurement quantities for the Baseline and BLU-108 variants of JSOW were

unchanged, the number of ATACMS Block 1A missiles was reduced from 800

to 652, and no programs were eliminated. Further, DOD later concluded

that it would continue as planned with its Longbow Hellfire procurement.

While we believe the weapons study (and by extension the defense

review) was a step in the right direction in the assessment of DOD-wide

requirements for weapons, its impact was, at best, limited.

Independent Reviews

Question Relevance of

Computer Models

Used in Weapons Mix

Study

We did not make an independent review of the models used for the Deep

Attack Weapons Mix Study, which provided the basis for DOD’s strategy for

developing and procuring deep attack weapons. According to several

observations, however, the weapons study used outdated computer

models and assumptions in developing its recommendations.

According to a congressionally directed assessment of the Quadrennial

Defense Review by the National Defense Panel, one of the key models

used in the weapons mix study was developed for the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization-Warsaw Pact scenario and 10 years ago was seen as

having significant shortcomings.8

 The Panel also found that the two

models used in the study are even less relevant today because of improved

weapons technology and changes in warfare. The Panel concluded that the

Quadrennial Defense Review sees major theater warfare as a traditional

force-on-force challenge (such as that envisioned in Central Europe during

the Cold War) and “inhibits the transformation of the American military to

fully exploit our advantages as well as the vulnerabilities of potential

opponents.”

8

The National Defense Panel: Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, May 15, 1997.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
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Proliferation of Guided Weapon Capabilities

and Acquisition Programs

The 1997 Defense Science Board Task Force on the Deep Attack Weapons

Mix Study9

 and the services’ official comments on the weapons mix study

also contended that the models were limited in their analysis of potential

future conflicts. The Task Force Board stated that the weapons mix study

models were very limited in their representation of modern warfare

maneuvers. The Board concluded that while the study was conducted with

the best available methods, “our confidence in the modeling results must

be limited, and our conclusions and acquisition plans must be shaped by

military experience and common sense.”

The Air Force concluded in its official remarks that the study clearly

illustrated the limited ability of DOD’s current models to analyze critical

components such as suppression of enemy air defenses and the impacts of

strategic attack and interdiction; nodal target analysis; logistics; and

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance. The Air Force said that such impacts, “if properly

captured in future modeling efforts, may reduce the numbers of weapons

required to achieve CINC objectives.”

In its official statement, the Navy reported that any computer model

output attempting to replicate the dynamic environment of the battlefield

must be tempered with military judgment, experience, and common sense.

The Navy further stated that the JCS conceptual doctrine of the future

should be considered when developing a future weapons mix but that the

models were incapable of doing this. Instead, an attrition, force-on-force

war in direct opposition to Joint Vision 2010 was modeled.

The National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board, and the Air Force

recommended that new models be developed for future studies and

decisions concerning ongoing force structure. DOD is developing a new

warfighting model called the Joint Warfare System, but its introduction is

several years away. The National Defense Panel said the Joint Warfare

System and other potential models are essential for ongoing force

structure decisions and recommended that DOD broaden the range of

models and accelerate their availability. The Defense Science Board stated

that its members know of no existing model that can assess the relative

value of multimission weapon systems over a range of conflicts. The Board

recommended that DOD develop innovative concepts for rapid evaluation

of broad military force structure issues and concluded that the Joint

Warfare System may provide the modeling capability to overcome

9

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS),

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, January 1997.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
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Proliferation of Guided Weapon Capabilities

and Acquisition Programs

shortcomings in the current analytical process. The Air Force stated that,

if properly developed, future modeling efforts may reduce the number of

weapons needed to meet the CINCs’ objectives. The Air Force also said that

DOD’s Joint Warfare System model may address some of these concerns

but that, in the end, sound military judgment is the remedy for modeling

limitations that may never be resolved.

Coupled with our findings of optimistic funding projections, inflated

weapon requirements, duplicative guided weapon programs, and

questionable quantities, we believe that DOD does not yet have a sound

basis to ensure that it has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack

weapon programs. While modeling is an important aspect in evaluating

alternative mixes of weapons and associated risks, the ultimate decisions

on the proper and cost-effective mix of weapons will require sound and

disciplined military and business judgment.

Joint Staff Plans

Another Weapons

Mix/Affordability

Study

The JCS Strike Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment working group

will conduct another deep attack weapons mix/affordability assessment in

1998. This group, according to a JCS official, was not directly involved in

the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study. While plans for this assessment are

not complete, it is not expected to re-do the weapons mix study. However,

it will consider the weapons mix needed to meet CINC requirements and

will also review the weapons requirement determination process. The

results of the study will be presented to the JCS.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 5 

Oversight of Guided Weapon Requirements

and Acquisition Programs Needs

Improvement

DOD does not have a central oversight body or mechanism to examine

weapon programs in the aggregate and to determine how many weapons it

needs or how many it can afford. The task of developing and procuring

weapons rests with the services, and DOD examines weapon requirements

and capabilities on an individual basis rather than in the aggregate before

beginning production. DOD’s oversight has not prevented, among other

things, duplication of development, service-unique programs, and

production schedule stretch-outs. Some DOD officials believe improved

oversight is needed, and DOD is considering a proposal to expand the Joint

Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office’s responsibilities to include the

coordination of air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs.

Oversight of Services’

Guided Weapon

Capabilities and

Programs

DOD is not providing effective management oversight and coordination of

the services’ guided weapon capabilities and programs to contain

development costs, control logistics impacts, maximize warfighting

flexibility, and avoid production stretch-outs. This problem is not new. In

1996, in our review of combat air power, we reported that DOD has not

been adequately examining its combat air power force structure and its

modernization plans from a joint perspective.1

 We found that DOD does not

routinely develop information on joint mission needs and aggregate

capabilities and therefore has little assurance that decisions to buy,

modify, or retire air power systems are sound. We concluded that the

Chairman could better advise the Secretary of Defense on programs and

budgets if he conducted more comprehensive assessments in key mission

areas. We added that broader assessments that tackle the more

controversial issues would enable the Chairman to better assist the

Secretary of Defense in making the difficult trade-off decisions that will

likely be required.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces reported that

it is not clear that DOD has the correct balance of deep attack weapons and

stated that “currently, no one in DOD has specific responsibility for

specifying the overall number and mix of deep attack systems.” The report

concluded that this situation illustrates the lack of a comprehensive

process to review capabilities and requirements in the aggregate. Current

institutional practices “allow the Services to develop and field new

weapons without a rigorous, DOD-wide assessment of the need for these

weapons and how they will be integrated with the other elements planned

for our arsenal.”

1

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 5 

Oversight of Guided Weapon Requirements

and Acquisition Programs Needs

Improvement

The individual services have always been the primary players in the

acquisition process and have been given broad responsibilities to organize,

train, and equip their forces under title 10 of the U.S. Code. Officials in

both the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary

of Defense view their own role in determining weapon requirements and

acquisition programs only as advisory. Neither office has taken

responsibility for critically assessing the overall capability of the guided

weapons in development, production, and inventory or for determining the

long-term cost-effectiveness of the services’ guided weapon acquisition

plans.

To achieve a stronger joint orientation within DOD, Congress enacted the

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

This act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs of the

combatant commands stronger roles in DOD matters, including the

acquisition process. As principal military adviser to the Secretary of

Defense, the Chairman is now expected to assess military requirements for

defense acquisition programs from a joint warfighting military perspective

and to advise the Secretary on the priority of requirements identified by

the CINCs and the extent to which program recommendations and budget

proposals of the military departments conform to these priorities. The

Chairman is also expected to submit to the Secretary alternative program

recommendations and budget proposals to achieve greater conformance

with CINC priorities. Subsequent legislation has given the Chairman

additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can eliminate or reduce

duplicative capabilities.2

Within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the J8 Directorate tracks the progress of

weapon acquisition programs, assesses the current capabilities available

to CINCs, and advises the services of apparent deficiencies. In addition, a

second group associated with JCS—the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council (JROC)3

—has the authority to advise the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on CINC requirement priorities,

assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs,4

 submit

alternative program and budget recommendations, and prepare net

assessments of capabilities. JROC validates the mission need statement

required for initiating major acquisition programs as well as the key

2

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484, sec. 901).

3

JROC is a cross-service, decisional council chaired by the Vice Chairman, JCS. Members include the

Vice Chiefs of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

4

JROC is required to review the requirement for any program designated as a major acquisition

program and can choose to review the requirement for other programs.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 5 

Oversight of Guided Weapon Requirements

and Acquisition Programs Needs

Improvement

operational performance parameters for the proposed weapon. Finally, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluates the extent to which the

services’ proposed guided weapon budgets conform to the priorities

established in DOD’s strategic plans (such as the Quadrennial Defense

Review) and to CINCs’ requirements and makes recommendations to the

Secretary of Defense.

The Defense Acquisition Board, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition and Technology, is the senior advisory group within DOD

chartered to oversee the defense acquisition process. The Board’s mission

is to help define and validate new system requirements, examine trade-offs

between cost and performance, explore alternatives to new research and

development, and recommend full-scale development and full-rate

production. The Board has broad review responsibility for decision

milestones during critical acquisition phases. In addition to reviewing the

mission need statements and operational requirements documents in the

initial phases of development, the Board also reviews the detailed analyses

of alternative solutions prepared by the services. These analyses provide

the rationale for one alternative over another and should include a

comparison of current and upgraded weapons with new proposed

weapons.

In 1996, Congress, in addition to asking DOD to conduct its Deep Attack

Weapons Mix Study, requested a report on how DOD approves development

of new guided weapons and avoids duplication and redundancy in guided

weapon programs.5

 It also sought information on the feasibility of carrying

out joint development and procurement of guided weapons. In response,

the Secretary of Defense issued a report to Congress in April 1996 on the

process for approving and initiating development programs.6

 The report

noted that through reviews by JROC and the Defense Acquisition Board,

several major guided weapon acquisition programs had been designated as

joint programs. DOD concluded that redundancies and duplication in the

services’ weapon acquisitions had been minimized as a result of reviews

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To the contrary, DOD’s oversight approach to the services’ weapon

acquisition and procurement has had very limited effect on guided weapon

programs. DOD’s oversight has not prevented inflated funding projections

for guided weapons, as discussed in chapter 2; inflated requirements for

guided weapons, as discussed in chapter 3; and instances of service-unique

5

P.L. 104-106, sec. 261.

6

Precision Guided Munitions Acquisitions Process Report, April 1996.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 5 

Oversight of Guided Weapon Requirements

and Acquisition Programs Needs

Improvement

weapons, overlap and duplication, production inefficiencies, increased

logistics burdens, and reduced interoperability, as discussed in chapter 4.

For example, JROC and the Defense Acquisition Board have approved the

acquisition of several guided weapon programs with very similar

capabilities—JASSM, SLAM-ER, the Tactical Tomahawk, and the Unitary

version of the JSOW—without adequate consideration of available

aggregate capabilities or aggregate requirements for such weapons.

Limited Recognition

of the Need to

Improve Oversight

and Coordination

Some DOD officials have recognized a need for increased oversight of

guided weapon programs. According to these officials, the Department

established an office to oversee acquisition of air-to-ground weapons

within the Air Force Office of Requirements and within the Navy’s

Aviation Requirements Branch. However, these oversight responsibilities

are adjunct to the regular duties of these offices, and no meetings have

taken place in over 4 years.

DOD has had more success in providing oversight of air-to-air missile

programs. In fiscal year 1989, in response to congressional concerns, the

Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office was established to eliminate

duplication in air-to-air missile programs. The Office has representatives

from the Navy and the Air Force requirements branches, and its operations

are guided by a memorandum of agreement and a charter. Representatives

are assigned to the Office rather than fulfilling their duties as adjunct

responsibilities. In recent years, the Office was successful in avoiding

duplication in the services’ air-to-air missile programs by ensuring the

continued joint development and procurement of the Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air Missile and the Air Intercept Missile-9X by the Navy and

the Air Force.

Currently, no joint coordinating office exists for the requirements and

acquisition of deep attack weapons. A proposal is circulating within the

Air Force and the Navy to expand the responsibilities of the current Joint

Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office to include the coordination of

air-to-ground weapons. Although the scope of such an office would have

to be expanded significantly to address all guided weapons, the success of

the Air-to-Air Missile Office has shown that the Air Force and the Navy can

effectively coordinate their requirements and establish joint programs for

the acquisition of similar weapons. Expanding the Office’s purview to

include guided weapons would, in our view, provide some assurance that

decisions in the deep attack area have been assessed from the perspective

of the services’ combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions DOD’s current investment strategy for guided weapons may not be

executable as proposed because it is contingent on sizable increases in

procurement funding within a relatively fixed defense budget. As major

commitments are made to the initial procurement of the planned guided

weapon programs over the next several years, a significant imbalance is

likely to result between funding requirements and available funds. As a

result of understated cost estimates and overly optimistic funding

assumptions, more programs have been approved than can be supported

by available funds. Such imbalances have historically led to program

stretch-outs, reduced annual procurement rates, higher unit costs, and

delayed deliveries to operational units. Every effort needs to be made to

avoid these “pay more for less” outcomes. Further, these imbalances may

be long-term and may restrict DOD’s flexibility to respond to unexpected

requirements or to procure potentially innovative systems.

The current inventory of deep attack weapons (guided and unguided) is

both large and capable, and DOD is improving some weapons to make them

even more effective. Although the existing inventory is considered

sufficient to support the current objectives of defense guidance, DOD’s

plans for individual weapons will, in the aggregate, almost double the size

of the guided weapon inventory at a time when worldwide threats are

stable or declining. DOD expects the new, more modern weapons to enable

warfighters to accomplish the same objectives with fewer weapons and

casualties and less unintended collateral damage.

DOD needs to establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack

capabilities and assess the incremental contribution of its guided weapon

acquisitions. Without such a requirement and analyses, it is difficult to

understand DOD’s rationale as to why, in the aggregate, it needs to almost

double the size of its guided weapon inventory, particularly in today’s

budgetary and security environment. Further, the services’ requirement

processes are focused on individual systems and appear to inflate the

quantity of each system needed. For example, the services use

conservative assumptions concerning threats and target lists, appropriate

weapon choices, the use of advanced tactics, and strategic reserves. The

use of more realistic assumptions would lead to lower weapon

requirements.

The services have had numerous opportunities to develop and procure

guided weapons in a more cost-effective and economical manner.

However, when reviewing the services’ currently planned programs in the

aggregate, we found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendations

weapon types and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured

for each target class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and more

accurate weapons rather than for options that may be as effective and less

costly.

DOD’s Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study was an opportunity for DOD to

critically assess its weapons procurement programs and provide a basis

for restructuring them. However, despite the significant effort that went

into the study, it still does not, in our view, give DOD the assurance that it

has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs.

Therefore, DOD cannot be confident that force structure and modernization

decisions will result in the most cost-effective mix of forces to fulfill the

national military strategy.

Because DOD does not routinely develop information on joint mission

needs and aggregate capabilities, it has little assurance that decisions to

buy, modify, or retire deep attack weapons are sound. Broader

assessments that tackle the more controversial deep attack issues would

enable the Secretary of Defense to make the difficult trade-off decisions

that will likely be required. Broadening the current joint warfare

capabilities assessment processes would be a good starting point.

Alternatively, the establishment of a DOD-wide coordinating office for

requirements and possible joint programs for the acquisition of deep

attack weapons, modeled after the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Office, would

provide some assurance that decisions in the deep attack area have been

assessed from the perspective of the services’ combined requirements,

capabilities, and acquisition plans.

Recommendations DOD’s planned spending for guided weapons will escalate rapidly over the

next few years, and key decisions will be made to start procurement of

some very costly and possibly unneeded guided weapons. Instead of

continuing to start procurement programs that may not be executable as

proposed, DOD should determine how much procurement funding can

realistically be expected to be available for guided weapons over the long

term and cost-effectively execute those programs within that level of

funding. In doing so, DOD should also consider the already large inventory

of guided weapons and the advances in technologies that are expected to

increase the effectiveness of future weapons as well as the current and

projected decline in threat.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,

• establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack capabilities;

• reevaluate the assumptions used in guided weapon requirements

determination processes to better reflect the new international situation,

realistic target sets, enhanced weapon effectiveness, proper weapon

selection, and the use of advanced tactics; and

• reevaluate the planned guided weapon acquisition programs in light of

existing capabilities and the current budgetary and security environment

to determine whether the procurement of all planned guided weapon types

and quantities (1) is necessary and cost-effective in the aggregate and

(2) can clearly be carried out as proposed within realistic, long-term

projections of procurement funding.

Further, we recommend, as we did in 1996 in our combat air power

reports, that the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, develop an assessment process that yields more

comprehensive information on procurement requirements and aggregate

capabilities in key mission areas such as deep attack. This can be done by

broadening the current joint warfare capabilities assessment process or

developing an alternative mechanism. One such alternative could be the

establishment of a DOD-wide coordinating office to consider the services’

combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans for deep attack

weapons. This office could be modeled after the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air

Missile Office.

DOD Comments and

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with

our recommendations, stating that the Joint Staff will be conducting a

follow-up to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and that a coordinating

office will be established to assess joint weapon requirements. However,

DOD stated that our report takes a snapshot of today’s inventory and

ignores how and why DOD got there and how it is profiting from that

experience. DOD said our report fails to recognize its significant efforts to

improve its requirements, acquisition, and oversight processes.

A follow-on study to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study is a good step

but we urge DOD to conclude the study with decisions on which programs

to cut back and which to end in order to ensure that its programs are fully

executable within expected budgets. Also, as a partial solution to the need

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendations

for more comprehensive assessments, we see DOD’s agreement to establish

a body to review and deconflict joint air-to-surface requirements as

important. We agree with DOD that such a body might better resolve issues

among the services with less DOD intervention. We urge DOD to pursue the

establishment of such a body and believe it should address all deep attack

requirements, not just air-to-surface requirements.

This report focuses on DOD’s plans to acquire additional guided weapons

for deep attack missions within the context of the existing inventory of

deep attack weapons. DOD has a variety of acquisition reform initiatives

underway that may have an impact on the structure and management of

individual acquisition programs. However, these initiatives have little

bearing on the determination of DOD-wide requirements for deep attack

weapons or on how to procure those requirements in the most

cost-effective manner possible.

We have also considered DOD’s efforts to improve its processes. In the

recent past, we have examined in considerable depth DOD’s requirements,

acquisitions, and oversight processes.1

 While we acknowledge DOD’s

efforts and progress to date in improving those processes, the problems

reported here of optimistic funding projections, inflated requirements,

overlapping and duplicative programs, and service-unique programs

continue. We urge DOD to continue its acquisition reforms and other

initiatives but also to reexamine the oversight process to determine ways

to provide more discipline in its processes and to fund fewer programs.

Although DOD’s official comments do not address the mismatch between

commitments and resources, DOD officials stated at the exit meeting on

this report that, due to the mismatch between commitments and

resources, DOD plans to reduce fiscal year 2000 procurement quantities for

several guided weapon programs. Reductions in annual procurement

quantities and stretch-outs in procurement schedules should not be the

inevitable solutions to the mismatch between its commitments to

programs and expected resources. Every effort should be made to avoid

these “pay more for less” outcomes.

1

High Risk Series (GAO/HR-97-6, Feb. 1997) and Combat Air Power (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20,

1996).

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 6.

See comment 2.

See comment 7.

See comment 4.

See comment 8.

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated September 16, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. As we point out in the report, the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study is

not, in itself, a solution but a tool to help defense decisionmakers make

the difficult but necessary decisions in the current budgetary and security

environment. Nevertheless, the Weapons Mix Study was important in that

it attempted to address the DOD-wide requirement for deep attack

weapons; we urge DOD to continue and improve on the process.

2. We recognize that DOD has a number of initiatives underway to control

the cost of ongoing programs. However, as our report points out, DOD

needs to fully address the affordability of programs before they are

approved. Even if DOD were to address the cost of each program, there are

too many guided weapon procurement programs to be effectively

supported with the limited amount of available procurement funding. This

problem results in DOD stretching out its procurement programs and

consequently increasing unit costs. We believe that this is an outcome DOD

should work to avoid.

3. We believe that DOD could do much better in terms of following its

policy on joint guided weapon programs. For example, the Joint

Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and the unitary variant of the Joint

Standoff Weapon (JSOW) are joint in name only.

4. In the report, we have addressed the roles and responsibilities of those

involved in oversight of requirements for and acquisition of guided

weapons. As we stated in the report, the oversight processes need to be

improved. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs need

to use not only military judgment but exercise sound business practices in

their evaluation of the services’ guided weapon plans.

5. We also believe that the weapons mix study process should continue

and be improved. However, the process should rely on models for

information, not answers, or as a substitute for sound military judgment

and business practices.

6. We recognize that much effort has been exerted to improve the services’

requirements processes. However, we believe that much more needs to be

done. The current processes and models permit the use of conservative

assumptions that unnecessarily inflate requirements.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

7. DOD does not explain in its written comments how it believes it can

execute its guided weapon acquisition programs as planned within budget

limitations. However, at the exit conference for this report, DOD officials

told us that they fully expect to reduce annual procurement quantities and

stretch-out procurement schedules, thereby accepting higher unit costs.

8. We believe DOD’s agreement to establish a body to review and deconflict

joint air-to-surface requirements is a partial solution to the need for more

comprehensive assessments. As DOD states, a body such as this might

better resolve issues among the services with less DOD intervention. While

we urge DOD to pursue the establishment of such a body, we believe it

should address all deep attack requirements, not just air-to-surface

requirements.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-99-32 Weapons Acquisitions
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David B. Best

William J. Gillies

Atlanta Field Office William R. Graveline

Carol T. Mebane

Dana S. Solomon

Chicago/Dayton Field

Office

Matthew R. Mongin

Myra A. Watts

Gerald W. Wood

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