ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Supreme Court

People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719

Caption in Supreme

Court:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. THOMAS

S. RINEHART, Appellee.

 

Docket No. 111719

Filed January 20, 2012

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The 2005 statutory amendment stating that, for the offense of criminal

sexual assault, “the term of mandatory supervised release shall range

from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the

defendant” is properly construed to provide for an indeterminate parole

term which is under the control of the Department of Corrections and

which a sentencing court need not specify in its judgment.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that

court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles County, the Hon. Gary

W. Jacobs, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Counsel on

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and C. Steve Ferguson,

State’s Attorney, of Charleston (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General,

and Michael M. Glick and Katherine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorneys

General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman and Luke

McNeill, of the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of

Springfield, of counsel), for the People.

Karen Munoz, Deputy Defender, and Colleen M. Morgan, Assistant

Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of

Springfield, for appellee.

Justices JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

ChiefJustice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,Karmeier,

and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 In 2007, defendant Thomas Rinehart was convicted of criminal sexual assault and

sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court

affirmed his conviction and sentence, but remanded with instructions for the circuit court of

Coles County to select a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) within the range of

three years to natural life contained in section 5-8-1(d)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections

(730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2006)). 406 Ill. App. 3d 272. The State appealed.

¶ 2 The central issue before us, then, is whether the appellate court erred in holding that

section 5-8-1(d)(4)requires the trial court to set a determinate MSR term within the statutory

range. In his request for cross-relief, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court

erred in allowing the State to pose various questions during voir dire. We affirm the

defendant’s conviction and sentence, and vacate the appellate court’s order on MSR.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 2006, the defendant lived with his girlfriend, Hope Scott, and her children, one of

whichwasA.A., a then-17-year-old girl with developmental disabilities. Sometime in August

of that year, the defendant borrowed Scott’s minivan to help her friends move to Mattoon

from Charleston, Illinois. A.A. rode alone with the defendant on one trip. Several weeks

later, she told Scott’s friends’ daughters that the defendant had forced her to have sex in the

back of the minivan on the day they moved. Subsequently, the police arrested the defendant,

and charged him with criminal sexual assault.

¶ 5 The case proceeded to a jury trial. During jury selection, the parties were permitted to

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question venire members pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 431 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (eff. May

1, 2007)). The State asked 5 of the 25 potential jurors who were questioned why a sexual

assault victim might delay in reporting an incident. The exchanges between the prosecutor

and the jurors were short.

“MS. KIGER [Assistant State’s Attorney]: Can you think of some reasons why

a sexual assault victim might not immediately report an incident?

MR. WHITE [Prospective Juror]: Why they would not report an incident?

MS. KIGER: Right away.

MR. WHITE: The victim?

MS. KIGER: Correct.

MR. WHITE: Well, they probably may say it really didn’t happen, and then the

falling out with the parents. Maybe there was a relationship, you know, age

difference relationship. Then the parents found out about it, convinced, you know.

Children are children.

MS. KIGER: Can you think of a reason why a victim who had had some things

happen to them might not immediately go to an adult or report it?

MR. WHITE: Scared.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a victim of sexual assault might

not immediately report it to someone?

MS. FULLER [Prospective Juror]: Fear, shame.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of a reason why a victim might delay in reporting

being raped or being a victim of sexual assault?

MS. HANFT [Prospective Juror]: Shame, embarrassment, fear.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual assault victim might

not automatically come forward?

MR. RALSTON [Prospective Juror]: Oh, I think maybe fear, and think you

would be a lesser person if something like that happened to you.

* * *

MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual assault victim might

not immediately report that?

MR. AYERS [Prospective Juror]: Yeah.

MS. KIGER: Can you tell me what some of those reasons would be?

MR. AYERS: Same, fear and scared to come forward.”

Defense counsel did not object to any of these questions. The State and the defense each

excused one of these jurors, so only three of those five venire members ultimately served on

the jury.

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¶ 6 At trial, A.A. testified for the State, and recounted the details of the attack. According to

A.A., while she and the defendant were between towns, he pulled the minivan off a familiar

state highway and onto an unfamiliar rural side road. He stopped the van and turned off its

engine. A.A. could see trees and a fence, and a distant house. She stated that the defendant

ordered her to get into the back of the van, where the rear seats had been removed, and take

off her clothes. She was scared and complied. She furtherstated that the defendant joined her

there and took off his clothes, then forced her to have sex. Afterwards, they got dressed, and

he instructed her not to tell anyone before resuming the trip to Charleston. A.A. identified

the defendant as the man who attacked her.

¶ 7 Detective James Hite of the Coles Countysheriff’s department also testified for the State.

He stated that he received a call on August 27, 2006, to investigate a sexual assault by the

defendant against A.A. Detective Hite contacted the Department of Children and Family

Services, who arranged an interview between a child advocacy center staffer and A.A. He

watched the interview and observed A.A.’s demeanor. Detective Hite also took photographs

of the site of the attack, which were submitted into evidence by the State.

¶ 8 The defendant presented no evidence on his behalf. The jury found him guilty, and the

trial court sentenced him to 28 years’ imprisonment, but not to a specific MSR term. Instead,

the court stated:

“I further order that the defendant will serve a period of [MSR] after serving his

sentence as mandated by statute.

Counsel, [it is] a little bit unclear to me what that period would be. There’s been

some recent legislation that would suggest to me that the applicable time upon the

defendant for this offense is not less than three and could be up to natural life, as the

statute indicates, regarding the mandatory supervised release period. I don’t think I

have to make that as part of my finding. It’s what the Department of Corrections will

impose upon him, but there is a minimum three-year mandatory supervised release

period. As I understand the statute, it could be beyond that period.”

The written sentencing judgment also did not mention MSR. Thereafter, the Illinois

Department of Corrections calculated the defendant’s sentence to include an indeterminate

MSR term of three years to natural life. The defendant appealed.

¶ 9 The appellate court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, vacated his MSR term, and

remanded with directions to set an MSR term within the statutory range. 406 Ill. App. 3d

272. The appellate court first addressed the defendant’s argument that the State’s questions

for prospective jurors asked them to prejudge A.A.’s credibility and predisposed them to

believe her testimony, thus denying him a fair trial. The appellate court noted that the

defendant had forfeited review of that issue, but considered whether it was plain error. Id.

at 276. The court concluded that allowing the questions was, indeed, error. According to the

appellate court,

“[The questions were] designed to expose whether a juror would automatically

perceive a delay in reporting to mean the victim was lying about the incident. A

negative response to the State’s question could have indicated potential bias against

the veracity of the victim’s testimony. While questions designed to discover bias are

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proper, these questions to prospective jurors asked jurors to speculate as to reasons

why a victim might not come forward. While the subject could be raised in voir dire

through artful questions, the questions asked by the prosecutor crossed the boundary

of acceptable voir dire.” Id.

¶ 10 The appellate court, however, refused to excuse the defendant’s procedural default. First,

the court held that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. Id. at 277. The State,

through A.A.’s testimony, presented evidence of the attack and its location, while the

defendant presented no evidence. Id. Second, the court held that the error did not affect the

fairness of the trial. Id. The appellate court stated:

“[W]hile the voir dire questions crossed the line of propriety, they did not

indoctrinate the jury and deny defendant a fair trial. The State’s questions, though

improper, were not pervasive. In addition, the jurors, during the same questioning,

recognized defendant’s innocence until proved guilty and asserted they would be

impartial. During trial, the jurors heard the victim testify she was afraid to tell her

mother, who was defendant’s live-in paramour, because she feared her mother would

not believe her and would punish her. The jurors did not have to rely on speculation

for determining the reason for A.A.’s delay in reporting the offense.” Id.

The appellate court further held that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of

counsel because he could not show prejudice from his attorney’s failure to object to the

State’s questions. Id. at 278.

¶ 11 The appellate court then addressed the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in

not sentencing him to an MSR term within the statutory range. The appellate court concluded

that the Unified Code of Corrections contains a determinate sentence structure, and an

indeterminate MSR term is inconsistent with that structure. Id. at 280-81. Additionally, the

court noted that the Code grants the trial court, not the Prisoner Review Board, the power to

impose an MSR term. Id. at 281. According to the appellate court, “Because section 5-8-

1(d)(4) contains an MSR term range for criminal sexual assault, the court also possesses the

duty to exercise its discretion and impose MSR within that range. The trial court, and not

DOC, is in the best position to assess and weigh the factors relevant to determine whether

a defendant should serve three years’ MSR, natural life, or a term in between.” Id. The

appellate court acknowledged that People v. Schneider, 403 Ill. App. 3d 301 (2010), reached

the opposite result, but declined to follow that case. Id. at 281-82.

¶ 12 This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb.

26, 2010). In his response brief, the defendant requested cross-relief, contending that the trial

court erred in allowing the State’s voir dire questions.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 If the defendant succeeds on the issue raised in his request for cross-relief, he would be

entitled to a new trial. Thus, we will address that issue first. Because defense counsel did not

object to the State’s questions, our discussion begins with plain error.

¶ 15 The plain-error doctrine offers criminal defendants a narrow path to appellate review of

procedurally forfeited trial errors. People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124 (2009). As a matter

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of convention, a prerequisite–or as we have previously termed it, an initial or first step (see

People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008); People v. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d 452, 462

(2011))–toward applying that doctrine is the existence of an error. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill.

2d 166, 189 (2010). Thus, we must determine whether the trial court erred in allowing the

State to ask certain venire members about their views on sexual assault allegations in which

there was a delay between an incident and the reporting of it.

¶ 16 The constitutional right to a jury trial encompasses the right to an impartial jury. See Irvin

v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961). The trial court is primarily responsible for initiating and

conducting voir dire (People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 476 (2000)), though it must permit

the parties to supplement its examination “by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper,”

pursuant to Rule 431 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (eff. May 1, 2007)). Because there is no precise test

for determining which questions will filter out partial jurors (see People v. Washington, 104

Ill. App. 3d 386, 390 (1982)), the manner and scope of the examination rests within the

discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. An

abuse of discretion occurs when the conduct of the trial court thwarts the purpose of voir dire

examination–namely, the selection of a jury free from bias or prejudice. People v. Williams,

164 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1994); People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993) (“[t]he purpose

of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about prospective jurors’ beliefs and

opinions so as to allow removal of those members of the venire whose minds are so closed

by bias and prejudice that they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their

oath”); see also People v. Clark, 278 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1003 (1996) (“The purpose of voir

dire is to enable the trial court to select an impartial jury and to ensure that the attorneys have

an informed and intelligent basis on which to exercise peremptory challenges.”). Stated

differently, a trial court does not abuse its discretion during voir dire if the questions create

“a reasonable assurance that any prejudice or bias would be discovered.” People v. Dow, 240

Ill. App. 3d 392, 397 (1992).

¶ 17 Accordingly, voir dire questions, whether asked by the trial court or by the parties with

the sanction of the court, must not be “a means of indoctrinating a jury, or impaneling a jury

with a particular predisposition.” People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 64 (1986). Rather than a

bright-line rule, this is a continuum. Broad questions are generallypermissible. For example,

the State may ask potential jurors whether they would be disinclined to convict a defendant

based on circumstantial evidence. See People v. Freeman, 60 Ill. App. 3d 794, 799-800

(1978). Specific questions tailored to the facts of the case and intended to serve as

“preliminary final argument” (People v. Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d 979, 989-90 (1996)) are

generally impermissible. But see People v. Faulkner, 186 Ill. App. 3d 1013 (1989) (holding

that the State may inquire whether venire members have deep-seated beliefs that prevent

them from returning a guilty verdict in a murder case where the State cannot produce direct

evidence of the victim’s body).

¶ 18 The defendant argues, tracking the appellate court’s analysis below, that the State’s

questions did not seek to uncover bias but, rather, sought to preeducate potential jurors on

an aspect of A.A.’s expected testimony, and thereby bolster her credibility. According to the

defendant, the State encouraged potential jurors to imagine why A.A. would not have told

anyone about the incident when it happened, and thus empathize with her. The defendant

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directs our attention to People v. Bell, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1007 (1987), and People v. Boston,

383 Ill. App. 3d 352 (2008).

¶ 19 In Bell, the defendant was charged with the murders of his parents. During voir dire, the

State asked a majority of the potential jurors whetherthey believed that people have a natural

impulse to confess their wrongdoings, and whether they believed that a person could carry

out a plan to murder a family member as a solution to problems in that relationship. The

defendant did not object to these questions. He was convicted. On appeal, the appellate court

chose to address the issue on the merits, and held that the questions were improper “because

they served primarily to indoctrinate the jurors as to the State’s theory at trial and asked them

to prejudge the facts of the case.” Bell, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1017.

¶ 20 In Boston, the defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault of his girlfriend.

During voir dire, the State asked all of the potential jurors whether they believed that the

government should not become involved in domestic incidents; whether they believed that

a woman who obtains an order of protection against a man, and then invites that man to her

home, has given implied consent to a subsequent sex act with the man, and has made herself

responsible for any subsequent violence with the man; and whether they believed that a

woman consents to a sex act if she does not scream or fight while she is being assaulted. The

defendant did not object to these questions. He was convicted. On appeal, the appellate court

did not discuss forfeiture, and simply noted that the evidence was closely balanced. Boston,

383 Ill. App. 3d at 356. The court held that the questions were improper because they

“highlighted factual details about the case and asked prospective jurors to prejudge those

facts,” and concerned matters of law or instruction, which are not appropriate areas of inquiry

under Rule 431(a). Id. at 355.

¶ 21 The questions in this case differ from those in Bell and Boston. Unlike the questions in

those cases, the questions here were less fact-driven, and more focused on potential jurors’

preconceptions about sexual assault cases, in an effort to uncover any bias regarding delayed

reporting and the credibility of a victim who informed no one about the alleged attack when

it happened. An answer which indicated a juror was less likely to believe a victim who did

not immediately report an incident would have given the State grounds to exercise

intelligently its peremptory challenges. The questions were brief, and the State did not

elaborate on the subject, but instead accepted the answers it received and factored them into

the decision on which jurors to excuse. Further, unlike the State in Bell and Boston, the State

here did not ask every potential juror about this subject, and instead posed a question on it

to only five potential jurors, one-fifth of the venire. Although we agree with the appellate

court that the subject could have been raised more artfully (406 Ill. App. 3d at 276), and

perhaps phrased in terms of a venire member’s bias and ability to put any bias aside in

reaching a verdict, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Because there was

no error, the defendant’s procedural default must stand. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d at 465.

¶ 22 Additionally, because therewas no error, the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel

contention must fail. Defense counsel’s failure to object to voir dire questions which the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing was not objectively unreasonable. People v.

Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326 (2011).

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¶ 23 We turn to the issue raised by the State in its appeal, whether the appellate court erred

in holding that section 5-8-1(d)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections requires the trial court

to set a determinate MSR term within the statutory range. Resolution of this issue is a matter

of statutory construction, and our review proceeds de novo. People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d

380, 389 (2006).

¶ 24 The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the

legislature. Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 513 (2007). The plain language of the statute

is the best indication of that intent, and if that language is clear and unambiguous, it must be

given effect. People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill. 2d 449, 454-55 (2008).

¶ 25 Section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections requires that “every sentence shall

include as though written therein a term [of MSR] in addition to the term of imprisonment.”

730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2006). Section 5-8-1(d)(4) provides that the MSR term for

certain sex offenses, including criminal sexual assault, “shall range from a minimum of 3

years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant.” 730 ILCS 5-8-1(d)(4)(West 2006).

That section does not indicate whether the trial court should choose a term within that range,

or whether the term is the range itself. The statute may be read either way, and its plain

language does not indicate the legislature’s intent.

¶ 26 If a statute’s language is unclear or ambiguous, if it is susceptible of more than one

reasonable reading, we must resort to other sources to aid our inquiry. See People ex rel.

Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 571 (2002). Such sources

include the maxim of in pari materia, under which two statutes, or two parts of one statute,

concerning the same subject must be considered together in order to produce a “harmonious

whole.” Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). Words and

phrases should be construed, not in isolation, but in light of other relevant provisions. People

v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243 (2008). “[W]e consider the statute in its entirety, keeping

in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it.”

People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (2009); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.

2d 264, 280 (2003) (“in determining the intent of the General Assembly, we may properly

consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law,

the evils sought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved”).

¶ 27 Section 5-8-1(d)(4) was part of Public Act 94-165 (eff. July 11, 2005), which amended

various sections of the Code, including section 3-3-2, and added section 3-14-2.5. Section

3-3-2(a)(3.5) provides that the Prisoner Review Board shall “hear *** and *** decide[ ] the

conditions of mandatory supervised release and the time of discharge from mandatory

supervised release, *** impose sanctions for violations of mandatory supervised release and

revoke mandatory supervised release for those serving extended supervised release terms

pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2(a)(3.5)

(West 2006).

¶ 28 Section 3-14-2.5, titled “Extended supervision of sex offenders,” provides:

“(a) The Department shall retain custody of all sex offenders placed on

mandatory supervised release pursuant to clause (d)(4) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code

and shall supervise such persons during their term of supervised release in accord

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with the conditions set by the Prisoner Review Board pursuant to Section 3-3-7 of

this Code.

(b) A copy of the conditions of mandatory supervised release shall be signed by

the offender and given to him or her and to his or her supervising officer.

Commencing 180 days after the offender’s release date and continuing every 180

days thereafter for the duration of the supervision term, the supervising officer shall

prepare a progress report detailing the offender’s adjustment and compliancewith the

conditions of mandatorysupervised release including the offender’s participation and

progress in sex offender treatment. The progress report shall be submitted to the

Prisoner Review Board and copies provided to the chief of police and sheriff in the

municipality and county in which the offender resides and is registered.

(c) Supervising officers shall receive specialized training in the supervision of sex

offenders including the impact of sexual assault on its victims.

(d) Releasees serving extended mandatory supervised release terms pursuant to

subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code may request discharge from supervision

as provided by subsection (b) of Section 3-3-8 of this Code. Requests for discharge

from extended mandatorysupervised release shall be supported bya recommendation

by the releasee’s supervising agent and an evaluation of the releasee completed no

longer than 30 days prior to the request for discharge from supervision. The

evaluation shall be conducted by a Sex Offender Management Board approved sex

offender evaluator and shall be at the releasee’s expense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5

(West 2006).

¶ 29 Public Act 94-165 created a comprehensive scheme regarding MSR for certain sex

offenses, which marked a philosophical and procedural change in how parole operates for

defendants convicted of such offenses. The appellate court here noted that the General

Assembly “carved out a limited exception for the crimes listed in section 5-8-1(d)[(4)]” (406

Ill. App. 3d at 280), but refused to give that decision any weight, and instead focused on a

purported inconsistency between section 5-8-1(d)(4) and the otherwise determinate sentence

structure of section 5-8-1(a). The Schneider court saw the impetus behind section 5-8-1(d)(4)

more clearly: “Presumablythe legislature, in using indeterminate language with regard to the

MSR term long after it generally abolished indeterminate sentences, specifically intended

indeterminate MSR terms in sexual assault cases.” Schneider, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 308. The

legislature abandoned the structure of determinate MSR terms accompanying other offenses

and adopted a structure of indeterminate or “extended” MSR terms for sex offenses precisely

because it viewed sex offenses differently, due to the risk of recidivism. See 94th Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 2005, at 82-83 (statements of Representative

Gordon) (this legislation “creates lifetime supervision for high-risk sex offenders”).

¶ 30 Further, under section 3-14-2.5(b), a sex offender’s parole officer must prepare a progress

report every180 days, and undersection 3-14-2.5(d) the offender mayrequest discharge from

MSR upon the recommendation of the officer. These provisions contemplate indeterminate

MSR terms, not determinate terms. The appellate court was incorrect in vacating the

defendant’s MSR term. We affirm the defendant’s conviction, and vacate the appellate

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court’s order on the issue of MSR. The defendant’s MSR term is an indeterminate three years

to natural life.

¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 Forthe reasons that we have stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part

and vacated in part.

¶ 33 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

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