Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction

Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

February 2010

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Contents

Introduction............................................................................................ 1

Part I: 

Background on Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations ................3

Part II: 

Ten Targeted Reforms for Improving Stabilization

and Reconstruction Operations............................................................ 13

Part III: 

The U.S. Office for Contingency Operations: Improving the 

Planning and Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations............................................................................................23

Appendix:

Departments of State and Defense Comments on Draft of 

this Paper .............................................................................................33

Endnotes...............................................................................................45

Acronyms..............................................................................................50

*The official version of this paper, including any corrections, is available on the 

SIGIR website: www.sigir.mil. 

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FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 1

Introduction

I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws 

and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; 

because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find 

practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and 

institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As 

that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are 

made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the 

change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace 

with the times.1

—Thomas Jefferson 

This paper addresses—and proposes an answer to—the question of 

who should be accountable for planning, managing, and executing 

stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs). The U.S. government’s existing approach provides no clear answer. Responsibilities 

for SROs are divided among several agencies, chiefly the Department 

of State (State), the Department of Defense (Defense), and the United 

States Agency for International Development (USAID). As a result, 

lines of responsibility and accountability are not well-defined. 

The lack of an established SRO management system forced the U.S. 

government to respond to challenges in Iraq through a series of ad hoc

agencies that oversaw stabilization and reconstruction activities with—

unsurprisingly—generally unsatisfactory outcomes. This paper suggests 

a new and comprehensive solution, comprising a collection of targeted 

operational reforms and the creation of an integrated management 

office—the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO)—that 

would be accountable for planning and executing SROs. 

After reviewing a draft of this report, the Departments of State and 

Defense found many of the specific recommendations useful. However, though viewing USOCO as an interesting and timely concept, 

the departments did not endorse it as a unified solution. They believe 

that the existing SRO management structure, which diffuses duties 

between and among varying agencies, is preferable to implementing a new, consolidated system. Further, Defense does not think that 

the Congress currently has the appetite for creating a new office like 

USOCO, and State believes that SRO problems chiefly arise from 

insufficient resources and not management weaknesses. State asserted 

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2 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

that the contingent approach now in place, albeit somewhat improvisational, is preferable to a more clearly defined and unified structure.

The departments’ comments are attached in an appendix.

Over the past decade, the United States has been involved in complex SROs in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations have demanded 

levels of interagency coordination and integration that the U.S. 

government could not meet, thereby exposing structural weaknesses 

in SRO planning and management. In Iraq, significant interagency 

breakdowns led to the waste of countless taxpayer dollars. SIGIR documented notable examples of these breakdowns in audit and inspection reports, identifying management failures and myriad instances 

of waste, fraud, and abuse. Taken together, these reports constitute a 

body of evidence buttressing this paper’s argument for a more comprehensive reform of SRO planning and execution. 

The extensive work on SROs by think tanks and government organizations reveals a generally held recognition of the civilian/military integration problem.2

 Several significant legislative and executive branch initiatives implemented in recent years have sought to redress the problem, 

including programs led by State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and Defense’s Partnership Strategy 

and Stability Operations office. Notwithstanding these efforts, the various 

reforms, as realized to date, have yet to yield a sufficient remedy. 

This paper is divided into three parts. Part I provides a brief background on SROs. Part II posits ten targeted reforms that could improve 

SRO execution. Part III proposes a new structural solution to address 

the weaknesses in SRO planning and management: the U. S. Office for 

Contingency Operations. Implementing the targeted reforms would address some of the existing shortcomings in contingency operations, but 

creating USOCO might provide an elusive “unified theory” for solving 

the persistent challenges that continue to daunt SRO management. 

USOCO would clarify several important matters. First, regarding accountability, it would bear the full authority and responsibility for all SRO 

planning and execution. Second, regarding results, USOCO would be 

responsible for all project and program decision-making and outcomes. 

In sum, USOCO would be answerable for every aspect of an SRO, from 

preparation to implementation, through to conclusion. 

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FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 3

Part I: Background on Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations

Stabilization and reconstruction operations:

straddle an uncomfortable perch between conventional warfighting and traditional development assistance, both of which—

and particularly the former—the United States can do well. These 

operations require a mix of skills and training addressing a range 

of issues, including establishing public security and the rule of 

law, facilitating political transitions, rebuilding infrastructure, and 

jumpstarting economic recovery. To complicate matters, stabilization 

and reconstruction missions must operate in far more demanding 

and often hostile environments than do traditional economic 

development programs. And they face narrow windows of opportunity 

to produce results. Stabilization and reconstruction encompasses 

military and civilian activities across the full spectrum of a conflict.3

The United States has engaged in about 15 SROs since World War II, 

most of which required significant U.S.-funded relief and reconstruction 

activities.4

 Table 1 lists the duration and expense of these operations, the 

majority of which have occurred within the past 20 years. This past decade’s 

operations in Iraq were the first to receive special inspector general oversight. The lessons learned from that oversight provide insight into the U.S. 

approach to managing SROs, and they underscore the need for reform.

A Brief History of SRO Reforms 

During the mid-1990s, in response to disjointed contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the U.S. government developed 

a new approach for managing complex contingency operations. A 

presidential directive established a useful framework for SRO reform, 

but it failed to effect enduring institutional change. After a subsequent 

policy shift away from “nation-building,” the reality of continuing 

engagements in the Middle East and Southwest Asia forced renewed 

reform efforts, yielding new presidential directives and concomitant 

congressional actions seeking to improve SRO planning, management, 

and oversight. 

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4 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

A chronological recounting of steps taken by the U.S. government 

to address SROs will place the reforms proposed in this paper in 

proper context. 

May 1997: Presidential Decision Directive 56

In May 1997, based on lessons learned in Somalia and Haiti, President 

Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled 

Managing Complex Contingency Operations. This directive created 

Table 1

U.S. Assistance for Stability and Reconstruction Operations

Total Obligated Assistance, 2009 $ Millions

Operation Duration Total Obligations

Iraq 2003–present 48,906.11 

Germany 1946–1952 32,994.60 

Afghanistan 2001–present 30,806.65 

Japan 1946–1952 17,214.00 

Bosnia 1995–present 2,461.59 

Kosovo 1999–present 1,312.68 

Dominican Republic 1965–1967 1,269.47 

Panama 1989–1995 739.70 

Haiti 1994–1996 499.62 

Lebanon 1982–1984 420.93 

Somalia 1992–1994 305.10 

Grenada 1983–1984 89.81 

Cambodia 1992–1993 84.46 

Note: The USAID Greenbook does not contain 2006–2007 data for Kosovo; values are instead taken 

from FY 2008 and FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations. Estimates of 

FY 2009 obligations for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are taken from the FY 2010 Congressional 

Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. SIGAR does not aggregate fiscal year obligations in its 

Quarterly Report; values are taken from the USAID Greenbook and the October 2010 SIGAR Quarterly 

Report. Total obligations for ongoing SROs current through the end of FY 2009.

Sources: USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), 2010, accessed 2/12/2010; DoS, 

Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 2008, p. 418; DoS, Congressional Budget 

Justification for Foreign Operations, 2009, Country/Account Summary; DoS, Congressional Budget 

Justification for Foreign Operations, 2010, Country/Account Summary; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, 10/2009; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/2009.

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FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 5

new planning and implementation mechanisms for complex contingencies, requiring agencies to review the adequacy of their management structures, legal authorities, budget levels, personnel systems, 

and operational procedures “to ensure that we, as a government, are 

learning from our experiences with complex contingency operations and institutionalizing the lessons learned.” 5

 To create a “cadre of 

professionals familiar with this integrated planning process,” PDD-56 

encouraged agencies to disseminate the Handbook for Interagency 

Management of Complex Contingency Operations published by the 

Defense Department.6

Although PDD-56 addressed the urgent need for SRO reform, its 

provisions were never truly implemented due to “internal bureaucratic 

resistance.” 7

 Ultimately, the directive was abandoned by President 

George W. Bush in early 2001, underscoring the need to pursue SRO 

reform by more than presidential directives, which may not have legally 

enduring effect.8

January 2003: National Security Presidential Directive 24, 

Post-War Iraq Reconstruction 

On January 20, 2003, less than 60 days before the invasion of Iraq, 

President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 

(NSPD) 24 on post-war Iraq reconstruction. At the urging of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, NSPD-24 placed the Defense 

Department in exclusive charge of managing Iraq’s post-war relief and 

reconstruction, supplanting the ongoing interagency planning process.9

 The directive created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), charging it with planning, overseeing, and 

executing relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq. ORHA was never 

able to establish sufficient capacity to operate effectively, and, within 

six weeks of the March 20 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had superseded and subsumed it.10

Both ORHA and CPA lacked sufficient personnel, contracting, information technology, and financial resources to carry out their respective 

missions. Moreover, neither was created with an organic inspector general to oversee the expenditure of funds. Much fraud, waste, and abuse 

might have been avoided had adequate oversight been institutionalized 

from the outset of operations in Iraq.

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May 2004: National Security Presidential Directive 36, 

United States Government Operations in Iraq

In May 2004, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 36, entitled United States Government Operations in Iraq. Superseding 

NSPD-24, this new directive formally transferred responsibilities for relief 

and reconstruction operations in Iraq from CPA/Defense to State, placing 

the Chief of Mission in charge of the Iraq reconstruction program. It also 

established two new temporary organizations to manage ongoing programs and projects: the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), 

within State, and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), within Defense. IRMO was charged with facilitating transition in Iraq, while PCO 

provided acquisition and project management support. 

Ambiguities in NSPD-36 bred coordination problems among State, 

USAID, and Defense and, one level down, among IRMO, PCO, and the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division. Lines of command and communication became blurred and crossed, in part, because 

Defense continued to control most of the contracting for the reconstruction program and, in part, because State had neither the capacity nor the 

experience to manage so large a reconstruction effort. 

July 2004: Creation of State/Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization

In July 2004, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator 

for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which was endorsed by 

the Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005.11 Charged 

with promoting a “whole-of-government” approach to stabilization and 

reconstruction operations, S/CRS’s core mission is to “lead, coordinate, 

and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or 

prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct 

societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a 

sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”12

S/CRS has accomplished several notable initiatives. It established the 

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix, which specified the 

many tasks involved in reconstruction and stabilization operations. It 

developed a database of deployable civilians and worked with the Joint 

Forces Command on a feasibility study for the Civilian Response Corps.13

It led government planning for potential contingency efforts in several 

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countries, including Sudan, Haiti, and Cuba. But, until 2009, S/CRS had 

not engaged in supporting the SROs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In comments to this paper, the State Department said that “in 2009, S/CRS 

deployed 65 members of the Civilian Response Corps and S/CRS staff to 

support Embassy Kabul and the civilian increases in Afghanistan.” 

For various reasons, S/CRS has yet to realize its potential.The causes 

of S/CRS’s limited progress include the failure to receive adequate 

funding, the lack of a timely and sufficiently strong enabling authority, 

the lack of interagency acceptance, its early decision to not focus on 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and its marginalization within State’s bureaucracy. State commented that the development of S/CRS, like Defense’s 

Goldwater-Nichols reform in the 1980s, will take years to implement.14

November 2005: Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 

On November 28, 2005, the Defense Department issued Defense 

Directive 3000.05, entitled Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. The directive committed the Pentagon to developing robust stability operations doctrine, 

resources, and capacities, defining stability operations as military and 

civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to war 

and designed to establish and maintain order.15 Significantly, Directive 3000.05 provided that such operations are a “core U.S. military 

mission” that must receive emphasis comparable to offensive and 

defensive operations. Since its issuance, the directive has bred the 

development of a substantial stability operations capability within the 

military; but the integration of this capability with the civilian side of 

SROs remains insufficient. 

December 2005: National Security Presidential Directive 44, 

Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction 

and Stabilization

In December 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44, entitled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. Premised on the principle that 

“reconstruction and stabilization are more closely tied to foreign policy 

leadership and diplomacy than to military operations,”16 NSPD-44 sought 

to implement changes that would move planning and implementation 

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of SROs into the State Department’s bailiwick.17The President charged 

S/CRS to lead the development of a new SRO civilian capacity, including the integration of “stabilization and reconstruction contingency 

plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”18

NSPD-44 established a National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, 

co-chaired by the Coordinator for S/CRS and a member of the NSC staff, 

directing it to manage the development, implementation, and coordination of SRO policies. 

March 2007: Interagency Management System 

In March 2007, the NSC Deputies Committee approved the Interagency 

Management System (IMS) to implement a “whole-of-government” 

approach for SROs that would “provide policymakers in Washington, 

Chiefs of Mission, and military commanders with flexible tools to 

achieve integrated planning processes for unified U.S. Government 

strategic and implementation plans, including: funding requests; joint 

interagency field deployments; and a joint civilian operations capability.”19 The IMS has three main components: the Country Reconstruction 

and Stabilization Group (CRSG); the Integration Planning Cell (IPC); 

and the Advance Civilian Teams (ACT).20 The CRSG is designed as an 

NSC-managed decision-making body to oversee SROs, co-chaired by 

the relevant regional assistant secretary from State, the S/CRS Coordinator, and the applicable NSC official. Notably, Defense does not have a 

co-chair position on the CRSG.21 Though approved nearly three years 

ago, the CRSG has yet to become effectively operational. At the tactical 

level, the IMS anticipated the development of rapidly deployable ACTs 

as well as an interagency SRO oversight group (the IPC) that would 

deploy and manage ongoing contingency operations. Like the CRSG, 

neither the ACTs nor the IPC is operational as conceived. 

The IMS has yet to garner significant support from the interagency 

community. An October 2007 Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report on the IMS concluded that “some interagency partners 

stated that the framework’s planning process is cumbersome and too 

time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been 

taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework’s effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. 

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government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination.”22

GAO further found that, because the IMS planning process had 

neither improved outcomes nor increased resources, “some offices 

and agencies have expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future 

stabilization and reconstruction plans.”23

According to State, the IMS has been “robustly exercised” at U.S. 

Southern Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command training events, 

and “components of the framework have been employed in real world 

situations, such as the 2008 crisis in Georgia.”24 The U.S. European 

Command, the U.S. Army Europe, and S/CRS used the IMS during 

the “Austere Challenge” exercise in April 2009.25

February 2008: Civilian Stabilization Initiative

Led by S/CRS, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) comprises 

an Active Response Corps (under development with 250 positions 

projected), a Civilian Response Corps (2,000 positions projected), and a 

Standby Reserve Corps (not funded).26 In June 2008, S/CRS and USAID 

received the first appropriation ($65 million) for CSI capacity, and in 

March 2009, the Congress provided $75 million more.27 The Administration requested $323 million for FY 2010, and in December 2009, the 

Congress appropriated $150 million in the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act of 2010. Future funding will be contingent upon S/CRS meeting the 

Congress’s desire to see the CSI demonstrate “efficient operations and 

measurable performance successes.”28

July 2008: USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy

USAID’s Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy (CMCP) established 

a basis for USAID cooperation with Defense in SRO joint planning, 

assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication.29 A companion document, Civilian-Military 

Cooperation Implementation Guidelines, detailed functional areas 

for USAID and Defense cooperation, provided legal guidance on 

operational issues, and illustrated approaches for implementing this 

policy framework.30

The CMCP names stabilization as a key element of USAID’s development mission,31 recognizing “that coordination with the DoD is 

one aspect of [USAID’s] vital role in U.S. national security, but it also 

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reiterates that DoD should not substitute for civilian capabilities.”32 New 

USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah testifed that “USAID still needs to fill 

a critical shortage of experienced middle- and senior-level managers,” 

and “a shrinking USAID has had to increasingly rely on contractors to 

manage programs.”33

October 2008: Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian 

Management Act of 2008 

In October 2008, President Bush signed the Duncan Hunter National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2009, which contained the 

Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 

(RSCMA).34 Effectively codifying S/CRS, RSCMA gave State the chief 

responsibility for planning and managing SROs, requiring it to develop 

a detailed interagency strategy for reconstruction and stabilization 

engagements. RSCMA authorized the establishment of a “Response 

Readiness Corps” to provide assistance in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Act also provided for a Presidentially appointed 

and Senate-confirmed Coordinator to lead the organization. 

Prior to passing under the FY 2009 NDAA, RSCMA had faced stiff 

resistance in the Congress as a stand-alone bill, having been introduced 

but failing to pass in the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses. Since its 

passage as part of the NDAA, implementation of RSCMA’s provisions 

has been limited.35

October 2008: Center for Complex Operations 

The NDAA for FY 2009 authorized Defense to establish, with support 

from State and USAID, a Center for Complex Operations (CCO) to 

serve as an information clearing-house on complex contingency operations and to develop an SRO training and education community.36 Since 

January 2009, the CCO has been housed at the National Defense University.37 Its mission is to: 

• coordinate interagency efforts to prepare for complex contingencies

• foster unity of effort on complex contingencies among U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and militaries, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations

• research and share lessons learned 

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• identify the planning, resource, or management gaps relating to complex operations that exist in Defense and the broader 

interagency community38

January 2009: Department of Defense Directive 1404.10

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed Defense Directive 

1404.10 on January 23, 2009, officially launching Defense’s Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW).39 The directive provided that the CEW 

“shall be organized, trained, cleared, equipped and ready to deploy in 

support of combat operations by the military; contingencies; emergency 

operations; humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; 

drug interdiction; and stability operations.”40 Civilians who sign up for 

CEW agree to deploy overseas in support of humanitarian, reconstruction and, if necessary, combat-support missions for up to two years. 

July 2009: State Department Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review 

On July 10, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced 

the inaugural State Department Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), paralleling Defense’s congressionally mandated 

Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDDR will provide a “comprehensive assessment for organizational reform and improvements to policy, 

strategy, and planning processes,” including:41

• a clear statement of U.S. foreign policy and development goals, 

and expected results

• the strategies necessary to achieve those results 

• the tools and resources required to implement the strategies 

• the means by which performance will be measured 

• the links with the broader whole-of-government foreign 

policy framework42

The QDDR is assessing the U.S. approach to SROs, including the integration of civil contingency response capacities with Defense. 

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August 2009: Presidential Study Directive on Global 

Development Policy

In late August 2009, President Barack Obama signed a Presidential Study 

Directive (PSD) authorizing National Security Advisor General James 

Jones and Chairman of the National Economic Council Lawrence Summers to lead a whole-of-government review of U.S. global development 

policy. The PSD process, while embracing matters far beyond contingencies, will help shape Administration policies regarding civil/military 

integration in SROs.

September 2009: Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05

Defense Instruction 3000.05 replaced Defense Directive 3000.05 as 

Defense policy on stability operations. It provided that, during SROs, 

the military shall support establishing civil security, restoring essential 

services, repairing and protecting infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian assistance “until such time as is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. governmental agencies, foreign governments and 

security forces, or international organizations.”43 Defense Instruction 

3000.05 emphasized the importance of integrating civilian and military 

efforts in preparing for and executing SROs. 

December 2009: Defense Proposal on Security Sector Assistance

On December 15, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sent a 

memorandum to Secretary Clinton suggesting “a new model of shared 

responsibility and pooled resources for cross-cutting security challenges” (reflecting an approach now employed by the United Kingdom). 

The proposal envisions a pooled-funding mechanism, requiring joint 

approval by Defense and State for support of SRO efforts in security, 

capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention.44 This new approach would modify the current system of SRO funding. However, the 

creation of the Complex Crisis Fund in the President’s 2010 Budget may 

supersede this proposal.

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Part II: Ten Targeted Reforms for Improving 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

As a growing number of agencies broaden their scope internationally and 

add important expertise and capacity, even working in the same issue from 

different angles, coordination has lagged behind. The result is an array of 

programs that overlap or even contradict ... and this is a source of growing 

frustration and concern.45

—Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

January 6, 2010

[SIGIR] correctly identifies under-funding, lack of capacity, and lack of 

authorities at the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International 

Development as the central obstacle[s] to an effective and flexible U.S. Government response to Stability and Reconstruction Operations. 

 —Under Secretary of Defense Michèle A. Flournoy, 

 Letter to SIGIR, January 27, 2010

Six years of SIGIR reports have uncovered a diverse array of issues 

in Iraq, including uncoordinated reconstruction management, poor 

program and project execution, and insufficient contract oversight. 

Many of the weaknesses exposed in SIGIR’s reports could be mitigated 

by the implementation of the following ten targeted reforms. Where 

appropriate, the Congress should consider enacting legislation 

requiring compliance. 

1. The NSC Should Lead SRO Doctrine and Policy Development 

A Council on Foreign Relations Report, entitled In the Wake of War: 

Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, suggested that “the National Security Advisor and his staff should be formally tasked with 

civilian-military coordination and establishing overarching policy 

associated with stabilization and reconstruction activities.”46 Similarly, a Center for Strategic Studies (CSIS) report, entitled Beyond 

Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New 

Strategic Era, recommended that the NSC lead an interagency effort 

to develop formal SRO concepts of operations, fundamental goals and 

purposes, and basic organizing principles. The CSIS report stated that:

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Interagency concepts of operation would articulate the United States’ 

overarching objectives in a given mission area, identify critical tasks 

that need to be undertaken, 

lay out an overall approach 

to how these tasks would 

be performed, and assign 

responsibility for specific 

areas to specific agencies. 

These concepts of operation 

would provide the basis 

for codifying an interagency division of labor in various mission 

areas and for better aligning agency authorities and resources with 

their operational responsibilities. They would also provide a basis 

for assessing agency capabilities to execute their assigned tasks, 

and developing action plans to remedy critical shortfalls.47

The State Department’s comments to this report noted that the NSC 

has responsibility for setting SRO policies. 

On October 7, 2009, the U.S. Institute of Peace in collaboration with 

the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute unveiled 

the first strategic doctrine ever produced for civilian agencies involved in 

stabilization and reconstruction operations, noting that “strategic guidance for civilian planners and practitioners engaged in these missions is 

overdue.”48 An NSC-developed set of directives governing SROs has yet 

to be implemented. 

2. Integrative SRO Planning Processes Should Be Developed 

In analyzing the challenges of interagency planning for SROs, the 

Government Accountability Office concluded that:

differences between the planning capacities and procedures of U.S. 

government civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to 

effective coordination.49

Although some improvements in the interagency planning process have 

been made since the 2007 GAO report, civilian agencies still lack sufficient capacity to develop and implement integrated plans for SROs. The 

The relevant agencies expected to participate in 

SROs should agree upon well-defined doctrine 

and policies to govern such operations. An NSCled interagency task force should lead a new SRO 

doctrine and policy formulation process to identify 

the applicable missions, roles, responsibilities, and 

operating procedures for all SRO participants. 

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FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 15

Congress should consider directing Defense to provide resources and 

personnel that could bolster civilian planning capabilities. In addition to 

financial support, Defense could 

provide trained and experienced 

advisors to help guide civilian 

agencies through a planning 

heuristic, while respecting the 

agencies’ jurisdiction. 

State’s comments regarding this 

proposal pointed to the Interagency Management System as 

the mechanism for integration. However, the IMS, although three years 

old, is not yet effectively operational.

3. New SRO Budgeting Processes Should Be Developed 

Effectively funding SROs requires an approach to national security 

resourcing that knocks down agency “stovepipes” and fosters an 

integrative approach. Critics of 

the U.S. government’s “outdated 

bureaucratic superstructure,” 

as Secretary Gates has called it, 

maintain that the current method 

of allocating national security 

resources is grossly inefficient.50

Defense is the chief recipient of 

national security funding. In Iraq, 

approximately 75% of all SRO 

funding was appropriated to the 

Defense Department, with the balance spread among the civilian agencies.51

The Senate Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for FY 2009 shed light on the consequences of this imbalance: “Defense 

funds are being used for urgent humanitarian and reconstruction assistance 

because the agencies normally responsible for those functions—State and 

USAID—are underfunded and lack authorities that allow for sufficient 

flexibility to respond to urgent, unanticipated requirements.”52

Section 1207 of the NDAA, first authorized in 2006, has provided some 

financial flexibility regarding funding for SROs, but the implementation 

All relevant agencies should work together to 

develop and implement integrated planning 

capabilities for SROs. Currently, there is “no 

systemic effort at strategic planning that is inclusive, 

deliberate, or integrative” for SROs.53Collaborative planning would yield better programs and 

improved project execution. Regular SRO planning 

exercises would develop interagency familiarity 

and understanding among participating personnel. 

The NSC and the Office of Management and 

Budget should work with the relevant agencies 

to develop potential SRO budget requirements. 

Developing budget requirements in advance of a 

contingency operation would give useful estimates of cost-levels that could profitably influence 

mission scope, help shape objectives, and enable 

better choices among potential courses of action. 

Moreover, advance cost estimates could provide 

policymakers with a basis for grappling with the 

budget implications of any potential SRO.54

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16 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

of programs and projects through this authority has proved problematic. 

The NDAA 2010 conference report amplified this point: 

While the conferees believe that the increased coordination between 

the Department of Defense and Department of State resulting from 

the joint formulation and implementation of security and stabilization 

projects under the section 1207 authority has value, the conferees 

reaffirm that Congress has always intended for this transfer authority 

to be temporary and are disappointed that the Department of State has 

not yet achieved the capacity to fulfill its statutory requirements.55

A December 15, 2009, Defense memo proposing Defense/State shared 

responsibilities for SRO resources called for a “single collocated staff of 

interagency detailees” to oversee and execute new SRO funding pools.56

In its comments to SIGIR, State noted that the new “Complex Crisis 

Fund” included in the President’s 2010 Budget signals a move to transfer 

Section 1207 authority to the State Department, potentially superseding 

the Defense proposal. 

The competing policies at play, as revealed by the conflict pools memo 

and the new Complex Crisis Fund, indicate that SRO funding and management issues are still very much in flux. Whatever the ultimate course, 

establishing clear lines of authority is essential to ensuring accountability 

for money and results. As the Iraq reconstruction program demonstrated, simply mandating that managers use reconstruction funds within a 

fixed time period will lead to poor outcomes.

4. Federal Personnel Laws Should Be Strengthened To Support SROs 

The U.S. government is replete with personnel possessing significant 

professional experience who could prove highly useful in complex 

contingencies. Future SROs 

should employ these valuable 

staffing resources more effectively. 

The federal competitive service 

system, however, does not provide 

incentives for agencies to detail 

employees to support SROs. 

The Congress should establish 

Existing personnel regulations impede federal 

civilian participation in SROs. They should 

provide incentives, rather than penalties, for 

those volunteering to deploy. Incumbent federal 

employees who deploy in support of SROs must 

be allowed to return to their home agency upon 

completion of their mission without penalty. 

USOCO.indb 16 3/9/2010 5:03:11 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 17

deployment incentives for qualified federal employees and ensure the 

protection of their employment rights. The State Department endorsed 

this proposal in its comments to SIGIR.

Regardless of incentives, federal civilians will not be available in sufficient numbers to ensure an adequate civilian workforce for future SROs. 

Contractors thus will continue to fill essential roles. Given this reality, the 

U.S. government should better prepare to deploy qualified and properly 

overseen contractors from the outset of an SRO. 

5. SRO Training Should Be Integrated and Enhanced

Several agencies have taken significant steps to improve joint SRO 

training, but the overall training picture is fragmented. State personnel 

regularly attend the Army War 

College, albeit in small numbers, 

while uniformed personnel have 

trained with S/CRS. Other SRO 

training initiatives are ongoing at 

State’s Foreign Service Institute, 

the Army’s Interagency Fellowship Program, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and 

Defense’s Center for Complex Operations. Developing a more integrated 

training system would improve operational coordination. The State Department agreed with this proposal.

6. Uniform Contingency Contracting Practices Should Be Adopted 

SIGIR’s reports repeatedly documented contingency contracting weaknesses 

in Iraq, from poor compliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) to ad hoc oversight systems that could not keep track of contracts. 

SIGIR found contracting entities that improvised systems and procedures 

to monitor contracts, and produced poor and incomplete contracting and 

procurement histories. These weaknesses led to fraud, waste, and abuse. As 

Secretary Gates aptly observed, “Contracting in Iraq was done willy-nilly.”57

The Commision on Wartime Contracting underscored this point, noting 

that the “weaknesses in the federal contract management and oversight 

systems creat[ed] plentiful opportunities for waste, fraud, and abuse.”58

In its Lessons in Contracting and Procurement report, SIGIR recommended that the provisions of the FAR most often used in contingency 

The Congress and the Administration should 

integrate (and increase funding for) SRO training programs. Unlike the military, civilians do 

not have much opportunity to pursue advanced 

training that would provide critical skills necessary 

for many of these SRO tasks. 

USOCO.indb 17 3/9/2010 5:03:11 
18 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

operations be distilled into a single, accessible guide for use by all contracting officers operating in an SRO. OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy endorsed the use of streamlined procedures, simplified 

open-market competitions, and interagency acquisitions.59

One of the chief causes of the contracting problems in Iraq stemmed 

from a decision that far pre-dated the invasion. The Department of the 

Army substantially reduced its acquisition workforce from over 10,000 

people in 1990 to approximately 5,500 in 1996 in response to the Defense 

Authorization Act for FY 1996, 

which required a reduction in the 

Defense acquisition workforce by 

FY 2000.60 This left the Army with 

a significant shortage of warranted contracting officers just as the 

largest overseas contracting program in U.S. history was beginning in 2003. The Army has taken 

steps to remedy its contracting 

problems, thanks in part to the 

Gansler Commission Report. The 

Department elevated the priority of expeditionary contracting 

capabilities, adding 5 new Army general officer positions and more than 

2,300 military and civilian contracting personnel. Deputy Secretary of 

Defense William Lynn also issued Defense Directive 3020.49 in March 

2009, addressing the policy for program management in preparing and 

executing acquisitions for contingency operations.

The State Department experienced unprecedented contracting burdens 

in Iraq. Its internal oversight capabilities in theater did not always match 

up with its rapidly expanded responsibilities. A notable example has been 

the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) oversight 

of the $2.5 billion police training program—where SIGIR concluded in 

its audit that “staffing had not increased with its workload.”61 As Secretary 

Clinton noted, “USAID and the State Department must have the staff, the 

expertise, and the resources to design, implement, and evaluate our programs.”62 State, however, does not currently have sufficient staff or systems 

to oversee its growing contracting responsibilities. 

The Congress and the Administration should 

implement new comprehensive contingency contracting procedures for use in SROs, expand the 

U.S. government’s contingency contracting capacity, and pursue the institutionalization of special 

contracting programs that have worked in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. The success of an SRO depends 

in part on effectively employing the government’s 

capacity to deliver services and materials in support 

of operations. Well-structured and properly tested 

contingency contracting procedures and a raft of 

well-qualified, warranted contracting officers would 

help ensure the proper use of taxpayer dollars during an SRO. 

USOCO.indb 18 3/9/2010 5:03:11 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 19

7. Permanent Oversight for SROs Should Be Created 

Oversight is a critical core governmental function; but oversight of SROs has 

been an ad hoc process.Despite recognition that a convergence of hazardous conditions in SROs—including a cash environment, the desire for quick 

results, and unstable working conditions—create vulnerabilities for fraud, 

waste, and abuse; no permanent system for SRO oversight currently exists. 

The U.S. government began spending huge sums of money in Iraq 

in 2003 without sufficient accounting processes in place.The significant fraud, waste, and abuse 

that ensued might have been 

deterred or detected had there 

been a robust oversight capability in place from the outset. In 

2003, the Congress created an 

office of inspector general to 

oversee the CPA’s activities. This 

office became SIGIR in 2004, with the Congress gradually extending 

its mandate to include oversight of all U.S.-funded Iraq reconstruction 

activities. By contrast, no Special Inspector General was created for 

Afghanistan until 2008—$38 billion and seven years into the program. 

The challenges inherent in operating in SRO environments, the specialized nature of contingency contracting, and the sheer number of programs and projects requiring review militate in favor of creating a single 

standing oversight capability for all SROs. Because these contingency 

operations are necessarily interagency enterprises, the body charged with 

overseeing them should possess a mandate enabling it to audit, inspect, 

evaluate, and investigate programs and projects conducted by any agency 

present in theater. 

The State Department commented that existing Inspector General 

(IG) offices are adequate to do the job. However, the existing IGs do not 

possess interagency authority, which could adversely affect their ability to 

evaluate programs and projects involving multiple U.S. agencies. 

8. Uniform SRO Information Systems Should Be Developed

In Iraq, SIGIR found that federal agencies stored program, financial, and 

project data on different information management systems that did not 

have common output formats and did not have common data-refresh 

The Congress should create an independent oversight office that would provide audit, inspection, 

evaluation, and investigative services for SROs. 

A new Special Inspector General for Overseas 

Contingency Operations (SIGOCO) would possess 

the necessary jurisdiction and resources to ensure 

focused oversight of an SRO. 

USOCO.indb 19 3/9/2010 5:03:11 
20 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

cycles. The resulting inability of the U.S. government to accurately and 

quickly compile and sort disparate project data caused an inefficient 

allocation of resources and gross redundancies. Moreover, the lack of 

common information management tools capable of providing a complete and integrated 

reconstruction picture prevented 

reconstruction managers from 

having a useful data-set covering all reconstruction activities 

and contributed to the waste of 

taxpayer dollars. Defense’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is currently exploring the 

development of a technological solution for information sharing among 

the various agencies engaged in Afghanistan. State agreed with SIGIR 

that this is a problem requiring a new and innovative solution.

9. International Organizations Should Be Integrated Into 

SRO Planning

According to an April 2009 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Brookings Institution:

The number of international organizations and nongovernmental actors 

active in the field of development and reconstruction greatly overshadows 

the number of U.S. government personnel and resources devoted to the 

same field. The United States would not only be wise to leverage these 

international and nongovernmental resources, but it would be shortsigned to invest in grand plans to strengthen its own capacity without also 

considering the capacities existent beyond the U.S. government.63

By signing the Rome Declaration on Harmonization, the Paris 

Declaration, and the Accra Agenda for Action, the United States reaffirmed the importance of coordinating with foreign governments in 

the planning and delivery of development assistance and its intention 

to cooperate with the international community to harmonize policies, 

procedures, and practices aimed at improving the effectiveness and 

Federal departments and agencies participating 

in overseas contingency operations need access 

to an interoperable integrated information 

technology system that can track all relief and 

reconstruction projects in theater. Years into the 

contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, stovepiped 

IT systems are still incompatible and thus track 

only about 70% of all projects constructed. 

USOCO.indb 20 3/9/2010 5:03:11 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 21

sustainability of development assistance. By extension, the practices 

promoted in those declarations are applicable, at least in part, to SROs. 

The most important participant in an SRO is, axiomatically, 

the host country. SRO planning 

and execution should attempt to 

ensure maximum host country 

participation from the outset. 

Achieving such participation 

would prove salutary throughout 

the life of an SRO and, perhaps 

most important, at mission’s end, 

when projects are transitioned to, and must be sustained by, the host 

country. In its comments to SIGIR, the State Department endorsed 

this proposal.

10. Uniform Geopolitical Boundaries Should Be Implemented

As the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested, the U.S. 

government should develop:

a common U.S. government 

template for dividing the world 

into regions in order to reduce 

friction and unnecessary seams 

between agencies, and enhancing 

information sharing and 

collaboration among agencies 

working on shared missions.64

Figure 1 illustrates the problem, which should be fairly simple to fix.

SRO doctrine, policy, and planning should be 

structured in anticipation of international participation. In developing SRO planning, training 

curricula, and systems, international involvement 

ought to be assumed. The political support embodied by an international coalition, as well as the 

usefulness of other nations’ insights and funding, 

would prove invaluable in resolving the complex 

issues that arise during SROs. 

The Administration should develop common 

boundaries for the manner in which Defense 

and State engage in their respective worldwide 

missions. Analyzing the same geopolitical situations from separate geographic boundaries could 

produce confusion and missed conclusions. 

USOCO.indb 21 3/9/2010 5:03:11 
22 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations Bureau of Western Hemisphere A
airs Bureau of European and Eurasian A
airs Bureau of Near Eastern A
airs Bureau of African A
airs Bureau of South and Central Asian A
airs Bureau of East Asian and Pacic A
airs Figure 1

USOCO.indb 22 3/9/2010 5:03:12 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 23

Part III: The U.S. Office for Contingency Operations: 

Improving the Planning and Management 

of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 

The expansion of DoD’s authorities and funding, driven by requirements in 

Afghanistan, Iraq and other conflict prone areas, have produced some notable 

successes in the past several years, but they have also stirred debate over 

U.S. government roles and missions that often required adjudication at [the 

level of the Secretaries of State and Defense]. These recurring debates have 

taxed the time and energy of our departments and do not meet our Nation’s 

long term needs. My sense is that these requirements will be enduring ones 

given current and future security challenges.

 —Secretary Robert Gates 

December 200965

We must significantly modify organizational structures to achieve better 

unity of effort.

—General Stanley McChrystal

August 200966

The Rationale for USOCO 

The creation of a new office to manage SROs—the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations—could significantly enhance SRO planning and execution. The seven-year Iraq stabilization and reconstruction program—the 

largest ever undertaken by the United States—began without a sufficiently 

established management structure capable of executing the unprecedented effort. In mid-2003, the U.S. government undertook a massive 

reconstruction mission—much larger than planned and now exceeding 

$53 billion—with an ad hoc management system. Some projects met contract specifications, but the many unacceptable outcomes stemmed chiefly 

from the lack of a clear, continuing, and coherent management structure 

(as opposed to a paucity of resources or poor leadership). 

Hard experience has shown that the United States did not have the 

financial, personnel, information technology, or contracting systems in 

place necessary to execute what became the most extensive and most 

expensive SRO in history. It is thus not surprising that the Iraq program 

failed to achieve its goals. 

USOCO.indb 23 3/9/2010 5:03:12 
24 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

At the outset, there was no established plan and no existing and 

well-resourced office to manage the effort. Eventually, the Iraq 

reconstruction program devolved along with the security situation. 

Decisions were driven by circumstances, and the unstable security 

environment impeded progress on all fronts, preventing success. 

Notwithstanding these painful realities, some of which were perhaps 

unavoidable, a well-developed SRO plan and a sufficiently robust 

interagency management office could have implemented program 

adjustments that might have averted the waste of hundreds of millions 

of taxpayer dollars. 

SIGIR squarely addressed this management weakness in its Lessons in 

Program and Project Management report: 

The Congress should consider a “Goldwater Nichols”-like reform 

measure to promote better integration among Defense, USAID, 

and State, particularly with respect to post-conflict contingency 

operations. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act initiated a fundamental 

reorganization of the Department of Defense. As a result of this Act, 

U.S. forces increased cooperation and integration. It was not an easy 

process, but over the past twenty years, the United States has benefited 

greatly from the improved coordination among the military services. 

The Iraq experience illustrates the need to expand cooperation and 

integration across U.S. agencies, but most especially among Defense, 

State, and USAID. . . . The Congress should consider new legislation 

that could advance further cooperation among Defense, State, and 

USAID on post-conflict contingency reconstruction and relief 

planning and execution.67

SIGIR’s book-length study, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 

Experience, reiterated and expanded upon this recommendation: 

The role of executive authority—and the lack thereof—over interagency 

coordination lies at the heart of the failures in the Iraq reconstruction 

program. . . . The lack of unity of command in Iraq meant that unity 

of effort was seldom achieved. Too often, programs were designed 

to meet agency goals, rather than U.S. national interests. Stronger 

integration was needed not only between the military and civilian 

USOCO.indb 24 3/9/2010 5:03:12 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 25

agencies but also among the civilian agencies themselves. With weak 

interagency cooperation an endemic feature of the U.S. national security 

system, reform efforts should press for structures that will promote 

the development of unifying strategy with clearly delineated agency 

responsibilities and adequate authority to enforce its execution.68

An integrated management structure is necessary to ensure effective 

interagency reconstruction efforts. After the reconstruction program 

got underway in 2003, at least 62 agencies ultimately became involved 

in managing [reconstruction] IRRF-funded projects. There were no 

interagency project management and information systems that could 

coordinate the activities of the hundreds of firms and subcontractors 

performing construction work orders at thousands of sites across Iraq. 

An integrated management structure could have helped to ensure 

that programs and projects were planned and executed with effective 

communication, control, and cooperation.69

The disintegration of reconstruction management in Iraq occurred because no accountable, integrated, interagency management office existed 

to oversee and execute the reconstruction program. Creating USOCO 

could fill that void and potentially obviate the recurrence of the kinds of 

breakdowns so often experienced in Iraq. 

Figure 2 graphically demonstrates the structural consequences of the 

U.S. government’s improvisational approach to managing the early stages 

of the Iraq SRO.

The Importance of Functional Integration

Upon creation by the Congress, USOCO would become the locus for 

planning, funding, staffing, and managing SROs, replacing the fragmented 

process that now exists. Importantly, it would provide a single office whose 

sole mission is ensuring that the United States is ready to go when the 

next contingency occurs; and USOCO would provide someone to hold 

accountable for failures in planning and execution.70 Currently, there is 

no single agency that devotes its entire mission to SROs. For State and 

Defense, they are but a small part of the departments’ larger missions. 

USOCO would streamline decision-making and eliminate the “lead 

agency” dilemma, which now causes departmental biases to affect SRO 

USOCO.indb 25 3/9/2010 5:03:12 
26 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

Figure 2USG Principal Decision Makers, Funds’ Flows & Special Authorities for Iraq

Essential

Services

Macroeconomic

Policies

External Economic

Relations

NEA/PA

Sullivan

Legend

Full Time Part Time Reg’r Meeting

Lines of Authority US Authority in Iraq

Funds Flow Decision Flow From

Groups to Com’tees Contractors Flow

Dashes indicate cross-organizational relationships

1 Neutralize Insur’ts/Keep Order1.4 Train and Equip Security Forces2 Elections3 Create Jobs/Essential Services4 Est. Base for Strong Economy5 Good Gov’e and Rule of Law6 Increase International Support Multiple Goals

Primary Strategic Plan Objectives

World Bank Iraq Core Donors 

Group

Teasury/IRAQ Debt Jim Baker NATO

USAID

IRRF

MNF 

Allies

U

N

E

C

A

P

R

M

N

E

D

DOJ/

OPDAT

NSPD 37

EAP

OMB

Cleveland

IRRF

USNATO

U/S E 

Larson

PA

IO

USUN

AS EB 

Tony Wayne

IPOG ECON

WK Group

EUR 

Bradtke

USAID

ANI/AR

EB/Terro Finance

Saloom

EB/Terro Finance

Turak

EUR/PGI

Secretary of State

Powell

D/Stab & Security 

Iraq & Afghan, Sp 

Advisor Kicklighter

U/S P 

Grossman

A/S RM 

Burnham

DAS. Bowab 

RM/FA

H

Iraq Assist 

Coordinator 

Raptel

Iraq Assistance 

Dep T McCulley

A/S NEA Burns

Coord’r for Iraq 

Schlicher

Deputy 

Coord’r for Iraq 

Godec

Coord’r Strategic 

Planning Blackwill

Sr Dir Def Policy 

Miller

Deputy Secretary

Armitage

Ambassador

Negroponte

DCM

Jerey

PC on Iraq

DC on Iraq

National Security 

Advisor, Rice

Dep. Nat’l Security 

Advisor, Hadley

Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld

Deputy Secretary

Wolfowitz

Chair Joint 

Chiefs, Myers

JSC Planning 

& Policy, 

Sharp

USCENTCOM

Abizaid

Commander US 

Forces in Iraq, Casey

Secretary

of the

Army

Oce of 

Sec Def

Feith

Defense

Support

Oce

OSD/PA

A/S INL

Charles

S/WCI

NSPD 27

Project &

Contract

Oce

MNS

Training

Command

Lt Gen

Petraeus

CPATT

MG Fil

Army 

Corps of 

Engineers

GRA

INL PDAS

TODD

D PAS DM

Rose Likins

IRMO

Amb Taylor

USAID

M

Stephenson

IR

NCI

IPGG

Daily

Political

P

A

Q

INL/PC

Police Training

Giord

DOJ/

ICITAP

OPDAT

PM/ISO/

PM/WRA

PMAT

PM/RSAT

Ruggiero

PM/PPA

Pol-Mil

Remier Iraq Policy/ Ops Group TBD

Strategic Planning

Meeting Support

Project 

Tracking/Reporting

Special Assignments

Political Aairs

Olson

Political General

Policy Planning

Public Dipl

Outreach

Fernandez

Cultural

Aairs

Press

Relations

Iraq Assist

Roberts

Core Donors

Strategic 

Communications 

Group (phone call)

U/S R

Harrison

DRL

USAID

N

E

D

U

S

T

R

IRRF

Bureau 

Strategy 

Meeting

wkdy

EUR/RPM

EUR/ERA

EU

NATO

U

N Treasury/IRAQ Debt

Jim Baker

World Bank Iraq

Reconst Fin Facil

Core Donors

Group

AC EB/ODF Dir Iraq

Nelson (Asst Coord)

EB/OMA Dep Dir

Engle (debt relief)

EB/EPC 

Mallon (Econ/Bus Dev)

Econ Aairs

Silverman

Dir Def 

Policy 

Sullivan

Sr Dir Str Plan

Southeast Asian

A O’Sullivan

U/S Group

on Iraq

NSC/PA

Wilkinson

USOCO.indb 26 3/9/2010 5:03:13 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 27

mission accomplishment. A senior NSC official observed that “lead 

agency really means sole agency, as no one will follow the lead agency if 

its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.”71 When a 

particular lead agency (State, Defense, or USAID) is put in charge, departmental bias can cause certain issues to become defined as a military, 

diplomatic, or assistance challenge, depending on which agency is in the 

lead. USOCO would bear none of these institutional prejudices.

As Secretary Clinton recently noted, “To exercise our global leadership effectively, we need to harness all three Ds—diplomacy, development and defense.”72 Regarding SROs, Defense has the capacity and 

resources, whereas State and USAID have the expertise but comparatively few resources. 

USOCO could resolve this issue by closely linking its planning and operations with State, Defense, and USAID, bringing out the best-developed 

SRO aspects from each, while avoiding the “stovepiping” that tends to 

limit departmental action. USOCO would fit between and among State, 

Defense, and USAID, providing the integrative “glue” that SRO planning 

and execution currently lack. Because it impinges upon existing “turf,” 

USOCO, as a concept, will draw resistance. But the decision on whether 

to pursue the proposal should be shaped by a careful analysis of whether 

the current departmentalized system has the genuine potential to generate 

an integrated approach to planning and managing SROs. 

Figure 3 shows how USOCO would fit within the broader U.S. government structure. 

NSC

DoD DoS

USOCO Chief of 

Mission

Combatant 

Commander

SRO

Elements 

DoS/DoD/all other 

agencies

Figure 3

USOCO & the U.S. Government: 

In the Event of a Declared Contigency Operation

USOCO.indb 27 3/9/2010 5:03:13 
28 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

A Novel Solution to an Enduring Problem

Sir Paddy Ashdown, who served as the High Representative for Bosnia 

and Herzegovina between 2002 and 2006, wrote of the need for innovative management structures to tackle modern contingency problems, 

observing that “new ways of structuring our actions and thinking about 

prevention, military intervention, and post-conflict reconstruction will 

require new structures and institutions in governments and international 

bodies.”73 Ashdown recognized that there is a place for bold reform in 

SRO management. 

To resolve the ongoing diffusion of SRO duties among Defense, State, 

and USAID (and other agencies), USOCO would bring together—under 

one roof—varied SRO mission elements, now spread among the departments, including:

• S/CRS 

• Defense initiatives established under its Stability Operations 

guidance

• USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)

• the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative 

Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP)

• the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance 

(OTA)

USOCO would also develop close working relationships with the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers and USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, elements of which might work regularly within the new structure. 

Key senior leadership positions within USOCO would include:

• Director: The USOCO Director would be a presidential appointee 

requiring Senate confirmation. Reporting is a sensitive issue, but options include dual reports to the Secretary of State and the Secretary 

of Defense (as is the case with SIGIR), with a possible limited additional report to the National Security Advisor. 

• Three Deputies: USOCO Deputy Directors would also be presidential appointees requiring Senate confirmation. The Secretary of State, 

the Secretary of Defense, and the USAID Administrator each would 

USOCO.indb 28 3/9/2010 5:03:13 
FEBRUARY 2010 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION I 29

recommend a senior executive to be nominated by the President and 

confirmed by the Senate. 

• Permanent Staff: The Director and the three Deputies would 

determine USOCO staffing levels, but the number would likely 

not amount to more than 200. Detailees from Defense, State, and 

USAID would supplement permanent staff. 

• Embedded Field Cells: USOCO cells should be positioned within 

Combatant Commands to work with the military on SRO planning. 

• Surge Personnel: In the event of a declared SRO, pre-positioned 

field cells would immediately be reinforced with deployable elements drawn from permanent USOCO personnel as well as “ready 

reserve” experts from other federal departments and contractors. 

Figure 4 outlines the internal organization of USOCO.

How USOCO Would Operate in a Contingency Environment

During an SRO, the USOCO Director would manage all stabilization and 

reconstruction assets. Importantly, the Director would shoulder complete 

accountability for, and responsibility over, the SRO’s budget, contracting, 

expenditures, and outcomes. The Director, though possessing authority 

over all program and project decision-making, would closely coordinate 

on needs and requirements with the Commanding General, the Chief of 

Mission, and the USAID Mission Director. 

SIGOCO Director International 

Liaison

Deputy 

Director 

Other Agencies

Deputy

Director (DoD)

Deputy

Director (DoS)

USAID/ 

OFDA

USAID/ 

OTI

S/CRS

3000.05 Treasury/ programs OTA

DOJ/ ICITAP

Commerce

Agriculture

HHS

Labor

Figure 4

USOCO: Internal Organizational Structure

USOCO.indb 29 3/9/2010 5:03:13 
30 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

Leadership coordination was an issue in Iraq; integrated preparation 

and interagency exercises could help obviate the recurrence of such in 

future SROs. The USOCO Director would operate in close cooperation 

with other leadership in theater. Relief and reconstruction personnel, including those on detail or assigned from other agencies, would fall under 

the Director’s aegis. Throughout the life of the contingency operation, 

USOCO staff would work closely on all SRO matters with State, USAID, 

and Defense, meaning transparent and consistent coordination and communication with the staffs of the Chief of Mission, the USAID Mission 

Director, and the Commanding General as well as with international 

organization and bilateral partners. 

Conclusion: Occam’s Razor74 for SROs

USOCO is a possible and plausible solution to the complicated and 

conflicted approaches afflicting current SRO management. As Figure 5 

displays, various aspects of the SRO mission are now distributed among 

a wide variety of agencies whose capacity to carry out their diverse 

missions vary greatly. The existing Interagency Management System, 

established three years ago, requires a Country Reconstruction and 

Stabilization Group, an Integration Planning Cell, and Advance Civilian Teams; but none is effectively operational today. At its heart, the 

USOCO proposal does not call for creating yet another new organization to deploy people into the field to support an SRO. Rather, it 

unifies the work done to date into a synergistic capacity, amalgamating 

diverse elements into an agile civilian-military entity capable of leading successful SROs. 

The consequences of not having a coherent SRO management system 

in Afghanistan were underscored in December 2009, when Ambassador 

Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, made the following observation about the Afghanistan SRO, 

into which more than $38 billion has already been invested: 

The whole thing was uncoordinated and did not get us very far. The upshot 

is that in the ninth year of the war we are starting from scratch.75

When briefed on the USOCO concept, former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft concluded that an integrated 

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management office like USOCO could help solve the chronic problem 

of poorly managed SRO operations. Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan 

Crocker also found the concept worthy and sensible, as did former 

USAID Mission Director in Iraq James “Spike” Stephenson. 

Recent SRO experiences make the time ripe for innovative reform of 

the current disintegrated approach. If established with alacrity, USOCO 

could potentially have a positive effect on the management of SROs in 

FY 2011. A recent RAND report noted that “Congress and the President 

[should] launch a debate on a fundamental reform of federal public 

administration in the national security sphere, focusing specifically on 

SSTR (stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction) operations 

as the current [and] most pressing need.”76 Creating USOCO should be 

part of that debate.

USOCO is a simple and straightforward remedy to a chronic and 

complex problem. It could solve the most enduring challenge that has 

confronted recent SROs: the lack of unity of command. While building 

on existing capacities and implementing lessons learned, USOCO would 

Figure 5

Life of the SRO Engagement

Stabilization Reconstruction

USAID

DoD

JUSTICE/OTA

TREASURY

DoS/INL

DoS/S/CRS

USAID/OTI

USAID/OFDA

DoS/ICITAP

Kinetic 

Planning, 

Operations

Drawdown to 

Normalization

PHASE 0

AGRICULTURE

Extent of Participation

Planning

COMMERCE

HHS

PHASE 0

DoS & USAID 

DIPLOMATIC & DEVELOPMENT

USOCO.indb 31 3/9/2010 5:03:14 
32 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

accomplish some important new things. First, it would simplify and 

streamline U.S. government operations by answering the question of who 

is in charge of preparing for and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. Second, it would create a clear point of accountability for 

the success or failure of SROs. Third, it would create an institution within 

which a core cadre of professionals could develop and refine the skills 

and expertise necessary for the U.S. government to plan and manage 

SROs effectively. Finally, and most importantly, it would improve mission 

coherence, management integration, unity of command, and unity of effort. Creating USOCO would increase the likelihood of an SRO’s success, 

which must be the principal touchstone of any proposed SRO reform. 

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Appendix: 

Departments of State and Defense Comments

on Draft of this Paper

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Endnotes

For a listing of key reports, monographs, and other publications that were reviewed in the process of developing this 

white paper, please see www.sigir.mil/applyinghardlessons/. 

1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1810. Part of this quotation is on Panel Four of the 

Jefferson Memorial. See www.monticello.org/reports/quotes/memorial.html.

2. During the course of its investigation on governmental reform of SROs, SIGIR consulted with and, to the extent 

possible, incorporated research, analysis and commentary from a broad range of individuals and organizations 

from academia and the private and public sector.

3. Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an 

Independent Task Force, 2005, pp. 4, 5, www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities_final.pdf.

4. Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005 (Combat Studies Institute 

Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2006), p. 53.

5. PDD/NSC 56 White Paper, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive,” May 1997, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.

6. PDD/NSC 56 White Paper, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: 

Presidential Decision Directive,” May 1997, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.

7. Nina Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the 

Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, CRS Report for 

Congress, June 16, 2009, p. 4.

8. Kathleen H. Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth, The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces, CSIS, February 2009, p. 21, 

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090219_hicks_futurecivilaffairs_web.pdf.

9. Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, 2005, p. 11, www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities_final.pdf.

10. DoD, Office of the Inspector General, Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by the Defense 

Contracting Command-Washington, March 2004, p. 2. See also L. Elaine Halchin, CRS Report for Congress, The 

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, June 6, 2005, p. 3.

11. Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization, CRS Report for Congress, January 19, 2005, pp. 1, 4, http://digital.library.unt.edu/

govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7335:1; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-447, § 408 (2004).

12. DoS, S/CRS Mission Statement, www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QXJ.

13. Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization, CRS Report for Congress, January 19, 2005, p. 5, http://digital.library.unt.edu/

govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7335:1.

14. See the Appendix for State’s full comments on the draft of this paper.

15. In September 2009, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 replaced Defense Directive 3000.05 and outlined Defense policy on stability operations. 

16. Dane F. Smith, An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building: The State Department Role in Peace Diplomacy, Reconstruction, and Stabilization, CSIS, April 30, 2009, p. 39.

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46 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

17. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, December 7, 2005, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html.

18. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction 

and Stabilization, December 7, 2005.

19. DoS, “National Security Presidential Directive-44: Frequently Asked Questions,” S/CRS website, www.crs.state.

gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=49QT.

20. Dane F. Smith, An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building: The State Department Role in Peace Diplomacy, Reconstruction, and Stabilization, CSIS, April 2009, p. 25-6.

21. DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, PowerPoint Briefing, “Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),” October 27, 2004, p. 8, www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/S&Rworkshop1004/5_

curtin.pdf; Joseph A. Christoff and Janet A. St. Laurent, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on Armed Services; GAO Report 08-228T, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions 

Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations, October 30, 2007, p. 6.

22. Joseph A. Christoff and Janet A. St. Laurent, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, GAO Report 08-228T, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to 

Improve Government wide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations, October 30, 2007, p. i.

23. Joseph A. Christoff and Janet A. St. Laurent, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, GAO Report 08-228T, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to 

Improve Government wide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations, October 30, 2007, p. 9.

24. Matthew Cordova, “A Whole of Government Approach to Stability: Civil-Military Cooperation Underpins 

Smart Power,” S/CRS’s Civilian Response, Issue No. 8, revised April 2009, p. 6.

25. U.S. Army, Stand-To!, May 22, 2009, www.army.mil/standto/archive/2009/05/22/. The Austere Challenge is an 

annual joint exercise whereby USEUCOM performs full spectrum operations at a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

26. DoS, On-the-Record Briefing with S/CRS Ambassador John Herbst, February 14, 2008, www.crs.state.gov/

index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4ZM4.

27. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, signed into law March 11, 2009; see also Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization 

and Conflict Transitions, p. 16.

28. DoS, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010, U.S. Senate, 111th Congress, July 9, 

2009, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:sr044.111.pdf.

29. USAID, “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” July 2008, p. 1, www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/

ma/documents/Civ-MilPolicyJuly282008.pdf.

30. USAID, “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” July 2008, p. 1, www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/

ma/documents/Civ-MilPolicyJuly282008.pdf.

31. USAID, “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” July 2008, p. 1, www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/

ma/documents/Civ-MilPolicyJuly282008.pdf.

32. USAID, “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” July 2008, p. 4, www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/

ma/documents/Civ-MilPolicyJuly282008.pdf.

33. Dr. Rajiv Shah, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, USAID Nomination Hearing, 

December 1, 2009.

34. RSCMA was included as Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 

FY 2009, which was signed into law on October 14, 2008, as P.L. 110-417. It is similar to an earlier bill proposed 

by Senators Lugar and Biden, which passed the Senate Foreign Relations committee, but did not go further.

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35. Senate Report 111-44, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 

2010, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:sr044.111.pdf.

36. Section 1031 of P.L. 110-417, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009.

37. David A. Sobyra, “SRO Moves to National Defense University,” SRO Newsletter, March 2009, Issue No. 4, http://

smallwarsjournal.com/documents/SROnewslettermarch2009.pdf. 

38. Section 1031 under Subtitle D of the NDAA amends Chapter 20 of Title 10, U.S.C., to authorize and address the 

purposes of the CCO.

39. Defense Directive 1404.10, January 23, 2009, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/140410p.pdf. On December 16, 2009, the U.K. Government announced the inauguration of its new Civilian Stabilization Group (CSG), 

providing 1,000 civilian experts from the public and private sectors to plan stabilization and reconstruction 

work in countries emerging from conflict and instability. The CSG will be part of the U.K.’s Stabilisation Unit, an 

interagency team working under the Department for International Development, the Foreign Office, and the 

Ministry of Defense.

40. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, January 23, 2009, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/140410p.pdf.

41. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, at a Town Hall meeting to announce the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Dean Acheson Auditorium, Washington, DC, July 10, 2009, www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2009a/july/125949.htm.

42. DoS, The Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, July 10, 2009, www.state.

gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125956.htm.

43. Defense Directive 3000.05, issued September 16, 2009.

44. Secretary Robert Gates, Introduction to proposal in Memorandum for Secretary of State, “Options for Remodeling Security Sector Assistance Authorities,” December 15, 2009.

45. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks by Secretary Clinton on ‘Development in the 21st Century’,” 

Washington, DC, January 6, 2010, http://jerusalem.usconsulate.gov/remarks010610.html.

46. Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an 

Independent Task Force, 2005, p. 11, www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities_final.pdf.

47. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform 

for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report, July 28, 2005, p. 45.

48. U.S. Institute of Peace, “USIP, Army Unveil First Civilian Doctrine for Peace Operations,” October 7, 2009, www.

usip.org/newsroom/news/usip-us-army-unveil-first-civilian-doctrine-peace-operations.

49. GAO Report 08-39, Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the 

Civilian Reserve Corps, November 2007, p. 3. 

50. Secretary Robert Gates, opening statement to the House Armed Services Committee on Building Partnership 

Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process, April 15, 2008. Gates said, “Over the last 15 years, the 

U.S. government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st century objectives with processes 

and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War. Operating within this outdated bureaucratic 

superstructure, the U.S. government has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a 

variety of means: new legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, ‘tsars,’ authorities, and initiatives with varying 

degrees of success.” Nonetheless, he acknowledged that some real progress modernizing the current system has 

been made.

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48 I Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons tothe reform of stabilizationand Reconstruction Operations

51. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress, 3/2004–1/2010.

52. Senate Report 110–335, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, p. 389.

53. Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium,” Joint 

Force Quarterly, April 1, 2006, pp. 80-81, www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i41/i41_iad_01.pdf.

54. While any cost estimates would naturally be based on myriad assumptions, they would provide a useful framework for pre-SRO planning.

55. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Conference Report 111–288 to Accompany H.R. 2647, 

October 7, 2009.

56. Secretary Robert Gates, Memorandum for Secretary of State, “Options for Remodeling Security Sector Assistance Authorities,” December 15, 2009, p. 3.

57. Secretary Robert Gates, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009.

58. Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost?: Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” June 

2009, p. 1.

59. Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement and Policy, “Emergency Acquisitions,” May 

2007, pp. 17-18.

60. Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, “Urgent Reform 

Required: Army Expenditionary Contraction,” October 31, 2007, p. 30.

61. SIGIR Audit 10–008, “Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for 

Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program,” January 25, 2010, p. 4.

62. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Speech on “Development in the 21st Century,” Center for Global 

Development, January 6, 2010.

63. Frederick Barton and Noam Unger, Civil-Military Relations, Fostering Development and Expanding Civilian 

Capacity, CSIS/Brookings, April 2009, pp. 5–6.

64. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform 

for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report, July 28, 2005, p. 7.

65. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Memorandum for Secretary of State, “Options for Remodeling Security Sector Authorities,” December 15, 2009.

66. General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, August 30, 2009.

67. SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction; Lessons in Program and Project Management, (March 2007), pp. 14-15.

68. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, February 2009, pp. 333–334.

69. SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, February 2009, p. 334.

70. In November 2008, the British Government published a consolidated document that sets out the most recent 

best practices in the field of SROs. The guidance noted the need for strong leadership, adding that “a single 

acknowledged authority with a formal mandate and the ability to make decisions” is required. It also pointed out 

that “genuine unity of effort requires civilian who understand the military and vice versa.” 

71. Christopher J. Lamb, “Redesigning White House and Interagency Structures,” in Civilian Surge: Key to Complex 

Operations, p. 29 (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, December 2008), quoting Rand Beers, 

Structure Challenges Seminar, 1st Panel Proceedings, Project on National Security Reform Conference on Integrating Instruments of National Power in the New Security Environment, July 25-26, 2007.

72. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton,Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 2010 

budget request, May 20, 2009.

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73. Paddy Ashdown, Swords to Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 

UK, 2007), p. 179.

74. Occam’s Razor is a principle, devised by 14th Century Franciscan Friar William of Ockham, which suggests that 

“the simplest answer is usually the best answer.”

75. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Senior U.S. diplomat and U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, in an interview with the Sueddeutsche Zeitung published on December 9, 2009.

76. Thomas S. Szayna et al., Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations, RAND, 2009, xxii.

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Acronyms

ACT Advance Civilian Team (Interagency Management System)

CCO Center for Complex Operations (DoD)

CEW Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

CMCP Civil-Military Cooperation Policy

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CSI Civilian Stabilization Initiative (S/CRS)

CRSG Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies

Defense U. S. Department of Defense

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

DoS U.S. Department of State

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

GAO Government Accountability Office

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Program 

(U.S. Department of Justice)

IG Inspector General

IMS Interagency Management System

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS)

IPC Integration Planning Cell (Interagency Management System)

IRFF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (DoS)

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IT Information Technology

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)

OMB Office of Management and Budget (Executive Office of the President)

ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

OTA Office of Technical Assistance (Department of the Treasury)

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)

PCO Project and Contracting Office (DoD)

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PSD Presidential Study Directive

QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (DoS/USAID)

RSCMA Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008

S/CRS U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization

SIGOCO Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations

SRO Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction

State U.S. Department of State

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USOCO U.S. Office for Contingency Operations

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