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74–374 PDF 2001

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: TEST FAILURES AND

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 8, 2000

Serial No. 106–255

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Advisor

JASON CHUNG, Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 8, 2000 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Coyle, Phillip, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department

of Defense; Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Office, accompanied by Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Threat Reduction, Department of Defense; and Avis Bohlen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control,

Department of State ..................................................................................... 64

Graham, Dr. William, chairman and president National Security Research, Inc.; Lawrence J. Korb, vice president and director of studies,

Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, senior staff scientist, arms control program, Union of Concerned Scientists; and Dr.

Kim Holmes, vice president and director the Kathryn and Shelby

Cullom Davis Institute, the Heritage Foundation, accompanied by

Baker Spring, research fellow, the Heritage Foundation .......................... 171

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Bohlen, Avis, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Department

of State, information concerning Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative ................................................................................................................. 125

Chenoweth-Hage, Hon. Helen, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Idaho:

Article entitled, ‘‘Facing the Risks: A Realistic Look at Missile Defense’’ ...................................................................................................... 159

The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder ................................................. 7

Coyle, Phillip, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department

of Defense, prepared statement of ............................................................... 68

Graham, Dr. William, chairman and president National Security Research, Inc, prepared statement of .............................................................. 175

Gronlund, Dr. Lisbeth, senior staff scientist, arms control program, Union

of Concerned Scientists, prepared statement of ......................................... 197

Holmes, Dr. Kim, vice president and director the Kathryn and Shelby

Cullom Davis Institute, the Heritage Foundation, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 214

Kadish, Lieutenant General Ronald, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense

Office:

Information concerning a closed hearing ................................................ 153

Information concerning differences in estimates ................................ 164, 166

Information concerning Modification P00053 ......................................... 147

Information concerning NMD RRFs ........................................................ 131

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 108

Korb, Lawrence J., vice president and director of studies, Council on

Foreign Relations, prepared statement of ................................................... 186

(1)

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: TEST

FAILURES AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS

AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

B–372, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Chenoweth-Hage, Tierney,

Allen, Schakowsky, and Burton, ex officio.

Also present: Representatives Kucinich and Turner.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;

R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Alex Moore, fellow;

Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and

Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. The House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations is now going to undertake a hearing entitled, ‘‘National Missile Defense: Test Failures in

Technology Development.’’

Under the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, ‘‘It is the policy

of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible

an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending

the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile

attack.’’ Adopted with broad bipartisan support and signed by the

President, the statute answered the question whether to deploy a

national missile shield, but could not mandate when a technologically feasible system would be ready.

When will effective and affordable National Missile Defense

[NMD], technology, be ready? That is the question we pose this

morning as we undertake oversight of a $10 billion technology development process that has yet to yield a deployable NMD system.

The Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI],

hastened the demise of the Soviet Union. Since then, we’ve moved

away from the global vision dubbed ‘‘Star Wars’’ to merely trying

to hit a bullet with a bullet and missing more often than not.

Without question, NMD program officials, today’s stewards of the

SDI legacy, confront complex technical challenges in a changing

strategic, diplomatic and political environment. This is rocket

science, and defending against emerging missile threats demands

an unparalleled degree of technological precision in launch detecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion, target discrimination, command and control coordination, and

target interception.

Our oversight of other complex weapons systems, the F–22

Raptor and the multirole Joint Strike Fighter, underscored the importance of permitting technology readiness to drive design and deployment decisions. In those programs, we saw a genuine sense of

urgency to overcome test failures, conquer new technology and

meet emerging threats.

Is a similar sense of urgency propelling the NMD technology program? A 1998 review of the missile defense program found motion

but not progress, a rush to failure caused in part by poor management and lack of aggressive oversight. The President’s hastily announced decision last week to defer initial NMD deployment steps,

‘‘until we have absolute confidence that the system will work,’’

holds proven technologies hostage to an artificial all-or-nothing

standard.

Factors other than technical feasibility appear to be constraining

NMD success. One of those factors, Russia’s refusal to discuss necessary changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM], Treaty,

could have been ameliorated had the President authorized construction contracts for that part of NMD technology we know will

work, the X-Band radar facility in Alaska. Under the pressure of

inevitable, if distant, NMD deployment, the Russians might be

more willing to accede to limited ABM changes rather than face

further loss of international stature in the event the treaty is

deemed a legal nullity or a strategic anachronism.

The ballistic missile threat is real, and it is growing. China is developing weapons using stolen U.S. warhead designs, and appears

willing to sell missile technology to rogue nations who may not be

tamed by deterrence alone. North Korea could resume flight tests

and acquire intercontinental missile capability at any time. Development of technology to defend against that threat should be pursued just as aggressively, unfettered by timidity over near-term

diplomatic or political fallout.

The next President deserves to choose from a complete menu of

mature NMD technologies in deciding how best to protect our national security.

Our witnesses this morning represent a wide range of views on

how to implement the national policy on missile defenses. We welcome them all and look forward to their testimony.

At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I would just start this morning, Mr.

Chairman, by thanking you for scheduling and conducting these

hearings. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the witnesses today for their time, their insights, as well as their testimony.

I think President Clinton is to be applauded for his decision last

week to defer any decision on deployment of a National Missile Defense. Those who seek to politicize this issue do the Nation a disservice, including those who last December said they would welcome such a decision, but who have subsequently claimed that deferral somehow evidences a failure to strengthen America’s defenses. As I stated earlier, such politicization demeans the seriousVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
3

ness of our need to establish defense priorities based on appropriate nonpolitical criteria.

In addition, such assertions are patently inaccurate. Our country’s defenses would only be substantially weakened should we

move to deployment under current conditions. The President’s decision seems to have been the only reasonable one available at this

time, given the substantial delays in testing schedules, the severe

cost overruns and several high-profile missile intercept failures.

Moreover, it appears to have at least recognized that Russia,

China and our NATO allies oppose deployment because it would

violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which they regard as a cornerstone to nuclear nonproliferation.

As testimony submitted in writing for today’s hearing by Professor Burton Richter clearly states, we are now in the third round

of missile defense debates. In rounds one and two we concluded,

after much effort, that the technology was not up to the job and

we opted for arms control. The Nixon administration wanted to defend our missile force and instead signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty. The Reagan administration wanted to defend the

entire Nation with what became known derisively and appropriately as the ‘‘Star Wars’’ defense system, but moved instead to

decrease the nuclear threat through a series of treaties to reduce

the number of nuclear warheads deployed on each side.

Now some propose the intercept-in-space, hit-to-kill system that

would be the most technologically challenging of possible alternatives. Rightfully, criteria for development have been set out and

have been largely accepted. One, we talk of the changing threat for

emerging missile states and the anticipated need for a national

missile defense.

Two, we talk about the cost of deployment. We talk about the effect of the National Missile Defense deployment on the United

States/Russia nuclear arms reduction process and the broader strategic environment, including effects on our relationships with

China, NATO allies and others.

Last, we speak of the technological readiness of the system for

deployment.

While these hearings have been directed by the majority and the

chairman mostly at the issue of technological readiness, we must

recognize that none of the elements can be reviewed in a vacuum.

Consideration of any one necessarily implicates some consideration

of others. I should like to add yet another, a fifth or perhaps a subset of the fourth criteria we must consider before deployment, and

that is the likely operational effectiveness of the planned National

Missile Defense against a real-world attack, which would include

countermeasures.

The intercept tests conducted prior to this date and prior to the

President’s decision did not assess operational effectiveness of the

planned National Missile Defense. That criterion for the deployment should be whether the fully deployed system would be able

to deal with countermeasures, not the much more narrow criterion

of whether the system can intercept cooperative targets on the test

range. If there are countermeasures that would be available to

emerging missile states that would defeat the full National Missile

Defense system, then it would make no sense for the United States

4

to begin deploying even the first stage until it demonstrates first

on paper and then on the test range that the full system could be

made effective against such countermeasures.

There is no doubt the countermeasure technology exists in even

rogue nations right now and that the capacity exists for them to

develop other measures. For instance, a September 1999 national

intelligence estimate on the ballistic missile threat to the United

States asserts that anti-simulation balloon decoys for nuclear warheads are readily available technology that emerging missile states

could use to develop countermeasures to U.S. National Missile Defense systems. It is only slightly more difficult to implement measures using numerous balloons which would be much more effective

as would be putting a warhead inside a balloon.

The combination of methods, tactics of overwhelming the defense

and other strategies, will be developed and may already exist. So

before we deploy at any time, we must consider the four criteria,

or the five as I have noted, and satisfy ourselves that the deployment of a National Missile Defense will actually be needed, as opposed to reliance on deterrence and diplomacy; that costs which

seem to be spiraling even as our confidence in the system remains

uncertain; that those costs are in a range warranting deployment

of a National Missile Defense as our best means to answering any

threat.

A system that in 1996 was estimated to cost between $9 billion and $11 billion now appears to be nearing $50 billion and can be

expected to increase. As the Union for Concerned Scientists write,

the proposed U.S. National Missile Defense system may decrease

the security of the United States. Russia and China would respond

to the deployment of such a system by deploying a greater number

of warheads than might otherwise have been planned.

In addition, Russia would likely increase its reliance on launchon warnings to ensure that any retaliatory strike would be large

enough to overwhelm the National Missile Defense system.

A decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system would

also have a generally negative effect on U.S. relations with Russia

and China and would threaten cooperative efforts to decrease the

number of nuclear weapons, improve controls on weapons and

weapons materials, and combat proliferation.

Finally, the National Missile Defense system could prompt

emerging missile states to concentrate on our modes of delivery.

We are a long way from achieving the kind of technological readiness that would provide confidence in the system. The number of

tests with real-world conditions would tell if the system would

work. A significant number of additional tests than are currently

planned would be necessary to establish a high enough level of confidence. A National Missile Defense would need to be tested in

many differing operational environments to take into account different possible countermeasures, each of which would require its

own set of tests to estimate the system’s performance under that

environment.

There must be objective, independent test assessments, with authority, meaning at least that the Department of Defense should

not be able to disregard the sound advice of the director of operational tests and evaluation.

5

As Professor Richter said, while the system proposed now has a

less ambitious goal than Star Wars, the task is still very difficult

and extraordinarily complex and challenging. The intercept-inspace, hit-to-kill system now in development is the most technically

challenging of all the possible alternatives. It is the easiest to confuse with relatively simple decoys. The proposed test program is inadequate to ensure the necessary reliability before we begin to

spend big money on National Missile Defense. The proposed system

is not ready to graduate from development to deployment, and

maybe it never will be.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time I would recognize the gentlelady Mrs. ChenowethHage.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Chairman Shays. I would

like to thank the subcommittee for taking the time, as you have

and are doing now, to examine this very, very critical issue of the

feasibility and deployability of the National Missile Defense system. By holding these hearings, Chairman Shays, you are opening

up an issue that is so vitally important and of great interest to the

American people. I thank you for being here and holding this hearing after the House has temporarily recessed.

Mr. Chairman, since the dawn of the space age, we have often

heard the crowing of the pessimists. Statements like ‘‘it can’t be

done’’ or ‘‘it is simply too expensive’’ have been the norm for the

day with many programs where technology was the central component that existed. Now, people said this about the development of

our military fighters in the 1970’s and about our tanks in the

1980’s and our stealth technology in the 1980’s and the 1990’s, but

each time these pessimists have been proven wrong.

The genius of the American people is such that the seemingly insurmountable becomes surmountable. Specifically in the case of the

National Missile Defense system, we are overcoming the failures

that have so far been encountered. Failures to a certain extent are

always expected. Now, any fourth grade student learns in his

science lessons that failures are central to the scientific process,

but they are overcome, just as we are overcoming many of the technical failures we are now encountering.

Mr. Chairman, when Ronald Reagan originally proposed his

Strategic Defense Initiative, people ridiculed it by calling it ‘‘Star

Wars.’’ The press accused him of proposing the impossible and people inflamed the public by saying research in this area could cause

a war. President Reagan refused to take no for an answer, and as

a result, we are now much closer to defending the American public

from ballistic missiles.

One of the arguments that people of goodwill on both sides of the

National Missile Defense debate raise is the Anti-Ballistic Missile

[ABM], Treaty of 1972, in that it prohibits the deployment of a National Missile Defense shield. However, I question this. Personally,

I do not believe that the ABM Treaty still constrains us in this

way, because with the death of the Soviet Union, many scholars

argue that the ABM Treaty is no longer binding.

Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record three papers that explore the legal viVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ability and application of the ABM Treaty to national missile defense and the timely report by Senator Thad Cochran regarding national missile defense.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection, so ordered.

[NOTE.—The report entitled, ‘‘Stubborn Things, a Decade of Facts

About Ballistic Missile Defense,’’ may be found in subcommittee

files.]

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

While I am concerned about the development of National Missile

Defense, I am not one that is overly concerned with test failures.

Tests occur precisely to resolve problems before deployment of our

National Missile Defense system. I have great faith in the ingenuity of our research scientists, and I rest easy knowing that America

possesses the very best research scientists and laboratories in the

world.

And with ongoing research into National Missile Defense, we are

on the cusp of being able to protect America from rogue states like

North Korea, Iran and Iraq. We cannot fail in our efforts to protect

the American people.

So, Mr. Chairman, again thank you very much for holding this

meeting. By exploring and exploding some of the myths surrounding the technical feasibility of National Missile Defense, we are

providing an important service for the American people. Only

through effectively addressing these myths will we ever be able to

defend the United States against missile attacks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

It would be my intention to recognize Mr. Allen and then Ms.

Schakowsky and then Mr. Turner who is a member of the full committee and Mr. Kucinich, who is a member of the full committee.

Both of you are equal participants. It just will be, your order will

be after the regular members, but fully participate.

Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all the

panelists here today and begin by thanking our chairman.

When I was elected to Congress, this is what I thought committee hearings would be like. That is, you would have people with all

different points of view coming before us and expressing their opinions, and we would have a chance to sort out the differences. But

too often I have found that the panels are weighted so much to one

side or another that we don’t have that opportunity. So I particularly appreciate Chairman Shays’ proceeding as he has with the variety of different panelists and perspectives that we will hear

today.

Second, I do want to begin by saying, let’s remember what this

system is: This is a very limited system designed to protect against

a handful of missiles launched by a rogue nation like—so-called

rogue nation like North Korea or Iran or Iraq. That’s it. It is not

a shield that protects us from major nuclear powers like Russia. It

is not a shield that would protect us against what China has or

could develop in the future. It is aimed simply against those ‘‘states

of concern,’’ as they are now called.

If we are going to make a rational decision about how to proceed

with a national missile defense and at what speed, I think we have

to keep in mind the four factors that should guide us. They have

been stated before, but they bear repeating.

First, the status of the threat at the time of the decision to deploy. There is no point in spending $50 billion or $60 billion on a

system if there is no obvious threat that needs to be dealt with.

59

Second, here as we struggle with our budget on a regular basis,

cost has to be a factor. Just within the last 12 months, the cost of

this system has multiplied significantly.

Third, the state of the technology, and here I would say there are

two technologies. First, there is the technology of being able to hit

a bullet with a bullet, the ability to intercept a missile that is fired

at the United States. But second, there is the technology of dealing

with potential countermeasures. That subject has been given more

attention in the last few months, but not in my view nearly

enough, because if the countermeasures that are available to socalled ‘‘states of concern’’ are such that they could overwhelm the

kinds of systems that we could develop, then the system will not

work as advertised.

Finally, we have to pay attention to our arms control agenda, because in the last analysis, diplomacy, if it works, is always cheaper

than an arms race. In this case, diplomacy should not be ignored

or pushed aside as we move ahead.

I happen to believe that if a national missile defense system

works as advertised and strengthens our national security, we

should build it, but if a National Missile Defense system will not

work as advertised or if it will diminish our national security, we

should not deploy it, we should not proceed. It is the answer to that

fundamental choice that I believe confronts us in Congress, and the

American people as well, that I hope this hearing today will illuminate. And I again thank Chairman Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Schakowsky.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for

holding this hearing today to discuss our National Missile Defense

program and its technological feasibility. I also want to thank Congressman Tierney for all of his work on this subject and for requesting this hearing today.

Last year, when the House of Representatives debated H.R. 4, a

bill making it the policy of the United States to deploy a national

missile defense system when technologically feasible, I stood on the

House floor and warned my colleagues that this policy would not

enhance the security of the United States, but that it could actually

bring this Nation closer to war.

Since then, we have seen our neighbors around the world express

opposition—NATO allies, Russia, China and others. Russia has

warned that it would abandon arms reduction agreements if we go

forward with the National Missile Defense program. China has

warned it may increase offensive production, and I stand by the

declaration I made last year.

Since the Reagan administration, we have been urged by wishful

thinkers to deploy a system for which workable technology does not

exist. Now many years and many billions of dollars later, we are

still pursuing what I view as an irresponsible, likely unnecessary

and unrealistic policy.

Believe me, I am pleased that President Clinton deferred the decision to deploy to the next administration. Had it not been for the

sound advice of some of today’s witnesses and others, the situation

may have been different. To me, NMD is just another example of

60

the Department of Defense spending billions of taxpayer dollars on

programs that are destined for failure or are not necessary.

As many of my colleagues know, I strongly believe we need a

comprehensive strategic review of our defense policy, and I am

pleased that today we can start by taking a closer look at national

missile defense.

I would like to end with a quote which is from a document produced by one of our witnesses today, Mr. Coyle: ‘‘deployment,’’ he

says, ‘‘means the fielding of an operational system with some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions

against realistic threats and countermeasures when operated by

military personnel at all times of day or night and in all weather.

Such capability is yet to be shown to be practicable for NMD.’’

Mr. Coyle, of course, will have an opportunity to elaborate, but

to me that sums it up. Not only does deployment risk a whole new

arms race and the alienation of our traditional allies and adversaries, it does not work. I know my constituents expect better.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to hear from

our witnesses and look forward to a healthy discussion today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be

here with the subcommittee today, and I appreciate your allowing

those of us who are not members of the committee to join with the

committee. I, of course, take a great interest in the work of your

subcommittee as a member of the full Government Reform Committee, as well as because of my work as a member of the Research

and Development Subcommittee and the Procurement Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.

I had the opportunity to be an original cosponsor of the National

Missile Defense legislation. I was pleased to do so. I thought it was

the right thing to do. I also enjoyed the opportunity to go with a

delegation of the Armed Services Committee, under the leadership

of subcommittee Chairman Curt Weldon, prior to the consideration

of that legislation by the House of Representatives, to Moscow to

present a report to members of the Russian Duma that outlined

the information that we had collected that indicated that there was

a real threat to our national security from nations such as Korea

and Iran.

That meeting was very productive. Though it did not result in

our counterparts in the Duma concurring with our proceeding with

such a defense system, I think it did represent a good-faith effort

on the part of the Congress to present to the members of the Duma

and their defense committee our thoughts and our reasoning and

to present it prior to the passage of the legislation in the Congress.

We have, I think, today, a greater military superiority over any

potential foe than we have possessed at any time in our history.

I know there is a lot of discussion, particularly in the Presidential

race, about our military readiness. Though we always have room

for improvement, I am convinced that we do possess a military that

is second to none, for which we should all be very proud, and we

are very grateful to those who serve in the uniform of the armed

services who defend us every day. It is in our national interest and

61

in the interest of world peace to maintain that unquestioned superiority.

National missile defense is, in my opinion, an essential element

of achieving that objective. History teaches us that nations inevitably pursue the development of increasingly sophisticated weapons, and I think that the old adage, ‘‘Eternal vigilance is the price

of peace,’’ is one we must continue to be mindful of.

There is no question that this issue we are discussing today must

be approached with reasoned judgment. There are legitimate issues

that must be addressed, issues such as the scope and nature of the

threat we face; the technological readiness for deployment and the

diplomatic issues, including, of course, the impact on the ABM

Treaty. I have no doubt that the threat is real, that North Korea

is developing the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon to the continental United States. I think that threat may also exist from Iran

and other nations, like Iraq.

There are those who desire to achieve military power through the

use of nuclear weapons. That is not to say that the delivery of a

nuclear weapon by a missile is the only method that may be chosen

by a potential foe.

I also understand that it is important to be sure that the technology is sufficient to successfully deploy a system. Otherwise, we

will pursue a reckless course, spending millions of dollars we would

not otherwise have to spend. But I am convinced that we have the

ability to be in a position to deploy—that the technology will and

can be sufficient to accomplish the goal.

Finally, I also believe that as we pursue the diplomatic front, and

we certainly should pursue it in every way possible, that at the end

of the day our allies, as well as those who are potential foes, should

be able to understand that this is an effort that we are making

that is in the interest not only of our own security but in the security of world peace.

At the end of the day, if we do not achieve agreement with those

other nations, I think it will still be in our national interest to deploy a limited system.

I concur with the President’s decision to defer deployment until

the next administration, not because I question the ability to

achieve a system that will work, but because I have evidenced by

the comments of Governor Bush and some of our Republican colleagues in the Congress that there is a debate that will take place

regarding the type of system that should be deployed.

The information that I have indicates that the threat currently

is a limited one, and that a system that has the capability of defending against limited attacks will be appropriate, but it is clear

that there are others who choose a more, ‘‘robust approach,’’ a more

‘‘Star Wars approach,’’ as was advocated in the Reagan administration. I think that Congress should engage in that debate, and that

issue deserves our attention.

So I am grateful, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this hearing today to give us all the opportunity to begin the course of making a reasoned judgment about a very important issue to the American people, and I appreciate the opportunity to share in this discussion.

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Turner. The committee is grateful to

have your participation, and also Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. Kucinich, you can close up here.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding

this committee meeting. I certainly want to express my appreciation to Mr. Tierney and the other members of the committee for the

work that they have done on this issue. As some of the members

know, this is something that I have been working on for the last

year, and I appreciate the fact that Mr. Shays has called the hearing, which I believe is one of the first opportunities we have had

in this House to get into this issue.

I would like, in some brief remarks here, to pose a number of

questions, and I think the first question that has to be asked is,

is this trip necessary? Why are we asking the American people to

even consider forking over an additional $60 billion when we have

already gone a great distance since 1983, when the Reagan administration first proposed Star Wars, to prove that this concept

doesn’t work; that it is an idea in search of an enemy; that it would

subvert any effort to be able to have fiscal responsibility in the

Federal Government; that it would undermine our efforts to maintain nuclear nonproliferation; that it would violate the ABM Treaty; and that it would generally be a disaster on a scale that hasn’t

been seen in this country with respect to trying to maintain American leadership for peace in the world?

I would submit that peace through proliferation is an Orwellian

construction which defies credibility; that you cannot tell the world,

as we are in a new millennium, that the way that we can achieve

peace is through an arms buildup.

Let’s sweep aside for a moment the debate over whether or not

this is technically possible, because it is not. Let’s sweep aside for

a moment the debate over whether or not we want to commit tens

of billions of dollars to this, because I don’t believe the American

people do. Let’s go right to the crux, what I think is the crux, of

this overarching debate, and that is, do we really want to get into

an era of nuclear proliferation?

Are we going to go back to the days of duck-and-cover drills,

where our children are going to be told to get under their desks

and get into a crouch and close their eyes and pray that they don’t

see the flash and pray that they aren’t incinerated in some nuclear

conflagration? Or are we going to use this opportunity and this debate to come back to the irreducible conclusion that the only way

to peace is through diplomacy and the way to nuclear arms reduction is through reducing and eliminating nuclear arms, which was

the central purpose of the Nonproliferation Treaty and of the ABM

Treaty.

This hearing today isn’t about castigating people who are serving

our country well and who are dedicated to America. We are all

good Americans. We all love our country. You don’t run for Congress unless you love your country. You don’t serve in the military

unless you love your country.

This isn’t about whether we love our country. We all love America and we can all love peace in the world, and we have different

views about how to achieve peace in the world. But I think that

when we get away from our titles—Congressman, General, ColoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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nel—and just get to being people shopping at the West Side Market

in Cleveland, people just want to live, they want to survive and

they don’t want their government putting them in a position where

the peace of the world can be at risk.

And that’s actually, as Ms. Schakowsky said earlier, that’s actually where we are going with this. Over a whacky idea that will

never work, we are engaging in discussions that can actually create

destabilization on the issue of peace.

Now, when we get into the questions and answers, I am going

to get into the cost discussions, because the American taxpayers

are interested about whether their money is being wasted or not.

But I just appreciated a moment here to just try to interject a note

of just playing straight out from the shoulder discussion about an

idea whose time should have been long past and about an idea that

for some reason, like the movie ‘‘The Alien,’’ just when you think

it is gone, it comes out of some compartment.

So thank you for all being here. I certainly look forward to the

discussion today, and I look forward to this continuing debate inside the House of Representatives and across the country.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I appreciate the panel’s patience, and we

have just a little housekeeping to take care of and then we will get

right to the witnesses.

I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee

be permitted to place an opening statement in the record, and that

the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose; and without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record and without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that written statements from the following individuals be included in the record: Ambassador Henry F.

Cooper, board chairman, High Frontier; Dr. Burton Richter, director emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; and Mr. Joseph

Cirincione, director, nonproliferation project, Carnegie Endowment

Diamond for International Peace.

I will just introduce our witnesses and they can begin their testimony. We have a panel of four individuals, three of whom will testify and we have two panels: Mr. Phillip Coyle, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense; testimony

from Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Department of Defense, accompanied by the

Honorable Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense Strategy and Threat Reduction, Department of Defense; and our third

testimony is from the Honorable Avis Bohlen, Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of Arms Control, Department of State.

The way we are going to do this is we are going to have a 5-

minute, and we will roll it over for another 5 minutes, giving you

10 minutes each for your testimony and then we will get right to

questions.

I will be absent for about 25 minutes, and we will give the floor

to Mrs. Chenoweth to start.

Mr. Warner, you may start.

Mr. WARNER. I don’t have an opening statement, sir.

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Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry. Mr. Coyle, we are starting with you and

then we are going to Mr. Kadish and then we will go to Ms.

Bohlen.

Mr. COYLE. Chairman Shays—— Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry. I do need to swear you in before I go, if

you would stand.

Is there anyone else who may be testifying that is accompanying

you, who may answer a question? If so, I would invite them to

stand.

It will just be the four of you? OK.

[Witnesses sworn].

Mr. SHAYS. I note the record that all four plus one have sworn

and affirmed.

Thank you. You may be seated and, Mr. Coyle, you may begin.

STATEMENTS OF PHILLIP COYLE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL

TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD KADISH, DIRECTOR, BALLISTIC

MISSILE DEFENSE OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD

WARNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY

AND THREAT REDUCTION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND

AVIS BOHLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ARMS

CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. COYLE. Chairman Shays, Mr. Tierney, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the testing of the

National Missile Defense system this morning. I have not had the

opportunity to address this committee before, and I appreciate the

opportunity to do so.

You requested that today’s testimony focus on the impact of the

test results to date, on technological maturity and deployment

schedules. You also asked that we address the relationship between

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the current proposals to design, test and deploy an effective missile system. First, I would like

to briefly discuss the progress so far. The NMD program has demonstrated considerable progress toward its defined goals in the last

2 years. The battle management, command, control and communication systems have progressed well. The potential X-Band radar

performance looks promising as reflected in the performance of the

ground-based radar prototype.

A beginning systems integration capability has been demonstrated, although achieving full systems interoperability will be

challenging.

The ability to hit a target reentry vehicle in a direct hit-to-kill

collision was demonstrated in the first flight intercept test last October. However, in this test, operationally representative sensors

did not provide initial interceptor targeting instructions, as would

be the case in an operational system. Instead, for test purposes, a

Global Positioning System signal from the target RV served to first

aim the interceptor. We were not able to repeat such a successful

intercept in the two subsequent flight intercept tests. Also, the root

cause of the failure in the most recent flight intercept test has not

been determined.

Because of the nature of strategic ballistic missile defense, it is

impractical to conduct fully operationally realistic intercept flight

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testing across the wide spectrum of scenarios. The program must,

therefore, complement its flight testing with various types of simulations.

Overall, NMD testing is comprised of interrelated ground, hardware and software in-the-loop testing, intercept and nonintercept

flight testing, computer and laboratory simulations and man-inthe-loop command and control exercises. Unfortunately, these simulations have failed to develop as expected.

This, coupled with flight test delays, has placed a significant limitation on our ability to assess the technical feasibility of the NMD

system.

The testing program has been designed to learn as much as possible from each test. Accordingly, the tests so far have all been

planned with backup systems so that if one portion of the test fails,

the rest of the test objectives might still be met.

Developmental tests in a complex program, especially those conducted very early, contain many limitations and artificialities, some

driven by the need for specific early design data and some driven

by test range safety considerations.

Additionally, the tests are designed so that they will not produce

debris in orbit that will harm satellites.

Also, the program was never structured to produce operationally

realistic test results this early. Accordingly, it was not realistic to

expect these test results could support a full deployment decision

now, even if all the tests had been unambiguously successful,

which they have not been.

Notwithstanding the limitations in the testing program and failures of important components in all three of the flight intercept

tests, the program has demonstrated considerable progress.

Compliance with the ABM Treaty has not had an adverse impact

to date on the developmental testing of the NMD system. In the

future, we desire additional ground-based interceptor test launches

from more operationally representative locations than the existing

Kwajalein Missile Range. Additional target launch sites which are

not restricted by the treaty would expand the test envelope beyond

that currently available, as recommended by the Welch panel, to

validate system simulations over the rest of the operating regimes.

Furthermore, we need a radar to skin track the incoming RV, reentry vehicle, rather than tracking a beacon transponder as has

been done with a radar on Oahu. We need this during early, midcourse flight in order to support creation of the Weapon Task Plan

which first aims the interceptor.

Some of the options for these improvements could raise ABM

Treaty issues. Any NMD test activity must be sufficiently well defined in order to properly assess the ABM Treaty implications and

determine whether the activity can be conducted under the existing

treaty.

Under the program of record, test results are not likely to be

available in 2003 to support a recommendation then to deploy a C–

1 system in 2005.

This is because the currently planned testing program is behind,

because the test content does not yet address important operational

questions and because ground test facilities for assessment are considerably behind schedule.

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NMD testing needs to be augmented to prepare for realistic operational situations in the operational test phase and is not yet aggressive enough to keep pace with the currently proposed schedules

for silo and radar construction and missile production. The testing

schedule, including supporting modeling and simulation, continues

to slip while the construction and production schedules have not.

Important parts of the test program have slipped a year in the

19 months since the NMD program was restructured in January

1999. Thus, the program is behind in both the demonstrated level

of technical accomplishment and in schedule.

Additionally, the content of individual tests has been diminished

and is providing less information than originally planned.

I am especially concerned that the NMD program has not

planned or funded any intercept until IOT&E operational testing

with realistic operational features such as multiple simultaneous

engagements, long-range intercepts, realistic engagement geometries, and countermeasures other than simple balloons. While it

may not be practical or affordable to do all of these things in developmental testing, selected stressing operational requirements

should be included in developmental tests that precede IOT&E to

help ensure sufficient capability for deployment.

For example, the current C-Band transponder tracking and identification system alluded to earlier, which is justified by gaps in

radar coverage and range safety considerations, is being used to

provide target track information to the system in current tests.

This practice should be phased out prior to IOT&E; this will ensure

that the end-to-end system will support early target tracking and

interceptor launch.

There is nothing wrong with the limited testing program the Department has been pursuing, so long as the achieved results match

the desired pace of acquisition decisions to support deployment.

However, a more aggressive testing program with parallel paths

and activities will be necessary to achieve an effective interim operational capability by the latter half of this decade. This means a

test program that is structured to anticipate and absorb setbacks

that inevitably occur.

The NMD program is developing test plans that move in this direction.

The time and resource demands that would be required for a program of this type would be substantial, as documented in the Congressional Budget Office report on the budgetary and technical implications of the NMD program. The Safeguard missile program

conducted 125 flight tests; the Safeguard program was an early

version of NMD. Similarly, the full Polaris program conducted 125

flight tests, and the full Minuteman program conducted 101 flight

tests.

Rocket science has progressed in the past 35 years, and I am not

suggesting that 100 or more NMD flight tests will be necessary.

However, the technology in the current NMD program is more sophisticated than in those early missile programs, and we should be

prepared for inevitable setbacks.

It is apparent that in these early programs an extensive amount

of work was done in parallel from one flight test to another. Failures that occurred were accepted and the programs moved forward

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with parallel activities as flight testing continued. As in any weapons development program, the NMD acquisition and construction

schedules need to be linked to capability achievements demonstrated in a robust test program, not to schedule per se.

This approach supports an aggressive acquisition schedule if the

test program has the capacity to deal with setbacks. On three separate occasions, independent panels chaired by Larry Welch—General, Air Force, retired—have recommended an event-driven not

schedule-driven program. In the long run, an event-driven program

might take less time and cost less money than a program that

must be regularly rebaselined due to the realities of very challenging and technical operational goals.

Aggressive flight testing, coupled with comprehensive hardware

in-the-loop and simulation programs, will be essential for NMD.

Additionally, the program will have to adopt a parallel fly throughfailure approach that can absorb tests that do not achieve their objectives in order to have any chance of achieving fiscal 2005 deployment of an operationally effective system. As noted by the CBO,

the Navy’s Polaris program successfully took such an approach 30

years ago.

Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with

some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly

without adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster composition,

timing, trajectory or direction and when operated by military personnel at all times of the day or night and in all weather. Such a

capability is yet to be shown practicable for NMD. These operational considerations will become an increasingly important part

of tests and simulation plans over the coming years.

In the full statement of my testimony, which has been provided

to the committee, I make a series of recommendations to enhance

the testing program. This includes more realistic flight engagements, tests with simple countermeasures beyond those planned,

flight intercept tests with simple tumbling RVs and tests with multiple simultaneous engagements.

Madam Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions

you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coyle follows:]

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Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.

Coyle, for your testimony.

The Chair now recognizes General Kadish for his testimony.

General KADISH. Madam Chairman, members of the committee,

thank you for the opportunity to testify on the National Missile Defense program this morning and to discuss the impact of the test

results to date on our technological maturity and the challenges we

face. I have not had the privilege of appearing before your committee until today, and I am pleased to be able to do so.

In general, there are basically two ways to look at the program’s

progress to date, and they could be termed the ‘‘glass half-full’’ and

the ‘‘glass half-empty.’’ While our objective is to make the glass

completely full, my assessment at the moment is that it is half full.

I say this because we have made remarkable progress and substantial technical progress, despite two high profile test failures.

As you know, we have been aggressively pursuing the development of the NMD system to achieve operational status as soon as

practicable.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. General, excuse my interpretation.

Would you pull your microphone closer?

General KADISH. Our complex goal of fielding a system within a

short timeframe is not unprecedented. Indeed, it has been compared with the urgent programs to deploy our Nation’s first nuclear

ICBM force.

On average, it took 43⁄4 years for the Poseidon, Polaris, Trident

I and——

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. General, would you please start over.

General KADISH. OK.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you very much.

General KADISH. In general, there are two ways to look at the

program’s progress to date, and they could be termed the ‘‘glass

half-full’’ or the ‘‘glass half-empty.’’ While our objective is to make

the glass completely full, my assessment at the moment is that it

is half full. I say this because we have made remarkable and substantial technical progress despite two high-profile test failures.

As you know, we have been aggressively pursuing the development of the NMD system to achieve operational status as soon as

practicable.

Our goal of fielding a complex system within a short timeframe

is not unprecedented. Indeed, it has been compared with the urgent

programs to deploy our Nation’s first ICBM force. On average it

took 43⁄4 years for the Poseidon, Polaris, Trident I and II sealaunch ballistic missile programs and a Minuteman I, II and III

ICBM programs to field the capability. That is from the engineering, manufacturing and the development stage to the achievement

of initial operational capability.

While the proposed NMD system is in some ways a more complex

system than its predecessors, each of these earlier programs had

its own significant managerial, technical, schedule and political

challenges to meet. In other words, our goal of defending the entire

country against an emerging threat by an NMD system on an aggressive acquisition schedule does not represent an unprecedented

divergence from the way we have procured some major systems in

the past. However, it does represent a major divergence from the

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way we have normally pursued weapon system programs over the

past 20 years.

I should also point out that all development programs experience

problems, especially in their early stages and when pioneering new

military capability. The Atlas ICBM program experienced 12 failures in its 21⁄2 year flight testing history and the Minuteman I program suffered 10 failures in a 31⁄2 year testing program. The Corona program in the early sixties to deploy our first strategic reconnaissance satellite survived 12 failures and mishaps before the first

satellite could be successfully orbited. Its engineering challenges included mating an unproven satellite to a booster, launching a

multistage rocket, separating the payload in space, ensuring the

right orbit, orienting and operating optical sensors and coordinating the ejection of film capsules, and recovering the undamaged

capsule after reentry.

The point is that birthing a revolutionary technology and making

it useful is a tough engineering job that requires discipline, patience and vision. To expect all activities to be successful is unrealistic given the history of such endeavors. When our Nation faced

great need, program support by our national leadership persisted

despite frustrations resulting from test failures and technical difficulties. As a result, once troubled programs have made profound

contributions to our national security.

Over the past 11 months the NMD program has had two failures

in the three intercept flight tests conducted so far. While these

were disappointments, we were able to collect valuable information

on the integration of the system and we have a full schedule still

ahead.

Let me briefly discuss a little different perspective on operational

testing. These early integrated flight tests that I mentioned do not

meet the generally accepted definition of operational realistic testing that Mr. Coyle pointed out. They were never intended this

early in the development phase. Ours is ‘‘walk before you run’’ approach. We have just recently entered the fully integrated testing

phase after which the tests in our current plan will become progressively more stressful. The increasing complexity of our tests

will involve among other things greater discrimination challenges,

longer ranges, higher closing speeds and day and nighttime shots.

The way our current testing program is planned, we will do a series of tests that become increasingly operationally realistic by the

time the final independent operational test assessments must be

made. This occurs years later in the program test series.

Now I’d like to discuss some other fact of life testing issues, specifically range limitations.

Range limitations are an inescapable reality and a direct result

of the fact that our test range extends over about 4,000 square

miles of the Pacific Ocean. These test restrictions include safety

constraints on missile overflight and impact areas. I’m sure we’d

hear about it if the missile parts came raining down on Californians or Hawaiians or startled fishermen in the Pacific Ocean. We

also don’t want to add to the space debris, that it might threaten

orbital or space launch paths. The effect of these restrictions is that

we are permitted to flight test in only a limited part of the designed operating envelope and along different geometries than

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those from which potential missile threats might appear. We have

to use robust simulations that are firmly anchored on and updated

from data from earlier ground and flight tests to test the system

under conditions our test ranges cannot permit.

These restrictions were highlighted in both General Welch’s and

Mr. Coyle’s independent reports and we need to address them as

we proceed with the program. We are doing that. It’s not that we

don’t want to change the restrictions but the cost, risk and policy

issues must be resolved. These fact of life constraints, however, do

not represent a problem for the near term, but we can increase our

confidence in the system as we proceed if they are addressed now.

Just to give you an example, let’s consider the necessary role of

the so-called C band beacon transponder and the global positioning

system [GPS], equipment attached to the target warheads. These

are necessary outgrowths of our testing limitations. None, I repeat

none, of this equipment in any way aids the kill vehicle in finding,

discriminating or intercepting the target during the final stages of

the flight test.

The C band beacon is necessary for the surrogate radar in Hawaii to act as if it were an upgraded early warning radar since we

do not have one down range for the test. The GPS system allows

the manager controlling the test to monitor the location of the target for range safety. It also provides the engineers examining post

test data a critical source of validation information. It helps us to

know what we saw or thought we saw at any precise time during

the engagement.

These beacons answer two of the most critical needs of any test

program, ensuring the safety of all in the area, in this case the

South Pacific, and ensuring we receive a comprehensive and adequate set of data. Should our other tracking systems fail during the

test and thus not provide the target’s location adequately, we

would as a last resort use the GPS data to direct the kill vehicle

to its sensor acquisition area in order to salvage the end game aspects of the test. In this case, we recognize it would no longer be

a successful integrated system test, but it would provide more and

useful information on the autonomous homing and discrimination

capability of the kill vehicle. Again, this is only as a backup in the

event of radar failure in the middle of what is a very expensive

flight test.

Finally, I’d like to discuss countermeasures. Countermeasures

and counter-countermeasures are part of the continuing interaction

of offensive and defensive systems throughout history. They are not

new, nor are they unforeseen or unplanned for. The NMD system

is itself a countermeasure against the threat of ballistic missiles.

The United States understands the challenge of missile countermeasures. We’ve been in the missile business for a number of decades now and we’ve developed some very sophisticated sensors,

computers and discriminants. We are continuing to refine these capabilities.

But it is fair to say that we have not fully tested the NMD systems against countermeasure suites we expect. It’s too early in our

development effort. Our early test objectives are focused on accomplishing the basic technology of hit to kill. We do, however, have

great confidence based on the testing and analysis we have done

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so far that we will be effective against the countermeasures we expect, and our future testing will confirm that confidence.

Still, critics continue to fuel the skepticism surrounding the issue

by using a simple technique, theory and practical application are

the same. In other words, countermeasures may be easy science on

paper, but effective ones are not all that simple to develop and

even less simple to implement. The engineering challenges are very

substantial. Structural issues can affect range, accuracy and payload, and no nation can place confidence in the effectiveness of its

program without testing. Those who argue that a system can be defeated by countermeasures usually base their argument on assumptions that favor the offense while downplaying the capabilities of

our emerging defensive system.

In my view, credible, sophisticated countermeasures are costly,

tough to develop, and difficult to make effective against our NMD

design. Simple, cheap attempts can be readily countered by our

system. I have made more extensive comments on this countermeasure issue in my written comments.

In summary, Madam Chairman, I believe our glass is half full.

We have made remarkable progress. We have shown that the foundation of our system hit to kill is achievable. While the test failures

we’ve had so far are certainly disappointments, they are not unprecedented for the program of this scope.

We have major challenges ahead as we work to continue to fill

the glass and my goal is to fill it, but our progress to date has been

solid. The challenges are no longer ones of basic science or technology. We know our fundamental design can work. The challenges

before us are those of engineering and integration and building reliability into the system.

Engineering, the schedule challenges and the technology integration tasks are tough. We are, however, ready to proceed aggressively.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]

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Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, General Kadish, for your

testimony. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Bohlen for her testimony.

Ms. BOHLEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Chairman,

Mr. Tierney, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our national missile

defense program and how it relates to the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty.

It is this administration’s position that we should not move forward with deployment of an NMD system until we have full confidence that that system will work and until we have made every

reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the cost of deployment and

to maximize the benefit. I am obviously not in a position to speak

on the technical or programmatic issues related to this system.

General Kadish and Mr. Coyle have authoritatively addressed

those aspects of the program. Instead, Madam Chairman, I will

focus my brief remarks on the diplomatic and political context in

which we have pursued the development of an NMD system and

the diplomatic and foreign policy ramifications of deploying such a

system.

When the President decided last summer for planning purposes

on an initial NMD architecture, he stated that he would make a

decision on whether to deploy this system based on four criteria;

our assessment of the threat, technological feasibility, cost and the

overall impact on national security. A week ago today, as you

know, the President announced that the NMD program is sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development

and testing but despite impressive progress, that there is not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness

of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment at this

time.

In making this decision, the President took into account the four

criteria I just mentioned, and he made clear that we will continue

to work with our allies and with Russia and with China to

strengthen their understanding of and support for our efforts to

meet the emerging ballistic missile threats and to explore, where

appropriate, creative ways we can cooperate to enhance their security against this threat as well.

Let me say just a few words about the diplomatic and foreign

policy context of NMD. At the end of the day, as the President has

repeatedly stated, no country can exercise a veto over a decision

that he or a future President might conclude is in the best interest

of the United States. But as he also noted in his speech last Friday,

while an effective NMD can be an important part of our national

security strategy, it can never be the sum total of that strategy or

of a strategy to deal with nuclear and missile threats. We cannot

fail to take the views and security requirements of our friends and

allies into account as we move forward on this program. We have

an obligation to do what is necessary to achieve consensus within

the NATO and Pacific alliance which are essential to our own security and to reassure others of the steadfast commitment of the

United States to preserving the international arms control regimes

that they have come to rely on for their own security.

To quote the President again, ‘‘Over the past 30 years, Republican and Democratic Presidents have negotiated an array of arms

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control treaties with Russia. We and our allies have relied on these

treaties to ensure strategic stability and predictability with Russia

to get on with the job of dismantling the legacy of the cold war and

to further the transition from confrontation to cooperation with our

former adversary in the most important arena, nuclear weapons.’’ We continue to believe that the ABM Treaty is, ‘‘a key part of the

international security structure we have built with Russia and

therefore a key part of our national security.’’ For that reason, we have sought to strengthen and preserve the

treaty even as we pursue our efforts to develop a national missile

defense. We continue to believe that strategic stability based on

mutual deterrence between ourselves and the Russians is still important in the post cold war period because we and the Russians

still have large nuclear arsenals. The ABM Treaty provides a

framework for ensuring strategic stability between our two countries, reducing the risk of confrontation and providing a basis for

further strategic reductions.

Clearly, deployment of the NMD system we are developing would

require changes to the ABM Treaty. The deployment of an ABM

radar at Shemya, AK, of 100 ground-based interceptors and 5 upgraded early warning radars for the defense of all 50 States would

violate the obligation contained in article I of the treaty not to deploy an ABM system to defend national territory. Such activities

would also be inconsistent with the locational restrictions of article

III of the treaty.

We of course do not believe that the proposed system would violate the core purposes of the treaty and in fact believe that updating the treaty to permit a limited NMD would strengthen it. Accordingly, since last summer we have engaged at the highest levels

in extensive discussions with Russia with the objective of reaching

agreement on modifications in the ABM Treaty which would permit

us to move forward with the limited NMD system proposed by this

administration within the ABM Treaty. We have to this end provided to Russia a draft protocol to the treaty.

Among U.S. allies, support for NMD is strongly conditioned on

first securing Russia’s agreement to cooperatively amend the ABM

Treaty. In the broader international community as well, support for

U.S. non-proliferation objectives on other foreign policy priorities is

also often linked to preservation of the ABM Treaty.

The degree to which other nations perceive that they have a

stake in preserving the ABM Treaty was clear during this year’s

MPT review conference. For our allies and others the ABM Treaty

is a touchstone of U.S.-Russian strategic stability. It is clearly perceived as an important foundation of the whole structure of international strategic security.

In the consultations that Under Secretary John Holum has conducted with his Russian counterparts, as well as discussions at

other levels, we have addressed three broad areas designed to meet

specific Russian concerns. First, we have made clear to Moscow

that in deploying a limited NMD system we are responding to a

new threat from long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of states

that threaten international peace and stability and we’re not seeking to change the core foundation of strategic stability with Russia.

We have told our Russian intelocutors that we believe the ABM

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Treaty should be preserved and strengthened by adapting it to a

new strategic environment that did not exist in 1972, using the

amendment procedures that are established by the terms of the

treaty itself. We have proposed only those treaty changes that we

believe are necessary to allow the United States to address those

threats we expect will emerge in the near term while also establishing the basis for further adaptations of the treaty in the future

should the emerging threat warrant.

Second, we have sought to demonstrate to the Russians that a

limited NMD system will not threaten their strategic deterrent and

cannot be made to have that capability. Indeed, criticism by Russian officials of our NMD program has not focused so much on the

impact of our proposed system on their deterrent but rather on

their concerns that these deployments would establish an infrastructure that would allow future breakout.

Finally, we have proposed to the Russians a series of confidence

building and transparency measures. To date, as you know, the

Russians have not agreed to our proposals to amend the ABM

Treaty, but we have come considerably closer to agreement on some

key aspects of the problem; for example, on the nature and reality

of the threat. This progress is reflected in the joint statement on

a Strategic Stability and Cooperation Initiative that was signed by

Presidents Clinton and Putin in New York on Wednesday, and I

have copies of that initiative if the members of the committee have

not had a chance to see that yet and would be happy to submit it

for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. BOHLEN. We have also been pursuing close consultations

with our NATO and Pacific allies who have all made clear that

they hope the United States will pursue strategic defense in a way

that preserves the ABM Treaty. Their support is important to us

for a number of reasons. Our European and Asian allies are crucial

to our efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles and missile technology, efforts

which continue to be a strong line of defense against the threat of

missile proliferation. Moreover, an effective NMD will require the

consent of two allies to upgrade the radars that are situated on

their territory.

Our allies have uniformly welcomed the President’s decision to

defer a decision on deployment as providing more time for discussion of the emerging ballistic missile threat and the role of ballistic

missile defense in responding to that threat. We will continue this

dialog with our allies in the months ahead. We have also made

clear to China that our national missile defense efforts are not directed against them.

In sum, Madam Chairman, the President’s decision has given us

more time to work toward narrowing our differences with Russia

and to involving our allies in shaping a coordinated response to the

emerging ballistic missile threat. We continue to believe that an effective NMD system can be developed and deployed within the context of resolving the concerns of our allies and the objections of

Russia.

Let me conclude by reiterating a point the President made in his

speech last Friday. He said, ‘‘No nation can have a veto over American security. Even if the United States and Russia cannot reach

agreement, even if we cannot secure the support of our allies at

first, the next President may nonetheless decide that it is in America’s national interest to go forward with deployment of NMD. But

by the same token, since the actions and reactions of others in the

world bear on our security, clearly it would be far better to move

forward in the context of the ABM Treaty and allied support.

America and the world will be better off if we explore the frontiers

of strategic defenses while continuing to pursue arms control, to

stand with our allies and to work with Russia and others to stop

the spread of deadly weapons.’’

Thank you.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Ms. Bohlen, for your testimony, and the Chair now first recognizes Mr. Tierney. We are in

a section now where each member will be recognized for 5 minutes

for their questions. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Coyle, thank

you for your testimony.

As I mentioned during my remarks earlier, I am particularly concerned about the issue of countermeasures. Let me make sure that

I understand your written testimony. You stated that targets in

flight tests will have at most unsophisticated countermeasures and

that they will employ only simple balloon decoys. Did I get that

right?

Mr. COYLE. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you talking about just flight test prior to the

deployment readiness review or all flight tests with test programs?

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Mr. COYLE. Both. The tests prior to the Development Readiness

Review only had a simple balloon as the decoy, and the tests that

are projected out into the future, that is, for the flight intercept

test I should say, only use simple balloons as decoys.

Mr. TIERNEY. So other countermeasures that are readily available, cooled shrouds, for example, that reduce the radiation emitted

by warheads, there’s no planned tests for that?

Mr. COYLE. Those would not meet the definition of an unsophisticated threat. The C1 system is designed only to meet the so-called

unsophisticated threat, and so a countermeasure like a cooled

shroud that you mentioned would have to be dealt with with future

versions of the NMD system called C2 or C3.

Mr. TIERNEY. Those types of countermeasures do exist, yet

there’s no plans made to deal with them, at least in the C1 stage.

And now would that also be true for tumbling RVs and things of

that nature, other countermeasures?

Mr. COYLE. A tumbling RV is a different matter that actually

might be the simplest thing for a nation to deploy. The easiest

thing of all is don’t even spin up the RV, just let it plop off the end.

It’s not as accurate when you do that but it is simpler, and so

that’s one of the reasons why I’ve recommended, and so has General Welch’s panel, that we try some tests with tumbling RVs along

the way.

Mr. TIERNEY. On the balloon decoys that are scheduled for tests

later in the program, to your knowledge, will they have a shape or

motion similar to the target reentry vehicle?

Mr. COYLE. Some of the balloons will be about the same size, but

they won’t have the same motion as the reentry vehicle.

Mr. TIERNEY. What about our radar on the ground, has the XBand radar been tested during a flight test to determine whether

it can deal with sophisticated or unsophisticated decoys?

Mr. COYLE. So far the only decoys we have used have been a single, simple balloon. Later on, there will be tests with balloons that

have radar absorbing material on them but just balloons.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just balloons.

General KADISH. Mr. Tierney, can I add to that a little bit?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. General Kadish.

General KADISH. The flight test program we have does not only

consist of intercept flight tests. We have other flight tests that we

call risk reduction flight tests that we fly against the radar and

other sensors separately, and we have done a number of those tests

against a wide range of countermeasures, including jammers. So although they were not intercept tests they were against our sensors

and we’d be glad to provide that data to you in the appropriate context.

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Mr. TIERNEY. I assume Mr. Coyle has that data.

Mr. COYLE. Yes, and those are fine tests to do. We certainly support them, but they’re not intercept tests and so they only go as

far as they go.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess what I’m talking about here is two things.

One is effectiveness, whether or not you test, see if it works. One

is level of confidence in any of this. If you test and it works once,

that doesn’t give us a great deal of confidence as it might if you

tested several times or test all the different permutations that we

could expect to see.

Mr. Coyle, in your testimony you stated there might be different

synergistic effects when multiple missiles are deployed. What did

you mean by that?

Mr. COYLE. Well, we probably should assume that if a so-called

rogue state were to send intercontinental ballistic missiles toward

the United States that they wouldn’t just send a single missile,

that they might send two or more, maybe several, and so part of

the challenge would be to see that you could deal with more than

one incoming missile at once.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does the current flight test plan test against multiple targets at all?

Mr. COYLE. So far there are no tests like that planned.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now the Rumsfeld Commission reported that countries with the technology to develop missiles most likely have the

technology to develop countermeasures. So I am assuming you

would agree that this is not a side issue to be dealt with somewhere down the road.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Gentleman’s time is up.

Mr. TIERNEY. May I finish the question?

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Yes, please do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. You would agree with me, sir, that this

is not a side issue to be dealt with somewhere down the road, that

this is a fairly integral part of our determination of whether or not

this system is going to be effective and whether or not we’ll have

a sufficiently high level of confidence in the system?

Mr. COYLE. Yes. That’s why we’ve been recommending that these

other kinds of tests would need to be done.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thank you.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.

Ms. Bohlen, I guess I need to have you explain to me like Vince

Lombardi used to, this is a football, because the issue of the viability of the ABM Treaty still troubles me. The original ABM Treaty

of course was signed with the Soviet Union, the Union of Soviet

States, and that no longer exists, and while the Confederation of

Independent States is who our administration is working with, a

new treaty with a new signator has not been accomplished that has

been ratified by the U.S. Senate. How is it then that the administration is relying so heavily on an ABM Treaty that has not been

ratified or the old treaty, that one of the two signators no longer

exists?

Ms. BOHLEN. Madam Chairman, I will answer your question in

two parts if I may. First of all, obviously this is a complex issue

with many, many parts to it, and I think the administration’s posiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion is well-known but to have a complete answer, perhaps the best

thing would be to submit a question in writing.

But I would just add to that I think we have operated on the

general principle that, as a matter of international law, agreements

in force between the United States and the Soviet Union at the

time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union are presumed to continue in force with respect to the Soviet successor state, and I think

there is a long record on this going back to the Bush administration. So that is the second part of my answer, but if you would be

pleased to submit a question we would be very happy to answer it.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you. I will, Ms. Bohlen. I think

it troubles many Americans that we’re engaging in a contract or a

treaty where one of the two signators no longer exists, and it is an

assumption on the part of the administration, but the Senate has

a role here, as do the American people, and having the administration produce a signed treaty that must be ratified by the Senate.

Is there—and I thank you for your answer and I will submit my

question in writing and look forward to your written answer.

Is there anyone else on the panel who would like to address this

issue?

I want to thank you for your testimony and while I agree that

diplomacy is exceedingly important, I guess I just have to think

that as we move from a nation whose major military policy was

mutual assured destruction to a new vision in the future, not so

new, since the 1980’s, of protecting and defending Americans from

foreign attack as our No. 1 priority, I hope in the future, I think

it’s a very worthy, worthy goal, and I guess I just have to echo

what my former boss, former Senator Steve Symms used to say,

I’m a dove, I just think we ought to be the best armed doves on

the planet, and I think that—he said that back in the 1980’s and

I think it still holds true.

General Kadish, your testimony was very informative, a very interesting study, but I do want to ask you. As you know, the President announced, and this has been referred to in testimony today,

that he was deferring to the next administration the decision on

whether to deploy the planned national missile defense system.

Now, neither the President nor the Department of Defense provided information on the effect that this decision will have on the

near term national missile defense options for our next President,

whomever that might be. General Kadish, what was your organization’s recommendation to the administration regarding the decision

to defer to the next administration the decision on whether to deploy the planned NMD system?

General Kadish.

General KADISH. Madam Chairman, we in the program office and

at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization worked very hard to

provide all the information required for the decision, and we presented that information as factually as possible up through the decisionmakers, and we did not provide a specific recommendation

but an integrated assessment of the status of the program.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. I see. My time is up and I now recognize Mr. Allen for his questions.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much.

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Let me return quickly to the subject of countermeasures. In your

testimony, General Kadish, you said that this is a system to defend

all 50 States against a limited attack involving intercontinental

ballistic missiles with unsophisticated countermeasures launched

by states of concern such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Well, buried in the word ‘‘unsophisticated’’ is an important issue. It seems

to me that we—almost any state—let me back up for a moment.

The Rumsfeld Commission some time ago warned us that North

Korea was proceeding more rapidly than some in our Intelligence

Community had expected with the development of missile technology. It is easier, so far as I can tell and you can react to this,

to determine how a country is proceeding on its missile technology

than on its countermeasure technology, and it seems to me that we

have limited information, classified, about the countermeasure

technology that states of concern may have or may acquire in the

future and on the other hand our own sensors, the technology surrounding our own sensors and our ability to discriminate among

countermeasures, such as decoys of one kind or another, is also

classified and yet if an adversary that can build an ICBM has sophisticated and not unsophisticated countermeasures, this system

may not work at all. And if you would react to that I’d appreciate

it.

General KADISH. Mr. Allen, as I tried to point out, there is no

military system that I’m aware of that is perfect either on the offense or the defense. So with that as a basic assumption, some of

them, however, are pretty good, and the basic architecture that we

laid out for the national missile defense program is that we would

start with an initial capability that we termed for purposes of discussions C1, for unsophisticated countermeasures based on the Intelligence Community’s best estimate of what we would expect to

see in the timeframe that we’re talking about, in the 2005 or middecade area. In addition, the system has inherent capability to go

beyond that, even though we would not necessarily design and test

aggressively to some of the more sophisticated countermeasures in

the early phases. But we had always planned to have followon

phases, at one time called capability two, or capability three as we

now refer to it, where the sophisticated countermeasures would be

incorporated into our testing and design activities.

So you need to look at the National Missile Defense program not

as an end item that is static forever. If you do, we miss the point

here because we will never be successful against the countermeasure issue. We do not view it that way. We view it as an ongoing aggressive activity that addresses the countermeasures in an

action response method based on our best intelligence and the inherent capability of the system.

Mr. ALLEN. If I can get one more question in, we’ve had all this

conversation about Shemya, the construction of radar facilities at

Shemya, AK. Let’s suppose that through negotiation or otherwise

North Korea abandons its missile program. Of what use against

Iran or Iraq would be a radar facility at Shemya, AK?

General KADISH. Iran and Iraq, there would be little use. It’s in

the wrong spot, and the curvature of the Earth plays a major activity.

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Mr. ALLEN. Let me make just one—this is not a question but one

comment. One, it’s maybe beyond the scope of these hearings today,

but one concern I have is that it seems to me that advocates of missile defense are not taking account of the logical and necessary responses that some others in the world would have to make, and it

is not just Russia, it’s not just the ABM Treaty. It is also China,

and China now has about 20 ICBMs, a very limited force. It seems

to me that an almost automatic response by the Chinese to the development of this system would be to increase their missile force.

That sets off potentially a chain reaction with India and Pakistan,

causes me great concern. As I say, maybe, Ms. Bohlen, if that’s

something you feel you could address today, I’d appreciate it.

Ms. BOHLEN. My first answer to that would be that China is already, independently of our national missile defense program, as

you know, engaged in a strategic modernization program. This is

unrelated to what we have done so far and this will considerably

increase their force, increase their survivable force.

China’s objections are well-known. They have been very public.

We have had a dialog with them also to try to persuade them that

the system is not in any way directed against them or against their

deterrent.

Obviously in their minds it becomes very much linked with the

whole issue of Taiwan and theater missile defenses in the region.

So we have tried to establish a clear boundary between those, those

two issues and we will continue those efforts at dialog. But we also

anticipate that whatever is decided about NMD, the Chinese strategic force will be considerably larger in a few years than it is now.

Thank you.

Mr. WARNER. If I might comment also, Mr. Allen, just on the link

of India and Pakistan, China has a range of missiles of varying

ranges, ones of a theater character, ones they are expanding substantially, for instance, and those that are opposite Taiwan. It is

really theater range missiles that pose the main threat to South

Asia as they would see it. So the growth in their ICBM capability

is unlikely to be that directly relevant.

I believe that growth is underway very much as Ms. Bohlen just

described. The strategic modernization of China’s force has been

well underway for well over a decade. We anticipate expansion and

greater technological capability over time, the South Asia piece, not

lessening it at all, but it tends to be more related to the pattern

at which China modernizes its intermediate range missiles which

can easily range into those countries.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Kucinich, you have the

floor for 5 minutes. We’ll be coming back with a 10-minute round

after Members have gone the first time, and I would like to note

that the chairman of the full committee Mr. Burton is here and

we’ll go to you after Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Shays, I’d be happy to yield to Mr. Burton,

at least yield, you know, my place to him if you would come back

to me.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich. I don’t want to be redundant. I just got here so if I cover some ground that has not yet,

or that has already been covered, please forgive me.

137

One of the things that’s concerned me as the chairman of the

committee and as a Member of Congress, and I think my colleagues

as well, has been the theft of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos and

Livermore, and a lot of people have said that the theft of those secrets could be analogous to what happened with the Rosenbergs

back in the fifties. I mean, it’s a major, major problem and we’ve

talked to a number of people about that. As I understand it, the

W–88 warhead technology is now in the possession of the Chinese

Communist Government and they also have other technology

through their connections with Loral and Hughes and other companies regarding their space satellite technology. They now have the

ability to build an ICBM, and they also have the ability to put multiple warheads on one missile and they also have the technology to

put that on a mobile launch vehicle that could be hidden in woods

or someplace else which would be very difficult for our spy satellites to pick up.

And the question I have, and I address this to any one of you,

is that how long will it be before they, and I know this is an estimate or guesstimate, how long will it be before they have a mobile

launched ICBM or permanently fixed ICBM silos with multiple

warheads such as the W–88 warhead where they can put 8 to 10

on one missile, how long will it be before they have one of those

operational, and what does it mean for U.S. security, and do we

have any way, do we have any way right now or in the foreseeable

future to intercept and shoot down the multiple warhead missile if

it’s launched at the United States? In other words, how long is it

going to take for them to perfect it, in your estimation? Once it’s

perfected, if they launched at the United States do we have any defense for it? And also because of the MIRVing, because they got as

many as 10 warheads on it, once those split apart in the outer atmosphere, could we shoot down all 10 of those smaller missiles

with the W–88 warhead or would we just lose a bunch of cities in

the United States?

I know it’s a pretty big question, but I’d like to have an answer

if I could. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WARNER. There has been a recent national intelligence estimate on these matters, and it’s at the classified level. I could—let

me just generally say, the Chinese have been—their next generation capability, both of intermediate range and long range, is mobile in character, one of their main efforts. So they have a mobile

missile capability in train. I don’t have the unclassified date so I

won’t speculate on that, but we can certainly make an arrangement

to make that available to you.

Similarly, we’ve long believed that the Chinese have the capability to move toward multiple independent reentry capability in the

years ahead, and I’m virtually positive that also is examined in

that estimate and we would be happy to bring it to you.

Mr. BURTON. How about the last part of the question, let’s say

for instance—and I’m not asking you to divulge any classified information because you don’t want to give the exact timetable—and

any one of you can answer this. Let’s say, for instance, that they

do in 5 years have an ICBM that is mobile launched or in a silo

that has multiple warheads and they launch it at the United

States. Do we have any defense capabilities that would shoot down

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those incoming ICBM missiles, the MIRV warheads, and if we don’t

they could hit as many as what, 8 or 10 cities, and I presume that

would amount to a real devastation of our economy and also cost

us maybe 20, 30, 40, 50 million people?

Mr. WARNER. Let me turn to General Kadish on the scheduling

and timing but put a couple of things quickly into context. First,

of course the primary objective of the NMD system being—that has

been examined and developed by this administration has been

linked to the question of the so-called states of concern like North

Korea, Iran, Iraq. It is a fact that it inherently has capability to

also intercept missiles from nations like China or Russia or it

would have when it were available.

On when it is available now will depend, as President Clinton

made the decision last week, now on the next President. We have

a program underway that will provide an option for the next President to have such a capability in the middle part of this decade if

he chooses to move in that direction, whoever that may be.

Mr. BURTON. So what you’re saying is if we—the next President

were to move very expeditiously on this some time within 5 or 6

years we could have a system that could intercept and shoot down

multiple warhead missiles coming in?

Mr. WARNER. The C1 capability is generally aiming at—the C1

and C1 enhanced is somewhere between a handful to a few tens

of reentry vehicles in flight. So by the time the C1 enhanced were

deployed, which could be in 2006, 2007 timeframe. Now as to the

issue of whether it would include—it would depend on the degree

of the countermeasures that might accompany the Chinese attack

because this one, as we’ve just talked about, is against simpler

countermeasures.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Be happy to have you respond.

Ms. BOHLEN. Could I just add to that? I think it’s worth pointing

out that we have no defenses against China’s present strategic system. It’s not the addition of a mobile system that will make us

more vulnerable. A more important point is I think you need to

focus on the limited size of the force and of the modernization.

Clearly we are not looking at a modernization that would in any

way or dimension approach the size of the Russian force which is

still arrayed against us or has been arrayed against us.

Mr. BURTON. If the chairman would just give me just a second,

I know, but that begs the issue. One missile launched at the

United States, hitting New York City or Chicago or Los Angeles,

would be devastating as far as loss of population and what it would

do to our economy, just one, and so whether or not they have the

capability to launch 30, 40, 50 or 60 missiles at one time really

isn’t the issue. Do we have the ability to shoot down or stop a missile of that type from hitting the United States? We do not have

at the present time and, according to what was just said, we’re

looking at the middle of the decade at the very earliest, the next

decade. That is if the President, the new President, gets on the

stick and gets the daggone thing underway.

So the big concern that I have is, you know, we don’t anticipate

conflict with anybody in the future, but you don’t know what might

happen, and so it seems to me that the responsible thing to do

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would be to get on with it as quickly as possible, and unfortunately, that’s not what’s happening right now.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to

direct my first question to Mr. Coyle. In your testimony on page 27

under observations and conclusions, you come up with—you say,

additionally the program will have to adopt a parallel, quote, fly

through failure approach that can absorb tests that do not achieve

their objectives in order to have any chance of achieving a fiscal

year 2005 deployment of an operationally effective system. I want

everybody to think about this for a moment.

Now, where I come from, Cleveland, OH, if something fails, it

doesn’t fly or if something doesn’t fly, it fails. You can’t keep flying

if you keep failing. Now, right here in your comment, you talk

about a fly through failure approach which implies that it fails but

it keeps flying. Do you want to help me with that?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir. The only point I was trying to make there

was that there will be failures in the test program, and if everything is in series, every time you have a failure, it sets back the

whole program and the whole program will take longer and longer

and longer. If the country expects to be able to achieve the kind

of capabilities we’re talking about on a 2005, 2006, 2007 time scale,

we’ll have to do things in parallel, such that if you have a failure

in one test you can in parallel go ahead with the second one.

Mr. KUCINICH. I understand what you’re saying now, except what

it implies is that, well, General Kadish was saying we are going to

walk first, then we are going to try to run. What you’re saying is

even if we haven’t learned how to walk, we’re getting ready to become an Olympic sprinter. It’s kind of an interesting construction

that you have there because I think through all of this we need to

explore the illogic that is laden heavily throughout all of these

propositions advancing this system.

Now, I wonder, Mr. Coyle, is there any maximum monetary

threshold above which you would recommend that the NMD is not

a cost effective weapons system?

Mr. COYLE. I think that’s a question for somebody else. I’m just

a test person.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. Well, let me ask it to someone else. General

Kadish, is there any maximum monetary threshold above which

you would recommend that the NMD is not a cost effective weapons system?

General KADISH. In the program management business and development business, Congressman, there’s a balance between cost,

schedule, risk and deploying and making weapons systems work,

and that’s an integrated process. Basically, what I can do is provide

you our best estimates.

Mr. KUCINICH. What’s the maximum? Just give me a maximum

number? Is it $60 billion, $100 billion, $200 billion? What would it

be?

General KADISH. I think, again, I could provide estimates of what

we think a particular program——

140

Mr. KUCINICH. We’re just here among friends. Give me a number.

General KADISH. I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Coyle.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, is there anyone here that has any numbers

at all, anyone? I have a document that was handed here, national

missile defense cost estimate increases 1996 to the year 2000. It

started off, I think Mr. Tierney was the one that was able to come

up with this. It started out with an amount of $9 to $11 billion and

it’s now at $50.5 billion. Now, you all remember that Star Wars

took us into the stratosphere of spending on R&D of over $60 billion. We’re now including all the estimated costs into the tropo- sphere fiscally of over $100 billion and more. I just wonder, General, is there any level of spending on NMD technology that could

cause the Department of Defense to sacrifice procurement of other

weapons, paying for operations and maintenance of the aging and

increasingly expensive arsenal of planes, ships, etc?

General KADISH. As a taxpayer, we’re all concerned, certainly I

am, about what things cost and work hard every day to do that and

make sure that we are proper stewards. Our current estimates for

the program which are under a major revision now because of the

President’s decision was in the neighborhood of a $20 billion acqui- sition cost of which $5.7 has already been spent and about a $32

billion life cycle cost for 20 years. Now, the CBO has done estimates and included more of the system elements than we would

have included, but it’s of that magnitude that we currently have as

an estimate, and as we go through the congressional appropriations

process and the way we do our budgeting, it’s for the Congress and

the administration to decide whether that’s adequate.

Mr. KUCINICH. I appreciate that. I would like to submit for the

record this attachment. How much time do I have? Do I have another minute?

Mr. SHAYS. Your time is over now, but you will have a significant

amount of time in your followup.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m told that the decisions I make today will have impact 10 years from now and that what we have today were made

by Members of Congress, Senate, the President 10 years earlier,

and so it’s hard for me to kind of visualize that. We’re in a world

10 years from now, but I sure want to make sure I’m making the

right decisions now.

I had voted against deployment of SDI and GPALS. I had voted

for research. I represent, I guess, kind of in the middle here. My

colleagues to my right didn’t vote for the National Missile Defense

Act of 1999, and my colleagues on—to my left, my other Republicans probably voted for deployment earlier, but this is the law. It

is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense capable of

defending the territory of the United States against limited missile,

ballistic missile attack. Mr. Warner, I want to know if you believe

that this is in fact the law.

Mr. WARNER. Yes, sir. It was signed by the President.

Mr. SHAYS. Does it have your total support?

Mr. WARNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. General Kadish.

141

General KADISH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Bohlen.

Ms. BOHLEN. Yes, sir. I would only add that the President issued

a statement at the time that made clear this was to be taken in

a context of arms control developments and appropriations—I’m

sorry, I don’t have the exact language, but I think the two things

have to be seen together. That represents administration policy.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Warner, is it your view that now it is not technically possible but it will be?

Mr. WARNER. We have a program underway that we believe has

made great progress that has demonstrated the fundamental technologies that in light of the recent testing difficulties and some

other issues has greater schedule risk than we would have hoped;

that is, the date at which it would be available, but certainly it is

our belief that we should, as the President directed, continue the

development to in fact see if we can meet the test that—remember,

we talked about the four tests that the President has laid out. One

of them is the one directly related to this law, and that is, is it

technologically feasible. I believe for limited national missile defense we as a Nation can develop that capability and will be able

to do so within the next several years.

Mr. SHAYS. General Kadish.

General KADISH. I would agree with that assessment, Mr. Chairman. We—at this point in time we’ve been aggressively testing the

system that we have put together over the last 24 to 36 months,

and we continue to do so and, as we continue to test it, will get

more confidence in it. But we do have confidence we can move this

system along within a very short period of time.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Mr. Chairman, my job is to make sure that military

equipment is adequately tested in realistic, operational situations.

It’s not unusual for new military systems to do quite well in early

technical testing, early developmental testing and then have great

difficulty when they get to more realistic operational testing.

Mr. SHAYS. I hear you there, but it’s not a question of whether

we’re going to deploy, it’s when, and the when depends in part on

whether the technology is there. My question is, you don’t believe

the technology is present but do you believe it will be?

Mr. COYLE. As I said in my testimony, that’s yet to be shown to

be practicable. By that I meant able to be reduced to practice so

that you could depend on it in a realistic operational situation, and

that’s why I said it the way I did, and so my view is it’s too early

to tell and we won’t know the answer to your question until we get

to operational testing.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I am going to come back for a followup.

Ms. Bohlen, I would guess I’d still like to ask your opinion, whether

you think it will be technologically possible.

Ms. BOHLEN. Mr. Chairman, with due respect I don’t feel I’m the

most competent person to address that question. I defer to my colleagues. I would note that the President said in his speech last Friday that there is not sufficient information about the technical and

142

operational effectiveness of an NMD system to move forward at

this time.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, Mr. Burton, I don’t need to yield you

time because I’ll give you full time to start as chairman, then we’ll

go to Mr. Tierney. So you have time to ask your questions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won’t take much time.

First of all, I appreciate very much your—and Mr. Tierney, I will

be through here in just about 1 minute but I really appreciate you

yielding to me.

One of the things that staff has just brought to my attention

which really concerns me is there is opposition by some people in

the Congress and in the country for us building a missile defense

system, but as I understand it, China in 1993 purchased from the

Russians the S–300, which is a missile defense system, and they’re

currently negotiating to buy the Russian S–400 system, and our

question is, why would it be logical for us to expect the Chinese,

who could potentially be a problem for us down the road, to build

a missile defense system around Beijing when we in the United

States can’t or won’t build a missile system? Does that seem logical

to you?

Ms. BOHLEN. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to my colleague, Mr.

Warner, but I would just note that we have a theater missile defense system. I think the systems you were talking about fall in

that general range.

Mr. BURTON. I’m not talking about—— Ms. BOHLEN. And we are permitted under the ABM Treaty to

have a site which we have chosen not to exercise.

Mr. BURTON. I’m not talking about a theater missile defense system. I’m talking about a fully launched missile defense system that

would protect the United States, the continental United States.

Mr. WARNER. The point—the illustrations that you cite of the S– 300 and S–400 are Russian theater missile defense systems. The

Chinese—the Russians are enthusiastically seeking to merchandise

those systems and have been for the last decades.

Mr. BURTON. But we have none around American cities or

around any part of the continental United States?

Mr. WARNER. We have theater missile defense systems under development. Our general purpose, our explicit purpose for them is

to deploy them to protect our troops in the field.

Mr. BURTON. But none around the United States or planned

around the United States or anything?

So what we could do is Beijing, around Beijing and around major

cities in China, they can deploy a theater missile defense system

like the S–300 or the S–400. But around Washington, DC, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York we cannot deploy a theater missile defense system or any kind of a missile defense system so they protect Beijing. Washington, DC, is fair game.

Mr. WARNER. They protect Beijing against theater missile

threats, shorter-range missiles from somewhere near their territory.

Mr. BURTON. Would those theater defense missile systems be effective in any way against an ICBM?

Mr. WARNER. They would not.

Mr. BURTON. You are sure?

143

Mr. WARNER. We have looked at that very carefully.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tierney, you have 5 minutes. We will roll it over

for another 5 minutes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me get back to one issue that you brought up, Mr. Chairman,

a little while ago about what the policy is in this country. We

talked about the policy of deploying a system as soon as technologically possible. But I think it also goes on to talk about an effective system. The fact of the matter is if the system cannot be

shown to be effective, then perhaps we shouldn’t deploy it, and,

again, I go back to the issue of having confidence in the effectiveness. It’s not enough to show that it works once or it works twice.

In order to have it do us any good at all, it’s going to have to be

shown that it works to such a degree that we can have confidence

to employ it and to deal with it as if it was going to work sufficiently, regularly to be effective. Also the whole policy is subject to

the annual authorization of appropriations, so the Congress very

much has something to say about where we go on this.

In section 3, the third section of the legislation that also we mention, which talks about the need to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces, the idea being that now we

have a conflict, it doesn’t say how we are going to resolve the conflict, if there is one, between deploying the system and negotiating

reductions, and we have to work and decide that.

I think there are circumstances that we can see that would serve

to actually encourage proliferation and undercut the effectiveness

of the national missile defense system if we’re not careful in how

we proceed on this. So I think we have to be on record in discussing and considering all of those aspects in determination of whether or not we go forward.

Mr. Coyle, maybe it would be helpful if you briefly discussed or

described what your office does and what your responsibilities are

as the primary advisor to the Secretary of Defense on testing and

evaluation issues.

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir. My responsibility and the responsibility of

my office is to oversee the testing programs that are conducted of

military equipment, and in particular to be sure, as I said earlier,

that they’re adequately tested in realistic operational situations,

which can mean, you know, in the mud and the rain and the dirt

or against countermeasures, all of the things that can arise in real

combat. I approve the test and evaluation master plans that are

submitted by the military departments for each of these testing

programs. I approve the operational test plans when we get to that

phase, when we get to operational tests—we’re not there yet with

national missile defense—and I report to the Secretary and to others, to the Congress as well, on the results of such tests.

Mr. TIERNEY. So I think it would be fair to say that Congress created your position outside the weapons program offices to ensure

that their testing and evaluation are up to par?

Mr. COYLE. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. How would you rate the technological difficulty of

this program in relation to other defense acquisition programs?

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Mr. COYLE. I think this is probably the hardest thing we’ve ever

tried to do. This is more difficult than the F–22 fighter aircraft;

more difficult than the Comanche helicopter; more difficult than

any aircraft carrier or submarine or tank or truck that we’ve ever

tried to build.

Mr. TIERNEY. With respect to the President’s four criteria in deciding whether or not there is going to be deployment, how would

you say the program is faring to date?

Mr. COYLE. I would say the progress to date is about what I

would have expected. What was difficult was that we faced a deployment readiness review, with implications there in the word

‘‘deployment,’’ when we were still very early and are still very early

in the developmental test program.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, you have raised concerns, I think, in your

role as director of IOT&E. In 1999, your report, for example, stated

that ‘‘undue pressure has been placed on the program and that test

conditions do not suitably stress the system in a realistic enough

manner to support acquisition decisions.’’

Did you also make a formal report during the deployment readiness review?

Mr. COYLE. I did, yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. What was your recommendation in that report?

Mr. COYLE. That report pointed out the limitations in the tests

that have occurred so far. Much of that discussion is in my long

statement for this hearing. So that report pointed out the limitations in the tests so far, and also pointed out the ways in which

the tests were not realistic, the ways in which the testing program

had slipped and other matters that I alluded to in my short statement.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you provide the subcommittee with that report?

Mr. COYLE. Certainly.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that it be accepted on

the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection.

Mr. TIERNEY. In the context of the deployment readiness review,

I have a hard time seeing how anyone examining the information

could possibly make a decision to deploy at this particular point in

time, especially when nowhere in the testing program are there

flight tests against some very basic countermeasures of multiple

warheads. And I think our intelligence agencies tell us that those

will be the norm. Why isn’t the Department of Defense listening?

Having read your report, why are they still going forward recommending deployment at this stage while it seems, to me at least,

that your report was very well-founded on some logical information?

Mr. COYLE. It might be better if General Kadish or Mr. Warner

answered that question.

Mr. TIERNEY. General Kadish, can you tell me—assuming that

you’ve read Mr. Coyle’s report, and assuming that all that he says

in there is accurate, why it is that the Department of Defense still

made a recommendation to deploy when it seems fairly clear that

it’s very, very premature at this point?

145

General KADISH. I think it’s helpful to understand how the program is structured and the confusion that surrounds this word ‘‘deployment.’’ What we have done and offered to the Congress and the

President was to say that we have a development program that’s

aggressively ongoing even today that it is trying to bring this technology into the field. In order to meet a date early in this mid-decade, we have to back up from 2005, the date we establish as the

earliest we could do this program, at the same time that we’re developing it and build the system at the same time we’re testing it

and designing it. That’s the way national programs of importance

in a very short time have to be done, so that you make decisions

to move to the next build cycle on an incremental basis based on

the results of your test, and that’s the program we constructed.

And this thought of deployment is that—is the decision to build

the system. That could be done incrementally, or it could be done

all at once, but you take a risk in any military program when you

design and build it at the same time. You need to do that, unfortunately, because of the way the world works in order to meet a

shorter time horizon for a program of this nature. If you want to

do as Mr. Coyle suggests and wait until you’re all finished with the

development, do operational testing with real soldiers under realistic conditions, which we intend to do, and then build the system,

then you have an automatic delay of at least 4 to 5 years before

you can have a useful capability in the field. So that’s the problem.

Mr. TIERNEY. Or under your plan, General, we can build something that doesn’t work, and then we’re really up the river, huh?

General KADISH. In the plan that we have put forth, there were

event-based milestones that checked our progress, and we just

passed one of those, the DRR if you will, that would check our

progress, and the country could make the decision whether it was

worthwhile to proceed.

Mr. TIERNEY. And we decided in this instance at least it’s not

yet?

General KADISH. The President made his decision based on the

information we provided.

Mr. TIERNEY. Based on the failures to date and the other considerations that were there.

I think there’s some concern about the significant delay in various aspects of the program, General, but let’s talk first about the

booster.

As I understand it, the flight test was supposed to be integrated,

right?

General KADISH. [Nodding in the affirmative.]

Mr. TIERNEY. They haven’t yet used the launch vehicle that was

intended for this system, right?

General KADISH. That’s correct. We never planned to use that

launch vehicle because we started the program very aggressively,

and we used a surrogate booster for our first test.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it’s not integrated to that extent?

General KADISH. It is not integrated to that extent. And that was

the way it was planned.

Mr. TIERNEY. But even the surrogate booster failed, is that right,

in the IFT–5?

General KADISH. That’s correct.

146

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, the new booster is supposed to undergo its

first boost vehicle test in February of this year, so the results could

be factored into the deployment readiness review, but that test was

delayed at least originally until July, right?

General KADISH. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. And now subsequently it’s been scheduled for

when?

General KADISH. Right now early next year in the January/February timeframe. We haven’t really scheduled a test at this point

in time.

Mr. TIERNEY. So this first booster was—has not occurred, it’s

been delayed over a year, it’s not available for deployment readiness review at this point?

General KADISH. Right. And never planned to be so.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, then, it wasn’t very integrated I guess is my

point.

Mr. Coyle, why is it important that the actual booster be tested

with the system rather than a surrogate?

Mr. COYLE. The actual booster will subject the kill vehicle on top

of it to faster speeds, higher speeds and greater accelerations, and

so you would want to make sure that this very energetic new booster doesn’t, in effect, hurt the kill vehicle when it’s launched.

Mr. TIERNEY. The third booster test, the one where you actually

combine the booster and the kill vehicle, how far has that been delayed now?

Mr. COYLE. My recollection is over a year.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I think, Mr. Coyle, that you mentioned that

even a greater impact might be felt with delays in the simulation

and ground test facilities. Can you tell us what the LIDS system

is and what it’s supposed to do?

Mr. COYLE. It’s a, if you will, computer simulation system which

allows various aspects to of the overall system to be played, to be

tried out in simulation.

Mr. TIERNEY. And the use of this system, at least initially, was

supposed to be available for the deployment readiness review?

Mr. COYLE. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. And how long has the development of that system

been delayed now?

Mr. COYLE. Again, my recollection is at least a year.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, I think both of those were being developed by

Boeing; is that right?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. General, is it true that you recently withheld part

of Boeing’s bonus because of delays in the booster in the LIDS program?

General KADISH. Among other things, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. How much in dollar numbers were they docked for

that?

General KADISH. I would have to get back to you with the specific

dollar amount if I take that for the record, but it was about a 50

percent reduction.

Mr. TIERNEY. So about $20 million?

General KADISH. I believe that’s the range.

[The information referred to follows:]

147

Modication P00053, which incorporates the award fee amount awarded for the 4th

Award Fee Period, reduced the total amount awarded for the 4th Award Fee Period

by $21,058,307.

Mr. TIERNEY. I’ll get back to this.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kadish, I am impressed with your testimony because as

we move in this Nation from a policy of mutual assured destruction

to a policy of mutual assured survivability, there is nothing more

important that the military and the Congress can engage in in accomplishing that vision. And very often the military, like Members

of Congress, catch an awful lot of flack, but I appreciate the perseverance that you have demonstrated. Perseverance is the key to

America’s survivability and to America being able to achieve peace

through strength. And I appreciate your testimony very much.

I did want to ask Mrs. Bohlen, the administration, as you have

testified to, has been negotiating with the Russians to amend the

ABM Treaty. These attempts, as we know, have been unsuccessful,

and the Secretary of Defense also said that development and deployment of the boost-phase intercept systems for the national defense would not obviate the need to amend the ABM Treaty.

I would like to direct this question to both you, Ms. Bohlen, and

Mr. Warner. My question is, what specific changes need to be made

to the ABM Treaty to deploy the limited ground-based national

missile defense system now planned; and that is to say, after it’s

been ratified by the U.S. Senate?

Ms. Bohlen.

Ms. BOHLEN. Thank you. Clearly at some point or another, deployment of the national missile defense system, which has been

under development and testing in this administration, would require changes to the ABM Treaty. Just to recall what I said in my

statement, the deployment of an ABM radar at Shemya, of 100

ground-based interceptors and 5 upgraded early warning radars for

the defense of all 50 States—this is just the C–1 program—would

violate the obligations contained in article I of the treaty not to deploy an ABM system to defend national territory. These activities

would also be inconsistent with the locational restrictions of article

III.

What we have proposed to the Russians is a draft protocol to the

treaty which would in effect amend the treaty in such a way as to

permit these activities, to render them not contrary to the treaty,

while at the same time retaining the provisions of the treaty that

underpin the relationship between us of strategic stability.

I think if I could take that a little bit farther, and I would be

happy to talk with you further about the specifics, I think what

we’re trying to do with the ABM Treaty is to preserve those elements which we continue to think are valuable, which are those

that define our strategic relationship with the Russians. I don’t

think that even those who support a more robust national missile

defense want to really take issue with that relationship of strategic

stability. It is very important in this post-cold war world. We continue to have large nuclear arsenals, and we do not want to send

a signal that we are trying to undercut the effectiveness of the

148

other country’s offense. So that is the core of the ABM Treaty that

we’re trying to preserve.

At the same time it is clear that we have moved into a new strategic environment with the threat that is coming from the ballistic

missile potential of the countries of concern that we have talked

about this morning, and we need to be in a position to respond to

that threat. And it is by the way, a threat that threatens not only

the United States, but the Russians and our European allies as

well.

So our problem is not to throw the baby out with the bath water.

We think that the core of strategic stability, which is at the heart

of the ABM Treaty, is something good and something we want to

preserve, but it needs to be adapted to new conditions, and that is

the essence of the task that we’ve been trying to do in our discussions with the Russians over the last year.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Ms. Bohlen.

Mr. Warner.

Mr. WARNER. I would like to reinforce the last issue that Ms.

Bohlen was just speaking about. We believe that mutual deterrence

with Russia is still a very important dimension of our relationship

in the world, and we want to sustain it. What we’re really saying

is that these are not mutually exclusive. We can sustain mutual

deterrence with Russia because the limited national missile defense

system we would deploy even in its two phases is one that would

not threaten the Russian retaliatory deterrent. And that is different, and I am just being clear, that’s quite different than the vision that, for instance, President Reagan had in the 1980’s.

On the question of changes to the ABM Treaty, there was one

additional element that came up as well. One of them was the

question of covering the whole 50 States or national territory.

That’s banned by the treaty in article 1. We would have to amend

that. Another one was location not in Grand Forks, which is currently what we’ve declared as our ABM area. There’s also a technicality that the location of the X-Band ABM radar was going to

be a lot more widely separated from the interceptors. Even when

we went to Alaska, we put the radar in Shemya, and we would

plan to put the interceptors in central Alaska. So we needed relief

not only being in Alaska, but in the separation between radar and

interceptors.

There was a third element, and that is we would upgrade the

five early warning radars, the three that were the classical ballistic

missile early warning radars in Alaska, Greenland and the United

Kingdom, and two that are in the United States, one in California,

one in Massachusetts.

We understand our plans would make those radars capable of

helping effect an ABM intercept. That’s different than the role they

play today when they are just warning. So we also had to propose,

and did in the proposed protocol, changes to article 6 and article

9 that would anticipate that these early warning radars could, in

fact, play a role in ABM intercept engagements.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Mr. Warner.

Mr. Chairman, I guess our major concern as I hear across America is we don’t—we’re nervous. The American people are nervous

about an ABM Treaty with Russia constraining us from protecting

149

the American people from a missile defense attack from rogue nations. And so that’s why I’ve really zeroed in on this particular

issue. And I don’t want to get particularly political on you, Mr.

Chairman, but I know as a woman that the No. 1 issue that women

are concerned about in America today is this issue. I can tell you

it’s not a health issue. It is where will America be in 10 years. And

is our military providing for the defense of America?

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance

of my time.

Mr. SHAYS. I thought you were going to bawl me out for calling

you Hage-Chenoweth instead of Chenoweth-Hage.

Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Coyle, General Kadish said a few moments ago that in light

of the President’s decision, there would have to be some reassessment of the projected cost of this program. And in your testimony— I may have heard him wrong, but I can come back to that. In your

testimony you said you had some recommendations for additional

testing to deal with some of the complexities that we’re talking

about, and just to run through them quickly, in your testimony you

said there should be—you said the target suites used in integrated

flight tests need to incorporate challenging, unsophisticated countermeasures that have the potential to be used against the NMD

C–1 system; for example, tumbling RVs and nonspherical balloons.

And you recommend use of the large balloon be discontinued because it doesn’t mimic in any way the current test RV, the reentry

vehicle.

The second, you said engagement times of day and solar position

need to be planned to stress the acquisition and discrimination

process by all the sensor bands, and you have to look at the effects

of weather.

Then you said, third, when an interceptor is launched against a

target cluster before the RV is actually identified, it is resolved and

discriminated against, you have to do some testing there. And then

you said at least—since it’s not likely that only one missile would

be fired by a state of concern that somehow believed its cause, its

interest would be advanced by firing missiles at the United States,

that you ought to do at least some engagement with two, at least

two, incoming missiles.

My question to you—and you had another example as well—

have—does this mean some additional time and some additional

cost in the program if your recommendations are accepted? I am

not asking you how much, but—Mr. Coyle’s office is looking at the

costs for these proposals, both the proposals that I’ve made and

that General Welch’s panel made, and he perhaps should be the

best to comment about that, whether or not it would take additional time will depend on how you do it. And as I said earlier, if

you do everything in series, certainly it will take longer, which is

why if the country intends to achieve dates on the order of 2005

or 2006 or 2007, I would recommend that the testing program be

done with more things happening in parallel.

Mr. Allen, General Kadish, do you have a comment?

General KADISH. We have taken Mr. Coyle’s as well as General

Welch’s and other recommendations internal to the program to enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
150

hance our ability to test the system, and we’ve taken those very seriously. They do cost money, and in some cases a lot of money. And

we are now in the process of trying to balance the schedule, the

cost and the technical risks associated with those. But I can assure

you we’re taking every one of those seriously and will continue, because as this program is in development phase, as long as we are

allowed to continue, there will be more discoveries of things we

ought to do that would make sense. So we are proceeding along

those lines.

Mr. ALLEN. Do you foresee at some future time, weeks or months

in the future, that you would come back and say, we’ve rethought

the system, here’s a new schedule, here’s a new estimate of cost?

Is that something you’re planning to do?

General KADISH. Yes, Congressman. We do that as a matter of

course. And I insist on us always trying to improve what we’re

doing. And we’re looking very carefully at the way we’re doing business now and where we will make the required adjustments based

on what we see so far to make it as effective as we can.

Mr. ALLEN. Do you have any date in mind in which you

might—— General KADISH. Yesterday was good for me, but the process is

a comprehensive one, so it’s going to take some weeks. And as we

go, we will be talking to Mr. Coyle, Dr. Gansler and all the leadership at OSD.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you.

I have one other question. And in looking at some of the press— this is more for you, Ms. Bohlen, than anyone else.

In looking at some of the press reflecting the debate in the administration over what it takes, what would be—what work at

Shemya would be a violation of the ABM Treaty?

It sounded as if there were three interpretations depending in

part on which agency, but also maybe crossing agencies. One interpretation that Mr. Cohen advanced was that the United States

would not violate the treaty until workers had laid rails to support

the Shemya radar. That’s a move that wouldn’t happen until 2002.

I gather that another legal interpretation was that the United

States would be in violation at the point when workers begin pouring concrete, which was previously scheduled to occur in May. And

a third interpretation was that the violation would not occur until

the concrete foundation for the radar site is complete, somewhere

in between the two times.

You know, if you look back at history, in 1983 we, the U.S. Government, objected to the Soviets’ construction of a large-phased

array radar near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. And the Reagan administration argued that the radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty.

They said Krasnoyarsk was a symbol of Soviet duplicity. And in

1989, the Soviets admitted that that radar had been built at a location not permitted under the ABM and was a technical violation of

the treaty, and they subsequently dismantled it.

Is the Department of State and the Pentagon as well taking a

look at—let me rephrase that. Has this dispute within the administration lawyers been resolved, to your knowledge, or are there still

these three interpretations of what would constitute a violation of

the ABM Treaty?

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Ms. BOHLEN. Mr. Allen, at this point I would say the point is

moot because the President has decided not to proceed with construction of the Shemya radar at this time.

There were a number of options which are under review, but

there was no decision made with respect to any of them, and at

this moment, as I say, the question is moot. When Secretary Cohen

spoke, he was expressing his views on this. It was not—there is no

administration position on this.

Mr. ALLEN. Would you agree with me that the question will no

longer be moot when another administration is confronted with the

same issue? Of course, I think your response is going to be, that

will depend on the state of our negotiations with the Russians, and

I wouldn’t accept that as an answer.

Ms. BOHLEN. I think the question will certainly arise again, and

if the next administration decides to go forward with the present

plans which include the construction of the Shemya radar, it will

certainly arise.

Mr. WARNER. The point on timing and options is exactly as she

said. We made clear, of course, whatever the Rubicon you cross,

where you have, in fact, begun construction, we made no—we made

clear to the Russians we understand putting an ABM radar on

Shemya is a violation of the treaty. So I mean, unlike Krasnoyarsk,

we are not going through any charade as they did for quite a time

and sort of claimed that the radar that was coming in at

Krasnoyarsk is not relevant. Whatever the point is at which it

might violate the treaty, we understand that a treaty violation will

occur when you finally have this radar.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you all very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Kucinich, you have 5 minutes, and then it will roll over for

another 5 minutes.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, to General Kadish, do you believe that a nuclear

war would have devastating consequences for all mankind?

General KADISH. I believe any war has devastating consequences.

Mr. KUCINICH. What about a nuclear war?

General KADISH. Of course.

Mr. KUCINICH. And do you think that effective measures to limit

antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons?

General KADISH. Congressman, I am a developer of weapons systems, and I feel a little out of my lane to answer that type of question. Perhaps Mr. Warner would tell you. Those are serious policy

questions that are out of my responsibility at this point in time.

Mr. KUCINICH. So what you’re saying then is that all you do is

build the weapons whether there’s a war or not?

General KADISH. What I am saying is I might have personal

opinions about those issues, but in my official responsibilities, my

primary responsibility is to develop the missile defenses for this

country as directed.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you.

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The reason why I asked that question, I actually developed those

two questions from the preface of the ABM Treaty. And so if we

look at where all this started years ago in 1972, an ABM Treaty— the purpose of the ABM Treaty was specifically to limit antiballistic missile systems that would be a factor in curbing the race of

strategic offensive arms and to lead to a decrease in the outbreak

of war involving nuclear weapons. Now, I would like to ask the administration’s representative here, how does the administration’s

position square with article 5 of the treaty which says that each

party undertakes not to develop tests or deploy ABM systems, etc.

Haven’t you already violated the treaty?

Ms. BOHLEN. No, it is not our view that we’ve already violated

the treaty. I think all the development and testing activities we’ve

conducted—but I would defer to General Kadish and Mr. Coyle on

that.

Mr. KUCINICH. You haven’t answered my question, and I want to

go to Mr. Warner.

Mr. Warner.

Mr. WARNER. Article 5—— Mr. KUCINICH. I want to go to Mr. Warner with a question here.

You said that according to the work on this treaty you’re doing

with the Russians, that you can have a shield that would not

threaten Russia’s retaliatory deterrence. Did you say that?

Mr. WARNER. I did.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. I just want to follow the logic of this. So

we’re asking American taxpayers to pay for a missile shield that

can be by definition penetrated by Russia?

Mr. WARNER. That is, in fact, the proposal; a limited national

missile defense, not a comprehensive defense.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. I just want to make sure that I understand

what’s being advanced here.

Mr. WARNER. Could we answer your article 5 question?

Mr. KUCINICH. I have just 5 minutes, and we will have more

time. I want to ask General Kadish a question.

As you know, it’s illegal to misuse the classification system, to

hide allegations of fraud or to reclassify previously unclassified information. That’s Executive Order 12958 at subsection 1.8(a) and

1.8(c). Now, as you know, someone at the Department of Defense

classified documents produced by Professor Postal of MIT that alleged that every NMD test has failed and that—secondly, that

there was considerable evidence that NMD contractor TRW had defrauded the government.

Why has the Department of Defense classified Professor Postal’s

allegations of fraud, and do you consider Department of Defense’s

classification of these allegations of fraud to be proper?

General KADISH. We take all allegations of fraud very seriously.

And we have aggressively, in my view, investigated them across—

not only within our purview, but also with outside agencies including the Department of Justice. So—and that applies to beyond Dr.

Postal’s particular allegations.

In that particular case I would prefer to talk to you offline a little

bit about the details, but I will say in general the classification of

Dr. Postal’s information was not to the allegations he made, but

some of the information upon which it was based. So we need to

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discuss that further in closed session, but I’ll be glad to do that

with you, Congressman.

[The information referred to follows:]

If a closed hearing were to be held the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

would have participants representing the legal, security, and technical perspectives.

In addition, representatives from OSD Policy and TRW corporate should be invited.

However, as there is currently a General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation underway, we believe that it will provide all desired insight into this issue, eliminating

the need for a closed hearing or other meeting.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, actually, General, with all due respect, it’s

been my experience that it’s better to have these discussions in

public.

General KADISH. My only—excuse me for interrupting you. My

only comment along that line is not to—it gets into classified information. That’s the reason why.

Mr. KUCINICH. Of course. But knowing there’s an Executive order

against classifying allegations of fraud, what steps are you taking

to investigate whether the Executive order was violated by Department of Defense employees?

General KADISH. The Department is taking steps to look at those

issues across a broad front.

Mr. KUCINICH. It’s been—it’s my understanding that the Department of Defense’s inspector general is not investigating, that he’s

waiting for a GAO report. Do you know anything contrary to that?

General KADISH. As far as the DOD IG, I am not specifically

aware of any activity they are doing, but GAO is looking at it as

well as other looks, as far as I know.

Mr. KUCINICH. So if there’s reasonable grounds to conclude that

there has been a violation of law regarding classification of allegations of fraud, would you refer—if you found that out—the case to

the Attorney General?

General KADISH. To the proper authorities immediately.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to go to this issue of states of concerns, which a few months ago were rogue nations, which a few

months before that were terrorist states, which a few months before that may have been countries getting money from the United

States. Which of the rogue nations are you getting ready to defend

against, General? Who are the rogue nations?

General KADISH. The direction we have is North——

Mr. KUCINICH. States of concern.

General KADISH. The direction we have in terms of the capability

of the system is for North Korea and the Middle East, Iran, Iraq

and possibly Libya.

Mr. KUCINICH. So if any of these nations become our friends in

the next few years, will you disband the program?

General KADISH. The responsibility that I have is to continue a

development program unless directed otherwise and possibly deploy. So I would defer that to a national decision.

Mr. KUCINICH. Sure.

Now, if a state of concern or a rogue nation or previously unfriendly nation intended to harm the United States, which mode of

weapons delivery is most likely? For example, smuggling a suitcase

of radioactive material and explosive detonator in a commercial

freighter to a U.S. port, using the—or using the most advanced and

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expensive weapons technology to launch and successfully target a

U.S. city with an intercontinental ballistic missile, which is most

likely?

General KADISH. I think the Intelligence Community as well as

the President stated that the most likely would be other means of

delivery.

Mr. KUCINICH. So you would say the less expensive, less complex

delivery method would be most likely?

General KADISH. If the question is most likely. I would point out,

however, that there is a reason why countries develop ballistic missiles, and it’s not to threaten only their neighbors.

Mr. KUCINICH. And how would NMD protect against less complex, less expensive threats?

General KADISH. I may defer to Mr. Warner, but from my point

of view, in the development phase there are other means of protection this country has that even exist today for the terrorist threat.

You can argue about how good those means are, but they do exist.

In the case of ballistic missiles, there is no defense if one should

be launched, so the country has to decide whether that is a worthwhile, even though unlikely, event to protect ourselves against.

Mr. KUCINICH. And according to what Mr. Warner said previously, if Russia—we would look to a treaty where Russia would

be able to have a retaliatory ability against our shield.

I would just like to conclude with this thought until we get to

the next round. When I sit in these hearings, I get a sense of—with

all due respect, because I know you’re trying to serve the country

as best you can, and you’re not making the policy. Somebody is

making the policy though. If they’re not in this room, someday they

ought to be hauled before a congressional committee and made to

account. But I get a feeling that I’m seeing the development for a

trailer for the second version of Dr. Strangelove, because what

we’re doing here is we’re really trying to condition the American

people to accept a new climate of fear. And I have to say, just as

one American, one Member of Congress from Cleveland, OH, I

don’t like that. I think that we can do better as a country in creating a world that believes that peace is possible, not that war is inevitable. And this idea that somehow that we will prepare for peace

through spending tens of billions of dollars, Mr. Chairman, for

preparation for war is hard to take. I just have to mention that

until I get my next opportunity to speak.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say that I am going to exercise my 10

minutes, and then Mr. Tierney has some questions he wants to

ask, and then we do want to get on to the next panel. I appreciate

the patience of the next panel.

I would like to touch on a number of issues. I’m sorry we’re

jumping around a bit, but hopefully there will be a sense of completeness to this. It’s my sense that we’ve moved from SDI to

GPALS—Global Protection Against Limited Strikes—to now a system of national missile defense that is somewhat limited attempting to deal with rogue nations and maybe an errant missile from

China or the Soviet Union.

It’s also my understanding that the ABM Treaty under article 14

allows each party may propose amendments to this treaty, and

agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the

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procedures governing the entry into the force of this treaty. So, I

mean, we wrote into the ABM the fact that we may someday want

to amend it. It also allows each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if

it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter

of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. This is article

15.

So this is not—while it is a significant untaking, it is certainly

within the agreement of the ABM. And it is logical that Members

would be concerned about a national missile defense system because the concept of ABM is deterrence, that logically one group

would say, after your first strike, we can obliterate you, so you’re

not going to want to do the first strike. But there is obviously a

concern with rogue nations.

I, like my colleague from Cleveland, fear the possibility of a nuclear weapon being literally brought in the trunk of a car or the

back of a truck or put on a ship and brought to port in the United

States and detonated, or chemical weapons. I mean, those are possibilities. But I also fear that 10 years from now I would have

voted against a limited national defense, and a missile is on its

way, and I think to myself what kind of decision did I make today?

And obviously costs are a factor in destabilization, but I would

love to just understand what it takes to get the Russians to sit

down. And it would seem to me that one of things it might take

to get them to sit down, to realize they have a benefit in this since

it is a limited national missile defense, is for us to have moved forward with the radar in Alaska. And I would like to know why did

the President decide not to move forward with the radar since the

technology is clearly, I think, there to move forward? And maybe

I’ll just throw it open to the floor. I would like that explained to

me.

Mr. WARNER. Well, as he announced it in his speech a week ago

at Georgetown, the main factor was, to him, that there were now

questions about the technical feasibility. He wanted the development program to go ahead.

Mr. SHAYS. Not of the radar.

Mr. WARNER. No, but of the overall system; that those tended to,

in his view, shove the initial operating capability out a year—he

spoke of how it was capable of now being fielded in 2006 or 2007— and given the fact that now that this deployment would probably

be a year later, there was not the same pressure to get the radar

construction under way that there would have been if you were trying to make 2005.

Mr. SHAYS. I’ll follow that up, but, General Kadish, do you have

a comment, Mr. Coyle, about the radar itself? Is the radar technologically there?

General KADISH. I think you have to look at this as an entire system, and we’ve tried to evaluate it as an entire system.

Mr. SHAYS. We will do that after you answer my question, if you

would.

General KADISH. The radar has progressed very well in the overall testing. It is probably one of the better elements in terms of our

expectations.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Coyle.

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Mr. COYLE. I would agree with that.

Mr. SHAYS. So there was really no technological reason why we

needed to wait on the radar.

Now, you wanted to make your point that we need to look at this

as a whole, but, Ms. Bohlen, isn’t it true that if we moved forward,

we would be calling the question, which the Russians seem to be

forcing us to do? Are they sitting down with us?

Ms. BOHLEN. They were sitting down with us, Mr. Chairman.

And as I indicated earlier, I think we have made some progress,

not as much, obviously, as we hoped. But in the sense that they

now accept that there is a threat, this was stated clearly in the

joint statement of the two Presidents at the Moscow summit in

June, there was absolutely explicit recognition that there is a

threat out there of missile proliferation, and that it poses a threat

to international stability.

The Russians are seized with the issue. I think they will certainly look at the totality of the system, and they will look at what

the next administration does on this.

Mr. SHAYS. By a vote of 317 for it, Congress and the President

signed into law the fact that we will have a national missile defense system. That’s going forward. Now, it is subject, obviously, to

annual appropriations of Congress, but I thought we got beyond

the issue of whether, and the question is when. And so it would

strike me that we had a viable part of the system that we could

begin to implement, and that there would be a positive side effect

to that, and that would simply be to force the Russians to know

we’re serious. I don’t think they think we’re serious. I think they

think that we’re going to back off.

And as far as our allies not being for the system, I don’t think

they fear what we fear, and I think they may have reason not to

fear it, but we have a reason to fear it. We think those missiles will

be directed at us, not them.

Ms. BOHLEN. Well, I would say that for the allies certainly the

threat in time is more immediate for them, the threat from the

Middle East, and I think we have gotten their attention on this

issue. There are many concerns out there, as you know. They are

concerned about what happens if we can’t get the Russians to agree

to amend the ABM Treaty. They are concerned about what this

does to strategic stability. They are concerned about decoupling.

They are concerned about what steps they should take to protect

themselves.

So I think this gives us more time to pursue that dialog, and I

think it’s very important that we have allied support.

Mr. SHAYS. My fear is that it will convince them that we’re not

serious. I mean, we had one part of the program we could begin

to implement that we know works, and we decided not to, and I

still am wondering why. Maybe one of you could tell me why we

needed to stop there when we could have begun to build it?

Ms. BOHLEN. I think as Mr. Warner just said, we would not— the delay in the radar—— Mr. SHAYS. Let Mr. Warner say. I am not hearing it right now.

Ms. BOHLEN. We won’t have a system.

Mr. WARNER. If the overall system is not going to be available

until 2006, and we think that there is a challenging but achievable

157

path to build the radar in Shemya, operationally test it and have

it ready in about 4 years, then you can delay the beginning of that

whole construction until the summer, the spring/summer of 2002

instead of the spring/summer of 2001.

Mr. SHAYS. I know you can do that. I’m just wondering why

we’re—— Mr. WARNER. I am saying the context was that if there was no

pressure to get started, why take that step now? The Russians are

clearly waiting for the new President. There is no doubt about that.

They began to signal that, in my view, to us in our talks with them

certainly by the spring of this year, if not earlier. I mean, they

know there’s an election coming. They know that this, the legacy

of whatever this President had done, would be subject to review by

the next President. So, in a sense, we could never escape from the

fact that there was going to be a new occupant of the White House.

And the Russians in a sense said, once we’ve looked at the balance

of all of this, we’ll wait and see who that is and what he wants to

do. And that, to my view, is where we stand on the question.

And the Russians were willing to do some things in the interim.

They did, in fact, acknowledge the threat. They’ve joined us in a

series of cooperative activities, an agreement signed in New York

just 2 days ago, but on the whole they’re saying, we’ll wait and deal

with the next administration.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. But your testimony still stands that the technology exists now that we could have moved forward?

Mr. WARNER. I want to clarify that. My personal judgment is

that overall we will be successful, but it will have to be demonstrated. In that sense, I mean, I completely agree with Mr.

Coyle. I think we have the fundamentals to do the job, but I can’t

say we’ve yet fully demonstrated it.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m talking about the radar.

Mr. WARNER. I’m sorry. About the radar? The radar is in. We believe it has come along very well to do the task we have asked of

it.

Mr. SHAYS. I just want the record to show that there is no technological reason not to move forward with the radar.

Mr. WARNER. That was not cited by the President as one of the

issues that he took into consideration, any difficulty with the radar.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I will yield to the ranking—not yield, but

give the ranking member—excuse me. Would the gentleman mind

if I just yield?

Do you have a question?

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. I do. I have a comment, Mr. Chairman,

that I would like to make for the record, in response to Mr.

Kucinich’s question. I think it was a very interesting and probing

question about terrorism versus realistic attack of an ICBM.

In making my statement I would like to enter into the record officially an article entitled, ‘‘Facing The Risks. A Realistic Look at

Missile Defense,’’ by John Train, who has been appointed as a contributing editor of Strategic Review and has received appointments

from Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton. And to sum up his testimony, he answers Mr. Kucinich’s question. He said, ‘‘The administration may settle for a shallow and vulnerable missile defense

that might not bother the Russians or some of the potential aggresVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00161 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sors it’s supposed to protect us from. An fanatic can attack the U.S.

using other weapons, notably biological and chemical, against

which we must defend ourselves. But many unstable countries are

also at great expense building missiles that can hit the U.S. in

coming years. One reason to erect defenses is to reduce the temptation for their use.’’ He concludes by saying, ‘‘We are likely to be attacked at our

weakest point and should leave no inviting apertures.’’ I think that sums it up, especially in view of the fact that we

know North Korea is spending far more money on building a missile defense system than they are feeding their starving people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection, we will put that in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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160

161

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, let me just pick up a little bit on the cost, if I can, for

a second. As I understand it, this program started with an estimate

of around $9 to $11 billion. I have a CRS report that tells us the

estimate in January 1999 was $10.6 billion, but yet CRS said by

February 2000, about a year later, this estimate rose to $26.6 billion. What caused that sharp increase?

General KADISH. When you’re dealing with cost estimates, you

have to define the time period and the elements that are included

in the cost.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, this was from 1999, when it was $10.6 billion, to February 2000, when it was $26.6 billion. So I think we’re

asking what elements changed to get that increase?

General KADISH. I would probably be better off if we did this in

response to the record, but just in general what I would say is that

the $20 billion figure, that includes $5.7 billion from 1991 to the

present as well as what our best estimate at the time of what the

ground-based system, the NMD system, was going to take to build.

That gets you to about a $20 billion figure. Now, those elements

are, of course, under review right now based on the decisions that

have been taken. But that—and I would like to be more specific for

the record to make sure that we line up what the CBO and the

CRS say versus what our estimate is, because the time horizons as

well as the elements are very important.

[The information referred to follows:]

The difference between the estimates is attributable primarily to a difference in

the number of fiscal years included and the number of missiles fielded by the program.

The FY00O President’s Budget submission (dated Feb 99) included $10.5B (cumulative total for FY1999-FY2005). $26.2 billion can be derived from the estimate that

supported the FY01 President’s Budget submission (dated Feb 00) and is the cumulative total for FY1991-FY2015. Additionally, the $26.2 billion included funding for:

an additional 80 interceptors which expanded the number of interceptors in the missile site from 20 to 100, upgrades for X-band radar in Alaska that was added as

part of the C1 expanded program, and for implementing the Welch Panel (Independent Review Team) recommendations.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, it jumped up that much by February 2000.

But the CPO in April 2000 said it was going to be $29.5 billion.

And then the CPO—the JOA—GAO, rather, in May 2000 said it

was going to be $36.2 billion. So, I mean, all these figures keep

jumping.

General KADISH. Right. And a large part of the reason for what

is implied as massive changes in the cost estimate, significant

changes, is because we added missiles. The original cost estimate,

as I recall, that we did was for 20 missiles in 2005, and that was

it, our so-called C–1 capability. But when we went to the expanded

C–1 where there were 100 missiles by 2007 under the old program,

then the cost estimates, of course, had to be included for those new

missiles that we added to the program.

Mr. TIERNEY. GAO says that added about $2 billion. Would that

be about right?

General KADISH. About $2 billion is about the number I remember for a large part of the missiles, right.

165

Mr. TIERNEY. So that still leaves a significant jump from $10.6 billion to $26.6 billion on that. Do you have some idea what the

rest of that was all about?

General KADISH. Again, I would like to be able to line those up

in a more disciplined manner to show you comparisons than I can

here in testimony.

[The information referred to follows:]

166

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Mr. TIERNEY. More recently as you went into the deployment

readiness review, your office was charged with evaluating the program as it stood in July or perhaps August of this year. I think you

came up with a new cost estimate for the DRR of $40.3 billion,

right?

General KADISH. There were a range of cost estimates done not

only by us, but by independent estimators within the Department.

Mr. TIERNEY. But yours was $40.3 billion, right?

General KADISH. The actual number, I can’t remember exactly

what it is, but it was around the $36—life cycle cost, it was about

$36, as I recall.

Mr. TIERNEY. If I give you a copy of your National Defense Review Agenda, your internal document, would that help you, because

that has it at $40.3 billion.

General KADISH. All right. If you take the cost comparison that

we did, the FYDP or the future years defense program, the acquisition costs, total acquisition costs, and put it from 2001 to 2028,

from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2028, and then your dollars,

which means fully inflation-adjusted, if you add an additional $5.7

from the earlier timeframe, from 1991, which then gets you from

1991 to 2028, it’s $40.3.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that’s the number you came up with on your

internal review?

General KADISH. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. But the cost analysis improvement group, can you

tell us who they are?

General KADISH. They are an independent cost estimating agency

within the Department of Defense.

Mr. TIERNEY. They came up with $43.2 billion, right?

General KADISH. They came up with about $1 billion more than

what we did.

Mr. TIERNEY. We came to $43.2 billion. That’s a little more than

$1 billion more.

General KADISH. Well, I guess I’m talking about the acquisition

costs.

Mr. TIERNEY. So if we were to take their number, we are at $43

billion, and I understand there are other costs that aren’t included

in those estimates, one of them being the operational requirements

document interoperability requirements. Those aren’t in your numbers, am I right?

General KADISH. We did a full cost——

Mr. TIERNEY. As much as I would like to get an explanation, either it was or it wasn’t. Was that in your number, the interoperability?

General KADISH. Yes, it was.

Mr. TIERNEY. So that’s in your $40.3 billion?

General KADISH. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. As I read your internal document, it does not

reflect that it is but that’s fine. How much were Mr. Welch’s adjustments?

General KADISH. We did our best estimate of what those elements would cost, and those are in our estimates as of this time.

But all these estimates are under review, based on what the PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00171 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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dent’s decision is, and we need to do an awful lot of work to make

sure that we get the best estimate we can on the program.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does your figure also include the alternative booster program costs?

General KADISH. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s another billion dollars or so.

General KADISH. Should we decide to do that, that decision has

not been taken.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does it include restructuring of the program to

remedy any testing delays?

General KADISH. No, it does not.

Mr. TIERNEY. It does not, all right. OK.

General KADISH. Well, let me make sure I get that question

right. For the test delays, yes. OK? For the additional time required in the extension of the program, no.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, with regard to the extension of the program,

Mr. Coyle, you provided on page 5 of your testimony a figure too

that shows graphically I think the slips in the flight test, the booster test and the LIDS that you identified earlier in that development. You also provided a general estimate of the range of slippage. I think basically the program is losing ground at the rate of

20 months every 3 years; is that correct?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. If you extend that out, by what date would the program be able to field all 100 intercepters?

Mr. COYLE. If the program were to continue to slip at the current

rate, it would extend the date another couple 21⁄2 years.

Mr. TIERNEY. So 100 interceptors due 2007, and that’s 7 years;

20 months for every 3 years would be 47 months. So a 4-year delay,

right?

Mr. COYLE. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. So actually, 2007 becomes 2011?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now GAO reported that the program cost increased by $124 million every month the program slips. So by your

calculation, that would add about another $5.8 billion?

Mr. COYLE. The arithmetic sounds right to me.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I did it in advance just to make sure. That’s

not my strong suit.

OK. Let me just finish up here then. Ms. Bohlen, the State Department has obviously been conducting negotiations on the system

and if we just disregarded the concerns of our NATO allies as some

people have proposed, and that would abrogate the ABM treaty, is

it likely that England and Denmark would allow us a place to forward deploy our radar sites?

Ms. BOHLEN. I think that’s a very real question, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. In all likelihood, they wouldn’t if we just went

against their wishes?

Ms. BOHLEN. I think we can’t absolutely say because you can’t

predict the circumstances under which this might happen.

Mr. TIERNEY. But it is a pretty good bet?

Ms. BOHLEN. But we cannot take it for granted that we would

have their permission, either to upgrade the early warning radars

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that we are talking about for the present system or building the

X-band radars that we want for the later phase.

Mr. TIERNEY. Without them, certainly that prevents us from

being able to field the kind of proposed missile defense system that

we are envisioning?

Ms. BOHLEN. Well, I would defer to General Kadish and Mr.

Coyle on whether there are alternatives.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, Mr. Coyle, if we didn’t have the support and

England and Denmark didn’t allow us to place our forward deployed radar sites on their territory, would that pretty much do

away with our ability to field the system as it is currently envisioned?

Mr. COYLE. Perhaps there would be some other alternative. I

don’t know.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Bohlen, I have seen a copy of an article from

Jane’s Intelligence Review that quotes several top level Russian officials. One is Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who declares that

Russia must develop new weapons capable of neutralizing any U.S.

ABM system. Another, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, director of

the Russian Defense Ministry’s Central Research Institute suggests

that Russia could redeploy its real mobile ICBMs if our defense

system goes ahead. So I think that people argue a little simplistically that while Russia shouldn’t have a veto over U.S. defense

policy—I think we would all agree on that—but don’t you think

that those statements or statements like that should at least let us

know that our actions have potential repercussions and we should

at least take them into account? I assume your department would

say that.

Ms. BOHLEN. I would certainly agree that our actions will have

potential repercussions. What the Russians might do in reality if

a future President decided to withdraw from the ABM treaty,

again, it would depend very much on the circumstances.

I hark back to what was said earlier, what Mr. Warner said. I

think the Russians realize that they will have to face up to the

problem, and I think they are waiting for a new administration to

see exactly what the dimensions of the issue will be and what they

will have to negotiate on.

I think we would certainly not want to minimize the consequences if we were to withdraw from the ABM treaty, and I

think that was certainly a factor that weighed in the President’s

decision.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. General, let me just say, isn’t it fairly

accurate—the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate said that one

potential effect of our deploying a National Missile Defense system

in violation of the ABM treaty would be for Russia or China to actually sell sophisticated countermeasures to other countries. Isn’t

that a real potential, that even though some of these so-called

rogue nations may not have sophisticated countermeasures at

present, that they could be purchased on the market from a ready

seller at some point?

General KADISH. That would be part of a proliferation regime,

obviously. The challenge, however, even if countermeasures are

sold, we have the ability to go through our C–3, our upgrade of the

system, to handle that, and I would assert that just getting counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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termeasures is not enough. They have to integrate them into the

total weapons system that they have and that is not a trivial challenge.

Mr. TIERNEY. I will let you go on that because the chairman

wants to move along, but I have a problem with the idea that we

always assume that it’s going to be too difficult for the rogue nations to have a missile system—to have countermeasures, but not

too difficult for them to have missiles.

General KADISH. We don’t assume it would be too difficult. We

assume that we could handle them based on our system design.

Mr. TIERNEY. Which we don’t provide the testing on, but thank

you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank all four of you. I would welcome you each to

make a closing remark if you would like to, if you have any comments to make. You have been very patient with this committee

and we appreciate it, and we look forward to getting to the next

panel. Thank you very much.

Our next panel is the Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, vice president and director of studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr.

Lisbeth Gronlund, senior staff scientist arms control program,

Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. William Graham, chairman and

president National Security Research, Inc.; and Dr. Kim Holmes,

vice president and director the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis

Institute, the Heritage Foundation.

I welcome you all to stand so I can swear you in.

Mr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement for the record.

Mr. SHAYS. No, we are going to swear you in, Mr. Korb.

Mr. KORB. You have to swear us?

Mr. SHAYS. You took my hand signal. You don’t have to put your

hand up yet. You are like me here. You are eager.

I hope we have four witnesses. If you would raise your right

hands. Thank you.

[Witnesses sworn].

Mr. SHAYS. I note for the record that all of our witnesses have

responded in the affirmative.

Have I left out a witness here? I am sorry. I should have pointed

out, Mr. Baker Spring, research fellow is with the Heritage Foundation.

Mr. Spring, you are welcome to respond to questions as well.

Maybe we could slide in a little bit to get you into this group just

a speck. Here. We are set. Thank you.

Mr. Korb, you are going to start out. I think we realize that you

have waited a while and I appreciate you being here.

Yes, Dr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have a concern with my schedule.

I had originally been told I would be able to leave by noon.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this.

Mr. GRAHAM. I deferred my schedule to 12:45, but I have a hard

cutoff.

Mr. SHAYS. We are going to accommodate you. Dr. Korb will be

happy to accommodate you. Correct? Or do you have a problem,

too?

Mr. KORB. I do, too, but I was told we would be out by noon.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s what we thought.

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Let me ask you, do you have a flight or do we have a flight here?

Do you want to negotiate between the two of you?

Dr. Graham will go, and if you could keep it to 5, maybe and we

will go from there.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will go as quickly as

I can and then I must excuse myself.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand. I apologize.

STATEMENTS OF DR. WILLIAM GRAHAM, CHAIRMAN AND

PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH, INC.; LAWRENCE J. KORB, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS; DR. LISBETH

GRONLUND, SENIOR STAFF SCIENTIST, ARMS CONTROL

PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; AND DR.

KIM HOLMES, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR THE KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ACCOMPANIED BY BAKER SPRING, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. GRAHAM. I have been asked to testify on test failures, technology development and ABM treaty provisions.

Let me state by way of background that I believe both General

Kadish and Dr. Coyle are exceptionally able individuals. On the

other hand, I am not here to defend the current program. I believe

that based on an assertion by Dr. William Perry when he was Secretary of Defense, that if the United States ever needed a national

ballistic missile defense system the country could take 3 years to

develop it and 3 years to deploy it, the infamous three-plus-three

system. I could find no substance to that plan when it was proposed by Dr. Perry and none now. I believe it was probably designed to respond to congressional critics of the lack of any NMD

program by the administration in the mid-1990’s, and they are now

struggling with a three-plus-five variant of that program, and their

testimony is evidence to that struggle.

Is there a need for ballistic missile defense? I served as a commissioner on the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat

to the United States, the Rumsfeld Commission. Its findings were

very different from those put forward by the intelligence community at that time, and I believe they are well enough known that

I won’t go into those, although I believe the testimony did show,

for example, that China is building new land-based and submarinebased ballistic missiles; Iran is building ballistic missiles; North

Korea, Syria, Libya, and probably Iraq as well.

Some believe that these ballistic missile developments by countries potentially hostile to the United States can best be handled

by nuclear deterrence, arms control and diplomatic means. The

problem with this approach is that it has been practiced for decades and has led to a current world situation where both missile

and weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, biological

threats continue to grow and proliferate. This, in turn, gives rise

to potential situations where deterrence, as we traditionally understand it, may no longer be effective.

The answer to a failing policy is not more of the same but the

formulation of a new policy.

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While nuclear deterrence and diplomacy will continue to play an

important role in U.S. counter proliferation policy, missile defenses

and other military measures will strengthen U.S. counter proliferation policy, providing substance and therefore diplomatic leverage.

Arguments to the effect that U.S. development and deployment of

ballistic missile defense systems will trigger a new arms race are

specious in view of the fact that the proliferating nations are already racing at full speed. What we must now do is try to counter

that growing threat.

Let me address technical feasibility for a moment. Many have

questioned the feasibility and the testing methodology of the ballistic missile defense systems. This is especially the case with the national defense rather than the theater defense systems, since I believe as a result of U.S. coalition and Israeli experience of being attacked by ballistic missiles during the Gulf war, the need for theater missile defenses is now widely understood and accepted.

The technical feasibility can be addressed from the vantage

points of both U.S. experience and technology. And I will summarize this very quickly, but I will say that the purpose of testing,

such as Dr. Coyle accurately described, is several fold, but the earliest part, the developmental testing, is to try to validate and improve the models that are used in the development of the system

and to detect and compensate for any items or characteristics that

were overlooked in the development of the models.

You would expect and look for failures of the models and, to some

degree, failures in the tests during that time. In fact, in insistence

on low risk early successes in the developmental testing, I believe

poses severe threat to U.S. leadership in the development of advanced technology in general, and cutting edge technology weapons

systems in particular.

This was a matter of direct concern to me when I was a science

advertiser to the President and one I have had a continuing interest in. Systems that are required to be low risk from the outset

must avoid the introduction of new and frequently untested technologies. Since the development and introduction of new technologies is, in fact, America’s strong suit and one we have invested

a great deal of money in, insisting on low risk complete early test

success is tantamount to giving up much of the strong, unique advantage that the United States has acquired through its enormous

investment in science and technology.

The time to hold weapons systems to a high standard of test success is in the late phases of engineering development and especially

in operational test and evaluation. By this time, the problems encountered in system development should have been worked out. A

system should be ready for deployment.

I believe Dr. Coyle’s testimony, in fact, in reality, has pointed out

that the administration has substantially underfunded operational

tests and evaluation assets and capability for national missile defense systems, and that underfunding and under support should be

rectified.

On the other hand, while it isn’t surprising there have been failures to date, there is an unusual disturbing aspect to the failures

encountered so far. In most cases, they have not occurred in the

new cutting edge technology aspects of systems tested, but rather

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in technologies that were developed decades ago and are now well

understood features of rocket and missile design. The failures to

date are typical of those caused by a lack of systems integration experience, rather than a lack of knowledge of missile and rocket design, and may be related to several characteristics of the defense

industrial base today. These include rapid downsizing of the defense industry over the last decade; a small number of new systems

that have been developed during that time period; the absence of

new systems being produced, deployed and operated for several

decades in the ballistic missile defense area, particularly national

missile defense; and the inability of the defense industry to attract

new technical talent and mentor its technical work force in the face

of strong economic competition from the high technology commercial sector.

The United States is learning once again that engineering, programmatic and operational experience is a difficult and expensive

capability to acquire and an easy capability to lose.

Nonetheless, as I summarize in the—— Mr. SHAYS. How much more do you have? I am conscious of Dr.

Korb as well.

Mr. GRAHAM. About 2 or 3 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. And I am just going to let you get on your way afterwards.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. I have given in my paper a table of 15

different programs, such experiences which are typical of high tech

missile and rocket-based programs that experienced a great deal of

difficulty in the first stage and since then, have become some of our

most successful systems.

I would also like to point out that the hardest part of the way

we do ballistic missile defense is the hit-to-kill aspect, one the Russians don’t deal with because they use nuclear warheads on their

interceptors and their Moscow defense system and also on their S– 300 and S–400 systems that they have deployed around other parts

of their country.

However, something like 80 percent of the time that we have gotten our hit-to-kill technology in the terminal homing phase, it has

actually proved to be successful. I think that’s actually a remarkably good record.

I give in my paper several—a whole list, in fact, of places where

the ABM treaty is interfering with or compromising the development of our ballistic missile defense system.

I would point out that in addition to the treaty now having been

substantially violated by the Soviet Union, as was discussed earlier, and being a unilateral constraint on the United States, it is,

in fact, playing a major role in limiting what we can do. Many of

the criticisms of the current system’s performance can be traced

back to ABM treaty limitations. I give those in my paper, but I

won’t take the time to go over them in the testimony.

Finally, I would like to say that a system design that would be

effective would be different from the current system design. It

would be a multilayer ballistic missile system design. It would involve ground-based components, sea-based, air-based and in the

foreseeable future, space-based components. Virtually all of those

are ruled out by the ABM treaty.

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But, in fact, with the ability to develop the full range of ballistic

missile defense aspects and take advantage of the fact that we

have the world’s best instrumentation for observing foreign missile

tests, and therefore, know today and will know in the future much

more about the real world performance of their countermeasures

than they will know, and be able to adapt to those when they test

their countermeasures, if not before. I have no concern with our

ability to overcome their countermeasures program, but I believe a

foreign country deploying a countermeasure against us should have

a real worry that we will know more about his countermeasure and

its actual performance based on our ground, sea, air and spacebased sensors, than he will have about the performance. This

doesn’t often come up in the discussion, but it is a very real worry

to any potentially hostile country.

So I don’t believe the countermeasures is a limiting factor on

what we can deal with. I believe it is a serious concern. I always

have. I believe we should deal with it. We are dealing with it. We

had an extensive experiment called MSX in which we put a satellite on orbit with a large array of sensors, fielded a large number

of countermeasures against it, not just a few but a large number;

not just simple but very sophisticated. We have the data on that.

No one else does.

So I would like to say, in conclusion, that if the United States

were to carry forward a national program, drawing on our best capability from all of industry, not just from one contractor or a contractor and a few subcontractors but all of our capability, and had

the constraint of the ABM treaty lifted from us, I have no doubt

that we could develop an effective ballistic missile defense system

and it would tend to discourage and deter other countries from

building ballistic missiles rather than encouraging them to build

them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for having to excuse

myself.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I understand. You told the committee staff that

you did have to leave. It just didn’t get relayed to me. Thank you.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for staying.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Korb, thank you for your patience.

Mr. KORB. I have a statement I would like to be made a part of

the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Put the mic in front of you. Is it on?

Mr. KORB. I will make a few comments. First of all, I would like

to commend you for holding this hearing and I think the testimony,

particularly of Mr. Coyle earlier, demonstrates the wisdom of Congress in setting up that separate Office of Test and Evaluation.

My testimony was prepared before President Clinton’s decision,

but I do support that decision as a victory for common sense, given

the technological and diplomatic problems that we were having

with the system.

I point out in my testimony that the system we are talking about

today has five components. All, to a certain extent, are pushing the

technological frontiers and all must work all of the time in order

for this system to be effective. I would also like to point out that

in this system, two of the five phased array radars, as was pointed

out by Congressman Tierney, are in other countries, and they are

not going to let us use their nations unless they support the deployment. Ms. Bohlen, I think was quite diplomatic, but the fact of the

matter is Denmark and Britain have said they will not let the

United States do it, that is increase the power of the phased array

radars if you violate ABM.

In terms of technological challenge, as people always point out,

we did the Manhattan project, we built the ICBM, we went to the

moon. But the fact of the matter is nobody was defending the moon

when we went there. This is a much greater technological challenge.

I am sure with enough time and money, we could get an NMD

system that’s 85 percent effective with a 95 percent confidence rate,

which as my colleague Dick Garwin, who worked on the hydrogen

bomb and was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, points out,

is what you need with this system. This is not just any weapons

system. NMD has to work and it has to work well when you use

it.

I am sure that with enough time and money we could hit a high

speed warhead in outer space under controlled circumstances, but

that’s not what the Pentagon is doing. NMD is a concurrent weapons development program, and the last one I was involved in was

called B–1, it happened when I was in government, in the early

80’s and that darn thing still doesn’t work because we rushed it

into production. NMD has not yet really been tested, in my view,

in a realistic battle environment.

Again, as my colleague Dick Garwin notes in order to be confident that the system would work, you would need 20 successes.

If you have three failures, then you need 47 successes, and we are

nowhere near meeting those cirteria.

Every time one system doesn’t work supporters turn to another

system. I have lived through Excaliber, Brilliant Eyes, Brilliant

Pebbles and now I hear people talking about new, more robust systems. I recently debated former CIA Director Jim Woolsey on boostphase. If the Pentagon is going to go to that system, it will need

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tem precisely; as we should, it will take 5 to 7 years. When supporters talk about a more robust and layered system, they should

know the devil is in the details. I think it is important to find out

what specifically they are talking about.

Supporters of NMD are arguing that it doesn’t have to be that

reliable. But, this is not just any weapons system. Don’t forget that we have spent $100 billion already and we have nothing, we have

no guarantee that spending another $100 billion will produce something that is technologically acceptable.

The ABM treaty is still valid. President Bush was the one who

wanted to make the Russians the Soviet successor state. In fact,

Secretary Baker demanded that they do and the President made

the statement. So if you want to go against it, you are going to

have to modify it. It still is in effect and, in fact, Congress, in 1996

basically, by talking about modifications to ABM, implicitly recognized that the Russians were the Soviet—were the successor state.

And then finally, I would like to quote a man who I had the

privilege of serving for 5 years, President Reagan. When he came

up with this, he dictated no timetable and did not prejudge any

specific technology.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Korb follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I have just come to the conclusion that if you want

to change a bland statement to one that’s quite forceful, just keep

the person waiting awhile. Your statement is said almost tongues

compared to the way you spoke just this past few minutes.

What kind of schedule do you have, Dr. Korb?

Mr. KORB. Well, I am OK now, thanks to one of your crackerjack

assistants here.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I know that you had another meeting. I appreciate you adjusting that. Thank you.

I think we now go to Dr. Graham. Oh, Dr. Graham has left. He

went.

Dr. Gronlund. I am sorry. You were to be No. 2 and now you are

No. 3. Thank you.

Ms. GRONLUND. That’s fine. So do I need to do anything or am

I live?

Mr. SHAYS. You are live.

Ms. GRONLUND. I am live. OK. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here. I am very impressed that you

were able to continue to work without lunch.

I have been asked to comment on two issues, the National Missile Defense testing program and the compliance of various proposed NMD systems with the ABM treaty. In light of President

Clinton’s recent announcement that his administration will not authorize deployment of its planned NMD system, I have focused my

comments to be relevant to the decisions the next President might

make about this or any other National Missile Defense system.

If the next President does decide to proceed with deployment of

an NMD system, it may differ somewhat from the one that is currently under development. For example, the United States could

take a totally different approach by developing a boost-phased defense. However, if the United States continues to develop an NMD

system designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course of their trajectory, it will necessarily operate in the same basic way as the one

the Clinton administration has been developing. Any mid-course

system, regardless of whether the interceptors are ground-based or

sea-based or air-based, would use infrared homing hit-to-kill interceptors guided by ground-based radars and space-based infrared

sensors, as would the system currently under development.

So let me now turn to the issue of the NMD test program. I will

focus on several questions. What would the next administration

need to know about the effectiveness of the NMD system before it

could make a well-informed deployment decision? Based on the

tests conducted so far, what do we know? Based on the planned

test program, what will we know and when will we know it? And

finally, what would a test program look like that was adequate to

provide the next administration with the information it needs to

make a deployment decision?

What should the United States know about any NMD system before it could make a well-informed deployment decision? As noted

in the 1998 report of the Welch panel, the first Welch report, three

steps are needed to demonstrate that an NMD technology is viable.

So the test program must demonstrate, first, reliable hit-to-kill;

second, reliable hit-to-kill at a weapons system level and; third, reliable hit-to-kill against real world targets.

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I note that there is a significant difference between demonstrating the ability to do something—which may require only one test,

and demonstrating the ability to do so reliably—which requires

many tests.

Now the NMD test program, as we heard previously from Dr.

Coyle, has demonstrated hit-to-kill but not reliable hit-to-kill nor

reliable hit-to-kill at a weapons systems level. However, there is no

fundamental reason to doubt that the United States can do so, perhaps by the end of the 19 tests scheduled so far through the next

4 to 5 years.

So I will focus on the third and the most demanding criteria laid

out by the Welch panel, demonstrating reliable hit-to-kill against

real world targets; namely those that incorporate countermeasures.

In his September 1st announcement that he would not authorize

deployment, President Clinton stated that there, quote, remained

questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to deal with

countermeasures. Unfortunately, this is likely to remain the case

unless major changes are made to the planned test program. At a

fundamental level, the current test program is not configured to

provide the next President with any information about whether the

proposed NMD system could reliably intercept real world targets

with realistic countermeasures. Although the current NMD program assumes that the countermeasure threat will continue to

evolve and that the full system that might be deployed after 2010

will be able to deal with complex countermeasures, all the tests

conducted so far and all those scheduled through at least the first

term of the next administration will be only of the system against

the, quote, defined C–1 threat.

What is the defined C–1 threat? How does it correspond to the

real world threat? The detailed definition of the C–1 threat is classified, but there is some public information that allows us to understand something about how it has been defined. The most detailed

publicly available official document that discusses countermeasures

that would be available to emerging missile states is the September

1999 National Intelligence Estimate. It states that emerging missile states probably would rely on, ‘‘readily available technology to

develop countermeasures,’’ and that they could do so, quote, by the

time they flight test their missiles.

Moreover, the NIE lists several of these technologies that emerging missile states could use. However, in response to questions during his testimony before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on June 29th, earlier this summer, Lieutenant General Kadish

stated that the defined C–1 threat does not include many of the

countermeasure technologies identified in the NIE as being readily

available to emerging missile states.

Thus, the targets the NMD system would be tested against exclude the very countermeasures that the U.S. intelligence community has stated would be available by the time the missile threat

exists.

Another fundamental limitation of the testing program is that

the defense has known in advance what the expected characteristics of the decoy and the warhead would be, and there is no reason

to assume that in the real world, the United States would know

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what the characteristics of an emerging missile state warhead

would be.

So unless the definition of the C–1 threat is changed, the test

program continued by the next administration will tell us nothing

about the ability of the proposed NMD system to intercept real

world targets.

So what would an adequate test program look like? The report,

the Rumsfeld Commission report, called attention to two important

issues relevant to countermeasure threat and analysis. First, the

failure to detect direct evidence does not mean that no such development is occurring.

Second, given the possibility of emerging missile states hiding

their development programs, a threat analysis must assess what

weapons or what countermeasures a country is capable of developing. This has been dubbed THINK-INT, or think intelligence.

I was on a panel of 11 independent physicists and engineers that

applied this THINK-INT methodology to understanding what countermeasures would be available to a country able to develop and

deploy a long-range ballistic missile. Our premise was that missile

and countermeasure capabilities would be consistent with each

other.

The panel produced a very detailed report, which I have here,

which was published in April of this year by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the MIT Security Studies program. In our

analysis, we assumed that the NMD system had all of the sensors

and interceptors planned for the full system that would be deployed

by 2010 or later. This is the system the Pentagon says will be effective against missile attacks using complex countermeasures.

We, in the report, surveyed the types of countermeasures that

would be available to an emerging missile state and then go into

considerable detail on three of those. First, are biological weapons

deployed on submunitions? The second, are nuclear weapons deployed with anti-simulation balloon decoys? And the third, are nuclear weapons covered with liquid nitrogen-cooled shroud?

There is more detail about this in my prepared testimony and I

will skip over that here, but say that we found that each of these

three countermeasures would defeat the fully deployed NMD system.

Now, none of the technical analysis in our report has been publicly disputed, and I believe in his testimony today, Lieutenant

General Kadish acknowledges that.

The main criticism levied at our report is that we underestimated how difficult it would be for emerging missile states to actually build and deploy the countermeasures we describe.

We believe that this criticism is incorrect because a country capable of building both an intercontinental range ballistic missile and

either a nuclear warhead or biological warhead to arm such a missile would clearly be able to build simple countermeasures. But

there is a time-honored way to answer questions like this, which

is: do the experiment. As we recommend in the countermeasures

report, the United States should establish an independent countermeasures red team whose job it would be to develop, build and test

countermeasures using technology available to emerging missile

states. Because a red team would try to build countermeasures,

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this type of intelligence gathering has been referred to as TRY-INT.

And I believe it was Dr. Graham who initially dubbed it TRY-INT.

Then the planned NMD system should be tested against the

countermeasures the red team determines would be available to potential attackers. So regardless of what NMD system the next administration pursues, it is essential that independent THINK-INT

and TRY-INT programs be established to analyze and build countermeasures to the planned NMD.

Once these programs determined which countermeasures were

feasible, the United States must then assess how effective they

would be against the planned NMD system through analysis and

flight testing. And it should only decide to deploy a system once it

has met all three of the Welch panel’s criteria. In particular, and

I will end with this, no NMD system should be deployed until it

is demonstrated that it can reliably intercept real world targets

using countermeasures.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gronlund follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Holmes, thank you.

Mr. HOLMES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I feel like

the last of the Mohicans here.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, there is a little edge to this panel. I think it

is maybe lunch or something.

Mr. HOLMES. Well, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to be here today. I have with me, as mentioned earlier,

Baker Spring, who is the Heritage Foundation’s senior analyst on

missile defense matters, to help answer any of your questions.

I would like to take the opportunity this afternoon, if I could, to

provide you with some of my conclusions regarding the implications

not only of the July 7 missile defense test, but also how the entire

missile defense testing program is going.

My first conclusion is that weak missile defense technology was

not the cause of the failed intercept test on July 7th. The primary

reason the test interceptor did not destroy its target was because

of the problem with a rocket technology that is 20 years old and

that was built 10 years ago. It is therefore factually incorrect to

conclude that the failure of the July 7 test proves that missile defenses are not technologically feasible. If anything, the results of

other tests in the past suggest the opposite.

During the first flight test of the kill vehicle in October of last

year, the system found and destroyed its target without the benefit

of many of the advanced tracking command, control, and communication technologies now being tested. And over the last year, the

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization can claim six successful test

intercepts of theater and National Missile Defense technology compared with only three significant failures. I think no fair assessment of the facts could lead anyone to conclude that a 66 percent

success rate suggests that missile defenses are not technologically

feasible and therefore should not be deployed. As a matter of fact,

that is basically the conclusion that Secretary of Defense Cohen

has reached.

My second conclusion is that even if the July 7 test were a failure and can be blamed on new missile defense technologies, it

would make no difference as far as the decision to deploy is concerned. A decision to deploy a National Missile Defense has already

been made. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 requires the

fielding of a national missile defense system as soon as is technologically possible. Signed by President Clinton on July 22, 1999,

this act is the law of the land. It is therefore a legal requirement

that the Federal Government continue to develop and test a variety

of systems to find the most effective and near-term alternative. The

Congress and the President have spoken. We must now find out

how best to proceed, not whether to proceed.

My third conclusion is that removing testing restraints will reduce technical risk in the program. The administration’s National

Missile Defense testing program is focused exclusively on the option of deploying interceptors at a fixed land-based site. This rules

out other approaches that may prove to be more technologically

feasible and more militarily effective. For example, despite the

wealth of recommendations that the United States pursue a seabased option, the administration policy bars even the development

and testing, let alone the deployment, of sea-based systems.

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The Clinton administration’s refusal to test sea-based systems is

all the more puzzling because they appear to be so promising. For

example, recent press reports indicate that a Pentagon study requested by Congress, but which the Congress has not yet received,

states that a sea-based system would add significant capabilities to

the land-based interceptors of the sort that was tested on July 7.

Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Operations on February 18th

stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense that foreclosing the sea-based option would, ‘‘not be in the best long-term interests of our country.’’ I agree with the CNO that foreclosing the sea-based option would

be shortsighted, which raises a question: If testing is required to

discern the feasibility of land-based technologies, why is it ruled

out to discern the feasibility of sea-based systems?

The answer appears to be in the administration’s adherence to

the ABM Treaty. The constraints that the ABM Treaty is imposing

on the testing program are having serious effects, as Dr. Graham

has said, both on the quality and the timetable of the entire missile

defense program, as they have had on a number of missile defense

programs over the last decades.

For example, the Patriot missiles of Gulf war fame were deliberately downgraded during the 1970’s and the 1980’s to comply

with the ABM Treaty. As a result, the United States had to deploy

systems less capable than they could have during Desert Storm.

Like the Patriot, the Navy’s Aegis tracking systems and interceptors have been repeatedly downgraded to comply with the ABM

treaty. The system was constrained in the 1980’s to avoid a violation of the treaty, but the Bush administration later initiated a

substantial upgrade to the system that would allow it to track and

intercept ballistic missiles. Unfortunately, because of the ABM

treaty, the Clinton administration severely cut and delayed this

program.

The Clinton administration imposed restrictions on the testing of

theater defense systems which prevent external sensors from providing early warning tracking and targeting data about possible

launches to the interceptor; likewise, a system of space-based, low

altitude sensors, which could have allowed the Navy theater-wide

system to provide a limited protection from attacks on American

soil, also have been delayed.

And as Chairman Shays mentioned this morning, I can find no

other reason than the ABM treaty to understand why the Alaska

radar was not being constructed. If there was, in fact, no technological reason, although we did not hear from the panel this morning, I would venture to say that the main reason was because they

consider it to be a violation of the ABM treaty, and that was the

main reason why they decided not to proceed.

Despite the outcome of the July 7 test, the Pentagon, I think,

must move forward quickly with the development and deployment

of missile defenses for America. And to that end, Congress and the

executive branch should make every effort to field missile defenses

as soon as technologically possible, as the law requires. We should

be abandoning the policy of trying to revive the defunct ABM treaty and lift all restrictions on testing of missile defense systems. We

have been talking all morning about testing. The assumption apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00216 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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parently behind testing is to try to get the best system you can get.

The ABM treaty is restricting the way we do that job.

I also recommend that a sea-based element be included in all

missile defense deployment plans and that Congress be holding

more hearings at the earliest possible time about alternative technical options like the sea-based system that I mentioned before.

Mr. Chairman, the Clinton administration has chosen to impose

restraints on the testing of missile defense systems. If missile defense testing continues to be managed in this way, the testing restraints will produce the self-fulfilling prophecy of ineffective systems. By intentionally foregoing promising avenues of development

such as the sea-based systems, the administration has chosen a

course that will inevitably result in a system that will not be optimally effective. Our goal should be instead to develop and deploy

the most effective missile defense system possible.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holmes follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. This ought to be a very interesting panel to hear your

answers to the questions, and we will start with Helen ChenowethHage.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. You did that right, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much. It confuses me sometimes, too.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. You are very gracious.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to direct some of my comments or questions to Mr.

Korb.

Mr. Korb, you commented on the Patriot missile, anti- missile

missile. But wasn’t the Patriot anti-missile missile designed originally as an anti-aircraft?

Mr. KORB. That’s how it started. As a matter of fact, it was

former Vice President Quayle that got the Congress to put money

into Patriot give it an anti-missile capability. That plan was not

put forward by either the Reagan or Bush administrations, that is

correct. Patriot was originally built as an anti-aircraft system.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. And a very courageous Army colonel in

Huntsville, AL, actually directed the startup of the production lines

on his own authority, recently retired but he upgraded the software

and deployment system in the Patriot.

You know, it’s my understanding, Mr. Korb, that the U.S. aerospace community has repeatedly met more daunting and challenging engineering challenges than that posed by finishing up what

we have already started. And it would seem to me that our biggest

concerns, as a Congress, should be looking at better management

practices. I mean, in your testimony you stated that we need to be

involved in at least 7 more years of vigorous research before we can

make an informed choice on deployment, but if we could concentrate on some of the management practices and removal of the

political constraints, I think that we would be miles ahead.

Mr. Korb, this is the reason I make this statement. We have had

a number of successes that we are not talking about, and we muddle around in the ABM treaty and we forget the successes that

have been instituted and have actually occurred since 1955 when

we first started this.

Now, using pre-SDI technology in 1984, the Army’s HOE experiment launched from an island in the Pacific, South Pacific, of a

Volkswagen-sized kill vehicle to intercept a Minuteman missile,

launch from Vandenberg Air Force base in southern California,

that was a success, wasn’t it?

Mr. KORB. Are you talking about the homing overlay experiment?

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. I am talking about the homing overlay

experiment.

Mr. KORB. Well, as it turned out, the Congress found out some

years later that that test was rigged, this came to light after the

Reagan administration left office. In fact, I believe there was a

GAO investigation and a congressional.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Well, I—— Mr. KORB. I don’t disagree with your point that we could eventually get the technology to work. I think that to the extent that you

do concurrent research development, you are increasing the

chances that you are going to have what General Welch called a

rush to failure.

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I would also point out that not every system works. We have had

spectacular failures. The division air defense (DIVAD) gun was a

system that we tried to rush and it never worked, and in fact, it

was because of the testing DIVAD there that Congress passed a

law that set up Mr. Coyle’s office.

Secretary Cheney had to cancel the A–12 because it just wasn’t

working.

So it may work, but my point is to the extent that you rush, you

increase the chances that it won’t.

Another point, this is not just another system. This, if it doesn’t

work, then you are going to have what Chairman Burton talked

about before, that is missiles raining down on the country. Then all

the money you have spent will have gone in vain. It is not like flying a plane, where you get to go make a second pass.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Well, you know, because there have

been allegations of tests being rigged, I am not convinced that they

were. What I am convinced of is this, that we learned a lot from

that launch, that whole launch, and in addition to that the Air

Force successfully intercepted a dying low altitude satellite with its

miniature homing vehicle launched from an F–15, also using preSDI technology.

The SDI program instituted a major technology demonstration

program that placed priority on dramatically reducing the size and

weight of critical compulsion and sensor and data processing and

other electronic systems, we have already done that, and to enable

an effective hit-to-kill interceptor system. Why are we continuing

to drape crepe? Most notable among these demonstration systems

was the delta series or what would has become familiar to us as

the delta star series, in 1989, which over a 9-month period gathered very important information. That’s all been done.

Also in 1989 the Army’s E-risk program repeated the HOE experience with a much lighter interceptor kill vehicle, using mid-1980’s

technology. There have been numerous other experiments that

demonstrate the maturity of the basic technology.

So I don’t want to see us just mull around in the ABM treaty

while other countries are advancing their systems and we are muddled down trying to reinvent the wheel.

The SDI program has produced the technology that was demonstrated in the award winning 1994 Clementine mission, which

returned to the moon for the first time in 25 years and provided

over a million frames of optical data. That’s all in our history of

what we have produced. But, unfortunately, President Clinton, in

his short-lived veto, line item veto authority, killed the Clementine,

an award-winning program that all of aerospace looked at.

So, Mr. Korb, my concern is, as former President John Kennedy

was noted as saying regarding the space program, one can always

make the perfect the enemy of the good, and this seems to me to

be exactly what we are trying to do, by not recognizing the accomplishments but focusing on our test setbacks.

So I thank you for your testimony.

Mr. KORB. Thank you.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. I wanted to ask Mr. Spring about the

ABM treaty. You know, it seems to me that this treaty has succeeded in its purpose of blocking the development, testing and deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00229 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ployment of an effective defense anti-ballistic missile system, at

least for the United States; and that last parenthetical phrase is

what concerns us all.

Mr. SPRING. Sure.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. This seems to meet the objectives of

those who wish to preserve the cold war mutual assured destruction policy that I have referred to earlier, a doctrine which may

benefit some but certainly doesn’t move us to mutual assured survivability.

I wonder if you would like to comment on that?

Mr. SPRING. Well, certainly the treaty does—and it was designed

to, from the outset—impose limitations on development and testing

as well as deployment. Those restrictions are found in articles 5

and 6 of the treaty. They affect sea-based, space-based, mobile,

ground-based and air-based systems. In my judgment, in terms of

development and testing, to put it in the context of, say, for example, the moon mission, we would say that well, we are going to go

to the moon, but we have a restriction that we can’t use liquidfueled rockets, or that we can’t use advanced computer technology.

That, in other words, all of the options that would otherwise be put

on the table are now being taken off as a matter of political constraint and diplomatic constraint.

The other restriction in article 6 says we can’t take theater missile defense systems and upgrade them to give them a long-range

or strategic ballistic missile defense capability. Well, the fact of the

matter is that our most advanced technologies, because they have

been proceeding in relative terms to the NMD system now in a relatively unconstrained fashion, are among the most advanced; and,

therefore, some of the best avenues to providing, in my judgment,

the most effective missile defense system that we can obtain as

soon as possible, according to law, would be to upgrade our missile

defense systems that are now categorized as theater defenses.

Those include most particularly the Navy theater-wide program.

So in my judgment, we are proceeding in this program essentially

with one hand tied behind our backs, as a result of the diplomatic

and political constraints that are imposed on it through what I

view to be unilateral observance of ABM restrictions as a matter

of policy by the Clinton administration.

It is not, in my judgment, a free and fair exploration of all the

technological options that would be available to the defense community.

Mrs. CHENOWETH-HAGE. Thank you, Mr. Spring.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Dr. Holmes, Mr. Spring, I am a little

struck by what I think is a rather extreme argument in your statement that the ABM treaty should no longer be considered binding

based on an argument, I guess, that since the Soviet Union dissolved Russia is not bound by the same agreements, and I see that

you cited a couple of prominent individuals who share that view

but I would like to ask you a question about the implications of

that.

Do you believe on that basis that no treaties currently exist between Russia and the United States other than the few that we

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might have signed since the break-up of the Soviet Union? So I

guess that would mean that no previous arms treaties, no status

of force agreements, no trade pacts, none of these continue to exist

in your mind?

Mr. HOLMES. Well, many of the treaties that existed with the Soviet Union have been handled on an individual basis, and so has,

actually, the ABM treaty. There was a multilaterization treaty, a

successor agreement that was signed with four countries, Ukraine,

Belarus, Khazakhstan and Russia, that the Clinton administration

signed and must be sent up to the Senate for its advice and consent

before it becomes the law of the land. So even the administration

believes that something must be done to have a legally binding

treaty. Otherwise, they would not have negotiated that agreement.

So, therefore, to answer that question you have to handle each

one of these agreements separately. The ABM treaty has been handled separately. It is now a successor agreement that has to be sent

up to the Senate. If the Senate approves that and ratifies it, then

it will be binding. If it doesn’t—— Mr. TIERNEY. What about the status of forces agreement and

trade pacts, do you think they are all out the window?

Mr. SPRING. Let me answer that question. The finding that we

had done for us by the law firm of Hunton and Williams was that

the ABM treaty is null and void by reason of impossibility of performance. That is, there was no state in existence today that could

have fulfilled the obligations the treaty imposed on the Soviet

Union, primarily for reasons of geographic scope.

The ABM treaty imposed restrictions with regard to the territory

of the Soviet Union which Russia does not control. As a result of

the impossibility of performance on obligations that are unique to

the ABM treaty, the treaty is null and void by force of international law.

That does not speak to the obligations of the United States relative to other treaty obligations with the Soviet Union and the succession issues that would surround them.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thanks.

Mr. HOLMES. Could I add one thing to that, if I may?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure. Sure.

Mr. HOLMES. This is also the view, by the way, not only of the

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but also the

Senate Majority Leader, who have, in many communications with

the White House, made the same point that we have made here;

primarily, that the successor agreement must be sent up to the

Senate for ratification before it becomes the law of the land.

Mr. TIERNEY. Terrific.

Dr. Gronlund, let me ask you about the latest intercept flight

test, the IFT–5. The Department of Defense provided a briefing and

gave us some slides, and one of them listed all the mission objectives that were supposedly accomplished by that IFT–5 test. When

you look at it—well, first you know what countermeasures were included in that target sweep?

Ms. GRONLUND. There was one large spherical balloon decoy.

Mr. TIERNEY. What happened to the deployment of that particular countermeasure?

Ms. GRONLUND. It didn’t inflate. It didn’t deploy properly.

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Mr. TIERNEY. My problem is anyway, that would be an unsuccessful interceptor, wouldn’t you think so?

Ms. GRONLUND. Well, they never got to the point of testing the

intercept because the killr vehicle did not release from the booster

properly.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you explain to me then how the Department

of Defense indicates that for discrimination, the full objective of

their plan was met? How would they get to that conclusion given

that scenario?

Ms. GRONLUND. No, I don’t know that, actually. I don’t.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right. Let me discuss with you a little bit, you

mentioned three different countermeasures that you thought

were—that you actually went into in further depth in your report.

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. One of them was submunitions.

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. As I understand it, you are not only talking about

submunitions with nuclear warheads, you are talking about submunitions with biological or chemical warheads?

Ms. GRONLUND. Particularly biological warheads.

Mr. TIERNEY. The premise being that any country like North

Korea, Iran or Iraq, if they were to have the capacity to send up

an anti-ballistic missile, they probably also have the capacity to use

submunitions on those?

Ms. GRONLUND. Right. A country that had an ICBM and had a

biological weapon would also be able to simply separate that agent

into 100 or more bomblets. This was something that I believe the

Rumsfeld Commission first noted would be an option for an emerging missile state, and people have raised various concerns about reentry heating, about disposal, and those are the things that we

looked into in great detail in our report.

Mr. TIERNEY. And your report indicated that submunitions——

Ms. GRONLUND. That if the country could already have a biological weapon that it could deliver by long-range missile, it could just

as readily put them on submunitions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, if you had as few as five missiles.

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Could you put 100 submunitions on each one?

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. You’d have 500 submunitions of biological agent

coming over, disbursing—in fact, that probably would be preferable

if you were a rogue country and you really wanted to disburse that

agent. It’d be better to have 100 different places of release than it

would be just one, right?

Ms. GRONLUND. It probably would, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. So if you had 500 coming over, even after we go

to C–3 on this stage, what are the total number of interceptors that

the system currently envisions?

Ms. GRONLUND. Which is 250 interceptors. Even if they were perfectly effective, fewer than half of the bomblets would be destroyed.

Mr. TIERNEY. So we should probably be real honest with the

American people and tell them that in terms of biological weapons

at least——

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes.

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Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. This system doesn’t cut it.

Ms. GRONLUND. Right, right.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I would guess you might even make the argument that if I were a rogue nation, I would be encouraged to go

that path as opposed to nuclear, since I knew you might be trying

to provide some sort of a nuclear deterrent.

Ms. GRONLUND. That is a possibility. I mean, the other reason

biological agents might be more attractive than nuclear weapons to

an emerging missile state is that it’s hard to get the fissile material

that you need to make a nuclear weapon. And, for example, North

Korea reportedly has enough material to make one or two nuclear

weapons, but there’s no, de facto limit to how many biological

weapons it could make.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you talk to us for a bit about the difference

between effectiveness and competence?

Ms. GRONLUND. Oh, boy. OK. Let’s say that you want to have a

system that is 95 percent effective but you also need to know with

some amount of certainty what the effectiveness is. For example,

if I gave you a coin, I said this coin is weighted and I want you

to tell me what the weighting is, and I let you flip it once and it

lands on heads, would you then say I am 100 percent certain that

this coin is weighted so it will always come up heads? No.

OK. So there’s both a certain confidence level of what the effectiveness is, or if you’re looking at the coin example, how the coin

is weighted, and the only way you can become highly confident of

what the weighting of the coin actually is is by flipping it a lot of

times. Or the analogy with missile defense testing, the only way

you can know with high confidence how effective the system would

be is to test it a lot of times.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, if we had—and I won’t go into all of those

of when we talked earlier—but a fairly significant number of relatively simple countermeasures that were available now to rogue

nations, it wouldn’t be enough to test against each one of those

countermeasures individually. Wouldn’t we have to test about them

in different combinations?

Ms. GRONLUND. Ideally, to have confidence the system would

work against an attack using countermeasures, you would want to

consider a lot of different possibilities, a lot of different real world

conditions, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Korb, maybe if I just ask you to answer this:

If we didn’t have great confidence in the system, what good does

it do us?

Mr. KORB. Could you speak a little louder?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure. If we don’t have a high level of confidence in

the effectiveness of this type of national missile defense system,

would it still be an important element, or what sort of an element

would it be in our entire defense?

Mr. KORB. Well, it obviously would be much more important than

any other system because the purpose of this is to detect an attack

by a rogue nation using a weapon of mass destruction, and if it

doesn’t work, all of the money the Nation spent on NMD is wasted.

It is not just another weapons system. We have lots of weapons

systems. If an airplane goes in and it misses its target, you can

come back again and hit it, but you get one shot at this, and if you

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miss, then in fact you’ve wasted all your money. So that’s why you

have to have a higher degree of confidence that it will be effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. So, therefore, the more importance of testing—— Mr. KORB. It’s much more important to test it more, say, than

the B–1 bomber. The B–1 bomber was rushed into production; it

hasn’t worked well yet, but it didn’t mean as much as NMD, because we then came with the B–2 we had other ways to deliver

bombs on target.

Mr. TIERNEY. One of the supposed purposes for this system is to

avoid accidental launchings or to at least protect against accidental

launchings from Russia or some other country. They already have

sophisticated countermeasures, don’t they?

Mr. KORB. The Soviets have not only countermeasures, they have

missiles with multiple warheads on them. Remember, that’s why

they first developed the multiple warheads was to be decoys. And

then somebody said, gee, why do you want to just have decoys, let’s

make them real. And so in effect it spreads apart and you then

have to—several of them even if you hit 1, the other 3, 4 or 10 get

through.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it’s not really effective against a biological submunitions scenario and it has limited effect against an accidental

launch from Russians with multiple warheads—— Mr. KORB. If it’s a multiple warhead, that’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. First, I would like to ask if any of you would like to

comment to any question that wasn’t asked of you by Helen or

John. Yes.

Mr. HOLMES. I’d like to comment on this idea that the missile defense system has to be perfect or near perfect before it can justify

actually building it. First of all, I know of no weapons system that

demands perfection before you actually begin deployment. But the

idea that somehow we would have more or less permanently, after

we made a decision to deploy, a national missile defense system

that would forever be static or stays the way it is—it will not improve over time—seems to me to underestimate not only what we

have learned from the history of the development of weapons systems, but also the technological capacity of this country. Because

the fact of the matter is, it’s hard for me to imagine if we made—

if we actually deploy a missile defense system, that it will be a 100

percent failure. It might have failure at the margins. Perhaps

sometimes it would catch some missile; maybe it won’t catch all of

them. But it would at least catch some of them. And so, therefore,

there would be some effect on the saving of lives of Americans even

if it is only partially successful. So the idea that it has to be 100

percent successful before we even make the decision to deploy

seems to me to be a false assumption.

Mr. SPRING. Maybe if I could just say something quickly with regard to biological threat, and that is that, first, the argument that

is put forward with regard to the biological threat in my judgment

is a perfect argument for why we need a boost-phase capability

which we are currently prohibited from even testing and developing, let alone deploying.

The second is that, at least with regard to biological attack by

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tions for civil defense, and I certainly advocate that we move forward with regard to those capabilities for homeland defense. But

with a nuclear weapon, I think that the options for that are limited

indeed. So I think that you have some options with regard to biological attack that you wouldn’t have in the case of nuclear attack.

Mr. KORB. Let me make one comment on something that was

said earlier about the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I think

an important point in the legislative history of that act is Senator

Levin’s amendment to it which talks about the fact, not just technologically feasible, but of the arms control implications of a deployment. I think you cannot just say just because it’s technologically feasible, that’s the end of the situation. As I read the legislative history and the Levin amendment, I think that also is a factor in the decision.

Mr. SPRING. Let me comment on that.

Mr. KORB. Wait, we’re going to be here forever. We all get one

shot here because I’ve got—— Ms. GRONLUND. And I haven’t gotten mine yet.

Mr. SHAYS. I thought I was in charge.

Ms. GRONLUND. I’d like to comment on the notion of the need for

a 100 percent perfection. There is a difference—this is the question

Mr. Tierney asked me—between the effectiveness and the confidence level. At a fundamental level, aside from how effective the

system would actually be, the United States will not know how effective it will be, which will make it very difficult to plan for using

it.

Now one of the things that Secretary of Defense Cohen says—in

fact, he says the real reason we need this system is to preserve

U.S. freedom of action so the United States can continue to use its

conventional forces around the world without fear of threat of being

hit by a ballistic missile. And he says if we have a national missile

defense we don’t need to worry about that; but in fact, if we have

a national missile defense, the President and the policy planners

will not know how effective it would be.

So if we’re now postulating that we’re going to go around the

world preserving our freedom of action to intervene and yet we

don’t know how effective our NMD system is, that could put us in

a situation we’re actually encouraging attacks that otherwise

wouldn’t have happened, and we still don’t know how effective the

system is. And, feelings aside, you know, whether or not people feel

that the system would be somewhat effective is irrelevant. It hasn’t

been proven. We have no basis—we have no basis for knowing

what the effectiveness is.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me—you know, I don’t know why I need to say

this, but for anyone in my staff to suggest when a hearing ends is

more difficult than developing a national missile defense system,

and all of you have come before committees before. So I don’t know

how many Members attend a hearing, and they get the right to ask

questions. Mr. Spring, I want to just hear what your comment is.

Mr. SPRING. On the—— Mr. SHAYS. What did you want to say?

Mr. SPRING. I was going to say with regard to the National Missile Defense Act, what was very clear in my judgment from that

legislative record is that there are dual goals of deploying the naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00235 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tional missile defense system, or requirement in that case, and the

goal of offensive reductions. Those also mentioned in the act are

not dependent on each other. In other words, it is not a case that

the search for offensive reductions is indeed a requisite for the deployment of a national missile defense system under the act.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask——

Mr. KORB. I disagree respectfully on that, and I think the legislative history will support my position. I didn’t comment on some of

the things they said. If we’re going to keep this hearing going, I

think we ought to adjourn for lunch and come back. I thought you

told us each to mention one thing we wish we were asked, but I

have strong disagreements——

Mr. SHAYS. I’d love to hear them and we’ll get out of here at five

of—I’ll hit the gavel—but I’d like to hear them. The whole purpose

of this is to have some issue of where the battle is. And so do you

want to—let’s hear where you disagree.

Mr. KORB. I am not saying this has to be a perfect system but

it has to be better than your average weapons system. In fact many

weapons systems never do work. There is a history of weapons systems, even after the lot of money, you not, being able to function

properly. And I think we have to recognize that as we go into this

debate.

Mr. SHAYS. You have 435 Members of Congress, 100 Senators,

and we have been somewhat over the lot on this issue, but I have

always believed in my heart of hearts that someday we will want

a missile defense system. I didn’t want nuclear weapons in space,

but I didn’t mind that we had sensors there, and I basically have

come to believe that we need to have a limited national defense

system. I’d just love to know in very short terms whether you, Doctor, would feel we need that or we shouldn’t even consider it.

Ms. GRONLUND. I think that it is something the United States

should continue R&D on, but I don’t think it helps the cause to deploy something that can’t do the job.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. But you are willing to say that we

should continue to see if we can develop a system?

Ms. GRONLUND. Sure.

Mr. KORB. I think we ought to continue research and development until we have a reasonable prospect that it will do what it’s

supposed to do. But like any other weapons system, you have to do

a cost-effectiveness analysis in terms of what it will cost, what you

will get, and what you will give up to get it.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Holmes.

Mr. HOLMES. Well, yes, I think it’s a strategic requirement. It’s

the law of the land. I think that the disagreements and problems

of the Russians can be worked out. We were very near doing that

in the early 1990’s in the Bush administration. And I think that

from what I have seen from talking to technical experts, that you

can have a reasonable assurance that over time you will have an

effective system.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, is it true that ABM, some of you have suggested this, prevent us from developing a system—Dr. Gronlund,

maybe you would respond—that gives us all the options for developing a system?

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Ms. GRONLUND. Well, I’m not quite sure what you mean, but one

charge that has been made is that the United States is prevented

from developing a sea-based system by the ABM Treaty and that

this would be much more effective. In fact, it would have the very

same limitations that the land-based system would have. So I don’t

think the ABM Treaty is standing in the way—I mean, there are

problems well before that in terms of developing an effective system.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just hear Dr. Korb.

Mr. KORB. I agree that at some point the ABM Treaty will prevent you from doing what you want, but I don’t think we’re there

yet.

Mr. SHAYS. But doing what you want in terms of deployment or

doing what you want in terms of even developing the maximum

and best system?

Mr. KORB. Well, I agree with, what Dr. Gronlund who said that

we are not there yet; that in other words, I see no evidence that

the program that has been started really since the mid-1980’s has

ever gotten to the point where you’d have to say, well, gee, if there

wasn’t an ABM Treaty, then I could start now, today, to go ahead

and move to the—into the next step.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe, Mr. Spring, I should have—you’re the one

who introduced it, in your concept of liquid fuel versus—— Mr. SPRING. Yes, exactly. My concern more generally—and I’ll

come back to the sea-based system—is that if what we do is at the

outset say that we’re going to limit ourselves to R&D, and in fact

limit ourselves to only a narrow scope of R&D, you will never be

in the position to get to saying at the level of assurance that my

colleagues on the panel want to obtain the level of confidence for

deployment.

Mr. SHAYS. But let me just specifically—is there any type of testing that we are prevented to be able to do because of the ABM

Treaty?

Mr. SPRING. Absolutely, and let me just use a specific example.

We cannot, under the administration’s policy as it interprets the

ABM Treaty and applies it today, test a sea-based ballistic missile

for ascent-phase intercept capability against a ballistic missile that

flies faster than 5 kilometers per second.

Mr. SHAYS. And that’s a significant example. Any others?

Mr. SPRING. The same thing would obtain to range; 3,500 kilometers, against a target ballistic missile with a range in excess of

3,500 kilometers.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want Dr. Gronlund to respond to that.

Ms. GRONLUND. But we’re not at the point where that is an

issue. We don’t have a sea-based system that is capable of intercepting long-range missiles; and if we did, it would have the same

technical issues associated with it as the ground-based system. The

basing mode is irrelevant if it’s a mid-course hit-to-kill interceptor.

Where it’s launched from is irrelevant to whether it will work and

whether it can deal with countermeasures.

Mr. SHAYS. If we could just divide up the next 10 minutes, and

then we’ll call it quits.

Mr. TIERNEY. Fine. Thanks. I actually have less than that. I

think early on when Mr. Allen was making his remarks, he was

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pretty salient when he said that if we had a system that actually

could work to a high degree of effectiveness that we had confidence

in and that wasn’t going to end up with less security for this country in terms of our relations with other countries and the effect

that it would have overall, that we all should look at trying to implement it. And the fact is we’re not anywhere near that yet. We’re

not anywhere near that in terms of the technical capability of this

program. I think the evidence has shown that very clearly today,

and I think there’s still some larger questions as to how we relate

to our former adversaries, now friends hopefully, as well as our allies, in all the other considerations and the further considerations

of whether or not this is the best priority for us to be attending to,

when in fact there are any number of other dangers, not the least

of which are biological weapons and chemical weapons and other

ways of delivery that we ought to be considering.

So all of those things said, I think the President’s decision was

right where it should have been, that it was much too premature

to deploy. And I think that the plan of the national missile defense

at the current time does not allow for the degree of testing that

would warrant us to feel real confident that this is the direction we

want to go in.

We should have a plan that has a lot more testing, that would

give us a lot more confidence in the effectiveness of this particular

system before we move forward. And then it should have a system

or a regime where those tests are analyzed by a relatively independent agency, by an absolutely independent agency. And if it is

going to be Mr. Coyle’s group—and I think he’s done a marvelous

job on a lot of things that he’s done—that people ought to have to

listen to him.

The legislation that we have now setting up his branch merely

gives him advisory capacity. Although he was right on the money

with the status, the current status of our situation and the fact

that we shouldn’t deploy, the Department of Defense was fully

ready to ignore his advice on this particular occasion. I don’t think

that’s a healthy thing for us.

So I think the witnesses today have done us a considerable service, both panels. I want to thank this panel very much for taking

your time and extending later into the afternoon than certainly you

anticipated, but I think it’s been extremely helpful, and want to

thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I did want to ask another question before I said

where I come down. So thank you for interrupting. I am not clear

as to why I should care what Europe feels about ABM, when this

was an agreement negotiated with the Russians, and in my judgment is somewhat outdated. And, Mr. Korb, you can respond to

that and I’ll throw it out to the others.

Mr. KORB. Well, you’ve got one practical reason. If you want an

effective system and one that’s under development, you’re going to

need consent of Denmark and England to put the—enhance the radars in their country. That’s one.

I think, No. 2, you do have a whole set of relationships with Europe that go into lots of areas, not the least of which is the future

of NATO. And if in fact you create a situation where there’s a

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break between the United States and Europe in terms of the way

that they approach problems, this will undermine us.

Mr. SHAYS. But they didn’t negotiate the ABM Treaty with us.

Mr. KORB. No, I understand, I understand, and I am not arguing

that you have to give them a veto. But your question is, should we

be concerned? I think you need to be concerned with how they feel

because we have a whole web of relationships with them that could

be affected.

Now, in the final analysis, I don’t think anybody would argue

that the United States should let other nations have a veto over

its security. Nobody is arguing that. But what you’re talking about

here is you’re not at a stage where you want to force that issue and

the consequences, given what’s happened with the technology.

Even Dr. Kissinger, who supports that in the piece he wrote in the

Washington Post, said, you know, before you go ahead with, you

know, abrogating the ABM Treaty and causing all these things,

you better decide what system you have and, you know, that you’re

ready to go ahead with it.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Dr. Gronlund, and then I’ll come to you. Dr. Gronlund, comment

about that question I asked in regards to paying attention to the

Europeans. I think you——

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes, I guess—I think U.S. security is more than

just the sum of the weapons systems that we deploy, and in part

it relies on our alliance relationship and our relationship to countries that aren’t our allies yet; in particular, Russia and China. So

what we are trying to do, I hope, is to maximize our security overall, and it may well be that going forward with something that has

marginal security benefits in terms of being able to defend against

emerging missile states and upsets our allies in Europe and upsets

Russia and China would be a net negative. So I think that’s a valid

question. That really is the big picture that we all should be looking at.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Holmes.

Mr. HOLMES. I certainly wouldn’t advocate ignoring our allies in

Europe, but I think one of the reasons why they are so hesitant—

it’s not the only reason—but one of reasons why is they sense the

administration is not fully committed to the program, and it’s

therefore sensing that they’re not getting any leadership from the

United States; say, for example the kind of leadership that you got

from Ronald Reagan during the Euromissile crisis when there was

also a tremendous debate about the deployment of SS–20 missiles

in Europe. That kind of leadership shows the allies will come along

when the United States leads. The United States is not leading on

this issue. They sense weakness, they sense uncertainty, so therefore they’re hesitating and holding back.

The President said last week, when he announced his decision to

delay deployment, that no nation has a veto over deployment. If

you look at the speech the way that came, he had spoken for almost 6 or 7 minutes about why because of China, because of Russia, because of NATO allies, etc., he was making the decision because of their objections, he was not going to proceed; and then he

proceeds to say that no nation has a veto. Is that a theoretical posVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:09 Nov 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00239 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\74374.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sibility or is in fact that always going to be the case because of the

uncertainty that Russia and China have?

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. My observation is simply to say that our

national missile defense system is, in fact, the law of the land. I’m

not convinced, frankly, and I’m happy to have you comment, but

I’m not convinced that the administration was an eager participant, and so it leaves me a little uneasy. I would have thought that

we would have had an opportunity to force the question with our

allies with the ability to move forward with the missile defense detection in Alaska and that we still would have left open tremendous options. But if I were our allies, I wouldn’t be convinced that

we’re supporting this program, even though it is in fact the law of

the land. But I recognize that it makes no sense to deploy it until

we know, one, it works, and two, that we can actually afford it.

Just a last comment from you or anyone else?

Mr. TIERNEY. Just before we leave the impression that—the law

of the land is as it was stated a couple of times here—Mr. Korb

I think certainly hit on this—the law of the land is that we’ll go

forward if there’s an effective national missile defense system that

is technologically feasible and ready to be deployed, and keeping

mindful of our relationships with our allies and the nonproliferation regime and things that we’ve been working on. So that all has

to be taken together. I think the administration was fully aware of

all of those different factors, and this system clearly wasn’t ready

to go to deployment when those things were considered and that’s

why the decision was properly made.

Mr. SHAYS. With that, you get to go to your meeting that was 2

hours ago, and we will adjourn this hearing. Thank you all for participating. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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