United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, National

Security Subcommittee, Committee on

Appropriation, House of Representatives

November 1998 ARMY

MODERNIZATION

The Warfighting Rapid

Acquisition Program

Needs More Specific

Guidance

GAO/NSIAD-99-11

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277968 

November 3, 1998

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman, National Security Subcommittee

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we evaluate the Army’s

implementation of the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). You

had expressed some concern about the program’s performance and

direction in its first 2 years. This report discusses the current status of the

program.

Background During congressional testimony in early 1996, the Army Chief of Staff

requested funds from Congress to speed up the fielding of urgently needed

new technologies to the soldier. The Chief of Staff stressed that Congress

and the Army could accelerate the development of new technologies by

making funds available more quickly than is normally required in the

budget process for new programs. The Army proposed WRAP as a tool that

would help jump-start technologies that were still under development but

nearing the production phase.

These new technologies were being tested in Army experiments designed

to support a new warfighting concept called Force XXI. Force XXI

embodies the Army’s vision of how military operations will be carried out

in the 21st century and relies heavily on the fielding in the year 2000 of the

4th Infantry Division, the Army’s first digitized division. The Army selected

technologies slated for WRAP funding from those tested in the Task 

Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE),1

 completed in

March 1997 and carried out to support the first digitized division.

Congress added $50 million to the Army’s fiscal year 1997 budget. The

money eventually funded the first 11 WRAP initiatives. However, the House

1

Report on the Plan for Fielding the First Digitized Division and First Digitized Corp, presented by the

Army to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, May 1998. The Task Force XXI AWE was one

of a series of AWEs designed to lead to a digitized division and corps. The objectives of this large-scale

field experiment were to (1) provide information to support investment decisions on the most

promising among 72 technology candidates that participated; (2) refine digitized tactics, techniques,

and procedures for brigade operations; (3) use advanced technologies and concepts that leverage the

capabilities of information-age technologies; (4) assess the digitized brigade combat service support

concept; and (5) assess two new technologies, Applique and Tactical Internet (discussed elsewhere in

this report).

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Committee on Appropriations, in its report on the fiscal year 1997 defense

appropriations bill, expressed concern that WRAP funds might be used for

limited fielding of unbudgeted items that had not competed for funds and

would not be affordable in future budgets.2

 Therefore, it required

notification to the defense committees prior to the obligation of WRAP

funds and stipulated that these funds could not be used to field interim

Land Warrior prototypes.3

When it established the program in early 1996, the Army planned to

request $100 million per year from fiscal year 1998 to 2003. In its guidance

for the program, the Army established the condition that these funds could

not be used for technologies requiring “indefinite experimentation” and

that WRAP candidates must be a compelling experimental success, urgently

needed, ready for production within 2 years, and sufficiently funded in the

out-years. Technologies requiring “continued experimentation” were to be

allowed to receive WRAP funding. According to the Army, these differ from

technologies needing indefinite experimentation in that they are not

mature but are expected to start production within 2 years.

Selected initiatives are funded from the Force XXI Initiatives (WRAP)

budget, which is a holding account created expressly for WRAP initiatives.

In fiscal year 1998, Congress appropriated $99.9 million for WRAP:

$61 million for the second year of the first 11 initiatives and $38.9 million

for the first year of new 1998-99 initiatives. However, recent actions taken

by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the congressional appropriations

committees will affect funding for new initiatives. For example, DOD

reduced fiscal year 1998 WRAP funding for 1998-99 initiatives to $8.6 million

(see app. I), and the appropriations conference committee reduced fiscal

year 1999 WRAP funding by $35 million to $64.5 million.

On July 16, 1998, the Army submitted 6 new candidates for funding in

fiscal years 1998-99 and 4 new ones for funding in fiscal years 1999-2000

(detailed descriptions of the 21 initiatives and candidates are in app. I). On

September 25, 1998, the appropriations conference committee denied

funding for two of the four fiscal year 1999-2000 candidates. The Army

plans to submit additional fiscal year 1999-2000 candidates by

December 1998. The Army is also required by the Senate Armed Services

Committee to submit quarterly reports on the status of obligated funds.

2

H.R. Rep. #104-617, pp. 158-159 (1996).

3

Under the Land Warrior Program, the Army is developing a computer/radio, software, integrated

headgear, a weapon subsystem, and protective clothing and equipment for the individual soldier. See

Battlefield Automation: Army Land Warrior Program Acquisition Strategy May Be Too Ambitious

(GAO/NSIAD-96-190, Sept. 11, 1996).

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Results in Brief In evaluating the program’s implementation to date, we noted the

following:

• The Army’s criteria for selecting WRAP candidates are open-ended and

allow room for different interpretations. As a result, although the Army

initially justified WRAP funding on the basis of the need to urgently field

technologies associated with the first digitized division, not all WRAP

initiatives support the first digitized division. Furthermore, some initiatives

do not meet all the Army’s criteria for WRAP funding.

• The Army is reducing the testing of new technologies through large-scale

warfighting experiments. As a result, the Army may need to change the

criteria used to evaluate and rate WRAP candidates. This may affect the

quality of future candidates.

• To date, the Army has not been able to finalize its selection of WRAP

candidates early enough to ensure timely approval by Congress. As a

result, the final approval of funds and the subsequent start-up of initiatives

have been delayed. Delays also occurred because the Army did not obtain

the timely release of WRAP funds from DOD and because DOD reduced

funding for WRAP. In spite of these delays, we believe that WRAP funds may

still help speed the fielding of some new technologies, though not as much

as originally estimated.

• After initial congressional approval of the first 11 WRAP initiatives, the

Army made substantial changes to some of them. These changes affected

program implementation. Congress was not informed of the changes

because current reporting requirements do not require the Army to report

such changes.

WRAP

Implementation to

Date

WRAP has experienced growing pains in its first 2 years. While evolving, the

program has lacked focus in the selection of initiatives. The assumptions

and expectations that drove WRAP at its inception have not been clearly

stated. As a result, we were unable to determine whether the results are

consistent with congressional intent. However, we found that (1) some

initiatives do not support the first digitized division, although the Army

initially justified WRAP funding on the basis of the need to urgently field

technologies associated with the first digitized division; (2) funds have

been used both for production items and development work; and

(3) future initiatives may not have sufficient test data for proper

evaluation. Furthermore, the Army is still trying to refine its selection

process so as to avoid the delays that so far have hindered the program’s

implementation. Meanwhile, Congress is not being informed of the

program’s progress or of changes in some ongoing initiatives.

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A Wide Range of Initiatives

Were Funded

WRAP criteria for selection of initiatives allow considerable room for

interpretation. Therefore, the WRAP initiatives funded so far are quite

different from each other. Some initiatives did not meet all the Army’s

criteria for WRAP funding, and others will not be fielded with the first

digitized division in 2000. They were approved, however, because they fit

the general description of urgently needed new technologies that the Army

is trying to field as quickly as possible. WRAP funds were also used to

purchase production items rather than to develop new technologies.

WRAP’s Link to the

Digitized Division Is

Unclear

Neither congressional restrictions nor the Army’s criteria specify whether

WRAP funds should be used only to support the Army’s first digitized

division. However, the Army initially justified WRAP funding on the basis of

the urgent need to field technologies associated with the first digitized

division, and appropriation of that funding occurred in a strategic

environment dominated by development of the first digitized division. For

example,

• the Task Force XXI AWE was carried out to support the digitized division,

• the first 11 WRAP initiatives were tested in the Task Force XXI AWE,

• the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) cited support for the

first digitized division as the top priority when selecting WRAP candidates,4

• about two thirds of fiscal year 1997 funding was for initiatives that support

the first digitized division, and

• the Army initially placed WRAP funds under the digitization budget before

establishing a separate Force XXI initiatives budget.

There is disagreement within the Army about whether WRAP should be

directly linked to the first digitized division. An Operational Test and

Evaluation Command (OPTEC) official believes that WRAP is directly related

to digitization, while the Director of the Acquisition Reform Reinvention

Lab, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition, believes that WRAP is an acquisition

streamlining tool that may or may not support digitization. He views WRAP

as part of the Army’s efforts to field needed technologies more rapidly,

regardless of their relationship to the digitized division.

We found that 3 of the first 11 initiatives, accounting for about one third of

all WRAP funds, will not be part of the first digitized division. These

initiatives, the Mortar Fire Control System, the Gun Laying and Positioning

System, and the Avenger Slew-to-Cue, together received $14.3 million in

4

See appendix II for an explanation of TRADOC’s role in the selection process.

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WRAP funds in fiscal year 1997 and are slated to receive $22.5 million in

fiscal year 1998. However, all six of the WRAP candidates submitted for

fiscal years 1998-99 funding are considered critical for the first digitized

division.

Not All Initiatives Met

Production Criterion

Two initiatives, Applique and Tactical Internet, did not meet the Army’s

criterion that WRAP candidates be ready for production within 2 years, but

as the backbone of the Army’s first digitized division, they were justified

on the basis of urgent need. 5

 Both were approved as continued

experimentation initiatives and are not expected to begin production until

fiscal year 2004.6

 An OPTEC official told us that other initiatives were clearly

closer to fielding but that the Army approved Applique and Tactical

Internet because it believed they were worth the expense of additional

development work. They received $12.3 million (about 26 percent) of the

$47.7 million of fiscal year 1997 WRAP funds and will receive $8.6 million

(about 14 percent) of the $61 million of fiscal year 1998 WRAP funds.

Purchases of Production

Items

WRAP funds have also been used to purchase substantial quantities of

production items (finished products ready for fielding). The Army

allocated $17.6 million of $61 million (about 29 percent) of WRAP funds in

fiscal year 1998 to procure production items. For example, the Army will

use 1998 WRAP funds to procure 432 Movement Tracking Systems, enough

to fully equip 2 Army divisions.

WRAP was created to help jump-start new technologies that require

developmental work and that must be fielded quickly. But production

items by definition do not require further testing or development. Army

criteria allow the use of WRAP funds for operational prototypes but do not

specify what distinguishes a prototype from a finished production item.

In our opinion, using WRAP funds to purchase large quantities of finished

products (more than are needed for operational prototypes) is not

consistent with the WRAP goal of developing new technologies until they

are ready for production. In response to our questions about this issue, the

5

Applique and Tactical Internet together make up the system officially known as the Force XXI Battle

Command, Brigade and Below, which basically consists of a laptop computer, software, a Global

Positioning System Receiver, and communications connectors.

6

See Battlefield Automation: Acquisition Issues Facing the Army Battle Command, Brigade and Below

Program (GAO/NSIAD-98-140, June 30, 1998).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
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Director of the Acquisition Reform Reinvention Lab told us that the Army

now acknowledges that the practice should be discontinued.

Reduced Testing and

Experimentation for

Future Candidates

The Army has not scheduled any AWEs through 1999 to test new

technologies. Consequently, it may be forced to rely increasingly on

candidates that have not proven themselves through prior testing, require

long-term experimentation, or may not be ready to begin production

within 2 years. Officials have expressed concern that this approach may

eventually lead to candidates that are less developed and take longer to

field. Some approved initiatives have not been proven in testing and are

less developed. While only 2 of 11 WRAP initiatives in fiscal years 1997-98

were defined as requiring continued experimentation, 3 of 10 candidates in

fiscal years 1998-99 fell into this category.

OPTEC was the lead evaluator for the Task Force XXI AWE. It evaluated the

72 participating initiatives and prepared ratings for 13 WRAP candidates.7

However, two of the three new continued experimentation WRAP

candidates (Close Combat Tactical Trainer XXI and Global Combat

Service Support System-Army) have not provided enough test and

experimentation data to allow OPTEC to carry out a thorough evaluation

and rating. They were still unrated as of July 1998. On September 25, 1998,

the appropriations conference committee denied funding for both

candidates.

OPTEC may decline to issue a rating if it does not have enough data to

conclude that the candidate is a compelling experimental success as

required by Army criteria. An OPTEC official said that the Army will find it

increasingly difficult to demonstrate such success because it has not

scheduled any AWEs or similar large-scale exercises through fiscal

year 1999. Without AWEs, he added, it will be difficult to find new

candidates at the same level of development and experimental testing as

the first group of candidates. He said that evaluation criteria may need to

be changed to introduce other ways of qualifying candidates. In our

opinion, this could result in more candidates that need continued

experimentation.

Meanwhile, the Army is trying to fill the gap created by the absence of

AWEs. The Director of the Army Acquisition Reform Reinvention Lab said

the Army is seeking alternatives to AWEs to expand its pool of WRAP

7

OPTEC is rating systems on a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating low risk and high

potential effectiveness and 5 indicating high risk and low potential effectiveness.

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candidates. The alternatives could include advanced technology and

advanced concept technology demonstrations, concept experimentation

programs, and battle lab warfighting experiments. Such candidate

technologies could then use WRAP funds to move more quickly through

development and into production. However, in our opinion, these

demonstrations may involve technologies that require lengthy testing and

experimentation.

Program Delays Have

Affected the Goal of Early

Fielding

The key to securing timely congressional approval of WRAP candidates is

the Army’s ability to finalize its selection early enough in the budget cycle.

To date, this has not happened. In requesting the release of fiscal year 1997

funds from DOD, the Army did not initially justify the need for or indicate

the ultimate destination of the funds, delaying the start-up and

implementation of programs. As a result, approval of WRAP funds was

delayed until very late in the fiscal year (see app. II for a description of the

Army’s process for WRAP candidate selection). Additionally, funding

reductions have also affected implementation. In the end, for most

initiatives, WRAP probably will not speed up fielding as much as initially

hoped.

The 1997 WRAP selection and approval process lasted most of fiscal

year 1997. The Army narrowed its list of candidates from 300 to 15 and

made its final selection after reviewing the results of a March 1997 Task

Force XXI AWE evaluation. The Army did not present the final 11

candidates to Congress until May 30, 1997. But even after the candidates

were selected, DOD withheld $47.7 million for several months in fiscal

year 1997 because the Army had not clearly stated which programs would

receive the funds and how the funds would be used. DOD released

$17.5 million of the funds in August 1997 and the remainder in late

September 1997. In fiscal year 1998, DOD again withheld funds, saying it

wanted to be certain they were needed. As of October 8, 1998,

$36.9 million of fiscal year 1998 funds still had not been released.

The Army has been trying to speed up its selection process in order to

receive WRAP funds earlier in the fiscal year, but with little success. The

fiscal year 1998 selection process took even longer than it had the

previous year and the Army did not present its list of candidates to

Congress until July 1998. This time the process was reportedly delayed by

continuing debate within the Army over candidates, insufficient test data,

and indecision about whether to submit candidates all at once or in

batches, as they were selected. The Army has acknowledged the need to

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start candidate selection earlier. For fiscal year 1999, it plans to convene

the next Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 1998, 

2 months earlier than the previous year, and submit the last batch of 1999

candidates to Congress no later than December 1998.

Funding cuts by DOD also affected the program. DOD reprogrammed WRAP

funds to other operations, such as the Small Business Innovation Research

Program.8

 In fiscal years 1997 and 1998, DOD reprogrammed $2.3 million

and $5 million, respectively, from WRAP to other programs. In addition, a

June 1998 omnibus reprogramming action further reduced fiscal year 1998

WRAP funds for new initiatives by $27.8 million, leaving funding for new

initiatives at $8.6 million. Army Airborne Command and Control System

officials estimated that the loss of about $0.6 million of an $11 million WRAP

allocation in fiscal year 1998 could delay the program by about 3 months.

In another program, officials agreed that even losses as small as

$0.2 million can have a negative effect on program plans.

Although there have been delays, we believe that many WRAP-funded

technologies may be fielded sooner because of the program. The Army

initially estimated that 9 of the first 11 WRAP initiatives would accelerate

the fielding of new technologies by an average of about 20 months. In its

justification to Congress, the Army did not provide accelerated fielding

estimates for two initiatives. Most estimates were made by the Army

before the initiatives were approved and had to be revised because the

selection and approval process took too long and funds were not released

when planned. According to the latest fielding projections by program

officials, six of the nine programs may not save as much time as originally

claimed, two may accelerate fielding as originally estimated, and one may

actually be ahead of the original fielding estimate (see table 1). Fielding

could be postponed further if there are more delays or funding shortfalls.

8

Congress established the Small Business Innovation Research Program in 1982 to stimulate

technological innovations, use small businesses to meet federal research and development needs,

foster and encourage minority and disadvantaged persons’ participation in technological innovations,

and increase the private sector’s commercialization of innovations derived from federal research and

development. The program was reauthorized and expanded in 1992 by the Small Business Research

and Development Enhancement Act.

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Table 1: Initial Estimates and Latest Projections of Time Saved by WRAP Funds in Fielding New Technologies

Initiative

Initial Army estimate

of months saved

(July 1997)

Initial Army

estimate of fielding

date (July 1997)

Latest fielding date

estimates

(August 1998)

Latest estimate of

months saved

Army Airborne Command and Control

System 21

August 2000 August 2000

21

Avenger Slew-to-Cue 20 August 1998 January 2000 3

Combat Synthetic Training Assessment

Range 18

June 1998 March 1999

9

Gun Laying and Positioning System 20 August 1998 July 1999 9

Lightweight Laser Designator

Rangefinder 18

October 1999 January 2000

15

Mortar Fire Control System 36 October 1999 July 2001 15

Palletized Load System - Enhanced 18 March 1999 September 1998 24

Radio Frequency Tags 18 September 1998 January 2000 2

Striker 15 September 1999 September 1999 15

Note: The Army did not calculate accelerated fielding estimates for Applique and Tactical

Internet.

Congress Not Notified of

Program Changes

The Army made substantial changes to some WRAP initiatives. These

changes prolonged implementation. The Army concluded, for example,

that the design of Avenger Slew-to-Cue was deficient and that the

technology would become obsolete before it would be fielded. In fiscal

year 1997, the Army thus made major changes in the design and

acquisition strategy of the program; this led to additional development

work and testing. Because of these changes, DOD has been withholding

1998 WRAP funding for the initiative. The Gun Laying and Positioning

System also experienced a schedule slippage that will delay fielding.

According to the program manager, the slippage will make it necessary to

alter funding (for example, by shifting funds from the out-years to

underfunded or unfunded years) in order to accelerate fielding. The

congressional defense committees were not informed of these

developments.

The Army is not required to issue progress reports or to notify Congress of

changes in ongoing programs. The only formal feedback mechanism is a

congressional requirement that the Army submit quarterly funding reports

to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the obligation of funds for

WRAP initiatives. The Army is also required to provide more frequent

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reports if WRAP has significant successes or failures. To date, the Army has

not submitted any of the required reports.

Conclusions After 2 years, there is growing uncertainty about which technologies

should receive top priority for WRAP funding. The Army’s criteria for WRAP

candidates are open-ended and do not ensure that initiatives share a

common set of characteristics. For example, there is disagreement within

the Army over whether WRAP and the fielding of the first digitized division

should be directly linked. In the absence of more precise selection criteria,

disagreements over which candidates are most appropriate for WRAP

funding will likely continue.

The Army may find it increasingly difficult to identify candidates that are

sufficiently developed in the near future because it has reduced large-scale

test and experimentation exercises and will thus have less data with which

to assess new WRAP candidates.

The Army has not presented its slate of WRAP candidates for congressional

approval early enough in the fiscal year to permit timely obligation of

funds. This has led directly to delays in fielding because estimates were

predicated on earlier availability of funds. Although some technologies

may be fielded sooner because of WRAP, in most cases the program will not

speed up fielding as much as originally expected.

The Army is required to report quarterly on the status of funding

obligations to the Senate Armed Services Committee. To date, it has not

met this requirement, and there is no other requirement for reporting on

program performance or status. We believe that Congress is being asked to

make funding decisions without all the information it needs. Information

presently not provided on a consistent basis includes

• program cost, schedule, and performance;

• planned obligations;

• any significant changes to program acquisition strategy; and

• any scheduled changes in program digital battlefield participation.

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Recommendation to

the Secretary of

Defense

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Army to issue WRAP guidance that calls for

• specific deadlines for candidate identification and selection to ensure

timely submission of candidates to Congress and timely obligation of

funds,

• minimum testing and experimentation requirements for WRAP candidates,

and

• periodic reports to Congress on the status of ongoing WRAP initiatives.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Given Congress’ 2 years of experience in reviewing Army requests for WRAP

funding of specific technologies and the disagreement within the Army

about which technologies are most appropriate for WRAP funding, this may

be an appropriate time for Congress to clarify its expectations of the

program and to ensure that these expectations are embodied in more

precise selection criteria for WRAP candidates.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with

our recommendation, but did not specify why its concurrence was not

complete. In its response, DOD stated that the Army is continuing to

examine potential improvements. DOD indicated that the Army will provide

recommendations for improvements by December 1, 1998, to the Office of

the Secretary of Defense Overarching Integrated Product Team leaders as

part of the Force XXI WRAP program update. DOD also stated that the Army

is continuing to examine potential improvements to the WRAP/Force XXI

process, including the schedules for candidate identification and selection,

the requirements for levels of testing and experimentation tailored to the

specific initiative, and the appropriate detail and frequency of reporting.

Since WRAP is now in its third year of implementation, we believe it is time

for specific remedies to address the issues that have been identified and

believe our recommendation addresses these issues.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the current status of the program, we reviewed the criteria used

to identify, evaluate, and select WRAP candidates. We interviewed both DOD

and Army officials responsible for the WRAP. We visited the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and

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Acquisition, Washington, D.C.; TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia; and OPTEC,

Alexandria, Virginia. We reviewed congressional funding restrictions and

selection criteria as well as the Army’s WRAP policy guidelines, Army

Systems Acquisition Review Council briefing packages, and resulting

administrative decision memorandums. We discussed budget

withholdings, assessments, and reprogramming with officials in the DOD

Comptroller’s Office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army

for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

With Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition and TRADOC’s assistance, we examined in

detail the WRAP candidate identification, selection, and approval process.

We examined how TRADOC identifies and screens candidates and reviewed

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development,

and Acquisition’s congressional briefings and OPTEC’s rating and evaluation

process. We also reviewed WRAP-related documentation, including program

management and budget documents, congressional hearings and briefings,

and AWE assessments. We also attended the Division AWE at Fort Hood,

Texas, and observed WRAP initiatives in the field.

We reviewed cost, schedule, and performance documentation at WRAP

initiative program offices and reviewed program acquisition plans and

schedules. We interviewed appropriate officials, received briefings, and

reviewed relevant program documents during visits to the Short-Range Air

Defense and Aviation Electronic Combat Project Offices, Redstone

Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama; the Simulation, Training, and

Instrumentation Command, Orlando, Florida; and the Armament and

Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity, Rock Island Arsenal, Rock

Island, Illinois. We also met with OPTEC officials and reviewed relevant

information papers and AWE assessments. We also discussed OPTEC’s

initiative rating process, particularly regarding test and experimentation

data necessary to support an OPTEC rating. We also discussed how TRADOC

and Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition officials incorporate ratings in the selection

process.

We performed our review from September 1997 to October 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and the Director,

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Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Associate Director,

Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Details of 21 WRAP

Initiatives and

Candidates

16

Appendix II 

Process for WRAP

Candidate Selection

20

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

22

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

24

Tables Table 1: Initial Estimates and Latest Projections of Time Saved by

WRAP Funds in Fielding New Technologies

9

Table I.1: Funding For Fiscal Years 1997-98 Initiatives 16

Table I.2: Army Description of Fiscal Years 1997-98 WRAP

Initiatives

17

Table I.3: Funding Requested For WRAP Candidates in Fiscal

Year 1998

18

Table I.4: Army Description of Fiscal Year 1998-99 Candidates for

WRAP Funding

19

Abbreviations

ASARC Army Systems Acquisition Review Council

AWE Advanced Warfighting Experiment

DOD Department of Defense

OPTEC Operational Test and Evaluation Command

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

WRAP Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix I 

Details of 21 WRAP Initiatives and

Candidates

Tables I.1 through I.4 show funding for two groups of Warfighting Rapid

Acquisition Program (WRAP) initiatives (fiscal years 1997-98 and fiscal

years 1998-99) and briefly describe the programs in each group.

Table I.1: Funding for Fiscal Years

1997-98 Initiatives

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Initiative 1997 1998

Applique $4.3 $2.6

Army Airborne Command and Control System 3.4 11.0

Avenger Slew-to-Cue 5.8 7.4

Combat Synthetic Training Assessment Range 1.1 5.4

Gun Laying and Positioning System 3.5 6.0

Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 5.0 2.8

Mortar Fire Control System 5.0 10.0

Palletized Load System-Enhanced 3.0 3.0

Radio Frequency Tags 2.9 2.9

Striker (Scout Common Vehicle) 5.6 3.9

Tactical Internet 8.0 6.0

Total $47.7a $61.0

aTotal does not add due to rounding.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix I 

Details of 21 WRAP Initiatives and

Candidates

Table I.2: Army Description of Fiscal Years 1997-98 WRAP Initiatives

Applique Digital battle command information system that provides on-the-move, almost real-time situation

awareness to tactical combat, combat support, and combat service support leaders at individual

fighting platforms.

Army Airborne Command and

Control System

An on-the-move node that provides corps, division, and brigade commanders mobility and

communications interoperability while maintaining sensor-to-shooter connectivity.

Avenger Slew-to-Cue Provides a digitized sensor-to-shooter link, enabling the squad leader or gunner to designate a

target for engagement.

Combat Synthetic Training

Assessment Range

Battle command training system that provides collective training for brigade-sized organizations at

Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Hood, Texas. In testing, the system provided realistic signal

intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicle intelligence/imagery, and joint surveillance target attack radar

system intelligence/imagery to the brigade combat team.

Gun Laying and Positioning

System

A tripod-mounted positioning and orienting device consisting of a nondevelopmental item

gyroscope, electronic theodolite, position location ground receiver, and a short-range eye-safe laser

rangefinder.

Lightweight Laser Designator

Rangefinder

A man-portable laser designator and target locator with eye-safe range finding, azimuth

determination, self-location, and data/image export capability. It can locate targets in day or night

with all-weather capability.

Mortar Fire Control System Integrates mortars into the fire support architecture and provides full field artillery tactical data

system compatibility. Consists of a high-mobility multiwheeled vehicle configured as a fire direction

center and three subsystems: position navigation, fire control, and situational awareness.

Palletized Load

System-Enhanced (Movement

Tracking System)

This platform is capable of loading and unloading itself and a companion trailer in 5 minutes to allow

flexible mission assignment and operation under adverse conditions. It consists of the Palletized

Load System platform and the Movement Tracking System (MTS). MTS can identify position, track

progress, and communicate with the operators of tactical wheel vehicles. It has global positioning

capability, can send base-to-mobile and mobile-to-base messages, and can locate/track an asset’s

position using personal computer-based software.

Radio Frequency Tags Provides asset visibility/in-transit capability to units and managers. The tags are an assemblage of

commercial off-the-shelf equipment that store embedded data of container contents, shipments,

and vehicle identification. The tags are fixed to containers to track material through the distribution

system.

Striker ( Scout Common Vehicle) High-mobility, multiwheeled, vehicle used by combat observation lasing teams. The system can

self-locate; determine range, azimuth, and vertical angle to a target; designate targets; and

enhance day/night observation. It will contain the same Fire Support Team computer mission

equipment as the Bradley vehicle.

Tactical Internet A software enhancement to improve voice-data contention and unit tasking order. Voice-data

contention is the ability of the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System radios to

synchronize voice and data transmission over the same radio path. Unit tasking order can

dynamically task-organize units within the Tactical Internet.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix I 

Details of 21 WRAP Initiatives and

Candidates

Table I.3: Funding Requested for

WRAP Candidates in Fiscal Year 1998

(as of August 1998) 

Dollars in millions

Candidate Fiscal year 1998

Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System $0.9

Analysis and Control Team-Enclave 0.7

Digital Topographic Support System-Light 0.9

Grenadier BRAT 2.5

High Speed Multiplexer Card 2.1

Near-Term Digital Radio 1.5

Close Combat Tactical Trainer XXIa 0

Global Combat Service Support System-Armya 0

Forward Repair System-Heavy 0

Tactical Simulation Interface Unit 0

Total $8.6

aFunding denied by congressional conference committee on September 25, 1998.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix I 

Details of 21 WRAP Initiatives and

Candidates

Table I.4: Army Description of Fiscal Year 1998-99 Candidates for WRAP Funding

Air and Missile Defense Planning

and Control System

Uses a network of computers and communication equipment to provide a joint integrated air picture

to battalion, brigade, division, corps, and theater commanders, providing real-time air situational

awareness and enhancing air defense-force protection.

Analysis and Control

Team-Enclave

High-mobility, multiwheeled, vehicle-mounted shelter with digital communication that allows the

brigade combat team to integrate, process, and interpret real-time sensor and broadcast reports

from remote intelligence data bases via a common ground station and to merge the information with

the brigade’s organic reconnaissance.

Close Combat Tactical

Trainer XXI

Provides combined arms training for the digitized division’s close combat heavy battalion and units

below. Supports the training of mission training plan tasks by the digitized force using all Force XXI

C4 I systems.

Digital Topographic Support

System-Light

Receives, updates, and disseminates digital terrain data to provide both digital and analog tactical

decision aids in support of the commanders’ battlefield visualization process.

Forward Repair System-Heavy Heavy contact maintenance vehicle that provides forward area battlefield maintenance to

mechanized forces.

Grenadier BRAT Automated, worldwide, beyond line-of-sight tracking and messaging system used to inject unit

location and limited messaging for nondigitized elements into existing and planned automated C2

systems. Links digitized and nondigitized forces.

High Speed Multiplexer Card Provides essential video and high-speed data access through mobile subscriber equipment. Allows

users to move voice, video, and data over the existing communication network.

Global Combat Service Support

System-Army (battalion

maintenance and management

modules)

These modules merge data from the Unit Level Logistics Ground System, the Unit Level Logistics

System, and the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System into a relational data warehouse

based on a client-server system.

Near-Term Digital Radio Provides high data rate communications between tactical operation centers at brigade level and

below.

Tactical Simulation Interface

Unit

Provides digitized training for two-way exchange between tactical command and control system

work stations and distributed interactive simulations.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix II 

Process for WRAP Candidate Selection

The Army’s process for identifying, evaluating, and selecting WRAP

candidates involves several organizations and a number of steps that lead

candidates from initial identification to final presentation by the Army

Chief of Staff to Congress. Key to securing timely congressional approval

of WRAP candidates is the Army’s ability to finalize its selection early in the

budget cycle. It is important that WRAP candidates be processed promptly,

since the success of the program depends on the timely development of

technologies determined to be urgently needed by the warfighter.

Proposals are initially submitted by the using commands to Training and

Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Battle Lab Board of Directors. Proposals

must include (1) a battle lab experiment plan containing an urgency of

need statement, test results, an acquisition strategy, and a budget estimate;

(2) an operational requirements statement addressing defense planning

guidance, threat, system requirements, and constraints; and (3) an

information paper addressing technical merit and maturity, criticality, and

priority of the warfighting effort, affordability, effectiveness, and budget

sustainability.

After the Board reviews the proposals, it forwards them to the TRADOC

Commanding General, who approves and prioritizes them and forwards

them to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development,

and Acquisition. Further review is then carried out by the Army Systems

Acquisition Review Council (ASARC), which is composed of 13

representatives from the Army’s commands, the Office of the Chief of

Staff, and the secretariats. The Council is convened by the head of the

Acquisition Reform Reinvention Lab (Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Research, Development, and Acquisition) on request from the TRADOC

Commanding General.

In assessing proposals for WRAP funding, the TRADOC Battle Lab Board of

Directors ensures that the candidates comply with WRAP criteria. For its

part, ASARC examines proposals for urgency of need, requirements,

affordability, and experimentation results. When assessing candidates,

ASARC relies on information from a number of sources, including the

Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), which was the lead

evaluator of the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE).

OPTEC evaluates candidates and issues its own ratings for consideration by

ASARC.

The Council reviews the proposals and can recommend approval by the

Army Chief of Staff, require further resolution of outstanding issues, or

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix II 

Process for WRAP Candidate Selection

recommend funding from other sources. The Council also approves

acquisition and funding strategies and assigns management

responsibilities. ASARC forwards its recommendations to the Army Chief of

Staff, who presents the final list of candidates for WRAP funding to

Congress for approval.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 11.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Charles Rey, Assistant Director

Stefano Petrucci, Communications Analyst

Boston Field Office Arthur Fine, Evaluator-in-Charge

Joseph Rizzo, Jr., Evaluator

(707285) Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-11 Army Modernization
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