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THE BALKANS: ASSESSING THE PROGRESS AND

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 10, 2003

Serial No. 108–13

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of Peace .................. 8

Mark Wheeler, Bosnia Project Manager, International Crisis Group ................. 14

General William L. Nash (Ret.), Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations .................................................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement 4

Daniel Serwer: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 11

Special Report, Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq, by the United 

States Institute of Peace .............................................................................. 36

Mark Wheeler: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 17

General William L. Nash: Prepared statement ..................................................... 24

(1)

THE BALKANS: ASSESSING THE PROGRESS 

AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:45 p.m. In Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

I apologize for being a little bit late. We are having a ceremony 

over in Statuary Hall that involves recognition of the contributions 

of our armed services and those of our allies. 

Today, the Europe Subcommittee will hear from General William 

L. Nash, U.S. Army, retired, from the Council on Foreign Relations 

and Project Director of the recent study Balkans 2010; Dr. Daniel 

Serwer from the U.S. Institute of Peace and Dr. Mark Wheeler 

from the International Crisis Group. 

It is with considerable interest and resolve to meet our oversight 

responsibilities that the Europe Subcommittee today holds a hearing on the Balkans, a region of immense geopolitical significance 

and concern over the past decade. A deeper and more extended consideration of the events of the past decade in the Balkans, and of 

U.S., European and NATO engagement in the region, might also 

prove to be helpful and instructive in assessing the present U.S.-

European relationship, the structure for international involvement 

in the Iraq aftermath, and the future roles for NATO and the European Union in the region. 

For it was the United States that led the international community in peace enforcement action in Bosnia and Kosovo after our 

European allies proved incapable of action early in this internal 

Yugoslav conflict. It was NATO that began to fundamentally reorient its mission and capabilities—from collective defense to collective security and intervention—through its operations in the Balkans; and it is NATO and the European Union which have begun 

to operationalize their imperfect capabilities to reconstruct and develop countries and societies that have suffered through war, ethnic cleansing and a range of injustices. They are engaged in efforts 

to create peace and greater prosperity and hope in the Balkans. 

Since 1991, when Slovenia, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia, the 

Balkans region emerged as the defining security challenge in Europe in the post-Cold War era. NATO military intervention eventuVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:16 May 20, 2003 Jkt 08421 PO 00000 Frm 000005 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\041003\86421 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
2

ally stopped the fighting in Bosnia in 1995 and began to reduce 

most of the overt violence in Kosovo in 1999 and in the former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001. NATO’s military commitment in the Balkans remains the Stabilization Force, SFOR, in 

Bosnia; the Kosovo Force, KFOR, in Kosovo; and until recently operation Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. 

Today, SFOR forces number approximately 12,000 military personnel, including about 2,000 Americans. KFOR forces are calculated at roughly 25,000 troops, including about 3,000 Americans. 

The NATO mission in Macedonia, with 450 personnel, has always been comprised entirely of European forces. Prior, however, 

to this NATO mission, a U.N. preventive peacekeeping force mission in Macedonia with two Scandinavian battalions and one reinforced U.S. Army battalion was terminated by a Chinese veto in 

the U.N. Security Council. 

I had the pleasure of visiting our troops there several times. In 

fact, it was I think to some extent the Members of this Committee 

that went to President Clinton and suggested our preventive peacekeeping force ought to go to Macedonia and that we would stand 

behind him and support him if he made that decision. 

On March 31 of 2003, NATO transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities in Macedonia to the European Union. 

Today, a great many problems remain in the countries that were 

formerly part of Yugoslavia, but the Balkans region is in better 

shape than at any other time in the past decade I think. All of the 

governments of these independent nations are democratically elected. All of the economies are experiencing some economic growth. 

All of the societies seem committed to seeking eventual membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions and are coming to understand 

what is required to achieve this goal. That is the good news. 

However, there remains much that is very troubling. The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic of Serbia on March 12 of 

this year, almost 1 month ago, demonstrates how fragile the situation in the Balkans remain. 

I might add that the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution yesterday expressing condolences and offering support to 

the people of Serbia and Montenegro. 

Small groups of extremist nationalists continue to oppose western standards of democracy and rule of law and are committed to 

blocking progress. Economic development is slow and difficult, and 

foreign investment is much less than expected due to continued political instability. Law enforcement, judicial systems and border 

controls are weak. Organized crime and official corruption are entrenched and widely prevalent and constitute a very major impediment to economic and political progress. Trafficking in weapons, 

drugs and human beings continues. And all of the above problems 

also raise concerns about the extent to which individuals and 

groups linked to terrorist organizations are able to operate in the 

region. 

The Administration has indicated that the U.S. will remain engaged in the Balkans for the foreseeable future, while asking European nations to take on ever-larger responsibilities. However, the 

U.S. must ultimately be realistic about what American leadership 

3

and military force can and cannot do and what the U.S. should be 

expected to do. 

Europeans have the most direct and obvious interests, it seems 

to me, in preventing further Balkan chaos and instability: An economic interest in developing markets and trade with the region 

and a security interest in protecting the borders of the European 

Union against criminal activity, terrorism and refugee flows. The 

EU indicates its willingness to take the lead in providing economic 

and technical assistance and encouraging political and economic reform in the region, with the aim of elevating standards of economic 

and political governance to EU norms. 

While Europe should play a critical role in helping the Balkan 

nations institutionalize democracy in the Balkans, the U.S., I think 

it is fair to say, is playing a major role. Because the U.S. led the 

NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, America has unique 

standing, influence and credibility with the people of the Balkans. 

Perhaps the main question for the U.S. is whether the EU has the 

political will, credibility and coherence to see its strategy through 

to success—and whether it will commit the necessary resources in 

a timely manner. I believe it is strongly in the U.S. interest to encourage and assist the EU to stay the course. 

But, at the same time, the U.S. has unique capabilities that are 

unmatched in Europe but still needed in the Balkans. The U.S. 

military is an essential deterrent I think to the reemergence of religious/ethnic violence, and the U.S. is viewed as the most neutral 

and trusted power by most of the people in the region. 

I believe that NATO missions in the Balkans cannot be discontinued responsibly until effective, alternative public security forces 

have been developed. It would seem that the Alliance should continue to play a role by transitioning from force deployments to security cooperation and engagement activities, such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace, in order to facilitate integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and institutions. 

The cohesiveness of the international community is perhaps the 

necessary element if further progress is to be made in the Balkans. 

Both the U.S. and the nations of Europe would like to integrate the 

countries of the Balkans into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Perhaps NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and Membership Action Plan process for future membership in the Alliance 

and the EU’s Stabilization and Association process for future membership in the European Union do offer the long-term strategy by 

which the international community can more usefully prioritize 

and organize its efforts and activities. 

Perhaps in this way cooperation and coordination of the Balkans 

region will present a unique opportunity through which the U.S. 

and its allies and partners may work together to constructively address many of the present challenges in the trans-Atlantic relationship. And perhaps our efforts and activities in the Balkans will 

help us conceptualize a new collaboration between the United 

States and Europe. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I apologize for 

going on at length. I thought it was good to provide something of 

a setting and my own views. 

4

But I turn now to the gentleman from Florida, the Ranking 

Member, Mr. Wexler, for any comments he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Today the Europe Subcommittee will hear from Gen. William L. Nash (U.S. Army, 

Ret.) from the Council on Foreign Relations, and project director of the recent study 

Balkans 2010, Dr. Daniel Serwer from the U.S. Institute of Peace, and Dr. Mark 

Wheeler from the International Crisis Group. 

It is with considerable interest and resolve to meet our oversight responsibilities 

that the Europe Subcommittee today holds a hearing on the Balkans—a region of 

immense geopolitical significance and concern over the past decade. A deeper and 

more extended consideration of the events of the past decade in the Balkans, and 

of US, European, and NATO engagement in the region, might also prove to be helpful and instructive in assessing the present US-European relationship, the structure 

for international involvement in the Iraq aftermath, and the future roles for NATO 

and the European Union in the region. For, it was the United States that led the 

international community in peace enforcement action in Bosnia and Kosovo after 

our European allies proved incapable of action early in this internal Yugoslav conflict. It was NATO that began to fundamentally reorient its mission and capabilities 

(from collective defense to collective security and intervention) through its operations in the Balkans. And, it is NATO and the European Union which have begun 

to operationalize their still imperfect capabilities to reconstruct and develop countries and societies that have suffered through war, ethnic cleansing, and a range 

of injustices. They are engaged in efforts to create peace and greater prosperity and 

hope in the Balkans. 

Since 1991, when Slovenia, Croatia and (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia, the Balkans region emerged as the

defining security challenge in Europe in the post-Cold War era. NATO military 

intervention eventually stopped the fighting in Bosnia in 1995, and began to reduce 

most of the overt violence in Kosovo in 1999 and in (the Former Yugoslav Republic 

of ) Macedonia in 2001. NATO’s military commitment in the Balkans remains the 

Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, and until 

recently Operations Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Today, SFOR 

forces number approximately 12,000 military personnel, including about 2,000 

Americans. KFOR forces are calculated at roughly 25,000 troops, including about 

3,000 Americans. The NATO mission in Macedonia, with about 450 personnel, has 

always been comprised entirely of European forces. Prior to this NATO mission, a 

UN preventive peacekeeping force mission in Macedonia with two Scandinavian battalions and one re-inforced U.S. Army battalion was terminated by a Chinese veto 

in the UN Security Council. On March 31, 2003, NATO transferred the peacekeeping responsibility in Macedonia to the European Union. 

Today, a great many problems remain in the countries that formerly were part 

of Yugoslavia, but the Balkans region is in better shape than at any other time in 

the past decade. All of the governments of these independent nations are democratically elected, all of the economies are experiencing economic growth, all of the societies seem committed to seeking eventual membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions 

and are coming to understand what is required to achieve this goal. That is the good 

news. 

However, there remains much that is very troubling. The assassination of Prime 

Minister Zoran Djindjic of Serbia on March 12th of this year, almost one month ago, 

demonstrates how fragile the situation in the Balkans remains. (I might add that 

the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution yesterday expressing condolences and offering support to the people of Serbia and Montenegro.) Small groups 

of extreme nationalists continue to oppose western standards of democracy and rule 

of law and are committed to blocking progress. Economic development is slow and 

difficult, and foreign investment is much less than expected due to continued political instability. Law enforcement, judicial systems and border controls are weak. Organized crime and official corruption are entrenched and widely prevalent, and constitute a very major impediment to economic and political progress. Trafficking in 

weapons, drugs and human beings continues. And, all of the above problems also 

raise concerns about the extent to which individuals and groups linked to terrorist 

organizations are able to operate in the region. 

5

The US Administration has indicated that the US will remain engaged in the Balkans for the foreseeable future, while asking the European nations to take on ever 

larger responsibilities. However, the US must ultimately be realistic about what 

American leadership and military forces can and cannot do—and what it should be 

expected to do. 

Europeans have the most direct and obvious interests in preventing further Balkans chaos and instability: an economic interest in developing markets and trade 

with the region, and a security interest in protecting the borders of the European 

Union against criminal activity, terrorism and refugee flows. The EU indicates its 

willingness to take the lead in providing economic and technical assistance, and encouraging political and economic reform in the region, with the aim of elevating 

standards of economic and political governance to EU norms. 

While Europe should play a critical role in helping the Balkans nations institutionalize democracy in the Balkans, the US is playing a major role. Because the US 

led the NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, America has unique standing, 

influence and credibility with the people of the Balkans. Perhaps the main question 

for the US is whether the EU has the political will, credibility and coherence to see 

its strategy through to success—and whether it will commit the necessary resources 

in a timely manner. I believe it is strongly in the US interest to encourage and assist the EU to stay the course. At the same time, the US has unique capabilities 

that are unmatched by Europe but still needed in the Balkans. The US military is 

an essential deterrent to the re-emergence of religious/ethnic violence, and the US 

is viewed as the most neutral and trusted power by most of the people in the region. 

I believe that NATO missions in the Balkans cannot be discontinued responsibly 

until effective, alternative public security forces have been developed. It would seem 

that the Alliance should continue to play a role by transitioning from force deployments to security cooperation and engagement activities, such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace, in order to facilitate integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and institutions. 

The cohesiveness of the international community is perhaps the necessary element if further progress is to be made in the Balkans. Both the United States and 

the nations of Europe would like to integrate the countries of the Balkans into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Perhaps NATO’s Partnership for Peace program 

and Membership Action Plan process for future membership in the Alliance, and the 

EU’s Stabilization and Association process for future membership in the European 

Union, offer the long-term strategy by which the international community can most 

usefully prioritize and organize its efforts and activities. And perhaps in this way, 

cooperation and coordination in the Balkans region will present a unique opportunity through which the US and its European allies and partners may work together to constructively address many of the present challenges in the trans-Atlantic relationship. (And, perhaps our efforts and activities in the Balkans will help us 

to conceptualize a new collaboration between the United States and Europe.) 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do, with your 

permission, is to defer to Mr. Engel, who, on our side of the aisle, 

for many years has been the leader on many issues affecting the 

Balkan region. With your permission, I would like him to deliver 

our opening statement. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Certainly. Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I would like to 

thank the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee for allowing me 

to give the opening statement on our side. 

While the Ranking Member is new to the ranking position on the 

Europe Subcommittee, he is already making his mark on U.S. policy toward Europe; and I look forward to working with him closely 

over the next 2 years. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. The Nation’s attention is rightfully focused on Iraq, and we are all grateful 

that the conflict is moving toward the next phase. But yet if so 

much attention is focused on the Middle East we must not lose 

sight of our important interests in Europe. Indeed, we have made 

substantial national investments to insure that the Balkans never 

6

again burst into the kind of warfare that occurred during the last 

decade; and again, I think for the most part we have been successful. 

The Dayton Accords, while not a perfect resolution, ended the 

war in Bosnia. The air campaign against Slobodan Milosevic ended 

Belgrade’s harsh policies against Kosova, and it led also to the 

Milosevic downfall and his trial in The Hague. 

Furthermore, the region is moving toward democracy. There are 

elected leaders in every country in the former Yugoslavia. Regional 

cooperation has expanded to promote trade, a coordinated security 

policy and against crime and trafficking. Yet, we still face many 

challenges in the region. 

The murder of Zoran Djindjic, the former prime minister of Serbia, scratched the surface off what seemed to be a reforming Serbian society and showed that the criminal elements on which the 

Milosevic regime so heavily depended have not gone away. While 

I am glad that there is now a crackdown I am saddened that this 

took an assassination to begin. 

In Bosnia, IFOR originally entered Bosnia with 60,000 troops. 

We are well below that now. Indeed, the U.S. has only 1,800 troops 

left there. Given the brutality of the Bosnia war, the international 

community has been successful in quelling the inter-ethnic violence, but in many ways the peoples remain separate. Bosnians, 

Croatians and Serbs especially still live in completely separate regions, and the presence of the SFOR mission remains important. 

In Kosova, we are still awaiting movement toward final status. 

As Members of this Subcommittee and our witnesses know, I 

strongly support the independence of Kosova. 

When I look at the situation, I can see only three possible outcomes: One, Kosova becomes part of Serbia, Yugoslavia, perhaps as 

a third republic; two, the international protectorate continues forever; or, three, Kosova becomes independent. The Kosova Albanians, the overwhelming majority of Kosovars, will never accept 

the first, going back to Serbia; and the second is untenable because 

the international community cannot stay there forever. This leaves 

only independence as the viable option. 

I must offer the following caution to the international community 

on Kosova. It is important not to delay the final status discussions 

too long, too many Kosovars are out of work, see Belgrade and the 

Europeans as holding back their legitimate quest for self-determination and are not seeing any hope. If there is no hope, the 

wrong elements gain the upper hand. It is important to move forward on final status discussions. 

Yet I must also caution my Albanian friends in Kosova. There 

should not be any acts of retribution against Serbs; and Albanians 

must not be perceived, fairly or unfairly, as repressing Kosovar 

Serbs, just as the Serbs and Milosevic repressed Albanians. The 

Serbs that left should be invited back, and all legal protections 

should be conferred upon them as due members of the national minority. 

They need to move on to passing the key laws so that Kosova 

will already be a functional nation-state. All that would be needed 

would be international recognition. Independence cannot be 

achieved without international recognition, and so the people of 

7

Kosova have to keep their eyes on the prize—the long-range goal 

of independence. 

I would also like to call the attention of the Subcommittee to the 

progress and challenges in Macedonia. Today, the war has ended; 

and the Ohrid Agreement is in an implementation phase. While in 

some instances the Ohrid Agreement is working; in other ways, 

there are holdups. While joint Macedonian and Albanian police 

units are beginning to patrol in many areas, other key laws have 

not been passed. 

I hope the witnesses will address the developments in Macedonia. 

Finally, I would like to touch on Albania. It took approximately 

a decade following the end of the Hoxha Regime, but it gives me 

great pleasure to report that the beginning of normalization of politics in Albania is working. Opposing parties are beginning to work 

together in Parliament and, different from the late 1990s elections, 

have proceeded without major hitches. Of course, there is still a 

long way to go. 

Albania remains the poorest nation in Europe; and, although 

there has been improvement in the economy, corruption and trafficking still are too widespread. I would like to see democratic institutions take hold in Albania in Kosova and in the rest of the Balkan region. It is not the people or the parties that we are concerned with. It is having the institutions take hold. 

I know that all three of the witnesses today will mention in detail some common things—the need for progress in the rule of law; 

expansion of the EU’s roles in bringing these nations into Europe 

as stable, market-based democracies; and fighting corruption and 

trafficking. I agree that these are key goals and look forward to 

your testimony today. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. 

We have two votes. I would like to introduce the witnesses before 

we proceed to the votes, and then we will be able to resume immediately upon return. 

First, Dr. Daniel Serwer is the Director of the U.S. Institute of 

Peace Balkans initiative. He has worked extensively on democratization in Serbia and has been deeply engaged in facilitating dialogue between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. Before working for the 

U.S. Institute of Peace, he served in a number of years in the U.S. 

Department of State from 1994 through 1996. He served as U.S. 

Special Envoy and Coordinator for the Bosnian Federation, mediating between Croats and Bosnians and negotiating the first agreement reached at the Dayton peace talks. 

Dr. Mark Wheeler, who flew in from Sarajevo, is the Bosnia 

Project Director of the International Crisis Group in Sarajevo. Previously, he has had a long distinguished academic career specializing in the Balkans and serving in various academic institutions 

in the United Kingdom. He has also been extensively involved in 

numerous government and nongovernmental organizations associated with the Balkans region over the past decade. 

General William L. Nash is the Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is one of the 

few Americans to have led both civilian and military peacekeeping 

8

operations in the Balkans. In 2000, at the request of the U.S. Government, he became the Regional Administrator for the United Nations in Northern Kosovo. 

General Nash’s previous military experience includes Assistant 

Division Commander, 3rd Infantry Division, Germany; commander 

of an armored brigade in Operation Desert Storm. He served as 

Commander of Task Force Eagle, a multinational division with 

more than 25,000 troops from 12 nations charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in northeastern BosniaHerzegovinia. He also presently serves as an adjunct professor at 

Georgetown University. 

Gentlemen, we will ask for and appreciate your patience as we 

go cast two votes. I would say we will be back in approximately 18 

minutes. So be at ease. 

The Subcommittee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Maybe there is a Democratic Caucus I don’t know about, but I 

think they will be here shortly. 

Gentlemen, we are looking forward to your statements. Your entire written statements will be made a part of the record. I want 

to hear from you. We want to hear from you, so we are going to 

set the clock at 10 minutes for each of you, rather than what you 

sometimes get around here. 

Dr. Serwer, you may summarize or proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, DIRECTOR, BALKANS 

INITIATIVE, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will summarize my 

written statement, which is available for the record. 

Mr. Chairman, I think there are two important transitions occurring in the Balkans today. One is from war to peace or, more precisely, from war, nationalism and dictatorship to peace, democracy 

and a European future. The other transition is from American to 

European leadership. 

As you suggested in your opening statement, both are going reasonably well, but there are some key issues that require U.S. engagement. I want to focus just on those. I am not trying to convince 

you that the U.S. has to remain engaged on everything, but we do 

have a $24 billion investment in the Balkans that we need to protect. 

In the transition from war to peace, U.S. attention, in my view, 

should focus on just three things. First is reform of the security 

services in Serbia, second is a decision on the final status of 

Kosovo, and third is capture of war criminals indicted by The 

Hague Tribunal. 

Let me talk about Serbia first. It is clear after the tragic assassination of Zoran Djindjic that it was a mistake to leave in place 

after Milosevic was overthrown in October 2000, the police, military security services and judiciary that served Milosevic so well. 

I think there is an important lesson here for Iraq. We cannot and 

should not leave an old regime in place, but we also can and should 

impose law and order. 

9

The new government that succeeded Zoran Djindjic has surprised 

most observers and maybe itself as well by finding the right path, 

by doing the right things; and I think we ought to be supporting 

them, as suggested by the Secretary of State’s recent visit. We also 

have to be careful that this vigorous crackdown, while completely 

justified and well-motivated, is not abused for political purposes 

and is not even seen as being abused for political purposes. 

I also think the United States should be prepared to expand the 

$110 million in assistance that it provides to Serbia, focusing specifically on reforming the security services and establishing the 

rule of law. 

The second problem meriting U.S. attention is the final status of 

Kosovo. This issue cannot, in my view, be put off forever. The critical pre-condition for opening negotiations is improved treatment of 

Serbs and other minorities within Kosovo. But there is a real need, 

both among the Serbs and among the Albanians, to begin a process 

of decision by 2004. Otherwise, there are serious risks of instability, there are serious risk of harming reform forces in Serbia, 

and there are serious risks of retarding the progress of both Kosovo 

and Serbia toward Europe. 

I believe it is possible to find a negotiated solution. Some time 

ago, about a year and a half ago, the United States Institute of 

Peace started some quiet contacts between young Serbs and young 

Albanians from Belgrade and Pristina, many of whom have very responsible positions, at a time when everybody said it couldn’t be 

done. It can be done. We have expanded those contacts considerably. We have quite a few people talking to each other; and it is 

clear to me that the time is coming when, even at the higher political levels, they will be able to talk to each other. 

The third issue on which we need to remain engaged is capture 

of indicted war criminals. This is critical to establishing the rule 

of law throughout the Balkans, and U.S. troops will not be able to 

leave Bosnia until it is done. Rule of law is critical to our own permanent interests in blocking terror, drugs and the illicit arms 

trade in the Balkans. 

Let me comment on the issue you raised concerning a haven for 

terror in the Balkans. There are some risks in that direction. But 

if there are two nominally Muslim populations that are favorable 

to the United States and opposed to terrorism, it is the BosnianMuslim population and the Albanian-Muslim population. 

Muslim terror has not proven to be an enormous problem. It has 

proved to be a sporadic problem in the Balkans. In fact, the biggest 

problem I think we have had on the security side in the Balkans 

is the sale by Bosnian Serb and Serbian companies of arms to Iraq. 

We should keep a close eye on that issue. 

Let me offer an idea of some things that we do not need to lead 

on in the Balkans. I don’t believe we should lead on economic reform and development. They are better handled by the IMF, World 

Bank and EU, which have vastly greater resources at their disposal. Social welfare is an enormous problem in the Balkans, but 

it should fall to others to handle it. State building should mostly 

be a EU responsibility, in my view, because these countries are 

going to be European states. And military reform should be hanVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:16 May 20, 2003 Jkt 08421 PO 00000 Frm 000013 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\041003\86421 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
10

dled primarily by NATO. We should play a complementary role 

with our bilateral assistance. 

Let me turn to the second big transition occurring in the Balkans: The transition from American to European leadership. The 

fact is that European-American cooperation of Balkans is today, 

very good. We cannot expect that good cooperation to be the tail 

that wags the dog and creates good cooperation in Iraq. But I do 

think it teaches us a lesson. 

When I first got engaged in the Balkans in the early 1990s, European-American relations were really bad in the Balkans. The 

United States had proposed lifting the arms embargo. The Europeans didn’t want to. 

We have worked at improving cooperation for a long time. The 

Americans took some strong leadership positions. We got the Europeans to come along with us, and I think that something like that 

needs to happen in Iraq as well. 

Europe is better equipped today than it was 10 years ago when 

it failed to deal with the Balkans, but it still lacks credibility. Europe needs to make its vision of the future more credible by treating the Balkans states as potential members. They are planning a 

decline in their assistance to the Balkans. They are planning to 

half it from 2000 to 2006. That has to stop, and they have to start 

treating the Balkans like a backwards region of the EU, not like 

some remote territory. 

Europe also needs common purpose and unity of command and 

control, especially in Macedonia. Things are going pretty well in 

Macedonia, as Mr. Engel mentioned; and I think that the credit is 

largely due to the Albanian and Macedonian leadership in government there right now. They are doing a fine job, and the Europeans 

are doing a fine job. The EU should be looking forward to taking 

over in Bosnia eventually, but only once the war criminals are in 

The Hague and the issue of divided armed forces in Bosnia has 

been overcome. 

Let me, before I conclude, address two current policy issues: 

What should we do about the conditions for bilateral U.S. assistance to Serbia, and what should we do about Kosovo final status? 

On the question of the conditions for bilateral assistance to Serbia, my suggestion to you is to leave them alone. Any change will 

be seen as moving the goalpost. They are still applicable even if 

some have been partly fulfilled, and they are needed to encourage 

reformers. If you tighten the conditions, it will undermine the reformers, who will be criticized for cooperating with people who always change what they want. If you loosen them, as the Council 

of Europe recently did, you will undermine the reformers because 

they won’t have a clear target to aim for. 

I think the conditions ought to be kept where they are, but I also 

think we should seek better coordination with the Europeans, who 

give much more assistance to Serbia and who have an enormous 

amount of influence if they want to exercise it. 

On Kosovo final status, I believe the United States needs to 

begin the process of preparing for final status negotiations. We 

have to decide on what forum we are prepared to have this discussion in, and we have to decide on the range of possible outcomes 

we are willing to accept. 

11

1The views expressed here are those of the author, not the US Institute of Peace, which does 

not take positions on policy issues. 

I don’t agree with Mr. Engel about there being only three options. I believe there are a lot more options. I believe the likely outcome will be a complicated one and not necessarily a simple one. 

We are going to need a strong U.S. mediator, probably coupled with 

a EU negotiator. But, most of all, we need to begin the process of 

thinking about it and stop telling everybody that this needs to be 

put off forever. 

Finally, the U.S., in approaching the issue of Kosovo final status, 

has to make it absolutely clear to everybody involved that whatever 

is decided will not be allowed to destabilize Bosnia or Macedonia. 

There will be no compensation for losses in these negotiations with 

the territory of other sovereign states. 

Mr. Chairman, we are closer to peace than to war, closer to European than American leadership. I believe the right way out of the 

Balkans is to finish the job: To finish security sector reform in Serbia, which is progressing much better under this new government; 

to finish the process of decisionmaking on Kosovo final status within the next few years; to get all of the indicted war criminals transferred to The Hague. Once we have done those three things, we 

should complete a smooth hand-off to Europe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Serwer, thank you very much for your statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER,1 DIRECTOR, BALKANS INITIATIVE, U.S. 

INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Mr. Chairman, let me first express to you my appreciation for holding this hearing on the Balkans, even while Washington’s attention is focused elsewhere. The 

United States Government has invested upwards of $24 billion in Balkans peace 

over the past decade, a substantial amount even if it will be dwarfed by spending 

in Iraq. We need to protect our investment and ensure that it pays dividends to the 

American taxpayer. 

There are two important transformations occurring in the Balkans today. The 

first is a transition away from nationalism, dictatorship and war towards peace, democracy, and a European future. The second is a shift of responsibility from the US, 

which led the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions as well as the fight against 

Milosevic, to the European Union, which shared leadership with the US in bringing 

peace to Macedonia and ultimately must lead the process of European integration 

for all of the Balkans. The objective of US policy should be to ensure the success 

of both these processes. 

FROM WAR TO PEACE

Let me talk first about the transition within the Balkans. We have seen marked 

progress in the last several years, especially in Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. 

These countries are leading the region towards NATO and the EU by concerted 

efforts to meet the membership requirements. I might fault each for shortcomings, 

but their leaderships are trying to match actions to ideals. 

I will not catalogue current problems in the Balkans, which lie principally in Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia. I want instead to focus on those that require 

continuing US engagement. Solve these few, and we can turn over leadership to the 

Europeans without endangering our investment. 

First among the problems requiring US attention is reform of the security sector 

in Serbia. It is all too clear in the aftermath of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic’s tragic assassination that it was a mistake to leave in place the network of criminals, 

security forces, businessmen and politicians that had been the backbone of the 

Milosevic regime. I do not agree with those who say the US pressed the Serbs too 

12

hard, or that Zoran would be alive today if we had ignored the issue of war criminals. The crackdown that the Serbian government is now pursuing, using extraordinary emergency powers, should have occurred immediately after the overthrow of 

Milosevic in October 2000. Even as it looks forward to a Serbia that meets the highest human rights standards, and warns Belgrade to avoid using emergency powers 

as a political tool, the US can and should support a limited crackdown as well as 

the essential follow-on measures: deep reform of the police, army and security services. We should be prepared to expand significantly the $110 million or so in assistance that we provide to Serbia, focusing the additional effort specifically on reform 

of the security services and the rule of law. 

The second problem requiring US attention is the final status of Kosovo. By the 

end of this year, the head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, will have 

turned over all but a few powers to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance, 

in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1244. He will also 

have succeeded, I believe, in opening a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on 

non-status issues of importance to both Serbs and Albanians. Before his death, 

Zoran Djindjic had called for immediate talks on final status, in order to avoid damaging the prospects for Serbia’s reform factions at the polls as well as Serbia’s prospects for a closer relationship with the EU. The Kosovar Albanians, for their part, 

want independence and will not sit still forever in an international protectorate. 

The US Government, in concert with European governments, has so far tried to 

postpone consideration of final status indefinitely. The Administration rightly claims 

that Kosovo has not yet met all the standards the UN has set as preconditions. At 

this point the crucial standard is treatment of Serbs and other minorities. The US 

should use all the influence deriving from its special relationship with the Kosovar 

Albanians to convince them that they must allow Serbs and other minorities to return to their homes securely, worship in their churches without risk, and travel 

throughout Kosovo without harassment or threat. If this happens, final status talks 

should begin. 

It will be difficult to postpone the opening of talks beyond 2004 in any event. The 

US needs to ready itself for a decision on Kosovo final status. Continuing refusal 

to face this issue will put the US behind the curve, creating serious risks of unrest 

and instability. Europe cannot be expected to proceed on Kosovo final status without 

the US. 

The third main issue on which the US needs to focus is establishment of the rule 

of law throughout the Balkans. This requires transfer of those indicted for war 

crimes to The Hague. Paddy Ashdown, the international community’s senior agent 

in Bosnia, has made justice his first priority, but unless Karadzic and Mladic are 

captured no one will believe it. Nor will it be possible to withdraw US troops. 

Rule of law goes far beyond the question of war criminals and touches vital US 

interests, such as ensuring there is no Balkans haven or transit point for international terrorists. A significant percentage of the drugs and arms reaching Europe 

pass through the Balkans and enrich its mafias, and until recently Serbian and Bosnian Serb companies were supplying Iraq with weapons. Terror, drugs and arms 

will be permanent US interests in the Balkans, and it behooves us to invest in 

building up the institutions required to meet our own security objectives. 

Let me make clear what I think we could do less in the Balkans. I do not believe 

the US should engage heavily on economic reform and development—the resources 

available to the US Government in this area are minimal, and the IMF, World Bank 

and the EU are vastly better equipped and funded. Likewise, social welfare concerns—while all too real and important—should fall to others. Most of the statebuilding function, while vital because the Balkan wars were due in large part to 

weak states, should fall to the EU, which will want to shape Balkan states in a European mold. Last but not least, we should look to NATO for leadership on military 

reform, and play a role when needed through NATO or in bilateral activities that 

complement NATO’s efforts. 

FROM US TO EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP

Let me turn to the transfer of leadership to the Europeans, who failed in the Balkans a decade ago but now have another opportunity. Today’s Europe is better prepared. It has fielded an excellent team: in addition to Ashdown in Bosnia and the 

Steiner in Kosovo, Javier Solana, Chris Patten and Erhard Busek in Brussels. Europe has footed most of the bill for the Balkans, and provides most of the troops—

now about 75%, vs. 15% for the US. European Foreign and Security Policy, while 

a shambles on Iraq, persists in the Balkans, as does successful European/American 

cooperation. 

13

The problem Europe faces is not in my view its admittedly limited military capacity, or even its reluctance to use it. There is no military challenge in the Balkans 

today that the Europeans cannot handle. The real problem is credibility. Especially 

the Albanians, but also the Serbs and Bosnians, show little respect for the Europeans, even though they pay the bills and even though the ultimate goal for all the 

peoples of the Balkans is integration within Europe. 

In order to make the vision of a future within Europe more credible, the European 

Union needs to stop treating the Balkans as a distant region that needs to be stabilized and begin to view it as a neighboring area into which the EU intends to expand. This shift has already occurred for Romania and Bulgaria, but not yet for the 

Western Balkans. Current EU plans call for a steady decline in assistance to the 

Western Balkans through 2006, to half the level provided in 2000. As pointed out 

by the European Stability Initiative, the EU has an opportunity at its Thessaloniki 

Summit in June to reverse this decline and begin to provide the Western Balkans 

with the kind of structural assistance that has worked so well to accelerate economic development in other laggard areas of Europe. This shift would greatly enhance the credibility of the EU and spur the countries of the Western Balkans to 

serious reform efforts. 

But the issue of credibility is not only one of resources and vision. Europe lacks 

common purpose and unity of command and control. It is easy to play the Europeans off against each other. To the extent they can agree among themselves, the 

positions they take are often the lowest common denominator. Rarely are they able 

to deploy all the levers of their considerable power to achieve a clear result, as 

Solana did—perhaps unwisely—when he forced Montenegro to stay in a confederation with Serbia. More often, they find it difficult to coordinate their economic, 

political, diplomatic and military instruments so as to achieve a clearly defined objective. Seldom do they even try. 

The next test for the Europeans is Macedonia, where they have taken over the 

military task from NATO. The prospects are reasonably good, mainly because the 

Macedonian and Albanian participants in the new government seem determined to 

fulfill their commitment to the peace process and at the same time to confront the 

crime and corruption that are the greatest threat to the country’s viability. Europe 

needs to focus on making Macedonia a success. Once that has been achieved they 

can and should take over the military mission in Bosnia, assuming the war criminals are in The Hague and NATO has the vexing problem of unifying the Bosnian 

armed forces on its way to resolution. 

CONCLUSIONS

Before concluding, I would like to address two important policy questions:

• What should the US do about the conditions for its assistance to Serbia in 

the wake of Zoran Djindjic’s assassination?

• What should the US do about the final status of Kosovo?

My Serb friends are looking to the US for help and support in the aftermath of 

the assassination. We should certainly give them all the assistance we can, not only 

in tracking down the murderers, but also in cracking down on the underworld whose 

dirty work they did. The new prime minister has made clear that he intends to pursue the reform direction mapped out by Djindjic. In fact, the Serbian government 

is seizing the opportunity to accelerate reform of the police, military and judiciary. 

The logical outcome is arrest and transfer to The Hague of indicted war criminals. 

The only question is how quickly this can be achieved. We should not, as the Council of Europe has done, drop the conditions or water them down. At most the Administration should consider whether the new Serbian government has had sufficient 

opportunity by the June 15 deadline to do what it knows it must do. The Administration should use the time between now and then to achieve a greater degree of 

coordination with the Europeans, who provide more benefits to Serbia and have substantial influence if they choose to use it. 

My Albanian friends are looking for the US to support Kosovo independence. It 

has to decide whether it will do so, if not which other solution it will support, and 

how any proposed solution will be sold to both Serbs and Albanians. While it is clear 

enough that the Security Council will have to bless a decision on final status, the 

US has to decide in what forum it wants the issue to be negotiated and who will 

lead the effort. A strong US mediator, possibly teamed with an EU counterpart, is 

crucial. The US also has to make it clear to all concerned that a decision on Kosovo 

final status will not be allowed to affect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 

Bosnia and Macedonia, where much of our decade-long investment in the Balkans 

14

lies. And it has to insist on protection of Serbs and other minorities, as a precondition to a decision on final status. 

We are today more than midway in the two transitions occurring in the Balkans: 

closer to peace than war, and closer to European than to US leadership. The right 

way out of the Balkans is to finish the job, withdrawing US troops only after the 

essential remaining tasks have been accomplished: security sector reform in Serbia, 

a decision on Kosovo final status, and transfer to The Hague of the indicted war 

criminals.

Mr. BEREUTER. We will now hear from Dr. Mark Wheeler, 

Project Director of the International Crisis Group Bosnia Project. 

Dr. Wheeler, you may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF MARK WHEELER, BOSNIA PROJECT 

MANAGER, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Mr. WHEELER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I prepared what I regarded as an amazingly brief statement for this Subcommittee, but 

of course it is far too long even to begin to present in the short time 

that we have available, even though I understand that you have 

been especially generous to us. So, as a consequence, I am going 

to provide a short summary of what was already a short paper. 

Now I am obviously going to address Bosnia and Herzegovina in 

particular. Despite their highly inauspicious beginnings, both peace 

implementation and state building in Bosnia-Herzegovina have belatedly begun to show good results. The international community 

has outlasted the hardliners, the firebrands, the mass murderers 

who regarded the Dayton peace as no more than a ceasefire. It has 

benefitted from positive developments in the neighborhood, above 

all, the demise of the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes. It has 

gradually learned on the job, equipping itself with the necessary 

tools and displaying more coherence in both setting and pursuing 

priorities. 

Finally, the international community has developed a plausible 

exit strategy, the handing over of the ad hoc arrangements established at Dayton to the institutional and self-sustaining processes 

of European integration. Along the way, renewed war has become 

virtually unthinkable; and the Bosnian state framework has acquired both the presumption of permanence and at least conditional legitimacy for the majority of the country’s citizens. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons have returned 

to their pre-war homes, even in areas where their own kind no 

longer rule the roost. Aside from peace itself, Dayton’s greatest gift 

was in providing for the absolute right of return. 

Dayton also provided, however, for institutions such as a central 

bank, a constitutional court and the office of the high representative. These have contributed respectively to creating a common economic space, to redefining the nationally exclusive and sovereign 

pretensions of the entities, and to setting the reform agenda in virtually every sphere. 

Although the enduring effects of ethnic cleansing remain predominant in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they are at least under sustained 

and occasionally successful attack on the ground, in the constitutional and fiscal structures of the government, and also in terms 

of political discourse. 

None of this would have happened, however, if the international 

community had not divested itself of its illusions or the competing 

15

political imperatives that had constrained its engagement at the 

outset. The mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not so much creep 

as jolt ahead, whether in the equipping of the high representative 

with the pro-consular powers he acquired at the end of 1997 or in 

accommodating SFOR’s gradual assumption of the sorts of policing 

tasks it had originally, at American insistence, refused to take on 

board. 

The paradox at the heart of the current situation we have in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the international community has had to get 

in ever more deeply, just as it realizes that time for getting out is 

fast approaching. The long-term effort to square this neocolonial 

circle by encouraging the emergence and victory at the polls of 

moderate nonnationalist political forces through whom the international community might work has recently taken a serious 

knock. 

The return of the big three nationalist parties to power following 

last October’s elections has exposed the naked reality of the conundrum confronting the international community. The high representative is increasingly compelled to intervene, to sack officeholders and to impose legislation in order to create the circumstances in which he will no longer have to do these things. In 

other words, to put himself out of a job. 

The fundamental reforms of the administrative order, the legal 

environment, the military and the economy that are necessary, 

whether for an exit from Bosnia by the international community or, 

more appropriately, an entry for Bosnia into the European Union, 

all these things would be very much easier to accomplish if the 

country were not now confronted in the economic sphere by a vicious circle of declining aid flows, rising debts and deficits, widespread poverty, pervasive corruption, stalled privatization, exiguous foreign investment and exclusively national or nationalist definitions of virtually all interests and all problems. 

What is worse, the political fragmentation bequeathed by Dayton 

and the private systems of coping that have insulated both BosniaHerzegovina and the international community from social disorder 

and mass protests are the same barriers that stand in the way of 

replacing this vicious cycle with the virtuous cycle of reform and 

escalating hope that is necessary to turn matters around. 

More than 7 years after the fighting stopped, Bosnia GDP remains less than half what it was in 1991. Public spending consumes 56 percent of this paltry GDP. While the remedies may be 

clear enough, rule of law direct foreign investment, export-led 

growth, rationalization and professionalization of government 

structures, but they are formidably hard to achieve, most especially 

because they challenge a status quo that may be dysfunctional and 

may indeed be intolerable in the long term but which works in the 

short term to the very great satisfaction of too many wielders of 

power and influence who benefit from it. 

The big international community project at the moment, the introduction of VAT on the state level and unifying the entity’s customs services, illustrates the intersection of ever deeper international engagement in ever more technical issues with the continuing intractability of Bosnian realities. In theory, the reform of 

indirect taxation in order both to shift the balance of power in 

16

favor of the state and to capture hundreds of millions of dollars lost 

to tax and customs evasion should be an ideal battleground on 

which to fight. 

The technical issues involved do not readily arouse the fierce 

popular resistance of national groups prone to claim that every innovation of any kind is a threat to their very national existence. 

On the other hand, neither do these reforms set the pulses racing, 

especially the pulses of those Bosnians who desire a more competent state capable actually of integrating into Europe. Such people, as Dr. Serwer said, would regard the capture of Radovan 

Karadzic, the immediate unification of the three national armies 

and, in fact, the abolition of the entities would be vastly more 

worthwhile projects for the international community to be undertaking. 

But here, again, we come back to the limitations of our Dayton 

framework. Some things are simply beyond the international community to even think about doing. 

In any case, reforms which are good in themselves and necessary 

for Bosnia-Herzegovina to progress toward a stabilization in association agreement with EU are not necessarily those that will have 

a tremendously ameliorating effect on the increasingly sour and 

critical atmosphere that has prevailed since the elections among 

those who ought to be the international community’s natural allies 

in Bosnia. What some historians have called the iron law of colonial ingratitude is beginning to show itself, and that is that 

Bosnians are becoming heartily tired of the presence of the international community and blame it for all the country’s failures; and, 

of course, the internationals blame the Bosnians for all their failures and show increasing impatience with their own capacity. 

This highlights another problem or set of problems in Bosnia. For 

a variety of reasons where, relating both to the country’s Cold War 

distinctiveness, Yugoslavia’s Cold War distinctiveness, and to 

Bosnian’s own especially favorable attitudes toward the old Yugoslav socialist experience, the international community has tended 

to exaggerate the eagerness with which Bosnians are going to be 

prepared to embrace either a post-Communist transition agenda or 

be ardently eager for European integration. This has been presumed, rather than proved. 

The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a rather more favorable memory of Tito’s Yugoslavia than many other people in the 

former Yugoslavia do; and, quite honestly, they take their place in 

Europe rather more for granted than those countries that used to 

be behind the old Iron Curtain. 

Well, these are some of the psychological obstacles to actually 

turning an exit strategy into an entry strategy. 

But it has to be said now that the most encouraging factor is 

that the international community is nowadays uncharacteristically 

united in promoting the reforms required for Bosnia to get into the 

EU and for itself to get out and that the EU, for its part, has 

proved remarkably ready to hold out and testify through such 

things as the European Union police mission, the ‘‘double-hatting’’ 

of Paddy Ashdown as a European special representative and, of 

course, the proposal that the EU should take over from SFOR the 

military force in 2004. 

17

All of these things, in a sense, are more than enough reason for 

quite a bit of optimism. But there is, of course, no guarantee of success if the rather haphazardly developing experiment that has 

characterized the past 7 or 8 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina is going 

to succeed. 

Let me just end by suggesting that there are some really rather 

important things that matter about what is going on in Bosnia 

today. For one thing, we are still looking to achieve a better, a fairer and a more sustainable peace than the one that was cobbled together in 1995. The international community, in other words, is 

still in a position to seek to do better now than it did during the 

early 1990s or at the end of the war. 

As I emphasized throughout, however, Bosnia-Herzegovina 

might—however fragile it might still be, it is far from being a hopeless case. But it is important for us as well that this shouldn’t ever 

be regarded as a hopeless case. Because it is terribly important in 

the contemporary world that a multinational state such as Bosnia 

and Herzegovina is should be seen to have a chance of success. 

Because all of the countries in which most of us live are increasingly multinational states; and in a sense, just as BosniaHerzegovina is a multinational essence of the old Yugoslavia, so in 

a sense it is a mirror for the sort of world which is increasingly becoming predominant. If it can’t succeed, then a lot of the rest of us 

are going to have great trouble in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Wheeler. I think it is a little 

harder for Americans to accept the fact that a multinational, multiethnic state should not be able to succeed. It may be a bit harder 

for us to grasp and to accept that than some other country. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wheeler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK WHEELER, BOSNIA PROJECT MANAGER, 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

BOSNIA & HERCEGOVINA

The citizens of Bosnia & Hercegovina (BiH) continue to labour under a heavy burden—and the international community continues to foot a substantial bill—for an 

avoidable war and an inadequate peace. Having failed to stop the war, either before 

it began or during the three-and-a-half years that followed, the eventual peacemakers at Dayton were stuck both with the results on the ground and with the admission of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman into their company. That meant 

on the one hand, accepting the effective partition of BiH while, on the other, seeking 

to establish mechanisms that might one day make it whole. 

Besides providing some common institutions for the otherwise vestigial state, the 

Dayton Peace Accords gave two million refugees and displaced persons the right to 

return to their pre-war homes, created a so-called High Representative to co-ordinate civilian peace implementation, and authorised the deployment of what turned 

out to be a 60,000-strong, NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). This was certainly not—to borrow Michael Ignatieff’s felicitous description of the American approach to post-Taliban Afghanistan—‘‘nation-building lite’’, but neither was it originally intended to be ‘‘nation-building long’’. 

The fact that the international community is still deeply engaged in BiH seven 

years after Dayton is probably its single greatest achievement. International engagement has outlasted the firebrands who saw Dayton merely as a temporary 

ceasefire. It has survived the regimes of Tudjman and Milosevic and their capacity 

to foment separatism and war. It has even endured long enough to civilise political 

discourse. This staying power and these changes have permitted progressive troop 

reductions, the downsizing of international agencies and NGOs, and the completion 

of most physical reconstruction. Yet in other less obvious ways the international 

community has become even more engaged as the years have passed. 

18

Clearly, putting a war-torn, multinational and post-communist country back together again is more complicated and time consuming than had been imagined—

or deemed politically admissible—at Dayton. It also reflects, however, the equally 

belated endowment of the High Representative with powers to sack whom he will, 

to impose such laws as he sees fit and, recently, actually to do some co-ordinating 

among the international organisations, financial institutions and big powers that 

have heretofore tended to pursue their own policy agendas. Post-Dayton Bosnia did 

not, therefore, start out as an international protectorate, but has gradually become 

one. Finally—and paradoxically—the increasingly intrusive activism of the international community reflects the likelihood that the end is nigh for the ad hoc ar- rangements mandated by Dayton. Time, patience, money, and interest are all running out. Paddy Ashdown would like to be the last High Representative. The Peace 

Implementation Council would like to declare Dayton implemented in 2005. Neither 

is likely, but the rush is nonetheless on to make BiH ready for a new sort of tutelage: the self-sustaining, self-disciplining and doubtless even longer-lasting process 

of European integration. This is why foreign functionaries and cock-eyed optimists 

alike nowadays repeat the mantra that the international community is pursuing not 

an exit strategy from Bosnia, but an entry strategy for Bosnia into the European 

Union. 

Before examining the reality or otherwise of BiH’s European future and highlighting the obstacles that stand in the way, it is worth looking briefly at what—

besides international community endurance—has gone right since the war. 

The country is peaceable and there is neither any appetite for nor any advantage 

to be gained from renewed warfare. Although there is still no consensus as to how 

it should be organised—and, particularly, whether the central institutions should 

stay weak and the two entities remain strong—the reality and legitimacy of the 

shared state have been much enhanced. Whether through unified sporting leagues, 

an increasingly common market and media space, a State Border Service, stateissued ID cards, or an occasionally functional tripartite presidency, centripetal 

forces have gained on centrifugal ones. 

Significant numbers of Serbs (perhaps 40 per cent) continue to pine for unification 

with Serbia in a shadowy future; but their politicians have come to accept BiH as 

the framework in which they must operate. Croats and their leaders no longer aspire to detach Hercegovina or to create a third entity. Instead, they see the development of the state as their best defence. Bosniaks, of course, have no place else to 

go, and remain the principal advocates of a more competent and coherent state. But 

the wartime flirtation of Alija Izetbegovic’s Party for Democratic Action (SDA) with 

a specifically Islamic course has faded. The party’s new president has told Bosniaks 

that drinking beer is no bar to joining the SDA. 

The large-scale return of refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes—

and especially the phenomenon of ‘‘minority return’’ over the past three years—is 

the most important measure both of the progress made and of Dayton’s integrative 

potential. Nearly a million people have gone home, some 40 per cent of them as ‘‘minorities’’ to towns and villages from which they were forcibly ‘‘cleansed’’ and in 

which their own ethnic group no longer rules. Many more might still return if jobs 

were available, if funds for reconstructing their houses could be assured, and if remaining bottlenecks could be removed, both inside Bosnia and in the region. The 

country will never regain its variegated pre-war demography, but the national-territorial homogenisation for which the war was fought is being mitigated. Most encouragingly, the entities’ political establishments no longer even dispute the right to return. 

Last year’s amendments to the entity constitutions are reinforcing this trend 

away from national-territorial exclusivity. Mostly agreed by the main parties and 

adopted by the entity parliaments—but in the end requiring partial imposition by 

the High Representative—these amendments resulted from a decision in 2000 by 

the state Constitutional Court. Ruling that the Dayton constitution guaranteed the 

full equality of Bosnia’s three ‘‘constituent peoples’’ throughout the country, the 

court struck down the provisions of the entity constitutions empowering Serbs as 

the ‘‘people of state’’ in Republika Srpska and granting Bosniaks and Croats dominion in the Federation. 

The elaborate mechanisms that have since been put in place for sharing power 

in the executive, for defining and defending ‘‘vital national interests’’ in the legislatures and courts, and for setting national quotas in the public service (according to 

the last pre-war census) are proving difficult to implement. They are also still matters more of form than of substance. But like the return of refugees (which they will 

further encourage), they testify to the fact that Dayton can serve to improve upon 

Dayton. In other words, institutions created by Dayton—the Constitutional Court 

19

and the High Representative—have managed to begin changing the nature of the 

all-powerful entities that emerged from Dayton. 

However, the post-war battle to improve upon the peace and, in fact, to provide 

an alternative ending to the war is far from won. The obstacles remain formidable 

and mutually reinforcing. Some are inherent. Like the old Yugoslavia of which it 

was the epitome, the multinational character of BiH complicates everything. Other 

problems are structural. The proliferation of layers of government with law-making 

powers (there are fourteen) is dysfunctional and unaffordable. The socialist smokestack economy is dead, but remains the model after which most people hanker. Most 

of what is consumed is imported. And the black and grey economies that wax on 

this trade crowd out domestic producers and law-abiding firms, impoverish the exchequer, and compromise the rule of law. Meanwhile, the foreign debt mounts and 

foreign aid declines. 

The long presence and increasingly exercised powers of the pro-consular regime 

have also become as much a part of the problem as they are essential to its solution. 

The High Representative and his helpmates initiate, promote and supervise reforms 

in virtually every sphere. As the final authority on Dayton implementation, the 

High Representative substitutes for the executive, legislative and judicial branches 

as required. Lord Ashdown has taken to acting too as Bosnia’s spiritual counsellor 

and cheerleader-in-chief. 

All this has the effect of relegating domestic political structures to the margins, 

reinforcing both the dependency syndrome and the propensity of politicians to obstruct the international agenda when they can, and to seek solace in private enrichment when they cannot. If high politics is reserved for the foreigners, then the locals 

will busy themselves with the low politics of patronage, graft and posturing. This 

conundrum illustrates how inherent, structural, legal and psychological factors 

interact to defer ‘‘closure’’. It shows, too, that even benign trusteeships have sellby dates. 

The return of the big-three nationalist parties to power at both state and entity 

levels following the October 2002 general elections has cast some of these dilemmas 

in strong relief. The victory of the parties that forged and fought the war has made 

it hard to spin the line that everything is going swimmingly in Bosnia. Notwithstanding a low turnout (54 per cent), the technical proficiency with which these first 

domestically-run elections were organised, and wishful assurances that the nationalist parties had changed their spots, essentially tribal voting was back after the 

electorate’s experiment with a non-nationalist alternative in 2000. 

Yet the defeat of the internationally-created and supported Alliance for Change 

coalition means that Lord Ashdown is even more obviously in the driving seat, and 

will require the politicians both to live up to their campaign commitments to reform 

and to accept responsibility when things go wrong. This is what happened last 

week, when he forced the resignation of the popularly elected Serb member of the 

sate presidency because of his failure to prevent either arms dealing with Iraq or 

contravention of the Dayton Accords by Republika Srpska military intelligence officers while serving as entity president. 

There is no doubt that it would be much easier to live with and pay for the 

feudalised structures bequeathed by the war and Dayton if BiH were a rich country. 

It would also be easier to reform those structures if the people and parties could 

be convinced that their rationalisation would help make them rich without, at the 

same time, jeopardising their respective ‘‘vital national interests’’. As matters stand, 

however, relative poverty and the insecurity it brings reinforce the grip of nationalist barons. Not only can they always play the cards of national solidarity and peril 

to keep their constituents in line, but they can also dispense the jobs, contracts, favours, and access to criminal opportunities that make a goodly part of the populace 

docile or complicit. The politics of patronage, clientage and corruption also inhibits 

the mobilisation of cross-cantonal, inter-entity, and all-national reform movements. 

Bosnia’s multiple fragmentation is thus a barrier to progress. But it is also an insurance policy against social disorder. Strikes, protests and demonstrations—as well as 

the initiatives of civil society—are invariably localised or nationally specific. 

Although you would be hard-pressed to guess from walking through the shopping 

precincts of the country’s larger cities or visiting the new hypermarkets that have 

sprouted on their outskirts, many still live in poverty. Some are not counted in official statistics; others keep their heads above the poverty line by legitimate and illegitimate means, running from compensatory support from family members, remittances from relatives abroad, working on the side, and black-marketeering. Nonetheless, according to recent calculations, 20 per cent of the populace lives beneath 

the poverty line, another 30 per cent hover around it, and the average net monthly 

salary is about $215. The official unemployment rate is 40 per cent, though the 

World Bank estimates that the real rate may be more like 20 per cent. Youth unemVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:16 May 20, 2003 Jkt 08421 PO 00000 Frm 000023 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\041003\86421 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ployment is particularly severe, and more than 60 per cent of young people tell pollsters they would emigrate if they could. 

The most dismal statistics relate to GDP. Despite extremely high, aid-driven rates of growth immediately after the war, GDP amounted to just $5.7 billion in 2002. 

This is less than half what it was before the war. Per capita GDP in 2001—at less 

than $1,900 in terms of purchasing power parity—was just about the lowest in 

South-Eastern Europe. No one expects GDP to regain its pre-war level before 2010. 

Public spending, meanwhile, accounts for 56 per cent of GDP—a rate that only very 

rich countries can sustain. 

As the international financial institutions, many domestic experts and the High 

Representative never tire of pointing out, the cure lies in transforming BiH from 

an aid-dependent, ill-governed, business-unfriendly, import-addicted, and deficit-ridden country in which only crooks enjoy a single market and the rule of law is capricious into its polar opposite. And if not that, then at least getting the country to 

the stage where it will be fiscally, legally and administratively competent to engage 

in the processes of European integration that can finish the job. But that, too, is 

a very tall order. 

Progress is being made, but it is late in the day. Whereas the former High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, concentrated on equipping the state with institutions sufficient to produce creeping ‘‘integration by sector’’, his successor has pursued what might be termed a strategy of ‘‘back to basics’’: rule of law, economic 

liberalisation, and restructuring government. State-building is still at the centre of 

the agenda, but it is now directed more towards streamlining, cost-cutting, inculcating responsibility and developing competence, on the one hand, and liberating entrepreneurship, attracting foreign investors, and stimulating exports on the other. 

The big project of the moment—the unification of the entities’ customs services 

and the introduction of value added tax (VAT) under the auspices of the state—illustrates the connections among these goals. Not only will state control over the 

main sources of tax and excise revenue serve to redress the balance of power between it and the entities, but it is also likely to produce vastly more revenue by 

eradicating the incompetence, inconsistency, and corruption that prevail in the entities’ management of indirect taxation. That these reforms are required for entry into 

the EU—and that the European Commission (EC) will pay for them—is another incentive. 

The ongoing struggle over VAT and customs is a striking example as well of how 

the international community is nowadays singing from the same hymnal in Bosnia. 

The international financial institutions would not in the past have supported an 

endeavour whose object was as much political as economic. Whether because the 

passage of time is concentrating minds, or simply because we are lucky in the personalities who currently occupy the key positions, the outbreak of unity among the 

foreigners is a wonder to behold. 

BiH has also been lucky in recent years that the EC has given every sign of appreciating its responsibilities and acting accordingly. Although Europe’s dismal 

record before and during the war created a dimension of reparation that is doubtless 

now diminishing in significance, self-interest continues to counsel special concern for 

and generosity towards Bosnia. Like the U.S., the EU can do without more instability in the region. Although the supposed terrorist threat in or from Bosnia has 

been much exaggerated, weak states with porous frontiers and poor people are vulnerable to financial crime and trafficking in drugs and people. Utterly failed states 

are more vulnerable still. The risk of total breakdown and the spectacle of hundreds 

of thousands of refugees again clamouring for sanctuary abroad may be slight, but 

the EU countries—even more than the U.S.—cannot be indifferent to it. Nor do they 

want more economic migrants. Europeanising Bosnia and the Balkans is a more attractive proposition than Balkanising Europe. 

The decisions last year to ‘‘double-hat’’ Lord Ashdown as an EU special representative, to take over the police-monitoring mission from the UN and, it seems, to beefup the EC delegation in Sarajevo have testified to the EU’s commitment and 

emphasised Bosnia’s European vocation. These innovations are working well. The 

more recently mooted suggestion that the EU should also assume responsibility 

from NATO for the 12,000-strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 2004 is more problematic. 

This is not because the EU lacks the capacity or because the U.S. has reservations 

about abetting any detachment of the nascent EU security arm from NATO. It is, 

rather, because the largely psychological and confidence-boosting role now played by 

SFOR troops would be jeopardised by a total American withdrawal. Bosniaks, in 

particular, would feel abandoned. As has been agreed in Macedonia, however, a visible NATO link can be maintained. What is more important in BiH is that a visible 

American connection should remain. Given the unfulfilled task of catching Radovan 

21

Karadzic, it might be best if an eventual EU force retained a U.S.-led intelligence 

capacity. 

Although the EU has gone a long way in BiH towards redeeming past failures, 

investing heavily in the present, and holding out the prospect of a European future, 

there is no guarantee that the welcome mat will be out forever. The reason is that 

the commitment of Chris Patten and Javier Solana to South-Eastern Europe may 

be as much personal as it is institutional. Moreover, the institutional framework 

itself is likely to change fundamentally when ten more countries enter the EU next 

year and a new constitutional charter is adopted. The Commission’s latest ‘‘working 

paper’’ reviewing Bosnia’s halting progress towards a feasibility study and 

Stabilisation and Association Agreement during 2002 already shows a disposition to 

replace carrots with sticks. This may be good tactics and sound strategy, but it could 

also be an intimation that the indulgence BiH will continue to need is wearing thin. 

Viennese wits used to observe before 1914 that the situation of their multinational empire might be hopeless, but it was not serious. The achievement in recent years in the Habsburgs’ former outpost of Bosnia & Hercegovina is to have 

transformed the hopeless into the merely serious.

Mr. BEREUTER. Next, we will hear from General William Nash. 

He is the Director of the Center for Preventive Action, Council on 

Foreign Relations and, by the way, the Project Director for the CPA 

report, Balkans 2010. 

General Nash, you may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL WILLIAM L. NASH (RET.), SENIOR 

FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

General NASH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing. But, 

more importantly, thank you for having the hearing. I think it 

comes at a very important moment for the Balkans; and it is, I 

think, important for the United States to tend to our business 

there. 

I will speak to you today about our report, Balkans 2010. In it, 

we address five major issues. We discussed the re-evaluation and 

clarification of the objectives of the international community and 

the reorganization of the presence of the international community 

in the region. We discussed issues relating to the rule of law and 

the development of criminal and civil justice. We talked about restructuring of Balkan economies, including banking, taxation, trade 

and pension systems. We discussed returning or resettling refugees 

in a way that respects individual choice; and, finally, we addressed 

education reform and establishment of a vigorous civil society, including a free and responsible press. 

In addition to my full statement, I would ask, sir, that you would 

include the report in the record. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, that will be the order. 

[The information referred to follows:]

NOTE: The above-mentioned report, Balkans 2010, by the Council on Foreign Relations, is not reprinted here. For information write to: The Publications Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. At the time of 

this hearing’s publication, this report is also available on the World Wide Web at: 

www.cfr.org/pdf/BalkanslTF.pdf.

General NASH. Sir, it was important and appropriate for you to 

note the successes in the region in the last decade; and I just endorse your comments there. 

I would highlight three areas where work remains, and that the 

report concentrates on. I will begin with the politico-criminal synVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:16 May 20, 2003 Jkt 08421 PO 00000 Frm 000025 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\041003\86421 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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dicates. It became clear in the work of the task force that most task 

force members considered the organized criminal groups to be the 

single greatest threat to regional stability, in large part because 

these groups’ survival depend on crushing any efforts to introduce 

transparency, accountability, and moderation in the political and 

economic systems of the state. 

The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic illustrates the scope 

and power of these groups, which include profiteers in alliance with 

hard-line politicians, unreformed agents of the police and security 

services, and corrupt members of the judiciary. Since his murder, 

as we have noted, there has been a high-profile and wide-ranging 

effort in Serbia to break the grip of these syndicates; and we were, 

frankly, pleased with this effort. I was pleased to see Secretary of 

State Powell acknowledge that and praise their efforts on his recent trip to Belgrade. 

But more of this same work needs to be done throughout the Balkans, not just in Serbia; and the task force recommended that 

these campaigns be a cooperative effort involving international actors and the local national actors and that they be launched with 

equal vigor in both Bosnia and Kosovo, as two examples, as soon 

as possible. 

We urge the Office of the High Representative and the U.N. mission in Kosovo, and all other relevant international agencies, to follow suit with targeted campaigns against individuals and groups 

associated with the illegal intersection of government and financial 

power. These are tasks that the United States should firmly support in cooperation with our European partners. 

The second major area is expanding the politico-criminal issue 

into building a larger concept of the rule of law; and there, too, I 

would begin that effort with the arresting of the war criminals. I 

was heartened that Secretary Powell also encouraged this effort to 

the new Prime Minister and that Mr. Zivkovic pledged early this 

month to fulfill Serbia’s obligations to the court. It is time for 

Karadzic and Mladic to go to The Hague. I think that conditionality remains the best stick to ensure progress on this front so long 

as our conditions are set in broad terms, with time limits sufficiently liberal to allow the local actors leeway in achieving the 

standards. 

I was very impressed with a discussion—when the task force was 

in Belgrade, we talked to one of the principles in the Ministry of 

Justice; and he went into a long litany of issues that they were 

working. But—and I would just tell you, sir, he wanted to do right 

and he knew pretty much what right was. The problem was the political capital he had to expend to pass each law and move each 

step down the road toward this reform—and I think you understand my term ‘‘political capital’’—that had to go about getting parliament to pass the laws necessary for reform and then to institute 

those reforms in reality. So that illustrates why it is helpful to 

have some leeway with conditionality, as recognition of the political 

reality that many of these reformers face. 

But the rule of law is more about bringing war criminals to justice. It means a legal system that is administered openly and fairly, 

according to prescribed statutes and regulations. Individuals and 

organizations are held accountable. Judges, police, minority rights, 

23

legitimate rulings are enforced. And I would emphasize that it encompasses both criminal and civil law. The latter is critical for economic development; and economic development, which has been 

disappointing, is crucial for any hope for a successful and stable future. 

Then, finally, sir, I would like to address the issue of the international presence in the region and the future roles of the United 

States and the European Union, vis-a-vis the Balkans. I mean two 

things: Ensuring that the European Union and NATO are the primary agents of international influence in the Balkans over the 

coming decade and then, by restructuring the current international 

presence, eliminating independent policymaking by ad hoc structures and transferring those responsibilities to permanent European, NATO, or responsible local institutions. 

The guiding principle for the task force was that the Balkans future does lie in Europe, both formally in terms of integration into 

European structures and institutions and informally in terms of 

shared norms and interests. Accordingly, the task force argued, as 

you stated, sir, that the Stabilization and Association Process within the European Union, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and the Membership Action Plan were the best tools as a 

guide for the path to full integration. 

The Balkans, I believe, represent a testing ground for the capability of the European Union as well as an opportunity for the development of a new type of collaboration between the United States 

and Europe, which could eventually contribute to the repair of 

transatlantic cooperation. I think it is in America’s best interest to 

encourage the Balkan states’ efforts to change, especially by using 

our influence in NATO, much related to the security services issues 

that Dr. Serwer talked about. Restarting, now, professional military education in U.S. schools for junior officers of the Serbian military should be included in this effort. It is also in America’s interest to recognize and support the EU’s lead in setting standards and 

providing assistance. 

This is not to say the United States can pull up and leave the 

Balkans. We should stay engaged on those issues that are critical 

to us. 

I would endorse personally Dan Serwer’s comments about security services and the war criminals issue. The final status process, 

I think, needs to begin. 

I would propose that we look into the issue of holding talks on 

technical and procedural matters now to set the stage for political 

discussions in the future. As you noted, sir, in your comments, we 

have less than 5,000 soldiers remaining in the Balkans. This is less 

than one of the brigades that went with me in 1995. It is a very 

significant reduction, and that marks well for the progress that we 

have made. But the remaining forces are needed at this time to 

provide that degree of stability so that all of the other political, economic, and social work can continue. 

Sir, I want to thank you again for giving me the opportunity to 

speak to you today, more particularly for keeping a focus on the 

Balkans at a time when it is not at the forefront of world affairs. 

It is this long-term commitment by the United States and its allies 

that has been a foundation for the transformation of the region. 

24

Until recently, I never thought I would have to defend the idea 

that staying the course and finishing the job is a necessary part of 

any international intervention. But we would not be at this juncture, discussing the finer points of completing the institution building in the Balkans, if we had not gone through the often messy, 

complicated but worthwhile tasks. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General Nash. 

[The prepared statement of General Nash follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL WILLIAM L. NASH (RET.), SENIOR FELLOW AND

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Thank you for inviting me to address this hearing of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. It comes at a critical moment for the Balkans, less 

than a month after Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic’s assassination in Serbia and little more than a week after the resignation of the Bosnian Serb member of Bosnia’s 

tripartite presidency amid scandals surrounding illegal arms exports to Iraq and alleged spying incidents. Today I wish to talk briefly about the current conditions in, 

and the challenges facing, the Balkan region, and to review some of the findings 

and recommendations in the Council on Foreign Relations’ recent independent task 

force report, Balkans 2010. I ask that the full text of the Balkans 2010 report be 

entered in to the record, and would like to note that the report is available at the 

Council on Foreign Relations’ website, at www.cfr.org. Unless otherwise noted, the 

report reflects the consensus views of task force members. I should clarify at the 

outset that when I say ‘‘Balkans,’’ I am referring primarily to the states of the 

former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia. 

The Balkan violence of the 1990s has run its course. With democratic governments in all of the former Yugoslav republics and regionwide ambitions to join the 

European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there is no 

longer a risk of major war between states. The Dayton Agreement ended the brutal 

war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and continues to provide both a framework 

for that country to move toward Europe and the means to root out the ethnic separatism that still holds it back. In Kosovo, the repression of the ethnic Albanians has 

ended and work is well underway in rebuilding that damaged society. Slobodan 

Milosevic, the primary architect of the decade’s violence, is on trial for his crimes 

at the international tribunal in The Hague. Across the states and regions of the 

former Yugoslavia, democratic governments share a common ambition to join the 

European Union and NATO. 

But work remains, and there are three areas from our report that I would like 

to emphasize. The first is the absolute necessity of confronting the politico-criminal 

syndicates that are endangering the development of democracy and free markets 

across the Balkans. The second and related point is the importance of building the 

rule of law, both civil and criminal, in the region. And the third is the essential reform of the international presence in the Balkans. 

I’ll start with the politico-criminal syndicates. In the course of working on the Balkans 2010 report, it became clear that many task force members considered the organized criminal groups to be the single greatest threat to regional stability, in 

large part because the groups’ survival depends on crushing the effort to introduce 

transparency, accountability, and moderation into the political and economic systems of the state. The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, attributed to an organized crime network with strong ties to former president Slobodan Milosevic’s regime, tragically illustrates the scope and power of these groups, which include criminal profiteers in alliance with hardline politicians, unreformed agents of the police 

and security services, and corrupt members of the judiciary. 

Since the Prime Minister’s murder, there has been a high-profile and wide-ranging effort in Serbia to break the grip of these syndicates, and this effort was rightly 

praised by Secretary of State Powell during his recent visit to Belgrade. However, 

this sort of concerted effort against politico-criminal syndicates is needed beyond 

Serbia. In fact, a principal recommendation of the Balkans 2010 task force was the 

implementation of vigorous campaigns aimed at crippling the politico-criminal syndicates that threaten internal and regional security. The task force recommended 

that these campaigns be a cooperative effort involving international actors and local 

forces, and that they be launched first in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the international presence is greatest. Now that Serbia has taken the initiative against these 

groups, it is all the more important that authorities in other areas, including the 

25

Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and the UN Mission in Kosovo 

(UNMIK), follow suit with targeted campaigns against the individuals and groups 

associated with the illegal intersection of government and financial power. The 

United States should firmly support these efforts. Simply put, reform won’t stick so 

long as these politico-criminal groups are flourishing. 

The second major issue I want to address is the importance of building the rule 

of law. First, you can’t talk about building the rule of law in the region without reiterating the absolute necessity of arresting war criminals, especially Radovan 

Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and sending them to The Hague. I was heartened that 

Secretary of State Powell strongly encouraged Serbia’s new Prime Minister, Zoran 

Zivkovic, to continue cooperation with the Hague Tribunal during his recent trip to 

Belgrade, and even more so that Mr. Zivkovic pledged on April 7th to fulfill Serbia’s 

obligations to the Court. I also believe that conditionality remains the best stick we 

have to ensure that progress on this front continues, so long as the conditions are 

set in broad terms, with time limits sufficiently liberal to allow local actors some 

leeway in achieving the required standards. Inflexible and arbitrary cut-off dates 

can be counterproductive when substantial progress toward the required standards 

is underway. But when there is continuous failure to abide by conditions, there 

must be a willingness to halt funding to demonstrate the consequences of inaction 

But rule of law is about more than bringing war criminals to justice. It means 

a legal system in which justice is administered openly and fairly according to prescribed statutes and regulations, individuals and organizations are held accountable, 

judges are impartial, minority rights are protected, and legitimate rulings are enforced. It encompasses both criminal and civil law: the latter is crucial for economic 

development, and economic development, in turn, is crucial to any hope for a successful, stable future for the Balkans. Indeed, strengthening the rule of law in both 

civil and criminal spheres is vital for achieving progress on other fronts in the region, as Secretary of State Powell rightly pointed out when he linked the extradition 

of war criminals with success against organized crime and the implementation of 

military reform. 

Finally, I want to focus on the role and structure of the international presence 

in the region, in particular the current and future roles of the United States and 

the European Union vis-a-vis the Balkans. By this I mean two things: ensuring that 

the European Union and NATO are the primary agents of international influence 

in the Balkans over the coming decade; and restructuring the current international 

presence to eliminate independent policymaking by ad hoc structures and transferring those responsibilities to permanent European or responsible local institutions. 

The guiding principle for the task force’s work was that the Balkans’ future lies 

in Europe—both formally, in terms of integration into European structures and institutions, and informally, in terms of shared norms and interests. If Europe is the 

goal, then Europe has to be the path, albeit with strong U.S. support and interests. 

Accordingly, the task force argued that the EU’s plan for the region—the Stabilization and Association Process—is, in conjunction with NATO’s Partnership for Peace 

program and Membership Action Plan, the best tool for putting the Balkan states 

on the path to full integration with western Europe by 2010. 

The Balkans represent both a testing ground for the capability of the EU as well 

as an opportunity for the development of a new type of collaboration between the 

United States and Europe, which could eventually become a template for future 

trans-Atlantic cooperation. While it is in America’s interest to encourage the Balkan 

states’ efforts to change—especially by using its influence in NATO to ensure a stable security situation and to guide military reform—it is also in America’s interest 

to recognize and support the EU’s lead in setting standards and providing assistance, and to help the EU stay the course and keep it accountable for its end of the 

deal. 

This is not to say that the United States can pull up stakes and leave the Balkans 

to the Europeans. In fact, there are elements of American involvement that are unmatched by Europe and will remain crucial in the region, including the U.S.’s 

unique political clout and its ability to speak with one voice. There are approximately 1,800 U.S. troops in Bosnia and 2,400 in Kosovo, drawn down significantly 

from previous highs but still necessary to help keep the peace and signal the U.S.’s 

ongoing commitment. Nor am I saying that the United States cannot stick up for 

its principles, interests, or methods—such as the use of conditionality—where those 

may diverge from our allies. Rather, the crucial point is that, while continued American engagement remains necessary for the Balkan states to achieve the stability 

that will make them productive partners, the current challenges facing the United 

States from areas other than the Balkans means that it is in the U.S. interest to 

take a supporting, rather than dominant role in Balkans reconstruction. 

26

In terms of the structure of the international presence: in the interest of time I 

won’t say much about that here, except that the current structure of international 

bodies in the region is inefficient and requires streamlining, and furthermore that 

the ultimate goal for the international presence is eventually to dismantle the ad 

hoc structures and transfer that authority to permanent European institutions or, 

preferably, competent local institutions. I refer you to the task force report for a 

more detailed discussion. 

I again thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today 

and, more particularly, for keeping a focus on the Balkans at a time when it is not 

at the forefront of world affairs. It is this long-term commitment by the U.S. and 

its allies that has been the foundation for the remarkable transformation of this region. Until recently, I never thought I’d have to defend the idea that staying the 

course and finishing a job is a necessary part of any international intervention. But 

we would not be at this juncture, discussing the fine points of completing the institution building of these fledgling democracies, if we had not gone through these 

often messy, complicated, but worthwhile tasks. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thanks to all of you for your written testimony 

and for your comments here today. 

I am going to turn first to the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Delahunt, for questions under the 5-minute rule times two. We 

are going to do 10 minutes each for a little more continuity in questions. 

Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I find it rather interesting to look out here and see the rather 

sparse attendance at this particular hearing when I think it was 

you, General Nash, that indicated that a while ago there would 

have been a room crowded with TV cameras and reporters and 

there would have been lines waiting outside. 

Staying the course, to use your term, General Nash, I think is 

something that we all should reflect on, particularly in the context 

of the moment. While I serve on this particular Subcommittee, my 

focus here on the Full Committee has been mostly dealing with 

Latin America, Central America and those issues. 

But it is interesting to listen to the problems and to the suggestions and to the themes that you all repeated, security forces, rule 

of law, both criminal and civil, because truly they are universal in 

nations that are emerging, if you will, democracies, whether it be 

Venezuela or Colombia or Haiti or Nicaragua or in the Balkans. It 

is the same set of issues, the same set of concerns that are expressed by those who study these issues wherever. I suspect that 

we will be hearing a year or 2 years from now another group as 

conversant with Iraq as you gentlemen are with the Balkans. 

Let me ask a question. The three of you have obviously spent 

considerable time and are very familiar with the problems of transition to democracy. Have you been consulted at all regarding Iraq 

and what the potential future is in terms of our involvement there? 

Dr. Serwer? 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Congressman, I think the answer in the case 

of the United States Institute of Peace and of me personally as well 

is yes. We have been consulted. We were consulted on issues of vetting and rooting out elements of the old regime. We have been consulted on questions of institution building. We have been consulted 

on questions of transitional justice and rule of law. That is not to 

say that we couldn’t have done more. It is not to say that in the 

rush to get things done every bit of our good advice was taken. But 

yes, I do think that we have been consulted and we have used a 

27

very broad range of experts from universities, from other think 

tanks and other institutions, international organizations. We are 

continuing those consultations right now. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is very encouraging. I wish that this kind 

of information had been made known to Members of Congress who 

have expressed concern about postwar reconstruction of Iraq. 

Dr. Wheeler, have you been, given your depth of experience and 

knowledge, in this area? 

Mr. WHEELER. Where I live in Sarajevo we are so far off the 

beaten track of international journalists now that the only time 

somebody from the New York Times or Reuters comes around to 

see me is when there is something big happening, and the inevitable question is what are the lessons from Bosnia? This happened 

in the autumn of 2001 in regard to Afghanistan and of course it 

has been happening in recent weeks in regard to Iraq. As a consequence, I have had to give some thought about what lessons 

there might be. 

Unfortunately, the most compelling lesson is probably that there 

isn’t one, in the sense that there is not an off-the-shelf kind of set 

of assumptions that you can expect the handlers of any new crisis 

to actually apply. In other words, the exigencies, the imperatives 

of any given set of circumstances are going to almost always mean 

that nobody is going to pay any attention in the heat of the moment, in the time of crisis, to the theoretical lessons that academics 

are going to have a lot of fun writing about in future years. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. General Nash. 

General NASH. The Council on Foreign Relations, sir, has done 

a number of studies on the postwar Iraq issues and I have been 

an active participant in those deliberations and assisted with the 

publication. Additionally, I am very proud to say that a number of 

former officers that served with me in Bosnia are senior members 

of the Central Command staff responsible for areas of postwar efforts, and we have had informal discussions. Though I have not 

been asked formally by anybody in the Department of Defense to 

provide advice, the fact that I——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Possibly the Department of State, also? 

General NASH. Or the Department of State or the fact that I occupied Iraq for 2 months following Operation Desert Storm. I have 

provided my views freely in a number of public ways, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. We thank you for the pro bono work, General. I 

hope they have your cell phone number. I concur with you, Dr. 

Wheeler, in terms of uniqueness and particular circumstances in 

many respects, but there are really general themes, as I said earlier. During the course of these hearings, we talk, for example, 

about the Balkans but I hear it all the time about Latin America. 

The movement toward democracy has really progressed rather rapidly if we are talking about elections. But when we are talking 

about democratic institutions, it is an extremely painful process. 

We have all experienced the pain in the Balkans. I just think that 

for those of us who are concerned about this instant crisis, given 

the nature of our arrival and our intervention, that this is going 

to be a very long, long and arduous journey. Your expertise, I 

would hope, would be made available, not just to the AdministraVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:16 May 20, 2003 Jkt 08421 PO 00000 Frm 000031 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\041003\86421 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

tion but on a continuing basis to individual Members of Congress 

as well as this particular Subcommittee. 

I do agree, by the way, that if there is one obvious problem, and 

I think you have all touched upon it, it is the vetting of the security 

services, and that is true whether it is Northern Ireland or Haiti 

or Bosnia. I think we grasp it intellectually but we do not make 

the resource commitment that is necessary. This is staying the 

course. This is not a 2- or a 3- or a 4- or a 5-year effort. This has 

to be sustained over a period, I daresay, of a decade or longer to 

ensure that the culture that evolves in terms of the security forces 

is one that is consistent with democratic principles. I have always 

wondered and suggested during other hearings that the kind of 

training that we do is done on an ad hoc basis. It is for a period 

of time. 

I have been talking recently to Members of the Subcommittee 

about a school of Americas for democracy which would actually be 

a venue, a campus, if you will, where there would be a consistency 

over an extended period of time, where the staff would be bilingual, 

would be multinational, where this would be an ongoing, sustained 

part of our foreign policy. Because with all of our deficits in terms 

of our security forces, our law enforcement sector, I think we have 

a vital role there in terms of not just democratizing the Balkans 

or Latin America but elsewhere in the country. 

We are doing this today as part of—and I won’t go on too much 

longer, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me. We are making this 

effort today in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland. The policing 

issue is a key issue in terms of the Good Friday agreements. If that 

can be resolved, I daresay, in terms of the police force in Northern 

Ireland, that we will see full implementation of the Good Friday 

Agreement in Northern Ireland, and they are looking to the United 

States to assist in that effort. 

Comment, if you will, and I won’t take any more time. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Serwer. 

Mr. SERWER. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I too think that there are 

some general lessons and I wanted to offer them. In my view, public security is job one. What we are seeing today in Iraq is most 

unfortunate, because we are seeing a situation in which people will 

not feel secure, will not feel protected. What you get in that situation is the formation of gangs, often on an ethnic basis. You get organized crime. Some of those folks looting today are looting resources that they will use to set up their businesses. It becomes 

more and more difficult every day that passes to reverse the situation. So I think public security is job number one. Apparently no 

provisions have been made for civilian policing in Iraq for the moment, so it has to be done by the soldiers. I might prefer that they 

not have that burden, but I think it has to be done that way. 

Governance is really job number two. I won’t go into that but I 

wanted to underline the importance, in addition to your long-term 

concerns, of the immediate need for public security. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Wheeler. 

General NASH. Amen. Amen, sir. 

Mr. WHEELER. I can, of course, think of a few negative lessons 

as well as these—I couldn’t agree more, that all the issues associated with law and order, rule of law, are the most fundamental 

29

ones. But there are some things that the international community 

is best not advised to do or make the centerpiece of either their exit 

strategies or their celebrations of their victories. One, of course, is 

early elections. Too many times, we have seen in other places, including Bosnia & Hercegovina, too much importance placed on the 

notion that democracy in all its glory will be fundamentally restored once you have elections. There has also been a tendency in 

some places to imagine that there were some shortcuts. 

One particular problem in Bosnia in the early years was the idea 

that if you somehow established a free media, people would immediately start loving each other once more and democracy and peace 

and brotherhood would be assured. The belief in magic bullets or 

magic cures is misplaced. 

Going soft at the beginning is another error that we certainly can 

learn about from the experience in Bosnia & Hercegovina, being 

frightened of the bad guys, being frightened to confront the hardliners assiduously at the start. You pay a price over many years 

if you actually fail to confront the enemies of peace at the very beginning who take it for granted that of course you are going to remain weak, and so some time has to be wasted in that respect. 

I think that is enough negative lessons. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. We are going to go for reasons of his 

Floor schedule to Mr. Engel next. The gentleman from New York 

is recognized for 10 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first talk about 

the situation in Kosova and I am wondering if you could comment. 

Some observers believe that as long as the U.N. Secretary-General’s emissary remains the highest authority in the land that neither the politicians from Kosova nor its citizens can really develop 

a true sense of responsibility toward the country as a whole, including its binary population. I am wondering if you could comment 

on that. I said in my opening statement that I thought final status 

discussions should not be shelved indefinitely because I think that 

if we do that, we will find as the years go by we may be in a situation that we may not like. I think now is the time that we can discuss this issue and have democracy in Kosova. 

I am wondering if anyone would care to comment on that question. Dr. Serwer? 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Engel, I agree entirely with you on the need 

to begin the process of decision making on final status. I do not 

think that the SRSG, the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, is at this point a great hindrance to the Kosovo institutions feeling responsible. In fact he has presented a plan for turning over all the authority he can, all the responsibilities he can, 

under Resolution 1244, by the end of this year. The real problem 

is that in order to decide Kosovo final status 1244 has to be 

changed. The only way of changing it in my view is through a negotiated solution between Belgrade and Pristina. I don’t see how a 

new Security Council resolution is going to pass without Belgrade’s 

having accepted it. The question is, can we design a process that 

will bring Belgrade and Pristina to some sort of negotiated agreement, one that satisfies at least part of each of their needs and 

probably not all of either side’s needs. 

30

I believe that there are many options and that the pure options 

that you referred to are not likely to be the only ones on the table. 

There are possibilities for all sorts of conditions being imposed on 

any proposed compromise solution, and I think we would all expect 

some conditions. After all, who will defend Kosovo if it were to become independent? I don’t know anybody who has solved that problem. It will require security guarantees from NATO, from Serbia. 

I don’t know from whom. How are its borders with Albania and 

Macedonia to be secured? It is going to require guarantees by 

Kosovo to its neighbors. 

I don’t mean to suggest that independence is the only outcome. 

I think there are a number of other possible outcomes, and what 

we need now is to begin the process of searching for a decent outcome, a decent negotiated solution. 

Mr. ENGEL. Talk to me about other outcomes because you and I 

have had some discussion in the past. I am convinced that independence ultimately is the only outcome. What other outcome can 

there possibly be? You surely don’t think that there can ever be 

any kind of a federation with Serbia anymore. Maybe in my estimation 10 years ago that might have been possible, but my feeling 

is that Milosevic through his repressive policies in essence caused 

the Serbs to lose Kosova. 

What would be an alternative to independence? 

Mr. SERWER. Congressman, we have offered a number of alternatives in our paper on Kosovo options. Just to cite a couple of 

them, there is the possibility of nominal sovereignty that Serbia 

would preserve even though Kosovo might have a seat at the 

United Nations, for example. 

There is the possibility of partition, or exchange of territory, or 

exchange of populations. I don’t mean to be advocating any of these 

things. It seems pretty clear to me that Belgrade before the assassination of Zoran Djindjic was prepared to come to the table with 

a proposal for partition and exchange of populations. It is not something that I would advocate, but it is a solution that Belgrade is 

certainly entitled to advocate. 

What does independence mean for a place like Kosovo? What 

does it mean about its relationship with its neighbors? How will it 

be defended? What kinds of security guarantees will it give to Macedonia? There are all sorts of problems that have to be resolved. 

This can’t be like the independence of the United States, declared 

one day, fought hard for and established unequivocally the next. 

Kosovo is not in that situation. It is not the 18th century. It is the 

21st century. It is going to be a whole lot more complicated. 

Mr. ENGEL. There are people who say that Mr. Djindjic, obviously before his assassination, in private would say that he understood that the Serbs have lost, or Belgrade has lost Kosova, but as 

a politician he couldn’t really advocate that or say that. 

In the event of Belgrade-Pristina negotiations, could you envision 

a day where a Serbian politician could permit Kosova to leave at 

least nominally or be independent and survive politically? 

Mr. SERWER. I believe it is generally accepted in Belgrade today 

that Belgrade will never again govern the Albanian population of 

Kosovo. That doesn’t mean that anybody in Belgrade supports independence. I talked with Zoran Djindjic about this a number of 

31

times before his death. He certainly was not aiming to hold on to 

all of Kosovo or to govern Kosovo again in the future. I don’t think 

he was quite reconciled to what you would regard as a satisfactory 

independence outcome. But the fact is that Belgrade Serbs have to 

ask themselves whether a democracy in Belgrade can claim to govern a population that won’t send any representatives to Belgrade. 

My view is that they have signaled clearly already that they intend 

at most to govern Serbs in Kosovo and not to govern Albanians. 

But we need to work out a structure in which the Albanians can 

be satisfied with an outcome of that sort. So far they have not been 

prepared to accept it and that is their right and that is what the 

negotiation has to be about. 

Mr. ENGEL. You mentioned borders. If anyone else would like to 

comment, I would be interested in hearing anybody else’s feelings 

on this. There have been proposals from time to time during the 

Bosnian War, for instance, of changing or shifting of borders. I 

know it makes people very nervous when you start talking about 

that. You say, for instance, you take the case of Bosnia, for example. It is partitioned between the Republic of Srpska and the Croat/

Bosnian Muslim entity. The Croat/Bosnian Muslim entity I think 

is a bit farcical because those communities while on paper are 

working together in the country, the report that we get is that the 

factions are actually different. Is it folly to start envisioning a situation where if the Serbs in Bosnia would want to be incorporated 

into Serbia, if the Serbs would shift borders, if different borders 

could be shifted? Is that something that anyone is talking about seriously? Or is it a situation where it is a terrible can of worms and 

once you open it, where does it end? 

Mr. WHEELER. It is certainly, Mr. Engel, a horrible can of worms 

which would be much better off not opened. Once you open one of 

these questions, then all of the rest tend to come out, usually in 

surprising and extremely unacceptable and distressing ways. This 

is why it seems to me, going back to your interest in Kosovo, any 

international support for current ideas in Belgrade, of lopping off 

the northern 20 percent of Kosovo, should be resisted. This of 

course was the quid pro quo which Djindjic expected to get and is 

the sweetener which many Serbs expect to receive in return for acknowledging what I would agree with you is the certain loss both 

of the territory of Kosovo, Metohia as they like to call it, and the 

people who live there. 

As far as Bosnia is concerned, Bosnia & Hercegovina is concerned, quite honestly I think we are fortunate, and I tried to make 

this point, that an ever decreasing minority of people living in Bosnia & Hercegovina actually envisage in a serious way carving up 

the territory of that particular sovereign state. It is vulnerable and 

therefore there is tremendous alarm expressed whenever talk of 

partitioning Kosovo or talk of compensating Serbia for the loss of 

Kosovo with the unification of Serbia and grip over the Serbs that 

comes up. These are very dangerous and destabilizing features. We 

have already fought too many wars over territories and frontiers. 

We should be much wiser to leave territorial settlements pretty 

much as they are. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if I could just have 

your indulgence for one more question. 

32

Mr. BEREUTER. Briefly, yes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes. Mr. Serwer, it is my understanding that Ali 

Ahmeti, who is an ethnic Albanian politician in Macedonia, has requested a visa to come to the United States but he hasn’t been approved. I am wondering if you have an opinion on that, whether 

he should receive his visa and be removed from the so-called blacklist given his role in the war? Also, how is he functioning in the 

Macedonian government and the level of acceptance of him? 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Engel, my understanding is the same, that he 

has requested a visa. The United States Institute of Peace under 

my signature invited him some time ago to come speak in Washington on a program that will make it quite clear that he accepts 

the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia. He has been 

participating actively and positively in the peace process in Macedonia. I think he is one of the mainstays of that process at this 

point. It seems to me clear enough that the time has come that he 

should visit Washington, become more familiar with the scene here, 

and give us a better idea of who he is and how committed he is 

to this peace process. I would very much welcome his getting a 

visa, but I don’t determine that and I understand that it is somewhere in the bureaucratic process. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. You are welcome. The gentleman from Florida, 

Mr. Wexler, is recognized. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to apologize 

for missing your oral statements. I was at another meeting as was 

Mr. Engel. You won’t believe me, but I actually read your statements last night. If you have spoken to this at great length, please 

tell me and there will be no reason to repeat it, but I was hoping 

that you could, any member on the panel or all three, speak to the 

issue of the European Union taking over the force in Macedonia. 

It seems to me that while that is something that, while not gone 

unnoticed by this Subcommittee, may be one of the most fundamental new directives or new directions coming out of European 

policy that will have fundamental ramifications in the future, both 

by the way Europe reacts to different situations and possibly to the 

way the United States reacts. I was hoping that you might be able 

to comment both from an American and from a European perspective, what different dynamic the European Union taking charge of 

Macedonia and potentially in further exercises what dynamic that 

creates? 

And, if there is time, the second question I would ask in that all 

three of you are such experts on this region, are there any lessons 

that we should learn from the rebuilding of the Balkans that 

should be applied to the rebuilding of Iraq? Are there any analogies 

to be made? Are there any suggestions that you have where mistakes or different courses in this region could have been taken that 

are applicable to Iraq and what lessons, if any, should we take to 

Iraq regarding our experiences here? 

General NASH. Sir, if I could, I will start on the first one. I am 

less concerned about the fact that the European Union is interested 

in developing their own ability to have a peacekeeping force or a 

military force to pursue common objectives, than I am that the 

33

United States as a NATO member, and the NATO membership as 

a whole, is less interested in being involved in these issues. In 

other words, I am not concerned that Europe is trying to do it, I 

am concerned that NATO is not wanting to do it more and remain 

involved. 

So I look upon the Macedonia case as more an abrogation by 

NATO of its responsibilities; and frankly, I look at that as the fact 

that the United States did not want to do it and therefore NATO 

backed off and the European Union picked up the bill. I think it 

is reflective of a trend that we are going to see more and more of: 

That is, the development of a capacity by the European countries 

to develop an independent military force to use at the time and 

place of their choosing without necessarily having reference to the 

United States. That is not necessarily bad in its own right, but it 

is in fact a reflection of their concern about our interest in such 

tasks and what they would perceive as the difficulty in working 

with us. 

Mr. SERWER. If I might, Congressman, I welcome the EU taking 

over the mission in Macedonia. I think it is a good thing. It is being 

done in close collaboration with NATO, which is providing some assets to support that mission. I think it is likely to be a good model 

for the future, in particular in Bosnia. I am not really concerned 

that the Europeans will develop too much independence in this respect. I think we are a long way from that. I think that what they 

need to develop is greater credibility, and credibility has less to do 

with their actual military capacity, which is more than sufficient 

for anything they face in the Balkans today, and more to do with 

unity of purpose and command and control. 

The Europeans remain very divided among themselves. You can 

play them off one against the other. They have some super people 

now running their operations in the Balkans: Solana, Patten, 

Busek, Steiner, Ashdown. These are great people. But there are 

five of them and it is not clear who is in charge of whom. So I think 

there are real problems still with European credibility that come 

from their command and control issues and their lack of unity of 

purpose, and I think they have to work more on that. Having some 

military force to deploy, having some police force to deploy, because 

after all they have taken over the police mission in Bosnia as well, 

it seems to me will encourage the kind of unity of command and 

control that is required. 

I would encourage greater European unity. I think a strong European partner may occasionally cause us difficulties but in the end 

will be a great asset. 

Mr. WHEELER. I agree totally with everything that Dr. Serwer 

has just said, and in fact I think we would regard what happened 

with the force in Macedonia as truly epic-making if it weren’t for 

the fact that only 325 soldiers are involved, which rather takes 

some of the thrill out of the proceeding. Because what really is impressive is the extent to which an arrangement was arrived at even 

in these times for a French brigadier general to take over this 

under NATO auspices. It shows that arrangements of any sort, 

whether we are talking about arrangements for conditional independence of Kosovo or anything else do tend to be possible if there 

is enough good will. 

34

Mr. WEXLER. If I could, I understand Mr. Delahunt asked a very 

similar question with respect to Iraq, so there is no reason for anyone to answer my second question. 

General NASH. I just said amen to Dan’s answer on that one, sir. 

If I could just add one point very quickly. One of the lessons of Bosnia vis-a-vis Afghanistan was that in Bosnia we provided a very 

strong military force to establish that aura of public security that 

Dr. Serwer talked about earlier as being a critical aspect. But the 

political arrangement within Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of Dayton 

was an artificial political arrangement that was made largely by 

people that were not citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In fact, only 

one signatory of the six or so that signed it were citizens of BosniaHercegovina. So in Bosnia we had a strong military force to establish public security and an artificial political arrangement. 

In Afghanistan, we went to great lengths to create a political arrangement, bringing together as many Afghan players as possible 

to help devise and bond the political arrangements for the interim 

government and the transition process, but we did not provide a 

sufficient security force to ensure that the entire country of Afghanistan had the requisite security and public safety to proceed 

down this political path. 

If you are asking for a lesson, I would suggest to you a military 

solution not unlike Bosnia and a political solution that followed a 

process somewhat like Afghanistan. 

Mr. WHEELER. Which is another way of saying that it would be 

a good idea to trust the arrival of the transitional political authority in Iraq to something like what happened in Afghanistan; in 

other words, internationalize it. 

Mr. SERWER. I confess I don’t agree with that. I believe that the 

U.N. is in no position to lead the political process in Iraq. I think 

the Americans have vital interests in Iraq that are engaged with 

the question of who governs Iraq. Having done what we have done, 

I think we will keep that under our control, with a lot of advice 

from others. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. I do have some questions, more than I can probably fit in here. Maybe the first sort of 

straightforward question would be directed to you, General Nash, 

but the other two witnesses certainly should feel free to make a 

contribution. I have a friend who is a retired general in the Italian 

Carbinieri. It has its equivalent in Spain and France and I understand a little bit about its training and its military and police functions. I wonder if you have an opinion about whether or not this 

kind of force could play a larger role in general in replacement for 

soldiers who are attempting to be peace enforcement people in 

these kind of conflicts and if you know whether or not any formal 

study has been given to that idea. 

General NASH. Sir, the idea of a constabulary type force, a 

carbinieri-gendarmerie of type force that combines low-end military 

with high-end police capacity in the pursuit of peacekeeping/public 

security issues has been of interest both to the Council on Foreign 

Relations and a number of other agencies around town, to include 

the U.S. Institute of Peace. I think it is a worthy objective. Obviously, as you mentioned, there are a number of nations that have 

35

such a capacity. In the Balkans, we were able to draw on that capacity to a certain degree, even in the American sectors, and to use 

it for various tasks and that was very valuable. I would encourage 

the United States to create a similar capacity for a wide ranging 

variety of missions, but I can’t give you a way to pay the bill, sir; 

and I am not going to train a division for such a capacity, given 

the fact that they are limited to the extent to where they can operate, whereas it is my judgment that the military forces, with specialized training, are able to handle many of the constabulary duties, supplemented by certain expertise and the like. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Serwer, I see you want to respond to that. 

Mr. SERWER. May I just add, Mr. Chairman, that we have done 

quite a bit of work on this question, particularly constabulary 

forces for Iraq. We have published a paper that with your permission I will provide to your office. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I appreciate it. 

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Mr. SERWER. That paper outlines not only the requirements for 

constabulary forces but also for judicial and prosecutorial resources 

to be deployed to Iraq. I think it is fair to say that this bit of unsolicited advice has not been taken by the Administration, but I think 

quite a bit of work has been done on what requirements there are 

and about how much they might cost as well. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Next, I want to ask the question about corruption. It seems most people agree that it is a corrosive, pervasive 

force in the Balkans. I think the deeper we look at it, the more we 

will find the misuse and theft of foreign aid from various countries, 

including our own, from public and nonpublic international organizations as well. How deep are the roots of this problem? Was it a 

problem in Tito’s Yugoslavia? Was it a problem in Yugoslavia before the disintegration of Yugoslavia? Is there something that 

makes it more difficult to wipe out in this part of the continent 

than other places? 

Mr. WHEELER. It is complicated because, of course, the historical 

legacy is one not simply of 50 years of communism and then 5 or 

10 years of war and postwar trauma. In this part of the world, and 

what I mean by that is Central and Eastern Europe, the nature of 

the state and the nature of the definition of power and the rule of 

the politician has often created circumstances which have been conducive to certain levels of corruption. But it certainly is the case 

that we have the worst of both worlds now in the former Yugoslavia, and that is that you do have a long period of decline and 

decay of the old Communist system leading ultimately to war and 

the breakup of the state and the creation of alternative structures 

which have been used to substitute for the normal economy and the 

normal insurance policies of people. 

So corruption has indeed become endemic. We have seen similar 

phenomenon, of course, in other East European countries, notably 

in Russia, where capitalism originally was defined almost in terms 

of Mafia style corruption. I have a feeling, however, that this—however natural and however dysfunctional this is, it is something that 

will gradually come to an end, not just because it is going to be assaulted ever more systematically with all sorts of local and international assistance but also because in a sense it is a phase, and 

I think we can look forward to that corrosion attenuating, although 

admittedly I am expressing here a tremendous amount of optimism, I suspect. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Looking at the aspirants for the EU and the aspirant countries for NATO, a particular focus, of course, is on judicial 

reform and on dealing with corruption. Do you think that these 

membership tests have had an important role in reducing the problems in those countries, and that is to say, if you in fact began to 

see Croatia moving toward NATO membership that we would see 

an acceleration in dealing with this problem? 

General NASH. My personal view, sir, is that some of this has 

been a ‘‘check the block’’ effort to reach standards. Many of the 

laws are put on the book, but there has not necessarily been wideranging implementation. So I am concerned about that as far as 

some of the membership process of both the EU and NATO is concerned. 

53

If I could go back to your earlier question and just comment 

quickly. You may have included in your examples a case in Kosovo 

where a member of the international community siphoned funds, 

embezzled funds from his program to considerable personal gain, as 

part of the corruption issue that was taking place on the repair of 

some public facilities. I think that is not endemic to the system, per 

se. I happen to know the individual who is accused, and I did not 

blink when it was reported that there had been a problem in that 

area. But at the same time one of the recommendations of the Balkan task force is to streamline and stop the ad hoc arrangements 

with respect to international organizations. As a result of the mixing of responsibilities by different organizations, it is not that one 

organization or another organization cannot handle the various 

tasks, but when the lines of responsibility are not clear, it is very 

hard to chase the rabbit all the way to where a wrong has been 

done. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I can believe that. And what is the solution for 

that problem because we have so many organizations, public and 

nonpublic, involved? 

General NASH. In the Balkans, we recommend more and more responsibility toward the European Union. In my view, in postwar reconstruction efforts, a lead agency has to take that responsibility 

and there should be no doubt about who is in charge and who is 

responsible for the strategic planning within the context of that organization. The second recommendation would be an early decision 

to allow timely planning, resourcing, and organizing those organizations. For example, the international community structure in 

Kosovo was put together in the last week of a nearly 3-month 

bombing campaign that was supposed to last a week. Putting it together and going right to work, you inevitably cobble together an 

organizational structure. The Office of the High Representative in 

Bosnia is an even worse example of a cobbled structure. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I have a related question coming from the Balkans 2010 report, General Nash. In it it says transitional justice 

cannot simply be confined to a courtroom in the Netherlands. So 

how do we expect and how did the people working around that 

table under your supervision expect the people and societies of the 

Balkan countries to come to terms with the violence and injustice 

of the past if they are not able to deal with those problems through 

their own judicial systems in their own countries? In other words, 

at what point does the International Criminal Tribunal in the 

Hague transfer responsibilities to the judicial systems and institutions of the Balkans region? 

General NASH. That is another area that is much easier to talk 

about than actually do. There are a couple of aspects of that. We 

felt that the ICTY, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, had to 

complete its work in the next year or two, and, in parallel with the 

development of the justice system within the respective countries, 

begin to transfer responsibility for trials. At the same time, the 

transitional justice issue concerns a reconciliation process and a 

recognition by the community of a wide variety of issues. We were 

fortunate to have on the task force Alex Boraine, a South African 

who is an expert in this area, who guided us in a number of our 

recommendations. But the reconciliation process happens in parVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:16 May 20, 2003 Jkt 08421 PO 00000 Frm 000057 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\041003\86421 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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allel with the international community helping to develop the local 

justice systems. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Wheeler? 

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, this is an interesting example of 

the predicaments we in the international community can get ourselves into. As the Balkans 2010 report does rightly emphasize, it 

is vastly important to have effective transitional justice mechanisms in place. A tremendous amount of effort has been placed on 

this in Bosnia & Hercegovina. Not only has there been talk of a 

South African style truth and reconciliation commission but real 

active steps have been taken toward creating a Bosnian state court 

that would be able to handle the war crimes cases that will never 

get to the Hague. There are estimated between 5,000 and 7,000 of 

such cases. A state court has duly in fact been established early 

this year. But it turns out that it can’t actually create a special 

panel to handle war crimes cases by Hague standards because, of 

course, the money has run out. So then there was on the one hand 

the international community demands that in the interest of the 

rule of law, and in this case transitional justice, the Bosnian state 

should do certain things or other Balkan states should do certain 

things, and the structures have been created which can’t at the end 

be made functional because there is no money and the donors are 

not interested in providing it. 

Mr. BEREUTER. And, Dr. Wheeler, if we were able to establish 

such a court, who would be the judges? How would they be selected? Would they have life tenure? Do we have enough trust in 

their capacity, their judicial demeanor and ethics that they should 

have life appointments? This is a problem in Southeast Europe and 

Bulgaria and Romania. 

Mr. WHEELER. In Bosnia & Hercegovina in general a high judicial and prosecutorial council has been in operation since the autumn and it is proceeding with general reappointment of judges 

and prosecutors who will after a probationary period get life appointments. 

Mr. BEREUTER. These are citizens of that country? 

Mr. WHEELER. The judges and prosecutors being appointed are 

all local but the high judicial prosecutorial council is mixed, eminent local jurists with a foreign chair. In the case of the war crimes 

chamber of the state court, certainly the proposal there is that 

there should be a mixed bench of international judges and local 

judges. 

Mr. BEREUTER. What is the best training capacity that we have 

in a multinational sense for judges from these countries emerging 

from communism and chaos? 

Mr. WHEELER. The best training capacity is simply to enforce the 

highest possible standards and get rid of the duds. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Is there an international organization that has 

taken this on, though, or many? For example, we have an academy 

for police operating out of Hungary. Do we have such an equivalent 

for judges anywhere? 

Mr. WHEELER. I am not aware of one. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Serwer? 

Mr. SERWER. I think you do have programs for training judges 

and prosecutors run by ABA/CEELI and other NGOs. I think the 

55

Council of Europe also has some of those. I only wanted to note 

that I believe that it has proved essential to have some international participation in the initial stages of prosecutions after 

some of these conflicts. I think it is quite clear in the case of 

Kosovo, for example, where we tried to do without it at first. 

Mr. BEREUTER. In a judicial end or just the prosecutorial end? 

Mr. SERWER. Both. We tried to do without it at first. We found 

that a Serb accused of violence against Albanians or an Albanian 

accused of violence against Serbs simply was not getting a fair trial 

in a court composed only of locals and with a local prosecutor. 

What we did was to overlay on that a system of international 

judges and prosecutors that works pretty well. We have one of 

those prosecutors working at the Institute now. It seems to us that 

this is a solution that will have to be used elsewhere. 

But it is a case of bringing judges and prosecutors into Kosovo, 

not having them sit in the Hague. So it is quite different from some 

of what is done in other parts of the Balkans. I think there is a 

real need for international engagement, capacity building, training, 

but also active international participation in the judicial process in 

these postconflict situations. Certainly in Iraq we won’t be able to 

entrust only to Iraqis the postconflict prosecutions. 

Mr. BEREUTER. There has been functioning for some time a multilaterally funded international judicial training program also for 

various other positions within the judicial process, for Latin America, in San Jose, Costa Rica. I remember visiting it in the midst 

of the eighties when we were having great difficulties there. No 

equivalent like that in one location at this point in Europe, but you 

mentioned several places where they are potentially getting some 

assistance, maybe including the Council of Europe. 

Mr. WHEELER. There are programs. Dr. Serwer remembers ABA/

CEELI. The Greek government supports the European Public Law 

Center. These various bodies, whether they are publicly supported 

or NGOs, do and can provide judicial training. As part of the belated root and branch reform of the judiciary and prosecution services in Bosnia now, training academies are being set up with individual foreign participation. But I am not aware that these bodies 

have been entrusted to any one particular foreign center or provider to work on it. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Two more questions, and I will just throw them 

before you so that you know you can plan your life and you will 

know that I am not going to keep you here forever. What do any 

of you think of the EU’s performance in policing in Bosnia? And 

why are we not able to capture and bring to justice in the Hague 

some of the most notorious war criminals? 

Mr. WHEELER. I will start with the EU if I might. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Fine. 

Mr. WHEELER. The politician’s answer would be of course that it 

is too early to say. The EU PM has only taken over from the International Police Task Force, the EU Mission, on the 1st of January. 

Certainly early indications are good. Some of the doubts that have 

been expressed over whether or not the EU PM would take human 

trafficking seriously were very quickly resolved and the EU PM 

showed that it certainly was going to take human trafficking issues 

seriously. There has been some worry about whether or not the EU 

56

PM would be sufficiently concerned about human rights in general 

because it didn’t have a special human rights section. 

Amnesty International certainly protested to Javier Solana about 

that. But I haven’t seen any cases emerge where dereliction of duty 

in propagating human rights in the police forces has yet come to 

the fore. The big question over whether or not the EU PM is going 

to be able to do the job in maintaining the progress that the U.N. 

made with police reform is whether or not its slimmed-down, newlook version of what is called collocation; in other words, instead 

of having bobbies on the beat, policemen on the beat, they are 

going to have supposedly high level expert police in ministries of 

the interior at the highest and medium levels. Whether or not that 

is going to work and mentoring and monitoring at that level as opposed to leading by example on the ground is going to work again 

remains to be seen. 

Mr. BEREUTER. It sounds doubtful. 

Mr. WHEELER. It hasn’t come a cropper yet. 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, I can try to address the question of 

capture of the war criminals. I presume you are talking mostly 

about in Bosnia. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I am. 

Mr. SERWER. About Karadzic and Mladic: I refuse to believe that 

it can’t be done. I believe that it is a question of what priority you 

assign to it. The people who do this work for us are in high demand 

to do other things. For a long time in the U.S. Government, it was 

argued that if we took Karadzic and Mladic, it would be disruptive 

of the Dayton peace process. This is clearly no longer true. I am 

not sure if it was ever true. It has been recognized for years that 

it isn’t true, that the Dayton peace process would go faster and better if they were captured. But it is not only a question of American 

priorities, because if I were one of these guys I wouldn’t spend a 

lot of time in the U.S. sector in Bosnia. I might spend more time 

in the French sector or one of these other sectors. I guess the 

French sector is now in fact the Italian sector. So it is a matter of 

priorities but a matter of priorities not only for us but also for our 

allies. 

I think it is a singular failing of the international community to 

have not captured them and sent them to the Hague at this point. 

Mr. BEREUTER. General Nash? 

General NASH. Sir, the second question first. We have not decided to do it. We have not made the decision to capture them. We 

have never given the order to our military forces to do it. 

Mr. BEREUTER. That is literally true? 

General NASH. We have not decided to do it. We may have said 

it is okay to do it. 

Mr. BEREUTER. But not emphasized it? Not put the resources behind it? 

General NASH. Right, and made the degree of commitment necessary. In the early days, of course, we almost had instructions to 

the contrary; that is, not to go to any extraordinary effort. That 

was a political decision that we were told. 

Sir, I am not sufficiently up to date on the EU policing in the 

time they have been there. I would just caution, and I pick up on 

a phrase from Dr. Wheeler, I would be cautious to start comparing 

57

the EU performance to a standard that was not met by the previous U.N. policing standard. We talked about mentoring with a 

cop on the beat, we should not assume that that was being done 

on a routine basis by the previous police training effort. And so I 

just caution about what standard we use in judging the EU’s capacity vis-a-vis the previous model. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Fair enough. 

My staffer tells me that there is a story out today that Russia 

is pulling all of their troops out of KFOR. Do you have any comment about that? Any knowledge about that? Why they would do 

that? 

Mr. WHEELER. That is not just today. SFOR announced last week 

that the Russians had said officially that they would say officially 

that they would withdraw both from KFOR and SFOR this year. 

But their forces are very small now. 

Mr. SERWER. My only comment would be that it has been a good 

experience for the Americans and for NATO to work with the Russians on the ground. It is a cooperation that persisted during some 

difficult moments, but I wouldn’t regard it as a disaster if they 

have other priorities at this point. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I did hear repeatedly from people involved that 

it was a good experience, not always so easy at the beginning, but 

a good experience. 

General NASH. Sir, I was not aware of this. I have been following 

other parts of the world of late. I am very shocked, frankly. It was 

the most phenomenal experience that I have ever had, the first 

time the Russian commander said to me, ‘‘Good morning, my commander.’’ It is very unfortunate that they are no longer able to 

meet that obligation or meet that requirement. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I hope it is not a geostrategic problem, but I suspect it could be. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being very patient and very 

exceptionally fine witnesses. What you have contributed here today 

is valuable to us and we will go back into it in some greater detail. 

Thank you very much for giving us your time. I appreciate it 

very much as the Committee does. The Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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