J-S74020-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP QUINN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3823 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0007262-1996

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and RANSOM, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2018

Phillip Quinn appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Delaware County, dismissing his petition for collateral relief filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-46. 

After review, we affirm.

On May 3, 2001, a jury found Quinn guilty of second-degree murder,1

robbery,2two counts of aggravated assault,3 possession of an instrument of 

crime (“PIC”),4 conspiracy to commit robbery,5 and conspiracy to commit 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907.
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aggravated assault.6 On July 7, 2001, the trial court sentenced Quinn to life 

imprisonment as to his conviction of murder in the second degree and an 

additional 51⁄2 to 11 years’ imprisonment as to his aggravated assault 

conviction. Quinn timely appealed his judgment of sentence, and on June 20, 

2003, this Court affirmed. On January 28, 2004, our Supreme Court denied 

Quinn’s petition for allowance of appeal. Quinn did not appeal our Supreme 

Court’s decision to the United States Supreme Court, and thus, his judgment 

of sentence became final on April 28, 2004. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

See also U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13, 28 U.S.C.A.

Sometime in 2004, Quinn suffered a heart attack and was temporarily 

hospitalized; however, he was able to file his first PCRA petition on September 

3, 2004, which the PCRA court denied on August 25, 2005. On October 24, 

2005, Quinn filed a second PCRA petition, which the PCRA court dismissed on 

September 12, 2007. On October 9, 2014, Quinn filed the instant, third, pro 

se PCRA petition, and on January 27, 2015, the court appointed as counsel 

Stephen F. Molineaux, Esquire. On June 10, 2015, counsel filed a 

Turner/Finley7 no-merit letter and a motion to withdraw his appearance. The 

court granted counsel’s motion and a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to 

dismiss without a hearing was served on Quinn. Quinn filed a written objection 

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5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3701.

6 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2702.

7 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1987).
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on July 31, 2016, and the PCRA court dismissed his petition on November 1, 

2016. Quinn timely appealed; both he and the PCRA court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Quinn raises the following issue for our review: Did the PCRA 

court err in finding the petition was untimely when it met the interference by 

government official and newly discovered fact exceptions? 

“Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported 

by the evidence of record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Before weighing the substantive merits of Quinn’s arguments, however, we 

consider whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present case. If the 

PCRA petition is untimely, then there is no subject matter jurisdiction over the 

case. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Pa. 2008). 

[T]he PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature 

and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from considering 

untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 

753 A.2d 201, 203 ([Pa.] 2000) (stating that “given the fact that 

the PCRA’s timeliness requirements are mandatory and 

jurisdictional in nature, no court may properly disregard or alter 

them in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA 

petition that is filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 ([Pa.] 1999) (holding that where a 

petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this Court 

has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition). [The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has] also held that even where the PCRA court 

does not address the applicability of the PCRA timing mandate, 

th[e Court would] consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a 

threshold question implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and 

ability to grant the requested relief. 
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Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 477-78 (Pa. 2003).

In order to satisfy the timeliness requirement, a PCRA petition “must 

normally be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final . . . 

unless one of the exceptions in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies and the 

petition is filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa. 2007) 

(citations and footnote omitted). Section 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii) provide that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence[.]

49 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii).

Quinn’s judgment of sentence became final on April 28, 2004. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for 

seeking the review.”). Thus, Quinn had until April 28, 2005, to file his PCRA 

petition. Quinn filed the instant petition on October 9, 2014, approximately 

91⁄2 years late. Therefore, it is facially untimely.
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However, Quinn avers that a 2004 heart attack incapacitated him, and 

consequently, he was unable to litigate his various PCRA claims.8 Specifically, 

Quinn argues that his health inhibited him from raising claims that

government officials (i.e., the PCRA court) interfered with his collateral relief 

litigation and that potentially exculpatory newly discovered facts have 

emerged since his trial. Quinn’s argument is meritless.

In order to meet the statutory requirements of the governmental 

interference exception, Quinn must “plead and prove that his failure to raise 

the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with 

the presentation of the claim [or claims] in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United State[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The government interference 

exception applies when, for example, the court affirmatively misleads the 

petitioner on a material issue. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 936 

A.2d 497, 502 (Pa.Super.2007) (“the PCRA court’s erroneous notification to 

appellant that PCRA counsel had withdrawn amounted to governmental 

interference” that excused his untimely filing of third PCRA petition alleging 

ineffective assistance by PCRA counsel). The exception may also apply where 

the government conceals exculpatory evidence from petitioner. See, e.g., 

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8 Quinn repeatedly refers to a “heart attack in 2004-2014;” however, it is 

unclear from Quinn’s brief how the omnipresence of heart-related issues 

impeded his ability to litigate his PCRA claims after he recovered from his 2004 

hospital stay. See generally, Brief of Appellant. 
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Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306 (Pa.2008) (suggesting that 

concealment of Brady material could form basis for relief under government 

interference exception if petitioner files PCRA petition within 60 days after 

discovery of concealment). 

The newly discovered facts exception provides that “the facts upon 

which the claim is predicated were unknown to petitioner and could not have 

been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii).

The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those 

facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence 

demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his 

own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have 

learned of the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence. This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the focus of 

this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly 

discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

Additionally, all of the time-bar exceptions are subject to a separate 

deadline. 

The statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the 

PCRA are also subject to a separate time limitation and must be 

filed within sixty (60) days of the time the claim could first have 

been presented. The sixty (60) day time limit . . . runs from the 

date the petitioner first learned of the alleged after discovered 

facts. A petitioner must explain when he first learned of the facts 

underlying his PCRA claims and show that he brought his claim 

within sixty (60) days thereafter. 
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Id. (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that section 9545(b)(2) 

also requires a showing of due diligence insofar that a petitioner must file the 

petition within 60 days that the claim could have first been presented. 

Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 350 (Pa. 2013).

Quinn’s only claim on appeal can be distilled down to his argument that 

he “had a heart attack in the course of his litigation in 2004 through 2014,” 

which inhibited his ability to take advantage of his right to file a petition(s) for 

collateral relief pursuant to the PCRA. Brief of Appellant, at 15. Quinn has 

neither alleged or proven any errors of a state and/or federal constitutional 

nature nor shown that his previous failure to raise a PCRA claim was the result 

of interference by government officials. Chester, supra. Moreover, Quinn 

has not advanced any newly discovered facts that were unavailable to him at 

the time of his trial. Brown, supra. Rather, he predicates his timeliness 

arguments solely on the occurrence of a heart attack in 2004.

9

 See 

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999) (jurisdictional 

limitations are mandatory and interpreted literally, thus, a court has no 

authority to extend filing periods except as statute permits). Therefore, 

Quinn’s PCRA petition is facially untimely and meets no exception.

Order affirmed.

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9 Cf. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(defendant’s illness (i.e. mental illness) did not toll jurisdictional time limits 

for filing his petition for post-conviction relief; illness was not specifically listed 

in PCRA as exception to one-year jurisdiction time limitation period for filing 

petition.).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/6/18