J-A10040-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYRELL M. GOODING

Appellant No. 560 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 25, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0003513-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2015

Tyrell M. Gooding (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his jury trial conviction for two counts of robbery (inflict 

serious bodily injury),1and one count each of aggravated assault,2 persons 

not to possess firearms,3and firearms not to be carried without a license.4 

We affirm.

On July 8, 2010, police arrested Appellant. Following a jury trial 

conducted on December 3-5, 2012, a jury convicted Appellant as stated 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
J-A10040-15

- 2 -

supra. On January 25, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 84 to 

168 months’ incarceration on the first robbery conviction, 84 to 168 months’ 

incarceration on the second robbery conviction to be served consecutively to 

the first, 84 to 168 months’ incarceration on the aggravated assault 

conviction to be served concurrently with the second robbery sentence, 48 

to 96 months’ incarceration on the persons not to possess firearms 

conviction to run concurrently with the second robbery sentence and the 

aggravated assault sentence, and 36 to 72 months’ incarceration on the 

firearms not to be carried without a license to run consecutive to the second 

robbery conviction. 

On February 22, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. This 

Court dismissed that appeal on May 2, 2013, for failure to file a docketing 

statement in compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 3517. See Commonwealth v. 

Gooding, 436 MDA 2013 (May 2, 2013, per curiam). Appellant thereafter 

filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, seeking reinstatement of his direct appeal rights 

based on counsel’s failure to file the docketing statement with this Court as 

ordered. The PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition on March 3, 2014. 

Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal on March 28, 2014, and filed a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal on June 10, 

2014. The trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on July 18, 2014.

Appellant raises the following issue for review: 
J-A10040-15

- 3 -

A. Did the trial court commit an error of law in sentencing the 

appellant because [the] evidence adduced at trial and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom were insufficient as a matter of 

law to support any finding of guilt?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 5 (all capitals removed). Specifically, Appellant asserts 

that, because the Commonwealth’s witnesses (1) testified they were under 

the influence of narcotics at the time of the incident, and (2) recanted their 

prior identifications of Appellant at trial, the Commonwealth put forth 

insufficient evidence to convict Appellant.5 See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-14. 

This claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.6 

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

____________________________________________

5 The only legal authority Appellant cites is the law pertaining to the 

standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims. See Appellant’s 

Brief, pp. 12-14. Additionally, Appellant includes no citations to the record 

to support his argument. Id. Ordinarily, such citation deficiencies may form 

grounds for waiver of claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119. However, because 

Appellant’s claim is basic and readily ascertainable, we will examine the 

claim on its merits.

6 Although, as the Commonwealth argues, this claim appears to challenge 

the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court 

has determined where witnesses recant their testimony, such a claim goes 

to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 970 A.2d 

440 (Pa.Super.2009); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 488 A.2d 348, 349 

(Pa.Super.1985).
J-A10040-15

- 4 -

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal 

denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa.2011).

Witness recantation occurs not infrequently in the prosecution of 

criminal matters. “It is well settled that it is within the trial court’s discretion 

to permit a party to impeach its own witness with prior inconsistent 

statements.” Commonwealth v. Grimes, 648 A.2d 538, 543 

(Pa.Super.1994). To properly invoke such discretion, the trial court must 

consider the following factors:

(1) whether the testimony was unexpected;

(2) whether the testimony was contradictory;

(3) whether the testimony was harmful to the party calling the 

witness and beneficial to the opposing side; and

(4) whether the scope of cross-examination was excessive.
J-A10040-15

- 5 -

Grimes, 648 A.2d at 543-44 (citing Commonwealth v. Waller, 444 A.2d 

653, 656 (Pa.1982)). Further, when faced with a witness who recants, our 

Supreme Court has ruled that the Commonwealth may introduce as 

substantive evidence, “only those prior inconsistent statements [of the 

witness] ‘that are demonstrably reliable and trustworthy[.]’” Id. at 544. 

Permitted “reliable and trustworthy” prior inconsistent statements include: 

(1) contemporaneous, verbatim, electronic, audiotaped or videotaped 

recordings of a witness’s statements, (2) statements given under oath at a 

formal legal proceeding, or (3) statements reduced to a writing signed and 

adopted by the declarant. Bibbs, 970 A.2d at 448 (citing Commonwealth 

v. Wilson, 707 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Pa.1998)). 

The trial court summarized the evidence introduced at the trial of this 

matter as follows:

At 5:30 a.m., on July 8, 2010, Officer Nathan Ishman (“Officer 

Ishman”) of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police (“HBP”) was 

dispatched to respond to a shots fired call at 18th and Regina 

Streets in the Allison Hill section of Harrisburg City. The 

dispatch also reported that a victim was in a residence at 40 

North 17th Street, one block west of the reported shooting 

location. Officer Ishman arrived at the 17th Street residence 

along with Officer Rudy of the HBP where they observed a 

chaotic scene through the open door with the victim seated on a 

chair and bleeding from the chest. In an attempt to stop the 

bleeding, one of the people present was putting pressure on the 

gunshot wound which was located at right chest above the 

breast. Officer Ishman was able to obtain the victim’s name, 

Deangelo Letterlough (“Letterlough”), date of birth and a few 

facts about the shooting incident. The information provided by 

Letterlough included a description of the individuals involved in 

the shooting. Letterlough was transported by ambulance to the 

hospital.
J-A10040-15

- 6 -

Officers Ishman and Rudy proceeded to 18th and Regina 

Streets on foot to investigate. At the crime scene, by a house 

on the northwest corner, the officers found a cellphone charger, 

black bandana and sunglasses. They also observed droplets of 

blood on the sidewalk alongside a small local store at 17th and 

Regina Streets across from the residence where Letterlough was 

found. After the crimes scene was secured, forensic 

investigator, Officer Christopher Silvio (“Officer Silvio”) gathered 

and processed the evidence police had recovered. In addition to 

gathering the items found by the responding officers, he found a 

white washcloth and took a blood sample from the droplets 

observed on the sidewalk. Officer Silvio later went to the 

medical center where Mr. Letterlough had been transported for 

the purpose of photographing his injuries and collecting his 

clothes as evidence. While at the hospital, he observed and 

photographed the gunshot wound to Letterlough’s right chest.

The washcloth and bandana were later tested for DNA 

evidence by Alex Glessner of the Pennsylvania State Police 

forensics lab. A DNA sample was collected from Appellant for 

comparison of the evidence tested. No interpretable results 

were obtained from the washcloth. However, testing of the 

bandana resulted in the identification of at least three DNA 

contributors from which Appellant could not be excluded. As 

Appellant’s profile matched some of the recovered DNA, Mr. 

Glessner concluded that he was a contributor; however, there 

was not a single majority contributor identified.

At trial, Mr. Letterlough testified to his version of the 

events that took place in the early morning of July 8, 2010. 

During the evening, Letterlough had run into Courtney Slade and 

the two were smoking PCP. The pair was walking around the 

Allison Hill area of Harrisburg with no particular destination. 

Letterlough testified that, as they approached the intersection of 

18th and Regina Streets, three men confronted them. He had 

recognized one of the men from a previous altercation over a 

woman. He said that they began arguing and he was ready to 

fight. While this exchange was taking place, Slade was 

attempting to diffuse the confrontation. The man with whom 

Letterlough was arguing made a cellphone call when suddenly, a 

second individual came running from behind Letterlough, who 

then put his hands up to fight. The second man said something 

similar to “this ain’t that type of party,” pulled a gun and 

demanded that Letterlough “give it up,” a term he recognized 

from his experience as street terminology meaning he was being 
J-A10040-15

- 7 -

robbed. Letterlough testified that the second man had pulled a 

revolver from the pocket of his basketball shorts but he “wasn’t 

giving him shit.” The second man shot at Letterlough as he was 

trying to walk away and, as Letterlough turned, he shot a second 

time hitting him in the chest. The gunshot wound entered 

through his right upper chest and exited his side. Letterlough 

continued running until he reached the residence on 17th Street 

where friends lived. The residents of the house assisted him and 

called an ambulance.

On December 17, 2010, Letterlough identified Appellant as 

the shooter when presented with his picture in a photo array. 

Although reluctant to cooperate with police, he eventually named 

him as “T” then Tyrell. In a statement provided in an interview 

with Harrisburg Detective Christopher Krokos (“Detective 

Krokos”), on March 11, 2011, he repeated that he was sure 

[Appellant] was the shooter. Despite his identification of 

Appellant as the shooter during two encounters with police, at 

trial, Letterlough stated that he was not sure that Letterlough 

was the shooter. He explained his inconsistency by saying that 

he had heard that [Appellant] was the shooter and recognized 

his face from Facebook. However, Letterlough said that when he 

saw Appellant in person while in jail, he realized that the shooter 

was a different height. Letterlough also changed his story in 

that he denied being pressured not to testify despite telling the 

police that he had been. Also, he said that the shooter was 

wearing a black T-shirt, rather than a white T-shirt, which he 

had reported to police.

Lead Detective, Christopher Krokos[,] testified to the 

identification information Letterlough gave regarding the 

shooting incident. Detective Krokos described the great difficulty 

he encountered when attempting to interview Letterlough about 

the night he was shot. As the investigation progressed, the 

Detective could not find Letterlough and since he would not 

contact him voluntarily, the Commonwealth issued a grand jury 

subpoena directing Letterlough to appear. The subpoena was 

ignored, a warrant issued and Letterlough was arrested.

Letterlough gave an initial interview on December 1, 2010, 

at which time he identified Appellant as the shooter when shown 

a photo array. Later, on March 11, 2011, while represented by 

counsel, the Commonwealth was able to finally obtain a sworn 

statement from Letterlough that provided [information] 

regarding [the] incident when he was shot.
J-A10040-15

- 8 -

Detective Krokos testified that Letterlough identified 

Appellant as the shooter within seconds of being shown the 

photo array containing his picture. He initialed the picture as did 

Detective Krokos, and the date and time were recorded along 

with the words “Tyrell shot Deangelo.” Detective Krokos was 

emphatic in his testimony that Letterlough was sure about his 

identification, otherwise they would not have relied upon the 

identification for the purpose of filing charges. 

In the sworn statement Letterlough again identified 

Appellant as the shooter. In the statement, Letterlough also 

stated that he had received a cellphone call from a restricted 

number pressuring him not to go to court in this case. Detective 

Krokos confirmed and the written statement evidenced that 

Letterlough had responded “yes” when asked, “Have you 

understood all my questions today?”

Courtney Slade was with Deangelo Letterlough on the 

night of the shooting. Slade testified at trial to knowing 

Letterlough as he had previously dated his sister. Slade stated 

that on the night of the shooting, he had met up with 

Letterlough on Market Street and the two of them were 

wandering and walking around high on drugs. At the 

intersection of 18th and Regina Streets, they encountered a 

group of men, one of whom argued with Letterlough. Slade said 

he was sitting on a porch when another man came running out 

of nowhere with a gun. He described the man as wearing shorts 

and a bandana. As Letterlough began running, the man with the 

gun chased him and, when the two were out of sight, Slade 

heard gunshots; however, he did not see the shooter. Based on 

his observations, he believed that the man who had been 

chasing Letterlough was the shooter.

Slade testified that, after he heard the shots, the shooter 

came back and put a gun to him saying “you go [sic] to give it 

up.” A scuffle ensued, two other men jumped in and ripped a 

gold chain from his neck and they all struggled for the gun that

had fallen to the ground. Slade got his chain back and ran to a 

house at 19th and Chestnut Streets while being chased by the 

shooter. The shooter pulled a gun on him again and shot three 

times. Slade was able to run away and meet up with his ride 

back at 18th and Chestnut as the shooter ran in a different 

direction.
J-A10040-15

- 9 -

Slade did not call police about the shooting as he said he 

intended on taking care of it himself. However, police 

interviewed him on January 12, 2011, at which time he provided 

a written, signed statement to Detective Krokos. In his 

statement to police he said that he was with Letterlough trying 

to diffuse the argument between him and the first man they had 

encountered. Police also showed him a photo array containing 

Appellant’s picture. He identified Appellant as the shooter and 

circled his picture in the photo array. Despite his prior 

identification of Appellant as the shooter, at trial he testified that 

he did not see the shooter in the courtroom. He explained the 

change in his story by saying that, although he had been sure 

that Appellant was the shooter, he was no longer sure about the 

identification because he had recently seen someone that looked 

like him. In the statement, he also said that he stayed in the 

same area as Letterlough during his initial confrontation, but at 

trial he said he had moved to a porch across the street.

With respect to the changes in Slade’s story, Detective 

Krokos testified that he had clearly explained and Slade had 

understood that the purpose for presenting the photo array was 

for Slade to identify who had robbed him and shot at him the 

night he was with Letterlough. He stated that Slade identified 

Appellant within a few seconds and the identification was verified 

by his own signature and that of Detective Heffner, Krokos’ 

partner at the time. The date and time were also written on the 

photo array.

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, July 18, 2014 (“1925(a) Opinion”), 

pp. 4-9.

Based on this evidence, the trial court determined:

The evidence presented a [sic] trial established that both 

victims, Letterlough and Slade, twice identified Appellant as the 

shooter for police. Independently, they both chose Gooding 

from a photo array and represented to police that they were 

certain as to his identity. Even though Letterlough and Slade 

may have later testified that [] they had become uncertain 

regarding the identification, Detective Krokos made clear that 

both victims chose Appellant’s picture from the photo array 

within seconds of seeing it and assured him of their certainty 
J-A10040-15

- 10 -

and understanding of the identification process. Any credibility 

issues are within [the] jury’s purview to resolve.

Regarding the robbery charges, Letterlough and Slade 

unequivocally testified that, individually at different times during 

the incident, the perpetrator pointed a gun at them and stated 

“give it up,” a phrase they understood to mean they were being 

robbed. In Slade’s case, during a scuffle with the perpetrator 

and the other individuals on the scene, a gold chain was ripped 

off his neck. Then, in both instances, the perpetrator took the 

confrontation to a more violent level by shooting at both men. 

Letterlough sustained a gunshot wound to the chest. This 

evidence sufficiently supports the jury finding that, in the course 

of committing a theft, Appellant inflicted serious bodily harm 

upon Deangelo Letterlough and placed Courtney Slade in 

imminent fear of serious bodily harm. 

The evidence also supports the conviction on the charge of 

aggravated assault. Both Letterlough and Slade testified to 

Appellant shooting Letterlough. There was no dispute that 

Letterlough was shot in the chest near vital organs of the body. 

Appellant’s act of shooting at both individuals clearly amounts to 

the infliction of serious bodily injury under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

1925(a) Opinion, pp. 11-12.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence 

the witnesses’ previously signed and/or adopted statements and photo 

arrays once the witnesses testified inconsistent with their previous 

statements at trial. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s 

determination that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports Appellant’s robbery and 
J-A10040-15

- 11 -

aggravated assault convictions.7 Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency of the 

evidence claim fails, and we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

 Judge Mundy joins in the memorandum.

President Judge Gantman concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/14/2015

____________________________________________

7 We note that neither Appellant nor the trial court’s 1925(a) opinion 

specifically address Appellant’s convictions for persons not to possess 

firearms and firearms not to be possessed without a license. However, 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on Appellant’s firearm 

convictions would fail. Appellant stipulated at trial that he was not licensed 

to carry a firearm in the Commonwealth on July 8, 2010. See N.T. 12/3-

5/2012, p. 254. Based on this stipulation and the identification evidence 

discussed supra, the jury found him guilty of firearms not to be possessed 

without a license. Id. at 272. Further, following the jury’s verdict, Appellant 

pleaded guilty to persons not to possess firearms based on a prior 

aggravated assault conviction. See id. at 278-281.