UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-8250

JUNE EVERETT,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES,

Defendant – Appellee, 

and

M. A. BENNETT, Major; ROY CHERRY, Superintendent Hampton 

Roads Regional Jail; DAVID L. SIMONS, Assistant 

Superintendent Hampton Roads Regional Jail; MARK A. GOOCH,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:08-cv-00622-RBS-TEM)

Submitted: November 9, 2010 Decided: February 25, 2011

Before WILKINSON and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Bernard J. DiMuro, Hillary J. Collyer, DIMUROGINSBERG, P.C., 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. John D. McChesney, RAWLS & 

MCNELIS, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

June Everett appeals the district court’s order 

affirming the magistrate judge’s ruling denying Everett’s motion 

to amend her complaint to add a previously unnamed party, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (c). We affirm the district 

court’s order.1

The federal government detained Sandra Kenley in two 

Virginia regional jails pending her removal from the United 

States. On December 18, 2005, Kenley died while awaiting 

removal. On December 8, 2007, June Everett, Kenley’s sister and 

estate administrator, timely filed the underlying cause of 

action in Virginia state court, naming several jail officials

(collectively “named Defendants”), and various unnamed 

individuals identified as “John Doe.” Everett alleged wrongful 

death, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-244 (Supp. 2010), and 

violation of Kenley’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Specifically, Everett

alleged that Defendants’ failure to provide Kenley with adequate 

medical care proximately caused her death.

 1 As the parties agreed in the district court to dismiss 

with prejudice Everett’s claims against all other defendants, we 

have jurisdiction to review the order in question. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 (2006).
4

The named Defendants removed the case to federal 

court. On July 24, 2009, Everett moved for leave to amend her 

complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), to add Appellee 

Prison Health Services, Inc. (“PHS”) as a defendant based on 

information obtained during discovery, and to add a state-law 

claim of medical malpractice against PHS. After a hearing, the 

magistrate judge denied Everett’s motion. Everett timely 

objected, thereby preserving the issue for review by the 

district court.2

We review the denial of a motion to amend a pleading 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) for abuse of discretion. Equal 

Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assoc., 602 F.3d 597, 602-03 (4th 

Cir. 2010); Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 428 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(en banc). “[A] district court has discretion to deny a motion 

to amend a complaint, so long as it does not outright refuse ‘to 

grant the leave without any justifying reason.’” Equal Rights 

Ctr., 602 F.3d at 603 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 179, 182 

(1962)). 

 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). The district court 

affirmed the order of the magistrate judge.

 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the 

district court could not modify or set aside any portion of the 

magistrate judge’s order unless the magistrate judge’s decision 

was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a); 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
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In this case, Everett could not amend her complaint

without “the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s 

leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This Rule provides that 

“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 

Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized this requirement, 

counseling that 

[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—

such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 

the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 

of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the 

leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely 

given.”

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Thus, prejudice to an opposing party 

and futility are two grounds for denial of a motion to amend

under Rule 15(a)(2). Where a proposed amendment is made beyond 

the statute of limitations and it would not relate back to the 

original complaint, such an amendment would be futile. In that 

case, a district court does not abuse its discretion under Rule 

15(a)(2) in denying a motion to amend. United States v. 

Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2000).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in affirming the denial of the motion to amend. 

Unless Everett’s proposed amendment relates back to the filing 

of the original complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(c)(1)(C), the amendment is barred by the statute of 
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limitations and thus is futile. The record supports the 

district court’s decision that PHS did not have sufficient 

notice of the action to avoid prejudice in defending it. See

Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2007) (en 

banc) (the notice requirements of Rule 15(c) ensure fair notice 

to newly named party and protect party from improper prejudice 

in defending itself). Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the magistrate 

judge’s denial of leave to amend.3

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

 3 After all briefs were filed, Everett filed a letter 

bringing to the court’s attention the Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485 

(2010). In Krupski, the Supreme Court held that “relation back 

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be added 

knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge 

or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.” Krupski, 

130 S. Ct. at 2490. This court had previously reached the same 

result in Goodman, 494 F.3d at 470 (“The Rule [now Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(c)(1)(C)] does not concern itself with the amending 

party’s particular state of mind except insofar as he made a 

mistake . . . . The Rule’s description of when such an 

amendment relates back to the original pleading focuses on the 

notice to the new party and the effect on the new party that the 

amendment will have.” (emphasis omitted)). We hold that the 

district court properly based its Rule 15(c) ruling on the 

inadequacy of notice to PHS, and not on an assessment of the 

knowledge possessed by Everett.
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED