GAO

United States General Accounting Office

 Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1999 DEFENSE 

INVENTORY

DOD Could Improve 

Total Asset Visibility 

Initiative With Results 

Act Framework

GAO/NSIAD-99-40

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

GAO

National Security and 

International Affairs Division Letr

B-278430 Letter

April 12, 1999

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

The Honorable Rod R. Blagojevich

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and

 International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm the logistics pipeline 

was clogged by thousands of duplicate requisitions and inadequately 

identified cargo containers. Logisticians could not find information about 

the status of requisitions, and the contents of over half the 40,000 large 

containers of equipment shipped in theater could not be readily identified. 

As a result, the logistics presence was much larger than was needed; 

according to the Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, better 

asset tracking could have saved $2 billion. In response to this problem, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) renewed its emphasis on implementing the 

Total Asset Visibility (TAV) initiative1

 for tracking equipment, supplies, and 

spare parts as well as requisitions on a continuous basis.

DOD expects the TAV initiative to (1) resolve wartime logistics 

management problems encountered in Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm and (2) improve its inventory management by supporting 

transfers of assets within and across components. The initiative is to cover 

all DOD assets—including secondary inventory2

 and ammunition—that are 

in storage, in processing, and in transit, along with accurate information on 

the status of requisitions. The TAV initiative is expected to access 

information from over 100 component logistics systems, including 

component TAV systems such as the Army TAV, which are supplied data 

from many other lower level systems. Although several target dates for 

implementing TAV have been missed, DOD now expects to have timely and 

1In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials stated that TAV has been referred to as a 

program for convenience. In view of DOD’s comments, we modified our report to describe TAV as an 

initiative, although TAV is described as a program in DOD’s Government Performance and Results Act 

Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000 in the Secretary of Defense 1999 Annual Report to the President 

and the Congress.

2

Secondary inventory includes spare parts, clothing, and medical supplies to support DOD operating 

forces worldwide.
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accurate intraservice and interservice information on and access to 

90 percent of its assets by 2000 and 100 percent of its assets by 2004.

As your Subcommittee requested, we reviewed DOD’s implementation of 

its TAV initiative. This review is one in a series that we are doing to address 

high-risk inventory management problems at DOD.3

 Specifically, this 

report discusses (1) the difficulty in determining the status of the 

initiative’s implementation, (2) planning weaknesses that affect the 

initiative’s implementation, and (3) strategies for addressing those 

weaknesses.

Results in Brief DOD lacks an adequate Departmentwide management framework for 

providing information to clearly determine the progress made in realizing 

TAV initiative goals. While some component and theater-specific asset 

tracking capabilities are reported to be operating, Departmentwide 

information on progress in achieving TAV initiative goals is minimal. 

Consequently, although implementing improved asset visibility is a high 

priority objective, DOD cannot clearly understand the extent to which it is 

achieving the objectives of having timely, accurate information on 

requisitions and assets and access to DOD assets. 

Along with the unclear picture of the initiative’s status, planning is 

inadequate at the strategic and implementation levels. DOD does not have 

a Departmentwide TAV strategic plan to show how the various TAV 

initiatives contribute to DOD’s goals for the initiative. Additionally, while 

DOD has an implementation plan, the plan has a number of key 

weaknesses. It does not describe how TAV will be integrated into 

Department work processes to realize the goals set for the TAV initiative. 

As a result, there is confusion over who is to use TAV and how it is to be 

used. At some locations the system is being installed but not used, 

according to a component manager. The plan also does not identify needed 

resources and does not address Departmentwide problems with systems 

that are critical to the successful implementation of the TAV initiative. 

3

In 1990, we began a special effort to review and report on the federal program areas that we identified 

as high risk because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. This effort, which 

was supported by the Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee on 

Government Reform, brought a much-needed focus to problems that were costing the government 

billions of dollars. We identified DOD inventory management as high risk in our 1992, 1995, 1997, and 

1999 high-risk reports.
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The initiative’s implementation problems have largely resulted from 

long-standing management issues that have hindered other major 

management initiatives. These issues include cultural resistance to change, 

service parochialism, the lack of outcome-oriented goals and performance 

measures, and the lack of management accountability. Resistance to 

changing from reliance on just-in-case inventory approaches to reliance on 

just-in-time inventory is a significant challenge for DOD in its approach to 

inventory management. This new way of doing business requires timely 

and accurate information about quantities and locations of items and a 

willingness by the item holders to transfer them to meet the priority needs 

of others. 

To improve Department management and implementation of the TAV 

initiative, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop a 

Departmentwide strategic plan and associated component implementation 

plans that would be based on the outcome-oriented principles of the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) and the 

Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.

Background The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) is responsible for the 

Departmentwide TAV initiative, and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA), is charged as Executive Agent to coordinate asset tracking 

initiatives across the services and DOD.4 The 1996 DOD-wide TAV 

implementation plan used for implementing TAV sets out initiative goals 

such as providing the capability to identify the location and status of assets 

and requisitions Departmentwide. The Joint TAV Office is responsible for 

providing useful data on assets to customers across the services. Two 

service components have formal TAV programs (the Army and the Navy), 

and other components are working to support the Departmentwide TAV 

initiative. (See app. III for detailed information on the roles and efforts of 

TAV offices.)

TAV has been cited in several Department planning documents as a critical 

initiative for improving logistics. The TAV initiative is cited as a 

requirement for satisfying the needs of logistics customers and 

fundamental to realizing the logistics vision in the 1998 DOD Logistics 

Strategic Plan. The TAV initiative is cited in DOD’s Quadrennial Defense 

4

DLA’s role as Executive Agent was transferred from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics on 

June 1, 1998.
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Review report for supporting logistics improvements. It is also referred to 

in the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Report as committing DOD to provide 

total visibility of equipment, supplies, and spare parts on a continuous 

basis. In asset management plans, such as DOD’s 1998 Logistics Strategic 

Plan and in Joint Vision 2010 (DOD’s blueprint for future joint operations), 

TAV is identified as an enabling technology to support deployable supply 

and maintenance information systems. The TAV initiative is also prominent 

in DOD’s 1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, and the 

Results Act Performance Plan in the 1999 Annual Report sets a goal of 

90-percent visibility of and access to DOD materiel assets by 2000 while 

resupplying deployed troops and, at the same time, reducing the average 

order to receipt time of assets by 50 percent. This plan is required by the 

Results Act, which states that agencies’ performance plans should 

generally include (1) performance goals; (2) an expression of the goals in 

an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form; (3) a description of the 

operational processes, skills, and technology and the resources required; 

(4) performance indicators; (5) a basis for comparing actual results with 

the performance goals; and (6) a description of the means used to verify 

and validate measured values. 

Initiative Status in 

Realizing TAV Goals is 

Not Clear

While DOD has established some general measures for determining the 

status of TAV implementation, these measures do not account for critical 

elements needed to realize most TAV initiative goals. Additionally, the 

established measures are vague and provide only general indicators of the 

progress that is being made. Further, data collected for those measures 

that were established have a number of weaknesses and are likely not good 

indicators of progress toward meeting Department goals set for TAV. As a 

consequence there is insufficient data to precisely determine the status of 

the TAV initiative’s progress toward meeting its Departmentwide goals.

The current overall goals of the TAV initiative are to provide (1) timely and 

accurate information on the location, condition, and identity of equipment 

and supplies at any point from asset origin to final destination, as well as 

the location of military personnel and units, and (2) the ability to use this 

information to improve the Department’s logistics practices. To 

accomplish these high-level Departmentwide goals, the 1996 TAV 

implementation plan sets forth a number of areas TAV needed to address, 

including (1) the tracking of requisitions; (2) the ability to locate assets in 

process, in storage, and in transit; and (3) improvement to logistics 

management within theaters of operation. However, the plan did not 

identify specific ways to measure the progress being made or to determine 
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the status of efforts to realize the overall TAV goals and the areas that 

needed to be addressed.

Current Department baselines for assessing the status of the TAV initiative 

meeting Department goals do not account for the full range of targets 

defined in the 1996 TAV implementation plan. For the TAV initiative, DOD 

is not, on a Departmentwide basis, measuring progress or determining the 

status of most of the areas the 1996 TAV implementation plan was to 

address; areas not measured include the tracking of requisitions, assets in 

process and in transit, and the improvement of logistics management 

within theaters of operation. However, DOD officials have stated that 

progress was being made in these areas. Also, for the TAV initiative on a 

Departmentwide basis, DOD has reported that inventory managers were 

able to track 94 percent of their secondary inventories in storage and had 

the capability to access 80 percent of those assets. These results were 

reported as a National Performance Review (NPR) performance indicator 

to support streamlining the DOD infrastructure in DOD’s Results Act 

Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000. However, these measures not only 

exclude those inventories in process and in transit (stated goals of the TAV 

initiative) but also do not account for critical initiative elements such as the 

timeliness and accuracy of the data. Components are also inconsistent in 

setting baselines for measuring progress toward improving the 

management of assets in storage. Components defined their own baselines 

by selecting in-storage inventories for measuring progress toward realizing 

TAV goals, and the in-storage inventories they selected varied by 

component, which made overall measurement of progress meaningless. 

For example, contrary to Department TAV goals, major quantities of 

in-storage inventory handled by weapons system managers were not 

included in one component’s computation. 

While the Department could provide examples of activities that supported 

TAV initiative goals and objectives, it was unable to aggregate component 

results in measures that show progress toward meeting TAV initiative goals. 

For example, DOD officials recognized that providing inventory managers 

the capability to redistribute assets using the TAV system was more 

important than only tracking assets, and components had examples of how 

they had redistributed some assets using TAV. However, there were no 

measures of how the TAV system was being used to support asset 

redistributions, and components lacked such measures. Agency officials 

stated that each component has the capability to redistribute assets within 

its own component and that the components were working jointly to use 

TAV to move toward redistributing assets across components. However, 
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agency officials could not provide reports or information indicating how 

TAV system benefits were being measured or reported within components. 

Weaknesses in 

Planning Have 

Hindered TAV 

Implementation

Prior DOD efforts designed to achieve TAV have not been realized, and the 

TAV initiative continues to experience delays. Planning for the TAV 

initiative was inadequate at both the strategic and implementation levels. 

DOD did not develop a strategic plan for the TAV initiative, and although 

two implementation plans have been developed, with the most current 

being approved in 1996, they do not address all the planning elements that 

are necessary for ensuring the timely completion of the TAV initiative. 

DOD recognized the need for a TAV strategic plan and issued a Joint TAV 

strategic plan dated January 1999. However, the plan focuses only on TAV 

information-sharing within theaters of operation rather than on ensuring 

that components are meeting Department goals set for the TAV initiative, 

such as reducing the logistics presence in theaters of operation and 

inventory levels in component supply depots. Since a Departmentwide 

strategic plan did not exist at the time of our review, we focused our review 

of planning efforts on DOD’s 1996 implementation plan. 

DOD Did Not Realize Its 

Goals in Prior TAV Efforts

The TAV initiative has evolved from other DOD attempts to improve 

visibility over its assets, in recognition that such visibility is the foundation 

for improving inventory management and other logistics functions. In 

1972, DOD set a goal to improve visibility over its inventories by 1980, but it 

did not achieve that goal. Later, during the Persian Gulf War, DOD’s 

problems with inventory management were highlighted when thousands of 

duplicate orders were placed because operational units had inadequate 

visibility over the status of their requisitions, and large amounts of material 

shipped to the theater were unavailable to U.S. forces because the location 

of the material was unknown. As a result of the Persian Gulf War logistics 

problems, in 1992 DOD again started developing an initiative to improve 

asset visibility. This initiative’s goal was to have total asset visibility by 

1995, but this attempt was also unsuccessful. A new plan to realize TAV 

was started in 1995; the plan was approved by the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition and Technology) in May 1996. See appendix IV for a 

list of Department attempts to improve asset visibility since 1972.

Implementation Plan Lacks 

Key Elements

The implementation plan approved in 1996 is not a broadly focused 

Departmentwide plan for the TAV initiative. This most current 
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implementation plan does not address the integration of TAV in component 

work processes, describe resource requirements, or describe how systems 

issues will be addressed. 

DOD Lacks a Plan for Guiding 

the Integration of TAV Into Work 

Processes

Critical elements describing how the TAV initiative will be used are lacking 

in the TAV implementation plan. The TAV plan does not set forth how the 

system will be used by the components in their day-to-day work processes, 

financial reporting, and the sharing of assets among commands and 

components. 

The TAV implementation plan does not describe how the TAV system will 

be integrated into components’ work processes to support DOD’s inventory 

management improvement targets, such as reducing inventory levels and 

minimizing the logistics presence in theaters of operation by providing 

more accurate information about inventory levels. Component TAV 

officials expressed concern that the 1996 TAV plan does not satisfactorily 

define users or user requirements and does not describe why users need 

the system to include the information. For example, one component 

official stated that the TAV capability was installed at some sites to support 

theater operations, but it was not clear how the system was to be used after 

it had been installed. As a result, according to this official, the capability 

was not used. Component managers also stated that the plan should 

clearly define the information that is to be made available to the user, why 

the information is needed, how it should be used, and how often it should 

be updated. Further, personnel at the March 1998 TAV users’ conference 

stated that DOD needs to develop user requirements, clarify those 

requirements, and tie those requirements to the data that is being requested 

from the components. 

The plan also does not set forth how TAV systems will integrate with and/or 

support other management information systems, such as financial 

management systems and reporting. Accurate reporting of inventory 

assets has been a long-standing problem for DOD, and data from TAV 

systems could be used to support reporting systems in the Department. 

DOD will overlook an opportunity to address financial reporting 

requirements if it implements a TAV system without addressing financial 

reporting requirements, such as accounting for assets on ships.5 Aligning 

5

Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating Materials and Supplies Could Yield 

Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94, Aug. 16, 1996) and Financial Reporting: DOD’s Fiscal Year 1996 

Financial Statements Inventory Reporting Does Not Meet Standards (GAO/AIMD-98-16, Dec. 24, 1997).
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financial systems is required and a critical element in accounting for 

operating material and supplies. Such requirements have not been defined 

in the current TAV plan, nor have they been agreed to by components.

Further, the plan does not set forth how TAV systems would be used to 

support the sharing of assets within component commands and/or among 

components, even though asset sharing is an overall goal of the initiative. 

Some supporting component systems have been aligned to support limited 

asset transfers among components, and a procedure for managing 

reparable item transfers has been approved by relevant DOD organizations. 

However, DOD components have not made all componentwide system 

changes necessary so that TAV will support the improved management of 

all inventory items, including ammunition and medical supplies, and they 

had no clear time line for making those changes.

Resource Requirements Are Not 

Identified

The implementation plan does not provide an overall estimate of the 

funding necessary to accomplish TAV-related projects. Funding for the 

TAV initiative is contained in the components’ and the Joint TAV Office’s 

budgets. However, there is no estimate of the total resources expended 

thus far or future funding requirements. Without an estimate of required 

funding, it is impossible for DOD to determine the priority the components 

are giving to TAV requirements or how those requirements rank in relation 

to other funding priorities within the components’ budgets.

According to agency officials, the components were giving important 

TAV-related work (such as maintenance on systems that support TAV) 

lower priority than other competing initiatives within components. For 

example, components are responsible for ensuring that information on 

their assets at lower level inventory sites is timely and accurate and that 

appropriate changes are made to systems to enable the provision of asset 

information to the TAV system. According to the Department’s TAV 

implementation plan, this requirement was originally scheduled to be met 

by March 1997; however, the completion date of this important element of 

TAV is currently not clear. Although some systems maintenance, such as 

Year 2000 concerns, merits a high priority in Department resource 

allocations, component officials stated that funding commitments have 

slipped because component commands gave a lower priority to needed 

TAV system modifications, thus delaying the input of information into the 

TAV system. While these decisions may well have been appropriate, DOD 

managers lacked the information to understand how these priority 

decisions would ultimately affect TAV implementation. According to one 

component official, unless funds are provided specifically to support each 
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component’s part in the TAV initiative, the Departmentwide TAV effort may 

fail because the components are giving funding priority to their own 

initiatives.

Departmentwide Systems Issues 

Are Not Addressed

The 1996 TAV implementation plan does not address how several key 

Departmentwide systems issues will be addressed as they relate to the TAV 

initiative. These issues relate to data quality, systems security, and the Year 

2000 problem.6

 While we recognize that responsibility for resolving these 

issues is outside of the TAV initiative management’s responsibility (which is 

monitoring progress with Departmentwide TAV requirements and 

coordinating action with relevant components), we believe the plan should 

indicate how DOD will address problems that can affect the success of the 

initiative. 

The 1996 TAV implementation plan describes data integrity as critical to the 

success of the initiative. The Defense In-transit Visibility Integration Plan, 

a part of the TAV initiative, also describes data quality and timeliness as a 

challenge in providing adequate information on in-transit assets. Data 

quality problems remain unresolved in TAV supporting systems. At a March 

1998 TAV conference, TAV users reported that they lacked confidence in 

TAV data and recommended that Departmentwide TAV managers develop 

procedures to measure data accuracy and to provide such procedures to 

TAV users. Department TAV officials said that while they were considering 

the development of a data quality monitoring process, they would continue 

to rely on the components to ensure that data is of sufficient quality for TAV 

system users. Only the Army had implemented a data quality monitoring 

process for its TAV data sources, in response to concerns raised by users of 

Army asset data. Improving data quality is particularly important to TAV 

initiative users because they will be relying on this data to redistribute 

assets from one location to another. Departmentwide and component TAV 

initiatives were to be supplied data from many component logistics 

systems from worldwide DOD locations. 

Security is another major issue for TAV users and data providers. We 

reported previously that DOD information indicated that hackers had 

gained access to its computer systems in 65 percent of 250,000 hacker 

6

The Year 2000 computer systems problem results from the inability of computer programs to interpret 

the correct century at the Year 2000 from a date that has only the last two digits to indicate the year.
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attacks in 1995.7 These attacks included logistics systems that feed data to 

TAV systems. While DOD has taken some steps to address problems with 

systems security, its 1996 TAV plan does not include an approach or 

strategy for protecting computer systems that could be vulnerable to data 

loss, destruction, or unwanted browsing. The TAV system uses approaches 

that have known vulnerabilities, such as Internet-based applications. Users 

and TAV initiative managers have expressed concerns about possible 

breaches to security in TAV systems. Through security breaches, 

unauthorized users could gain access to critical aspects of component 

activities such as the type, quantity, and condition of weapon systems and 

ammunition in component locations. Moreover, DOD has not defined in its 

plan what information will be classified or how it will be restricted from 

unauthorized users. While we believe that creation of a systems security 

initiative only for TAV would not be appropriate, TAV plans should describe 

how components such as the Defense Information Systems Agency will 

address and resolve these TAV-related security problems and provide time 

frames for addressing and resolving them.

Agency officials have stated that the Year 2000 problem is serious, and they 

agreed that the problem is not addressed in TAV plans. For one element of 

the TAV initiative—the Joint TAV initiative—DOD developed a draft Joint 

TAV Year 2000 Contingency Plan dated January 29, 1999. However, the plan 

does not provide assurance that interim plans have been developed in the 

event of a problem with critical systems. For example, the plan states that 

Army TAV is the only TAV source for information on Army retail stocks; 

however, the plan does not describe any alternative plans for obtaining 

information on Army retail stocks. We have reported that interim plans are 

particularly important if an initiative such as TAV depends on the 

successful operation of other systems.8

 The TAV system will access 

information from over 100 component logistics systems, which are built on 

many other lower-level systems. If a number of these systems were 

disabled by Year 2000 problems, the scope of information available in the 

TAV system could be dramatically affected. For example, according to an 

Air Force official, if the two automated systems containing most of the Air 

Force’s asset information were to cease operations, the Air Force would 

still be able to track its assets through its lower level systems, but the TAV 

7Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks

(GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996).

8

Logistics Planning: Opportunities for Enhancing DOD's Logistics Strategic Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-28, 

Dec. 18, 1996).
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system would lose track of the assets. Air Force supply inventories were 

valued at over $27 billion as of September 30, 1997.9

In prior work, we have reported that DOD lacks key management and 

oversight controls to enforce good management practices, direct 

resources, and establish a complete picture of its progress with fixing 

systems. We have also pointed out that DOD lacks assurance that 

components will be prepared should their systems miss the Year 2000 

deadline or fail unexpectedly in operations.10 While DOD has since taken 

action to better address the Year 2000 challenge, the TAV implementation 

plan does not describe how the initiative will ensure that component 

systems will be Year 2000 compliant and describe alternatives for operating 

the TAV system in the event of a component system failure.

Strategies for 

Addressing Initiative 

Weaknesses

Our prior high-risk reports indicate that key underlying causes of inventory 

management problems have not been effectively addressed in the past. 

These causes include cultural resistance to change and service 

parochialism, the lack of outcome-oriented goals and performance 

measures, and the lack of management accountability for correcting 

problems and for following through to confirm performance results. These 

problems are the underlying causes of the TAV initiative management 

weaknesses. The Results Act offers a model for responding to the serious 

systemic challenges to realizing the goals that DOD set for the TAV 

initiative. The act provides DOD a framework for management that 

includes developing clear goals and performance measures for the TAV 

initiative that would show components’ progress in realizing the culture 

changes necessary to support TAV goals. Components’ involvement in a 

Departmentwide TAV strategic plan, along with measures to determine 

components’ support for initiative goals, should improve accountability 

and cause components to better work together to meet the TAV initiative 

goals. The Clinger-Cohen Act, which emphasizes the need to analyze 

information technology investments, can also help the Department to 

assess whether TAV technology investments are commensurate with the 

benefits that will be gained.

9DOD’s Materiel and Distribution Management Fact Book (fiscal year 1997).

10Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, 

Apr. 30, 1998).
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Resistance to Change Limits 

Progress

As we noted in a prior report describing attempts to make Departmentwide 

changes in asset management practices,11 cultural resistance to change and 

service parochialism have contributed to the difficulty of implementing 

corrective actions to improve DOD systems that are at risk. We pointed out 

that DOD believed that it was better to overbuy items (just in case) than to 

manage with the amount of stock needed (just in time). As a result of this 

attitude and other inventory management weaknesses, DOD has acquired 

and held too much inventory. This resistance, along with a reluctance to 

share assets across components and a lack of an appropriate system 

infrastructure to support and track such transfers, is a major cause of 

DOD’s problems in realizing its Departmentwide TAV initiative goals. 

Initiative and component managers cited the lack of willingness to transfer 

assets across the Department as a major obstacle to improving inventory 

management practices. They noted that this problem had led to conflicts 

about the sharing of data and providing funding to ensure that quality data 

was supplied to the Departmentwide TAV initiative. According to TAV 

representatives, components have been reluctant to transfer assets to the 

maximum extent and to make necessary policy and system changes 

because they had purchased assets with their funds, and their managers 

perceive such assets as belonging to the purchasing DOD component 

rather than the Department as a whole.

In prior work, we obtained views from experts in the academic field and 

officials from nine large private sector companies that were concerned 

about inventory management.12 These experts indicated that a 

combination of many techniques is needed to bring about successful 

cultural change, but two are of prime importance. These techniques are 

(1) top management’s commitment and support for desired values and 

beliefs and (2) training to convey desired values and beliefs and develop 

the skills needed to implement them. The TAV implementation plan does 

not describe how these elements will be addressed to achieve the needed 

changes. In addition, developing and implementing appropriate 

performance measures as a means to support needed cultural change, such 

as the dollar values of interdepartmental asset transfers, would create the 

11Organizational Culture: Use of Training to Help Change DOD Inventory Management Culture

(GAO/NSIAD-94-193, Aug. 30, 1994).

12Organizational Culture: Techniques Companies Use to Perpetuate or Change Beliefs and Values

(GAO/NSIAD-92-105, Feb. 27, 1992).
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needed framework for tracking progress in diminishing components’ 

parochialism.

Results Act and ClingerCohen Act Can Provide a 

Useful Management 

Framework for Change

DOD recognized that it was crucial to have outcome-oriented strategic and 

performance plans to guide implementation of the TAV initiative and help 

overcome major inventory management problems. In its 1998 Logistics 

Strategic Plan, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) stated 

that executive agents and related components must develop and submit 

strategic and supporting plans for logistics areas under their responsibility 

and that the plans’ content and format were to be governed by Results Act 

provisions. However, this has not yet been accomplished for the TAV 

initiative. DOD lacks a Departmentwide strategic plan with clear, 

outcome-oriented goals and performance measures to guide 

implementation of the TAV initiative. 

The 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan guidance required that executive agents 

develop plans to include actions to be taken, completion dates, and 

resource requirements to satisfy Results Act requirements. These 

principles reflect the outcome-oriented principles of the Results Act, which 

the Congress anticipated would be institutionalized and practiced at all 

organizational levels in federal agencies. Outcome-oriented principles 

include (1) establishing broad general initiative goals and quantifiable, 

measurable, outcome-oriented performance goals and related measures; 

(2) developing strategies for achieving the goals, including strategies for 

overcoming or mitigating major impediments to goal achievement; (3) 

ensuring that goals at lower organizational levels align with and support 

broad initiative goals; and (4) identifying the resources that will be required 

to achieve goals. Such an approach could determine component progress 

with culture change by measuring inter-component asset sharing. Such an 

approach could also mitigate component parochialism and make the best 

use of Department resources.

DOD does not routinely link its performance measures to specific 

organizational units or individuals that have sufficient flexibility, 

discretion, and authority to accomplish desired results. In commenting on 

a draft of this report, DOD stated that TAV should not be managed as a 

stand-alone initiative. This position is inconsistent with its descriptions of 

the TAV initiative in DOD documents such as its Results Act reports to the 

President and the Congress, the 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan, and the 

Defense Reform Initiative. Furthermore, such a position has resulted in 

little centralized direction to move components toward meeting 
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Department goals set for the TAV initiative. We found no outcome-oriented 

goals or performance measures assigned to specific components to 

measure their progress in using the TAV capability. The lack of 

performance measures deters accountability for components. Improved 

accountability would help guarantee that component efforts remain 

focused on supporting Department goals set for the TAV initiative.

Without clear, hierarchically linked goals and performance measures that 

are supported by components, DOD cannot adequately motivate 

components to better work together to meet Departmentwide TAV goals. 

We found, for example, that components were developing and 

implementing their own TAV capabilities, but they believed that they owned 

the assets, and they would remain reluctant to transfer assets to other 

components unless DOD transferred ownership to a central DOD authority. 

The Results Act, with its strategic planning and reporting requirements, 

provides a framework for improving the management of the TAV initiative. 

Considering the significance of DOD’s problems in improving its asset 

management through the TAV initiative, we believe modeling TAV planning 

against Results Act requirements would improve the chances of successful 

implementation of the initiative. 

Furthermore, TAV initiative component accountability and performance 

would be improved by following Clinger-Cohen Act elements calling for 

investment analyses that focus on Department goals set for the TAV 

initiative. Although the TAV implementation plan states that an economic 

analysis of initiative costs and benefits would be done, the TAV initiative 

lacked investment analyses that are needed to support financial decisions 

and establish performance goals for investing in the TAV initiative. The 

Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires performance-based and results-oriented 

decision-making for all major investments in information technology. The 

act requires agencies to establish goals for improving efficiency through 

the effective use of information technology and to develop performance 

measures to assess how well information technology investments support 

agency initiatives. The act also requires that major systems development 

initiatives have investment analyses. 

Conclusions It is uncertain whether DOD will ultimately achieve its TAV initiative goals. 

While DOD has achieved some successes through its current effort, it has 

minimal information for assessing the initiative’s status overall, and the 

effort is weakened by inadequate strategic and implementation planning. 

Many of the initiative’s problems have resulted from long-standing 
B-278430

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

management challenges that DOD encounters as it works to implement 

new initiatives that span components. These challenges include cultural 

resistance to change and service parochialism, the lack of 

outcome-oriented goals and performance measures, and the lack of 

management accountability. The Results Act and the Clinger-Cohen Act 

provide effective guidance for developing clear goals and performance 

measures that are linked to and supported by components and would allow 

DOD to address these challenges. Such an approach is also required in 

DOD’s 1998 Logistics Strategic Plan for initiatives such as TAV. 

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that actions be taken 

to develop a Departmentwide TAV strategic plan and associated 

component implementation plans based on the outcome-oriented 

management principles embodied in the Results Act and the Clinger-Cohen 

Act; such plans must be agreed to and supported by relevant components. 

Specifically, all plans should

• describe a complete management structure and officials (including 

component officials) that will be accountable for ensuring the timely 

success of the TAV initiative;

• describe how the initiative will be incorporated into DOD work 

processes in support of DOD’s TAV performance goals and how 

appropriate training will be put in place to support the new work 

processes and the related cultural change that must be made to support 

Departmentwide asset sharing;

• identify complete resource requirements for implementing the TAV 

initiative and include related investment analyses that show how the 

major information technology investments will support TAV initiative 

goals; 

• identify how Departmentwide systems issues that affect implementation 

of TAV will be addressed; and

• establish outcome-oriented TAV initiative goals and performance 

measures for all relevant components and closely link the measures to 

improvement targets established in documents such as DOD’s Logistics 

Strategic Plan and the Results Act Performance Plan in the Annual 

Report to the President and the Congress.
B-278430

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendation to follow the principles embodied in the Results Act and 

the Clinger-Cohen Act13 regarding the TAV initiative. However, DOD did 

not describe what action it planned to take on our recommendation to 

develop a Departmentwide TAV strategic plan to guide component 

implementation plans using the Results Act framework. DOD’s comments 

are included in their entirety as appendix I. 

DOD stated that it has not created a formal Departmentwide TAV program 

but that better asset management will be attained by each component 

through improvement to its business and inventory systems and databases. 

DOD stated that it plans to ensure that each component addresses 

increased asset visibility as part of its overall logistics supply chain 

modernization, but in the context of improved inventory management 

practices. DOD also stated that to the extent that the modernization of 

inventory management practices requires information technology 

investments, DOD will adhere to the principles of the Clinger-Cohen Act 

and that the appropriate management structures are in place for 

implementation. DOD also stated that it plans to continue to monitor 

progress in achieving the TAV goals in the Results Act Annual Performance 

Plan for fiscal year 2000 as part of its overall acquisition reform initiative. 

DOD officials stated that TAV has been referred to as a program for 

convenience. Although TAV is described as a program in the Department’s 

Results Act Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000 in its 1999 Annual Report 

to the President and the Congress, we modified our report to reflect DOD’s 

comments and now describe TAV as an initiative.

Given the Department’s approach to managing the TAV initiative, it is 

unclear how the goals, objectives, and time lines described in major 

Department documents such as its Results Act Performance Plan for the 

year 2000 will be met. Currently, components lack plans that explain how 

they would integrate TAV into their work processes to support transfers of 

assets to other components, and they did not provide time frames for 

realizing the goals set for TAV in Department planning documents. 

Therefore, we continue to believe that the Secretary of Defense should 

develop a Departmentwide strategic plan and associated component 

13The Department refers to the Clinger-Cohen Act as the Information Technology Management Reform 

Act (ITMRA). The ITMRA was later renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act to honor the principals of the 

ITMRA.
B-278430

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

implementation plans based on the principles embodied in the Results Act 

and the Clinger-Cohen Act.

Appendix II describes our objectives, scope, and methodology for this 

report. Appendix III describes the TAV initiatives and programs under way 

in various components. Appendix IV describes Department plans that have 

been made to support asset-tracking efforts, with cited completion dates. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 10 days after its issue date. At that time, we 

will send copies of this report to Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator Daniel 

K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Carl Levin, Senator 

Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens, Senator Fred Thompson, and 

Senator John Warner and to Representative Dan Burton, Representative 

John R. Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis, Representative John P. Murtha, 

Representative David Obey, Representative Ike Skelton, Representative 

Floyd Spence, Representative John M. Spratt, Jr., Representative Henry A. 

Waxman, and Representative C.W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or 

Ranking Minority Member of Senate and House Committees and 

Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable 

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, 

Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the 

Navy; General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps; 

F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Air Force General 

Charles Robertson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command; 

Army Lieutenant General Henry T. Glisson, Director, DLA; and the 

Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

Copies will also be made available to others upon request.
B-278430

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V. 

Sincerely yours,

David R. Warren

Director

Defense Management Issues
B-278430

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Comments From the 

Department of Defense 

22

Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

25

Appendix III

TAV Initiatives Across 

DOD

27

Appendix IV

History of Department 

Plans to Realize TAV

31

Appendix V

Major Contributors to 

This Report

33

Related GAO Products 35

Figures Figure III.1: Departmentwide TAV Organization 27
Contents

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Abbreviations

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

NPR National Performance Review

TAV Total Asset Visibility
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApeInxdi
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Now on pp. 3, 15.
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApIexndi

As your Subcommittee requested, we reviewed the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) implementation of its Total Asset Visibility (TAV) 

initiative. Specifically, we reviewed (1) the difficulty in determining the 

status of the initiative’s implementation, (2) planning weaknesses that are 

affecting initiative implementation, and (3) strategies for addressing those 

weaknesses. 

We interviewed and reviewed documents from DOD officials and 

contractors that are implementing TAV across DOD and within the military 

components; officials that are implementing initiatives supporting TAV; and 

officials responsible for logistics modernization initiatives within the 

military components. Additionally, we reviewed progress reports and 

briefings on TAV implementation and other related information. We did not 

independently verify the accuracy of this information. We also did not 

validate the actual fielding of the TAV capability in theaters of operation as 

described by agency officials for this report. However, we observed 

demonstrations of the Joint TAV, the Army, and the Navy TAV capabilities. 

We also attended portions of the 5-day TAV users’ conference held at the 

Xerox Document University in Virginia in March 1998.

We interviewed officials and gathered relevant documentation for our 

review at the following locations:

• Joint TAV Office within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Logistics), Alexandria, Virginia; 

• Navy TAV initiative within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Logistics, Supply Programs and Policy Division, 

Arlington, Virginia; 

• Army TAV initiative within the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Logistics, Logistics Integration Agency, Alexandria, Virginia; 

• Army TAV System Development Group, Logistics Support Activity, 

Huntsville, Alabama;

• Navy TAV Systems Development Group, Naval Inventory Control Point, 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; 

• Transportation Command Directorate of Operations and Logistics, Scott 

Air Force Base, Illinois; 

• Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Office of Materiel Management and the 

Air Force Supply, Fuels, and Procurement Division, Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia; and 

• Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 
Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

To identify strategies for improving the TAV initiative’s implementation, we 

reviewed and analyzed DOD and component strategic and implementation 

plans maintained in the Joint TAV Office, the U.S. Transportation 

Command, and the military components. In analyzing the plans, we applied 

fundamental strategic planning practices identified in our prior work on 

this topic, including our prior reports that addressed the implementation of 

strategic management processes in government agencies, including 

approaches to the Results Act. DOD recognizes the need for a TAV 

strategic plan and finalized a Joint TAV plan in January 1999. However, 

since the Joint TAV strategic plan was oriented on theater asset visibility, 

we focused our review of planning efforts on DOD’s 1996 implementation 

plan, which claimed to be a Departmentwide TAV implementation plan.

We conducted our work between July 1997 and January 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix III

TAV Initiatives Across DOD ApIexndi

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) is responsible for the 

TAV initiative. The Director, DLA, is the Executive Agent charged with 

coordinating asset-tracking initiatives across the services and DOD. The 

Executive Agent role was transferred to the DLA Director from the Army 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics effective June 1, 1998. The transfer was 

done, according to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Logistics), because DLA was better positioned to create work processes 

and supporting systems that meet DOD logistics requirements. The 

Executive Agent is supported by a Joint TAV Office, which is led by a 

Director and supported by representatives from each major component. 

The Joint TAV Office monitors execution of the TAV implementation plan 

and advises key component executives on the implementation status. 

Figure III.1: Departmentwide TAV Organization

Source: DOD.

Deputy Under Secretary

of 

Defense (Logistics)

Deputy Under Secretary

of 

Defense (Logistics)

Army Army Marine

Corps

Marine

Navy Corps Navy Air

Force

Air

Force DLA DLA TRANSCOM TRANSCOM

Director,

Defense Logistics

Agency, Executive Agent

Director,

Defense Logistics

Agency, Executive Agent

Director,

Joint TAV Office

Director,

Joint TAV Office
Appendix III

TAV Initiatives Across DOD

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Several related initiatives and programs support the development of TAV 

across the Department. The Army TAV program is led by the Army Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Navy TAV program is led by the Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. According to TAV officials, each 

component is also working with the Joint TAV Office to facilitate access to 

assets for Departmentwide use. The Departmentwide TAV initiative is 

supported by a number of component efforts. Those major efforts are 

described in the following sections.

Joint Total Asset 

Visibility

The Joint TAV program is led by the Joint TAV Office. The Office is to 

provide users with timely and accurate information on the location, status, 

and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies. The Office’s role 

is to obtain access to data from component systems, convert the data into 

useful information, and present the information to customers across all 

components. The Office’s program involves major subinitiatives for 

tracking the status of personnel, medical assets, ammunition, and supplies.

Global Transportation 

Network

The Global Transportation Network is led by the U.S. Transportation 

Command. The network is the principal tool for tracking DOD’s in-transit 

assets. It provides the ability to track the identity, status, and location of 

DOD unit and nonunit cargo, passengers, patients, forces, and military and 

commercial airlift, sealift, and surface assets from origin to destination 

during peace, contingencies, and war. The network is to collect, integrate, 

and distribute transportation information to commanders in chief, the 

services, and other DOD customers, giving visibility of a requirement when 

it is initiated and providing continuous visibility as it moves through the 

transportation system.

Automatic 

Identification 

Technology

The automatic identification technology effort is led by DLA. The effort 

involves using many technologies, including bar codes, magnetic stripes, 

integrated circuit boards, optical memory cards, radio frequency 

identification tags, and orbiting satellites, to track the location of assets. 

The effort also includes the hardware and software required to read 

information from the technologies and integrate that information with 

other logistics data.
Appendix III

TAV Initiatives Across DOD

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Army Total Asset 

Visibility

The Army TAV capability is an automated tool that is managed by the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. It is designed to improve the ability of 

soldiers, logisticians, and managers to obtain and act on the information 

about the location, quantity, condition, and movement of assets through the 

Army logistics pipeline. Fielding of the tool, completed in 1996, provides 

visibility of 99 percent of Army inventories across all classes of supply, 

according to the Army. Prototypes of the tool were used in Somalia, 

Rwanda, and Haiti and were also being used to support military operations 

in Bosnia. According to the Army, some of the key benefits of the tool 

include easier distribution of assets, reduced inventories and receipt 

processing times, and fewer duplicate requisitions due to improved asset 

tracking.

Navy Total Asset 

Visibility

The Navy TAV program is led by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 

Logistics. In 1992, the Navy piloted TAV through its Virtual Master Stock 

Item Record Program. This program consolidated Navy assets into one 

database that enabled item managers to use and redistribute assets 

efficiently. The Navy later partnered with DLA to provide the Agency 

access to Navy assets. The program is designed to provide the Navy the 

ability to track and access primarily secondary inventory, including 

ammunition. According to the Navy, it has targeted numerous TAV 

capabilities, including visibility of assets on ships and inventory control 

point/defense reutilization and marketing service linkage to assets 

categorized for disposal. 

Air Force Total Asset 

Visibility

The Air Force TAV efforts are coordinated through the Air Force Supply, 

Fuels, and Procurement Division and involve refining its two servicewide 

asset visibility systems dealing with wholesale and retail assets. The Air 

Force also redistributes excess consumable assets both internally and to 

other services within the same theater of operation. According to the Air 

Force, it has visibility and access to Air Force-managed assets at its 

wholesale and retail activities and at repair contractor facilities and storage 

distribution points.

Marine Corps Total 

Asset Visibility

The Marine Corps TAV effort is led by the Installations and Logistics 

Department. The Corps is creating a logistics information data warehouse 

to share data and provide an overall TAV capability within the Corps. The 
Appendix III

TAV Initiatives Across DOD

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Marine Corps describes in its fiscal year 1998 Installations and Logistics 

Campaign Plan the concepts for acquiring TAV capabilities in the future. 

TAV is also a required operational capability within the Marine Corps 

Master Plan. 

Defense Logistics 

Agency TAV

The Defense Logistics Agency coordinates TAV efforts through its Office of 

Materiel Management. The Agency uses data generated by some 

component facilities to support its lateral redistribution and procurement 

offset initiatives by providing its item managers access to these cross 

component asset-tracking capabilities. DLA is also the Executive Agent for 

the Joint TAV initiative and the Department’s overall automated 

identification technology effort.
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix IV

History of Department Plans to Realize TAV ApVenIxdi

Obtaining total asset visibility has been a DOD goal since at least 1972. 

Attempts at reaching this goal have repeatedly failed and deadlines have 

slipped. In 1972 DOD expected to implement an early version of TAV by 

1980, but did not. DOD again developed a plan in 1992 with the target of 

realizing TAV by 1995; this attempt at TAV was again not fulfilled. The 

current plan—the May 1996 Defense TAV Implementation Plan—contains 

completion dates for several project elements but no target date for 

achieving total asset visibility. However, the 1998 DOD Logistics Strategic 

Plan does state that timely, accurate information for 90 percent of 

Department assets would be available on the TAV system by 2000 and for 

100 percent of Department assets by 2004. 

a

DOD Regulation 4140.1-R, chapter 4, “Asset Management.”

Name/date of plan Plan objectives Target completion date 

Logistics Systems 

Plan (1972)

Eliminate unnecessary duplication of inventories and establish common use of 

inventories wherever operationally acceptable and economically beneficial. Material 

managers will exercise the capability to effectively and comprehensively track and 

control inventories. These changes were to be realized through improvements to 

interservicing and materiel management planning.

1980

DOD Total Asset 

Visibility Plan (1992)

Provide managers the capability to have access to and act on timely and accurate 

information about the location, quantity, condition, movement, and status of DOD 

materiel assets.

1995

DOD TAV 

Implementation Plan 

(1996)

Expands the scope of the 1992 plan to include personnel and medical inventories, 

but the core targets for asset tracking remained the same.

No clear completion date

1998 DOD Logistics 

Strategic Plan

Meet total asset tracking requirements established in DOD regulation on asset 

management.a 2004
Appendix IV

History of Department Plans to Realize TAV

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report ApVenxdi

National Security and 

International Affairs 

Division,

Washington, D.C.

Charles I. Patton, Jr. 

Lawson (Rick) Gist, Jr.

B. Scott Pettis

Robert R. Poetta

Leo G. Clarke III

Kenneth Knouse

James Murphy

F. Earl Morrison
Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Related GAO Products ApendxViI

Navy Inventory Management: Improvements Needed to Prevent Excess 

Purchases (GAO/NSIAD-98-86, Apr. 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD 

Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, Apr. 30, 1998).

Department of Defense: Financial Audits Highlight Continuing Challenges 

to Correct Serious Financial Management Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-158, 

Apr. 16, 1998).

Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress by Using Best 

Practices for Reparable Parts (GAO/NSIAD-98-97, Feb. 27, 1998).

Managing for Results: Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Can Help 

Address Strategic Planning Challenges (GAO/GGD-98-44, Jan. 30, 1998).

Army Logistics System: Opportunities to Improve the Accuracy of the 

Army’s Major Equipment Item System (GAO/AIMD-98-17, Jan. 23, 1998).

Defense Inventory Management: Expanding Use of Best Practices for 

Hardware Items Can Reduce Logistics Costs (GAO/NSIAD-98-47, 

Jan. 20, 1998).

Financial Reporting: DOD’s Fiscal Year 1996 Financial Statements 

Inventory Reporting Does Not Meet Standards (GAO/AIMD-98-16, 

Dec. 24, 1997).

Defense Inventory: Inadequate Controls Over Air Force Suspended Stocks 

(GAO/NSIAD-98-29, Dec. 22, 1997).

Defense IRM: Poor Implementation of Management Controls Has Put 

Migration Strategy at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-5, Oct. 20, 1997).

Defense Inventory: Management of Surplus Usable Aircraft Parts Can Be 

Improved (GAO/NSIAD-98-7, Oct. 2, 1997).

Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal Agencies’ 

Strategic Plans (GAO/GGD-97-180, Sept. 16, 1997).

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for 

Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, Aug. 13, 1997).
Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-40 Defense Inventory

Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000 

Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, Aug. 11, 1997).

DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-219R, Aug. 5, 1997).

Inventory Management: The Army Could Reduce Logistics Costs for 

Aviation Parts by Adopting Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-97-82, Apr. 15, 

1997).

Defense Logistics: Much of the Inventory Exceeds Current Needs 

(GAO/NSIAD-97-71, Feb. 28, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-97-5, 

Feb. 1997).

DOD’s GPRA Implementation (GAO/NSIAD/GGD-97-65R, Jan. 31, 1997).

Defense Inventory: Spare and Repair Parts Inventory Costs Can Be 

Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-47, Jan. 17, 1997).

Logistics Planning: Opportunities for Enhancing DOD’s Logistics Strategic 

Plan (GAO/NSIAD-97-28, Dec. 18, 1996).

Defense IRM: Critical Risks Facing New Material Management Strategy

(GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept. 6, 1996).

Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating 

Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94, 

Aug. 16, 1996).

Inventory Management: Adopting Best Practices Could Enhance Navy 

Efforts to Achieve Efficiencies and Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-156, 

July 12, 1996).

Management Reform: Completion Status of Agency Actions Under the 

National Performance Review (GAO/GGD-96-94, June 12, 1996).

Defense Logistics: Requirement Determinations for Aviation Spare Parts 

Need to Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-96-70, Mar. 19, 1996).

Managing for Results: Achieving GPRA’s Objectives Requires Strong 

Congressional Role (GAO/T-GGD-96-79, Mar. 6, 1996).

(709281) Letr
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