[Cite as In re E.H., 2020-Ohio-2835.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF: : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

E.H., W.H., J.N. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

 : 

 : 

 : Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108 

 : 2019 CA 00109 

 : 2019 CA 00110 

 : 

 : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case Nos. 

F2017-0351, F2017-0352, F2017-

0353 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: May 6, 2020 

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant-Father For Appellee-LCJFS 

JERMAINE COLQUITT PAULA M. SAWYERS 

33 West Main Street 20 South Second Street 

Suite 109 Fourth Floor 

Newark, OH 43055 Newark, OH 43055 

For Mother Guardian ad Litem 

Carolynn E. Fittro SCOTT SIDNER 

1335 Dublin Road 39 Northview Drive 

Suite 115F Johnstown, OH 43031 

Columbus, OH 43215 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 2 

Wise, Earle, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant-Father, C.H., appeals the October 1, 2019 judgment entries of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio, Juvenile Division, denying motions for 

legal custody and terminating his parental rights and granting permanent custody of his 

children to appellee, the Licking County Department of Job and Family Services. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On May 22, 2017, appellee filed complaints for temporary legal custody of 

E.H. born in March 2015 (Case No. F2017-0351), W.H. born in March 2017 (Case No. 

F2017-0352), and J.N. born in November 2012 (Case No. F2017-0353), claiming the 

children to be dependent children. Father of E.H. and W.H. is appellant herein; father of 

J.N. is J.A., presumed deceased; mother of all three children is N.H. Appellee had been 

granted emergency shelter care of the children three days earlier. 

{¶ 3} An adjudicatory hearing was held before a magistrate on July 12, 2017. By 

decisions filed same date, the magistrate found the children to be dependent and ordered 

temporary custody of the children to remain with appellee. The trial court approved and 

adopted the magistrate's decisions via judgment entries filed July 13, 2017. Case plans 

were immediately filed thereafter. 

{¶ 4} On November 8, 2017, mother filed motions to grant temporary custody of 

the children to either the children's maternal grandparents or their maternal great aunt 

and uncle. 

{¶ 5} On April 18, 2018, appellee filed motions for permanent custody due to the 

parents being unable to make any significant progress on the case plans and the children 

should not or could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable amount of time. 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 3 

Mother's motions for temporary custody were to be heard at the permanent custody 

hearing. Hearings were held before a magistrate on February 15, and 22, 2019. Prior to 

the hearings, mother orally moved to amend her motions for temporary custody to 

motions for legal custody to either of the aforementioned relatives. By decisions filed July 

22, 2019, the magistrate denied the motions for legal custody and granted appellee's 

motions for permanent custody. 

{¶ 6} Each parent filed objections. By judgment entries filed October 1, 2019, the 

trial court denied the objections, approved and adopted the magistrate's decisions, and 

granted permanent custody of the children to appellee. 

{¶ 7} Appellant-Father filed an appeal in each case and this matter is now before 

this court for consideration.1 The assignments of error in each of the three appeals are 

identical and are as follows: 

I 

{¶ 8} "THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 

MOTHER'S MOTION TO GRANT LEGAL CUSTODY OF ALL THREE MINOR 

CHILDREN TO EITHER MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO 

MATERNAL GREAT AUNT AND UNCLE [C. AND T. A.] AND ERRED IN GRANTING 

THE LICKING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES 

PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN." 

II 

 

1Mother also filed appeals (Case Nos. 2019 CA 00111, 2019 CA 00112, and 2019 CA 

00113), and her arguments will be reviewed therein. 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 4 

{¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BEST INTERESTS

OF THE MINOR CHILDREN WOULD BE SERVED BY THE GRANTING OF 

PERMANENT CUSTODY." 

I 

{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, father claims the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying mother's motions for legal custody to relatives. We disagree. 

{¶ 11} R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) states the following in pertinent part: 

 (A) If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child, 

the court may make any of the following orders of disposition: 

 (3) Award legal custody of the child to either parent or to any other 

person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting legal 

custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in a 

complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to 

the proceedings. 

{¶ 12} We agree with the following analysis set forth by our colleagues from the 

Eighth District in In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and 100971, 2014-Ohio4818, ¶ 19-22: 

 Legal custody is significantly different than the termination of 

parental rights in that, despite losing legal custody of a child, the parent of 

the child retains residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. In 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 5 

re G.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95410, 2011-Ohio-4090, ¶ 14, citing R.C. 

2151.353(A)(3)(c). In such a case, a parent's right to regain custody is not 

permanently foreclosed. In re M.J.M. [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 2010-

Ohio-1674] at ¶ 12. For this reason, the standard the trial court uses in 

making its determination is the less restrictive "preponderance of the 

evidence." Id. at ¶ 9, citing In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 

N.E.2d 552 (7th Dist.2001). "Preponderance of the evidence" means 

evidence that is more probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative 

value. In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7. 

 Unlike permanent custody cases in which the trial court is guided by 

the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) before terminating parental rights 

and granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not provide 

factors the court should consider in determining the child's best interest in 

a motion for legal custody. In re G.M. at ¶ 15. We must presume that, in 

the absence of best interest factors in a legal custody case, "the legislature 

did not intend to require the consideration of certain factors as a predicate 

for granting legal custody." Id. at ¶ 16. Such factors, however, are 

instructive when making a determination as to the child's best interest. In 

re E.A. [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 2013-Ohio-1193] at ¶ 13. 

 The best interest factors include, for example, the interaction of the 

child with the child's parents, relatives, and caregivers; the custodial history 

of the child; the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement; and 

whether a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 6 

remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's 

home. R.C. 2151.414(D). 

 Because custody determinations " 'are some of the most difficult and 

agonizing decisions a trial judge must make,' " a trial judge must have broad 

discretion in considering all of the evidence. In re E.A. at ¶ 10, quoting 

Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). We 

therefore review a trial court's determination of legal custody for an abuse 

of discretion. Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). 

An abuse of discretion implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 

219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

Accord, In re L.D., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-985, 2013-Ohio-3214; Stull v. Richland 

County Children Services, 5th Dist. Richland Nos. 11CA47 and 11CA48, 2012-Ohio-738. 

{¶ 13} Final hearings were held on February 15, and 22, 2019. On the morning of 

the first hearing date, mother orally moved to amend her motions for temporary custody 

to motions for legal custody to either the children's maternal grandparents (F.M. and E.M.) 

or their maternal great aunt and uncle (C.A. and T.A.). T. at 7-8. The magistrate 

acknowledged that the grandparents and the great aunt signed a statement of 

understanding form as required under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). T. at 8. 

{¶ 14} The children's maternal grandmother, F.M., testified she and her husband 

live in a three bedroom mobile home. T. at 12. They have enough income to meet all of 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 7 

their financial needs as well as the children's. T. at 14. She was aware of the oldest child 

having special needs, but the child was getting help and that would continue. T. at 15. 

She could not testify to the child's special needs "because I don't know." T. at 27. She 

was not aware of any issues with the younger two children. T. at 15. She had sisters 

and sisters-in-law as a support system to help out. Id. She did not know the children's 

birthdates. T. at 31. She has visited with the children and they are bonded. T. at 16. 

She never filled out paperwork seeking placement because "it happened so fast" and the 

original caseworker told her not to bother because they would not get the children. T. at 

19-20. F.M. stated she had convictions for a DWI in 2009 and one in 2012, and a drug 

related charge, "but I went to rehab, I finished that, and I've been clean for five years." T. 

at 20-21. She no longer consumes alcohol. T. at 21-22. Her drug related charge was 

abusing harmful intoxicants in 2013. T. at 22. She denied having a substantiated physical 

abuse case with Children's Services when mother was a child, stating, "[t]hat went 

nowhere," "I never went to court for none of that." T. at 23, 43. She stated she has always 

wanted the children. T. at 27. 

{¶ 15} F.M.'s husband, E.M., testified he understood the oldest child had special 

needs as the child was autistic. T. at 47. He has visited with the children and they are 

bonded. T. at 49-50. He testified he was prepared to have the children in his home. T. 

at 50. However, in October 2018 and again just prior to the hearing, E.M. told the 

guardian ad litem he did not think it was feasible for him and his wife to care for the 

children. T. at 55. Overnight he changed his mind. Id. He explained "there were doubts 

whether we would be able to handle them and everything, and she has guaranteed me 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 8 

or promised me that she's had a change of heart and that she really wants to do it so I 

agreed with her." T. at 56. He did not know the children's birthdates. T. at 66. 

{¶ 16} The children's maternal great aunt, C.A., testified she was aware that the 

oldest child had autism, and she would be able to meet the child's special needs. T. at 

77. She lives in a three bedroom home with her husband and her seventeen year old 

child. T. at 78. She and her husband have enough income to meet all of their financial 

needs as well as the children's. T. at 79-80. She has a close bond with the oldest child 

because at one time, her older daughter was taking care of the child. T. at 81. She really 

did not know much about the youngest child. Id. The oldest child was removed because 

C.A.'s daughter failed to complete the required paperwork. T. at 85. The original 

caseworker asked C.A. to take a drug screen, but she refused. T. at 83. C.A. tried to 

visit with the children once a week until the oldest child was removed from her daughter's 

care. T. at 86-87. C.A. wanted the children, but did nothing to follow up because she 

was "waiting to hear what everything was going on because I'd been kinda of in the loop. 

I don't really know where the children are, what's going on with them." T. at 88. The 

guardian ad litem called C.A. and left two voice messages that she acknowledged 

receiving, but never returned his calls. T. at 92-93, 347-348. C.A. never had all three of 

the children over at the same time. T. at 95. She did not know the children's birthdates. 

T. at 101. 

{¶ 17} The foster mother of the oldest child testified the child's been diagnosed 

with autism and cognitive delays. T. at 125, 129-130. She explained the child's behaviors 

and the in home treatment she provides for the child. T. at 126-127. She opined the child 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 9 

"takes a lot of care, a lot of constant care and [the child's] always going to take a lot of 

constant care for the rest of [the child's] life." T. at 128. 

{¶ 18} Rebecca Inboden is the family's ongoing caseworker. She testified the 

maternal grandmother would not be able to pass a home study because of her criminal 

history. T. at 268. Plus she had "demonstrated some fairly inappropriate and 

uncooperative behavior towards agency staff." Id. Maternal grandfather stated he could 

not care for the children by himself. T. at 269. Maternal great aunt "acknowledged that 

she had a history of substance abuse and that she had sought treatment for that." T. at 

269-270. Appellee asked her to do a random drug screen, but she refused. T. at 297. 

There was also a concern that her husband had a domestic violence conviction in the 

past; therefore, C.A. and her husband would have been excluded as potential relative 

options for the children. T. at 270. C.A. was told she could visit with the children. She 

visited in February of 2018, and did not return for any more visits. T. at 300-301. Ms. 

Inboden opined the relatives "would be probably very overwhelmed very quickly with the 

children's needs, and how young the children are, and how extensive the needs are, and 

the level of care that's involved." T. at 300. 

{¶ 19} In his decisions filed July 22, 2019, the magistrate noted several concerns 

with the maternal grandparents, the most notable was his concern with F.M.'s "apparent 

lack of knowledge about these children." F.M. was not able to testify to the oldest child's 

special needs because she just did not know. Given the foster mother's testimony as to 

this child's significant needs, it is apparent F.M. "has no real idea" as to what the child's 

needs are. The magistrate noted this is especially important given the fact that the 

maternal grandparents "are on the fence about becoming permanent custodians for these 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 10 

children." They admitted to telling the guardian ad litem on more than one occasion that 

they could not care for the children, but changed their minds the night before the hearing. 

This was a concern as they "don't seem fully committed to taking on responsibility for 

these three children." The magistrate concluded the following: "Given the hesitance of 

the two to take on this task, the scale of the task presented by three young [children] and 

the exceptional needs of [J.], the undersigned simply cannot see how this would work 

long-term. For these reasons, the motion of Mr. and Mrs. [M.] for custody should be 

denied." 

{¶ 20} The magistrate had the same concerns with C.A. It was unclear whether 

she understood all that was involved in caring for the oldest child's special needs and add 

to that "the needs of caring for two other young children and it seems that Ms. [A.], though 

acting with good intentions, has not demonstrated that she is able and willing to take on 

these three children and meet their needs permanently." The magistrate concluded her 

request for legal custody should be denied. 

{¶ 21} Upon review, based upon a preponderance of the evidence presented as 

outlined above, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motions 

for legal custody. 

{¶ 22} Assignment of Error I is denied. 

II 

{¶ 23} In his second assignment of error, father claims the trial court erred in 

finding clear and convincing evidence that the children's best interests would be best 

served by granting permanent custody to appellee. We disagree.
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 11 

{¶ 24} R.C.2151.414(B)(1) states permanent custody may be granted if the trial 

court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the 

child and: 

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot 

be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or 

should not be placed with the child's parents. 

(b) The child is abandoned. 

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who 

are able to take permanent custody. 

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *. 

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents 

from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an 

abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any 

court in this state or another state. 

{¶ 25} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence "which will provide in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. See In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). 

"Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 12 

reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had 

sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof." Cross at 477. 

{¶ 26} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining whether a 

child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not 

be placed with the parents. Said section states in pertinent part the following: 

(E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this 

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the 

Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court 

shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and 

convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this 

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the 

Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's 

parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with 

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either 

parent: 

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency 

to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child 

to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the parents have 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 13 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to 

the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to 

resume and maintain parental duties. 

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant. 

{¶ 27} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets forth the factors a trial court shall consider in 

determining the best interest of a child: 

(D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held 

pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) 

or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Revised 

Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited 

to, the following: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's 

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, 

and any other person who may significantly affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the 

child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 14 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 

2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary 

custody of an equivalent agency in another state; 

(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 

permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section 

apply in relation to the parents and child. 

{¶ 28} Father does not contest the fact that the children were placed in appellee's 

temporary custody on May 19, 2017, adjudicated on July 12, 2017, and the permanent 

custody hearings were held on February 15, and 22, 2019. As found by the trial court, 

the children have been in appellee's custody for over twelve months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). 

{¶ 29} Ms. Inboden testified the initial concerns with the family were domestic 

violence between mother and father, mental health concerns for mother, and substance 

abuse concerns for both parents. T. at 236-237. Father's case plan addressed mental 

health and substance abuse issues, and medical neglect of the children. T. at 237-238, 

257. At the initial intake in May 2017, father tested positive for amphetamines, 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 15 

methamphetamine, and THC. T. at 258. Father self-referred for substance abuse 

services at LAPP, but did not complete the program and his case was "closed non 

successful, uncompliant." T. at 260-261. Father's substance abuse continued to be an 

ongoing problem. He tested positive for drugs on multiple random drug screens, and 

refused drug screens on at least two occasions. T. at 244-245, 259-260, 281-282, 313-

314. Father's substance abuse remains a concern. T. at 261. 

{¶ 30} As for mental health, father had a past diagnosis of PSTD which he felt was 

no longer relevant. T. at 262. Also, there was a concern of domestic violence. Id. Father 

never produced verification of undergoing any mental health evaluation. T. at 263, 311. 

Father's mental health remains a concern. Id.

{¶ 31} Father's parenting skills were an issue as the two older children had 

developmental delays i.e., difficulties with speech, articulation, communicating. T. at 250, 

263. Father attended one or two classes at Heartbeats, a pregnancy and parenting 

support facility, but did not follow through. T. at 263-264. Father's parenting skills remain 

a concern. T. at 264. 

{¶ 32} Father's employment and housing were not an issue until he and mother 

separated and he moved to North Carolina to live with his brother. T. at 264-265. Father 

provided verification of employment in North Carolina. T. at 265. 

{¶ 33} Father regularly visited with the children and the visits went "[v]ery well," he 

was "very attentive and engaged with the kids." T. at 266. He even traveled from North 

Carolina for visitations. T. at 199, 303. 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 16 

{¶ 34} The children were in foster care and were making remarkable progress. T. 

at 266-268. Their basic and special needs were being met, and their respective foster 

parents wanted to adopt them. T. at 114, 128-129, 266, 268, 309. 

{¶ 35} Ms. Inboden stated the case plan services have not been completed and 

"what has been attempted, doesn't appear to be sufficient to alleviate the concerns or 

provide any reassurance that the children's needs will be met and they'll be safe." T. at 

274. 

{¶ 36} Scott Sidner is the guardian ad litem. He testified he observed visits 

between father and the children and they went "[r]eally well." T. at 338-339. He could 

tell father "loved the kids and vice versa." T. at 340-341. Father responded appropriately 

to the children's behaviors and redirected the children when necessary. T. at 340. He 

"was doing really well in the last part of the visits, not just his section but coming there 

and interacting with the kids and everything." T. at 341. However, he did not believe 

father was capable of meeting the basic and special needs of the children. T. at 357. It 

was his opinion that granting permanent custody to the agency would be in the children's 

best interests. T. at 358. 

{¶ 37} Father testified at the time of the hearing, he and mother had been 

separated for eight months. T. at 197-198. He lived in North Carolina with his brother 

and his family in a rented home. T. at 197. He travels to Ohio every two weeks to visit 

with the children. T. at 199. He acknowledged that he was given a copy of the case plan, 

and understood what was required: maintain employment/income, substance abuse 

assessment and treatment, and mental health counseling. T. at 200-201. He was 

currently employed and received disability income. T. at 199-200, 206. He completed 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 17 

LAPP education, but did not follow up on recommended services because "I wanted to 

get something that showed a completion, a certificate." T. at 201-202. Instead he 

completed an online program through Open Path. T. at 202; Father's Exhibit B. However, 

he admitted to testing positive for illegal substances after completing the program and 

using marijuana in the past few months prior to the hearing. T. at 202-203. He did not 

refuse one of the drug screens, he just wanted to wait "to allow the time to actually have 

to urinate." T. at 320, 330-331. He received a mental health discharge from the VA in 

2015. T. at 326-327; Father's Exhibit C. He did not seek any additional mental health 

evaluation other than ongoing reevaluation with a VA therapist "just to see if there's any 

need for any further concern. They deemed nothing at that point. That there was no 

further concern for any continuous evaluation." T. at 203-204, 327-328. He felt his 

continuous involvement with the VA was satisfactory. T. at 328. He stated he took an 

online parenting class. T. at 209, 324-326; Father's Exhibit A. Although the oldest child 

was not his child, he consider the child to be his, and was aware of the child's special 

needs. T. at 204. Father stated Ms. Inboden had told him that he would never get his 

children back as long as he stayed with mother. Id. 

{¶ 38} On the issue of permanent custody regarding father, the magistrate found 

the children had been in the agency's temporary custody for twenty months of a 

consecutive twenty-two month period, and father "has also made minimal progress" on 

his case plan objectives. See Magistrate's Decisions filed July 22, 2019. While he did 

engage in mental health services through the VA, participated in an online program for 

substance abuse, and took an online parenting class, he admitted to continued 

"substance abuse through much of the case." He did not have independent housing and 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 18 

lived out of state. The magistrate found father "may be worse off than when the case 

started as well." The magistrate further noted because father now lives in North Carolina, 

the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (hereinafter "ICPC") applied in this 

case. As quoted by the magistrate, Article VI(A) of the ICPC states, " 'no child subject to 

this compact shall be placed into a receiving state until approval for such placement is 

obtained.' " Article VI(B) states if " 'the public child placing agency in the receiving state 

does not approve the proposed placement then the child shall not be placed.' " The trial 

court did not receive any such approval from North Carolina; therefore, the magistrate 

could not recommend an order of placement with father. The magistrate recommended 

the termination of parental rights, and determined "the best way for these children to 

achieve stability and permanency is through adoption." The magistrate recommended 

permanent custody of the children to the agency. By judgment entries filed October 1, 

2019, the trial court denied father's objections and approved and adopted the magistrate's 

decisions. 

{¶ 39} As explained by our brethren from the Second District in In re A.J.S. & R.S.,

2d Dist. Miami No. 2007CA2, 2007-Ohio-3433, ¶ 22: 

Accordingly, issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. In this 

regard, "[t]he underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the 

trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view 

the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, 

and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 19 

testimony." Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 

80, 461 N.E.2d 1273. Finally, an appellate court must adhere to every 

reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's judgment and findings of 

fact. In re Brodbeck, 97 Ohio App.3d 652, 659, 647 N.E.2d 240, citing 

Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 1994-Ohio-432, 638 

N.E.2d 533. 

{¶ 40} Further, " 'the discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining 

whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be 

accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the 

court's determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.' " In re Mauzy 

Children, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2000CA00244, 2000 WL 1700073, *2 (Nov. 13, 2000), 

quoting In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th Dist.1994). 

{¶ 41} From the testimony, it is clear that father loves his children and wishes to 

parent them. However, the evidence is also clear that despite the services and 

caseworkers available to him for some twenty-one months, he has not been able to 

maintain the services and/or successfully complete them. The children are thriving in 

their respective foster homes and appear to be healthy and happy. Given the evidence 

presented, it is impossible for this court to second guess the trial court. As stated above, 

credibility, reliability, and forthrightness are within the province of the trier of fact. 

{¶ 42} Upon review, we find sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the 

trial court's decisions to terminate father's parental rights and grant permanent custody of 

the children to the agency. 
Licking County, Case Nos. 2019 CA 00108, 2019 CA 00109, 2019 CA 00110 20 

{¶ 43} Assignment of Error II is denied. 

{¶ 44} The judgments of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio are 

hereby affirmed. 

By Wise, Earle, J. 

Delaney, P.J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur. 

EEW/db