Charlton Salter

Southern Nuclear
Charlton Salter

40 Inverness Center Pkwy

Birmingham, AL 35242

(205) 992-5193 office

(706) 339-5775 mobile
Changes

 PRA and important industry lessons-learned are 

incorporated in the AP1000TM K/A catalog and are 

identified by the terms “PRA related” or “OE related”.

 Tasks are not included in the AP1000TM catalog because 

the plant specific task list is a better representation of 

required operator skills and knowledges.

 One importance rating is used for all sections except 

generics, A2s, and fuel handling.
Changes

 Asterisks (*), Question Ratings (?), and Difference 

Ratings (†) have been removed.

 Section 2, Generic Knowledges and Abilities, 

importance ratings not applicable to ROs were marked 

N/A.

 Knowledge and Ability stem statements were revised.

 Reviewed CFRs to ensure each K/A included a 

reference to all applicable CFRs.
Section 2

 Was

 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes 

of plant operation.

 Is

 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during any mode 

of plant operation.
Section 2

 Was

 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control 

room.

 Is

 Ability to direct licensed personnel activities inside the 

control room.

 Ability to direct non-licensed personnel activities inside 

the control room.
Section 2

 Was

 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant 

procedures during all modes of plant operation.

 Is

 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating 

procedures during any plant condition.
Section 2

 Was

 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as 

rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high 

pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

 Is

 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures, such as 

rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high 

pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen or hydrogen.
Section 2

 Was

 Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on 

reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant 

system temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion, 

etc.

 Is

 Ability to use On-Line Power Distribution Monitoring 

System and/or procedures to determine the effects on 

reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant 

system temperature, secondary plant, or fuel depletion.
Section 2

 Was

 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical 

Specification action statements for systems.

 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

 Is

 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical 

Specification action statements that require a reactor 

shutdown.

 Ability to apply Technical Specifications with action 

statements of less than or equal to one hour that require a 

reactor shutdown.

 Ability to determine and/or interpret Technical Specifications 

with action statements of greater than one hour.
Section 2

 Was

 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as 

fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey 

instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

 Is

 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as 

fixed radiation monitors and alarms, or personnel 

monitoring equipment.
Section 2

 Was

 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as 

fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey 

instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

 Is

 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems such as 

fixed radiation monitors and alarms, or personnel 

monitoring equipment.
Section 2

 Was

 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate 

action steps.

 Is

 Knowledge of Emergency Operating Procedure entry 

conditions.

 Was

 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

 Is

 Knowledge of for Emergency Operating Procedures 

major action categories.
Section 2

 Was

 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may 

arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or 

activities.

 Is

 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise 

during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities, 

such as analysis and interpretation or radiation and activity 

readings as they pertain to administrative, normal, abnormal, 

and emergency procedures, or analysis and interpretation of 

coolant activity including comparison to emergency plan or 

regulatory limits.

 Rating for RO was changed to N/A
Section 2

 Deleted

 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those 

actions that require immediate operation of system 

components and controls.

 Added

 Ability to use integrated control systems to operate plant 

systems or components.
Section 2

 RO ratings changed to N/A

 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of SROs.

 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement 

procedures.

 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for 

limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of 

safety related equipment.

 Ability to determine and/or interpret Technical 

Specifications with action statements of greater than 

one hour.
Section 3

 Section 3 – Systems

 Changed the systems to reflect those in the AP1000

 Make stems consistent throughout the catalog

 Revised K1, K2, K3, K5, K6, A1 and A4 stems 

 Ensured Knowledge and Ability statements support 

the stems.
Systems K1

 K1 Was:

 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the (system) and the 

following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

 K1 Is:

 Knowledge of the physical or control/protection logic 

relationship between the (system) and the following 

systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

 For mechanical and electrical systems the System 

Specification Document (SSD) Appendix A, ‘Interface 

Lists,’ – list of supporting and dependent systems
Systems K1

 For I&C systems, the list was developed by reviewing 

the System Functional Requirements documents and 

the System Functional Diagrams

 The stem was revised to delete the statement “or 

cause-effect relationships.” Cause-effect relationships 

are addressed in K5.

 Identifies the systems that have a direct interaction, 

either a plant protection/control logic relationship or 

physical piping relationship
Systems K1

 Electrical systems typically were not included in K1, they 

are addressed in K2.

 PLS typically not included in K1 because all systems are 

controlled through the PLS, and the specific controls and 

interlocks are listed in K4.

 Relationship to PMS is found in K1 as either RTS (LCO 

3.3.1), ESAS (LCO 3.3.2), or PAMS (LCO 3.3.3). For 

example, the SGS has no piping connection to PXS but 

does have a plant protection/control logic relationship in 

that SGS instrumentation provides a reactor trip so RTS is 

included in K1. SGS instrumentation also provides for 

several ESAS actuation signals so ESAS is included in K1.
Systems K2

 K2 Was:

 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: 

(CFR: 41.7)

 K2 Is:

 Knowledge of bus or division power supplies to the 

following: (CFR: 41.7)

 For mechanical systems, K2 comes from the SSD, 

Appendix B-3, “Electrical Requirements”.
Systems K3

 K3 Was:

 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 

(system) will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)

 K3 Is:

 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 

(system) will have on the following systems or system 

parameters: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

 K3 lists the systems included in K1 that will be affected 

by a loss of (system) .
Systems K4

 K4 Was:

 Knowledge of (system) design feature(s) and/or 

interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

 K4 Is:

 Knowledge of (system) design feature(s) and/or 

interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

 For mechanical systems the SSD section 1.0, “System 

Functions”, and section 4.0, “System Operation and 

Performance”, are the source for these K/As.
Systems K4

 For I&C systems, the list was developed by reviewing 

the System Functional Requirements documents and 

the System Functional Diagrams.

 K4 contains the Safety-Related Functions, LicensingRelated Functions, Defense-in-Depth Functions, and 

Non-Safety-Related Functions.
Systems K5

 K5 Was:

 Knowledge of the following operational implications as 

they apply to the (system): (CFR: 41.5/45.7)

 K5 Is:

 Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and 

effect relationships of the following as they apply to the 

(system): (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
Systems K5

 The stem for K5 was revised to include cause-andeffect relationships. It was moved from the previous 

K1.

 For mechanical systems K5 comes from section 5.0, 

“Equipment Requirements” of the SSD.

 Includes application of generic fundamentals.
Systems K6

 K6 Was:

 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the 

following (system) components: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)

 K6 Is:

 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the 

following on (system) components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 TO 

45.8)
Systems K6

 The stem for K6 was modified to address plant conditions, 

system malfunctions, and component malfunctions on 

(system).

 K6 lists the systems included in K1 that will have an effect 

on (system) if the listed system is not operating according 

to design. It also lists the components of system (system) 

whose failure can affect the operation of the (system).

 For mechanical systems, the relevant events and 

malfunctions listed in Section 4.0, “System Operation and 

Performance,” and components from Section 5.4, 

“Component Requirements,” of the SSD were included in 

K6.
Systems A1

 A1 Was:

 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 

(to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 

operating the (system) controls including: (CFR: 

41.5/45.5)

 A1 Is:

 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 

associated with operation of the (system) including: 

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)
Systems A1

 The stem for A1 was revised by removing reference to 

exceeding design limits, and now includes any 

departure beyond normal operating characteristics.

 A1 includes parameters associated with operation of 

the (system) .
Systems A2

 A2 Was:

 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction 

or operations on the (system) and (b) based on those 

predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the 

consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 

41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)

 A2 Is:

 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 

malfunctions or operations on the (system) and (b) based on 

those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or 

mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or 

operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5 / 45.13 / 45.13)
Systems A2

 The stem for A2 was not revised.

 A2 is the ability to mitigate the consequences of 

selected items from K6.
Systems A3

 A3 Was:

 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the (system) , 

including: (CFR: 41.7/45.13)

 A3 Is:

 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the (system) , 

including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.13)
Systems A3

 The stem for A3 was not revised.

 A3 includes the automatic features of the (system) 

identified in K4.

 A3 also includes related functions listed in LCO 3.3.1, 

“Reactor Trip Instrumentation,” and 3.3.2, “ESAS 

Instrumentation.”
Systems A4

 A4 Was:

 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the 

control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8)

 A4Is:

 Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control 

room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 TO 45.8)
Systems A4

 The A4 stem was revised to read “and” instead of 

“and/or.”

 A4 includes those systems having manual control 

functions.

 A4 for the Fuel Handling System (FHS) includes 

manual operation of refueling equipment from the 

equipment location.
Procedures K1

 K2 Was:

 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (event) and 

the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

 K1 Is:

 Knowledge of the relationship between the (event) and 

the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 

/ 45.3)
Procedures K1

 K1 in the AP1000TM catalog is the equivalent of K2 in 

the legacy catalogs.

 K1 was revised to identify relationships between events 

and systems or components. 

 K1 includes systems and equipment that are important 

to successful procedural implementation
Procedures K2

 K1 Was:

 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 

following concepts as they apply to the (event): (CFR 

41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

 K2 Is:

 Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and 

effect relationships of the following as they apply the 

(event): (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)
Procedures K2

 K2 in the AP1000 catalog is the equivalent of K1 in the 

legacy catalogs.

 K2 was revised to identify knowledge of operational 

implications or cause and effect relationships between 

procedures and systems/components.

 K2 includes concepts important to successful 

procedural implementation
Procedures K3

 K3 Was:

 Knowledge of the reasons for the following as the apply 

to the (event): (CFR 41.5 /41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

 K3 Is:

 Knowledge of the reasons for the following actions as 

they apply to the (event): (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 

45.13)

 K3 was clarified to reflect the basis for operator 

responses to events.

 K3 includes the rationale for monitoring and operating 

specific plant components.
Procedures A1

 A1 Was:

 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they 

apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

 A1 Is:

 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they 

apply to a Reactor Trip or Safeguards Actuation: (CFR: 

41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

 A1 was not modified.

 A1 includes application of system and component 

interrelationships identified in K1.
Procedures A2

 A2 Was:

 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they 

apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

 A2 Is:

 Ability to evaluate the following parameters and/or 

conditions as they apply to a Reactor Trip or Safeguards 

Actuation: (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.6)

 The A2 stem was revised.

 A2 describes parameters and conditions that 

determine the effectiveness of procedure actions with 

respect to plant response.
Changes to the AP1000 Knowledge’s 

and Ability Catalog

 Section 4 – Abnormal and Emergency Procedures

 Revised EK1, EK2 and EA2 stem statements

 EA2 change – ‘operate and/or monitor’ to ‘operate and 

monitor’ – from the control room

 Sections 5 and 6 were not reviewed for changes
Questions?