United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

Fred Thompson, U.S. Senate

April 1995 OPERATION DESERT

STORM

Investigation of a U.S.

Army Fratricide

Incident

GAO/OSI-95-10

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Office of Special Investigations

B-260897 

April 7, 1995

The Honorable Fred Thompson

United States Senate

Dear Senator Thompson:

In response to your request, and that of former Senator James R. Sasser, this report presents the

results of our investigation of events leading to a fratricide incident during the Persian Gulf

War; assessment of the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following the incident; and

investigation of allegations that Army officials hindered those investigations or influenced their

outcome. The incident involved engineers attached to the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division and

elements of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. One U.S. serviceman was killed; a

second was wounded.

We briefed U.S. Army representatives and the deceased serviceman’s immediate family on the

content of our investigation. However, we did not obtain written comments from the

Department of the Army on this report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we

plan no further distribution until April 21, 1995. We will then send copies to interested

congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. We will

also make copies available to others upon request. If you have questions concerning this report,

please call me, or Assistant Director Barbara Cart of my staff, at (202) 512-6722. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Richard C. Stiener

Director
Executive Summary

Purpose In the early morning of February 27, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War,

Army Corporal Douglas Lance Fielder was unintentionally killed by U.S.

soldiers who had mistaken him and his fellow engineers as the enemy.

Senator Fred Thompson concurred with former Senator James R. Sasser’s

earlier request that GAO (1) determine the events that had led to the

fratricide, (2) assess the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following

the fratricide, and (3) investigate allegations that Army officials hindered

investigations of the fratricide incident or influenced their outcome. The

Army investigations determined that the actions and decisions of all

individuals involved in the incident had been reasonable and appropriate

under the existing circumstances.

Background On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the emirate of Kuwait.

They refused to withdraw by the United Nations-imposed deadline of

midnight, Eastern Standard Time, January 15, 1991. U.S. and allied forces

thus implemented Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991, beginning

with an extensive air campaign. The ground war began on February 24,

1991, and ended February 28, 1991, when allied commanders declared a

cease-fire.

Results in Brief Several critical factors, involving mainly the 3rd Armored Cavalry

Regiment (ACR) but also the engineers of the 1st Armored Division (AD),

resulted in the February 27, 1991, fratricide incident. At approximately

2:30 a.m. (Persian Gulf Time) that day near Umm Hajul, Iraq, elements of  ̧  ̄

the 3rd ACR crossed a U.S. Army Corps boundary line into a sector known

to be controlled by the 1st AD. Their operation plans and operation orders

were incomplete and confusing, in part, because they did not contain

current intelligence information. Further, coordination along the corps

boundary had disintegrated. More importantly, the 3rd ACR commanders

did not maintain command and control of their units. They, for example,

did not determine their and their troops’ positions, thus allowing them to

cross the corps boundary past which they knew friendly forces might be

located. They also did not abide by the stated rules of engagement—not to

fire below the boundary and not to fire unless fired upon.

After crossing the southern boundary, elements of the 3rd Squadron, 3rd

ACR, identified what they thought were enemy troops around buildings and

fired on them, killing one U.S. soldier, Corporal Fielder, and wounding a

second, Sergeant James E. Napier. They, along with three other engineers

of Charlie Company, 54th Engineer Battalion, were attached to the 1st AD

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Executive Summary

and were located on a 1st AD main supply route, awaiting a recovery

vehicle for their disabled ammunition and explosives carrier. They did not

know of or use the appropriate antifratricide signals during the fratricide

incident.

The 3rd ACR’s AR (Army Regulation) 15-6 investigation of the incident,

which consisted of initial and supplemental investigations, found the 3rd

ACR commanders not responsible for the incident. The initial Investigating

Officer did not conduct a complete and thorough investigation, counter to

Army regulations for AR 15-6 investigations. Further, neither Investigating

Officer sought to resolve inconsistent claims concerning warning shots

fired at the engineers and purported return fire from the engineers. In

addition, the Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate who reviewed the AR

15-6 investigation stated his supposition to GAO that the second

Investigating Officer’s “objectivity was skewed” and he had a

predetermined conclusion concerning the case.

After his review, the Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate

recommended that three 3rd ACR officers be reprimanded and the

engineers’ Executive Officer be admonished. However, at the discretion of

the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, two reprimands were not

made part of the officers’ official military personnel files, the third was

withdrawn, and the admonishment was allowed to stand.

GAO found no evidence of intentional document destruction, witness

intimidation, or witness retaliation. However, GAO questions the

completeness and accuracy of the investigations. Further, several 3rd ACR

personnel received heroism awards, related to the incident, that were

based on misleading statements and inaccurate information.

Principal Findings

The Incident Among the critical factors resulting in the fratricide were the 3rd ACR’s

Operation Plan and Operation Order for the February 27, 1991, mission;

they were incomplete and contained contradictory, outdated intelligence

information about enemy presence. Further, coordination between the VII

Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps along the boundary had disintegrated, and

maps used by the 3rd ACR commanders and troops in preparation for the

mission were outdated and did not accurately depict the 3rd ACR’s

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Executive Summary

objective. Communication failures—from the 3rd ACR through the

squadrons to the troops—also contributed to the confusion leading to the

incident. Both the 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel Douglas Starr, and the 3rd

Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel John H. Daly, Jr., failed to maintain

command and control of their subordinate units by, among other things,

not ensuring subordinates’ knowledge of their southern boundary, past

which they knew friendly forces might be located; not determining their

and their units’ positions relative to the boundary; and not abiding by the

stated rules of engagement.

In addition, the engineers were not in compliance with all of the then

current U.S. Army regulations pertaining to antifratricide. The failure of

the engineer’s Executive Officer, 1st Lieutenant Kevin Wessels, to know of

and employ antifratricide recognition signals during the initial stages of

the incident may have allowed the incident to deteriorate further.

According to the I Troop Commander, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR, Captain

Bodo Friesen, he initially ordered the gunner of his M1A1 Abrams Main

Battle Tank (M1A1) to fire warning shots away from the engineers.

However, the two engineers who were observing the 3rd Squadron’s

vehicles stated that they attempted to identify themselves before and after

they were fired upon and they saw no warning shots. They claimed the

first shots were fired directly at them. Immediately on firing the warning

shots, Captain Friesen’s tank driver and gunner reported return fire from

the engineers’ position, a claim the engineers and other 3rd Squadron

troops dispute. Captain Friesen ordered his gunner and two Bradley

Fighting Vehicles (Bradley) to fire. A cease-fire was then called. Sergeant

Napier was wounded during this firing sequence.

While I Troop elements were developing and engaging the targets, the 3rd

Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly, moved into the engagement area.

He failed to exercise proper command and control by not requesting

Captain Friesen’s assessment of a developing situation—which at that

point appeared to Captain Friesen to be under control—and ordered his

Bradley gunner to fire at an unconfirmed target. Corporal Fielder was

killed during this firing sequence. Further, Lt. Colonel Daly dismounted

two troops from his vehicle without advising his subordinate units,

exposing the dismounts to the risk of fratricide.

GAO estimates that the time between the first shots and the fatal shots was

7 minutes 15 seconds. Approximately 25 minutes elapsed between when I

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Executive Summary

Troop, 3rd Squadron, first misidentified the engineers and their

identification as U.S. troops.

Incomplete, Inaccurate

Investigations

Within hours, the 3rd ACR began an AR 15-6 investigation. By regulation,

such investigations are to be thorough and impartial and make

recommendations as warranted by the facts. The first Investigating

Officer, in his investigation and reinvestigation, found that all personnel

had acted responsibly and recommended that all be absolved of any

criminal or administrative responsibility for the incident. Among other

shortcomings, the first Investigating Officer overlooked numerous

documents and other information, including an audio tape recording of the

incident that GAO located. (See app. I.)

Following investigation reviews by the 54th Engineer Battalion

Commander and the VII Corps Staff Judge Advocate, in October 1991 the

XVIII Airborne Corps directed that a supplemental AR 15-6 investigation be

conducted. The second Investigating Officer also did not elicit evidence

that some 3rd Squadron personnel—including crew members aboard the

3rd Squadron Commander’s Bradley—had recognized U.S. vehicles before

the fatal shots were fired. He also misstated facts, such as that the

engineers were not wearing Kevlar helmets or Load Bearing Equipment

that would have aided identification. The second Investigating Officer

concurred that all involved individuals had acted responsibly and

recommended that they be absolved of all responsibility for the incident.

Later, a Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate, at the direction of the

Commander in Chief, Headquarters Forces Command, performed a legal

review and analysis of the report of investigation. He stated his

supposition to GAO that the second Investigating Officer had a “skewed”

objectivity and a predetermined conclusion concerning the case and

would not have determined anything unfavorable about the XVIII Corps.

The Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate recommended reversing the

two Investigating Officers’ findings, noting, among other failings, the

involved 3rd ACR officers’ “negligent” actions that placed their soldiers at

risk and their “dereliction of duty” for assuming that personnel in a rear

area were enemy. Based on his recommendations, three 3rd ACR officers

were reprimanded and the engineers’ Executive Officer was admonished.

However, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief, Forces Command,

two reprimands were not made part of the officers’ permanent military

files, the third was withdrawn, and the admonishment stood.

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Executive Summary

GAO found no evidence of intentional document destruction, witness

intimidation, or retaliation against witnesses. However, the investigations’

conclusions and recommendations were not supported by the evidence

available to the Army investigators.

Questionable Heroism

Awards

GAO determined that heroism awards related directly to the fratricide

incident and given to two officers and several men of the 3rd ACR had been

based on misleading statements and misrepresentations by the 3rd ACR

Commander, Colonel Starr, and the 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel

Daly. Award support referred to “enemy” presence and “hostile fire”

during the fratricide incident and stated that it had occurred at an airfield

about 28 kilometers from the incident site. Following a GAO briefing, the

Army Office of Inspector General (OIG) analyzed the awards and requested

in August 1994 that these, and any similar, awards be revoked. As of

March 1995, the matter was still pending.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army (1) reexamine, for their

appropriateness, the disciplinary actions taken regarding this fratricide

incident and the disposition of those actions and (2) follow up on the

Army OIG request that improperly supported awards for participation in

fratricide incidents be revoked.

Agency Comments GAO twice briefed U.S. Army representatives on the findings of its

investigation. However, GAO did not obtain official agency comments on

this report.

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Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Events Leading to the

Fratricide Incident

12

Charlie Company, 54th Engineer Battalion 12

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 18

Attack Plan on Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield Issued by 3rd ACR

Commander

25

Chapter 2 

The Fratricide

Incident

31

The Engineers 31

Initiation of 3rd ACR Attack on Al Busayyah Northeast 35

Detection of the Suspected Enemy (Engineers) and Recognition

of U.S. Vehicles

40

The Firing on and Further Recognition of U.S. Vehicles 41

3rd Squadron Dismounts 43

Reporting of Fratricide 43

Chapter 3 

Army Investigations

of the Fratricide

Incident and

Subsequent Review

45

The Army Investigation 45

Investigation Reopened to Answer Additional Questions 47

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigation by XVIII Airborne Corps 47

Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate’s Review 48

Chapter 4 

GAO’s Investigation

and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6

Investigative Findings

51

“Graphics and Journals of the Operation” 52

“Objective Bill” 54

“Identification of Units” 56

“Cease Fire” 60

XVIII Airborne Corps/VII Corps “Boundary” 64

“Essential Information...” 66

“Conditions Contributing to Incident” 74

Investigative Conclusions 78

“Initial Investigations” 88

“Cpt Friesen Allegations” 90

Questionable Awards Related to Fratricide Incident 92

Recommendations to the Secretary of the Army 93

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Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded During

February 27, 1991, Fratricide Incident

94

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 108

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 109

Figures Figure 1.1: Engineers’ Assignment Within 1st AD, VII Corps 13

Figure 1.2: U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division and 3rd Armored

Cavalry Regiment

14

Figure 1.3: M548 Ammunition Carrier and Trailer 15

Figure 1.4: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 16

Figure 1.5: Small Emplacement Excavator and Trailer 17

Figure 1.6: 3rd ACR’s Assignment Within XVIII Airborne Corps 19

Figure 1.7: 3rd ACR Assignment and Engineers’ Location 23

Figure 1.8: Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield and Qalib Al Luhays

Airfield

24

Figure 1.9: 3rd Squadron’s Mission and Planned Passage of Lines 27

Figure 2.1: Times of Significant Occurrences Involving the

Fratricide

31

Figure 2.2: M1A1 Abrams Tank 32

Figure 2.3: Bradley Fighting Vehicle 33

Figure 2.4: Map Coordinates for Redirected 3rd ACR Attack on Al

Busayyah Northeast Airfield, Objective Tim

37

Figure 2.5: Troop Positions Before and During the Fratricide

Incident

39

Figure 2.6: 3rd Squadron’s Line of Communication 40

Figure 4.1: U.S. Army Map of Attack Area for Objective Bill 76

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Abbreviations

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment

AD Armored Division

AR Army regulation

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FM (Army) Field Manual

FRAGO fragmentary order

GAO General Accounting Office

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

OIG Office of the Inspector General

M1A1 M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank

M548 M548 Ammunition Carrier

mm millimeter

MSR Major Supply Route

OSI Office of Special Investigations

PsyOps Psychological Operations team

TAC Tactical Command Post

TOC Tactical Operations Center

kilometer approximately 3,280.8 feet or 0.62 mile

meter approximately 3.28 feet

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Chapter 1 

Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

This chapter provides our determination of the events that led to the

February 27, 1991,1

 fratricide incident during the Persian Gulf War.

Charlie Company,

54th Engineer

Battalion

The U.S. Army’s 54th Engineer Battalion, Wildflecken, Germany, deployed

to the Persian Gulf on January 25, 1991,2

 as part of Operation Desert

Storm. Upon its arrival in the Persian Gulf, the battalion’s mission was to

provide direct support for the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division (AD) from

Ansbach, Germany. Charlie Company, 54th Engineer Battalion, supported

the 2nd Brigade, 1st AD (see fig. 1.1), and was primarily responsible for

establishing a logistics line, or route for logistics support, marking the

center route of the 2nd Brigade as it advanced during the war. Prior to the

war’s beginning, the 1st AD ordered that (1) any vehicle that broke down

was to be moved to the logistics line to await recovery and (2) personnel

assigned to the vehicle were to remain with the vehicle until recovery.

1

Almost immediately after the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, the United States and

allied countries deployed troops to the Middle East, implementing Operation Desert Shield. Iraqi

forces refused to withdraw by the United Nations’ Jan. 15, 1991, deadline; and on Jan. 17, 1991, U.S.

and allied forces implemented the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm. The ground war began on

Feb. 24, 1991, and ended Feb. 28, 1991.

2

The dates and times in this report concerning events in the war theater are based on Persian Gulf

Time.

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Chapter 1 

Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.1: Engineers’ Assignment

Within 1st AD, VII Corps

At approximately 1130 hours3 on February 24, 1991, the 1st AD, including

its support units, began its movement to breach the Saudi Arabia/ Iraq

berm, or border. (See fig. 1.2.) It encountered little resistance and moved

at a very rapid pace.

3

Military time is measured in hours, numbered from 1 to 24, from one midnight to the next. For

example, 0100 hours equates with 1:00 a.m., 1300 hours is 1:00 p.m., and 2315 hours is 11:15 p.m.

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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.2: U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

Camp


Mankey

Assembly


Area


Garcia

50 East-West Grid Line

UMM HAJUL

Highway 8

Iran

Persian


Gulf

Saudi Arabia Kuwait

VII Corps

XVIII Corps

Iraq

N

3rd ACR 1st AD

At approximately 1700 hours on February 26, 1991, an M548 Ammunition

Carrier (M548), towing a 1.5-ton trailer full of explosives (see fig. 1.3), broke

down while traveling as part of the combat support “trains” along the

logistics line. The M548 was attached to Charlie Company, 54th Engineer

Battalion. Once it was determined the M548 could no longer operate,

Charlie Company’s Executive Officer, 1st Lieutenant Kevin Wessels,

notified his commanding officer of the situation and his exact location.

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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.3: M548 Ammunition Carrier and Trailer

It was decided that Lieutenant Wessels and the M548 crew, Specialist Craig

Walker and Corporal Lance Fielder,4

 would remain with the vehicle until

vehicle recovery units arrived. Two vehicles—a High Mobility

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) (see fig. 1.4) and a Small

Emplacement Excavator towing a 1.5-ton trailer full of explosives (see fig.

1.5)—accompanying the M548 were also to remain, along with their crews,

Sergeant James Napier and Specialist Robert Driben.

4

Corporal Fielder was promoted posthumously to Sergeant effective Feb. 26, 1991.

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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.4: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

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Figure 1.5: Small Emplacement Excavator and Trailer

After contacting his commanding officer, Lieutenant Wessels contacted

the 54th Engineer Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC)—the

command post element that includes the staff activities involved in

sustaining and planning operations—and the 2nd Brigade Logistics

Operations Center, advising them of the situation and the engineers’

location. He was told that it could be the next day before they were

recovered. Taking a defensive position, the engineers positioned the

HMMWV, a “soft-skinned” vehicle with the unit’s radios, between the M548

and the excavator and assigned guards. All three vehicles were equipped

with the standard antifratricide5

 recognition decals, an inverted “V.” The

crews had previously mounted a blackout light on a camouflage pole atop

the M548. The light, a 1st AD antifratricide device, was to be illuminated

during combat maneuvers at night when the vehicle was moving.

However, the light was not illuminated because the M548 was located on

the logistics line and was not operating.

5

Fratricide is the employment of weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy its

equipment or facilities but which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly

personnel.

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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

3rd Armored Cavalry

Regiment

3rd ACR’s Deployment and

Mission in the Persian Gulf

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) deployed from Fort Bliss, Texas,

to Saudi Arabia on October 1, 1990, as part of Operation Desert Shield.

Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, the regiment was involved in training

exercises and later established a base of operations at Tactical Assembly

Area Cactus. With the onset of Operation Desert Storm, the 3rd ACR’s

primary mission was to act as a screening force6

 to protect the right flank

of the XVIII Airborne Corps. (See fig. 1.2.) The 3rd ACR’s Operation Plan

called for it to move north-to-northeast from the Saudi Arabia/Iraqi border

into Iraq and then turn east, executing what became known as the “Hail

Mary.” The boundaries7

 of operation for these movements were defined

prior to the ground war.

3rd ACR’s Initial Ground

Battle

The direct involvement of the 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel Douglas Starr,

in the initial U.S. ground battle in the Persian Gulf conflict is relevant to a

full understanding of the February 27, 1991, fratricide incident. During

Operation Desert Shield and the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, the

3rd ACR was deployed along the southern edge of the Iraqi border. On

January 22, 1991, Blue Platoon (scout platoon), I Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd

ACR, (see fig. 1.6) became the first U.S. ground unit to be involved in the

conflict. Led by Colonel Starr, the platoon conducted a reconnoitering

mission approximately 100 kilometers west of the 3rd ACR assembly area.

During this mission, the platoon encountered a Saudi Arabian border

guard who requested assistance as his position had come under attack

from Iraqi soldiers across the berm.

6

A screening force maintains surveillance; provides early warning to the main body; impedes and

harasses the enemy with supporting fire; and, within its capability, destroys enemy reconnaissance

elements. (Operational Terms and Symbols (or Army Field Manual), FM 101-5-1, Oct. 1985)

7

Boundaries are a control measure normally drawn along identifiable terrain features and used to

delineate areas of tactical responsibility for subordinate units. Within their boundaries, units may

maneuver within their overall plan without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise

restricted. (FM 101-5-1)

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Figure 1.6: 3rd ACR’s Assignment

Within XVIII Airborne Corps

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Knowing the scout platoon was without reinforcements and out of artillery

range, Colonel Starr directed the platoon leader to scan for targets and to

advise him before engaging any Iraqi soldiers. However, without warning,

Colonel Starr began conducting reconnaissance by fire8

 onto the Iraqi

positions. The platoon leader took this as a “sign” to engage the enemy and

directed his platoon to “engage any target that presented itself.” The

platoon then received return fire from the Iraqi soldiers and breached the

berm. After suffering two casualties, inflicting casualties on the Iraqis, and

taking several Iraqi prisoners of war, the platoon withdrew from the

engagement.

According to Colonel Starr, he chose to take charge and become directly

involved because he believed the engagement had “serious political

implications” and he did not want the platoon leader on the “blame line.”

Following the incident, Colonel Starr briefed the XVIII Corps Commander,

who questioned Colonel Starr’s direct involvement in the mission and

engagement. Colonel Starr responded by saying, “Excuse me, but I thought

that is why we came over here.” According to Colonel Starr, he advised the

XVIII Corps Commander of the situation that had confronted him and that

an “inferior” unit was firing on him.

Colonel Starr later briefed his subordinate commanders and troops

concerning what was learned about the enemy. He felt the engagement

had had positive effects on the 3rd ACR and was a cause of envy, as one of

the 3rd ACR platoons had been “blooded” and was considered combat

qualified. He said that his briefing—the tone of which was to “act

aggressively to win” the battle—had an effect on his troops similar to

drawing a “moth to a flame.”

The Blue Platoon leader also briefed the 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt.

Colonel John H. Daly, Jr., and other squadron personnel on the incident

and lessons learned. These lessons included the following:

• Combat experience is valuable because the commander sets the tone.

• Commanders should develop methods to communicate with dismounts, as

lack of communication can lead to mission failure.

• Safety is paramount, even in combat. Controlling fire and maneuvering

elements are critical to mission accomplishment and preserving the force.

8

Reconnaissance by fire occurs when troops fire on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to

disclose its presence by movement or return fire. (FM 101-5-1)

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Coordination of the Corps

Boundary

Prior to the ground war, the 3rd ACR was assigned to be the right flank

screen force for the XVIII Airborne Corps along the XVIII Airborne

Corps/VII Corps boundary. The 3rd Squadron was the 3rd ACR’s right flank

unit. The 2nd Brigade, 1st AD, was the VII Corps’ left flank element. (See

fig. 1.2.)

The 1st AD and the 3rd ACR agreed on contact points9

 and exchanged

liaison officers10 at both the regiment and division levels. Additionally,

equipment and personnel were dedicated from the 3rd Squadron and the

1st AD to maintain visual contact and radio communications along the

corps boundary and ensure coordination between the 3rd ACR and 2nd

Brigade, 1st AD.

Coordination of Corps

Boundary Broken

On February 22, 1991, in advance of the ground war, the 2nd Squadron, 3rd

ACR, began breaching the Saudi/Iraqi berm, penetrating approximately 10

kilometers inside Iraq. The remaining squadrons of the 3rd ACR began

moving into Iraq at approximately 1500 hours, February 24, 1991. The 3rd

ACR advanced with the 2nd Squadron in the lead and the 1st and 3rd in

reserve. The 1st Squadron eventually went on line with the 2nd Squadron

while the 3rd Squadron continued as the reserve. The 1st AD was

positioned in Assembly Area Garcia below the Saudi/Iraqi berm. (See fig.

1.2.) Its lead elements began breaching the berm at approximately 1500

hours, February 24, 1991.

The 3rd ACR and the 2nd Brigade, 1st AD, attempted to maintain the flank

screen coordination during the move into Iraq. However, the flank screen

coordination between the 3rd ACR and the 2nd Brigade was discontinued

by midmorning on February 25, 1991, after the 2nd Brigade, 1st AD,

bypassed the 3rd Squadron and advanced approximately 18 kilometers

forward of the 3rd Squadron’s position.

3rd ACR Mission to Attack

Airfield

Several times during the 3rd ACR’s movement into Iraq, it came under the

operational control of the 24th Infantry Division, XVIII Airborne Corps.

(See fig. 1.6.) At 1200 hours on February 26, 1991, the XVIII Airborne

Corps advised the 3rd ACR that it was then under the operational control of

the 24th Infantry Division and ordered it to attack from the assembly area

9

Designated, easily identifiable points on the terrain where two or more units are required to meet.

(FM 101-5-1)

10Personnel dedicated to communicating between elements of the military forces to ensure mutual

understanding and unity of purpose and action. (FM 101-5-1)

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known as Objective Red Prime at grid coordinates PU 0862.

11 (See fig.

1.9.) The 3rd ACR was to clear the airfield at grid coordinates PU 460530

(see fig. 1.7, legend 1)—later referred to as both Objective Bill and

Objective Tim12—and to seize Qalib Al Luhays Airfield located at grid

coordinates PU 740600 (see fig. 1.8), later referred to as Objective Joe.

11Grid coordinates identify a geographical point where north/south and east/west lines intersect in

respect to a map grid. For example, the grid coordinates PU 0862 indicate the geographical area (PU),

the north/south grid line (08), and the east/west grid line (62). Coordinates may be written with varying

specificity, i.e., 0862, 080621, and 08006210 represent the same coordinate.

12At 1430 hours, the XVIII Airborne Corps again directed the 24th Infantry Division to seize the airfield,

identified as Objective Tim, but provided different grid coordinates—PU 470517. This was the actual

location of the Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield. (See fig. 1.7, legend 2.)

Page 22 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.7: 3rd ACR Assignment and Engineers’ Location

1

2

3

5

4

7

6 6

7

North UMM HAJUL

South

West

East

UMM HAJUL

Scale 1:35,000

1 Airfield - Obj. Bill/Tim at PU 460530


2 Obj. Tim at PU 470517


3 Airfield - Obj. Bill at PU 440495


4 Airfield - Obj. Bill at PU 4650


5 Engineers’ location at PU 441488


6 50 east/west grid - corps boundary


7 Road running northwest to southeast


53

52

51

50

49

48

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

54

53

52

51

50

49

48

54

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Al Busayyah


Northeast 


Airfield

Fence


Hard packed roads


Trails

Legend

Page 23 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 1 

Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.8: Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield and Qalib Al Luhays Airfield

30'

15'

NOT USABLE


JALIBAH SOUTHEAST / 118


105

QARAT AL HAWAWISH

QULAY AT DHULAH

MUHAFAZAT DHI QAR


MUHAFAZAT AL BASRAH

RAJMAT HAYTHAMAH

QARAT SHAWIYAH

UMM HAJUL


 AL BUSAYYAH NORTHEAST / 98 / s

AL UTAYMAT

NOT USABLE


QALIB AL LUHAYS / 16


125 28 KM. 17MI.

APPROXIMATE

ASH SHAMIYA

Wall

Wall

Building Wall

Storage area

Fence

pumping station

Wall

Telephone line

Wall

Flares

tower

Oil

5

6

7

8

0 8

0 7

Scale 1:250,000 Kilometer

Wall

Source: U.S. Army

The 3rd ACR, at 1300 hours, February 26, 1991, informed its squadrons that

they were then under the 24th Infantry Division’s operational control. The

Page 24 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

3rd ACR further advised the squadrons that future operations would be

oriented to the east/southeast with their northern operational boundary as

the 67 east/west grid line and the southern boundary as the 50 east/west

grid line. The squadrons were directed to seize Objective Bill, the

previously mentioned airfield, at grid coordinates PU 440495 (see fig. 1.7,

legend 3), with a “gas plant” given as a second objective. For unknown

reasons, the 3rd ACR used different grid coordinates for the airfield than

the XVIII Airborne Corps had given it. Further, the PU 440495 grid

coordinates placed the objective below the 50 east/west grid boundary.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons, the lead squadrons of the 3rd ACR, began

arriving at the assembly area for the mission, Objective Red Prime,

between 1400 and 1600 hours, February 26, 1991. The lead elements of the

3rd Squadron began arriving at approximately 1730 hours and were

located in Tactical Assembly Area Claw at grid coordinates PU 0762. (See

fig. 1.9.)

Attack Plan on Al

Busayyah Northeast

Airfield Issued by 3rd

ACR Commander

The Plan The 3rd ACR Operations Officer, a lieutenant colonel, wrote the Operation

Plan based on direction from the 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel Starr. The

3rd ACR Operations Officer then issued an initial Warning Order13 to the 3rd

ACR squadrons at 1820 hours, February 26, 1991, by radio, indicating that it

would be followed shortly by a fragmentary order, or FRAGO.

14 The mission,

as stated in the Warning Order, was to attack and destroy an airfield at

grid coordinates PU 4650, beginning at 2100 hours. This was the third grid

coordinate issued for Objective Bill. (See fig. 1.7, legend 4.) The Warning

Order indicated that, after an indirect15 artillery bombardment of the

objective, the 1st and 2nd Squadrons would attack east, followed by the

13A Warning Order is a preliminary notice that an action or order is to follow. Usually issued as a brief

oral or written message, it is designed to give subordinates time to make necessary plans for the

operations. (FM 101-5-1)

14A FRAGO is an abbreviated form of an operation order used to inform units of changes in missions

and the tactical situation. (FM 101-5-1)

15Indirect fire is delivered on a target that the firing unit cannot see. Direct fire is delivered on a visible

target. (FM 101-5-1)

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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

3rd Squadron. After direct fire onto the field by the 1st Squadron, the 3rd

Squadron would move through the other two squadrons, performing a

passage of lines, to assault the airfield. (See fig. 1.9.) They were told that

the north flank was open; no units were to their right, or southern, flank;

and reconnaissance helicopters with nighttime vision capabilities would

reconnoiter the area 1 hour before the attack.

Page 26 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Figure 1.9: 3rd Squadron’s Mission and Planned Passage of Lines

800


700


600


500


400


300


0					 																			 100					 																						200					 																						300					 																							400					 																					500


XXX


Corps Boundary

Limit of


Advance

CP A CP B

CP C

CP D

Engineers

CP F

PP

CP E

A-F Checkpoint coordinates


G 3rd ACR assembly area “Objective Red Prime” 


 at PU 0862


H 3rd Squardron Tactical Assembly Area Claw 


 at PU 0762


I 3rd ACR northern corps boundary 67 east /west grid 


J 3rd ACR southern corps boundary 50 east/west grid


K 54th Engineers’ location PU 441488


L Passage of lines point PU 390550


XXX


Corps Boundary

(J)

(I)

(K)

(H)

TAA


CLAW

(G)

(L)

Objective 


Red Prime

K Troop

I Troop

M 


 Company

CMD


GRP

Direction 


of Attack


East

L Troop


and


Trains

3rd


Squadron


Attack


Formation

Page 27 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 1 

Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

At 1856 hours on February 26, 1991, the 3rd ACR Operations Officer issued

the FRAGO to the 3rd ACR squadrons by radio. The FRAGO stated, “enemy

resistance was stiffening and to expect mines, fighting positions and local

counterattacks.” The squadrons were advised there was “no left flank unit”

but there was a possibility that the 1st AD was on the right, or southern,

flank. The attack mission was to begin at 2100 hours, destroying Objective

Bill at grid coordinates PU 4650 and continuing the following day to

Objective Joe, a second airfield (Qalib Al Luhays Airfield) (see fig. 1.8) at

grid coordinates PU 7460. Further, according to the FRAGO, the

reconnaissance helicopters, which were to target the airfield at PU 4650

beginning at 2030 hours, would report over the 3rd ACR Command radio

frequency any enemy locations they detected. Colonel Starr stated that he

had the helicopters conduct the reconnaissance only because “it was so

damn dark” and because “if they [enemy] were out there, they were more

likely to be at the airfield than behind a sand dune.”

Concern Over the Southern

Boundary

Colonel Starr and the 3rd ACR Operations Officer were concerned about

the southern boundary from the time they received the Warning Order

from the 24th Infantry Division to attack the Al Busayyah Northeast

Airfield. According to Colonel Starr, the southern-most part of the airfield

was too close to the 3rd ACR/1st AD boundary to allow the 3rd ACR to

effectively maneuver and secure the airfield. Therefore, he had included a

buffer zone in his initial operation plan. The 3rd ACR Operations Officer

said concern also existed that an enemy force could use the road running

southeast to northwest through the objective (see fig. 1.7, legend 7) to

reinforce the area from the south.

According to a 1st AD Liaison Officer who was involved in the flank screen

coordination, at approximately 1300 hours on February 26, 1991, he was

directed by the 3rd ACR Command Group to drive east of the 3rd ACR

location to determine the location of the 2nd Brigade, 1st AD. The liaison

officer crossed the XVIII Airborne Corps/VII Corps Boundary and located

the 2nd Brigade’s main supply route, or logistics line. Although unable to

determine the exact location of the 2nd Brigade’s lead units, he did locate

a broken-down vehicle along the 2nd Brigade’s main supply route. The

liaison officer returned at dusk to the 3rd ACR Tactical Command Post

(TAC)—the headquarters element located well forward on the

battlefield—and advised one of the TAC Battle Captains. The liaison officer

believed the Captain passed the information regarding the 2nd Brigade’s

location to the 3rd ACR Operations Officer, as he seemed concerned about

the flank units.

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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

Colonel Starr, concerned about a lack of communication and coordination

between the 1st AD and 3rd ACR, ordered his command and control

helicopter to transport a 1st AD Liaison Officer and a 3rd ACR TOC

Operations Officer to an area where communications with the 1st AD could

be established. At approximately 1900 hours, the 1st AD Liaison Officer

established radio communications with “Iron Oscar,” the 1st AD Assistant

Division Commander. The liaison officer requested that Iron Oscar allow a

5-kilometer buffer zone around the airfield as the 3rd ACR wanted to fire

indirect artillery into the area. Iron Oscar denied the buffer zone because

the 1st AD had supply lines and logistics elements in that area. He also

stated that the 2nd Brigade had previously passed the 3rd ACR objective

and that no enemy was present.

Attack Plan Issued to 3rd

Squadron

At approximately 1900 hours, Lt. Colonel Daly, the 3rd Squadron

Commander, 3rd ACR, sent a Warning Order to all 3rd Squadron troop

commanders by radio to be prepared to receive an Operation Order at

2000 hours at the 3rd Squadron TOC. The troop commanders were further

advised that the mission—to attack an airfield located at grid coordinates

PU 4650—would begin at 2100 hours and that the 1-50,000 kilometer “map

sheets” (such as fig. 4.1) would be needed for the mission.

At 2015 hours, Lt. Colonel Daly and others briefed the troop commanders

about the mission. The squadron was to move in a wedge, or diamond,

formation with M Company, a tank company, at the point; K and I troops

as scouts to the left and right flanks, respectively; and L Troop following

behind. (See fig. 1.9.) After the indirect artillery and direct fire by the 1st

Squadron, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons would coordinate the passage of

lines at the PU 380550 grid coordinates. They were briefed that buildings

would be at the center of the airfield, to expect stiff enemy resistance, and

that “surface laid mines” were possibly at the airfield.

The 3rd Squadron issued grid coordinates to the troop commanders as

checkpoints to navigate to the airfield, including (A) PU 170550, (B) PU

290550, (C) PU 450550, (D) PU 462522, (E) PU 467484, and (F) PU

470430. (The final two coordinates would obviously take the 3rd

Squadron over the southern boundary, the 50 east/west grid line.) The 3rd

Squadron would thus attack north-to-south, directly over the airfield. To

assist their navigation, the 3rd Squadron troop commanders had a Global

Positioning System, a small lightweight global positioning receiver that

allowed users during Operation Desert Storm to receive map coordinate

Page 29 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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Events Leading to the Fratricide Incident

signals plus or minus 16 meters. The Psychological Operations (PsyOps)16

team attached to the 3rd Squadron was to begin broadcasting an Iraqi

surrender appeal at grid coordinates PU 450550. After moving over the

airfield, the 3rd Squadron would reform south, follow the 1st Squadron

after it bypassed the airfield, and continue to Objective Joe (Qalib Al

Luhays Airfield) at grid coordinates PU 7460 (see fig. 1.8).

16PsyOps is a planned psychological activity directed towards the enemy to create attitudes and

behavior favorable to the achievement of military objectives. (FM 101-5-1)

Page 30 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 2 

The Fratricide Incident

This chapter provides our determination of the events during the

February 27, 1991, fratricide incident.

Figure 2.1: Times of Significant Occurrences Involving the Fratricide

The Engineers The engineers were lightly armed, having only M-16 assault rifles, two

M-203 grenade launchers, a .45-caliber pistol, and a .50-caliber machine

gun mounted on top the M548. During the course of the evening of

February 26, 1991, all the engineers, except for Lieutenant Wessels who

monitored the radios inside the HMMWV, took turns standing hourly guard

duty. When not on guard, they slept. At approximately 0230 hours on

February 27, 1991, Specialist Driben was on guard and had awakened

Specialist Walker so that he could assume the duty. As Specialist Driben

waited for Specialist Walker, they heard vehicles approaching in the

Page 31 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 2 

The Fratricide Incident

distance. While Specialist Walker retrieved a set of night vision goggles

from the M548, Specialist Driben ran to the front of the Small Emplacement

Excavator. Specialist Walker joined Specialist Driben at the front of the

excavator and stood on top of the excavator’s bucket. Using the goggles in

turn, they identified an M1A1 Abrams tank (M1A1) and Bradley Fighting

Vehicles (Bradley) approaching from their northern flank. (See figs. 2.2

and 2.3.)

Figure 2.2: M1A1 Abrams Tank

Page 32 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 2 

The Fratricide Incident

Figure 2.3: Bradley Fighting Vehicle

Both Specialist Walker and Specialist Driben said they thought that the

vehicles were part of the recovery unit that was to rescue them. Specialist

Walker attempted to identify himself to the approaching vehicles by

switching off and on an infrared light affixed to the night vision goggles.

As the vehicles continued their advance, Specialist Walker handed the

goggles to Specialist Driben, who confirmed they were American vehicles.

Specialist Driben then gave the goggles back to Specialist Walker and

started to alert Lieutenant Wessels when they began receiving direct

machine-gun fire from the approaching vehicles. Both Specialist Driben

Page 33 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 2 

The Fratricide Incident

and Specialist Walker ran immediately between the vehicles, awakening

the other engineers and announcing that they were taking friendly fire.

As Sergeant Napier awoke, he was wounded in the right leg by the

incoming fire. He leaped from the excavator, yelling that he had been hit.

Specialist Walker then told Sergeant Napier to follow him as he ran for

cover. However, Sergeant Napier fell, unable to move further. Specialist

Driben, seeing Sergeant Napier fall, went to his aid.

Meanwhile, Corporal Fielder had positioned himself near some bushes

located behind the vehicles. Specialist Driben saw Corporal Fielder and

directed Sergeant Napier to crawl towards Corporal Fielder, while he ran

to the HMMWV to retrieve his medical bag. During this period, Lieutenant

Wessels was attempting to contact the 1st AD by radio requesting help in

obtaining a cease-fire. Specialist Driben ran back to Sergeant Napier and

Corporal Fielder’s position.

When Specialist Walker realized that Sergeant Napier was not following

him, he returned to Sergeant Napier, Specialist Driben, and Corporal

Fielder’s position and advised them of an indention in the sand located

approximately 100 yards behind the M548. Corporal Fielder directed

Specialist Walker to carry Sergeant Napier to the indention. Specialist

Walker removed his Load Bearing Equipment17 and, utilizing a fireman’s

carry, carried Sergeant Napier to that location. Corporal Fielder then

instructed Specialist Driben to prepare a “hasty defensive position”

beyond where Specialist Walker had carried Sergeant Napier.

Specialist Driben ran, followed closely by Corporal Fielder, towards

Specialist Walker and Sergeant Napier’s location. While Corporal Fielder

was running, he was apparently hit in the lower leg by machine-gun fire,

causing him to fall. Corporal Fielder continued moving, making it to the

edge of the position held by Specialist Walker and Sergeant Napier.

Corporal Fielder assumed a kneeling position and began yelling to

Specialist Driben to establish another defensive position.

Lieutenant Wessels then fired a green star cluster18 into the sky in an

attempt to illuminate the area. Within seconds, Corporal Fielder was hit by

17Load Bearing Equipment is the equipment, such as packs, pouches, straps, and belt, that a soldier

uses for carrying various items in the field in addition to clothes and a weapon. The items, determined

by the commanders, may include ammunition, radio, canteen, etc.

18Unknown at the time to the lieutenant, a green star cluster was a daytime, ground-to-ground

antifratricide recognition signal. The nighttime, ground-to-ground antifratricide recognition signal was

a white star cluster.

Page 34 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Chapter 2 

The Fratricide Incident

three more rounds of machine-gun fire, causing him to fall on top of both

Specialist Walker and Sergeant Napier.

Within seconds after firing the green star cluster, Lieutenant Wessels could

hear the firing vehicles begin to flank his position. Realizing the situation

was continuing to deteriorate, Lieutenant Wessels removed a red lens

flashlight from his Load Bearing Equipment. Turning it on, he began

walking in the direction of the flanking vehicles with his arms raised. At

this time, he could hear the command of “cease fire, cease fire” coming

from the vehicles.

As Lieutenant Wessels approached a Bradley, the Bradley’s commander

identified him as an American. In addition, a dismount from Lt. Colonel

Daly’s Bradley approached Lieutenant Wessels as to his identity and unit.

Lieutenant Wessels advised him and then proceeded with him to the area

where the other engineers were located. It was then that Lieutenant

Wessels learned that Corporal Fielder had been killed.

Initiation of 3rd ACR

Attack on Al

Busayyah Northeast

At 2100 hours on February 26, 1991, the day before the fratricide incident,

the 3rd ACR began moving east towards the Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield

in the Umm Hajul area with the 3rd Squadron following the 1st and  ̧  ̄

2nd Squadrons. At approximately 2200 hours, a 1st AD Liaison Officer

reported to the 3rd ACR Executive Officer, a lieutenant colonel, that the 1st

AD had denied the second request for the 5-kilometer buffer zone. The 3rd

ACR Executive Officer, in turn, advised the 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel

Starr. Based on the denial, Colonel Starr directed the 3rd ACR Fire Support

Officer to cancel all artillery targets close to or below the 50 east/west

boundary line.

Although scheduled for approximately 2200 hours, at approximately 2400

hours, two reconnaissance helicopters began conducting operations along

the PU 55 east/west grid coordinate—one in the northern sector, the

second in the southern sector—to detect enemy in the area, including the

Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield. One helicopter crew reported to Colonel

Starr at approximately 0115 hours, over the 3rd ACR Command radio

frequency, that the airfield was “probably cold,” meaning no enemy (or

friendly personnel) were detected.

As the 3rd ACR continued its advance east, the M Company Commander,

3rd Squadron, received a FRAGO from the Operations Officer, 3rd Squadron,

establishing a new 3rd Squadron limit of advance at grid coordinates

Page 35 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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The Fratricide Incident

PU 465500. At approximately 0034 hours on February 27, 1991, an M

Company platoon leader began attempting to coordinate the passage of

lines with C Troop, 1st Squadron, at grid coordinates PU 380550.

While the passage of lines was being coordinated, the 3-18 Field Artillery

unit fired indirect artillery onto the airfield from 0100 to 0110 hours. At

0118 hours, the 3rd ACR TOC sent a radio message to all elements of the 3rd

ACR, advising the 1st Squadron to “fire eastward only if fired upon” and the

3rd Squadron not to “fire across the 50 grid [50 east/west]” boundary.

Subsequent to the 3rd ACR TOC message, the 3rd Squadron’s Operations

Officer issued a FRAGO via the 3rd Squadron Command radio frequency to

the 3rd Squadron troop commanders: The 3rd Squadron was to continue

following behind the 1st Squadron, pass through the 1st Squadron after the

1st Squadron’s direct fire on the airfield, and proceed east then southeast.

The 3rd Squadron was to cross over grid coordinates PU 462522 and

proceed to grid coordinates PU 465500, the limit of advance. (See fig. 2.4,

legends 3 and 5.) The FRAGO further established three details: the Rules of

Engagement—“will not fire unless fired upon”; the PU 50 east/west grid

coordinate was the boundary line; and the airfield was “probably cold.”

Page 36 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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Figure 2.4: Map Coordinates for Redirected 3rd ACR Attack on Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield, Objective Tim

1

6

2

7

53

7

UMM HAJUL North

South

West

East

UMM HAJUL

Scale 1:35,000

1 Al Busayyah NE/Obj. Tim at PU 470517


2 Obj. Bill at PU 4650


3 Grid coordin. to be crossed at PU 462522


4 50 corps boundary


5

5 Limit of advance at PU 465500


6 Engineers at PU 441488


7 Road running northwest to southeast

52

51

50

49

48

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 53

52

51

50

49

48

4 4

3

Al Busayyah


Northeast 


Airfield

Fence


Hard packed roads


Trails

Legend

Page 37 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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The 1st Squadron Commander experienced radio problems at

approximately 0139 hours; and because no enemy had been detected at

the airfield, Colonel Starr canceled the 1st Squadron’s direct fire order. At

approximately 0145 hours, the 3rd Squadron began moving through the 1st

Squadron to assault the airfield. During the movement toward the airfield,

Lt. Colonel Daly in his Bradley, the Bradleys of the 3rd Squadron

Operations Officer and the 3rd Squadron Fire Support Officer, the PsyOps

HMMWV, and a FOX19 vehicle traveled as the 3rd Squadron Command

Group. The Command Group oriented itself approximately 100 meters to

the rear of the M Company Commander. The M Company Commander

positioned himself 100 meters behind M Company’s Red Platoon leader,

who, in turn, was the point of the 3rd Squadron wedge formation. (See fig.

1.9.)

At approximately 0209 hours, the point platoon leader crossed what he

believed to be the airstrip of the Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield (Objective

Bill). This information was relayed to Lt. Colonel Daly, who reported it

over the 3rd ACR Command radio net. Minutes later Lt. Colonel Daly

reported over the 3rd ACR Command radio net that he had not found the

airfield but instead had crossed a road.

As the wedge’s point moved forward, I Troop’s Red Platoon Leader—the

far right element of the 3rd Squadron wedge formation—reported to the I

Troop Commander, Captain Bodo Friesen, that he saw a fence and spotted

a tower in the distance. (See fig. 2.5, legends 9 and 10.) Captain Friesen

reported to the 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly, that I Troop

had found the airfield and, according to Captain Friesen, received Lt.

Colonel Daly’s permission to break the fence perimeter and secure the

area. The White Platoon, an I Troop tank platoon, breached the fence and

moved directly towards the tower. Other platoon elements of I Troop also

moved inside the fence.

19A FOX is a wheeled armored vehicle equipped with a fully integrated Nuclear, Biological, Chemical,

and Reconnaissance System.

Page 38 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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The Fratricide Incident

Figure 2.5: Troop Positions Before and During the Fratricide Incident

4

UMM HAJUL North

South

West

East

UMM HAJUL

Scale 1:35,000

1 M Company Commander


2 Approximate position of 3rd Squadron Commander


 and 3rd Squadron Command Group when enemy 


 contact is reported


3 Approximate position of 3rd ACR Command Group


4 Position of 3rd Squadron Fire Support Officer


2

1

6

5

3

5 Approximate position of 3rd Squadron 


 Commander when fatal shot fired


6 Engineers


7 50 corps boundary


8 Road running northwest to southeast


9 Fence


10 Helicopter pad and tower

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

53

52

51

50

49

48

9

53

52

51

50

49

48

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

7 7

8

8

Fence


Hard packed roads


Trails

Legend

Al Busayyah


Northeast 


Airfield

10 •

Page 39 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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Detection of the

Suspected Enemy

(Engineers) and

Recognition of U.S.

Vehicles

Once inside the fence, the I Troop elements fanned out while moving

south, unaware that they were approaching the XVIII Airborne Corps/VII

Corps’ 50 east/west boundary line. (During reconnaissance, one I Troop

tank erroneously reported that Chevrolet vans were fleeing the area; the

supposed vehicles were actually two jackasses.) As the I Troop elements

continued their movement, Captain Friesen detected two human “hot

spots,” which were believed to be enemy, moving in and around what were

believed to be buildings. Captain Friesen reported the detection to Lt.

Colonel Daly, through the I Troop TOC Commander. (See fig. 2.6.)

Figure 2.6: 3rd Squadron’s Line of

Communication

3rd Squadron


Commander


(Lt. Colonel Daly)

I Troop


TOC

I Troop


Commander


(Captain Friesen)

Indirect

Direct

Lt. Colonel Daly then advised Colonel Starr that enemy dismounts had

been detected but that they appeared to be confused and did not want to

give up. Colonel Starr told Lt. Colonel Daly to develop the situation but to

try to get the dismounts to surrender. Lt. Colonel Daly advised Colonel

Starr that he would lay down a field of fire in an attempt to get them to

surrender.

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According to the 3rd ACR Fire Support Noncommissioned Officer, Lt.

Colonel Daly also advised Colonel Starr that he had seen “an M548 vehicle

with full ammunition,” but he identified it as an Iraqi vehicle. The 3rd ACR

Air Liaison Officer also monitored this report. (Earlier briefings to the

Regiment had indicated that the Iraqis had vehicles in their inventory that

looked similar to the M548.) Colonel Starr then ordered Lt. Colonel Daly to

secure the vehicle so that it could be destroyed later. According to Colonel

Starr’s gunner, Colonel Starr twice told Lt. Colonel Daly to confirm that

the target was enemy before firing, and Lt. Colonel Daly acknowledged

this order at least once.

Meanwhile, Captain Friesen requested the Blue Platoon, I Troop, to assist

him in developing the situation, as he was approximately 600 meters from

the hot spots. Two Bradleys from Blue Platoon, Blue 35 and Blue 36,

joined Captain Friesen. They continued forward, approximately 200-250

meters from the target.

The Firing on and

Further Recognition

of U.S. Vehicles

Captain Friesen requested, and received, permission from Lt. Colonel Daly

to fire warning shots. At the time, Lt. Colonel Daly was located between

1.8 and 2.3 kilometers northeast of Captain Friesen’s location. (See fig. 2.5,

legend 2.) According to Captain Friesen and his gunner, the machine gun

was elevated and angled at 45 degrees when his gunner fired a short burst

left of the target area. Within seconds, Captain Friesen’s driver and gunner

reported return fire. Captain Friesen then ordered his gunner and Blue 35

and Blue 36 to engage the target.

After approximately 30 seconds of firing, Lt. Colonel Daly, who according

to the I Troop Executive Officer and others was continually requesting

situation reports, ordered a cease-fire. The I Troop Commander, Captain

Friesen, passed the cease-fire order to his platoons. Captain Friesen was

also advised that Lt. Colonel Daly was directing the PsyOps team to be

brought forward to broadcast an Iraqi surrender appeal. Captain Friesen

ordered Blue 35 and Blue 36 to continue holding fire and not to fire unless

fired upon, as one of the dismounted troops appeared wounded and he

thought the dismounted troops might be attempting to surrender.

Meanwhile, the five vehicles of the 3rd Squadron Command Group moved

towards the engagement area. By the time the Command Group arrived on

the scene, one of the targets was burning.

When Lt. Colonel Daly reported contact to Colonel Starr, Colonel Starr’s

gunner began scanning the area through his thermal sights until he was

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able to see what I Troop was looking at. The gunner told us that he located

a HMMWV and an ammunition carrier and that he relayed this information to

Colonel Starr, who was talking to Lt. Colonel Daly over the regimental

command network.

When the vehicle ignited, the 3rd ACR Fire Support Officer, who was

approximately 2 kilometers away from the targets, looked through his

binoculars at the burning vehicle. Because it “certainly looked like an M548

vehicle” and the 3rd ACR used M548s as ammunition carriers, he called on

the artillery command network to inquire if any of his vehicles were lost.

He was later advised that all 3rd ACR artillery M548s had been accounted for.

Meanwhile, Lt. Colonel Daly positioned his Bradley approximately 200

meters from the target area, forward and left of Captain Friesen’s position.

(See fig. 2.5, legend 5.) His gunner, who was scanning the area through the

Bradley’s thermal sights, described the scene to Lt. Colonel Daly: Two

soldiers were running to the left, away from the burning vehicle; one

appeared to be “carrying something” that “looks like an RPG

[rocket-propelled grenade]” on his back; one soldier went down to his

knees while yelling at the other soldier; then one continued running

through some bushes; and one soldier appeared to be moving around to

the Bradley’s front.

Lt. Colonel Daly told us of that scene, “There is a discussion of them

fleeing. ‘Fleeing’ is the wrong word. They are moving around in front of

us.” The I Troop Executive Officer, who was on the 3rd Squadron

Commander’s network, recalled receiving reports from Lt. Colonel Daly to

the effect, “Hey, they’re getting away. They’re running left. You got to get

on there and stop them. They’re getting away.”

Lt. Colonel Daly’s gunner requested permission to fire, saying, “Sir, let me

fire. Let me fire. I can fire at his feet. I can switch it to chain and fire in the

ground in front of him.” Lt. Colonel Daly initially denied his request, then

gave permission to fire.

The gunner fired the machine gun at the ground troops, killing Corporal

Fielder. Seconds before the gunner fired, a green star cluster appeared in

the sky overhead.

Upon hearing and seeing the firing but not knowing who had fired, Captain

Friesen reinforced his previous cease-fire command. The Blue Platoon

Leader told Captain Friesen that Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley had fired. This

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was confirmed by the I Troop TOC. The PsyOps team then began

broadcasting the Iraqi surrender appeal, minutes after the green star

cluster had appeared.

3rd Squadron

Dismounts

At the time Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley fired, the first of two individuals

from his Bradley was on the ground, preparing to reconnoiter the area.

After dismounting, the two individuals ran in front of the I Troop vehicles

that were continuing to hold fire. They were initially thought to be enemy

troops and were identified as Americans only after I Troop personnel

detected their Kevlar helmets through their Thermal Imaging System gun

sights.

Reporting of

Fratricide

Under orders from Captain Friesen, Blue 35 and Blue 36 began to flank the

engaged area from the west. During this process, Blue 36 encountered the

engineers’ Executive Officer, 1st Lieutenant Wessels, and confirmed that

he was an American. At that same time, Lieutenant Wessels identified

himself to a dismount from Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley and led him to the

engagement area. During this sequence of events, the I Troop Green

Platoon Leader reported that, although he was unable to identify the

dismounted troops on the ground, it appeared as though enemy prisoners

of war had been taken.

In the meantime, a second dismount from Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley

approached Blue 35, as he had become lost trying to follow the first

dismount. Because ordnance began to explode aboard the engineer

vehicles, Blue 35 started to maneuver away; and the second dismount got

inside Blue 35’s Bradley. Before Blue 35 moved, the first dismount ran to

Blue 35 and advised that American troops had been engaged.

Troops from Blue 35 and Blue 36 then dismounted and proceeded to the

engagement area. They administered immediate medical attention to

Sergeant Napier. However, ordnance continued to explode; and at one

point, an explosion knocked many of the troops to the ground. Fearful that

another explosion was imminent, both victims were taken from the scene

using a HMMWV. All other troops moved away from the exploding vehicles.

Both Captain Friesen and Lt. Colonel Daly were subsequently made aware

that friendly soldiers had been engaged. Lt. Colonel Daly then reported to

Colonel Starr that a fratricide had occurred. Colonel Starr relayed the

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information to the 3rd ACR TOC; and a medivac helicopter was dispatched

to the incident site at approximately 0435 hours to evacuate both victims.

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Army Investigations of the Fratricide

Incident and Subsequent Review

The Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation20 to ascertain facts

concerning the incident, conducted by the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate21

absolved all personnel of any criminal or administrative responsibility. A

supplemental AR 15-6 investigation, conducted by a brigadier general with

the XVIII Airborne Corps, supported these findings and recommendations.

However, a Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate reviewed the

supplemental investigation and reversed the previous findings and

recommendations. He instead found three 3rd ACR commanders to be

negligent before and during the fratricide and recommended that they

receive reprimands. He also found the engineers’ Executive Officer to be

negligent and recommended that the Executive Officer be issued an

admonition. After consideration by the Commander in Chief, Forces

Command, two of the reprimands were not made part of the individuals’

official military personnel files; and the other reprimand was withdrawn.

The admonition was allowed to stand.

The Army

Investigation

Within hours of the fratricide incident, the 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel

Starr, ordered the 3rd ACR Executive Officer, a lieutenant colonel, to begin

an AR 15-6 investigation, as he wanted to “capture the information now, as

it would be revisited later.” Colonel Starr also ordered the 3rd ACR

Executive Officer to contact the 24th Infantry Division, XVIII Airborne

Corps, and the VII Corps to advise them of the fratricide, which he did.

The 3rd ACR Executive Officer subsequently requested the 3rd ACR Judge

Advocate, a captain, to accompany him to the accident site. Upon their

arrival at the site, the 3rd ACR Executive Officer delegated the investigation

to the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate, based on the Judge Advocate’s assertion

that the Executive Officer had been involved in the Operation Plan and,

therefore, should not conduct the investigation.

The AR 15-6 investigation began on February 27, 1991, and was concluded

on March 3, 1991. The original investigative materials consisted of a

schematic drawing that indicated the grid coordinates for the engineers’

vehicles and the 3rd Squadron Fire Support Officer, one other unidentified

grid coordinate, and two photographs of the burned engineer vehicles. The

20AR 15-6, in general, establishes procedures for both informal investigations, involving a single

investigating officer, and formal investigations, or “boards of officers,” which may involve more than

one investigating officer. The primary function of any such investigation is to “ascertain facts and

report them to the appointing authority. It is the duty of the investigating officer or board to ascertain

and consider the evidence on all sides of each issue, thoroughly and impartially, and to make findings

and recommendations that are warranted by the facts. . . .” (AR 15-6 Update, sec. 1-4 and 1-5, June 11,

1988)

21The 3rd ACR Judge Advocate has since left the military. He declined our request for an interview.

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3rd ACR Judge Advocate, as the Investigating Officer, took 11 statements

on the morning of February 27, 1991, from those who were directly

involved in the incident, including 3 of the engineers. Over the next 4 days,

3rd ACR personnel gave eight additional statements and six follow-up

statements. At the conclusion of the AR 15-6 investigation, the 3rd ACR

Judge Advocate provided his report of findings and recommendations to

Colonel Starr, who delivered the report to the XVIII Airborne Corps and

the 1st AD Commander.

The AR 15-6 investigative findings included the following:

• “The airfield overlapped the 50 grid line, thus the proper clearing of the

objective required a boundary violation.

• “Information regarding possible 1st AD 2nd Brigade trains [combat service

support units] in the AO [Area of Operation] was not disseminated to the

troops clearing the airfield.

• “Information regarding 1AD [1st AD] antifratricide thermal devices was

passed to the 3/3 ACR [3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR].

• “The 3rd ACR and the 1AD LNO [1st AD Liaison Officers] acted properly in

requesting a 5-km [kilometer] safety zone; however, when the request was

denied, a buffer to cover the airfield should have been requested.

• “Spot reports by I Troop lead [sic] to confusion, especially in the area of

returned fire.

• “Commanders on the scene complied with the Law of War and ROE [Rules

of Engagement] and in fact made numerous attempts to encourage

surrender that were not required by the Law of War or ROE [Rules of

Engagement].

• “Information regarding our planned attack was not passed to the engineer

personnel in the objective.

• “After hours of review of what were split-second decisions, based upon

the circumstances present, all personnel acted reasonably and

responsibly.”

In view of his findings, the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate, as the Investigating

Officer, recommended the following:

• “All personnel involved be absolved of any criminal or administrative

responsibility.

• “Objectives in the future must be entirely within the unit boundaries.

• “Friendly forces in the area be informed of operations in the area.

• “Coordination regarding anti-fratricide signals be made prior to operations

that will contact sector boundaries, to include frequencies and call signs.

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• “Information regarding potential friendly forces in the area be passed to

the actual attacking force.

• “CPL [Corporal] Fielder be recommended for a Bronze Star with ‘V’ Device

for the valor he displayed in exposing himself to fire in order to aid his

wounded fellow soldier.”

Investigation

Reopened to Answer

Additional Questions

Because the VII Corps Commander raised concerns that the AR 15-6

investigation did not answer tactical questions or address questions of

responsibility, the investigation was reopened on May 2, 1991. The 3rd ACR

Commander, Colonel Starr, appointed the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate as AR

15-6 Investigating Officer to conduct the reopened investigation to answer

the questions forwarded by the VII Corps Commander. The reopened

investigation was completed on May 4, 1991.

In a second report of investigation, the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate concluded

the following:

• “All personnel involved acted responsibly.

• “Additional exchange of information between the 1st AD and the 3d [3rd]

ACR may have proved useful.

• “Better dissemination of known information by both 3d [3rd] ACR and 1st

AD to the Commanders and troops in the actual area concerned would

have been beneficial.”

Supplemental AR 15-6

Investigation by XVIII

Airborne Corps

The 54th Engineer Battalion Commander and the VII Corps Staff Judge

Advocate undertook subsequent reviews of the AR 15-6 investigation.

Based on their reviews, they requested that the XVIII Airborne Corps

address additional questions concerning the fratricide incident. On

October 18, 1991, the XVIII Airborne Corps directed that an informal

supplemental AR 15-6 investigation be conducted. It appointed a brigadier

general as the Investigating Officer.

Prior to the supplemental investigation’s close, the Department of the

Army’s Vice Chief of Staff and Inspector General were briefed on the

investigation’s status by the second Investigating Officer. Additionally, the

Commander in Chief, Forces Command, requested the Army’s Office of

Inspector General (OIG) to informally review the investigation. Following

the OIG review, the Army’s Chief of Staff was briefed. Because of questions

raised by the OIG during its review and inquiries from Corporal Fielder’s

family, the Office of the Army Chief of Staff forwarded additional

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Incident and Subsequent Review

questions to the second Investigating Officer. His supplemental

investigation, which generally supported the original investigation, was

officially closed on March 17, 1992. (See ch. 4 for the second Investigating

Officer’s investigative findings and recommendations.)

Forces Command

Staff Judge Advocate’s

Review

Upon completing the supplemental investigation, the second Investigating

Officer’s results were forwarded to the Army’s Headquarters Forces

Command, which requested its Staff Judge Advocate to review them. The

Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate, in a report dated April 3, 1992,

recommended reversing the second Investigating Officer’s findings and

recommendations and found the 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel Starr; the

3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly; and the I Troop Commander,

Captain Friesen, negligent in their actions before and during the fratricide

incident. Further, he recommended that they be issued reprimands. He

also recommended that the engineers’ Executive Officer, 1st Lieutenant

Wessels, be admonished for his negligence.

Specifically, the Staff Judge Advocate found that Colonel Starr had “failed

to exercise reasonable and prudent caution” when authorizing 3rd

Squadron elements to move south without first determining their exact

location and was “negligent” in placing his forces at risk by allowing them

to cross the corps boundary and in failing to ensure that the individuals in

the other zone were in fact enemy before action was taken against them.

He stated that Lt. Colonel Daly “knew or should have known” that the 50

east/west grid line was the boundary, put his soldiers at “considerable

risk” by allowing them to cross the corps boundary in front of advancing

friendly troops, and was “negligent” in failing to determine his and his

subordinates’ locations before allowing them to move south. Further, Lt.

Colonel Daly’s assumption that individuals sighted outside his axis of

advance were the enemy amounted to “negligence and dereliction of duty.”

With regard to Captain Friesen, the Staff Judge Advocate found that his

failure to ensure that he knew the southern boundary of his line of

advance was “negligence,” resulting in Sergeant Napier’s injury and

endangering the other engineers.

The Staff Judge Advocate also found that the engineer’s Executive Officer,

1st Lieutenant Wessels, was “negligent” in only placing men on guard and

failing to establish defensive perimeters and a plan of defense. Further,

Lieutenant Wessels should have taken more steps to protect his men by

identifying himself or indicating that he was surrendering. The Staff Judge

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Advocate recommended that an admonition be issued to Lieutenant

Wessels.

On the basis of his recommendations, Colonel Starr, Lt. Colonel Daly, and

Captain Friesen were reprimanded; and Lieutenant Wessels received an

admonition. After considering replies made by those reprimanded, the

Commander in Chief, Forces Command, the final authority on the

disposition of the AR 15-6 investigation, decided to withdraw the reprimand

to Captain Friesen. He also decided to file the reprimand for Lt. Colonel

Daly in his military personnel records jacket—which is maintained at the

local installation level and is not part of the official personnel records

reviewed for promotion purposes—for 1 year. Colonel Starr’s reprimand

was not placed in his personnel file. Lieutenant Wessels did not respond to

the admonishment, and it was allowed to stand.

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

Our investigation and analysis of the supplemental AR 15-6 investigation

indicate that its findings—which upheld the initial AR 15-6

investigation—were incomplete, inaccurate, and not supported by

available evidence. However, those findings were sufficient for the

reviewing Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate to reach conclusions

and make recommendations that were the opposite of those of the two

Investigating Officers.

We agree in the main with the Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate’s

findings, which he based on information derived from the AR 15-6

investigations. Further, we found no evidence that documents were

intentionally destroyed or that witnesses were intimidated or retaliated

against. However, the Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate stated his

supposition to us that the Investigating Officer had a predetermined

conclusion for the AR 15-6 investigation and that, as a result, the

Investigating Officer’s “objectivity was skewed” in favor of those in

command during the incident. Our investigation supports that statement.

In addition, a number of 3rd ACR personnel received awards for valor

during the incident. Those awards were based on misleading statements

and misrepresentations by officers involved in the incident, including the

3rd ACR and 3rd Squadron Commanders.

Although we analyzed both the initial and supplemental investigations, our

analysis emphasizes the supplemental investigation, quoting the headings

and findings from its investigative report, because it answered questions

and provided details beyond those of the initial investigation.

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“Graphics and

Journals of the

Operation”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

The Investigating Officer found “no evidence of foul play or misfeasance in

the handling of records,” as all records for the 3rd Squadron TAC and TOC

had been lost when “the original vehicles used as the . . . TOC and/or the . . .

TAC broke down and records were left with them.” “However, the personal

notes of the [3rd Squadron] Commander and Staff principals involved

provide adequate evidence to reach the findings contained in the [initial

Investigating Officer’s] report.”

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

GAO’s Findings We found no evidence that foul play or misfeasance occurred in the

handling of records. However, our investigation indicates that the 3rd ACR

Judge Advocate did not secure all relevant logs and records pertaining to

the mission as soon as possible after the incident occurred. Further, we

found no evidence that the 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly, or

his staff provided any personal notes to the original Investigating Officer,

the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate.

The second Investigating Officer obtained documents and records from

only three witnesses. Had both Investigating Officers attempted to probe

further, they would have obtained a wealth of documents, information,

and insight into the incident. For example, during our investigation, we

obtained an audio tape recording of the fratricide incident as it occurred

(see app. I.) and evidence of two additional audio tapes. Documents

outside the 3rd ACR were also available that assisted us in our

investigation.

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

“Objective Bill”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

“Objective Bill was identified as a possible XVIII Airborne Corps objective

prior to the start of the ground war. It was one of several Iraqi airfields in

the area to be used by the 101st Air Assault Division for their future

operations. Since this objective was approximately 130 km [kilometers]

deep into Iraq, it was not determined prior to the start of the ground war

which unit would eventually be assigned to take the Objective. That

decision would be made later in the war based on the tactical situation at

the time. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) was assigned

Objective Bill by the XVIII Airborne Corps on the afternoon of 16 [26]

February 1991 at about 1600 hours—only five hours before crossing the

line of departure. The 3d ACR commander decided to attack the objective

from the north in order to attack perpendicular to the long axis of the

airfield. To execute this plan, it was essential to obtain approval from the

1st AD for a . . . 5 km buffer zone into the 1st AD zone. The purpose of the

boundary change or buffer zone was to ensure that no friendly troops

were in the vicinity of the objective.” When the request was denied, the

revised plan, for a west-to-east attack, was adopted.

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

GAO’s Findings We were unable to confirm that Objective Bill was an identified XVIII

Airborne Corps objective prior to the ground war’s beginning. The only

reference to this area that we were able to locate was made in a

February 26, 1991, “Critical Facilities Study,” which referred to an

“unidentified heliport with a control tower and support buildings.”

We determined the 3rd ACR had learned as early as 0400 hours on

February 26, 1991, that it would be placed under the operational control of

the 24th Infantry Division. At 1200 hours, February 26, 1991, the XVIII

Airborne Corps placed the 3rd ACR under the 24th Infantry Division and

ordered the 3rd ACR to first clear the airfield at grid coordinates PU

460530 (Objective Bill) (see fig. 1.7, legend 1) and then seize the Qalib Al

Luhays Airfield at map grid coordinates PU 740600 (see fig. 1.8). This was

9 hours, rather than 5 hours, before crossing the line of departure. At 1430

hours, the XVIII Airborne Corps directed the 24th Infantry Division to seize

Objective Tim (Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield) at grid coordinates PU

470517 (see fig. 1.7, legend 2). However, three different sets of

coordinates were given for Objective Bill, possibly contributing to

confusion during the mission.

The 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel Starr, acknowledged that he was initially

surprised that the buffer zone was denied; he then “assumed someone

must be just over the [boundary] line.” He changed the attack’s orientation

to west-to-east because to “attack against a boundary is not smart.”

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

“Identification of

Units”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

The engineer guards (54th Engineer personnel), using night-vision devices,

“immediately recognized the oncoming . . . 3d ACR tanks as friendly”

vehicles since “the M1[A1] tank is easily identifiable due to its unique

profile.” The 3rd ACR forces did not identify the engineer vehicles because

“a.The . . . vehicles were in a slight depression. . . .

“b.The poor weather conditions caused the 3d ACR forces to conduct the

engagement primarily through thermal sites [sic]. The drivers, gunners,

and commanders tried other night vision devices as well as the naked eye

but found the thermal sites [sic] to be the most effective. . . .

“c.The Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) does not have a distinctive

profile nor is it seen on the battlefield in great numbers. . . .”

d.The 1.5-ton trailer attached to the excavator looked “like a small

building” through the thermal sights. Based on the other vehicles’

locations, the “trailer was the only vehicle that could be seen clearly. The

other vehicles could not be clearly seen until the 3d ACR vehicle[s]

maneuvered to the flanks of the engineer unit after the fatal shots had

been fired.

“e.The HMMWV, which is identifiable, was masked behind the SEE trailer.

“f.The M548 ammunition carrier was behind the SEE and trailer and is not

as easily identifiable as the M1A1 tank.

“g.The engineer unit did not possess blue filtered strobe lights and white

star clusters which were the USCENTCOM [U.S. Central

Command]-approved anti-fratricide devices. . . .

“h.The engineer personnel did not wear their Kevlar helmets or Load

Bearing Equipment (LBE) which would have been distinctive through the

thermal sites [sic] of the 3d ACR vehicles.”

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i.The 3rd ACR did not send mounted or dismounted reconnaissance patrols

to identify the engineer unit because it was believed “that the ‘enemy’ unit

might inflict casualties. . . .”

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Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

GAO’s Findings To follow the investigator’s line of reasoning,

a.The evidence indicates that the engineer vehicles were located in a slight

depression.

b.Hours before the incident, it had rained. Reports differ as to the visibility

at the time of the incident, ranging from clear with stars and moon shining

to overcast. However, weather conditions were not a factor in the incident

and were not the reason 3rd ACR personnel used their Thermal Imaging

Systems. We were told that 3rd ACR personnel usually used these systems

at night.

c.The Small Emplacement Excavator has a very distinctive profile (see fig.

1.5); however, we agree that it may not have been a common sight on the

battlefield.

d-f.Prior to the fatal shots being fired, the M548 Ammunition Carrier (see

fig. 1.3) was visible to crew members aboard Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley.

Additionally, the gunner for Colonel Starr had detected the M548 and the

HMMWV from approximately 2 kilometers and advised the Colonel. Later,

the 3rd ACR Fire Support Officer was also able to detect the burning M548

with binoculars from a distance of about 2 kilometers.

g.The engineers were not in complete compliance with the Anti-Fratricide

Standard Operating Procedures in effect when the incident occurred. They

were unaware of the nighttime antifratricide recognition devices.

h.When the incident occurred, three of the five engineers were wearing

their Load Bearing Equipment. Specialist Walker removed his Load

Bearing Equipment to carry Sergeant Napier. Specialist Driben had his

equipment and Kevlar helmet on during the entire incident. Medical

personnel had to remove Corporal Fielder’s equipment after the incident.

Lieutenant Wessels had his Kevlar helmet on during the incident.

i.Lt. Colonel Daly dismounted two personnel from his Bradley.

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

“Cease Fire”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

“There was no binding cease-fire in effect that applied to the [3rd]

Squadron Commander, LTC [Lt. Colonel] Daly, when the fatal shots were

fired. The I Troop Commander, CPT [Captain] Friesen, had previously

ordered his unit to stop firing because he determined that a sufficient

volume of fire had been delivered and he was no longer receiving return

fire from the ‘enemy’ unit. This so called cease-fire or check-fire was, in

essence, CPT Friesen ordering the troops under his command to stop

firing and not fire again without his permission. It was simply a fire control

measure that applied only to I Troop and was not a cease fire in the legal

sense that applied to any other unit. In fact, the I Troop cease-fire was

never violated because no I Troop unit fired again in this encounter. LTC

Daly, the next higher commander, monitored the cease-fire on the radio

and took it as a fire control measure that CPT Friesen had imposed on I

Troop. LTC Daly was clearly authorized to order the resumption of firing

independently of any I Troop fire control measures. His order to fire at

what he thought were maneuvering and/or escaping enemy troops was

justified and within the established Rules of Engagement.”

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GAO’s Investigation and Analysis of

Supplemental AR 15-6 Investigative Findings

GAO’s Findings We determined that both AR 15-6 investigations did not address all relevant

issues, specifically (1) the issue surrounding the firing of the warning shots

by Captain Friesen, (2) return fire from the target area, and (3) Lt. Colonel

Daly’s direct involvement in the incident and the elapsed time from the

warning shots until the fatal shots. Based on our investigation and review

of an audio tape of the incident, transcribed in appendix I, we are

providing a detailed analysis of the events.

As Captain Friesen moved inside the fence, he detected dismounted

soldiers (the engineers), who he presumed were “enemy soldiers,” moving

in and out of “buildings.” He requested elements of I Troop’s Blue Platoon

to assist him. Those elements became confused and had difficulty locating

his position. By this point, Captain Friesen had cut off his auxiliary

speaker that monitored the 3rd Squadron’s frequency, thus severing his

ability to listen to the 3rd Squadron Commander’s radio communications.

Moving closer to the detected soldiers, he requested and received

permission from Lt. Colonel Daly to fire warning shots, although he had

not confirmed that his target was the enemy. After receiving permission,

according to Captain Friesen and his crew, they shot at an elevated

45-degree angle away from the engineers.

However, Captain Friesen’s and his crew’s statements about the angle of

the warning shots were not consistent with the engineer guards’

description of the firing sequence. The engineer guards stated the first

firing they saw was directly at them; one of the engineers described the

firing as the “tracer rounds walked right past [me].”

Further, according to Captain Friesen and his crew, once the “warning

shots” were fired they saw what they believed to be return fire. This was

contradicted by (1) the engineers, as they stated they did not fire any

weapons during the incident, and (2) other I Troop personnel, who were

told by Captain Friesen that they were taking fire, as they did not see

return fire. Based on Captain Friesen and his crew’s perception of return

fire, the warning shots fired by Captain Friesen were perhaps

(1) mistakenly fired directly at the engineers, striking their vehicles and

creating sparks or arcs that appeared like muzzle fire or bullet tracers to

the I Troop Commander and his crew, or (2) the warning shots arcing from

Captain Friesen’s vehicle, which had the appearance of return fire.

Prior to the warning shots being fired, the 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt.

Colonel Daly, was approximately 2.5 kilometers northeast of the

engineers’ location, following approximately 100 meters to the rear of the

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M Company Commander. (See fig. 2.5, legends 1 and 2.) Colonel Starr, the

3rd ACR Commander, directed Lt. Colonel Daly to move to the area. As Lt.

Colonel Daly and the 3rd Squadron Command Group moved south

towards the area, Captain Friesen fired the warning shots, just as Lt.

Colonel Daly was moving through the fenced area, approximately 1.8

kilometers from Captain Friesen’s position. This caused the engineers on

guard to alert the other engineers that they were receiving friendly fire and

seek immediate cover. Based on what Captain Friesen thought was return

fire, he ordered Bradley Fighting Vehicles Blue 35 and Blue 36, along with

his own gunner to engage. During this volley of fire the Small

Emplacement Excavator was hit, wounding Sergeant Napier.

Lt. Colonel Daly—seeing the firing by Captain Friesen, Blue 35, and Blue

36—interpreted all the firing to be part of the warning-shot sequence and

believed it was excessive. Lt. Colonel Daly ordered Captain Friesen to

cease fire; Captain Friesen, in turn, ordered Blue 35 and Blue 36 to cease

fire.

As Lt. Colonel Daly continued to move towards the area, he was told that

the I Troop elements had received fire. He directed that I Troop continue

observing the “enemy” while the PsyOps team was brought forward. As the

situation developed, Captain Friesen determined that at least one soldier

appeared to have been wounded and one appeared to be surrendering. He

reaffirmed to his subordinate units to “continue holding fire” as he

believed the enemy had been contained. All of this information was

relayed to the I Troop TOC over the I Troop Command radio frequency.

Further, according to the I Troop Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel Daly was

given constant situation reports during this period over the 3rd Squadron

Command radio frequency.

As Lt. Colonel Daly moved closer, his Bradley driver commented that he

could “run him [a soldier] over.” Once Lt. Colonel Daly had arrived on the

scene and moved forward of the I Troop elements there, transmissions

came across the Squadron Command radio frequency network from both

Lt. Colonel Daly’s and the 3rd Squadron Operations Officer’s vehicles that

“[t]hey’re getting away; they’re running left.” Lt. Colonel Daly’s gunner

stated that one of the soldiers looked as though he might have a weapon

or rocket-propelled grenade on his back. The gunner insisted on firing and

requested that Lt. Colonel Daly “allow him to fire at his feet,” saying “I can

switch it to chain and fire in front of him.” Lt. Colonel Daly’s initial

response to firing was “no.” However, he then gave permission. His gunner

fired the machine gun, fatally wounding Corporal Fielder.

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Approximately 3 minutes and 45 seconds before Lt. Colonel Daly’s gunner

fired the fatal shots, Captain Friesen noted Bradley vehicles (which we

now know included Lt. Colonel Daly’s) to his left. Approximately 22

seconds before the fatal shots, Captain Friesen was informed that the 3rd

Squadron Command Group was near him. After the shots were fired,

Captain Friesen immediately inquired of his own troop. He was then

directed (by Lt. Colonel Daly) to switch radio frequencies and speak

directly with Lt. Colonel Daly. (See fig. 2.6.)

The time sequence from the initial warning shots to the fatal shots was

approximately 7 minutes 15 seconds. Captain Friesen, the Blue Platoon

Leader, and the I Troop Executive Officer all thought the situation was

under control before the Lt. Colonel arrived on the scene and fired. Other

soldiers on the scene saw Lt. Colonel Daly’s actions as unwarranted and

believed the Lt. Colonel wanted, as one soldier said, to “just get in some

shots.” (See app. I.)

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XVIII Airborne

Corps/VII Corps

“Boundary”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

“The I Troop 3/3 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) Command Group was

on the XVIII Airborne Corps side of the XVIII-VII Corps boundary during

the incident despite not knowing the location of that boundary. Therefore,

the warning shots from the I Troop Commander’s vehicle were fired

across the boundary into the VII Corps zone. Current Army doctrine (FM

100-5-1) [FM 101-5-1] allows firing direct fire across a boundary at an

enemy position. . . . Two I Troop Bradleys, I-35 and I-36, had unknowingly

maneuvered to the VII Corps side of the boundary when they later fired

the shots that wounded SPC [Specialist] Napier. When the 3/3 ACR

squadron commander, LTC [Lt. Colonel] Daly, arrived on the scene he was

faced with a situation where the suspected enemy unit and I Troop had

exchanged fire. Therefore, he believed that the engineer unit was a

confirmed Iraqi unit.

“Additionally, it was reasonable to believe the ‘enemy’ force might be

deploying anti-tank weapons, other weapon systems and/or calling for

artillery fire. LTC Daly, at this point, did not conduct a position check to

determine his location relative to the boundary because he felt he was in a

combat engagement situation. The primary rule of

engagement—protection of the force—allowed LTC Daly to maneuver to

what he believed was the optimum combat location which was

approximately 900 meters into the VII Corps zone. The fatal shots were

fired from that location. Based upon FM 100-5-1 [FM 101-5-1] and the Rules

of Engagement, the 3/3 ACR did not violate Army doctrine by firing into or

crossing into the VII Corps zone under the existing circumstances.”

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GAO’s Findings Colonel Starr and Lt. Colonel Daly knew the 50 east/west grid line was the

corps boundary. The I Troop Commander, Captain Friesen, was unaware

of the corps boundary’s significance, since he was unaware of the change

in the attack’s orientation. According to the original operation plan, the

3rd Squadron was to proceed 7 kilometers south of the 50 east/west grid

line. Captain Friesen and elements of I Troop crossed the 50 east/west

boundary before any shots were fired. The warning shots and subsequent

firing by Captain Friesen occurred approximately 1 kilometer inside VII

Corps territory.

When I Troop first reported contact, Colonel Starr was approximately 800

meters north of the boundary. Lt. Colonel Daly was approximately 1.3

kilometers north of the boundary. Neither Commander determined his

own location, or those of their subordinate units, even though they knew

that they were operating near the corps boundary and friendly troops

might be across the boundary. Further, after contact was first reported

and the elements of I Troop had engaged the target, Lt. Colonel Daly

moved approximately 2.3 kilometers, crossing the corps boundary and

became directly involved in the incident.

As Lt. Colonel Daly and the 3rd Squadron Command Group moved toward

the area, they passed the 3rd ACR Command Group, situated adjacent to

the fence. (See fig. 2.5.) The 3rd ACR Fire Support Coordinator announced

over the 3rd ACR Command radio network that “you’ve got 800 meters” to

the 50 east-west boundary. The Fire Support Coordinator received a

confirmation of “Roger” from someone.

No firing was conducted across the corps boundary; all firing occurred on

the VII Corps side of the boundary. However, the boundary stipulated in

the FRAGO had been breached before Captain Friesen identified the

suspected enemy.

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“Essential Information

. . .”

“From the Regiment to the

Squadrons”—Investigating

Officer’s Findings

“Intelligence before 24 February 1991 (Ground Day) indicated that Iraqi

ground forces had . . . anti-armor weapons which could defeat, at the very

least, Bradley Fighting Vehicles.” Intelligence also “indicated that the first

belt of Republican Guards” was in the Objective Bill area, with “a possible

Battalion-sized element dug in on the airfield at Objective Bill and other

Iraqi units in the vicinity.”

“The . . . 3d ACR, upon receiving the mission to seize Objective Bill, issued a

warning order at approximately . . . 1800” on February 26, 1991. The

Regimental Operation Officer gave the Warning Order “face to face with at

least two of the three Squadron Commanders . . . with notice that a FRAGO

(Fragmentary Order) would follow shortly. The gist of the Warning Order

was to attack an airfield [at] grid PU 447520 and destroy the enemy located

at or near that airfield,” leaving enemy prisoners of war minimally guarded

in large groups after reporting their location. “The unit was to advance no

farther than the 58 North/South grid. At the time, it was believed that no

one was on the 3rd ACR’s right (south) flank.” The basic plan was for the

3rd Squadron to seize the airfield with the 2nd Squadron holding the

enemy in the north and the 1st Squadron providing a base of fire as

support.

“The 3d ACR was to cross the Line of Departure [the 20 north/south grid

line] at 2100 hours. After the warning order, the FRAGO followed. It was

issued over the radio at 1856 from the Regimental Tactical Operations

Center (TOC) by the Regimental Operations Officer. The enemy situation

was briefed as resistance stiffening. The unit was to expect mines and

protected dug-in fighting positions. Local counter-attacks were to be

expected. The friendly situation was briefed as possibly the 1st AD on the

right flank. The mission remained the same. The 3d ACR Line of Departure

was the 20 North/South grid line. At . . . the 39 North/South grid line, the

units were to stop and an Artillery preparation of the objective was to be

fired. At the end of the Artillery preparation the 2d and 1st Squadrons were

to move forward until halted by the Regimental Commander. The 1st

Squadron was to begin a direct fire preparation of the objective and the 3d

Squadron was to pass through the 1st Squadron and attack from North to

South. There was to be an OH-58 [helicopter] reconnaissance of the target

at 2030. The FRAGO called for a 2,500 meter buffer zone around the airfield.

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There was a follow on mission to another airfield some 25 kilometers to

the east.

“The available graphics, chiefly supplied by the personal notes of the 1st

Squadron Commander, clearly show the 50 [east/west] grid line as the

southern boundary. They also depict a buffer zone roughly bounded by PU

445465 to PU 500465 as a southern limit of advance.

“Sometime after 2200, the Regiment was aware that the request for the

buffer zone from 1st AD had been denied. The helicopter with the

Regimental Liaison Officer . . . and Regimental Assistant Operations

Officer . . . did not return to the Regimental Command Post until after

2130, at the earliest. Their discussions with the 1st AD Command . . . were

reported soon thereafter to the Regimental Command Group. [The 3rd ACR

Executive Officer] recalls that [the Regimental Liaison Officer] reported

that the 1st AD had passed by the objective much earlier in the day. He

reported that the 1st AD told [the Regimental Liaison Officer] that there did

not appear to be enemy on the airfield. He did not report a specific grid

location of friendly forces; only that there may have been elements of the

2nd Brigade, 1st AD logistical units south of the airfield.

“In a combat situation commanders at each level receive and process the

full range of information on the intelligence situation, friendly situation,

etc. Essential information is then passed to subordinate commanders in

the form of plans, orders, reports and/or guidance. Full verbatim

information is usually not passed to each lower level. In this case, the

Regimental commander was faced with a vague enemy situation. The

progress of the attack was so rapid that the intelligence information flow

never caught up with the maneuver. Even though the 1st AD reported that

they had not seen any enemy on the airfield as they passed near it twelve

hours earlier, intelligence clearly revealed that Iraqi forces were in the

area. The [helicopter] reconnaissance conducted five hours before the

attack did not detect any enemy on the objective. Based on this

information, the Regimental commander believed that there was probably

no enemy on the objective and he passed that assessment to the 3/3 ACR

[3rd Squadron]. However, based on this information, it would have been

foolish for the Regimental or Squadron commanders to assume that no

enemy was on the objective.

“In this uncertain enemy situation, the only prudent course of action to

minimize potential U.S. casualties was to attack the airfield as if enemy

was present. It is unclear whether or not the information concerning the

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buffer zone denial and report that friendly troops might be in the area was

successfully passed from Regiment to squadron. However, the essential

conclusion based on that information was, in fact, successfully passed to

the squadrons when COL Starr ordered no one to fire south of the 50

East/West grid line. There was no time to issue written orders or to have

face-to-face coordination meetings. Under the existing circumstances, the

regiment verbally disseminated the essential combat information to the

squadrons.”

“From the Squadron to the

Troop”—Investigating

Officer’s Findings

“All troop commanders, as well as the operations officer and intelligence

officer of the 3/3 ACR [3rd Squadron], agreed that they expected ‘heavy’ or

‘stiff’ resistance on Objective Bill. They all understood that the plan called

for a west to east movement along the 55 east/west grid line followed by

an artillery preparation and a direct fire preparation of the objective,” and

“a north to south attack on the airfield” through the 1st Squadron by the

3rd Squadron.

“When the axis of the attack was changed from N-S to W-E the squadron

issued orders by radio while on the move. The Troop Commanders knew

of a southern boundary. They all knew they were the southern most XVIII

Airborne Corps unit. They all, however, were unaware of the location of

the 1st Armored Division units. Some Troop Commanders knew of the 50

[east/west] grid line as being the boundary. . . . [T]he M Troop [Company]

Commander has notes which reflect the identification of the 50 east/west

grid line as the Southern Boundary.” He recalled that he had received

information about the grid-line boundary “while on the move”; and “[h]e

believed that that information was passed to him on the Operations and

Intelligence [communications] net.” Further, “he wrote it at the time in his

commander’s notebook.”

“However, CPT Friesen, [the I Troop Commander,] testified that he was

unaware of the 50 east-west grid line as the boundary. All other Troop

Commanders were north of CPT Friesen, and consequently their

knowledge of the boundary was not as critical because they were not near

the boundary. At no time did the 3/3d ACR [3rd Squadron], either through

the Commander or Staff, pass to the Troop Commanders the possibility

that friendly forces might be in the area. This was because no such specific

information was received by the Squadron from the Regiment. Based on

the information passed to the Squadron and the location of the airfield as

it appeared on the map, the Squadron Commander and Troop

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Commanders felt that they were a comfortable distance from any

boundary.

“. . . Throughout the operation, M Troop [Company], the tank troop,

remained the centerpiece of the 3rd Squadron’s attack plan. The attack on

the airfield went as planned. All 3/3 ACR [3rd Squadron] forces and fires

remained well above the 50 grid line. It was not until I Troop reported a

possible ‘enemy’ unit to the south that the element of I Troop and the 3/3

ACR [3rd Squadron] command group moved south to counter what they

believed to be an enemy threat. The importance of the boundary at that

point was not significant to the I Troop Commander and 3/3 ACR [3rd

Squadron] Commander because they believed they were in contact with an

enemy force.”

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GAO’s Findings Neither Colonel Starr nor Lt. Colonel Daly ensured that their subordinate

commanders received essential tactical information, ranging from

intelligence to orientation of attack.

Most of the intelligence information collected prior to the ground war

about potential 3rd ACR objectives became obsolete once the ground war

began. As a result, commanders had to rely on the most current

intelligence that could be obtained. However, intelligence information

contained in the operation order from the 3rd ACR to its squadrons was

inaccurate.

According to the 3rd ACR intelligence personnel we interviewed, the 3rd

ACR Command Group knew that no known enemy were present at the

objective at the time the operation plan was issued because the enemy had

moved to the Qalib Al Luhays Airfield. According to the 3rd ACR

intelligence personnel, they focused their attention on Objective Joe—the

Qalib Al Luhays Airfield, located approximately 28 kilometers further east

and north (see fig. 1.8) that was to be attacked the following day—and not

on Objective Bill. One intelligence officer considered Objective Bill the

“regiment’s own little internal mission,” undertaken only as an

afterthought as the regiment pushed east.

The 3rd ACR Commander, Colonel Starr, ordered two helicopters to

reconnoiter the 3rd ACR sector in advance of the attack. Using the 3rd ACR

Command radio frequency, one of the helicopters reported to Colonel

Starr that it had seen no enemy at Objective Bill. The 3rd Squadron Fire

Support Officer advised Lt. Colonel Daly of the report, and Lt. Colonel

Daly acknowledged receiving the information. Further, while the 3rd

Squadron was engaged in the passage of lines attacking Objective Bill, the

3rd Squadron’s Operations Officer advised the M Company Commander

that the airfield was “probably cold” and established that the Rules of

Engagement were “not [to] fire unless fired upon.”

Concerning the attack’s orientation, the 3rd ACR and 3rd Squadron

Commanders knew the 50 east/west grid line was the corps boundary.

Colonel Starr advised Lt. Colonel Daly, who was in the process of

coordinating the passage of lines, to change the attack’s orientation to

west-to-east and that the 50 east/west grid line was the boundary.

However, the 3rd Squadron’s Operations Officer told the M Company

Commander, the lead attack company, that the movement was being

changed to east-to-southeast with the 50 east/west grid line as the

boundary. Neither the right flank unit, I Troop, which would be closest to

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the corps boundary, nor the rear attack unit, L Troop, received any of the

information. Our attempts to interview the K Troop Commander were

unsuccessful; however, he indicated during the AR 15-6 investigation that

he was aware of the attack’s changed orientation and of the 50 east/west

grid line as the southern boundary. There was no indication that Lt.

Colonel Daly attempted to confirm that the subordinate units had received

the information or to relay information that friendly forces might be in the

area.

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“Conditions

Contributing to

Incident”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

“. . . [T]hree conditions . . . increased the likelihood of a fratricide incident.

These contributing factors were:

“a. BOUNDARY PLACEMENT: The boundary between the two Corps

passed through the southern tip of Objective Bill. U.S. Army doctrine is to

place an objective solely within the zone of the attacking force. Efforts to

deconflict the attack on this objective were not successful. Although some

safeguards to prevent friendly fire incidents were taken by the

Commander of the 3rd ACR (shift of the artillery preparation, cancellation

of the direct fire preparation, and attack parallel to the boundary), they

proved to be inadequate.

“b. BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS: The conditions that existed at the time

were difficult. It had been raining, it was cold, cloud cover caused almost

zero illumination and the unit believed it was attacking at night against an

enemy of unknown size. Due to poor visibility the entire operation was

conducted primarily with thermal sights. FM radio communications were

sometimes poor due to the distances between units and the weather

conditions. Additionally, the 3d ACR forces had been continually moving

with little rest for over 60 hours.

“c. INFORMATION FLOW: The 3d ACR and its subordinate units had the

mission of attacking assigned objectives and maintaining contact on the

boundaries of the XVIII Airborne Corps with the VII Corps. Therefore, all

3d ACR commanders at every level should have been acutely aware,

without being specifically informed, that they were often operating near a

boundary, potentially near friendly troops. Under the existing adverse

circumstances the minimum essential combat information was passed

from Regiment through Squadron to the troop commanders. However, the

Regimental Commander and the Squadron Commander should have

placed more emphasis on the proximity of the objective to the boundary,

possible friendly forces in the area, reasons why the buffer zone was

denied, and why the attack plan was changed. Had the I Troop

Commander been fully apprised of all the available information, this

regrettable incident might have been avoided.”

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GAO’s Findings With concern to (a) boundary placements, the maps in use when the 3rd

ACR developed the Operation Plan reflected that the southern-most tip of

the objective airstrip was approximately 900 meters north of the boundary

and within the XVIII Airborne Corps zone. Further, the maps did not show

the fence line that crossed the boundary. (See fig. 4.1.)

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Figure 4.1: U.S. Army Map of Attack Area for Objective Bill

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

55

54

53

52

51

50

49

48

47

46

45

44

43

55

54

53

52

51

50

49

48

47

46

45

44

43


42

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

UMM HAJUL

Ruins

49

42

49

56 56

Source: U.S. Army

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As the 3rd Squadron advanced, I Troop encountered a fence and saw a

tower in the distance. (See fig. 2.5.) I Troop then reported that it had

identified the airstrip even though the maps that the 3rd ACR and the 3rd

Squadron used did not depict a fenced area within the area of the attack.

The attention of the 3rd Squadron focused on this report.22 Lt. Colonel

Daly believed the fenced area was the airstrip. All 3rd Squadron troop

units, except I Troop, stopped.

The 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly, gave I Troop permission

to move inside the fence. As I Troop moved inside the fenced area, it

unwittingly breached the corps boundary. Had Captain Friesen, the I

Troop Commander, relied on his maps and Global Positioning System, he

would have realized that the airstrip was approximately 2 kilometers to

the northeast.

Weather was not a factor in the incident’s (b) battlefield conditions. The

incident did occur at nighttime, but reports varied as to

illumination—from clear with stars and the moon shining to overcast.

The Investigating Officer was correct in his assessment concerning (c)

information flow that all 3rd ACR commanders should have been aware

that they were near a boundary and potentially friendly forces and, more

importantly, that the 3rd ACR and 3rd Squadron Commanders should have

emphasized those two aspects and provided the reasons for the buffer

zone’s denial and the Operation Plan’s change. We also agree that if

Captain Friesen had had all available information, the fratricide incident

might have been avoided. But the radio communications flow was also

limited within the 3rd Squadron. Although most communications within

the squadron were conducted using “secure voice,” the PsyOps HMMWV and

the FOX vehicle, part of the 3rd Squadron Command Group during the

incident, did not have “secure” radio capability, because they lacked

connecting cables and cryptographic equipment. Both vehicles were, in

effect, without communications throughout the ground war as well as the

fratricide incident. This may have resulted in the PsyOps HMMWV’s delayed

receipt of a report over the “unsecure” radio to broadcast an Iraqi

surrender message. Additionally, the 1st Squadron Commander’s radio

went dead at the same time that the 3rd and 1st Squadrons were

coordinating the passage of lines. Further, the erroneous radio reports of

vans fleeing when they were actually jackasses heightened the anxiety

among some I Troop personnel who heard the report.

22Prior to this report, the 3rd Squadron Commander reported to the 3rd ACR Commander that a

hard-packed road the squadron had crossed was the airstrip. He then realized that it was not.

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Investigative

Conclusions

Investigating Officer’s

“Conclusion”

“The actions and decisions by the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment

Commander; 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment Executive Officer;

Commander, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment; Commander, I

Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment; and all other involved

individuals were reasonable and appropriate under the existing

circumstances. [1] The troop commander reported the suspected enemy

unit to higher headquarters before firing; [2] a warning shot was ordered

by the squadron commander and fired by the troop commander; [3] the

troop commander did not fire directly on the suspected enemy until he

believed that he was under fire from that force; [4] the squadron

commander stopped his attack, went to the scene, [and] ordered a PsyOps

team to broadcast an Iraqi surrender message on the loudspeakers. [5] The

squadron commander ordered a short burst to be fired only when he

thought the suspected Iraqis had returned fire, had rejected the chance to

surrender, and were trying to escape or occupy fighting positions. [6] All

personnel involved complied with the published Rules of Engagement.”

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GAO’s Conclusions We found nothing to dispute the Investigating Officer’s conclusion

regarding the 3rd ACR’s Executive Officer. However, we disagree with the

Investigating Officer’s conclusion that the actions and decisions of the

commanders of the 3rd ACR, 3rd Squadron, and I Troop “were reasonable

and appropriate under the existing circumstances.” Based on our analysis

of the evidence available to the Investigating Officer—and the Forces

Command Staff Judge Advocate, with whose conclusions we are in general

agreement—and the additional evidence found in our investigation, we

believe the following concerning the actions and decisions cited by the

Investigating Officer:

1.The I Troop Commander, Captain Friesen, did report the suspected

enemy to higher headquarters as cited. However, Captain Friesen did not

confirm that the target was the enemy before firing.

2.The 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly, did order a warning

shot; and Captain Friesen then directed his gunner to fire, which he did.

This order countermanded the FRAGO, i.e., not to fire unless fired upon and

not to fire below the 50 east/west grid line.

3.The statement concerning Captain Friesen’s not firing directly on the

suspected enemy until perceiving return fire was disputed by the

engineers. They stated that the first shots were fired directly at them and

denied engaging in return fire. However, the Investigating Officer did not

resolve this issue.

4.The actions the Investigating Officer described—Lt. Colonel Daly’s

stopping his attack, going to the scene of the sighting, and ordering a PsyOps

team broadcast—were reasonable and appropriate as far as he delineated

them; but he failed to address pertinent facts. According to Lt. Colonel

Daly, Colonel Starr ordered him to the scene at that point. Once at the

scene, Lt. Colonel Daly did not establish contact with the I Troop

Commander, who believed he had the situation under control with the

“enemy” appearing to surrender; fired on an unconfirmed target and fired

below the 50 east/west grid line—violating the existing Rules of

Engagement as stated in the FRAGO; and endangered his own men by

dismounting them without informing the other U.S. troops in the area. In

addition, although his directions to the PsyOps team occurred before the

fatal shots were fired, the engineers did not hear the message until after

those shots were fired.

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5.Lt. Colonel Daly allowed his gunner to fire after the gunner reported

seeing an individual running away from the burning vehicle then moving

around to the Bradley’s front “carrying something” that looked like a

rocket-propelled grenade launcher on his back. There was no indication of

return fire at the time Lt. Colonel Daly fired. Further, we found no

evidence that Lt. Colonel Daly provided an opportunity for the engineers

to surrender. We agree that the engineers could have appeared to be

escaping as all were seeking cover from the shots fired at them.

6.Although those involved complied with the “published” Rules of

Engagement, they violated the Rules of Engagement as stated in the FRAGO,

i.e., not to fire unless fired upon and not to fire below the 50 east/west grid

line. In addition, Lt. Colonel Daly did not confirm that the targets were

enemy before firing, as ordered by Colonel Starr.

In his conclusions, the Investigating Officer did not address all pertinent

“actions and decisions” of Colonel Starr and Lt. Colonel Daly that

demonstrated the failure of the two commanders to exercise proper

command and control23 of their respective units. Further, the AR 15-6

investigation, on which the Investigating Officer based his

recommendation against the engineers’ Executive Officer, contained

inaccurate information and did not fully address whether the engineers

had established defensive perimeters and a plan of action.

Colonel Starr’s Failure to

Exercise Proper Command

and Control

Essential Information Not

Disseminated to Subordinates

Colonel Starr did not disseminate essential information to subordinate

commanders, specifically about the buffer zone’s denial and the existence

of a 1st AD logistics line just below the 50 east/west corps boundary, one

reason for the buffer’s denial.

Colonel Starr and the 3rd ACR Operations Officer based the original 3rd ACR

operation plan on the assumption that the 1st AD would grant a buffer

zone, allowing the 3rd ACR to cross the 50 east/west corps boundary into

23Commanding a cavalry troop and controlling the efforts of subordinate elements requires four basic

skills: “Make sound tactical decisions based on your most current information”; “Turn your decisions

into plans and orders”; “Communicate your plans and orders to subordinate leaders”; and “Supervise

and control the actions of your subordinate units as they execute your orders.” (AR-FM 17-97, pp. 2-1

and 2-2)

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an area controlled by the 1st AD. Colonel Starr was advised that his request

for a buffer zone had been denied before the original operation plan was

issued at approximately 1856 hours, February 26. Yet, he issued the plan

without modification and without indicating that the initial request for the

buffer zone had been denied. The 3rd ACR plan became the basis for the

3rd Squadron’s operation plan.

Further, before the original operation plan was developed, Colonel Starr

and his operations officer knew that a 1st AD logistics line or Major Supply

Route (MSR) existed just below the 50 east/west corps boundary. This MSR

had been preplotted prior to the ground war’s beginning and was clearly

shown on the 3rd ACR Operations Officer’s maps and graphics. However,

we found no indication that Colonel Starr accounted for the MSR in his

operation plan. He also did not advise his subordinate commanders that

the buffer zone had been denied because the 1st AD had logistics lines in

the area, had bypassed the airfield (on its left flank) earlier in the day, and

had not detected any enemy there.

The 3rd ACR operation plan was initiated at 2100 hours, as the 3rd ACR

began its movement towards Objective Bill. Approximately 1 hour later,

Colonel Starr’s second request for a buffer zone was denied. Colonel Starr

then canceled the indirect artillery fire of all targets in the area south of

the airfield and below the 50 east/west corps boundary but did not

disseminate the reason for the cancellation to all subordinate

commanders. According to Colonel Starr, he also canceled the direct fire

onto the airfield because he knew no known enemy was present. He then

proceeded with the passage of lines. (Colonel Starr stated that one reason

for proceeding with the passage of lines was to give Lt. Colonel Daly the

experience of leading a regimental attack because “John had not been out

in front yet.”)

At approximately 0034 hours, February 27, 1991, while the 3rd Squadron

was beginning to execute the passage of lines with the 1st Squadron,

Colonel Starr told Lt. Colonel Daly to change the 3rd Squadron’s scheme of

maneuver to attack the airfield west to east, instead of north to south. This

was almost 4 hours after the operation plan had been initiated and almost

3 hours after the second request for a buffer zone had been denied.

Our investigation showed that confusion existed throughout the 1st and

3rd Squadrons as a result of the changed plan. In particular, the 1st

Squadron Commander did not meet with Colonel Starr and was unaware

of the reasons for the changes in the original operation plan. The 1st

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Squadron Commander’s radio went dead at approximately 0139 hours. At

that time, Colonel Starr directed him to “cease fire,” cancel the direct fire

on the airfield, and begin passing the 3rd Squadron through the 1st

Squadron. According to Colonel Starr, the 1st Squadron was not to provide

direct fire unless it was engaged. The 1st Squadron Commander believed

his communications problem was the reason Colonel Starr had directed

the passage of lines to begin.

Further, according to witnesses we interviewed who were directly and

indirectly involved in the mission’s planning process, the assault onto

Objective Bill took on the characteristics of an internal mission and/or a

“training mission.” This is best illustrated by the fact that the 3rd ACR

Executive Officer was asleep at the time of the attack. Further, Colonel

Starr acknowledged that this was not a critical mission.

Incorrect, Confusing

Information Disseminated

Colonel Starr issued the original operation plan to the 3rd ACR Squadrons

with intelligence information about a second airfield 28 kilometers further

to the northeast and with reference to both Objective Bill—the Al

Busayyah Northeast Airfield—and Objective Joe—the Qalib Al Luhays

Airfield. Further, the squadrons were advised that battalion-size units were

located at the “airfield.” The 3rd Squadron misconstrued this information

as describing the enemy situation at Objective Bill when the statements

actually referred to the possibility of enemy battalions being at Objective

Joe. Third ACR intelligence personnel and operations officers told us that

they knew no known enemy was present at Objective Bill when the

original operation plan was being developed. They were more concerned

with Objective Joe—the Qalib Al Luhays Airfield—that was located 28

kilometers further to the northeast.

The 3rd ACR Operation Plan also described enemy resistance as “stiffening,

with mines, fighting positions and local counterattacks,” although Colonel

Starr had been advised by the 1st AD before the plan’s issuance that

probably no enemy was present at Objective Bill. The plan’s description

pertained to the overall theater of operations, not activity at or near the

airfield. As a result, that information may have confused the 3rd ACR

subordinate commanders regarding enemy strength at Objective Bill.

Positions Not Determined and

Boundary Not Secured Against

Breaching

Although Colonel Starr told Lt. Colonel Daly on February 27, 1991, that the

50 east/west grid line was the corps boundary and not to fire south of it,

Colonel Starr did not determine his position relative to the objective and

allowed elements of the 3rd Squadron to cross the corps boundary.

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Further, the 3rd ACR TOC radio log notes that—20 minutes after the 3rd

Squadron began passing through the 1st Squadron—Colonel Starr was

concerned about the “right flank” or corps boundary. Yet, he did not place

a unit or vehicle to screen along the 50 east/west corps boundary to ensure

that the boundary was not breached.

In addition, when elements of the 3rd Squadron detected the fenced area

and spotted a tower, they believed they had located the objective.

Subsequently, Colonel Starr parked on a road adjacent to the fence

approximately 800 meters north of the 50 east/west corps boundary. From

his position, he should have determined that the objective airstrip was

located approximately 2.2 kilometers northeast of his location and that the

3rd Squadron units were breaching the corps boundary.

Lt. Colonel Daly’s Failure

to Exercise Proper

Command and Control

Lt. Colonel Daly failed to exercise proper command and control of the 3rd

Squadron during Operation Bill: He did not ensure that all of his

subordinate commanders were fully aware of the changed operation plan,

did not ensure that his subordinates were aware of the corps boundary,

became confused as to the location of the airfield and allowed I Troop to

cross the corps boundary, did not advise the I Troop Commander that he

was assuming control or dismounting soldiers, and violated the stated

Rules of Engagement.

Lt. Colonel Daly based the 3rd Squadron Operation Plan on the original 3rd

ACR Operation Plan, which noted the possibility of the 1st AD being on the

3rd ACR’s right flank. It was issued to the 3rd Squadron troop commanders

approximately 45 minutes before the 3rd ACR began to move at 2100 hours,

February 26, 1991. According to the I and L Troop Commanders, the troop

commanders’ briefing on the 3rd Squadron Operation Plan lasted between

5 and 30 minutes. They were told that the 3rd Squadron would conduct a

passage of lines through the 1st Squadron and attack the airfield, Objective

Bill, from north to south. There is indication that the 50 east/west grid line

was identified as the corps boundary. However, there is no indication that

they were told of the possibility of the 1st AD’s presence on their right

flank.

After the 3rd Squadron began to move, the 3rd Squadron Operations

Officer issued a FRAGO to the troop commanders establishing a new Limit

of Advance on the 50 east/west corps boundary—in effect, directing the

troop commanders to attack against the corps boundary and stop.

Subsequently, while the 3rd Squadron was coordinating the passage of

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lines, Lt. Colonel Daly and his operations officer were told by Colonel

Starr to change the 3rd Squadron attack plan and scheme of maneuver to

attack from west to east and not to fire south of the 50 east/west grid line.

The 3rd Squadron Operations Officer then issued another FRAGO stating

that after the direct fire onto the airfield and the passage of lines, the 3rd

Squadron was to proceed east then southeast. The FRAGO established the

Rules of Engagement to “not fire unless fired upon”; established the 50

east/west grid line as the corps boundary; and stated that the airfield was

“probably cold.”

Based on our investigation, the I Troop and L Troop Commanders did not

receive the FRAGO outlining the changed 3rd Squadron Operation Plan. The

FRAGO contained essential information regarding the operation, yet Lt.

Colonel Daly did not verify that all his troop commanders received this

information. Additionally, the 3rd Squadron Fire Support Officer, who was

part of the 3rd Squadron Command Group, said he was confused about the

50 east/west grid line. He advised us that he was unaware that it was the

corps boundary line but instead thought it was a fire support coordination

point. I Troop was also unaware that the 50 east/west grid line had been

established as the corps boundary and that there were possible 1st AD

troops on its right flank. Further, Lt. Colonel Daly knew that the 50

east/west grid line was the corps boundary. Yet he did not ensure that his

subordinates were aware of the boundary, which may have prevented I

Troop’s boundary breach.

As the 3rd Squadron advanced east towards the airfield, Lt. Colonel Daly

initially reported that the squadron had found the airfield but then

reported that they had crossed a road. (See fig. 2.5.) Minutes later, when I

Troop reported seeing a fence and a tower, Lt. Colonel Daly authorized I

Troop to breach the fence and reconnoiter the area, failing to first

determine I Troop’s location in relation to his own. As a result, he allowed

I Troop to unwittingly cross the corps boundary.

Once I Troop had fired the warning shots, Lt. Colonel Daly crossed the

corps boundary. Without attempting to communicate directly with the I

Troop Commander, Lt. Colonel Daly moved forward of the I Troop

Commander’s vehicle. After observing the dismounted troops (engineers)

through his Thermal Imaging System, he did not contact the I Troop

Commander to obtain his assessment of the situation or to announce to

the I Troop Commander that he was assuming control.

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Further, while authorizing his gunner to engage the target, Lt. Colonel Daly

did not advise the I Troop Commander that he was dismounting two

soldiers from his Bradley to sweep the area. His failure to communicate

this information led to confusion and endangered the lives of the two

dismounts, as they were initially thought to be enemy soldiers.

Lt. Colonel Daly also violated the rules of engagement in effect at that

time. Specifically, he authorized I Troop to fire warning shots below the 50

east/west grid line at an unconfirmed target, resulting in the wounding of a

U.S. soldier. Further, relying on his gunner’s assessment, he allowed his

gunner to fire below the 50 east/west grid line at an unconfirmed target,

resulting in the death of a U.S. soldier.

Executive Officer, Charlie

Company, 54th Engineer

Battalion

The Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate, based upon his review of the

AR 15-6 investigation, found 1st Lieutenant Wessels negligent for failing to

establish defensive perimeters and a plan of defense. Specifically:

(1) “1LT Wessels failed to ensure that his soldiers were wearing their

helmets, web gear, and flack [sic] jackets.” (2) “Knowing that 1AD

personnel had been engaged by Iraqi dismounts in the 1AD rear area, he

should have done more than only placing men on guard.” (3) “While there

is some discrepancy in the number of times that I Troop fired on his

position, it seems almost without controversy that this action lasted from

approximately 30 to 45 minutes with sporadic activity.” (4) “1LT Wessels

should have taken more positive steps to either identify himself or indicate

that he was surrendering to preclude further harm to his men.”

Our investigation indicates that the AR 15-6 contained inaccurate

information and did not fully address these points. As a result, the basis

for the findings of the Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate was limited.

Load Bearing Equipment and

Kevlar Helmets

The Investigating Officer reported that “[t]he engineer personnel did not

wear their Kevlar helmets or Load Bearing Equipment (LBE) which would

have been distinctive through the thermal sites [sic] of the 3d ACR

vehicles.” This conclusion appears to be based on statements by the I

Troop Commander that had the engineers been wearing Kevlar helmets

and Load Bearing Equipment, “we could have probably identified them

earlier.” However, as previously noted, the engineers disputed this

evidence, as several were wearing Load Bearing Equipment and/or Kevlar

helmets.

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Guard Rotation We do not dispute this finding.

Incident’s Length of Time The Investigating Officer reported that “[t]he airfield proper was taken at

approximately 0230 hours” and that “[a]t about 0300 (local) on 27

February 1991 the I Troop Commander, CPT Friesen, fired warning shots

to the left (southeast) of the target.” Thus, according to the Forces

Command Staff Judge Advocate, he determined the entire incident

occurred in about 30 to 45 minutes. Yet, several of the soldiers we

interviewed indicated that the entire incident took no more than 5 to 10

minutes, and the tape of the incident (see app. I) lasts approximately 7

minutes and 15 seconds. Our investigation indicates that the warning shots

were fired at approximately 0300 hours with the fatal shots being fired at

approximately 0307 hours. (See fig. 2.1.)

Identification Efforts According to the Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate, based on

information contained within the AR 15-6 investigation, he determined that

had 1st Lieutenant Wessels established a defensive perimeter and

developed a plan of defense, the approaching 3rd ACR vehicles would have

been able to identify the Engineers’ vehicles and would not have been able

“to sneak up” on them. In addition, 1st Lieutenant Wessels should have

known the radio frequency for the 3rd ACR’s flank unit; he should have

known that the white star cluster was the appropriate antifratricide signal;

and he should have used his flashlight earlier to identify his unit.

Our investigation indicates that the targets were identified by some 3rd

ACR personnel as a HMMWV and an ammunition carrier (i.e., “a U.S. type

vehicle”) before the fatal shots were fired, although they were not

confirmed as friendly vehicles. Further, the 3rd ACR did not “sneak up” on

the engineers, as the engineers heard the vehicles approaching and, using

night vision goggles, immediately identified them as friendly vehicles.

While 1st Lieutenant Wessels perhaps should have known the radio

frequency for the 3rd ACR’s flank unit, that issue was not addressed in the

AR 15-6 investigation. In addition, 1st Lieutenant Wessels maintains that he

was never told that the white star cluster was an antifratricide signal.24

Finally, our investigation indicates that when the incident began, 1st

Lieutenant Wessels attempted to make radio contact with the 1st AD to

request a cease-fire. He next fired the green star cluster in an attempt to

illuminate the area, not knowing that the green star cluster was an

antifratricide signal. He then began walking toward the 3rd ACR vehicles

with his arms raised while holding a red lens flashlight. However, the

24Unknown at the time to the lieutenant, a green star cluster was a daytime, ground-to-ground

antifratricide recognition signal. The nighttime, ground-to-ground antifratricide recognition signal was

a white star cluster.

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entire incident—from warning shots to fatal shots—occurred in

approximately 7 minutes and 15 seconds, not the 30 to 45 minutes as noted

in the AR 15-6 investigation.

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“Initial Investigations”

Second Investigating

Officer’s Conclusions and

Recommendations

The second Investigating Officer, who conducted the supplemental AR 15-6

investigation, concluded that “[t]he investigation and reopened

investigation conducted by [the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate, a captain] were

done in a professional manner. His appointment as investigating officer

during combat operations was justified due to the unavailability of more

senior officers. However, an investigating officer senior to LTC Daly [the

3rd Squadron Commander] should have been appointed upon conclusion

of the hostilities. The [reopened] investigation . . . answered many

previously unanswered questions and disclosed additional facts which

supported [the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate’s] original recommendations and

findings.”

At the conclusion of the supplemental AR 15-6 investigation, the second

Investigating Officer recommended the following to the Army:

• “That all personnel involved be absolved of any criminal or administrative

responsibility.

• “That the Army doctrine that an objective be entirely within the attacking

unit’s zone be reemphasized.

• “That anti-fratricide measures and devices be emphasized and

disseminated to all units/detachments on the battlefield. However, I would

urge that future anti-fratricide measures be passive and not restrict the

proper applications of firepower.

• “That the importance of information flow to subordinate units on

objectives, boundaries, intelligence information, and location of friendly

elements be emphasized.”

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GAO’s Conclusions The original Investigating Officer, the 3rd ACR Judge Advocate, declined

our request for an interview. However, our analysis of the original

investigation indicated that the Investigating Officer did not conduct a

complete and thorough investigation. Taking into consideration the 3rd

ACR’s continued combat situation and other extraneous factors, he did not

interview several key personnel who were directly or indirectly involved,

including Colonel Starr and the I Troop Commander’s gunner; did not

obtain documents at the troop, squadron, and regimental levels; did not

resolve the warning shot/return fire issue, by not questioning the I Troop

personnel or the remaining engineers concerning the issues; and did not

note the locations of any of the firing units.

In addition, the findings and recommendations of the second Investigating

Officer are not supported by available evidence uncovered during his and

the original Investigating Officer’s investigations. Further, the Forces

Command Staff Judge Advocate stated his supposition that the second

Investigating Officer had a predetermined conclusion concerning the case.

As part of the XVIII Airborne Corps, according to the Staff Judge

Advocate, the Investigating Officer would not have determined anything

that was unfavorable about the Corps, which had had a successful

operation in the Persian Gulf War. As a result, the Investigating Officer’s

“objectivity was skewed.” That predetermined conclusion and skewed

objectivity, in our belief, resulted in findings and recommendations that

favored those in command whose actions and decisions most contributed

to the fratricide’s occurrence.

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“Cpt Friesen

Allegations”

Investigating Officer’s

Findings

The second Investigating Officer also addressed allegations of a cover-up

and retribution raised by the I Troop Commander, Captain Friesen.

Specifically, Captain Friesen alleged that members of the 3rd ACR would

not provide statements in support of his officer evaluation report appeal

because they feared retribution from the Squadron Commander. The

second Investigating Officer concluded that “[t]here is no evidence of any

attempt by anyone to hinder the investigation or wrongly influence the

conclusions and recommendations of the investigating officer. There is no

evidence that any retribution was taken against any individual that

testified in the investigation.”

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GAO’s Findings We found no evidence that documents pertaining to the incident were

intentionally destroyed or that witnesses were intimidated or retaliated

against. However, we question the initial decision to appoint an officer of

lesser rank to investigate senior grade officers. Further, the AR 15-6

investigations were incomplete and inaccurate; the investigators’ findings

and conclusions were not supported by available evidence; and the

investigators’ recommendations favored the command.

AR 15-6 authorizes commanders to investigate matters within their

command, particularly those that are conducted to find facts that would

assist them in the efficient and safe operation of their command. However,

a 1994 study25 on the investigative capability of the Department of Defense

indicated that command-directed investigations “are, as a class, the type of

investigation most subject to abuse” and “investigators who conduct

commander-directed investigations are more subject to command

influence than MCIO [military criminal investigative organization]

agents. . . . This ‘influence’ can occur even when there is no overt action by

a commander. . . .”

In addition, the Department of Defense study found that AR 15-6

investigators often lack investigative training and experience and “the

investigations often are of such poor quality that a matter must be

reinvestigated by a judge advocate before any disciplinary action can be

taken against the subject.”

Regarding this fratricide incident, a judge advocate from the 3rd ACR

Command was involved in the initial investigation. His investigation was

not thorough and some of the evidence—the command logs that

documented the events as they occurred—was not maintained.26 The

Army’s internal review process outside of the command raised concerns

and caused a reinvestigation of the incident at the corps level. However, as

the reviewing Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate found, the second

investigator’s findings favored the 3rd ACR Command. Indeed, using the

25At the recommendation of the Congress, on Nov. 27, 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced the

formation of an Advisory Board on the Investigative Capability of the Department of Defense. The

Board held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed testimony and documents. Their findings

and recommendations were reported to the Congress in the “Report of the Advisory Board on the

Investigative Capability of the Department of Defense.”

26Although we agreed with the overall findings of the Army’s AR 15-6 investigation in our investigation

of the Apache helicopter fratricide incident (Operation Desert Storm: Apache Helicopter Fratricide

Incident (GAO/OSI-93-4, June 30, 1993)), we noted that the investigators failed to secure the most

critical pieces of evidence in that case—the three Apache gun tapes that had recorded the entire

incident. Months after the chain of custody had been broken in Saudi Arabia, a U.S. news agency

returned the tapes to the Army. The Army never discovered who had released the tapes to the news

agency.

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same investigative information that the two Army investigators used, the

Forces Command Staff Judge Advocate recommended disciplinary action

be taken against the commanders. However, at the discretion of the

Commander in Chief, Forces Command, two of the three reprimands were

not made part of the officers’ official permanent records, and the third

reprimand was withdrawn.

Questionable Awards

Related to Fratricide

Incident

During our investigation, we learned that a number of 3rd ACR personnel

had received awards for events directly related to the February 27, 1991,

fratricide incident. These awards included three Bronze Star Medals with

“V” Device for valor, the same medal awarded posthumously to Corporal

Fielder. These three awards were issued on the basis of misleading

statements and misrepresentations by Colonel Starr, the 3rd ACR

Commander; Lt. Colonel Daly, the 3rd Squadron Commander; and other

3rd ACR personnel.

Award Language Following the fratricide incident, the 3rd ACR surgeon, who assisted the

wounded Sergeant Napier, was awarded a Bronze Star with “V” Device.

According to the support for his award, the surgeon was recognized for

“bravery and valor” when he was asked to “perform an emergency

medivac mission” while the regiment was “still in contact” and “clearing

the sector of enemy.” The mission was conducted during the “early

morning hours” when there was “little or no available ambient light due to

marginal weather conditions.” He and his crew were able to “successfully

locate and extract the wounded.” The surgeon’s actions were in the “best

tradition of the service.” When the award was presented, the surgeon was

cited for “heroism involving conflict with an armed enemy.”

The second individual was an 82nd Airborne Liaison Officer, a captain,

attached to Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley during the fratricide incident. He,

along with another soldier, dismounted from the Bradley during the

incident. According to the support for his award, the Liaison Officer was

cited for “exceptionally meritorious heroism in the face of hostile fire”

during a regimental attack to seize “Qalib Al Luhays Airfield.” He

distinguished himself by “volunteering to dismount and take ‘enemy’

personnel prisoner.” Rushing forward of friendly vehicles, he was

responsible for “defusing the situation, restoring order and saving the lives

of at least four American soldiers.” When the award was presented, the

Liaison Officer was cited for “heroism involving conflict with an armed

enemy.”

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The third individual, a sergeant attached to Lt. Colonel Daly’s Bradley

during the fratricide incident, dismounted from the Commander’s Bradley

during the incident. According to the support for his award, the sergeant

was cited for “exceptionally meritorious heroism in the face of hostile fire”

during a regimental attack to seize “Qalib Al Luhays Airfield.” The sergeant

distinguished himself “by volunteering to dismount and assist in taking

enemy prisoners.” Rushing forward of friendly vehicles, he was

responsible for “defusing the situation, restoring order and saving the lives

of at least four American soldiers.”

GAO’s Findings The awards were based on misleading statements and misrepresentations,

as indicated by the language from the award support, from Colonel Starr

and Lt. Colonel Daly. We also found additional misleading statements and

misrepresentations given by other individuals in support of the awards.

These statements seriously masked the actual events of the fratricide.

Furthermore, the support for two of the awards placed the fratricide

incident at the wrong Iraqi airfield—the Qalib Al Luhays Airfield, which

was approximately 28 kilometers to the northeast of the Al Busayyah

Airfield that the 3rd ACR and 3rd Squadron were attacking when the

fratricide occurred. (See fig. 1.8.)

As a result of our briefing to Department of the Army officials in May 1994,

the Army Office of Inspector General conducted a preliminary analysis of

the valorous awards that had been presented to members of the 3rd ACR.

On August 4, 1994, the Deputy Inspector General requested the Assistant

Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to take “action

. . . to revoke these awards” and “to identify and revoke similar valorous

awards improperly authorized for the incident at Qalib Al Luhays airfield

or other known fratricide incidents.” However, as of March 29, 1995, the

matter was still pending.

Recommendations to

the Secretary of the

Army

In light of the additional evidence determined in our investigation, we

recommend that the Secretary of the Army reexamine, for their

appropriateness, the disciplinary actions resulting from the February 27,

1991, fratricide incident and the disposition of those actions. We also

recommend that the Secretary of the Army follow up on the request put

forth by the Army Office of Inspector General concerning revocation of

improperly supported valorous awards for participation in fratricide

incidents.

Page 93 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

The following transcript is of radio communications that were recorded

during the February 27, 1991, fratricide incident. A crewman aboard an

M1A1 Abrams Tank—part of I Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR—recorded the

event using a hand-held audio microcassette tape recorder. His stated

intent was to capture historical events and battles of Operation Desert

Storm.

The tape includes (1) the secure-voice FM radio conversations of I Troop,

3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR and White Platoon, I Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR

and (2) the intercom conversations of the M1A1 Abrams Tank crew. The

Information Resources Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) thoroughly analyzed the tape and determined that the tape was

original and, except where noted, was continuous and unaltered. Further,

as part of our extensive efforts to produce an accurate transcript, the M1A1

Abrams Tank Commander assisted us in editing the tape.

Identification of

Speakers/Troop

References

Call Sign Unit and Vehicle Bumper Number

Black Troop Headquarters

 Black 6 I Troop Commander, Captain Bodo Friesen

 Black 5 I Troop Executive Officer

 Black 3 I Troop TOC

White 2nd Platoon (Tank)

 White 1 White 2-1 Platoon Leader

 White 2 White Platoon 2-2

 White 3 White Platoon 2-3

 White 4 White Platoon 2-4

 White 4 (IC) White Platoon 2-4 (Intercom)

Blue 3rd Platoon (Scout)

 Blue 1 Blue 3-1 Platoon Leader

 Blue 5 Blue Platoon 3-5

 Blue 6 Blue Platoon 3-6

Red 1st Platoon (Scout)

 Red 1 Red 1-1 Platoon Leader

 Red 3 Red Platoon 1-3

Green 4th Platoon (Tank)

 Green 1 Green 4-1 Platoon Leader

Page 94 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Thunder 3 3rd Squadron Operations Officer

Thunder 6 3rd Squadron Commander, Lt. Colonel John H.

Daly, Jr.

Bravo Section Blue Platoon

Abbreviations *** inaudible radio transmission

aux auxiliary speaker used to monitor various radio

frequencies

CO commanding officer

co-ax 7.62 mm co-axial machine gun

dismounts personnel on the ground

EPW enemy prisoner of war

H-E high explosive ammunition for 25 mm automatic

gun

heat round type of ammunition

higher referring to 3rd Squadron Commander

IC intercom

net radio frequency (network)

PsyOps Psychological Operations team

red lens flashlight with a red lens

sit rep situation report

tracer type of ammunition

Page 95 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Transcript

White 1: We have three little white spots at the top of the tower, break. *** They’re

not big enough to be humans, but there is something there, over.

[According to White 1 and others, the “white spots” were later determined

to be birds in a tower.]

Black 6: *** go ahead; get a pull red lens out; see who can spot it. [The I Troop

Commander, Captain Friesen, used a red lens flashlight to direct elements

of the Blue Platoon to his location.]

White 4 (IC): There’s what he’s talking about. Go down a little bit. See it? There’s two up

on the top.

Voice: Roger.

Black 6: You got the lens, Bravo?

White 4 (IC): They say they’ve seen the dismounts.

White 4 (IC): Black 6-6 said he’s closing in on them. I couldn’t find them. I scanned. He’s

over to my left somewhere.

White 1: White 4, White 4, White 4. Break.

White 1: Did you copy my last? Over.

White 4: This is White 4. Negative. Over.

White 1: Roger. We have three hot spots in the tower. Break. There’s one in the top,

two at the bottom. Break. They’re hot, they’re not big enough to be human,

but there’s something in there that’s hot. Over.

White 4: White 4. Roger. Break.

White 4: Black 6, White 4.

White 4 (IC): Watch out for the bottom.

Black 6: Blue, Black 6. You got that Bravo Section coming?

Page 96 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

White 4 (IC): I’m backing down off this hill.

White 4 (IC): There might be somebody behind you, man. Hold on.

White 4 (IC): I Troop. We check and see.

White 4 (IC): Okay, go straight back a little bit.

White 4 (IC): That ought to scared them all away. [Engine noise in the background.]

White 4 (IC): [Expletive deleted.]

White 4 (IC): Okay, hold up right there.

White 4 (IC): *** everybody stand ***

White 4: Black 6, White 4.

Blue 5: *** Blue 5.

Black 6: Bravo Section, Blue, this is Black 6. You coming this way?

Blue 5: I don’t know where you are. Over.

Red 1: Black 6, this is Red 1. My Bravo Section’s got a visual on you. Over.

Black 6: Roger. We’ve got two dismounts about 600 meters out in front of us, next

to some buildings. We’ll wait for you to come up, and we’ll see what’s

what.

Red 1: This is Red 1, wilco. Let me pass it down.

Blue 1: Blue-5, are you in touch with Black-6?

White 4 (IC): Yeah, Blue-5 done got...

Blue 1: *** [expletive deleted] it. Get your [expletive deleted] over to Black 6. ***

Black 6: Okay, calm down. Just get a section up here. These guys aren’t going

anywhere.

White 4 (IC): Who the [expletive deleted] is he talking to?

Page 97 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

White 4 (IC): Sergeant [Blue 5].

Red 3: Black 6, this is Red 3. You still got that red lens up?

White 4 (IC): That was Sergeant [Blue 5] ***

Voice: *** say again?

Red 3: Black 6, this is Red 3. Do you still got that red lens up?

Black 6: Negative. I’ve got my head inside right now. [He was inside his vehicle.]

White 4 (IC): Don’t blame you. So do I.

White 4 (IC): You know Sergeant [Blue 5] is going to have something to say to him about

this fussing.

White 4 (IC): Yeah, he will.

White 4 (IC): That wasn’t *** sound like it was [expletive deleted] [Blue 5].

White 4 (IC): *** I don’t know.

White 4 (IC): That’s who it sounds like.

White 4 (IC): Whoever it was is stressing hard, man.

White 4 (IC): That *** was Blue 1.

White 4 (IC): Stressing hard as a [expletive deleted].

White 4 (IC): Look for the buildings, man.

Black 6: Three, this is 6. You been monitoring all this?

Black 3: This is 3, roger. Higher [3rd Squadron Commander] is aware. He just keeps

asking for situation report.

Black 6: Roger. I cut the aux [3rd Squadron Command radio frequency] off, cause

it’s just too much ... confusion.

Page 98 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Black 6: These guys aren’t going anywhere. I’m not sure if they see us or not, but

they’re standing still.

Black 3: Three, roger that.

Black 3: There’s just two of them, correct?

Black 6: As far as we know, but there’s some dwellings and —I can’t make it out,

possibly vehicles, but I’m not certain. I’m going to wait a little bit more

before I go up.

Black 3: This is 3. Roger.

Black 3: How far past the tower are you?

White 4 (IC): There is some Bradleys there.

Blue 6: Black 6, this is Blue 6. I’m back to the right of you. Over.

TAPE STOPS/STARTS

[WARNING SHOTS FIRED]

Voice: *** See where ***

White 4 (IC): Yeah. They’re hauling ass.

Black 3: Six, this is 3. Sit rep.

Black 6: They got one coming over to the wire towards us, looks like.

Black 3: Roger.

Black 3: Does it look like they’re going to surrender, over?

Black 6: They’re firing. We’re engaging.

White 4 (IC): That’s close.

White 4 (IC): [Expletive deleted], need to pull some tanks up.

Black 6: *** hold your fire.

Page 99 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

White 4 (IC): That [expletive deleted] lightening up out there.

White 4 (IC): That’s tracer rounds, man.

Black 3: Cease fire, 6.

Black 6: Cease fire real quick, Blue. Let’s see if there’s anything else down there.

Blue 5: Roger.

White 4 (IC): That’s twice it was H-E from the Bradleys.

White 4 (IC): Yeah, that was Bradleys firing.

White 4 (IC): That was looking about 6-6, firing some co-ax too.

White 4 (IC): Man.

Black 6: Blue, pump a couple of rounds into that far building. There’s still some

guys in there.

Voice: Black 6, you’re coming in really good.

White 4 (IC): See ’em?

Black 3: Cease fire, 6. Cease fire. [Thunder] 6 wants you to stop.

Black 6: We’re cease fire.

Black 3: Black 6, you monitoring.

Black 6: This is 6, roger. I gave a cease fire. We’re holding.

White 4 (IC): *** whoever in that building up, comin’ out of that [expletive deleted].

White 4 (IC): Yeah, arms raised.

White 4 (IC): *** put a heat round in that [expletive deleted], man.

Black 6: Blue elements, you all be real careful. Scan left and right. Make sure

there’s nothing else out there.

Page 100 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Black 3: Roger. He [Lt. Colonel Daly] wants you to keep a good close eye on it.

They’re bringing the PsyOps guys up here, so they can talk to them in their

own language and try to get them out. Over.

Black 6: We’ve got one already down. I’m not sure if he’s wounded or not. We’re

observing. Continue to holding fire, night hawk elements.

White 1: *** this is White 1, sit rep.

White 1: Are they at a building. Break. With occupants in it. They fired shots to left

and right. Break.

Voices: *** [Simultaneous transmissions.]

Voice: *** and we’ve got one coming over the wire towards us.

Voices: *** [Simultaneous transmissions.]

Blue 5: Black 6, this is Blue 5. I have one underneath the truck and one behind the

building. Over.

Voices: *** [Simultaneous transmissions.]

Blue 5: This is Blue 5 ***

Blue 5: This is Blue 5. I have dismounts underneath the truck. Over.

White 4 (IC): [Expletive deleted.]

Black 6: Roger. Continue to observe. Fire only when fired upon.

Blue 5: *** standing behind the building ***

Black 6: Roger. One under the truck, one standing behind the building.

Black 3: Six, this is 3. They did engage you, correct?

Black 6: Roger.

Green 1: Black 6, this is Green 1. We’re right behind you. Do you want us to move

up? Over.

Page 101 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Black 6: Roger. Cover my left. We’ve got one guy standing up. I’m not sure if he’s

going to surrender or what. He’s in clear sight, though. He must be trying.

Black 6: Green, just stand back. I’ve got Brads on the left already. You’re good

where you are.

Voice: ***

Black 3: Six, this is 3. You got them all? They’re contained now, correct?

Black 6: Say again, 3?

Black 3: This is 3. Roger. You’ve got them contained right now, correct?

Black 6: Affirmative. They’re not going anywhere.

Black 3: Okay. Roger. They’re going to bring the PsyOps guys up

White 1: White-1 ***

Voices: *** [Simultaneous transmissions.]

Black 6: Roger.

Voices: *** [Simultaneous transmissions.]

White 2: Did the Brads dismount some people, over?

Voices: *** [Simultaneous transmissions.]

White 1: White 1, roger. Break.

White 1: The enemy is dismounted to your right front.

Voice: Roger.

White 1: ... approximately a thousand meters.

White 2: That’s a roger. We’re watching. I just wanted to make sure we had some

guys out there.

White 1: White 1, roger. Break. ***

Page 102 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Voice: ***

White 1: I’m watching the six *** building.

White 2: This is White 2, roger.

White 4 (IC): That’s a Bradley there.

White 4 (IC): Bradley?

White 4 (IC): Yeah.

White 4 (IC): Okay, [Blue 5].

Blue 1: Black 6, Bravo-Blue is reporting dismounts down on the ground.

White 4 (IC): Blue 1 don’t know his people on the ground.

Black 6: Blue 1, say again?

Blue 1: Roger. There’s still dismounts on the ground.

Black 6: Roger. We’ve got two in sight right here. They’re not going anywhere,

though.

Blue 1: Okay. There’s at least three.

Black 6: One’s making a run towards us here. Let’s see what he does.

Black 6: Bravo Section, can you see what that guy’s doing? He’s running toward

you.

Black 6: He’s stopped at the wire now.

White 1: *** White 3, can you see any of this?

White 3: White 3. Say again? Over.

White 1: Roger. Do you see dismounts on the ground in front of you, over? Break.

Enemy type?

White 3: White 3. Negative.

Page 103 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Black 3: Six, is there a vehicle out there with dismounts, over?

Black 6: Bravo Section can see a truck. I can see some dismounts. Bravo, what kind

of vehicle they got?

Blue 5: *** It’s hard to say. It might be an old pickup truck. Break. ***

Voice: ***

Black 6: He’s not running any more. I think he stopped behind a berm somewhere

there.

Black 3: Thunder 3 is somewhere up there by you.

Black 3: They saw two of them running to that truck.

TAPE STOPS/STARTS

Black 6: Roger. I don’t think these guys know that we got them in our sights.

FATAL SHOTS FIRED

Black 6: Cease fire. Everybody hold your fire. Hold your fire.

Blue 1: Black 6, that’s higher elements doing that.

Black 6: Understand.

Black 6: Three, get on higher net. There’s somebody else here engaging these guys.

Black 3: That was Thunder 6.

Black 3: He wants you to come up on the net, 6.

Black 6: Roger. I’m switching.

White 4 (IC): Oh, Thunder 6 done got in the [expletive deleted].

White 4 (IC): They did not fire up on him.

White 4 (IC): Who is that, that’s the CO? That’s the Colonel, ain’t it.

Page 104 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

White 4 (IC): Yeah.

White 4 (IC): Just wanted get in some shots.

Black 3: Black 6, you coming up on the net?

White 4 (IC): They’re engaging him, [expletive deleted] him.

White 4 (IC): I heard something that sounded like a main gun, [expletive deleted].

Voice: ***

White 4 (IC): Where’s my cigarette box at? ***

TAPE STOPS/STARTS

Voice: *** get away.

Voice: What’s your direction? Over.

Black 6: I don’t have an orientation. They’re on the far side of the building. Over.

Black 6: Bravo Section, are you in a position where you can see anything?

Black 6: Blue, go ahead and sweep around the building and go after those guys.

Black 3: Six, did you monitor?

Black 6: Roger, Blue’s going to sweep.

Voice: ***

Black 6: That’s the PsyOps guys.

Voice: ***

Black 6: Blue, did you monitor instructions specific?

Blue 1: Roger.

Black 6: Roger.

Page 105 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Voice: ***

White 4 (IC): [Expletive deleted], Blue in this [expletive deleted] again, boy.

Voice: *** that truck ***

Black 5: White, this is Black 5.

White 4: White 4.

White 4: Black 5, White 4.

Black 5: Roger. Still no hot spots over by the tower?

White 4: This is White 4, negative. There are like two little-bitty hot spots. If they’re

not big enough to be people, I don’t know what they are.

Black 5: This 5, roger. Continue to monitor.

White 4: Four, roger.

TAPE STOPS/STARTS

Green 1: I do not know who’s on the ground. But I see apparently two individuals

walking around, and it looks like they have gathered three or four of the

people, which I assume are the prisoners, and they’re up on their knees

now.

Black 3: Roger. They’ve got the prisoners on their knees *** they got the prisoners.

Over.

Black 3: Six. He said it says looks like two friendlies has rounded up three or four

of the EPWs. Break. They got them away from the burning shack and on

the ground and on their knees. Over.

White 4 (IC): And now he’s a [expletive deleted] hero, great. Send him home.

Black 6: Green, do you still see any dismounts or vehicles that are not amongst our

Bradleys, over?

Green 1: Ah, negative.

Page 106 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix I 

Transcription of Audio Tape Recorded

During February 27, 1991, Fratricide

Incident

Black 6: Roger.

[End of recording.]

Page 107 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix II 

Scope and Methodology

We conducted our investigation between March 1993 and November 1994.

In doing so, we conducted over 108 interviews of current and former U.S.

Army and Air Force personnel who were directly or indirectly involved in

the February 27, 1991, fratricide incident. These included the four

surviving engineers, 3rd ACR Commander, 3rd Squadron Commander, I

Troop Commander, the second Investigating Officer, and most crew

members of the armored vehicles that were party to or witnessed the

incident. The first Investigating Officer declined our request for an

interview. We also interviewed archivists at the division and regimental

levels and at the Center for Military History.

We reviewed personal notebooks, a photograph, aerial imagery, and

diaries of many of the above personnel. In addition, we reviewed records

and documents at the corps, division, regimental, and squadron levels; the

entire AR 15-6 investigation, its reviews, and two related U.S. Army

Inspector General investigations; and regulations governing Army

investigations, as well as Army policies regarding command and control.

We also examined historical records and documents at the Center for

Military History.

During our investigation, we found a previously unknown audio radio

transmission recorded during the incident. (See app. I.) With the FBI’s

assistance, we thoroughly analyzed the transmission. The M1A1 Abrams

Tank Commander also assisted us in transcribing the tape. Further, we

sought assistance from the Defense Mapping Agency in developing special

mapping products.

We formally briefed Senator Thompson’s office on January 6, 1995, and

Senator Sasser’s office on April 21, 1994, concerning our investigation. At

the April 1994 briefing, we were requested to brief Douglas Lance Fielder’s

immediate family. We did so on April 22, 1994, in Nashville, Tennessee. We

also provided briefings to U.S. Army representatives on May 10, 1994, and

June 3, 1994, on the content of our investigation. We did not obtain official

agency comments on a draft of the report.

Page 108 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Office of Special

Investigations,

Washington D.C.

Barbara J. Cart, Assistant Director for Defense and National

Security Crimes

Randy Stone, Senior Special Agent

M. Jane Hunt, Senior Communications Analyst

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

Richard J. Hynes, Senior Evaluator

Office of the General

Counsel, Washington,

D.C.

Barbara Coles, Senior Attorney

(600279) Page 109 GAO/OSI-95-10 Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident
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