NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

STEPHANIE PEDROZA, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

CORY PEDROZA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0655 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2013-009846

The Honorable Monica Edelstein, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Thomas A. Morton, Phoenix

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

FILED 07-11-2024
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

Decision of the Court

2

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 In this post-decree family court case, Stephanie Pedroza 

(Mother) appeals the superior court’s order granting Cory Pedroza (Father) 

final legal decision-making authority, modifying equal parenting time, and 

modifying child support for their son, D.P. Mother also appeals the denial 

of her motion to alter or amend judgment. Because Mother has shown no 

error, the superior court’s orders are affirmed, and her request for 

attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal is denied. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father have one child in common, D.P., born in 

May 2011. In December 2013, Mother filed for dissolution of marriage. After 

hearing from both parties, the court issued a consent decree of dissolution

in October 2014. Among other provisions, the decree required Father to pay 

$355 in monthly child support, established joint legal decision-making and 

awarded Father less than equal parenting time. At Mother’s request, child 

support was modified once in 2018. 

¶3 Mother petitioned to modify child support again in 

September 2022, amending her petition in October 2022. Father opposed

that petition and counter-petitioned to modify legal decision-making

authority, parenting time and child support. The court then set an 

evidentiary hearing for June 2023. As discussed below, Mother failed to 

make required pretrial disclosures and also failed to cure that lack of 

compliance during the hearing, where both parties testified. 

¶4 Although asking that child support be modified, Mother 

asked that the parenting time and joint legal decision-making orders in the

decree remain in place. She also testified, however, that the parties had not 

been following the parenting time orders in the decree given Father’s work 

schedule and the desire for D.P. to spend time with his brothers at Father’s 

house. In support of his counter-petition, Father testified that Mother often 

made unilateral decisions about D.P., such as enrolling him in a new school 

and extracurricular activities, without consulting Father. Father also 

testified that he has been asking Mother for equal parenting time for several 

years, but she has consistently refused. 

¶5 The court’s subsequent ruling set forth several findings, 

including a change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare. The court 

noted that “the best interest of the children is the primary consideration in 

awarding legal decision-making authority and parenting time” before 
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

Decision of the Court

3

analyzing the factors enumerated in Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 25–

403 (2024)1 in making its best interests findings. The court made findings 

that “[b]oth Parties appear to have a close, loving, and bonded relationship”

with D.P., but that D.P. was struggling in school and had poor attendance. 

The court also raised concerns that “Mother has not been forthcoming or 

truthful with respect to her income and household earnings.” 

¶6 The order affirmed joint legal decision-making but found that 

awarding Father final legal decision-making authority was in D.P.’s best 

interests because Mother “is not open to reasonable discussions on 

adjustments/modifications as Child grows and the day-to-day 

circumstances change.” The court also found that “establishing a steadier 

routine across two households is better for [D.P.’s] long-term growth and 

well-being.” Accordingly, the court changed parenting time to equal 

parenting time on a 5/2/2/5 schedule, with a corresponding modification 

in child support. The court also awarded Father attorneys’ fees and costs

under A.R.S. § 25-324. 

¶7 Mother filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which 

the court denied. This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 

12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Father did not file an answering brief, which could be 

considered a confession of error. Gibbons v. Indus. Comm’n, 197 Ariz. 108, 

111 ¶ 8 (App. 1999). This court may, however, exercise its discretion to 

waive this general rule and address the merits of an appeal absent an 

answering brief. Id. Because this case implicates the best interests of a child, 

this court addresses Mother’s arguments on the merits.

I. Mother Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Addressing 

Her Exhibits. 

¶9 Mother argues the court erred in precluding her from 

submitting any “exhibits at all for the sole reason that she submitted her 

exhibits late.” The superior court has “broad discretion in ruling on 

discovery and disclosure matters,” and this court will review those rulings 

for an abuse of discretion. Link v. Pima County, 193 Ariz. 336, 338 ¶ 3 (App.

1998). Pointing to Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 (2003), Mother asserts that the 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

Decision of the Court

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superior court “must not exclude evidence of the child’s best interest, which 

leads to a less-informed decision, because a parent failed to follow a court 

order.”

¶10 Contrary to Mother’s argument, the superior court did not 

preclude her from submitting exhibits given her tardy disclosure. At trial, 

Mother stated that her exhibits were not marked and asked the court how 

she should proceed. The court noted that unmarked exhibits were not 

timely received under the court’s orders. The court then offered her 

alternatives. The court stated it would take judicial notice of a document 

previously filed. The court also stated it would allow Mother to provide 

foundation for specific exhibits at trial and rule on any objections then. 

¶11 Mother sought to offer just one exhibit at trial. After Mother 

testified that she sought to enroll D.P. in a school because of its ranking, she 

moved to mark and admit a screenshot of school rankings into evidence. 

The court denied the motion and did not admit the screenshot, explaining 

that Mother’s exhibit was “late, it wasn’t filed timely and the Court has not 

heard why it’s critically important, something statutorily the Court needs 

to consider.” Mother responded by moving on. She did not seek to admit 

any other exhibits into evidence, opting instead to use Father’s timelymarked exhibits. The court also took judicial notice of Mother’s Affidavit of 

Financial Information and the consent decree. For these reasons, Mother is 

incorrect in arguing the superior court “allowed [her] to submit no exhibits 

at all.”

¶12 On appeal, Mother argues her proposed exhibits included 

communications between the parties and information on D.P.’s current 

school and Father’s proposed schools. But those proposed exhibits are not 

part of the record. Nor does Mother show how her proposed exhibits differ 

from Father’s exhibits, admitted without objection, that she used at trial. 

Mother has not shown “what additional evidence [s]he would have 

presented, or how it would have affected the trial court’s decision.” In re 

Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 303 ¶ 13 (App. 2000).

¶13 Finally, Mother argues her due process rights were violated 

because she was denied “the opportunity to present her exhibits.” “Due 

process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 

and in a meaningful manner.” Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 (1979).

Here, Mother had an opportunity to timely disclose and have marked 

exhibits, which she failed to do. Mother then had an opportunity to offer 

exhibits at trial, which she attempted once. Mother used exhibits Father had 

admitted without objection, and the court took judicial notice of some prior 
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

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filings. Mother also testified and, as discussed above, had an opportunity 

to present her exhibits, even if she did not take advantage of that 

opportunity. On this record, Mother has shown no denial of due process. 

II. Mother Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Modifying 

Parenting Time. 

¶14 This court reviews an order modifying parenting time for an 

abuse of discretion. Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112, 116 ¶ 10 (App. 2015). In 

doing so, “[t]his court views the evidence in the light most favorable to 

upholding the superior court’s orders and will affirm findings if reasonable 

evidence supports them,” Smith v. Smith, 253 Ariz. 43, 45 ¶ 9 (App. 2022), 

given the superior court is “in the best position” to observe the parties, Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004).

¶15 Mother argues the superior court improperly “applied a 

presumption that a parenting plan will be equal time,” even though 

Arizona law imposes no such presumption. The court’s ruling does state 

that “[t]he law presumes an equal plan in the absence of concerns for a 

Child’s physical and emotional well-being.” Courts have historically 

indicated there is a presumption of equal time as a “short-hand explanation 

of a more comprehensive constitutional and statutory analysis,” rather than 

an actual legal presumption. Smith, 253 Ariz. at 46 ¶ 14. Here, like in “other 

cases using the presumption language, the parents did not bear a specific 

burden of proof to overcome presumed equal parenting time.” Id. at 46 ¶ 

17. The mere use of this shorthand does not establish an abuse of discretion, 

especially in light of the other evidence supporting the superior court’s best 

interests findings. See id.

¶16 Moreover, courts are directed to maximize time with each 

parent if it is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 47 ¶¶ 14-19. The superior 

court has “discretion to determine parenting time based on all the evidence 

before it,” id. at 47 ¶ 18, and it may modify a parenting time order 

“whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child,” A.R.S. 

§ 25–411(J).

¶17 Mother is right that “the Arizona courts consider best 

interests” in determining parenting time, and that is exactly what the court 

did here. The court made specific findings about all the factors set forth in 

A.R.S. § 25-403, and analyzed those findings, concluding that “it is not in 

Child’s Best Interest to continue to have unequal time with both parents.” 

The court provided reasons for its findings and explained that “establishing 

a steadier routine across two households is better for Child’s long-term 
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

Decision of the Court

6

growth and well-being.” Moreover, the findings are supported by the trial 

evidence.

¶18 Mother also argues the superior court “imposed the burden 

of proof on Mother to demonstrate why equal time is not in the child’s best 

interest.” Yet Mother fails to provide any citations to the record supporting 

such an argument. And what Mother perceives as an unfair burden is 

consistent with Arizona law, which views equal parenting time as a

“starting point for the superior court’s best-interests analysis.” Smith, 253 

Ariz. at 47 ¶ 17. 

¶19 Finally, Mother argues the superior court considered “fitness 

and safety issues as being the only acceptable reasons for opposing an equal 

time plan.” But contrary to Mother’s assertions, the court analyzed all the 

A.R.S. § 25-403 factors, which extend far beyond fitness and safety, in 

assessing D.P.’s best interests concerning parenting time. As Mother 

concedes, the court “shall consider all factors that are relevant to the child’s 

physical and emotional well-being, including” those set forth in A.R.S. §25-

403(A), “such as relationships with each parent, relationship with others in 

the household, and adjustment to home, school and community.”

¶20 The superior court found that “[b]oth Parties appear to have 

a close, loving, and bonded relationship with” D.P. and that “[b]oth Parties 

report that [D.P.] is well-adjusted to their households and gets along with 

Stepparents and step siblings.” In supporting its conclusion, the court also 

made findings that it “does not find Mother’s assertions that [D.P.] is 

comfortable and adjusted to her household and would not be as 

comfortable with Father to be persuasive.” The evidence supports these 

findings. Thus, Mother has not shown error.

III. Mother Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Its Factual 

Findings.

¶21 A decision regarding legal decision-making authority is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 

420 ¶ 7 (App. 2003). This court does not reweigh the evidence and construes 

the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the ruling. Hurd v. 

Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶¶ 16, 19 (App. 2009). The superior court’s ruling will 

be affirmed if there is substantial evidence in the record supporting that 

ruling, id. at 52 ¶ 16, and this court accepts the superior court’s factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous, In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, 409 

¶ 16 (App. 2011).
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

Decision of the Court

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¶22 Mother argues the superior court’s findings are “contrary to 

the evidence,” specifically objecting to the finding that “Mother is in the 

habit of substituting her own preferences for [the court’s] orders,” which 

contributed to the court’s award of final decision-making authority to 

Father. To support her argument, Mother points to several text messages 

between her and Father and seeks to offer her view of the context 

surrounding the messages. In doing so, she is essentially asking this court 

to reweigh the evidence, something this court will not do. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 

at 52 ¶16. On this record, Mother has not shown the court’s ruling is an 

abuse of discretion.

IV. Mother Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Modifying

Child Support.

¶23 The superior court has broad discretion in determining child 

support, and this court will review the award for an abuse of discretion. 

Nash v. Nash, 232 Ariz. 473, 478 ¶ 16 (App. 2013). On appeal, Mother argues 

the superior court “applied an incorrect factor” of her household income in 

determining child support, implying the court used her current spouse’s 

income as a factor in its calculations. Mother, however, fails to provide any 

citations to the record indicating that the superior court considered her 

household income or her current spouse’s income in determining child 

support. “Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is 

insufficient.” MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011). 

Defendants’ failure to meaningfully develop such an argument constitutes 

abandonment and waiver. Id.; see also Ace Auto. Products, Inc. v. Van Duyne, 

156 Ariz. 140, 143 (App. 1987) (“It is not incumbent upon the court to 

develop an argument for a party.”).

¶24 Notwithstanding waiver, the court found “Mother has not 

been forthcoming or truthful with respect to her income and household 

earnings.” But the court made this reference to her “household earnings” 

when considering whether she may have “intentionally misled the Court,” 

not for the purpose of determining child support. By contrast, the superior 

court refers specifically to Mother’s individual income in its child support 

order, finding: 

There are numerous cash deposits into her bank 

accounts that are not accounted for on the 

submitted [affidavit of financial information] 

and that call into question the veracity of 

Mother’s assertions that she is not earning

income as a real estate agent. There is no way to 
PEDROZA v. PEDROZA

Decision of the Court

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verify Mother’s true income, however, and 

given the other factors and Father’s ability to 

support Child, no Child Support is reasonable.

¶25 While Mother objects to the consideration of her current 

spouse’s income, she did not provide copies of her bank statements, which 

Father had requested for the hearing. Asserting she did not have bank 

statements, Mother instead provided her husband’s bank statements. 

Mother then testified she deposited cash into that bank account. Based on 

the evidence presented, the court found that “Father demonstrated through 

bank records that there are large cash deposits to Mother’s joint accounts 

with her Husband that are significantly higher than as reported on her”

affidavit of financial information. The court also found “Mother filed the 

instant case solely looking to modify Child Support and then fai[le]d to 

meaningfully disclose and provide accurate financial information.” For 

these reasons, including that Mother failed to provide clear financial 

information, she has also failed to show the court abused its discretion in 

determining child support. 

V. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

¶26 Mother seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under 

ARCAP 21. Because ARCAP 21 does not provide an independent basis for 

a fee award, and because Mother is not the prevailing party on appeal, her 

request is denied. 

CONCLUSION

¶27 The superior court’s order is affirmed.