2024 IL App (1st) 231161-U 

SECOND DIVISION

May 21, 2024

No. 1-23-1161 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re the Marriage of ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

WILLIAM PRUENTE, ) Cook County.

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

and ) No. 12 D 009805 

 ) 

DAWN PRUENTE, ) Honorable 

 ) Andrea Webber, 

 Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Ellis and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

 ORDER

 

¶ 1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed; respondent’s petition 

to enforce judgment was a de facto motion to modify the judgment because the motion 

sought to engraft a new responsibility on petitioner; the trial court had jurisdiction to 

amend the Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations Calculation Court Order to reflect the 

change in petitioner’s pension. 

¶ 2 In October 2013, the circuit court of Cook County entered a judgment of dissolution of 

the marriage of Dawn and William Pruente which incorporated a marital settlement agreement 

(MSA). William was a Chicago Police officer. The trial court entered a Qualified Illinois 
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Domestic Relations Order (QUILDRO) with regard to William’s pension and provided that

Dawn was entitled to 50% of William’s pension. 

¶ 3 In 2022, the pension board notified William it was revoking his monthly pension benefits 

due to his conviction of a felony connected to his job as a police officer. The board informed the 

parties that they were entitled to a lump sum refund of William’s contributions to the pension 

fund but to make a distribution of the funds the board required a modified QUILDRO order 

setting out exact dollar amounts each party was to receive. William filed a petition to modify the 

QUILDRO order to direct 50% of the lump sum to be paid to each party. Dawn filed a petition 

seeking an order requiring William to pay her the monthly amounts that she would have received 

had the pension not been revoked. The trial court held it did not have jurisdiction over Dawn’s 

petition because it sought to modify the dissolution judgment. The trial court granted William’s 

motion to modify the Order to reflect the change in his pension. Dawn appealed. 

¶ 4 For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 The facts are largely undisputed. In 2013, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution 

of the parties’ marriage incorporating by reference and making part of the judgment the parties’ 

October 2013 marital settlement agreement (MSA). All of the provisions of the MSA were 

“adopted as the Orders of this Court” and the judgment required “each of the parties [to] perform 

any and all of his or her duties and obligations under the terms of this [MSA.]” In the judgment, 

the trial court retained jurisdiction “for the sole and exclusive purpose of enforcing all the terms 

of this Judgment *** including all the terms of the [MSA.]” 

¶ 7 The MSA allocated the marital property between the parties “to reach a 50/50 allocation 

of assets and liabilities.” The MSA contains a separate section titled Pension Plans and Deferred 
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Compensation Plans. This section of the MSA states the parties “agree to equally divide the 

marital portion of WILLIAM’s interest in the policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago 

[(pension plan)] he received incident to his employment with the Chicago Police Department.” 

During the marriage and briefly after the marriage ended, William worked as a police officer for 

the Chicago Police Department and participated in a pension plan. The MSA required Dawn to 

draft a Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations Order [(QUILDRO)] to effectuate the parties’ 

intent. The trial court retained jurisdiction “to modify this paragraph [of the MSA] in order to 

qualify the parties’ Agreement as a [QUILDRO.]” 

¶ 8 On October 25, 2013, the trial court entered the QUILDRO regarding William’s pension. 

The QUILDRO states it “is entered to implement a division of the party’s [sic] interest in the 

retirement system.” The QUILDRO directed the pension plan to pay the alternate payee (Dawn) 

50% of the member’s (William’s) retirement benefit. 

¶ 9 In 2015, William was arrested and charged with perjury, official misconduct, and 

obstruction of justice connected to his employment as a police officer. William was convicted in 

2016 but remained employed until his resignation and retirement in May 2019. William applied 

for his retirement benefits and initially, the pension plan awarded William a monthly income 

retirement benefit. In August 2019, the trial court entered the Order identifying Dawn as the 

alternate payee of William’s retirement benefit and setting forth the precise dollar amount of 

William’s monthly income benefit Dawn was to receive as her marital share. The order states 

that the pension plan shall pay Dawn the amounts listed “but only if and when the benefits are 

payable pursuant to the QUILDRO and Section 1-119 of the Illinois Pension Code.” The Order 

provided a dollar-amount calculation for a monthly retirement benefit payable to Dawn of 

$1,721.07 per month. 
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¶ 10 The Order provided that the trial court retained jurisdiction to establish or maintain the 

Order as a QUILDRO Calculation Court Order (Order), to enter amended QUILDROs and 

QUILDRO Calculation Court Orders “to conform to the parties’ QUILDRO, [MSA], to the 

parties’ Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage ***, to any modifications of the parties’ 

QUILDRO, [MSA,] or Judgment, or to any supplemental orders entered to clarify the parties’ 

QUILDRO, [MSA,] or Judgment,” or to enter a supplemental order “to clarify the intent of the 

parties *** regarding the benefits allocated” in accordance with (1) the parties’ agreement or 

judgment; (2) any modifications of the parties’ agreement or judgment; or (3) “any supplemental 

orders entered to clarify the parties’ Agreement or Judgment.” 

¶ 11 In November 2022, the pension plan revoked William’s monthly income benefit due to 

his conviction of a felony connected to his work as a Chicago police officer and the board

informed the parties they only were entitled to a lump-sum refund of William’s pension 

contributions. The pension plan required an amended Order to disperse the lump sum refund. 

¶ 12 In December 2022, Dawn filed her initial Petition to Enforce Judgment for Dissolution 

and Other Relief. In February 2023, William filed a motion to dismiss the petition. William 

meanwhile filed a Motion for Entry of Modified QUILDRO Calculation Court Order (Order) to 

allow a lump sum distribution of his pension contributions. 

¶ 13 In April 2023, Dawn filed her Second Amended Petition to Enforce Judgment for 

Dissolution and Other Relief (Petition), which is at issue in this case. The petition states the 

parties agreed to equally divide William’s martial interest in his pension. The petition states that 

William “had broad discretion *** in performing under the Pension provisions” and that Dawn 

“had a reasonable expectation of receiving her portion of the bargained for Pension benefits from 

[William’s] pension.” The petition states the pension plan denied William his benefits based on 
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his felony convictions and thus Dawn received nothing pursuant to her bargained for “property 

rights” due to William’s intentional conduct. The petition alleges that in committing a felony and 

losing his pension, William “breached his duties to [Dawn] under the MSA.” 

¶ 14 Count I of the petition alleges that the parties agreed that Dawn would receive 50% of 

William’s marital portion of his pension “as it existed on the date of Judgment October 13, 

2013.” The Petition charged William with being the steward of Dawn’s portion of William’s 

pension as a marital asset and that Dawn is entitled to her benefit of the bargain and her portion 

of the pension. The petition states the judgment should be “enforced” requiring William to 

provide Dawn with her marital portion of the pension (pre-revocation of the monthly income 

benefit) or a monetary equivalent. Count II of the petition seeks, in the alternative, restitution for 

William’s “destruction and waste of Dawn’s portion of his pension” due to his “purposeful 

actions resulting in his convictions.” 

¶ 15 In May 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on William’s motion to dismiss and on 

Dawn’s petition. Following the hearing, the court found that the relief sought in Dawn’s petition 

was a modification of the terms of the parties’ MSA and that the court lacked jurisdiction to 

modify it. The trial court entered a written order finding that:

“[t]he Court does not have jurisdiction to modify the terms of the parties’ 

[MSA] as the terms of the parties’ [MSA] are non-modifiable. The Court must 

enforce the terms of the parties’ [MSA] as written;

[t]he [Judgment incorporating the MSA] do not contain provisions for 

what will occur in the event the Petitioner does not receive his pension, and the 

relief the Respondent is seeking constitutes a modification to the terms of the 

[MSA];
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[t]he Respondent is not entitled to such relief under the terms of the MSA 

and the Court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief.” 

¶ 16 The trial court denied the petition and, over Dawn’s objection, granted William’s motion 

to enter an amended QUILDRO Calculation Court Order (Order) for distribution of his pension 

contributions. The amended Order calculates a dollar amount payable to Dawn as her 50% share 

of the termination refund or lump-sum retirement benefit ($64,294.93).

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant Dawn the relief 

she sought in her petition which would require William to pay her the sums she would have 

received if his pension had not been revoked. More than 30 days have elapsed since entry of the 

final judgment in the dissolution proceeding, which means the judgment was final; therefore, the 

trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the case. “[E]ntry of a final order in a dissolution 

proceeding becomes a final and conclusive adjudication after the passage of 30 days from its 

rendition.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Figliulo, 2015 IL App (1st) 

140290, ¶ 11. “After the expiration of 30 days, the provisions of [the] judgment relating to 

property rights [become] fixed and final.” Rifkin v. Rifkin, 114 Ill. App. 3d 555, 559 (1983). 

“After a 30–day period, property provisions in a MSA are not modifiable.” In re Marriage of 

O’Malley ex rel. Godfrey, 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 42. See also In re Marriage of Brubaker, 

2022 IL App (2d) 200160, ¶ 19 (“Judgments for dissolution of marriage are entitled to the same 

degree of finality as are judgments in other proceedings, even in those judgments that 

incorporate an MSA.”). However, courts retain jurisdiction to enforce their judgments even after 

the judgment becomes final. “[A] trial court retains indefinite jurisdiction to enforce the terms of 

a judgment. [Citation.]” In re Marriage of Hall, 404 Ill. App. 3d 160, 164 (2010). 
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¶ 19 In this instance whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant Dawn relief is determined 

by whether Dawn’s petition sought to enforce the dissolution judgment or to modify the 

judgment. 

¶ 20 There is a distinction between enforcing a judgment and modifying a judgment. A party 

is seeking to enforce a judgment when that party “requests a determination of the parties’ rights 

and obligations with respect to the terms” of the judgment (In re Marriage of Figliulo, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 140290, ¶ 12) or “is attempting to enforce the parties’ rights and obligations” that are 

“clearly laid out in the marital settlement agreement and judgment of dissolution” ((Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of O’Malley ex rel. Godfrey, 2016 IL App (1st) 

151118, ¶ 44 (quoting In re Marriage of Hall, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 165)). 

¶ 21 Contrarily, a party is seeking to modify the judgment when that party is seeking to 

impose “new or different obligations” on the parties. In re Marriage of O’Malley ex rel. Godfrey, 

2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 44 (quoting Hall, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 165). 

¶ 22 The trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and MSA. Hall, 404 Ill. App. 

3d at 164. The issue in this case is whether Dawn’s petition seeks enforcement of the MSA, 

which the court has authority to do, or seeks a modification, which it lacks jurisdiction to do after 

30 days, which is a question we review de novo. See In re Marriage of O’Malley ex rel. Godfrey, 

2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 42 (“The trial court’s jurisdiction over a modification to the parties’ 

MSA is a question of law and thus subject to de novo review.”). 

¶ 23 “In order to determine whether [a] petitioner *** sought to enforce the dissolution 

judgment, we look to its terms.” In re Marriage of Figliulo, 2015 IL App (1st) 140290, ¶ 12.

Dawn’s petition seeks to “enforce” the “judgment” by requiring William to provide Dawn with 

her marital portion of a monthly income pension benefit, or a monetary equivalent. 
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¶ 24 On appeal, Dawn acknowledges the trial court does not have jurisdiction to modify the 

dissolution judgment or the documents incorporated therein (hereinafter, collectively the 

“judgment”) and that it only has jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. However, she argues the 

trial court erred in finding her petition sought modification of the judgment rather than 

enforcement. Dawn argues the trial court erred in its determination because the judgment is clear 

on its face and her petition sought enforcement of the judgment “by an alternative means.” Dawn 

relies on “paragraph 6.11 of Section VI of the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement” as the 

source of William’s purported obligation under the judgment to provide Dawn with the amount 

calculated on the August 2019 QUILDRO Calculation Order (Order) ($1,721.07 per month).

Dawn argues that “once the [Order] was entered in 2019, the monetary amount [Dawn] is 

entitled to was fixed” because it became part of the judgment 30 days after it was entered and 

thereafter represented “[t]he amount [Dawn] is entitled to” as a “known monetary figure as set 

by the trial court.” 

¶ 25 We find that Dawn’s interpretation of the MSA as entitling her to the amount calculated 

in the August 2019 Order is contrary to the parties’ expressed intent in the unambiguous 

language of the judgment and MSA. First, the parties agreed to equally divide William’s interest 

in the pension he received incident to his employment. Paragraph 6.11 required Dawn to draft a 

QUILDRO “to effectuate the intent.” The unambiguous language of the MSA, given its plain and 

ordinary meaning, does not express an intent to provide Dawn with a monthly income, but that is 

what she seeks in her petition. Dawn’s petition seeks to engraft a new responsibility on William 

to provide Dawn a monthly income benefit (or equivalent cash amount) calculated based on the 

monthly income benefit he could have received irrespective of the “interest in the [pension] he 

[actually] received incident to his employment.” 
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¶ 26 The QUILDRO directed the pension plan to pay Dawn “the indicated amounts of the 

member’s retirement benefits.” There is nothing in the language of the dissolution judgment,

MSA, QUILDRO, or Order to indicate an intent that Dawn is entitled to a “monthly income 

benefit” that is not paid by the pension plan but is instead paid and funded by William. Not only 

is this contrary to the parties’ expressed intent in the provisions specifically addressing William’s

pension, it is also contrary to the parties’ intent “to reach a 50/50 allocation of assets and 

liabilities.” If William was required to fund this payment to Dawn from a source other than the 

pension plan, his allocation of marital assets would decrease and Dawn would experience a 

corresponding increase in her allocation of marital assets.

¶ 27 The plain language of the judgment does not express any intent to award Dawn an 

amount William could have received or any fixed amount. The 2019 QUILDRO Calculation 

Court Order, by its own plain and unambiguous language, did not fix a right in Dawn to a fixed 

payment. The judgment does not provide a fixed payment irrespective of the pension payments.

The Order merely reflects the percentage of the actual pension benefit she is entitled to receive 

under the judgment. If the parties intended Dawn to receive a fixed payment, they could have 

added specific language to reflect that intention. In re Marriage of Hall, 404 Ill. App. 3d 160, 

167 (2010) (holding the petitioner’s interest was not limited to specified retirement plans because 

had the parties intended to limit petitioner’s interest to specific retirement plans, they could have 

added language to effectuate that intent). 

¶ 28 Dawn’s petition is not seeking enforcement of the MSA which was incorporated into the 

judgment. Rather, Dawn’s petition seeks to impose a new or different obligation on William to 

himself pay her this benefit. Therefore, we find Dawn’s petition seeks to modify the judgment, 

which the court could not do. Based on our finding that Dawn’s petition actually sought to
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modify the judgment rather than enforce it, the trial court’s finding it lacked jurisdiction is 

affirmed. We have no need to address whether Dawn would be entitled to relief if the court had 

jurisdiction. 

¶ 29 Finally, despite Dawn’s argument to the contrary, we find the trial court properly 

amended the QUILDRO Calculation Court Order (Order) to reflect the change in William’s 

retirement benefit. Dawn argues the amended Order “improperly modified the judgment” by 

removing Dawn’s monthly benefit from the marital portion of William’s pension. Dawn takes 

the position that she became entitled to the monthly payment once William retired and the 

August 2019 Order was entered. Dawn argues the trial court engrafted a new obligation on Dawn 

to accept much less than the parties intended. We disagree.

¶ 30 First, the August 2019 Order provided that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter 

amended QUILDRO Calculation Court Orders “to conform to the parties’ [judgment], to any 

modifications of the parties’ [judgment,] or to any supplemental orders entered to clarify the 

parties’ [judgment;]” and to enter supplemental orders to clarify the parties’ intent regarding the 

benefits allocated therein in accordance with the parties’ judgment. As stated above, the parties 

clearly expressed intent in the judgment was to equally divide the marital share of the pension 

benefit Willliam actually received, not some theoretical benefit he may have received. We find 

the trial court, pursuant to its retained jurisdiction, properly amended the Order to reflect the

parties’ intent expressed in the unambiguous language of the judgment to award Dawn a 

percentage of the pension benefit William would actually receive.

¶ 31 In Hall, the court upheld the trial court’s modification of a QDRO to reflect the

petitioner’s interest in all of the respondent’s retirement plans and not certain specified plans. In 

re Marriage of Hall, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 166. The court held that the “petitioner is not seeking to 
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impose new or different obligations on the parties. Rather, she is attempting to enforce the 

parties’ rights and obligations with respect to respondent’s retirement plans, which were clearly 

laid out in the marital settlement agreement and judgment of dissolution.” Id. (citing In re 

Marriage of Allen, 343 Ill. App. 3d 410, 413 (2003)). In Allen, the court upheld the trial court’s 

order modifying a QDRO to reflect the proper formula for calculating the petitioner’s share of 

the respondent’s pension. Allen, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 413. The Allen court held:

“[T]he court has jurisdiction to amend a QDRO to conform it to the 

judgment. *** The judgment in this case specified a formula for use in 

determining the petitioner’s share of the respondent’s pension. *** The 

amendment to the QDRO changed the formula to conform to the judgment. This 

change did not impose new or different obligations on the parties. The rights and 

obligations of the parties vested when the judgment became final. [Citation.] The 

amendment to the QDRO was necessary to enforce the petitioner’s rights and 

obligations with respect to the pension. Since the amended order only enforced 

the provisions of the judgment, the court had jurisdiction to make the 

modifications.” Allen, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 412-13. 

¶ 32 Similarly, in this case, the amendment to the Order was necessary to enforce William’s 

obligations with respect to the pension. That obligation was for the pension plan to pay Dawn 

50% of the marital share of William’s pension benefit he receives incident to his employment. 

As a result of the revocation of William’s monthly income benefit, the pension benefit he will 

receive changed and therefore, pursuant to the judgment, Dawn was no longer entitled to a 

monthly income benefit. The amendment to the Order conformed the Order to the judgment to 

require the payment of 50% of the marital share of William’s Termination Refund or Lump-Sum 
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Retirement Benefit to Dawn. Thus, in this case, “[s]ince the amended order only enforced the 

provisions of the judgment, the court had jurisdiction to make the modifications.” Allen, 343 Ill.

App. 3d at 412-13. 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.