U.S. CUSTOMS

SERVICE

Better Targeting of

Airline Passengers for

Personal Searches

Could Produce Better

Results

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Honorable

Richard J. Durbin

United States Senate

March 2000

GAO/GGD-00-38

United States General Accounting Office General Government Division

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 1 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

B-281000

March 17, 2000

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

United States Senate

Dear Senator Durbin:

The Customs Service faces a major challenge in effectively carrying out its

drug interdiction and trade enforcement missions while facilitating the

flow of cargo and persons into the United States. To carry out its mission,

Customs inspectors are authorized to detain and search airline passengers

they suspect may be bringing contraband, such as illegal drugs, into the

country. Concerns have been raised about Customs’ policies and

procedures for selecting or “targeting” passengers for examinations and

conducting personal searches, including strip-searches and x-rays.

Recently some airline passengers have filed lawsuits against the Customs

Service claiming that they had been singled out by inspectors for

examination on the basis of discriminatory practices and were

inappropriately subjected to personal searches, particularly strip-searches.

Approximately 140 million passengers entered the United States on

international flights during the two fiscal years 1997 and 1998. From these

arriving international passengers, Customs inspectors selected about

102,000 passengers for some form of personal search.

You asked us to review Customs’ policies and procedures for conducting

personal searches and to determine the controls Customs has in place to

ensure that airline passengers are not inappropriately selected or

subjected to personal searches. Specifically, we agreed to provide

information and analysis on Customs’ personal search data to identify the

characteristics—race (White, Hispanic, Asian, or Black) and gender—of

passengers who were more or less likely to be subjected to more intrusive

searches (i.e., strip-searched or x-rayed) and the results of searching those

passengers. We also agreed to describe Customs’ current policies and

procedures for conducting personal searches and Customs’ management

controls over the personal search process.

Our analysis of personal search data for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 was

limited to data contained in Customs databases and therefore focused on

the passenger characteristics available for 102,000 arriving international
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passengers whom Customs subjected to some form of personal search. As

a result, we could not include in our analysis any information about the

remainder of the approximately 140 million arriving international

passengers, including passengers who had only their baggage searched.

Inspectors select passengers for further examination on the basis of

Customs’ policies and procedures and their professional judgment and

experience. Of those selected for further examination, about 102,000

passengers were subjected to some form of personal search. Of those

102,000 passengers, 95 percent were searched by inspectors for

contraband (e.g., illegal drugs) or hidden weapons by patting the

passenger’s clothed body (commonly referred to as a frisk or patdown);

4 percent were strip-searched; and 1 percent were subjected to an x-ray

exam. About 3 percent of the passengers only frisked or patted down had

positive results (i.e., contraband was found); 23 percent of the stripsearches were positive; and 31 percent of the x-ray searches were

positive.1

Generally, searched passengers of particular races and gender were more

likely than other passengers to be subjected to more intrusive types of

personal searches (being strip-searched or x-rayed) after being subjected

to frisks or patdowns. However, in some cases those types of passengers

who were more likely to be subjected to more intrusive personal searches

were not as likely to be found carrying contraband. Specifically, White

men and women and Black women were more likely than Black men and

Hispanic men and women to be strip-searched rather than patted down or

frisked, but they were less likely to be found carrying contraband. The

most pronounced difference occurred with Black women who were U.S.

citizens. They were 9 times more likely than White women who were U.S.

citizens to be x-rayed after being frisked or patted down in fiscal year

1998. But on the basis of x-ray results, Black women who were U.S.

citizens were less than half as likely to be found carrying contraband as

White women who were U.S. citizens. Some patterns of selecting

passengers for more intrusive searches indicated that these more intrusive

searches sometimes resulted in certain types of passengers being selected

for such searches at rates that were not consistent with the rates of finding

contraband.

We recommend that Customs compare the characteristics of those

passengers subjected to personal searches with the results of those

searches to better target passengers carrying contraband.

 

1

 Generally, Customs performs patdowns before conducting x-rays and strip-searches.

Results in Brief
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During the course of our review, Customs developed new policies and

procedures for personal searches that include new requirements for

supervisory review and approval and procedures intended to ensure that

passengers subjected to personal searches know their rights. We identified

four management controls, such as training provided to inspectors and

supervisors on conducting personal searches and more systematic

evaluation of complaints, that Customs uses to help ensure that inspectors

use their search authority fairly and judiciously. In conjunction with

improved data on the characteristics of those passengers subjected to

personal searches, as recommended above, these policies and controls

could better safeguard the rights of U.S. citizens and the traveling public.

In addition to collecting revenue from international trade, Customs’

mission is to ensure that goods and persons entering and exiting the

United States do so in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations. The

Customs Service is responsible for carrying out its trade enforcement and

drug enforcement missions and facilitating the flow of cargo and persons

into the United States.

Congress, in exercising its power to protect the nation’s borders, has given

Customs broad authority to conduct searches of persons and their luggage.

Customs regulations provide that persons, such as passengers coming into

the United States, are liable to inspection and a search by a Customs

officer for carrying contraband, such as illegal drugs.

Routine border searches of persons entering the United States that are

conducted without a warrant or probable cause in general have been held

to be reasonable by the Supreme Court simply because the searches occur

at the border, e.g., ports of entry. The Supreme Court has not defined a

“routine” search at ports of entry, but various federal courts have made

determinations on what constitutes a routine border search. Various

federal courts, in general, have found that routine border searches require

no suspicion or a low level of suspicion.

The Supreme Court has indicated that strip, x-ray, and body cavity

searches would be considered nonroutine but has specifically not

expressed a view on the level of suspicion required for such searches.

Various federal courts, with some exceptions, have held that nonroutine

searches require “reasonable suspicion” in order to be justified.

In fiscal year 1998, approximately 71.5 million passengers arrived at

airports in the United States on international flights. When passenger data

are available, some passengers entering the United States are subject to

Background

Customs’ Search Authority

Passenger Inspections and

Personal Searches
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record checks conducted by Customs inspectors prior to flight arrival.

When passengers enter the United States, at the control point or “primary”

inspection, INS inspectors are to perform record checks, ask passengers

questions about their travel, and let them pass through the airport or refer

them to Customs for further examination.

Passengers referred for further examination are sent to “secondary,”

where Customs inspectors can subject passengers to additional questions

and a search of their luggage and personal belongings. If an inspector

suspects that a passenger may be carrying or smuggling contraband, the

inspector may search a passenger’s clothing and ultimately subject the

passenger to a personal search. Personal searches range from a frisk or a

patdown to more intrusive searches that include strip-searches, body

cavity searches, x-rays, and monitored bowel movements (MBMs).

Customs inspectors carry out strip-searches.2

 Customs requires licensed

medical personnel are required by Customs to perform the latter three

types of searches at medical facilities.

According to Customs, the nature of the suspicion determines the degree

of search or detention warranted. In other words, the greater the

intrusion, the greater must be the reason for conducting the search. Less

intrusive searches—frisks or patdowns—require “some” or “mere

suspicion”3

 by the inspector. Customs policy is that a patdown will be

conducted only if an officer has some or mere suspicion that contraband is

being concealed on the passenger. In addition, more intrusive searches

require that an inspector have “reasonable suspicion”4

 that a passenger

may be smuggling contraband. Customs instructs inspectors never to use

a person’s gender, race, color, religion, or ethnic background as a factor in

determining any level of suspicion. Further, inspectors are required to

articulate their facts or reasons for conducting a search and for each

successive level of search and to obtain approval from a supervisor or the

port director in advance of the search. Supervisory approval is not

required for an immediate patdown for weapons (frisk). According to

 

2

 Inspectors of the same gender as the passenger are to conduct strip-searches. The revised Personal

Search Handbook now refers to these types of searches as partial body searches.

3

 According to Customs, “some” or “mere suspicion” is the minimal level of suspicion required to

conduct a patdown search. By policy, Customs requires that inspectors are to articulate to a

supervisor at least one fact (e.g., inconsistent answers to inspector’s questions) before conducting a

patdown.

4

According to Customs, “reasonable suspicion” is more than some or mere suspicion and is based on

specific, articulable facts. These facts, when taken together with reasonable inferences from these

facts, would lead a reasonable officer (inspector) to suspect that a person might have merchandise

contrary to law.
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Customs’ Personal Search Handbook (Handbook),5 if the officer cannot

articulate such facts, then a patdown, strip-search, x-ray, body cavity

search, or MBM detention should not be performed. Table 1 lists the

current search type; the reason (or suspicion) for the search; and the

official who can authorize the search, if required.

Search type Search type definition Suspicion level required Approval required

Immediate patdown

(commonly referred to as a

frisk)

A search necessary to ensure that

a person is not carrying a weapon.

Suspicion that a weapon may

be present.

No approval required.

Patdown for merchandise A search for merchandise (including

contraband) hidden on a person’s

body.

One articulable fact. On-duty supervisor.

Partial body search The removal of some of the clothing

by a person to recover merchandise

reasonably suspected to be

concealed on the body.

Reasonable suspicion based

on specific, articulable facts.

On-duty supervisor.

X-ray The use of a medical x-ray by

medical personnel to determine the

presence of merchandise within the

body.

Reasonable suspicion based

on specific, articulable facts.

Port director and court order

needed without the consent of

suspect. Only port director

needed with the suspect’s

consent.

Body cavity Any visual or physical intrusion into

the rectal or vaginal cavity.

Reasonable suspicion based

on specific, articulable facts.

Port director and court order

needed without the consent of

suspect. Only port director

needed with the suspect’s

consent.

MBM The detention of a person for the

purpose of determining whether

contraband or other merchandise is

concealed in the alimentary canal.

Reasonable suspicion based

on specific, articulable facts.

Port director.

Source: U.S. Customs Service.

The Handbook provides direction and guidance to its inspectors when

they conduct each type of personal search. The Handbook contains factors

for inspectors to consider when making decisions to conduct a personal

search. The factors have been grouped into six primary categories:

• Behavioral analysis is the recognition of physiological signs of

nervousness. Examples include cold sweats, flushed face, and avoiding

eye contact.

• Observational techniques involve recognizing physical discrepancies in

appearance. Examples include unexplained bulges in clothing and an

unnatural gait.

 

5

Customs issued the Handbook in March 1997 and revised it in September 1999. The revisions were

not in place when we did our analysis.

Table 1: Customs’ Policies for Personal Search by Type, Suspicion Level, and Approving Official
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• Inconsistencies are conflicts identified in the interview/and or

documentation. Examples include catching the person making a false

statement and an unreasonable explanation for travel.

• Intelligence is information developed by another officer that may include

information from automated intelligence systems.

• K-9 involves searches conducted in response to an alert by a Customs

canine.

• Incident to a seizure or arrest involves searches conducted in

continuation of a seizure action related to previously discovered illegal or

hidden merchandise. For example, finding contraband in a false-sided

suitcase would provide a basis for conducting a patdown to determine if

additional merchandise is hidden on the person.

In 1999, Customs directed reviews of personal search policies and

procedures to ensure that its targeting practices did not discriminate on

the basis of race, color, ethnicity, religion or gender. As a result, Customs

has implemented a number of changes to its personal search policies and

procedures. For example, since May 1999, Customs has required

supervisory approval for patdown searches for merchandise, including

contraband. Also, a Customs officer is to notify the responsible U.S.

Attorney in cases where passengers are detained for more than 8 hours

and probable cause for arrest has not been developed.

Customs has also been testing new nonintrusive technology to give airline

passengers an option for less intrusive searches. At selected airports,

Customs is using body scan imaging instead of patdowns. This procedure,

used only with the passenger’s consent, allows inspectors to see if

contraband is concealed under clothing.

The recent changes that Customs has made to its personal search

procedures were a result of internal decisions and other studies.

According to the Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations, the basis

for recent changes in Customs’ personal search policies and procedures

was to establish uniformity and standardization throughout the ports for

conducting personal searches and to establish internal controls over the

process. He added that Customs needed uniformity because various ports

had different procedures for conducting personal searches.

In 1999, two groups reported on the need for Customs to reassess its

methods for targeting passengers for personal searches.

• In June 1999, Treasury’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)

issued a report on Customs search policies and procedures that included

Changes to Personal Search

Requirements

Impetus for Changes to

Customs Personal Search

Policy
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an assessment of Customs’ methods for “targeting” or selecting passengers

for interview and examination. The objective of the OPR study was to

ensure that Customs’ targeting policies were not based on discriminatory

factors. The study focused on targeting practices at the Port of Miami (FL)

and training provided at the Customs Academy in Glynco, GA. The report

noted that Customs’ advanced passenger targeting is based more on highrisk flights—from drug source or transit countries—rather than

information on passengers. The report also found that “Customs did not

conduct routine reviews to ensure that the criteria and targeting policy,

including trend analysis, are accurate and do not become discriminatory.”

The report cited New York’s JFK Airport and Miami Airport as large

airports that had used trend analysis as an important and successful tool in

the fight against drug smuggling. In fiscal years 1997 and 1998, Miami and

JFK were first or second in the country for drug seizures. The report cited

that the drug seizure rate was approximately 70 percent in instances where

a suspected internal drug carrier was sent to the hospital for an x-ray. The

OPR review team believed that trend analysis of drug seizures is a useful

tool and is nondiscriminatory as long as articulated facts support the

searches and are not based on factors such as race or gender.

OPR recommended that Customs “should continue to conduct regular,

periodic reviews to validate the targeting criteria and process to assure

that the factors used in targeting continue to be reasonable predictors of

illegal activity, and to ensure that targeting is not based on race, color,

ethnic origin, or gender.” OPR also recommended that “Customs should

also conduct periodic program reviews to ensure that the techniques,

criteria, efficiency, and cost effectiveness of passenger targeting are

accomplishing the interdiction mission.” In response to the OPR report,

Customs agreed with both recommendations and has stated that it “will

continue to conduct periodic reviews of the targeting criteria and process,

as well as the program review to ensure that our mission is accomplished.”

• In its July 1999 report, Customs’ Passenger Targeting Committee reported

that Customs’ passenger selectivity and targeting methodologies require

regular reassessment and updating. The Committee reported that “...the

use of a standard list of targeting criteria has little value in a constantly

changing travel environment.” The Committee recommended that

Customs eliminate the use of the articulable factor list and emphasize to

inspectors that certain factors once thought to be suspicious may no

longer be relevant. In addition, the Committee recommended that

Customs pursue new data collection technology that will provide a method

to routinely assess whether inspectors properly target individuals.
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The Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations said that Customs had

developed the 43 factors contained in Appendix C of the Handbook on the

basis of professional judgment, experience in the field, and information

from past seizures, and the factors provided a compendium of successful

drug seizures from a historical perspective. He said that although

Customs still believes that many factors on the original list are viable

reasons to select (target) passengers for personal searches, Customs has

decided to eliminate the factors as a result of the Passenger Processing

Committee’s findings. In place of the list, Customs has included in the

revised Handbook six primary categories, which we previously discussed,

for inspectors to use to determine whether to conduct a personal search.

We agreed to provide information and analysis on Customs’ personal

search data to identify race and gender of passengers who were more or

less likely to be subjected to more intrusive searches (i.e., strip-searched

or x-rayed) and the results of searching those passengers. To do this, we

analyzed Customs' personal search reports for air passengers subjected to

personal searches during fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Such searches were

done only after passengers were sent to secondary.

We also agreed to determine Customs’ policies and procedures for

conducting personal searches and how they are implemented at airports.

To do this, we interviewed Customs headquarters officials in the Office of

Field Operations and port officials at four airports—John Fitzgerald

Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York, O’Hare International

Airport in Chicago, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), and Miami

International Airport. We also reviewed Customs’ program documents,

including its Handbook.

Further, we agreed to describe Customs’ management controls over the

personal search process. We interviewed key officials at Customs

headquarters and at the four airports. Our review focused on four internal

controls intended to help ensure that inspectors follow Customs’ policies

and procedures:

• training on targeting and personal search procedures,

• supervisory review and approval required for most personal searches,

• Customs’ use of its program to measure the efficiency of its targeting, and

• a complaint process used to identify and resolve passenger complaints.

To obtain information on Customs’ (1) personal search policies and

procedures and how they are implemented at airports and (2) management

Scope and

Methodology
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controls over the personal search process, we also conducted a national

mail survey of 1,176 inspectors and 177 supervisors at 15 airports6

 with the

largest volume of international passengers. Specifically, we asked

inspectors and supervisors for their views about personal search policies,

procedures, and practices; Customs training; and supervisory approval for

personal searches. The response rates for inspectors and supervisors were

66 percent (775) and 74 percent (131), respectively. In reporting the

results of the survey, we report the number or percentage of inspectors

and supervisors who provided their responses to a particular survey

question.

See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our scope and

methodology and appendices II and III for mail survey results for

inspectors and supervisors.

We conducted our work from August 1998 through January 2000 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We

requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of the

Treasury. The U.S. Customs Service provided comments that are

summarized at the end of this letter; included in the report, where

appropriate; and reproduced in appendix IV. Customs also provided

technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

Approximately 140 million international passengers entered the United

States during fiscal years 1997 and 1998. From the entering international

passengers, Customs inspectors selected some passengers for further

examination. Of those selected for further examination, about 102,000

passengers were subjected to some form of personal search. Our analysis

was limited to data contained in Customs databases and therefore focused

on only certain passenger characteristics of the 102,000 international

arriving passengers who Customs subjected to some form of personal

search. As a result, we could not include in our analysis any information

about the remainder of the approximately 140 million arriving

international passengers, including passengers who had only their baggage

searched. In commenting on our report, Customs said that it did not

dispute our statistical analysis. However, it also pointed out that factors

outside of the information gathered during the personal search, such as

country of departure, may contribute to the decision to carry out a more

intrusive search.

 6

 The 15 airports serve the cities of Atlanta; Boston; Chicago; Dallas-Ft. Worth; Detroit; Washington,

D.C., metropolitan area; Honolulu; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New York; Newark; Orlando; San

Francisco; and San Juan.

Customs Subjected

Certain Types of

Passengers to More

Intrusive Searches

Than Other

Passengers, But Those

Searches May Have

Had Fewer Positive

Results
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Table 2 provides search results for 102,000 passengers who were subjected

to some form of personal search during fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

Negative Positive

Search type Number Percent Number Percent Total number

Frisk/patdown 93,764 97 3,005 3 96,769

Strip 2,989 77 883 23 3,872

X-ray 985 69 434 31 1,419

Body cavity 14 44 18 56 32

Note: Fourteen incidents of monitored bowel movements were excluded.

Source: GAO analysis of Customs' data.

Generally, passengers of particular races and gender were more likely than

other passengers who had been selected for further searches to be

subjected to more intrusive types of personal searches (being stripsearched or x-rayed). However, in some cases those types of passengers

who were more likely to be subjected to more intrusive personal searches

were not more likely, or even as likely, to be found carrying contraband.

The most pronounced difference occurred with Black women who were

U.S. citizens. They were 9 times more likely than White women who were

U.S. citizens to be x-rayed after being frisked or patted down in fiscal year

1998. But on the basis of x-ray results, Black women who were U.S.

citizens were less than half as likely to be found carrying contraband as

White women who were U.S. citizens were. Some patterns of selecting

passengers for more intrusive searches indicated that these more intrusive

searches sometimes resulted in certain types of passengers being selected

for such searches at rates that were not consistent with the rates of finding

contraband.

To determine the types of characteristics that influenced the likelihood of

passengers who were selected for further searches being subjected to

more intrusive personal searches and their likelihood of being found

carrying contraband, we examined the effects of the four variables within

Customs’ data. These variables were gender; race (White, Black, Hispanic,

and Asian); citizenship status (U.S. citizens or noncitizens); and fiscal year

(1997 and 1998). We measured the effect of each of these variables on the

likelihood of passengers being intrusively searched and carrying

contraband, and we controlled for the effects of the other variables.7

 

7

 We used multivariate logistic regression and loglinear models to eliminate differences between

groups that were due to chance or random variation. Tables 3 through 6 provide likelihoods (or odds

ratios) which are derived from these models and which provide a simple description of the differences

across the groups of passengers we compare. See Appendix I for a fuller discussion of these models

Table 2: Number and Percent of

Passengers With Positive or Negative

Search Results by Type of Search,

Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998

Gender and Race Were

Strongly Related to the

Likelihood of Passengers

Being More Intrusively

Searched and the

Likelihood of Them

Carrying Contraband
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We found that gender and race were related to the likelihood of

passengers who were selected for further searches being subjected to

more intrusive searches but not necessarily in the same way that they

were related to the likelihood that passengers were found carrying

contraband. Generally, citizenship and fiscal year were not as strongly

related. The following results focus on the relationships between

passengers’ race and gender for U.S. citizens in fiscal year 1998 and the

likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches or x-ray examinations and

the likelihood of finding contraband wherever searched. The tables show

the (1) gender ratios, which compare the likelihood for women relative to

men, within race categories; and (2) race ratios, which compare the

likelihood for Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics relative to Whites within

gender categories.

We note, however, where these effects differ for noncitizens and in fiscal

year 1997. We did not include information on the origin of flights, which

inspectors told us is a consideration in selecting passengers for searches,

because this factor was not collected and therefore not included in

Customs’ database.

Appendix I contains a detailed discussion of the effects of all four

variables on passengers being subjected to more intrusive searches and

their likelihood of being found carrying contraband.

To describe how the likelihood of being strip-searched or x-rayed was

affected by passengers’ gender or race, we computed the likelihood of

more intrusive personal searches being conducted for U. S. citizens by

race and gender. We then compared the likelihoods across types of

passengers to determine how much more or less likely certain types of

passengers were to receive more intrusive searches than other passengers.

Table 3 shows the likelihood of being strip-searched by race among men

and women who were U.S. citizens in fiscal year 1998.

 and the likelihoods derived from them. Our multivariate results are on the basis of the 67,553 cases

(66%) with no missing data. We did, however, repeat the analysis including cases that were coded as

missing and found that the overall results with respect to the effects of sex, citizenship, and year were

similar.

Passengers With Certain

Characteristics Are More

Likely to Be Subjected to

More Intrusive Personal

Searches After Being Patted

Down or Frisked
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Race Gender

Likelihood of

being stripsearched Gender ratio Race ratio

White Male 0.0821

White Female 0.0821 1.00

Black Male 0.0506 0.62

Black Female 0.1421 2.81 1.73

Asian Male 0.0093 0.11

Asian Female 0.0260 2.81 0.32

Hispanic Male 0.0217 0.26

Hispanic Female 0.0611 2.81 0.74

Note: The gender ratios compare the expected likelihoods of being strip-searched for women relative

to men, within race categories. The race ratios compare the expected likelihoods of being stripsearched for Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics relative to Whites within gender categories.

Source: GAO analysis of Customs’ data.

As shown in table 3, of those passengers who were searched, Whites were

more likely to be strip-searched than all minority groups except Black

women; and among Whites, men and women were equally likely to be

strip-searched. Among minorities, however, there were large differences

between men and women in the likelihood of being strip-searched as

opposed to patted down or frisked. Black, Asian, and Hispanic women

were nearly 3 times as likely to be strip-searched, after being patted down

or frisked, as men of those races; but White women and men were equally

likely to be strip-searched. For example, the likelihood of being stripsearched for Black men was .0506; and the likelihood was .1421 for Black

women (.1421/.0506 equals 2.81, or nearly 3 times).8

 Further, most

minorities, especially Asians (by factors of .11 for men and .32 for women),

tended to be strip-searched less often than Whites, except for Black

women, who were more likely to be strip-searched than all other types of

passengers.

Moreover, in fiscal year 1997 Black women were also more likely to be

strip-searched than all other women and men passengers. This was not

the situation for noncitizens in 1998; among them, White men and women

were most likely to be searched.

 8

 The likelihood (or odds) represents the number of passengers strip-searched compared to the number

of passengers just frisked or patted down. For example, the likelihood of being strip-searched for

Black men was .0506, which indicates that there were 5 Black men strip-searched for every 100 who

were frisked or patted down. In tables 3 through 6, the gender ratios given reflect the likelihood for

women relative to men, within race categories. The race ratios reflect the likelihood for Blacks,

Asians, and Hispanics relative to Whites, within categories of gender. Appendix I contains the

frequencies and calculated likelihoods and ratios for each type of search and search result by year,

citizenship status, race, and gender.

Table 3: Differences Between U.S.

Citizen White and Minority Men and

Women in Being Strip-Searched, in

Fiscal Year 1998
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For U.S. citizens, table 4 shows the differences between men and women

of all races in the likelihood of being x-rayed in fiscal year 1998.

Race Gender

Likelihood of

being x-rayed Gender ratio Race ratio

White Male 0.0053

White Female 0.0073 1.39

Black Male 0.0457 8.65

Black Female 0.0635 1.39 8.65

Asian Male 0.0008 0.16

Asian Female 0.0012 1.39 0.16

Hispanic Male 0.0196 3.71

Hispanic Female 0.0272 1.39 3.71

Note: The gender ratios compare the expected likelihoods of being x-rayed for women relative to

men, within race categories. The race ratios compare the expected likelihoods of being x-rayed for

Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics relative to Whites within gender categories.

Source: GAO analysis of Customs’ data.

Our analysis shows substantial differences across races in the likelihood

of being subjected to x-ray searches but smaller differences between men

and women. Among searched U.S. citizens of all races in fiscal year 1998,

women were 1.39 times more likely than men were to be x-rayed. Black

and Hispanic men and women were about 4 to 9 times more likely than

White men and women to be x-rayed after being patted down or frisked.

The likelihood of Asian men and women being x-rayed was low relative to

any other type of passengers.

Gender differences shown in table 4 were similar for U.S. citizens in fiscal

year 1997; however, among searched noncitizens in both fiscal years,

women were less likely than men were to be x-rayed. The race differences

noted in table 4 were similar for U.S. citizens in fiscal year 1997. Such

differences were not as great for noncitizens as for citizens.

Although searched passengers with certain characteristics were subject to

more intrusive searches, they were not always as likely to be found

carrying contraband. Table 5 shows the differences in the likelihood of

strip-searches yielding positive results for White and minority men and

women who were U.S. citizens in fiscal year 1998. White and Asian men

and women were less likely than Black and Hispanic men and women to

be found carrying contraband when they were strip-searched. Among all

races, especially Blacks, women were less likely to be found carrying

contraband than men were.

Table 4: Differences Between U.S.

Citizen White and Minority Men and

Women in the Likelihood of Being Xrayed, in Fiscal Year 1998

Some Types of Passengers

More Likely to be Subject to

More Intrusive Searches Are

Not As Likely to be Found

Carrying Contraband
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Race Gender

Likelihood of stripsearches being positive Gender ratio Race ratio

White Male 0.2506

White Female 0.1947 0.78

Black Male 0.6155 2.46

Black Female 0.2756 0.45 1.42

Asian Male 0.2506 1.00

Asian Female 0.1947 0.78 1.00

Hispanic Male 0.5880 2.35

Hispanic Female 0.4568 0.78 2.35

Note: The gender ratios compare the expected likelihoods of strip-searches being positive for women

relative to men, within race categories. The race ratios compare the expected likelihoods of stripsearches being positive for Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics relative to Whites within gender categories.

Source: GAO analysis of Customs’ data.

Black women were about half (or .45 times) as likely as Black men to be

found carrying contraband during strip searches; White, Hispanic, and

Asian women were about three-quarters (or .78 times) as likely to be found

carrying contraband as their male counterparts. Blacks and Hispanics

were more likely than Whites to be found carrying contraband; Asians

were less likely. The differences between men and women and between

minorities and Whites shown in table 5 were similar for U.S. citizens and

noncitizens in both years.

As noted earlier, the types of searched passengers who had higher

likelihoods of being strip-searched were not always as likely to be found

carrying contraband. Comparing the likelihoods and likelihood ratios in

tables 3 and 5 shows that Black women, who had the highest likelihood of

being strip-searched among U.S. citizens (.1421), were half as likely to be

found carrying contraband during a strip-search as Black men (.45 times)

and less likely than Hispanic men (.2756/.5880 equals .47 times) and

Hispanic women (.2756/.4568 equals .60). However, Black women were

1.4 times as likely to be found carrying contraband than White women.

Table 6 shows the differences in the likelihood of x-ray searches yielding

positive results for White and minority men and women who were U.S.

citizens in fiscal year 1998.

Table 5: Differences Between U.S.

Citizen White and Minority Men and

Women in the Likelihood of Stripsearches Yielding Positive Results in

Fiscal Year 1998
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Race Gender

Likelihood of x-rays

being positive Gender ratio Race ratio

White Male 0.5869

White Female 0.5869 1.00

Black Male 0.5869 1.00

Black Female 0.2816 0.48 0.48

Asian Male 0.3407 0.58

Asian Female 0.3407 1.00 0.58

Hispanic Male 0.3407 0.58

Hispanic Female 0.3407 1.00 0.58

Note: The gender ratios compare the expected likelihoods of x-ray searches being positive for

women relative to men, within race categories. The race ratios compare the expected likelihoods of

x-ray searches being positive for Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics relative to Whites within gender

categories.

Source: GAO analysis of Customs data.

For all types of passengers who were subject to x-rays, except Blacks,

women were somewhat more likely than men to be found carrying

contraband. Among Blacks who were x-rayed, women were about half as

likely as men to be found carrying contraband. Apart from Black men, who

were equally as likely to be found carrying drugs as their White

counterparts, minorities were generally less likely to be found carrying

contraband than Whites who were x-rayed. Further, for those subjected to

x-ray searches, Black women were least likely to be found with

contraband. The differences shown for U.S. citizens in fiscal year 1998

were similar for U.S. citizens and noncitizens in both years. Again, some

of the types of searched passengers with a relatively high likelihood of

being x-rayed had a relatively low likelihood of being found with

contraband. Hispanic women, for example, were 4 times as likely to be xrayed as White women were, but they were about two thirds as likely to

have contraband found during an x-ray.

Customs inspectors rely on their professional judgment and their

experience, as well as guidance and intelligence information, when

deciding to select or target passengers for interviews or examinations that

may include personal searches.9

To understand the rationale for inspectors’ decisions to conduct personal

searches, we analyzed 70 randomly selected search reports. The reports

contained the inspectors’ reasons for subjecting passengers to patdowns.

They usually provided more than one reason for conducting patdowns.

 

9

 Customs provides training to its inspectors on conducting personal searches. Training is discussed in

the next section.

Table 6: Differences Between U.S.

Citizen White and Minority Men and

Women in the Likelihood of X-ray

Searches Yielding Positive in Fiscal

Year 1998

Customs Processes,

Policies, and

Procedures for

Targeting Passengers

and Conducting

Personal Searches
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In our survey, few inspectors and supervisors indicated that the Customs’

award program influenced their peers in referring or approving requests

for personal searches or in pursuing or approving requests for more

intrusive searches.

As a result of evaluations of its personal search procedures and on its own

initiative, Customs has implemented a number of changes.

Inspectors use the Handbook, which provides guidance and sets forth

procedures for conducting personal searches. On the basis of internal

decisions and studies, Customs has revised its personal search procedures.

At the time of our fieldwork (from March 1999 to June 1999), inspectors

were following the March 1997 Handbook, which included in Appendix C a

list of 43 objective articulable facts that could lead to a personal search.

This list comprised actions (facts) that might lead an inspector to decide

that a personal search was warranted.10 Customs had developed the 43

factors contained in Appendix C on the basis of professional judgment,

experience in the field, and information from past seizures. According to a

Customs official, the factors provided a compendium of information about

drug seizures from a historical perspective. The September 1999

Handbook eliminated Appendix C and now lists six primary categories for

inspectors to consider when making decisions about subjecting

passengers to personal searches. Customs officials from the Passenger

Programs Division told us that the original 43 factors contained in the

Handbook were developed to assist inspectors on the basis of previous

successful drug seizures.

During the course of our review, Customs developed new policies and

procedures for personal searches. These policies include new

requirements for supervisory approval and review related to personal

searches, legal considerations, and procedures intended to ensure that

passengers subjected to personal searches know their rights and

understand Customs’ search policy. Policy changes include the following:

• A supervisor must approve all patdown searches, except immediate

searches for weapons.

• A port director must approve all searches that require moving a person to

a medical facility for a medical examination.

 

10 The list had been in existence for over 10 years.

Customs’ Personal Search

Guidance and Recent

Changes

Handbook

Changes to Customs Policy
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• Any person detained for 2 or more hours will be able to have a Customs

officer notify a person of the passenger’s choice about the delay.11

Customs inspectors can receive information on potential drug smugglers

from their Passenger Analytical Units (PAUs), which are located at

international airports. PAUs are generally composed of senior inspectors

with access to law enforcement databases that can assist them in

identifying the potential risk from incoming flights and passengers to

determine the level of examination needed.12

PAUs identify or target flights and individual passengers on the basis of

their research of information. In addition, PAUs may develop their own

targets on the basis of information from past seizures.

Inspectors also have access to information from the Advanced Passenger

Information System (APIS).13 APIS provides information on passengers

destined for the United States in advance of their arrival. Information on

passengers is processed through the Interagency Border Inspection

System, which includes the combined databases of Customs, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of State, and

about 21 other federal agencies, along with access to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center. Using this system,

inspectors have the ability to check records to try to identify terrorists,

drug traffickers, and other violators.

Eighty-five percent of inspectors and 92 percent of supervisors responding

to our surveys said that they relied on PAU data to assist them in targeting

passengers to be sent to secondary examination from a moderate to very

great extent. This includes information developed by PAUs and from

automated systems. Inspectors and supervisors said that they also relied

heavily on information from seizure reports or information from past

seizures.

 

11 Passengers carrying drugs would not be permitted to have a Customs officer notify a person about

the delay.

12 Information is also provided to Rovers, which are teams of specially trained inspectors who target

passengers on high-risk flights on the basis of observing passengers’ behavior, data from PAUs, and

previous drug smuggling trends.

13 Airlines and foreign governments participating in APIS collect passengers’ biographical data,

including name and date of birth, at the time of the flight’s departure and transmit it to Customs Data

Center which performs checks against federal law enforcement databases while the flight is en route

to the United States.

Studies Information Sources for

Inspectors to Use to Select

Passengers for Searches
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To determine what factors inspectors reported for conducting personal

searches, we randomly selected 70 search reports for fiscal years 1997 and

1998. 14 Our analysis showed that inspectors usually provided more than

one reason for conducting patdowns. In responding to our mail survey to

inspectors at the 15 largest airports, inspectors said that they generally

relied on a number of factors in making their decisions to refer passengers

at secondary for personal searches.

In the 70 reports we reviewed, the inspectors provided a total of 208

different reasons for conducting patdowns. The majority of the search

reports (45 of 70) provided 3 or more reasons for performing a patdown.

The most common of the 208 reasons listed by inspectors for conducting

patdowns were:

• behavior, such as exhibiting signs of nervousness (16 percent);

• arriving from a country known to be a source of drugs (15 percent);

• appearance (12 percent);

• having a trip of short duration (7 percent);

• wearing thick-soled or bulky shoes (6 percent); and

• giving evasive answers to the inspector’s questions (6 percent).

When asked in our survey about the extent to which inspectors used the

five following factors in their decisions to send passengers from primary to

secondary, inspectors generally agreed about the following five factors in

their decisions to send passengers for personal searches.15 Most of the

inspectors responded that they consider to a moderate, great, or very great

extent:

• general information e.g., a high-risk flight or a flight from a high-risk

country (85 percent);

• specific information and intelligence about an individual (93 percent);

• observational and behavioral techniques (98 percent);

• professional judgment based on past experience (96 percent); and

• interviews with individual passengers (97 percent).

 14 The sample was selected to identify the reasons inspectors provided for conducting patdowns, but it

should not be projected to the universe of 85,008 patdowns conducted in fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

15 We identified these five factors on our own and validated them through pretesting our survey.

Inspectors’ Reasons for

Conducting Patdowns

Varied
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Customs has an awards program that provides recognition to its staff for

their work. Of the 17 Customs’ awards for its employees, 3 encourage

their efforts for searches that result in subsequent seizures from

passengers carrying contraband.

• The Commissioner may grant the Blue Eagle Award for significant

narcotics seizures.16

• Local management officials, including Customs Management Center

directors, may confer the Special Enforcement Actions Ribbon for a

notable seizure.

• Local joint committees may confer Superior Achievement Awards, which

may include letters of commendation for uncovering the existence of new,

unknown, or unique methods of smuggling.

We surveyed inspectors and supervisors in order to determine their

opinions about the extent to which Customs’ awards system may have

influenced their personal search decisions. Eighty-eight percent of

inspectors who responded to our survey indicated that Customs’ awards

program influenced inspectors to “some or little” or “no extent” in

referring passengers for personal searches. In addition, 89 percent of the

responding inspectors said that Customs’ awards program influenced

inspectors to some, little, or no extent in pursuing more intrusive searches.

Furthermore, 96 percent of the supervisors who responded to our survey

said that to no extent are supervisors more likely to approve inspectors’

requests to refer passengers for personal searches because it would

improve the inspectors’ chances of receiving an award. In addition, 97

percent of the responding supervisors said that to no extent are

supervisors more likely to approve inspectors’ requests to pursue more

intrusive personal searches because it would improve the inspectors’

chances of receiving an award.

We identified four management controls that Customs uses to help ensure

that inspectors use their search authority fairly and judiciously and to

safeguard the rights of U.S. citizens and the traveling public.

• Training is provided to inspectors and supervisors on how to select or

target individuals for interview and examination and how to conduct a

personal search.

 

16 A “significant” seizure is defined as $1 million in cash, 1,000 pounds of cocaine, 100 pounds of opium,

5,000 pounds or marijuana or hashish, or 50 pounds of heroin.

Most Inspectors and

Supervisors Do Not Believe

Awards Influenced the

Numbers of Passengers

Selected for Searches

Customs’ Management

Controls for Personal

Searches
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Page 20 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

• Supervisory or port director approval is required for all personal searches

(except frisks) to try to ensure that objective reasons for the searches are

articulated and approved in advance and that the outcomes of searches are

properly documented.

• A complaint process has been developed that is intended to provide a

system for responding to all passenger complaints.

• A program was established to measure the effectiveness of passenger

targeting for secondary searches and passenger compliance with the laws

that Customs enforces, including drug laws.

Customs is to provide basic training on personal searches to all new

inspectors and offers additional courses to supplement this training. The

four ports that we visited also provided a variety of training to inspectors

on personal search policy and procedures that included on-the-job

training. These courses differed from port to port.

Most inspectors (89 percent) and supervisors (87 percent) who responded

to our survey questions believed that classroom training they received on

personal searches was more than or generally adequate. The majority of

these inspectors (84 percent) and supervisors (88 percent) also believed

that nonclassroom training provided by the ports, including on-the-job

training, was more than or generally adequate.

Recent internal and external studies of Customs’ personal search policies

recommended changes to improve Customs’ personal search training.

Some of these recommendations have already been implemented. In

addition, in June 1999, a new Assistant Commissioner was appointed to

direct the new Office of Training and Development to centralize all of

Customs’ training, including its personal search training.

Customs requires all entry-level inspectors to attend an 11-week course,

“Customs Inspector Basic Training,” at the Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. Among their courses, new

inspectors receive training on targeting passengers for interview and

examination and on conducting personal searches. Training on personal

searches includes a Passenger Selectivity course that covers interviewing

techniques and behavioral and observational techniques, as well as

courses on professionalism and Customs’ search authority. According to

Customs’ Assistant Commissioner for Training and Development,

mandatory training was not provided for air passenger supervisors

because they have received personal search training as inspectors.

Customs Provides Training

on Personal Searches That

Most Inspectors and

Supervisors Considered

Adequate

Required and Optional Personal

Search Training
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Most inspectors (93 percent) and supervisors (95 percent) who responded

to our survey said that they had received basic training. Most of these

inspectors (89 percent) and supervisors (87 percent) believed the required

basic training they received on personal searches was more than or

generally adequate.

In addition to basic training, Customs provided additional personal search

training at FLETC and at the ports. Advanced training courses are offered

at FLETC, but these courses are optional. Training provided by the four

ports we visited included personal search procedures, briefings on recent

drug seizures at airports, on-the-job training, and updates on personal

search policies. This training may vary from port to port and is not

mandatory. Fifty-three percent of the inspectors believed that the

required, additional, and port training they received improved their ability

to identify passengers carrying contraband at least to a moderate extent.

In addition to the basic, additional, and port training, Customs also offered

specialized training for inspectors who had been assigned to Rover

teams.17 Rover training was taught by Rover supervisors and inspectors but

offered only at JFK and Miami airports. Sixty-seven percent of the

inspectors who responded to our survey had taken passenger enforcement

Rover training, and 39 percent of the supervisors who responded to our

survey had received Rover enforcement training.

Treasury, Customs, and a private contractor had recently completed

reviews of Customs’ personal search policies and procedures. Among

other things, they recommended ways for Customs to improve personal

search training that included (1) developing new training courses, (2)

reevaluating existing training, and (3) establishing a system for tracking all

training provided to inspectors and supervisors. Customs had agreed with

these recommendations and has begun to implement some of them.

• Treasury’s June 1999 OPR study recommended changes in personal search

training and recording training received by inspectors and supervisors.

OPR reported that Customs’ Basic Training Course and many of the

advanced training courses did not allocate sufficient time for training

inspectors and supervisors on issues related to professionalism (e.g.,

 

17 The Rover teams carry out proactive inspections by observing and interviewing passengers before

the passengers present their declaration of goods being brought into the United States to an inspector

at the control point. Their training includes training similar to that provided to other inspectors, such

as passenger targeting, post-seizure analysis, and observational and interviewing techniques. The

purpose of the Rover training is specifically to enhance the teams’ ability to target and identify

passengers who may be carrying contraband and examine passengers more effectively.

Recent Studies Recommended

Changes to Customs’ Personal

Search Training and Tracking

System
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diversity, sensitivity, ethics, or interpersonal skills). OPR recommended

that Customs work with FLETC to provide entry-level instruction on

professionalism and promote professionalism in all job series.

Customs agreed with this recommendation. According to Customs, it is

currently conducting nationwide professionalism training at all ports by

requiring all inspectors and supervisors to take five new courses to

supplement their basic training. 18 In addition, the Commissioner has

announced that professionalism training is to be incorporated into all

aspects of training at FLETC.

OPR also reported that local training was not always captured in Customs’

training database. Consequently, there was no way to accurately

determine all of the training that inspectors received at the ports. OPR

recommended that Customs ensure that (1) all training is entered into the

training database, (2) training records are reviewed annually to certify they

are accurately maintained, and (3) the Office of Internal Affairs verifies

and certifies training records during inspections. Customs agreed with

these recommendations and now requires that all training be recorded in

the training database. Each port is responsible for the accurate data entry

and maintenance of the records.

Although the four ports we visited had recorded basic required FLETC

training in the training database, additional courses provided at the ports

were not consistently reported in the training database.

• The March 1999 Passenger Processing Targeting Committee reviewed how

inspectors apply their knowledge and training to target or select

passengers for inspection. The Committee made several

recommendations. For example, the Committee recommended that

Customs reassess the validity of the Rover training conducted at the JFK

and Miami airports. Specifically, it recommended that skilled Rovers and

trainers review the current training to determine if it is appropriate for all

airports or should be adapted for each port. According to the Acting

Director of Passenger Operations, Customs has suspended Rover Training

taught at the JFK and Miami airports. Customs has engaged a contractor

to review its entire Rover training so that its policies and procedures are

more consistent among the ports.

 

18 The five courses are Interpersonal Communications, Cultural Interaction, Passenger Enforcement

Selectivity Training, Confrontation Management/ Verbal Judo, and Customs’ Personal Search Policy.
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• The Customs Service hired Booz·Allen & Hamilton to review air passenger

interpersonal communications that included two areas related to training.

The contractor’s report included three recommendations related to

training. Specifically, it said that:

(1) Customs should clarify and standardize policies and procedures to

ensure that inspectors are not confused about or unsure of personal

search policies and procedures. The contractor found that search

procedures in the field sometimes vary from what the inspectors were

taught at FLETC. It recommended that Customs revise the Handbook,

deliver it to all inspectors, and provide training on the new policy.

Customs issued a revised Handbook in September 1999; according to

Customs officials, training was provided to all staff involved with personal

search inspections.

(2) Customs should standardize communication to passengers subjected

to a personal search. This should include information about Customs’

policy and the personal search process and providing courses on

interpersonal communications for supervisors and inspectors at the top 15

airports. Customs had developed a new mandatory course in

Interpersonal Communications.

(3) Customs should make Rover training available to all inspectors. It was

recommended that Customs develop an abbreviated course to be made

available to more inspectors or offer the course on video for wider

distribution. Customs’ Office of Training and Development is reassessing

its Rover training; the Rover training taught at the JFK and Miami airports

has been suspended while the course is being revised.

In June 1999, the Commissioner announced the appointment of a new

Assistant Commissioner to direct a new Office of Training and

Development. The Office is expected to, among other things, centralize all

Customs training, ensure that mandatory training courses are provided to

inspectors and supervisors, and ensure that all training is recorded

accurately in Customs’ training database. The new Assistant

Commissioner is also to direct implementation of the recommendations on

training mentioned above.

According to Customs’ Handbook, supervisory approval is required for

patdowns (except for weapons) and strip-searches. X-rays (both

consensual and involuntary), body cavity searches, and MBM detentions

prior to the search require port director approval. Supervisors and port

New Office of Training and

Development

Supervisory Approval Is

Required for Personal

Searches
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directors are expected to make an independent assessment of the facts

and decide whether the inspector’s reasons for the search warrant the

level of search requested. Each progressive level of search (e.g., after a

strip-search, approving a subsequent request for an x-ray) has to be

approved separately so that it is clear that the reasons articulated for the

additional searches are justified.

Supervisors and port directors do not have to be present to authorize a

personal search, nor do they have to be present during the search.19 They

can authorize personal searches from a remote location, including over the

telephone or by radio. According to officials at the four airports we

visited, remote approval was generally used only when there was a

shortage of supervisors available.

Generally, supervisors, who have authorized personal searches, whether

results were positive or negative, are to review and approve or disapprove

each search report20 prepared by the inspecting officer. Their approval is

intended to indicate that the search was approved in advance and they

were satisfied that the reasons provided for the search were appropriate

for the type of search conducted. When details are missing or unclear, the

supervisor will work with the officer to correct the report.

At the time of our initial fieldwork, supervisory approval was not required

to authorize a patdown of a passenger. However, officials at two of the

four airports we visited told us they required supervisory approval for all

patdowns.21

During fiscal year 1999, Customs changed its procedures. For example, all

patdowns are to be approved in advance by a supervisor, unless there is

concern that a passenger may have a weapon. In addition, the port

director must now approve all searches that require moving a person to a

medical facility for a medical examination (i.e., body cavity, x-ray, and

MBM); and this authority cannot be delegated unless the port director is

away (e.g., on leave) from the port. Previously, a supervisor’s approval

was required for these requests. In the event of a prolonged detention (8

 

19 The Handbook provides that when possible, approvals should be granted in person.

20 A search report documents that a personal search has been performed. It includes the type of

search, reason(s) for conducting the search, and the results of the search. Positive searches (resulting

in enforcement action) are reported on the Search, Arrest & Seizure Report. Negative searches are

reported on the Inspectional Operations Incident Log.

21Beginning in May 1999, Customs required that all patdown searches must have supervisory approval

in advance of the search.

New Policy of Approval for

Personal Searches
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hours or longer) where probable cause that a passenger has been carrying

contraband has not been developed, any further detention must be

reapproved by the port director. The previous policy was that supervisory

approval was required for a medical examination regardless of the length

of detention.

Customs has also developed a Supervisor’s Check Sheet that is to be used

to record all negative personal searches. Among other things, the check

sheet requires the supervisor to certify that the search criteria had been

reviewed and found appropriate and that the supervisor had reviewed the

search criteria and results, examination, and personal search process with

the inspector for lessons learned. Positive searches are to result in

enforcement action and are documented in seizure and arrest reports.

Most inspectors responding to our survey said that at their respective

ports, they are required to obtain approval from their supervisors (or

seniors) prior to conducting personal searches. Specifically, 97 percent

responded that they needed approval for patdown searches; and 99

percent responded that they needed approval for all types of more

intrusive searches, such as strip-searches and x-rays. Most inspectors

responding to our survey said they had not conducted personal searches

without supervisory (or senior) approval within the last 6 months. For

example, over 99 percent of the inspectors responded that they never, or

rarely, conducted strip-searches or x-rays without supervisory approval.

Most inspectors responded to our survey that their requests for personal

searches were usually approved. For example, inspectors reported that 93

percent of strip-searches requested were approved, and 75 percent of xrays requested were approved. Supervisors’ responses regarding

approvals also indicated that they approved the majority of search

requests. However, inspectors and supervisors reported that fewer

requests for x-rays were approved than any other requests for personal

searches.

Customs recently revised and centralized its system for processing and

responding to all types of passenger complaints, including personal

search-related complaints. During fiscal year 1997, Customs reported that

the 22 largest international airports combined received approximately 1

complaint for every 58,647 passengers processed. At the 4 airports we

visited, we reviewed all 42 passenger complaints about personal searches

filed during fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Our review showed that Customs

responded to passenger complaints, and it also revealed problems with

the process. Our analysis of the complaint files showed that (1) the

Supervisory Approval Is

Required and, According to

Inspectors and Supervisors,

Almost Always Obtained for

Personal Searches

Customs Responds to

Passenger Complaints, but

Some Discrepancies Exist

Between the Passengers’

Complaints and Customs’

Files
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Page 26 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

passenger’s complaint and Customs’ record of the search sometimes

differed, and (2) Customs’ files did not always contain documentation on

the resolution of the complaint. Officials at the airports we visited said

they did not receive documentation on how complaints were resolved, and

Customs headquarters did not require them to keep documentation at the

port or at the Customs Management Center on how cases were resolved.

According to Customs officials, Customs has assigned passenger service

representatives at 17 of the largest international airports. The

representative is responsible for dealing with the passengers’ complaints.

The representative is to interact with the traveling public and try to

improve passenger relations. In addition, the representative is to assist

travelers in addressing any Customs-related questions or concerns. Until

recently, the representative was to respond in writing to passengers about

their complaints sent to the port.

In March 1999, Customs established a Customer Satisfaction Unit in

headquarters to centralize and standardize the passenger complaint

process. This Unit is now responsible for reviewing and responding to all

passenger complaints.

Customs has also developed a complaint tracking system, which is to

record all complaints (verbal, telephonic, and written) and their resolution

at airports around the country. Customs will be able to use the system to

review and analyze all complaints nationally and by airport. Headquarters

officials also said that a Complaint Review Committee is to be established

at the major airports. The Committee is to periodically monitor and

review the complaint system to determine whether customer service

standards are being met and to determine whether training or disciplinary

measures are necessary in instances when Customs’ personnel do not

meet standards.

Passenger complaints about personal searches at the 4 selected airports,

including those related to strip-searches, totaled 42 in fiscal years 1997 and

1998. Our analysis of these complaints identified discrepancies in 10 of the

42 complaint files reviewed. We found differences between what was

reported by passengers and what was contained in Customs’ records. For

example, in fiscal year 1997, one passenger complained that a woman

inspector told her to strip and she was searched thoroughly. Customs’

record shows that the search was a patdown, and the written response to

the passenger stated that the personal search she experienced is referred

Few Personal Search Complaints

Were Filed But Differences Exist

Between Complaints and

Customs’ Files
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to as a patdown. In addition, Customs’ files did not contain documentation

on whether discrepancies had been resolved for any of the 10 cases.22

In fiscal years 1997 and 1998, 4 of the 42 complaints at the 4 ports alleging

inspector misconduct during a personal search were referred to Customs’

Office of Internal Affairs. According to airport officials, investigations

were completed, and airport management took the appropriate action. In

each case, no action was taken against the inspector because Customs

found no evidence of wrongdoing.

Customs has developed a program intended to measure passenger

compliance with all the laws it is responsible for enforcing, including drug

laws. The program, Compliance Examination (COMPEX) measurement

system, requires a port to randomly examine a sample of passengers

drawn from those who were not targeted in routine passenger processing.

These data are to be used to estimate the number of violations that pass

through the port undetected. COMPEX data are then combined with the

number of violations detected by routine, targeted examinations to create

an estimate of the rate of violations that occurred among the overall

passenger population.

COMPEX is designed to allow Customs to measure the effectiveness of

targeting by comparing the results of targeted exams with the estimated

rate of violations in the overall population of passengers. The program

was established to comply with the Government Performance and Results

Act (GPRA),23 which requires all federal agencies to measure how well

they achieve their missions. COMPEX data are to be used nationally to

measure the effectiveness of its targeting efforts in compliance with

GPRA. In addition, ports are to use COMPEX data as a tool for improving

passenger processing and targeting efficiency.24 Customs officials said that

three of the four airports we visited have been utilizing COMPEX since

fiscal year 1996.

Customs’ Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 1997-2002 states that under

COMPEX, Customs had established a national goal of identifying

passengers carrying contraband from targeted inspections at a rate of 10

times more than randomly selected passengers who are carrying

 

22 The files did not provide any additional information regarding the complaint. Therefore, we could

not determine whether the passenger or Customs was correct.

23 P.L. 103-62 (1993).

24 Targeting efficiency is a comparison of the results of targeting passengers for selection to the results

of randomly selecting passengers for searches.

Customs Plans to Use

COMPEX Data to Monitor

Ports’ Targeting of

Passengers
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contraband. This goal is to be achieved by fiscal year 2002. However,

individual ports have established interim goals. Table 9 shows the interim

goals for the four ports we visited and the ports’ targeting efficiency.

Port Fiscal year

Port’s targeting efficiency

goal, as established by

headquarters

Targeting efficiency, as

measured by headquarters

LAX 1997 3x (better) 4.35x

1998 5x 14.80x

JFK 1997 2x 1.46x

1998 5x 3.30x

O’Hare 1997 10x 14.21x

1998 10x 13.12x

Miami 1997 10x 5.30x

1998 10x 6.30x

Source: Customs, COMPEX program data.

Officials at the four ports said that they focus on achieving their portspecific goals. Although headquarters has directed the ports to use

COMPEX data to improve passenger processing and targeting efficiency,

port officials said headquarters has not provided specific guidance or

direction on how the ports should use COMPEX data. Headquarters

program officials said that they informally reviewed COMPEX data on a

monthly basis to determine different targeting efficiency rates. A

headquarters program official said headquarters expects the port directors

to take the necessary management steps to improve their targeting

efficiency rates without further direction from headquarters. However, the

port officials from the four ports we visited said that headquarters has not

taken any action on the basis of COMPEX results. In commenting on our

draft report, Customs disagreed that it had not provided guidance to the

ports on the use of COMPEX. Customs pointed out that it had issued a

memorandum on August 7, 1997, to its ports and management centers

concerning the use of COMPEX. At the time of our review, this

memorandum was neither mentioned nor provided to us by port or

management center officials.

Customs officials said they have taken steps to address issues related to

COMPEX and to assess how the ports are using COMPEX data.

• Customs officials created a Passenger Data Analysis Team in June 1999.

This unit is to review the targeting practices at airports and to analyze

personal search data. A Customs official has stated that Customs

expected this unit to begin analyzing COMPEX data by December 1999. As

Table 7: COMPEX Targeting Efficiency

Goals and Targeting Efficiency for

Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998

Customs Has Begun to Address

COMPEX Issues
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of November 1999, this unit had three full-time employees.

• Customs developed a Data Improvement Plan to address problems, such

as missing data and data-entry errors. The Plan requires that the port

personnel who are responsible for entering COMPEX data are to assess

the accuracy of data input. After assessing the data, the port personnel

who entered the data will have 60 days to draft an improvement plan to

correct any data inaccuracies. According to a headquarters program

official, the port directors have sufficient management skills to resolve

specific problems related to inaccurate data entry.

• Customs has designed a COMPEX survey for use at most major airports.

The survey includes a variety of questions related to COMPEX, including

how the data are being collected and entered into the system. As of

November 1999, Customs officials said they had administered the survey at

Newark, Atlanta (Hartsfield), Miami, and Chicago’s O’Hare airports.

Customs program officials told us they plan to continue to administer the

survey on an ad hoc basis, but they have not set a deadline for the

completion of the survey or a time frame for the final analysis of the

survey results.

Recent litigation has called into question Customs’ personal search

procedures that initially target airline passengers for examination. As a

result of internal decisions and studies, Customs revised its personal

search practices and procedures. In response to OPR’s recommendation,

Customs agreed to conduct periodic reviews to validate the targeting

criteria and process to ensure that (1) the factors used in targeting are

reasonable predictors of illegal activity; and (2) targeting is not based on

race, color, ethnic origin, or gender. Customs also agreed to conduct

periodic program evaluations, reviewing the techniques, criteria,

efficiency, and cost effectiveness of passenger targeting.

We analyzed personal search data that Customs had in its databases.

These databases included only certain passenger data on the 102,000

international arriving passengers whom Customs subjected to some form

of personal search. Therefore, we could not include in our analysis

information about the characteristics of the millions of other arriving

international passengers not subject to personal searches.

Our analysis showed that generally, searched passengers of particular

races and gender were more likely than other passengers to be subjected

to more intrusive types of personal searches (being strip-searched or xrayed). However, some types of passengers who were more likely to be

Conclusions
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subjected to more intrusive personal searches were not always as likely to

be found carrying drugs or other contraband. For example, White men and

women and Black women were more likely than Black men and Hispanic

men and women to be strip-searched rather than patted down or frisked,

but they were less likely to be found carrying contraband. In fiscal year

1998, Black women who were U.S. citizens were 9 times more likely to be

x-rayed than White women who were U.S. citizens. But x-ray results

indicated that Black women who were U.S. citizens were less than half as

likely to be found carrying contraband as White women who were U.S.

citizens were.

Customs has not analyzed passenger data to determine the relationships

between the characteristics of those passengers selected for personal

searches and the results of those personal searches. By doing such an

analysis, Customs would be able to determine if the rate at which

inspectors target passengers with certain characteristics is similar to rates

at which those passengers are found to be carrying contraband. This

information could help Customs ensure compliance with its policies and

procedures to better target passengers and improve its targeting

efficiency.

We recommend that Customs analyze the characteristics of passengers

selected for intrusive searches and the results of those searches as part of

the periodic evaluation it has agreed to do on the basis of OPR’s

recommendation. It should use these data to help to develop criteria for

determining which passengers to search.

On February 29, 2000, Customs provided comments on the draft report.

Customs said that they were pleased that GAO did not find a pattern

indicating that it had engaged in discriminatory selection of passengers for

personal searches on the basis of race, gender, or ethnic origin. It would

be more accurate to say that we did not address the causes of any patterns

in the data related to selection of passengers for more intrusive searches

and so did not assess the issue of discrimination in relation to passenger

selection and the search process.

Customs said that it agreed with our recommendation and has already

taken several actions to accomplish this objective. Some of these actions

related to data collection and data analysis are:

• With respect to data collection, Customs said that it has taken steps to

collect more complete and accurate data on persons subjected to personal

searches. For example, race, gender, and citizenship used to be optional

Recommendations

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation
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Page 31 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

fields in its automated records. Data entry of these elements is now

mandatory. In addition, other new mandatory data have been added, such

as the port where the flight arrived from and where the traveler initiated

his or her trip.

• With respect to data analysis, Customs said that it is closely monitoring

data on personal searches. In May 1999, it established a Passenger Data

Analysis Team that began publishing weekly reports with data by race and

gender. The report shows the results of Customs personal searches.

Customs added that due to its increased management oversight, improved

guidance in the form of the new personal search handbook, and recent

training to Customs officers authorized to conduct personal searches, it is

now achieving improved results. For example, Customs cited that its

positive search results have increased from 3.5 percent in fiscal year 1998

to 5.73 percent in fiscal year 1999.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no additional distribution of this report until 30 days from

its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to Senator William V. Roth,

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Senator Ted Stevens, Senator Robert C.

Byrd, Senator Fred Thompson, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Senator Ben

Nighthorse Campbell, Senator Byron Dorgan, Senator Susan Collins,

Senator Carl Levin, Senator Phil Gramm, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes,

Senator Michael B. Enzi, Senator Tim Johnson, Representative C.W. Bill

Young, Representative David R. Obey, Representative Bill Archer,

Representative Charles B. Rangel, Representative Philip M. Crane,

Representative Sander M. Levin, Representative Amo Houghton,

Representative William J. Coyne, Representative Jim Kolbe, and

Representative Steny H. Hoyer in their capacities as Chairman or Ranking

Minority Member of Senate or House Committees and Subcommittees. We

are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable Jacob J. Lew,

Director, OMB; the Honorable Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the

Treasury; and the Honorable Raymond Kelly, Commissioner of Customs.

We will also make copies available to others on request.
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Page 32 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

The major contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix V. If

you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact

me or James M. Blume, Assistant Director, on (202) 512-8777.

Sincerely yours,

Laurie E. Ekstrand

Director

Administration of Justice Issues
Page 33 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches
Page 34 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Contents

1 Letter

38

Analysis of Customs Personal Search Data 38

Customs’ Policies and Procedures for Conducting

Personal Searches

57

Customs’ Management Controls 59

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope,

Methodology, and

Additional Results of

Analysis

Appendix II 61

Inspector Survey

Appendix III 72

Supervisor Survey

Appendix IV 84

Comments From the

U.S. Customs Service

Appendix V 87

GAO Contacts and

Staff

Acknowledgments

Table 1: Customs’ Policies for Personal Search by Type,

Suspicion Level, and Approving Official

5

Table 2: Number and Percent of Passengers With Positive

or Negative Search Results by Type of Search, Fiscal

Years 1997 and 1998

10

Table 3: Differences Between U.S. Citizen White and

Minority Men and Women in Being Strip-Searched, in

Fiscal Year 1998

12

Tables

Table 4: Differences Between U.S. Citizen White and

Minority Men and Women in the Likelihood of Being Xrayed, in Fiscal Year 1998

13
Contents

Page 35 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Table 5: Differences Between U.S. Citizen White and

Minority Men and Women in the Likelihood of Stripsearches Yielding Positive Results in Fiscal Year 1998

14

Table 6: Differences Between U.S. Citizen White and

Minority Men and Women in the Likelihood of X-ray

Searches Yielding Positive in Fiscal Year 1998

15

Table 7: COMPEX Targeting Efficiency Goals and

Targeting Efficiency for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998

28

Table I.1: Number and Percentage of Passengers

Subjected to Personal Searches in 1997 and 1998 by

Gender, Race, Fiscal Year, Citizenship Status, Type of

Search, and Search Results

40

Table I.2: Number and Percent of Passengers Subject to

Types of Searches by Fiscal Year, Gender, Race, and

Citizenship

41

Table I.3: Number and Percent of Passengers With

Positive or Negative Search Results by Fiscal Year,

Gender, Race, Citizenship Status, and Type of Search

42

Table I.4: Number and Percentage of Frisks/Patdowns,

Strip-Searches, and X-ray Searches by Fiscal Year,

Citizenship, Race, and Gender

44

Table I.5: Number and Percentage of Positive and

Negative Searches for Strip-Searches by Gender, Race,

Citizenship Status, and Fiscal Year

45

Table I.6: Number and Percentage of Positive and

Negative Searches for X-ray by Gender, Race,

Citizenship Status, and Fiscal Year

46

Table I.7: Models Fitted Tables in Which (1) Being StripSearched Versus Nonintrusively Searched and (2) Xrayed Versus Nonintrusively Searched are CrossClassified by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Gender, and

Race

47

Table I.8: Models Fitted to Tables in Which Search

Outcomes are Cross-Classified by Fiscal Year,

Citizenship, Gender, and Race for Passengers (1) StripSearched and (2) X-rayed.

48

Table I.9: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred

Model in Which Type of Search Is Cross-Classified by

Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race, and Gender, for Stripsearches versus Nonintrusive Searches

50
Contents

Page 36 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Table I.10: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred

Model for the Table in Which Type of Search Is CrossClassified by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race, and

Gender, for X-ray Searches versus Nonintrusive

Searches

52

Table I.11: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred

Model for the Table in Which Result of Search Is CrossClassified by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race, and

Gender, for Strip-Searches Only

54

Table I.12: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred

Model for the Table in Which Result of Search Is CrossClassified by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race, and

Gender, for X-ray Searches Only

56

Abbreviations

APIS Advanced Passenger Information System

COMPEX Compliance Examination Measurement System

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

MBM monitored bowel movement

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility

PAU Passenger Analytical Unit

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System

APAS Automated Passenger Analysis System
Page 37 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and

Additional Results of Analysis

Page 38 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

We were asked to review Customs’ policies and procedures for conducting

personal searches and to determine the controls in place to ensure that

airline passengers are not inappropriately selected or subjected to

intrusive personal searches. Specifically, we agreed to provide information

and analysis on (1) Customs’ personal search data to identify the

characteristics—race (White, Hispanic, Asian, or Black) and gender—of

passengers who were more likely to be subjected to intrusive searches

(i.e., strip-searched or x-rayed) and the results of searching those

passengers; (2) Customs’ policies and procedures for conducting personal

searches and how they are implemented at airports; and (3) Customs’

management controls over the personal search process.

Customs inspectors are to document all incidents and personal searches,

recording basic information about the passenger and a brief narrative

describing the search and/or seizure. Data from these documents are to be

entered into one of two centralized databases. The first is the Treasury

Enforcement Communications System (TECS) Search, Arrest, and Seizure

report, which documents positive incidences resulting from either a

personal search or baggage search or both (i.e., contraband was found in a

passenger’s luggage resulting in a seizure and/or arrest, but no

merchandise was found on the passenger’s body). The second is the TECS

Incident Log, which records all negative personal searches. We used data

from both sources for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 for our analysis.

We received data on the types of searches passengers were subjected to;

the results of the searches; and the passengers’ races, genders, and

citizenship status from both fiscal years. We did not see the need to

independently verify the accuracy or completeness of the Customs data

because Customs has taken steps to ensure complete passenger

information for each incident (e.g., requiring information on origin of

flight).

We received information on the passengers’ genders and races—White,

Black, Hispanic, and Asian.1

 We also received the citizenship status for

each passenger when it was available. For purposes of our analysis, we

collapsed the information into two categories to contrast U.S. citizens and

noncitizens. About 20 percent of the cases were missing data on race, and

20 percent were missing data on citizenship status.

 

1

 The number of Native Americans subjected to personal searches in 1997 and 1998 (n=79) was too

small to include in our multivariate analyses.

Analysis of Customs

Personal Search Data
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 39 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

One of our objectives was to examine information on personal searches of

passengers conducted by Customs in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 and

determine whether the fiscal year and gender, race, or citizenship status of

the passengers searched affected the likelihood of whether they were

searched intrusively (x-rayed or strip-searched) rather than nonintrusively

(frisked or patted down).2 Our analysis focused on only those passengers

subjected to personal searches. Our analysis did not include all passengers

who entered the country or those who only had their baggage searched.

We also considered whether the more intrusive searches conducted were

positive or negative to determine whether or not the more intrusive

searches of certain types of passengers resulted in their having similar

likelihoods of yielding positive results.

In conducting our analysis, we first looked at the percentages of searched

passengers in both fiscal years 1997 and 1998 for each gender, race, and

citizenship group that were patted down or frisked, strip-searched, and xrayed. We also looked at the percentages in each group that were found to

be concealing contraband. We then considered these four factors

simultaneously and used both loglinear and logistic regression models to

determine the effects of these factors on the likelihood of being stripsearched as opposed to patted down or frisked and of being x-rayed as

opposed to patted down or frisked. The models, which are described

below, allowed us to determine the effects of each factor independently of

one another and to determine whether they interacted with one another

(i.e., whether the effect of gender on the likelihood of being strip-searched

as opposed to patted down was different for minorities from the likelihood

for Whites, or for citizens versus noncitizens).

Table I.1 shows the numbers and percentages of searched individuals

overall by fiscal year, gender, race, citizenship, and the type and outcome

of the search that was conducted. Slightly more searches were conducted

in 1998 than in 1997, and overall men outnumbered women among the

persons who were searched by roughly 3 to 1 (76,342 men compared to

24,431 women). The fact that information on citizenship and race is

missing for about 20 percent of the individuals who were searched makes

it somewhat more difficult for us to reliably estimate the relative numbers

of citizens and noncitizens and the relative numbers of persons of each

race who were searched. Among those individuals for whom we have

data, noncitizens substantially outnumbered citizens among persons

 2

 Another type of personal search is a body cavity search. Body cavity searches are defined as any

visual or physical intrusion into body cavities. However, only 32 such searches were performed in both

fiscal years 1997 and 1998, so we excluded these from any analyses.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 40 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

searched. There were more Hispanics searched than there were Whites;

and Whites outnumbered Blacks and Asians among individuals searched

by about 2 to 1 (25,634 Whites to 12,777 Blacks) and about 3 to 1 (25,634

Whites to 8,450 Asians), respectively.

Number Percent

1997 49,624 49

1998 52,468 51

Fiscal year

Female 24,431 24

Male 76,342 75

Missing data 1,319 1

Gender

White 25,634 25

Black 12,777 13

Asian 8,450 8

Hispanic 31,397 31

Native American 79 0

Missing data 23,755 23

Race

U.S. citizen 30,004 29

Noncitizen 50,819 50

Missing data 21,269 21

Citizenship

Frisk/patdown 96,769 95

Strip 3,872 4

X-ray 1,419 1

Body cavity 32 0

Type of search

Search results Negative 97,752 96

Positive 4340 4

Note 1: All percentages are calculated on the basis of the total number of passengers subjected to

personal searches (102,092).

Note 2: Some passengers who were x-rayed may have been strip-searched as well. All passengers

who were strip-searched and x-rayed were first either patted down or frisked.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.2 shows the numbers and percentages of individuals in each fiscal

year that were subjected to the various types of searches. The more

intrusive searches occurred with the same relative frequency in fiscal

years 1997 and 1998.

Table I.1: Number and Percentage of

Passengers Subjected to Personal

Searches in 1997 and 1998 by Gender,

Race, Fiscal Year, Citizenship Status,

Type of Search, and Search Results
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 41 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Nonintrusive Intrusive

Frisk /patdown Strip-Search X-ray

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Total

number

Fiscal year

1997 47,134 95 1,775 4 696 1 49,605

1998 49,635 95 2,097 4 723 1 52,455

Gender

Female 22,716 93 1,334 5 364 1 24,414

Male 72,976 96 2,338 3 1015 1 76,329

Missing data 1,077 82 200 15 40 3 1,317

Race

White 23,644 92 1,820 7 154 1 25,618

Black 11,494 90 785 6 490 4 12,769

Asian 8,304 98 138 2 7 0 8,449

Hispanic 30,261 96 569 2 565 2 31,395

Native

American

72 91 7 9 0 0 79

Missing data 22,994 97 553 2 203 1 23,750

Citizenship

U.S. 28,011 93 1,562 5 421 1 29,994

Noncitizen 48,421 95 1,557 3 824 2 50,802

Missing data 20,337 96 753 4 174 1 21,264

Note: All percentages are calculated on the basis of the total number of passengers subjected to

personal searches (102,060), excluding body cavity searches.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

The percentages of passengers being intrusively searched, as opposed to

nonintrusively searched, appeared to be similar for those persons for

whom information on citizenship and race was missing and those for

whom such information was available. However, the 1,317 persons for

whom information on gender was missing were considerably more likely

than others to have been strip-searched or x-rayed. For example, 15

percent of those searched passengers for whom information on gender

was missing were strip-searched, but 5 percent of those known to be

women and 3 percent of those known to be men were strip-searched.

Table I.3 shows that positive search results occurred in about 4 percent of

all searches for both men and women. Searches of Blacks and Whites were

more likely to yield positive findings than searches of Hispanics and

Asians, and searches of citizens were more often positive than searches of

noncitizens. There were sizable differences in the percentages of

nonintrusive and intrusive searches that yielded positive results. X-ray

results were positive 31 percent of the time, positive strip-searches

Table I.2: Number and Percent of

Passengers Subject to Types of

Searches by Fiscal Year, Gender, Race,

and Citizenship
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 42 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

occurred 23 percent of the time, and positive frisks and patdowns

occurred 3 percent of the time. These latter differences in the percentages

of positive results by type of search may account for some or all of the

differences in the percentages of positive results across race and

citizenship categories. As table I.2 showed, there were differences across

race and citizenship categories in the percentages subjected to the

different types of searches.

Negative Positive

Number Percent Number Percent Total Number

Fiscal year

1997 47,406 96 2,218 4 49,624

1998 50,346 96 2,122 4 52,468

Gender

Female 23,445 96 986 4 24,431

Male 73,370 96 2,972 4 76,342

Missing data 937 71 382 29 1,319

Race

White 23,950 93 1,684 7 25,634

Black 11,905 93 872 7 12,777

Asian 8,168 97 282 3 8,450

Hispanic 30,423 97 974 3 31,397

Native American 76 96 3 4 79

Missing data 23,230 98 525 2 23,755

Citizenship

U.S. 28,259 94 1,745 6 30,004

Noncitizen 49,044 97 1,775 3 50,819

Missing data 20,449 96 820 4 21,269

Type of search

Frisk/patdown 93,764 97 3,005 3 96,769

Strip 2,989 77 883 23 3,872

X-ray 985 69 434 31 1,419

Body cavity 14 44 18 56 32

Note: All percentages are calculated on the basis of the total number of passengers subjected to

personal searches (102,092).

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Tables I.1, I.2, and I.3 suggest that a number of characteristics that we

examined are related to passengers being intrusively searched and to

searches being positive. However, the differences are potentially

misleading because they involve looking at the effect of each characteristic

independently of the other characteristics. Because we were concerned

Table I.3: Number and Percent of

Passengers With Positive or Negative

Search Results by Fiscal Year, Gender,

Race, Citizenship Status, and Type of

Search
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 43 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

that the effects of certain characteristics may account for or interact with

others, we cross-classified the types and outcomes of searches by each of

the four characteristics (fiscal year, gender, citizenship, and race)

simultaneously and, using multivariate techniques, estimated the effect of

each characteristic controlling for every other characteristic.3

Table I.4 shows the numbers and percentages of searched persons who

were patted down or frisked, strip-searched, and x-rayed for each of the

categories of individuals who were cross-classified by gender, race, and

citizenship in each fiscal year. Tables I.5 and I.6 show the actual numbers

and percentages of persons searched for whom positive search outcomes

resulted, again for each of the categories of individuals who were crossclassified by gender, race, and citizenship in each fiscal year, for persons

strip-searched (table I.5) and x-rayed (table I.6).

 3

 Our multivariate results are on the basis of the 67,553 cases with no missing data. However, we did

repeat the analysis including cases that were coded as missing and found that the overall results with

respect to the effects of sex, race, citizenship, and year were similar.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 44 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Type of search

Fiscal Frisk / Patdown Strip-search X-ray

year

Citizenship

status Race Gender Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Total number

White Male 2,567 93 188 7 18 1 2,773

White Female 732 93 42 5 9 1 783

Black Male 1,717 92 67 4 77 4 1,861

Female 913 88 100 10 29 3 1,042

Asian Male 1,672 98 25 1 2 0 1,699

Female 625 97 22 3 0 0 647

Male 8,089 97 99 1 174 2 8,362

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 2,209 95 76 3 35 2 2,320

White Male 4,592 94 275 6 24 0 4,891

Female 1,369 93 98 7 12 1 1,479

Black Male 1,176 92 58 5 47 4 1,281

Female 738 82 106 12 54 6 898

Asian Male 876 99 8 1 1 0 885

Female 338 97 8 2 1 0 347

Male 1,989 95 51 2 45 2 2,085

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 548 87 67 11 15 2 630

White Male 3,079 89 344 10 36 1 3,459

Female 698 88 86 11 7 1 791

Black Male 2,106 92 76 3 115 5 2,297

Female 1,005 89 86 8 38 3 1,129

Asian Male 1,584 99 22 1 0 0 1,606

Female 564 97 18 3 1 0 583

Male 9,258 97 101 1 160 2 9,519

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 2,217 95 75 3 41 2 2,333

White Male 5,440 92 435 7 22 0 5,897

Female 1,352 92 100 7 15 1 1,467

Black Male 1,294 89 94 6 61 4 1,449

Female 719 85 96 11 33 4 848

Asian Male 1,067 99 11 1 0 0 1,078

Female 340 97 10 3 1 0 351

Male 2,178 97 21 1 43 2 2,242

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 484 93 27 5 10 2 521

Note: These totals are based on the 67,553 cases with no missing data. These totals also exclude

body cavity searches and Native Americans.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.4: Number and Percentage of Frisks/Patdowns, Strip-Searches, and X-ray Searches by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race,

and Gender
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 45 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Results for strip-searches

Fiscal Negative Positive

year

Citizenship

status Race Gender Number Percent Number Percent Total number

White Male 157 84 31 16 188

Female 31 74 11 26 42

Black Male 49 73 18 27 67

Female 88 88 12 12 100

Asian Male 23 92 2 8 25

Female 18 82 4 18 22

Male 60 61 39 39 99

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 61 80 15 20 76

White Male 203 74 72 26 275

Female 77 79 21 21 98

Black Male 31 53 27 47 58

Female 77 73 29 27 106

Asian Male 8 100 0 0 8

Female 8 100 0 0 8

Male 26 51 25 49 51

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 46 69 21 31 67

White Male 296 86 48 14 344

Female 73 85 13 15 86

Black Male 47 62 29 38 76

Female 74 86 12 14 86

Asian Male 17 77 5 23 22

Female 16 89 2 11 18

Male 72 71 29 29 101

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 57 76 18 24 75

White Male 355 82 80 18 435

Female 87 87 13 13 100

Black Male 62 66 32 34 94

Female 69 72 27 28 96

Asian Male 10 91 1 9 11

Female 7 70 3 30 10

Male 16 76 5 24 21

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 17 63 10 37 27

Note: These totals are based on the 67,553 cases with no missing data. These totals exclude body

cavity searches and Native Americans.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.5: Number and Percentage of Positive and Negative Searches for Strip-Searches by Gender, Race, Citizenship Status,

and Fiscal Year
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 46 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Results for x-ray searches

Fiscal Negative Positive

year

Citizenship

status Race Number Percent Number Percent Total

White Male 9 50 9 50 18

Female 4 44 5 56 9

Black Male 38 49 39 51 77

Female 23 79 6 21 29

Asian Male 2 100 0 0 2

Female 0 0 0 0 0

Male 118 68 56 32 174

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 22 63 13 37 35

White Male 18 75 6 25 24

Female 4 33 8 67 12

Black Male 27 57 20 43 47

Female 39 72 15 28 54

Asian Male 1 100 0 0 1

Female 1 100 0 0 1

Male 32 71 13 29 45

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 9 60 6 40 15

White Male 24 67 12 33 36

Female 5 71 2 29 7

Black Male 71 62 44 38 115

Female 27 71 11 29 38

Asian Male 0 0 0 0 0

Female 1 100 0 0 1

Male 120 75 40 25 160

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 31 76 10 24 41

White Male 17 77 5 23 22

Female 9 60 6 40 15

Black Male 38 62 23 38 61

Female 26 79 7 21 33

Asian Male 0 0 0 0 0

Female 1 100 0 0 1

Male 32 74 11 26 43

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 6 60 4 40 10

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

To distinguish the statistically significant effects from insignificant effects

in these tables, we fit a series of models, which varied in terms of the

direct and interactive effects they included.4

 The top panel of table I.7

 4

 A main effect includes, for example, the relationship between gender and the likelihood of being stripsearched. An interaction effect includes, for example, the relationship between a category of race and

gender on the likelihood of being strip-searched.

Table I.6: Number and Percentage of Positive and Negative Searches for X-ray by Gender, Race, Citizenship Status, and Fiscal

Year
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 47 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

shows the models fitted to table I.4 when x-rays are excluded and the

numbers of persons strip-searched are compared to the numbers patted

down or frisked. The bottom panel of table I.7 shows the models fitted to

table I.4 when strip-searches are excluded and the numbers of persons xrayed are compared to the numbers patted down or frisked. The two

panels in table I.8 show models fitted to the two tables in which positive

and negative search outcomes are contrasted for strip-searches and for xrays.

The models we fit were logistic regression models that allowed the four

characteristics (fiscal year, gender, citizenship, and race) to be related to

one another but varied in terms of the main and interaction effects of those

characteristics on whether searches were intrusive and whether intrusive

searches were positive. In each of these analyses we fit and compared a

series of four models.

• Model 1 is a baseline model of independence.

• Model 2 is a main effects model, which includes all direct effects of all

independent variables (e.g., race, gender, fiscal years, citizenship).

• Model 3 includes all two-way interactions between factors in addition to

the main effects included in Model 2.

• Model 4, which eliminates the insignificant variables (p>.05), is the

preferred (final) model for each table. Model 4, in all analyses, fits the data

acceptably (p<.10) and/or accounted for the large bulk (60%) of the

associations present in the data.

Marginals/effects fitted

Likelihood ratio

chi-square df P

Explained

variationa

Strip searches versus nonintrusive searches

Model 1 {YCSR} {T} 1686.6 31 <.001 0%

Model 2 {YCSR} {YT}{CT}{RT}{ST} 355.8 25 <.001 79%

Model 3 {YCSR} {YCT}{YRT}{YST}{CST}{CRT}{SRT} 37.2 13 <.001 98%

Model 4 {YCSR}{YT}{CT}{RT}{YRWT}{CRB,HT}{SRWT} 62.7 22 <.001 96%

 X-ray searches versus nonintrusive searches

Model 1 {YCSR} {T} 733.3 31 <.001 0%

Model 2 {YCSR} {YT}{CT}{RT}{ST} 59.6 25 <.001 92%

Model 3 {YCSR} {YCT}{YRT}{YST}{CST}{CRT}{SRT} 17.6 13 .17 98%

Model 4 {YCSR}{RT}{ST}{CST}{CRWT} 32.8 25 .14 96%

a The percentage of explained variation refers to the amount of variability in the 32 different observed

likelihoods in each table that is accounted for by the model.

Table I.7: Models Fitted Tables in Which (1) Being Strip-Searched Versus Nonintrusively Searched and (2) X-rayed Versus

Nonintrusively Searched are Cross-Classified by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Gender, and Race
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 48 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Note: Bracketed letters refer to variables that are associated with one another under the differing

models: Y = Fiscal year, C = Citizenship, S = Gender, and R = Race. Subscripts denote the particular

categories of race that are involved in the interactions under the differing models: W = White, H =

Hispanic, B = Black. T= the outcome of being subject to either a strip or x-ray search.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Marginals/effects fitted

Likelihood ratio

chi-square df P

Explained

variationa

Positive versus negative results for strip-searches

Model 1 {YCSR} {T} 138.0 31 <.001 0%

Model 2 {YCSR} {YT}{CT}{RT}{ST} 46.8 25 .005 66%

Model 3 {YCSR} {YCT}{YRT}{YST}{CST}{CRT}{SRT} 22.6 13 .047 84%

Model 4 {YCSR}{YT}{CT}{RT}{ST}{SRb

T} 40.6 25 .026 71%

Positive versus negative results for x-ray searches

Model 1 {YCSR} {T} 43.5 31 .067 0%

Model 2 {YCSR} {YT}{CT}{RT}{ST} 25.4 25 .440 42%

Model 3 {YCSR} (YCT}{YRT}{YST}{CST}{CRT}{SRT} 5.7 13 .956 87%

Model 4 {YCSR}{YT}{RT}{SRb

T} 17.7 28 .934 60%

a

 The percentage of explained variation refers to the amount of variability in the 32 different observed

likelihoods in each table that is accounted for by the model.

Note: Bracketed letters refer to variables that are associated with one another under the differing

models: Y = Fiscal year, C = Citizenship, S = Gender, and R = Race. Subscripts denote the particular

categories of race that are involved in the interactions under the differing models: W = White, H =

Hispanic, B = Black. T= the outcome of the search being positive for finding contraband.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

The model chosen as the preferred model to describe the effects of fiscal

year, race, gender, and citizenship on the likelihood of being strip-searched

as opposed to simply frisked or patted down is one that involves the

effects of all factors, some of which are interacting. The effects of the four

factors can be seen in the ratios in table I.9 and are described as follows:

• The effect of fiscal year (or the change from 1997 to 1998) is different for

minorities and Whites. Among searched minorities, the likelihood of being

strip-searched declined slightly by a factor of .87. For Whites, however, the

likelihood of being strip-searched increased between 1997 and 1998 by a

factor of 1.40. This was true for both men and women and for citizens as

well as noncitizens.

• The effect of citizenship is different for Blacks and Hispanics from the

effects for Whites and Asians. Among Whites and Asians, citizens are less

likely than noncitizens to be strip-searched, by a factor of 0.76; among

Table I.8: Models Fitted to Tables in Which Search Outcomes are Cross-Classified by Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Gender, and

Race for Passengers (1) Strip-Searched and (2) X-rayed.

The Likelihood of Being

Strip-Searched
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 49 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Blacks and Hispanics, citizens are more likely than noncitizens to be stripsearched, by factors of 1.51 and 1.97, respectively.

• Race interacts with fiscal year and citizenship. In general, though,

minorities are less likely to be strip-searched than Whites. Among citizens,

however, Black women were nearly 3 times as likely as White women

(2.78) to have been strip-searched as opposed to nonintrusively searched

in 1997, and they were nearly twice as likely (1.73) to have been stripsearched in 1998.

• Gender has an effect for minorities, but no effect for Whites. Among all

three minority groups, women were 2.81 times as likely as men to be stripsearched. Among Whites, however, men and women were equally likely to

be strip-searched. This gender effect was the same for both citizens and

noncitizens in both fiscal years.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 50 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Strip-searches

(expected frequencies)

Fiscal

year

Citizenship

status Race Gender Nonintrusive

StripSearchLikelihoods of

strip-search

Gender

ratio Race ratio

Citizenship

ratio

Fiscal year

ratio

White Male 2558.23 196.77 0.0769

Female 718.72 55.28 0.0769 1.00

Black Male 1718.10 65.90 0.0384 0.50

Female 914.45 98.55 0.1078 2.81 1.40

Asian Male 1673.75 23.25 0.0139 0.18

Female 622.70 24.30 0.0390 2.81 0.51

Male 8086.00 102.00 0.0126 0.16

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 2206.78 78.22 0.0354 2.81 0.46

White Male 4597.33 269.67 0.0587 0.76

Female 1385.72 81.28 0.0587 1.00 0.76

Black Male 1166.42 67.58 0.0579 0.99 1.51

Female 725.84 118.16 0.1628 2.81 2.78 1.51

Asian Male 874.73 9.27 0.0106 0.18 0.76

Female 336.00 10.00 0.0298 2.81 0.51 0.76

Male 1990.44 49.56 0.0249 0.42 1.97

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 574.78 40.22 0.0700 2.81 1.19 1.97

White Male 3090.24 332.76 0.1077 1.40

Female 707.79 76.21 0.1077 1.00 1.40

Black Male 2111.29 70.71 0.0335 0.31 0.87

Female 997.16 93.84 0.0941 2.81 0.87 0.87

Asian Male 1586.75 19.25 0.0121 0.11 0.87

Female 562.82 19.18 0.0341 2.81 0.32 0.87

Male 9257.03 101.97 0.0110 0.10 0.87

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 2223.19 68.81 0.0310 2.81 0.29 0.87

White Male 5429.16 445.84 0.0821 0.76 1.40

Female 1341.81 110.19 0.0821 1.00 0.76 1.40

Black Male 1321.16 66.84 0.0506 0.62 1.51 0.87

Female 713.57 101.43 0.1421 2.81 1.73 1.51 0.87

Asian Male 1068.12 9.88 0.0093 0.11 0.76 0.87

Female 341.13 8.87 0.0260 2.81 0.32 0.76 0.87

Male 2152.20 46.80 0.0217 0.26 1.97 0.87

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 481.58 29.42 0.0611 2.81 0.74 1.97 0.87

Note: The gender ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for women

relative to men within race, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The race ratios compare the

likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians relative to Whites

within gender, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The citizenship ratios compare the likelihood of

being subjected to strip-searches for U.S. citizens relative to noncitizens within gender, race, and

fiscal year categories. The fiscal year ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to stripsearches in 1998 relative to 1997 within gender, race, and citizenship categories.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.9: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred Model in Which Type of Search Is Cross-Classified by Fiscal Year,

Citizenship, Race, and Gender, for Strip-searches versus Nonintrusive Searches
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 51 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

The results of the preferred model to describe the effects of fiscal year,

race, gender, and citizenship on the likelihood of being x-rayed as opposed

to simply frisked or patted down is depicted in table I.10 and are described

as follows:

• There was no change from fiscal years 1997 to 1998.

• The effect of citizenship is different for minorities from the effect for

Whites and different among men and women. Among minority men, there

were no differences between citizens and noncitizens in the likelihood of

being x-rayed. Among White women, the difference was slight (i.e., citizens

were slightly less likely to be x-rayed, by a factor of 0.9). Among minority

women, however, citizens were more likely than noncitizens to be x-rayed,

by a factor of 1.7. This difference was the same in both fiscal years.

• The effect of race and the differences between Blacks and Whites, and

between Hispanics and Whites, are greater among citizens than among

noncitizens. Among noncitizens, Blacks and Hispanics were more likely

than Whites to be x-rayed, by factors of 4.5 and 1.9, respectively; Asians

were much less likely to be x-rayed than Whites. Among citizens, however,

Blacks and Hispanics were 8.7 and 3.7 times as likely as Whites to be xrayed.

• The effect of gender on the likelihood of being x-rayed is the same for

minorities as for Whites and the same in both fiscal years. It differed,

however, for citizens and noncitizens. Among noncitizens, women were .8

times as likely to be x-rayed than men; among citizens, women were 1.4

times as likely as men to be x-rayed.

The Likelihood of Being

X-Rayed
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 52 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

X-ray searches

(expected frequencies)

Fiscal

year

Citizenship

status Race Gender Nonintrusive X-ray

Likelihoods

of x-ray

Gender

ratio

Race

ratio

Citizenship

ratio

Fiscal year

ratio

White Male 2558.85 26.15 0.0102

Female 734.67 6.33 0.0086 0.84

Black Male 1715.58 78.42 0.0457 4.47

Female 907.06 34.94 0.0385 0.84 4.47

Asian Male 1672.60 1.40 0.0008 0.08

Female 624.56 0.44 0.0007 0.84 0.08

Male 8104.11 158.89 0.0196 1.92

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 2207.52 36.48 0.0165 0.84 1.92

White Male 4591.73 24.27 0.0053 0.52

Female 1370.94 10.06 0.0073 1.39 0.85

Black Male 1169.54 53.46 0.0457 8.65 1.00

Female 744.72 47.28 0.0635 1.39 8.65 1.65

Asian Male 876.26 0.74 0.0008 0.16 1.00

Female 338.60 0.40 0.0012 1.39 0.16 1.65

Male 1994.89 39.11 0.0196 3.71 1.00

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 548.08 14.92 0.0272 1.39 3.71 1.65

White Male 3083.49 31.51 0.0102 1.00

Female 698.98 6.02 0.0086 0.84 1.00

Black Male 2123.91 97.09 0.0457 4.47 1.00

Female 1004.31 38.69 0.0385 0.84 4.47 1.00

Asian Male 1582.67 1.33 0.0008 0.08 1.00

Female 564.60 0.40 0.0007 0.84 0.08 1.00

Male 9236.90 181.10 0.0196 1.92 1.00

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 2221.30 36.70 0.0165 0.84 1.92 1.00

White Male 5433.29 28.71 0.0053 0.52 1.00

Female 1357.04 9.96 0.0073 1.39 0.85 1.00

Black Male 1295.77 59.23 0.0457 8.65 1.00 1.00

Female 707.11 44.89 0.0635 1.39 8.65 1.65 1.00

Asian Male 1066.10 0.90 0.0008 0.16 1.00 1.00

Female 340.60 0.40 0.0012 1.39 0.16 1.65 1.00

Male 2178.29 42.71 0.0196 3.71 1.00 1.00

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 480.91 13.09 0.0272 1.39 3.71 1.65 1.00

Note: The gender ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for women

relative to men within race, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The race ratios compare the

likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians relative to Whites

within gender, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The citizenship ratios compare the likelihood of

being subjected to strip-searches for U.S. citizens relative to noncitizens within gender, race, and

fiscal year categories. The fiscal year ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to stripsearches in 1998 relative to 1997 within gender, race, and citizenship categories.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.10: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred Model for the Table in Which Type of Search Is Cross-Classified by Fiscal

Year, Citizenship, Race, and Gender, for X-ray Searches versus Nonintrusive Searches
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 53 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

The results of the preferred model to describe the effects of fiscal year,

race, gender, and citizenship on the likelihood of strip-searches having

positive results are depicted in table I.11 and are described as follows:

• There was a small decline in the likelihood of strip-searches being positive

between 1997 and 1998. All groups were less likely to be found carrying

contraband by a factor of 0.8.

• In both fiscal years, among men and women of all races, citizens were 1.5

times as likely as noncitizens to be found with contraband when they were

strip-searched.

• Race interacted with gender; that is, the difference between Blacks and

Whites was less pronounced among women than men. For both men and

women, Hispanics were 2.4 times as likely to yield positive strip-search

results as Whites, and Asians were equally as likely as Whites to yield

positive results. Blacks were, like Hispanics, about 2.4 times as likely as

Whites to yield positive results among men, but 1.4 times as likely to yield

positive results among women who were strip-searched.

• Although women were, among minorities, more likely than men to be stripsearched when they were searched, their strip-searches were not more

likely than those of their male counterparts to yield positive results.

Among Whites, Hispanics, and Asians, strip-searches of women were less

likely than strip-searches of men to yield positive results, by a factor of 0.8.

Among Blacks, strip-searches of women were less than half as likely as

strip-searches of men to yield a positive result.

The Likelihood of StripSearches Being Positive
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 54 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Results from strip-searches

(expected frequencies)

Fiscal

year

Citizenship

status Race Gender Negative Positive

Likelihoods

of positive

Gender

ratio

Race

ratio

Citizenship

ratio

Fiscal year

ratio

White Male 155.40 32.60 0.2098

Female 36.11 5.89 0.1630 0.78

Black Male 44.22 22.78 0.5152 2.46

Female 81.25 18.75 0.2307 0.45 1.42

Asian Male 20.66 4.34 0.2098 1.00

Female 18.92 3.08 0.1630 0.78 1.00

Male 66.35 32.65 0.4921 2.35

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 54.98 21.02 0.3823 0.78 2.35

White Male 209.66 65.34 0.3116 1.49

Female 78.90 19.10 0.2421 0.78 1.49

Black Male 32.86 25.14 0.7652 2.46 1.49

Female 78.95 27.05 0.3427 0.45 1.42 1.49

Asian Male 6.10 1.90 0.3116 1.00 1.49

Female 6.44 1.56 0.2421 0.78 1.00 1.49

Male 29.46 21.54 0.7310 2.35 1.49

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 42.73 24.27 0.5679 0.78 2.35 1.49

White Male 294.34 49.66 0.1687 0.80

Female 76.03 9.97 0.1311 0.78 0.80

Black Male 53.74 22.26 0.4143 2.46 0.80

Female 72.54 13.46 0.1855 0.45 1.42 0.80

Asian Male 18.82 3.18 0.1687 1.00 0.80

Female 15.91 2.09 0.1311 0.78 1.00 0.80

Male 72.36 28.64 0.3958 2.35 0.80

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 57.36 17.64 0.3075 0.78 2.35 0.80

White Male 347.82 87.18 0.2506 1.49 0.80

Female 83.70 16.30 0.1947 0.78 1.49 0.80

Black Male 58.19 35.81 0.6155 2.46 1.49 0.80

Female 75.26 20.74 0.2756 0.45 1.42 1.49 0.80

Asian Male 8.80 2.20 0.2506 1.00 1.49 0.80

Female 8.37 1.63 0.1947 0.78 1.00 1.49 0.80

Male 13.22 7.78 0.5880 2.35 1.49 0.80

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 18.53 8.47 0.4568 0.78 2.35 1.49 0.80

Note: The gender ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for women

relative to men within race, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The race ratios compare the

likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians relative to Whites

within gender, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The citizenship ratios compare the likelihood of

being subjected to strip-searches for U.S. citizens relative to noncitizens within gender, race, and

fiscal year categories. The fiscal year ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to stripsearches in 1998 relative to 1997 within gender, race, and citizenship categories.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.11: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred Model for the Table in Which Result of Search Is Cross-Classified by

Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race, and Gender, for Strip-Searches Only
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 55 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

The results of the preferred model to describe the effects of fiscal year,

race, gender, and citizenship on the likelihood of x-ray searches being

positive are depicted in table I.12 and are described as follows:

• There was a somewhat larger decline in the likelihood of x-ray searches

being positive between 1997 and 1998 than was the case for strip-searches.

All groups were less likely to be found to be carrying contraband when xrayed, by a factor of 0.7.

• Citizenship had no effect on the likelihood of x-ray results being positive.

• Race interacted with gender in its effect on whether x-ray searches were

positive. Hispanics and Asians were less likely to be found carrying

contraband than Whites among both male and women passengers x-rayed,

and Blacks were less likely to be found carrying contraband than Whites

among women. Among men, Blacks were equally as likely to be found

carrying contraband as Whites.

• X-rays were equally as likely to yield positive results for women and men

among Whites, Hispanics, and Asians, but less than half as likely to yield

positive results for women than men among Blacks.

The Likelihood of X-Ray

Searches Being Positive
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 56 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Results from x-ray searches

(expected frequencies)

Fiscal

year

Citizenship

status Race Gender Negative Positive

Likelihoods

of positive

Gender

ratio

Race

ratio

Citizenship

ratio

Year

ratio

White Male 9.93 8.17 0.8232

Female 4.99 4.11 0.8232 1.00

Black Male 42.29 34.81 0.8232 1.00

Female 20.86 8.24 0.3950 0.48 0.48

Asian Male 1.42 0.68 0.4779 0.58

Female 0.07 0.03 0.4779 1.00 0.58

Male 117.80 56.30 0.4779 0.58

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 23.75 11.35 0.4779 1.00 0.58

White Male 13.22 10.88 0.8232 1.00

Female 6.64 5.46 0.8232 1.00 1.00

Black Male 25.83 21.27 0.8232 1.00 1.00

Female 38.78 15.32 0.3950 0.48 0.48 1.00

Asian Male 0.74 0.36 0.4779 0.58 1.00

Female 0.74 0.36 0.4779 1.00 0.58 1.00

Male 30.52 14.58 0.4779 0.58 1.00

1997

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 10.22 4.88 0.4779 1.00 0.58 1.00

White Male 22.75 13.35 0.5869 0.71

Female 4.47 2.63 0.5869 1.00 0.71

Black Male 72.53 42.57 0.5869 1.00 0.71

Female 29.73 8.37 0.2816 0.48 0.48 0.71

Asian Male 0.07 0.03 0.3407 0.58 0.71

Female 0.82 0.28 0.3407 1.00 0.58 0.71

Male 119.41 40.69 0.3407 0.58 0.71

Noncitizen

Hispanic

Female 30.66 10.44 0.3407 1.00 0.58 0.71

White Male 13.93 8.17 0.5869 1.00 0.71

Female 9.52 5.58 0.5869 1.00 1.00 0.71

Black Male 38.50 22.60 0.5869 1.00 1.00 0.71

Female 25.83 7.27 0.2816 0.48 0.48 1.00 0.71

Asian Male 0.07 0.03 0.3407 0.58 1.00 0.71

Female 0.82 0.28 0.3407 1.00 0.58 1.00 0.71

Male 32.15 10.95 0.3407 0.58 1.00 0.71

1998

U.S.

Hispanic

Female 7.53 2.57 0.3407 1.00 0.58 1.00 0.71

Note: The gender ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for women

relative to men within race, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The race ratios compare the

likelihood of being subjected to strip-searches for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians relative to Whites

within gender, citizenship, and fiscal year categories. The citizenship ratios compare the likelihood of

being subjected to strip-searches for U.S. citizens relative to noncitizens within gender, race, and

fiscal year categories. The fiscal year ratios compare the likelihood of being subjected to stripsearches in 1998 relative to 1997 within gender, race, and citizenship categories.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs data.

Table I.12: Expected Frequencies Under the Preferred Model for the Table in Which Result of Search Is Cross-Classified by

Fiscal Year, Citizenship, Race, and Gender, for X-ray Searches Only
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

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To determine Customs’ policies and procedures for conducting personal

searches, we interviewed Customs headquarters officials in the Office of

Field Operations, Passenger Processing Operations. We also met with

officials from the Office of Chief Counsel to discuss Customs’ border

search authority, several recent lawsuits, and the bases for changing and

drafting new search policies implemented at airports around the country.

We also reviewed agency program documents, including the Handbook

(March 1997) and the revised version (September 1999); Customs’ Law

Course; and Passenger Selectivity Training provided at the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) at Glynco, GA.

We reviewed recent directives and proposed changes to Customs’ personal

search policies and procedures. We also reviewed reports and

recommendations from internal and external organizations, including the

Customs’ Passenger Processing Targeting Committee and the Department

of the Treasury’s Office of Professional Responsibility.

To determine how policies and procedures were implemented at airports

around the country and obtain views of inspectors and supervisors, we

conducted an anonymous national mail survey. We were not able to

interview inspectors or supervisors conducting passenger processing

because Customs headquarters officials told us that we would be

interfering with on-going investigations or “active” cases.5

We had planned to obtain the views of inspectors and supervisors at the

four airports we visited about (1) air passenger inspection policies and

procedures; (2) training related to passenger processing; and (3) the

impact, if any, of awards and promotions on the number and types of

personal searches conducted. Customs’ Chief Counsel’s Office insisted

that one of its attorneys be present at all of our interviews with the

inspectors and supervisors in order to protect the interests of Customs and

possible legal interests of inspectors who could be subject to litigation

involving personal searches. Also, the Chief Counsel said that counsel

would treat the interviews as informal depositions and help ensure that

our questions were consistent with the objectives of the review. Customs

also stated that “inspectors cannot be immune from disciplinary action

resulting from an admission to GAO that they violated Customs policy or a

regulation, which is made in front of Chief Counsel. Therefore, responses

 

5

 In developing our methodology, we discussed personal searches with inspectors and supervisors at

Washington Dulles International Airport, located in Virginia.

Customs’ Policies and

Procedures for

Conducting Personal

Searches
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 58 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

are not confidential.” Customs added that inspectors and supervisors

would meet with us on a voluntary basis.

In commenting on our draft report, Customs said that inspectors and

supervisors who we sought to interview were all potential defendants who

could be personally liable in civil lawsuits on the basis of actions, policies,

and procedures on which we wanted to question them. In addition,

Customs added that Treasury employees, including its attorneys who

would attend inspector interviews, are obligated by Customs to report

evidence of misconduct and could not grant blanket immunity to

inspectors who would be interviewed, as requested by the National

Treasury Employees Union.

Subsequently, the National President of the National Treasury Employees

Union recommended that inspectors not participate in interviews with us

because there was no guarantee that employees would be immune from

discipline based on an admission to us that they violated Customs policy

or regulation. Prior to Customs’ decision to treat our interviews as

depositions and its concern about the issue of disciplinary action, the

Union was supportive of our interviewing inspectors.

On January 14, 1999, the Commissioner of Customs sent a letter to the

Comptroller General suggesting that as an alternative to inspector and

supervisor interviews, we conduct an anonymous mail survey of airport

inspectors and supervisors. We subsequently developed an anonymous

mail survey to obtain the views of inspectors and supervisors assigned to

air passenger processing. The Union provided us with a letter to its

members that supported our mail survey and requested its members to

complete it.

We sent surveys to all 1,176 inspectors and all 177 supervisors assigned to

passenger processing at 15 airports in the United States with the largest

volume of international passengers. The surveys included questions on

targeting methods, personal search practices, and training. The response

rate for inspectors was 66 percent, and for supervisors the response rate

was 74 percent. See appendix II and appendix III for copies of our survey

instruments.

The practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce

nonsampling errors. Differences in the wording of questions, in the

sources of information available to respondents, or in the types of people

who do not respond can lead to somewhat different results. We took steps

to minimize nonsampling errors. For example, we developed our survey
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 59 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

questions with the aid of a survey specialist and pretested the questions

prior to submitting them to inspectors and supervisors.

To obtain data on the reasons passengers were selected for searches, we

reviewed 70 random patdown search reports for all searches conducted in

fiscal years 1997 and 1998. We focused on patdowns because they

represent the first level of personal search. Because patdowns at that time

were to be conducted at the discretion of the inspector, we could obtain

the reasons provided by the inspector for initiating the search. Our sample

was selected from the database for the Automated Passenger Analysis

System, which contains all passenger search and seizure information, both

positive and negative. A separate population was created to limit the scope

of the sampling to fiscal years 1997 and 1998 in-bound commercial air

passengers who had been subject to patdown searches. The populations

consisted of a total of 85,800 search reports. Because of the small sample

size, we did not project the results to the population.

To determine the management controls in place that were intended to

ensure that passengers are not inappropriately subjected to personal

searches, we interviewed key officials at Customs headquarters and at the

four ports. We identified four internal controls that could be used to

ensure that inspectors are conducting personal searches in accordance

with prescribed guidelines. These are (1) training on personal search

procedures; (2) supervisory oversight and approval for referrals to pursue

personal searches; (3) a complaint process to identify and resolve

passenger complaints related to personal searches; and (4) the Compliance

Examination Measurement System (COMPEX), which measures the

effectiveness of passenger targeting for secondary searches and passenger

compliance with the laws that Customs enforces, including drug laws.

At each port we interviewed the port directors, supervisory inspectors

designated by the ports, and passenger service representatives responsible

for handling passenger complaints. To determine training standards and

requirements for supervisors and inspectors related to personal search

policies and procedures, we interviewed individuals responsible for

training and reviewed the mandatory training requirements, advanced and

refresher training requirements, and on-the-job training provided at the

ports.

We reviewed all passenger complaint files for complaints related to

personal searches filed at the four ports in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. We

reviewed the files to determine the process for handling and resolving

passenger complaints at the ports.

Customs’ Management

Controls
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, Methodology, and Additional Results of Analysis

Page 60 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

As previously discussed, the national mail surveys sent to inspectors and

supervisors at 15 airports also included questions about training, personal

search procedures, and supervisory oversight of personal searches

conducted at the ports.

To understand how Customs is using and implementing COMPEX, we

interviewed program officials at the four ports, Customs Management

Centers, and headquarters. We also obtained data from headquarters

program officials.

We conducted our work from August 1998 through January 2000 in

accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. We

received comments on a draft of this report from the Department of the

Treasury. The U.S. Customs Service provided comments that are

summarized at the end of the letter; included in the report, where

appropriate; and reproduced in appendix IV. Customs also provided

technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.
Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix II

Inspector Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix III

Supervisor Survey

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Appendix IV

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

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Appendix IV

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

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Appendix IV

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service

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Appendix V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 87 GAO/GGD-00-38 Airline Passengers Selected for Personal Searches

Laurie E. Ekstrand, (202) 512-8777

James M. Blume, (202) 512-8777

In addition to those named above, Kathleen H. Ebert, Wendy C. Simkalo,

Lisa G. Shibata, Bunnie Lempesis, Norman J. Rabkin, Barry J. Seltser,

Wendy Ahmed, Douglas M. Sloane, Stuart M. Kaufman, Donna M. Leiss,

Geoffrey R. Hamilton, Jan B. Montgomery, Lauren E. Bloomquist, and

Gretchen T. Leyman made key contributions to this report.

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments
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