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Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in

the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military

scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social,

and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united

us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not

only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war

against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will

participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of World

War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various

materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride

in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called “the

mighty endeavor.”

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The

following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting

those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army’s significant military feats from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military

History by George L. MacGarrigle. I hope this absorbing account of

that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements

during World War II.

M. P. W. Stone

Secretary of the Army
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Aleutian Islands

3 June 1942–24 August 1943

After securing strategically located bases during its war with

China, Japan set out to create its long-coveted greater east Asia coprosperity empire. Opening with a crushing attack upon Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 that temporarily neutralized the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Imperial High Command quickly followed by

dispatching large forces to seize the Philippines, Malaya, and the

Netherlands East Indies and preparing plans for new bases from

which to strike Australia and India. By June 1942 Japanese authority on the Asian mainland had extended beyond Malaya into Thailand and Burma. In the western Pacific, it encompassed most of the

larger islands north of Australia and east of Midway.

In the wake of such astounding military success, Japan decided

to push onward rather than consolidate its gains. Its next objectives,

New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, were clearly to be used as

steppingstones to Australia. Between those objectives and the Australian continent was the Coral Sea, where in early May the American Navy had checked a powerful Japanese fleet in a battle that

frustrated the enemy’s hope for an early invasion of Australia.

Remaining on the defensive throughout the Pacific, the United

States hurriedly fortified island bases along a great arc extending

from Pearl Harbor to Sydney to keep open the shipping routes to

Australia. With only limited numbers of troops available, it nevertheless joined Australia in planning an offensive in New Guinea and

the Solomons to halt Japanese advances. To command this offensive

in what became known as the Southwest Pacific Area, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt selected General Douglas MacArthur, leaving

the remainder of the Pacific theater under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

Nimitz’s command was divided into three combat areas (north,

central, and south). The North Pacific Area extended west from the

continental United States, Canada, and the Territory of Alaska

across the Pacific to the Asian mainland. Included within Nimitz’s

North Pacific Area were Japan’s northern islands, the Kuriles, and,

just 650 miles to the east, Alaska’s Aleutian chain.

Protruding in a long, sweeping curve for more than a thousand

miles westward from the tip of the Alaskan Peninsula, the Aleutians
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provided a natural avenue of approach between the two countries.

Forbidding weather and desolate terrain, however, made this approach

militarily undesirable. While spared the arctic climate of the Alaskan

mainland to the north, the Aleutians are constantly swept by cold winds

and often engulfed in dense fog. The weather becomes progressively

worse in the western part of the chain, but all the islands are marked by

craggy mountains and scant vegetation. Despite such inhospitable conditions, neither the United States nor Japan could afford to assume that

the other would reject the Aleutians as an impractical invasion route.

Japanese concern for the defense of the northern Pacific increased when sixteen U.S. B-25 bombers, led by Lt. Col. James H.

Doolittle, took off from the carrier Hornet and bombed Tokyo on 18

April 1942. Unsure of where the American raid originated, but suspicious that it could have been from a secret base in the western

Aleutians, the Imperial High Command began to take an active interest in capturing the island chain.

Strategic Setting

The Aleutians first appeared as a Japanese objective in a plan prepared under the direction of one of Japan’s most able commanders,

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. With help from the Japanese Army, Yamamoto intended to “invade and occupy strategic points in the Western Aleutians” as well as Midway Island on the western tip of the

Hawaiian chain. He envisioned these two sites as anchors for a defensive perimeter in the north and central Pacific. His plan also included

the final destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. By using the Aleutians

and then Midway as bait, he intended to lure the already weakened

American fleet from Pearl Harbor and annihilate it before new construction could replace the losses it had sustained on 7 December.

An attack on the Aleutians in early June 1942, Yamamoto believed,

would draw the U.S. fleet north to challenge his forces. With the departure of the U.S. warships from Pearl Harbor, he would then move

his main fleet to seize Midway. Because of Midway’s importance—the

island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor—he concluded that

Nimitz would redirect his fleet from the Aleutians to Midway to prevent the loss of the island. Waiting off Midway to intercept that force

would be the largest concentration of naval power ever assembled by

Japan. After overwhelming the American fleet, Yamamoto would have

undisputed control of the central and western Pacific.

Yamamoto commanded an armada of 176 warships and auxiliaries.

A portion of that force, the Northern Area Fleet, with 2 small aircraft
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carriers, left the Kurile Islands to attack the Aleutians, while the remainder of his fleet, which included 4 large aircraft carriers, 9 battleships, and 12 transports, converged on Midway. The Aleutian attack

was a sideshow, yet it would reduce Yamamoto’s overall available

strength in carrier aircraft during the fight for Midway on 4–5 June, one

of the decisive battles of all time and the turning point of the Pacific war.

Operations

Before Japan entered World War II, its navy had gathered extensive information about the Aleutians, but it had no up-to-date information regarding military developments on the islands. It assumed

that the United States had made a major effort to increase defenses in

the area and expected to find several U.S. warships operating in Aleutian waters, including 1 or 2 small aircraft carriers as well as several

cruisers and destroyers. Given these assumptions, Yamamoto provided the Northern Area Fleet, commanded by Vice Adm. Boshiro

Hosogaya, with a force of 2 small aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines, and 4 troop transports, along with supporting

auxiliary ships. With that force, Hosogaya was first to launch an air attack against Dutch Harbor, then follow with an amphibious attack

upon the island of Adak, 480 miles to the west. After destroying the

American base on Adak (in fact, there was none), his troops were to

return to their ships and become a reserve for two additional landings:

the first on Kiska, 240 miles west of Adak, the other on the Aleutian’s

westernmost island, Attu, 180 miles from Kiska.

Because U.S. intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code,

Admiral Nimitz had learned by 21 May of Yamamoto’s plans, including the Aleutian diversion, the strength of both Yamamoto’s and

Hosogaya’s fleets, and that Hosogaya would open the fight on 1 June

or shortly thereafter. Nimitz decided to confront both enemy fleets,

retaining his three aircraft carriers for the Midway battle while sending a third of his surface fleet (Task Force 8) under Rear Adm.

Robert A. Theobald to defend Alaska. Theobald was ordered to hold

Dutch Harbor, a small naval facility in the eastern Aleutians, at all

costs and to prevent the Japanese from gaining a foothold in Alaska.

Theobald’s task force of 5 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 6 submarines

quietly left Pearl Harbor on 25 May to take a position in the Alaskan

Sea 400 miles off Kodiak Island, there to wait for the arrival of Hosogaya’s fleet. In the meantime Theobald established his headquarters on

Kodiak and met with Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Simon B. Buckner, Jr.,

the commander of the Army’s Alaska Defense Command.
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Command authority in the North Pacific Area was divided and

cumbersome. Upon reaching Alaska, Theobald became commander of all Allied naval and air forces, authority over the ground

forces, which remained under Buckner, with whom he was to work in

a spirit of “mutual cooperation.” While Theobald reported directly

to Admiral Nimitz as his agent in the North Pacific Area, Buckner

answered to the commander of the San Francisco–based Western

Defense Command, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, who was responsible

for the defense of Alaska and western Canada. Any differences between Nimitz and DeWitt in the North Pacific Area would be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington for resolution.

As of 1 June 1942, American military strength in Alaska stood at

45,000 men, with about 13,000 at Cold Bay (Fort Randall) on the tip of

the Alaskan Peninsula and at two Aleutian bases: the naval facility at

Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island, 200 miles west of Cold Bay, and a

recently built Army air base (Fort Glenn) 70 miles west of the naval station on Umnak Island. Army strength, less air force personnel, at those

three bases totaled no more than 2,300, composed mainly of infantry,

field and antiaircraft artillery troops, and a large construction engineer

contingent, which had been rushed to the construction of bases.

On Theobald’s arrival at Kodiak, he assumed control of the U.S.

Army Air Corps’ Eleventh Air Force, commanded by Brig. Gen.

(later Maj. Gen.) William C. Butler. This force consisted of 10 heavy

and 34 medium bombers and 95 fighters, divided between its main

base, Elmendorf Airfield, in Anchorage, and at airfields at Cold

Bay and on Umnak. Theobald charged Butler to locate the Japanese fleet reported heading toward Dutch Harbor and attack it with

his bombers, concentrating on sinking Hosogaya’s 2 aircraft carriers.

Once the enemy planes were removed, Task Force 8 would engage

the enemy fleet and destroy it.

On the afternoon of 2 June a naval patrol plane spotted the approaching enemy fleet, reporting its location as 800 miles southwest

of Dutch Harbor. Theobald placed his entire command on full alert.

Shortly thereafter bad weather set in, and no further sightings of the

fleet were made that day.

Early the next morning, despite dense fog and rough seas, Hosogaya launched some of his aircraft to attack Dutch Harbor. Only half

reached their objective. The rest either became lost in the fog and

darkness and crashed into the sea or returned to their carriers. In all,

seventeen planes found the naval base, the first arriving at 0545. As

the Japanese pilots looked for targets to engage, they came under intense antiaircraft fire and soon found themselves confronted by U.S.
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fighter planes sent from Fort Glenn on Umnak Island. Startled by the

American response, they quickly released their bombs, made a cursory strafing run, and left to return to their carriers. As a result of their

haste they did little damage to the base. But Hosogaya’s fleet remained unlocated, and the U.S. planes based at Cold Harbor had received no word of the attack because of a communications failure.

The next day the Japanese returned to Dutch Harbor. This time

the enemy pilots were better organized and better prepared. When

the attack finally ended that afternoon, the base’s oil storage tanks

were ablaze, part of the hospital was demolished, and a beached

barracks ship was damaged. Although American pilots had finally

located the Japanese carriers, attempts to destroy them proved fruitless. As bad weather again set in, all contact with the enemy fleet

was lost. In all, the Japanese raid claimed 43 U.S. lives, of which 33

were soldiers. Another 64 Americans were wounded. Eleven U.S.

planes were downed, while the Japanese lost ten aircraft.

During the two-day fight, Task Force 8 had remained south of Kodiak Island, taking no part in the action. Not until the 5th did Theobald

send it to investigate a report of enemy warships in the Bering Sea

Buildings burning after the first enemy attack on Dutch Harbor, 3

June 1942. (DA photograph)
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heading south toward Unalaska Island, which he interpreted to be a

landing force intent upon seizing Dutch Harbor. In the meantime, he

instructed Butler to attack the enemy ships with all available aircraft.

Rapidly developing clouds in the area where the enemy ships were reported prevented Butler’s pilots from finding the enemy. Six recently

assigned B-17 Flying Fortress bombers equipped with radar reported

scoring hits upon enemy ships, but these later proved to be uninhabited islands in the Pribilofs chain—north of Dutch Harbor.

While Task Force 8 entered the Bering Sea, Hosogaya’s fleet

moved south to join Yamamoto, who had just suffered the loss of his

four large carriers off Midway. Unable to lure U.S. surface ships into

range of his battleships, Yamamoto ordered his fleet to return to

Japan. Rather than have the Northern Area Fleet join him, Yamamoto

now instructed Hosogaya to return to the Aleutians, execute his original mission, and thereby score a success to help compensate for the

Midway disaster. Forgoing the planned attack on Adak, Hosogaya

moved directly to the western Aleutians, occupying Kiska on 6 June

and Attu a day later. He encountered no opposition on either island,

but the Japanese public was in fact told that this was a great victory. It

learned about the disaster at Midway only after the war was over.

At Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the news of Yamamoto’s great

loss prompted the dispatch of two aircraft carriers from Japan to reinforce Hosogaya. Having correctly anticipated Nimitz’s next move—the

dispatch, on 8 June, of his two carriers to destroy Hosogaya’s fleet—

Imperial Headquarters saw an opportunity to immobilize the U.S. Pacific Fleet by eliminating its only carriers. When Nimitz learned of the

capture of Kiska, he countermanded his order. Unwilling to risk the

loss of his only carriers in the Pacific to land-based planes from Kiska,

and presumably informed that Hosogaya would soon have four carriers at his disposal in the North Pacific, he decided to retain his carriers

for spearheading a major advance in the Central Pacific.

For the Japanese, Kiska without Midway no longer had any

value as a base for patrolling the ocean between the Aleutian and

Hawaiian chains, but Kiska and Attu did block the Americans from

possibly using the Aleutians as a route for launching an offensive on

Japan. Originally intending to abandon the islands before winter set

in, the Japanese instead decided to stay and build airfields on both

islands. Although Generals Buckner and DeWitt would in fact

argue for a northern approach to Japan along the Aleutians, the real

motive for planning the recapture of the two remote islands was

mainly psychological—to remove the only Japanese foothold on

American soil in the Western Hemisphere.
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By mid-June the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the sooner a

determined effort was made to oust the Japanese from the Aleutians, the lesser the means required to do it would be. They also theorized that the attack on the Aleutians and the occupation of its

westernmost islands might be part of a holding action designed to

screen a northward thrust by Japanese forces into Siberia’s maritime provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula. As a result, they informed Theobald and Buckner of their concern about a possible

Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union that might also include the

occupation of St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea and of nearby

Nome and its adjacent airfields on the Alaskan mainland.

Supporting the possibility of an invasion of the Alaskan mainland

were reports of a Japanese fleet operating in the Bering Sea. On 20
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June alone, three separate sightings placed an enemy fleet somewhere between the Pribilof and St. Lawrence Islands, suggesting that

either an enemy raid on or an outright invasion of the Alaskan mainland was imminent, with Nome the likely objective. As a result, a

sense of urgency bordering on panic set in that triggered what was to

become the first mass airlift in American history. Within thirty-six

hours, military as well as commandeered civilian aircraft flew nearly

2,300 troops to Nome, along with artillery and antiaircraft guns and

several tons of other equipment and supplies. Not until early July—

when U.S. intelligence reported with some certainty the departure of

Hosogaya’s fleet from the Bering Sea—did the threat of invasion of

the Alaskan mainland decline, allowing for the redeployment of many of

the troops hastily assembled at Nome.

Adak served as the forward staging

base in the Aleutians for attacking

Attu and Kiska. Note the airstrip in

the foreground. (DA photograph)
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In keeping with the Joint Chiefs’ desire to move quickly to regain

Kiska and Attu, Theobald and Buckner agreed to establish a series of

airfields west of Umnak from which bombers could launch strikes

against the closest of the enemy-held islands, Kiska. First to be occupied was Adak, 400 miles from Umnak. Landing unopposed on 30

August, an Army force of 4,500 secured the island. Engineers completed an airfield two weeks later, a remarkable feat that they were to

duplicate again and again throughout the campaign. On 14 September

U.S. B-24 heavy bombers took off from Adak to attack Kiska, 200

miles away. Repeated bombings of Kiska during the summer and into

the fall convinced the Japanese that the Americans intended to recapture the island. As a result, by November they had increased their

garrisons on Kiska and Attu to 4,000 and 1,000 men respectively.

During the winter months the Japanese would count on darkness and

the habitually poor weather to protect them from any serious attack.

Although continually restrained by the greater importance and

more pressing needs of the Solomons and New Guinea Campaigns,

the buildup of U.S. Army forces in the Alaska Command continued,

reaching 94,000 soldiers by January 1943. By then an additional thirteen bases had been built in Alaska, many of which were in the Aleutians. With an unopposed Army landing on Amchitka Island on 11

January, Alaska Command forces were now within fifty miles of Kiska.

Just surviving the weather on Amchitka was a challenge. During

the first night ashore, a “willowaw” (a violent squall) smashed many

of the landing boats and swept a troop transport aground. On the second day a blizzard racked the island with snow, sleet, and biting wind.

Lasting for nearly two weeks, the blizzard finally subsided enough to

reveal to a Japanese scout plane from Kiska the American beachhead

on Amchitka. Harassed by bombing and strafing attacks from Kiska,

engineers continued work on an airfield on Amchitka completing it

in mid-February. Japanese attacks on the island then sharply declined.

As U.S. forces came close to Kiska and Attu, the enemy’s outposts

became increasingly more difficult to resupply. In mid-March, Rear

Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, who had replaced Admiral Theobald in

January, established a naval blockade around the islands that resulted

in the sinking or turning back of several enemy supply ships. When a

large Japanese force, personally led by Admiral Hosogaya, attempted

to run the blockade with 3 big transports loaded with supplies escorted by 4 heavy cruisers and 4 destroyers on 26 March, the largest

sea fight of the Aleutian Campaign took place, remembered best as

the last and longest daylight surface naval battle of fleet warfare.

Known as the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, the closest land-
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mass in the Bering Sea, the smaller U.S. force compelled Hosogaya to

retire without completing his mission and resulted in his removal

from command. Henceforth, the garrisons at Attu and Kiska would

have to rely upon meager supplies brought in by submarine.

Of the two islands, Kiska was the more important militarily. Containing the only operational airfield and having the better harbor,

Kiska was scheduled to be recaptured first. For that purpose,

Kinkaid asked for a reinforced infantry division (25,000 men). When

not enough shipping could be made available to support so large a

force, he recommended that Attu be substituted for Kiska as the objective, indicating that Attu was defended by no more than 500 men,

as opposed to 9,000 believed to be on Kiska. If the estimate was correct, he indicated, he would require no more than a regiment to do

the job. Kinkaid also noted that U.S. forces based on Attu would be

astride the Japanese line of communications and thus in a position

to cut off Kiska from supply and reinforcement, which in time would

cause Kiska to “wither on the vine.”

After gaining JCS approval on 1 April for the Attu operation

(code-named SANDCRAB) and obtaining the needed shipping, work

began to recapture the little, fog-shrouded island at the western end

of the Aleutian chain. Attu is 35 miles long and 15 miles wide, with

snow-capped peaks that reach upward to 3,000 feet. Steep slopes extend down from the peaks to treeless valleys below, carpeted with

muskeg, a “black muck” covered with a dense growth of lichens and

moss. Because the Japanese current has a moderating effect on temperatures, much of the time in the outermost Aleutians the muskeg

is barely firm enough for a man to cross on foot. The same current

accounts for the pea-soup fogs, the constant pervading wetness, and

the frequent storms that make the outer Aleutians so forbidding.

Kinkaid, the commander of Northern Pacific Force, pulled together an imposing armada to support the invasion. In addition to

an attack force of 3 battleships, a small aircraft carrier, and 7 destroyers for escorting and providing fire support for the Army landing force, he had 2 covering groups, composed of several cruisers,

destroyers, and submarines, for early detection of a possible challenge by the Japanese Northern Area Fleet. Reinforcing the naval

support, the Eleventh Air Force was to provide 54 bombers and

128 fighters for the operation, holding back a third of the bomber

force for use against ships of the Japanese fleet.

Early in the planning phase, U.S. intelligence upgraded the estimated enemy strength on Attu threefold from its original figure of

500 men, prompting a request for additional forces. Because Buckner
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had but a single infantry regiment in Alaska, widely dispersed

throughout the territory, the War Department provided the needed

troops from DeWitt’s Western Defense Command, selecting the 7th

Infantry Division, then stationed near Fort Ord, California, as the

unit to recapture Attu. Trained as a motorized force and at one time

scheduled for duty in the deserts of North Africa, the 7th Division

was reported to be in a high state of readiness; because of its location

near the coast, it could readily undergo the amphibious training required for its new mission. After completing that training during

April 1943, the men of the division embarked from San Francisco on

transports with their commander, Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown.

Arriving at windswept, partially snow-covered Fort Randall

(Cold Bay) on the 30th, the troops spent the next four days on the

crowded transports. The cold, damp Aleutian weather was far different from the warm California beaches they had just left. Because

of shortages in cold weather equipment, moreover, most of the men

would enter combat wearing normal field gear. While senior commanders realized that the troops would suffer from the weather,

most believed that within three days the fight for Attu would be

Troops hauling supplies forward to units fighting the Japanese in the

Chichagof area, May 1943. (DA photograph)
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over, particularly since the assembled naval support for the landings

included three battleships along with several cruisers and destroyers.

Three weeks before, a concerted air and naval bombardment of

both Attu and Kiska had begun, but it had been largely limited to

Kiska because of the continual fog covering Attu. Poor weather

caused Kinkaid to postpone the departure of the invasion force

from Cold Bay to 4 May, a day behind schedule, and as the convoy

neared Attu storms and poor visibility forced yet a further delay

until the 11th. The bad weather also seriously reduced the air and

naval strikes against Attu.

Despite unremitting fog, the much-delayed assault opened on 11

May at widely separated points on the eastern portion of the island.

In a predawn attack the 7th Scout Company paddled ashore from

submarines onto a small beach (Beach SCARLET), nine miles northwest of Chichagof Harbor, the location of the main Japanese base

and General Brown’s ultimate objective. Meeting no opposition,

the scout company moved inland. At noon, the 7th Division’s reconnaissance troop (less one platoon) landed at SCARLET and moved

to join the scout company. Upon linkup, the two units, which conThe west arm of Holtz Bay viewed from the ridge over which the troops

advanced onto Attu Note the crashed Japanese Zero. (DA photograph)
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stituted a provisional battalion, were to occupy the head of the valley where a pass gave access to one of the valleys leading back from

Holtz Bay. In the meantime, at the end of the western arm of Holtz

Bay, the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry came ashore at Beach

RED. If the 1st Battalion encountered opposition when advancing on

its first objective, a camel-back hill mass designated as “Hill X,”

the provisional battalion was to attack the enemy from the rear.

The men of the 1st Battalion, after passing through a rock-studded approach to Beach RED in landing craft, had to scale a steep escarpment that began about 75 yards from the water’s edge and rose

200 to 250 feet above the beach. From there they started working

their way down the west side of Holtz Bay virtually unopposed until

1800 when heavy enemy fire halted their advance short of Hill X.

When the 1st Battalion came ashore Beach RED, the main attack

at Massacre Bay finally got under way as the 2d and 3d Battalion

Combat Teams of the 17th Regiment landed unopposed on Beaches

BLUE and YELLOW, approximately 6 miles south of Chichagof Harbor. Had the landing not been delayed because of dense fog and

high seas, a third combat team—the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, attached to the 17th Regiment—would also have come

ashore. As it was, that unit remained aboard ship until the next day.

Slowed by the slippery muskeg, the 2d and 3d Battalions stumbled side by side up Massacre Valley, dividing on either side of a

hogback. Both battalions came under fire at 1900; part way up the

ridges overlooking the valley, the enemy, occupying dug-in positions obscured in a thin mist, pinned them down. Attempts by the 3d

Battalion, on the left (southwest), to reach Jarmin Pass, the regimental objective at the head of the valley, failed, resulting in heavy

losses. (A platoon from the 7th Reconnaissance Troop made subsidiary landings at Alexai Point and joined the main body at Massacre Bay without opposition.)

The fog, which had hampered the landings, likewise concealed

the attackers from the enemy. Not until midafternoon did the Japanese commander, Col. Yasuyo Yamazaki, order his men from their

caves to the prepared outer defenses surrounding Chichagof Harbor, a trace that extended from Hill X on the west arm of Holtz Bay,

southward to Jarmin Pass, and then eastward to Sarana Bay.

When General Brown came ashore at Massacre Bay toward the

end of D-day, the tactical situation was far from clear, but what information was available would not have indicated that a long drawnout struggle was in prospect. By 2130, five hours after the main landings commenced, he had a total of 3,500 men ashore; 400 at Beach
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SCARLET, 1,100 at Beach RED, and 2,000 at Beaches BLUE and YELLOW. On the northern front, the 1st Battalion was close to Hill X and

within twenty-four hours the 32d Regiment, with its 1st and 3d Battalions, was due to arrive from Adak. In the southern sector, the 2d

Battalion of the 17th reported that it was within 1,000 yards of Sarana

Pass, and the 3d Battalion indicated that it was about 600 yards short

of Jarmin Pass. The next day, the 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment, on ship

in Massacre Bay, was to come ashore to reinforce the 17th Regiment. If additional forces were needed, General Buckner had agreed

to release the 4th Infantry Regiment, an Alaska unit, on Adak Island. Everything considered, it would not have been unreasonable to

suppose that within a few days Attu would be taken.

The next day, with naval and air support, Brown’s men continued

their two-pronged attack toward Jarmin Pass. Frontal assaults from

Massacre Bay by the 17th Infantry failed to gain ground. As patrols

probed to develop enemy positions, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry,

came ashore at Massacre Bay. In the meantime, in the northern sector, the 1st Battalion, finding the enemy dug in on Hill X, made a

double envelopment which succeeded in gaining a foothold on the

crest of the hill, but the Japanese held firm on the reverse slope.

That night the first casualty report of the operation revealed that

forty-four Americans had been killed since the start of the invasion.

Further efforts of the Massacre Bay force on the 13th to gain

Jarmin Pass again failed, even with the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, entering the fight to reinforce the 3d Battalion, 17th Regiment. As U.S.

losses continued to mount, front-line positions remained about the

same as those gained on D-day. Vicious and costly fighting occurred

to the north as the enemy attempted to drive the 1st Battalion troops

from Hill X, but the crest remained firmly in American hands at

nightfall. The 3d Battalion, 32d Regiment, by then had landed on

Beach REDand was moving forward to reinforce the hard-pressed

1st Battalion on Hill X. Naval gunfire and air support of the ground

troops continued insofar as weather conditions allowed.

Weather as well as the enemy continued to frustrate the American advance. Although surface ships continued to bombard reported

enemy positions ashore on the 14th, close air support was extremely

limited due to incessant fog that engulfed the island. In an attempt to

hasten the capture of Jarmin Pass, Brown ordered a combined attack

by his North and South Landing Forces, by then each with three

battalions. While the South Landing Force attempted to inch forward up Massacre Valley to gain the pass, North Landing Force was
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to drive the enemy off the reverse slope of Hill X, continue on to

seize Moore Ridge, and then take Jarmin Pass from the rear.

Each attack quickly bogged down. In the northern sector the

provisional battalion that had landed on Beach SCARLET remained

checked, unable to break out to reach the immobile 1st Battalion,

17th Infantry, and when 3d Battalion, 32d Regiment, failed to reach

its assault positions in time, Brown canceled the combined attack.

That evening in a report to higher headquarters, he summarized

the four days of fighting, concluding that “progress through passes

will, unless we are extremely lucky, be slow and costly, and will require troops in excess to those now available to my command.”

The next morning, the 15th, success remained elusive until 1100

when the fog lifted in the northern sector, revealing that the enemy

had withdrawn to Moore Ridge in the center of Holtz Valley, leaving behind food and ammunition. The pullback by the Japanese allowed the provisional battalion to break out and eventually link up

with the two battalions near Hill X. As the men of North Landing

Force then entered the valley in chase, the relatively clear sky allowed enemy troops on occupying Moore Ridge to place accurate

fire upon them. Already slowed by that fire, the pursuit ended when

a friendly air strike hit advancing American troops by mistake.

Back on Adak, the forward command post for Admiral Kinkaid

and General DeWitt, the reported situation at Attu appeared grim.

Of special concern to Kinkaid was the exposed position of the ships

directly supporting Brown’s forces ashore. A Japanese submarine

had already attacked (unsuccessfully) one of Kinkaid’s three battleships, and reports persisted that a Japanese fleet would soon arrive

to challenge the landing. As a result, Brown was told that the Navy

would withdraw its support ships on the 16th, or in any event no

later than the 17th, leaving him with an unprotected beachhead and

a major reduction in supporting fire.

Communication problems between Brown and Kinkaid and DeWitt, located more than 400 miles away, coupled with Brown’s continued requests of reinforcements—the latest, on the 15th, for part of

Buckner’s 4th Infantry Regiment—and a long dispatch requesting

large quantities of engineer and road-building equipment, and the

lack of any positive indications of a speedy breakthrough on Attu persuaded Kinkaid that Brown had bogged down. When he consulted

with DeWitt and Buckner, both agreed with him that Brown should

be replaced. Upon their recommendation, Kinkaid appointed Maj.

Gen. Eugene M. Landrum to take command of Attu on the 16th.
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An advance by North Landing Force broke the deadlock on

Attu the same day Landrum assumed command. By then a foothold

on the northern end of Moore Ridge had been won in the center of

Holtz Valley, thereby gaining control of the entire ridge. The Japanese, greatly outnumbered by the Americans and in danger of being

taken from the rear, withdrew that night (16–17 May) toward

Chichagof Harbor for a final stand.

Well before dawn, troops controlled by the 32d Regiment in the

northern sector moved forward and by daylight discovered that the

enemy had gone. Patrols reported that the east arm of Holtz Bay

was free of the enemy, allowing for much-needed resupply by sea. In

the meantime, the 17th Regiment in the southern sector (at Massacre Valley) also found previously defended enemy positions abandoned, and it occupied Jarmin Pass.

The Japanese pullback to Chichagof Harbor followed by the

linkup of U.S. forces on the 18th provided the turning point of the

battle. While nearly another two weeks of hard, costly fighting remained, the uncertainty and frustration of the first few days on Attu

never recurred. It was slow business taking the machine-gun and

“Aleutians Cemetery” by Edward Lanning. More than 3,000 Japanese

and Americans died in the fighting at Attu. (Army Art Collection)
23

mortar nests left manned on the

heights by the retreating Japanese, but eventually the combined American force, reinforced with a battalion of the

4th Infantry, drew a net around

Chichagof Harbor. The end

came on the night of 29 May

when most of the surviving Japanese, about 700 to 1,000

strong, charged madly through

American lines, screaming,

killing, and being killed. The

next day the enemy announced

the loss of Attu, as American units cleared out surviving enemy

pockets. Although mopping-up operations continued for several

days, organized resistance ended with the wild charge of 29 May,

and Attu was once more in American hands.

The Americans reported finding 2,351 enemy dead on the island; an additional few hundred were presumed to have been buried

in the hills by the Japanese. Only 28 Japanese surrendered. Out of

a U.S. force that totaled more than 15,000 men, 549 had been killed,

another 1,148 wounded, and about 2,100 men taken out of action by

disease and nonbattle injuries. Trench foot was the most common

affliction. Most of the nonbattle casualties were exposure cases, victims of the weather and inadequate clothing.

Taking heed of the Attu experience, Kinkaid sought to ensure

that the final assault in the Aleutians, against Kiska, would be made

with better-equipped and more seasoned soldiers. For the coming

invasion his assault troops would wear clothing and footwear better

suited for the cold weather; parkas were substituted for field jackets

and arctic shoes for leather boots. The landing force would consist

of either combat veterans from Attu or troops trained at Adak in

the type of fighting that had developed on Attu.

U.S. intelligence now upgraded its earlier estimates of enemy

strength on Kiska to about 10,000 men. In keeping with that increase,

Kinkaid arranged for his ground commander, Maj. Gen. Charles H.

Corlett, U.S. Army, to receive 34,426 troops, including 5,500 Canadians, more than double the original strength planned for the operation earlier in the year. Code-named COTTAGE, the operation was to

begin on 15 August, onto an island 3 to 4 miles wide with a high, irregular ridge dividing its 22-mile length and with a defunct volcano at
24

its northern end. The Japanese had occupied only the central, eastern

portion of the island, locating their main base and airfield at Kiska

Harbor. They also had small garrisons on Little Kiska Island and

south of the main harbor at Gertrude Cove.

Unlike Attu, Kiska was subjected to a heavy preinvasion bombardment. Reinforced during June and operating from new airfields

(at Attu and nearby Shemya), the Eleventh Air Force dropped a

total of 424 tons of bombs on Kiska during July. During the same

month, a strong naval task force lobbed 330 tons of shells onto the island. The combined air and surface bombardment continued into

August, interrupted only by bad weather.

Starting in late July, most pilots reported no signs of enemy activity on the island, although a few noted that they had still received

light antiaircraft fire. These reports led intelligence analysts to conclude that the Japanese on Kiska had been evacuated (as was done

from Guadalcanal six months before) or had taken to the hills. Convinced that the later contention was more probable, Kinkaid ordered the attack to take place as scheduled, noting that if the Japanese were not there the landings would be a “super dress rehearsal,

good for training purposes,” and the only foreseeable loss would be

a sense of letdown by the highly keyed up troops.

Departing Adak, the staging area for the invasion, an amphibious force of nearly a hundred ships moved toward Kiska, reaching

the island early on 15 August. Unlike the dense fog experienced at

Attu on D-day, the seas were strangely calm and the weather unusually clear. After threatening to land at Gertrude’s Cove on

Kiska’s east side of the island, Corlett’s men went ashore on the

west side of the island; by 1600 a total of 6,500 troops were ashore.

The next day Canadian troops came ashore onto another beach farther north. As with the fight for Attu, the landings were unopposed.

As Allied troops pushed inland, the weather returned to the more

normal dense fog and chilling rain and wind. Veterans of the Attu

campaign, in particular, expected that the enemy was waiting on

the high ground above them to take them under fire.

The only guns that were fired, however, were those of friend

against friend by mistake; partly on that account, casualties ashore

during the first four days of the operation numbered 21 dead and

121 sick and wounded. The Navy lost 70 dead or missing and 47

wounded when the destroyer Amner Read struck a mine on 18 August. By the time the search of the island, including miles of tunnels,

ended, American casualties totaled 313 men.
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The Allies had attacked an uninhabited island. The entire enemy

garrison of 5,183 men had slipped away unseen. To make the embarrassment complete, the Kiska evacuation had been carried out on 28

July, almost three weeks before the Allied landing. The original plan of

the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had been to withdraw

the garrison gradually by submarine, but this scheme had been abandoned in late June because most of the submarines assigned to the operation had been lost or damaged. The Japanese also feared that by

gradually weakening the garrison over a prolonged period, the operation might fail. It was then decided to evacuate the force at one time,

in one movement, using cruisers and destroyers as transports. The

date, at first set for early July, was postponed until 28 July. Between

then and D-day, Kiska had been under attack and close surveillance by

American naval units and the Eleventh Air Force, but the erroneous

reports of flak and Japanese activity—which inexperienced observers

brought back—had gone unquestioned. Surprise was achieved, but it

was not the Japanese who were surprised.

On 24 August 1943, Corlett declared the island secure, marking the

end of the Aleutian Islands Campaign. By year’s end, American and

Canadian troop strength in Alaska would drop from a high of about

144,000 to 113,000. By then the North Pacific Area had returned to

complete Army control. During 1944 the Canadians would leave and

U.S. Army strength in the Alaska Defense Command decrease to

63,000 men. Although interest in the theater waned, it was in the Aleutians that the United States won its first theater-wide victory in World

War II, ending Japan’s only campaign in the Western Hemisphere.

Analysis

In clearing the Japanese invaders from the Aleutians, the objective had been partly to eliminate a potential military threat but

mainly to eradicate a psychological blot. Japan’s foothold in the

Western Hemisphere was gone. Starting in June 1942 the Japanese

had threatened America’s northern flank. Fourteen months later

the reverse was true, although the idea of using the western Aleutians as steppingstones to Japan had no official approval. General

DeWitt and others from time to time urged an assault by this route

upon Japan’s Kurile Islands, but commitments to other theaters,

and the desire of the Soviet Union not to have its neutrality with

Japan compromised, thwarted sanction of the proposal.

From the Japanese perspective, however, the threat remained.

The bored American troops stationed in the Aleutians during the
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last two years of the war were not involved. But harassing attacks by

the U.S. Eleventh Air Force from bases in the Aleutians against the

Kurile Islands during that period resulted in Imperial Headquarters’

maintaining a large defensive force in the area which, toward the

war’s end, amounted to about one-sixth of Japan’s total air strength.

The centerpiece of the campaign was the battle for Attu. In terms

of numbers engaged, Attu ranks as one of the most costly assaults in

the Pacific. For every 100 enemy found on the island, about 71 Americans were killed or wounded. The cost of taking Attu was thus second only to Iwo Jima. Of some consolation, the invasion of Rendova

in the Solomon Islands during June proceeded well largely because

of the struggle for Attu. In an attempt to either reinforce or evacuate

Attu, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters had ordered the Fifth Fleet

north from Truk in May to the western Aleutians, thereby greatly reducing Japanese naval strength in the Solomons area. While the fleet

never reached the Aleutians, its absence from the Solomons allowed

the American landings at Rendova to be virtually unopposed.

Stung by the brutal fight for Attu, Admiral Kinkaid sought to

avert the same mistakes at Kiska. While the full-blown attack three

months later upon the deserted island was an embarrassment, the

detailed preparation for Kiska was worth the effort. Lessons learned

by the Army in preparing and equipping troops to survive the rigors

of combat in wretched weather and difficult mountain terrain would

prove useful during the upcoming Italian campaign. Many amphibious warfare techniques developed during the Attu landings

were refined for Kiska and were further improved and applied to

advantage in later amphibious operations in the Pacific.

In one sense the departure of the Japanese from Kiska without

a fight was unfortunate. It gave American commanders a false picture of what might be expected from the enemy when the odds were

hopelessly against him. Instead of fighting to the death, as at Attu,

he had faded into the fog without a struggle. But Attu, not Kiska,

was to provide the pattern of future battles against the Japanese.
27
28

Further Readings

For those who wish to study the Aleutian Islands Campaign in

more detail, the following official histories provide a carefully documented account of the operation: Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts (1964); Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts, and

Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944 (1964); and Wesley F. Craven and

James L. Cate, eds., The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August

1942 to July 1944 (1950), The Army Air Forces in World War II. The

best known popular history of the campaign is Brian Garfield’s The

Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians

(1969). Another book that provides a vivid account of the ground

fighting on Attu, one with personal anecdotes from all ranks, is The

Capture of Attu as Told by the Men Who Fought There (1944).

PIN : 068914–000

CMH Pub 72–6

Cover: The reinforcing 4th Infantry moves inland from Massacre Bay.

(DA photograph)