GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

April 1999 WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION

Effort to Reduce 

Russian Arsenals May 

Cost More, Achieve 

Less Than Planned

GAO/NSIAD-99-76

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

GAO

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282010 Letter

April 13, 1999

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Since the early 1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) has supported 

Russia’s design and construction of two facilities intended to promote U.S. 

national security by helping to reduce Russian arsenals of nuclear and 

chemical weapons. The first, a storage facility now under construction at 

Russia’s Mayak nuclear complex, is intended to facilitate Russia’s 

elimination of nuclear weapons by providing safe and secure storage for 

nuclear materials (such as plutonium) removed from such weapons. The 

second, a pilot chemical weapons destruction facility to be built near 

Russia’s Shchuch’ye chemical weapons storage depot, is intended to 

destroy that depot’s nerve agent weapons, accelerate destruction of such 

weapons at other depots by providing a proven destruction technology, and 

help Russia comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention.1

 DOD has 

supported these facilities through its Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

program.2

Your committee has expressed concerns about the cost of the Mayak and 

Shchuch’ye facilities, the likelihood that they will become operational on 

schedule, and the extent to which the United States is likely to realize its 

national security objectives for them. Accordingly, our specific objectives 

in response to your request were to assess

1The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, 

retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The Convention, which entered into force on

April 29, 1997, requires signatory states to destroy any stocks that they may have of such weapons over 

a 10-year period and provides for the possible granting of a 5-year extension.

2

The CTR program was initiated in 1991 to help former Soviet states reduce risks posed by weapons of 

mass destruction. The Congress has provided DOD with more than $2.7 billion through fiscal year 1999 

for the CTR program. For more information regarding this program, see our reports entitled Weapons

of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-222, Sept. 

27, 1996), Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union—An

Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995), and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat

From the Former Soviet Union (GAO/NSIAD-95-7, Oct. 6, 1994).
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• whether the Mayak project will be completed on schedule and within 

past DOD estimates of its total cost to the United States,

• whether the United States has made progress in ensuring that the 

completed Mayak facility would achieve U.S. national security 

objectives by safely and securely storing retired materials taken only 

from dismantled nuclear weapons,

• whether the Shchuch’ye project will be completed on schedule and the 

status of DOD efforts to estimate its total cost to the United States, and

• whether the completed Shchuch’ye facility will achieve U.S. national 

security objectives by helping Russia destroy the Shchuch’ye depot’s 

stocks and accelerate elimination of all Russian chemical weapons 

under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Results in Brief Russian funding shortfalls have substantially increased the Mayak facility’s 

estimated cost to the United States while underscoring the need for 

substantial additional assistance if the Shchuch’ye project’s broader 

objectives are to be attained. Russian reluctance to share critical 

information with the United States may limit Mayak’s national security 

benefits and has contributed to delays in the Shchuch’ye project.

Russia’s failure to fund its share of the costs of the Mayak facility has 

already increased estimated U.S. costs for Mayak from $275 million to

$413 million, deferred construction of one of the facility’s two planned 

storage buildings, and delayed the facility’s initial availability by about

3 years. U.S. costs for Mayak could ultimately increase to almost

$1.3 billion if DOD eventually opts to build the facility’s originally planned 

second building and help Russia prepare, package, and transport plutonium 

for storage at Mayak.

Notwithstanding its growing investment in the Mayak project, the United 

States continues to lack clear assurance that Russia will actually use the 

Mayak facility in a manner that will ensure the achievement of all U.S. 

national security objectives for the project. U.S. and Russian negotiators 

have drafted—but have not yet concluded—an agreement that could assure 

DOD that weapons-grade plutonium at Mayak is securely stored and would 

not be used for weapons in the future. However, Russian negotiators have 

not agreed to U.S. proposals aimed at confirming that Mayak’s plutonium 

would originate solely from dismantled weapons and that Mayak would 

thus support Russia’s dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
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The Shchuch’ye project has fallen about 18 months behind schedule since 

October 1997 and now is not scheduled to begin operating until 2006. 

Several factors, including Russia’s failure to promptly provide needed 

information about the chemical weapons to be destroyed, have slowed 

both completion of the facility’s conceptual design and DOD’s efforts to 

refine its $750 million estimate of the pilot facility’s cost to the United 

States. The project also fell behind schedule because DOD increased the 

time allotted for constructing, testing, and starting up the pilot facility, due 

in part to funding limits.

The United States lacks assurance that the Shchuch’ye project will achieve 

its broader national security objectives of accelerating the destruction of 

such weapons at other depots and helping Russia comply with the 

Chemical Weapons Convention. As designed, the U.S.-funded pilot facility 

would destroy most of the depot’s 5,600 metric tons of chemical weapons—

although not until well past Russia’s Chemical Weapons Convention 

deadline for destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile—and 

provide Russia with a proven technology for use at its four other nerve 

agent depots. However, Russia’s economic difficulties strongly suggest that 

it would be unwilling or unable to invest the billions of dollars needed to 

construct and operate destruction facilities at the four depots that store the 

rest of its 32,000 metric ton nerve agent stockpile. As a result, DOD is 

counting on large-scale assistance from other nations to fund the additional 

facilities needed to help Russia fully comply with the Chemical Weapons 

Convention and so realize the Shchuch’ye project’s broader objectives.

This report suggests that if the Congress wishes to have greater assurance 

that the Shchuch’ye project will achieve its stated broad national security 

objectives, it may wish to require DOD to identify specific funding sources 

for the construction of the four additional chemical weapons destruction 

facilities or provide further justification for continuing the project.

Background The Mayak facility is intended to promote U.S. national security interests 

by allowing Russia to safely and securely retire nuclear materials removed 

from dismantled nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, which had about 

30,000 nuclear weapons at the time of its collapse, may have produced as 

much as 200 metric tons of plutonium and 1,200 metric tons of highly 

enriched uranium—sufficient for producing over 70,000 nuclear weapons. 

Following the 1991 Soviet collapse, Russian officials indicated that a 

shortage of secure storage space for nuclear material might impede their 

ability to retire and eliminate nuclear warheads. 
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Although U.S. agencies were unable to confirm the existence of such a 

shortage, DOD agreed in 1992 to provide $15 million to help Russia design a 

facility to hold nuclear materials from dismantled weapons. In 1993, DOD 

agreed to provide another $75 million to help build such a facility at Mayak. 

DOD informed congressional committees in 1996 that it would cap its 

growing investment in Mayak at half of the facility’s cost. Based on 

then-current DOD cost estimates, such a cap would have limited total U.S. 

expenses for Mayak at about $275 million. As of February 1999, DOD had 

obligated about $165 million for Mayak and expended about $83 million.

Mayak’s two planned storage buildings were designed to accommodate a 

total of 50,000 containers3

 filled with as much as 66 metric tons of 

plutonium and 536 metric tons of highly enriched uranium.4

 By mid-1998, 

the first of these storage buildings and several support buildings had been 

partially constructed. Initial operations were to start in 1999.

DOD has also been supporting design and construction of the Shchuch’ye 

pilot chemical weapons destruction facility to promote U.S. national 

security by (1) destroying all nerve agent-filled munitions at a Russian 

chemical weapons storage depot, (2) accelerating Russia’s chemical 

weapons destruction efforts by providing a proven nerve agent destruction 

technology and a facility design that could be adapted for use at other 

storage sites, and (3) helping Russia meet its Chemical Weapons 

Convention deadlines. By ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in 

1997, Russia agreed to destroy its chemical weapons by 2007, with a 

possible extension to 2012. However, it does not have an operational 

capability to destroy large quantities of chemical weapons5

 and its seven 

declared chemical weapons storage depots contain 40,000 metric tons of 

chemical weapons agent—the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpile. 

Over 80 percent of this stockpile consists of the lethal nerve agents sarin, 

soman, and VX. According to executive branch officials, the destruction of 

Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, especially its nerve agents, would 

3

In addition to the cost of the Mayak facility, DOD also has spent $63 million to produce about 32,700 

nuclear material containers for Russian use at a facility such as the one being built at Mayak.

4These amounts are sufficient to build more than 29,000 nuclear weapons.

5

The United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on April 25, 1997, and is obligated to 

destroy its 31,500-ton stockpile by 2007. The Congress had already directed the U.S. Army to destroy 

this stockpile. According to the Army, 13 percent of the stockpile had been destroyed by mid-January 

1999. It plans to complete the destruction of the entire U.S. stockpile by 2004.
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significantly reduce the chemical weapons threat faced by the United 

States.

In 1994, DOD began taking initial steps toward providing Russia the 

capability of destroying chemical weapons at the Shchuch’ye depot, which 

stores about 2 million artillery projectiles and rocket and missile warheads 

filled with nerve agents. The project would result in a pilot facility capable 

of destroying 500 metric tons of nerve agents annually. Russia could 

expand the pilot facility into a full-scale facility capable of destroying

1,200 metric tons annually. DOD plans to fund the entire cost of the pilot 

destruction facility. As of the end of 1998, DOD had obligated about

$95 million for the project and expended about $56 million.

Mayak Will Cost DOD 

More and Be Available 

Later Than Planned

Because of Russian funding shortfalls, DOD now plans to bear about 90 

percent of the cost of constructing a truncated version of the Mayak facility 

that will be available almost 3 years later than previously scheduled. DOD 

estimates that the smaller facility will cost the United States about

50 percent more than the amount that DOD had previously planned to 

contribute toward the full-sized facility. U.S. costs could increase to as 

much as $1.3 billion if DOD opts to expand Mayak to its originally-planned 

size and to help Russia load Mayak with plutonium.

Russian Funding Shortfalls 

Lead to Higher U.S. Costs, 

Smaller Facility, Delayed 

Opening

DOD’s 1996 assumption that Russia would pay for half of Mayak’s costs has 

not been born out by subsequent events. According to a DOD estimate, 

through 1999 Russia had programmed about $45 million for Mayak—less 

than 14 percent of all U.S.-Russian Mayak funding. In April 1998, Russian 

officials informed DOD that Russia would be unable to contribute 

significant funds for Mayak in the future and asked DOD to fund Mayak’s 

completion.

After concluding that it could not allocate the funds needed to complete the 

entire facility by 1999 as planned, DOD chose to extend the time allotted 

for constructing Mayak’s first storage building and to defer the second 

storage building. DOD estimated that the smaller facility could be 

completed by mid-2002 at a cost of $413 million—$138 million more than 

DOD’s 1996 cap of $275 million for the full-sized facility. DOD’s new 

estimate included $20 million to cover the cost of extending the project and 

$36 million for new infrastructure items needed to operate Mayak. The
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truncated, 25,000-container facility would be able to hold 50 metric tons of 

plutonium and 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium.6 In January 

1999, Russia agreed that DOD would contribute no more than $413 million 

for a 25,000-container facility.7

However, DOD officials continue to budget and plan for the possibility that 

DOD will opt in 2000 to proceed with the deferred second storage building, 

which could be completed by mid-2006 and designed to hold an additional 

100 metric tons of plutonium. DOD officials told us that Russia would need 

the second building if it chooses to retire more plutonium as a result of the 

elimination of nuclear weapons. DOD estimates that the second building 

would cost the United States another $230 million—raising total U.S. 

Mayak design and construction costs to about $642 million.

DOD May Help Russia 

Prepare Plutonium for 

Storage at Mayak

DOD may also provide another $650 million to help Russia prepare, 

package, and transport plutonium for storage at Mayak. In April 1998, 

Russian officials informed DOD that Russia lacked the resources to fully 

utilize its capabilities for preparing and packaging materials for storage at 

Mayak and that this lack of resources could constrict Russian nuclear 

weapons dismantlement. According to DOD officials, DOD subsequently 

proposed that it would help Russia prepare, package, and transport 

plutonium for storage at the facility. DOD officials informed us that such 

aid would be contingent on Russia’s willingness to provide the United 

States with access to the facilities that would prepare and package the 

plutonium.

The CTR program office estimates that helping Russia prepare, package, 

and transport 50 metric tons of plutonium for storage at Mayak’s first 

building by 2006 could cost DOD about $223 million. The cost of such an 

6Unlike highly enriched uranium, plutonium produces heat and can change in ways that could raise 

safety concerns if stored at too high a temperature for too long. While Mayak’s first building was 

designed to safely hold no more than 33 metric tons of plutonium, the initial results of a

DOD-sponsored study indicate that it could safely hold the 50 metric tons of plutonium that Russia now 

plans to retire at Mayak. Containers holding 50 metric tons of plutonium would fill about half of the 

building’s storage capacity. The remaining half could be used to store up to 200 metric tons of highly 

enriched uranium. Whether Russia will store any highly enriched uranium at Mayak is unclear, given 

that it has agreed to sell 500 metric tons of uranium from dismantled weapons to the United States after 

converting the uranium into low-enriched fuel for power reactors. 

7

The Congress has barred the obligation or expenditure of any fiscal year 1998 funds for Mayak until

15 days after DOD notifies the Congress that DOD and Russia have entered into an agreement that 

specifies the total cost to the United States for the facility, as well as an agreement that incorporates the 

principle of transparency with respect to the use of the facility (P.L. 105-85, sec. 1407).
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effort would increase sharply if DOD were also to help Russia fill Mayak’s 

second building—if constructed—with another 100 metric tons of 

plutonium. The CTR program office estimates that preparing, packaging, 

and transporting a total of 150 metric tons of plutonium for storage at a 

two-building Mayak facility by 2010 would cost DOD roughly $650 million. 

Such an effort, coupled with the cost of designing and constructing both 

buildings, could raise total U.S. Mayak costs to almost $1.3 billion, as 

shown in table 1.

Table 1: Mayak Facility’s Capacity, Schedule, and Cost Estimates

Note: Shaded areas represent potential future costs.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

Russian Officials Press for 

Additional U.S. Support

Russian officials continue to seek additional U.S. support for various 

Mayak-related facilities. In 1998, DOD refused to pay about $76 million for 

items—including a garage, a car wash, a bus station, and an overly large 

heating plant—that it considered non-essential. In November 1998, 

Russian officials argued that Russia could not afford to pay for several such 

items that they stated would be needed to ensure Mayak’s certification for 

operation by Russian authorities. DOD officials, while rejecting almost all 

of the items, agreed to pay for a fire station and to consider heating plant 

options because they considered these items to be integral to Mayak’s safe

Mayak facility, as planned in 

1996

Mayak facility, as currently 

planned 

Mayak facility, if expanded to 

originally-planned size

Capacity Two buildings holding a total of 

50,000 containers

One building holding a total of 

25,000 containers

Two buildings holding a total of 

50,000 containers

Estimated start of operations 1999 2002 2002 (first building)

2006 (second building)

Estimated U.S. cost of design and 

construction 

$275 million $413 million $642 million

Estimated U.S. cost of loading 

facility with plutonium 

(preparation, packaging, and 

transportation)

$0 $223 million 

(50 metric tons)

$650 million

(150 metric tons)

Total estimated U.S. cost of 

facility design, construction, 

and loading

$275 million $636 million $1.29 billion
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operation. Russia’s continued economic difficulties suggest that it will 

continue to press DOD for additional support for such items in the future.8

Full Achievement of 

U.S. National Security 

Objectives at Mayak 

Hinges on Russian 

Decisions

The United States cannot ensure it will achieve the full range of its Mayak 

national security objectives unless and until Russia agrees to measures 

needed to confirm that the completed facility contains only materials from 

dismantled nuclear weapons. DOD appears to have made greater progress 

toward being able to confirm that weapons-grade materials at Mayak are 

not available for reuse in weapons and are being stored securely and safely.

Ongoing Negotiations 

Continue Efforts to Define 

U.S. Access

In a January 1996 joint statement with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the 

Russian Minister for Atomic Energy stated that the Mayak facility would 

have “joint accountability and transparency measures” that would permit 

the United States to confirm Mayak’s use. However, in September 1996, we 

reported that the United States and Russia had not made any progress in 

finalizing transparency arrangements for Mayak, which was then scheduled 

for completion less than 3 years later.9

 We noted that without a detailed 

transparency arrangement the United States would be unable to ensure 

that Russia was using Mayak to store materials from dismantled weapons 

and that those materials were not being reused for weapons. We therefore 

suggested that the Congress consider linking DOD’s ability to obligate 

funds for constructing Mayak to the completion of a transparency 

agreement. 

The Congress subsequently barred DOD from obligating fiscal year 1998 

funds for Mayak until 15 days after DOD had notified the Congress that 

DOD and Russia had entered into an agreement incorporating the principle 

of transparency with respect to the facility’s use.10 In October 1997, the 

United States and Russia began negotiating an agreement to define the 

8

Russia’s economic situation raises concerns about its ability to pay the cost of operating Mayak once 

the facility is completed. Russian officials have stated that Mayak could cost as much as $80 million a 

year to operate. Although DOD officials have not estimated Mayak’s life-cycle costs, a U.S. contractor 

estimate suggests that the facility could cost Russia about $12 million to $13 million a year for 

operations and maintenance.

9See our report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction

Program

10This restriction is found in P.L. 105-85, sec. 1407. 
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transparency measures that the United States would be allowed to employ 

at Mayak. By February 1999, the negotiators had partially drafted a 

possible agreement. DOD officials that we spoke with could not predict 

when the agreement would be completed.

Weapons Origin of Mayak’s 

Future Contents in Doubt

DOD is attempting to secure sufficient access to the plutonium entering 

Mayak to be confident that it was removed from dismantled nuclear 

weapons. Knowing that the plutonium originated from nuclear weapons 

would provide evidence that Russia is dismantling such weapons. 

U.S. officials have defined several criteria for assessing whether plutonium 

originated from a nuclear weapon. DOD officials informed us that Russian 

negotiators have offered to allow U.S. measurements relevant to one of 

these criteria to be made as plutonium enters Mayak for storage and to 

supplement these measurements with written pledges that the stored 

material originated from weapons. U.S. officials told us that Russian 

negotiators have agreed to measurements that would provide confidence 

that Mayak’s plutonium is weapons grade.

However, according to U.S. officials, Russian negotiators have not agreed 

to allow U.S. measurements regarding the shape of the alleged plutonium 

components and other U.S. criteria. Russian officials have stated that all 

plutonium components will be reshaped before they are shipped to Mayak 

for U.S. measurement.11 Such reshaping would reduce DOD’s ability to 

confirm that the weapons-grade plutonium entering Mayak had been 

removed from weapons and that Mayak is directly supporting Russia’s 

elimination of nuclear weapons. Russian negotiators rebuffed a U.S. 

request to allow measurements of Mayak-bound plutonium at the reshaping 

facility prior to its reshaping because of (1) the lack of any U.S.-funded 

activities at the reshaping facility and (2) Russian sensitivities concerning 

the information that the United States would obtain. DOD officials 

informed us that they intend to make the taking of weapons-origin 

measurements a condition of any CTR aid to Russia’s preparation, 

packaging, and transportation of plutonium for storage at Mayak.

11According to DOD officials, Russian negotiators stated that the reshaping was intended to deny 

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to sensitive information. The Agency’s 

membership includes more than 100 nations that do not have nuclear weapons. See our report entitled 

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Challenges Facing the International Atomic Energy Agency

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-93-284, Sept. 22, 1993).
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Draft Access Agreement 

Provides Pledge That 

Materials Will Not Be 

Removed and Allows DOD 

Monitoring

DOD is also seeking to increase its confidence that nuclear materials stored 

at Mayak would not be used to produce new Russian nuclear weapons and 

would be stored securely.12 The draft agreement contains provisions 

addressing both of these objectives, although questions remain concerning 

Russia’s plans for providing physical security for the facility.

The draft agreement includes a Russian pledge not to remove any material 

from Mayak—other than for emergency purposes13—without first 

negotiating sufficient provisions to assure the United States that the 

materials would not be reused for weapons. To bolster U.S. confidence 

that these materials would be securely stored, the draft agreement would 

provide the United States with considerable access at Mayak. U.S. 

monitors would be allowed to inspect Mayak six times a year and utilize 

data generated by Mayak’s material control and accounting system. U.S. 

monitors would be allowed to spend at least 5 days to conduct the initial 

inspection. During each inspection, they would be allowed to download 

recorded data from sensors used by the Russians to identify, scan, and 

track each container as it passes through Mayak’s unloading and incoming 

control rooms. Annually, U.S. monitors would be able to select randomly 

up to 120 storage shafts and verify the identifying tags on the containers in 

those shafts against Mayak’s records.14 U.S. monitors would have the right 

to scan one container from each of the selected shafts to determine its 

contents. Russia also would be required to inventory a random number of 

containers twice a year with U.S. participation.

Details regarding Mayak’s physical security measures remain unclear, 

however. DOD officials informed us that Russia has been reluctant to 

provide information about Russia’s plans to provide physical security for 

the facility. The lack of such information could impair DOD’s ability to 

assess Russian requests for safety-related equipment.

DOD has addressed Mayak’s safety by reviewing its design. DOD officials 

reviewed Russian design documents in October 1996 and identified several 

12In November 1998, Russian officials informed us that they had secured temporary storage space for 

materials from nuclear weapons that would be sufficient until Mayak begins operating in 2002. They 

stated that the temporary storage space is unsuited for long-term storage, in part because it depends 

heavily on guards for security.

13The draft agreement specifies the United States would have to be notified of any such removal.

14One hundred twenty shafts a year would constitute about 4 percent of Mayak’s shafts and could 

contain almost 2 metric tons of plutonium.
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safety concerns. A 1997 U.S. follow-up review concluded that the Russians 

had incorporated some changes in their design and had provided sufficient 

additional data to resolve remaining issues. DOD officials informed us that 

they are continuing to monitor the design of key safety-related 

components.

Shchuch’ye Project 

Has Fallen Behind 

Schedule

The Shchuch’ye project has fallen behind schedule since October 1997, 

delaying the preparation of a more accurate cost estimate and the pilot 

facility’s planned start-up date. The project has fallen behind schedule 

largely due to delays in completing the facility’s conceptual design and U.S. 

funding constraints.

Development of the 

Facility’s Conceptual Design 

and Cost Estimate Is Behind 

Schedule

In October 1997, U.S. and Russian officials agreed to a joint schedule for 

the Shchuch’ye project. This new schedule estimated that the facility’s 

conceptual design15 would be completed by April 1998. DOD officials have 

recently verified that it was not completed until February 1999. DOD 

officials attributed this 10-month delay to three factors.

The conceptual design fell behind schedule partly because Russia did not 

promptly provide detailed specifications for the types of chemical weapons 

stored at the Shchuch’ye depot to U.S. engineers, despite repeated U.S. 

requests. Without these specifications, U.S. engineers could not verify that 

the facility’s weapons-handling equipment would safely extract nerve 

agents from these weapons. According to a DOD official, by the end of 

January 1999, Russia had provided enough information about the weapons 

stored at the Shchuch’ye depot to allow completion of the conceptual 

design. However, the delay led DOD to defer fabrication of test

weapons-handling equipment from January 1999 to July 1999. According to 

a DOD official, this delay could impact the overall project schedule.

The conceptual design also fell behind schedule partly because of delays in 

verifying the safety and effectiveness of Russia’s chemical agent 

destruction process for Russian VX nerve agent.16 The process employs a 

chemical compound to neutralize the nerve agents extracted from the 

15In U.S. engineering practice, a project’s conceptual or preliminary design is complete when 35 percent 

of its total design is complete.

16This process had already been demonstrated to be effective destroying other Russian nerve agents.
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chemical weapons and then transforms the neutralized agents into a solid 

waste product, which will be stored in bunkers next to the facility. During 

testing, U.S. engineers discovered that the waste product’s flash point17

was about 20 degrees Fahrenheit below the threshold that U.S. fire code 

standards would classify as “explosive.”18 In response to U.S. concerns, 

Russian engineers modified the chemical compound used to neutralize the 

nerve agents to produce a waste product with a flash point that was 

acceptable, according to a DOD official.19 However, several additional 

months were needed before U.S. and Russian engineers were able to 

produce acceptable test quantities of the modified chemical compound.20

In addition, the facility’s conceptual design fell behind schedule partly 

because Russian officials did not obtain needed investment and site 

permits until June 1998—1 year behind schedule. Russian officials were 

reluctant to complete more than 10 percent of the Shchuch’ye facility’s 

design without these permits, which are roughly equivalent to a U.S. 

environmental impact assessment. According to DOD officials, the 

October 1997 schedule underestimated the length of time the Russian 

Ministry of Defense would need to obtain the permits under new laws and 

regulations that strengthened the role of regional commissions.

Due to the delay in completing the conceptual design, DOD officials have 

deferred the completion of a more reliable estimate of the pilot facility’s 

cost from April 1998. Their preliminary estimate of the pilot facility’s cost 

is about $750 million. DOD officials expect that the final cost estimate for 

the pilot facility will be about the same or lower than the preliminary 

estimate. DOD intends to fund the entire cost of the Shchuch’ye pilot 

facility with CTR funds, including its start up and demonstration with 

various agents and munitions. In accordance with our 1996 

recommendation, the Secretary of Defense has stated that DOD will not 

obligate funds for the Shchuch’ye pilot facility’s construction until DOD has 

17A volatile combustible substance’s flash point is the lowest temperature at which vapors above it will 

ignite when exposed to flame.

18DOD officials acknowledged that the waste product’s low flash point should have been identified 

during DOD’s 1996 review of the Russian process.

19Under U.S. fire code standards, the modified waste product would be classified as flammable.

20A DOD official informed us that the project might encounter additional delays in verifying the Russian 

process. For example, Russian scientists were not able to start joint toxicology testing and waste 

evaluation in early February 1999 as planned. The resultant delay of this activity until early summer 

1999 could impact the overall project schedule, according to this DOD official.
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developed a sound cost estimate based on a completed conceptual 

design.21

Pilot Facility Construction 

and Start of Operations 

Delayed by 18 Months

The October 1997 joint schedule would have also accelerated the 

Shchuch’ye pilot facility’s construction and start of operations by about

2 years over prior U.S. schedules. Under this schedule, the pilot facility 

would have started operating in December 2004. According to DOD 

officials, Russian officials sought to accelerate the schedule because they 

had publicly committed to begin destroying chemical weapons earlier than 

the prior schedule would have allowed. According to DOD officials and 

documents, DOD officials were concerned about the new schedule’s 

practicality as they signed it, and they told Russian officials that its 

implementation would be subject to confirmation of U.S. funding and other 

factors.

In June 1998, DOD officials abandoned the October 1997 schedule and 

adopted a new schedule that shifted the start of the pilot facility’s 

operations to June 2006, a delay of 18 months. They did so because the 

completion of the facility’s conceptual design had been delayed, annual 

CTR funds would not be sufficient to support the accelerated construction 

schedule,22 and DOD’s experience with U.S. chemical weapons destruction 

facilities demonstrated that more time would be required to test and start 

up the pilot facility. 

Pilot Facility Construction 

Schedule Depends on 

Russian Funding

DOD’s plans to fund the entire cost of building the Shchuch’ye pilot facility 

hinge on Russia’s ability to prepare the facility’s site for construction and 

operations. U.S. officials have conditioned U.S. assistance for the pilot 

facility’s construction on Russia’s completion of several social and 

industrial infrastructure projects, such as gas and water lines, storm 

sewers, housing, and a rail line from the storage depot to the destruction 

facility. These projects are estimated to cost almost $240 million. Russia 

must complete initial social and industrial infrastructure projects by late 

August 1999 before DOD officials will authorize the U.S. contractor to 

21See our report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction

Program.

22The funding shortage worsened when CTR officials cut about $85 million from the Shchuch’ye project 

budget in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to provide additional funding for the Mayak project. This funding 

was restored in fiscal years 2002 to 2004.
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mobilize for construction in September 1999. Russia was scheduled to 

start construction of the initial infrastructure projects in May 1998 but has 

delayed doing so until June 1999—leaving only 3 months for their 

completion. Russia will have to complete additional social and industrial 

projects for U.S. assistance to continue.

Shchuch’ye Project 

May Not Fully Achieve 

All U.S. Objectives

The Shchuch’ye project cannot achieve its broader national security 

objectives unless Russia receives a large infusion of additional funding. 

Destroying Russia’s large chemical weapons stockpile, particularly its 

nerve agents, has been a long-standing U.S. goal. The Shchuch’ye project 

was intended to serve this goal by (1) destroying all nerve agent-filled 

munitions at one Russian chemical weapons storage depot, (2) accelerating 

Russia’s chemical weapons destruction efforts by providing a proven nerve 

agent destruction technology and a facility design that could be adapted for 

use at four other nerve agent-filled weapons storage sites, and (3) helping 

Russia meet its Chemical Weapons Convention deadlines. Although the 

U.S.-funded pilot facility would largely achieve the first objective, Russia’s 

faltering economy and limited international assistance raise serious doubts 

about the sources of funding for constructing the four additional facilities 

needed to fully achieve the second and third objectives.

Pilot Facility Would Destroy 

Most Weapons at 

Shchuch’ye Depot

As designed, the Shchuch’ye pilot facility would destroy 95 percent of the 

nerve agents stored at the nearby depot. The depot stores about 2 million 

weapons, mostly artillery rounds and rocket warheads, filled with about 

5,600 metric tons of chemical agents (about 14 percent of Russia’s total 

declared chemical weapons stockpile)—primarily nerve agents.23 The 

pilot facility will not be able to destroy 5 percent of the nerve agents, which 

are contained in large-diameter rocket and missile warheads that will not 

fit on its processing lines.

23The Shchuch’ye facility would not destroy a small amount of phosgene-filled projectiles stored at the 

Shchuch’ye depot. Phosgene is a widely used commercial chemical (carbonyl chloride) and the 

weapons themselves present a minimal threat, according to DOD officials.
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Extending Shchuch’ye 

Technology to Other Depots 

Could Cost Russia Billions 

of Dollars

Although the Shchuch’ye project would provide a proven design for a 

chemical weapons destruction facility that Russia could use at four other 

nerve agent storage depots, DOD and State Department officials informed 

us that Russia’s dire economic outlook could hinder its ability to provide 

the billions of dollars needed to erect four additional destruction facilities. 

DOD officials told us that Russia could adopt the Shchuch’ye design for use 

at (1) the Kizner depot—which stores artillery projectiles and rocket 

warheads similar to those at Shchuch’ye—and (2) three depots that store

air-deliverable nerve agent weapons, if the weapons-handling equipment 

were redesigned. However, Russia could require over $3 billion to 

construct these four additional facilities and provide needed 

infrastructure—as well as additional billions of dollars for their operations.

According to DOD officials and documents, Russia is directing its limited 

funds toward the design and construction of two facilities to eliminate bulk 

blister agents, rather than nerve agents. Executive branch officials are 

counting on substantial assistance from other nations to fund the 

construction of the four additional facilities needed to destroy Russia’s 

entire nerve agent stockpile. However, according to DOD and State 

Department officials, foreign assistance for Russia’s chemical weapons 

destruction efforts is largely limited to U.S. support for the Shchuch’ye 

project, although Germany has provided some aid to help Russia eliminate 

blister agents. DOD officials expressed hope that the U.S. investment in 

building the Shchuch’ye pilot facility will encourage other nations to help 

Russia eliminate its chemical weapons.24

Russia Is Unlikely to Meet 

Its Chemical Weapons 

Convention Targets

The Shchuch’ye pilot facility’s limited capacity and delayed start of 

operations will prevent Russia from destroying the Shchuch’ye depot’s 

nerve agent stocks before Russia’s Chemical Weapons Convention deadline 

of 2007. The U.S.-funded pilot facility is scheduled to begin destroying 

nerve agents by 2006 at a rate of about 500 metric tons annually. At this 

rate, it would finish destroying the small- and medium-diameter weapons 

that contain 95 percent of the depot’s 5,600 metric tons of agent in 2017—

10 years after the expiration of Russia’s Convention deadline and 5 years 

24According to DOD, foreign international assistance for Russia's chemical weapons destruction 

program currently totals about $18 million. Germany is providing about $9.6 million to help eliminate 

bulk blister agents; Italy has pledged $8 million for a facility at Kizner; and two other countries are 

funding public health studies. Other interested countries are waiting for Russia to demonstrate its 

commitment to the program before pledging assistance, according to DOD.
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after the expiration of an extension to that deadline. By completing the 

full-scale facility with a capacity of 1,200 metric tons annually, Russia could 

destroy the Shchuch’ye depot’s entire nerve agent stockpile by its extended 

Convention deadline. However, to do so, Russia would have to provide 

about $250 million to expand the facility—roughly the same amount that it 

failed to provide for the Mayak project. DOD officials informed us that 

DOD has no plans to help construct the full-scale facility.

Although Russia’s 1995 chemical weapons elimination plan called for the 

completion of five nerve agent facilities by 2001, even the most advanced of 

these projects—the Shchuch’ye pilot facility—will not become operational 

until 2006. The Shchuch’ye depot’s stocks constitute only about 17 percent 

of its nerve agent stockpile. Given Shchuch’ye’s role as a pilot facility for 

the Russian nerve agent destruction program, Russia is unlikely to destroy 

the nerve agents stored at the four other depots in time to meet even its 

extended Convention deadline.25

According to a State Department official and a nongovernmental 

organization, ongoing efforts to eliminate Russian chemical weapons—

however prolonged—are important to ensuring the continued viability of 

the Convention itself and securing a broader range of security benefits 

flowing from the Convention. The State Department official said that 

Russia’s ability to meet its Chemical Weapons Convention time frame is 

less important than its willingness to persevere in its efforts to eventually 

eliminate its entire chemical weapons stockpile.

Conclusions The recent history of the Mayak and Shchuch’ye projects indicates that U.S. 

efforts to reduce the threat of Russian nuclear and chemical weapons will 

cost more than previously estimated and take longer than previously 

scheduled. Unless Russia and other foreign nations take certain steps, 

these facilities will not provide the United States with all the national 

security benefits that it sought. Russia’s funding shortfalls and reluctance 

to provide DOD with crucial information have hampered DOD’s efforts and 

limited prospects for achieving all of these projects’ intended benefits 

within expected time frames.

25Russian defense officials, speaking before the collapse of the Russian economy in mid-1998, stated 

that Russia was unlikely to meet its Chemical Weapons Convention targets. According to DOD officials, 

Russian officials have expressed interest in obtaining assistance in improving security at Russia’s seven 

chemical weapons storage sites as the weapons there await destruction. Russia has yet to define the 

specific physical security improvements needed at each of its storage sites.
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The extent and nature of the partially built Mayak facility’s costs and 

benefits to the United States remain unsettled. Russia’s funding shortfalls 

will substantially increase U.S. costs beyond the $165 million that DOD has 

obligated to date and the $275 million cap that DOD set in 1996. Although 

current plans call for no more than $413 million in U.S. funding for Mayak, 

the United States could ultimately spend up to $1.3 billion to design and 

build an enlarged facility and load it with 150 metric tons of plutonium. 

Mayak’s national security benefits would be constrained by a continued 

Russian refusal to allow U.S. confirmation that the materials at Mayak were 

removed from weapons. However, Mayak could still provide the United 

States with some assurance that at least 50 metric tons of weapons-grade 

plutonium—enough to provide Russia with more than 6,200 nuclear 

weapons—were being securely stored and were not available for use in 

weapons. If expanded to its originally-planned size, Mayak could allow 

DOD to monitor Russia’s storage of roughly 75 percent of all the plutonium 

estimated to have been produced by the Soviet Union—an amount 

sufficient for more than 18,000 nuclear weapons.

The Shchuch’ye project’s outlook is more problematic. If constructed, the 

pilot facility would slowly eliminate about 17 percent of Russia’s nerve 

agents over the next 2 decades. Given that DOD already has obligated 

about $95 million for the Shchuch’ye project, achieving this limited benefit 

would cost the United States an additional $655 million—assuming Russia 

can fund needed infrastructure projects that may cost almost $240 million. 

Nonetheless, the $750 million investment by the United States would not be 

sufficient to ensure the realization of the project’s broader objectives—

accelerating Russia’s destruction of its entire 32,000 metric ton nerve agent 

stockpile and its fulfillment of its Chemical Weapons Convention deadlines. 

Although the Shchuch’ye project could provide a proven technology for 

these facilities, Russia’s ongoing economic difficulties—as illustrated by 

Mayak’s funding shortfalls—strongly suggest that it would be unwilling or 

unable to invest the billions of dollars needed to construct the additional 

facilities it will need. As a result, DOD is counting on substantial assistance 

from other nations to fund the construction of these additional facilities 

and ensure that the Shchuch’ye project realizes its broader objectives.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Since substantial international assistance is essential for achieving the 

Shchuch’ye project’s broader objectives, the Congress may wish to direct 

the Secretary of Defense to report to it regarding the specific sources of 

funding for the four additional facilities needed to eliminate Russia’s nerve 

agent stockpile. If the Secretary of Defense cannot identify these likely 
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sources with specificity, the Congress may wish to consider seeking further 

justification for the project from the Department of Defense.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

Although DOD and the Department of State generally concurred with the 

factual information presented in this report, both agencies took exception 

to our suggested matter for congressional consideration. DOD also 

disagreed with some aspects of our analysis, particularly those concerning 

the projects’ ability to realize their national security objectives. 

DOD objected to statements in our report that it stated suggest that the 

United States would not realize its national security goals at Mayak or 

Shchuch’ye. DOD stressed that these projects would achieve their most 

pressing national security goals. For example, DOD stated that Mayak 

would achieve its major security objective of safely and securely storing 

fissile material that could otherwise be used to assemble nuclear weapons. 

It also stated that ensuring that such materials were derived from 

dismantled nuclear weapons was not Mayak’s primary or sole security 

objective. Similarly, DOD expressed confidence that Shchuch’ye would 

destroy a substantial and threatening portion of the Russian chemical 

weapons stockpile and validate technology needed to facilitate destruction 

of similar agents elsewhere. DOD recommended that we alter the initial 

paragraph of our conclusion to better reflect its perspectives.

We did not intend to suggest that the United States is unlikely to achieve 

any of its national security goals at Mayak and Shchuch’ye. Instead, as 

stated in our report, we concluded that the United States cannot ensure it 

will achieve the full range of its national security objectives for Mayak 

unless and until Russia agrees to allow the United States to undertake 

measures needed to confirm that Mayak contains only materials from 

nuclear weapons. Our report also concluded that, although the Shchuch’ye 

facility could eliminate the bulk of the Shchuch’ye depot’s chemical 

weapon stocks, the project is very unlikely to achieve its broader 

objectives unless Russia receives a large infusion of additional funding.

These objectives have long been key elements of the rationale for 

supporting the Mayak and Shchuch’ye projects. For example, Mayak’s 

primary function as a repository of materials derived from Russian nuclear 

weapons elimination has been reflected since 1992 in the titles of

U.S.-Russian agreements governing U.S. aid for Mayak. In congressional 

testimony in March 1996, DOD officials reaffirmed Mayak’s intended role in 

removing potential bottlenecks in Russia’s elimination of nuclear weapons. 
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In 1997, the executive branch made weapons-origin transparency one of 

three key U.S. transparency negotiation objectives. While a U.S. failure to 

achieve such transparency would not degrade Mayak’s usefulness for 

storing materials that could be used for weapons, it would eliminate 

Mayak’s role in providing assurance that CTR aid is facilitating the 

dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons—and would therefore signal a 

diminution of Mayak’s intended national security benefits.

Similarly, the executive branch’s rationale for constructing the pilot 

Shchuch’ye destruction facility has long included the goal of 

“jump-starting” Russian chemical weapons elimination. Without the 

realization of this goal, the $750 million Shchuch’ye project would result 

only in the gradual elimination of about 17 percent of Russia’s nerve agents 

and the validation of its technology. It would not help eliminate the 

remaining 83 percent of Russia’s nerve agents, including the air-deliverable 

nerve agents that the United States originally placed a higher priority on 

destroying than the munitions at Shchuch’ye.

DOD acknowledged that Russia needs a large-scale infusion of funds from 

other nations to fully implement its Chemical Weapons Convention 

obligations. However, DOD stated that the report we suggest it provide to 

Congress concerning such funding would penalize the project for its 

current problems and could ultimately hurt efforts to obtain foreign funds. 

It stated that tying the Secretary of Defense’s ability to obligate funds to 

such a report would be ill-advised. DOD also suggested that Russia’s plans 

to enlarge the pilot facility could allow it to eliminate Shchuch’ye’s stocks 

within its Chemical Weapons Convention deadline—if the deadline is 

extended by 5 years—and that Russia’s economy could recover sufficiently 

to allow Russia to fund its chemical weapons elimination efforts. The 

Department of State stated that the report that we had suggested would 

needlessly slow the project without adding significantly to available 

information.

We disagree with these critiques. According to DOD, it plans no further 

fundling of chemical weapons distruction facilities beyond the pilot plant at 

Schehuch’ye. Thus our suggestion is motivated not by the pilot project’s 

current problems but by the fact that its benefits will be limited to a 

relatively modest reduction of Russian nerve agent stocks unless foreign 

governments begin committing funds on a scale that they have yet to do. 

While a Russian economic recovery could allow Russia to expand the pilot 

facility and build new facilities, Russia’s current and projected economic 

condition suggests that such speculation is not a sound basis for near-term 
B-282010

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U.S. decision-making. Because prospects for achieving Shchuch’ye’s 

broader objective of “jump-starting” Russia’s destruction of its entire 

stockpile appears to rest on the possibility of support from countries other 

than the United States or Russia, we believe that the Congress may wish to 

weigh the likelihood of such support in considering this costly project. The 

presentation of current and complete executive branch information 

concerning this topic could therefore assist the Congress in this decision.

We have modified the wording of the matter for congressional 

consideration to clarify our intent.

DOD’s and State’s comments are reprinted in appendixes I and II. The 

agencies also provided technical suggestions that were incorporated where 

appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

Our Mayak and Shchuch’ye assessments are case studies utilizing extant 

data and information. To assess the status and projected cost of the Mayak 

facility, we interviewed officials of DOD’s Threat Reduction Policy Office, 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Office, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bechtel Corporation, and the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory. We reviewed and analyzed current and past 

status and conference reports, design documents, safety and thermal 

analyses, and cost estimates concerning Mayak. We also interviewed 

officials from Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy and monitored a 2-day 

senior level conference near Washington, D.C., on Mayak’s prospects that 

was jointly sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the 

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. The conference included presentations 

by Russia’s VNPIET design bureau and South Urals Construction Company.

To assess the efforts being made to ensure that Mayak will store materials 

from dismantled nuclear weapons safely and securely, we interviewed DOD 

and other U.S. officials concerning the ongoing transparency negotiations. 

We also reviewed the currently agreed-upon language in the draft 

agreement.

To assess the Shchuch’ye project’s current status, prospects for 

completion, and potential cost to the United States, we interviewed 

officials of DOD’s Threat Reduction Policy Office, the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, and the Army 

Corps of Engineers. We reviewed and analyzed current and past status and 
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

conference reports, design documents, and other analyses concerning the 

project.

To assess the Shchuch’ye facility’s potential impact on Russia’s prospects 

for meeting its international chemical weapons commitments, we reviewed 

the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and identified the 

specific milestones applicable to Russia, and reviewed CTR program 

documents to determine the facility’s planned date of initial operations and 

its capacity. We also met with DOD and State officials regarding other 

nations’ assistance to Russia’s chemical weapons elimination effort.

We conducted our review from October 1998 through March 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed, we plan no further distribution of this report until

14 days from the date of the report, unless you publicly announce its 

contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other 

congressional committees; the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of 

Defense; the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State; and the 

Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies 

will also be available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson, 

Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues. If you or your 

staff have any questions concerning this report, he can be reached at

(202) 512-4128. Major contributors to this report were Boris Kachura, 

Pierre Toureille, and Michael Rohrback.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

National Security and International Affairs
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenIxdi

See p. 18

See p. 18
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

See p. 19

See p. 19

See p. 3
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

See p. 19
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

See p. 3

See p. 16

See p. 8
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of State ApenxIdi

See p. 19

See comment 1.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of State

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated March 16, 1999.

Comment 1. We have not reprinted the Department of State’s technical comments. 

We have incorporated these comments as appropriate.

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