No. 86-540 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

PAUL W. HERRON, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

SHARON M. HERRON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Lei£ Erickson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

I. James Heckathorn, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

M. Dean Jellison, Kalispell, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 26, 1987 

Decided: April 30, 1987 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Sharon M. Herron appeals from a judgment following 

remand entered by the District Court, Eleventh Judicial 

District, Flathead County. We affirm. 

This cause was before us in Herron v. Herron (19801, 186 

Mont. 396, 608 P. 2d 97. Therein we set forth the pertinent 

facts relating to the marriage of the parties. We reversed 

the District Court and remanded it for retrial on the issues 

of property distribution and maintenance. 

As to the judgment entered by the District Court after 

remand, Sharon appeals from the provisions of that judgment 

involving the division of the marital property, the provision 

for maintenance of the wife, and the support provision for 

the minor child of the parties. 

Relating to the marital property division, our remand 

indicated that both parties should share equally in the 

portion of the value of the property attributable to 

contribution from the marriage and appreciation during the 

marriage, but that the parties should not share equally in 

the total value of the property since much of the marital 

assets came to the marriage principally as gifts for Sharon 

from her deceased father, George Robbin. 186 Mont. at 402, 

608 P.2d at 102. 

On remand, the District Court found that the net value 

of the marital estate subject to distribution was $508,389, 

summarized as follows: 

Ranch $200,000.00 

Lake place 40,000.00 

Medical practice 75,089.00 

Rohbin estate 104,500.00 

Gold coins 32,000.00 
Third Avenue East home 55,000.00 

Savings account 1,800.00 

TOTAL MET VALUE $508,389.00 

The District Court then divided the net value of 

$508,389 as follows: 

To Paul 

Medical practice $ 75,089.00 

Husband's portion coin 

collection 32,000.00 

One-half Robbin estate 52,250.00 

To Sharon 

Ranch $ 200,000.00 

House 55,000.00 

One-half Robbin estate 52,250.00 

Lake lot 40,000.00 

Savings 1,800.00 

Sharon objects to the division of marital property on 

the grounds that she is required to pay Paul $52,250 out of 

the sale of the assets given to her; that the award does not 

take into account that sale of the ranch will require costs 

of commissions and expenses; and that the valuation of 

$104,500 determined by the court to be remaining from the 

George Robbin's estate for division is contrary to the 

evidence. Sharon maintains that the remaining estate merely 

consists of stock plus a savings account and that the other 

assets have been distributed or dissipated. 

Contrary to Sharon's contentions, however, the District 

Court in its findings carefully considered the assets of the 

marital estate, including the lake place, the value of Paul's 

medical practice, the sale of the Kalispell medical arts 

building, and the George Robbin estate. The District Court 
traced the acquisition of the assets, beginning with 

contributions from George Robbin when he was alive, amounts 

of property received from his estate, contributions made by 

the parties during their marriage which increased to the 

value of the marital assets, and the effect of appreciation. 

In accordance with our remand, it determined the value of 

direct gifts from George Robbin totalling $117,500, and 

determined that this amount should be credited to Sharon's 

favor in distributable marital assets. In distributing 

property, the court was faced with the biggest single asset, 

that of the ranch, which it had to consider in relation to an 

equitable division. In its conclusion of law, the District 

Court stated: 

The Supreme Court remand also directs this court to 

consider assets received by devise or inheritance 

as made principally for respondent's [Sharon] 

benefit. 608 P.2d at 100. However, this court 

found it necessary to split the inherited assets 

now remaining in the Robbin estate. The two major 

assets available for distribution in the marital 

estate are the ranch and the Robbin estate. An 

award of both of these assets to respondent 

entirely would result in an inequitable division of 

the assets in view of the joint marital 

contributions and appreciation factor during the 

marriage. 608 P.2d at 102. The parties chose to 

divide the gold coin collection equally and 

Respondent did not rebut Petitioner's contention 

that the remainder of the two certificates of 

deposit were depleted on joint obligations. The 

division of the remainder of the Robbin estate is 

reflective of an equitable value allocation of the 

available assets rather than a finding that the 

parties share equal entitlement to the estate 

assets. 

It is clear that the District Court followed in the best 

manner available the directions of our remand in dividing and 

allocating values to the parties out of the marital estate. 

The findings of fact by the District Court cannot be set 
aside by us unless they are clearly erroneous, Rule 52, 

Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. The conclusions of law by 

the District Court are reasonable based upon its findings and 

are equitable in the circumstances. We therefore affirm the 

division of the marital property by the District Court. 

The next issue raised by Sharon is the award of 

maintenance. In the first decision of the District Court, 

Paul was ordered to pay Sharon the sum of $400 per month for 

a period of four years. On remand, the District Court 

determined that Paul should pay Sharon maintenance in the 

amount of $1,000 per month for a period of two years 

commencing in July, 1986. Sharon attacks the maintenance 

award upon the ground that it is insufficient; that she has 

but $7,000 per year income of her own; and that she is 

required to pay the mortgage payments, the delinquent taxes 

and the costs of repairing the ranch house to make it 

saleable, in addition to her own living expenses and that of 

their child. 

Yet the District Court was careful in its findings to 

consider the factors set out in 5 40-4-203, MCA, regarding 

maintenance. In our remand, we requested the District Court 

to consider carefully the advisability of placing any time 

restrictions on the duration of maintenance payments. 186 

Mont. at 406, 608 P.2d 102-103. 

After determining the distribution of the parties' 

marital property, the District Court considered the assets 

awarded and what they might eventually provide in the way of 

financial security at a comfortable level for Sharon. The 

District Court recognized that a certain adjustment period 

would be necessary until she would be able to convert the 

assets to income producing property. On that ground the 

District Court determined, in consideration of her age, her 

loss of professional skills, and other factors, that she 
would need maintenance for two years after which the 

availability of her more than adequate resources would 

provide maintenance and should provide security. The 

District Court stated in its conclusions that the 

distribution was intended to be a means by which Sharon could 

establish independent financial security fitting her station 

in life without the need for indefinite maintenance which, in 

the light of petitioner's job situation, could not be 

assured. Since the case first came to us, it appears that 

Paul's medical practice had been severely limited due to his 

loss of rights at the hospital and that the possibility of an 

assured income from his medical practice was "tenuous at 

best. " 

In resolving the problem by awarding maintenance in the 

sum of $1,000 per month for two years, the District Court 

took into account the earning capability of the husband, his 

assets available to make those payments, and the period of 

adjustment necessary for the wife to establish her own 

independent security. This case illustrates the constant 

problem of district courts in marital dissolutions, that is, 

the shaping of the most equitable and least futile solution 

for a problem created by imperfect people in imperfect 

situations. We hold that the District Court acted properly 

in making the maintenance award. 

The final issue raised by Sharon is that the District 

Court did nothing about the support payments due the wife 

from the husband. The parties have four children, three 

having reached majority, and the fourth child is 17 years 

old, with a fairly severe learning disability. She is 

probably unemployable and requires the care of her mother. 

The former award to Sharon as support money for this child 

was $300 per month. The evidence here indicates that the 

husband has been paying Sharon $225 per month. The District 
Court on remand refused to consider the issue because it was 

outside the scope of our order of remand. There is no issue 

therefore upon which we can act with respect to the support 

money payments. Whatever rights or obligations accrue to 

either of the parties arising out of the original order of 

support money for the minor child are undisturbed by the 

decision of the District Court on remand, and by this 

Opinion. 

We affirm the District Court.