BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, DC 20590

) Establishment of Slot Exemption Proceeding ) At Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport ) Docket Pursuant to 49 USC §41718 ) DOT
- OST
- 2000
- 7182 )

Consolidated Answer of JetBlue Airways Corporation Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to:

James Hnat Jonathan B. Hill Executive Vice President Corporate Affairs, J. Parker Erkmann General Counsel & Secretary Benjamin M. Berlin JetBlue Airways Corporation Cooley LLP 27

- 01 Queens Plaza North 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Long Island City, NY 11101 Suite 7 00 Washington, D.C. 200 04

- 2400 (202) 962

- 8356 jhill@ cooley .com perkmann@ cooley .com Robert C. Land bberlin@cooley.com Senior Vice President for Government Affairs & Associate General Counsel Counsel for Jet Blue Airways Corporation JetBlue Airways Corporation 1212 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 1212 Washington, DC 20005

April 1 , 20141 BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, DC 20590

________________________________________________ ) Establishment of Slot Exemption Proceeding ) At Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport ) Docket Pursuant to 49 USC §41718(b) ) DOT
- OST
- 2000
- 7182 ________________________________________________) Consolidated Answer of JetBlue Airways Co rporation JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue”) hereby submits the following Consolidated
Answer to the competing applications for the pair of slot exemptions to be reallocated for service at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (“DCA”) pursuant to the provisions of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR

- 21”). 1 In light of the Congressionally

- established criteria for awarding AIR

- 21 slot exemptions, JetBlue’s application to introduce low fare competitive service in the DCA

- Jacksonville, FL (“JAX”) market stands far above the competing applications of American A irlines (“American”) , Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”) , and People Express Airlines, Inc. (“People Express”) because it provides competitive nonstop air transportation on a monopoly nonstop route and produce s the maximum competitive benefits , includin g low fares

. 2 The application of American to serve Long Island MacArthur Airport (“ISP”) satisfies only one of the slot exemption criteria

— the promotion of air transportation to communities without existing nonstop service

— but only because American itsel f has decided to cease DCA

ISP service. Additionally, an award of slot exemptions to American, DCA’s dominant carrier,

1 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b). 2 In addition, JetBlue’s application has the strong support of the Jacksonville community and Florida ’s legislators , including U.S. Representatives Corrine Brown, Ander Crenshaw, Ron DeSantis, and Ted Yoho

. The Representatives’ letter of support is attache d as Exhibit B6

- 2014A

- 104. Additional l etters of support are being sent directly to the Department.2 undermines the important directive in AIR

- 21 to foster competition at DCA. The application of Southwest to serve Kansas City, Missouri (“MCI”) produces $ 8.4 million less in consumer savings than JetBlue’s application; thus, it fails to maximize competitive benefits and therefore does not merit an award of the slot exemptions. Finally, the application of People Express should be dismissed because People Express does not have economic authority to engage directly or indirectly in air transportation, and the Department should not award scarce slot exemptions to V ision Airlines, a carrier with questionable operational and financial viability. The Department has interpreted section 41718’s silence regarding how to weight the five within

- perimeter slot exemption criteria as providing it with the discretion to weight the criteria as it sees fit. 3 This discretion provides the Department with the “essential flexibility it needs” to ensure that “ its determinations

. . . will maximize public benefits. ” 4 In this proceeding, JetBlue submits that its application maximizes public benefits because it produces the greatest competitive benefits, including low fares, introduces competitive nonstop service on a monopoly nonstop route to DCA, and promotes greater competition at DCA. Accordingly, JetBlue respectfully requests that the Department reallocate the available slot exemptions for its proposed
DCA

- JAX service.
I. The Department Should Not Award Additional Slot Exemptions to American The Department should not award additional slot exemptions to American, DCA’s dominant carrier

. Doing s o would harm competition at DCA , reward American’s squander ing of

3 See DOT Order 2012

- 7

- 26 at 16 (July 24, 2012) (“[T]he Department has the discretion to premise an award based upon satisfaction of less than the greatest number of criteria, or even one criteria, listed in Section 41718(b), based upon the Department’s analysis of the relative merits of each carrier’s proposal when evaluated under the Section 41718(b) criteria.”). 4 Id. (citing DOT Order 2000

- 7

- 2).3 scarce slots by artificially restricting capacity , and reward its voluntary decision to ceas e operations to small

- hub airports. American’s application incessantly asserts that ISP is a small community and that awarding it the slot exemptions would allow the Department to reconfirm its commitment to

ensur ing small community access to DCA

. 5 Despite American’s protestations, its application does not promote air transportation to a small community. While ISP is a small

- hub airport , it unquestionably s erv es a large community. In its own application, American emphasizes the fact that ISP serves approximately 1.9 million people. In its zeal to advocate , American conveniently has forgot ten that the Department expressly rejected the idea that a community of more than one million people could qualify as a small community under section 41718(b)(3). 6 American’s oversight is hard to excuse when one considers the fact that American participated in the proceeding in which DOT re

- stated the limitation on small communities and was served with the order awarding the slot exemptions to Southwest, DOT Order 2013

- 5

- 6 , less than one year ago. The Department should ignore American’s inaccurate statements that its DCA

- ISP proposal promotes air transportation to a small community

. A. Aw arding The S lot Exemptions To American, DCA’s Dominant Slot Holder, W ould H arm C ompetition A fundamental Congressional goal in AIR

- 21 is the promotion of competition at DCA. Indeed, the statute directs the Department to favor: (1) new entrants and limited incumbent air carriers, (2) the introduction of competitive service on monopoly routes, an d (3) the service that provides the maximum competitive benefits, including low fares. The Department has repeatedly stated that promotion of competition is a critical goal in the allocation of slot exemptions. See

5 Applic ation of American Airlines at 3, 6

- 12. 6 Order 2013

- 5

- 6 at 10 (“ As we have noted previously, service to a community with a population of well over one million people would not meet the small community criterion.”).4 Order DOT

- OST

- 2000

- 7

- 2 at 20 (July 5, 200 0) (allocating slot exemptions because the “proposals would meet the statutory criteria of providing competitive nonstop air transportation on DCA monopoly nonstop routes by offering low

- fare service to compete with US Airways’ monopoly”); Order DOT

- OST

- 20 04

- 8

- 3 at 6 (Aug. 9, 2004) (allocating slot exemptions because proposal “provide[d] competitive nonstop air transportation on a monopoly nonstop route to DCA” and “produce[d] the maximum competitive benefits, including low fares.”). Given the Congressional directive, the award of additional slot exemptions to an air carrier with unequalled market dominance at DCA is unwarranted and contrary to Congressional intent

. American’s dominant position at DCA harms co nsumers because American leverages its dominance to regularly charge higher fares on its monopoly routes. The result of American’s dominance is evident particularly in markets that have suffered from a chronic lack of competition. In the 44 markets that have been served solely by American from the f ourth quarter of 2010 through the third quarter of 2013, fares have risen on average by 11.9%

. 7 Not only does American charge higher fares on its monopoly routes, of which DCA

- JAX is one, it artificially restricts capacity at DCA. By operating limited and valuable DCA slots ( including many of its large

- jet air carrier slots ) with small regional aircraft, American has effectively further restrict ed capacity at already under

- utilized DCA by limiting the number of seats in a given market . Of the 67 destinations that American will continue to serve after the required slot divestitures, 80 % of them will be served with regional jets more than half of the time and another 7.5 % will be served with regional jets at least part of the time

. 8 Because of the slot constraints and the artificial and anticompetitive limitation of the number of seats through

7 See Exhibit B6

- 2014A

- 101 8 Regional jet in this instance refers to the CR7, CRJ, DH8, E175, and ERD.5 the use of smaller aircraft, fares at DCA are very high. 9 Through its operating history at DCA, American has proven that it would rather s quander the scarce public resources , many of which it obtained at no cost, rather than serve additional communities , where competition may already exist, and provide meaningful levels of service using higher capacity aircraft

. American has provided no reason to believe that it would abandon its history of anticompetitive behavior and do otherwise in the future. American’s attempt to equate its slot portfolio with that of JetBlue is laughable. As the Department is aware, Am erican recently completed its merger with US Airways, the dominant carrier at DCA before the merger. If the Department of Justice had not intervened with a lawsuit challenging the merger , American would have controlled 67 % of DCA’s departures. As the Uni ted States aptly noted, except for the divestiture, American “would have had two

- thirds of the flights at Reagan National but only half the airport’s passengers.” 10 Despite being required to divest 104 air carrier slots , American still owns 5 8 % of DCA slots

. American’s contention that “American Airlines, JetBlue and Southwest must be treated equally” 11 does not withstand scrutiny. As the chart below shows, JetBlue owns only 7% of DCA slots , even after the divestiture

. American’s DCA slot portfolio dwa rfs that of JetBlue.

9 The Department has repeatedly found that fares at DCA are higher than at other airports. See, e.g. , Notice on Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaG uardia Airport, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,322, 26,323 n.12 (May 11, 2010) (“DOT calculated that, at DCA, US Airways charged on average 124% of the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL), a cost

based index that the Department has used historically to assist in its eval uation of pricing. However, in markets where it held a 95 to 100% share of nonstop departures, US Airways charged substantially more.”). 10 Resp. of Pl. United States to Pub. Comments on the Proposed Final Judgment at 11 n.7, United States v. US Airways Grp ., Inc. , No. 1:13

- cv - 01236 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2014) (“U.S. Comments”)

. 11 Application of American Airlines at 9.6 American’s Slot Portfolio Is 8 Times Larger Than JetBlue’s 12

T he Department should not treat JetBlue and American equally. The Department should treat them for what they are : JetBlue, a pro

- competitive force that offers significant consumer savings to travelers with award

- winning customer service on all large jets , and American, a legacy carrier that takes advantage of its dominant position to squander valuable slots, artificially restrict capacity and maintain higher far es . Additionally, under the terms of the Proposed Final Judgment, American “shall not acquire any interest in any slot at DCA that was in use at the completion of the Transaction without providing notice to the United States at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to the acquisition.” 13 The slot exemptions at issue in this proceeding were in use at the time the American

- US Airways merger was completed; therefore, American cannot acquire an interest in the slot exemptions without first notifying the Depart ment of Justice. American’s application is silent as to whether American has complied with this obligation. Unless American informs the Department otherwise, the Department should not even consider American for the slot

12 Refers to number of operated slots based on October 2013 and October 2014 schedule (provided by Diio), includes unannounced frequencies from JetBlue and Southwest 13 Proposed Final Judgment § XIII.A, United States v. US Airways Grp. , No. 13

- 01236 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013). AA/US 58% DL 12%

UA 9%
B6 7% WN/FL

10% Other

4% Post
- Divestiture DCA Slots

US 56% AA 11%

DL 12%

UA 8% B6 4% WN/FL

4% Other

5% Pre
- Divestiture DCA Slots7 exemptions because American would be barred from obtaining them by the judgment of a federal
court. 14
B. American Does Not Need The Slot Exemptions To Continue Service T o ISP American makes much of the fact that it had to divest 104 slots at DCA, 15 but this is nothing more than an attempt to draw the Department’s attention away from the fact that American, as discussed above, is still by far the dominant carrier at DCA and has the flexibility in its slot portfolio to continue to serve DCA

- ISP without the slot exemptions at issue in this
procee ding . On January 15, 2014, American announced that it would no longer provide year

round, daily service from DCA to the following communities: Augusta, Georgia (AGS); Detroit, Michigan (DTW); Fayetteville, North Carolina (FAY); Fort Walton Beach, Florida (VPS); Islip, New York (ISP); Jacksonville, North Carolina (OAJ); Little Rock , Arkansas (LIT); Minneapolis, Minnesota (MSP); Montreal, Canada (YUL); Myrtle Beach, South Carolina (MYR); Nassau, Bahamas (NAS); Omaha, Nebraska (OMA); Pensacola, Florida (PNS) ; San Diego, California (SAN) 16 ; Savannah, Georgia (SAV); Tallahassee, Florida (TLH); and Wilmington, North Carolina (ILM). 17

14 Even if the slot exemptions at issue in this proceeding are not considered a “slot at DCA” as that term is defined in the Pr oposed Final Judgment, the point remains. The United States required the notification provision so it could determine whether “any future slot acquisition” at DCA would adversely impact competition. See Competitive Impact Statement at 14 , United States v . US Airways Grp. , N o. 13

- 01236 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013)

. 15 Sixteen of these slots were not being used by American anyway, but rather were under lease and operated by JetBlue. 16 American was not required to relinquish any slot exemptions; it chose to discont inue service to San Diego to increase service to LAX. 17 Press Release, American Airlines, American Airlines to Implement Network Changes As A Result of DOJ

- Mandated Slot Divestitures (Jan. 15, 2014) , available at http://hub.aa.com/en/nr/pressrelease/americ an - airlines

- to

- implement

- network

- changes

- as - a result

- of

- doj

- mandated

- slot

- divestitures (last accessed on Apr. 1 , 2014).8 American undeniably has the slot portfolio to continue serving most of these communities despite the required divestiture. As the Department of Justice noted, American “has sufficient capacity to complete the divestitures and maintain service to most, if not all, of the cities it currently serves simply by using its slots more efficiently, e.g. , by using larger aircraft and reducing frequency on some of its routes.” 18
American’ s attempt to mislead the Department as to the impact of their recent divestiture is revealed when one considers that A merican’s choice to stop serving San Diego, California is not connected to the Department of Justice ’s required divestitures in any way. American was not required to divest any of its slot exemptions, including its beyond

- perimeter slot exemptions. In fact, San Diego cannot be served from DCA using a slot because of DCA’s 1250

- mile perimeter restriction. American served San Diego pursuant to a pair of beyond

- perimeter slot exemption s . American made a business decision to withdraw its San Diego service to add additional frequencies to Los Angeles a t San Diego’s expense

. The Department should not reward American’s attempt to game the slot exemption criteria. If American did not cancel its own DCA

- ISP service, American’s application would not satisfy any of section 41718(b)’s decisional criteria. Instead of continuing to serve DCA

- ISP using its large slot portfolio , American has decided to babysit other slots. As American’s recent service decisions indicate , and the size of its slot portfolio supports, American could continue service to ISP without these additional slot e xemptions. The Department should not reward American’s anticompetitive behavior.

18 U.S. Comments at 36 n.64.9 C. JetBlue’s DCA
- JAX Proposal Is Superior T o American’s DCA
- ISP P roposal . 1. Islip I s Not A Small C ommunity . Although American touts its commitment to serving small communities as the reason for proposing DCA

- ISP, Islip does not qualify, in any way, as a small community. While the term “small communities ” is not defined by statute, the Department has consistentl y interpreted it to mean communities with less than one million people. 19 American’s application stated that the population of Suffolk County, New York, which represents a fraction of the individuals living around ISP, is nearly 1.5 million residents. Cle arly, American’s proposed DCA

- ISP service does not satisfy the small

- community decisional criterion. Indeed, American appears to have confused the requirement to serve a medium

- or small

- hub airport found in 49 U.S.C. § 41718(c)(3) with the decisional cri teria the Secretary must promote, including air transportation to small communities, found in § 41718(b). Service to a small

- hub airport does not necessarily satisfy the criteria for service to a small community. Many large cities are served by multiple airports, and often the large city’s secondary and tertiary airports qualify as small

- or medium

- hub airports. A small

- or medium

- hub airport in a large community would not satisfy section 41718(b)(3)’s requirement. Although t he Secretary could still con sider it, the proposal would have to rely on the other four decisional criteria as the basis for the award

. 2. Low Demand For N onstop DCA
- I SP S ervice Does N ot Justify An Award O f Slot E xemptions. There is limited demand for nonstop service to DCA from ISP. As the chart below shows, o nly 2.3% of total pa ssengers from ISP travel to DCA, ranking DCA the seventh most

traveled upon ISP destination. 20 Of the small number of passengers carried on ISP

- DCA , only

19 DOT Order 2013

- 5

- 6 at 10 (May 7, 2013); DOT Order 2004

- 12

- 6 at 7 (Dec. 6, 2004). 20 See O&D Surve y, as provided by Diio (YE 3Q13).10 47%

— less than half

— of those are local (less than 20 PDEW) . American could easily meet
DCA

- ISP demand with its existing slot portfolio by routing its connecting passengers through other destinations or with its existing slot portfolio

. Demand F or Nonstop DCA
- I SP Service Is Not Large Enough T o Support An Award 21 Rank Destination PDEW Share 1 MCO* 398 22.6% 2 PBI* 271 15.4% 3 FLL* 209 11.8% 4 TPA* 189 10.7% 5 BWI 127 7.2% 6 RSW* 42 2.4% 7 DCA 41 2.3% * JetBlue provides nonstop service from JFK to these destinations Additionally, American’s DCA

- ISP service is i ll

- timed for connections at American’s DCA hub and is not conducive for business travelers. As the ISP traffic data demonstrates, American’s proposal to serve DCA

- ISP with small region al jets is a waste of valuable AIR

- 21 slot exemptions. The Department should not award these scarce resources to American so that it can charge inflated, monopoly prices and artificially restrict capacity. 3. JetBlue’s P roposal W ill P rovide C ompetitive N onstop A ir Transportation O n A M onopoly N onstop R oute A nd P roduce M aximum C ompetitive B enefits W hile A merican’s P roposal W ill D o N othing B ut P rovide S ervice T o A S mall
- hub A irport W ithout N onstop S ervice T o DCA. JetBlue’s DCA

- JAX proposal offers greater benefits to the traveling public. As was discussed in detail in its Application , the proposed DCA

- JAX service will provide sorely needed competition on a monopoly route and produces competitive benefits by lowering fares. Not once

21 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio (YE 3Q13).11 in its application did American mention providing competitive benefits, including low far es. American relies solely on one factor: providing service in a market that does not have nonstop service to DCA. Ironically, while American has announced plans to cut its twice daily DCA

- ISP service, it continue s flying the route prior to the DCA slot divestitures taking effect. This peculiarity makes the point that it is entirely in American’s discretion to continue service to ISP without the slot exemptions. Am erican has made the decision th at ISP is not important enough to it to use one of its many slots to continue serv ic e . I nstead American has cho sen to ask the Department to again provide it further access to DCA by awarding the available pair of slot exemptions . Unlike JetBlue , wh ich has had to pay dearly for most of the slots it operates at DCA, American has received most , if not all , of its slots at no cost.
II. JetBlue’s DCA
- JAX Application Is Superior To Southwest’s Proposal to Serve Kansas City JetBlue’s application to serve DCA

- JAX is superior to Southwest’s application because it would best promote competition at DCA, maximize competitive benefits, and generate the greatest government savings. As discussed in detail in JetBlue’s applic ation, the presence of JetBlue at an airport “is one of the most important explanatory factors behind which airports have lower fares than others.” 22 In addition to lowering fares and growing markets, JetBlue offers air travelers unparalleled customer serv ice, winning numerous awards, including the prestigious JD Power Award for Customer Satisfaction for nine years in a row. 23

22 Michael D. Wittman & William S. Swelbar, MIT Int’l Ctr. For Air Transp., Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of Competition, Consolidation, and Low

- Cost Carriers , Report No. ICAT

- 2013

- 07 at 11 (Aug. 2013). 23 See Exhibit B6

- 2014

- 101 of JetBlue’s Application.12 A. An Award T o JetBlue Promotes Competition A t DCA Southwest is no longer the paragon of low

- cost carrier (“LCC”) competition. As discussed in detail in JetBlue’s Application, the “ Sou thwest E ffect ” has weakened greatly , and Southwest, the nation’s largest domestic airline, has begun to act increasingly like a legacy carrier. In May 2013, the MIT International Center for Air Transportation’s issued a report, entitled Trends and Market Forces Shaping Small Community Air Servic e in the United States , that concluded that Southwest “has started to behave more like other network legacy carriers in the past six years,” noting in particular that Southwest “has started to undertake the capacity discipline strategies also practiced by larger network carriers.” 24 The study found that “while other LCCs/ULCCs were increasing flights and showing some growth in smaller markets, Southwest Airlines was cutting scheduled flights at many of the markets it helped
create.” 25 Comparing Southwest to JetBlue, the study found that “Southwest cut 9.8% of its scheduled domestic flights from smaller airports 26 from 2007

- 2012, as opposed to a 21.3% increase in scheduled flights at these airports by LCC competitor JetBlue Airways.” 27 As the chart below demon strates, Southwest clearly is no longer the low

- fare force it used to be. In fact, fare growth at all of its top ten airports by seats outpaced the average by as much as 16%.

24 Michael D. Wittman & William S. Swelbar, MIT Int’ l Ctr. For Air Transp., Trends and Market Forces Shaping Small Community Air Service in the United States , Report No. ICAT

2013

- 02 at 7

- 8 (May 2013). 25 Id. at 8

- 9. 26 The MIT study defines “smaller airport” as “airports classified as medium

- hubs, small

- hubs , or non - hubs by the FAA. Id. at 3 n.1. 27 Id. at 9.13 Growth O f Southwest’s Fares At Its Top 10 Airports Exceeds The Average Fare Growth 28

On the other hand, JetBlue’s fare growth in its focus cities in most cases ha s risen less, or modestly more, than the average. In the case of SJU, fares have actually come down by 3%. Fare Growth A t JetBlue’s Focus Cities I s Generally Less Than T he Average 29

Southwest’s competitive strategy is especially important given its DCA slot portfolio, which while not as large as American’s , is considerably larger than that of JetBlue. The difference in JetBlue’s and Southwest’s DCA slot portfolio allows Southwest to operate 12 more daily roundtrips from DCA than JetBlue. Moreover Southwest has received , not including its

28 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio (YE 4 Q 08 vs. YE 3Q13). 29 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio (YE 4Q08 vs YE 3Q13). 24% 27%

19% 31%

19% 24%
19% 29%
23% 29%

15% 11% 8% 24%

13% 14% 16% 17% 18% 15%

BWI DAL/DFW DEN HOU/IAH LAS LAX MDW/ORD OAK PHX SAN WN Average

14%

9% 9% 12% 15%

- 3% 13% 14%

3% 15% 17%

1%

JFK/EWR/LGA LAX/LGB BOS FLL MCO SJU B6 Average14 pendent e lite authority, 12 slot exemptions in the past to serve Houston Hobby; 30 JAX or Milwaukee; 31 Atlanta; 32 Fort Lauderdale, Fort Myers, or West Palm Beach

. 33 In sharp contrast to Southwest, JetBlue chooses to use its limited slot portfolio to compete vigorously against American. As the chart below shows, JetBlue uses 96% of its slots to compete directly against the dominant American. Awarding the slot exemptions to JetBlue will allow JetBlue to introduce true LCC competition to additional DCA routes and increase the competitive environment at DCA. JetBlue Uses 96% Of Its DCA Slots To Compete Against American, Southwest Uses Only 33% 34

30 DOT Order 2013

- 5

- 6 (May 7, 2013). 31 DOT Order 2008

- 2

- 28 (Feb. 27, 2008). 32 DOT Order 2007

- 5

- 12 (May 18, 2007); DOT Order 2004

- 4

- 2 (Apr. 1, 2004). 33 DOT Order 2003

- 1

- 16 (Jan. 22, 2003). Two of the four slot exemptions awarded to AirTran in this order were later withdrawn, DOT Order 2004

- 8

- 27 (Aug. 25, 2004), and awarded to Atlantic S outheast Airlines, Inc., DOT Order 2004

- 12

- 6 (Dec. 6, 2004). 34 Published schedule (October 2014) for JetBlue and Southwest provided by Diio. Includes 11 of Southwest ’ s announced 33 frequencies in American

- competitive markets (STL, MCI, RSW, BNA, MSY, TPA) and 23 of JetBlue ’ s 24 announced frequencies in American

- competitive markets (BDL, BOS, CHS, FLL, MCO, NAS, TPA) 96%

33%

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

B6 WN15 B. JetBlue’s DCA
- JAX Service Will Provide Greater Competitive A nd Consumer Benefits JetBlue’s DCA

- JAX application is superior to Sout hwest’s for the simple reason that it produces the maximum competitive benefit, including low fares. As JetBlue discussed in detail in its Application, the Jet Blue E ffect reduces fares on routes it enters by an average of $32, nearly twice as much as the effect Southwest has on fares. 35 Comb ining the greater number of
new passenge rs stimulated with the JetBlue E ffect, JetBlue’s DCA

- JAX proposal will produce $ 8.4 million more in consumer savings than Southwest’s proposal

. 36 Southwest’s characterization of Kansas City, without Southwest servic e, as the most underserved medium or large market within the DCA perimeter is a red herring. Congress explicitly directed the Secretary to consider five factors when awarding within

- perimeter slot exemptions

— the promotion of air transportation: (1) by n ew entrant air carriers and limited incumbent air carriers; (2) to communities without existing nonstop air transportation to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; (3) to small communities; (4) that will provide competitive nonstop air transportation on a monopoly nonstop route to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; or (5) that will produce the maximum competitive benefits, including low fares. 37 Promoting air transportation to “underserved airports” does not appear on the list, and the Departme nt should not focus on passengers per departure; it should, as Congress explicitly directed, award the slot exemptions to the application that produces the maximum competitive benefits.

35 Michael D. Wittman & William S. Swelbar, MIT Int’l Ctr. For Air Transp., Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of Competitio n, Consolidation, and Low

- Cost Carriers , Report No. ICAT

- 2013

- 07 at 4 (2013). 36 See section II.B.2 of JetBlue’s Consolidated Answer. 37 49 U.S.C. 41718(b).16 1. JetBlue’s Proposed DCA
- JAX Stimulates 134,060 New Enplanements While Southwest Stimulates Only 100,801 The consumer benefits of JetBlue’s proposal, and their superiority to those of Southwest’s proposed service to a supposedly underserved market, are demonstrated by the fact that JetBlue’s proposed DCA

- JAX service will stimulate 33 % greater new traffic than Southwest’s DCA

- MCI service. JetBlue proposes an average one

- way, nonstop fare of $110, which is approximately 41% lower than American’s current average one

- way fare of $185. 38 Consistent with JetBlue’s experience in other markets, JetBlue’s traffic model predicts that its lower fares will stimulate a total of 134,060 new passengers (58,400 on JetBlue and 75,600 on American) in the first year of service. On the other hand, JetBlue’s traffic model predicts that Southwest’s service , if continued , would result in the carriage of only 88,732 passengers. 39 Because Southwest would only be backfilling service offered by Frontier and because American has raised its average fare sinc e Southwest began DCA

- MCI service, it is reasonable to estimate that Southwest’s service accounts for the stimulation of an additional 12,070 new passengers fly ing DCA

- MCI on American. 40 As the chart below shows, both American and Southwest have raised the ir fares since Frontier exited the market.

38 DOT O&D Survey via Diio, trailing four quarter data (captured March 22, 2014). 39 Southwest’s traffi c stimulation can be estimated by multiplying the number of seats Southwest would offer in the first year, 104,390, by the load factor, 85%. 40 To the extent there is any confusion regarding the consumer savings offered by Southwest’s DCA

- MCI service, the D epartment should credit JetBlue’s estimates because Southwest failed to include any analysis in its application.17 Nonstop DCA
- MCI Fares Before 41 A nd After Southwest’s Entry 42

As a result of JetBlue’s great er fare savings, it s proposal will stimulate 33 % more new enplanements

. JetBlue’s P roposed Service Will Stimulate 33,259 More Enplanements 43

In addition, JetBlue’s estimated 41% fare reduction is significantly greater than Southwest’s estimate that DCA

- MCI fares would increase only 21% if Southwest exited the market. 44

41 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio (YE 3Q13). Includes estimate of baggage and cancellation fees consistent with Southwest’s Application (Ex hibit WN

- 2). 42 Application of Southwest Airlines (Exhibit WN

- 2). 43 See Exhibits B6

- 2014A

- 102 and B6

- 2014A

- 103 for JetBlue traffic stimulation calculations. 44 Application of Southwest Airlines at 3. $186 $140 $147 $188

Before WN (YE 3Q13) After WN (current)

100,801 134,060

DCA-MCI DCA-JAX18 2. JetBlue’s Proposed DCA
- JAX Service Produces $ 8.4 Million More In Consumer Savings JetBlue’s greater traffic stimulation and larger effect on competitor’s pricing will lead to consumer savings of $ 8.4 million more than Southwest. JetBlue’s proposal offers significantly greater consumer savings an d should be award ed the slot exemptions. As the chart below shows, JetBlue’s proposal generates more savings for existing passengers, creates greater savings for new passengers, and leads to greater competitive benefits. JetBlue’s Proposed DCA
- JAX Service Produces $ 8.4 Million More I n Consumer Savings 45

Southwest did not include its estimated traffic stimulation and consumer savings resulting from an award of slot exemptions for DCA

- MCI service because surely those benefits would not be sufficient to justify an award. Not only does Southwest know how to perform these calculations, it is common for Southwest to perform a detailed analysis specifically for the purpose of completing an application for slot exemp tions. When the results of that analysis suits

45 See Exhibit B6

- 2014A

- 102 for calculations of Southwest’s consumer savings. Calculations of JetBlue’s estimated consumer savings can be found in Exhibit B6

- 2014A

- 103.19 Southwest’s needs, it includes them in its application. 46 Moreover, Southwest has based its attacks on other airlines’ applications for slot exemptions on the ground that the airlines did not offer an estimate d traffic stimulation and consumer fare savings in its initial application. 47 One must wonder why Southwest did not perform these calculations for its current proposal. Held to its own standard , Southwest should not be allowed to argue that its proposal s timulates more traffic or creates greater consumer savings than JetBlue’s

. In Southwest’s own words, its “after

the

- fact traffic forecast and fare proposal are improper, contrived and not credible.” 48 Additionally, any local DCA

- MCI benefits must be reduce d by the percentage of travelers coming from OAK, if the Department is to believe that that DCA

- OAK same

- plane service will produce significant traffic. Every seat sold to a DCA

- OAK passenger, most likely at a fare considerably higher than Southwest’s average proposed DCA

- MCI fare, is a seat that a local MCI customer cannot purchase. The lost local capacity that is drained by the through service, so high ly touted by Southwest, must be taken as a reduction in Southwest’s service proposal to MCI and, therefore, be considered a reduction of its claimed benefit in the DCA

- MCI market. 3. The Benefits O f Southwest’s Same
- Plane Service T o OAK Are Greatly Overstated
T he Department should disregard the alleged benefits of same

- plane service to Oakland, California (“OAK”) because they are significantly inflated. First, Southwest has promised and failed to deliver benefits from similar same

- pla n e service in its application for a beyond

perimeter slot exemption to serve Austin, Texas, with same

- plane service to San Diego,

46 See Application of Southwest Airlines Co., Docket DOT

- OST

- 2000

- 7182 (Dec. 5, 2012). 47 See Consolidated Reply of Southwest Airlines Co. and Motion for Leave to File at 4, Docket DOT

- OST

- 2000

- 7182 (Dec. 31, 2012). 48 Id. at 4.20 California (“SAN”)

. 49 As the chart below shows, Southwest’s same

- plane service represents only 14% of total DCA

- SAN traffic, or 29 passengers da ily each way (“PDEW”) . An equally miniscule benefit can be expected from Southwest’s proposed DCA

- OAK same

- plane service given the much smaller market size of 49 PDEW , especially when one considers that Southwest already offers one - stop service from DCA t o OAK through Houston and St. Louis. Southwest Has Captured Only 14% of DCA
- SAN Traffic Through One
- Stop Service 50

Second, DCA

- OAK has sufficient one

- stop service. Of the 49 PDEWs for DCA

- OAK as of year

- end 3Q13 , 51 6 1% ( 32 PDEW ) were carried by Delta over Salt Lake City, Utah (“SLC”) and Los Angeles, California (“LAX”) and 2 6 % ( 13 PDEW ) were carried by American over Phoenix, Arizona (“PHX”). Southwest carried only 1 PDEW in the DCA

- OAK market, connecting over Houston or St. Louis. Third, s ame - plane service is only marginally more convenient than one

- stop service. As the chart below shows, the time savings offered by same

- plane service is negligible

.

49 See DOT Order 2012

- 5

- 12 (May 14, 2012) (noting that Southwest would continue from Austin, Texas on a single

- plane basis to San Diego, California). 50 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio (YE 3Q13). 51 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio (YE 3Q13). WN via

AUS 29 PDEW Other 201 PDEW DCA
- SAN

230 PDEW WN 1 PDEW Other 48 PDEW DCA
- OAK

49 PDEW21 Same
- Plane Connection Times Offer Almost No Advantage Over A Connection 52

Given the minimal time savings, the Department should expect minimal, if any, benefits from Southwest’s proposed service. If, however, the Department believes that Southwest’s DCA

OAK same

- plane service will offer any benefits and lead to increased DCA

- MCI

- OAK traffic , it
must reduce the amount of new local DCA

- MCI traffic stimulated and the total consumer savings offered to DCA

- MCI passengers because the number of seats available for purchase will be reduced. Southwest cannot have it both ways. C. JetBlue’s Proposal Will Result I n Greater Government Savings JetBlue’s entry into the DCA

- JAX market will result in significant government savings. As discussed in JetBlue’s application, JAX is an important destination for numerous government travelers with business related to the significant number of government installations and the amount of government

- funded research performed in the area. For fiscal year 2014, American offers a DCA

- JAX government YCA fare of $383 and a government

– CA fare of $260, pursuant
to a contract with t he GSA. 53 Government travelers are allowed to purchase air transportation on

a non - GSA contract carrier if that carrier’s fare is lower than the GSA contract rate. JetBlue’s average proposed fare for nonstop DCA

- JAX service is $110, an impressive $150 low er than the lowest government contract fare. Not only will JetBlue’s DCA

- JAX service save the

52 See Southwes t published schedule for March 28, 2014 (itineraries with shortest connection times shown). 53 U.S. General Services Administration, Airline City Pairs, http://cpsearch.fas.gsa.gov/ (last accessed Apr. 1 , 2014). Plane Change No Plane Change Routing Connection Time Routing Connection Time Time Savings DCA -MCI- ABQ 45 min DCA -HOU- ABQ 45 min 0 min DCA -STL- LAS 35 min DCA -HOU- LAS 30 min 5 min DCA -MCI- DAL 45 min DCA -STL- DAL 25 min 20 min DCA -LAS- SAN 70 min DCA -AUS- SAN 45 min 25 min DCA -HOU- OAK 50 min

-- -- --22 government money in the present fiscal year, the mere presence of JetBlue at the airport is likely to cause future GSA contract bids for the route to decrease. As a result, an award of slot exemptions to JetBlue will save the United States a significant amount of money. Southwest’s proposed service, on the other hand, would result in less government savings because Southwest’s average DCA

- MCI fare is only a negl igible $8 less than the lowest GSA contract fares for nonstop DCA

- MCI service.
III. The Department Should Not Award T he Slot Exemptions To People Express Airlines, Inc. The Department should not award the valuable slot exemptions to a carrier that lacks economic authority to engage directly or indirectly in air transportation. And even if the Department overlooked the fact that People Express lacked authority, Vision Air lines

— whose role in the proposed service is unclear

— lacks the financial wherewithal to justify the award of the slot exemptions.

A. T he Department Should Disregard T he Application O f People Express Airlines Because It Lacks Authority T o Hold Itself Out A s A n Air Carrier , Either Directly O r Indirectly In order to engage directly or indirectly in air transportation, a carrier is required to hold economic authority from the Department pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 41101 or 41301, either in the form of a “certificat e of public convenience and necessity” or in the form of an exemption from the certificate requirement. A carrier may not hold itself out as engaging in air transportation without such authority. 54 This economic authority is in addition to any safety auth ority necessary under applicable Federal Aviati on Administration requirements.

54 The Department has fined People Express for engaging in air transportation without the required economic authority. DOT Order 2012

- 5

- 7 (May 9, 2012).23 The Department should refuse to award valuable and scar c e slot exemptions to People Express Airlines, Inc. (“People Express”) because it lacks certificate or exemption authority from the Department. The Department regularly refuses to award valuable and scar c e slot exemptions to companies that lack certificate or exemption authority from the Department. 55 People Express Airlines, Inc. (“People Express”) applied for a Ce rtificate of Public Convenience and Necessity on March 19, 2012. 56 Review of docket OST

- 2012

- 0042 on Regulations.gov reveals that Peoples Express has not received certificate authority from the DOT to hold itself out as providing common carrier services, i n its name or any name. Additionally, a search of Regulations.gov reveals that People Express has not received an exemption to hold itself out as directly or indirectly engaging in air transportation. It is unclear whether People Express plans to hold ou t service indirectly or whether Vision Airlines is applying for the slot exemptions under the name P eople Express. Should the latter be the case, the Department should not award the slot exemptions to Vision Airlines because Vision Airlines, Inc. has, to the extent a search of the DOT docket section revealed, not filed to do business under the name People Express Airlines, Inc. or PEOPLExpress pursuant to Part 215 of the Department’s regulations. Based upon the foregoing , People Express is ineligible to r eceive an award of slot exemption s at DCA because it is not an air carrier and cannot provide carriage of persons,

55 DOT Order 2004

- 4

- 2 at 16 (Apr. 1, 2004) (holding that it was “not in the public interest to award slot exemptions” to an applicant that “lack[ed] effective certificate authority from the Department and the FAA,” noting that its final fitness certification and FAA certification were still pending); DOT Order 1998

- 4

- 22 at 23 (Apr. 21, 1998) (noting the Department’s reluctance “to take the extraordinar y step of granting slot exemptions to [a carrier] when its certification by the FAA is still pending, as is its final fitness certification. ”). 56 See Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, Docket DOT

- OST

2012

- 0042 (Mar. 19, 2012 ).24 property , and mail within the United States and because Vision Airlines, Inc. has not applied for the DCA slots. The Peoples Express application should be dismissed.
B. Neither People Express Nor Vision Airlines Should Be Awarded T he Slot Exemptions Because Vision Ai rlines Is Not Financially Stable Assuming tha t the Department overlooked the fact that Vision Airlines has not applied for the slot exemptions and does not have authority to do business as People Express, the Department should not award it the slot exemptions because Vision Airline’s credit report
in dicates that it has failed to pay its current expenses, bringing its economic viability i n to grave doubt . Only two months ago, the State of South Carolina filed liens against Vision Airlines for past due state taxes amounting to approximately $3,700. Additionally, in 2013 the States of Nevada and South Carolina filed liens against Vision Airlines amounting to approximately $39,000 that remain open. Vision Airlines’ difficulty in paying might stem from the fact that it has serious legal troubles. In 2 011, Vision Airlines was hel d liable for $ 5.3 million in haz ard pay and interest because it failed to properly pay its pilots, flight attenda nts, and other air crew members. 57 Vision Airlines also j ust recently finished paying $44,000 to Okaloosa County , F lorida after being charged by the State of Florida with grand theft of more than $100,000 in unpaid passenger facility charges. 58 The fact that Vision Airlines has failed to timely pay its taxes raises serious questions about its ability to continue as a going concern and its compliance disposition

. Moreover, t he Dun & Bradstreet Report on Vision Airlines indicate s that Vision Airlines is more than 90 days delinquent on paying its $300,000 bill for surety insurance and

57 See Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc. , No. 11

- 15646 (9th Cir. July 18, 2012). Even more troubling than Vision’s financial instability, is the fact that it, when performing services under contract in a war zone, appears to have fired all of its pilots a nd crew members who knew about their right to hazard pay and hired new crew ignorant of their entitlement to hazard pay to keep the money for itself. 58 Kari C. Barlow, NWF Daily News, Vision Airlines Sends Okaloosa Its Final Check , http://www.nwfdailynews .com/local/vision

- airlines

- sends

- okaloosa

- its

- final

- check

- document

1.286993 (last accessed Apr. 1 , 2014).25 only pays 45% of its bills on time. The Department should not award these valuable slot exemptions to an air carrier whose continued operations are in question. C. JetBlue’s Application Provides Great er Public Benefit Than That O f People Express’ Even if the Department were to seriou sly consider the application of People Express, JetBlue’ s application is far superior because it serves a market that can support year

- round nonstop service, 59 produces maximum competitive benefits , and introduces much needed

c ompetition on a monopoly route.
IV. Conclusion In light of the considerable consumer and the superior competitive benefits of JetBlue’s application, the Department should exercise its discretion to select JetBlue’s proposed DCA

- JAX service.

Dated: April 1 , 2014 Respectfully submitted,

Robert C. Land Senior Vice President for Government Affairs And Associate General Counsel

59 The Department has noted the important of operating year

- round service when withdrawing two slot exemptions from AirTran. DOT Order 2004

- 8

- 27 at 2 ( Aug. 27, 2004) (“[S]lot exemptions are scarce resources that are in very high demand by carriers that are willing and able to use them on a year

- round basis for their proposed service.”).Exhibit B6
- 2014A
- 101 Average Fares in American Monopoly Markets 60

Market Sole Carrier YE 3Q11 Fare YE 3Q13 Fare % Change DCA

- OAJ American $142 $301 111.4% DCA

- CRW " " $149 $264 77.7% DCA

- ILM " " $154 $221 43.4% DCA

- TYS " " $146 $204 39.1% DCA

- CAK " " $112 $156 38.6% DCA

- SDF " " $145 $190 31.1% DCA

- VPS " " $153 $198 29.2% DCA

- ROC " " $131 $165 26.6% DCA

- FAY " " $147 $184 25.7% DCA

- BHM " " $145 $175 21.2% DCA

- CHA " " $150 $181 20.7% DCA

- SYR " " $148 $177 19.5% DCA

- BGR " " $155 $181 16.7% DCA

- ACK " " $190 $219 15.2% DCA

- TLH " " $164 $188 14.9% DCA

- GSP " " $137 $157 14.8% DCA

- PWM " " $144 $165 14.6% DCA

- ALB " " $134 $151 13.3% DCA

- LIT " " $146 $165 13.1% DCA

- BTV " " $151 $171 13.0% DCA

- BUF " " $118 $132 12.4% DCA

- MVY " " $198 $220 11.3% DCA

- PHL " " $79 $87 10.1% DCA

- BDA " " $162 $178 9.3% DCA

- YHZ " " $232 $248 6.9% DCA

- SRQ " " $136 $145 6.5% DCA

- AGS " " $162 $172 6.2% DCA

- GSO " " $157 $164 4.0% DCA

- SAV " " $159 $165 3.3% DCA

- NAS " " $190 $195 2.8% DCA

- MHT " " $118 $121 2.5% DCA

- CLT " " $155 $155 0.1% DCA

- PNS " " $177 $171 (3.3%) DCA

- LAS " " $223 $213 (4.4%) DCA

- PBI " " $150 $143 (4.7%) DCA

- PHX " " $281 $267 (5.0%) DCA

- SAN " " $243 $227 (6.6%) DCA

- HPN " " $200 $183 (8.2%) DCA

- PIT " " $110 $100 (9.5%) DCA

- EYW " " $197 $173 (12.0%) DCA

- HHH " " $198 $172 (13.3%) DCA

- CAE " " $168 $145 (13.7%) DCA

- DAY " " $149 $124 (16.7%) DCA

- ORF " " $119 $52 (56.1%)

Average American $160 $177 11.9%

60 See O&D Survey, as provided by Diio . Includes monopoly markets th at have been flown by American on a continuous basis (without competition from 4Q10

– 3Q13).EXHIBIT B6
- 2014 A
- 102 Consumer Savings Calculations for Southwest’s Proposed DCA
- MCI Service

(A) Nonstop miles (B) Total fared passengers excl. F9 as of YE 3Q 2013 (DOT O&D Survey via Diio), excludes 1.6% of passengers on zero fare tickets (C) Revenue stimulation assumption (high case) (D) Assumed monopoly base fare excl. ancillary fee estimate (Application of Southwest Airlin es, Exhibit WN

- 2) (E) 9.1% estimate of ancillary baggage and cancellation fees (DOT Form 41 via Diio) * (D) (F) (D) + (E) (G) Current average DCA

- MCI fare (Application of Southwest Airlines, Exhibit WN

- 2) (H) (G)

- (F) (I) (H) / (F) (J) (B) * (F) * (1+ (C)) (K) (J)

- (B) (L) (B) * [$2 07 ( “ US DCA

- MCI Fare at US DCA monopoly pricing ” , Application of Southwest Airlines, Exhibit WN

- 2)

- $171 ( “ Current DCA

- MCI Average Fare ” , Application of Southwest Airlines, Exhibit WN

- 2)] (M) (K) * [(F)

– (G)] * 0.5, follows method outlined by the FAA in “ FA A Airport Benefit

- Cost Analysis Guidance ” , Office of Aviation Policy and Planning, FAA, Dec. 15, 1999 (N) (L) + (M) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) Fare Change
Market Miles Passengers Before Stimulation Predicted Service Stimulation (revenue) Base Fare Fees Total Average Fare w/ WN Absolute % Pax After Stimulation Annual WN Pax Existing Pax New Pax Total Consumer

Surplus DCA-MCI 949 144,380 50% $188 $19 $207 $171 ($36) (17%) 228,016 88,732 $4.5M $1.8M $6.4M Fare Stimulation Average Fare Before WN Consumer SurplusExhibit B6
- 2014A
- 10 3 JetBlue Fare Stimulation Calculations

(A) Nonstop miles (B) Total fared passengers as of YE 3Q 2013 (DOT O&D Survey via Diio), excludes 4.3% of passengers on zero fare tickets (C) Conservative estimate of market revenue stimulation based on JetBlue ’ s track record (D) Total DCA

- JAX revenue as of YE 3Q 2013 (DOT O&D Survey v ia Diio) / (B) (E) 9.1% estimate of ancillary baggage and cancellation fees (DOT Form 41 via Diio) * (D) (F) (D) + (E) (G) Projected JetBlue average fare in year 1 based on comparable DCA markets , includes 4.4% ancillary fee estimate (DOT Form 41 via Diio (H) (G)

- (F) (I) ( H) / (F) (J) (B) * (F) * (1+ (C)) (K) (J)

- (B) (L) (B) * [(F)

- M e ], where M e is the new equilibrium price of $113, assuming AA matches B6 fare, weighted by expected market share, plus ancillary fee estimate (DOT Form 41 via Diio) (M) (K) * [(F)

- M e ] * 0.5, follows me thod outlined by the FAA in “ FAA Airport Benefit

- Cost Analysis Guidance ” , Office of Aviation Policy and Planning, FAA, Dec. 15, 1999 (N) (L) + (M) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) Fare Change
Market Miles Passengers Before Stimulation Predicted Service Stimulation (revenue) Base Fare Fees Total Projected B6 Fare Absolute % Pax After Stimulation New Pax Existing Pax New Pax Total Consumer

Surplus DCA-JAX 634 140,419 20% $169.28 $15.40 $184.68 $110 ($75) (41%) 274,479 134,060 $10.0M $4.8M $14.8M Fare Stimulation Average Fare Before B6 Consumer SurplusExhibit B6
- 2014A
- 104
Letter of SupportCertificate of Service I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Consolidated Answer of JetBlue Airways Corporation was served this 1st day of April , 2014 via email transmission on the following persons: robert.wirick@aa.com francis.heil@aa.com howard.kass@aa.com sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com jeff.morgan@delta.com bob.kneisley@w nco.com leslie.abbott@wnco.com Charles.donley@squiresanders.com marshall.sinick@squiresanders.com robert.cohn@hoganlovells.com patrick.rizzi@hoganlovells.com john.fredericksen@suncountry.com thomas.ting@suncountry.com dan.weiss@united.com steve.morrissey@u nited.com jonathan.linde@united.com karine.faden@united.com lhalloway@crowell.com gmurphy@crowell.com john.varley@virginamerica.com jegillick@zsrlaw.com jhfoglia@zsrlaw.com anita.mosner@hklaw.com Jennifer.nowak@hklaw.com mike.morisi@flypex.com shawn.voyles@flypex.com dhernandez@vedderprice.com nssparks@fedex.com sllunsford@fedex.com jyoung@yklaw.com lgrunewald@yklaw.com steve.grossman@flyjacksonville.com quince.brinkley@mwaa.com Susan.Kurland@dot.gov Esta.Rosenberg@dot.gov Todd.Homan@dot.gov bri an.ctr.meehan@ faa .gov fbavent@airlineinfo.com info@airlineinfo.com and via First Class Mail on the following : Mayor Vincent Gray Executive Office of the Mayor 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 316 Washington, DC 20004 Mayor Alvin Brown Mayor’s Office City Hall at St. James Building 117 W. Duval St Suite 400 Jacksonville, FL 32202 John Potter President and CEO Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority 1 Aviation Circle Washington, DC 20001 Arnaldo Deleo General Manager Aviation Bureau Port Authority Government of Puerto Rico PO Box 362829 San Juan, PR 00936

- 2829

___________ /s/

______________________ Michael R. Radlick