VOLUME 17

FEATURED ARTICLE: 

MSS at the Air Force Academy

TOPICAL FOCUS: Interagency Ops

REGIONAL FOCUS: Africa

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Department of Military & Strategic Studies

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Airman Scholar Journal

Volume 17 Fall 2011

Published by the Department of

MILITARY & STRATEGIC STUDIES

United States Air Force Academy

Dean of Faculty

Brig. Gen. Dana Born

Department Head

Col. Thomas A. Drohan

Editor

Dr. Brent J. Talbot

The opinions expressed in Airman Scholar Journal do not represent any official policies

of the Dean of Faculty, US Air Force Academy, US Air Force or US government.

They are presented to stimulate discussion on

Current military issures and domestic and international affairs. 
Table Of Contents I

Table of Contents

Featured Article

1 WHO SPEAKS FOR OUR PROFESSION?

Military & Strategic Studies At The 

USAF Academy

Thomas Drohan and Steven Pomeroy

Topical Focus: Interagency Operations

8 CONSTRUCTING A WAY TO VICTORY:

The US Interagency Conflict over Reconstruction 

and Development Operations during Wartime

Kimber Shealy

15 PANDEMICS: Recommendations for 

International Preparedness, Response and 

Coordination

Matt Brew and Hal Schmidt

Regional Focus: Africa

26 Using AFRICOM to Counter

China’s Aggressive African Policies

Drew Petry

33 US Policy and The Libyan Dilemma

Paul Sikkema

Book Reviews

37 Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 

Terrorism, by Robert Pape 

 Reviewed by 

John Lovvorn

40 Africa Doesn’t Matter: How the West has Failed 

the Poorest Continent and What We Can Do 

About It, by Giles Bolton

 Reviewed by 

Sarah Nickisch

From The Editor

In this issue our feature article discusses the 

evolution of--and justification for--the Air 

Force Academy’s newest academic major: Military & Strategic Studies, an appropriate topic 

to launch the department’s redesigned journal. 

Professor and Department Head, Colonel Tom 

Drohan, and co-author Associate Professor, Lt 

Colonel Steve Pomeroy, make their case for the 

evolution of MSS as crucial for the development of Air Force strategic thinkers. Following 

their lead, we move on to our topical focus of 

the month: Interagency Operations, featuring two articles authored by cadet scholars-

-including Hal Schmidt, top graduate of the 

class of 2011. Our regional focus this month 

is Africa, where cadet scholar authors discuss 

two leading concerns of AFRICOM: Chinese 

competition on the African continent, and the 

impact of the “Arab Spring” on Libya. Our 

cadet scholars published herein wrote for MSS 

400S, Joint and Coalition Operations, demonstrating the result of departmental efforts to 

develop strategic thinkers. 

Future issues of Airman Scholar Journal will 

continue to offer featured articles by faculty, 

and topical and regionally focused articles 

provided by faculty and cadets. Both military 

and civilian academic faculty and staff are 

encouraged to submit articles for publication 

and nominate outstanding cadet papers for 

inclusion in the journal. We also encourage 

faculty and cadets to write reviews of newly 

published books dealing with airpower, current 

conflicts, strategy and other military-relevant 

topics. Send all submissions in word format 

(with Chicago-style endnotes) to ASJeditor@

usafa.edu

MSS at AFA 1

The Normandy invasion was based on a 

deep-seated faith in the power of the 

air forces, in overwhelming numbers, 

to intervene in the land battle...Without that air force, without the aid of its 

power, entirely aside from its ability to 

sweep the enemy air force out of the 

sky, without its ability to intervene in 

the land battle, that invasion would 

have been fantastic... Unless we had 

faith in the air power to intervene and 

to make safe that landing, it would have 

been more than fantastic, it would have 

been criminal.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower1

War is our business. To do 

it well, our graduates must 

have a firm understanding 

of military power and its place within 

the American Republic. Since the 

1954 founding of the United States Air 

Force Academy (USAFA), the study of 

the context, theory, and application of 

military power has remained central 

to the institution’s mission. Indeed, 

one may argue such expertise is the 

essence of a military academy education. 

Nonetheless, throughout the Academy’s 

existence, arguments have raged over the 

disciplinary content and organizational 

ownership of this essence. Just as the 

founders, leaders, and scholars of the 

Academy sought to blend officer education and training, the earliest stirrings of 

the Department of Military and Strategic 

Studies tried to reconcile the theoretical 

aspects of military power with practical 

applications. Today, this Department is 

one of only a handful at North American undergraduate or graduate institutions offering an accredited disciplinary 

major focused on understanding the 

theory and application of military power 

regardless of time and context. Given 

the importance of military power to 

American security, the broader scholarly 

enterprise warrants castigation for its 

neglect.

At the time of USAFA’s founding, 

American national security girded upon 

then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 

policy of the New Look, meaning a nearexclusive reliance upon the deterrent 

value of air-delivered atomic weapons. 

Because of this, understanding military 

power was of the highest national concern. As a West Point graduate, Eisenhower valued the necessity of educating 

professional military officers within a 

service-unique academy environment. 

A year later, Secretary of the Air Force 

Harold E. Talbott reflected this belief in 

his July 11, 1955, testimony before the 

House Subcommittee Hearings. Talbott 

commented, “the Air Force Academy is 

built upon a proud foundation and so it 

should be. For the Academy is a bridge 

to the future, gleaming with promise of 

peace in a stable, sane world...Our airpower has kept the peace...It is keeping 

the peace, God willing, it will keep on 

doing so. This Academy, we are founding today, will carry forward that great 

effort.”2

 Eisenhower concurred. In his 

1955 dedication message, he foresaw 

the Air Force Academy, “taking its place 

beside West Point and Annapolis.”3 He 

set USAFA’s benchmark high, commenting, “the Air Force Academy joins 

a proud company. The honored histories of the two older institutions [West 

Point and Annapolis] provide a peerless 

standard against which, in future years, 

the excellence of the new Academy will 

be measured and found worthy.”4 It was 

now up to the Academy’s founders and 

first cadre to ensure they educated and 

trained cadets to meet the “peerless standard” of “the two older institutions.”

Military Studies was one of the 

three areas specified by the Stearns-

...the Academy is a bridge to the future, gleaming with 

promise of peace in a stable, sane world...Our airpower has 

kept the peace... It is keeping the peace, God willing, it will 

keep on doing so. 

 - Harold Talbott, former Secretary of the Air Force 

WHO SPEAKS FOR OUR PROFESSION?

Military & Strategic Studies at the USAF Academy

THOMAS DROHAN AND STEVEN POMEROY

Colonel Thomas Drohan is Professor 

and Department Head of Military & 

Strategic Studies. Lt Colonel Steven 

Pomeroy is an Associate Professor 

of Military & Strategic Studies, and 

the Departments’s Deputy Head for 

Curriculum.
2 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

Eisenhower Board (1954) establishing 

a balanced curriculum in the new Air 

Force Academy. Despite the centrality military studies held in the minds 

of USAFA’s founders, little consensus 

existed among faculty and staff regarding what the content ought to be and 

who ought to teach it. The Dean’s 

faculty (DF) tended to adopt broad academic perspectives, while the Commandant’s Cadet Wing (CW) cadre focused 

on practical training applications. As a 

result, Military Studies emerged in the 

sixties reflecting Cold War mind sets 

and tactical perspectives. The Commandant’s daily priority was training cadets, 

which suppressed Military Studies as an 

evolving scholarly discipline. Regarding what Military Studies should be, 

the Prussian military theorist Carl von 

Clausewitz commented “the first, the 

supreme, the most far-reaching act of 

judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by 

that test the kind of war on which they 

are embarking; neither mistaking it for, 

nor trying to turn it into, something 

that is alien to its nature.”5

 The successful officer, therefore, had to distinguish 

carefully the dynamics of war’s everchanging character while relating to the 

enduring nature of war. Certain midtwentieth century intellectuals, including the famed American historian, social 

critic, and commentator Lewis Mumford 

claimed, “the Army has usually been the 

refuge of third-rate minds.”6

 Clearly, 

the Academy preferred Clausewitz to 

Mumford, but neither DF nor CW could 

agree how to achieve this. Through 

the 1970s, military training priorities 

battered, buffeted, and strangled the 

academic credibility of Military Studies. 

Mumford was winning.

In the seventies, Military Studies 

organized within a new CW organization, the Deputy Commandant for 

Military Instruction (CWI), which 

included training. Later in 1980, a Permanent Professor of Military Instruction 

(then-Col Philip D. Caine, formally a 

senior member of the Academy’s history 

department) was established.7 Caine’s 

leadership was instrumental in creating 

a new academic discipline. He developed a faculty foundation drawn from 

related fields, including history, political science, and education. In addition, 

Caine established a Ph.D. selection 

process to generate and sustain expert 

faculty. Assiduous personnel planning also ensured the best operational 

experience entered the ranks of CWI. 

During the 1980s, the first curriculum 

benefited from greater continuity in 

military leadership, Ph.D. oversight 

(including Dr. Jim Titus, whose 1983 

arrival marked the first Ph.D. and the 

first officer awarded tenure as Associate 

Professor status in CW), and energetic 

talent in instructional technology (Dr. 

Dorri Karolick, an educational technologist). In later years, Caine’s prescience 

reaped benefits. 

The benefits were yet to come, 

however. Meanwhile, tensions between 

the Academy’s educational and training missions inhibited Military Studies 

(“Mil Stu” in cadet parlance). According 

to General Caine, Military Studies was 

at this time: “a branch of the Military 

Training Division, which was a major 

problem. It left the Military Studies curriculum and personnel with the stigma 

of change, mediocre instruction, and 

fluid curriculum attached to Military 

Training programs. This was a major 

obstacle to gaining any kind of solid 

academic credibility for the Professional 

Military Studies [PMS, a fortunately 

short-lived moniker] program.”8

 Thus, 

Caine’s first action upon becoming CWI 

was to split the organization into two 

divisions: the Military Studies Division 

(CWIS) and the Military Training Division (CWIT).

 For the first time since 1961, 

a dedicated academic organization 

charged with developing academically 

sound and credible military education 

existed at USAFA.9

As Caine noted, Military Studies 

and its successors delivered a fluidly 

haphazard collection of courses whose 

content was determined by available 

faculty interests and expertise (perhaps 

abetted by a not-so-strategic Air Force 

assignment process) rather than by 

a coherent disciplinary major. CWI 

offered courses on a variety of strategic, 

doctrinal and operational topics but had 

not framed them to serve as a purposeful, integrated cadet program of study. 

For instance, CWI offered a course on 

“global strike” due mainly to the presence of a bomber pilot faculty member, 

but there was no treatment of other Air 

Force competencies or richer theoretical approaches to strategy and warfare. 

In response to Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force interest, an interdisciplinary 

minor, then major, prosaically (committee-created) entitled MDOS (Military 

Doctrine, Operations, and Strategy) was 

established in the 1990’s.10 Given that an 

academic discipline results in a system 

of orderly behavior recognized as being 

characteristic of that discipline, the 

multidisciplinary “MDOS” did not fit 

the mold.11 In fact, there was only one 

required MDOS course in the major, 

Carl Von Clausewitz 

courtesy of Clausewitz.com
MSS at AFA 3

reflecting a lack of depth in doctrine, 

operations and strategy. In 2000, Military Strategic Studies (MSS) replaced 

MDOS to provide cadets with a “scholarly approach to understanding and 

investigating new knowledge, ways of 

working, and perspectives on the world 

around them.”12 Since its establishment, 

MSS has purposefully developed the 

context, theory and application of military power as the professionally relevant 

and academically rigorous framework of 

a new academic discipline. 

A study of other degree-awarding 

programs in military-related fields 

of study at universities across North 

America, Europe, Asia, and Australia 

highlighted the need for a contemporary-oriented military and strategic 

studies discipline.13 As such, there 

occurred a systematic program of 

course development in strategy providing context and theory and operations 

(application). Strategy courses included 

Developing the Military Strategist, 

Theory of Military Transformation, 

Theory of Air, Space, and Information Power, Civil-Military Relations, 

and Counterinsurgency Theory and 

Practice. Operations courses spanned 

Air Warfare, Space Operations and the 

Warfighter, Information Operations, and 

Special Operations. These efforts soon 

bore fruit. As the Academy experienced 

several years of increased Congressional 

scrutiny due to pressing gender and 

religious issues, outside investigations 

brought recommendations for changes 

that not only addressed social concerns 

but also military training and academics.

 In 2005, Congress selected Admiral 

Charles Larson, former Superintendent of the Naval Academy, to study 

the Academy’s social environment and 

recommend changes. Larson’s findings 

emphasized the Academy must remain 

“relevant to the larger Air Force” and 

focused “on the deliberate development 

of Air Force officers... The Academy ...

must reflect the values and norms of the 

broader Air Force while maintaining the 

high academic standards of a world-class 

university.”14 Larson saw an “organizational drift and academic split” because 

USAFA was the only service academy 

with an academic department under the 

Commandant.15 

The admiral advocated separating 

the education and training functions 

as the best way to ensure in-depth and 

comprehensive excellence. In his mind, 

placing an education function within 

CW, an organization focused on training, diluted scholarship and faculty 

expertise, thereby inhibiting cadet intellectual potential. The growth of Military 

Strategic Studies within the Commandant’s realm therefore struck him as an 

“approach [that] fragments rather than 

integrates cadet development,” a point 

General Caine made years earlier.16 To 

fix this, he recommended transferring 

MSS from the Cadet Wing to the Dean 

of Faculty. This led to the inactivation of 

the 34th Education Group and the establishment of the Department of Military 

Strategic Studies (DFMI). His recommendation replicated how a joint force 

integrates expertise to create operational 

synergies. Within the joint construct, 

each air, ground, and maritime component delivers unique excellence, and to 

Larson, this meant academics logically 

fit within the Academy’s academic component. Seeking to increase the professional relevance of cadet academics, his 

report’s ninth finding noted:

At the Air Force Academy, the Commandant is responsible for cadet training as 

well as an entire academic department 

and major-Military Strategic Studies 

(MSS)...This is in contrast to the other 

two service academies and promotes 

a separation of the education mission and blurs the distinction between 

education and training...In fact, we 

believe it creates the perception that 

the Dean’s faculty are neither good 

military role models nor informed and 

capable enough to oversee and teach 

the courses in the MSS major.17

Larson believed MSS as a professionally relevant academic department 

would flourish within the Dean of 

Faculty and improve the effectiveness 

and efficiency of cross-integrated and 

internally consistent mission elements 

with each focused on its distinctive 

capabilities.

Military Strategic Studies also 

featured prominently in Larson’s second 

finding, which described the need for 

separate mission element capabilities 

aligned through a common Academy 

mission and vision. He stated:

The Academy Mission Elements are Not 

Well Integrated—Historically, there has 

been competition rather than cooperation between the Academy’s three 

mission elements or “pillars”—academic, athletic, and military training. 

Although the Air Force Academy has its 

own mission statement, each element, 

in turn, has developed separate visions 

and mission statements that reinforce 

rather than integrate their distinctive 

contributions to the overall mission. 

This stovepiped approach fragments 

rather than integrates cadet development.18 

To prevent further fragmentation, 

DF’s newest academic department had 

to become fully emplaced within the 

Academy’s disciplinary majors. Larson’s 

recommendations, including aligning 

the Department of Military and Strategic 

Studies within the Dean of Faculty and 

securing its equality with its peers in the 

basic sciences, engineering, humanities, 

and social sciences, therefore helped 

Since its establishment, MSS has purposefully developed 

the context, theory and application of military power as the 

professionally relevant and academically rigorous framework 

of a new academic discipline. 
4 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

answer Eisenhower’s dedication benchmark to educate Air Force officers to a 

“peerless standard.” 

A comparative look at MSS begins 

best by noting differences relative to its 

academy antecedents. At USMA, the 

Commandant’s Department of Military 

Instruction teaches Military Science 

but not Military and Strategic Studies. 

As General Caine commented, the Air 

Force Academy tried this approach at 

USAFA for fifty years, during which it 

attempted to pursue academic excellence 

in a CW organization characterized by a 

high operations tempo and an unstable 

faculty corps due to the military assignment process. Meanwhile, to improve 

its education, USMA has established an 

interdisciplinary Military Defense and 

Strategic Studies major that resembles 

USAFA’s earlier interdisciplinary MDOS, 

with courses provided by multiple 

departments. At the United States 

Naval Academy, an academic dean 

oversees a Department of Professional 

Development (Professional Programs, 

Seamanship & Navigation, Waterfront 

Readiness). There is no military/nautical studies discipline or major, or sight 

of it on Annapolis’s horizon. During an 

era in which the United States demands 

more high quality strategic thinkers 

steeped in the context, theory, and application of military power, USAFA has 

earned lessons to which its peers should 

pay heed. 

Within USAFA, MSS starts where 

political science ends with respect to 

military strategy, uses historical and 

other approaches to evaluate theory, and 

applies concepts in contemporary and 

future decision-making scenarios. As 

in the social sciences, MSS uses methods to evaluate operational concepts 

and strategic frameworks. As in the 

humanities, MSS addresses the human 

struggle of warfare. Literally, MSS is 

the “military” portion of “strategic 

studies.”  In this, the discipline adopted 

scholar-strategist Richard Betts’s distinctions among military studies, strategic 

studies, and security studies to propose 

“MSS” as an appropriate description for 

military studies at USAFA. As a military 

profession-focused academic discipline, 

MSS differs in content and methods 

from other departmental offerings, yet 

shares some sources. In this, MSS is 

as complementary to other disciplines 

as Clausewitz’s Trinity is to Sun Zi’s 

maxims.

Reflecting its interdisciplinary 

heritage, MSS faculty possesses diverse 

operational experiences and academic 

backgrounds, which fuels innovation 

and responsiveness to contemporary 

and notional future strategic needs. The 

Department’s active duty faculty blends 

rated officers from multiple flying communities with space operators, nuclear 

operators, intelligence, and multiple 

mission support career fields. Exchange 

officers from the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, 

Royal Air Force, and Japan Air SelfDefense Force add joint and coalition 

perspectives on combined operations. 

The Department’s first sponsored PhD’s 

began to return in 2006, establishing 

a cycle of developing MSS associate 

professors. Doctoral degrees comprise 

humanities and social sciences disciplines, including history, economics, 

public policy, strategy, and education, 

among others. An active faculty development program includes professional 

development seminars each semester, 

monthly theorist seminars, auditing 

requirements, classroom visitations, 

a faculty resource center, and lessonby-lesson assessment of learning and 

associated data collection and analysis.

The summation of the efforts by 

the Department of Military & Strategic 

Studies provides for the young strategist’s education. Consistent with Betts’s 

model, the discipline contends there 

must be a balance of the formal reasoning of the social sciences and the 

informal reasoning of the humanities, 

which is one reason why MSS faculty 

draws equally from each. Although 

some would argue this creates a dichotomy, the reality is different. Returning 

to the time of USAFA’s founding, the 

“American Clausewitz,” Bernard Brodie 

ruminated:

Economists ...have a theoretical training that in its fundamentals bears many 

striking parallels to strategic concepts...

The usual training in economics has its 

own characteristic limitations, among 

which is the tendency to make its possessor insensitive to and often intolerant of political considerations that get 

in the way of his theory of calculations. He is normally extremely weak 

in either diplomatic or military history 

or even in contemporary politics, and 

is rarely aware of how important a deficiency this is for strategic insight...The 

devotees of a science like economics, 

which is clearly the most impressive of 

the social sciences in terms of theoretical structure, tend to develop a certain 

disdain and even arrogance concerning 

other social science fields, which seem 

to them primitive in their techniques 

and intellectually unworthy.19

Brodie, a social scientist who 

clamored for scientific rigor in national 

security strategy, realized the important 

utility of disciplines whose methods 

lacked a formal theoretical and predictive structure. For MSS, the humanities 

matter for the perspective they provide 

The successful strategist therefore requires knowledge 

residing in both the social sciences and the humanities. 

Teaching the context, theory, and application of military 

power demands, as Larson and Caine understood, that this 

admixture occurs in the context of a discipline focused upon 

strategy.
MSS at AFA 5

thereby rendering the judgment “war 

is too important to be left to the generals” as ridiculous as saying “war is too 

important to be left to the politicians.” 

War, perhaps the most human of all 

activities, is the thinking business of all 

departments at the Air Force Academy, 

a responsibility for which the Department of Military and Strategic Studies 

contributes its unique voice as we prepare cadets for the most consequential 

profession of all, the profession of arms.

NOTES

1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe 

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 

261.

2 Testimony of Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of 

the Air Force, U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Appropriations, 84th Congress, 1st 

Session, 1955, 224. 

3 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 11, 

1955, Dedication Message. 

4 Ibid. 

5 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael 

Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. 

6 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 

(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 

1934), 95. Mumford certainly was critical of the 

military, but he was also one of the few American 

intellectuals who supported an early American 

entry into World War Two.

7 Caine retired as a Brigadier General and his 

hereafter referred to by his retired rank. 

8 Brigadier General Philip D. Caine, CWI 1980 

- 1992 End of Tour Report, 13-14. General Caine’s 

tenure at USAFA saw many significant changes 

and evolutions. His perspective on the development of Military Studies into the Department of 

Military and Strategic Studies is peerless. Professional Military Studies later became “Military Art 

and Science,” an appellation blindly adopted from 

the United States Military Academy and Army 

Reserve Officer Training Corps.

in educating strategists. Brodie decried 

the lack of this in his day’s strategists, 

lamenting:

Thus, where the great strategic writers 

and teachers of the past...based the 

development of their art almost entirely 

on a broad and perceptive reading of 

history, in the case of Clausewitz and 

Jomini mostly recent history but exceptionally rich for their needs, the present 

generation of “civilian strategists” are 

with markedly few exceptions singularly 

devoid of history.20

The successful strategist therefore 

requires knowledge residing in both 

the social sciences and the humanities. Teaching the context, theory, and 

application of military power demands, 

as Larson and Caine understood, that 

this admixture occurs in the context of a 

discipline focused upon strategy.

As educators, these are not easy 

tasks. The discipline of Military and 

Strategic Studies as practiced at the 

United States Air Force Academy blends 

the approaches of the social sciences and 

humanities to sustain a new discipline 

central to a military academy’s valueadded mission. Failure to do so would 

result in an incomplete education. This 

generates creative scholarly and administrative tensions, but if the strategist is 

to be educated properly, the tensions are 

necessary. Lack of scientific rigor or the 

perspectives needed to understand the 

human mind precede strategic failure. 

It is not enough to equip the minds of 

Academy-graduated strategists with 

specialization in solely the social sciences or humanities. They need both. 

In part, the core curriculum serves to 

provide this; however, individual courses 

in behavioral science, history, political science, and the like cannot refract 

their disciplines through the prisms of 

strategy and military theory as well as 

a discipline designed for that purpose. 

Although courses such as these may 

touch upon the strategy and the context, theory, and application of military 

power to explain their unique concepts, 

they cannot provide the education in 

how to synthesize these varied thoughts 

and apply them to contemporary and 

notional future strategic problems. This 

is the business of those teaching Military 

and Strategic Studies.21 

As such, the pedagogy of MSS 

requires applying to our military profession Plutarch’s ancient advice: the mind 

is not a vessel to be filled but a fire to 

be kindled. To serve the nation best, 

the mind’s passions must continuously 

develop, for study and reflection upon 

these permit decisions and actions 

for the better. Thus, in answering the 

popular conventional wisdom questioning the state-of-thought within American military and strategic studies, we 

in the arena of such an enterprise must 

speak for our profession. If our actions 

are to speak louder than our words, 

our protégés need to have done their 

thinking well, too. This is the essence of 

harmonizing the “strategic lieutenant” 

with the increasing intellectual demands 

of competitive military thinking, a major 

desired outcome of Military and Strategic Studies.

To this, the Department of Military and Strategic Studies provides a 

humanistic and scientifically rigorous 

approach focused on military and strategic studies expertise to prepare well 

the young officer strategist for service 

to the nation. But there is something of 

deeper import here. The strength of a 

free people comes from their education. 

For it is through education the people 

learn to ask courageous questions and 

to answer them with credible depth of 

knowledge. As productive members 

of the American Republic, it is up to 

all citizens to do this, because in such a 

republic, we all speak with equal import, 

The mind is not a vessel 

to be filled but a fire to be 

kindled. 

 - Plutarch
6 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

16 Ibid., 5-1. Admiral Larson contended that 

concentrating like functions within the appropriate 

mission element delivered a given element’s best 

product. Thus, by including all majors within DF, 

he attempted to ensure the best possible education. 

Concentrating training within CW provided focus 

on officer training. .

17 Ibid., 5-3. 

18 Ibid., 5-1. See also Finding Nine, page 5-3 , 

Recommendation Two, page 6-1, and Recommendation Twelve, page 6-3.

19 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: 

Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 474 – 475. 

20 Ibid., 475. 

21 The reality of human thought is that ideas 

know no boundaries, meaning a history course, for 

example, may well require a discussion of strategy 

to understand a topic. Conversely, a military and 

strategic studies course may examine the past of 

human thought, i.e. history, to test the relevance 

and validity of an idea.

9 During the Academy’s formative period, Military Studies transferred to the Dean of the Faculty 

for a year, a Directorate of Military Affairs was 

established, and an academic major planned. By 

1960, a new Commandant’s priorities prompted its 

return, so CW reacquired the responsibility. See 

Paul T. Ringenbach, Battling Tradition: Robert F. 

McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force Academy (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2006), 169. 

10 CWIS and MDOS continued evolving as 

part of the 34th Education Group (EDG). Until 

reorganization under the Objective Wing Concept 

in 1994, the 34 EDG organized as a Division of 

Military Instruction that included training under 

CWIT. This organization designed and taught all 

military education courses, managed the Commandant’s educational enhancement programs, 

and generally taught School of Advanced Air 

and Spacepower Studies concepts at the undergraduate level. Organized into two squadrons, 

a profound conceptual leap occurred in January 

2001. The mission became “producing aerospace 

officers schooled in the application of military and 

aerospace power,” a clearly innovative step towards 

the current Department of Military and Strategic 

Studies mission of “developing Air Force officers 

educated in the context, theory, and application of 

military power. See Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, 

“EDG Options Historical Brief,” Department of 

Military and Strategic Studies, Historical Records.

11 Marietta Del Favero, “What is an Academic 

Discipline,” available at www.answers.com/topic/

academic-disciplines, accessed 1 July 2008. 

12 Ibid. 

13 A short list of example programs includes: 

1) in North America, Johns Hopkins University’s 

School for Advanced International Studies, the 

University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and 

Strategic Studies, Missouri State University’s 

Defense and Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

and the Royal Military College of Canada’s Military and Strategic Studies program; 2) in Europe, 

King’s College’s War Studies Program and London’s 

International Institute for Strategic Studies; 3) in 

Asia, the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies 

in Singapore, the Regional Centre for Strategic 

Studies in Sri Lanka, the Institute of Strategic 

and International Studies in Malaysia, and India’s 

Centre for Asian Strategic Studies; 4) in Australia, 

the Australian National University’s Strategic and 

Defence Studies Centre.

14 Quotes in this paragraph from Agenda 

for Change, http://www.usafa.edu/index.

cfm?catname=Scouting. Accessed March 18, 

2010. Both the Agenda for Change and the Larson 

Report emerged at a complex time in the Academy’s history. Under intense public and Congressional observation resulting from several highly 

publicized sexual assaults, the Agenda for Change 

and Larson Report expanded in scope to examine 

and report on multiple areas of cadet experience, 

of which academics were only one.

15 Department of the Air Force, “A Study and 

Report Related to Permanent Professors at the 

United States Air Force Academy,” (April 2004), 

3-8. This study, commissioned by the Secretary of 

the Air Force is known informally as the Larson 

Report, and is hereafter cited as such. Chapter and 

page are the basis of the document’s pagination. 

Thus, 3-8 equates to chapter three, page eight. 

THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY CHAPEL
Interagency Conflict 7

I

n Herat, Afghanistan, during 

the late months of 2006, a group 

of military and civilian workers 

presented over 12,000 fruit trees to 

districts in Herat to help the economy 

and provide an alternative to the illegal 

opium field farming. The medley of 

government, military and aid workers 

operating together under a Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT) facilitated this donation through the United 

Nations’ Disbandment of Illegal Armed 

Groups. The Afghani local government officials had worked with the PRT 

and the UN to complete this donation, 

allowing the Afghani leaders not only to 

benefit from the economic and agricultural development, but also from playing 

a direct role with the PRTs to improve 

their province.1

 Since 2002, PRTs have 

played a vital role in Iraq and Afghanistan as they perform counterinsurgency 

(COIN) through development and stability operations, such as working with 

local councils, providing veterinary and 

other agriculture and livestock services, 

building schools and essential infrastructure, and post-war reconstruction. 

With over fifty active teams, the military 

has taken on an unprecedentedly large 

role in stability and reconstruction 

efforts in these two countries in what 

many deem a civilian responsibility.2 

However, with the funding, manpower, 

mass organizational capabilities and 

ability to send forces into dangerous 

areas, the military seems most capable at 

this time to carry out these operations.3

During a time of war and heavy COIN 

operations, the military should be heavily involved in reconstruction and stability operations. Civilian organizations 

that specialize in these areas, though, 

should play a significant role, receive 

more funding, and take on an increased 

share of responsibility in development 

and stability work in Afghanistan, Iraq 

and other fragile and failed states.

During the 1990s, the United States 

dealt with many conflicts throughout 

the world, such as in Eastern Europe, 

Somalia, and Haiti. The US government relied heavily on the United States 

Armed Forces for nation building or 

reconstruction.4

 With the ability to react 

swiftly to natural disasters and the organization and manpower to handle large 

aid operations, the military is the most 

capable organization for development, 

aid and reconstruction missions, to the 

chagrin of the military’s civilian development counterparts. As the role of stability operations grew in importance, not 

only as a post-conflict but preventative 

action in fragile states, many advocated 

for greater civilian involvement and 

responsibility. During this time many 

different organizations, like the State 

Department (DoS), the US Agency for 

International Development (USAID), 

non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs), international financial institutions and the US military competed for 

different foreign development tasks. This 

competition created an incredibly inefficient and overlapping system with little 

structure or cooperation.5 Since these 

operations had become more prevalent 

in US security initiatives, President Bill 

Clinton attempted to resolve some of the 

issues through his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, The Clinton 

Administration’s Policy on Managing 

Complex Contingency Operations, in 

an attempt to create a better system 

for interagency cooperation, planning 

and management. Although this PDD 

proved ineffective in accomplishing 

most of its objectives, it did contribute to 

the “unity of effort” problem by bringing 

With the ability to react swiftly to natural disasters and 

the organization and manpower to handle large aid 

operations, the military is the most capable organization 

for development, aid and reconstruction missions, to the 

chagrin of the military’s civilian development counterparts.

Cadet Kimber Shealy is a History 

major/Arabic minor in the Class of 

2011. 

CONSTRUCTING A WAY TO VICTORY:

The US Interagency Conflict over Reconstruction and

Development Operations during Wartime

KIMBER SHEALY
8 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

To win the hearts and minds of the Afghani and Iraqi people 

the US must focus on three categories of effort: governance, 

development and security. 

some of the aforementioned-involved 

organizations into closer synchronization with each other.6

 The improved, yet 

still weak and fragmented management 

of nation-building operations would 

soon become even more important with 

the outbreak of war in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the weakness of these 

operations as well as the competition 

among agencies would be exacerbated. 

After 9/11 and the initial conventional war phase and “victory” in Iraq, 

the military commander and DoS saw 

the need to rebuild the war-torn urban 

centers and assist new governments 

as a way of ensuring that the US left 

the countries in a condition of relative 

stability with the potential to prosper. 

The Senate did not want the traditional, 

military-led development operations 

to run this mission in the usual fashion 

of “cobbled together plans, people and 

resources in an ad hoc fashion, usually 

with the Defense Department in the 

lead.”7

 The Bush Administration desired 

civilian workers to rebuild Iraq’s political 

system, schools, and buildings in a way 

that would bring the country prosperity 

while still keeping its cultural identity.8 

In 2005, President Bush created the 

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, titled Management of 

Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations 

to create the Office for the Coordinator 

for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) 

and shift responsibility of the management of stability and reconstruction 

efforts to the State Department.9

 The 

Department of Defense agreed with 

this transfer and commented, “Military 

action alone cannot bring long-term 

peace and prosperity; therefore, we 

need to include all elements of national 

and institutional power.”10 By providing 

the mechanism by which these organizations can function and cooperate 

together, the shared operations will not 

only relieve stress placed on the military, 

but also provide a more effective system 

for reconstruction and stability in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.11

Despite a lack of funds and manpower, the S/CRS quickly took off after 

its creation in 2005. Different from 

USAID, this new office focused on 

short-term aid during the beginning 

transition of failed or fragile countries 

and the foundation for further development.12 Active in about thirty countries, 

but mostly in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan 

and Sudan, S/CRS recruits not only DoS 

employees but an array of agricultural, 

medical, political and financial specialists to find the best solutions providing 

improved stability. Needing a diverse 

group of specialists to choose from when 

the situation demands led the S/CRS 

to create the Civilian Response Corps, 

which takes volunteers from nine US 

government agencies, all with varying 

experiences and specialties. Not only 

does S/CRS pull from these different 

agencies, it also has an active or reserve 

employee pool, based upon the military’s 

system of reserve forces who can be 

called up when needed.13

Although the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability emphasizes the necessity of civilian 

employees in these particular missions, 

it does not discredit the requirement 

of military forces. In more tumultuous 

countries, such as Afghanistan, the civilian workers not only need the military 

for security, but also, the military has 

provided a system under which the 

civilians work. This cooperation and 

“whole-of-government” approach, even 

if brittle at times, is necessary in most 

effectively providing reconstruction, 

stability and development in the most 

desperate regions.14

As the pendulum swung towards 

a primarily civilian force in 2005, 

criticisms of NSPD 44 brought policymakers back to the table. Although 

civilian workers do play a crucial role in 

these operations, many DoS and DoD 

employees believed that the military 

plays an integral part as well. By having 

the aforementioned structure and 

security provided by the military, civilian forces can begin reconstruction and 

stability operations much sooner after or 

even during a conflict to prevent further 

deterioration and to set a good foundation for long-term nation-building.15

In 2005, the DoD Directive 3000.05, 

Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition and Reconstruction (SSR) 

Operations, helped resolve this issue 

by recognizing that American civilian 

specialists or foreign professionals will 

be most effective in completing these 

operations, while the military will be 

needed in a supporting role to main 

order and provide security when its 

partners cannot.16 This relationship 

between the military and civilians would 

allow the military personnel to focus on 

their more traditional operations, while 

still providing the needed support and 

reaping the benefits of civilian nationbuilding and reconstruction.17 Although 

Directive 3000.05 set clear directions 

and had good intentions, the implementation proved difficult due to the slow 

formations of integral parts and funding 

for the civilian forces.18

Many of these initiatives and 

directives dealt primarily with unifying organizations throughout the US 

government to address global instability 

and its threat to US national security. 

The military supports these initiatives, 

but adds another reason for reconstruc-
Interagency Conflict 9

tion and stability efforts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan: counterinsurgency. In 

the military’s battle against terrorism, 

counterinsurgency doctrine has quickly 

become a priority as the enemy, especially in Afghanistan, continues to fight 

an insurgent war. These untraditional 

wars have posed a conundrum to the 

US military and policymakers as they 

try to formulate the most effective way 

to achieve victory. Australian Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen describes 

counterinsurgency as “a competition 

with the insurgent for the right and the 

ability to win the hearts, minds and 

acquiescence of the population.”19 To 

win the hearts and minds of the Afghani 

and Iraqi people the US must focus on 

three categories of effort: governance, 

development and security. From there 

the US military can effectively aid the 

foreign governments and try to provide 

a stable and potentially prosperous 

society. Whether a prosperous society 

comes through construction, education, 

security, agriculture, or government, the 

people will respond and side with the 

group that can most capably meet their 

needs.20

Focusing on Afghanistan, the most 

basic way to win the Afghani people 

over lies with first meeting their most 

basic needs, such as food, shelter, water 

and means of making a living. Not only 

will this provide a more stable country 

and possibly prevent it from falling 

into future conflicts, but meeting these 

needs will begin to persuade the Afghani 

people and government away from the 

insurgents. After basic needs are met, 

the US can then try to meet the needs of 

the society as whole. This refers to local 

governments and councils, education, 

agriculture and other means of employment. As the US actually provides 

means for stability in Afghanistan, the 

people will discard their support for 

insurgents, allowing victory for the US. 

Coincidently, the Taliban has taken on 

similar strategies recorded in the Code 

of Conduct for the Mujahidin of the 

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This 

code of conduct instructs members to 

adhere to Islamic principles and work 

to “win the hearts of Muslims at large.”21

The competition over who can better 

persuade the Afghani people continues, 

but the United States holds a resource 

that the Taliban does not have access 

to quite as easily: money. In General 

Petraeus’ speech to counterinsurgency 

commanders in 2003, Petraeus’ claimed, 

“Money can be ammunition.”22

From the US military’s Coalition 

Humanitarian Liaison Cells that had 

been in place in 2001, a new unit formed 

that would attempt to bring together 

the efforts of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and 

other NGOs. Officially formed in late 

2002, the military dubbed these units 

as Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs), which would potentially create 

mechanisms to aid their counterinsurgency efforts and to create support 

for the new central government. First 

deployed in Afghanistan, the PRTs were 

formed to coordinate both military 

and civilian power and capabilities for 

reconstruction tasks and political and 

security advisement.23 The military portion of these teams allowed the groups to 

venture into more unstable and hazardous areas, while the civilian component provided a strong diplomatic and 

nation-building expertise. Currently, the 

civilian component can consist of DoS, 

USAID, a variety of other US government organizations, NGOs, specialists 

depending on the area or the need, and 

indigenous workers.24 The PRTs do 

not intend to work long-term in Iraq 

and Afghanistan but aim to provide an 

immediate response to the destruction 

and desolation in order to promote stability and prosperity. Kilcullen describes 

the military’s role in development in one 

of his twenty-eight articles of counterinsurgency: “Most importantly, know that 

your operations will create temporary 

breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will eventually win the war.”25

Differing in size from fifty to three 

hundred people, the PRTs consist of 

military support personnel, such as 

communications, protection, intelligence, or logistics, political advisors, 

development experts and a variety of 

other more specific specialists, such as 

agriculturalists, engineers, or financial 

advisors. Members that understand the 

culture and language are one of the most 

important requirements in these groups, 

so that the team can successfully help 

the people in a particular area. In all of 

the teams’ activities, the groups ensure 

that they have the approval of local leaders and the central government for both 

coordination and diplomatic considerations.26 As the PRTs grew in popularity, 

International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) took control of a portion of the 

PRTs along with the United States.27

International organizations set clearer 

guidelines for PRTs and improved the 

relationship between civilian and military forces within the groups. Some of 

these guidelines gave more of an identity 

and motivation to PRTs, such as the missions to build provincial capacity, foster 

economic development, strengthen the 

rule of law and promote reconciliation. 

Within the first few years, the results 

First deployed in Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams were formed to coordinate both military and 

civilian power and capabilities for reconstruction tasks and 

political and security advisement.
10 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

and benefits of these teams led other 

countries to follow the US-lead. By 

2005, Britain, Germany, the Dutch, New 

Zealand and other coalition countries 

created their own PRTs to use throughout Afghanistan.28 Since then, even 

more countries have joined this effort, 

and together have created a robust and 

diverse reconstruction and stabilization 

effort.

In Afghanistan, many tribal leaders 

are especially enthusiastic about the 

United States’ effort to help rebuild their 

villages. For example, in 2005, a PRT 

team met with the village elders a few 

hours south of Kabul to discuss what the 

elders believed their village needed. The 

inclusion of the Afghani government 

not only allowed the American PRT 

to better understand what the village 

desired, but also allowed the elders to 

feel involved with the reconstruction, 

which built a sense of pride and allegiance with the Americans. At the end 

of the meeting, PRT members added 

that the Afghans were in charge of the 

reconstruction and the US remained 

solely to facilitate the process. After 

the meeting, the two groups agreed to 

build actual school buildings so that the 

province will prosper in the future.29

With this development, children would 

soon be able to attend school again. 

Other specific projects include repair of 

infrastructure, irrigation and pipeline 

construction, medical assistance and 

agricultural techniques and assistance.30

In Iraq, the mission remains much 

the same but with a greater emphasis 

in different areas. For example, the US 

and Iraqi leadership have prioritized 

the need for reconstruction of war torn 

cities and villages as well as political advisement. All with the intent of 

creating a more prosperous and stable 

society to prevent autocratic rule or 

the growth of terrorism, the US has 

achieved some great victories in helping 

the Iraqi people. To combat both the 

problems of unemployment and the 

need for reconstruction, the US government created almost 70,000 jobs, many 

involving reconstruction and clean up of 

war debris.31 The PRTs also have focused 

on teaching government employees in 

Iraq basic business skills and civics to 

decrease the gap between the minority 

of highly educated individuals and the 

rest of the government workers. One of 

the most impressive and effective aspects 

of these groups in Iraq is that they do 

not just give free aid, but mentor Iraqis 

on setting up budgets to fund their 

country’s own reconstruction.32

Within the first few years of action, 

the PRTs have proven themselves successful in multiple ways. First, they 

provide stability to regions through 

reconstruction and other aid efforts. 

These major efforts not only create 

a more stable country, but allow the 

people to grow closer to the US, as they 

see it as best meeting their needs. Secondly, and equally important, the teams 

are helping resolve the interagency 

conflict with respect to development and 

stability projects. In the conflicts in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, both the military and 

civilian organizations are needed, and 

PRTs are the medium for this cooperation to occur. Former Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice commented on the 

effectiveness of the combined militarycivilian force in 2007: “The logic behind 

PRTs is simple. Success in Iraq relies on 

more than military efforts; it requires 

robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be 

fully supported and integrated with our 

civilian and diplomatic efforts across 

the entire US government to help Iraqis 

clear, hold, and builwd throughout all of 

Iraq.” 34 The division of labor will provide the advantage of different points of 

view in projects due to the diverse vocations and experience levels of the members of a PRT. Early civilian involvement 

in stabilization efforts will also provide a 

better foundation for long lasting development after the US military leaves Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

Although many praise the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, they also 

receive large amounts of criticism. From 

calling them “successful but not sufficient” to harmful and a mere public 

affairs’ stunt, the consistent criticism has 

forced leaders of the groups to reevaluate their tactics and operations.35 Critics 

first analyzed the lack of a strategic plan 

and the reactionary attitude of the PRTs. 

Without a clear objective or plan, military and civilian leaders have no way of 

correctly evaluating the teams’ performances as successful or unsuccessful. 

In Afghanistan, lacking an objective has 

led to inconsistent goals and accomplishments for PRTs. This occurs, for 

example, when one group believes the 

most important aspect of its mission is 

to provide security and prevent attacks 

within that city, paying little attention 

to the people, where another group 

believes that security remains important 

but secondary to creating relationships 

with the village leaders and people and 

attempting to meet their needs.36 Not 

only do inconsistencies dwell in the 

Within the first few years of action, the PRTs have proven 

themselves successful in multiple ways. First, they provide 

stability to regions through reconstruction and other aid 

efforts... Secondly, and equally important, the teams are 

helping resolve the interagency conflict with respect to 

development and stability projects.
Interagency Conflict 11

American PRTs, but the combination 

of German, UK and a variety of other 

coalition PRTs in Afghanistan create 

even greater ambiguities over what PRTs 

should be accomplishing and how.37

Along with no clear mission, the 

coalition PRTs have no unified commander under which they reside. A 

leader that would oversee these operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq could 

provide a better and more informed 

chain-of-command that could address 

stability and reconstruction doctrinal 

issues, give the PRTs a cohesive mission, and help with the inconsistencies 

in operations. 

The commander 

could work with 

the leaders of 

similar organizations to ensure 

that miscommunication is kept to 

a minimum and 

that the different 

development and 

aid organizations 

work together in 

the most advantageous ways for 

both the coalition 

and the countries 

of interest. Also, 

with a unified PRT 

command, the various countries’ teams 

could better coordinate efforts together 

and disperse ideas with greater ease.38

With a vague mission and no 

strategic oversight, some PRTs believed 

that achieving success could be found in 

building the most buildings or providing the greatest number of services in 

the shortest amount of time, with little 

regard to the opinions of the indigenous people. The PRTs not only did 

this to impress their superiors, but also 

to quickly impress the local people of 

Afghanistan and Iraq and prove that the 

coalition forces came with good intentions. Robert Perito of the US Institute 

of Peace commented on the issue saying, 

“Pressure from senior military authorities to demonstrate progress...resulted 

in the hasty construction of building 

without reference to the Afghan government’s capacity to support these activities. Schools were built without teachers 

and clinics without doctors.”39 Also, the 

desire to quickly achieve success had 

led to some substandard construction 

of buildings or inadequate understanding of certain projects, such as piping 

and water distribution. These haphazard 

projects may achieve temporary success 

and excite the people of the village; but 

in the end, they harm the indigenous 

people more than they help as a portion 

of the buildings and projects fail.

Part of the reason for the aforementioned ineffectiveness or poor quality 

of reconstruction and stability effort 

lies with the lack of language, ethnic, 

political and religious expertise within 

the PRTs.40 This issue has led to many 

mistakes and taboo behavior within 

Afghanistan and Iraq that have hindered 

the American PRTs to make swift strides 

towards stabilization. For example, the 

State Department has not prioritized 

the people it sends to the PRTs leaving 

many junior Foreign Service Officers to 

act as the main diplomatic representatives on the teams.41 The Office for the 

Coordinator of Stability and Reconstruction and its Civilian Response Corps 

should become more involved with this 

issue, as its Civilian Response Corps 

vastly consists of retired diplomats, area 

and skill experts, linguists, and military 

members.42 Also, the military has also 

recognized its deficiencies in cultural 

and language experts, and reemphasized the importance of training more 

personnel in these specialties. The US 

Air Force, for example, has more than 

doubled the amount of its Foreign Area 

Specialists and Political-Military Specialists.43

Finally, and one of the 

greatest disparagements of 

Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams, people have criticized 

the mere presence of military 

members in development, 

aid and reconstruction activities. The criticism comes 

mostly from the NGOs that 

have resided in a region for 

some time and feel that the 

military’s presence “[blurs] 

the line between military and 

humanitarian assistance.”44

This criticism was especially 

relevant at the beginning of 

both Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom as traditional military operations continued 

throughout the countries, while at 

the same time, largely military PRTs 

attempted to provide aid and assistance 

while in uniform. The NGOs believed 

that the PRTs presence and their similar 

missions endangered the non-military 

relief workers, since the indigenous 

people, including some insurgents, 

might identify the NGO staff with the 

US military. As the threat of attack 

increased, especially of less protected 

people, insurgents began targeting relief 

workers. After one of its personnel was 

killed, the renowned Doctors without 

PRT SUPPORTING FARAH PROVINCE IN AFGHANISTAN
12 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

and just under $1.5 billion dollars of 

support for its mission.49 With CORDS 

falling under the purview of the military, 

it had the money, manpower, structure 

and ability to travel throughout South 

Vietnam, which allowed it to provide 

mass amounts of aid and reconstruction 

in more isolated regions.50 Looking at 

the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

the PRTs should attempt to replicate 

CORDS functions. Although the wars 

cannot perfectly be compared, the long 

and painful lessons of Vietnam may 

provide additional guidance for counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

In the current state of war, the 

US military’s mission and command 

take immediate precedence. If the US 

can provide security, attack insurgent 

infrastructure and win over the noninsurgent citizens, then the US can look 

towards achieving military success in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. With this said, 

the military must also understand the 

long term role and immediate benefits of 

other organizations and civilian advisors 

in reconstruction, stability and counterinsurgency missions and work with 

them to achieve those advantages. Once 

the war has ended, US Armed Forces 

should shift responsibility of development and stability operations back over 

to the civilian organizations, while still 

keeping minimal forces present for security reasons. Also, the civilian organizations that would take this responsibility 

must have the training, knowledge, 

and experience necessary to successfully complete development operations. 

Interagency competition and conflict 

will continue, but an ability to recognize 

what is in the best interest of the United 

States and the countries of interest 

remains crucial. Whether in wartime 

or peace time, American agencies must 

continue fervently discussing possible 

solutions, recognizing others’ expertise, 

and working together.

Borders left Afghanistan and blamed the 

PRTs for the increase of attacks on relief 

workers. In this same sense, civilian 

workers for development and stability believed that the military uniforms 

among them on the PRTs compromised 

the relief workers’ mission by making 

their efforts seem part of a military 

strategy.45

The criticism continues, but during 

a time of war, as the United States finds 

itself in currently, the military will continue to play a heavy role in reconstruction. However, this does not mean that 

civilian workers should not be heavily 

involved as well. In 1967, the military 

created a similar group to the Provincial 

Reconstruction Team called the Civil 

Operations and Rural Development 

Support (CORDS). This group united 

both civilian and military personnel to 

provide security for the people, persuade the people of the superiority of 

South Vietnam and target the insurgents’ infrastructure.46 Before they came 

together, the different groups, including 

the military, were ineffective in providing humanitarian aid and means of 

development on their own. PRT commanders should examine many of this 

program’s characteristics, as the lessons 

learned therefrom may make the current teams more effective and provide 

understanding to the civilian personnel within PRTs. For example, CORDS 

had an agreed upon and clear objective, 

which allowed greater “unity of effort” 

among the different organizations and 

groups. Writing on the strategy used, 

Dale Andrade claims, “Key to the entire 

strategy is the integration of all efforts 

towards a single goal.”47 Moreover, the 

US military funded the Vietnam wartime reconstruction and development 

groups, placing them within the military 

chain of command, yet the groups 

consisted of primarily civilian workers.48

The Department of Defense recognized 

the benefits of this program and CORDS 

received over 7,600 advisors by 1969, 

NOTES

1 “Herat PRT and government officials provide 

12,000 fruit trees to local farmers,” NATO: 

International Security Assistance Force, accessed 

April 25, 2011, last modified November 27, 2006, 

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/ pressreleases/2006/

pr061127-307.htm.

2 Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

America’s Security Role in a Changing World, 

ed. Patrick Cronin (Washington, D.C.: National 

Defense University Press, 2009), 152.

3 Nina Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and 

Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve 

Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: CRS 

Report for Congress, 2011), 1.

4 Christopher D. Mallard, “The Office of the 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), NSPD 44, DOD Directive 3000.05,” 

Project on National Security Reform, accessed 

April 26, 2011, last modified 2010, http://www.

pnsr.org/web/page/940/sectionid/579/pagelevel/3/

interior.asp.

5 Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and 

Conflict Transitions, 4.

6 Mallard, S/CRS, NSPD 4, DODI 3000.05.

7 S. Rep. No. 108-THE STABILIZATION AND 

RECONSTRUCTION CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2004 (2004), accessed April 20, 

2011, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 

8 “Fact Sheet: Expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams Speed the Transition to Self-Reliance 

,” The White House: President George W. Bush, 

accessed April 21, 2011, last modified July 2007, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/

news/releases/2007/07/20070713.html.

9 Mallard, S/CRS, NSPD 4, DODI 3000.05.

10 Robert Gates, Report to Congress on the 

Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.04 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 2, accessed 

April 25, 2011, 
Interagency Conflict 13

http://policy.defense.gov/downloads/ Congressional_Report_on_DoDD_3000-05_Implementation_final_2.pdf.

11 Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and 

Conflict Transitions, 5.

12 Robert Loftis, “Conversations With America: 

Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” interview by 

Cheryl Benton, February 25, 2011, U.S. Department of State, accessed April 26, 2011, http://www.

state.gov/r/pa/plrmo/cwa/157164.htm.

13 Civilian Response Corps, accessed April 23, 

2011, http://www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/.

14 Loftis, “Conversations: Diplomacy in the 21st 

Century.”

15 Gates, Implementation of DODI 3000.05, 3.

16 Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05: 

Stability Operations, accessed April 25, 2011, 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres /pdf/ 

300005p.pdf.

17 Gates, Implementation of DODI 3000.05, 30.

18 Mallard, S/CRS, NSPD 4, DODI 3000.05.

19 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: 

Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Australian Air Force, accessed April 25, 

2011, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/

iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf.

20 Dan Moy, interview by author, December 10, 

2010.

21 Afghanistan Islamic Emirate Rules and 

Regulations for Mujahidin Pashto (Seized 2009), 

accessed April 26, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 

pages/frontline/obamaswar/etc/mullahomar.pdf.

22 David Petraeus, “Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 

Military Review (September-October 2008).

23 Robert Perito, The U.S. Experience with 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 

United States Institute of Peace: Special Report, 2, 

accessed April 27, 2011, http://www.usip.org/files/

resources/sr152.pdf.

24 National Strategic Studies, America’s Security 

Role, 223.

25 Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles.”

26 Peter Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient, 11-12, http://www.diis.dk/

sw11230.asp.

27 National Strategic Studies, America’s Security 

Role, 223.

28 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 13.

29 “Time for tea and ambushes and now nationbuilding,” The Economist, February 10, 2005, 

accessed April 26, 2011, 

http://www.economist.com/node/ 

3651906?story_id=E1_PGVTJDG&CFID=163042

862&CFTOKEN=15884294.

30 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams look 

at way forward in Afghanistan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization News, March 17, 2010, 

accessed April 26, 2011, http://www.nato.int/

cps/en/SID-17D60110-5201667A/natolive/

news_62256.htm.

31 Ben Barber et al., Iraq PRTs (n.p.: U.S. Agency 

for International Development, 2007), 2.

32 Barber et al., Iraq PRTs, 7-8.

33 Condoleezza Rice (11 Jan 2007), quoted in 

Ben Barber et al., Iraq PRTs, B.

34 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 1.

35 Perito, The U.S. Experience with PRTs, 3.

36 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 28.

37 Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 15.

38 Perito, The U.S. Experience with PRTs, 9.

39 Perito, The U.S. Experience with PRTs, 9,12.

40 David Kobayashi, “Integrating Civilian and 

Military Efforts in Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams ,” Project on National Security Reform, 

accessed April 26, 2011, last modified 2010, http://

www.pnsr.org/web/page/935/sectionid/ 579/pagelevel /3/parentid/590/interior.asp.

41 Perito, The U.S. Experience with PRTs, 13.

42 Civilian Response Corps, accessed April 23, 

2011, http://www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/.

43 Paul Koscak, “More officers headed for 

foreign liaison jobs,” Air Force Times, February 

26, 2011, accessed April 27, 2011, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/02/ air-force-officersheaded-to-liason-jobs-022611w/.

44 National Strategic Studies, America’s Security 

Role, 225.

45 Perito, The U.S. Experience with PRTs, 9.

46 Dale Andrade and James Willbanks, 

“CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lesson 

from Vietnam for the Future,” Small Wars Journal 

(March-April 2006): 11, accessed April 24, 2011, 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/ milreviewmarch2.pdf.

47 Andrade and Willbanks, “Cords/Phoenix,” 

11.

48 Perito, The U.S. Experience with PRTs, 14.

49 Dale Andrade, “Three Lessons FromVietnam,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2005, 

accessed April 25, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2005/12/28/

AR2005122801144.html.

50 Andrade and Willbanks, “Cords/Phoenix,” 

16.

Knowlege is indivisable. 

When people grow wise in 

one direction, they are sure to 

make it easier for themselves 

to grow wise in other 

directions as well.

-- Isaac Asimov
14 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

T

he influenza pandemic of 1918 

was one of the worst global health 

crises in recorded history. The 

influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, 

known as the “Spanish Flu”, killed more 

people than World War I--estimates 

range somewhere between 20 and 

40 million.1 In the two years that this 

scourge ravaged the earth, a fifth of 

the world’s population was infected, 

and more people died of influenza in 

a single year than in four-years of the 

Black Death Bubonic Plague from 1347 

to 1351.2 It is estimated that 28% of all 

Americans were infected.3 The influenza 

virus had an intense virulence, with a 

mortality rate of 2.5% compared to the 

previous influenza epidemics, which 

were less than 0.1%.4 Furthermore, 

the death rate for 15 to 34-year-olds of 

influenza and pneumonia were 20 times 

higher in 1918 than in previous years, 

which was extremely unusual since 

influenza typically targets the elderly 

and young children.5 Its effect continues to be felt, as the United States bases 

its assumptions for severe pandemic 

response on the 1918 influenza.6 

The 1918 influenza pandemic represents the threat that pandemics pose to 

the international community, not only 

in terms of the toll in lives, but also the 

havoc pandemics and epidemics can 

wreak on weak governments. Age-old 

diseases such as cholera, tuberculosis, 

and malaria, coupled with emerging 

diseases like HIV/AIDS, SARS, H5N1 

(Avian Flu), and H1N1 (Swine Flu) 

demonstrate that the international community cannot continue to isolate the 

disease challenges of one nation from 

other nations, conceptually or practically.7

 Increased trade and commerce 

and the ability of international travelers 

to go from New York to Beijing in less 

than a day evidence the ever-increasing 

urgency and inter-dependence of global 

health conditions,8 especially the threat 

of pandemic disease spread. Given the 

current estimate global population of 

6.9 billion9, if a pandemic of the same 

virulence as the 1918 influenza were to 

spread across the globe today, 2.3 billion 

would be infected and 76 million would 

be killed. The global community cannot 

afford such a healthcare crisis, as even 

the most basic healthcare services are 

insufficient in many states today.

This article asserts that the United 

States must take an active role in mobilizing support for the establishment 

of a direct international convention 

concerning pandemic preparedness, 

response, and cooperation through the 

World Health Organization (WHO). 

This paper provides an overview of 

the current structure of international 

organizations and policies related to 

disease prevention and control, presents 

a summary of pandemics that currently 

threaten the global community, examines several case studies reflecting the 

deficiencies in the current pandemic 

preparedness and response policies on 

an international level, and presents recommendations for improving the readiness of the international community for 

preventing and dealing with pandemics.

World Health Organization

First an understanding of the 

function and structure of the WHO is 

necessary. According to the WHO Constitution, “The objective of the World 

Health Organization...shall be the 

attainment by all peoples of the highest 

possible level of health.”10 The International Health Conference adopted the 

WHO Constitution in New York from 

19 June to 22 July 1946, which representatives of 61 States then signed on 22 

July 1946, clearing the way for the conPANDEMICS: Recommendations for 

International Preparedness,

Response and Coordination

MATT BREW AND HAL SCHMIDT

Cadet Matt Brew is an Astronautical 

Engineering major in the Class 

of 2011. Cadet Hal Schimdt is 

an Electrical Engineering major/

Spanish minor and “Top Grad” in 

the Class of 2011.

The 1918 influenza pandemic represents the threat that 

pandemics pose to the international community, not only 

in terms of the toll in lives, but also the havoc pandemics 

and epidemics can wreak on weak governments.
Pandemic Interagency Response 15

stitution to enter into force on 7 April 

1948.11 Eighty two articles comprise 

the WHO Constitution, outlining the 

functions, membership, organs, budget, 

voting, legal capacity, and interpretation 

of the WHO.12 

Of particular importance to preparedness and response to pandemics, 

the constitution outlines the following 

WHO functions: “to establish and maintain such administrative and technical 

services as may be required, including 

epidemiological and statistical services; 

to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases; to develop, establish and promote 

international standards with respect to 

food, biological, pharmaceutical and 

similar products...”13 Additionally, 

Article 20 provides that each member 

state undertakes that it will take action 

to comply with any convention or 

agreement adopted by the WHA within 

eighteen months after the WHA agrees 

to adopt said convention or agreement. Following any action taken, each 

member state will notify the DirectorGeneral of the action taken, and if the 

member state is unable to the convention or agreement within the time limit, 

it will provide a statement explaining 

the the reasons for non-acceptance. In 

case of acceptance, each member will 

make an annual report to the DirectorGeneral of its status in implementing the 

convention or agreement.”14

The WHO constitution establishes 

three bodies that carry out the functions 

of the WHO: the World Health Assembly (WHA), the Executive Board, and 

the Secretariat. The WHA is composed 

of delegates representing the member 

states, and it meets annually.15 It is 

tasked with determining the policies of 

the organization, appointing the Director-General, reviewing and approving 

reports and activities of the Board and of 

the Director-General and instructing the 

Board about matters upon which action, 

study, investigation or report may be 

considered desirable.16 Additionally, the 

WHA oversees the financial policies of 

the organization, reviews and approves 

the budget, instructs the Board and the 

Director-General to inform the member 

states and international organizations, 

governmental or non-governmental, 

about any matter regarding health which 

the WHA considers appropriate.”17

The second body of the WHO is 

the Executive Board, which acts as the 

executive organ of the WHO and meets 

at least twice a year.18 Its functions 

include advising the WHA on questions 

referred to it by the WHA and on issues 

assigned to the WHO by conventions, 

agreements and regulations, submitting to the WHA for consideration 

and approval a general program of 

work covering a specific period, and 

taking emergency measures within the 

functions and financial resources of 

the WHO to address events requiring 

immediate action.19 Specifically, “it may 

authorize the Director-General to take 

the necessary steps to combat epidemics, to participate in the organization of 

health relief to victims of a calamity and 

to undertake studies and research the 

urgency of which has been drawn to the 

attention of the Board by any Member 

or by the Director-General.”20

The third body of the WHO is the 

Secretariat, which is composed of the 

Director-General and any administrative and technical staff deemed necessary to the WHO’s operation.21 The 

Director-General is responsible for 

managing and reporting to the Executive Board on the budget and expenses 

of the WHO.22 Additionally, and of 

interest in relation to pandemic preparedness, the Director-General (or his 

representative) may establish procedures 

by agreement of the member states that 

permit him direct access to their various 

health administrations and national 

health organizations, governmental or 

non-governmental.23 It is important to 

note that this access may only occur 

with express permission of the member 

states. Moreover, he may establish direct 

relations with international organizations whose activities and efforts come 

within the areas of responsibility of the 

WHO.”24

According to Professor Allyn Taylor 

of the Georgetown University Law 

Center, “The foundation of the WHO’s 

unique responsibility to implement the 

right to health is the organization’s affiliation with the United Nations system 

as a specialized agency.”25 The United 

Nations charter provides the basis for 

the relationship between the UN and 

WHO—specifically those sections that 

establish UN as the “directing and coordinateing authority on international 

health work.”26 The WHO assumes the 

chief responsibility to execute the aims 

of the UN Charter with respect to health 

and disease mitigation.27 With specific 

focus on the preventing and limiting the 

spread of diseases, the WHO promulgated the International Health Regulations (IHR). 

International Health

Regulation

According to the WHO, the “International Health Regulations (IHR) are 

an international legal instrument that 

is binding on 194 countries across the 

globe, including all the Member States of 

75 percent of epidemics during the last three decades 

have occurred in countries where war, conflict, and 

prolonged political violence have crippled their capacity to 

respond.
16 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

WHO. Their aim is to help the international community prevent and respond 

to acute public health risks that have the 

potential to cross borders and threaten 

people worldwide,”28 while limiting 

interference with global travel and 

global commerce. The WHA adopted 

the original IHR in 1969, having been 

preceded by the International Sanitary 

Regulations of 1951, which Fourth 

World Health Assembly adopted.29 The 

1969 Regulations, which initially covered six “quarantinable diseases” were 

amended in 1973 and 1981, primarily to 

reduce the number of covered diseases 

from six to three (yellow fever, plague 

and cholera) and to mark the global 

eradication of smallpox.”30 The 2005 

revisions to the IHR, which entered into 

force on 15 June 2007, “require countries 

to report certain disease outbreaks and 

public health events to WHO.”31 The 

impetus to update them in 2005 was 

the 2003 SARS epidemic that began in 

China. As the WHO Director-General 

at the time stated, “SARS has shown us 

the size of the challenges we face. These 

new measures will help us respond even 

more effectively to the next public health 

threat.”32

The updated IHR have in theory 

significantly improved the international 

community’s abilities and resources to 

respond to the spread of disease. In 

particular, the IHR 2005 created decision instrument criteria that facilitate 

more rapid assessment and notification of health/disease events.33 Under 

the IHR, state parties are required to 

assess at the national level all reports 

of urgent events inside their territories 

within 48 hours by applying the decision 

instrument specified by the IHR.34 This 

instrument provides state parties with 

the parameters used to decide whether 

or not a specific event needs to be notified to WHO under the 2005 update to 

the IHR. When a state party identifies 

a notifiable event, it must report it to 

WHO within 24 hours of assessing the 

public health information related to 

the event.35 Notification must “include 

details of any health measure employed 

in response to the event as well as 

accurate and sufficiently detailed public 

health information available, including 

case definitions, laboratory results and 

number of cases and deaths.”36

As mentioned above, the 2005 

IHR establishes a decision instrument 

for states to use in assessing whether 

or not public health events qualify as 

“notifiable”. According the IHR, the four 

decision criteria are: “(1) the seriousness of the event’s public health impact; 

(2) the unusual or unexpected nature 

of the event; (3) the risk of international disease spread; and (4) or the risk 

that travel or trade restrictions will be 

imposed by other countries.”37 Events 

that meet one or more of the criteria 

must be assessed by the state party, 

and those that meet two or more of the 

criteria must be notified to the WHO.38 

The IHR is a key factor in current 

international policy on preventing and 

responding to pandemic diseases, as 

well as on cooperation to mitigate their 

effects.

New Threats

The primary factors making pandemic preparedness a crucial issue for 

international security are the resurgence of the some of the human race’s 

oldest nemeses in the forms of cholera, 

malaria, and tuberculosis, the ongoing 

HIV/AIDS pandemics39, and the more 

recent outbreaks of SARS, H5N1, and 

H1N1.

SARS

China’s failure to disclose information concerning the Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic 

in early 2003 prompted World Health 

Assembly resolutions to update International Health Regulations which would 

in turn broad outbreak control measures 

and expand information-sharing.40 Due 

to surveillance and investigation limitations of the previous regulations within 

sovereign nations, the viral respiratory 

illness spread from Guangdong, China 

to over 40 countries around the world 

within weeks, resulting in 8,098 infections and 774 deaths before the outbreak 

was finally contained.41 While press 

reports claim that new WHA resolutions 

give WHO greater “power” and “authority” to combat international threats 

posed by infectious diseases, this case 

study will determine if the revisions will 

indeed do more to mitigate and prevent 

modern-day diseases in the interconnected world.42

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 

is a respiratory illness caused by the 

SARS-associated coronavirus (SARSCoV). It typically begins with a fever of 

104.1° F or more and may include other 

symptoms such as headache, discomfort, and body aches. Some people have 

mild respiratory symptoms at the start 

and after 2-7 days may develop a dry 

cough that leads to pneumonia. Severe 

diarrhea occurs when SARS attacks the 

digestive system in about 10-20% of 

patients. The infection spreads primarily 

through close person-to-person contact; 

the virus that causes SARS, in particular, is transmitted most readily through 

indirect contact by infected droplets 

that are inhaled or land on a surface or 

object when a person coughs or sneezes. 

When another person touches the 

Their aim is to help the international community prevent 

and respond to acute public health risks that have the 

potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide
Pandemic Interagency Response 17

contaminated surface and then touches 

their mouth, nose, or eyes, the virus is 

passed on. Those at risk of becoming 

infected with SARS include people age 

40 or older, especially those over 65, and 

people with other medical conditions 

or returning illnesses that weaken the 

immune system. Health care workers 

and family members of someone who 

is infected with SARS are also 

at risk. As one might expect, 

health care workers were 

most affected from the SARS 

epidemic in 2003.43

The first case of SARS 

was reported in the southern province of Guangdong, 

China in November 2002. 

The patient was a farmer who, 

despite being attended to at a 

local hospital, died soon after 

without a known cause of 

death. Suddenly, five people 

were reported dead in an 

outbreak of a flu type virus. 

While the Chinese government took initial action to 

prevent the spread of the 

infection, it did not notify 

the WHO of the “Atypical 

Pneumonia” outbreak until 

February 2003 when it 

became clear that it could 

not contain the epidemic. 

Even then, the information 

was vague. This unwillingness to cooperate with the international 

community ultimately meant delays in 

efforts to control the worldwide outbreak. 

In February, cases began appearing in Vietnam when an American 

businessman traveling from China was 

treated for pneumonia type symptoms 

in Hanoi and the medical staff assisting him developed the disease. Doctor 

Carlo Urbani at the hospital identified 

the unusual outbreak and informed the 

WHO and Vietnamese government. 

He too would later die from the disease 

after being exposed to it. The severity of the SARS symptoms and rapid 

infection of health care workers worried international health authorities of 

a new pneumonia epidemic. Thus, in 

March 2003, the WHO issued its first 

global alert about SARS. When a doctor 

treating the first affected people in Hong 

Kong stayed at a hotel in the Kowloon 

Peninsula, he infected 16 of the hotel 

visitors. The WHO later issued its first 

SARS-related travel advisory when cases 

were reported in Singapore, Canada, 

Hong Kong, and the United States as 

a result of those visitors traveling. The 

WHO coordinated international effort 

to identify and treat SARS. Experts from 

the Organization were even provided to 

assist the Chinese Ministry of Health in 

epidemiological and laboratory support 

upon request.

At the end of March, the Hong 

Kong Department of Health issued 

isolation orders for the Amoy Garden 

housing estate where 213 people had 

already been admitted to the hospital 

for SARS to prevent spread beyond the 

15,000 residents of the estate. In April, 

China began quarantining citizens with 

SARS to camps and resorts to further 

isolate the infection. Also in April, 

criticism in China and abroad emerged 

concerning the undercounting of SARS 

cases in hospitals. When cases would 

be identified as “probable” in Taiwan, 

cases in Shanghai would be identified as “suspected” and death cases 

due to SARS were reported as being 

due to other complications.44 Finally, 

under mounting pressure, Chinese officials allowed international 

officials to investigate the situation. 

It revealed an old healthcare system 

with bureaucracy and a lack of communication in an attempt to convince its citizens and the world that 

everything had been going smoothly. 

China finally decided to cooperate 

with the WHO and updated their 

total cases to 1190 with 46 deaths. On 

June 26, 2003, the WHO stated that 

“the global public health emergency 

caused by the sudden appearance and 

rapid spread of SARS is coming to an 

end.”45 Regrettably, the end came with 

a total of 774 deaths. 

In order to prevent sovereign 

nations from similarly hiding or 

masking the effects of an epidemic, the WHA adopted two 

resolutions on SARS and international 

law on infectious disease control at 

its 56th Annual Meeting.46 The SARS 

resolution advises WHO member 

states to take eleven courses of action 

to “enhance, support, and strengthen 

national, regional, and international 

efforts to address the SARS outbreak.”47

The resolution does not create new 

obligations, but simply recommends 

that WHO member states report SARS 

cases quickly and transparently. The 

resolution also requests the WHO 

Director-General take eleven steps to 

US AIRMAN PROVIDING VACCINE TO 

COLOMBIAN WOMAN AND CHILD
18 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

respond to SARS. Each request, like the 

request to “strengthen the functions 

of WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and 

Response Network,” falls into existing 

areas of WHO policy for disease control, 

meaning WHO powers have not really 

increased. 48

According to David Fidler, the IHR 

resolution also does not change existing 

international law by giving WHO more 

power and authority. The WHO Constitution states that WHA resolutions 

are not legally binding. For instance, 

the WHA can adopt treaties or IHR, but 

they only become binding international 

law when a WHO member state has 

agreed to be bound. The provision of 

the resolution to consider information 

attained from non-governmental sources 

and to check it using disease study principles had already been approved by the 

WHA.49 The WHO’s Global Outbreak 

Alert and Response Network had been 

using that technique since it was created 

in 1998. Unfortunately it seemed unacknowledged during its existence that 

while the network provided opportunities for greater surveillance, it also posed 

challenges to make sure government 

responses to outbreaks were appropriate. Likewise, the provision that recommends the Director-General collaborate 

with national authorities in evaluating 

a disease threat and amount of control 

measures as well as performing onthe-spot studies is approved by WHO 

policies. The resolution does not give the 

WHO power to send personnel into a 

country to investigate an outbreak without that country’s permission. As one 

WHO spokesman said, “any country has 

an ultimate veto over allowing a visitor 

entry; there’s no way around that.”50 The 

right to sovereignty, then, still poses a 

significant challenge to effective mitigation of disease spread. 

The request that the Director-General alert the international community 

of a serious public health threat arguably 

grants the WHO new political power. 

While WHO issued SARS related alerts 

throughout the outbreak, its authority to 

do so is not specifically stated in previous IHR or in the WHO Constitution. 

This does not seem to result, however, 

in drastic change of international law. 

The global alerts issued during the 

epidemic were met, so acceptance of this 

WHO capability was present before the 

resolution. Furthermore, WHO places 

the decision of how it will use its ability 

to issue alerts in the hands of WHO 

member states. According to the WHO 

Constitution, alerts may be issued “on 

the basis of criteria and procedures 

jointly developed with Member States.”51

Although the resolutions do not 

create international law that binds its 

member states, they do serve as examples of “soft law,” or non-binding norms, 

principles, and practices that influence state behavior.52 They encourage 

member states to cooperate with other 

countries and with WHO in disease 

surveillance and outbreak response. The 

WHO cannot enforce this duty but it is 

still politically powerful. One reason is 

because the SARS outbreak has proven 

that international cooperation is in a 

country’s self-interest. China suffered in 

public health as well as politically and 

economically because of its initial decision to not cooperate, and now serves 

as an example of what happens when 

a nation attempts to hide an outbreak 

or does not accept assistance. Another 

reason is that the WHO gained credibility in its response to the SARS outbreak 

among its member states. Coupled 

with new resolutions, the organization 

is leveraging its position to strengthen 

international infectious disease control.

HIV/AIDS

Acquired Immune Deficiency 

Syndrome (AIDS), a pandemic whose 

spread and adverse effects (often sickness and death) occur prevalently in, 

but are not limited to, fragile states and 

ungoverned spaces, has revealed how 

infectious disease can weaken and destabilize state governments.53 According to 

UNAIDS, there are 33.3 million people 

globally living with HIV, the AIDS 

causing virus, of whom 22.5 million are 

living in sub-Saharan Africa.54 As Dr. 

Peter Piot, former UNAIDS Executive 

Director, warns, “How can governments function, public services operate, 

agriculture and industry thrive, and law 

enforcement and militaries maintain 

security, when they are being stripped 

of able-bodied and skilled women and 

men.”55 Exacerbating the issue is that 

countries with poor governance tend to 

resist IHR with the intention to protect 

state and global populations because 

they appear to threaten their national 

sovereignty.56 AIDS, like the SARS and 

H5N1 viruses, emphasizes the importance of rising above the concept of 

sovereignty if global pandemics are to be 

effectively prevented or contained. 

AIDS is the potentially life-threatening final stage of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. The 

virus weakens the immune system by 

attacking helper T cells, which serve 

as the “main switch” for the immune 

response. By the time an HIV patient is 

diagnosed with AIDS, which can take 10 

or more years from the time of the HIV 

infection, the body has fought hard to 

defeat the virus, but is beginning to lose 

the battle. The immune system is crippled, giving disease-causing organisms 

that are common in the environment the 

opportunity to cause infection. When 

the helper T cells should be activated 

to fight the invader, the cell is activated 

instead by the viral RNA to become a 

virus factory for itself. The major modes 

of HIV transmission include unprotected sexual activity, intravenous drug 

use, and infected mother to the child 

before or during birth through the placenta.57 Given these modes of transmission, it does not come as a surprise as to 

why fragile and ungoverned states are 

most affected by HIV and AIDS. These 
Pandemic Interagency Response 19

states often lack the health education, 

training, and infrastructure needed for 

HIV and AID prevention and treatments.

The table above shows the regional 

HIV and AIDS statistics. While clearly a 

global issue, concern is easily diverted to 

underdeveloped and developing parts of 

the world. 

One of the leading organizations 

in combating HIV/AIDS is UNAIDS, 

a joint United Nations program that 

“leads and inspires the world in achieving universal access to HIV prevention, 

treatment, care and support.”58 As a 

UNAIDS Cosponsor, WHO is responsible for leading the response to HIV/

AIDS. WHO supports the development 

of national HIV/AIDS treatment and 

care programs while increasing HIV 

prevention and strengthening health 

systems.59 Many other organizations 

such as the NGO World Vision also aid 

in the fight against AIDS. The efforts of 

these organizations seem to be producing positive outcomes. From 2001 to 

2009, the rate of new HIV infections 

in 33 countries (22 of which were from 

sub-Saharan Africa) decreased by at 

least 25%. In 2009, services to prevent 

mother-to-child transmission of HIV 

exceeded 50% worldwide. Before the 

end of 2010, greater than 6 million 

people were placed on antiretroviral 

treatment, or drugs that slow the replication of HIV, in low and middle income 

countries.60

Despite these achievements, there 

are still many areas in which to improve. 

For every person who starts antiretroviral treatment, two people become 

newly infected with HIV. Furthermore, 

7,000 people a day become newly 

infected with HIV.61 According to 

UNAIDS, “weak national infrastructures, financing shortfalls and discrimination against vulnerable populations 

are among the factors that continue 

to impede access to HIV prevention, 

treatment, care and support services.”62 

Yet another issue is government 

ambivalence toward agencies providing 

assistance with HIV/AIDS programs 

and their own National AIDS Control 

Program.63 Sovereign nations need to 

embrace the epidemic as a real problem 

that deserves their attention and, in 

many cases, external help. 

H5N1

Another recent example of the 

challenges to current pandemic response 

policies was Indonesia’s refusal to 

share H5N1 (Avian Flu) samples with 

WHO in late 2006. Indonesia chose 

not to share influenza H5N1 samples 

with WHO for “risk assessment (e.g., 

surveillance) or risk management (e.g., 

vaccine development) purposes.”64

Adults & Children 

living with HIV

Adults & Children

newly infected

with HIV

Prevalance among 

adult population

Adult & child

Deaths due to 

Aids

Sub- Saharan Africa 22.5 million 1.8 Million 5.0% 1.3 Million

Middle East and North Africa 460,000 75,000 .02% 24,000

South and South-East Asia 4.1 Million 270,000 .03% 260,000

East Asia 770,000 82,000 0.1% 36,000

Central and South America 1.4 Million 92,000 0.5% 58,000

Caribbean

240,000 17,000 1.0% 12,000

Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.4 Million 130,000 .08% 76,000

Western and Central Europe 820,000 31,000 .02% 8500

North America 1.5 Million 70,000 .05% 26,000

Oceania 57,000 4500 .03% 1400

Total

33.3 Million 2.6 Million .08% 1.8 Million

REGIONAL HIV AND AIDS STATISTICS - 2009 
20 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

Indonesia’s decision was primarily concerned with the iniquities in the global 

vaccine system: developing countries 

cannot afford vaccines developed from 

samples that pharmaceutical companies 

freely obtain from the WHO-operated 

Global Influenza Surveillance Network 

(GISN).65 Indonesia’s concerns were 

reinforced by WHO’s acknowledgment 

that patents had been sought on modified versions of H5N1 samples shared 

through the GISN without the consent of the countries that supplied the 

samples. H5N1’s spread and the threat 

of pandemic influenza heightened this 

perceived inequality, as experts posited 

that developing countries would have 

minimal access to vaccine for pandemic 

influenza without substantial changes in 

global vaccine production and supply.66

The standoff showcases the difficulties posed by the current non-binding 

soft law policies related to cooperation 

on disease spread and fundamental 

problems extant in the global vaccine system. Essentially, Indonesia 

claimed that the samples are its sovereign property and do not constitute 

resources that other countries or the 

international organizations can access 

and use without Indonesia’s consent.67 

This claim directly contradicted the 

ethos and practice of sample sharing 

under which GISN had operated, which 

are based on accessing and analyzing influenza virus samples to inform 

development of interventions.68 Legally, 

Indonesia’s arguments were plausible, 

as WHO did not organize GISN under 

treaty law, so no states had treaty obligations to share samples. In addition, 

international law on infectious diseases 

applicable to Indonesia when this controversy began contained no obligations 

to share samples with WHO, as the 2005 

revision to the IHR had not yet taken 

effect.69

In addition to exploiting basic 

sovereignty principles of international 

law, Indonesia exploited international 

law under the Convention on Biological 

Diversity (CBD), which was developed 

to address biological diversity.70 The 

CBD recognizes that countries have 

sovereign control of biological resources 

found within their territories.71 It is 

unlikely that Indonesia would have been 

able to successfully withhold samples 

once the revised IHR took effect in May 

2007. However, a continued weakness of 

the IHR (and the current international 

approach to pandemic preparedness) 

is that is does not mandate that countries share infectious disease samples, 

only that states alert the WHO if public 

health incidents meet the decision 

criteria.72

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the significant threats the 

international community faces from 

diseases old and new, action must be 

taken to better secure the global community from the possible catastrophe 

of a world-wide pandemic. Two areas 

of focus are prominent: prevention 

and response. Before examining the 

areas from improvement, it is useful to 

investigate whether or not international 

organizations have been successful in 

the past in attempting to convince states 

to adopt international law to address 

multi-laterally threats to international 

security. 

Precedent for the creation of international laws by international organizations that motivate governments 

to adopt appropriate legal standards 

to address international issues can be 

found in the experiences of the United 

Nations Environment Programme 

(UNEP) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).73 In some 

cases, UNEP has served as an effective 

lawmaking platform for nations in areas 

related to the human and environmental health.74 By doing so, UNEP has 

significantly advanced the development 

of international law that is focused on 

local conditions and concerns.75 UNEP 

has identified a variety of innovative 

mechanisms for securing international 

agreement on environmental matters. 

By structuring its conventions with 

broadly framed international agreements combined with requirements for 

implementation through domestically 

based legislation, the organization has 

attracted the widest possible consensus.76

The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer to 

the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer provides a 

prime example.77 To slow the depletion 

of the ozone layer, UENP cultivated 

broad consensus among nations.78 

Under the Montreal protocol, ratifying 

nations are required to gradually reduce 

their consumption and production of 

particular ozone-depleting chemicals. It 

also states that member nations should 

establish domestic legislation and policies that conform to the convention.79 

Many governments established national 

legislation in conformity with the treaty, 

including the United States, Mexico, and 

twelve European nations.”80

The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) has also employed agreements that appeal to a broad base of 

nations, coupled with nationally crafted 

implementation measures, to secure 

adoption of international agreement on 

marine environmental matters.81 As a 

consequence of the 1989 Exxon Valdez 

oil spill, IMO convinced nations to take 

action on the grave threat posed by oil 

pollution, and encouraged adoption of 

the International Convention on Oil 

Pollution Preparedness, Response and 

Cooperation (OPRC).82 According to 

the convention, “Parties to the OPRC 

convention are required to establish 

measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.”83 In addition 

to wide-ranging measures for emergency 

international response, the treaty mandates that each nation institute its own 

national system for preparedness and 
Pandemic Interagency Response 21

response, including a national contingency plan.84 As of March 2011, 105 

states, including the United States, have 

signed the OPRC.85 

The success of UNEP and IMO 

illustrate that international organizations 

can have significant influence on developing international hard law. The OPRC 

serves as an excellent model for a global 

convention on pandemics, perhaps even 

titled “The International Convention on 

Pandemic Preparedness, Response and 

Cooperation” (ICPPRC). The convention would specify mandate that state 

parties take certain precautions against 

pandemic spread, establish mandatory reporting procedures, and make it 

incumbent upon developed state parties 

to aid lesser developed parties in dealing 

with pandemic outbreaks. The United 

States should sponsor and promote the 

adoption of such a convention through 

the mechanisms of the WHO and IHR, 

while emphasizing the multi-lateral 

nature of the convention.

The ICPPRC would reinforce the 

efforts of WHO’s already established 

Global Outbreak Alert and Response 

Network (GOARN). The stated primary 

aims of GOARN are to:

Assist countries with disease control 

efforts by ensuring rapid and appropriate technical support to affected 

populations, investigate and characterize events and assess risks of rapidly 

emerging epidemic disease threats, and 

support national outbreak preparedness 

by ensuring that responses contribute 

to sustained containment of epidemic 

threats.86

The ICPPRC would give GOARN 

more financial and technical resources 

to accomplish its objectives of better 

securing the global community against 

the threat of pandemics and mitigating 

their effects, as well as provide GOARN 

with better access to nation’s populations 

for study and research.

The first requirement of the convention would be to set aside an international pandemic emergency fund for 

use in case of a pandemic outbreak in 

a country that ratifies the convention. 

This fund would be used to provide 

vaccine research and production for the 

disease in question and medical care for 

infected persons. Release authority for 

funds would fall to GOARN, perhaps 

supplemented by a voting process for 

all ratifying nations. This fund would 

ensure GOARN and the WHO have 

resources ready to immediately put measures in place to minimize the effect of a 

pandemic outbreak.

Next, the convention would specify 

that WHO employees and GOARN 

members are allowed access to ratifying states’ populations for research 

and sample collection without needing 

permission from the state in question to 

enter the state’s territory. This requirement is intended to prevent future 

incidents similar to Indonesia’s refusal 

to share H5N1 samples with the WHO 

in 2006, which increase the likelihood 

of pandemic spread and decrease the 

international community’s ability to 

provide aid to affected states. (Indonesia’s issues with the global vaccine 

supply system are addressed later in this 

paper). However, WHO and GOARN 

would only be able to take samples with 

the assistance of domestic health care 

officials, to ensure proper treatment of 

infected persons and to notify the state 

of the occurrence.

Finally, the convention would 

strengthen WHO’s enforcement capabilities if ratifying countries choose not 

to comply with the convention. Reliance 

on the tradition adherence international laws like the OPRC and Montreal 

Protocol would be the primary basis 

for enforcing the ICPPRC. However, 

the convention should also include that 

language establishes measures for punishing ratifying states that do not comply 

with the convention. These measures 

might include denying states access to 

the international pandemic emergency 

fund, as well as denying access to scientific data related to pandemic prevention 

produced by WHO and GOARN.

The ICPPRC would constitute an 

enormous step in improving international preparedness and response 

capability for a pandemic, but the U.S. 

and global community must also address 

the global health system in order to 

effectively support the adoption and 

implementation of the ICPPRC. To 

begin to address the global health 

system, the global community—led by 

the U.S.—needs to accomplish two critical tasks. First, the U.S. must spearhead 

a program to ensure vaccines are more 

accessible to Third World countries and 

developing countries that are most vulnerable to pandemic disease spread and 

the ensuing social instability that can 

result from pandemic disease spread. 

A salient example of the international 

community’s failure to support developing countries with affordable and 

reliable vaccines is the H5N1 outbreak 

mentioned previously. Indonesia’s 

argued that the WHO’s handling of the 

development of H5N1 vaccines incident 

exposed inequities in the global influenza surveillance system.87 Developing 

countries provided information and 

virus samples to the WHO-operated 

system, pharmaceutical companies in 

industrialized countries then obtained 

free access to such samples, exploited 

them, and patented the resulting 

products, which the developing countries could not afford.88 A pandemic of 

global scale would place unprecedented 

demands on both international and 

With the current budget-cutting atmosphere in 

Washington D.C., it will be all too easy for pandemic 

preparedness to fall by the wayside.
22 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

The reactionary pattern of international law on infectious diseases can no 

longer be considered adequate among 

an international community at risk of 

disastrous pandemics from unknown, 

future repositories of virulent diseases. 

In other words, instead of creating law in 

response to an outbreak, states neglecting public health and failing to report 

disease events to authorities, and then 

more guidelines being recommended, 

states need to work multi-laterally with a 

strong organization defining and enforcing acceptable behavior. As Taylor notes, 

“Objective conditions of international 

life, as reflected by the rapid international spread of disease in general, and 

the HIV/AIDS pandemic in particular, 

evidence the ever-increasing urgency 

and inter-dependence of global health 

conditions. 

Taking steps to improve the international community’s pandemic preparedness will not be an easy task, especially 

as the world continues to recover from 

the 2007-2009 global recession. With the 

current budget-cutting atmosphere in 

Washington D.C., it will be all too easy 

for pandemic preparedness to fall by the 

wayside of national legislation. However, the stakes are high—the world can 

ill afford another global outbreak of disease on the scale of the 1918 influenza 

pandemic. The United States must step 

into its role as a global leader and meet 

the pandemic threat head-on before it 

strikes while the world is unprepared.

NOTES

1 Molly Billings, “The Influenza Pandemic of 

1918,” Human Virology at Stanford, 1997, <http://

virus.stanford.edu/uda/>.

2 Ibid, 2.

3 Jeffery Taubenberger and Ann Reid, “Initial 

Genetic Characterization of the 1918 “Spanish” 

Influenza Virus,” Science, 1997, <http://www.bi.ku.

dk/dna/course/papers/L2.taubenberger.pdf>.

national health officials and vaccine 

companies.89 “The planning effort will 

be more than a matter for experts in 

the fields of influenza virology, surveillance, and epidemiology; it must also 

involve experts in international politics, 

economics, and law.”90 As recommended 

by Dr. David Fedson, a global influenza 

vaccine fund “might be needed to facilitate multinational vaccine purchases 

and distribution, especially for countries 

with limited resources.”91 This fund 

could be implemented as part of the 

aforementioned international pandemic 

emergency fund, or as a separate fund 

that is constantly in use. The U.S. should 

take steps to improve the global vaccine supply system, making it equitable, 

affordable, and efficient.

Second, the U.S. and the international community must increase WHO 

funding to deal with basic healthcare 

needs and healthcare emergencies 

in failed states and developing countries. A prime example of the results of 

neglecting this issue is the international 

community’s lack of financial support 

for improving healthcare in Somalia.92 

According to WHO spokesperson Paul 

Garwood, “WHO had requested, in 

the 2010 Consolidated Appeals Process 

for Somalia, $46 million, of which only 

8 per cent have been funded so far.”93 

The WHO’s efforts in Somalia have 

resulted in millions of children receiving 

vaccinations and hundreds of medical staff receiving training in surgery 

and surveillance of disease outbreaks. 

However, the WHO is preparing to 

reduce these activities due to inadequate 

financial support, even as reported 

cholera cases continue to rise and the 

risk of more outbreaks is very high.94 

This is exactly the situation the United 

States and the international community 

cannot allow to occur. In the case of 

Somalia, the absence of a functioning 

government has led to piracy that has 

adversely affected international shipping, as 219 attacks on ships occurred in 

2010.95 Economic losses due to Somali 

piracy are estimated at between $3 and 

$5 billion since the pirates began their 

attacks in the mid 2000’s.96 Additionally, the failed Somali state stands as a 

fertile training and recruitment area 

for extremist Islamic groups. The U.S. 

and the international community must 

ensure that WHO has sufficient funding 

to increase basic health care services in 

developing countries, especially those 

that teeter on the border of becoming 

failed states.

CONCLUSION

International coordination for the 

prevention and response of major infectious disease outbreaks is insufficient 

under current WHO and IHR capacities. 

In order to address national sovereignty, 

primarily “soft law” IHR, and failed/

fragile state challenges to effective 

international policy, a global convention 

on pandemics called “The International 

Convention on Pandemic Preparedness, Response and Cooperation” should 

be established. This convention will 

strengthen GOARN in disease surveillance, enforce and strengthen IHR 

among ratifying countries, as well as 

ensure the U.S. takes the lead in making 

vaccines and funding for basic healthcare services and healthcare emergencies 

readily available to vulnerable developing states. Cronin speaks to the importance of the latter:

Countries beset by poor governance and low levels of state capacity 

have failed in today’s world to contain 

and manage the spread of a contagion 

and mitigate its economic and political toll. The data here are compelling: 

75 percent of epidemics during the last 

three decades have occurred in countries where war, conflict, and prolonged 

political violence have crippled their 

capacity to respond, leaving their neighbors and the world vulnerable. (Cronin 

105-106).97
Pandemic Interagency Response 23

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. 

6 Flu.gov, Pandemic Planning Assumptions, 

<http://www.pandemicflu.gov/professional/pandplan.html>.

7 A L Taylor, “Making the WHO Work: A Legal 

Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health,” American Journal of Law and 

Medicine, 1992, 12-13.

8 Ibid, 35.

9 U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. and World Population Clocks,” 9 May 2011, <http://www.census.gov/

main /www /popclock.html>.

10 World Health Organization, Constitution of 

the World Health Organization (New York, 22 July 

1946), 1, <http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/

EN/constitution-en.pdf>.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid, 1-18.

13 Ibid, 2.

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid, 5.

16 Ibid, 6.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid, 8.

19 Ibid, 8-9.

20 Ibid, 9

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, 10.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Taylor, 12-13.

26 Ibid, 13.

27 Ibid.

28 World Health Organization, “What are the 

International Health Regulations?,” 10 April 2008, 

<http://www. who.int/features/qa/39/en/index.

html>.

29 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations 2005, 2nd Ed., 

1, <http://whqlibdoc.who .int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf>.

30 Ibid, 1.

31 World Health Organization, “What are the 

International Health Regulations?”

32 World Health Organization, “Key Step Forward on International Health Rules”, Press Release, 

28 May 2003, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/

news/releases/2003/prwha7/en/index.html>.

33 World Health Organization, IHR Brief No. 

2: Notification and other reporting requirements 

under the IHR (2005), <http://www.who.int/ihr/

ihr_brief_no_2_en.pdf>.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid, 1.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid, 2.

39 Taylor, 7.

40 Patrick M. Cronin, ed. America’s Security 

Role in a Changing World (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, 2009), 106.

41 “Basic Information about SARS,” Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, <http://www.cdc.

gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm>.

42 Rob Stein, “WHO Gets Wider Powers to 

Fight Global Health Threats,” Washington Post, 

23 May 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/articles/A46356-2003May27.html>.

43 “SARS.” UCLA LOSH. <http://www.losh.

ucla.edu/losh/resources-publications/ fact-sheets/

sars_english.pdf>.

44 “SARS Epidemiology,” SARSReference, 

<http://www.sarsreference.com/ sarsref/epidem.

htm>. 

45 “SARS Outbreak,” Gartner, <http://www.

gartner.com/pages/ story.php.id.3557.s.8.jsp>.

46 World Health Assembly, Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), WHA56.29, May 

28, 2003.

47 David Fidler, “Developments involving SARS, 

International Law, and Infectious Disease Control 

at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World Health 

Assembly,” The American Society of International 

Law Insights. <http://www.asil.org/insigh108.

cfm>.

48 Ibid.

49 World Health Assembly, GlobaHealth Security: Epidemic Alert and Response, WHA54.14, 

May 21, 2001.

50 World Health Organization, “Key Step Forward on International Health Rules.” 

51 David Fidler, “Developments involving 

SARS, International Law, and Infectious Disease 

Control at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World 

Health Assembly,” The American Society of 

International Law Insights, <http://www.asil.org/

insigh108.cfm>.

52 Ibid.

53 Cronin, 106.

54 “2009 AIDS Epidemic Update,” UNAIDS, 

<http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/epidemiology/2009 aidsepidemicupdate/>.

55 Harley Felbaum, Kelley Lee, and Preeti Patel, 

“The National Security Implications of HIV/

AIDS,” plosmedicine, <http://www.plosmedicine.

org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.

pmed.0030171>.

56 Cronin, 106.

57 Judith Goodenough and Betty McGuire, Biology of Humans, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Pearson, 

2010), 373.

58 “Strategy Goals by 2015,” UNAIDS, <http://

www.unaids.org/en/strategygoalsby2015/>.

59 “WHO,” UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/

en/aboutunaids/unaidscosponsors/who/>.

60 “UN Secretary-General outlines new 

recommendations to reach 2015 goals for AIDS 

response,” UNADIS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/

media/unaids/contentassets/documents/pressrelease/2011/ 20110331_PR_S Greport_en.pdf>.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.
24 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

63 Hartwig, Eng, Daniel, Ricketts, and Quinn, 

“AIDS and “shared sovereignty” in Tanzania from 

1987 to 2000: a case study,” pubmed, <http://www.

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15652692>.

64 David Fidler, “Influenza Virus Samples, 

International Law, and Global Health Diplomacy,” 

Emerging Infectious Diseases, Jan. 2008, <http://

www.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/1/88.htm#1>. 

65 Ibid. 

66 David Fedson, “Pandemic Influenza and 

the Global Vaccine Supply”, Clinical Infectious 

Diseases, June 2003. http://web.ebscohost.com/

ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=c9a151c1-

8d30-4b7a-950e-ec7a7d2cfc1c%40 

sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=15.

67 Fidler, “Influenza Virus Samples.”

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 United Nations. Convention on Biological 

Diversity, UN Treaty Series, 1993, <http://www.

cbd.int /convention/>.

71 Ibid.

72 World Health Organization, “IHR Brief No. 2. 

73 Taylor, 33.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Peter Sand, “Lessons learned in global 

environmental governance,” Boston College 

Environmental Affairs Law Review, Winter 

1991, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/

detail?vid=5&hid=15&sid=c9a151c1-8d30-4b7a950e-ec7a7d2cfc1c%40sessionmgr10&bdata=Jn

NpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h

&AN=9611080791>. 

77 Taylor, 33.

78 Ibid, 34.

79 United Nations Environmental Programme, 

“Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 7th Edition, 

2006.

80 Taylor, 33.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 International Maritime Organization, “International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Coooperation (OPRC), 30 Nov 

1990, <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/

ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Oil-Pollution-Preparedness,-Responseand-Co-operation-(OPRC).aspx>, 

84 Taylor, 34.

85 International Maritime Organization, “Status 

of Conventions”, <http://www.imo.org/About/

Conventions/ StatusOfConventions /Documents/

status-x.xls>.

86 WHO. “Global Outbreak Alert and Response 

Network-GOARN,” <http://www.who.int/csr/outbreak network/goarnenglish.pdf>. 

87 Fidler, “Influenza Virus Samples.”

88 Ibid.

89 Fedson. 

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 UN News Centre, “Funding Shortage could 

force UN health agency to curtail activities in 

Somalia,” 26 Mar. 2010, <http://www.un.org/

apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34211&Cr=somal

i&Cr1>.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 “At Sea,” The Economist, 3 February 2011, <http://www.economist.com/

node/18070160?story_id= 18070160>. 

96 Ibid.

97 Cronin, 105-106.

98 Talyor, 35.
Africom & China 25

T

he African continent provides 

an interesting case study for the 

future application of American 

power. Gone are the days of large-scale 

American invasions of third world countries like Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, 

American power is shifting toward more 

diplomatic and economic pressuring and 

posturing. Africa is currently the proving ground for this quasi-application, 

and the recent creation of U.S. Africa 

Command is the legitimization of this 

new approach. In the post-Cold War 

world, world powers must come up with 

real solutions to problems in the third 

world, rather than sweeping them under 

the rug for what may seem to be the 

greater good. The emerging economic 

importance of several African nations 

must be nurtured and welcomed, but 

also watched closely. Threats to these 

developing economies (and democracies, in some cases) include terrorism, 

humanitarian crises, and influence from 

a possibly mal-intentioned China. U.S. 

AFRICOM faces these challenges on 

a daily basis, and must expand its role 

on the continent to ensure political and 

economic stability in support of US 

policy.

Formation and Current

Operations of AFRICOM

On 6 February 2007, President 

George W. Bush formally announced 

his decision to create a Unified Combatant Command for Africa called U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM).1 US 

interest in Africa is largely a product 

of two factors: the end of the Cold War 

and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. For the most part, US 

involvement in Africa grew only after 

both of these events had occurred. In 

fact, in the decade between the Soviet 

Union’s collapse and the beginning of 

the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 

there were only 20 military operations 

on the African continent. Department 

of Defense war planners publicly stated 

that the United States “had very little 

traditional strategic interest in Africa,” 

and ranked the continent last in the 

Clinton Administration’s 1998 inventory 

of “Integrated Regional Approaches” 

to US security.2

 Perhaps the American 

strategic assessment of Africa in the 

1990’s was distorted by what might be 

the only American military intervention well known to the public: the “Black 

Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, 

Somalia in 1993. Along with the 1991 

Gulf War, the Battle of Mogadishu was a 

first conflict of the information age, and 

combatant commanders were given little 

chance to take risks, lest the American 

public think their sons would soon go 

off to fight another Vietnam. For this 

reason, American policymakers found 

it easier to ignore the African continent 

than to intervene in humanitarian situations, with the 1994 Rwandan genocide standing as the most obvious and 

terrible example of the consequences of 

non-intervention.

In the intervening years between 

the end of American military action in 

Africa and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 

threats to American security were 

allowed to fester in Eastern and Northern Africa. Osama bin Laden himself 

found refuge in Sudan after leaving his 

home country of Saudi Arabia. Bin 

Laden spent five years in Khartoum 

growing Al Qaeda into a beast capable 

of lashing out at the west. His organization proved its capabilities with the twin 

bombings of US Embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania, and a former associate 

once testified in American court that bin 

Laden “was busy training terrorists and 

even trying to buy material for a nuclear 

bomb.”3

 After 9/11, the US was forced to 

reevaluate its assessment of Africa as a 

strategic non-factor and created AFRICOM.

From its inception, AFRICOM has 

faced an identity crisis. Its mandate is 

to promote American interests through 

military, diplomatic, and economic 

means. The command’s mission statement reads: “AFRICOM, in concert 

with other U.S. government agencies 

and international partners, conducts 

sustained security engagement through 

military-to-military programs, militarysponsored activities, and other military 

operations as directed to promote a 

stable and secure African environment 

in support of U.S. foreign policy.4

AFRICOM reflects the security 

threats American leaders perceive, and 

Using AFRICOM to Counter

China’s Aggressive African Policies

DREW PETRY

Cadet Drew Petry is an Aeronautical 

Engineering major in the Class of 

2012. 
26 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

shows the need to prevent Africa from 

becoming a haven for international 

terrorist organizations. Barkely writes 

that “Extreme poverty, ethno-religious 

divisions, corrupt and weak governance, 

failed states, and large tracts of ‘ungoverned space’ combine to offer what many 

experts believe to be fertile breeding 

grounds for transnational Islamist 

terror.”5

 AFRICOM’s dual nature is 

exposed upon an examination of U.S. 

economic interests on the continent. 

As of 2006, U.S. imports of African oil 

reached 921 million barrels, just under 

20 percent of total U.S. consumption; 

this figure surpassed oil imports from 

the Middle East, meaning Africa is the 

largest source for U.S. oil outside the 

American continents. Additionally, U.S. 

imports from Africa grew by 51 percent 

since 2000, while imports from the 

Middle East fell by about five percent.6

 

The third prong of AFRICOM’s mission, 

humanitarian aid and development, is 

the most complex. AFRICOM is the 

first American military command to 

heavily include other U.S. government 

agencies in the DoD planning process. 

In addition to a non-traditional military 

role, part of AFRICOM’s identity crisis 

comes as a result of its piecemeal construction. AFRICOM took chunks of 

U.S. European Command, U.S. Central 

Command, and U.S. Pacific Command 

and combined them into one operation 

covering all of Africa except Egypt. The 

need for reorganization was highlighted 

after conflicts emerged on the ‘seam’ 

between EUCOM and CENTCOM, 

especially in the Darfur region along the 

Sudan/Chad border. Over time, African crises required more and more of 

EUCOM’s resources. In 2006, General 

James Jones testified before Congress 

that EUCOM’s staff spent more than half 

its time on Africa issues, up from almost 

none in 2003.7

The map below8 shows a graphical 

depiction of the territory each combatant command gave up to create AFRICOM. 

The map opposite9

 shows Africa 

with depictions of each nation’s struggle 

with nourishment and water supply, 

which provides context for some of the 

challenges facing AFRICOM and its 

governmental partners. The map does 

not show areas of political or armed 

conflict, but there is often a correlation 

between resource shortages and instability. The Horn of Africa is a particularly 

challenging region because it faces both 

severe water stress and high undernourishment, in additon to a lack of governance.

 AFRICOM relies on a very small 

staff to face these challenges. Its 

component commands include elements from the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marines, and it also hosts special 

operations forces. “Its staff of 2,000 

includes no regular troops, no ‘triggerpullers,’ unlike its sibling CENTCOM, 

which oversees Iraq and Afghanistan.”10 

Another feature which distinguishes 

AFRICOM from typical combatant 

commands is the lack of permanent 

U.S. bases within the command’s area 

of responsibility. AFRICOM is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and 

maintains no permanent bases on the 

African continent. The closest it comes 

to a permanent base is the installation at 

Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which is the 

leased home of the Combined Joint Task 

Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 

a force inherited from CENTCOM 

designed to carry out “political, military, 

and economic activities—particularly in 

Ethiopia and Kenya—aimed at combating terrorism and strengthening the 

capacity of regional governments and 

the well-being of their populations.”11 

Until Operation Odyssey Dawn, the 

designation of NATO’s intervention 

in Libya, which commenced in March 

2011, CJTF-HOA was AFRICOM’s only 

lasting military involvement on the 

continent. CJTF-HOA has successfully 

prevented al Qaeda and other terrorist 

networks from gaining a feared foothold 

in the Horn of Africa, mainly through 

civic action programs and similar stability operations.12 This means that U.S. 

power in Africa is centered on the Horn 

of Africa, especially Sudan, Somalia, and 

neighboring countries.

Chinese Involvement in Africa

China, with its burgeoning economy and seemingly insatiable thirst for 

raw material, is aggressively expanding into African countries with rich 

energy and mineral resources. In order 

to understand China’s current involvement in the region it is first important 

to understand the recent drivers of 

China’s engagement on the continent. 

In the 1960s, Beijing began to distance 

itself from its pro-Soviet policies and 

instead opted for a so-called ‘three 

worlds’ approach, which recognizes the 

importance of the developing world in 

international affairs.13 Mao identified 

China as a developing country in the 

third world and described Africa as an 

important player in the struggle against 

imperialism, but did not invest heavily 

in an economic partnership between the 

two regions. Perhaps Mao held on to 

AFRICOM
Africom & China 27

the ancient belief that China should be 

self-sufficient and avoid importing items 

which it could manufacture or mine 

itself.

This philosophy changed in the late 

1970’s when Deng Xiaoping “set China 

on a gradualist road of capitalist-oriented development that produced three 

decades of near 

double-digit growth 

and a rise in living 

standards that has 

brought a ninefold increase in per 

capita income to 

$1,700 in 2005,” and 

reduced the number 

of people living in 

poverty in China 

from “280 million in 1978 to 140 

million in 2004.”14 

China’s economy 

continues to grow: 

The International 

Energy Agency 

expects China’s oil 

imports to triple by 

2030. The world 

has likely never 

seen such an explosive growth rate 

sustained for such a 

long period of time. 

“Chinese demand 

for raw materials of 

all sorts is growing so fast and creating such a bonanza for farmers, miners 

and oilmen that phrases such as “bull 

market” or “cyclical expansion” do not 

seem to do it justice. Instead, bankers 

have coined a new word: supercycle.”15

Increased Chinese involvement in 

Africa is in part designed to counter 

western dominance. At the 2003 China 

Africa Cooperation Forum held in 

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Chinese Premier 

Wen Jiabao said China continues to 

invest in Africa in part because “Hegemony is raising its ugly head.”16 This 

position resonates well with some African leaders who dislike the strings which 

are often attached to American aid. One 

Nigerian businessman says “The US 

will talk to you about governance, about 

efficiency, about security, about the environment. The Chinese just ask: ‘How do 

we procure this license?’”17 Additionally, 

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe 

says “China provides a new alternative 

direction...the foundation of a new 

global paradigm.”18 These two statements are not representative of thinking 

shared by all African leaders, but they do 

explain how easily China has been able 

to expand its role on the continent.

China’s first major investment in 

African energy came in 1996 when the 

China National Petroleum Corporation 

invested in Sudan’s oil fields. Today, 

Sudan supplies ten percent of China’s 

oil requirements. In the years since this 

initial investment, Chinese corporations have expanded their reach into 

more oil-rich countries. As a result, 31 

percent of China’s oil requirements come 

from Africa, with expansion coming 

soon after China buys large oil fields 

in Nigeria’s delta region.19 The ChinaAfrica economic relationship is now 

quite large. There 

are over 800 Chinese 

companies doing 

business in 49 African 

countries, and trade 

between China and 

Africa has skyrocketed from $10 billion 

in 2000 to $50 billion 

just six years later.20 

Trade between China 

and Africa is depicted 

on the following page, 

and demonstrates the 

growth since initial 

Chinese investments 

of the early 1990s. It 

is important to note 

that about half of the 

trade relationship 

comes from Chinese 

exports to Africa. 

Many of the items 

African countries 

import from China 

are simple manufactured goods, while a 

growing proportion 

includes tech products such as televisions and computers. In total, about $15 

billion of the goods African countries 

import from China are from manufacturing or machinery and transportation 

sectors.21

Also depicted on the next page is a 

by-country breakdown of the amount 

of Chinese investment going into 

Africa. The red or darker shaded states 

show that China is not focusing on one 

specific region, or solely on oil producing nations. China is concerned with 

its long term trade relationship with the 

DEGREE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT AND WATER STRESS IN AFRICA
28 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

continent, and investing in many countries buys political capital while simultaneously undercutting the West’s ability 

to create the hegemony Premier Jiabao 

spoke of at the 2003 Economic Forum.

A byproduct of China’s long term 

trade goals is that Chinese enclaves are 

showing up in African cities. The pioneer generation of immigrants is establishing what is known as a bridgehead, 

just as Chinese miners and railroad 

workers did in 19th century California. 

Once the bridgehead is established, 

workers will begin to recruit family 

members to join the growing business 

opportunities in their adopted home. 

With up to 50,000 Chinese nationals 

already living in countries like Nigeria, 

the bridgehead is clearly established and 

reports “indicate that a strong prevalence for family recruiting is already 

underway.”24

There is little doubt that China’s 

increased economic presence on 

the continent benefits Africa’s poor. 

According to analysts working for the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development (OECD), the “intensified aid and trade links with China have 

resulted in higher economic growth 

rates, better trade terms, increased 

export volumes, and higher public revenues. This is far from saying ‘all is well,’ 

but any quality of life improvement in 

some of these nations is to be preferred 

over the status quo.”25

China has paired increased investment with increased political influence 

in Africa. Some scholars believe that 

China is attempting to portray itself as 

an alternative political and economic 

model compared to the West. The best 

example of China’s desired future role in 

African politics is seen by its willingness 

to finance the design and construction 

of the African Union’s new headquarters 

building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a 

cost of $150 million26 (depicted on the 

opposite page).27 

Some African leaders view successful Chinese involvement in Africa as a 

sign that Western political and economic 

models will not work on their continent. 

They are impressed by China’s ability 

to lift 400 million of its citizens out of 

poverty and improve the quality of life 

for its remaining citizens, all in the span 

of 20 years. This economic development 

sans democracy warrants concern for 

the West and for AFRICOM. Western 

leaders must be aware of the risk of African countries choosing political stability and economic progress over human 

rights and democracy.28

AFRICOM’s Strategic Response to 

Increased Chinese Presence

AFRICOM must convince the 

people of Africa that political and 

economic progress is possible even with 

high standards for human rights and 

democracy. Winning the hearts and 

minds of average Africans by convincing them that America is a force for 

good which offers stability and security 

CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA IN 2005

CHINA’S TRADE WITH AFRICA
Africom & China 29

is the best way of ensuring victory over 

Chinese influence as well as extremist 

groups such as al Qaeda. The best way 

to win hearts and minds is to enable 

Africans to improve their own lives. 

One action designed to win hearts and 

minds was a two-ship cruise of US Navy 

ships through West Africa which took 

place in 2008. During the cruise, the 

ships stopped in seven countries along 

the oil-rich 

Gulf of Guinea 

and “came 

ashore to 

mend roads, 

renovate 

schools and 

health clinics, 

bring medical supplies 

and provide 

free health 

care,” as well as 

military training to host 

nation security 

forces.29 A 

Naval officer 

in charge of 

the cruise stated 

that he saw certain strengths about AFRICOM’s operation, including a change in mindset from 

“‘We’re going to take the beach’ to ‘we’re 

going to deliver supplies to the beach.’”30 

This sense of cooperation and willingness to shift from a war mindset to one 

of civil-military cooperation is critical to 

AFRICOM’s success in the future. This 

mission, dubbed the Africa Partnership Station, represents the first effort to 

reach out to energy-rich African nations 

fearful of increased U.S. military presence in the region.

More hope for success in convincing Africans to turn simultaneously 

towards democracy and economic 

growth comes from Nigerian Senate 

President Ken Nnamani. In a welcome 

address for Chinese President Hu Jintao 

in April 2006, Nnamani stated that “no 

nation can sustain economic development in the long run without democracy.”31 AFRICOM leadership must take 

advantage of this homegrown African 

realization and use it to stem the Chinese influence rolling through Africa. 

In order to be seen as a legitimate 

force, AFRICOM must tell the truth 

and say that its economic intentions in 

Africa are not entirely pure. America is 

obviously attempting to wean itself from 

oil imported from unstable regions such 

as the Middle East. Being open about 

this fact allows American policymakers 

to portray American-African partnerships as win-win situations. AFRICOM’s attempt at building goodwill in 

oil-rich countries on the Gulf of Guinea 

back in 2008 provides an example of this 

forthrightness:

“We wouldn’t be here if it wasn’t 

in [American] interests,” acknowledges 

Commodore Nowell. Despite the talk 

of soft power and the much-vaunted 

humanitarian aspect of the naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea, the real 

emphasis is still on security. It is plainly 

in America’s interest to help African 

navies and armies to stop thefts of crude 

oil, illegal fishing and immigration, drug 

trafficking and piracy. All these hurt 

local economies, undermine political 

stability and threaten to turn poor countries into failed states, such as Somalia, 

that may breed terrorism.32

Since at least the 1990’s, the spread 

of democracy has been seen as a conflict 

management strategy. The advent of a 

command dedicated to establishing 

stability in Africa 

shows that the 

US Government 

recognizes that 

“sustained stability 

depends in part on 

Africa’s economic 

development, which 

requires attention 

to the processes of 

conflict management and effective 

governance.”33 

Understanding 

the importance of 

democracy to economic success provides a roadmap for 

AFRICOM’s future, 

and is especially important in light of the 

so called “Arab Spring” or Awakening 

taking place across North Africa. There 

is perhaps no purer form of democracy 

than for the people to directly overthrow and remake a government the 

way they see fit. AFRICOM should 

observe how these countries choose to 

remake themselves, and must do its best 

to insert as much American goodwill as 

possible. With good fortune, countries 

such as South Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and 

others will turn wholeheartedly towards 

democracy and prove China wrong: 

that economic success and western-style 

democracy are not mutually exclusive 

but rather are complementary.

DESIGN OF NEW AFRICAN UNION BUILDING
30 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

Conclusion

Integrating Africa into the global 

economy is a necessary step in the 

march toward stability throughout the 

continent. Economic “reform is one of 

the most critical priorities if Africa is to 

grow and become more fully integrated 

into the global economy.”34 The United 

States must expand AFRICOM’s role 

in order to provide it with the ability to 

foster goodwill, represent American economic interests, and support emerging 

democracies. AFRICOM’s role should 

be expanded militarily to shut down al 

Qaeda, diplomatically to anchor military 

opinions, and economically to provide 

aid and training to African countries. 

One measure of AFRICOM’s success will 

be its ability to manage crises effectively 

without overreacting. As one Department of Defense official put it, the U.S. 

Government can consider AFRICOM a 

success “if it keeps American troops out 

of Africa for the next 50 years.”35 

NOTES

1 Russell L. Barkely, AFRICOM: Security, Development, and Humanitarian Functions (New York: 

NOVA Science Publishers, 2009), 4.

2 Ibid, 6.

3 Andrew Harding, Bin Laden’s Sudan 

Links Remain, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

africa/1559624.stm>.

4 About US Africa Command, <http://www.

africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>.

5 Barkely, 7.

6 Patrick M. Cronin, Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing 

World (NDU Press: Washington, D.C., 2009), 322.

7

Barkely, 54.

8

“About US Africa Command,” <http://www.

africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>.

9 Patrick M. Cronin, Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing 

World (NDU Press: Washington, D.C., 2009), 329.

10A Light Footprint: The Pentagon’s Unusual 

African Arm, <http://www.economist.com/

node/18561821>.

11 Cronin, 311.

12 Cronin, 314.

13Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: An 

Introduction (Routledge, New York, 2009), 132.

14Chris Alden, China in Africa (Zed Books: 

New York, 2007), 10.

15The New Colonialists: China’s Hunger for 

Natural Resources, <http://www.economist.com/

node/10853534>.

16 Alden,16

17 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, China’s 

Expansion Into the Western Hemisphere (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2008), 

224.

18 Ibid, 224.

19 Alden, 12.

20 Ibid, 14.

21 Ibid, 19.

22 Adam Blenford, China in Africa: Developing 

Ties, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7086777.

stm>.

23 Ibid.

24 Robert I. Rotberg, China Into Africa: Trade, 

Aid, and Influence (Brookings Institute Press: 

Washington, D.C., 2008), 287.

25 Eric C. Anderson, China Restored (Praeger: 

Denver, 2010), 59.

26 Blenford.

27 Ibid.

28 Rotberg, 287.

29 Americans Go A-Wooing: The Pentagon Courts Governments in Africa, Especially 

Where There’s Oil, <http://www.economist.com/

node/11021220?story_id=11021220>.

30 Ibid.

31 Rotberg, 289.

32 Americans.

33 Lieber, 217.

34 Princeton N. Lyman and Patricia Dorff, 

Beyond Humanitarianism: What You Need to 

Know About Africa and Why it Matters (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2007), 

210.

35 Barkely, 59.

South Sudan’s Independence From Sudan Recognized by African Union

(online at: http://www.au.int/)

15 August 2011 – “This is a historic day for South Sudan and for the African Continent as well.” With these words Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union, warmly 

welcomed General Sallva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, at the 

African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 

An enthusiastic South Sudanese Delegation celebrated its admission to the African 

Union. Dr Ping announced that the AU Member States had promptly accepted South 

Sudan as the 54th Member. Moreover, he expressed his wish to see the two Sudan’s working 

“towards ensuring lasting peace and stability.” Speaking of a “crucial moment” for the Republic of South Sudan, Mr Ping mentioned the pending organization of an African Solidarity 

Conference on Post- Conflict Reconstruction and Development for Sudan “with the view to 

mobilizing support for the new nation, from within and outside Africa.”

In his statement General Salva Kiir Mayardit declared that his country had already 

ended hostilities in the “longest civil war in Africa” and chosen “freedom, justice and 

equality” as key words for the future. He also promised to “do everything possible to realize 

a smooth and successful transition”, living in peace with the “brothers and sisters” of the 

Republic of Sudan, and to take the Declaration of Independence of South Sudan “as the 

beginning of a new struggle.”
The Libyan Dilemma 31

thaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, 

Byzantines, Arabs, or Italians, Libyan 

territory has been subjected to foreign 

rule for the majority of its history. Libya 

did not become an internationally 

recognized independent nation until 24 

December 1951—and then only because 

the United Nations declared in 1949 

that Libya should be independent. As an 

independent state, Libya has spent the 

majority of its history under the rule of 

Muammar Gaddafi, who came to power 

by a military coup on 1 September 1969. 

 Since then, Gaddafi has led Libya 

towards his unique vision of a socialist, Islamist utopian state. Moreover, 

Gaddafi’s dreams extended beyond the 

borders of Libya. He sought first to unify 

the Arab states, and also proposed a 

unification of Africa into what could be 

called the United States of Africa.1

 However, despite his considerable effort and 

craft towards these ends, they were never 

achieved, and he is now fighting to hold 

on to his position of power as rebellion 

inspired by the ongoing “Arab Spring” 

movements in Tunisia and Egypt seek to 

remove the Libyan dictator. 

The history of United States’ relations with Gaddafi is in itself complex—

understandable only within its historical 

context. Gaddafi came to power in the 

middle of the Cold War. While Gaddafi identified himself neither with the 

United States’ or Soviet Union ideologically, choosing instead to form his 

unique brand of government, he came 

into economic partnership with the 

Soviet Union, even purchasing Soviet 

Arms to use in his war against Chad.2

Thus, from the beginning, the relationship between him and the United States 

was uneasy. 

Gaddafi’s support of international 

terrorism only made matters worse. 

Gaddafi was generally opposed to the 

West and the role that it played in 

the international arena. He pursued 

personal political objectives against the 

West through acts of terrorism. The 

bombing of a nightclub in West Berlin-

-targeting American GIs in attendance, 

and the bombing of a French Airliner-

-UTA (Union des Transports Aériens) 

flight 772 were responses of Gaddafi 

to the United States’ and France’s 

attempts to take down his regime.3

Most famously, the Lockerbie bombing 

of U.S. carrier Pan Am Flight 103 over 

U.S. Policy and the Libyan Dilemma

PAUL SIKKEMA

I

n the past few months, Egypt, 

Libya, and other North African 

and Middle Eastern states have 

come into the spotlight in international 

politics. Seemingly contagious social 

uprisings demanding government 

overhaul are springing up with the hope 

of bringing about the process of democratization. The African continent may be 

experiencing the beginning of a pivotal 

stage in its history, and the importance 

of how the United States handles this 

transformation cannot be underestimated. Renewed and revitalized African 

governments offer the United States 

a chance to renew and revitalize its 

relationship with these governments, 

which in some cases, is a much needed 

renewal.

Today, Libya offers the United 

States one of the most complex set of 

conditions to which diplomats have to 

respond. In order to fully appreciate the 

complexity and potential at stake, a short 

summary of the history of U.S.-Libya 

relations is in order, including the role 

of Muammar Gaddafi in this relationship. Next, the potential of the region 

will be discussed, and why it should be 

so important to the United States. Lastly, 

the author will address how the United 

States ought to treat the current situation in Libya. 

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Libya has rarely had the opportunity to be its own independent entity. 

Whether it was by the Phoenicians, CarCadet Paul Sikkema is a Legal 

Studies major/Spanish minor in the 

Class of 2012.

Half of the Libyan population 

is under the age of 25.

This is a powerful 

demographic that Gaddafi 

simply ignored.
32 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December 

1988 marked the high point of Gaddafisponsored terrorism against the West.4

However, in the past decade, Gaddafi has made significant steps towards 

mending relationships with the West. In 

July 2007, Libya released five Bulgarian 

nurses and a Palestinian doctor who had 

been wrongfully convicted of infecting 

400 children in Benghazi with the HIV 

virus. This release marked the resolution 

of a long-standing point of contempt 

between Gaddafi and the European 

Union. More importantly, in 2003 

Gaddafi decided to dismantle 

his WMD programs, denounce 

terrorism, and sign international 

non-proliferation treaties. Since 

that time, Gaddafi had been 

significantly more cooperative with the West, and up until 

the recent revolution, had even 

taken a prominent role in the 

UN Security Council, and hosted 

African Union, Arab League, and 

Arab-African summits. Gaddafi 

even made a first ever visit to the 

United States in 2009 to deliver 

a speech at the United Nations 

General Assembly.5 It is somewhat ironic that Gaddafi’s reign 

over Libya could end when political ties between Libya and the United 

States were at their strongest. 

While Gaddafi’s image may have 

been improving in terms of international 

diplomatic relations, popular resentment 

of his regime has only grown worse in 

the past few years. In February 2011, a 

breaking point was reached. The catalyst 

for revolt was the recent popular revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia--and, to be 

sure, many of the same factors that led 

to uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia were 

also present in Libya. 

REASONS FOR

REVOLUTION IN LIBYA

Despite Gaddafi’s efforts to build a 

socialist state, distribution of wealth has 

remained far less than equal. Libya has 

gained a vast amount of wealth from its 

petroleum resources, even becoming 

the world’s 12th largest exporter of oil.6

 

And, to be sure, Libya does have one of 

the strongest economies in Africa. However, Libya is deemed a rentier state--

one which receives its primary source 

of income by renting out its national 

resources rather than producing wealth 

domestically. Thus, the wealth gained 

from oil is distributed only to the elite, 

leaving the majority of the Libyan population in poverty.7

Among this poor segment of the 

population are the youth and young 

adults. Half of the Libyan population is 

under the age of 25.8 This is a powerful demographic that Gaddafi simply 

ignored. However, it is precisely this 

demographic that is inciting protest and 

rebellion, demanding its share of the 

country’s relatively vast oil wealth. 

Extreme rates of unemployment 

have also led to a drastic increase of 

economic refugees. Prior to the recent 

revolts, unemployment rates reached 

above 20%. Because of the high rates 

of unemployment, more than 33,000 

families were driven to live in slums and 

shacks, unable to provide themselves 

with stable incomes.9 Another contributing factor to the potential overthrow 

of Gaddafi’s regime is that he has, like 

most dictators, generally disregarded 

concern for human rights. Opposition 

of his government or his policies was 

simply not tolerated. Many of the laws 

Gaddafi implemented were repressive in 

nature. Law 73 of 1973 outlawed dissent 

from the government--explicitly denying Libyans the freedom of expression.10

Law 20 of 1991 demanded the execution 

of any member of society whose continued existence would lead to the dissolution of Libyan society (one can 

assume that this law was interpreted loosely). Furthermore, the 

“Code of Honor” of March 1997 

allowed the Libyan government 

to collectively punish organizations, families, even whole towns 

and municipalities for the wrongdoings of an individual. Clearly, 

there are no checks on Gaddafi’s 

government’s legislative power, 

and Gaddafi has used this power 

to abuse the human rights of his 

people. 

Such arbitrary legislation has 

given Gaddafi title to pursue and 

neutralize political threats. The 

Libyan dictator has a history of 

ordering the assassination of dissidents. 

This form of political terrorization and 

control has extended beyond Libyan 

boundaries even onto United States’ 

soil with the assassination attempt by 

a Libyan agent upon Faisal Zagallai, a 

political dissident and doctoral student 

at the University of Colorado in 1980.

Gaddafi has extended his political 

suppression by claiming complete control of the Libyan media and press. Prior 

to the revolution, all news, whether 

in newspapers or on television, was 

controlled by the government. Gaddafi 

has understood the power that the press 

yields and seized that source of power to 

serve his ends. He televised the executions of political dissidents nationally, 
The Libyan Dilemma 33

virtually frightening his people into 

obedient submission.11 However, his 

excessive policies, in the end, only contributed fuel to fire the revolt. 

The role of technology and communication in the current revolution 

is not to be underestimated. Despite 

Gaddafi’s control over news and media, 

protestors were able to find their voices 

by means of social networking sites of 

the 21st Century. Those in favor of toppling Gaddafi’s regime and creating a 

new and reformed government in Libya 

formed their own group on Facebook. 

This group, as of this writing, has well 

above 130,000 members, and is growing.12 Protestors have used this site to 

post videos, cartoons, discussions, and 

generally comment on the inadequacy of 

the current Libyan government and the 

need for reform. Access can be granted 

to this revolutionary nexus by any smart 

phone or computer with internet--quite 

a prolific source of communication for 

any group acting under the radar of 

government control. Oddly enough, 

Mark Zuckerberg (creator and founder 

of Facebook.com) may have become 

one of the most significant contributors 

to government and cultural revolution 

in Libya and the rest of Africa and the 

Middle East. Indeed, the Arab Spring 

may become known as the Facebook 

revolution.

The importance of this technology 

was quickly recognized by Gaddafi, who 

promptly prohibited the use of internet in Libya. This drastic measure was 

implemented to prevent both the ability 

of Libyan protestors to further organize 

their revolt and the ability of the outside 

world to see what exactly was going on 

inside of Libya. However, blocking use of 

the internet was not entirely successful, 

and videos are still emerging from the 

chaos within Libyan borders--including 

one video of the remains of government 

officials who were allegedly burned to 

death after refusing to obey Gaddafi’s 

orders.13

Another notable factor that likely 

contributed to the recent revolt against 

Gaddafi’s regime is his age. Gaddafi has 

been in control of Libya for more than 

41 years, but has no obvious successor. Gaddafi has said that his son Saif 

al-Islam will succeed him; however, 

Gaddafi is careful not to show his son 

support for taking on his supposed 

upcoming presidency, leaving a feeling of doubt regarding Gaddafi’s true 

intentions for succession.14 This could 

likely leave the state in a violent power 

struggle after his death or removal. It 

is worth noting that Egypt’s former 

president, Mubarak, was similarly situated before being driven from office by 

Egyptian revolutionaries.15

What began as protests in February 

2011 has descended into all-out civil war 

between Gaddafi’s loyalist forces and the 

revolutionaries. Fighting continues to 

rage across Libya as of this writing. The 

revolutionaries in Libya are fighting for 

a more liberal democratic form of government. A leader of the revolutionary 

forces and potential future king of Libya, 

Muhammad El-Senussi, has promised 

to pursue whatever form of government 

the people of Libya seek, to include a 

constitutional democracy.16 

While NATO has decided to intervene using airpower against Ghadafi’s 

forces and enforcing a UN established 

no-fly zone, intervention as of this writing remains limited, with U.S. involvement being underplayed by the media. 

The civil war in Libya has brought many 

challenges that the international community will have to address. Traditionally, the United States plays a central role 

in the treatment of any global crisis, so 

an analysis of what concerns are at stake 

is first necessary before any evaluation of 

national policy can be formulated. 

CONCERNS AND

QUESTIONS FOR THE 

UNITED STATES

The first concern is the humanitarian aid needed for the thousands 

seeking safety in neighboring countries. 

Huddled masses have found their way 

to Libyan border regions, hoping to find 

respite from the violence of the civil war. 

An estimated 180,000 people are fleeing 

from Libya either as Libyan citizens 

who are now refugees, or as immigrant 

workers hoping to be repatriated to their 

countries of origin. This vast numbers of 

people at the borders, however, have created a logistical nightmare. How can this 

exodus be accommodated? International 

aid is already being provided--German 

aid ships returned Egyptian nationals from Libya, the British government 

chartered flights to move European 

refugees from Tunisia, and the World 

Food Program pledged $38.7 million 

to assist refugees, while the European 

Union pledged another $42 million for 

the same.17 

The second problem is significantly 

more nuanced. To what extent should 

the international community, and the 

United States in particular, be involved 

in the overthrow of Gaddafi and the 

institution of a new form of government? The United States has already 

been engaged in regime changes and 

national restructuring both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In these instances, the 

United States has taken the lead role 

to replace former governments. Thus, 

the vast economic burden of rebuilding 

these states has fallen squarely on the 

shoulders of the American taxpayers. 

To be sure, rebuilding nations halfway 

around the world by use of expeditionary military forces is costly--especially 

Protestors were able to

find their voices by means 

of social networking sites 

of the 21st Century.
34 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

after ten plus years of engagement in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. 

It is safe to say that the United States 

should not wish to undergo yet another 

global operation to overthrow Gaddafi’s 

government and attempt to create in its 

place another liberal democracy. For 

one, the economic crisis that the United 

States is experiencing could not permit 

another full-fledged operation. More to 

the point, though, American interests 

in the region are not even close to what 

its interests were in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

The United States, then, must evaluate 

its interests in the region and formulate 

the best course of action to address the 

situation in Libya in a way that is agreeable in the international arena while 

simultaneously acting within the context 

of its interests. 

REGIONAL INTERESTS

So, what are the interests of the 

United States in Libya? There are both 

economic and political interests at stake-

-the more pressing of which is the latter.

United States economic interests in 

the region are, at present, marginal. The 

U.S. purchases less than three percent 

of Libya’s export of oil, so oil is not the 

major concern. However, the price of 

oil is affected by the civil war in Libya, 

which initially rose slightly above $100 

per barrel as violence erupted against 

Ghadafi, and this burden was relayed to 

Americans and others at the pump.18 

Before dismissing Libya as a region 

without significant economic interest 

to the United States, one should first 

consider the potential economic benefits 

of Libya being under a more liberal and 

just form of government. As was mentioned earlier, Libya is a rentier state.19

Its greatest source of wealth is from its 

oil reserves. However, this wealth is kept 

only by the elite who can benefit from 

renting out access to these resources. 

This resulted in the vast amount of poverty for the masses despite Libya’s wealth 

of resources. This is the inequality that 

revolutionary forces in Libya are fighting 

to abolish. If they are successful in overthrowing Gaddafi’s regime and establishing a government that is accountable to 

the people, then Libya’s oil wealth could 

trickle down to the masses, and in turn 

enlarging and strengthening the middleclass.

A middle-class is an essential ingredient for a boom of economic growth 

and development of a stable democracy. 

Money reaching a new middle-class 

would stimulate a consumption of 

goods, which, in turn, would lead to 

further economic growth, allowing for 

pay raises and creating job opportunities to remedy the high unemployment 

rate in Libya. As the middle class is able 

to generate more and more income, the 

economy grows. This is precisely what 

is happening in India.20 If Libya can 

turn itself into an economic asset to the 

global market, nations will be scrambling to take advantage of the opportunities in Libya--the United States 

included. 

In fact, the United States has 

already exhibited interest in strengthening economic ties in North Africa. The 

North African Partnership for Economic 

Opportunity (NAPEO) was established 

in order to fully investigate just how 

much economic opportunity lies in the 

North African region and how to take 

advantage of that opportunity. Through 

this organization, entrepreneurs from 

the United States and Libya have already 

been talking and working together to 

create economic opportunities and 

growth in both the public and private 

sectors.21 Initiative for taking advantage 

of economic opportunities in Libya 

has already been begun, but with the 

possibility of restructuring the Libyan 

government (and, thus, economy) to 

one that allows for a stronger and more 

influential middle class, the opportunity in Libya becomes exponentially 

greater. This opportunity should not be 

overlooked by United States policy, and 

ought to factor into overall U.S. analysis 

of national interests in the region. 

However, the U.S. should also 

consider Libya as a potential ally in the 

region. Libya, having close ties to both 

the African and Arab communities, 

would be an extremely beneficial ally 

for the U.S. Generally, the United States 

does not enjoy a very healthy rapport 

with many Arab states. Most relationships are based upon the U.S. appetite 

for oil. While it may be a stretch, the 

ongoing revolution in Libya could be 

viewed as a potential turning point for 

U.S.-Arab relations. 

On 6 April 2011, the Arab League 

hosted an “Arab-West Dialogue Forum” 

in its headquarters in Cairo. This forum 

was held in recognition of the extraordinary events occurring in the region, 

including the revolutions in Tunisia, 

Egypt, and Libya. Speakers at this forum 

advocated a rejuvenation of Arab relations with the West. These revolutions 

have given the West the opportunity 

to see a more humanized and relatable 

version of the Arab world. That is to 

say, the people of the Arab world also 

seek the traditionally Western ideals of 

democracy and recognition of human 

rights. Thus, Libya presents, not only an 

economic opportunity, but a political 

and diplomatic one as well. Speakers at 

the “Arab-West Dialogue Forum” hoped 

that the circumstances in Tunisia, Egypt, 

and Libya could spark a new epoch in 

their relations with the West. U.S. policy 

should reflect this hope as well.22

U.S. purchases less than

three percent of Libya’s 

export of oil...

However, the price of oil is 

affected by the civil war

in Libya.
The Libyan Dilemma 35

A PROPER RESPONSE

The best way for the United States to 

contribute to the stability (and hopefully 

the subsequent economic prosperity) 

of Libya is very much a “less is more” 

approach. Military intervention will 

only further the contempt of the ArabAfrican world for the West, viewing the 

U.S. as puppeteers of their leaders and 

acting recklessly and unapologetically in 

pursuit of national interests (a contempt 

dating back to the age of European colonialism in Africa). However, the United 

States does have interests in the area and 

would be acting prudently to pursue 

the realization of the potential of those 

interests. 

First, military action by the United 

States should should remain at a minimum. Cynicism towards United States 

military operations is already a problem 

in the Arab world. The U.S. has already 

assumed a backseat role in the establishment of the no-fly zone over Libya, but 

the sensitivity of Western military action 

is still evident. The Arab League and 

rebel forces in Libya have both pleaded 

for military intervention in the form of 

a no-fly zone, and this plea for Western 

assistance makes military intervention 

that much more politically palatable. 

However, Gaddafi was quick to skew this 

reality to fit his agenda, claiming that 

military involvement by Western powers 

would allow them to “take control of 

Libya and to steal their oil.”23 The Arab 

League, though supporting the enforcement of a no-fly zone, criticized the 

implementation when it expanded to 

include the bombing of ground targets. 

While the destruction of these targets 

benefitted the mission of the no-fly 

zone, the Arab League claimed that this 

action was killing more civilians rather 

than protecting them. Clearly, military 

intervention is very sensitive. The best 

way for the United States and NATO to 

respond to this situation is to cooperate with the Arab League as much as 

possible. This will go a long way toward 

changing the perception of the United 

States by Arab League member states.24

However, though limited military action in the form of airpower is 

underway, what must remain under 

consideration is that, in order for the 

United States to realize the vast potential 

in Libya, Gaddafi must fall from power. 

In order to gain an ally in North Africa 

and a potential strong tie to the Arab 

League, the revolutionary forces must 

succeed in their overthrow of the Libyan 

strongman. If Gaddafi is able to somehow put down the revolutionary forces, 

the subsequent violence and bloodshed 

involved in the likely killing and persecution of anti-Gaddafi forces would be 

egregious, and the brutal dictator would 

remain in power, likely seeking to return 

to a past of sponsoring international 

terror and the proliferation of WMD.

Second, the bulk of the United 

States’ financial commitment to Libya 

should be geared towards humanitarian support for refugees. While greater 

military involvement remains a risky 

political endeavor, humanitarian aid to 

refugees is a politically safe way to take 

action and contribute where it is most 

needed. The “logistical nightmare” of the 

exodus of the refugees from Libya is a 

problem that the United States can and 

must continue to address, for, in many 

cases, the lives of the refugees depend 

upon it.25

In order to pursue the economic 

potential in Libya, efforts should be 

made to strengthen economic ties to 

the region--essentially expanding upon 

the work already begun by NAPEO. The 

economic potential in Libya ought to 

be tapped by American and European 

businessmen, and U.S. policy ought to 

encourage whatever possible to facilitate this process. American agriculture 

companies have the technological 

capacity to transform Libya’s nascent 

farming industry. With the help of the 

United States, Libya could stop having to 

import food (it currently imports 75% 

of its agricultural needs26). Encouraging economic ties between American 

agriculture and Libya as well as investment by the American and European 

corporate (and perhaps governments) to 

build infrastructure necessary to support 

a rejuvenated agriculture and consumer 

industry will go a long way in restoring, 

Libya’s economy and weaning it from 

rentier state status. Moreover, it will do 

much to improve relations between the 

United States, Libya, and the Middle 

East.

The most important aspect of 

United States policy for the revolution in 

Libya is to simply view it as an opportunity to strengthen relations and gain 

credibility with the Arab League. The 

best way to achieve this is to cooperate with the the Arab League in efforts 

to remove Gaddafi and rebuild Libya. 

This relationship would allow for some 

much-needed growth of American influence and political clout in a turbulent 

region. 

The worst thing that the United 

States could do at present would be to 

assume a leadership role. Not only can 

the U.S. not afford to do so in economic 

terms, but exploits in Iraq and Afghanistan have been controversial in the 

region and economically draining in 

domestic terms. Democracy is spreading 

organically in Libya and elsewhere in the 

region, greatly assisted by social media 

and networking. Perhaps the United 

States--if truly interested in the spread 

of democracy--should do nothing more 

than invest in the spread of commuPerhaps the United States--

if truly interested in the 

spread of democracy--

should do nothing more 

than invest in the spread of 

communication technology 

and social media
36 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

nication technology and social media 

to those areas where human rights 

are being violated and the hopes of 

democracy remain stillborn. The United 

States, NATO, or even the United 

Nations cannot afford to intervene in 

every instance of human rights violations around the globe. The greatest 

contribution is to empower the voice 

of those oppressed. Social networking 

and improved means of communication 

and organization are proven methods 

for popular empowerment, and thus, 

modern communication tools may hold 

the key to the spread of liberal democracy.

CONCLUSION

The turning of the tide in Libya 

presents an opportunity for U.S. 

policymakers that cannot be ignored. 

American relations with much of Africa 

and the Middle East are tense, and Libya 

could hold a key to revitalizing those 

relationships, even strengthening the 

NATO partnership. Developing fragile 

and failed states is the greatest challenge 

that the international community will 

have to face in the coming years.27 Given 

its current momentum, Libya provides a 

prime opportunity for the United States, 

NATO, the UN and EU to pull millions 

of people out of poverty and give them 

the political voice that they deserve. 

There is also much room for political 

and economic gain in the region. The 

iron is hot. The question ought to be, 

not if, but how the U.S. and international community might facilitate the 

process.

NOTES 

1 “Libya.” U.S. Department of State, 17 Nov. 

2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.

htm>

2 Ibid.

3 David Meyers, “Libya: A Triumphant Gaddafi 

Will Use Terrorism to Retaliate against America 

and the World.” The Daily Caller, 18 Mar 2011, 

<http://dailycaller.com/2011/03/18/a-triumphantgaddafi-will-use-terrorism-to-retaliate-againstamerica-and-the-world/>

4 Michael Evans, “Colonel Gaddafi Was ‘greatest, State-sponsored Terror Threat of 1980s’ - 

Times Online.” The Times: UK News, World News 

and Opinion, 5 Oct 2009, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6860875.ece>

5 “Libya.” U.S. Department of State.

6 Robert Plummer, “BBC News - Libya’s Oil 

Wealth Not Trickling down,” BBC – Homepage, 

21 Feb 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12523038>

7 Raymond Gilpin, “Oil and Turmoil in 

Libya.” United States Institute of Peace, 10 Mar 

2011, <http://www.usip.org/publications/oil-andturmoil-in-libya>

8 Plummer, 21 Feb 2011.

9 “Libya’s Jobless Rate at 20.7 Percent: Report 

Reuters,” Reuters.com, 2 Mar 2009, <http://

af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE521

06820090302?pageNumber=2>

10 “UNDP-POGAR: Country Themes,” UNDPPOGAR: Home, <http://www.pogar.org/countries/

theme.aspx?cid=10>

11 Ibid.

12 Libyan rebel Facebook site online at <http://

www.facebook.com/17022011libya>

13 Spencer Ackerman, “Desperate Gaddafi 

Bombs Protesters, Blocks Internet,” Wired.co.uk, 

(Wired UK), 22 Feb 2011, <http://www.wired.

co.uk/news/archive/2011-02/22/libya-gaddafibombs-protestors>

14 Patrick M. Cronin, America’s Security Role in 

a Changing World, University Press, 2009, 307.

15 Ibid.

16 John W. Miller “Libyan Prince: I’m Ready to 

Be King,” Real Time Brussels – WSJ Blogs, WSJ, 20 

Apr 2011.

17 Scott Sayare and Alan Cowell. “Libyan Refugee Crisis Called a ‘Logistical Nightmare,’”  New 

York Times, 3 Mar 2011, <http://www.nytimes.

com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04refugee.html>

18 Gilpin.

19 Ibid.

20 Rachna Saxena, “The Middle Class in India,” 

Deutsche Bank Research, 15 Feb. 2010, <http://

www.usip.org/publications/oil-and-turmoil-inlibya>

21 “Libya.” U.S. Department of State.

22 Arab-West Dialogue Forum Opens at Arab 

League in Cairo,” <http://www.newspusher.com/

EN/post/1302174601-2/EN-/arab-west-dialogueforum-opens-at-arab-league-in-cairo.html>

23 Tom Pfeiffer, “Libyan Rebels Urge No-fly 

Zone to Stop Death Toll,” Reuters, Reuters.

co.uk. 9 Mar 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/

article/2011/03/09/uk-libya-east-nofly-idUKTRE72820R20110309>

24 “Arab League Criticizes Libya No-Fly 

Zone Implementation,” 20 Mar 2011, <http://

www.voanews.com/english/news/Russia-andChina-Lead-Opposition-to-Air-Assault-onLibya----118324124.html>

25 Sayare and Cowell.

26 “Libya.” U.S. Department of State.

27 Cronin, 458.

Those who deny freedom 

to others deserve it not for 

themselves.

-- Abraham Lincoln
Book Review 37

Book Review

DYING TO WIN: The Strategic Logic

of Suicide Terrorism

BY ROBERT PAPE

REVIEWED BY JOHN LOVVORN

In his book, Dying to Win: The 

Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 

Robert Pape argues against the typical 

media stereotype of the suicide bomber 

as a crazed religious fanatic. By using a 

database of all recorded suicide terrorist attacks since their beginnings in the 

early 1980s, Pape claims that suicide 

terrorists are not the disgruntled, brainwashed Muslim youth that Americans 

typically think of, but actually come 

from the middle levels of society and 

can be of any religion or nationality. 

He also asserts that the vast majority 

of suicide attacks (96% as of the end 

of 2003)1

 are not individual attacks by 

fanatics but are part of a larger campaign 

targeting specific, political objectives. 

Pape’s thesis is that suicide terrorism 

campaigns are created when 1) a group’s 

traditional homeland is militarily occupied by a foreign power, 2) the foreign 

power is a democracy, and 3) the group 

enjoys support from the local community sustained by a religious difference 

between the occupier and the occupied 

society.2

 Pape believes that religion plays 

an important role in suicide terrorism, 

but that it is not a specific religion that 

leads to suicide terrorism, simply the 

difference in religion between occupied 

and occupier increases the effectiveness of the act as well as the ability to 

recruit suicide terrorists.3

 A breakdown 

of Pape’s thesis will further explain the 

individual aspects of his argument and 

show where U.S. foreign policy can act 

to counter this deadly tactic.

First, the definition of occupation 

must be explained. The term ‘occupation’ 

as used by many terrorist groups is different from the one commonly accepted. 

An occupation does not have to be 

direct military control of a government 

but can simply be a military presence 

based in the country that the terrorists 

believe coerces the government to make 

decisions othewise going against the will 

of the leadership or populace. Military 

and economic aid can also be viewed as 

occupation, especially if foreign troops 

are stationed nearby, if it comes with 

stipulations that the government must 

change certain policies. Any controlling of another country’s government 

by means that involve the military is 

termed “occupation” by terrorist groups 

and is grounds for resistance and, in 

more extreme cases, suicide bombing 

campaigns.4

Of the 301 suicide terrorist attacks 

from 1980 to 2003 that occurred as part 

of an organized terrorist campaign, all of 

them were aimed at the removal of a foreign occupier from a particular group’s 

homeland: Hezbollah wanted to remove 

Israel from southern Lebanon; the Tamil 

Tigers wanted an end to Sri Lankan 

control of Tamil; the Sikhs wanted to 

remove the Indian presence in Punjab; 

Hamas wants Israel to give up territory 

in Palestine; the Kurds want Turkey to 

provide sovereignty to Kurdistan; 

the Chechens want Russia to leave 

Chechnya; and al-Qaeda is angered by 

U.S. presence in Islamic lands, specifically Saudi Arabia.5

 All of these groups 

have resorted to suicide terrorism in 

an effort to achieve the political goal 

of independence for their homelands. 

These groups lack the military strength 

to challenge the occupiers conventionally, so they, as many other groups 

throughout history and in all parts of 

the world, have resorted to guerilla-style 

fighting and terrorist campaigns in an 

attempt to overcome occupiers by asymmetric means. However, these groups, 

unlike most resistance and terrorist 

groups throughout history, eventually 

resorted to suicide terror because they 

saw it as the best means to remove a 

democratic occupier and had the necesCadet John Lovvorn is a Military 

& Strategic Studies/Middle East 

Studies double major/Arabic 

minor in the Class of 2012.

the vast majority of suicide 

attacks are not individual 

attacks by fanatics but are 

part of a larger campaign 

targeting specific, political 

objectives. 
38 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

sary religious motivation and community support to follow through.

Resistance groups tend to resort 

to suicide terrorism when the country 

occupying their homeland is a democracy because democracies have proven 

to be susceptible to pressure from their 

citizens to change policy. 

Since 1980, the target country of 

every suicide terrorism campaign has 

been a democracy; Turkey, the U.S., 

France, India, Sri Lanka, Israel, and 

Russia were all defined as democratic 

when they became targets of suicide 

terror campaigns.6

 Terrorists target 

democracies because they perceive them 

as weak, not in terms of military power-

-terrorists know they cannot match their 

occupier in conventional strength. The 

“weakness” of democracies comes from 

the low tolerance to violence expressed 

by citizens of a democracy, whether 

this results from direct attacks upon the 

homeland, or measured by lives of soldiers lost; the influence of citizenry upon 

politics and state policy can result in 

withdrawal from what might be labeled 

unfortunate adventures abroad.7

 Terrorists believe that if they can inflict enough 

cost on the citizens of a democracy, the 

citizens will change the government or 

its policies, thus resulting in the withdrawal of the occupying army from the 

territory the terrorists claim to defend. 

In order for terrorists to have a 

continuous flow of volunteers for suicide 

bombing missions, and in order to 

be able to promise the designation of 

“martyr” to those who volunteer, the 

terrorist group carrying out a suicide 

campaign must have the support of the 

local community. Suicide campaigns are 

costly to terrorists in terms of members, so they must be able to recruit 

from the local community to replace 

martyrs. Also, only the community 

can truly grant someone the title of 

“martyr” and honor their sacrifice with 

statues, pictures, speeches, etc., so the 

terrorist group must have the support 

of the community in order to remove 

the cultural taboo against suicide and 

proclaim the attackers as martyrs or 

heroes.8 To do this, the terrorists must 

harden the boundaries between the 

occupiers and the occupied and solidify 

the “us versus them” mentality. Religious differences are most convincing to 

create an us versus them mentality. In 

the Middle East, an obvious metaphor 

is the religious crusade--which references an unjust past where land and 

resources were extracted from their 

rightful owners and passed to occupiers 

of another religious faith and culture, 

thereby threatening the existence of the 

displaced society.

Osama bin Laden and other prominent extremist leaders used the idea 

of a religious crusade against Islam to 

incite violence against the U.S. In one of 

his videos in February 2003, bin Laden 

claimed, “One of the most important 

objectives of the new Crusader attack 

[in 2003] is to pave the way and prepare 

the region after its fragmentation, for 

the establishment of what is known 

as ‘the Greater State of Israel,’ whose 

borders will include extensive areas of 

Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, all 

of Palestine and large parts of the Land 

of the Two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia].”9

Such a perceived, projected loss of territory, resources, and especially culture 

enables Al Qaeda to scare Islamic societies into believing they will lose the right 

to determine their own future. Arguing 

against the loss of self-determination is 

what terrorists use to escalate the conflict to a level where society accepts acts 

of suicide and mass-murder as martyrdom and just killing.10 Capitalizing on a 

religious difference to create the fear of 

losing self-determination within a community provides terrorist groups with 

the support they need to launch their 

suicidal campaigns.

Pape believes that the best way for 

the U.S. to be victorious over the suicide 

terrorists is to return to a policy of 

“offshore balancing” in the Middle East. 

He argues that if U.S. troops are completely removed from all Middle East 

countries as soon as possible, the feeling 

of occupation in the region will dramatically decrease and the rationale labeling 

America as the enemy becomes stillborn--suicide bomber volunteers will, in 

turn, decrease. He also asserts that in the 

long run, America should reduce its reliance on foreign oil, eventually becoming 

totally energy independent, so that the 

U.S. will have little to no involvement in 

the Middle East.11

Pape’s proposed strategy, while it 

aims at what he identifies as the heart of 

the problem: occupation, is not practical and would not solve the terrorism 

dilemma. First, an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Middle 

East could lead to disaster and chaos, 

especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Leaving troops, even in small numbers 

after the major ongoing drawdowns are 

complete, until the climate is completely 

stable could take years, which would not 

be timely enough for Pape’s solution. 

Second, if an all-out withdrawal was 

possible and accomplished in a timely 

manner, the presence of U.S. forces 

offshore, “balancing” the region would 

still be grounds to consider the region 

under the influence of occupation by Al 

Qaeda’s standard of measurement. In 

fact, this could increase terrorist recruiting from communities that currently 

are friendly to the U.S. because it could 

then be argued that the entire region is 

under military occupation from offshore 

rather than just those states where U.S. 

Terrorists target democracies 

because they perceive them 

as weak...

The “weakness” of 

democracies comes from the 

low tolerance to violence.
Book Review 39

troops currently reside. The U.S. would 

progress from “occupying” a few Middle 

Eastern countries where troops are on 

the ground, to occupying the entire 

region with forces floating offshore. 

Terror groups would seek to sell the 

same old arguments to the local communities, as occupation and coercion 

of the region, claiming invasion awaited 

any country that did not bow to American interests. Though Pape is trying to 

target the root cause of suicide terrorism, his solution would only exacerbate 

the problem in the Middle East, because 

complete disengagement in the era of 

globalization is impractical.

Based on Pape’s thesis, there are 

two areas that U.S. foreign policy can 

address to undermine the conditions he 

believes are necessary for suicide terrorism. Obviously, America will not stop 

being a democracy, nor will it give up its 

interests, which are now global. The U.S. 

also cannot completely remove its troops 

from Iraq, Afghanistan, or especially the 

Gulf region without increasing security 

risks therein. For example, even if the 

U.S. became independent of Mideast oil, 

the world economy of the 21st century 

will continue to be driven by oil for the 

foreseeable future. The U.S. has a role in 

protecting sea lanes and Gulf oil flow, 

both of which will require a continued 

offshore and shore-based presence. 

However, America can minimize its 

troop deployments/presence as intended 

by the current drawdown policy in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, project an atmosphere 

of aiding local government actions and 

decisions rather than those conforming 

to American ideals and influence. This 

would dispel the feeling of occupation 

more thoroughly than American forces 

simply waiting offshore. Moreover, Arab 

governments who receive aid from 

the U.S. with policy stipulations are 

also seen as occupied by America. It is 

imperative that America make every 

effort to remove the feeling of occupation from Middle Eastern communities 

by becoming more culturally aware in all 

its interactions with the Middle East.

The other condition for terrorism 

that the U.S. can work to erode is the terrorists’ community support. In the short 

term, the U.S. cannot change its image of 

being a predominantly Christian nation, 

nor should it do so. But it can project 

an image of tolerance by advertising the 

success and freedoms of Muslims and 

other non-Christian groups living in the 

U.S. America must clearly demonstrate 

and advertise that it is not on a “crusade” 

against Islam or Arab culture if it is to 

erode the community that continues to 

support the terrorist groups.

Local communities will not support 

suicide bombings and mass murder if 

they believe that America has the communities’ best interests in mind.12 To 

foster this kind of relationship, the U.S. 

must ensure that all military members 

and political aides have at least a basic 

level of cultural understanding. 

 Pape’s thesis counters the traditional 

belief that crazed religious extremists 

are behind suicide terror and that such 

actions cannot be deterred. The real 

cause stems from foreign occupation. 

This assertion is certainly correct and his 

book is a worthwhile read in following the logic of this argument. Though 

his data readily supports his claim, his 

solution aimed primarily at offshore 

balancing seems impractical in the globalized world and still leaves open the 

strong likelyhood of terrorists rationalizing the offshore presence as continued 

occupation. Though Pape is correct that 

the U.S. must work to create a counterterror strategy that is not perceived as 

an attack upon Islam, nor an effort to 

kill more terrorists than are produced, 

because such policies are doomed to 

failure; the real key, which he seems to 

overlook, is to reduce the appearance of 

occupation and the differences between 

“us” and “them” while still encouraging 

cooperation and negotiation that accompany nation-building efforts. If the U.S. 

can manage its international image and 

demonstrate its ideals, thereby expending more efforts to win “hearts and 

minds,” it will do much to curb community support for suicide terror and eliminate mainstream terrorist sympathy, all 

the while minimizing troop footprints 

and working in partnership with subject 

states to build successful societies. 

Abandonment to offshore is not the best 

solution.

NOTES

1 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic 

Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 

House, 2005), 15.

2 Ibid, 126.

3 Ibid, 87.

4 Ibid, 46.

5 Ibid, 21, 43.

6 Ibid, 45.

7 Ibid, 44.

8 Ibid, 81-82.

9 Quoted in Ibid, 121.

10 Ibid, 92-94.

11 Ibid, 237-250.

12 Ibid, 153.

The only sure weapon against 

bad ideas is better ideas.

-- Alred Whitney Griswold
40 Airman Scholar • Fall 2011

In his book, Africa Doesn’t Matter: 

How the West Has Failed the Poorest 

Continent and What We Can Do About 

It, Giles Bolton, a former European aid 

worker in both Kenya and Rwanda, 

attempts to answer the questions that 

surround “the West’s” current foreign 

aid predicament: where is all that money 

going and why isn’t it helping Africa? He 

also explains why Africa has not mattered to the West and why it should now. 

Through his recount of facts and 

stories that depict the reality of the 

African continent, Bolton gives advice to 

Western governments, large aid corporations, and the average individual 

about how to bring about change. His 

main point for readers to take home is 

his proposed set of “politically feasible” 

solutions to problems of managing aid, 

trade, and globalization in favor of poor 

countries. Bolton suggests that the West 

needs to restructure its African aid 

system, not just due to a sense of moral 

obligation, but also as a matter of Western self-interest.

Bolton likes to place his readers into 

a recurring scenario: being the leader of 

a fictitious African nation. Bolton gives 

the reader his/her own African country – Uzima - and paints a clear picture 

of both the qualitative and quantitative 

issues and demands that would come 

with the average conditions of such a 

country. For example, he purports that 

even with a well-intentioned, uncorrupt government, underinvestment and 

poverty would still prevail and keep 

Africa in an ongoing trap. Bolton is not 

saying that corruption does not exist or 

that it is not a factor in this vicious cycle, 

but that corruption is not the primary 

problem and bringing about the end of 

corruption would not result in the solution. Like this common African misconception, Bolton walks readers through 

an extensive list of myths and ideas for 

quick solutions to show both their ineffectiveness and impossibility.

After sorting through Africa from 

its oddly sketched borders to infrastructure, Bolton reminds readers that 

to date, Africa has simply not mattered 

enough to result in Western efforts to 

precipitate real change. He suggests that 

Africa does not play a large enough role 

in the current world economy and is 

not of political or military significance. 

As such, the Western world will simply 

stick to its percieved humanitarian duty 

of providing feel-good aid to Africa 

without accountability, oversight, or 

direction.

However, with the growing interconnectedness of globalization, it is 

imperative that Western governments 

focus not only upon aid and trading 

agreements, but also educating voters 

and taxpayers who are contributing their 

tax dollars indirectly into the global 

system. As the global system continually 

becomes more interconnected, Africa 

will suddenly (and, in reality, already 

does) matter.

Bolton authored another book with 

a similar title: Aid and Other Dirty Business: How Good Intentions Have Failed 

the World’s Poorest Continent. Other 

books with similar complaints of the 

West and its aid, each with varying soluBook Review 

AFRICA DOESN’T MATTER: 

How the West Has Failed the Poorest 

Continent and What We Can Do About It

BY GILES BOLTON 

REVIEW BY SARAH NICKISCH

Cadet Sarah Nickisch is an African 

Studies major with Arabic and 

Spanish minors in the Class of 2013.

Bolton suggests that the West needs to restructure its 

African aid system, not just due to a sense of moral 

obligation, but also as a matter of Western self-interest.
Book Review 41

tions, are Robert Calderisi’s The Trouble 

with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t 

Working, and Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not 

Working and How There Is a Better Way 

for Africa by Dambisa Moyo. While the 

facts are similar in content, each authors’ 

solutions are diverse. Bolton makes a 

point to demonstrate that the common 

man and Western voter can do something to incite change in the Western 

world’s relationship with Africa. 

The major fault found with Bolton’s 

Africa Doesn’t Matter is easily gathered 

from the title: the exclusion of “the East.” 

Bolton focuses primarily on the Americas and Europe throughout his critique 

of the current aid system. His statistics 

are solely concentrated on the Western world. The only information about 

Asian relations with Africa is a chart 

including a single data column regarding 

Japan. In order to look at this issue and 

its varying solutions with the big picture 

in mind, it is absolutely necessary to 

approach all angles, including the role of 

Asia in Africa, and particularly, the role 

of China [as mentioned elsewhere in this 

journal]. 

In sum, Bolton’s perspectives are 

well-articulated throughout the book, 

and he should be commended for his 

clarity and intriguing anecdotes. Ranging from personal stories to fictional 

scenarios, he clearly depicts to his 

readers a picture of Africa’s current state 

of poverty, how it affects the day-today decisions of its inhabitants, and 

how it should affect those who are on 

the outside looking inward, from large 

governing bodies to the average shopper 

at the check-out line. Globalization will 

increasingly mean that everyone, even 

Africans, do indeed matter.

SEE YOUR BOOK REVIEW IN PRINT HERE!

Are you keeping up on your reading list, or better yet, perusing those

listed on the Chief of Staff ’s reading list? If so, consider writing a review

of the next book you read dealing with airpower, current conflicts, strategy 

and other military-relevant topics. Send your submission in word format

(with Chicago-style endnotes, if used) to ASJ-Editor@usafa.edu

Chief of Staff ’s Reading List 2011:

Strategic Context

Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power

by Robert Kaplan

Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It  

by Richard Clarke and Robert Knake

The Return of History and the End of Dreams 

by Robert Kagan

Technology Horizons: A Vision for the Air Force Science and Technology

by Dr. Werner Dahm

A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 

by Alistair Horne

Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of

Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia 

by Ahmed Rashid

Leadership

Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace...

One School at a Time 

by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower

in War and Peace 

by Mark Perry

The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 1945-1953 

by Robert Dallek

Secrets of Special Ops Leadership: Dare the Impossible;

Achieve the Extraordinary 

by William Allen Cohen

Military Heritage

The All Americans 

by Lars Anderson

Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of Legendary Ace Robin Olds 

by Robin Olds, Christina Olds and Ed Rasimus

Red Eagles: America’s Secret MiGs 

by Steve Davies

Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan

by Herman S. Wolk