United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on

Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

October 1998 BOSNIA PEACE

OPERATION

Mission, Structure, and

Transition Strategy of

NATO’s Stabilization

Force

GAO/NSIAD-99-19

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-281072 

October 8, 1998

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The December 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia

and Herzegovina and its supporting annexes (also known as the Dayton

Agreement) provided the structure and mandates for an international

operation intended to promote an enduring peace in Bosnia and stability in

the region. In mid-December 1997, recognizing the continued need for an

international military force in Bosnia, President Clinton announced that

the United States would continue to take part in the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO)-led military force in Bosnia—known as the

Stabilization Force (SFOR)—after June 1998, thereby enabling the Bosnia

peace operation’s civilian aspects to proceed in a secure atmosphere. The

operation’s civilian aspects include efforts to return refugees and

displaced people to their homes across ethnic lines; develop democratic,

multiethnic governments at all levels; and ensure that persons indicted for

war crimes are brought to justice.

As requested, this report provides information on (1) how SFOR’s

operations in Bosnia have changed since mid-1997, particularly its support

for the operation’s civil aspects, and whether any such changes have

exceeded SFOR’s defined mission; (2) the mission and force structure of the

post-June 1998 SFOR follow-on force, including the decision-making

sequence for U.S. participation in the force and the status of developing

the force’s new Multinational Specialized Unit; and (3) NATO’s transition

strategy for removing NATO-led forces from Bosnia. Appendix I provides

background information on the overall structure of the military and

civilian components of the Bosnia peace operation.

Our Prior Reports on

the Bosnia Peace

Operation

We have reviewed progress in implementing the Dayton Agreement’s

military and civilian provisions since early 1996. In May 1997, we reported

that the Bosnia peace operation had helped Bosnia take important first

steps toward the Dayton Agreement’s goals.1

 The NATO-led military

forces—first the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later SFOR—had created

1

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement’s Goals

(GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997). See also Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton

Agreement’s Goals—An Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997).

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and sustained an environment that allowed the peace process to move

forward and Bosnians to begin returning to normal life. Nevertheless,

while the task of implementing the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement

had begun, Bosnia remained politically and ethnically divided due

principally to the failure of the political leaders of Bosnia’s three major

ethnic groups to embrace political and social reconciliation and to fulfill

their obligations under the Dayton Agreement. Many western observers

told us that based on the current pace of political and social change in

Bosnia, some sort of international military force would likely be needed

there for many years to deter an outbreak of hostilities while Bosnians

continue the reconciliation process.

In June 1998, we reported that the pace of implementing the Dayton

Agreement had accelerated beginning in mid-1997, due to a renewed

commitment and level of effort—both political and military—by the

international community.2

 This renewed commitment led to an increased

and intense involvement of the operation’s civilian and military

organizations in implementing the agreement. Their efforts, combined with

international pressure on Bosnia’s political leaders and positive political

changes in the country, helped to accelerate the pace of Dayton

implementation. However, we reported that conditions in Bosnia will have

to improve significantly before international military forces could

substantially draw down; even with the accelerated pace of implementing

the agreement, it will likely be some time before these conditions are

realized.

Results in Brief The increased emphasis on implementing the Dayton Agreement that

began in mid-1997 included an intensified effort by SFOR to support the

agreement’s civil provisions. For example, SFOR began taking a more active

role in efforts to return people to their prewar homes in areas controlled

by another ethnic group, detain persons indicted for war crimes, and elect

and install multiethnic governments at all levels. In the spring of 1998, SFOR

also began to support a March 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution to

stop the flow of arms and other military assistance to Serbia’s province of

Kosovo, where fighting had broken out, and to other areas of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These efforts by SFOR are

consistent with its mission as defined by the Dayton Agreement and NATO

operation plans. Although SFOR’s support for the civilian aspects of the

peace operation increased, the force continued to employ most of its

2

See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement

Increased (GAO/NSIAD-98-138, June 5, 1998).

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resources to control the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb

militaries, its primary mission.3

The mission and force structure of the SFOR follow-on force—which will

also be called SFOR—will remain largely the same as prior to June 1998.

SFOR levels in Bosnia increased from about 31,700 troops in August 1998 to

about 36,100 troops at the time of the September elections in Bosnia4

 but

are expected to decrease again by November 1998. In light of SFOR’s need

to deal with civil disturbances, NATO established a new Multinational

Specialized Unit, a paramilitary- or gendarmerie-type unit, within SFOR. As

of September 1998, only part of the specialized unit was operational

because countries have not yet committed sufficient resources to the unit.

This new unit will not replace U.S. or other SFOR combat units.

After considering several military analyses and a range of factors,

including improvements in Republika Srpska’s political environment

during late 1997 and early 1998, the executive branch decided in

January 1998 to reduce the U.S. troop level for the SFOR follow-on force

from about 8,500 troops in Bosnia to about 6,900 troops. After the

drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military identified ways to reduce

U.S. force levels.5 NATO then lowered operational requirements for the

follow-on force. NATO will continue its practice of reviewing SFOR

operations every 6 months to determine whether SFOR force levels could be

further reduced.

NATO has developed a transition strategy for an eventual disengagement

from Bosnia. As of September 1998, NATO had not fully developed specific

criteria for determining when conditions would allow SFOR combat units to

3

The war in Bosnia was fought among Bosnia’s three major ethnic/religious groups—Bosniaks

(Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), and Croats (Roman Catholics)—the latter two being

supported directly by the republics of Serbia and Croatia, respectively. This report defines “Bosniaks”

as “Muslims,” the definition used in State Department human rights reports.

4

Bosnia held a countrywide election for national and entity-level governments on September 12 and 13,

1998. These elections were supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE). Bosnia consists of two entities: (1) Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb Republic; and (2) the

Federation, the Bosniak-Bosnian Croat entity.

5

U.S. force levels were reduced to 6,900 troops in Bosnia by mid-July 1998. The number of U.S. troops

in Bosnia was scheduled to increase to between 10,500 to 11,300 troops around the time of Bosnia’s

September 1998 elections due to a planned troop rotation and to decrease back to 6,900 by November

1998. U.S. SFOR and non-SFOR personnel in Croatia would remain at about 500, while the number of

U.S. troops in Italy and Hungary supporting the SFOR operation—but not part of SFOR—had

decreased from about 3,600 troops down to 2,600 troops by July 1998.

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draw down and withdraw, but was in the process of doing so.6 The NATO

transition strategy consists largely of turning over various activities to

local authorities or the peace operation’s civilian organizations as

conditions permit. The transition strategy calls for the Multinational

Specialized Unit to leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR’s

combat units. According to Department of Defense (DOD) and NATO

officials, specific drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before

NATO’s next 6-month review of SFOR operations.7 During this review, NATO

will assess changes to the security and political conditions in Bosnia,

including the results of the September 1998 elections, and determine

whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced.

Intensified SFOR

Operations

In mid-1997, SFOR intensified its support for the civilian aspects of the

Dayton Agreement and later began operations that supported the United

Nations arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the

same time, SFOR continued its primary mission of controlling the three

militaries in Bosnia. SFOR’s actions in all of these areas were consistent

with its Dayton mission and were part of much broader international

efforts that helped accelerate the pace of Dayton implementation.

Increased SFOR Support

for Dayton’s Civil Aspects

With the increased international emphasis on implementing the Dayton

Agreement, beginning in mid-1997 SFOR increased its support for the

civilian components of the peace operation. This increased support is

consistent with SFOR’s authority as specified in annex 1A of the Dayton

Agreement. The agreement specified that if resources were available and

assistance were requested, NATO-led forces were to (1) help create secure

conditions for the conduct of other Dayton Agreement tasks, such as

elections; (2) assist the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and

other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;

(3) observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian

populations, refugees, and displaced persons and respond appropriately to

deliberate violence to life and person; and (4) monitor the clearing of

minefields and obstacles.

6

The U.S. executive branch prepared what it referred to as “benchmarks” in early 1998; however, these

“benchmarks” are not intended to provide criteria for determining when NATO forces can draw down

or withdraw; instead, the executive branch believes that they represent the point at which Dayton

implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. The executive

branch did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led military force.

7

According to a July 28, 1998, letter from President Clinton to Congress, NATO is also expected to

develop an estimate of the time likely to be required for implementation of the military and civilian

aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the criteria. The letter states that while they will be useful

as a tool to promote and review the pace of Dayton implementation, these estimated target dates will

be notional, and their attainment will be dependent upon a complex set of interdependent factors.

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SFOR’s support for civilian aspects of the operation was often provided

indirectly as SFOR conducted its primary military mission. For example,

SFOR’s general security presence has ensured that fighting among the three

militaries in Bosnia has not resumed, thereby allowing the operation’s

civilian organizations to continue their work and the people of Bosnia to

proceed with the long process of political and social reconciliation.

Further, during August 1997 SFOR began to take control of special police as

called for by annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement,8

 a step toward

disbanding and disarming them and/or bringing them under the U.N.

restructuring program for civilian police. This move helped convince

Bosnian Serb political leaders to begin to participate in the U.N. police

restructuring program in September 1997.

In other cases, SFOR provided more direct support for the implementation

of the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement, primarily by providing a

security presence, as shown in table 1.

8

Although special police had always been considered military forces under annex 1A of the Dayton

Agreement, NATO-led forces in Bosnia had not taken steps to control them until mid-1997, when

requested to do so by the High Representative.

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Table 1: SFOR Support for the Civil Aspects of the Dayton Agreement Since Mid-1997

Civil aspect SFOR support

Freedom of movement Since May 1997, SFOR has supported international efforts to increase freedom of movement in Bosnia

by helping the U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) to enforce its police checkpoint policy.a SFOR

assisted IPTF by confiscating weapons and identity cards of noncompliant police; jointly patrolling with

IPTF’s unarmed police monitors in certain sensitive geographic areas, such as the strategically

important area of Brcko; and by cooperating in removing 38 of 151 identified illegal checkpoints (as of

mid-March 1998).b

Minority returnsc In June/July 1997, SFOR troops began to provide general and local security for people returning to their

prewar homes across ethnic lines. SFOR’s security presence has been the most important

confidence-building measure thus far for these returnees. In the spring of 1998, during a period of

increased violent incidents associated with visits and returns across ethnic lines, SFOR began to

coordinate international efforts at all levels to ensure a phased and orderly return process.

Detention of war crimes

indictees

From July 10, 1997, through October 2, 1998, SFOR troops detained nine persons indicted for war

crimes;d no persons indicted for war crimes had been detained by NATO-led troops in Bosnia during

1996 and the first half of 1997. These detentions, along with other international efforts, helped

encourage other indictees to surrender voluntarily to the international war crimes tribunal. From April 28,

1997, through October 2, 1998, a total of 26 indictees were surrendered to the tribunal, over three times

as many as had been surrendered prior to that time; three of the indictees were later released due to

lack of evidence.

Arms control SFOR assisted OSCE in its efforts to gain Bosnian Serb compliance with arms reductions targetse by

(1) restricting the Bosnian Serb military’s movements and training as a means of forcing compliance, 

(2) inspecting military storage and installations to account for heavy weapons, and (3) helping to

transport weapons to their reduction sites. All parties met their arms reductions requirements by the

October 31, 1997, deadline. 

Demining SFOR helped U.S. and international civilian organizations establish an indigenous demining capacity in

Bosnia. Specifically, SFOR has (1) trained and equipped 450 military deminers from all three militaries in

Bosnia and monitored their performance; (2) trained 71 military demining instructors in late 1997, who in

turn trained 430 deminers in early 1998; and (3) established three military demining training centers in

Bosnia that are staffed by the SFOR-trained demining instructors.

aThis policy prohibited any fixed or mobile checkpoint that (1) was manned by two or more police

officers and (2) operated for more than 30 minutes without a valid IPTF checkpoint permit.

bSFOR has also supported, on a case-by-case basis, IPTF-led inspections of local police stations.

During these inspections, according to a NATO document, weapons in excess of the expected

inventory are immediately confiscated and subsequently destroyed.

c“Minority returns” refers to people that return to areas under the control of another ethnic group.

In many cases, the group that is currently in the minority was in the majority before the war and

would return to majority status if all internally displaced persons and refugees returned.

dAnother indictee was shot and killed by SFOR soldiers after he fired at them. On July 22, 1998,

SFOR soldiers incorrectly identified and detained two people and later transferred them to

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague, the Netherlands (hereafter

referred to as the international war crimes tribunal), based on the belief that they had been

indicted by the tribunal.

eBosnian Serb political leaders had largely not complied with interim arms reduction targets as of

December 31, 1996. This policy changed during the summer of 1997.

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SFOR Support for the Civil Aspects of the Dayton Agreement Since Mid-1997 (continued)

Civil aspect SFOR support

Media During October 1997, SFOR supported the High Representative—the lead international civilian official in

Bosnia—in his attempts to curtail media that “blatantly and persistently” violated the Dayton Agreement

by taking control of five radio and television transmitters operated by Bosnian Serb hard-liners. This

move shut down inflammatory broadcasts aimed against the international community and allowed the

reform of the Bosnian Serb media network to begin under international supervision. 

On May 20, 1998, SFOR began a phased withdrawal from the five transmitter towers; as of early

September 1998, four of the five towers had been returned to Bosnian Serb authorities. Following

withdrawal from all of the towers, SFOR will continue to ensure the network’s compliance with its

restructuring agreement by media monitoring, routine patrols of the tower sites, and unannounced

technical inspections of the network’s tower equipment.

Electing and installing

multiethnic governments

SFOR supported OSCE in preparing for and administering Bosnia’s municipal elections held in

September 1997 and Republika Srpska’s National Assembly elections held in November 1997. Among

other things, SFOR ensured increased security during the polling periods; provided significant planning

and logistics support to OSCE, such as the transportation of ballots and other election materials; and

provided personnel to the OSCE/SFOR joint elections operations center.f

 These elections resulted in a

more pluralistic political culture and began the process of developing multiethnic governments

throughout Bosnia.

In late 1997 and early 1998, SFOR supported international efforts to install the newly elected, relatively

moderate Republika Srpska government by, among other things, increasing patrols and establishing

observation posts in the vicinity of Republika Srpska government offices in and around Pale, the base of

Bosnian Serb hard-liners. SFOR also assisted OSCE in helping to form multiethnic municipal councils

and governments by ensuring a safe environment for, and freedom of movement to, council meetings in

contentious areas. 

Establishing Bosnia’s

national institutions

SFOR supported the High Representative’s efforts to establish Bosnia’s national institutions that would

link the country’s three major ethnic groups, primarily by providing security, communications, and liaison

to meetings of the Standing Committee on Military Matters. The committee, which was established in

early June 1997 and has met infrequently since then, was designed to coordinate the activities of the

three militaries in Bosnia at the national level.g

Opening civilian airports SFOR, which controls the airspace over Bosnia, worked with the Office of the High Representative

(OHR) to open up Bosnia’s regional airports by, among other things, ensuring that there were no

technical grounds to preclude making the airports available to civilian traffic.

f

The precursor to SFOR—IFOR—provided similar support to OSCE during Bosnia’s

September 1996 elections.

gAlthough the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armed forces are attempting to merge into a unified

Federation Army, each of the three major ethnic groups—Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and

Bosniaks—still maintains its own separate military. This condition must evolve into a unified armed

forces, according to a State Department official, if Bosnia is to become a unified country. As an

interim measure under the Dayton Agreement, the Standing Committee on Military Matters is to

coordinate the activities of the armed forces. An international official was appointed coordinator to

the committee’s secretariat in March 1998.

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According to officials from the U.S. mission to NATO, the North Atlantic

Council9

 provided guidance and approved additional rules of engagement

specifically for SFOR’s operations against the Bosnian Serb media. The

council did not provide additional guidance for other SFOR operations that

support the civil aspects of the peace agreement since these operations

were already covered by existing rules of engagement.

SFOR’s Military Tasks

Related to Kosovo

In late April/early May 1998, according to a NATO report, SFOR stepped up its

military operations near Bosnia’s border with the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia to help ensure compliance with a U.N. Security Council arms

embargo related to the escalating crisis in Serbia’s province of Kosovo.

For the purpose of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, the Security

Council called on all countries to prevent the sale or supply of arms and

related materiel to Kosovo and other areas of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia.10 The prohibition covered such things as the sale and supply of

weapons and ammunition; military vehicles, equipment, and spare parts;

and training for terrorist activities. This resolution was aimed at

preventing the participants in the Kosovo conflict—Serbs and ethnic

Albanian Muslims—from receiving illicit military assistance from outside

actors.

According to a senior SFOR officer, the increased monitoring of the border

and other tasks associated with SFOR support for the arms embargo do not

constitute a new mission for SFOR but are an integral part of SFOR’s original

mission to keep the peace in Bosnia. He explained that SFOR will have

failed in its mission if the nationalist passions and anger of the Kosovo

conflict—the same things that started the war in Bosnia—are allowed to

permeate the country. Thus, the specific tasks being conducted by SFOR are

designed to create a climate that does not allow Serb and Muslim

extremists to inflame passions inside Bosnia.

This view was reinforced by a NATO Secretary General’s report that

concluded SFOR is conducting Kosovo-related operations under the

authority of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement. Specifically, the

agreement gives SFOR “the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and

inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the

[SFOR] believes may have military capability. The refusal, interference, or

9

The North Atlantic Council is the political leadership of NATO, which comprises 16 countries:

Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

10U.N. Security Council resolution 1160 dated March 31, 1998.

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denial by any Party of this right to observe, monitor, and inspect by the

[SFOR] shall constitute a breach of this Annex and the violating Party shall

be subject to military action by the [SFOR], including the use of necessary

force to ensure compliance with this Annex.”11

SFOR’s Continuing

Military Tasks

Throughout 1997 and 1998, SFOR continued to fulfill tasks associated with

its primary mission of enforcing the Dayton Agreement’s military aspects,

as outlined in annex 1A of the agreement. Under SFOR supervision, the

three militaries in Bosnia continued to observe the October 1995 cease-fire

and to keep their forces separated. The militaries also demobilized

additional troops, bringing their forces down to 55,500 soldiers by October

1997.12 SFOR enforced compliance with the military provisions of the

Dayton Agreement by continually patrolling throughout the country,

including in the zone of separation;13 routinely monitoring and inspecting

SFOR-approved military storage sites and installations; and monitoring

SFOR-approved military training and movement activities.14

According to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),15 because

the Dayton Agreement’s military objectives have largely been achieved,

SFOR is in a position to provide broad support to civil implementation,

within its existing mandate and capabilities. IFOR had largely accomplished

Dayton’s military objectives by the end of its mission in December 1996,

11Article VI, paragraph 6, of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement.

12At the time of the October 1995 cease-fire, the three militaries in Bosnia had over 400,000 men under

arms, including civilian militias and an estimated 45,000 police that fought in conjunction with the

three armies.

13The zone of separation is an area generally 2 kilometers wide on each side of the interentity

boundary line between Bosnia’s two entities—the Federation and Republika Srpska.

14During 1997, under SFOR direction, the three militaries reduced the number of their military storage

sites and installations (cantonment sites) by 29 percent, from 770 sites to 545 sites; SFOR in early 1998

directed a further 25-percent reduction in cantonment sites by the end of February 1999.

15SACEUR is a U.S. Army general officer who is also the Commander in Chief, U.S. European

Command. For purposes of this report, we refer to him only as “SACEUR.” As the Commander in

Chief, U.S. European Command, this general officer has the authority to plan and conduct U.S. land,

maritime, and air operations within the command’s geographic area of responsibility, which includes

Bosnia and other areas of the Balkans region. As SACEUR, he is responsible for, among other things,

the development of NATO defense plans, the determination of NATO force requirements, and the

deployment and exercise of NATO forces under his command or control.

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thereby allowing SFOR to be deployed with about half the force levels of

IFOR.

16

SFOR’s Follow-on

Force

On June 15, 1998, the U.N. Security Council authorized the SFOR follow-on

force, also known as SFOR, for a 12-month mission but left open the

possibility that the authorization could be extended if warranted by the

situation in Bosnia and developments in implementing the Dayton

Agreement.17 SFOR’s mission will remain the same, but overall SFOR force

levels are expected to decrease by November 1998. In January 1998, based

on many political-military considerations such as improved conditions in

Bosnia, the executive branch decided to draw down U.S. forces in Bosnia

from about 8,500 troops to about 6,900 troops. After the United States

decided to draw down troops, NATO lowered the operational requirements

for the SFOR follow-on force. The new Multinational Specialized Unit began

operations in late August 1998 but with force levels far below operational

requirements due to the lack of force commitments from troop

contributing countries.

Mission and Force

Structure

The mission of the follow-on force will continue to be to (1) deter renewed

hostilities and (2) contribute to a secure environment for ongoing civil

implementation efforts in order to stabilize and consolidate the peace. As

with IFOR and the first SFOR mission, the SFOR follow-on force has the

authority to use force to ensure the parties’ compliance with annex 1A and

force protection.

According to NATO documents, SFOR will continue, within its means and

capabilities, to provide broad support for the implementation of the

Dayton Agreement’s civil aspects. Specifically, it will assist

• UNHCR as a matter of high priority, with the phased and orderly return of

refugees;

• IPTF in the reform and restructuring of Bosnia’s local police;

• OSCE in support of Bosnia’s September 1998 elections, including the

installation of elected officials;

16The transfer of authority from the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR took place on

December 20, 1995. IFOR was deployed with about 60,000 troops and was to complete its mission and

be withdrawn from Bosnia by December 1996. Recognizing the continued need for an international

military force, in December 1996 the North Atlantic Council authorized a new mission—SFOR—for an

18-month period. SFOR had an authorized force level of 31,000 troops but consistently maintained

somewhat higher force levels throughout 1997.

17U.N. Security Council resolution 1174.

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• the international war crimes tribunal by transferring persons indicted for

war crimes to the tribunal; and

• the High Representative in implementing the civil aspects of the

agreement.

SFOR will retain its existing force structure of three multinational divisions

in Bosnia led by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, as

well as air, naval, and support units located outside of Bosnia (see figs. 1

and 2). The number and nationality of maneuver brigades and battalions

within the three multinational divisions will generally remain the same18

(see app. II). The United States will remain the largest force provider to

SFOR, and Americans will continue to hold the key NATO military positions

that control the operation.

18The only exception is the addition of a Belgian battalion and the withdrawal of a Malaysian battalion.

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Figure 1: Map of SFOR’s Military Sectors in Bosnia

Drvar

Pale

Tuzla

Brcko

Mostar

Banja Luka

Bihac

Doboj

Belgrade

Srebrenica

Croatia

Croatia

Serbia

MND (N)

(US Sector)

MND

(UK Sector)

(SW)

MND

(French Sector)

(SE)

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Ploce

Neum

MND (SW)

MND (N)

MND (SE)

= Multinational Division (Southwest)

= Multinational Division (North)

= Multinational Division (Southeast)

Montenegro

Bosniak control

Federation Bosnian Croat

control

Bosnian Serb control - Republika Srpska

Interentity boundary line

NATO military sectors

Sarajevo

Gorazde

Split

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Albania

Kosovo

Serbia

Montenegro

Croatia

Hungary

Italy

Adriatic

Sea

Italy Romania Slovenia

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Figure 2: Organization of the SFOR Follow-on Force, as of August 1998

SACEUR

Multinational

Specialized

Unit

Support

Command

Multinational

Division 

(North)

Multinational

Division 

(Southwest)

Multinational

Division 

(Southeast)

COMSFOR

AIRSOUTH NAVSOUTH STRIKEFORSOUTH

Consolidated

Aviation Task

Force*

Deployed in Bosnia

Deployed outside Bosnia

COMSFOR = Commander Stabilization Force

AIRSOUTH = Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe

NAVSOUTH = Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe

STRIKEFORSOUTH = Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe

*Dual function: provides SFOR's operational reserve for all of Bosnia and provides sector 

SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Legend

Operational authority

Direct support provided by units of NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe Command

support for the U.S. - led Multinational Division (North).

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In preparation for the SFOR 6-month review due in December 1997, and in

contemplation of a possible drawdown, NATO had performed a

troop-to-task analysis for a smaller force19 with a relatively restricted

mission called for under the first SFOR operation plan. Under this plan,

NATO would have executed a phased drawn down to reduced deterrence

force levels when security conditions in Bosnia had substantially

improved. The U.S. military contribution to this force would have been

6,900 troops, with a significantly reduced force structure. In

December 1997, the North Atlantic Council—based on NATO military

authorities’ assessment of SFOR operations—determined that conditions in

Bosnia would not allow SFOR to draw down to those levels for the

foreseeable future.

U.S. Decision to Draw

Down Forces in Bosnia

In late January 1998, the President decided that the United States would

prefer to contribute about 6,900 troops to the SFOR follow-on force in

Bosnia rather than continue to provide about 8,500 troops. NATO lowered

its operational requirements for the follow-on force after the United States

decided to draw down its forces. The U.S. drawdown occurred by

mid-July 1998. The number of U.S. troops in Bosnia increased to between

10,500 and 11,300 troops by mid-September 1998 and, under current plans,

will decrease to 6,900 troops by November.20

Factors Considered in

Decision-making Process

In describing the decision-making process, DOD officials told us that during

December 1997 and January 1998 DOD had considered a wide range of

political-military factors in deciding on the U.S. contribution to the SFOR

follow-on force. They said that DOD’s decision to recommend a draw down

to 6,900 personnel in Bosnia was based on a Joint Staff strategic

assessment of the mission to be accomplished, the environment that it was

likely to be accomplished in, and the risks to U.S. soldiers and their ability

to accomplish their mission.

During the strategic assessment process, according to DOD officials,

improvements in Bosnia’s political and security environment, particularly

in Republika Srpska, led DOD to conclude in January 1998 that existing U.S.

force levels in Bosnia could safely be reduced. DOD officials believed that

the rise of a relatively moderate Bosnian Serb leadership under Republika

Srpska President Plavsic beginning in mid-1997—including the election of

19This force was known as “SFOR Phase III” or “Deterrence Force (DFOR).”

20Planned rotations that increased U.S. force levels also occurred during prior elections in Bosnia. For

example, in October 1997, the number of U.S. Army personnel in Bosnia peaked at 14,400 due to the

planned troop rotation around the time of the September 1997 municipal elections

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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a relatively moderate Republika Srpska parliament and moderate Prime

Minister in November 1997 and mid-January 1998, respectively—and the

resulting reduction in power of Bosnian Serb hard-liners had improved

conditions such that U.S. forces in Bosnia could safely be drawn down to

6,900 troops.

A December 1997 options document prepared by the Joint Staff, which

was the basis for the January 1998 drawdown decision, presented

information on the force structure and associated force levels required for

a range of potential missions for the SFOR follow-on force. In describing the

option that was selected by the National Command Authority, the

document indicated that the U.S. military could accomplish the current

SFOR mission with two combat battalions in the country rather than its

existing three combat battalions, thereby allowing the United States to

reduce forces there to 6,900 troops.

In the decision-making process, DOD had considered an operational

assessment done by the U.S. European Command21 in late October 1997.

This assessment—based on troop-to-task analyses for various mission

options—showed that

(a) if the SFOR follow-on force were to continue SFOR’s current mission, the

United States would have to maintain its current force levels of about

8,500 troops22 and its current force structure in Bosnia, particularly its

combat capability that included three U.S. combat battalions and two

aviation task forces;23 and

(b) if security conditions in Bosnia substantially improved and SFOR’s

mission were to be reduced to providing restricted support for civil

implementation, the United States could withdraw one of the three U.S.

combat battalions from Bosnia and thereby reduce the number of U.S.

troops there to 6,900.24

21Among its other responsibilities, the U.S. European Command directs the development and

execution of U.S. military operations in support of the NATO alliance.

22The actual number of U.S. troops in Bosnia varied significantly under the first SFOR mission, mainly

due to planned troop rotations. As of mid-November 1997, the United States had 8,300 troops in

Bosnia.

23One aviation task force supported the U.S. military sector only, the other served as SFOR’s

operational reserve for all of Bosnia.

24This force structure was designed for the U.S. contribution to SFOR Phase III or Deterrence Force.

NATO in December 1997 decided not to draw down to deterrence force levels.

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DOD had also considered SACEUR’s military judgment that to do the current

SFOR mission with a 6,900 U.S. force level for Bosnia, the United States

would have to maintain three combat battalions in the country and

relocate some units nearby to Croatia. While this would have shifted some

U.S. troops from Bosnia to Croatia, the overall U.S. SFOR force levels in

theater would have remained about the same.

After the decision was made, the U.S. military spent February through

April 1998 identifying ways of reducing U.S. force levels in Bosnia to 6,900

troops while still maintaining three combat battalions in the country—the

option of moving some units to Croatia was no longer being considered. In

early March 1998, SACEUR explained to us that three U.S. combat battalions

were still needed in Bosnia because (1) although the situation on the

ground in Bosnia had changed and the risk had been reduced somewhat,

the situation had not altered sufficiently to draw down the number of U.S.

combat battalions from three to two;25 and (2) the Multinational

Specialized Unit is not a replacement for SFOR’s combat units.

NATO Lowered Some

Operational Requirements After

the U.S. Drawdown Decision

On February 20, 1998, NATO decided that the SFOR follow-on force would

continue SFOR’s existing mission, and soon after, the U.S. military and NATO

began the troop-to-task analysis and force generation process for that

force. To reach the 6,900 U.S. force level in Bosnia, DOD determined during

this process that the U.S. military would maintain its three combat

battalions in the country and instead reduce the number of other combat,

combat support, and combat service support units. In planning for the

drawdown, DOD expected other countries to contribute resources to make

up for some of the U.S. force reductions, but other countries generally did

not commit to do so.

Instead, to achieve the reduced troop level objective, the SFOR

Commander—a U.S. Army general officer26—reassessed the force’s

operational requirements during March and April 1998 and determined

that the force could perform its mission with the lower-than-expected

number of resources. This included, for example, consolidating two U.S.

aviation task forces27 and reducing the number of U.S. attack helicopters

25According to a special assistant to SACEUR, SACEUR had never concluded that the current SFOR

mission could be accomplished with only two U.S. combat battalions in Bosnia.

26The SFOR Commander is also the Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, and Seventh Army,

which are part of the U.S. European Command. For purposes of this report, we refer to him only as the

“SFOR Commander.”

27The consolidated task force would serve as both the SFOR operational reserve and the U.S. military

sector’s aviation support unit.

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from 40 to 16. After another NATO country agreed to contribute an

additional two attack helicopters, the SFOR Commander determined that

the force could accomplish its mission with only 18 attack helicopters in

the consolidated task force. In another case, after the U.S. military decided

to remove the U.S. target acquisition battery from the Sarajevo airport,28

the SFOR Commander decided that the battery was not needed given the

low artillery threat in the Sarajevo area.29

According to DOD officials, NATO finalized the operational requirements for

the SFOR follow-on force in late April 1998 and, in late May, officially

approved the requirements and decided to draw down SFOR force levels.

As of August 1998, 35 countries had pledged to provide about 33,300

soldiers to the SFOR follow-on force in Bosnia and Croatia, a lower number

than the first SFOR mission (see table 2).30 Almost all of these troops are

located in Bosnia. These numbers increased significantly around the time

of Bosnia’s September 1998 elections and are expected to decrease back

to August levels by November 1998. Appendix II provides more detailed

information on the number of troops contributed to the SFOR follow-on

force.

Table 2: Troop Contributions to the

SFOR Follow-on Force, as of

August 1998

Country In Bosnia In Croatiaa Total

NATO countriesb 26,740 848 27,588

Non-NATO countriesc 4,947 803 5,750

Total 31,687 1,651 33,338

aNumbers are not available for 3 of the 12 countries with troops located in Croatia.

bFifteen of 16 NATO countries pledged troops for the SFOR follow-on force.

cTwenty non-NATO countries pledged troops for the SFOR follow-on force.

Source: DOD documents.

NATO plans to continue the practice of reviewing SFOR operations at least

every 6 months to determine whether changes in conditions in Bosnia

28The Sarajevo airport is located in the French military sector.

29A target acquisition battery detects and tracks incoming artillery and mortar rounds in order to direct

artillery fire back to the source of the incoming rounds. A U.S. target acquisition battery would remain

on call in Germany.

30Actual SFOR force levels have varied over time. For example, the number of SFOR troops in Bosnia

and Croatia increased to about 39,000 from August through October 1997 because of the support

provided to OSCE for preparations for, and conduct of, Bosnia’s municipal elections held in

mid-September. By mid-November 1997, SFOR force levels had declined to about 34,300 troops in

Bosnia and 2,500 support troops in Croatia.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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would allow changes to SFOR’s tasks and force structure. These reviews

would permit NATO members, in consultation with other SFOR contributors,

to consider possible force reductions, taking into account the level of SFOR

support required for military and civil implementation and deterrence

requirements. The first 6-month review for the follow-on force would

occur sometime before the end of December 1998.

Multinational Specialized

Unit

According to NATO officials and documents, the Multinational Specialized

Unit—which has been described as a paramilitary, constabulary, or

gendarmerie-type unit—will assist in dealing with civil disturbances

associated with the return of refugees and displaced persons and the

installation of elected officials. In doing so, the unit will work in close

cooperation with international civilian organizations in Bosnia and will not

engage in police functions. As of early September 1998, the new unit was

significantly short of infantry personnel and air and ground transport

assets and unable to become fully operational. According to SACEUR, the

unit is an added force rather than a replacement for SFOR’s combat

battalions and will leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR’s

combat units.

Unit Is Underresourced and

Not Fully Operational

Under current NATO plans, the Multinational Specialized Unit would consist

of 800 soldiers in a brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, and

support and reserve components. As of September 3, 1998, five

countries—specifically, Argentina, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, and the

United States—had pledged about 500 of the required 800 soldiers. This

would provide enough resources for one of the two battalions, a reserve

company, a logistics company, and most of the brigade headquarters staff.

Italy pledged to provide the bulk of these resources, or about 370

personnel; Argentina made the second largest pledge of about 70

personnel.31 DOD plans to provide two U.S. military personnel to the

brigade headquarters, which will be based in the Sarajevo area.

No countries had agreed to contribute resources to fill NATO operational

requirements for the unit’s air and ground transport or for most of the

second battalion.32 Because of these shortfalls, only one of the unit’s two

battalions became operational before Bosnia’s September 1998 elections.

According to DOD officials, the first battalion became combat ready on

August 20, 1998. SACEUR said he had visited the battalion and considers

31This represents Argentina’s first contribution to a NATO-led force in Bosnia.

32Argentina pledged to provide some personnel for the second battalion headquarters, but no country

had pledged personnel for the three companies in the second battalion.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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them fully operational and most capable. The unit’s Italian commander,

according to DOD officials, prefers to use the battalion’s organic ground

transport rather than SFOR air transport that is external to his span of

control.

Differing views were expressed about why European countries are

reluctant to contribute resources to the Multinational Specialized Unit.

Senior international officials in Bosnia told us that European countries

with troops in Bosnia believe that they had no operational requirement for

such a unit; they believe their soldiers are already trained for and capable

of dealing with civil disturbances faced by SFOR.

33 On the other hand,

SACEUR said that European countries are reluctant to provide resources

because they view the unit as an effort by the United States to remove U.S.

troops from Bosnia while European troops remained behind. According to

a DOD official, the United States has reinforced this belief by contributing

only two people to the brigade headquarters, rather than contributing a

more significant number such as a company of military police.

As constituted, the new Multinational Specialized Unit is to operate under

SFOR control and the same rules of engagement as other SFOR elements.

The SFOR Commander will have the authority to control the unit’s

operations, within the operational parameters specified by each

participating country’s national command authority.34 As of late July 1998,

questions remained as to where, when, and how the unit would use force

in fulfilling its mission and how the unit would coordinate its actions with

IPTF and local police authorities.

DOD officials said that the Multinational Specialized Unit should be looked

at as a long-term “force multiplier” for SFOR because the unit is providing a

new capability, rather than as a near-term unfilled requirement. They

believe that the one-battalion-strong unit is quite capable and that the

slower-than-expected deployment of the Multinational Specialized Unit

will actually benefit, rather than hinder, the unit’s ability to conduct

33They also told us that (1) the rules of engagement and mission of the unit were unclear; and

(2) depending on the unit’s mission, the unit could interfere with the efforts of international civilian

organizations to restructure Bosnia’s police forces in accordance with democratic policing standards.

34Since the start of NATO-led operations in Bosnia, national command authority for participating

forces has remained with each country. Participating countries have allowed their forces to participate

in IFOR and SFOR within specified areas and with specific rules of engagement. The SFOR operation

plan of June 1998 contains the most permissive rules of engagement for countries participating in the

Multinational Specialized Unit and other SFOR elements; the plan also permits each participating

country to issue clarifying instructions that restrict these rules of engagement to ensure compliance

with such things as national law. These clarifying instructions must be developed in consultation with

the SFOR Commander.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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operations. They said that the slower deployment will allow the unit to be

built and trained gradually for the mission and will enable better turnover

of the unit’s forces in the future. According to SACEUR, under current plans

the second battalion will come on line during the spring of 1999, as

remaining forces are committed for this purpose.

Unit Will Not Replace SFOR

Combat Units

In early February 1998, DOD officials stated that the new specialized unit

would eventually replace U.S. and other combat units in Bosnia. They said

that the new unit would (1) take over SFOR’s “policing” functions and

thereby allow SFOR’s combat units to withdraw and (2) remain in Bosnia

after these units withdraw.

However, by June 1998, this view of the unit’s role had changed. According

to SACEUR, the Multinational Specialized Unit is not a replacement for

SFOR’s combat battalions either in the near or long term; it will leave

Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR combat units. SACEUR said that

the unit would allow SFOR to facilitate a secure climate of return for

refugees and prevent hard-liners in Bosnia from inciting civil disturbances

and intimidating returnees. NATO would deploy the unit immediately; the

unit’s work would be finished when those refugees and displaced persons

who want to go home are afforded an opportunity to do so. After the unit

departed, NATO and SFOR would then be left with the problem of deterring

any resumption of the conflict.

DOD officials later explained that during the debate within NATO over the

Multinational Specialized Unit’s role in the transition strategy, other NATO

members did not accept the U.S. view of the unit’s role. Instead, they—and

the NATO operation plan for the SFOR follow-on force—agreed with the

views articulated by SACEUR.

Development of

NATO’s Transition

Strategy

As outlined in NATO documents, NATO’s strategy for transitioning NATO-led

forces out of Bosnia consists of (1) reducing the size, role, and profile of

the SFOR follow-on force as conditions in Bosnia improve; and

(2) progressively transferring responsibilities to Bosnia’s institutions,

other civil authorities, the United Nations, the High Representative, OSCE,

and other international organizations as appropriate. While NATO has

established aims or objectives that are similar to those set by the civilian

side of the Bosnia peace operation, NATO has not yet fully developed

specific criteria for determining when conditions will have been achieved

that would allow SFOR units to draw down or withdraw. According to DOD

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officials, the drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before

NATO’s next 6-month review of SFOR operations.

NATO in Early Stages of

Developing Drawdown

Criteria

In describing its transition strategy for Bosnia, NATO has continued its

effort to delineate conditions that must be met for the desired end-state

objective for NATO operations in Bosnia to be realized. (See app. IV for a

chronology showing the development of NATO’s end-state objective.) These

conditions, described as “aims” in the NATO operation plan, are similar to

(1) the set of “benchmarks” developed by the executive branch in early

1998 (see app. V) and (2) a set of conditions/goals established by the Peace

Implementation Council’s Steering Board in early June 1998 (see app. VI).35

 All three sets of aims describe the political, social, economic, and security

conditions that the international community hopes to achieve in Bosnia at

some undefined point in time.

While NATO has further defined the conditions to be achieved in Bosnia, it

has not yet established criteria that would link improvements in specific

conditions to a drawdown or withdrawal of NATO forces from Bosnia. In

early June 1998, SACEUR said that NATO would develop criteria that would

relate troop levels and overall force structure to the accomplishment of or

progress toward reaching the U.S. executive branch “benchmarks,” that is,

conditions that are to be realized in Bosnia. According to SACEUR, in

determining when and by how much to draw down forces, NATO will look

at such things as the level of cooperation and security conditions in

particular geographic areas in Bosnia and the way in which NATO troops

contribute to the accomplishment of each one of the executive branch

“benchmarks.”

According to DOD officials, the operation plan for the SFOR follow-on force

directs SFOR to develop drawdown criteria in conjunction with the peace

operation’s principal civilian organizations. As part of this effort, DOD and

NATO are working to prioritize NATO’s stated objectives and conditions so

that NATO planners can focus on the most important tasks to be

accomplished before a troop drawdown and/or eventual withdrawal can

begin. According to DOD and State Department officials, some of these

conditions do not necessarily have to be completely achieved prior to an

SFOR drawdown or withdrawal.

35The Peace Implementation Council Steering Board is an international organization that provides

political guidance to the High Representative. The Steering Board directed the High Representative to

submit for its consideration a report on progress toward these goals by mid-September 1998.

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In the absence of drawdown criteria, the U.S. military has been reducing

its contribution to SFOR due to considerations other than mission

requirements and may continue to do so in the future. Many U.S. military

officials told us that concern about continued political support for the

mission played a large role in the January 1998 decision to drawdown U.S.

forces in Bosnia from about 8,500 troops to 6,900. Further, according to

U.S. officials at NATO’s military headquarters and the U.S. European

Command, cost and other factors may drive future decisions regarding the

timing of U.S. force reductions. In commenting on a draft of this report,

DOD stated that to insinuate that the process was largely the result of “top

down” political and cost concerns rather than force appropriate reasons

was misleading and inaccurate.

Recent Events and SFOR’s

Next 6-Month Review

Although NATO has not yet finalized its drawdown criteria, DOD, State, and

NATO have recognized that the results of the September 1998 elections,

along with other changes in Bosnia’s political and security conditions, will

play a large role in NATO’s upcoming decision on whether conditions would

allow a further reduction in SFOR force levels. As previously stated, NATO

will again consider potential SFOR force reductions sometime before the

end of December 1998.

While the overall security situation has improved in Bosnia, political and

security conditions remain very volatile and will likely remain so for the

foreseeable future.36 For example, in early September 1998, a senior State

Department official told us that after the upcoming elections, returns of

refugees and displaced persons across ethnic lines would likely spark

violent incidents that require an SFOR response, even with the expectation

that relatively moderate Bosnian Serb leaders would be elected. Also, in

the recent elections, Republika Srpska voters elected a hard-line Serb

nationalist to replace the relatively moderate Plavsic as Republika

36For a description of changes in Bosnia’s political and security conditions from mid-1997 to mid-1998,

see Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated As International Involvement

Increased.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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Srpska’s President.37 Thus, it may be more difficult than anticipated by DOD

and State to implement key civil aspects of Dayton that directly affect

Bosnia’s security environment—specifically, the return of non-Serb

refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes in Republika Srpska

and the integration of non-Serbs into Republika Srpska’s police forces.38

Moreover, as previously discussed, the situation in Kosovo has the

potential to inflame nationalist passions in Bosnia and thereby adversely

affect the security environment there.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD, State, and the U.S. European Command provided comments on a

draft of this report. DOD and State agreed with much of our draft report and

said that the decision to draw down U.S. troops in Bosnia was made only

for force-appropriate reasons. Both agencies said that any inference that

political considerations played a role is incorrect. DOD further said that the

U.S. military did conduct detailed troop-to-task/operational and strategic

mission analyses and that a thorough, strategically-based examination by

the Joint Staff and the U.S. European Command led to the range of

proposed options from which the option with the associated force

structure was chosen. DOD also indicated that the drawdown decision was

largely based on the recommendation of SACEUR, in his capacity as the

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command. Our draft report had

discussed the operational and strategic analyses mentioned by DOD, but we

modified the report to focus more clearly on the timing of the U.S. and

NATO decision-making sequences and the related military assessments.

37Nikola Poplasen—the newly-elected President of Republika Srpska, President of the Serb Radical

Party of Bosnia, and a paramilitary commander during the war—ran as a candidate for a coalition of

Serb Radicals and another hard-line nationalist party, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). According to

OHR and OSCE documents, the Serb Radical Party of Bosnia has also publicly linked itself with the

Serb Radical Party of Serbia—led by Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister and former paramilitary

commander Vojislav Seselj—to the cause of uniting into one nation Serb people from Serbia,

Montenegro, Croatia, and Republika Srpska, thereby challenging Bosnia’s territorial integrity and

violating the Dayton Agreement. Immediately after the election, the Serb Radical Party encouraged its

supporters to intimidate and harass OSCE and other international organizations and incited its

supporters to demonstrate by creating rumors that OSCE would remove Poplasen as a candidate for

violating election rules. On September 21, 1998, OSCE ruled that the Serb Radical Party had violated

numerous election rules and removed nine candidates from the party’s candidate lists for Bosnia’s

Parliamentary Assembly and Republika Srpska’s National Assembly, but did not remove Poplasen as a

candidate. The High Representative has the authority to remove from office any elected official in

Bosnia who obstructs Dayton implementation.

38We note that almost no progress had been made in these two areas as of late September 1998, even

after the installation of the relatively moderate Republika Srpska government in January 1998. In

June 1998 we reported that although the moderate Republika Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik,

had expressed full support for Dayton implementation, he had appointed Ministers of Justice, Interior,

and Defense who had either expressed limited support for Dayton implementation or were closely

associated with hard-line nationalists and people indicted for war crimes; thus, these people may

continue to obstruct efforts to implement Dayton.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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DOD was also concerned about what it said was our negative portrayal of

the manning and readiness of the Multinational Specialized Unit. We

believe that our report accurately depicted the status of the unit’s manning

and readiness. However, we have added to the report information on DOD’s

views regarding the Multinational Specialized Unit. DOD’s written

comments and our response to them are included in appendix VII.

The Department of State found the draft report to be good overall, but it

observed that SFOR’s support for the civil aspects of Dayton needed to be

considered in the larger context that would include international civilian

efforts—particularly with regard to surrendering indictees to the

international war crimes tribunal—as civilian and military efforts to

implement Dayton had been closely coordinated since mid-1997. We have

expanded our discussion of this matter, noting that prior GAO reports on

the Bosnia peace operation discuss in great detail the larger context of

international efforts in Bosnia.39 State’s written comments and our

response to them are included in appendix VIII.

The U.S. European Command concurred with DOD’s response to the draft

report and commented on additional issues. The command said that

(1) we should not use of the term “expanded scope” when referring to SFOR

military operations; (2) our description of the timing of U.S. troop

reductions was incomplete; (3) one battalion of the Multinational

Specialized Unit was fully operational; and (4) our report created an

impression that NATO allies are not fully supportive of force requirements

for the SFOR mission. We believe our report accurately depicted the

situation in each of these four areas, but we have modified the report to

add the command’s views on these matters. The command’s written

comments and our response to them are included in appendix IX.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess how the scope of the NATO-led military force’s operations in

Bosnia has changed since mid-1997, we made visits to Bosnia in June and

October 1997 and February 1998. During these visits, we did audit work in

numerous locations throughout Bosnia and interviewed officials from the

headquarters of SFOR and two of its multinational divisions; OHR; the U.N.

Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including IPTF, U.N. Civil Affairs, and

the Mine Action Center; UNHCR; and OSCE; as well as Bosnian displaced

persons, many of whom had returned to their homes in areas controlled by

another ethnic group. We also visited NATO headquarters and the U.S.

39See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement

Increased and Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement’s Goals.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, during September 1997 and

February 1998 and obtained information from U.S. and NATO officials at

these locations. Further, we analyzed numerous situation reports and

other documents from U.S. agencies, NATO, SFOR, OHR, OSCE, IPTF, UNHCR, and

other organizations.

To assess (1) the mission, force structure, and force levels of the recently

approved, NATO-led military force in Bosnia and (2) NATO’s strategy for

transitioning NATO-led forces out of Bosnia, we obtained information from

U.S. and NATO officials at NATO headquarters and the U.S. mission to NATO;

SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, Bosnia; DOD, the State Department, and the

Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. European

Command and U.S. Army Europe in Germany. We also analyzed State, DOD,

U.S. European Command, NATO, and OHR documents pertaining to these

issues.

We conducted our audit work from June 1997 through October 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and

Defense, the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and other

appropriate congressional committees. Copies will also be made available

to other interested parties upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson,

Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may be

contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions about

this report. Other major contributors to the report include David Bruno, 

B. Patrick Hickey, and Judith McCloskey.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin F. Nelson, Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Background

30

Appendix II 

SFOR Troop

Contributions and

Organization

33

Appendix III 

U.S. Force Reductions

in Bosnia

40

Appendix IV 

Development of

NATO’s End-State

Objective for Bosnia

42

Appendix V 

Executive Branch

Objectives and

Conditions for

Creating an

Irreversible Peace

Process in Bosnia

44

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Contents

Appendix VI 

Peace Implementation

Council’s Set of

Conditions for a

Self-Sustaining Peace

in Bosnia

48

Appendix VII 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

50

Appendix VIII 

Comments From the

Department of State

54

Appendix IX 

Comments From the

U.S. European

Command

58

Tables Table 1: SFOR Support for the Civil Aspects of the Dayton

Agreement Since Mid-1997

6

Table 2: Troop Contributions to the SFOR Follow-on Force, as of

August 1998

17

Table II.1: Troop Contributions to the SFOR Follow-on Force, by

Country, as of August 1998

34

Table III.1: Other Countries’ Responses to Reductions in U.S.

Military Assets in Bosnia

41

Table V.1: U.S. Executive Branch Objectives and Conditions for

Ensuring a Self-Sustaining Peace Process

45

Figures Figure 1: Map of SFOR’s Military Sectors in Bosnia 12

Figure 2: Organization of the SFOR Follow-on Force, as of

August 1998

13

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Contents

Figure I.1: Organization of the Bosnia Peace Operation, as of

December 1997

31

Figure II.1: Organization of the U.S. Military Sector 36

Figure II.2: Organization of the French Military Sector 37

Figure II.3: Organization of the British Military Sector 38

Figure II.4: Organization of the SFOR Support Command in

Croatia

39

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

IFOR Implementation Force

IPTF International Police Task Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OHR Office of the High Representative

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SFOR Stabilization Force

UNHCR U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

UNMIBH U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix I 

Background

Implementing the Dayton Agreement is a complex, decentralized peace

operation designed to help Bosnia’s political leaders achieve the

commitments they had made in signing the agreement. These

commitments include providing a secure environment for the people of

Bosnia; developing the institutions and practices of a unified, multiethnic,

and democratic country that respects the rule of law; surrendering people

indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

to the tribunal; ensuring the right of refugees and displaced persons to

return to their prewar homes; and rebuilding the economy.

To assist the parties in their efforts, the international community

established military and civilian components of the Bosnia peace

operation. The peace operation consists of five principal organizations—a

multinational military force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) and four international civilian organizations. It also includes

numerous countries and international organizations that have donated

economic and other assistance to aid in Bosnia’s reconstruction and

recovery since late 1995.1

 Figure I.1 shows how the operation was

organized as of December 1997.

1

In the first year of Bosnia’s Priority Reconstruction Program, 59 donors—48 countries and

11 organizations—pledged $1.9 billion for Bosnia’s economic reconstruction. In the program’s second

year, the pace of donor contributions slowed somewhat as 31 of the program’s original donors pledged

an additional $1.2 billion. In 1998, 26 countries and 4 international organizations pledged an additional

$1.25 billion for the program, bringing the total amount pledged for Bosnia’s economic reconstruction

to $4.35 billion since late 1995.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix I 

Background

Figure I.1: Organization of the Bosnia Peace Operation, as of December 1997

Ground

operations

Air

operations

Naval

operations

NATO

NAC OSCE

PIC

steering

board

United

Nations

World Bank

European

Union

IMF, EBRD

Bilateral

donors

SHAPE

SFOR OHR UNHCR UNMIBH

Economic

reconstruction

projects CIMIC

Brcko

Supervisor IPTF

JCC Civil

Affairs

JCC

working

groups

OSCE

mission

Elections

Human

rights

Arms

control

Democratization

Interagency

task forces

Mine

Action

Center

CIMIC

EBRD

IMF

IPTF

JCC

NAC

NATO

OHR

OSCE

PIC

SFOR

SHAPE

UNHCR

UNMIBH

Legend

Civil Military Cooperation

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

International Monetary Fund

International Police Task Force

Joint Civilian Commission

North Atlantic Council

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Office of the High Representative

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Peace Implementation Council

Stabilization Force

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

Coordination

Outside Bosnia

Inside Bosnia

Note: Coordination in Bosnia occurs at all levels among these organizations.

Source: GAO analysis.

Authority

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix I 

Background

The peace operation’s military component consists of a NATO-led military

force. The North Atlantic Council, the political leadership of NATO,

authorized a military force, known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), for

a 1-year mission that began on December 20, 1995. Recognizing the need

for a continued NATO force in Bosnia, the North Atlantic Council in

December 1996 authorized SFOR for an 18-month period that ended on

June 20, 1998. The mandate of IFOR and later SFOR was to (1) monitor and

enforce the military aspects of the agreement, including the separation and

cantonment of the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb militaries in

Bosnia;2

 and (2) support the operation’s civilian organizations in

accomplishing their missions, when requested and if resources allowed.

The civilian component of the peace operation contained many

organizations. OHR was established by the Dayton Agreement to assist the

parties in implementing the civil aspects of the agreement and to

coordinate the operation’s civilian organization. Other organizations

participating in the operation include UNMIBH, with its unarmed, civilian

police monitoring operation—IPTF—and other components; OSCE, which

was to administer many aspects of and supervise countrywide elections,

monitor arms control measures, and monitor and report on human rights;

and UNHCR, which was responsible for developing a plan for and fostering

the phased, orderly return of Bosnia’s refugees and displaced persons, of

whom about 1.3 million have not returned home.

2

IFOR, and later SFOR, had the authority to use force to ensure implementation of annex 1A of the

Dayton Agreement and the protection of IFOR. The U.N. Security Council provided IFOR’s authority to

use force in resolution 1031 on December 15, 1995, and provided SFOR’s authority in resolution 1088

on December 12, 1996.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

This appendix provides information on troop contributions to SFOR by NATO

and non-NATO countries (see table II.1) and organizational charts for SFOR’s

three multinational divisions in Bosnia, as well as the support command in

Croatia (see figs. II.1 through II.4). The three divisions are led by the

United States, France, and the United Kingdom and operate in three

separate military sectors.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

Table II.1: Troop Contributions to the

SFOR Follow-on Force, by Country, as

of August 1998

Country In Bosnia In Croatia Total

NATO

Belgium 800 50 850

Canada 1,250 1,250

Denmark 747 747

France 2,500 a 2,500

Germany 2,470 a 2,470

Greece 280 280

Italyb 1,970 1,970

Luxembourg 18 18 36

Netherlands 1,080 1,080

Norway 615 615

Portugal 320 320

Spain 1,550 1,550

Turkey 1,520 1,520

United Kingdom 5,000 a 5,000

United Statesb, c 6,900 500d 7,400

Subtotal 26,740 848 27,588

(continued)

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

Country In Bosnia In Croatia Total

Non-NATO

Albaniae 35 35

Argentinab 68 68

Austria 230 230

Bulgaria 30 28 58

Czech Republic 640 640

Egypt 270 270

Estonia 41 41

Finland 341 341

Hungary 310 310

Ireland 50 50

Jordan 10 10

Latvia 39 39

Lithuania 40 40

Morocco 650 650

Poland 400 400

Russia 1,400 1,400

Romaniab 21 200 221

Sloveniab 22 35 57

Sweden 510 510

Ukrainef 380 380

Subtotal 4,947 803 5,750

Total 31,687 1,651 33,338

aNumber of troops deployed in Croatia is not available.

bIncludes the country’s contribution to SFOR’s new Multinational Specialized Unit.

cThe United States has deployed about 2,600 additional non-SFOR troops in Hungary and Italy in

support of U.S. SFOR troops.

dIncludes some non-SFOR troops supporting the SFOR operation.

eAs of September 1998.

f

Scheduled to increase the contribution during the summer and autumn of 1998.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

Figure II.1: Organization of the U.S. Military Sector

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Denmark)

Multinational

Division 

(North)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

Authority exercised by commander of Multinational Division (North) in conjunction with

Deputy Supreme Commander, Multinational Forces in Bosnia for Russian Forces

Operational authority

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(U.S.)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(U.S.)

Platoon

(Estonia)

 Platoon

(Lithuania)

Platoon

(Latvia)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Sweden)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Poland)

Transport 

Battalion

(Norway)

Military

Police

Battalion

(U.S.)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(U.S.)

Combat

Engineer Brigade

(U.S.)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

(U.S.)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

(Turkey)

Airborne 

Brigade

(Russia)

Support

Brigade

(U.S.)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Finland)

Note: SFOR’s consolidated aviation task force also provides sector support for Multinational

Division (North).

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

Figure II.2: Organization of the French Military Sector

Multinational

Division 

(Southeast)

Engineer

Battalion

(France)

Air Mobile

Company

(France)

Armored 

Reconnaissance

Company

(France)

Platoon

(Jordan)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

(Morocco)

Airborne 

Battalion

(Portugal)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Egypt)

Platoon 

(Ireland)

Military Police

Company

(France)

Platoon

(Albania)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Ukraine)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

(GermanyFrance)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

(Spain)

Mechanized

Infantry Brigade

(Italy)

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

Figure II.3: Organization of the British Military Sector

Multinational

Division 

(Southwest)

Armored 

Recon

Battalion

(U.K.)

Aviation

Battalion

(U.K.)

Artillery

Battalion

(U.K.)

Combat

Engineer

Battalion

(U.K.)

Military Police

Company

(U.K.)

HQ Defense

Company

(U.K.)

Platoon

(Bulgaria)

Platoon

(Luxembourg)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Canada)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Czech Republic)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Belgium)

Armored

Infantry Battalion

(U.K.)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(U.K.)

Mechanized

Infantry Battalion

(Netherlands)

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix II 

SFOR Troop Contributions and Organization

Figure II.4: Organization of the SFOR Support Command in Croatia

Support

Command

(U.K.)

Transport and

Security 

Company

(Greece)

Aviation

Battalion

Medical

Battalion

Combat

Engineer

Battalion

Transport

Battalion

Transport

Company

(Austria) Air Element 

(Slovenia)

Support Element 

(Belgium)

Logistics

Battalion

Combat

Engineer

Battalion

(Hungary)

Support

Group

(Germany-France)

Logistics

Battalion

Platoon

(Luxembourg)

Platoon

(Bulgaria)

Combat

Engineer

Battalion

(Romania)

Note: U.S. SFOR troops in Croatia serve in the SFOR support command and at the SFOR

headquarters in Zagreb.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix III 

U.S. Force Reductions in Bosnia

This appendix provides information on the drawdown of U.S. forces in

Bosnia from about 8,500 personnel to about 6,900 personnel. In planning

for the drawdown, the Department of Defense (DOD) expected other

countries to contribute additional assets to make up for some of the U.S.

force reductions; however, as shown in table III.1, other countries

generally did not commit to do so. According to the Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR), the “expected contributions” were SFOR

hopes—nothing more—as the countries never were committed to numbers

listed in the table below. DOD officials also said that there was never any

specific commitment by any country to provide additional forces; rather,

there was just a general sense that the allies might be prepared to meet

unfilled U.S. requirements.

In most cases, NATO reassessed its operational requirements during March

and April 1998 and determined that SFOR could accomplish its mission with

the reduced force levels that would result from the U.S. drawdown. The

United States, however, will provide 32 more civil affairs personnel than it

had originally planned to make up some of the shortfall in this category.

Also, a U.S. target acquisition battery will remain on call in Germany.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix III 

U.S. Force Reductions in Bosnia

Table III.1: Other Countries’ Responses to Reductions in U.S. Military Assets in Bosnia

U.S. military assets U.S. reductions

Expected contributions from

other countries

Actual pledges from other

countries

Two aviation task forcesa Consolidated two task forces into

one by August 1998; new task force

given dual-hatted mission of sector

support and theater operational

reserve.

Attack helicopters reduced from 40

to 16.

Medium lift helicopters reduced

from 25 to 15.

The reduction in helicopters

reduced the number of U.S. troops

in Bosnia by about 590.

A company of 10-12 attack

helicopters was expected to be

provided by another NATO country

(for a total of 26-28 attack

helicopters in the consolidated task

force). 

None expected.

2 attack helicopters were

pledged by the Netherlands

(for a total of 18 attack

helicopters in the

consolidated task force).

Not applicable.

Target acquisition batteryb This low-density, high-usage asset

is to be removed from Sarajevo

airport, located in the French

military sector, for a reduction of 30

U.S. troops in Bosnia.

Another NATO country was

expected to provide this resource.

None provided.

Civil affairs and

psychological operations

personnel

Number of these personnel in U.S.

military sector reduced significantly,

with psychological operations

personnel reduced to one-third of

previous numbers.

Unnamed countries were expected

to provide replacement civil affairs

personnel.

No replacements expected for

psychological operations personnel.

None provided.

Not applicable.

Artillery and fire supportc Reduced by 70 percent, for a

reduction of at least 400 U.S. troops

in Bosnia.

Unnamed countries were expected

to provide resources for some fire

support and field artillery units. 

The U.S. European Command

determined that other artillery

supportc could be removed from

Bosnia at a very low level of risk.

None provided.

Not applicable.

aOne of these task forces supported the U.S. military sector in Bosnia, and the other served as the

SFOR operational reserve that covered all of Bosnia.

bThe target acquisition battery at the Sarajevo airport consisted of one Q-36 radar and support

equipment with a crew of about 30 personnel. A target acquisition battery detects and tracks

incoming artillery and mortar rounds in order to direct artillery fire back to the source of the

incoming rounds.

cThe United States provided the bulk of this support to the Nordic-Polish brigade as a condition of

the brigade’s operations in Bosnia.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix IV 

Development of NATO’s End-State Objective

for Bosnia

This appendix provides a chronology showing the development of NATO’s

end-state objective for its operations in Bosnia from December 1995

through December 1996.

IFOR Established in

December 1995 With

No End-State

Objective

In December 1995, as directed by the North Atlantic Council, the operation

plan for the first NATO-led mission in Bosnia, IFOR, was approved with an

end date rather than an end-state objective.1

 In the absence of a defined

end state, IFOR’s objectives were to complete the military tasks specified in

the Dayton Agreement, to support the operation’s civilian organizations

when requested and if resources allowed, and to withdraw from Bosnia by

December 1996.

End-State Objective

Approved in

December 1996

The North Atlantic Council approved an end-state objective when it

established the second NATO-led mission in Bosnia—SFOR—in

December 1996. According to the SFOR operation plan, the desired NATO

end state is an environment adequately secure for the “continued

consolidation of the peace” without further need for NATO-led military

forces in Bosnia. The plan lists four conditions that must be met for the

desired end-state objective to be realized:

• The political leaders of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups must demonstrate a

commitment to continue negotiations as the means to resolve political and

military differences;

• Bosnia’s established civil structures must be sufficiently mature to assume

responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the Dayton Agreement;

• The political leaders of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups must adhere on a

sustained basis to the military requirements of the Dayton Agreement,

including the virtual absence of violations or unauthorized military

activities; and

• Conditions must be established for the safe continuation of ongoing,

nation-building activities.

In defining these conditions, NATO recognized that the ability of NATO forces

to withdraw without the conflict resuming is closely linked to the

achievement of the Bosnia peace operation’s civilian goals.

Although the SFOR operation plan defined an end-state objective, it also

asserted that these conditions would be achieved within 18 months, by

1

The Dayton Agreement provided little guidance about what would constitute a desired end state for

NATO operations in Bosnia. The agreement sought to establish “lasting security” based on a “durable

cessation of hostilities” but did not further define these terms.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix IV 

Development of NATO’s End-State

Objective for Bosnia

June 1998. The plan did not, however, provide information on how the

civil-related conditions were to be achieved or what criteria NATO would

use to determine when the desired end state had been realized. Instead,

the plan based the 18-month time frame on the assumption that the

international community would develop a political framework and civil

implementation strategy for 1997 and 1998 that would increase the

emphasis on efforts of the operation’s civilian organizations and Bosnia’s

political leaders to consolidate the peace.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix V 

Executive Branch Objectives and

Conditions for Creating an Irreversible

Peace Process in Bosnia

This appendix provides the key objectives and conditions (what the

executive branch refers to as “benchmarks”) that the executive branch

believes must be achieved if the peace process is to become irreversible

(see table IV.1). The objectives and conditions cover 10 different areas,

most of which are related to the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement.

The linkage between the executive branch “benchmarks” and a drawdown

of NATO-led forces in Bosnia is unclear. In early June 1998, a senior State

Department official said that NATO-led forces may be able to drawdown

and withdraw once a “critical mass” of progress toward some or all of

these “benchmarks” has been achieved. This official did not further define

the term “critical mass.” In a letter to Congress dated July 28, 1998, the

President said that the 10 conditions represent the point at which Dayton

implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led

military force. The letter did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led

military force.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix V 

Executive Branch Objectives and

Conditions for Creating an Irreversible

Peace Process in Bosnia

Table V.1: U.S. Executive Branch Objectives and Conditions for Ensuring a Self-Sustaining Peace Process

Area Objectives Conditions to be realized

Military stability Ensure absence of conflict; support

continued military balance.

Establish basis for interentity cooperation.

Prevent return of extremist influence.

Cease-fire maintained.

Weapons remain in storage, and arms

limits not exceeded.

Special police disbanded or restructured.

Interentity arms control and

confidence-building measures adopted.

Covert external support for entity armies

terminated.

Federation train and equip programa

completed; traditional support and

sustainment arrangement with Federation

Army in place.

Police and judicial reform Restructure, equip, and train police in

accordance with democratic standards.

Separate police forces from party/ethnic

control.

Reform and integrate judicial sector.

All local police forces restructured and

ethnically integrated, equipping underway.

Basic skill and human rights training

completed.

Police deal effectively with civil

disturbances and disorder.

Police academies functioning; leadership

professionalized.

Intelligence services/secret police stripped

of police function.

Effective judicial reform program in place.

Operationalize Bosnia’s institutions Entity/national institutions functioning and

taking increased control of functions now

under international authority.

Empower legitimate institutional control

over revenue collection and disbursement.

Dismantle corrupt, nongovernmental

entities/institutions.

Curb official corruption.

Outlawed pre-Dayton institutions dissolved.

Functioning customs services and control

over revenues established.

Transparency established in budgets and

disbursements.

Funds flowing to Bosnia’s national

institutions; permanent staff and facilities in

place.

(continued)

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix V 

Executive Branch Objectives and

Conditions for Creating an Irreversible

Peace Process in Bosnia

Area Objectives Conditions to be realized

Media reform Divest political parties of control over

media.

Access to media for all political parties.

Foster growth of independent media.

Political parties divested of control of

broadcast networks.

Entity- and national-level policy and

regulatory structures in place.

Opposition party access to airwaves for

future elections guaranteed under new

election law.

Alternative and/or independent media

generally available throughout Bosnia.

Electoral process and democratization Election results implemented.

Influence of extremists reduced as

moderates gain control.

Elections are conducted in a free and fair

manner.

Local, entity, and national governments

beginning to function transparently.

Parties accept binding arbitration for

implementation of results in contested

local elections.

Electoral laws modified to meet

international/OSCE standards.

September 1998 elections conducted in

free and fair manner.

Need for OSCE supervision reduced.

Economic reconstruction and recovery Republika Srpska economy improving,

Federation economy continues to improve.

Foster interentity trade, commercial links,

and inter-dependence.

Free market economic reforms in place.

Improve investment climate.

Interim currency circulating freely, being

used for official transactions.

Agreement reached on permanent

currency.

Public corporations formed; privatization

laws in line with Dayton.

Transparent budgets in place; government

control established over sources of

revenue.

Major infrastructure (i.e., transportation,

power, telecoms) repaired and functioning.

Businesses and industry are opening,

expanding.

International Monetary Fund program in

place, traditional lending programs begun.

(continued)

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix V 

Executive Branch Objectives and

Conditions for Creating an Irreversible

Peace Process in Bosnia

Area Objectives Conditions to be realized

Refugee returns A credible minority return process is

functioning.

Process for regional returns underway.

Entity property laws comply with Dayton.

Property Commission fully functioning.

Entity governments permit or participate in

phased, orderly, cross-ethnic returns.

Key cities have accepted substantial

returns (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar).

Local police protect returnees of all ethnic

groups.

Brcko Arbitral award implemented without

violence.

Secure environment for returns established.

Ethnic integration continues; multiethnic

administration functioning.

Local elections implemented.

Integrated police functioning.

Two-way returns progressing.

Ethnic reintegration of Brcko continues.

Economic investment, job creation

underway.

War crimes Parties to the Dayton Agreement

cooperate with the international war crimes

tribunal in arresting and prosecuting

indictees.

Significant number of top indictees at the

Hague.

Control of political, military, and media

sectors by war criminals terminated.

Indictees’ access to economic resources

terminated.

Entity justice sectors cooperating with the

war crimes tribunal.

Local authorities facilitate the

apprehension of indictees.

International organizations International organizations and agencies

effectively carry out implementation efforts

without military support.

Local authorities and/or entity armies

capable of assuming responsibility for

demining operations.

OHR demonstrates authority to encourage

and enforce interentity agreements without

military backup.

OSCE, NATO, and the European Union

develop more traditional relationships with

Bosnia.

aThe Federation train and equip program is a U.S.-led international effort to provide training and

equipment for the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries as they integrate into a unified Federation

military.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VI 

Peace Implementation Council’s Set of

Conditions for a Self-Sustaining Peace in

Bosnia

In a declaration dated June 9, 1998, the Steering Board of the Peace

Implementation Council—the body that provides political guidance to the

High Representative—established a set of 11 conditions that must be

realized for a self-sustaining peace to take hold in Bosnia. The Steering

Board did not attempt to link improvements in conditions to a drawdown

or withdrawal of NATO-led forces from Bosnia, nor did it establish specific

criteria for measuring progress in the 11 areas. The declaration stated the

following:

“The Steering Board underscores that conditions must be established in order for Bosnia

and Herzegovina to become a modern country with the key elements of democratic

institutions in place and the basic factors of ethnic confrontation removed: that requires a

self-sustaining peace. The Steering Board asks the High Representative to submit for its

consideration a report on the state of peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by

mid-September [1998]. The report should focus on progress in relation to, inter alia, the

following goals in the main areas:

• “A significant mass of returns reached and the phased, orderly, peaceful return of

 refugees and displaced persons on a self-sustaining basis in significant numbers.

• A self-sustaining and continuing cease-fire supported by transparent mechanisms for

 military to military cooperation.

• A core of basic legislation that imposes the rule of law and the establishment of an

 independent judiciary.

• Consolidation of free-market reforms, including a transparent privatisation that

 precludes political influence on the key economic sectors, and maintenance of an

 IMF [International Monetary Fund] program and effective free movement of goods,

 services and capital within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• The restructuring, re-integration, retraining and equipping of police in both Entities

 [the Federation and Republika Srpska] in accordance with democratic and

 professional standards.

• The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions, with revenue and disbursement

 mechanisms brought under the control of legitimate authorities.

• The regulation of media in accordance with democratic standards and the availability

 of free and independent media throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• The regular conduct of elections and implementation of election results in accordance

 with democratic standards.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VI 

Peace Implementation Council’s Set of

Conditions for a Self-Sustaining Peace in

Bosnia

• Cooperation by the Parties to the Peace Agreement with the ICTY [international war

 crimes tribunal] in the arrest and prosecution of war criminals.

• The consolidation of multi-ethnic institutions and of a secure environment for returns

 in Brcko.

• Full cooperation in peace implementation by neighbouring countries.”

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated September 3, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. Our report reflects DOD’s views that the new Multinational Specialized

Unit represents an additive capability rather than a replacement for SFOR

units. We have added information to convey DOD’s views that (a) the

one-battalion-strong unit is already quite capable and (b) the unit’s Italian

commander prefers to use the battalion’s organic ground transport rather

than air transport that is external to his control.

2. DOD’s comments present information on operational and strategic

analyses and commanders’ revised assessments without stating when

these analyses and assessments occurred. We revised our report to clarify

the timing of the various military assessments for U.S. participation in the

SFOR follow-on force.

As discussed in the report, none of the assessments provided to us by DOD

showed that the U.S. drawdown decision in January 1998 was based on an

operational or troop-to-task analysis of mission options. The troop-to-task

analyses done by the U.S. military prior to the drawdown decision, which

were the basis of the late October 1997 U.S. military/U.S. European

Command assessment, determined the U.S. force structure and force

levels necessary to perform (1) the current SFOR mission and (2) a

relatively restricted mission in a substantially more favorable operating

environment. Neither analysis showed that the U.S. military could

accomplish the current SFOR mission with only two combat battalions or

6,900 troops in Bosnia. In contrast, the options document referred to by

DOD said that the U.S. military could accomplish the current SFOR mission

with only two combat battalions in Bosnia, thereby allowing the U.S.

military to draw down to 6,900 troops.

After the U.S. drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military did the

troop-to-task analysis for the SFOR follow-on force concurrently with

NATO/SFOR and identified ways of reducing force levels in Bosnia to 6,900

troops while still maintaining three U.S. combat battalions in Bosnia.

According to officials from NATO military headquarters, DOD, and the U.S.

European Command, the U.S. military and NATO began these troop-to-task

analyses and the force generation process for the follow-on force in late

February 1998. During this process, SACEUR and the SFOR Commander

revised their assessments and concluded that SFOR could accomplish the

current SFOR mission with the reduced U.S. force levels. According to DOD

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Department of Defense

officials, NATO finalized its operational requirements for the SFOR follow-on

force in late April 1998 and, in late May 1998, officially approved the

operational requirements and decided to draw down SFOR force levels.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated September 11, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. We have expanded our discussion of the larger context of military and

civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, particularly in the area

of international efforts to bring war crimes indictees to justice. We also

noted that prior GAO reports on the Bosnia peace operation discuss in great

detail the larger context of international efforts in Bosnia.1

2. We believe that our report accurately reflects the status of the

Multinational Specialized Unit’s manning and readiness. Our report states

that the unit is not a replacement for U.S. or other SFOR combat units. We

note that State’s assertion that the unit adds to the capabilities of the

international community to implement all aspects of the Dayton

Agreement goes beyond the unit’s role as currently articulated by NATO. As

discussed in our report, NATO intends for the unit to enhance SFOR’s

capability to deal with civil disturbances associated with returns of

refugees and displaced persons and the installation of elected officials.

1

See Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement

Increased; Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement’s Goals; and

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement’s Goals—An Update.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix IX 

Comments From the U.S. European

Command

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix IX 

Comments From the U.S. European

Command

See comment 5.

Now on p. 39.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
Appendix IX 

Comments From the U.S. European

Command

The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. European Command’s letter

dated September 10, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. Appendix VII provides DOD’s comments on our draft report and our

response to them.

2. We believe SFOR’s scope of operations has expanded but not beyond the

bounds of the Dayton Agreement. We agree with the U.S. European

Command that annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement has always called for

the NATO-led force in Bosnia—first IFOR and later SFOR—to take control of

special police; however, we note that neither NATO-led force began to

control special police until mid-1997, after the High Representative had

asked NATO to do so. We have added information on this matter to the

report. We have also added the command’s view that because the Dayton

Agreement’s military objectives had largely been achieved, SFOR is in a

position to provide broad support to civil implementation, within its

existing mandate and capabilities.

3. Our report discussed the timing of the U.S. drawdown, but we modified

the report to clarify the information.

4. We believe our report accurately depicts the status of the Multinational

Specialized Unit. However, we have added the command’s view that one of

the unit’s two battalions is fully operational and most capable, as well as

information provided by the command on plans for the second battalion to

start operations during the spring of 1999 as forces are committed for this

purpose.

5. We did not intend for our report to leave the impression that NATO allies

are not fully supportive of force requirements for the SFOR mission; rather,

we had intended to describe the U.S. military and NATO/SFOR planning

processes for the SFOR follow-on force and to illustrate how operational

requirements for the force appeared to be driven by the planned reduction

in U.S. forces in Bosnia. Thus, the report included information on NATO

lowering its operational requirements for the follow-on force during the

force generation process that occurred after the U.S. decision to draw

down to 6,900 troops in Bosnia.

(711361) Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-19 Bosnia Peace Operation
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