Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 27 , 20 11

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

_________ _______ ___ NO. 14

- 10

- 00768

- CR NO. 14

- 10

- 00769

- CR

_____________ ______ NERY EDUARDO BENAVIDES , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1225222 & 1225223



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant, Nery Eduardo Benavides, was found guilty by a jury of agg ravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. 1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021 (West 2011). The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years‟ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of C riminal Justice on each conviction. We affirm.

1 The aggravated sexual assault of a child charge was brought in cause number 1225222, while the indecency with a child charge was brought in cause number 1225223.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND The complainant in both cause numbers is K.A. K.A. was fifteen years‟ old at the time of appellant‟s trial and was thirteen when she made her first outcry.

While K.A. was in eighth grade at Hambrick Middle School she was reading a book
about sexual abuse in her language arts class. K.A. became upset and laid her head down on her desk. When that class period ended, K.A. went to her next class and that teacher

sent K.A. to see a counselor.

Rose Alvarez is a counselor at an Aldine Independent School District (“AISD”)

m iddle s chool and she was the first witness to testify . K.A. came into Alvarez‟s office and sat down in the corner of the office. K.A. remained quiet, made no eye contact with Alvarez, and put her face in her hands. Alvarez had to leave her office for lunch duty, so he gave K.A. a piece of paper and asked her to write down her feelings and they would talk
about it when she returned.

When Alvarez returned to her of fice thirty minutes later, K.A. was still there. In Alvarez‟s absence, K.A. had written on the sheet of paper. The paper was entered into evidence as State‟s Exhibit 1. In addition to detailing K.A.‟s feelings, K.A. had also
written in three lines: “mad e me touch his private parts,” “licked me in private parts,” and “take clothes off and get on top of me.” Alvarez then began talking to K.A. about what she had written. The two of them went sentence by sentence through everything K.A. had written. They talked for more than an hour. During that discussion, Alvarez learned the sexual abuse had begun when K.A. was seven or eight and had con tinued for some period of time. K.A. identified appellant as one of the people who had sexually abused her.

Alvarez t estified that K.A. made A‟s and B‟s and that she had no discipline problems at school.
Alvarez informed the school principal of the situation and she then called the police. Deputy Mitchell Pena of the Harris County Sheriff‟s Department arrived soon after3

Alvarez had called the police. 2 After he arrived in Alvarez‟s office, Pena contacted Children‟s Protective Services (“CPS”) about the situation.
Alvarez also telephoned K.A.‟s mother, M.T. Alvarez asked M.T. if she could come to the school as quickly as possible. She also asked M.T. to come alone. Alvarez was not certain if she told M.T. the reason she was asking her to come to the school. M.T. arrived about 45 minutes after Alvarez called. Despite Alvarez‟s request that she come alone, M.T. was acco mpanied by a cousin. M.T. came into Alvarez‟s office and without talking to Alvarez, Pena, or K.A., she slapped K.A. twice with the flat of her hand. Pena instructed M.T. to calm down. Alvarez then told M.T. that K.A. had said that appellant,
her two ol der brothers, and a cousin had sexually assaulted her. Pena eventually took K.A. to CPS and when he did, M.T. followed in her own car. K.A. testified next. At the time of appellant‟s trial, K.A. was in the tenth grade at
AISD high s chool. K.A. plays bas ketball, volleyball, and she runs track. K.A. also
testified that she is still an A

- B student. K.A. testified that she stays out of trouble, has never been suspended, and has never been in a gang. K.A.‟s testimony then turned to the allegations against appellant. K.A. confirmed that she was upset by the book they were reading in her language arts class because the situation in the book “was kind of like what was going on with [her].” K.A. testified that she was about six years old when the abuse began . K.A. could not remember what grade
she was in when the abuse started. K.A. verified that she had detailed the sexual abuse she experienced in the writing she had done in Alvarez‟s office. According to K.A., in the first incident, appellant took her in to his bedroom and he touched her breast and private parts underneath her clothes. She testified that appellant stopped when they heard someone coming. K.A. did not tell anyone about the incident because she was afraid no
one would believe her. K.A. tes tified the abuse occurred almost every day. K.A.

2 Deputy Pena testified that his first name is “Mitchell;” however, he is identified in the c ontents section of the Reporter‟s Record as “Jose.”4

testified the incidents occurred in appellant‟s bedroom, her bedroom, and the trailer‟s bathroom. During some of the incidents, appellant came into K.A.‟s room wearing only a towel, he would place K.A. on his lap and mak e her touch his pr ivate parts. K.A. also testified that appellant would place his mouth on her private parts. According to K.A.,
this occurred about two times. K.A. also testified that appellant would take his clothes off and get on top o f K.A. K.A. explained the incidents occurred during the day after she came home from school. According to K.A., there were no adults home when the incidents took place. According to K.A., the incidents went on for a long time.

K.A.‟s father died when sh e was a little girl. Her mother, M.T. eventually married another man, Evelio . According to K.A., they lived alone in a three bedroom trailer located off West Little York. The family eventually moved the trailer a few blocks away
to a location on Cedar H ill. K.A. could not remember exactly when they moved, but she testified it could have been the summer before she started the fourth grade. K.A. testified that appellant , who was Evelio ‟s nephew from Honduras, lived with them when the trailer

was o n West Little York
, not when they lived on Cedar Hill. 3 K.A. was not certain how long appellant lived with them in the trailer, but she thought it was a long time , more than a

year

. K.A. testified that while appellant was living in the trailer, she shared a room with her two brothers, E .A. and J .A. According to K.A., while he lived in the trailer, appellant
had his own bedroom.

K.A. testified that she has lived with her aunt , her mother‟s sister, in an almost identical trailer, since sh e reported the abus e. K.A. also testified that , prior to the time she reported the sexual abuse, she had a good relationship wi th her mother. K.A. considered
her mother to be a s trict, but good mother. K.A. testified that her mother did n ot ask her what was wrong when she came to Alvarez‟s office. K.A. also testified that she has never
talked to her mother about the abuse. She also testified that her mother has told her that

3 K.A. explained the sequence of various relatives moving into the trailer on West Little York. According to K.A., appellant arrived first, followed by her brother E.A., and finally her other brother J. A. All came from Honduras.5

she does not believe K.A. was sexually abused. However, despite telling K.A. she does
not believ e she has been sexually abused, K.A. testified that her mother drives her to therapy at the Children‟s Assessment Center once a week. K.A.‟s mother continues to do
this even though CPS no longer requires that K.A. go to therapy.
During her testimony, K .A. denied having a boyfriend at the time she first reported
the sexual abuse. K.A. also denied that she hung around with people she had been told not to hang around with. K.A. denied that when she was thirteen, she wanted to stay out later
than her moth er allowed. She also denied that she had ever sought out information about how to join a gang or that her brother Edwin had seen her doing that and had rep orted it to
her mother.
Deputy Pena was the next witness to testify. Pena testified that he respond ed to the call reporting a sexual assault. According to Pena, he went to Alvarez‟s office where he interviewed K.A. Pena described K.A. as scared and afraid, specifically that she was
afraid of her mother. Pena testified that M.T. arrived while he was o n the telephone with CPS. He then heard M.T. screaming and hitting K.A. Pena then heard K.A. crying and yelling because M.T. had struck her. Pena separated K.A. and her mother and he then explained the situation to M.T. Pena then drove K.A. to the CPS facility. Pena said K.A. was scared and crying the whole time he was with her. Sergeant James Fitzgerald from the Harris County Sheriff‟s Department testified next. Fitzgerald was assigned to the Children‟s Assessment Center and he was the investigator o n K.A.‟s sexual abuse complaints. 4 Fitzgerald was investigating all four people K.A. had accused of abusing her. Fitzgerald was able to contact and talk to both of

4 Fitzgerald explained the function of the Children‟s Assessment Center. According to Fitzgerald, the Children‟s Assessment Center is a one

- stop facility to investigate allegations of child sexual abuse. Law enforcement, CPS w orkers, psychologists, and pediatric medical specialists are all assigned to the Center and they are able to completely investigate allegations of sexual abuse and also provide psychological services and any other follow

- up services a sexual abuse victim m ight require.6

K.A.‟s brothers, but he was unable to locate the cousin, and was not able to talk to

appe llant. Fitzgerald detailed how he investigated K.A.‟s sexual abuse complaints. Initially,
he watched the videotape of K.A.‟s initial interview with the Houston Police Department at the Children‟s Assessment Center. According to Fitzgerald, the statements made by K.A. in her police interview were consistent with her initial report of sexual abuse. Fitzgerald
also interview ed family members and school counselors to get K.A‟s history. Fitzgerald testified he did not uncover anything during his investigatio n that made him question
K.A.‟s statements. Fitzgerald also testified that K.A. did not exhibit any behavior changes or change in her grades. According to Fitzgerald, this is fairly consistent with delayed outcry cases. Fitzgerald also reported that K.A. did not have any criminal history or history of gang involvement. This was the case despite the fact that one of K.A.‟s brothers told Fitzgerald that he thought K.A. was trying to join a gang. One brother also told Fitzgerald he believed K.A. had a boyf riend. However no one could tell Fitzgerald the nam e and he never followed up on that information

. Fitzgerald testified that he found it a little odd that the brothers could not provide any details such as the name of the gang, or some idea of
what it wa s or where the gang was located. The State rested at the conclusion of Fitzgerald‟s testimony.
Appellant then called several witnesses. Appellant‟s first witness was M.T., K.A.‟s mother. M.T. testified that she believed appellant came to live in her tra iler in
2000 and that he lived there f or about six months. According to M.T., when appellant moved into the trailer, five people were already living there: M.T., Evelio , K.A., and K.A.‟s half

- brothers K. and C. M.T. testified that appellant started worki ng with her
husband Evelio the day after his arrival from Honduras. M.T. also testified that appellant
and Evelio worked six days a week from six in the morning to six or seven in the ev ening.7

M.T. also testified about K.A.‟s sexual abuse allegations. M. T. received a call from a school counselor who asked her to come to the school immediately. M.T. told the counselor she needed the reason so she could explain to her boss why she needed to leave work early. According to M.T., the counselor told her that K.A. “had had sex.” M.T. admitted she was upset when she arrived at the school and that she slapped K.A. According to M.T., she slapped K.A. because she thought K.A. had had sex with one of her school friends and M.T. felt this had broken her trust by no t telling her first. M.T. testified the counselor and the deputy explained the reason she had been called to the school. M.T.‟s response was “that‟s not right . That that‟s a lie.” M.T. told the deputy th is even though she had not talked to K.A., she si mply did not believe her allegations. In addition,
M.T. testified that none of he r family believes K.A.
M.T. also denied K.A. and the other young children were ever left alone in the trailer, not even after they got off from school. According to M.T., th e children would get dropped off the school bus at her sister Blanca‟s trailer and she would then take car e of the
children after school. M.T. directly testified she did not believe K.A. was telling the truth.
M.T. testified that she had always had an exc ellent relationship with K.A. until K.A. reached the age of thirteen. According to M.T., K.A. wanted the same amount of freedom that her two older brothers had at that time. When M.T. refused to bend on her rules, K.A. became upset with her. K.A. then a lways got very quiet around M.T. and started telling her that she wanted to live with M.T.‟s sister. M.T. thought K.A. wanted to live with her aunt because “she gives her, her freedom.” As an example of the freedom K.A. has living with her aunt, M.T. tes tified that K.A. now goes to parties every weekend and can stay out until one or two o‟clock in the morning.
M.T. also testified that K.A. had expressed interest in finding out about gang activities and she believed K.A. was hanging out with a neighbor, a person M.T. believed

m ight not be of good character. However, on cross

- examination, M.T. admitted she had8

never been called to school because K.A. had gotten in trouble, that K.A. gets very good grades, and is on several sports teams.
Finally, M.T. test ified that she still takes K.A. to therapy once a week.
The next witness to testify was Evelio , M.T.‟s husband. Evelio testified appellant
i s his nephew and he arrived from Honduras on April 27, 2000. According to Evelio
, appellant started working for him the day after his arrival. Evelio testified they worked six days a week and they worked from six in the morning until six or seven in the evening.
Evelio also testified that appellant lived in the trailer for about six months.

Evelio testified that he did not believe K.A.‟s accusations. He also admitted he had never discussed the allegations with appellant. Evelio also admitted that he, M.T., E.A., and J.A., had met with appellant‟s defense counsel to prepare for the trial. According to
Evelio , they discuss ed K.A.‟s allegations.
E.A. was the next witness to testify for appellant. According to E.A., he lived in the trailer with K.A., M.T., Evelio , and his two little brothers. E.A. testified appellant
came from Hond uras after he did. E.A. testified the first time he met appellant was when he arrived at the trailer from Honduras. E.A. also testified appellant lived in the trailer for
about six months. E .A. denied sexually abusing K.A. E.A. classified M.T. as a str ict
mother. On cross

- examination, E.A. admitted he was not able to provide Fitzgerald with any information about any gangs K.A. might have been interested in or the name of any boyfriend K.A. might have had. Finally, E.A. testified that he does not belie ve his sister and believes she is making up all of the accusations against appellant.
Next, appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant testified he arrived in the United States in April of 2000 when he was seventeen. Appellant moved in with his uncle
and he lived there for about six months. Appellant also worked with his uncle as a plumber‟s assistant. According to appellant, he worked in that job from April 200 0 until9

April of 2003. Appellant testified that he and h is uncle worked every day, with an occasional Sunday at home. Appellant then denied K.A.‟s accusations. Appellant also admitted he never talked to Fitzgerald during his investigation of K.A.‟s accusations.

On cross

- examination, in response to a question asking how long it took him to earn a journeyman‟s or apprentice plumber‟s license, appellant answered: “Sir, given my illegal situation, I couldn‟t obtain a plumbing license, but on behalf of the company, I got a helper‟s license.” Appellant then admitted that both he and his e ntire family were aware that a conviction meant that he could be permanently deported.
When asked about the fact he never met with Fitzgerald during his investigation, appellant admitted his uncle never told him that somebody was looking for him. Appellan t also testified that his uncle did not know where he lived, his telephone number, or any way to get in touch with him. Appellant then testified: “Between my uncle and I, we don‟t spend much time together.” Appellant also admitted that he had never spoke n with his uncle or any of his uncle‟s family about K.A.‟s accusations. Then, in response to the following: “So, without talking to you, everyone just doesn‟t believe [K.A.]. They just assume you are t elling the truth, correct?” appellant answered “Yes, sir.”
After appellant testified, appellant rested. The State then called two rebuttal

w itnesses. T he first rebuttal witness was Dr. Danielle Medera
, a staff psychologist at the Children‟s Assessment Center who had worked with K.A. for approximately one year

. Medera testified about the effects of sexual abuse on children. According to Medera, “the effects of trauma all depend on the individual.” As a result, therapists such as herself, “see a huge spectrum of symptoms in the children depending on age an d g ender and what not.” Medera testified that while some children may experience bad grades and discipline issues as a result of abuse, others, such as a child who is experiencing trauma at home on a daily basis, might do very well in school because they view school as a safe10

place where they can control their own life

. Medera then turned specifically to K.A. Medera testified that K.A. did have a lot of interpersonal issues when she started working with her. According to Medera, K.A. “has problems makin g eye contact, making friends, trusting people. So while she may have had an A in a regular English class, she has a lot of symptomatology. She may be bright but she‟s also suffering in a lot of other areas.”

Medera also testified about children and thei r memory regarding traumatic events. According to Medera, children frequently have fragmented memories regarding the
traumatic event. She then testified that : [d] epending on the child, there may be salient features of the i ncident that stick with them. I t could be sensory issues like sight, smell, where they

were. A lot of times, if you have a child that‟s been victimized and

re

- victimized over years, expecting them to go back and remember exactly how old they were on this one incident, you know, at what time of day it was when they were raped on a daily basis, none of us could remember that four years ago. If it is something that happened to you every day, you wouldn‟t remember the time that it happened on Wednesday, four years ago, necessarily, what da tes and times. Medera next testified about delayed disclosure of sexual abuse. According to Medera, over half of her patients had a delayed outcry. Medera explained delayed outcry
often results from the fact that the abuser is someone the victim knows a nd trusts. As a result of that dynamic, the sexual abuse victim starts “feeling shame or guilt” and that causes them to delay d isclosing the abuse. Medera then discussed what may cause or trigger a child to disclose sexual abuse. Medera explained this v aries from child to child
and it is not unusual for the initial disclosure to occur wi th a non

- family member. According to Medera, this is especially true if the victim has a particularly close relationship with a family member, such as a mother. Medera explained the child is trying to protect the family member.11

Medera also explained that it is not unusual for family members to not believe a child alleging sexual abuse. Medera testified that parents are frequently in denial often because they “don‟t wan t to believe that this happens in society, let alone this happened in your house.” Medera then turned specifically to K.A.‟s case :

[K.A.‟s] mother, from what [K.A.] describes in group therapy, does not believe that the abuse happened. The conflict that we see is that [K.A.‟s] case is closed with CPS. There‟s no reason, once CPS stops mandating the child comes to therapy, that she needs to be transported or brought to therapy. So, basically, mom could have stopped bringing her when CPS closed the case. But mom continually brings her to therapy on time. Every week we see [K.A.]. So, for me, my question is, if you really don‟t believe it happened, why would you continually bring your daughter to therapy? At some level does she know what happened[?]

Med era was then asked about „coaching.” Medera testified she did not believe K.A. had been coached. In Medera‟s experience, the coaching cases she had seen occurred in divorce situations. Medera explained you can frequently discover when a
child has been c oached because it is difficult for a child to keep straight in their minds the story they are supposed to tell because it really did not happen to them. Medera then testified that she did not have any coaching concerns about K.A. and that K.A. has
maintai ned her version of events since Medera started working with her.

On cross

- examination, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense Counsel]: Would you agree with me, Doctor, that not all kids tell the

truth?
[Medera]: Yes, I agree with you.
[Defense Coun sel]: Would you also agree with me that even though some kids go

through therapy, they might not be telling the truth?
[Medera]: About the sexual abuse?
[Defense Counsel]: Yes.12

[Medera]: I do not believe that children make this up.
[Defense Counsel]: You ‟re basically testifying in front of this jury that you don‟t

think that kids make up situations dealing with sexual abuse?
[Medera]: In my clinical experience, the only time I‟ve seen children say

something like this is in a coaching case. And in th is case coaching isn‟t relevant.
[Defense Counsel]: I just gave an example where the kids with mama move into a

new house with a new stepfather, a new father. The mother never tells the kids, “here, say things about the new father so that I can split up with the new father and go back to your father.” It‟s basically something that‟s created by the kids themselves.
[Medera]: I understand children saying things to be able to break up the

new marriage, but sexual abuse is not something that children can make up to break up anything.
[Defense Counsel]: Your testimony here today is that kids don‟t make up sexual

abuse allegations to break up a family?
[Medera]: In my clinical experience at the CAC, no, I have not seen that

situation happen, and especially keeping a story consistent over this length of time. There‟s no reason for a child to do that. The second rebuttal witness was Stacey Sederis, an assistant district attorney with the Harris County District Attorney‟s office. Sederis testified regarding two issue s: (1) the procedures involved in handling investigations of child abuse allegedly committed by a juvenile , who, by the time the alleged victim makes an outcry, has become an adult; and (2) the District Attorney‟s decision to not accept charges ag ainst K.A .‟s t wo older brothers.
T he esse n ce of Sederis‟ testimony is that the reason the District Attorney‟s office did not accept charges against K.A.‟s now adult brothers E.A. and J.A. was a matter of timing.
According to Sederis, when a person is suspected of committing a sexual assault as a juvenile, but has become an adult by the time the victim discloses the incident, the district attorney, in order to prosecute the suspect, must get the suspect certified as an adult.13

Sederis then explained it was the poli cy of the Harris County District Attorney to not seek to certify a juvenile suspected of committing a crime as an adult unless it is a murder, capital murder, or agg ravated sexual assault. Sederis then continued:

In sex cases it‟s extremely rare for us to certify a sex case, whether it‟s an indecency or sexual assault of a child because normally what he [sic] want

- - kind of the way the office views it is we need to provide as many services as possible to that juvenile so that we can help them kind of transition into adulthood without having any sort of psychological or emotional problems. And the juvenile probation department has many, many services for kids, whereas the adult system doesn‟t. So it‟s very rare for us as an office to certify any sort o f sex crime unless the

- - unless there‟s something really aggravating about it; for instance, a gun or any sort of weapon was used, or the complainant was kidnapped, or something like that, then we may consider certification.

Sede ris then t estified that the decision was made not to accept the charges against K.A.‟s older brothers because the district attorney‟s office was “boxed into a legal loophole
because [it] did not find out about those cases until later because the complainant didn‟t outcry on those . I believed in the merits of the case. I believed that we should accept charges o n both of those suspects. My superior, the prosecutor above me, also believed that we should accept charges on those cases. We both believed the complainant was telling t he truth, we just couldn‟t because of the age.”
Following the close of the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of both charges

. The trial court assessed appellant‟s punishment at twenty years‟ confinement in the
Institutional Division of the Texas D epartment of C riminal Justice on each conviction

. This appeal followed.

D ISCUSSION Appella nt raises five issues on appeal . We address each of those issues in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the evidence14

In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence adduced at trial by the State wa s insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree.

A. The standard of review
In a sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact cou ld have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Salinas v. State , 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness‟ s testimony. Jones v. State , 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence pr esented, credit the witnesses it chooses to, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it
sees fit. Sharp v. State , 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Reconciliation of
conflicts in the evidence is w ithin the jury‟s discretion, and such conflicts alone will not call for reversal if there is enough credible evidence to support a conviction. Losada v.
State , 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An appellate court may not

re

- evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence produced at trial and in so doing substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. King v. State , 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State , 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure the jury
reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993);
Harris v. State , 164 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref‟d).

B. Analysis

Appellant was charged with two offenses : aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. To establish the offense of aggravated sexual ass ault of a child, the State must prove appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the sexual organ of a15

child to contact or penetrate the mouth of another person, including the actor, and the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii)
, (a)(2)(B) (West 2011). To establish the offense of indecency with a child, the State must prove appellant engaged in sexual contact with a child younger than seventeen years of age and that appellant is not the person‟s spous e. Id. at § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. at § 21.01(2).

In this case, the State presented the testimony of K.A. detailing the sexual abuse inflicted by appellant

. K.A.‟s testimony described exactly what appellant did to her as
well as where the abuse occurred. K.A. also provided a timeframe for when the abuse
occurred. This evidence, the testimony of K.A. describing the events, standing alone is sufficient to support appellant‟s convictions. 5 See Lane v. State , 174 S.W.3d 376, 386 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref‟d) (concluding that, because th e complainant was able to describe the sexual contact, the location where the contact occurred, and her statements were consistent with the statements she made at the Children‟s Assessment Center, her testimony was sufficient to support the conviction) ; se e also Jensen v. State , 66 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref‟d) (“The testimony of a victim, standing alone, even when the victim is a child is sufficient to support the con viction for sexual assault.”). The jury also heard th e various witnesses who testified they did not believe K.A. had been sexually abused by appellant. However, the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Tinker v. State , 148 S.W.3d 666 , 669 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Therefore, the jury could reasonably have chosen to believe K.A.‟s testimony and disbelieve the testimony of appellant and K.A.‟s family members.

5 This evidence includes K.A.‟s testimony she was not married to appellant and her age at the time of the events at issue in this case.16

We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant‟s conviction. We overrule appellant‟s first issue.

II. D ate of the alleged offenses in the indictments

In his second issue, appellant contends his due process rights were violated because the indictments did not specify a date or distinguish be tween conduct on any given date that corresponded reasonably near the date alleged in the indictment s : “on or about November 29, 2004.” Appellant goes on to argue that K.A. testified the sexual abuse occurred when she was six or seven years old which woul d place the events in either 2000 or 2001, three years earlier than the date alleged in the indictment s

. 6 According to appellant, this violated his right to adequate notice as guaranteed by the D ue P rocess of L aw C lause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In both indictments, the State alleged appellant committed the offenses on or about November 29, 2004 . In addition, both jury charges instructed the jury they were not bound by the specific date alleged in the indictment. Ins tead, the jury was instructed “that a conviction may be had upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense, if any, was committed at any time withi n the period of limitations.” At the time the offenses were committed, t he statute of limitations for both aggravated sexual assault of a child a nd indecency with a child is ten years from the date of the victim‟s eighteenth birthday. See Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 740, §§ 1, 4, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2403 (amended 2007) (current version at T ex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.01(1 ) (West Supp.
200 9 ) ) (sexual assault) ; see also Act of May 30, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1162, § 6, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3802, 3806 (amended 2009) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.01(1) (West Supp . 2009)) (indecency with a child)

.

6 This calculation is based on K.A.‟s birth date of November 30, 1994.17

Typically, the date alleged in an indictment is an approximation that allows the State to prosecute a defendant for acts occurring within the limitations period. Hendrix v.
State , 150 S.W.3d 839, 853 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref‟d). The “on or about” language of an indictment allows the State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the in dictment and within the statutory limitations period. Id. Therefore, when an indictment alleges that some relevant event transpired “on or about” a particular date, the accused is put on notice to prepare for proof that the event happened at any time wit hin the statutory limitations period. Thomas v. State , 753 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We overrule appellant‟s second issue on appeal.

III. Appellant’s vouching claim

In his third issue, appellant complains that the prosecutor engaged in egr egious conduct by eliciting testimony that impermissibl y vouch ed for K.A. and then referencing that testimony in his closing argument. Appellant contends the prosecutor initially engaged in impermissible vouching by calling Sederis to the witness stand a nd then he :
[L] unged into how the workings of the Harris County District Attorney‟s intake division worked and how it was that juvenile cases were considered through the juvenile division of the Harris County District Attorney‟s intake division in order to explain what it was that caused the District Attorney‟s office to reject filing charges against KA‟s brothers and to emphasize the credibility of KA and the credibility of the district attorney‟s office when charges are ultimately brought to bear upon an accused.

A ppellant also contends that the State engaged in improper vouching during closing argument when the prosecutor, referencing the State‟s decision to not accept charges against K.A.‟s two older brothers, said: “The case law is very clear. Our hand s were basically tied, certainly on the younger brother.” The end result of all this according to appellant, was that it was as if the prosecutor himself was testifying.18

In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must reflect that i t

was brought to the attention of the trial court in accord with applicable rules by a timely request, objection, or motion which specifically sets out the nature of the complaint in a sufficiently comprehensible manner that it informs the trial court of i ts nature and basis and
obtained e ither an adverse ruling or a refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) ; Moore v.
State , 278 S.W.3d 444 , 451 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009 , no pet.)

. Prosecutorial misconduct is an independent basis for an objection that must be specifically urged in order for error to be preserved. Temple v. State , 342 S.W.3d 572, 603 n.10 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet. ). In support of his argument tha t the prosecutor engaged in egregious conduct, appellant referenced numerous pages in the reporter‟s record. However, nowhere on the referenced pages did appellant lodge a prosecutorial misconduct objection. Therefore, we conclude appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.

To the extent appellant‟s third issue can be construed as an issue complaining that the trial court erred by admitting evidence that improperly vouched for K.A.‟s credibility, we conclude appellant has also failed to preserve that issue for appellate review as he did not object on that basis in the trial court. 7 We overrule appellant‟s third issue.

IV. Appellant’s bolstering claim

In his fourth issue, appellant contends the prosecution improperly bolstered K.A. ‟s credibility by eliciting testimony on that subject from three different witnesses : Fitzgerald, Sederis, and Medera. In support of this issue appellant once again cites to numerous pages in the reporter‟s record of appellant‟s trial. However, having ch ecked the referenced pages, we find no objections that the challenged testimony improperly bolstered K.A.‟s credibility. For the reasons stated above in P art III of this opinion, we hold

7 We note appellant admits there we re no objections lodged in his discussion of his fifth issue asserting his trial counsel was ineffective.19

appellant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. We ov errule appellant‟s fourth issue on appeal.

V. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim

In his final issue on appeal , appellant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (1) failed to object to allegedly improper vou ching and bolstering testimony ; (2) failed to limit the testimony of Alvarez, the outcry witness ; and (3) failed to object to the State‟s allegedly improper and prejudicial final argument.

A. The standard of review

In reviewing claims of ineffective assi stance of counsel, we apply a two prong test.
See Salinas v. State , 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To
establish ineffective assistance of couns el, appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his trial counsel‟s representation was deficient in that it fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s def

iciency, the result of the trial would have been different. Id.
An accused is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. King v. State , 649 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). However, reasonably effective assistance of
counsel does not mean error

- free representation. Ex parte Felton , 815 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance, the appellate court looks to the totality of th e representation and the particular circumstances of the case. Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). There is a strong presumption that counsel‟s actions and decisions were reasonably professional and were motivated by sound trial strategy. Salinas , 163 S.W.3d at 740; Stults v. State , 23 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref‟d). To overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, “any allegation of ineffectiveness must20

be firmly founded in t he record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 814. When determining the validity of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, any judicial review must be highly deferential to
trial counsel and avoid the deleterious effects of hindsight. Ingham, v. State , 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). When the record is silent as to the reasons for trial counsel‟s conduct, a finding that trial counsel was ineffective would require impermissib le speculation by the appellate court. Stults , 23 S.W.3d at 208. Absent specific explanations for counsel‟s decisions, a record on direct appeal will rarely contain sufficient
information to evaluate an ineffective assistance claim. Bone v. State , 77 S. W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When trial counsel has not had an opportunity to explain his or her actions or inactions, an appellate court cannot find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no competent attorne y would have engaged in it.” Goodspeed v. State , 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If a criminal defendant can prove trial counsel‟s performance was deficient, he still must prove he was prejudiced by his counsel‟s actions. Thompson , 9 S.W.3d a t 812. This requires the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the trial counsel had acted professionally. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine c onfidence in the outcome.
Malett v. State , 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

B. Vouching and bolstering

In the first part of his final issue, appellant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object to evidence that he argues c onstituted a direct comment on the truth of K.A.‟s allegations against appellant. Under this sub

- issue, appellant challenges his trial counsel‟s failure to object to Fitzgerald‟s testimony during the State‟s

case

- in

- chief
, as well as Medera ‟s and Sederis‟ rebuttal testimony. In addition, while acknowledging that in most cases the record is inadequate on direct appeal to resolve
ineffective assistance of counsel claims
, appellant argues this case falls into that small21

group of cases where the record establ ishes ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law despite the fact trial counsel has not had an opportunity to explain his handling of appellant‟s defense.
To overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, any allegation
of ineffe ctiveness must be firmly founded in the record and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. In addition, appellant‟s trial counsel was not afforded t he opportunity to explain his decisions or trial strategy. Accordingly, the record is silent as
to the reason s for trial counsel‟s conduct.

T he Court of Criminal Appeals recently addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel case involving facts similar to those at issue here. See Lopez v. State , 343 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In Lopez , the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it is a rare case in which trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and an appellate court may address and dispose of the claim on direct appeal. Id. at 143. The court declared that it is a “difficult hurdle to overcome: the record must dem onstrate that counsel‟s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, and that no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel‟s acts or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Id. The cour t went on to hold that because the record was silent as to why trial counsel failed to object to the extra outcry witnesses‟ testimony which served solely to enhance the complainant‟s credibility, the defendant
failed to meet his burden under the first Str ickland prong. Id. We turn first to appellant‟s allegation that his trial counsel‟s performance was deficient because he did not object to four different parts of Fitzgerald‟s testimony during
the State‟s case

- in

- chief. First, appellant contends his trial counsel should hav e objected when the State asked Fitzgerald if there was anything in his investigation that made him question K.A.‟s statements. Fitzgerald answered “no.” Second, appellant complains that his trial counsel should have objected when the State asked Fitzger ald “what sort of22

research did you do on [K.A.] just for your own knowledge on whether or not she may be telling the truth or lying?” Fitzgerald then detailed his investigation of K.A.‟s complaints. Third, appellant asserts his trial counsel should have objected when the State asked “when presenting these cases for charges, do y ou input your own opinion and your own background and expertise into whether or not you believe charges are more valid than others?” Fitzgerald answered “Yes, sir, I do.” Finally , appellant complains that his trial counsel should have objected when the State asked “[a]nd you felt after your investigation to file the charges?” Fitzgerald answered “yes, sir.”

E ven assuming Fitzgerald‟s testimony was a direct comment on K.A.‟s cre dibility
, it is plausible that appellant‟s trial counsel did not object to the above testimony because he sought to attack K.A.‟s credibility by having Fitzgerald testify on his investigation and the reasons why charges were not brought against the three o ther people K.A. alleged had sexually abused her. See Alexander v. State , 282 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref‟d ) ( “a strategy that seeks to establish that the defendant is not guilty while discrediting contrary testimony by the State‟s key witness on elements of the charged offense is objectively reasonable”). Therefore, since the record is silent as to why appellant‟s trial counsel failed to object to Fitzgerald‟s testimony, appellant did not me e t his burden under the first Strickland prong. L opez , 343 S.W.3d at 143 ; Goodspeed , 187
S.W.3d at 392

. We turn next to the testimony of the two rebuttal witnesses, Medera and Sederis.
Madera testified (1) on the characteristics of coaching ; (2) that K.A. had maintained her version of the events throughout the time Medera had dealt with her ; and (3) she did not believe K.A. had been coached. During Sederis‟ s testimony, she explained why the decision was made to not accept charges against K.A.‟s b rothers. Sederis also testified that she “believed in the merits of the case. I believed that we should accept charges on both of those suspects. My superior, the prosecutor above me, also believed that we should accept charges on those cases. We belie ved [K.A.] was telling the truth, we just23

couldn‟t because of the age.” Appellant asserts his trial counsel‟s failure to objec t to this testimony qualifies as one of those rare cases whe n the record on direct appeal establishes
ineffective assistance of c ounsel even though it does not reveal his trial counsel‟s subjective reasoning.
Once again, even assuming the challenged testimony was a n improper direct comment on K.A.‟s credibility, it is plausible that appellant‟s trial counsel did not object to
the ab ove testimony as part of a reasonable trial strategy to deal with a case that would be
de cided by whether or not the jury believed K.A.‟s testimony. 8 Specifically, appellant‟s trial counsel could have elected not to object to Medera‟s testimony because he wanted the opportunity to attack K.A.‟s credibility by having Medera testify about possible motives K.A. might have to fabricate her allegations against appellant. Likewise, appellant‟s trial counsel may not have objected to Sederis‟ s testimony as he saw an additional opportunity to attack K.A.‟s credibility by emphasizing the role of the investigating officer in the district attorney‟s decision to not accept charges against K.A.‟s brothers. During

cross

- examination, Fitzgerald testified that both of app ellant‟s brothers denied K.A.‟s allegations. Fitzgerald also testified that he “saw nothing to disbelieve what they were telling me.” Appellant‟s trial counsel was then able to emphasize Fitzgerald‟s role in the district attorney‟s decision not to accept charges against the brothers during Sederis‟ s testimony in an effort to convince the jury that K.A. was not telling the truth in any of her allegations. We conclude appellant‟s trial counsel‟s failure to object to Medera‟s and
Sederis‟ s testimony does no t constitute conduct so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. Therefore, s ince the record is silent as to why appellant‟s trial

8 During the final seconds of his closing argument during the guilt

- innocence phase, appellant‟s trial counsel told the jury: “it comes down to whethe r you want to believe [K.A.] or you want to believe the mother, Evelio the father, [E.A.] the brother, [appellant] the father‟s nephew, and they are all circling the wagons just because they don‟t want [appellant] deported.”24

counsel failed to object, appellant did not meet his burden under the first Strickland prong. L opez , 343 S.W.3d at 143; Goodspeed , 187 S.W.3d at 392.

C

. Alvarez’s outcry testimony
Appellant contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request the hearing required by article 38.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereby limit the amount of hearsay testimony admitted during his trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072 (West 2005)

. Article 38.072 provides that a child abuse victim‟s statement regarding the abuse made to another person is not inadmissible hearsay if th e statement describes the alleged offense and the person to whom the statement is made is at least eighteen years old and is the first person to who the child made a statement about the offense. Id. Article 38.072 also requires that the State give notice of its intent to use an outcry witness at least fourteen days before the trial begins and that the trial court conduct a hearing and determine that the statement is reliable based on the time, content, and circumstances of the statements. Id.

at art. 38. 072(b)(1)
, (2).
The record on appeal discloses that the State timely filed the notice required by
article 38.072. In addition, as already detailed above, Alvarez testified about K.A.‟s outcry statement. Beyond that, the record is silent. The record doe s not disclose whether appellant‟s trial counsel requested a hearing or whether such a hearing occurred. Any determination that appellant‟s trial counsel was ineffective with regard to K.A.‟s outcry statement would require impermissible speculation by the appellate court. Stults , 23
S.W.3d at 208.

D

. State’s final argument In the final part of his fifth issue on appeal, appellant contends his trial counsel‟s performance was deficient because he failed to object to the State‟s allegedly improper and prejud icial comments during the State‟s closing argument during the punishment phase of25

appellant‟s trial. 9 Appellant specifically complains of his trial counsel‟s failure to object

to two of the State‟s argument s : (1) that there would be no guarantee that appe llant would be deported or that he would not return to the United States to be with his children; and (2) the State‟s reference to a plea offer made to appellant prior to trial and, according to appellant, the State‟s request that the court punish appellan t for the hell he put K.A. through as a result of his rejection of that offer. In response, the State asserts appellant
waived this final part of his fifth issue because he failed to brief how he was prejudiced from the improper argument as required by Rule 38.1(i) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 10 We agree. An appellant‟s brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). This requirement is not satisfied by merely uttering brief, conclusory statements unsupported by legal citations

. See King v. State , 17 S.W.3d 7, 23 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref‟d). Appellant‟s briefing on this issue provides no citations to legal authorit y supporting h is conclusory argument that he was prejudiced by the State‟s allegedly improper argument ; therefore, it falls short of the minimum required to present an issue for appellate review. Id. Because appellant inadequately briefed this issue, he
has waived any potential error. Id.
Having addressed and rejected each contention made by appellant, w e overrule his
f ifth and final issue.

9 Appellant elected to have t he trial court determine his punishment.

10 The entire section of appellant‟s brief addressing prejudice consists of the following: “As regards counsel‟s failure to object to the prosecutor‟s urging that he be punished for not accepting the plea offers, pre judice is apparent in the trial court‟s consideration of the rejected plea offers at the time the Court assessed punishment at 20 years in prison.”26 C ONCLUSION Having overruled all of appellant‟s issues, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment.

/s/ John S. Anderson Justice

Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Brown, and Christopher.
Do Not Publish

— T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2( b).