FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2022-2961

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SHANNON D. CHRISTIE,

Appellant,

v.

DAVID G. QUALLS, as the 

personal representative of the 

Estate of Ollie Mae Dean Qualls,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Gadsden County.

David Michael Frank, Judge.

June 12, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Shannon D. Christie appeals the final distribution and 

discharge of the Estate of Ollie Mae Dean Qualls (the Estate).

Christie argues the trial court deprived her of due process when it 

failed to hear her motion to remove the personal representative 

and distributed the estate without determining if the 

apportionment was “reasonable and equitable.” 

Without addressing the merits, we affirm because, based on 

the record on appeal, we cannot determine whether Christie has 

standing to challenge the final distribution and discharge orders. 
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I.

After Ollie Mae Dean Qualls died, her son, David G. Qualls 

(“Qualls”), petitioned the trial court to open a formal 

administration of the Estate and appoint him personal 

representative. A formal notice of the probate administration was 

served on the beneficiaries, except those who waived service, and

all the requirements under the applicable statutes and rules were 

followed. Thus, Qualls was appointed the Estate’s personal 

representative, and letters of administration were issued.

After resolving certain creditor claims, Qualls filed a “Petition 

to Determine Beneficiaries” (the Petition). Christie moved the trial 

court for a hearing on the Petition, and filed her own petition to 

remove Qualls as personal representative. However, the trial court 

never set Christie’s motions and petition for a hearing and never 

disposed of the matters. 

Later, on Qualls’ motion, the trial court ordered the final 

distribution and discharge of the Estate. This appeal follows. 

II.

Section 733.506, Florida Statutes, provides that 

“[p]roceedings for [the] removal of a personal representative may 

be commenced by the court or upon the petition of an interested 

person.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, Christie must be an 

“interested person” to seek the removal of Qualls as the Estate’s 

personal representative. 

In Florida, an “interested person” is “any person who may 

reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the 

particular proceeding involved” and “may vary from time to time 

and must be determined according to the particular purpose of, 

and matter involved in, any proceedings.” § 731.201(23), Fla. Stat. 

In a probate proceeding, a person “may reasonably be expected to 

be affected by the outcome” of the proceeding if they are a 

beneficiary of the estate. But on the record before us, it is unclear 

whether Christie is a beneficiary of the Estate. 

A beneficiary is a “devisee in a testate estate.” § 731.201(2), 

Fla. Stat. Christie, however, is not identified in the will, her father 
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is. But her father predeceased the decedent, therefore, for Christie 

to have standing as an “interested person” she must have inherited 

her father’s future interest identified in the probated will. See

§ 732.603(1), Fla. Stat. (the Florida Anti-Lapse statute).

The burden was on Christie to establish her standing in the 

proceeding below to properly seek the removal of Appellee as the 

Estate’s personal representative. See Cates v. Fricker, 529 So. 2d 

1253, 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). But because the trial court never 

held a hearing on the Petition, or Christie’s other filings, the record 

is devoid of evidence that would have established Christie’s 

standing as an “interested person.” Thus, Christie cannot carry her 

burden. 

Even if Christie could establish standing, the arguments on 

appeal were unpreserved, and therefore are not subject to 

appellate review. See Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 

So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) (citing Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio 

Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999)).

Accordingly, the trial court’s final distribution and discharge 

orders are AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Shannon D. Christie, pro se, Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.