NO. 4-02-0713

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: the Marriage of

LINDA S. WALLER, n/k/a LINDA S. SACHS,

       Petitioner,

       and

DENNIS B. WALLER,

       Respondent-Appellant,

       and

THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID

ex rel. LINDA S. WALLER, n/k/a LINDA S.

SACHS,

       Intervening Petitioner-Appellee.	)

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)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 88C149  

Honorable

Michael Q. Jones,

Judge Presiding.

		JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:

		The trial court dissolved the marriage of petitioner, Linda S. Waller (n/k/a Sachs), and respondent, Dennis B. Waller,

and awarded custody of their son, Joshua Waller, to petitioner. 

A modified order of support required respondent to pay child

support until Joshua's eighteenth birthday, September 10, 2001. 

Joshua was not expected to graduate from high school, however,

until May 31, 2002.  On behalf of petitioner, the Illinois

Department of Public Aid (Department) filed a motion to require

respondent to continue paying child support until Joshua's

expected date of graduation.  Over respondent's objection, the

trial court granted the motion.  Respondent appeals, arguing that

the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to

consider the parties' current financial circumstances.  We agree.

		We hold that before extending the termination date of a

support order to provide support for an 18-year-old until his or her graduation from high school, the trial court must comply with sections 510(a) and 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution

of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(a), 513 (West

2000)).  By refusing to apply those statutory sections to the

facts of the case, the trial court abused its discretion. 

Therefore, we reverse the judgment.  Because it is clear, from

the undisputed evidence, that respondent lacked the ability to

pay child support after Joshua turned 18, an order requiring him

to do so could never stand; we remand, however, for entry of an

order fixing the amount of the arrearage.

	I. BACKGROUND

		The modified order of support, entered on March 19,

1997, required respondent to pay $320 per month in child support

"until September 10, 2001," as well as become current on the

then-existing arrearage.  On August 6, 2001, the Department filed

its motion to extend child support.  The Department alleged that

although Joshua would attain the age of majority on September 10,

2001, his senior year in high school would not end until May 31,

2002.  Attached to the motion was a letter, from the high-school

principal, confirming Joshua's expected date of graduation.  The

Department prayed "[t]hat the [s]upport order continue through

May[] 2002" and the trial court "enter a judgment" against

respondent "for arrears."

		On October 16, 2001, respondent filed a response to the

motion to extend child support, admitting the allegations in the

motion but adding that "he [was] unemployed at this time and

unable to make extended payments."  He prayed that the trial court deny the motion for that reason.  On the same day, he filed

a financial affidavit averring that he was 45 years old, unem

ployed, and without any source of income.  Other than a car,

which he valued at $500, he had no assets.  His monthly living

expenses totaled $1,074.

		At respondent's request, or with his agreement, the

trial court continued the hearing on the motion several times,

until June 4, 2002.  In the hearing and in a memorandum he filed

before the hearing, respondent made a twofold argument:  (1)

under section 510(d) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/510(d)

(West 2000)), child support ended when the child turned 18; and

(2) a trial court could award postmajority support only under

section 513 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/513 (West 2000)),

which required a new proceeding in which the trial court consid

ered the parties' current financial circumstances.  

		After hearing the arguments, the trial court disagreed

with respondent.  It explained, in a dialogue with his attorney:  

		"I respectfully disagree with the proposition

that you can't order [s]ection 505 child

support after a child turns 18.  I think I

have the authority to modify the order, and I

think that when the legislature says[,] [in

section 505(g),] the termination date shall

not be earlier than age 18[,] *** they could

have said the termination date shall be no

later than 18.  They didn't say that.  ***

			The problem that I've got here is, being fair to [respondent], I just don't understand

why this wasn't heard sooner.  If[,] back in

September or October of 2001[,] I would have

said the [m]otion is allowed, then [respon

dent] knows *** he can file a motion to mod

ify.  [He could have said:]  [']Hey, Judge, 

*** I don't like your ruling, but I hear you

ordered me to pay child support.  Now let me

tell you about this change of circumstances

since that order was entered.  I've lost my

job['--]or whatever.  That's the problem that

I [have've] got.  

	* * *

		I think I can continue[,] under [s]ection

505[,] a child[-]support [obligation] past

the [eighteenth] birthday without requiring a

[hearing on a possible] change of circum

stances *** or without implicating [s]ection

513.

	* * *

			*** [I]t is not a [section] 510 modifi

cation to extend the termination date [rather

than change the monthly amount of child sup

port] ***.  ***

	* * *

			[Section 505(g) says:] [']Nothing in

this subsection shall be construed to prevent the court from modifying the order.[']  ***

	* * *

			[Section] 513 doesn't apply because we

haven't terminated [respondent's] child[-]

support obligation under [s]ection 505.

	* * *

			I'm ruling that since [petitioner] filed

a motion before the [eighteenth] birthday of

this child and asked me to modify the termi

nation date[,] *** under [s]ection 505 I have

the authority to do that, and I'm doing it."

		Notwithstanding its ruling, the trial court allowed

respondent to make an offer of proof as to his current financial

situation.  Respondent testified, essentially, to the facts in

his financial affidavit:  his lack of income and assets.  He

testified that after "a long time and a lot of resumes," he

finally landed a job on March 11, 2002, only to be fired seven

weeks later for failing to comply with his employer's unethical

demands.  Respondent insisted he lacked the means to pay child

support.

		In an amended judgment order entered on August 1, 2002,

the trial court granted petitioner's motion to extend child

support until May 31, 2002.  The Court held that "it [had] the

authority through [s]ection 505 to do so and that no modification

under [s]ection 510 [was] implicated[,] nor [was] [s]ection 513

implicated."  The court found that under the modified order of

support, respondent owed $8,611.14 plus statutory interest, whereas under the modified order of support as extended, he owed

$11,171.14 plus statutory interest.  The court entered a judgment

against respondent for the latter figure.

		In a motion to reconsider, respondent argued that

"[w]hile [s]ection 505(g) does provide the [c]ourt with authority

to modify a support order, this clause is not independent of

[s]ection 510."  The trial court denied the motion for reconsid

eration.

		This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS

		This appeal turns on the meaning of sections 505, 510,

and 513 of the Dissolution Act.  We interpret statutes de novo.  See Hogan v. Adams, 333 Ill. App. 3d 141, 146, 775 N.E.2d 217, 221 (2002).  When a party appeals an order modifying an award of

child support, we ask whether the trial court abused its discre

tion.  In re Marriage of Mulry, 314 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 732 N.E.2d 667, 671 (2000).  The trial court abused its discretion

only if its decision was "clearly against logic."  State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Leverton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083, 732 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (2000).  The question here is whether the trial

court had the statutory authority to extend respondent's child-

support obligation in the fashion it did.  

		The Department argues that a trial court has the power,

in certain circumstances, to order the payment of support beyond

the child's eighteenth birthday.  We agree with that truism. 

Attaining the age of majority, 18 years, is an emancipating

event.  In re Marriage of Ferrarro, 211 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799-800, 570 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1991).  Normally, child support ceases at

emancipation, but the parties can agree otherwise, or the judgment

can provide otherwise.  750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2000).  Section

513(a) describes the instances when a trial court "may award sums

of money *** for the support of *** children of the parties who

have attained majority."  750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2000).  One of

those instances is when "the child of the parties is still

attending high school, even though he or she attained the age of

18."  750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2000).  

		We disagree with the Department that "[i]t is child

support under section 505, and not educational expenses pursuant

to section 513, that is at issue in cases where a child needs

support while finishing high school."  Section 513(a)(2) de

scribes "educational expenses" as a type of "support [for] ***

children *** who have attained majority," including those in high

school.  750 ILCAS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2000).   "Support" is simply a

general term that can include "educational expenses" for a child

who has turned 18 but is still in high school.  "Educational

expenses" may include "room" and "board," just as the more

generic term, "support," may include shelter and food.  A court

can award "support" to disabled unemancipated children, minor or

nonminor (750 ILCS 5/513(a)(1) (West 2000)), and a particular

kind of support, "educational expenses," to "nonminor children"

in school (750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2000)).  In short, if the

child has attained majority, the trial court must turn to section

513 when deciding whether to award support for that "nonminor

child."  

		The modified order of support stated that respondent's

obligation to pay support would cease when Joshua ceased being a

minor.  To require respondent to continue paying support after

Joshua turned 18, the trial court had to change, or "modify," the

modified order of support.  Therefore, section 510, entitled

"Modification *** of provisions for *** support," had obvious

relevance.  750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2000).  Section 510(a) provides

that "[a]n order for child support may be modified" in two

circumstances, only one of which (the parties agree) has any

possible applicability to this case:  "upon a showing of a

substantial change in circumstances."  750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West

2000).  

		The Department contends that modifying the date the

parent may cease paying child support is not truly a modification

within the meaning of section 510.  It cites two cases holding

that a parent's obligation to pay child support ends, by opera

tion of law, when the child abandons the parental home (Meyer v. Meyer, 222 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361-62, 583 N.E.2d 716, 719-20 (1991)) or gets married (In re Marriage of Daniels, 296 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449, 695 N.E.2d 1376, 1378-79 (1998)).  The Department

reasons, by analogy, that the period during which a parent must

pay support extends, by operation of law (without a showing of a substantial change of circumstances), to the date the 18-year-old

beneficiary of the support is scheduled to graduate from high

school.  

		We disagree with the Department's reasoning.  Meyer and Daniels relied on section 510(d) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 1998)), which provided:  "Unless otherwise agreed

in writing or expressly provided in a judgment, provisions for

the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child ***."  (Emphasis added.)  Meyer, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 583 N.E.2d at 719-20; Daniels, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 695 N.E.2d at 1379.  No statute says:  "Absent an order or agreement,

provisions for the support of a child are extended to the date he

or she graduates from high school, regardless of emancipation."

		In In re Marriage of Offer, 275 Ill. App. 3d 986, 990, 657 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1995), we held that section 510(a) applied

to a petition to extend maintenance.  We see no principled reason

to distinguish between an extension of child support and an

extension of maintenance; both are a "modification" of an order

of child support or maintenance within the meaning of section

510.  In In re Marriage of Stanley, 133 Ill. App. 3d 963, 973, 479 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (1985), we held that the "duration" of

maintenance and child support was "modifiable upon a showing of

substantially changed circumstances"--the showing section 510(a)

required.  We have declined to read into section 510(a) an

exception for certain types of modifications.  In re Marriage of Turrell, 335 Ill. App. 3d 297, 310, 781 N.E.2d 430, 442 (2002) (section 510(a) "does not distinguish between 'procedural' and

'substantive' changes").

		To require continued support until graduation day, the

trial court had to change the modified order of support by

effectively drawing a line through the words "until September 10,

2001," and substituting the words "until May 31, 2002."  A modification is a modification.  Section 510(a) imposes condi

tions for modifying an order of support and, on its face, makes

no exception for extending the period during which the parent

must pay support.  We will not interpret an unambiguous statute

as having subtle exceptions or limitations that are absent from

the text.  Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill. 2d 384, 390-91, 769 N.E.2d 924, 928 (2002).  If the legislature

intended to make an exception for modifying the duration of

support, it surely would have considered the exception important

enough to say so in section 510.  Increasing the period during

which the parent must pay monthly support means more money out of

the parent's pocket, just as surely as increasing the monthly

amount.

		In section 505(g), the trial court purported to find

authority, separate and distinct from section 510, to change the

modified order of support.  Specifically, the trial court relied

on the language, in section 505(g), that "[t]he termination date

shall be no earlier than the date on which the child covered by the order will attain the age of majority or is otherwise emanci

pated" and "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to

prevent the court from modifying the order."  (Emphasis added.) 

750 ILCS 5/505(g) (West 2000).  Just because a court can order

postmajority support, it does not follow that it has unfettered

discretion to do so.  Further, just because nothing in section

505(g) prevents a court from modifying a support order, it does

not follow that nothing in section 510(a)--or, for that matter,

any other section of the Dissolution Act, such as section 513-- prevents the modification.

		The Department argues that even if section 510 was

applicable, the evidence showed a substantial change of circum

stances in that Joshua would not graduate from high school until

May 2002.  We do not understand how Joshua's expected date of

graduation was a change in circumstances.  The Department offers no explanation and does not cite any pages of the record that

shed light on that question.  A "change in circumstances," within

the meaning of section 510(a)(1), is a change that occurred

sometime after the entry of the modified order of support.  See

In re Marriage of Hughes, 322 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 751 N.E.2d 23, 26 (2001).  According to the petition for a judgment of

dissolution, Joshua was born on September 10, 1983.  Presumably,

he would not have started kindergarten until 1989.  By our count,

he was right on schedule when he began his senior year of high

school in 2001, the year he turned 18.  The parties must have

known, from the date of Joshua's birth, that he would reach the

age of majority before graduating from high school.  

		"When determining whether there is sufficient cause to

modify, courts consider both the circumstances of the parents and

the circumstances of the child."  In re Marriage of Lambdin, 245 Ill. App. 3d 797, 806, 613 N.E.2d 1381, 1389 (1993).  The trial

court erroneously concluded that respondent's financial circum

stances were irrelevant.  "For a modification to occur, there

must be a change in the child's needs, an increase in the fa

ther's income, or a change in the financial condition of the

mother."  In re Marriage of Pettifer, 304 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328, 709 N.E.2d 994, 996 (1999).  The record contains no evidence of

any of those changed circumstances. 

   		Even if the evidence did show a substantial change in circumstances, we would nevertheless reverse the trial court's

judgment because the trial court refused to consider the factors

in section 513(b) and thereby caused substantial prejudice to

respondent.  Section 513(b) provides:

			"In making awards under paragraph ***

(2) of subsection (a) [(which allows support

for 18-year-olds who are still in high

school)], *** the court shall consider all

relevant factors that appear reasonable and

necessary, including:

			     (1) The financial resources of both

parents.

				(2) The standard of living the

child would have enjoyed had the mar

riage not been dissolved.

				(3) The financial resources of the

child.

				(4) The child's academic perfor

mance."  750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2000).

		Like section 510 of the Dissolution Act, section 513

was directly applicable to this case, and the trial court erred

in sidestepping both of those sections.  Section 510 was applica

ble because the trial court was modifying a support order. 

Section 513 was applicable because the trial court was

"award[ing] sums of money *** for the support of [a] child *** who [had] attained majority."  750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2000).  

		We disagree with respondent that the trial court's

failure to follow sections 510 and 513 deprived it of jurisdic

tion.  Subject-matter jurisdiction flowed from the Illinois

Constitution, not from the Dissolution Act.  See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335, 770 N.E.2d 177, 185 (2002).  Nevertheless, the trial

court disregarded controlling statutory law, to the substantial

prejudice of respondent, and thereby abused its discretion.  See

Leverton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1083, 732 N.E.2d at 1096.  A court should not order a parent to pay a greater amount of support than

the parent can reasonably afford.  In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 552, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986).

	III. CONCLUSION

		For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's

amended judgment order.  Respondent remains obligated, however,

to pay the arrears in child support that accrued prior to Septem

ber 10, 2001; we remand for entry of a judgment order stating the

arrearage ($18,611.14) and statutory interest calculated consist

ent with Burwell v. Burwell, 324 Ill. App. 3d 206, 753 N.E.2d 1259 (2001).

		Reversed; cause remanded with directions.

		KNECHT and MCcCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.