J-S41003-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY ALLEN REID, JR.,

Appellant No. 1194 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 29, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-67-CR-0006147-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2017

Appellant, Jeffrey Allen Reid, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his jury conviction of murder of the first degree, 

murder of the second degree, robbery, and related crimes.1 Specifically, he 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder convictions. 

Appellant also claims a Brady violation.2 We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant purports to appeal from the denial of post-sentence relief. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 1). The appeal properly lies from the judgment of 

sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions. See 

Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1125 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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We derive the facts of the case from the trial court opinion and our 

independent review of the certified record. 

Seeking money to get out of town, Appellant embarked on a series of 

three botched robberies with his girlfriend and several other co-conspirators. 

(See Trial Court Opinion, 10/06/16, at 4-5). When these proved 

unsuccessful, Appellant decided to call a friend, Dashaun Davis, and ask him 

to come over, to rob him, knowing that he usually had money. (See id. at 

9). 

When Davis arrived, Appellant’s cohort, NaQuan Coakley, tried to rob 

him at gunpoint. Appellant was nearby. Davis reached for the revolver. 

Coakley fired, several times. While this was happening, Davis called out to 

Appellant by his street name, “Sincere.” Appellant told Coakley to “finish 

him” or “off him.” (N.T. Trial, 3/07/16, at 261; see also Trial Ct. Op., at 9-

10).

Appellant asked the other robbers for help in disposing of Davis’ body, 

but they refused. By this time they heard the sound of sirens coming from 

police cars responding to reports of shots fired. Everybody scattered. 

Later, in prison, Appellant was housed with cellmate Andrew Horn. 

Appellant asked Horn to write to his (Appellant’s) attorney claiming that 

Coakley had told him that he shot Davis, and Appellant was not involved. 

Horn wrote a letter, but did not send it. Instead, Horn became a prosecution 

witness at trial. 
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Horn testified, inter alia, that Appellant told him that he gave the order 

to Coakley to finish off the victim, Davis. Another co-conspirator, Malik 

Williams, (Coakley’s younger brother), also testified against Appellant.

The jury convicted Appellant of murder of the first degree, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a), and murder of the second degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2502(b).3 The trial court imposed a sentence of life without parole on 

murder of the first degree4 plus a consecutive aggregate term of not less 

than twenty-four years nor more than forty-eight years of incarceration in a 

state correctional institution on the other non-murder convictions.5 The 

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions without a hearing. This 

timely appeal followed.6

Appellant presents three questions for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the [m]otion for 

[p]ost-[s]entence relief where the evidence was not sufficient to 

support a conviction for [m]urder in the [f]irst [d]egree?

____________________________________________

3 The jury also convicted Appellant of criminal attempt, robbery─threat of 

immediate serious injury; conspiracy─robbery-threat of immediate serious 

injury; and robbery─infliction of serious bodily injury. Appellant does not 

raise any challenge to these convictions on appeal.

4 The court concluded that the sentence for murder of the second degree 

merged for purposes of sentencing. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 2).

5 When the verdict was read, Appellant responded with obscenities, on the 

record, at both the judge and the jury. (See N.T. Trial, 3/10/16, 455-56). 

6 Appellant timely filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal. The 

trial court filed an opinion on October 6, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the [m]otion for 

[p]ost-[s]entence relief where the evidence was not sufficient to 

support a conviction for [m]urder in the [s]econd [d]egree?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

the Appellant’s request for a mistrial and subsequent request for 

a new trial on the grounds of a Brady violation?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).

Preliminarily, we note that although Appellant purports to challenge 

the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder convictions, in fact, aside from 

lengthy quotations of general principles not in dispute here, his argument 

challenges credibility, chiefly that of Andrew Horn. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 

12) (“the record is bereft of any credible evidence . . .”), (see id. at 16) 

(same). 

A challenge to witness credibility goes to the weight rather than the 

sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Palo, 24 A.3d 1050, 

1055 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 34 A.3d 828 (Pa. 2011) (“Directed 

entirely to the credibility of the Commonwealth’s chief witness, Appellant’s 

claim challenges the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 54 A.3d 348 (Pa. 2012) (“Given additional evidentiary 

circumstances, ‘any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the identification 

testimony goes to its weight.’”) (citation omitted). 

“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and to assess the credibility 
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of the witnesses. This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the 

jury on issues of credibility.” Commonwealth Dougherty, 860 A.2d 31, 36 

(Pa. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 835 (2005) (citations omitted). 

Appellant fails to develop any other argument in support of his bald 

denials of sufficiency. As the Commonwealth correctly notes, our Supreme 

Court has determined that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

which is really a challenge to the weight of the evidence, must fail. (See

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13) (citing Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 

666, 672 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000)). Accordingly, we 

reject Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, as waived. 

Additionally, because Appellant failed to raise and preserve a proper weight 

claim, that issue is waived as well.

Moreover, the first sufficiency claim would not merit relief. “Because 

evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is 

de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

107 A.3d 52, 66 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 43 (2015) (citation 

omitted). 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for 

first degree murder, we are obliged to determine whether 

the evidence presented at trial and all reasonable 

inferences derived therefrom, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are 

sufficient to satisfy all elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

To convict a defendant of first degree murder, the 

Commonwealth must establish a human being was unlawfully 
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killed, the defendant was responsible for the killing, and the 

defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. See 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)[.] The Commonwealth may use wholly 

circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of showing the 

accused intentionally killed the victim, [ ], and circumstantial 

evidence can itself be sufficient to prove any or every element of 

the crime[.]

Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 841 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 135 

S. Ct. 480 (2014) (case citations omitted). “Although a conviction must be 

based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need 

not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.” Commonwealth v. 

McCollum, 926 A.2d 527, 530 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Murder of the first degree is defined by statute as follows:

(a) Murder of the first degree.─A criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an 

intentional killing.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).

Here, Appellant denies, without developing an argument supported by 

reference to pertinent authority, that the evidence was sufficient to prove his 

specific intent to kill. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 9-10). He also baldly 

asserts that there was insufficient evidence to link him as an accomplice or 

co-conspirator to the murder of Davis committed by Coakley. (See id. at 

12). We disagree.

“[I]t is well-established in Pennsylvania law that the specific intent to 

kill can be formed in a fraction of a second, and may be found whenever the 
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defendant acts with a conscious purpose to bring about the death of the 

victim.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 980 A.2d 35, 47 (Pa. 2009), cert. 

denied, 560 U.S. 928 (2010) (citations omitted). “[T]he Commonwealth can 

prove the specific intent to kill from circumstantial evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1269 (Pa. 2000), cert. 

denied, 533 U.S. 932 (2001) (citation omitted). “Furthermore, all coconspirators to a murder may be found guilty of first degree murder, 

regardless of which person actually inflicted the wound which resulted in 

death.” Small, supra at 672 (citing Commonwealth v. Gibson, 688 A.2d 

1152, 1158 (Pa. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 948 (1997)). 

In this case, the jury was free to accept the evidence that Appellant 

conspired with Coakley to rob Davis, and specifically ordered Coakley to 

murder Davis. Such evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s 

involvement in a conspiracy to rob Davis, and Appellant’s order to finish 

Davis off when he resisted, and recognized Appellant. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 502 (Pa. 1995), cert. denied, 519 

U.S. 826 (1996) (evidence of appellant’s involvement as gang member 

admissible to prove motive for victim’s murder and existence of criminal 

conspiracy). Appellant’s first insufficiency claim would not merit relief. 
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Appellant’s second claim, insufficiency of the evidence for murder of 

the second degree, fails for the same reasons.7 Here, again, Appellant 

challenges the credibility of the evidence. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 16) 

(“The record is bereft of any credible evidence . . . “). Credibility goes to 

weight, not sufficiency. The jury was free to accept the evidence that 

Appellant ordered the death of the victim, Davis, in the course of conspiring 

to commit a felony, a robbery, which was sufficient to establish murder of 

the second degree. Appellant’s second insufficiency claim would fail on the 

merits. 

Finally, in his third claim, Appellant asserts a Brady violation, 

maintaining that the Commonwealth failed to turn over the cell phone billing 

records of the victim, Deshaun Davis. (See id. at 17-20). He claims he is 

entitled to a new trial. We disagree. 

“[T]o establish a Brady violation, an appellant must prove three 

elements: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was 

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) 

____________________________________________

7 Second degree murder is defined by statute as follows:

Murder of the second degree.─A criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed 

while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in 

the perpetration of a felony.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).
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prejudice ensued.” Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 783 (Pa. 

2013) (citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant argues that a Brady violation occurred because billing 

records of cell phone usage for a phone registered to the victim, Mr. Davis, 

were not turned over by the Commonwealth. Notably, the billing records did 

not include the content of conversations. Nevertheless, Appellant maintains 

that the absence of a record for receipt of a text message on the night Davis 

was murdered could have been used to impeach Horn’s testimony that he 

was told Appellant called Davis, so he could rob him. Appellant fails to 

establish a Brady violation. 

First, Appellant fails to show how such information would be 

exculpatory or could be used for impeachment. To the contrary, at trial, 

counsel for Appellant conceded that he did not know if any such evidence 

would be favorable. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 17 (citing N.T. Trial, at 403)). 

Moreover, as noted, the billing records did not include the text of any 

messages. Absent an indication of content, the claim that such evidence 

would be exculpatory or useful for impeachment is no more than speculation 

and conjecture. 

In any event, Appellant does not deny that he was at the murder 

scene; he only claims that he was merely present. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 

12). The determination of guilt or innocence depended on whether he was 
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an active participant in the robbery and murder. Whether or not Appellant 

called Davis would not have been determinative of guilt or innocence. 

Secondly, Appellant fails to show that the supposed evidence was 

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently. Thirdly, 

Appellant fails to demonstrate that prejudice ensued, in other words, that 

the phone records would have undermined confidence in the verdict. 

A Brady violation is established by showing that the favorable 

evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 

such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. 

Importantly, the mere possibility that an item of 

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, 

or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not 

establish materiality in the constitutional sense. In order 

to be entitled to a new trial for failure to disclose evidence 

affecting a witness’[s] credibility, the defendant must 

demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be 

determinative of his guilt or innocence. In assessing the 

significance of the evidence withheld, a reviewing court must 

bear in mind that not every item of the prosecution’s case would 

necessarily have been directly undercut had the Brady evidence 

been disclosed. 

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 986 A.2d 808, 815 (Pa. 2009) (citations, 

quotation marks, and other punctuation omitted) (emphasis added). 

Appellant fails to show he was prejudiced. His Brady claim does not merit 

relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/2017