IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 11, 2011 Session

PHILLIP SULLIVAN v. WILSON COUNTY, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 09C934 Joseph P. Binkley, Jr., Judge

No. M2011-00217-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 22, 2012

An employee was terminated by a local power board after a detective sent his employer a

letter stating the employee sold narcotic drugs from the truck the employee used during his

shift and that the employee admitted selling the drugs. The employee denied selling illegal

drugs or making such an admission to the detective, but the administrative law judge in

charge of the evidentiary hearing determined the statementsin the detective’sletter were true.

The employee later filed suit against the detective who authored the letter, his supervisors,

and the county employing the individual defendants. The former employee asserted causes

of action for defamation, negligence, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress. The trial court concluded the former employee was collaterally

estopped from relitigating the veracity of the statements in the detective’s letter leading to

the former employee’s termination and dismissed the complaint in toto. We affirm. All of

the employee’s causes of action were based upon statements the detective made in his letter

to the employer, which the employee alleged were false. Because the employee is estopped

from denying the truth of those statements, he has no basis on which to pursue any of the

causes of action set forth in his complaint.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR. and ANDY D. BENNETT, JJ., joined.

Michelle Blaylock Owens, Michael Clifford Gillespie, Nashville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Phillip Sullivan.

Jeffrey M. Beemer, Kelly Marie Telfeyan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Wilson

County, Jonathan Daniel, Lane Mullins, and John Edwards.
OPINION

Phillip Sullivan worked for Nashville Electric Services (“NES”) as a Field Services

Technician for about three years when he was terminated in 2008. NES moved to fire Mr.

Sullivan after Detective Jonathan Daniel sent a letter to NES suggesting Mr. Sullivan had

sold narcotic drugs while he was driving an NES truck during working hours. A hearing was

held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on October 15, 2008. Mr. Sullivan testified

during the hearing and denied ever selling drugs, either from his NES truck or otherwise.

Detective Daniel testified Mr. Sullivan admitted he had sold drugs from his NES truck

twenty to thirty times over the past year. The ALJ found Detective Daniel to be more

credible and recommended that Mr. Sullivan be terminated based on her finding that Mr.

Sullivan used an NES vehicle to conduct illegal activities.

NES accepted the recommendation and fired Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan appealed his

termination, and the chancery court affirmed. Mr. Sullivan then filed a lawsuit against

Detective Daniel, two of his supervisors, and Wilson County, the employer of the three

individual defendants. Mr. Sullivan alleged Mr. Daniel’s letter contained defamatory

statements and claimed the defendants were liable to him for defamation/libel, negligence,

false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The

defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Sullivan’s complaint based on collateral estoppel and the

Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the “GTLA”), which the trial court granted. Mr.

Sullivan appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint, arguing collateral estoppel and

the GTLA do not bar the litigation of his claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On November 19, 2007, a residence located on Cascade Drive in Hermitage was under

surveillance by the narcotics division of the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department because

an individual named Earl Pemberton was allegedly using that residence to sell illegal drugs.

Phillip Sullivan drove a truck in his employment with NES as a Field Services Technician.

An undercover narcotics agent observed Mr. Sullivan park his truck outside and enter the

residence on Cascade Drive while it was undersurveillance. Mr. Sullivan was not then under

suspicion for illegal drug activity. However, when the narcotics agent observed Mr. Sullivan

enter the residence and then leave a short time later, the agent informed the other agents in

the area and asked Lane Mullins, who was the Sergeant with the Wilson County Sheriff’s

Department Narcotics Division, to follow the NES truck Mr. Sullivan was driving. Sergeant

Mullins followed Mr. Sullivan’s truck to a nearby Wal-Mart where he observed Mr. Sullivan

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engage in a hand to hand transaction with a woman in the parking lot.

Mr. Sullivan claims the woman he met in the Wal-Mart parking lot was a friend of his

who had asked to borrow some money. He alleges he was not aware of any drug activity

going on at the Cascade Drive residence. Mr. Sullivan testified that he had sold a car

belonging to his wife’s grandmother to Mr. Pemberton, an individual he knew spent time at

the residence on Cascade Drive, and that Mr. Pemberton owed him a payment on the car.

When Mr. Sullivan’s friend asked him for a loan, Mr. Sullivan went to the Cascade residence

to collect the payment from Mr. Pemberton so he would have the money to lend to his friend.

Mr. Sullivan asserted that what appeared to Sergeant Mullins to be a hand to hand drug

transaction on November 19 was in fact simply the transfer of cash to his friend.

Mr. Pemberton was later arrested, and the car Mr. Sullivan had sold him was

impounded. Mr. Pemberton had not fully paid Mr. Sullivan the amount he owed on the car,

and Mr. Sullivan contacted the sheriff’s department at the behest of his mother-in-law in an

effort to obtain possession of the car.

1

When Mr. Sullivan called the sheriff’s office he spoke with Jonathan Daniel, a

detective working in the narcotics division. During their conversation, Detective Daniel

learned that Mr. Sullivan was employed by NES and that he drove an NES truck. When Mr.

Sullivan explained his interest in the automobile, Detective Daniel invited Mr. Sullivan to

come down to meet with him at the station to discuss the situation. Detective Daniel did not

then mention to Mr. Sullivan that he suspected Mr. Sullivan was the individual Sergeant

Mullins had observed in the Wal-Mart parking lot on November 19, 2007.

When Mr. Sullivan arrived at the sheriff’s department, Detective Daniel brought him

upstairs to a room used for interviews. Mr. Sullivan and Detective Daniel have conflicting

accounts of what occurred while Mr. Sullivan was at the sheriff’s department. The ALJ

made the following findings of fact concerning this meeting :

2

On March 27, 2008, Employee went to the Wilson County Sheriff’s

Department to discuss ownership of a vehicle that was seized during a

narcoticsinvestigation. Two Wilson County Sheriff’s Detectives were present

at this meeting, Daniels and Detective Jeremy Rich (“Rich”), with Daniels

being the head officer on the case, therefore he conducted the meeting and

The car was still titled in the name of his mother-in-law. 1

The ALJ prepared a Report of Findings of Fact and Recommendations following the hearing on 2

October 15, 2008.

3
Rich just listened. Daniels informed the Employee that on November 19,

2007, the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department had been conducting a

narcoticssurveillance on a residence on Cascade Drive (“Cascade Residence”)

and that Employee had been observed by several detectives pulling up in an

NES truck, parking near the Cascade Residence and entering the Cascade

Residence. After Employee spent several minutes in the Cascade Residence,

he left and another Wilson County Sheriff’s Office detective, Lane Mullins

(“Mullins”), followed Employee. Employee was seen stopping in a Walmart

parking lot on Andrew Jackson Parkway. In the Walmart parking lot,

Employee was seen getting out of the NES truck where he approached a red

car with a woman in the driver’s seat. Once on the driver’s side, a hand to

hand exchange occurred. Then the Employee got back into the NES truck and

drove away. Detectives followed the woman in the red car, . . . but did not

follow Employee. [The woman] was stopped and questioned, but was not

arrested or cited by the detectives. At the March 27, 2008 meeting, Daniels

questioned Employee extensively about his relationship with [the woman],

asking very specific questions regarding the type of relationship the Employee

had with [the woman]. Employee denied any type of relationship other than

friends that used to work together at a company in Mt. Juliet in the past.

Daniels posed a hypothetical similar to the events that occurred November 17,

2008 [sic], and stated that Employee responded that he had purchased pills

from Earl Pemberton (“Pemberton”) that day and then sold them to [the

woman], his only customer, and that he estimated that he had sold pills in his

NES truck twenty (20) or thirty (30) times over the course of a year.

Daniels did not arrest Employee, but the statements made by Employee

to Daniels that day prompted Daniels to contact NES and submit an affidavit

to NES describing the events stated above. This in turn prompted NES to

prefer charges for termination of Employee’s employment at NES for selling

narcotics while he was on duty in an NES vehicle. (Citations to record

omitted.)

Despite Mr. Sullivan’s testimony that he was giving money to his friend and not

selling her any drugs when he was observed in the Wal-Mart parking lot on November 19,

2007, the ALJ found Detective Daniel to be more credible than Mr. Sullivan, explaining:

Employee’s post hearing brief states that NES’s evidence is speculative

and circumstantial. However, Employee failed to refute any of NES’s

evidence. Neither the testimony of Employee nor the testimony of [the woman

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friend] was enough to refute any of NES’s proof. When having to compare the

testimony of a six (6) year experienced narcotic detective that testified the

event in the Walmart parking lot looked to his experienced eyes like a drug

buy as compared to Employee’s testimony at the Administrative Law hearing

that he was giving his mistress two hundred ($200) dollars for tags and various

other expenses, a woman he denied as his mistress while talking to police

detectivessome 8 months earlier, more weight must be placed on the testimony

of the detective.

In the March 27, 2008 meeting at the Wilson County Sheriff’s Office,

Employee told Daniels he sold drugs while in the NES truck. But after charges

for termination are preferred against Employee, Employee states that (I)

Daniels, a seasoned veteran detective, misunderstood the statements he made

at the March 27, 2008 meeting; (ii) [the woman friend] is his mistress and the

exchange witnessed [by] Mullins, a detective with ten years experience on

November 19, 2007 in the Walmart parking lot was Employee giving his

mistress two hundred ($200) dollars for car tags, gas and other necessities and

not a drug buy; and (iii) Daniels submitted the affidavit to NES in retaliation

for Employee failing to provide assistance to Daniels in the Wilson County

Sheriff department’s quest to “bust” Pemberton. Again, more weight must be

placed on the testimony of the detectives since it was evident from their

testimony that they had already built a very substantial case against Pemberton

through hundreds of hours of surveillance of the Cascade Residence . . . and,

which is furthered by the fact that Pemberton was subsequently arrested and

indicted for conspiracy to sell drugs and the Cascade Residence was the

subject of a police raid where drugs were confiscated. In addition, John

Edwards, with 15 years service for the Wilson County Sheriff’s department

and presently the detective lieutenant over the narcotics division, acted as

undercover detective and purchased drugs directly from Pemberton so the case

against Pemberton was pretty solid without having to rely on Employee’s

assistance to build a case against Pemberton. (Citations to record omitted.)

Based on the ALJ’s findings of fact, the ALJ recommended that Mr. Sullivan be

terminated from his position at NES. The ALJ wrote:

Charges were preferred against Employee because he admitted to Daniels that

he sold drugs out of his NES vehicle and he was observed doing so by a

seasoned narcotics detective who has witnessed hundreds of drug transactions.

Testimony at the Hearing showed that Employee admitted to selling drugs out

of his NES vehicle in the March 27, 2008 meeting with Daniels and Rich.

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As part of its report and recommendation, the ALJ expressly found (1) Mr. Sullivan

sold narcotic drugs from an NES truck while he was on duty and (2) Mr. Sullivan admitted

to Detective Daniel that he sold drugs out of his NES vehicle twenty to thirty times over the

course of a year.

The Electric Employees’ Civil Service and Pension Board of the Metropolitan

Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted the ALJ’s Report of Findings of

Fact and Recommendation and terminated Mr. Sullivan’s employment with NES. Mr.

Sullivan appealed the ALJ’s report and recommendation to the chancery court, which

affirmed the report and recommendation after concluding “substantial material evidence in

the record supports the NES Board’s decision to terminate Phillip Sullivan.” Mr. Sullivan

did not appeal the chancery court’s judgment, and the judgment became final by May 27,

2010.

B. SEPARATE LAWSUIT

After the chancery court affirmed the firing of Mr. Sullivan, he filed a complaint

against Wilson County, Jonathan Daniel, Lane Mullins, and John Edwards. Mr. Sullivan

alleged the statements Detective Daniel made in his letter to NES that led to NES’s

preferment of charges against him were false. Specifically, Mr. Sullivan takes issue with the

following statements Detective Daniel included in his letter:

Sullivan stated that . . . he did sell a white female ten (10) Lortab pills for

$100.00. . . . Sullivan stated that [the white female] is his only customer, and

that he does not make a profit from the sales. Detective Daniel asked Sullivan

how many times he has sold narcotics in his NES truck. Sullivan estimated

twenty to thirty times, but maintained that [the woman] was his only customer.

Sullivan stated that he has been selling narcotics to [the woman] for

approximately one year. Sullivan said that he sells to [the woman]

approximately once a week and that she orders ten to twenty Lortab pills at a

time.

Claiming these statements were false, Mr. Sullivan asserted in his Complaint that each

of the defendants was liable to him for defamation/libel, false light invasion of privacy,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. Mr. Sullivan alleged Detective

Daniel was negligent in tendering a false statement to Mr. Sullivan’s employer and that the

other defendants were negligent in their supervision of Detective Daniel. In addition, Mr.

Sullivan alleged Wilson County was liable to him for Detective Daniel’s actions pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 when Detective Daniel intentionally wrote and tendered a false

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letter to his employer, NES.

3

Wilson County filed a motion to dismiss the negligent supervision claim based on

Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205, part of the GTLA, which immunizes governmental

entities for injuries proximately caused by certain acts by their employees. In ruling on the

county’s motion to dismiss, the trial court wrote:

The Court finds that the negligent supervision claim is governed by the

Governmental Tort Liability Act. Because the underlying torts allegedly

committed by County employees are intentional tortsfor which Wilson County

retains its immunity pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205, the Court finds

that the Plaintiff cannot pursue a negligent supervision claim against Wilson

County.

4

The three individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Sullivan’s claims for

negligence and false light invasion of privacy. The trial court granted this motion,

explaining:

With respect to the Plaintiff’s claim for negligence, the Court finds that

Jonathan Daniel, Lane Mullins, and John Edwards are immune from suit

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

310(b) provides that no claim may be brought against a government employee

for damages for which the immunity of the governmental entity is removed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 provides:

3

Anyone incurring any wrong, injury, loss, damage or expense resulting from any act or

failure to act on the part of any deputy appointed by the sheriff may bring suit against the

county in which the sheriff serves; provided, that the deputy is, at the time of such

occurrence, acting by virtue of or under color of the office.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 provides in relevant part:

4

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is removed for injury proximately caused

by a negligent act of omission of any employee within the scope of his employment except

if the injury arises out of:

. . . . .

(2) false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious

prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with

contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of privacy, or civil rights.

7
Because Wilson County’s immunity from suit would be removed pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205, Jonathan Daniel, Lane Mullins, and John

Edwards are immune from suit for negligence under the Tennessee

Governmental Tort Liability Act.

With respect to the Plaintiff’s claim for false light invasion of privacy, the

Court finds that the Plaintiff cannot pursue this claim against Jonathan Daniel,

Lane Mullins, or John Edwards because the Plaintiff has failed to prove that

the subject letter was “publicized” as that term is used in the context of the tort

of false light invasion of privacy.

Mr. Sullivan filed a motion in limine in which he argued his Fifth Amendment

constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when Detective Daniel failed to

give him Miranda warnings prior to eliciting his purported admission on March 27, 2008,

about selling drugs from the NES truck. As a result, Mr. Sullivan argued, the ALJ erred in

refusing Mr. Sullivan the opportunity to testify about Detective Daniel’s violation of his

rights during the administrative hearing. Although it is not clear from the record, Mr.

Sullivan was presumably arguing that because his constitutional rights were violated, his

purported admission should not have been admitted at the administrative hearing and he

should not be estopped at the trial of his case from presenting evidence concerning the

veracity of the statements in Detective Daniel’s letter to NES that resulted in his termination.

The trial court deferred ruling on this motion in limine to permit the parties to brief the issue.

Wilson County and the individual defendants then filed a motion for summary

judgment in which they asked the trial court to dismiss Mr. Sullivan’s claims for libel and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as the claim against Wilson County for

liability pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302. The court granted summary judgment on

the claim for libel and dismissed that count after concluding the doctrine of collateral

estoppel barred Mr. Sullivan from pursuing that claim. The court explained:

With respect to the Plaintiff’s claim for libel, the Court finds that the doctrine

of collateral estoppel applies. Pursuant to the Tennessee Court of Appeals’

decision in Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1991), it is the law of this State that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel are applicable to give conclusive effect to the quasi-judicial

determinations of administrative agencies. Having determined that the

findings and recommendation of the ALJ and the decision of the Board in the

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case of Nashville Electric Service v. Phillip Sullivan, 08-C-7-41-34-3, Docket

No. 08-07, is the type of quasi-judicial determination to which preclusive

effect may be given, it must be determined whether the elements of this

defense have been established herein.

First, the issue to be decided in the pending litigation, i.e., whether the

statements made by Detective Daniel in his letter to NES were true, is identical

to the issue that was before the ALJ at the administrative hearing and the

Davidson County Chancery Court on appeal. Second, in determining whether

the charges preferred against the Plaintiff by NES were substantiated, the truth

of the statements made in Detective Daniel’s letter to NES was actually raised,

litigated, and decided by the ALJ at the administrative hearing and the

Davidson County Chancery Court on appeal. Third, on May 27, 2010, thirty

days after the entry of the Davidson County Chancery Court’s ruling affirming

the ALJ’s findings and recommendation and the Board’s determination, the

Chancery Court’s judgment became final. Fourth, the Plaintiff was a party to

the proceedings before the ALJ and the Chancery Court. Fifth, the Plaintiff

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the truthfulness of the statements

made by Detective Daniel in his letter to NES at the evidentiary hearing before

the ALJ and before the Chancery Court on appeal.

Because it is a question of law for the Court to determine whether the

doctrine of collateral estoppel applies and because all five elements of the

doctrine of collateral estoppel are satisfied, the Court hereby finds that the

doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to the Plaintiff’s claim for libel.

Because it has already determined that the statements made in Detective

Daniel’s letter to NES were true and because truth is an absolute defense to a

claim for libel, the Plaintiff’s claim for libel is hereby dismissed with

prejudice.

The trial court initially declined to dismiss Mr. Sullivan’s claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress or the claim against Wilson County for liability pursuant to

section 8-8-302, but in a later ruling the court dismissed both of these claims. In the Order

dismissing these two claims, the court also addressed Mr. Sullivan’s earlier-filed motion in

limine concerning the alleged violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

In denying Mr. Sullivan’s motion in limine, the court wrote:

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the Plaintiff was not subject to

a custodial interrogation on March 27, 2008, so as to be entitled to receive

Miranda warnings. In determining whether an individual is “in custody” for

9
purposes of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v.

Arizona, “the relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the

circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider

himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated

with a formal arrest.” State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tenn. 1996).

“The test is objective from the viewpoint of the suspect, and the unarticulated,

subjective view of law enforcement officials that the individual being

questioned is or is not a suspect does not bear upon the question.” Id. at 852.

In concluding that the Plaintiff was not “in custody,” the Court makes

the following findings. First, the Plaintiff voluntarily initiated contact with the

Wilson County Sheriff’s Department to discuss recovering a vehicle that

belonged to his wife’s grandmother, which was seized from Earl Pemberton

during the course of a drug arrest. Second, the Plaintiff went to the Wilson

County Sheriff’s Department voluntarily and of his own free will. Third, the

Plaintiff was advised by Detective Daniel and Detective Reich, during the

course of the interview, that he was there voluntarily and was free to leave at

any time. Fourth, the door to the interview room was left open at all times and

neither Detective Daniel nor Detective Reich blocked the Plaintiff’s pathway

to the door. Fifth, at the conclusion of the interview, the Plaintiff left the

Wilson County Sheriff’s Department without hindrance. The fact that the

Plaintiff was escorted from the building is of no consequence as it was the

standard practice and procedure for visitors of the Sheriff’s Department to be

escorted in, around, and out of the building.

Supporting the Court’s finding that the Plaintiff was not subject to a

custodial interrogation is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

California v. Beheler, which recognized that “Miranda warnings are not

required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or

because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” 463 U.S.

1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

Also, having concluded that the Plaintiff was not “in custody” when he

admitted to selling narcotics out of his NES truck, the Court finds, in accord

with the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Beheler and Mathiason,

that the Plaintiff’s admissions were “not tainted by the failure to give the

Miranda warnings.” State v. Blackburn, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 279,

at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 1991).

Moreover, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Chavez v. Martinez “that a violation of the constitutional right against self10
incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against

himself in a criminal case,” 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003), the Court finds that the

Plaintiff cannot assert that his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination has been violated because he has not been charged with a crime

or compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding.

After addressing Mr. Sullivan’s motion in limine, the trial court modified its earlier

Order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and the claim against Wilson County for liability pursuant to section 8-8-

302. The court wrote:

It is for the Court to determine, in the first instance, whether a

defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous

as to permit recovery. Lane v. Becker, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145, at *14

(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2010) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

46 cmt. h). The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress must be dismissed as to Defendant Jonathan Daniel.

Having previously determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the

Plaintiff from relitigating whether the statements made by Detective Daniel in

his letter to NES were true and having now determined that the doctrine of

collateral estoppel likewise precludesthe Plaintiff from relitigating the veracity

of the admissions he made to Detective Daniel on March 27, 2008, the Court

concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Detective Daniel’s conduct in sending the letter to NES rose to the level of

extreme and outrageous conduct. Having found that no claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress will lie against Detective Daniel, the Court

likewise dismisses the Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress as to Defendant Lane Mullins and DefendantJohn Edwards, who were

only named as Defendants in this case as a result of their supervisory roles.

Finally, because all claims as to Defendants Jonathan Daniel, Lane

Mullins, and John Edwards have been dismissed, the Plaintiff’s claim against

Wilson County for violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 is likewise

dismissed.

Mr. Sullivan appeals from the trial court orders dismissing his claims against the

defendants.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

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Mr. Sullivan argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims. He

asserts that collateral estoppel does not apply to the administrative hearing and does not

prevent his litigation of the claims set forth in his complaint. Mr. Sullivan also argues the

trial court erred in holding Detective Daniel did not violate his constitutional rights when he

failed to give Mr. Sullivan Miranda warnings because he was subjected to a custodial

interrogation.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court dismissed some of Mr. Sullivan’s claims pursuant to a motion to

dismiss and other claims pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. A Tennessee Rule of

Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint itself. Willis v. Dept. of Corrections, 113 S.W.3d 706, 710

(Tenn. 2003); Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999). The trial court should

grant a motion to dismiss only “when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 710. On

appeal from an order granting a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion this court must, like the

trial court, presume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true. We must review the

trial court’s legal conclusions regarding the adequacy of the complaint de novo, without a

presumption of correctness. Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 710; Fahrner v. SW Mfg., 48 S.W.3d 141,

144 (Tenn. 2001); 421 Corp. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, 36 S.W.3d

469, 479-80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment enjoys no presumption of

correctness on appeal. Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn.

2008); Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004). We review the

summary judgment decision as a question of law. Id. Accordingly, this court must review

the record de novo and make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. R.

Civ. P. 56 have been met. Eadie v. Complete Co., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tenn. 2004);

Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004). Those requirements are that

the filings supporting the motion show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Blair, 130

S.W.3d at 764.

V. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BARS RELITIGATING ISSUES THE ALJ DECIDED.

Collateral estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that bars a party from relitigating

in a later proceeding legal or factual issues that were raised and necessarily determined in an

earlier proceeding. Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Barnett v.

Milan Seating Sys., 215 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tenn. 2007), Massengill v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629,

12
631-32 (Tenn. 1987), and State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2000)). To prevail on a claim of collateral estoppel the party asserting it must show:

(1) that the issue to be precluded is identical to an issue decided in an earlier

proceeding, (2) that the issue to be precluded was actually raised, litigated, and

decided on the merits in the earlier proceeding, (3) that the judgment in the

earlier proceeding has become final, (4) that the party against whom collateral

estoppel is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party to the earlier

proceeding, and (5) that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted

had a full and fair opportunity in the earlier proceeding to contest the issue

now sought to be precluded.

Mullins, 297 S.W.3d at 535, (citing Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.2d 103, 118 (Tenn. 2001)

(Birch, J., concurring and dissenting)).

We first note that in Tennessee the law is clear that “[t]he doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel are applicable to give conclusive effect to quasi-judicial determinations

of administrative agencies.” Morris v. Esmark Apparel, 832 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. App.

Ct. 1991); see Mangrum v. Wal-Mart Stores, 950 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)

(recognizing that Morris v. Esmark Apparel established the rule in Tennessee that collateral

estoppel doctrine applies to give conclusive effect to quasi-judicial administrative decisions

if requirements of collateral estoppel are met). So long as the “administrative agency is

acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the

parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” Tennessee courts give the agency’s

determination the same preclusive effect as they would if the agency had been a court of law.

Morris, 832 S.W.2d at 566 (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S.

394, 422 (1966) and Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986)).

Morris v. Esmark Apparel was the first case in Tennessee to determine that collateral

estoppel applies to administrative decisions. While the parties to the administrative hearing

and the subsequent lawsuit were the same in Morris, 832 S.W.2d at 564, the parties are not

the same in the case at bar. The administrative hearing concerned Mr. Sullivan’s termination

of employment with NES and the parties included only NES and Phillip Sullivan. The case

at bar is related to the administrative hearing and was filed as a result of the administrative

hearing’s outcome, but the two proceedings do not share a “mutuality of parties.” None of

the current defendants was a party in the hearing before the ALJ.

Several cases in Tennessee have discussed whether collateral estoppel should apply

in situations where there is not a mutuality of the parties in the two proceedings under

consideration. Justice Koch addressed this issue in the case Beaty v. McGraw, 15 S.W.3d

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819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998):

At common law, the collateral estoppel doctrine required mutuality of

the parties and could only be used defensively. Thus, a defendant traditionally

employed the doctrine to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating a claim that the

plaintiff has previously litigated against the defendant and lost. The United

States Supreme Court expanded the application of the collateral estoppel

doctrine in federal courts when it discarded the common-law mutuality of

parties requirement. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 326-

33 (1979).

Id. at 825.

In this case, the defendants are asserting that Mr. Sullivan, the plaintiff, is precluded

from relitigating the issues of whether he admitted selling narcotics from the NES truck

during working hours and whether his admission to Detective Daniel was truthful or not.

This type of collateral estoppel is commonly referred to as “defensive” collateral estoppel,

because the defendants are asserting the doctrine against the plaintiff.

Offensive collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to preclude a defendant

from relitigating an issue the defendant did not succeed on in an earlier proceeding. Beaty,

15 S.W.3d at 825. While offensive collateral estoppel still requires mutuality of the parties

in Tennessee, defensive collateral estoppel does not require the parties to be identical in the

two proceedings. Trinity Indus. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 185 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2001); Beaty, 15 S.W.3d at 825. As the court explained in Phillips v. General Motors

Corp., 669 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), so long as the defendant in the later

proceeding is in the same position to the plaintiff as the adverse party was in the earlier

proceeding vis à vis the issue to be precluded, which the court described as privity, collateral

estoppel is available to the defendant in the later proceeding so long as the defendant can

satisfy the five requisite elements of collateral estoppel. Id. at 669. Therefore, since the

individual defendants and Wilson County are in privity with NES with respect to whether

Mr. Sullivan sold narcotics from an NES truck and whether Mr. Sullivan made an admission

to Detective Daniel, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is available to the individual

defendants and Wilson County.

The question whether collateral estoppel applies to a particular set of facts is a

question of law. Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 535 (citing Morris v. Esmark Apparel, 832 S.W.2d

563, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)). Therefore, courts reviewing a trial court’s decision to

dismiss a complaint on the basis of collateral estoppel must review the record de novo

without a presumption of correctness. Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 535.

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Mr. Sullivan argues collateral estoppel does not apply to the administrative hearing

herein because the issue before the ALJ was not identical to the issue the trial court ruled was

precluded. Second, he contends he did not have a full and fair opportunity to contest the

veracity of the statements in Detective Daniel’s letter to NES or whether he had admitted

selling narcotics during his interview with Detective Daniel on March 27, 2008. Finally, he

claims the issue precluded was not previously raised, litigated, and decided on the merits

before the ALJ. Mr. Sullivan does not contest the finality of the chancery court’s judgment

affirming the Board’s termination of his employment or that he was a party to the earlier

proceeding.

A. The Issue Before The ALJ Was Identical To The Issue The Trial Court Has

Ruled Is Precluded.

The issues determined by the ALJ must be identical to the issues in the instant lawsuit

for collateral estoppel to come into play and prevent Mr. Sullivan from litigating his claims.

Mr. Sullivan’slibel/defamation claimsform the basis of his complaint against Wilson County

and the individual defendants. “To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff

must prove that (1) a party published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement was

false and defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement

or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement.” Davis v. The

Tennessean, 83 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l

Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn.1999) (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 580 B (1977)).

Truth is an absolute defense to a claim for defamation when the otherwise defamatory

meaning of the words used turns out to be true. Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d

412, 420 (Tenn. 1978); accord Carroll v. Times Printing Co., 1987 WL 10332, at *1 (Tenn.

Ct. App. May 5, 1987). As the Tennessee Court of Appeals explained in Stones River

Motors v. Mid-South Pub. Co., 651 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983):

The damaging words must be factually false. If they are true, or essentially

true, they are not actionable, even though the published statement contains

other inaccuracies which are not damaging. Thus, the defense of truth applies

so long as the “sting” (or injurious part) of the statement is true.

The statements Detective Daniel made that Mr. Sullivan relies upon for his defamation

claim are that Mr. Sullivan sold narcotic drugs from an NES truck during his shift and that

he admitted selling narcotics from the NES truck twenty to thirty times over the course of a

year. The issue before the ALJ was whether the charges NES preferred against Mr. Sullivan

were substantiated so to justify the termination of his employment with NES. The basis for

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NES’s decision to prefer charges against Mr. Sullivan was the letter it received from

Detective Daniel describing Mr. Sullivan’s sale of narcotic drugs from the NES truck during

working hours and his subsequent admission. Thus, the truth of Detective Daniel’s

statements was at the heart of the issues before the ALJ. Accordingly, we conclude that the

issue that was before the ALJ is identical to the issue the trial court has ruled is precluded in

this case.

B. Mr. Sullivan Had A Full and Fair Opportunity To Litigate The Issues

Before The ALJ.

Detectives Daniel and Rich both testified at the ALJ hearing about the statements Mr.

Sullivan made at the station on March 27, 2008. Detective Daniel testified that Mr. Sullivan

admitted during the interview that Mr. Pemberton had given him ten narcotic pills on

November 19, 2007, and that he had given them to his friend at Wal-Mart in exchange for

$100. Detective Daniel also testified that Mr. Sullivan told him he had sold pills from his

NES truck twenty to thirty times over the preceding year. Detective Rich confirmed that Mr.

Sullivan admitted selling drugs from the NES truck when he was at the Wilson County

Sheriff’s Department on March 27, 2008. Mr. Sullivan’s attorney vigorously cross-examined

both Detective Daniel and Detective Rich about their testimony.

Mr. Sullivan testified at length. He repeatedly denied that he ever sold drugs, either

from the NES truck or otherwise. He also denied being aware that Mr. Pemberton was

involved in illegal drug activity. Further, he denied making any statement to Detective

Daniel in which he admitted selling any illegal drugs. He had ample opportunity at the

hearing to explain the purpose of his meeting at the Wal-Mart parking lot, and he testified

unequivocally that he lent his friend $200 and did not transfer any drugs to her. Finally, Mr.

Sullivan’s attorney went through the letter Detective Daniel sent to NES line by line with Mr.

Sullivan at the hearing before the ALJ, and Mr. Sullivan had the opportunity to admit or deny

each statement Detective Daniel included in the letter he sent to NES.

Based on our review of the transcript of the hearing before the ALJ, we conclude Mr.

Sullivan had a full and fair opportunity at the ALJ hearing to contest the issues the trial court

has ruled are precluded.

C. The Issues To Be Precluded Were Actually Raised, Litigated, And

Decided On The Merits In The Earlier Proceeding.

Following the close of evidence at the hearing before the ALJ, the ALJ made findings

of fact, as described above. The ALJ acknowledged the conflicting testimony and explained

that she found Detective Daniel’s testimony to be more credible than Mr. Sullivan’s. The

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ALJ expressly found that Mr. Sullivan sold narcotic drugs from an NES truck while he was

working and that Mr. Sullivan had admitted selling narcotic drugs to Detective Daniel on

March 27, 2008, during his interview at the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department. In other

words, the ALJ ultimately ruled that the statements Mr. Sullivan claims are defamatory were

in fact true. We thus conclude that the issue the trial court has ruled is precluded was in fact

previously raised, litigated, and decided on the merits by the ALJ.

Mr. Sullivan appealed the Board’s decision based on the ALJ’s report and

recommendation, and the chancery court affirmed it by Order on April 21, 2010. Mr.

Sullivan did not appeal that Order, which became final thirty days later. Having determined

that all five elements of collateral estoppel have been established, we hereby affirm the trial

court’s Order that collateral estoppel applies and precludes Mr. Sullivan from relitigating

whether or not he sold narcotics from an NES truck on November 19, 2007, or whether he

admitted selling narcotics from an NES truck when he met with Detective Daniel at the

Wilson County Sheriff’s Department on March 27, 2008. Since Detective Daniel’s

statements form the basis of Mr. Sullivan’s defamation/libel claim, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment dismissing this claim.

VI. REMAINING CLAIMS

Mr. Sullivan claims he was subjected to a custodial interrogation when he was

interviewed in March 2008 without being informed of his right to remain silent, his right to

an attorney, and his right to avoid self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment

of the United States Constitution. The trial court addressed this issue thoroughly in its Order

denying Mr. Sullivan’s motion in limine. We agree with the trial court’s analysis of this

issue, which is quoted in full above, and affirm its conclusion that Mr. Sullivan was not

subjected to a custodial interrogation when he voluntarily went down to meet with Detective

Daniel at the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department on March 27, 2008. Therefore, we hold

that his constitutional rights were not violated and the ALJ did not err in permitting Mr.

Sullivan’s admission to be introduced into evidence.

The trial court dismissed Mr. Sullivan’s defamation/libel claim after concluding that

the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded him from relitigating the truthfulness of the

statements Detective Daniel made in his letter. The trial court then dismissed the remaining

claims Mr. Sullivan asserted in his Complaint based on different provisions of the GTLA.

A review of Mr. Sullivan’s Complaint shows that each count is based on what Mr. Sullivan

characterizes as the false statements Detective Daniel made in his letter to NES. Because Mr.

Sullivan is collaterally estopped from litigating the truthfulness of the statements Detective

Daniel made in the letter to NES that resulted in his termination, the remainder of his claims

collapse like a house of cards because he has nothing left to support them. Mr. Sullivan has

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no basis upon which to argue the defendants were negligent or that they are liable for false

light invasion of privacy or the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, Mr.

Sullivan has no basis on which to argue Wilson County is liable to him for damages under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 because he is precluded from asserting Detective Daniel tendered

a false letter to his employer. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed

5

Mr. Sullivan’s claims against all of the defendants. All other issues are pretermitted.

We have no reason and therefore decline to address whether the GTLA provides an additional basis 5

to justify dismissing Mr. Sullivan’s causes of action. 

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VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Sullivan’s

complaint with prejudice. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed to the appellant, Phillip

Sullivan, for which execution shall issue, if necessary.

_________________________________

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE

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