NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 1, 2011

Decided June 6, 2011

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 10-2886

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY JEROME BANDY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division.

No. 2:09cr125-001

Rudy Lozano, Judge.

Order

Anthony Bandy pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm despite a felony conviction. 

18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal because three of his convictions are violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B). Bandy 

was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. His appointed attorney has moved to 

withdraw, concluding that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967). Bandy filed a response under Circuit Rule 51(b).

Bandy contends, among other things, that his guilty plea is invalid because he is not 

mentally competent. He tells us that he suffers from “obsessive-compulsive disorder, 

pre-pubescent adolescent retardation, and a hero complex.” He does not submit any 

medical evidence, however, or even contend that a physician or psychologist ever has 

concluded that he suffers from any mental shortcoming. Self-diagnosis does not call into question a person’s competence to plead guilty. The district court addressed Bandy 
No. 10-2886 Page 2

personally during the plea colloquy, and nothing in his responses implies any deficit in 

his understanding of the charges or the legal process, or his ability to consult with 

counsel. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (discussing the mental state required for a guilty plea). At the end of this colloquy, the judge found Bandy competent. 

We have reviewed the presentence report in addition to the plea colloquy. The PSR relates: “defendant denied any history of mental health treatment.” The PSR also states 

that Bandy is a high school graduate. Neither Bandy nor his lawyer took issue with either aspect of the PSR before or at sentencing. An appeal based on a premise of mental 

incompetence would be frivolous.

Bandy also contends that his 1996 conviction in Georgia for burglary should not 

have been counted as a violent felony. Counsel also considered this subject and concluded that such an argument would be frivolous. We agree with counsel’s assessment. 

Burglary is a violent felony, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and a state conviction for burglary counts

when it meets the federal definition of generic burglary—entry into a building for the 

purpose of committing a crime. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Georgia’s 

statute, Ga. Code §16–7–1(a), covers several different kinds of burglary, see United States 

v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 832 (11th Cir. 2006), and is divisible under the approach of United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2009). As Taylor permits, see 495 U.S. at 

599–602, the district court looked at the charging documents to determine whether Bandy was convicted of generic burglary. The indictment specifies that Bandy and others 

entered several dorm rooms on a college campus, intending to steal the occupants’ possessions. That meets the federal definition of generic burglary. And, given AlmendarezTorrez v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), it would be frivolous to argue that any details 

about this conviction had to be proved anew beyond a reasonable doubt in the federal 

prosecution. (Bandy acknowledges that the 1996 Georgia conviction is his, rather than 

that of someone else with the same name.)

Bandy contends that counsel should have asked the district judge to ignore the 1996 

conviction because, he asserts, his lawyer in the Georgia prosecution did not advise him

that a burglary conviction would have collateral consequences, such as a longer sentence for a later conviction for another crime. That argument is frivolous. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), holds that convictions used to support federal recidivist 

enhancements may be contested on only one ground: that the defendant, if indigent, 

was not offered the opportunity to have the assistance of counsel at public expense. 

Bandy was represented by counsel in the Georgia prosecution, so Custis precludes the 

sort of argument Bandy now proposes to make.

Bandy also contends that the district judge should have suppressed some evidence 

that the prosecutor wanted to use, if a trial had been held. Bandy’s unconditional guilty 

plea waives that contention, see United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), so his proposed appellate argument would be frivolous.

Counsel correctly concluded that any challenge to the 210-month sentence would be 

frivolous. The sentence falls within a properly constructed range (188 to 235 months) 
No. 10-2886 Page 3

and therefore is presumed reasonable. United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 

2005). See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). The judge explained why he chose 

210 months, discussing the seriousness of Bandy’s offense, his criminal history (he has 

many convictions in addition to the three violent felonies), and the need to deter other 

felons from acquiring firearms. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). The sentence is unexceptionable.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous.