UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Candice N. CIMBALL SHARPTON, Senior Airman 

U.S. Air Force, Appellant 

No. 14-0158 

Crim. App. No. 38027 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

Argued April 29, 2014 

Decided June 13, 2014 

BAKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

ERDMANN, STUCKY, RYAN, and OHLSON, JJ., joined. 

Counsel

For Appellant: Captain Nicholas D. Carter (argued); Captain 

Isaac C. Kennen. 

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel C. Taylor Smith (argued); 

Colonel Don M. Christensen (on brief); Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. 

Military Judge: W. Thomas Cumbie 

THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION. 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

2 

Chief Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Appellant asserts that the United States Air Force Court of 

Criminal Appeals (CCA) abused its discretion in finding legally 

sufficient evidence to support her conviction for larceny from 

the Air Force. Appellant argues that the victim in the case of 

credit card larceny is necessarily the bank issuing the card or 

the merchants selling the goods purchased. We disagree. In 

this case, as in United States v. Lubasky, the victim of the 

larceny is the person or entity suffering the financial loss or 

deprived of the use or benefit of the property at issue. 68 

M.J. 260, 263-64 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 

FACTS 

 In April 2010, the Air Force issued a General Purchase Card 

(GPC) to Senior Airman Candace N. Cimball Sharpton, enabling her 

to purchase medical supplies for the Air Force hospital at 

Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi. The CCA found that the 

GPC was established through a government contract with U.S. 

Bank, which issued the cards to authorized cardholders who were 

only allowed to use them for government purchases. United 

States v. Cimball Sharpton, 72 M.J. 777, 781 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 

App. 2013). After GPC charges were reviewed by an Air Force 

approving official, the Air Force would pay them off using 

Department of Defense funds appropriated for Air Force spending. 

The actual payments were made by the Defense Finance Accounting 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

3 

Service (DFAS) with money from an account allotted to the U.S. 

Air Force. 

 In July 2010, an approving official noticed some suspicious 

charges on Appellant’s account from stores including the Army 

and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Walgreens, and Walmart. 

After spotting such charges for several consecutive months, in 

September 2010 the official reported them to her superior. A 

subsequent investigation revealed Appellant had purchased 

approximately $20,000 worth of personal goods using her GPC at 

AAFES, Walgreens, and Walmart stores. Cimball Sharpton, 72 M.J. 

at 779. Air Force investigators collected surveillance videos 

and store receipts confirming Appellant’s unauthorized 

purchases. DFAS subsequently paid U.S. Bank for all the 

unauthorized charges made by Appellant. 

 Appellant was charged with, among other things, one 

specification of larceny in violation of Article 121, Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 921 (2012). The 

larceny specification stated: 

In that SENIOR AIRMAN CANDICE N. CIMBALL SHARPTON, 81st 

Medical Support Squadron, United States Air Force, 

Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, did, at or near the 

state of Mississippi, on divers occasions, between on or 

about 1 June 2010 and on or about 30 September 2010, 

steal money, military property, of a value greater than 

$500.00, the property of the United States Air Force. 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

4 

 Appellant was tried by a military judge alone. Though she 

pled not guilty, Appellant did not dispute any elements of the 

larceny charge. Appellant stipulated to the existence of video 

surveillance of Appellant making the alleged transactions. She 

also stipulated to the fact that DFAS paid U.S. Bank for the 

unauthorized charges: 

MJ: [D]efense counsel, you’re willing to stipulate that 

the charges that the accused made on her government 

purchase card to Walgreens in the amount of approximately 

2,400 dollars, and to AAFES in the amount of 18,333 

dollars and 78 cents, that those charges were actually 

paid for by the Defense Accounting and Finance Service 

[sic]? 

 [DC]: Yes, your honor. 

 Appellant was convicted of one specification of larceny in 

violation of Article 121, UCMJ; one specification of using 

oxycodone in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ; one specification 

of using cocaine in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ; and one 

specification of fraudulent enlistment in violation of Article 

83, UCMJ.1

 She was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, twelve 

months of confinement, reduction to E-1, and a $20,000 fine, 

with six months of additional confinement if the fine was not 

paid. The convening authority approved the sentence except for 

the six months contingent confinement. Cimball Sharpton, 72 

M.J. at 779. 

 

1

 Appellant was found not guilty on a second oxycodone charge. 

The military judge removed the “military property” provision 

from the larceny specification. 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

5 

Before the CCA, Appellant argued that the guilty finding on 

the larceny specification was legally and factually insufficient 

because the wrong victim was named in the charge. Id. The CCA 

rejected this argument, stating that larceny was properly 

charged with the Air Force as victim because: 

The appellant’s misconduct could not have been charged 

as a larceny from the merchants offering the goods, 

because those merchants made a sale for which they 

were compensated, and therefore they did not lose 

anything of value. Similarly, the appellant’s 

misconduct could not have been charged as a larceny 

against US Bank, because US Bank was wholly repaid for 

the appellant’s purchases, just as it would be for 

authorized purchases. The only victim in this case 

was the United States Air Force, whose funds were 

obligated by the appellant’s unauthorized, repeated 

purchases for her personal use. 

Id. at 781. The CCA affirmed the findings and sentence. Id. at 

786. 

 Appellant then appealed to this Court, which granted 

hearing on the following issue: 

WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

FINDING THE EVIDENCE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 

CONVICTION FOR LARCENY FROM THE AIR FORCE. 

DISCUSSION 

Questions of law, including questions of legal sufficiency, 

are reviewed by this Court de novo. United States v. Kearns, 73 

M.J. 177, 180 (C.A.A.F. 2014). This Court has adopted the 

Supreme Court’s standard for legal sufficiency, namely, that 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

6 

“‘the relevant question’” an appellate court must answer is 

“‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 

(C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979)). 

The elements of the crime of larceny are: 

(a) That the accused wrongfully took, obtained, or 

withheld certain property from the possession of 

the owner or of any other person; 

(b) That the property belonged to a certain person; 

(c) That the property was of a certain value or of 

some value; and 

(d) That the taking, obtaining, or withholding by the 

accused was with the intent permanently to 

deprive or defraud another person of the use and 

benefit of the property or permanently to 

appropriate the property for the use of the 

accused or for any person other than the owner. 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 46.b. 

(2012 ed.) (MCM). The term larceny “encompasses and 

consolidates what in the past were separate crimes, i.e., 

larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement, and obtaining property 

by false pretenses.” Lubasky, 68 M.J. at 263. “Any of the 

various types of larceny under Article 121 may be charged and 

proved under a specification alleging that the accused ‘did 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

7 

steal’ the property in question.” MCM pt. IV, para. 

46.c.(1)(a). 

A 2002 amendment to the MCM specifically addresses 

identifying the victim in a larceny charged under Article 121, 

UCMJ, and committed through credit, debit, and electronic 

transactions: “Wrongfully engaging in a credit, debit, or 

electronic transaction to obtain goods or money is an obtainingtype larceny by false pretense. Such use to obtain goods is 

usually a larceny of those goods from the merchant offering 

them.” MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)(h)(vi) (emphasis added). The 

Drafters’ Analysis states that the amendment was included to 

“provide guidance on how unauthorized credit, debit, or 

electronic transactions should usually be charged.” MCM

Analysis of the Punitive Articles app. 23 at A23-17 (emphasis 

added). However, the analysis leaves open the possibility that 

“[a]lternative charging theories are also available.” Id. 

We view this as a case where such an alternative charging 

theory should apply, given that it was neither the merchants nor 

U.S. Bank but the Air Force who suffered the financial loss 

resulting from Appellant’s larceny. Based on the facts 

presented, the Air Force agreed to pay U.S. Bank for all GPC 

purchases.2

 Cimball Sharpton, 72 M.J. at 781. It is clear -- in 

 

2

 See also Air Force Instruction 64-117, which states that: 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

8 

fact stipulated to by Appellant -- that DFAS paid U.S. Bank the 

full amount owed for the unauthorized charges. In view of the 

elements of Article 121, UCMJ, Appellant (a) wrongfully obtained 

property (namely the Air Force’s appropriated money) that (b) 

belonged to a certain person (the Air Force) and (c) was of a 

certain value. By the time we reach element (d) the accused has 

taken, obtained, or withheld that money with the intent of 

wrongfully and permanently depriving the Air Force of its use. 

No other party suffered financially as a result of Appellant’s 

actions. 

Both the Government and the CCA attempt to distinguish this 

case from our decision in Lubasky. We find no need to do so. 

In Lubasky, as in this case, the victim of the credit card 

larceny and the victim of the fraudulent ATM and debit 

transactions were those who suffered the financial loss. 68 

 

Charges on the cardholder statement that involve 

misuse or abuse by the cardholder are not disputable 

with the Bank. If the transaction was processed in 

accordance with the controls established (i.e., within 

the purchase limits, not from a vendor with a blocked 

Merchant Category Code) then the Bank has fulfilled 

its responsibilities under the contract and the 

government is obligated to make payment for the 

transaction. The government must seek restitution 

from the employee for any losses as a result of their 

improper transaction. 

Dep’t of the Air Force, Instr. 64-117, Air Force Government-Wide 

Purchase Card (GPC) Program para. 3.8.5.2 (Sept. 20, 2011). 
United States v. Cimball Sharpton, No. 14-0158/AF 

9 

M.J. at 263-64. Lubasky is fully consistent with our decision 

today. 

The Air Force suffered the financial loss in this case. 

Therefore, the Government was correct in charging larceny from 

the Air Force. Since the Air Force was a proper victim, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

DECISION 

 The decision of the United States Air Force Court of 

Criminal Appeals is affirmed.