alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 295.1 Purpose. ( a ) The purpose of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) is to assisted United States businesses to carry out research and development on high risk, high pay-off, emerging and enabling technologies. These technologies are: ( 1 ) High risk, because the technical challenges make success uncertain;
( 2 ) High pay-off, because when applied they offer significant benefits to the U.S. economy; and
( 3 ) Emerging and enabling, because they offer wide breadth of potential application and form an important technical basis for future commercial applications.
( b ) The rules in this part prescribe policies and procedures for the award of cooperative agreements under the Advanced Technology Program in order to ensure the fair treatment of all proposals. While the Advanced Technology Program is authorized to enter into grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts to carry out its mission, the rules in this part address only the award of cooperative agreements. The Program employs cooperative agreements rather than grants because such agreements allow ATP to exercise appropriate management oversight of projects and also to link ATP-funded projects to ongoing R&D at the National Institute of Standards and Technology wherever such linkage would increase the likelihood of success of the project.
( c ) In carrying out the rules in this part, the Program endeavors to put more emphasis on joint ventures and consortia with a broad range of participants, including large companies, and less emphasis on support of individual large companies.
[62 FR 64684, Dec. 9, 1997]
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: In re Shilpa B. T rivedi

, Relator

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 6

- 0 0 804

- C V

Trial court case number: 20 1 4

- 54049

Trial court: 2 15 th District Court of H a rri s County

On October 14 , 2016

, the relator

, Shilpa B. Trivedi filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the respondent trial judge ’s August 9 , 201 6 order d irecting

that re lator’ s pleadings be struck if she fails to pay $41,574.38 in attorneys’ fees within 60 days of that order. With the petition, relator has filed an emergency motion seeking a stay of the August 9, 2016 sanctions order and a stay of the emergency hearing set for October 21, 2016, on several issues related to attorney’s fees and other matters.

A lthough relator’s emergency motion contains a certificate of service, it fails to

contain the required certificate of compliance that all parties have been notified by

expe dited means that an emergency motion for temporary relief has been or will be filed

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.10(a). Accordingly, we DENY relator’s emergency motion without prejudice to refiling within 3 days of the date of this order an amended emergency motion to stay that contains a certificate of compliance. See id.

In addition, while relator’s appendix contains two cover pag es with district clerk image numbers for the exhibits, it fails to contain a single index with page numbers for

all exhibits and the bookmarks fail to link to those exhibits. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 9.4(h) (“An electronically filed record in an original proceeding . . . that includes more than one item must contain bookmarks to assist in locating each item.”). Th us
, we ORDER

r elator, within 3 days of the date of this order, to file a supplemental record with an

index with page numbers a nd bookmarks that link to the exhibits

. See id. 9.4(h), 52. 7(b)

.2 Finally, t he Court requests a response to the petition for writ of mandamus by any real party in interest. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52. 8(b)(1)

. The response, if any, shall be filed

within 30 days from the date of this order

. See id. 2, 52.4

.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: / s/ Lau ra Higley

X Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: O ctober 14, 2016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

APPOINTMENT TO THE

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF LAW

EXAMINERS :

:

:

:

: NO. 978

SUPREME COURT RULES DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURAM

AND NOW , this 23 rd day of February

, 202 4

, Adam C. Bonin

, Esquire

, Philadelphia

,

is hereby appointed as a member of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners for a term

of three years, commencing April 1, 202 4

.
§ 25.41 Stay pending appeal. ( a ) An initial decision is stayed automatically pending disposition of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal to the authority head.
( b ) No administrative stay is available following a final decision of the authority head.
### §728. Misuse of Department purchase cards

(a) In General.—(1) The Secretary shall prohibit any employee of the Department who the Secretary or the Inspector General of the Department determines has knowingly misused a purchase card from serving as a purchase card holder or approving official.

(2) Such a prohibition shall be in addition to any other applicable penalty.

(b) Misuse.—For purposes of this section, the term "misuse" means—

(1) splitting purchases;

(2) exceeding applicable purchase card limits or purchase thresholds;

(3) purchasing any unauthorized item;

(4) using a purchase card without being an authorized purchase card holder; or

(5) violating ethics standards.

(Added Pub. L. 115–407, title V, §501(a), Dec. 31, 2018, 132 Stat. 5376.)
#### Julia D. Smith, Appellant, v. Roy A. Smith, Respondent.

In an action for separation, judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint after trial," unanimously affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Present — Lewis, P. J., Carswell, Johnston, Sneed and Wenzel, JJ. [See 274 App. Div. 790.]
Editorial Note on Subpart A of Part 9701
Editorial Note: At 73 FR 58435, Oct. 7, 2008, the application of subpart A to part 9701 was rescinded.

§ 9701.101 Purpose. ( a ) This part contains regulations governing the establishment of a new human resources management system within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 9701. As permitted by section 9701, these regulations waive and replace various statutory provisions that would otherwise be applicable to affected DHS employees. These regulations are issued jointly by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
( b ) The system established under this part is designed to be mission-centered, performance-focused, flexible, contemporary, and excellent; to generate respect and trust through employee involvement; to be based on the principles of merit and fairness embodied in the statutory merit system principles; and to comply with all other applicable provisions of law.
1 The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 03-3981

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Agustine Rangel-Arteaga, also known * as Adolpho Rangel-Arteaga, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 7, 2004 Filed: October 14, 2004

___________ Before MURPHY, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Agustine Rangel-Arteaga pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and stipulated that he faced a statutory mandatory minimum prison term of 20 years because he had a prior felony drug conviction. After the government decided not to seek a substantial-assistance downward departure, Rangel-Arteaga moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court 1 denied his motion, and later sentenced-2- him to 240 months imprisonment and 10 years supervised release. Rangel-Arteaga appeals, and in a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), he challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As part of his written plea agreement, Rangel-Arteaga promised not to appeal or to seek postconviction review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As to direct review, he waived “any and all rights to appeal [his] conviction in this case, including a waiver of all motions, defenses and objections which [he] could assert to the charges or to the Court’s entry of Judgment against [him], including review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 of any sentence imposed and any and all issues inhering therein,” with two exceptions: (1) he could challenge his conviction and sentence if the Eighth Circuit or Supreme Court later found that the substantive basis of his plea failed to state a crime; and (2) he could appeal if the sentencing court agreed that further review of a legal issue raised at sentencing was needed. With the services of an interpreter, Rangel-Arteaga also signed a pre-plea statement which reiterated that his decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary, and reiterated that he was waiving his right to appeal. The appeal waiver was discussed at the change-of-plea hearing, and the court received Rangel-Arteaga’s assurance that he had read his plea agreement with the assistance of an interpreter, and that he understood its key provisions. The record in this case demonstrates that Rangel-Arteaga’s plea and plea agreement were voluntary and he understood he was waiving his appellate rights, that his sentence is consistent with the plea agreement, and that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the appeal waiver. SeeUnited States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct. 501 (2003). We have reviewed the entire record independently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and we find no nonfrivolous issues not covered by the waiver. Accordingly, we enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal.

______________________________
Resolution 09-7 

Approved September 22, 2009 

Whitefish, Montana 

As certified by 

R. Steven Brown 

Executive Director 

MEANING OF “SOLID WASTE” UNDER THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND 

RECOVERY ACT (RCRA) AS IT APPLIES TO NON-HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAMS 

WHEREAS, on January 2, 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) published an 

“Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Identification of Non-Hazardous Materials That Are Solid 

Waste” (FR Vol. 74 No. 1), to address the issue of which non-hazardous materials are or are not “solid 

waste” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and to assist EPA in developing 

certain standards under sections 112 and 129 of the Clean Air Act; and 

WHEREAS, as a part of the rulemaking, U.S. EPA is considering whether materials such as whole waste 

tires used in combustion devices should be classified as solid waste under RCRA, thus requiring 

processing (e.g., chipping or shredding) prior to use as a fuel in combustion devices; and 

WHEREAS, some states with independent waste tire programs have suggested that the federal definition 

of solid waste under RCRA should be amended to exclude whole tires so that no chipping or shredding is 

required prior to use as a fuel in combustion devices; and 

WHEREAS, states that do not have independent waste tire statutes are concerned about their ability to 

regulate whole tires as solid waste if whole tires are excluded from the definition of solid waste; and 

WHEREAS, in either case, states are operating waste tire disposal programs that are protective of the 

environment. 

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL OF THE 

STATES: 

Urges U.S. EPA to create a subcategory under section 129 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) rules for 

combustion of waste materials with heat recovery and regulate this combustion similarly to the CAA, 

section 112 standard for maximum achievable control technology (MACT), or, in the alternative, exclude 

whole tires from the definition of solid waste at the point of combustion (see attachment). 
Attachment to Resolution 09-7 

Proposed statutory and/or regulatory amendment at 42 U.S.C. sec. 6903(27) and/or 40 CFR 

157.2:

 “Solid waste” means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a wastewater treatment plant, water 

supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material including 

solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, 

mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not include solid or 

dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows 

or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under section 402 of the 

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source, special nuclear, or 

byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923), or 

combustion of whole tires that have been recovered or diverted from the solid waste stream and 

used as legitimate alternative fuel pursuant to an established state waste tire program.
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of Unico, Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended February 28, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I Kenneth Wiedrich, Chief Financial Officer of Unico, Incorporated (the "Company"), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, was adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1. the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended February 29, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Dated: June 2, 2008/s/ Kenneth Wiedrich
Kenneth Wiedrich
Chief Financial Officer
Editorial Note on Part 303
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 303 appear at 68 FR 56555, Oct. 1, 2003.

§ 303.9 Restrictions on the transfer of duty-exemptions. ( a ) The sale or transfer of a duty-exemption from one firm to another shall not be permitted.
( b ) The sale or transfer of a business together with its duty-exemption shall be permitted with prior written notification to the Departments. Such notification shall be accompanied by certifications and representations, as appropriate, that: ( 1 ) If the transferee is a subsidiary of or in any way affiliated with any other company engaged in the production of watch movements components being offered for sale to any territorial producer, the related company or companies will continue to offer such watch and watch movement components on equal terms and conditions to all willing buyers and shall not engage in any practice, in regard to the sale of components, that competitively disadvantages the non-affiliated territorial producers *vis-a-vis* the territorial subsidiary;
( 2 ) The sale or transfer price for the business together with its duty-exemption does not include the capitalization of the duty-exemption *per se;*
( 3 ) The transferee is neither directly or indirectly affiliated with any other territorial duty-exemption holder in any territory;
( 4 ) The transferee will not modify the watch assembly operations of the duty-exemption firm in a manner that will significantly diminish its economic contributions to the territory.
( c ) At the request of the Departments, the transferee shall permit representatives of the Departments to inspect whatever records are necessary to establish to their satisfaction that the certifications and representations contained in paragraph (b) of this section have been or are being met.
( d ) Any transferee who is either unwilling or unable to make the certifications and representations specified in paragraph (b) of this section shall secure the Departments' approval in advance of the sale or transfer of the business together with its duty-exemption. The request for approval shall specify which of the certifications specified in paragraph (b) of this section the firm is unable or unwilling to make, and give reasons why such fact should not constitute a basis for the Departments' disapproval of the sale or transfer.
[49 FR 17740, Apr. 25, 1984, as amended at 50 FR 43568, Oct. 28, 1985]
Home > NRC Library > ADAMS Public Documents

# SECY-12-0003 - Draft Final Policy Statement on Volume Reduction and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management

Accession Number: ML113400169

Date Released: Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Package Contents

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    - ML113400160 - SECY-12-0003 - Draft Final Policy Statement on Volume Reduction and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management (5 page(s), 1/9/2012)
    - ML113400177 - SECY-12-0003 - Enclosure 1:  Draft Final Policy Statement on Volume Reduction and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management (6 page(s), 1/9/2012)
    - ML113400182 - SECY-12-0003 - Enclosure 2:  Original Policy Statement on Low-Level Waste Volume Reduction (1 page(s), 10/12/1981)
    - ML113400195 - SECY-12-0003 - Enclosure 3:  Public Comments (15 page(s), 1/9/2012)
    - ML113400201 - SECY-12-0003 - Enclosure 4:  Summary of Public Comment Letters Received (1 page(s), 1/9/2012)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7521

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ARTHUR MANSFIELD BECKNER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CR-92-141, CA-96-24-R)

Submitted: March 27, 1997 Decided: April 3, 1997

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arthur Mansfield Beckner, Appellant Pro Se. Julie C. Dudley, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Beckner, Nos. CR-92-

141, CA-96-24-R (W.D. Va. Sept. 11, 1996). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Marco Community Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Thomas M. Whelan, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the period covered by the report.
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |     |  |                                                                    
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: November 15, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ Thomas M. Whelan                                               
|                        |  |     |  | Thomas M. Whelan, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
### §3540. Purpose

The purpose of special restorative training is to overcome, or lessen, the effects of a manifest physical or mental disability which would handicap an eligible person (other than a person made eligible under subparagraph (C) of such section 1 by reason of a spouse being listed in one of the categories referred to in that subparagraph) in the pursuit of a program of education.

(Pub. L. 85–857, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1200, §1740; Pub. L. 96–466, title III, §331, Oct. 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 2198; renumbered §3540 and amended Pub. L. 102–83, §5(a), (c)(1), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 406; Pub. L. 107–103, title I, §109(a), Dec. 27, 2001, 115 Stat. 986; Pub. L. 109–444, §3(b)(4), Dec. 21, 2006, 120 Stat. 3307; Pub. L. 109–461, title III, §301(b)(4), title X, §1006(b), Dec. 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3427, 3468.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Such section, referred to in text, probably means section 3501(a)(1) of this title. See 2006 Amendment note below.

#### Amendments

2006—Pub. L. 109–461, §1006(b), provided that as of the enactment of Pub. L. 109–461, the amendments made by Pub. L. 109–444 were deemed for all purposes not to have taken effect and that Pub. L. 109–444 ceased to be in effect. See Amendment notes below and section 1006(b) of Pub. L. 109–461, set out as a Coordination of Provisions With Pub. L. 109–444 note under section 101 of this title.

Pub. L. 109–461, §301(b)(4), substituted "(other than a person made eligible under subparagraph (C) of such section by reason of a spouse being listed in one of the categories referred to in that subparagraph)" for "(as defined in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) of section 3501(a)(1) of this title)".

Pub. L. 109–444, which substituted "(other than a person made eligible under subparagraph (C) of such section by reason of a spouse being listed in one of the categories referred to in that subparagraph)" for "(as defined in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) of section 3501(a)(1) of this title)", was terminated by Pub. L. 109–461, §1006(b). See Amendment notes above.

2001—Pub. L. 107–103 substituted "subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) of section 3501(a)(1) of this title" for "section 3501(a)(1)(A) of this title".

1991—Pub. L. 102–83 renumbered section 1740 of this title as this section and substituted "3501(a)(1)(A)" for "1701(a)(1)(A)".

1980—Pub. L. 96–466 inserted "(as defined in section 1701(a)(1)(A) of this title)" after "person".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2006 Amendment

Amendment by section 301(b)(4) of Pub. L. 109–461 applicable with respect to a payment of educational assistance for a course of education pursued after Dec. 22, 2006, see section 301(d) of Pub. L. 109–461, set out as a note under section 3501 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1980 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–466 effective Oct. 1, 1980, except as otherwise specifically provided, see section 802(c) of Pub. L. 96–466, set out as a note under section 3452 of this title.

1 See References in Text note below.