65258 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Transportation Security Administration 

49 CFR Parts 1540, 1542, 1544, 1546 

and 1548 

[Docket No. TSA–2004–19515] 

RIN 1652–AA23 

Air Cargo Security Requirements

AGENCY: Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), an agency within 

the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Border and Transportation Security 

Directorate, proposes to amend current 

transportation security regulations to 

enhance and improve the security of air 

cargo transportation. The Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act directed 

TSA to implement measures to enhance 

the security of air cargo transported in 

both passenger and all-cargo aircraft. In 

discharging this responsibility, TSA 

conducted analyses of internal and 

external threats, risk and vulnerability 

assessments, and security measures 

already in place. This proposed 

rulemaking would require the adoption 

of security measures throughout the air 

cargo supply chain; these security 

measures will be applicable to airport 

operators, aircraft operators, foreign air 

carriers, and indirect air carriers. These 

proposed regulatory requirements 

would impose significant barriers to 

terrorists seeking to use the air cargo 

transportation system for malicious 

purposes. 

This proposal would also change the 

applicability of the requirement for a 

‘‘twelve-five’’ security program from 

aircraft with a maximum certificated 

takeoff weight ‘‘of 12,500 pounds or 

more’’ to those with a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight of ‘‘more than 

12,500 pounds.’’ This change would 

conform the regulation to recent 

legislation.

DATES: Send your comments on or 

before January 10, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by the TSA docket number, to 

this rulemaking using any one of the 

following methods: 

Comments Filed Electronically: You 

may submit comments through the 

docket Web site at http://dms.dot.gov.

Please be aware that anyone is able to 

search the electronic form of all 

comments received into any of our 

dockets by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or signing the 

comment, if submitted on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You may review the applicable Privacy 

Act Statement published in the Federal 

Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477), or you may visit http://

dms.dot.gov.

You also may submit comments 

through the Federal eRulemaking portal 

at http://www.regulations.gov.

Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or 

In Person: Address or deliver your 

written, signed comments to the Docket 

Management System, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 

20590–0001; Fax: 202–493–2251.

Comments that include trade secrets, 

confidential commercial or financial 

information, or sensitive security 

information (SSI) should not be 

submitted to the public regulatory 

docket. Please submit such comments 

separately from other comments on the 

proposed rule. Comments containing 

trade secrets, confidential commercial 

or financial information, or SSI should 

be appropriately marked as containing 

such information and submitted by mail 

to the individual listed in FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. 

Reviewing Comments in the Docket:

You may review the public docket 

containing comments in person in the 

Dockets Office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Dockets Office is 

located on the plaza level of the NASSIF 

Building at the Department of 

Transportation address above. Also, you 

may review public dockets on the 

Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. 

See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for 

format and other information about 

comment submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Tamika McCree, Transportation 

Security Administration, Office of 

Transportation Security Policy (TSA–9), 

601 South 12th Street, Arlington, 

Virginia, 22202, (571–227–2632), 

tamika.mccree@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The TSA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. We also invite comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy, 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from adopting the proposals in this 

document. See ADDRESSES above for 

information on where to submit 

comments. 

With each comment, please include 

your name and address, identify the 

docket number at the beginning of your 

comments, and give the reason for each 

comment. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. You may submit 

comments and material electronically, 

in person, or by mail as provided under 

ADDRESSES, but please submit your 

comments and material by only one 

means. If you submit comments by mail 

or delivery, submit them in two copies, 

in an unbound format, no larger than 8.5 

by 11 inches, suitable for copying and 

electronic filing. 

If you want TSA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

rulemaking, include with your 

comments a self-addressed, stamped 

postcard on which the docket number 

appears. We will stamp the date on the 

postcard and mail it to you. 

Except for comments containing 

confidential information and SSI, we 

will file in the public docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with TSA personnel 

concerning this rulemaking. The docket 

is available for public inspection before 

and after the comment closing date. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late to the extent practicable. We 

may change this rulemaking in light of 

the comments we receive. 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

You can get an electronic copy using 

the Internet by— 

(1) Searching the Department of 

Transportation’s electronic Docket 

Management System (DMS) web page 

(http://dms.dot.gov/search); 

(2) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s web page at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/

aces140.html; or 

(3) Visiting the TSA’s Law and Policy 

web page at http://www.tsa.dot.gov/

public/index.jsp. 

In addition, copies are available by 

writing or calling the individual in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section. Make sure to identify the docket 

number of this rulemaking. 

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This 

Document 

ACSSP—Air Carrier Standard Security 

Program 

ASAC—Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee 

ATSA—Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act 

CBP—U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65259

1Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. 107–296 (Nov. 

25, 2002).

2 49 U.S.C. 114(d).

3 49 U.S.C. 44901(a)

4 49 U.S.C. 44901(f)

5See discussion on Known Shipper Program at 

IV.G.

6See discussion of aircraft operator security 

programs in IV. of this preamble.

C–TPAT—Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism 

DHS—Department of Homeland 

Security 

DOT—Department of Transportation 

DSIP—Domestic Security Integration 

Program 

EA—Emergency Amendment 

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration 

IAC—Indirect Air Carrier 

IACSSP—Indirect Air Carrier Standard 

Security Program 

IC—Information Circular

SD—Security Directive 

SIDA—Security Identification Display 

Area 

SSI—Sensitive Security Information 

TSA—Transportation Security 

Administration

Outline of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: 

I. Background 

II. Efforts Leading to the Development of This 

NPRM 

A. The Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee 

B. Air Cargo Security Strategic Plan 

C. TSA–CBP Air Cargo Coordination 

III. Summary of the Rulemaking 

A. Who is affected by this NPRM? 

B. Why is this regulatory change 

necessary? 

C. How did TSA enhance cargo security 

after September 11, 2001? 

D. What would this proposed rulemaking 

do to strengthen the current air cargo 

security regulatory regime? 

E. How will TSA enforce compliance? 

F. Did TSA invite recommended changes? 

G. Were other solutions considered and 

why were these proposals chosen over 

others? 

IV. Summary of Proposed Amendments 

A. Current regulation of aircraft operators 

and foreign air carriers 

B. Security Threat Assessments for Air 

Cargo Workers 

C. Security Measures for Persons Boarding 

an All-cargo Aircraft 

D. Screening Cargo 

E. Securing the Cargo Operating 

Environment 

F. Accepting Cargo from Comparable 

Entities 

G. Known Shipper Program 

H. Establish All-Cargo Operator Standard 

Security Program 

I. Strengthen Foreign Aircraft Operator 

Security Measures 

J. Enhancing Existing Requirements for 

IACs 

K. Establishing New Training and 

Personnel Requirements 

V. Section-by-Section Analysis of Proposed 

Changes 

VI. Compliance Schedule 

VII. Fee Authority for the Security Threat 

Assessment 

VIII. Regulatory Evaluation Summary 

IX. The Proposed Amendment 

X. International Trade Impact Assessment 

XI. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Analysis 

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

XIII. International Compatibility 

XIV. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

XV. Environmental Analysis 

XVI. Energy Impact

I. Background 

On September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks against the United States 

resulted in unprecedented human 

casualties and property damage. In 

response to those attacks, Congress 

passed the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA), which established 

the Transportation Security 

Administration. TSA was created as an 

agency within the Department of 

Transportation (DOT), operating under 

the direction of the Under Secretary of 

Transportation for Security. On March 

1, 2003, TSA was transferred to the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS);1 the office formerly designated 

DOT Under Secretary for Transportation 

Security is now Administrator of TSA. 

TSA continues to have the statutory 

authority and responsibility that ATSA 

granted to the Administrator with 

respect to security in all modes of 

transportation.2 In ATSA, Congress set 

forth the following specific 

requirements for TSA in the area of air 

cargo security:

• Provide for screening of all 

property, cargo, carry-on and checked 

baggage, and other articles, that will be 

carried aboard a passenger aircraft 

operated by an air carrier or foreign air 

carrier; 3 and

• Establish a system to screen, 

inspect, or otherwise ensure the security 

of freight that is to be transported in allcargo aircraft as soon as practicable.4

TSA has addressed air cargo security 

through the issuance of regulations, 

Security Directives (SDs), and 

Emergency Amendments (EAs) to 

security programs. All cargo loaded on 

passenger aircraft is subject to security 

requirements through TSA’s known 

shipper program, which prohibits 

operators of passenger aircraft from 

transporting any cargo from shippers 

that are unknown.5 Notably, in 49 

U.S.C. section 44901(a), Congress 

expressly provided that the known 

shipper program is a form of screening 

that need not be carried out by a Federal 

government employee, unlike most 

screening of persons and property that 

is loaded on a passenger aircraft. Thus, 

aircraft operators carry out screening 

using the known shipper program.

The known shipper program has been 

substantially strengthened since 

September 11, 2001, and additional 

security measures have been 

implemented over the last two years. 

TSA prohibits aircraft operators in 

passenger operations under full 

programs 6 from transporting cargo 

unless a Known Shipper ships it. 

Entities may qualify for Known Shipper 

status if they meet certain security 

requirements. This proposed rule would 

codify the known shipper program as 

well as provide enhancements to the 

existing structure to strengthen the 

program further.

This proposed rule also includes 

other elements to improve security of air 

cargo carried on passenger aircraft. With 

respect to all-cargo aircraft, this 

proposed rule would enhance security 

significantly by requiring the adoption 

of a number of measures by airports, 

aircraft operators, and indirect air 

carriers (IACs), sometimes known as air 

freight forwarders. 

Following the acts of terrorism on 

September 11, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) and then the 

Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) took steps to amend security 

regulations governing aviation security, 

including the acceptance and handling 

of air cargo. While other agencies, 

including FAA, regulate safety 

considerations in the transportation of 

cargo and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) regulates the entry of 

cargo into the United States, TSA is 

solely responsible for the security of 

shipments of air cargo. The 

requirements outlined in this proposed 

rule, including those presently 

implemented by security directives, 

would comprehensively enhance the 

security of air cargo. These proposals 

would fill gaps in existing air cargo 

security regulations to mitigate the 

threat of terrorism to this vital industry.

Section IV of this NPRM specifically 

addresses each of the changes made to 

49 CFR parts 1540–1548 and discusses 

how those changes will improve air 

cargo security. The major objectives of 

the program are to prevent passenger 

and large all-cargo aircraft from being 

used as weapons and to prevent 

unauthorized explosives from being 

carried aboard, and potentially 

detonated, during flight. In summary, 

DHS is proposing to establish a 

Standard Security Program for all-cargo 

aircraft operators utilizing aircraft with 

a take-off weight of over 45,500 kg. 

These carriers currently are not covered 

by the requirement in section 

65260 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

7 the ASAC report is protected at Sensitive 

Security Information under 49 CFR part 1520.

1544.101(a) as they relate to the cargo 

provisions of section 1544.205 because 

they do not carry passengers. Instead, 

these all-cargo operators typically 

follow provisions of 1544.101(d) and (e), 

which are intended to govern the 

operations of much smaller aircraft. The 

current rules for cargo carried on certain 

passenger aircraft, and for other allcargo operations under the existing 

Twelve-Five Standard Security Program, 

would be enhanced. DHS also proposes 

to extend security threat assessments, or 

focused background checks, to air cargo 

industry workers who handle air cargo 

but do not operate within a secure area. 

Currently, these workers are not 

screened, leaving the possibility that 

they could introduce weapons, 

explosives, or individuals into the air 

cargo system. For similar reasons, we 

also propose to extend Secure 

Identification Display Area 

requirements at airports that have these 

areas under § 1544.205 to cargo 

operation areas not covered by the 

current language of this regulation. We 

also seek to ensure persons traveling on 

all-cargo aircraft are screened to ensure 

they do not pose a threat to the aircraft. 

Finally the draft regulation would 

bolster the requirements imposed on 

indirect air carriers in recognition of the 

fact that vulnerabilities within their 

operations could lead to the 

introduction of weapons, explosives, or 

individuals who may jeopardize the 

security of aircraft. None of these 

measures is currently covered under 

existing TSA or other agency 

regulations. 

CBP has issued regulations governing 

international air cargo, but the CBP 

regulations have a different purpose 

than these proposed regulations. As a 

result, there is no redundancy in the 

two programs. Internationally, CBP 

requires aircraft operators to report 

cargo manifest data in advance of arrival 

into the United States under 19 CFR 

4.7–7a. This requirement, however, may 

be fulfilled at the time the aircraft is 

already flying to the United States, 

when it may be too late to prevent an 

incident that would destroy the aircraft 

and potential ground-level targets. TSA 

and CBP are currently engaged in efforts 

to leverage their respective regulatory 

programs to further militate against an 

act of terrorism through air cargo. While 

CBP also has other security-focused 

regulations, the CBP mission and 

statutory authority concentrates on 

preventing the entry of high-risk goods 

from entering the United States upon 

arrival at the border. These CBP 

regulations do not govern the security 

requirements that air carriers must 

implement in order to prevent the 

introduction of explosives or operatives 

as cargo moves through the supply 

chain and onto aircraft for flight. TSA 

regulations and proposed amendments 

address this different security threat. 

II. Efforts Leading to the Development 

of This NPRM 

This NPRM is the result of more than 

a year of industry consultation, strategic 

planning and interagency coordination 

by TSA and DHS. The foundation of the 

policy changes recommended here are 

TSA’s consultations with industry 

through its Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee (ASAC), the development of 

the DHS/TSA Air Cargo Strategic Plan, 

and coordination within the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

A. The Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee 

The Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee, a standing committee 

organized under the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act, was created in 1989, in 

the wake of the crash of Pan Am 103 

over Lockerbie, Scotland, to provide the 

federal government with expert 

consultation on aviation security issues. 

Previously managed by the FAA, ASAC 

is now managed by TSA. ASAC is 

composed of 27 organizations with a 

stake in securing the aviation sector; 

members include groups representing 

victims and survivors of terrorist acts, 

freight forwarders, aircraft owners, 

airports, aircraft manufacturers, 

representatives of passenger and cargo 

airline management and labor, and 

representatives of key federal 

government agencies. 

In April 2003, ASAC established three 

Air Cargo Security working groups: 

Shipper Acceptance Procedures (which 

focused on known shipper and other 

screening protocols), Indirect Air Carrier 

Security and Compliance, and Securing 

the All-Cargo Aircraft. ASAC working 

group members consisted of 

representatives from the following 

organizations and agencies, listed 

alphabetically: Air Courier Conference 

of America; Air Forwarders Association; 

Air France; Air Line Pilots Association; 

Air Transport Association; Airport Law 

Enforcement Action Network; Airports 

Council International—North America; 

Allied Pilots Association; American 

Association of Airport Executives; 

American Trucking Association; 

Association of Flight Attendants; 

Aviation Consumer Action Project; 

British Airways; Cargo Airline 

Association; Coalition of Airline Pilots 

Association; Federal Aviation 

Administration; Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; International Air 

Transport Association; Lufthansa; 

National Air Carrier Association; 

National Customs Brokers and 

Forwarders Association of America; 

National Industrial Transportation 

League; Regional Airline Association; 

Transportation Intermediaries 

Association; U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection; U.S. Department of 

Transportation—Office of the Secretary; 

U.S. Department of State; U.S. Postal 

Service; and Victims of Pan Am Flight 

103. 

On October 1, 2003, ASAC presented 

TSA with its final report on air cargo 

security, which included 42 

recommendations covering 22 topical 

areas.7 The working group’s 

recommendations included 

strengthening the known shipper 

program by improving technology links 

between aircraft operators and the 

federal government, leveraging new 

technology to create a more layered 

cargo security approach, augmenting 

requirements to achieve known shipper 

status, strengthening the Indirect Air 

Carrier Standard Security Program 

(IACSSP) and securing the all-cargo 

aircraft operating area. The 

recommendations from the consensus 

report are reflected throughout this 

NPRM.

B. Air Cargo Security Strategic Plan

While the ASAC working groups were 

completing their independent 

assessments of air cargo security, TSA 

was developing an extensive strategic 

plan for securing air cargo (Air Cargo 

Strategic Plan). The Air Cargo Strategic 

Plan, which was completed in 

November 2003, and approved by the 

Department of Homeland Security in 

January 2004, evaluated TSA’s and 

others’ analyses of air cargo security, 

including the ASAC report. Based on 

these evaluations, the Air Cargo 

Strategic Plan details a threat-based, 

risk-managed program for securing the 

air cargo transportation system. The Air 

Cargo Strategic Plan contains a vision to 

ensure that TSA has adequately 

considered the security of air cargo 

operations. It identifies priority actions 

based on risk, cost, deadlines, 

performance, research and technology 

initiatives, and coordinated stakeholder 

outreach efforts. The Air Cargo Strategic 

Plan focuses on a multi-layered 

approach to security. 

The Air Cargo Strategic Plan contains 

sensitive security information (SSI); 

therefore, its contents cannot be 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65261

8SSI is information obtained or developed in the 

conduct of security activities, including research 

and development, the disclosure of which TSA has 

determined would: constitute an unwarranted 

invasion of privacy; reveal trade secrets or 

privileged or confidential information obtained 

from any person; or be detrimental to transportation 

security. 49 CFR 1520.5(a)(1–3); 69 FR 28066, 

28082–28083 (May 18, 2004).

9See discussions of Twelve-Five Standard 

Security Program at III.C. and IV.G.

disclosed to the public.8 In summary, it 

prescribes TSA’s mission in the area of 

air cargo: providing the most effective 

security program possible while 

maintaining effective stewardship of 

resources and not unduly impeding the 

flow of commerce. The plan is 

multimodal, ensures that TSA has 

adequately considered the expanse of 

the air cargo security domain, and 

details a program for denying terrorists 

the opportunity to exploit that system. 

It identifies priority actions based on 

risk, cost, deadlines, performance, 

research and technology initiatives, and 

coordinated stakeholder outreach efforts 

in four strategic components: enhancing 

shipper and supply chain security, 

identifying elevated risk cargo through 

prescreening, identifying technology for 

performing targeted air cargo 

inspections, and securing all-cargo 

aircraft through appropriate facility 

security measures.

This NPRM proposes to implement 

many of the provisions of the Air Cargo 

Strategic Plan and ensures that the 

appropriate regulatory framework exists 

for additional measures that are not 

regulatory in nature. In addition to 

regulatory changes, aspects of the Air 

Cargo Strategic Plan will be 

implemented through security program 

updates, SDs and EAs, research and 

development programs, and publicprivate cooperative endeavors. 

C. TSA–CBP Air Cargo Coordination 

Since its establishment in November 

2002 by the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 (Pub. L. 107–296), the Department 

of Homeland Security has had, as one of 

its central tenets, the goals to reduce 

redundancy and improve effectiveness. 

This priority has particularly been the 

case in the area of air cargo security. 

Shortly after their transfer to the DHS, 

TSA and the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (formerly, the United States 

Customs Service) initiated an 

interagency program to leverage 

resources, eliminate unnecessary 

duplication and ensure compatibility 

between their respective air cargo 

security programs. The goal of this 

endeavor is to ensure that DHS has a 

comprehensive, coordinated policy for 

securing air cargo entering, transiting 

within and departing the United States. 

This NPRM complements CBP’s 

programs, including the following 

primary coordination areas: the TSA 

known shipper program in conjunction 

with Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C–TPAT); targeting, 

risk assessment, and compliance 

measurement; technology research and 

development; and explosives detection 

canine programs. This interagency 

coordination is instrumental to the 

implementation of TSA’s layered 

approach to air cargo security and to 

many of the systems and processes that 

will support the regulatory changes 

proposed in this NPRM, and coincides 

with a Congressional mandate in the 

conference report accompanying the 

DHS appropriations act (H.R. Conf. 

Report No. 108–280 (2004) (‘‘Air Cargo 

Report’’)) that directed TSA to consider 

testing the expansion of C–TPAT to the 

domestic air cargo supply chain. 

III. Summary of This Rulemaking 

As explained further in section IV, 

this NPRM would enhance aviation 

cargo security significantly by requiring 

a number of measures. The NPRM 

would create a mandatory security 

program for all-cargo aircraft operations 

over 45,500 kg (100,309.3 pounds) and 

would amend existing security 

regulations and programs for other 

aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, 

airport operators, and IACs. The current 

rules for cargo carried on certain 

passenger aircraft, and for all-cargo 

operations under the existing TwelveFive Standard Security Program 9 would 

be enhanced. Existing screening 

requirements for aircraft operators 

would be extended to cover all-cargo 

operations. Airports or aircraft operators 

would be required to secure the cargo 

operations areas. The definition of 

‘‘Indirect Air Carrier’’ included in 49 

CFR 1540.5 would be amended to 

include those transporting goods via allcargo aircraft and all IACs would be 

subject to a more thorough vetting by 

TSA prior to receiving authorization to 

operate.

This NPRM also would require 

Security Threat Assessments for 

individuals who have unescorted access 

to cargo carried by certain aircraft 

operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs.

TSA is proposing these amendments 

after extensive consultation with 

industry through its Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee, and with other 

Federal agencies including the 

Department of Transportation and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection. These 

amendments would significantly 

enhance aviation cargo security. 

A. Who Is Affected by This NPRM? 

TSA regulates four segments of the air 

cargo industry: (1) Airports serving 

cargo operations; (2) passenger aircraft 

operators that transport cargo; (3) allcargo aircraft operators; and (4) IACs. 

Each segment is currently required to 

implement some type of TSA cargo 

security program. The current regulatory 

regime covers domestic entities in these 

four categories as well as foreign air 

carriers that operate into or out of the 

United States. The proposals in this 

NPRM would amend current security 

requirements for all of these industry 

segments, both through direct regulatory 

changes and through anticipated related 

security program changes. 

B. Why Are These Regulatory Changes 

Necessary? 

TSA has identified two critical risks 

in the air cargo environment: (1) The 

hostile takeover of an all-cargo aircraft 

leading to its use as a weapon; and (2) 

the use of cargo to introduce an 

explosive device onboard a passenger 

aircraft in order to cause catastrophic 

damage. The magnitude of these risks is 

determined by factoring in the presence 

of credible threats and the existence of 

possible vulnerabilities that a terrorist 

could exploit. Many steps taken since 

September 11, 2001 have reduced the 

capabilities of international terrorist 

organizations; however, the terrorist 

threat remains. Likewise, new aviation 

security requirements have reduced the 

vulnerability of the air cargo system. 

Nonetheless, TSA, in cooperation with 

its many partners in the air cargo 

transportation industry, has identified 

additional enhancements of air cargo 

security to reduce further the likelihood 

of cargo tampering or unauthorized 

access to the aircraft with malicious 

intent. This NPRM addresses the 

remaining vulnerabilities in the air 

cargo system. TSA invites public 

comment on whether these concerns are 

appropriately addressed and adequately 

accounted for in this NPRM. 

Terrorists have attempted to use air 

cargo to attack U.S. passenger aircraft on 

occasions in the past, and aviation 

generally continues to be a priority 

target for terrorists. The threat to air 

cargo represents a meaningful risk. TSA 

believes that strengthening air cargo 

security requirements through this 

proposed rulemaking will mitigate the 

threats. 

C. How Did TSA Enhance Cargo 

Security After September 11, 2001? 

Federal air cargo security 

requirements date back to the 1970’s 

and have since evolved. Since 

65262 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

10See Section IV. G.

11The specific criteria for the known shipper 

program are SSI under 49 CFR part 1520.

12The DSIP is a limited program under 49 CFR 

1544.101(g). TSA has made this program available 

to all-cargo aircraft operators, in part, to allow those 

entities to interline cargo with passenger aircraft 

operations.

13 67 FR 8205 (Feb. 22, 2002).

September 11, 2001, the Federal 

Government has moved expeditiously to 

strengthen air cargo security even 

further. Immediately after September 11, 

FAA prohibited the shipment of all 

cargo aboard passenger aircraft. Later, 

this restriction was partially lifted to 

allow cargo from known shippers to be 

transported on passenger aircraft 

operators, but not cargo from unknown 

shippers.10 By limiting air cargo aboard 

commercial passenger aircraft to known 

shippers only, FAA reduced the 

likelihood that cargo would pose a 

security threat to passenger aircraft. 

Since its creation, TSA has also taken 

several emergency measures to 

strengthen existing requirements, 

including additional qualifying 

requirements for the known shipper 

program.11

In the all-cargo aircraft environment, 

several all-cargo aircraft operators have 

voluntarily adopted the TSA Domestic 

Security Integration Program (DSIP) 12 to 

transfer cargo to passenger aircraft 

operators and to apply security 

identification display area (SIDA) 

requirements to all-cargo operations. 

The DSIP has been in place since 1992. 

FAA also strengthened the requirements 

for IACs immediately after September 

11 by requiring additional steps to 

achieve IAC status. On February 22, 

2002, TSA implemented the security 

program for Aircraft 12,500 Pounds or 

More, which became effective April 1, 

2002 and applies to operators of aircraft 

with Maximum Certificated Take Off 

Weight (MTOW) more than 12,500 

pounds in scheduled or charter service 

that are carrying passengers, cargo, or 

both and are not otherwise required to 

have a full or partial security program.13

The rule also requires the pilot, flight 

engineer, or flight navigator assigned to 

duty during flight time on all regulated 

aircraft operators to have successfully 

completed a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check (CHRC). It calls 

for restricted access to the flight deck if 

the aircraft has a flight deck door, and 

it mandates use of security coordinators, 

security training, procedures for bomb 

threats, and contingency plans.

In June 2002, TSA completed an 

extensive Air Cargo Security Scenario 

Analysis. The specific contents of this 

report are sensitive security 

information, and accordingly not 

publicly releasable. Where available, 

actual data were used for calculations; 

where data were not obtainable, 

estimates were identified and used. The 

analysis examined various scenarios, 

which focused on varying degrees of 

cargo screening, and which were 

selected to prevent or deter the 

introduction of explosive devices into 

the cargo holds of passenger aircraft. It 

was the first known attempt to 

conceptualize and conduct a detailed 

examination of the different security 

regimes, measure implementation costs 

and assumptions, and account for 

potential responses of the industry to 

the security changes, including the 

potential costs of implementation. The 

scenarios and variants ranged from 

screening unknown shipper cargo to 

screening cargo on passenger aircraft or 

preventing any cargo from being 

transported on passenger aircraft. The 

various scenarios were compared in 

terms of costs, benefits, and 

effectiveness. 

TSA also has enhanced cargo security 

by implementing a web-enabled Known 

Shipper database to centralize data on 

persons and businesses that are 

authorized to ship air cargo on 

passenger aircraft to allow quick and 

efficient verification of a shipper’s 

status while reducing redundancy. The 

initial version of the database was 

deployed in the Fall of 2002 and is 

currently being used by aircraft 

operators and IACs on a voluntary basis. 

Most of the major airlines, and 400 

IACs, are participating. The database 

already consists of over 400,000 known 

shippers. In the near future, TSA plans 

to make use of the system mandatory for 

all aircraft operators, foreign air carriers 

and IACs required to participate in the 

known shipper program. This proposed 

rule would provide authority for this 

planned change, which would be 

implemented in the security programs 

of the aircraft operators, foreign air 

carriers and IACs. 

At the core of this endeavor, the 

Known Shipper database will allow 

aircraft operators, foreign air carriers 

and IACs to submit electronically 

information on their known shippers to 

TSA and to verify electronically 

whether a client has been approved 

with known status under the program. 

This effort will offer a number of 

benefits, both for facilitating trade and 

improving security. Persons and 

businesses seeking Known Shipper 

status will no longer have to obtain this 

status from every aircraft operator, 

foreign air carrier or IAC with whom 

they do business; instead, once a 

shipper is accepted into the database, 

they will be considered known to all 

aircraft operators, foreign air carriers 

and IACs with access. 

In November 2003, TSA required U.S. 

aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, 

and IACs to carry out certain additional 

security measures with respect to cargo. 

The U.S. intelligence community 

continued to receive and evaluate a high 

volume of reports indicating possible 

threats against U.S. interests. These 

reports, combined with recent terrorist 

attacks, created an atmosphere of 

concern. Terrorist groups such as Al 

Qaeda are capable of sophisticated 

tactics. The Department of Homeland 

Security was concerned about AlQaeda’s continued interest in aviation, 

including using cargo aircraft to carry 

out attacks on critical infrastructure. In 

recognition of this threat, TSA made a 

determination that these circumstances 

required immediate action to ensure 

safety in air transportation. The 

additional measures TSA required in 

response to those concerns are 

described in IV. A. 

D. What Would This Proposed 

Rulemaking Do To Strengthen the 

Current Air Cargo Security Regulatory 

Regime? 

TSA is implementing a layered 

security solution throughout the lifecycle of the air cargo shipment and the 

aircraft on which it is being transported. 

As discussed in more detail in section 

IV. of this NPRM, TSA proposes to: 

• Require security threat assessments 

for individuals with unescorted access 

to cargo; 

• Codify cargo screening 

requirements first implemented under 

SDs, EAs, and part 1550 programs 

issued in November 2003; 

• Require airports with SIDAs to 

extend them to cargo operating areas; 

• Require aircraft operators to prevent 

unauthorized access to the operational 

area of the aircraft while loading and 

unloading cargo; 

• Require aircraft operators under a 

full or all-cargo program to accept cargo 

only from an entity with a comparable 

security program or directly from the 

shipper; 

• Codify and further strengthen the 

Known Shipper program; 

• Establish a security program 

specific to aircraft operators in all-cargo 

operations with aircraft with a 

maximum certificated takeoff weight 

more than 45,500 kg; 

• Strengthen foreign air carrier 

security requirements essentially to 

parallel the requirements on U.S. 

aircraft operators; and 

• Enhance security requirements for 

Indirect Air Carriers. 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65263

14 GAO–03–344 December 2002.

15Report Number SC–2002–113 (September 19, 

2002). This report is SSI.

16See Regulatory Evaluation for the Air Cargo 

Security Requirements NPRM, Table 1, Ten-Year 

Undiscounted Cost Summary for passenger and allcargo flight cargo screening.

TSA’s proposed security requirements 

are infused throughout the supply chain 

instead of concentrating all efforts on 

one measure, such as physical 

inspection, at a single stage potentially 

resulting in significant disruption of the 

supply chain. This NPRM is a central 

component of this solution and 

proposes updating the requirements 

applicable to airports, aircraft operators, 

IACs, and foreign air carriers currently 

operating under a security program, and 

instituting new security requirements 

for all-cargo aircraft operators and the 

freight forwarders servicing them. 

E. How Will TSA Enforce Compliance?

TSA relies on its staff of field 

inspectors to enforce compliance among 

regulated parties. As noted in various 

sections above, TSA also believes that 

issuance of a voluntary disclosure 

program, development and distribution 

of security training materials for certain 

IAC employees and agents, and 

implementation of enhanced electronic 

communication capabilities will 

materially enhance the regulated 

parties’ compliance ability and 

orientation. 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended that TSA implement a 

voluntary disclosure program to 

facilitate and improve compliance by 

regulated parties. TSA has received 

numerous similar requests from 

regulated parties. TSA agrees that 

aviation security is promoted by 

creating incentives for regulated entities 

to identify, disclose and correct their 

own instances of non-compliance, and 

to invest in efforts to preclude their 

recurrence. As a result, in December 

2003, TSA implemented a voluntary 

disclosure program. Details of the 

program are available via the Internet on 

the TSA Web site at http://www.tsa.gov,

with a link titled ‘‘TSA Announces Civil 

Enforcement Policies’’ in the section on 

Law & Policy. TSA’s program is 

designed to encourage compliance with 

TSA regulations, foster secure practices, 

and encourage the development of 

internal evaluation programs. Upon 

detecting an inadvertent violation not 

yet known to TSA, a regulated entity 

must take immediate action to correct 

the violation. The regulated entity must 

report the violation to TSA in writing 

within 24 hours of detection and submit 

a detailed written report within 10 

calendar days of the initial reporting. 

The regulated entity must develop a 

corrective action plan to ensure that the 

noncompliance remains corrected. After 

the regulated entity takes these steps, 

TSA may issue a letter of correction 

instead of a civil penalty action for the 

violation, provided all other elements of 

the policy are met. This program has 

been issued in a separate action and is 

not part of this rulemaking proposal. 

F. Did TSA Consider Recommended 

Changes? 

Yes, in addition to its own 

assessments, TSA based the policy 

changes proposed in this NPRM on 

recommendations received from the 

Department of Transportation Office of 

Inspector General (OIG), the General 

Accounting Office (GAO), and the 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

(ASAC). In addition, TSA has 

coordinated its efforts with other 

agencies in the Department of 

Homeland Security, including the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, which 

has statutory authority for screening 

cargo entering and departing the United 

States. 

The Department of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General completed 

its audit of the air cargo security 

program in September 2002. This report 

is SSI. Accordingly, its distribution is 

restricted. In the report, the OIG offered 

14 specific recommendations to increase 

the level of security as to ‘‘insiders’’—

namely employees of aircraft operators 

and IACs with access to cargo. These 

recommendations varied from 

increasing the vetting of IACs seeking 

approval of their security program to 

training and testing requirements to 

improved compliance enforcement. 

Further, in December 2002, the GAO 

issued its report, ‘‘Vulnerabilities and 

Potential Improvements for the Air 

Cargo System (GAO–03–344).’’ GAO 

traced the implementation of 

recommendations delivered during the 

1990’s and the development of 

technologies or operational procedures 

that might be used to enhance air cargo 

security. GAO did not make specific 

recommendations, but called for TSA to 

develop a comprehensive plan for air 

cargo security that includes priority 

actions identified on the basis of risk, 

costs, deadlines for completing those 

actions, and performance targets. TSA 

completed this strategic plan in 

November 2003. As noted previously, 

this document includes SSI and is not 

available to the public. 

As previously discussed, TSA also 

considered the ASAC consensus report 

transmitted on October 1, 2003. 

G. Were Other Solutions Considered and 

Why Were the Proposals in the NPRM 

Chosen Over Others? 

TSA recognizes that the air cargo 

industry is large and complex, 

composed of numerous shippers, 226 

domestic and foreign aircraft operators 

providing services through 2,789 

stations at U.S. airports, and 

approximately 3,200 IACs with over 

10,000 business locations. Together 

these entities transport approximately 

$30 billion worth of goods per year. In 

recognition of this breadth and 

complexity, TSA considered the full 

gamut of potential solutions for 

enhancing air cargo security in 

developing this NPRM. TSA analyzed 

the existing regulatory structure for air 

cargo security in the United States, 

partnered with industry, reviewed a 

variety of external assessments of the air 

cargo system, and coordinated with 

other agencies in the Department of 

Homeland Security with air cargo 

security experience and responsibilities, 

such as CBP, to develop solutions for 

today’s challenges. TSA also reached 

out to numerous international entities 

including the European Commission, 

Transport Canada and International Air 

Transport Association to assess best 

practices and regulatory regimes that 

might be applicable to the U.S. 

environment. 

The majority of participants in the 

ASAC air cargo security working groups 

have stated that proposals to require the 

inspection of every piece of cargo 

shipped on passenger aircraft are 

impractical. Instead, they recommended 

a risk-based targeting strategy to identify 

higher risk cargo for additional scrutiny; 

relying, in part, on the Government 

Accounting Office (GAO) report on 

Vulnerabilities and Potential 

Improvements for the Air Cargo 

System,14 the Department of 

Transportation’s Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) Audit of the Cargo 

Security Program,15 and TSA’s Air 

Cargo Security Scenario Analysis. These 

reports have cautioned that, in the 

absence of an appropriate targeting 

methodology and data, a requirement 

for inspection of 100% of air cargo 

would severely burden the just-in-time 

delivery that is currently a key 

competitive feature of many U.S. 

manufacturing and distribution 

industries, and could have particularly 

severe negative impacts on aircraft 

operators, IACs and their employees and 

agents. TSA agrees with this assessment. 

TSA believes that a requirement to 

inspect every piece of cargo could result 

in an unworkable cost of more than 

$650 million in the first year of 

implementation.16

65264 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

17This document is SSI and, accordingly, not 

publicly releasable.

18This report is protected as Sensitive Security 

Information under 49 CFR part 1520.

In its final presentation to TSA, ASAC 

noted that the layered solution outlined 

in its forty recommendations would 

significantly enhance air cargo security 

while ensuring that commerce is not 

disrupted, two goals TSA is committed 

to achieving. It was the sense of the 

ASAC that technology solutions must be 

pursued as aggressively as possible. 

Specifically, the committee’s 

recommendations included using 

technology to improve communication 

links between regulated parties and the 

federal government, leveraging new 

technology to create a more layered 

cargo security approach, and using 

technology to enable enhanced 

requirements for achieving Known 

Shipper status.

Similarly, TSA reviewed FAA’s 

October 2001 ‘‘Air Cargo Threat 

Assessment’’ (DOT/FAA/AR–02/15) 

analysis of the vulnerabilities of the 

current air cargo security program.17 In 

this report, FAA’s overall assessment 

was that an integrated security regime 

was required. These FAA 

recommendations have been considered 

and are reflected in portions of this 

NPRM.18

The Department of Transportation 

Office of the Inspector General audited 

the FAA’s air cargo security program. 

The OIG’s report of this audit and its 

results, including data sources, are SSI. 

Like the ASAC and FAA, the OIG 

determined that air cargo security could 

best be bolstered by implementing 

layered solutions throughout the air 

cargo system; and offered fourteen 

specific recommendations. TSA 

concurred with the OIG’s assessment 

and these recommendations are 

reflected in both TSA’s air cargo 

strategic plan and in this NPRM. 

TSA will continue to use SDs and EAs 

as required to address immediate 

threats. These directives are issued to 

regulated parties outlining specific 

requirements that must be met as part of 

their security programs and are 

protected as sensitive security 

information. 

Like TSA, CBP also relies on a layered 

security program for securing air cargo 

and both agencies are committed to 

determining how best to leverage 

individual resources and avoid 

unnecessary redundancy. As a result, 

TSA and CBP have initiated a dialogue 

for coordinating their respective air 

cargo security activities. TSA and CBP 

initiated this effort shortly after DHS 

was established and the agencies 

received a Congressional mandate to 

continue this effort during Fiscal Year 

2004. TSA and CBP are looking closely 

at how best to apply their combined 

experience in promoting supply chain 

security, securing cargo prior to loading, 

and applying risk-based targeting 

programs. In addition, through this 

effort, DHS is committed to ensuring the 

maximum degree of consistency 

between TSA and CBP programs and 

minimizing the impact on industry by 

coordinating requirements and 

procedures. 

Within the BTS Directorate, CBP and 

TSA have distinct, but equally vital, 

security missions in securing air cargo. 

Historically, CBP has primarily been 

responsible for determining the 

admissibility of the cargo held on the 

aircraft and as such is concerned about 

cargo that may carry threats to be 

deployed once the cargo reaches U.S. 

borders. TSA, on the other hand, is 

responsible for securing both domestic 

aircraft and foreign flights destined for 

the United States from destruction or 

hijacking and as a result is primarily 

concerned with the illicit loading of 

explosives or stowaways on board. 

The priority mission of CBP is to 

prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons 

from entering the United States. That 

mission means improving security at the 

nation’s physical borders and ports of 

entry, but it also means extending the 

zone of security beyond our physical 

borders—so that American borders are 

not the first line of defense. With regard 

to the securing of international air cargo, 

CBP has a long history of screening and 

inspecting cargo upon arrival in the 

United States. Today it continues this 

challenge with a refined focus on 

stopping terrorists and terrorist weapons 

at our nation’s borders. 

TSA’s mission is to provide security 

in all modes of transportation, with a 

priority emphasis on aviation. Like CBP, 

TSA employs a threat-based, riskmanaged approach to securing air cargo. 

Therefore, we focus our efforts in the 

passenger environment on preventing 

the introduction of explosive devices 

into the cargo bays of passenger air 

carriers. In the all-cargo environment, 

while measures are taken to prevent the 

introduction of an explosive device on 

an all-cargo aircraft, our primary 

concern is focused on keeping intruders 

or stowaways off the aircraft, as a 

hijacking causes significant loss of life 

and other damage on the ground and in 

the air. 

Extensive interagency analysis and 

outreach to both industry and other 

federal agencies have led TSA to 

conclude that a threat based, risk 

managed, layered solution will provide 

the highest degree of security in the air 

cargo environment while causing the 

least financial and procedural impact on 

a business sector that contributes 

significantly to the United States and 

global economies. TSA invites public 

comment on the feasibility of this 

approach overall, on the specific rule 

changes and requirements proposed in 

this NPRM, and on other possible 

actions, such as a requirement to inspect 

100% of air cargo, that have been the 

subject of public discussion but which 

TSA, for reasons outlined above, has 

determined not to propose in this 

NPRM. 

IV. Summary of Proposed Amendments 

A. Current Regulation of Aircraft 

Operators and Foreign Air Carriers and 

Proposed Amendments 

TSA regulations currently cover a 

variety of aircraft operators as part of an 

overall, layered approach to security. 

Aircraft operators with scheduled or 

public charter passenger operations 

using aircraft with a passenger seating 

configuration of 61 or more, or those 

using smaller aircraft that enplane 

passengers from or deplane passengers 

into a sterile area, must have full 

programs under § 1544.101(a). These 

operators often carry cargo in addition 

to passengers and must comply with 

cargo security requirements under 

§ 1544.205. 

Aircraft operators using aircraft in 

scheduled or public charter passenger 

operations using aircraft with a 

passenger seating configuration of 31 or 

more but 60 or fewer seats must have a 

partial program under § 1544.101(b). 

Aircraft operators using aircraft with 

a maximum certificated takeoff weight 

of 12,500 pounds or more, in scheduled 

or charter service, carrying passengers 

or cargo or both, must have a twelve-five 

program under § 1544.101(d) & (e). 

Aircraft operators using aircraft in 

private charter passenger operations 

using aircraft with a passenger seating 

configuration of 61 or more or a 

maximum certificated takeoff weight 

greater than 45,500 kg (100,309.3 

pounds) must have a private charter 

program under § 1544.101(f), as well as 

having a twelve-five program. 

This NPRM is proposing to add 

another type of program. As discussed 

further in this preamble, TSA is 

proposing that aircraft operators 

operating all-cargo aircraft with a 

maximum certificated takeoff weight of 

more than 45,500 kg (100,309.3 pounds) 

have an all-cargo program under 

proposed § 1544.101(h) & (i). 

Certain foreign air carriers must have 

security programs as well. Those with 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65265

scheduled or public charter passenger 

operations using aircraft with a 

passenger seating configuration of 61 or 

more, or those using smaller aircraft that 

enplane passengers from or deplane 

passengers into a sterile area (analogous 

to U.S. operators with full programs), 

must have security programs under 

§ 1546.101(a) or (b). Those in scheduled 

or public charter passenger operations 

using aircraft with a passenger seating 

configuration of 31 or more but 60 or 

fewer seats must have programs under 

§ 1546.101(d) (analogous to U.S. 

operators with partial programs).

In addition, in November 2003, in 

response to threats, TSA required 

foreign air carriers that perform all-cargo 

operations using aircraft with a 

maximum certificated takeoff weight of 

12,500 pounds or more to carry out the 

All-Cargo International Security 

Procedures issued by TSA. 69 FR 3939 

(Jan. 27, 2004). In this NPRM, TSA is 

proposing to codify this procedure and 

to create foreign air carrier security 

programs analogous to a U.S. twelvefive program in all-cargo operations and 

to the proposed all-cargo program in 

part 1544. 

Additionally, in November 2003, TSA 

issued SDs and EAs requiring domestic 

aircraft operators under a full program 

or a twelve-five all-cargo program and 

foreign air carriers to apply further 

screening measures to cargo. More 

specifically, TSA required that these 

operators inspect a percentage of cargo 

prior to loading it on an aircraft. 

Aircraft operators under a full 

program must also continue to abide by 

the requirements of the Known Shipper 

program. Generally, these aircraft 

operators may transport only cargo from 

a known shipper. Congress specified in 

ATSA, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(a), 

that a Federal employee is not required 

to carry out screening requirements for 

a passenger aircraft operator of the 

Known Shipper program. These 

screening functions may be performed 

by the private sector. Likewise at 

44901(a), Congress distinguished that 

Federal screeners must conduct certain 

passenger screening. Operators of allcargo aircraft do not share this 

distinction. All-cargo aircraft operators 

also may perform cargo screening; it is 

not required that a Federal employee 

carry out screening of all-cargo aircraft. 

The security procedures required for 

the varying programs are focused to 

address the greatest perceived threats to 

the respective operations. Accordingly, 

TSA requires the most security 

procedures under the layered approach 

to those operations perceived to have 

the highest threat. For instance, the full 

program focuses security requirements 

both to protect the large number of 

passengers on board the aircraft as well 

as to prevent the largest of aircraft from 

being hijacked and used as a missile to 

attack another target, and thus are 

subject to the most intense security 

measures. The proposed all-cargo 

program would focus on the latter threat 

because aircraft operators under this 

proposed program generally use the 

same types of aircraft as those used 

under a full program. All-cargo 

operations under the twelve-five 

program require layers of security 

appropriate to the lower threats posed 

by smaller aircraft. TSA has developed 

a measured approach to match security 

requirements with the possible risks. 

B. Security Threat Assessments for Air 

Cargo Workers 

TSA currently requires a variety of 

individuals working in aviation to 

submit to a criminal history records 

check. Generally, these individuals 

work on airport grounds and have 

access to secure areas. 

In the cargo environment, many other 

persons have access to cargo before 

someone who works for the airport and 

has had such a check handles it. In this 

rulemaking, TSA proposes to require 

additional persons who have unescorted 

access to air cargo, but do not have 

unescorted Security Identification 

Display Area (SIDA) access, to undergo 

a security check to verify that they do 

not pose a security threat. 

TSA recognizes that the number of 

individuals with access to cargo is 

large—approximately 63,000—and that 

the companies that they work for run 

the gamut from complex organizations 

to ‘‘mom and pop’s.’’ Therefore, 

requiring all these individuals to 

undergo fingerprint-based criminal 

history background checks would be a 

time-consuming and costly process. 

TSA believes that potential security 

concerns related to unescorted access to 

cargo by these individuals would be 

best addressed at this time by requiring 

the individuals to submit to a Security 

Threat Assessment program, focused on 

the threat of terrorism. A Security 

Threat Assessment, as proposed in this 

NPRM, would rely on checks of existing 

intelligence-based records and databases 

to ensure that an individual who is a 

known or suspected threat is prohibited 

from working in positions that could 

allow that individual to have unescorted 

access to air cargo. This program adopts 

best practices from the financial services 

and transportation security 

communities to reduce the likelihood 

that a terrorist could gain access to 

cargo. 

In proposed §§ 1544.228, 1546.213, 

and 1548.15, TSA would prohibit 

aircraft operators under a full program 

or all-cargo program; foreign air carriers 

operating under §§ 1546.101(a) (b) or (e); 

and each IAC from authorizing any 

individual to have unescorted access to 

cargo unless the respective operator has 

verified the identity of that individual 

in a manner acceptable to TSA, and that 

individual has successfully completed a 

CHRC under 49 CFR 1542, 1544, or 

1546, Security Threat Assessment 

pursuant to proposed Subpart C of part 

1540, or another Security Threat 

Assessment approved by TSA. 

TSA has also considered extending 

security threat assessment requirements 

in additional contexts. For instance, 

TSA considered requiring every 

employee of an entity regulated by TSA 

that is in the business of cargo 

transportation to submit to a security 

threat assessment. TSA proposes that 

the layered approach of requiring 

assessments for those individuals with 

unescorted access to cargo, combined 

with requirements to secure cargo upon 

acceptance, are at this time sufficiently 

focused on the potential security threat. 

TSA also considered requiring each 

person who boards for transportation on 

an aircraft under an all-cargo security 

program to submit to a security threat 

assessment. Alternatively, TSA 

considered requiring persons who board 

an aircraft under an all-cargo security 

program who require prohibited items 

during the flight to perform their duties 

to submit to the assessment. TSA has 

not proposed these measures but invites 

comments on these considerations. 

C. Security Measures for Persons 

Boarding an All-Cargo Aircraft 

TSA is proposing to codify 

requirements for screening persons 

other than passengers boarding the allcargo aircraft with a maximum 

certificated take-off weight greater than 

12,500 pounds. See proposed § 1544.202 

and § 1546.202. Under FAA rules, some 

persons who are not flight crew 

members or passengers may travel on an 

all-cargo aircraft, such as handlers 

escorting an animal being shipped via 

air cargo. See 14 CFR 121.583 and 

121.587. Such individuals could be in a 

position to attempt to take over the 

aircraft. TSA believes that it is necessary 

to screen such persons to ensure that 

individuals traveling on aircraft under 

an all-cargo program, or under a twelvefive program in an all-cargo operation, 

do not present a security threat. Such 

screening is now being done under SDs 

issued in November 2003 and is 

included as a proposed regulatory 

requirement in this NPRM. While 

65266 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

Congress specified in 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) 

that a Federal employee must conduct 

screening of persons in passenger 

operations, section 44901(f) has no such 

requirement for all-cargo operations. 

Accordingly, the private sector may 

conduct screening in all-cargo 

operations in compliance with TSA 

standards.

D. Screening Cargo 

To guard against unauthorized 

weapons, explosives, persons, and other 

destructive substances or items in cargo, 

TSA proposes to codify a requirement 

for aircraft operators to inspect a portion 

of air cargo, including that offered by 

known shippers. See proposed 

§§ 1544.205 and 1546.205. An SD issued 

to operators with full programs in 

November 2003 requires that a portion 

of known shipper cargo be inspected, 

and this NPRM would codify that 

change. In addition, an SD issued 

requires operators of Twelve-Five allcargo aircraft inspect a portion of cargo. 

When conducting inspections, aircraft 

operators are required to follow TSAapproved requirements. 

In addition, aircraft operators 

operating under full programs are 

currently required to submit individuals 

conducting cargo screening to a 

fingerprint-based CHRC under 

§ 1544.229 to reduce the likelihood that 

a terrorist could gain such employment 

to facilitate the introduction of 

unauthorized persons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other substances or 

items. This proposed rule would also 

require aircraft operators operating 

under all-cargo programs to submit their 

cargo screeners to a CHRC under 

§ 1544.229, mitigating the possibility 

that an authorized person would 

threaten or otherwise compromise the 

security of the aircraft operations. 

TSA considered several other 

requirements for cargo screening that 

are not included in this NPRM. For 

instance, TSA considered prohibiting all 

cargo from transportation on passenger 

aircraft. TSA recognizes, however, that 

this requirement would likely lead to 

significant economic impact on 

passenger operations. Moreover, TSA 

proposes that a layered approach to 

security requirements, including those 

proposed in this NPRM, would provide 

for an appropriate level of security and 

could be implemented without undue 

hardship on the affected stakeholders. 

TSA also considered requiring physical 

inspection of 100% of all cargo on all 

aircraft, or alternatively on passenger 

aircraft. However, as noted in III.G. 

above, 100% inspection of cargo would 

be impractical and would severely 

impact the rapid delivery of air cargo. 

TSA invites comment on these 

considerations. 

E. Securing the Cargo Operating 

Environment 

Measures to prevent unauthorized 

individuals from gaining access to the 

cargo operations area are necessary to 

prevent tampering with the aircraft or 

the cargo and to remove a potential 

access point for stowaways. Currently, 

at airports that have complete programs 

under 49 CFR 1542, and therefore are 

required to have a SIDA based on the 

presence of covered passenger 

operations, all individuals working in 

the SIDA must have an airport-approved 

photo identification (ID) media that 

meets standards established by TSA. 

This ID must be displayed at all times 

above the waist on the individual’s 

outermost garments. To obtain a SIDA 

ID, a person must successfully undergo 

a fingerprint-based CHRC and 

successfully complete training in 

accordance with the airport’s security 

program (see 49 CFR 1542.205, 

1542.211, and 1542.213). In addition, 

procedures must be in place for 

challenging all persons not displaying 

appropriate ID for the area in which 

they are found. Currently, all-cargo 

operations are not specifically covered 

under airport SIDA requirements. 

At airports that are required to have 

a SIDA because of the presence of 

covered passenger operations, TSA 

proposes in this NPRM to extend SIDA 

requirements to cargo operating areas. 

See proposed § 1542.205. As previously 

discussed, the potential consequences of 

an all-cargo aircraft being hijacked and 

used as a missile to attack another target 

are comparable to the consequences of 

a hijacking of a passenger aircraft of the 

same size. Accordingly, TSA proposes 

to add a layer of security to protect these 

aircraft further by applying SIDA 

requirements in cargo operating areas. 

Airports that currently have SIDA have 

the associated procedures and 

requirements in place. TSA believes that 

airports that have SIDA will be able to 

extend SIDAs to areas where cargo is 

loaded and unloaded without great 

challenges. Indeed, the cargo operation 

areas at many of these airports already 

are SIDAs. TSA also considered 

extending SIDA requirements to airports 

that serve all-cargo carriers and are not 

currently required to have a SIDA. 

Airports without SIDAs, however, 

would be required to implement many 

unfamiliar requirements in order to 

create SIDA. These airports also may 

have only occasional and unpredictable 

all-cargo aircraft traffic, such as ondemand charter operations. In this 

NPRM, TSA proposes that aircraft 

operators implement other measures 

that will enhance security instead of 

requiring airports without SIDAs to 

create them. Accordingly, TSA proposes 

in § 1544.225 to require that the aircraft 

operator prevent unauthorized access to 

the operational area of the aircraft while 

loading or unloading cargo. Note that 

aircraft operators now must comply 

with § 1544.217, which requires covered 

aircraft operators to arrange for a law 

enforcement presence to respond to any 

situations that may arise. TSA believes 

that the aircraft operator is well 

positioned to provide sufficient security 

for their aircraft operations, in lieu of an 

airport SIDA. TSA invites public 

comment on the economic, operational, 

and security implications of this 

approach. TSA also proposes to require 

that, before placing an all-cargo aircraft 

back into service after a period spent 

unattended, the aircraft operator 

conduct a security inspection of the 

aircraft. See proposed § 1544.225 and 

§ 1546.103(a)(1). Together, these 

provisions would reduce the likelihood 

of successful tampering, stowaway 

boarding, or the introduction of an 

improvised explosive device or other 

destructive substance or item. Similar 

provisions are currently required of 

passenger aircraft operators operating 

aircraft of the same size. 

F. Accepting Cargo From Comparable 

Entities 

TSA is proposing to authorize aircraft 

operators under full or all-cargo 

programs to accept cargo only from the 

shipper, or from an entity with a 

security program comparable to the 

aircraft operator’s. See proposed 

§ 1544.205(e) and § 1546.205(e). The 

purpose of this proposed amendment is 

to prohibit aircraft operators from 

carrying cargo transferred from persons 

or businesses without the appropriate 

security measures to guard against the 

introduction of unauthorized weapons, 

explosives, persons, or other destructive 

substances or items. TSA will provide 

these aircraft operators in their security 

programs with a more detailed account 

of what cargo may be accepted. 

G. Known Shipper Program 

TSA proposes to codify and 

strengthen the Known Shipper program 

in regulation at 49 CFR 1544.239, 

1546.215, and 1548.17. As discussed 

above in section III., paragraph C., ‘‘How 

did TSA enhance cargo security after 

September 11, 2001?,’’ the Known 

Shipper program is a protocol to 

distinguish shippers about whom 

security-relevant information is known 

from those shippers about whom the 

aircraft operator has inadequate 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65267

19 67 FR 41635, 41637 (June 19, 2002).

20 67 FR 79881, 79883 (December 31, 2002).

information. This program applies to 

aircraft operators with full programs, 

corresponding foreign air carriers, and 

IACs that offer cargo to such aircraft 

operators and foreign air carriers.

TSA considered extending a 

regulatory program directly to shippers 

of cargo that intend to use air 

transportation. By doing so, TSA would 

have direct oversight and regulatory 

authority throughout the cargo supply 

chain. The number of potential 

shippers, however, may be unwieldy. 

Potentially any person or business may 

ship cargo by air. TSA proposes, 

instead, to focus on aircraft operators 

and IACs as discussed through this 

NPRM. 

Certain operational elements of the 

Known Shipper program are sensitive 

security information and cannot be 

divulged. However, the existence of the 

program is a matter of public record. 

Congress recognized the existence of the 

Known Shipper program in the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 

107–71, at section 110. Since September 

11, 2001, cargo from unknown shippers 

has not been permitted to be transported 

aboard aircraft operated under a full 

program. 

TSA considered allowing unknown 

shipper cargo on passenger aircraft after 

physical inspection. TSA recognizes 

that this cargo could provide 

considerable business opportunity to 

aircraft operators, but determined that 

this measure could not assure adequate 

security. No single technology currently 

exists with sufficient versatility to 

handle the vast array of cargo sizes, 

shapes, and materials to ensure security 

while maintaining acceptable 

throughput, or processing time. TSA 

welcomes comments and 

recommendations on this issue. 

Although the Known Shipper 

program has been in existence for over 

10 years in its current form and has its 

roots in security programs that date back 

to 1976, it has not previously been 

identified in security regulations; rather, 

it has been in the aircraft operator 

security programs. TSA is proposing to 

codify and enhance the Known Shipper 

program in this NPRM. 

TSA will consider, but TSA is not 

proposing to allow cargo submitted by 

unknown shippers to be transported on 

passenger aircraft under a full program 

at this time. TSA invites public 

comment on the costs, benefits and 

practical implications associated with 

screening cargo from unknown shippers 

to the degree necessary to permit it to 

be transported on commercial passenger 

aircraft. 

As discussed in III.C. above, TSA is 

implementing a comprehensive 

strengthening of the Known Shipper 

program. These improvements 

centralize and automate the vetting of 

applicants to the Known Shipper 

program. Under this NPRM, when 

proposing a shipper for the Known 

Shipper program, an aircraft operator, 

foreign air carrier, or IAC would be 

required to submit an application 

electronically to TSA for vetting against 

terrorist and law enforcement data. This 

information will then be stored in a 

central database along with the 

shipper’s status in the program. Aircraft 

operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs 

would be required to check a shipper’s 

status on the system before accepting its 

cargo for transport on passenger aircraft. 

This proposed requirement will enable 

TSA to conduct a thorough threat 

assessment of those seeking to ship by 

passenger aircraft. 

To assist in implementing the 

enhancements to the Known Shipper 

program, TSA proposes in this NPRM 

that, when TSA so requires, the aircraft 

operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs 

will submit known shipper information 

electronically and update it as needed. 

TSA has designed its known shipper 

database, including the necessary 

Internet elements, to ensure that shipper 

lists are not compromised. TSA believes 

that the proposed changes would 

facilitate industry participation in the 

Known Shipper program by reducing 

the administrative burden on individual 

aircraft operators. 

H. Establish All-Cargo Operator 

Standard Security Program 

Aircraft operators using passenger 

aircraft with a passenger seating 

configuration of sixty-one seats or more 

in scheduled or public charter service 

must have a full program under 49 CFR 

1544.101(a), using the Aircraft Operator 

Standard Security Program (AOSSP). 

Aircraft operators using passenger 

aircraft that have a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight greater than 

45,500 kg (100,309.3 pounds), or a 

passenger-seating configuration of 61 or 

more, that are not government charters 

or in private charter service, must have 

a program under 49 CFR 1544.101(f). 

Currently, however, all-cargo aircraft 

operators operating aircraft of a similar 

size and potential destructive power are 

subject to the Twelve-Five program, 

rather than the full program. These 

operators are currently required to 

implement security programs in 

accordance with TSA’s Twelve-Five 

Standard Security Program governing 

aircraft with a maximum take off weight 

of 12,500 pounds or more. In addition, 

some cargo operators voluntarily 

participate in the more comprehensive 

DSIP. Considering the potential risks 

associated with heavier all-cargo 

aircraft, TSA proposes to require 

additional steps for securing all-cargo 

aircraft weighing more than 45,500 kg 

(100,309.3 pounds) at § 1544.101(h). 

These measures would be incorporated 

into a mandatory All-Cargo Aircraft 

Operator Standard Security Program. 

The program will include elements of 

the DSIP.

Extending pertinent requirements to 

all-cargo aircraft operators operating 

above the 45,500 kg threshold would 

institute security measures for all-cargo 

aircraft comparable to passenger aircraft 

of the same size. An all-cargo aircraft 

with maximum certificated takeoff 

weight greater than 45,500 kg could 

cause significant damage if taken over 

and used as a weapon. TSA also applies 

this applicability threshold in the 

private charter program,19 49 CFR 

1544.101(f), and it is consistent with 

international security standards adopted 

by the International Civil Aviation 

Organization.20

TSA recognizes that the operations of 

all-cargo aircraft operators and 

passenger aircraft operators are not 

identical and looks forward to working 

with industry to ensure that proposed 

new requirements are tailored to 

accommodate those differences. 

I. Strengthen Foreign Aircraft Operator 

Security Measures 

TSA currently requires foreign air 

carriers using aircraft of a certain size 

and engaged in scheduled or public 

charter passenger operations and 

landing or taking off in the United 

States to have a TSA-approved security 

program. Foreign all-cargo air carriers 

are subject to certain security 

requirements identified in a security 

program issued by TSA under part 1550 

in November 2003, including random 

inspection of cargo. See 69 FR 3939 (Jan. 

27, 2004). TSA is proposing to amend 

§ 1546.101 to make these requirements 

permanent and incorporate them into 

the foreign air carrier regulations in 

recognition that these measures were 

implemented on an emergency basis 

and should now be available for public 

comment as part of this rulemaking. 

TSA proposes to extend to foreign allcargo air carriers requirements to 

implement a level of security similar to 

that of U.S. aircraft operators using the 

same size aircraft. Under the proposed 

amendment to § 1546.101, foreign air 

carriers would be required to adopt and 

implement a security program 

acceptable to TSA for all flights using an 

65268 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

all-cargo aircraft with a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight of more than 

45,500 kg that land or take off in the 

United States. This security program 

would essentially parallel the 

requirements of the proposed all-cargo 

program for U.S. aircraft operators. This 

NPRM also proposes that foreign air 

carriers in all-cargo operations with 

aircraft over 12,500 pounds and up to 

45,500 kg also implement security 

programs. This security program would 

essentially parallel the requirements of 

the Twelve-Five Standard Security 

Program for U.S. aircraft operators. The 

remaining proposed amendments would 

require foreign air carrier security 

programs to provide a level of security 

similar to that required of U.S. aircraft 

operators serving the same airport and 

employ equivalent procedures. These 

procedures include application of 

security measures to persons and 

property on board the airplane under 

proposed § 1546.202, measures for 

acceptance and screening of cargo under 

proposed § 1546.205, introduction of 

security threat assessments for cargo 

personnel in the United States under 

proposed § 1546.213, and application of 

Known Shipper program requirements 

under proposed § 1546.215. 

J. Enhancing Existing Requirements for 

IACs 

The IAC, sometimes called a freight 

forwarder, is a crucial part of the air 

cargo system, acting as an intermediary 

between the shipper and the aircraft 

operator for approximately 80% of all 

air cargo shipped on passenger aircraft 

in the United States. TSA estimates that 

there are 3,200 entities in the United 

States operating as IACs ranging from 

large corporations to sole proprietors 

working out of their homes. All IACs are 

required to maintain a security program 

known as the IACSSP and are regulated 

under 49 CFR 1548. This NPRM 

proposes to expand the definition of 

IAC to include businesses engaged in 

the indirect transport of cargo on larger 

commercial aircraft, regardless of 

whether the operation is conducted 

with a passenger aircraft or an all-cargo 

aircraft. 

In addition, TSA plans to strengthen 

security requirements for all IACs. 

Specifically, TSA proposes to vet 

businesses more thoroughly before they 

are authorized to do business as IACs, 

strengthen a requirement for periodic 

recertification of IAC status, and 

strengthen security requirements for 

accepting and processing air cargo. 

These amendments to the rules 

governing IAC operations are intended 

to improve the security of the air cargo 

supply chain by infusing better security 

during the period between when a 

package leaves a shipper and when it is 

presented to the aircraft operator. 

A key element of TSA’s proposed 

enhanced IAC standard security 

program is a more thorough vetting of 

entities seeking authority to do business 

as IACs. To strengthen the application 

process, TSA is developing a web-based, 

centralized system for validating and 

revalidating IACs. This system will 

improve security through an enhanced, 

more effective vetting process while 

facilitating the application, renewal and 

review process for the industry. 

Upon implementation of the Internetbased system, TSA proposes, under 

§ 1548.7, to require all businesses to use 

the system to obtain initial IAC approval 

and to renew their approval. In doing 

so, TSA proposes to require IAC 

applicants to submit more information 

about themselves and their business 

than is currently required, including 

basic corporate records. IACs would 

also be required to use the system to 

notify TSA of any changes to their 

corporate structure and to renew their 

status annually. These two steps will 

allow TSA to check whether the 

applicant is a legitimate business and 

determine whether the business or 

personnel poses a threat to 

transportation security.

These planned new IAC vetting tools, 

combined with the centralization of 

information and automated 

communications, would enable TSA to 

implement effectively a program to 

remove IAC authorization from those 

persons found to be security risks 

during revalidation or found to be out 

of compliance. In this NPRM, TSA 

proposes procedures for withdrawing 

IAC security program approval. 

TSA’s envisioned electronic 

validation/revalidation process is also 

indicative of the DHS commitment to 

improving security while promoting 

best business practices. By automating 

much of the current paper-based 

process, TSA would be able to 

accelerate the validation and 

revalidation process, and industry 

would have an improved means of 

communication with TSA that 

facilitates TSA’s ability to notify IACs 

and aircraft operators of pending 

actions. 

K. Establishing New Training and 

Personnel Requirements 

TSA is proposing to add regulatory 

text to: expand general security 

requirements to include the protection 

of stored or en route cargo under 

§ 1548.9; implement training under 

§ 1548.11; require IACs to appoint 

Security Coordinators under § 1548.13; 

authorize IACs to receive and require 

IACs to confirm receipt of, and to 

implement SDs and Information 

Circulars under § 1548.15. 

To ensure that IAC employees 

understand and are trained to 

implement their security 

responsibilities, TSA is proposing to 

require a comprehensive and recurrent 

training program for IACs. This program 

would cover procedures for accepting, 

accessing and handling cargo intended 

for transport on aircraft as well as record 

keeping, acceptance and maintenance of 

Sensitive Security Information, and 

communication protocols and other 

requirements in the security program. 

As part of this initiative, TSA proposes 

to develop computer and/or video-based 

instructional materials and a testing 

tool, including a minimum standard 

that an employee will be expected to 

meet, and protocols for situations where 

employees fail to meet the threshold. 

Development of these training tools will 

coincide with the review and 

consideration of this NPRM and 

revisions to the IACSSP; training 

materials should be available to IACs 

shortly after these changes are 

implemented. TSA believes that 

development and distribution of these 

training tools will enhance regulatory 

compliance among the IAC community. 

TSA invites public comment on the 

practical and economic implications of 

requiring training of IAC and IAC agent 

personnel, and on the best means for 

achieving a high training standard 

without disrupting commerce. 

TSA also proposes to require IACs to 

designate a Security Coordinator at the 

corporate level. This individual will be 

responsible for implementing the IAC’s 

security program and will serve as the 

IAC’s primary point of contact for 

communication with TSA. The Security 

Coordinator can be an existing 

employee with additional duties, but 

someone in this role must be available 

24 hours a day. Establishment of IAC 

security coordinators is crucial to 

ensuring that TSA has an open line of 

communication with this important 

class of regulated parties. Currently, 

airport operators and aircraft operators 

must have Security Coordinators. 

As TSA is presented with new threat 

and vulnerability information, TSA may 

need to require IACs to adjust their 

actions accordingly. Currently, TSA 

communicates such information to 

regulated parties, particularly to aircraft 

operators, by issuing SDs and 

Information Circulars. TSA is proposing 

to implement a parallel capability for 

IACs. IACs would be authorized to 

receive SDs, and required to verify 

receipt of the directive or circular and 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65269

to notify TSA how they will comply 

with it. If an IAC is unable to comply 

with a SD, it would be allowed to 

propose an alternative means of 

compliance to TSA. Formalizing this 

two-way communication is necessary to 

ensure sufficient measures are enacted 

when the threat changes, such as during 

a heightened state of alert. 

TSA also proposes to codify existing 

general requirements of the IACSSP to 

require IACs to enhance the security of 

cargo stored or en route to the aircraft 

operator. The proposal to enhance en 

route and storage security is intended to 

ensure that IACs are held accountable 

for securing the goods entrusted to them 

throughout those legs of the supply 

chain for which they are responsible. 

Acceptable security measures are likely 

to include standards for facility security, 

and lock and seal requirements for 

conveyances. TSA invites suggestions 

from interested parties regarding the 

most appropriate solutions available. 

V. Section-by-Section Analysis of 

Proposed Changes 

Part 1540—Civil Aviation Security: 

General Rules 

Section 1540.5—Terms Used in This 

Subchapter 

TSA proposes to broaden the 

definition of ‘‘Indirect Air Carrier’’ by 

removing the word ‘‘passenger,’’ in 

order to expand TSA security program 

requirements to freight forwarders that 

offer cargo to all-cargo aircraft 

operations. The ASAC Air Cargo 

Security working groups (‘‘ASAC 

working groups’’) recommended, and 

TSA agrees, that limiting the definition 

of IAC to only those persons that tender 

cargo to a passenger aircraft would be 

inconsistent with TSA’s goal of 

extending a security regime to all-cargo 

aircraft operations.

Sections 1540.201 Through 1540.209—

Subpart C—Security Threat 

Assessments 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that the 

identities of personnel who have 

unescorted access to cargo to be shipped 

by air should be verified, and that such 

personnel should be subject to 

appropriate background checks. TSA 

proposes to create a type of personnel 

background check to be called a 

‘‘Security Threat Assessment.’’ This 

Security Threat Assessment would 

include a search by TSA of domestic 

and international databases to 

determine the existence of indicators of 

potential terrorist threats that meet the 

standards set forth in proposed Subpart 

C of part 1540. This subpart is 

procedural and sets out the scope and 

basic procedural requirements of a 

Security Threat Assessment, including 

related fee requirements, and provides 

for review of TSA determinations in 

connection with Security Threat 

Assessments. 

In proposed §§ 1544.228, 1546.312, 

and 1548.15, operators would be 

required to ensure that individuals who 

have unescorted access to cargo undergo 

a Security Threat Assessment or other 

check. See the discussion of § 1544.228 

below. This requirement would apply to 

aircraft operators operating under full or 

all-cargo programs, the corresponding 

foreign air carriers, and IACs that offer 

cargo to such operators. 

TSA’s proposed Security Threat 

Assessment would require in § 1540.203 

that operators verify the individual’s 

identity, after which TSA would check 

their identity information against 

intelligence records and other data 

related to terrorism. Operators would be 

required to submit the individual’s 

name, date and place of birth, social 

security number and date of 

naturalization (if a naturalized citizen), 

citizenship status, alien registration 

number (if applicable) and a detailed 

description of the measures taken to 

verify the individual’s identity. After 

assessing this data to determine whether 

the individual poses or is suspected of 

posing a threat to national security, 

transportation security or of terrorism, 

under proposed § 1540.205, TSA would 

notify the regulated party and the 

individual. This notification can take 3 

forms: 

1. Security Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo. This notification 

would indicate that TSA has not found 

that the individual presents a known or 

suspected threat to security. Upon 

receipt of this notification, the operator 

may authorize the individual 

unescorted access to air cargo. 

2. Initial Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access. This 

notification would be issued if TSA 

knew or suspected the individual of 

posing a threat. The individual would 

be able to appeal this determination 

through adjudication, but the individual 

would not be permitted unescorted 

access to air cargo while the appeal is 

pending. 

3. Final Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access. If the 

individual was determined to present a 

threat after an initial determination was 

issued and the individual has an 

opportunity to appeal that 

determination, this notification would 

inform the operator and the individual 

that he or she must be barred from 

having unescorted access to air cargo. 

Section 1540.207 would set out the 

appeals procedures under this proposal 

to provide appropriate due process. 

Section 1540.209 would establish the 

fee requirements necessary to recover 

associated costs of the Security Threat 

Assessment. Under the proposed rule, 

the operator would not permit the 

individual to handle cargo until the 

operator and the individual were 

notified of a Security Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access by TSA. In 

cases where TSA issues a Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access, TSA may notify government 

agencies for law enforcement or security 

purposes, or in the interests of national 

security. TSA recognizes that the 

requirement for background checks may 

cause affected businesses to alter their 

hiring practices. However, TSA believes 

that the security benefits of this 

requirement will be considerable and 

that TSA will be able to conduct the 

initial assessments in an expeditious 

fashion, providing timely notice to the 

regulated party. 

Part 1542—Airport Security 

Section 1542.1—Applicability of This 

Part 

Currently, part 1542 applies to airport 

operators regularly serving aircraft 

operators with full programs, private 

charter programs, or partial programs 

under part 1544, or the corresponding 

foreign air carriers under part 1546. 

Airport operators under part 1542 must 

have and carry out security programs as 

described in that part and, under 

§ 1542.5, must allow TSA to conduct 

inspections on the airport. Airports that 

do not regularly serve such operations, 

or only serve twelve-five programs, are 

not now subject to part 1542. 

TSA proposes to revise § 1542.1 by 

adding subparagraph (d) to require that 

each airport that serves an aircraft 

operator with any security program 

under part 1544 or a foreign air carrier 

under part 1546 would be subject to 

§ 1542.5. This would ensure that TSA 

could inspect aircraft operators and 

foreign air carriers using an airport that 

does not have a security program. It is 

critical that TSA have access to those 

aircraft operations to determine whether 

they are in compliance with the security 

requirements. Accordingly, the 

proposed addition of subparagraph (d) 

would provide that TSA may enter an 

airport that is not otherwise subject to 

part 1542 to conduct an inspection on 

an aircraft operator or a foreign air 

carrier regulated under parts 1544 and 

1546, respectively. This proposal would 

not require that any additional airport 

operators obtain security programs; it 

65270 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

21 67 FR 41635 (June 19, 2002), amended by 67 

FR 79861 (Dec. 31, 2002).

22Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. 

L. 108–176.

would only require that certain airport 

operators allow TSA to conduct 

inspections under § 1542.5. 

Section 1542.205—Security of the 

Security Identification Display Area 

(SIDA) 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that, at 

airports that currently have one or more 

SIDAs, the SIDA should be extended or 

a new SIDA created to encompass air 

cargo operations. These airports have 

complete programs under § 1542.101(a) 

and serve the passenger aircraft 

operators with full programs. Under 

current § 1542.205, for each SIDA the 

airport operator must establish and 

carry out a personnel identification 

system, subject each individual who has 

unescorted access to a criminal history 

records check, and ensure each 

individual with unescorted access is 

properly trained. Currently, air cargo 

operations are not required to be 

conducted in SIDAs. 

Under paragraph 1542.205(a) TSA is 

proposing to add a new paragraph (a)(2) 

that expands the scope of operations 

that must be in a SIDA by requiring 

airports with SIDAs either to expand 

existing or create new SIDA to 

incorporate areas of cargo operations. 

These cargo operations areas would 

include areas where cargo is regularly 

sorted, loaded, or unloaded by certain 

aircraft operators or foreign air carriers. 

The SIDA would only be extended to 

areas on airport grounds.

This proposed change would apply 

only to aircraft operations conducted 

under a full program, and those 

operating under an all-cargo program. 

Also, only areas of the airport that are 

regularly used for these cargo operations 

would be made SIDAs. Areas on these 

airports that are only occasionally used 

would not need to be SIDAs, but the 

aircraft operator would be required to 

provide security for the area under 

proposed § 1544.225(d). Similarly, at 

airports that do not have SIDAs 

pursuant to §§ 1542.103(a) and 

1542.205(a), aircraft operators would 

provide security under proposed 

§ 1544.225(d). All airport operators who 

would be affected by the proposed 

amendment of paragraph 1542.205(a) 

currently have a SIDA and are already 

subject to the requirements of 

§ 1542.103(a) and § 1542.205. 

TSA also proposes to revise current 

paragraph 1542.205(b)(2), which states 

that an individual must undergo an 

employment history verification under 

§ 1542.209 before gaining unescorted 

access to a SIDA. This paragraph would 

be changed to clarify that a criminal 

history records check is required 

pursuant to § 1542.209 rather than an 

employment history verification. This 

clarification would make the text of 

§ 1542.205(b)(2) consistent with that of 

§ 1542.209. 

Finally, TSA proposes to add new 

paragraph 1542.205(c). This paragraph 

would make it clear that an airport 

operator that is not required to have a 

complete program under § 1542.103(a) 

is not required to establish a SIDA 

under proposed § 1542.205. 

The security measures required in a 

SIDA provide additional safeguards 

against unauthorized persons from 

gaining access to cargo operations where 

they could tamper with the cargo or 

stow away in attempt to take over the 

aircraft in flight, or introducing into 

cargo an unauthorized explosive, 

incendiary, or destructive substance or 

item. 

Part 1544—Aircraft Operator Security: 

Air Carriers and Commercial Operators 

Section 1544.101—Adoption and 

Implementation 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that allcargo aircraft operations conducted in 

aircraft with a maximum certificated 

take-off weight of more than 45,500 kg 

(100,309.3 pounds) should be subject to 

certain security requirements beyond 

those applicable to such operations 

under the current Twelve-Five Standard 

Security Program. TSA has already 

determined that this size aircraft is of a 

size that could cause significant damage 

if taken over and used as a weapon, and 

thus when this size aircraft is used in 

private charter passenger operations it 

must be operated under a private charter 

security program.21 Additionally, the 

45,500 kg threshold is consistent with 

international security standards adopted 

by the International Civil Aviation 

Organization. Accordingly, to ensure 

consistent treatment of similar aircraft, 

TSA proposes, in § 1544.101(h) and (i), 

to apply the same threshold by requiring 

that all-cargo operations in such aircraft 

be covered under an all-cargo program. 

Note that such aircraft carry both cargo 

and certain other persons (not 

passengers) in accordance with FAA 

rules. 14 CFR 121.547 and 121.583. 

These persons handle the cargo and 

perform other operations related to the 

flight.

Operations under an all-cargo 

program would no longer be under the 

current twelve-five program. 

Accordingly, TSA proposes to amend 

paragraph 1544.101(d)(1) to conform to 

the addition of the all-cargo program by 

providing that the twelve-five program 

does not apply for operations under an 

all-cargo program. 

In addition, TSA proposes to change 

the requirement for a twelve-five 

program from aircraft with a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight ‘‘of 12,500 

pounds or more’’ to ‘‘more than 12,500 

pounds.’’ This section initially was 

based on the requirement in ATSA 

section 132(a) that TSA implement a 

security program for charter air carriers 

for aircraft having a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 

pounds or more. In Vision 100, section 

606(a), this was changed to require 

security programs for aircraft with a 

weight of more than 12,500.22 This 

proposed amendment is consistent with 

Congressional intent. Vision 100 also 

codified the requirement for charter air 

carrier security programs in 49 U.S.C. 

44903(l)(1).

Vision 100 section 606(a) also codifies 

in new 49 U.S.C. 44903(l)(2) an 

exemption for armed forces charters so 

they are not subject to the requirements 

of 44903(l)(1). Such military operations 

are not subject to the requirements of 

§ 1544.101(d) or (e) and no TSA rule 

change is needed to implement this 

provision. 

TSA also proposes to amend 

paragraph 1544.101(e)(1), which lists 

the elements of the twelve-five program. 

TSA proposes the following 

enhancements to the twelve-five 

program for all-cargo operations: 

§ 1544.202 (Persons and property 

onboard the all-cargo aircraft) and 

§ 1544.205(a), (b), and (d) (Acceptance 

and screening of cargo: Preventing or 

deterring the carriage of any explosive 

or incendiary, Screening and inspection 

of cargo, and Refusal to transport). 

Section 1544.202—Persons and Property 

Onboard the All-Cargo Aircraft 

Section 1544.201 currently requires 

passenger operations under full 

programs or private charter to screen, 

inspect, and provide other security for 

persons who board their aircraft and 

their accessible property. This section is 

geared largely to cover screening of 

passengers and their accessible 

property, though it also covers security 

measures for other persons boarding 

aircraft operated under full programs or 

private charter programs. 

TSA proposes to add new § 1544.202. 

This section would require aircraft 

operators to apply the security measures 

in their security programs to persons 

who board the aircraft, and to their 

property. This proposed requirement is 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65271

intended to prevent persons who may 

pose a security threat from boarding and 

to prevent or deter the carriage of 

unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, 

and other destructive substances or 

items. This section would authorize 

TSA to incorporate into the security 

programs screening for unauthorized 

persons, or substances or items that 

could be used to pose a threat to 

transportation security. 

TSA proposes to incorporate this 

requirement into both the twelve-five 

program for all-cargo operations and the 

proposed new all-cargo program. Such 

operators currently apply security 

measures to persons who board their 

aircraft under SDs that TSA has issued 

in response to threats. TSA envisions 

these measures to continue under this 

proposed rule. 

Section 1544.205—Acceptance and 

Screening of Cargo 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that 

security measures for and screening of 

air cargo should be enhanced. TSA 

proposes to amend paragraphs 

1544.205(a), (b), (c), and (d) to broaden 

the scope of security measures that may 

be required in an aircraft operator 

security program, and to reference the 

Known Shipper program.

Specifically, TSA is proposing to 

require aircraft operators operating 

under a full, all-cargo, or twelve-five 

security program to inspect cargo for 

unauthorized persons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other destructive 

substances or items. TSA believes that 

this amendment is necessary to prevent 

the introduction of stowaway hijackers, 

explosive devices, or other threats into 

air cargo. Carriers under these programs 

are currently required to inspect cargo 

to protect against such potential threats. 

This proposed provision would not alter 

that requirement but is adding it to the 

CFR and providing industry an 

opportunity for public comment. The 

security measures in proposed 

§ 1544.205(a) and (b) are the same as 

those incorporated into SDs that have 

been issued and are currently being 

carried out by aircraft operators with 

full programs and twelve-five programs. 

Proposed § 1544.205(b) would 

authorize TSA to incorporate into an 

aircraft operator’s security program 

screening of cargo for unauthorized 

persons, or substances or items the 

intentional misuse of which could pose 

a threat to transportation security. 

Current § 1544.205(c) provides that 

the aircraft operator must prevent access 

by persons other than an aircraft 

operator employee or its agent. TSA is 

proposing to add that persons 

authorized by the airport operator or 

host government also may have access. 

Such individuals as Customs inspectors 

and airport law enforcement officers 

must have access to such areas. 

TSA also proposes to strengthen the 

cargo acceptance requirements 

applicable to aircraft operators operating 

under a full program or an all-cargo 

program. Pursuant to proposed 

§ 1544.205(e), an aircraft operator would 

be permitted to accept cargo for air 

transportation only from entities that 

have comparable security programs. 

TSA believes that this provision is 

necessary to secure the aircraft by 

strengthening the integrity of the air 

cargo supply chain. These requirements 

parallel those currently applied to 

operations conducted under a full 

program. 

TSA also proposes, in § 1544.205(f), to 

require each aircraft operator to carry 

out the requirements of its security 

program for cargo to be loaded on its 

aircraft outside the United States. Not 

all of the part 1544 requirements can be 

carried out in other countries. Rather, 

TSA works with the host governments, 

under international agreements, to 

ensure that the security measures in 

place provide the appropriate level of 

security. 

Section 1544.225—Security of Aircraft 

and Facilities 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that 

additional steps should be taken to 

assure that attempted unauthorized 

access to the aircraft and cargo is 

detected and prevented. 

Proposed paragraph 1544.225(d) 

would require the operators of aircraft 

operating under a full program or an allcargo program to prevent unauthorized 

access to the operational area of the 

aircraft while loading or unloading 

cargo. This requirement would apply to 

operations conducted both within and 

outside a SIDA. TSA recognizes that 

current paragraph 1544.225(b) requires 

all aircraft operators operating under 

security programs to prevent 

unauthorized access to each aircraft. 

Proposed paragraph (d) would broaden 

this requirement, for aircraft operated 

under a full or an all-cargo program, to 

clarify that unauthorized access must be 

prevented to the operational area 

around the aircraft during cargo loading 

and unloading operations. This measure 

would provide an additional layer of 

protection around the aircraft. 

Section 1544.228—Security Threat 

Assessments for Cargo Personnel 

TSA proposes to require persons who 

have unescorted access to cargo to 

undergo a security check. This would 

require that they comply with the 

requirements of subpart C of part 1540 

by successfully completing a Security 

Threat Assessment, or that they undergo 

a criminal history records check under 

current rules, or other approved 

Security Threat Assessment. This 

requirement would apply to aircraft 

operators under a full program or an allcargo program. 

TSA believes that this step is 

necessary to reduce the likelihood of a 

terrorist gaining employment in a 

position with access to cargo for the 

purpose of introducing an explosive, 

stowaway hijacker, or other destructive 

substance into air cargo. Extending 

Security Threat Assessments to these 

individuals would allow for a 

comparable degree of security for all 

personnel with access to cargo on behalf 

of regulated parties from the time it is 

picked up from a shipper to the time it 

is loaded on the aircraft. 

This proposal would allow for 

another Security Threat Assessment to 

be approved by TSA. For instance, if the 

individual had undergone a Security 

Threat Assessment for the issuance of a 

hazardous materials endorsement on a 

commercial drivers license in 

accordance with 49 CFR 1572.5, TSA 

could approve that as acceptable for 

compliance with proposed § 1544.228.

TSA has proposed a fee structure and 

collection process to fund some or all of 

the costs associated with the proposed 

Security Threat Assessment 

requirements. The proposed fee may be 

found at section VII titled Fee Authority 

for the Security Threat Assessment of 

this NPRM. 

Section 1544.229—Fingerprint-Based 

Criminal History Records Checks 

(CHRC): Unescorted Access Authority, 

Authority To Perform Screening 

Functions, and Authority To Perform 

Checked Baggage or Cargo Functions 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that the 

identities of persons who perform 

certain key actions with air cargo should 

be subject to verification and that the 

backgrounds of these persons should be 

checked. TSA proposes to broaden the 

background check requirements by 

revising paragraph 1544.229(a)(1)(iii)(B) 

to include a cross-reference to the new 

paragraph 1544.229(a)(1)(iii)(C). The 

new paragraph requires persons who 

screen cargo that will be carried on an 

aircraft of an operator required to screen 

cargo under part 1544 to submit to a 

CHRC under § 1544.229. Currently, 

§ 1544.229 applies, in pertinent part, 

only to persons having authority to 

screen cargo, in the United States, of an 

65272 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

aircraft operator required to screen 

passengers under this part, or serving as 

an immediate supervisor of such an 

individual, when the cargo will be 

carried in the cabin of the aircraft. 

Accordingly, only cargo screeners for 

operators with full programs currently 

are subject to § 1544.229. This new 

requirement parallels the current 

requirement that persons who screen 

passengers and carry-on baggage 

(accessible property) must comply with 

§ 1544.229. TSA also proposes to 

require that cargo screeners for 

operators with all-cargo programs be 

subject to the criminal history records 

check requirements of § 1544.229. This 

change would provide an additional 

protection against individuals who 

screen cargo for the largest all-cargo 

aircraft from using their positions to 

introduce unauthorized explosives, 

incendiaries, persons, or destructive 

substances or items into the cargo or 

aircraft. 

Section 1544.239—Known Shipper 

Program 

Proposed § 1544.239 would codify the 

Known Shipper program in the federal 

regulations. The ‘‘known shipper’’

concept, which differentiates cargo 

being shipped by recognized entities 

from that originating with unknown 

parties, has been a fundamental element 

of air cargo security since 1976. The 

program has also been recognized as a 

global standard by the International Air 

Transport Association (IATA) and was 

recognized by the United States 

Congress as a form of screening in 

ATSA. Aircraft operators operating 

under a full program would be required 

to have a Known Shipper program 

including measures to ensure the 

shippers’ validity and integrity, to 

inspect or further screen cargo, and to 

provide shipper data to TSA. Aircraft 

operators must meet these requirements 

in accordance with the standards 

detailed in their security program. The 

Known Shipper program would apply to 

operations under full programs. 

Aircraft operators with full programs 

are already required to maintain a 

Known Shipper program under their 

security programs. TSA believes that it 

is prudent to set out the major features 

of this program in regulation at this 

time. Additional changes to how the 

Known Shipper program must operate 

may be included in revisions to the 

security program. 

Part 1546—Foreign Air Carrier Security 

Section 1546.101—Adoption and 

Implementation 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that 

cargo operations of foreign air carriers 

that land or take-off in the United States 

should be required to conform to 

essentially the same requirements as 

those applicable to comparable 

operations by domestic aircraft 

operators. TSA proposes to broaden the 

provisions of § 1546.101 to require each 

foreign air carrier landing or taking off 

in the United States to adopt and carry 

out an appropriate security program for 

each covered all-cargo operation. TSA 

proposes to establish the requirements 

of an appropriate security program for a 

covered foreign air carrier conducting 

all-cargo operations for operations in 

aircraft having a maximum certificated 

take-off weight greater than 45,500 kg 

(100,309.3 pounds) (analogous to a U.S. 

all-cargo program under part 1544), and 

for operations in aircraft having a 

maximum certificated take-off weight 

greater than 12,500 pounds up to 45,500 

kg (100,309.3 pounds) (analogous to a 

U.S. twelve-five program in all-cargo 

operations under part 1544). 

Section 1546.103—Form, Content, and 

Availability of Security Program 

TSA proposes to make an 

administrative change to paragraph 

1546.103(a) by removing the word 

‘‘passenger’’ and changing ‘‘U.S. air 

carriers’’ to ‘‘U.S. aircraft operators.’’

In paragraph 1546.103(b), TSA 

proposes to add paragraphs 1546.101 (e) 

and (f) to the introductory text. This 

proposed change broadens the 

requirements to embrace cargo 

operations. 

Section 1546.202—Persons and Property 

Onboard the Airplane 

This proposed new section parallels 

the requirements of the proposed 

aircraft operations in the United States. 

The rationale for this addition is 

described in the section-by-section 

analysis for § 1544.202. 

Section 1546.205—Acceptance and 

Screening of Cargo 

The ASAC Working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that, 

consistent with recognition of the 

sovereignty of foreign states, aviation 

security regulations should be clarified 

with respect to the duty of foreign air 

carriers for the security of air cargo 

loaded in or destined for the United 

States. TSA proposes to amend 

paragraph (a) and add paragraphs (c), 

(d), (e), and (f) to § 1546.205. These 

paragraphs are parallel to those for U.S. 

aircraft operators in proposed 

§ 1544.205. 

Proposed paragraph 1546.205(d), 

‘‘Screening and inspection of cargo in 

the United States,’’ would provide that 

each foreign air carrier must ensure that, 

as required in its security program, 

cargo is screened and inspected for 

explosives, incendiaries, unauthorized 

persons, and other destructive 

substances or items as provided in the 

foreign air carrier’s security program, in 

accordance with § 1546.207, and 

§ 1546.215 if applicable, before loading 

it on its aircraft in the United States. 

Proposed paragraph 1546.205(e), 

‘‘Acceptance of cargo in the United 

States,’’ would provide that each foreign 

air carrier may accept cargo in the 

United States only from the shipper, or 

from an aircraft operator, foreign air 

carrier, or IAC operating under a 

security program under this chapter, 

with a comparable cargo security 

program as provided in its security 

program.

Proposed paragraph 1546.205(f) 

would provide that, for cargo to be 

loaded on its aircraft outside the United 

States, each foreign air carrier must 

carry out the requirements of its security 

program. 

Section 1546.213—Security Threat 

Assessment for Cargo Personnel in the 

United States 

TSA proposes to require persons who 

are not required to complete a CHRC 

under §§ 1542.209, 1544.229, or 

1544.230 and who have unescorted 

access to cargo, to comply with the 

requirements of subpart C of part 1540 

by successfully completing a Security 

Threat Assessment. This requirement 

would apply to foreign air carriers 

under paragraphs 1546.101(a), (b), or (e). 

The rationale for this security measure 

parallels that rationale described in the 

section-by-section analysis for 

§ 1544.228. 

Section 1546.215—Known Shipper 

Program 

TSA proposes to codify the Known 

Shipper program for the foreign air 

carriers just as we proposed in 

§ 1544.239. The rationale for adding this 

new section is the same as stated in the 

section-by-section analysis for 

§ 1544.239. 

Part 1548—Indirect Air Carrier Security 

Section 1548.5—Adoption and 

Implementation of the Security Program 

TSA proposes to revise paragraphs (a), 

(b), and (c) of § 1548.5 regarding the 

adoption and implementation of the 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65273

IACSSP. The proposed change to 

paragraph 1548.5(a) would specify that 

no IAC may offer cargo to an aircraft 

operator operating under a full program 

or an all-cargo program specified in part 

1544, or to a foreign air carrier operating 

a passenger operation under paragraphs 

1546.101(a) and (b) or an all-cargo 

program under paragraph 1546.101(e), 

unless that IAC has and carries out an 

approved security program under part 

1548. 

The proposed change to paragraph 

1548.5(b) would broaden the scope of 

screening actions that may be required 

in an individual IAC’s security program. 

IACs having cargo screening 

responsibilities under current 

§ 1548.5(b)(1) and their approved 

security programs must ‘‘[p]rovide for 

the safety of persons and property 

traveling in air transportation against 

acts of criminal violence and air piracy 

and the introduction of any 

unauthorized explosive or incendiary 

into cargo aboard a passenger aircraft.’’

TSA proposes to revise this requirement 

to provide that the IAC must ‘‘provide 

for the security of persons and property 

traveling in air transportation against 

acts of criminal violence and air piracy 

and the introduction of any 

unauthorized person, explosive, 

incendiary, or other destructive 

substances or items as provided in the 

IAC’s security program.’’

This provision would also broaden 

the duty of IACs to include cargo to be 

carried on an aircraft operated under an 

all-cargo program rather than solely in 

passenger operations. This change 

parallels the cargo security requirements 

in proposed §§ 1544.205 and 1546.205. 

It authorizes TSA to incorporate into an 

IAC’s individual security program 

screening of cargo for unauthorized 

persons, or substances or items the 

intentional misuse of which could pose 

a threat to transportation security. 

Under § 1548.5(b)(1)(i), this requirement 

would apply from the time the IAC 

accepts the cargo to the time it transfers 

the cargo to an entity that is not an 

employee, agent, contractor, or 

subcontractor of the IAC. This proposed 

provision clarifies the existing IAC 

security program requirement that the 

IAC is responsible for carrying out 

security measures under this part when 

its employee, agent, contractor or 

subcontractor fulfills its function. 

Section 1548.5(b)(1)(ii) would apply 

while the cargo is stored, en route, or 

otherwise being handled by an 

employee, agent, contractor, or 

subcontractor of the IAC. Section 

1548.5(b)(1)(iii) would apply regardless 

of whether the IAC has or ever has 

physical possession of the cargo. At 

times, IACs perform cargo services that 

may include arranging for transportation 

of cargo by other entities. This proposed 

amendment clarifies that the IAC is 

responsible for these shipments even 

though the IAC, itself, does not have 

physical possession. Proposed 

paragraph 1548.5(b) would also require 

the IAC to assure that its employees, 

agents, contractors, and subcontractors 

comply with the requirements of the 

IAC’s security program. This provision 

currently is in the IACs’ standard 

security programs. 

The proposed change to paragraph 

1548.5(c) would assure that the content 

of each IAC security program reflects 

the scope of security measures 

established under proposed § 1548.5(b), 

references Known Shipper program 

requirements that are proposed to be 

codified in § 1548.17, and establishes a 

new requirement that each IAC security 

program include documentation of the 

procedures and curriculum used to 

accomplish the training of persons who 

accept, store, transport or deliver cargo 

for or on behalf of the IAC. This training 

would be required under proposed new 

§ 1548.11. 

Section 1548.7—Approval, Amendment, 

Annual Renewal, and Withdrawal of 

Approval of the Security Program 

TSA proposes to restructure and 

revise this section both to reflect actual 

practices and enhance the security of 

this regulatory regime. The proposed 

revision of paragraph 1548.7(a) accounts 

for the fact that TSA has developed the 

IACSSP. Consistent with current 

practices, rather than submitting a 

security program for TSA approval, an 

entity would request approval to operate 

under the IACSSP. The proposed 

addition explains how an applicant 

must seek approval to operate under the 

IACSSP, including a record-keeping 

requirement and a list of information 

that the applicant must submit to TSA 

for consideration. Paragraph 1548.7(a) 

also proposes the process that TSA will 

follow to approve an applicant’s 

operation under a security program, 

proposes that approvals would be 

effective for one year, and provides that 

the approved IAC must notify TSA of 

changes to the initial application. TSA 

would use the information submitted by 

IAC applicants to verify their legitimacy 

through a check of publicly-available 

records and to cross check that 

information against data on known and 

suspected terrorists. 

Under current practices, TSA issues 

an IACSSP to expire each year. The 

proposed addition of paragraph 

1548.7(b) presents the processes an IAC 

must follow to annually seek renewed 

TSA approval to operate under the 

IACSSP. Annual renewal would be a 

continuation, and codification, of the 

current practice. Other entities regulated 

by a TSA security program, such as 

aircraft operators and airports, must 

obtain FAA certification. IACs are not 

required to do so. Additionally, TSA has 

found that the IAC industry has a high 

degree of turnover. Accordingly, TSA 

proposes in paragraph 1548.7(b) that the 

IAC must submit to TSA for renewal at 

least 30 calendar days prior to 

expiration of the IACSSP as well as 

other standards for the submission. The 

proposed renewal standards also 

include that the IAC certify that it has 

provided TSA with its most up-to-date 

information and acknowledge that 

intentional falsification of the 

information may be subject to civil and 

criminal penalties. The addition further 

proposes the standard for TSA to renew 

the approval of an IACSSP. Proposed 

§ 1548.7(b) otherwise codifies the 

existing security program required for 

annual renewal.

The proposed additions of paragraphs 

1548.7(c), (d), and (e) revise the existing 

requirements of paragraphs 1548.7(b), 

(c) and (d), respectively. Many of the 

changes parallel changes made 

previously to similar requirements for 

airport operator security programs and 

aircraft operator security programs in 

§§ 1542.105 and 1544.105. In part, the 

new paragraphs have been moved to 

ensure that the structure of the section 

remains logical. Proposed § 1548.7(c) 

closely parallels the existing § 1548.7(b), 

but adds § 1548.7(c)(6)—allowing a 

group of IACs to submit a proposed 

amendment together. Proposed 

paragraph 1548.7(d) is the same as the 

existing paragraph 1548.7(c). The 

proposed paragraph 1548.7(e) revises 

the existing Emergency Amendments 

(EA) standards of the existing paragraph 

1548.7(d). The proposed paragraph is 

separated into three subparagraphs for 

easier reading. Proposed paragraph 

1548.7(d)(1) substitutes ‘‘aviation 

security’’ for ‘‘safety in air 

transportation or in air commerce’’ to 

clarify the breadth of TSA’s EA 

authority. Proposed paragraph 

1548.7(d)(2) reorganizes existing EA 

standards to emphasize immediate 

effectiveness and that TSA will provide 

a brief statement regarding the rationale 

for the EA. Finally, paragraph 

1548.7(d)(3) provides the IAC with 15 

days to file a petition for 

reconsideration but provides that the 

filing of the petition does not stay the 

effective date of the amendment. 

TSA proposes to codify procedures 

for TSA to withdraw an IAC’s approval 

to operate under the IACSSP with the 

65274 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

addition of paragraph 1548.7(f). The 

proposed standard for withdrawal is a 

TSA determination that the operation is 

contrary to security and the public 

interest. Proposed paragraph 1548.7(f) 

provides procedures for notice, 

response, and petition for 

reconsideration. The affected IAC would 

be able to request a stay of the 

withdrawal. TSA also proposes the 

codification of emergency withdrawal 

procedures. This proposal creates 

procedural guidelines to implement 

withdrawal of a security program and 

affords due process to the IAC. The 

emergency procedures would allow the 

IAC to submit a petition for 

reconsideration, but the filing of a 

petition will not stay the effective date 

of withdrawal. 

Proposed paragraph 1548.7(g) adds 

provisions for proper service of 

documents in the withdrawal 

proceedings. Procedures for time 

extensions are proposed at paragraph 

1548.7(h). 

Section 1548.9—Acceptance of Cargo 

TSA proposes to revise paragraph 

1548.9(a) to broaden the scope of the 

IAC’s duty to prevent or deter the 

carriage of unauthorized persons or 

destructive substances or items on board 

an aircraft to the existing requirements 

regarding explosives and incendiaries. 

With the expanded definition of IAC, 

this provision proposes to require IACs 

to carry out these procedures whenever 

offering cargo for air transportation on 

all-cargo aircraft, as well as a passenger 

aircraft under a full program. This 

proposed section further provides that, 

subject to TSA approval of the 

provisions of the IAC’s security 

program. Additionally the proposed 

amendment would add a requirement 

that the IAC request the shipper’s 

consent to search or inspect the cargo. 

TSA proposes to revise paragraph 

1548.9(b) by adding all-cargo aircraft 

operations to the search and inspection 

requirements. Under current paragraph 

1548.9(b), this duty extends only to 

cargo that is intended for shipment 

aboard a passenger aircraft. By removing 

the word ‘‘passenger,’’ this paragraph 

would extend to cargo for shipment 

aboard all-cargo aircraft operations as 

well. Proposed paragraph 1548.9(b) 

would delete the requirement, found in 

current paragraph 1548.9(b), that the 

IAC must search or inspect cargo. This 

amendment is primarily aimed at 

creating a parallel structure to the 

requirements found in parts 1544 and 

1546. 

Section 1548.11—Training and 

Knowledge for Individuals with 

Security-Related Duties 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that 

certain employees of IACs, and of 

agents, contractors, and subcontractors 

performing services for IACs, should be 

subject to security-related training. 

These enhanced requirements for 

training covers individuals who perform 

security-related duties to ensure the 

appropriate security standards are met. 

TSA proposes to add new 

§ 1548.11(a), which specifies that an 

IAC must not use any individual to 

perform any security-related duties to 

meet the requirements of its security 

program unless the individual has 

received training as specified in its 

security program. This requirement 

would cover employees of the IAC as 

well as employees of any agent, 

contractor, or subcontractor performing 

security-related duties for the IAC. 

Under proposed § 1548.11(b), 

additional training would be specified 

for individuals who accept, handle, 

transport, or deliver cargo for or on 

behalf of the IAC. This training must 

include, at a minimum, requirements 

contained in the applicable provisions 

of part 1548, applicable SDs and 

Information Circulars, the approved 

airport security program applicable to 

their location, and the aircraft operator’s 

or IAC’s security program to the extent 

that such individuals need to know in 

order to perform their duties. 

Proposed paragraph 1548.11(c) would 

require annual recurrent training of 

covered individuals in these elements of 

knowledge. Pursuant to proposed 

§ 1548.7(a), initial training of the 

identified individuals performing duties 

for the IAC must be completed before an 

IAC may begin operations under its 

approved security program. 

Section 1548.13—Security Coordinators 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that 

communication among regulated aircraft 

operators, airport operators, TSA, and 

IACs concerning security matters must 

be improved, and responsibility for 

compliance by IACs with TSA security 

requirements must be clarified. TSA 

proposes to require each IAC to 

designate and use an Indirect Air Carrier 

Security Coordinator (IACSC). The IAC 

would be required to appoint the IACSC 

at the corporate level, and IACSC would 

be directed to serve as the IAC’s primary 

contact for security-related activities 

and communications with TSA, as set 

forth in the IACSSP. Either the IACSC 

or an alternate IACSC would be required 

to be available on a 24-hour basis. This 

proposed addition parallels existing 

security coordinator positions required 

of airport operators in § 1542.3 and 

aircraft operators in § 1544.215. 

Section 1548.15—Security Threat 

Assessments for Individuals Having 

Unescorted Access to Cargo 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that the 

identities of personnel who have 

unescorted access to cargo to be shipped 

by air should be verified, and that such 

personnel should be subject to an 

appropriate background check. TSA 

proposes to add new § 1548.15, which 

would prohibit each IAC from 

authorizing any individual unescorted 

access to cargo until the IAC has 

verified the identity of that individual 

in a manner acceptable to TSA, and that 

individual has successfully completed a 

Security Threat Assessment pursuant to 

proposed subpart C of 1540. The 

rationale for this security measure 

parallels that described in the sectionby-section analysis for § 1544.228.

Section 1548.17—Known Shipper 

Program 

TSA proposes to add new § 1548.17 to 

codify the Known Shipper program in 

regulation. This addition is essentially 

the same as that for aircraft operators 

under proposed § 1544.239. 

Section 1548.19—Security Directives 

and Information Circulars 

The ASAC working groups 

recommended, and TSA agrees, that 

communication between regulated IACs 

and TSA concerning security matters 

must be improved, and responsibility 

for compliance by IACs with TSA 

security requirements must be clarified. 

In the past, when threat conditions 

required that additional security 

measures be carried out immediately, 

TSA has issued EAs to IACs’ security 

programs. This section would, in part, 

provide a procedure for TSA to impose 

such measures using SDs. TSA proposes 

to add new § 1548.19, which would 

authorize TSA to issue SDs and 

Information Circulars to regulated IACs, 

and would mandate compliance by the 

IAC with each SD that it receives. 

Proposed § 1548.19 would also require 

the IAC to acknowledge in writing 

receipt of the SD within the time 

prescribed in the SD, and to specify the 

method by which the measures in the 

SD have been implemented (or will be 

implemented, if the SD is not yet 

effective) within the time prescribed in 

the SD. In the event that the IAC is 

unable to implement the measures in an 

SD, proposed § 1548.19 would authorize 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65275

23 Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2004, Section 520, Pub. L. 108–

90, October 1, 2003, 117 Stat. 1137.

the IAC to submit proposed alternative 

measures and the basis for the 

alternative measures to TSA for 

approval. The IAC would be required to 

submit the proposed alternative 

measures within the time prescribed in 

the SD and, if they are approved by 

TSA, the IAC would be required to 

implement them. 

Proposed § 1548.19 also provides that 

each IAC that receives an SD may 

comment on the SD by submitting data, 

views, or arguments in writing to TSA, 

and that TSA may amend the SD based 

on comments received. Proposed 

§ 1548.19 also provides that submission 

of a comment would not delay the 

effective date of the SD. 

Proposed § 1548.19 also provides that 

each IAC that receives a SD or 

Information Circular and each person 

who receives information from a SD or 

Information Circular would be required 

to restrict the availability of the SD or 

Information Circular, and information 

contained in either document, to those 

persons with a need-to-know. The IAC 

would be required to refuse to release 

the SD or Information Circular, and 

information contained in either 

document, to persons other than those 

with a need-to-know without the prior 

written consent of TSA. 

VI. Proposed Compliance Schedule 

Most of the provisions in this 

proposed rule would codify existing SD 

requirements. It appears to TSA that 

most of the new provisions in this 

proposed rule are achievable by the 

regulated parties within 90 days. 

However, TSA recognizes the need for 

further time to implement some 

provisions. TSA proposes that the 

proposed rule, if adopted, would 

become effective as follows: 

(1) The proposed rule would become 

effective 90 days after the date of 

publication of the final rule in the 

Federal Register and operators would 

generally be required to comply with 

the requirements (with the exception of 

the compliance date described in VI. 

(2)). 

(2) TSA proposes that certain 

measures in the proposed rule would 

require compliance by 180 days from 

the date of publication of the final rule 

in the Federal Register. TSA believes 

IACs will need as much as 180 days to 

introduce new training requirements 

under § 1548.11 and to establish and 

operate under a TSA security program 

pursuant to § 1548.7. Finally, TSA 

proposes to provide 180 days for aircraft 

operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs 

to comply with the security threat 

assessment for those individuals 

required to submit to the requirements 

pursuant to proposed §§ 1544.228, 

1546.213, and 1548.15. 

TSA requests additional information 

from the public on how many operators 

would be affected, what the impact 

would be on those individual operators, 

and the proposed compliance schedule. 

VII. Fee Authority for Security Threat 

Assessment 

The USA PATRIOT Act did not grant 

TSA authority to collect fees to cover 

the costs associated with completing 

background checks. However, on 

October 1, 2003, legislation was enacted 

requiring TSA to collect reasonable fees 

to cover the costs of providing 

credentialing and background 

investigations in the transportation 

field, including implementation of the 

USA PATRIOT Act requirements.23 Fees 

collected under this legislation (Section 

520) must be used to pay for the costs 

of conducting or obtaining a criminal 

history records check (CHRC); reviewing 

available law enforcement databases, 

commercial databases, and records of 

other governmental and international 

agencies; reviewing and adjudicating 

requests for waivers and appeals of TSA 

decisions; and any other costs related to 

performing the background records 

check or providing the credential.

Section 520 mandates that any fee 

collected shall be available for 

expenditure only to pay for the costs 

incurred in providing services in 

connection with performing the 

background check or providing the 

credential. The fee shall remain 

available until expended. TSA is 

establishing this fee in accordance with 

the criteria in 31 U.S.C. 9701 (General 

User Fee Statute), which requires fees to 

be fair and based on (1) costs to the 

government, (2) the value of the service 

or thing to the recipient, (3) public 

policy or interest served, and (4) other 

relevant facts. 

Summary of Security Threat Assessment 

Requirement 

TSA currently requires a variety of 

individuals working in aviation to 

submit to criminal history records 

checks to reduce the likelihood that a 

terrorist would gain employment that 

would give them access to the aircraft. 

Generally, these individuals work on 

airport grounds and have unescorted 

access to secure areas. In the cargo 

environment, many other persons have 

access to cargo before someone who has 

had such a check handles it. TSA 

recognizes that the number of 

individuals handling cargo is very large 

and that extending fingerprint-based 

records checks to these people would 

likely be a very time-consuming and 

costly process that would cause a major 

disruption to the domestic and 

international transportation of goods. 

TSA is proposing a focused Security 

Threat Assessment program to 

determine whether individuals seeking 

to handle cargo present a terrorist threat. 

This program will reduce the likelihood 

that a terrorist might gain access to a 

cargo aircraft.

Flexibility will be achieved by 

ensuring that each of the following 

individuals with unescorted access to 

cargo be required to have either a 

Security Threat Assessment or 

unescorted SIDA access: (1) IAC 

personnel; (2) Aircraft Operator 

personnel operating under a full 

program or an all-cargo program; and (3) 

Foreign Air Carrier personnel under 49 

CFR 1546.101(a), (b), or (e). TSA also 

proposes to conduct a Security Threat 

Assessment on each officer, director and 

person who holds 25 percent or more of 

total outstanding voting stock of an 

Indirect Air Carrier or entity applying to 

become an IAC. 

Security Threat Assessment Population 

Personnel with unescorted access to 

cargo that work for an IAC, an aircraft 

operator, or a foreign air carrier would 

be required to undergo a name-based 

Security Threat Assessment. 

Additionally each officer, director and 

person who holds 25 percent or more of 

total outstanding voting stock of an 

Indirect Air Carrier or entity applying to 

become an IAC would be required to 

undergo a name-based Security Threat 

Assessment. TSA approximates a de 

minimis number of persons who hold 25 

percent or more total outstanding voting 

stock that are not also officers or 

directors of these IACs. Accordingly, 

TSA has not accounted for these 

individuals separately. However, those 

personnel with unescorted SIDA access 

have undergone a criminal history 

records check. TSA would accept the 

criminal history records check in lieu of 

the proposed Security Threat 

Assessment for these personnel. 

The Indirect Air Carrier Population 

TSA estimates that there are 

approximately 3,800 companies that are 

defined as IACs. TSA further estimates 

that there are approximately 7 

employees per IAC. Therefore the total 

population is estimated to be 26,600. 

65276 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

24The HAZMAT Endorsement Program is a 

program currently being developed by the TSA to 

provide background checks on drivers with a 

Hazardous Materials Endorsement on their 

Commercial Drivers License. Initially, all current 

endorsement holders will have a name-based check 

performed on them and, as an individual renews or 

applies for a HAZMAT endorsement, a fingerprintbased background check will be performed.

25The third party assessments include (i) those 

performed by the Office of National Risk 

Assessment (ONRA) and (ii) FBI named-based 

checks through Automated Case Systems (ACS).

Cargo Personnel Not Subject to Other 

TSA Security Threat Assessments 

TSA has estimates that there are 

approximately 65 aircraft operators and 

foreign air carriers operating all-cargo 

flights that have employees who are 

subject to the proposed Security Threat 

Assessment. As discussed in the 

economic evaluation, aircraft operators 

and foreign air carriers have some 

employees who are required to submit 

to the fingerprint-based SIDA check but 

some employees would only be required 

to submit to the Security Threat 

Assessment. Because most of the 

operator employees are covered in the 

SIDA background check requirements, 

TSA believes that only a limited number 

of employees would be required to 

submit to a Security Threat Assessment 

and not the security assessment for 

SIDA workers. There may be instances 

where all employees with access to the 

cargo will have the security assessment 

for SIDA workers. TSA estimates that 

there are approximately 25 employees 

for each aircraft operator and foreign air 

carrier operating all-cargo flights who 

would be required to submit to a 

Security Threat Assessment. Therefore 

the total population is estimated to be 

1,625 (65x25). 

Total Initial Population 

Given the IAC population of 26,600 

and the population of relevant aircraft 

operators and foreign air carriers 

operating all-cargo flights employees of 

1,625, the total population subject to a 

Security Threat Assessment is 28,225 

(26,600 + 1,625). This initial population 

would be required to submit to a 

Security Threat Assessment during the 

first year of the program. 

Recurring Population 

TSA estimates approximately 15% of 

the initial total population would be 

required to submit to a Security Threat 

Assessment each year after the initial 

assessment. This percentage represents 

new employees or employees with a 

new requirement for the Security Threat 

Assessment. Therefore the recurring 

population that would be required to 

submit to a Security Threat Assessments 

is estimated to be 4,234. 

Five Year Population 

Given the first year population of 

28,225 and subsequent annual recurring 

population of 4,234, we estimate that 

the total population receiving a Security 

Threat Assessment over the first 5 years 

is 45,161 (28,225 + 4 × 4,234). 

Program Costs 

This section summarizes TSA’s 

estimated costs for establishing the 

program, processes, and resources to 

establish and perform the Security 

Threat Assessment on the appropriate 

population. 

Leveraging Existing Resources 

Where possible, TSA would leverage 

existing processes, infrastructure and 

personnel that are envisioned to be in 

place for other Security Threat 

Assessment programs at the time this 

program on Security Threat Assessment 

begins operation. Existing infrastructure 

that would be leveraged include the 

HAZMAT Endorsement Program’s 24

Hazardous Materials Endorsement 

Screening Gateway System (HMESG); 

however, some modifications to these 

systems would be necessary to meet 

proposed requirements. These changes 

would include connectivity with 

additional government agencies, 

software enhancement and additional 

backup capabilities. In addition to the 

HMESG, this program would leverage 

existing real estate and Project 

Management Office personnel. The 

additional costs that would be incurred 

by the HAZMAT program have been 

identified in the recurring cost section 

below.

Start-Up Costs 

We estimate that the total start-up 

costs would be $690,000. This includes 

$570,000 for hardware and software 

modifications for the existing HAZMAT 

HMESG and $120,000 for program 

management personnel. See Figure 1 

below for additional details. 

Recurring Costs 

We estimate that the total annual 

recurring costs would be $928,354 for 

the first year and $214,102 for each 

subsequent year. These costs include an 

annual $50,000 expense TSA will incur 

for connectivity and $66,454 expense 

for use of the HAZMAT program 

infrastructure. The use of the HAZMAT 

program infrastructure would include 

use of program management, 

adjudication and fee processing 

personnel, use of real estate, and use of 

systems. The first recurring year would 

have significantly higher costs 

associated with those costs that are 

completely variable (i.e., a function of 

the number of Security Threat 

Assessments performed). The combined 

first year cost for third party terrorist 

threat 25 checks and third party 

clearinghouse fees will be $783,675 and 

the costs for the four following years 

would be $93,414 annually.

FIGURE 1.—COSTS ESTIMATES

Category and subcategory Description Start-Up Year 1 Recurring 

Hardware/Software: 

HAZMAT HMESG Modification ..................... The Hazardous Materials Endorsement Screening Gateway System.$570,000 .................... ....................

HAZMAT HMESG Connectivity ..................... ............................................................................... .................... $50,000 $50,000 

Hardware/Software Total ........................... ............................................................................... 570,000 50,000 50,000 

Federal Personnel: Personnel to staff program 

office.

Additional federal employees will be required to 

staff the program office during the start-up 

phase. In the start-up phase, one FTE at 

$120,000 annually will be necessary for program implementation and development.

120,000 .................... ....................

Total Federal Personnel ............................ ............................................................................... 120,000 .................... ....................

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65277

26 31 U.S.C. 902.

FIGURE 1.—COSTS ESTIMATES—Continued

Category and subcategory Description Start-Up Year 1 Recurring 

Third Party Clearinghouse Fee: Third Party 

Clearinghouse Fee.

The third party clearinghouse will collect and 

process the applicant’s biographical information, collect the applicant fee and forward the 

information and fee to TSA.

.................... 84,675 12,702 

Total Third Party Clearinghouse Fee ........ ............................................................................... .................... 84,675 12,702 

Terrorist Threat Assessment: 

Automated Case System Fee (FBI name 

based checks-Automated Case Systems).

A terrorist threat analysis is the process of 

querying applicant names in terrorist threat 

and criminal databases. This cost is derived 

by multiplying the total population by the cost 

per applicant of several database checks. $20 

per applicant.

.................... 564,500 67,260 

Office of National Risk Assessment Fee ...... A terrorist threat analysis is the process of 

querying applicant names in terrorist threat 

and criminal databases. The cost is derived by 

multiplying the total population by the cost per 

applicant of several database checks: $4 per 

applicant.

.................... 134,500 13,452 

Total-Terrorist Threat Assessment ............ ............................................................................... .................... 699,000 80,712 

Additional costs to existing programs: Additional 

costs incurred by HAZMAT program.

Leveraging the planned infrastructure to the 

HAZMAT program will increase the total recurring costs by 1% per year. The cost here is 

1% of the average relevant annual costs. Includes Federal and Contractor personnel, Office Facilities, and Systems.

.................... 66,454 66,454 

Total additional costs to existing programs ............................................................................... .................... 66,454 66,454 

Total Costs ................................................. ............................................................................... 690,000 928,354 214,102 

Total Costs 

Based on its population and cost 

estimate assumptions, TSA estimates 

that start-up phase costs would be 

approximately $690,000 and recurring 

phase costs would be approximately 

$928,354 annual for the first recurring 

year and $214,102 for each subsequent 

year. Therefore the total cost of the 

program for the first 5 years would be 

$2,474,762. 

Cost Adjustments 

Pursuant to the Chief Financial 

Officers Act of 1990, DHS/TSA will 

review this fee at least every two 

years.26 Upon review, if it is found that 

the fee is either too high or too low, a 

new fee will be proposed.

Fee Calculation 

TSA is proposing to charge a fee to 

cover the recurring costs of the program. 

Start-up costs will be provided by TSA. 

Recurring Phase Costs 

TSA estimates that the total annual 

recurring phase costs for the first 5 years 

would be $1,784,762. These total costs 

consist of the sum of the first year costs 

plus the four recurring years at $214,102 

per year. The expected applicants 

divide these costs over the first 5 years. 

Therefore the fee associated will be $39 

($1,784,762/45,161) per applicant, 

rounded to the nearest dollar from 

$39.52. The fees are based on summing 

the annual costs and population over 5 

years. This calculation is done in order 

to account for any variability that may 

arise from the imprecise nature of the 

population and cost estimates. 

Fee Remittance Process 

TSA would employ a third party to 

establish the infrastructure for collecting 

data and fees, cleansing data, and 

forwarding the funds and information to 

TSA. This process would function in a 

similar manner to other TSA 

background check programs and may 

include the services of Pay.gov. The 

third party processing costs are 

accounted for in the ‘‘Third Part 

Clearinghouse Fee’’ category in Figure 

1–Cost Estimates. 

VIII. Regulatory Evaluation Summary 

Proposed changes to Federal 

regulations must undergo several 

economic analyses. First, Executive 

Order 12866 directs each Federal agency 

to propose or adopt a regulation only if 

the agency makes a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531–2533) 

prohibits agencies from setting 

standards that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. In developing U.S. 

standards, this Trade Act requires 

agencies to consider international 

standards and where appropriate, as the 

basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

(Public Law 104–4) requires agencies to 

prepare a written assessment of the 

costs, benefits and other effects of 

proposed or final rules that include a 

Federal mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation). 

In conducting these analyses, TSA has 

determined this proposed rule: 

(1) Has benefits which are likely to 

justify its costs, is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in the 

Executive Order, but is significant due 

to public interest, rather than 

economically; 

(2) Will not have a significant impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities; 

65278 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

(3) Imposes no significant barriers to 

international trade; and 

(4) Does not impose an unfunded 

mandate on State, local, or tribal 

governments, or on the private sector. 

These analyses, available in the 

docket, are summarized below. 

Economic Impacts 

This summary highlights the costs 

and benefits of the proposed rule to 

amend the transportation security 

regulations to further enhance and 

improve the security of air cargo 

transportation. TSA has determined that 

this is not a major rule within the 

definition of Executive Order 12866, as 

annual costs or benefits to all parties do 

not pass the $100 million threshold in 

any year. Likewise there are no 

significant economic impacts for each of 

the required analyses of small business 

impact, international trade, or unfunded 

mandates. A separate detailed 

regulatory evaluation is available in the 

docket and TSA invites comments on all 

aspects of the economic analysis. 

TSA proposes to create a mandatory 

security program for all-cargo aircraft 

operations over 45,500 kg (100,309.3 

lbs) and to amend existing security 

regulations and programs for aircraft 

operators, foreign air carriers, airport 

operators, and IACs. IAC would be 

redefined to include those transporting 

goods via all-cargo aircraft. Mandatory 

security programs for all-cargo 

operations would replace the voluntary 

DSIP and extensively build on the 

requirements of the Twelve-Five 

Standard Security Program. TSA also 

proposes to expand the use of 

background checks and threat 

assessments to new populations, 

including IAC employees and 

individuals who have unescorted access 

to cargo, where such operations are 

either outside of the currently defined 

airport SIDA.

Costs 

The following sections summarize the 

estimated costs of this NPRM by general 

category of who pays. A summary table 

is provided for an overview of the cost 

items, the regulation section creating the 

requirement, and a brief description of 

cost elements. Both in this summary 

and the economic evaluation, 

descriptive language is used to address 

the consequences of the regulation. 

Although the regulatory evaluation 

attempts to mirror the terms and 

wording of the regulation, no attempt is 

made to replicate precisely the 

regulatory language and readers are 

cautioned that the actual regulatory text, 

not the text of the regulatory evaluation, 

is binding. 

Aircraft Operators will incur 

additional costs to comply with 

requirements of this NPRM. Over the 

10-year period of 2004–2013, all-cargo 

aircraft operators are estimated to incur 

costs totaling approximately $600,000 to 

comply with new requirements to 

require background checks for 

individuals who screen cargo for allcargo airplanes and their supervisors, as 

well as for employees with unescorted 

access to the cargo. The NPRM proposes 

to require all-cargo aircraft operators to 

screen all persons entering the aircraft. 

This requirement is estimated to impose 

additional costs of approximately $33.7 

million over the ten-year period of this 

analysis. All-cargo aircraft operators 

also will be required to take additional 

measures to secure the aircraft and 

facilities at an estimated cost of $33.6 

million. Although every all-cargo 

operator will now have to designate a 

security coordinator, many already have 

the requirement. The estimated cost for 

these duties is $200,000. All-cargo 

aircraft operators who conduct 

operations with airplanes having a 

maximum certificated take-off weight 

greater than 45,500kg (100,309.3 lbs) 

would be required to provide additional 

law enforcement capability to comply 

with proposed requirements to extend 

or create new secure areas to encompass 

air cargo operations. TSA estimates this 

ten-year cost to be $27 million. Finally, 

proposals to require random screening 

of cargo on passenger aircraft and on allcargo flights are estimated to impose 

additional ten-year costs of $493 

million, and $167 million, respectively. 

Airport Operators of airports that 

currently have one or more SIDAs will 

be required to extend or create a new 

SIDA to encompass air cargo operations. 

This proposed change would apply only 

to aircraft operations conducted with 

airplanes having a maximum 

certificated take-off weight greater than 

45,500kg (100,309.3 lbs) operating a full 

or all-cargo program. TSA estimates the 

cost of this requirement to be $900,000 

over the ten-year period of this analysis. 

This cost reflects the cost of additional 

employee badges, and the 

administrative costs of updating the 

airports’ security plans. 

Indirect Air Carriers will be impacted 

in several ways if the proposals in this 

NPRM become effective. IACs will be 

required to complete Security Threat 

Assessments for individuals having 

unescorted access to cargo. This 

requirement is estimated to impose 

costs totaling $3.4 million over ten 

years. IACs also will be required to 

implement training and develop a 

testing tool for individuals who perform 

security related duties to meet the 

requirements of their security programs. 

These costs are estimated at $15.1 

million over the ten-year period 2004–

2013. These costs include the cost of 

initial training and annual recurrent 

training for the IAC labor force. This 

NPRM establishes new requirements for 

IACs to obtain approval, to amend, and 

for annual recertification of their 

security programs. The costs estimated 

to comply with these requirements are 

$36 million over the period of this 

analysis. 

Foreign Air Carriers’ costs inside the 

United States are considered domestic 

costs for the purpose of this analysis, 

and therefore were not estimated 

separately from domestic carrier costs; a 

separate discussion for these costs is not 

included. This method of cost 

consideration reflects the way DOT 

reports on foreign aircraft operations in 

the U.S. and the way it reports the cost 

impact of such aircraft operations on the 

U.S. economy. 

TSA will incur costs as a result of the 

proposed rule. To develop the training 

that IACs will be required to implement 

and ensure that IAC employees have 

completed will cost the agency 

approximately $450,000. TSA also will 

incur costs to administer the Known 

Shipper program of approximately $24.5 

million. The cost to TSA for the vetting 

of IACs is estimated at $2.6 million. 

TSA will also be modifying a system 

under development for another rule to 

accommodate the Security Threat 

Assessments in this proposed rule. The 

costs of utilizing this system are 

included in a fee proposal and therefore 

are captured in the unit costs used to 

develop the costs for the aircraft 

operators and IACs. 

In summary, the cost impacts of this 

NPRM are estimated to total 

approximately $837 million, 

undiscounted, over the period 2004–

2013. Aircraft operators will incur costs 

totaling $758 million; airport operators 

$900,000; IACs $51 million; and TSA 

anticipates cost expenditures to 

administer the provisions of the NPRM 

at $28 million over the ten year analysis 

period. Details on how estimates were 

developed, as well as the discounted 

value comparisons, are included in the 

full regulatory evaluation. The following 

table summarizes the estimated costs. 

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65279

<FNP> Benefits 

The primary benefit of the proposed 

rule would be increased protection to 

persons and property in the U.S. from 

acts of terrorism; however, some aspects 

of this proposed rule would provide 


EP10NO04.000</GPH>
65280 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

27Paraphrase from Business-Times article of Dec. 

9, 2003. The same elements were reported in 

numerous news services at approximately the same 

time.

cost savings for the industry as well. 

This NPRM is intended to enhance and 

improve the security of air cargo 

transportation. The proposed rule is 

designed to prevent unauthorized 

persons, explosives, incendiaries, and 

other substances or items from being 

introduced into the air cargo supply 

chain. Persons on the ground, in 

buildings, and elsewhere in our society 

would also be afforded enhanced 

protection against acts of terrorism 

involving the use of an all-cargo aircraft. 

The warning late in 2003 from U.S. 

Intelligence sources was swift and 

simple: terrorists are considering using 

cargo aircraft—freighters that carry 

mostly boxes instead of people. 

Homeland Security officials recently 

declared the existence of intelligence 

that indicated al-Qaeda may be plotting 

an attack using cargo planes. One 

security conscious carrier has petitioned 

the U.S. government to allow checks on 

people with access to cargo planes.27

Strengthening air cargo security and 

expanding security measures to allcargo aircraft operations would provide 

important countermeasures against 

possible terrorist activities aimed at 

ultimately destroying commercial 

passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft 

in flight. Provisions of the NPRM also 

reduce the opportunity for terrorists to 

use aircraft involved in the transport of 

cargo to achieve their goals. 

Although it is difficult to impossible 

to project statistically the likelihood of 

incidents of terrorist acts involving 

aircraft, the following table reports the 

costs of several significant events that 

give examples of the potential impact of 

terrorism to civil aviation:

EXAMPLES OF INCIDENTS

Year Event Type of attack Property loss Loss of life/bodily injury Total cost 

1986 ............... Pan Am 073 .......................... Aircraft hijacking ................... $0.55M .......... $66M death $72.5M injury .... $139.05M 

1987 ............... Korean Airlines 858 .............. Mid-air explosion ................... ....................... $345M ...................................

1988 ............... Pan Am 103 .......................... Mid-air explosion ................... $184M ........... $810M ................................... $994M 

2001 ............... New York World Trade Center.Aircraft used as a weapon .... ....................... ............................................... $16B28

28The General Accounting Office (Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade 

Center, GAO–02–700R, May 29, 2002) reviewed 8 separate studies that estimated the impact of the 9/11 destruction of the World Trade Center. 

Their conclusion was that the best estimate of un-reimbursed cost was $16 billion. 

Following significant security 

incidents, such as those reported in the 

table titled ‘‘Examples of Incidents,’’

security agencies have strengthened 

measures designed to prevent 

recurrences. For this reason, the full 

benefits of avoiding losses such as those 

presented in the table are not claimed in 

this NPRM. However, terrorist events 

continue to be threatened. Moreover, it 

appears that the use of a large 

commercial aircraft as a weapon, 

unprecedented prior to September 11, 

2001, has the potential to raise the cost 

of a terrorist event by an order of 

magnitude. (The table titled ‘‘Example 

of Incidents’’ does not reflect the 

additional costs of investigations, 

government action, and loss of business 

due to decreased passenger levels. 

Consideration of these costs would 

increase the cost of a successful terrorist 

event beyond the numbers presented in 

the table titled ‘‘Example of Incidents.’’

Against this scale, it is clear that 

avoiding just one incident of the 

magnitude that has been characteristic 

of the types of terrorist acts this 

proposed rule is intended to protect 

against more than justifies the costs 

imposed by this NPRM.) 

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The Act covers a wide range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations, 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule will have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the determination is that it 

will, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the Act. However, if an 

agency determines that a proposed or 

final rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the 1980 RFA provides 

that the head of the agency may so 

certify and a regulatory flexibility 

analysis is not required. The 

certification must include a statement 

providing the factual basis for this 

determination, and the reasoning should 

be clear. 

As part of implementing the security 

plan, TSA expects security to be 

integrated into actions the same way 

safety has become integral to how things 

are done rather than adding layers or 

extra program costs. For this reason, in 

years beyond the initial year, costs are 

limited to an annual report, insuring 

their own plan is followed, and vetting 

any new employees. TSA has conducted 

an initial regulatory flexibility analysis. 

There are a substantial number of IACs 

and all-cargo carriers that are impacted, 

but TSA’s initial finding is that the 

impacts are not substantial. 

TSA has made several conservative 

assumptions in this analysis, which may 

have resulted in an overestimate of the 

costs of the proposed rule. For example, 

even though TSA believes most airports 

and all-cargo carriers have many 

elements of this rule already in place as 

good business practice or out of their 

own concerns for security, costing was 

done as if the entire group would be 

implementing these as new 

requirements. Based on information 

gathered through other efforts with the 

airports, TSA believes the airports have 

reached out to the aviation community 

and already successfully completed 

fingerprint-based criminal history 

records checks, and provided access 

badges and the associated access 

training. As a conservative measure, 

TSA has assumed that there are 

additional expenses to provide IDs for a 

limited group of employees at 100 

locations. Also, there is a distinct 

possibility that very few additional law 

enforcement officers would be required, 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65281

29For a technical explanation of how the detailed 

data was segmented see the separate Regulatory 

Evaluation.

but TSA allowed for the full-time 

equivalent coverage for two shifts for 20 

of the carrier locations. This equated to 

an average of 0.6 per carrier and $27 

million over the 10 years. 

IACS 

IACs are a subset of freight 

forwarders. The larger category of 

freight forwarders includes all modes of 

transportation.29 Without better 

information, the characteristics of the 

total industry are assumed to apply to 

the IACs. The threshold for small 

business for this industry is $6 million 

and the distributions are as follows:

FREIGHT FORWARDING

[Number of firms in Duns for SIC 4731 02 by employees (not all records have employee data)] 

Employees Primary SIC +Secondary 

SIC 

# w FTE and 

sales data Category % Cmltv %

1–4 ....................................................................................... 4154 4404 4311 55.2 55.23

5–9 ....................................................................................... 1493 1602 1584 20.3 75.52

10–19 ................................................................................... 826 907 898 11.5 87.02

20–49 ................................................................................... 519 597 591 7.6 94.59

50+ ....................................................................................... 336 427 422 5.4 100.00

Total .......................................................................... 7328 7937 7806 100.0 ........................

[Number of firms in Duns for SIC 4731 02 by sales] 

Sales Primary +Secondary Category % Cmltv %

<$20k ............................................................................................................... 5 5 0.0 0.0

$20–$50k ......................................................................................................... 41 62 0.6 0.6

$50,001–$100k ................................................................................................ 109 167 1.6 2.2

$100,001–$249,999 ......................................................................................... 749 880 8.3 10.5

$250k–$499,999 .............................................................................................. 1763 1877 17.7 28.3

$500k–$999,999 .............................................................................................. 3230 3360 31.8 60.0

$1m–$6m ......................................................................................................... 3264 3503 33.1 93.1

>$6 million ........................................................................................................ 627 725 6.9 100.0

Total ...................................................................................................... 9788 10579 100.0 ........................

Using the data above and the 3,800 

population values in the analysis, all 

but 6.9% (or 3540) would be small 

entities for this analysis. To evaluate the 

impact, the data was segmented and the 

smallest of the small were examined to 

see if there was a significant impact. If 

the smallest group can be shown not to 

have significant impact, and because the 

relationship remains somewhat 

proportional as firm size increases, it is 

a reasonable conclusion that the overall 

impact is also insignificant. Once again, 

specific D&B firm data for the smallest 

10.5% with revenues less than $250,000 

was examined. This group provided 

1110 useable records. 

To estimate the impact, the individual 

cost items from the report above per 

employee are multiplied times the 

number of employees and then the cost 

per firm is added. The results are 

summed over the entire population 

which results in an impact of $72,700 

on $170,278,465 of revenue or at a rate 

of .04% in the first or most expensive 

year. This rate of impact is not 

significant. See the following table for a 

summary of the calculation.

Item Rate Firm costs Per employee 

costs 

Annual Reporting .......................................................... 75/report/firm ................................................................ 75 ........................

Training ......................................................................... 4 hrs/employee @ $25 ................................................. ........................ 100

Security duties .............................................................. 20 Hrs/Firm @ 43 ......................................................... 860 ........................

Decertification ............................................................... 1 5 of Firms @250=2.50/Firm ...................................... 2.5 ........................

STA ............................................................................... 55/Employee ................................................................. ........................ 55

Total ................................................................... ....................................................................................... 937.5 155

All-Cargo Operations 

For All-Cargo Operations, DOT form 

41 data from BTS TRASTATS was 

analyzed. The following distribution 

was found.

FREIGHT

[Aircraft size percentage] 

Firm size >=100 <100 Total 

Large ...................... 77.7 0.8 78.5

Small ....................... 21.1 0.3 21.5

FREIGHT—Continued

[Aircraft size percentage] 

Firm size >=100 <100 Total 

All Firms .............. 98.8 1.2 100.0

65282 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTURES

[Aircraft size percentage] 

Firm size >=100 <100 Total 

Large ...................... 47.2 15.9 63.1

Small ....................... 22.9 14.0 36.9

All Firms .............. 70.0 30.0 100.0

PASSENGER FLIGHT REPORTING

FREIGHT

[Aircraft size percentage] 

Firm size Large Small Grand 

total 

Large ....................... 88.3 8.5 96.7

Small ....................... 1.5 1.8 3.3

89.8 10.2 100.0

Although it reflects revenue data for 

the large carriers (>$6 million) and 

many midsize carriers, too many small 

carriers are missing revenue data to 

make a cost comparison. TSA invites 

public comment on existing cost and 

revenue relationship as firms are 

experiencing under the existing security 

directives. 

X. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 

prohibits Federal agencies from 

establishing any standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 

safety, are not considered unnecessary 

obstacles. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. TSA has 

assessed the potential effect of this 

proposed rule and has determined that 

it imposes the same costs on domestic 

and international entities and thus has 

a neutral trade impact. 

XI. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

Analysis 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among 

other things, to curb the practice of 

imposing unfunded Federal mandates 

on State, local, and tribal governments. 

Title II of the Act requires each Federal 

agency to prepare a written statement 

assessing the effects of any Federal 

mandate in a proposed or final agency 

rule that may result in an expenditure 

of $100 million or more (adjusted 

annually for inflation) in any one year 

by State, local, and tribal governments, 

in the aggregate, or by the private sector, 

such a mandate is deemed to be a 

’’significant regulatory action.’’

This proposed rule does not contain 

such a mandate. The requirements of 

Title II do not apply. 

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act 

of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.), 

a Federal agency must obtain approval 

from the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) for each collection of 

information it conducts, sponsors, or 

requires through regulations. This 

proposal contains information 

collection activities subject to the PRA. 

Accordingly, the following information 

requirements are being submitted to 

OMB for its review. 

Title: Air Cargo Security 

Requirements. 

Summary: TSA proposes to amend 

current transportation security 

regulations to further enhance and 

improve the security of air cargo 

transportation. Specifically, TSA 

proposes to create a mandatory security 

program for all-cargo aircraft operations 

over 45,500 kg (100,309.3 lbs) and to 

amend existing security regulations and 

programs for aircraft operators, foreign 

air carriers, airport operators, and IACs. 

TSA is also proposing to expand 

security threat assessment requirements 

to new populations, including certain 

individuals who have unescorted access 

to air cargo and each officer, director 

and person who holds 25 percent or 

more of total outstanding voting stock of 

an Indirect Air Carrier or entity 

applying to become an IAC. 

Use of: Security programs that are 

developed or amended as a result of this 

proposal will be kept on file and 

updated so that TSA inspectors may 

check for regulatory compliance and 

uniform application of the rules. 

Evidence of appropriate employee 

training in security matters will also 

become a part of this record. Security 

threat assessments conducted as a result 

of this proposal will be used to 

determine employment suitability for 

those who have unescorted access to 

cargo and each officer, director and 

person who holds 25 percent or more of 

total outstanding voting stock of an 

Indirect Air Carrier or entity applying to 

become an IAC. 

Respondents (including number of):

The likely respondents to this proposed 

information requirement are aircraft 

operators, foreign air carriers, IACs, and 

their employees who undergo security 

threat assessments for a total of 

approximately 37,090 respondents the 

first year and approximately 8,800 

respondents each following year, for an 

average of 18,230 respondents for each 

of the next 3 years. The annual 

respondents include both new entrants 

and renewals. The number consists of 

65 all-cargo operators, 3800 IACs, and 

their affected employees. TSA invites 

comments regarding these estimates. 

Frequency: Upon implementation, 

security programs related to this 

proposal, including employee training 

records, will need to be kept on file and 

updated as necessary. Security threat 

assessments will be conducted for all 

existing and subsequent new employees 

who have unescorted access to cargo 

where such employees do not already 

have unescorted SIDA access. 

Annual Burden Estimate: The annual 

burden associated with the security 

program is estimated to be 30,920 hours, 

while the annual burden associated 

with the security threat assessments is 

estimated to average 3,559 hours over 

the next 3 years, for a combined average 

annual total of 34,479 hours. 

The agency is inviting comments to—

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

information requirement is necessary for 

the proper performance of the functions 

of the agency, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology. 

Individuals and organizations may 

submit comments on the information 

collection requirement by January 10, 

2005, and should direct them via fax to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget, Attention: DHS–TSA Desk 

Officer, at (202) 395–5806. Comments to 

OMB are most useful if received within 

30 days of publication. 

As protection provided by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, as amended, 

an agency may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a collection of information unless it 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. The OMB control number for 

this information collection will be 

published in the Federal Register after 

OMB approves it. 

XIII. International Compatibility 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is TSA policy to 

comply with International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65283

and Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. TSA has 

determined that these proposed 

regulations are consistent with ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices. 

XIV. Executive Order 13132, 

Federalism 

TSA has analyzed this proposed rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We 

determined that this action would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and therefore 

would not have federalism implications. 

XV. Environmental Analysis 

TSA has reviewed this action for 

purposes of the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 

4321–4347) and has determined that 

this action will not have a significant 

effect on the human environment. In 

accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, 

appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this 

rulemaking action qualifies for a 

categorical exclusion. The FAA order 

continues to apply to TSA in 

accordance with the Homeland Security 

Act (Pub. L. 107–296), until DHS 

publishes its NEPA implementing 

regulations. 

Energy Impact 

The energy impact of this document 

has been assessed in accordance with 

the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 

(EPCA) Public Law 94–163, as amended 

(42 U.S.C. 6362). We have determined 

that this rulemaking is not a major 

regulatory action under the provisions 

of the EPCA.

List of Subjects 

49 CFR Part 1540

Air carriers, Aircraft, Airports, Civil 

Aviation Security, Law enforcement 

officers, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1542

Air carriers, Aircraft, Airport Security, 

Aviation safety, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1544

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, 

Freight forwarders, Incorporation by 

reference, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1546

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Foreign Air 

Carriers, Incorporation by reference, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures. 

49 CFR Part 1548

Air transportation, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures.

IX. The Proposed Amendment 

For the reasons set forth above, the 

Transportation Security Administration 

proposes to amend Title 49 of the Code 

of Federal Regulations parts 1540, 1542, 

1544, 1546, and 1548 as follows:

PART 1540—CIVIL AVIATION 

SECURITY: GENERAL RULES 

1. The authority citation for part 1540 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44907, 44913–44914, 44916–44918, 

44935–44936, 44942, 46105.

2. Amend § 1540.5 by revising the 

definition of ‘‘indirect air carrier’’ to 

read as follows:

§ 1540.5 Terms used in this subchapter.

* * * * *

Indirect air carrier means any person 

or entity within the United States not in 

possession of an FAA air carrier 

operating certificate, that undertakes to 

engage indirectly in air transportation of 

property, and uses for all or any part of 

such transportation the services of an air 

carrier. This does not include the 

United States Postal Service (USPS) or 

its representative while acting on the 

behalf of the USPS.

* * * * *

3. Add Subpart C—Security Threat 

Assessments to read as follows:

Subpart C—Security Threat 

Assessments

Sec. 

1540.201 Applicability and definitions. 

1540.203 Operator responsibilities. 

1540.205 Notification. 

1540.207 Appeal procedures. 

1540.209 Security threat assessment fee.

§ 1540.201 Applicability and definitions. 

(a) This subpart applies to: 

(1) Each aircraft operator operating 

under a full program described in 49 

CFR 1544.101(a); 

(2) Each foreign air carrier operating 

under a program described in 49 CFR 

1546.101; 

(3) Each indirect air carrier subject to 

49 CFR part 1548; and 

(4) Each individual with unescorted 

access to cargo under one of these 

programs. 

(b) For purposes of this subpart, 

aircraft operator, foreign air carrier, and 

indirect air carrier listed in paragraphs 

(a)(1) through (a)(3) of this section are 

referred to as ‘‘operator,’’ and the 

individuals listed in paragraph (a)(4) of 

this section are referred to as 

‘‘individual.’’

(c) An individual poses a security 

threat under this subpart when TSA 

determines that he or she is a threat: 

(1) To national security; 

(2) To transportation security; or 

(3) Of terrorism. 

(d) For purposes of this subpart 

(1) Date of service means—

(i) The date of personal delivery in the 

case of personal service; 

(ii) The mailing date shown on the 

certificate of service; 

(iii) The date shown on the postmark 

if there is no certificate of service; 

(iv) Another mailing date shown by 

other evidence if there is no certificate 

of service or postmark; or 

(v) The date in an e-mail showing 

when it was sent. 

(2) Day means calendar day.

§ 1540.203 Operator responsibilities. 

(a) Each operator subject to this 

subpart must ensure that an individual 

with unescorted access to cargo must 

complete the Security Threat 

Assessment described in this section. 

(b) Each operator must: 

(1) Authenticate the identity of the 

individual by—

(i) Reviewing two forms of 

identification, one of which must be a 

government-issued photo ID; or 

(ii) Other means approved by TSA. 

(2) Submit to TSA a Security Threat 

Assessment application for each 

individual that is signed by the 

individual and that includes: 

(i) Legal name, including first, 

middle, and last; any applicable suffix; 

and any other names used. 

(ii) Current mailing address, including 

residential address if different than 

current mailing address, and all other 

residential addresses for the previous 

seven years and email, if applicable. 

(iii) Date and place of birth. 

(iv) Social security number, if 

applicable. 

(v) Citizenship status and date of 

naturalization if the individual is a 

naturalized citizen of the United States. 

(vi) Alien registration number, if 

applicable. 

(vii) The following statement reading:

Privacy Act Notice: Authority: The 

authority for collecting this information is 49 

U.S.C. 114, 40113, and 49 U.S.C. 5103a. 

Purpose: This information is needed to verify 

your identity and to conduct a Security 

Threat Assessment to evaluate your 

suitability for completing the functions 

required by this position. Your Social 

Security Number (SSN) or alien registration 

number will be used as your identification 

number in this process and to verify your 

identity. Furnishing this information, 

including your SSN or alien registration 

65284 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

number, is voluntary; however, failure to 

provide it will prevent the completion of 

your Security Threat Assessment, without 

which you may not be granted authorization 

to have unescorted access to cargo. Routine 

Uses: Routine uses of this information 

include disclosure to TSA contractors or 

other agents who are providing services 

relating to the Security Threat Assessments; 

to appropriate governmental agencies for law 

enforcement or security purposes, or in the 

interests of national security; and to foreign 

and international governmental authorities in 

accordance with law and international 

agreement. 

The information I have provided on this 

application is true, complete, and correct to 

the best of my knowledge and belief and is 

provided in good faith. I understand that a 

knowing and willful false statement, or an 

omission of a material fact, on this 

application can be punished by fine or 

imprisonment or both (see section 1001 of 

Title 18 United States Code), and may be 

grounds for denial of authorization or in the 

case of parties regulated under this section, 

removal of authorization to operate under 

this chapter, if applicable.

(3) Retain the individual’s signed 

Security Threat Assessment application 

and any communications with TSA 

regarding the individual’s application, 

for 180 days following the end of the 

individual’s service to the operator. 

(c) Records under this section may 

include electronic documents with 

electronic signature or other means of 

personal authentication, where accepted 

by TSA.

§ 1540.205 Notification. 

(a) TSA review. In completing the 

Security Threat Assessment, TSA 

reviews—

(1) The information required in 

§ 1540.203(b) and transmitted to TSA; 

and 

(2) Domestic and international 

databases relevant to determining 

whether an individual poses a known or 

suspected security threat or that confirm 

an individual’s identity. 

(b) Security Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access. TSA serves a 

Security Authorization on the 

individual and the operator if TSA 

determines that an individual does not 

pose a known or suspected security 

threat. 

(c) Initial Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access. TSA serves 

an Initial Denial of Authorization on the 

individual and the operator if TSA 

determines that the individual poses a 

known or suspected security threat. The 

Initial Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access includes—

(1) A statement that TSA has 

determined that the individual poses a 

security threat; 

(2) The basis for the determination;

(3) Information about how the 

individual may appeal the 

determination; and 

(4) A statement that if the individual 

chooses not to appeal TSA’s 

determination within 30 days of receipt 

of the Initial Denial of Authorization, or 

does not request an extension of time 

within 30 days of the Initial Denial of 

Authorization in order to file an appeal, 

the Initial Denial of Authorization 

becomes a Final Denial of Authorization 

for Unescorted Cargo Access. 

(d) Final Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access. If TSA 

determines that an individual poses a 

known or suspected security threat, 

TSA serves a Final Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access on the operator and the 

individual who appealed the Initial 

Denial of Authorization. 

(e) Withdrawal by TSA. TSA serves a 

Withdrawal of the Initial Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access on the individual and a Security 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access on the operator, if the appeal 

results in a determination that the 

individual does not pose a threat to 

security. 

(f) Final Disposition. Within 30 days 

of receipt of a Security Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access or a Final 

Denial of Authorization for Unescorted 

Cargo Access, the operator must: 

(1) Update the individual’s permanent 

record to reflect the results of the 

Security Threat Assessment; 

(2) Grant or deny the individual’s 

unescorted access to cargo based on the 

results of the threat assessment.

§ 1540.207 Appeal procedures. 

(a) Scope. This section applies to 

individuals who wish to appeal an 

Initial Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access that is based 

on TSA’s Security Threat Assessment. 

(b) Grounds for Appeal. An individual 

may appeal an Initial Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access if the individual is asserting that 

he or she does not pose a known or 

suspected security threat. 

(c) Appeal. An individual initiates an 

appeal by submitting a written reply or 

written request for materials from TSA. 

If the individual fails to initiate an 

appeal within 30 days of receipt, the 

Initial Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access becomes final, 

and TSA serves a Final Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access on the operator and the 

individual. 

(1) Request for materials. Within 30 

days of the date of service of the Initial 

Denial of Authorization for Unescorted 

Cargo Access, the individual may serve 

upon TSA a written request for copies 

of the materials upon which the Initial 

Denial of Authorization was based. 

(2) TSA response. Within 30 days of 

receiving the individual’s request for 

materials, TSA serves copies upon the 

individual of the releasable materials 

upon which the Initial Denial of 

Authorization was based. TSA will not 

include any classified information or 

other protected information described in 

paragraph (f) of this section. 

(3) Correction of records. If the Initial 

Denial of Authorization for Unescorted 

Cargo Access was based on a record that 

the individual believes is erroneous, he 

or she may correct the record, as 

follows: 

(i) The individual may contact the 

jurisdiction or entity responsible for the 

information and attempt to correct or 

complete information contained in his 

or her record. 

(ii) The individual must then provide 

TSA with the revised record, or a 

certified true copy of the information 

from the appropriate entity, before TSA 

may determine that the individual 

meets the standards for the Security 

Threat Assessment. 

(4) Reply. (i) The individual may 

serve upon TSA a written reply to the 

Initial Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access within 30 days 

of service of the Initial Denial of 

Authorization, or 30 days after the date 

of service of TSA’s response to the 

individual’s request for materials under 

paragraph (c)(1) of this section, if the 

individual served such a request. 

(ii) In an individual’s reply, TSA will 

consider only material that is relevant to 

verifying identification or determining 

that the individual does not pose a 

known or suspected security threat. 

(5) Final determination. Within 30 

days after TSA receives the individual’s 

reply, TSA serves a Final Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access or a Withdrawal of the Initial 

Denial of Authorization. 

(d) Final Denial of Authorization for 

Unescorted Cargo Access. (1) If TSA 

determines that the individual poses a 

security threat, TSA serves a Final 

Denial of Authorization for Unescorted 

Cargo Access upon the individual and 

the operator. The Final Denial of 

Authorization includes—

(2) A statement that TSA has 

reviewed the Initial Denial of 

Authorization, the individual’s reply, if 

any, and any other materials or 

information available to him or her and 

has determined that the individual 

poses a known or suspected security 

threat.

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65285

(e) Withdrawal of Initial Denial of 

Authorization. If TSA concludes that 

the individual does not pose a security 

threat, TSA serves a Withdrawal of the 

Initial Denial of Authorization on the 

individual and the operator. 

(f) Nondisclosure of certain 

information. In connection with the 

procedures under this section, TSA does 

not disclose classified information to 

the individual, as defined in Executive 

Order 12968 section 1.1(d), and reserves 

the right not to disclose any other 

information or material not warranting 

disclosure or protected from disclosure 

under law. 

(g) Extension of time. TSA may grant 

an individual an extension of time of 

the limits set forth in this section for 

good cause shown. An individual’s 

request for an extension of time must be 

in writing and be received by TSA at 

least 2 days before the due date to be 

extended. TSA may grant itself an 

extension of time for good cause. 

(h) Judicial review. For purposes of 

judicial review, the Final Denial of 

Authorization for Unescorted Cargo 

Access constitutes a final TSA order in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 46110.

§ 1540.209 Security threat assessment fee. 

(a) Imposition of fees. The fee of 

$39.00 is required for TSA to conduct a 

security threat assessment for a 

candidate who has unescorted access to 

cargo and who is subject to the 

requirements of Part 1540, Subpart C, 

and each officer, director and person 

who holds 25 percent or more of total 

outstanding voting stock of an Indirect 

Air Carrier or entity applying to become 

an IAC. 

(b) Remittance of fees. (1) A candidate 

must remit the fee required under this 

subpart to TSA, in a form and manner 

acceptable to TSA, each time the 

candidate or an aircraft operator, foreign 

air carrier, or indirect air carrier submits 

the information required under 

§ 1540.203 to TSA. 

(2) Fees remitted to TSA under this 

subpart must be payable to the 

‘‘Transportation Security 

Administration’’ in United States 

currency and drawn on a United States 

bank. 

(3) TSA will not issue any fee refunds, 

unless a fee was paid in error.

PART 1542—AIRPORT SECURITY 

4. The authority citation for part 1542 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44905, 44907, 44913–44914, 44916–

44917, 44935–44936, 44942, 46105.

5. Amend § 1542.1 by adding 

paragraph (d) to read as follows:

§ 1542.1 Applicability of this part.

* * * * *

(d) Each airport that serves an aircraft 

operator operating under a security 

program under part 1544 of this chapter, 

or a foreign air carrier operating under 

a security program under part 1546 of 

this chapter. Such airport operators 

must comply with § 1542.5 of this part. 

6. Revise paragraphs 1542.205(a) and 

(b)(2) and add paragraph (c) to read as 

follows:

§ 1542.205 Security of the security 

identification display area (SIDA). 

(a) Each airport operator required to 

have a security program under 

§ 1542.103(a) must establish at least one 

SIDA, which must include the following 

areas: 

(1) Each secured area must be a SIDA. 

(2) Each area that is regularly used to 

sort cargo that may be carried by an 

aircraft operator under a full or all-cargo 

program as provided in § 1544.101(a) or 

(h) or under a foreign air carrier program 

under § 1546.101(a), (b), or (e), and each 

area that is regularly used to load cargo 

on or unload cargo from such aircraft, 

must be a SIDA. 

(3) Other areas of the airport may be 

SIDAs. 

(b) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(2) Subject each individual to a 

criminal history records check as 

described in § 1542.209 before 

authorizing unescorted access to the 

SIDA.

* * * * *

(c) An airport operator that is not 

required to have a complete program 

under § 1542.103(a) is not required to 

establish a SIDA under this section.

PART 1544—AIRCRAFT OPERATOR 

SECURITY: AIR CARRIERS AND 

COMMERCIAL OPERATORS 

7. The authority citation for part 1544 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44905, 44907, 44913–44914, 44916–

44918, 44932, 44935–44936, 44942, 46105.

8. Amend § 1544.101 by revising 

paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(4), and (e)(1) and 

add new paragraphs (h) and (i) to read 

as follows:

§ 1544.101 Adoption and implementation.

* * * * *

(d) * * * 

(1) Is an aircraft with a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight more than 

12,500 pounds.

* * * * *

(4) Is not under a full program, partial 

program, or all-cargo program under 

paragraph (a), (b), or (h) of this section. 

(e) * * * 

(1) The requirements of §§ 1544.215, 

1544.217, 1544.219, 1544.223, 1544.230, 

1544.235, 1544.237, 1544.301(a) and (b), 

1544.303, and 1544.305; and for allcargo operations, §§ 1544.202, 

1544.205(a), (b), and (d).

* * * * *

(h) All-Cargo program—adoption:

Each aircraft operator must carry out the 

requirements of paragraph (i) of this 

section for each operation that is—

(1) In an aircraft with a maximum 

certificated takeoff weight of more than 

45,500 kg (100,309.3 pounds); and 

(2) Carrying cargo and authorized 

persons and no passengers. 

(i) All-Cargo program—contents: For 

each operation described in paragraph 

(h) of this section, the aircraft operator 

must carry out the following, and must 

adopt and carry out a security program 

that meets the applicable requirements 

of § 1544.103(c): 

(1) The requirements of §§ 1544.202, 

1544.205, 1544.207, 1544.209, 1544.211, 

1544.215, 1544.217, 1544.219, 1544.225, 

1544.227, 1544.228, 1544.229, 1544.230, 

1544.231, 1544.233, 1544.235, 1544.237, 

1544.301, 1544.303, and 1544.305. 

(2) Other provisions of subpart C of 

this part that TSA has approved upon 

request.

(3) The remaining requirements of 

subpart C of this part when TSA notifies 

the aircraft operator in writing that a 

security threat exists concerning that 

operation. 

9. Add new § 1544.202 to read as 

follows:

§ 1544.202 Persons and property onboard 

the all-cargo aircraft. 

Each aircraft operator operating under 

an all-cargo program or a twelve-five 

program in an all-cargo operation, must 

apply the security measures in its 

security program for persons who board 

the aircraft, and for their property, to 

prevent or deter the carriage of 

unauthorized weapons, explosives, 

incendiaries, persons, and other 

destructive substances or items. 

10. Amend § 1544.205 by revising 

paragraphs (a), (b), (c) introductory text, 

(c)(2) and (d); and adding new 

paragraphs (e) and (f) to read as follows:

§ 1544.205 Acceptance and screening of 

cargo. 

(a) Preventing or deterring the carriage 

of any explosive or incendiary. Each 

aircraft operator operating under a full 

program, an all-cargo program, or a 

twelve-five program in an all-cargo 

operation, must use the procedures, 

facilities, and equipment described in 

its security program to prevent or deter 

the carriage of unauthorized persons, 

65286 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

explosives, incendiaries, and other 

destructive substances or items in cargo 

onboard an aircraft. 

(b) Screening and inspection of cargo.

Each aircraft operator operating under a 

full program or an all-cargo program, or 

a twelve-five program in an all-cargo 

operation, must ensure that cargo is 

screened and inspected for 

unauthorized persons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other destructive 

substances or items as provided in the 

aircraft operator’s security program and 

§ 1544.207, and as provided in 

§ 1544.239 for operations under a full 

program, before loading it on its aircraft. 

(c) Control. Each aircraft operator 

operating under a full program or an allcargo program must use the procedures 

in its security program to control cargo 

that it accepts for transport on an 

aircraft in a manner that: 

(1) * * * 

(2) Prevents access by persons other 

than an aircraft operator employee or its 

agent, or persons authorized by the 

airport operator or host government. 

(d) Refusal to transport. Each aircraft 

operator operating under a full program, 

an all-cargo program, or a twelve-five 

program when in an all-cargo operation, 

must refuse to transport any cargo if the 

shipper does not consent to a search or 

inspection of that cargo in accordance 

with the system prescribed by this part. 

(e) Acceptance of cargo only from 

specified persons. Each aircraft operator 

operating under a full program or an allcargo program may accept cargo for air 

transportation only from the shipper, or 

from an aircraft operator, foreign air 

carrier, or indirect air carrier operating 

under a security program under this 

chapter with a comparable cargo 

security program, except as provided in 

its security program. 

(f) Screening of cargo outside the 

United States. For cargo to be loaded on 

its aircraft outside the United States, 

each aircraft operator must carry out the 

requirements of its security program. 

11. Amend § 1544.225 by adding new 

paragraph (d):

§ 1544.225 Security of aircraft and 

facilities.

* * * * *

(d) When operating under a full 

program or an all-cargo program, 

prevent unauthorized access to the 

operational area of the aircraft while 

loading or unloading cargo. 

12. Add new § 1544.228 to read as 

follows:

§ 1544.228 Security threat assessments 

for cargo personnel. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator operating under a full program 

or an all-cargo program, and to each 

individual who has unescorted access to 

cargo accepted by such an aircraft 

operator. 

(a) Before gaining unescorted access 

to cargo, each individual must 

successfully complete one of the 

following: 

(1) A criminal history records check 

under §§ 1542.209, 1544.229, or 

1544.230 of this chapter, if the 

individual is otherwise required to 

undergo such a check under those 

sections; or 

(2) A Security Threat Assessment 

under part 1540 subpart C of this 

chapter; or 

(3) Another Security Threat 

Assessment approved by TSA. 

(b) Each aircraft operator must ensure 

that each individual who has access to 

its cargo has either successfully 

completed one of the checks in 

paragraph (a) of this section or is 

escorted by such an individual. 

13. Amend § 1544.229 by adding 

introductory text, revising paragraphs 

(a)(1)(iii) introductory text and 

(a)(1)(iii)(B) and adding new paragraph 

(a)(1)(iii)(C) to read as follows:

§ 1544.229 Fingerprint-based criminal 

history records checks (CHRC): Unescorted 

access authority, authority to perform 

screening functions, and authority to 

perform checked baggage or cargo 

functions. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator operating under a full program, 

a private charter program, or an allcargo program. 

(a) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(iii) Each individual granted authority 

to perform the following screening 

functions at locations within the United 

States (referred to as ‘‘authority to 

perform screening functions’’): 

(A) * * * 

(B) Serving as an immediate 

supervisor (checkpoint security 

supervisor (CSS)), and the next 

supervisory level (shift or site 

supervisor), to those individuals 

described in paragraph (a)(1)(iii)(A) or 

(a)(1)(iii)(C) of this section. 

(C) Screening cargo that will be 

carried on an aircraft of an aircraft 

operator required to screen cargo under 

this part.

* * * * *

14. Add new § 1544.239 as follows:

§ 1544.239 Known shipper program. 

This section applies to each aircraft 

operator operating under a full program 

under § 1544.101(a). 

(a) For cargo to be loaded on its 

aircraft in the United States, each 

aircraft operator must have and carry 

out a known shipper program in 

accordance with its security program. 

The program must: 

(1) Determine the shipper’s validity 

and integrity as provided in its security 

program;

(2) Provide that the aircraft operator 

will separate known shipper shipments 

from unknown shipper shipments; and 

(3) Provide for the aircraft operator to 

ensure that cargo is screened or 

inspected as set forth in its security 

program. 

(b) When required by TSA, each 

aircraft operator must submit in a form 

and manner acceptable to TSA: 

(1) Information identified in its 

security program regarding an applicant 

to the known shipper program; and 

(2) Upon learning of a change to the 

information specified in paragraph 

(b)(1) of this section, corrections and 

updates of this information.

PART 1546—FOREIGN AIR CARRIER 

SECURITY 

15. The authority citation for part 

1546 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44905, 44907, 44914, 44916–44917, 

44935–44936, 44942, 46105.

16. Amend § 1546.101 by revising the 

introductory text and paragraph (a) and 

by adding paragraphs (e) and (f):

§ 1546.101 Adoption and implementation. 

Each foreign air carrier landing or 

taking off in the United States must 

adopt and carry out a security program, 

for each scheduled and public charter 

passenger operation or all-cargo 

operation, that meets the requirements 

of—

(a) Section 1546.103(b) and subparts 

C, D, and E of this part for each 

operation with an airplane having a 

passenger seating configuration of 61 or 

more seats;

* * * * *

(e) Sections 1546.103(b)(2) and (b)(4), 

1546.202, 1546.205(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 

and (f), 1546.213, and 1546.215 for each 

all-cargo operation with an airplane 

having a maximum certificated take-off 

weight more than 45,500 kg (100,309.3 

pounds); and 

(f) Sections 1546.103(b)(2) and (b)(4), 

1546.202, 1546.205(a), (b) and (c), 

1546.213, and 1546.215 for each allcargo operation with an airplane having 

a maximum certificated take-off weight 

more than 12,500 pounds but no more 

than 45,500 kg. 

17. Amend § 1546.103 by revising 

paragraph (a)(1) and paragraph (b) 

introductory text to read as follows:

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65287

§ 1546.103 Form, content, and availability 

of security program. 

(a) * * * 

(1) Acceptable to TSA. A foreign air 

carrier’s security program is acceptable 

only if TSA finds that the security 

program provides a level of protection 

similar to the level of protection 

provided by U.S. aircraft operators 

serving the same airports. Foreign air 

carriers must employ procedures 

equivalent to those required of U.S. 

aircraft operators serving the same 

airport if TSA determines that such 

procedures are necessary to provide a 

similar level of protection.

* * * * *

(b) Content of security program. Each 

security program required by 

§ 1546.101(a), (b), (c), (e) or (f) as 

applicable, must be designed to:

* * * * *

18. Add § 1546.202 to read as follows:

§ 1546.202 Persons and property on board 

the airplane. 

Each foreign air carrier operating 

under § 1546.101(e) or (f) must apply 

the security measures in its security 

program for persons who board the 

airplane, and for their property, to 

prevent or deter the carriage of 

unauthorized weapons, explosives, 

incendiaries, persons, and other 

destructive substances or items. 

19. Amend § 1546.205 by revising 

paragraphs (a) and (b) and adding new 

paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) to read as 

follows:

§ 1546.205 Acceptance and screening of 

cargo. 

(a) Preventing or deterring the carriage 

of any explosive or incendiary. Each 

foreign air carrier operating a program 

under § 1546.101(a), (b), (e) or (f) must 

use the procedures, facilities and 

equipment described in its security 

program to prevent or deter the carriage 

of unauthorized persons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other destructive 

substances or items in cargo onboard an 

airplane. 

(b) Refusal to transport. Each foreign 

air carrier operating a program under 

§ 1546.101(a), (b), (e), or (f) must refuse 

to transport any cargo if the shipper 

does not consent to a search or 

inspection of that cargo in accordance 

with the system prescribed by this part. 

(c) Control. Each foreign air carrier 

operating a program § 1546.101(a), (b), 

or (e) must use the procedure in its 

security program to control cargo that it 

accepts for transport on an airplane in 

a manner that: 

(1) Prevents the carriage of any 

unauthorized persons, explosives, 

incendiaries, and other destructive 

substances or items aboard the airplane. 

(2) Prevents access by unauthorized 

persons other than a foreign air carrier 

employee or its agent, or persons 

authorized by the airport operator or 

host government. 

(d) Screening and inspection of cargo 

in the United States. Each foreign air 

carrier operating a program under 

§ 1546.101(a), (b), (e), or (f) must ensure 

that, as required in its security program, 

cargo is screened and inspected for 

explosives, incendiaries, unauthorized 

persons, and other destructive 

substances or items as provided in the 

foreign air carrier’s security program, in 

accordance with § 1546.207, and 

§ 1546.213 if applicable, before loading 

it on its airplane in the United States. 

(e) Acceptance of cargo in the United 

States. Each foreign air carrier operating 

a program under § 1546.101(a), (b), or (e) 

may accept cargo in the United States 

only from the shipper, or from an 

aircraft operator, foreign air carrier, or 

indirect air carrier operating under a 

security program under this chapter 

with a comparable cargo security 

program, as provided in its security 

program. 

(f) Acceptance of cargo to be loaded 

outside the United States. Each foreign 

air carrier subject to this section that 

accepts cargo to be loaded on its 

airplane outside the United States must 

carry out the requirements of its security 

program. 

20. Add a new § 1546.213 to read as 

follows:

§ 1546.213 Security threat assessments 

for cargo personnel in the United States. 

This section applies to each foreign 

air carrier operating under 

§ 1546.101(a), (b), or (e), and to each 

individual who has unescorted access in 

the United States. 

(a) Before gaining unescorted access 

to cargo, each individual must 

successfully complete one of the 

following: 

(1) A criminal history records check 

under §§ 1542.209, 1544.229, or 

1544.230 of this chapter, if the 

individual is otherwise required to 

undergo such a check under those 

sections; or

(2) A Security Threat Assessment 

under part 1540 subpart C of this 

chapter; or 

(3) Another Security Threat 

Assessment approved by TSA. 

(b) Each foreign air carrier must 

ensure that each individual who has 

access to its cargo has either 

successfully completed one of the 

checks in paragraph (a) of this section 

or is escorted by such an individual. 

21. Add new § 1546.215 as follows:

§ 1546.215 Known shipper program. 

This section applies to each foreign 

air carrier operating a program under 

§ 1546.101(a) or (b). 

(a) For cargo to be loaded on its 

aircraft in the United States, each 

foreign air carrier must have and carry 

out a known shipper program in 

accordance with its security program. 

The program must: 

(1) Determine the shipper’s validity 

and integrity as provided in its security 

program; 

(2) Provide that the foreign air carrier 

will separate known shipper shipments 

from unknown shipper shipments; and 

(3) Provide for the foreign air carrier 

to ensure that cargo is screened or 

inspected as set forth in its security 

program. 

(b) When required by TSA, each 

foreign air carrier must submit in a form 

and manner acceptable to TSA: 

(1) Information identified in its 

security program regarding an applicant 

to the known shipper program; and 

(2) Upon learning of a change to the 

information specified in (b)(1) of this 

section, corrections and updates to the 

information.

PART 1548—INDIRECT AIR CARRIER 

SECURITY 

22. The authority citation for part 

1548 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 114, 5103, 40113, 

44901–44905, 44913–44914, 44916–44917, 

44932, 44935–44936, 46105.

23. Amend § 1548.5 by revising 

paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) to read as 

follows:

§ 1548.5 Adoption and implementation of 

the security program. 

(a) Security program required. No 

indirect air carrier may offer cargo to or 

perform cargo services for an aircraft 

operator operating under a full program 

or an all-cargo program specified in part 

1544 of this subchapter, or to a foreign 

air carrier operating under a program 

under § 1546.101(a), (b), or (e) of this 

subchapter, unless that indirect air 

carrier has and carries out an approved 

security program under this part. 

(b) General requirements. (1) The 

security program must provide for the 

security of persons and property 

traveling in air transportation against 

acts of criminal violence and air piracy 

and the introduction of any 

unauthorized person, explosive, 

incendiary or other destructive 

substances or items as provided in the 

indirect air carrier’s security program. 

This requirement applies: 

65288 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

(i) From the time the indirect air 

carrier accepts the cargo to the time it 

transfers the cargo to an entity that is 

not an employee, agent, contractor or 

subcontractor of the indirect air carrier; 

(ii) While the cargo is stored, en route, 

or otherwise being handled by an 

employee, agent, contractor or 

subcontractor of the indirect air carrier; 

and 

(iii) Regardless of whether the indirect 

air carrier has or ever had physical 

possession of the cargo. 

(2) The indirect air carrier must assure 

that its employees, agents, contractors, 

and subcontractors comply with the 

requirements of the indirect air carrier’s 

security program. 

(c) Content. Each security program 

under this part must —

(1) Be designed to prevent or deter the 

introduction of any unauthorized 

person, explosive, incendiary or other 

destructive substances or items onto an 

aircraft; 

(2) Include the procedures and 

description of the facilities and 

equipment used to comply with the 

requirements of §§ 1548.9 and 1548.17 

regarding the acceptance and offering of 

cargo. 

(3) Include the procedures and 

curriculum used to accomplish the 

training required under § 1548.11 of 

persons who accept, handle, transport, 

or deliver cargo for or on behalf of the 

indirect air carrier.

* * * * *

24. Revise § 1548.7 to read as follows:

§ 1548.7 Approval, amendment, annual 

renewal, and withdrawal of approval of the 

security program. 

(a) Original Application. (1) The 

applicant must apply for a security 

program in a form and a manner 

prescribed by TSA not less than 90 

calendar days before the applicant 

intends to begin operations. The 

application must be in writing and 

include: 

(i) Business name; other names, 

including doing business as; state of 

incorporation, if applicable; and tax 

identification number. 

(ii) The names, addresses, and dates 

of birth of each officer, director, and 

each person who holds 25 percent or 

more of total outstanding voting stock of 

the entity. 

(iii) A signed statement from each 

person listed in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of 

this section stating whether he or she 

has been an officer, director, or owner 

of an IAC that had its security program 

withdrawn by TSA. 

(iv) Copies of government-issued 

identification of persons listed in 

(a)(1)(ii) of this section. 

(v) Addresses of all business 

locations. 

(vi) Whether the business is a ‘‘small 

business’’ pursuant to section 3 of the 

Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632). 

(vii) Statement acknowledging and 

ensuring that each employee of the 

indirect air carrier who is subject to 

training under § 1548.11 will have 

successfully completed the training 

outlined in its security program before 

performing security-related duties. 

(viii) Other information requested by 

TSA concerning Security Threat 

Assessments. 

(ix) Statement acknowledging and 

ensuring that each individual will 

successfully complete a Security Threat 

Assessment under § 1548.15 before the 

individual has unescorted access to 

cargo. 

(2) Approval. TSA will approve the 

security program by providing the 

indirect air carrier with the Indirect Air 

Carrier Standard Security Program and 

any Security Directives upon 

determining that: 

(i) The indirect air carrier has met the 

requirements of this part, its security 

program, and any Security Directives. 

(ii) The approval of its security 

program is not contrary to the interests 

of security and the public interest.

(iii) The indirect air carrier has not 

held a security program that was 

withdrawn within the previous year, 

unless otherwise authorized by TSA. 

(3) Commencement of operations. The 

indirect air carrier may operate under a 

security program when it meets all 

requirements, including but not limited 

to successful completion of training and 

Security Threat Assessments by relevant 

personnel. 

(4) Duration of security program. The 

security program will remain effective 

until the end of the calendar month one 

year after the month it was approved. 

(5) Requirement to report changes in 

information. Each indirect air carrier 

with an approved security program 

under this part must notify TSA, in a 

form and manner approved by TSA, of 

any changes to the information 

submitted during initial application. 

This notification must be submitted to 

the designated official for reapproval 

within 30 days from the date the change 

occurred. Changes included in the 

requirement of this paragraph include 

but are not limited to changes in the 

indirect air carrier’s contact 

information, owners, business addresses 

and locations, and form of business 

entity. 

(b) Renewal Application. (1) Unless 

otherwise authorized by TSA, each 

indirect air carrier that has a security 

program under this part must timely 

submit to TSA, at least 30 calendar days 

prior to the first day of the anniversary 

month of initial approval of its security 

program, an application for renewal of 

its security program in a form and a 

manner approved by TSA. Upon timely 

submittal of an application for renewal 

and unless and until TSA denies the 

application, the indirect air carrier’s 

approved security program remains in 

effect. 

(2) The application for renewal must 

be in writing and include a signed 

statement that the indirect air carrier 

has reviewed and ensures the 

continuing accuracy of the contents of 

its initial application for a security 

program, subsequent renewal 

applications, or other submissions to 

TSA confirming a change of information 

and noting the date such applications 

and submissions were sent to TSA, 

including the following certification:

[Name of indirect air carrier] (hereinafter 

‘‘the IAC’’) has adopted and is currently 

carrying out a security program in 

accordance with the Transportation Security 

Regulations as originally approved on [insert 

date of initial approval]. In accordance with 

TSA regulations, the IAC has notified TSA of 

any new or changed information required for 

the IAC’s initial security program. If new or 

changed information is being submitted to 

TSA as part of this application for 

reapproval, that information is stated in this 

filing. 

The IAC understands that intentional 

falsification of certification to an air carrier 

or to TSA may be subject to both civil and 

criminal penalties under 49 CFR 1540 and 

1548 and 18 U.S.C. 1001. Failure to notify 

TSA of any new or changed information 

required for initial approval of the IAC’s 

security program in a timely fashion and in 

a form acceptable to TSA may result in 

withdrawal by TSA of approval of the IAC’s 

security program.

(3) TSA will renew approval of the 

security program if TSA determines 

that: 

(i) The indirect air carrier has met the 

requirements of this part, its security 

program, and any Security Directives; 

and 

(ii) The renewal of its security 

program is not contrary to the interests 

of security and the public interest. 

(4) If TSA determines that the indirect 

air carrier meets the requirements of 

paragraph (b)(3) of this section, it will 

renew the indirect air carrier’s security 

program. The security program will 

remain effective until the end of the 

calendar month one year after the 

month it was renewed. 

(c) Amendment requested by an 

indirect air carrier or applicant. An 

indirect air carrier or applicant may 

submit a request to TSA to amend its 

security program as follows: 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65289

(1) The request for an amendment 

must be filed with the designated 

official at least 45 calendar days before 

the date it proposes for the amendment 

to become effective, unless a shorter 

period is allowed by the designated 

official. 

(2) Within 30 calendar days after 

receiving a proposed amendment, the 

designated official, in writing, either 

approves or denies the request to 

amend. 

(3) An amendment to an indirect air 

carrier security program may be 

approved if the designated official 

determines that safety and the public 

interest will allow it, and if the 

proposed amendment provides the level 

of security required under this part. 

(4) Within 30 calendar days after 

receiving a denial of the proposed 

amendment, the indirect air carrier may 

petition the Administrator to reconsider 

the denial. A petition for 

reconsideration must be filed with the 

designated official. 

(5) Upon receipt of a petition for 

reconsideration, the designated official 

either approves the request to amend or 

transmits the petition, together with any 

pertinent information, to the 

Administrator for reconsideration. The 

Administrator will dispose of the 

petition within 30 calendar days of 

receipt by either directing the 

designated official to approve the 

amendment or by affirming the denial. 

(6) Any indirect air carrier may 

submit a group proposal for an 

amendment that is on behalf of it and 

other indirect air carriers that co-sign 

the proposal. 

(d) Amendment by TSA. TSA may 

amend a security program in the interest 

of safety and the public interest, as 

follows: 

(1) TSA notifies the indirect air 

carrier, in writing, of the proposed 

amendment, fixing a period of not less 

than 30 calendar days within which the 

indirect air carrier may submit written 

information, views, and arguments on 

the amendment. 

(2) After considering all relevant 

material, the designated official notifies 

the indirect air carrier of any 

amendment adopted or rescinds the 

notice of amendment. If the amendment 

is adopted, it becomes effective not less 

than 30 calendar days after the indirect 

air carrier receives the notice of 

amendment, unless the indirect air 

carrier petitions the Administrator to 

reconsider no later than 15 calendar 

days before the effective date of the 

amendment. The indirect air carrier 

must send the petition for 

reconsideration to the designated 

official. A timely petition for 

reconsideration stays the effective date 

of the amendment. 

(3) Upon receipt of a petition for 

reconsideration, the designated official 

either amends or withdraws the notice 

of amendment or transmits the petition, 

together with any pertinent information, 

to the Administrator for reconsideration. 

The Administrator disposes of the 

petition within 30 calendar days of 

receipt by either directing the 

designated official to withdraw or 

amend the notice of amendment, or by 

affirming the notice of amendment. 

(e) Emergency Amendments. (1) If 

TSA finds that there is an emergency 

requiring immediate action with respect 

to aviation security that makes 

procedures in this section contrary to 

the public interest, the designated 

official may issue an emergency 

amendment, without the prior notice 

and comment procedures described in 

paragraph (d) of this section. 

(2) The emergency amendment is 

effective without stay on the date the 

indirect air carrier receives notification. 

TSA will incorporate in the notification 

a brief statement of the reasons and 

findings for the emergency amendment 

to be adopted. 

(3) The indirect air carrier may file a 

petition for reconsideration with the 

Administrator no later than 15 calendar 

days before the effective date of the 

emergency amendment. The indirect air 

carrier must send the petition for 

reconsideration to the designated 

official; however, the filing does not 

stay the effective date of the emergency 

amendment.

(f) Withdrawal of approval of a 

security program. TSA may withdraw 

the approval of the indirect air carrier’s 

security program, if TSA determines 

continued operation is contrary to 

security and the public interest, as 

follows: 

(1) Notice of proposed withdrawal of 

approval. The designated official will 

serve a notice of proposed withdrawal 

of approval that notifies the indirect air 

carrier, in writing, of the facts, charges, 

and applicable law, regulation, or order 

that forms the basis for the 

determination. 

(2) IAC reply. The indirect air carrier 

may respond to the notice of proposed 

withdrawal of approval no later than 15 

calendar days after receipt of the 

withdrawal by providing the designated 

official in writing with any material 

facts, arguments, applicable law, and 

regulation. 

(3) TSA review. The designated 

official will consider all information 

available, including any relevant 

material or information submitted by 

the indirect air carrier, before either 

issuing a withdrawal of approval of the 

indirect air carrier’s security program or 

rescinding the notice of proposed 

withdrawal of approval. If a withdrawal 

of approval is issued, it becomes 

effective upon receipt by the indirect air 

carrier or 15 calendar days after service, 

whichever occurs first. 

(4) Petition for reconsideration. The 

indirect air carrier may petition the 

Administrator to reconsider the 

withdrawal of approval by serving a 

petition for consideration no later than 

15 calendar days after the indirect air 

carrier receives the withdrawal of 

approval. The indirect air carrier must 

serve the petition for reconsideration to 

the designated official. Submission of a 

petition for reconsideration will not 

automatically stay the withdrawal of 

approval. The indirect air carrier may 

request the designated official to stay 

the withdrawal of approval pending 

consideration of the petition. 

(5) Administrator’s review. The 

designated official transmits the petition 

together with all pertinent information 

to the Administrator for reconsideration. 

The Administrator will dispose of the 

petition within 15 calendar days of 

receipt by either directing the 

designated official to rescind the 

withdrawal of approval or by affirming 

the withdrawal of approval. The 

decision of the Administrator is a final 

order under 49 U.S.C. 46110. 

(6) Emergency withdrawal. If TSA 

finds that there is an emergency 

requiring immediate action with respect 

to aviation security that makes 

procedures in this section contrary to 

the public interest, the designated 

official may issue an emergency 

withdrawal of the indirect air carrier’s 

security program, without first issuing a 

notice of proposed withdrawal effective 

without stay on the date that the 

indirect air carrier receives notice of the 

emergency withdrawal. In such a case, 

the designated official will send the 

indirect air carrier a brief statement of 

the facts, charges, and applicable law, 

regulation, or order that forms the basis 

for the emergency withdrawal. The 

indirect air carrier may submit a 

petition for reconsideration under the 

procedures in paragraphs (f)(2) through 

(f)(5) of this section; however, this 

petition will not stay the effective date 

of the emergency withdrawal. 

(g) Service of documents for 

withdrawal of approval of security 

program proceedings. Service may be 

accomplished by personal delivery, 

certified mail, or express courier. 

Documents served on an indirect air 

carrier will be served at the indirect air 

carrier’s official place of business as 

designated in its application for 

65290 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

approval or its security program. 

Documents served on TSA must be 

served to the address noted in the notice 

of withdrawal of approval or 

withdrawal of approval, whichever is 

applicable. 

(1) Certificate of service. An 

individual may attach a certificate of 

service to a document tendered for 

filing. A certificate of service must 

consist of a statement, dated and signed 

by the person filing the document, that 

the document was personally delivered, 

served by certified mail on a specific 

date, or served by express courier on a 

specific date. 

(2) Date of service. The date of service 

will be the date of personal delivery; if 

served by certified mail, the mailing 

date shown on the certificate of service, 

the date shown on the postmark if there 

is no certificate of service, or other 

mailing date shown by other evidence if 

there is no certificate of service or 

postmark; or if served by express 

courier, the service date shown on the 

certificate of service, or by other 

evidence if there is no certificate of 

service. 

(h) Extension of time. TSA may grant 

an extension of time of the limits set 

forth in this section for good cause 

shown. An indirect air carrier’s request 

for an extension of time must be in 

writing and be received by TSA at least 

2 days before the due date to be 

extended. TSA may grant itself an 

extension of time for good cause. 

25. Revise § 1548.9 to read as follows:

§ 1548.9 Acceptance of cargo. 

(a) Preventing or deterring the carriage 

of any explosive or incendiary. Each 

indirect air carrier must use the 

facilities, equipment, and procedures 

described in its security program to 

prevent or deter the carriage on board an 

aircraft of any unauthorized person, 

explosive, incendiary, and other 

destructive substances or items as 

provided in the indirect air carrier’s 

security program. 

(b) Refusal to transport. Each indirect 

air carrier must refuse to offer for 

transport on an aircraft any cargo if the 

shipper does not consent to a search or 

inspection of that cargo in accordance 

with this part, or part 1544 or 1546 of 

this chapter. 

26. Add new § 1548.11 to read as 

follows:

§ 1548.11 Training and knowledge for 

individuals with security-related duties. 

(a) No indirect air carrier may use any 

individual to perform any securityrelated duties to meet the requirements 

of its security program unless that 

individual has received training as 

specified in its security program 

including their individual 

responsibilities in § 1540.105 of this 

chapter. 

(b) Each indirect air carrier must 

ensure that individuals who accept, 

handle, transport, or deliver cargo for or 

on behalf of the indirect air carrier have 

knowledge of the applicable provisions 

of this part, applicable Security 

Directives and Information Circulars, 

the approved airport security program 

applicable to their location, and the 

aircraft operator’s or indirect air 

carrier’s security program to the extent 

that such individuals need to know in 

order to perform their duties. 

(c) Each indirect air carrier must 

ensure that each individual under 

paragraph (b) of this section for the 

indirect air carrier successfully 

completes recurrent training at least 

annually on their individual 

responsibilities in § 1540.105 of this 

chapter, the applicable provisions of 

this part, applicable Security Directives 

and Information Circulars, the approved 

airport security program applicable to 

their location, and the aircraft operator’s 

or indirect air carrier’s security program 

to the extent that such individuals need 

to know in order to perform their duties. 

27. Add new § 1548.13 to read as 

follows:

§ 1548.13 Security coordinators. 

(a) Indirect Air Carrier Security 

Coordinator. Each indirect air carrier 

must designate and use an Indirect Air 

Carrier Security Coordinator (IACSC). 

The IACSC and alternates must be 

appointed at the corporate level and 

must serve as the indirect air carrier’s 

primary contact for security-related 

activities and communications with 

TSA, as set forth in the security 

program. Either the IACSC or an 

alternate IACSC must be available on a 

24-hour basis. 

(b) [Reserved]. 

28. Add new § 1548.15 to read as 

follows:

§ 1548.15 Security threat assessments for 

individuals having unescorted access to 

cargo. 

This section applies to each indirect 

air carrier, and to each individual who 

has unescorted access to cargo accepted 

by such an indirect air carrier. 

(a) Before gaining unescorted access 

to cargo, each individual must 

successfully complete either—

(1) A criminal history records check 

under §§ 1542.209, 1544.229, or 

1544.230 of this chapter, if the 

individual is otherwise required to 

undergo such a check under those 

sections; or 

(2) A Security Threat Assessment 

under part 1540 of this chapter; or 

(3) Another Security Threat 

Assessment approved by TSA. 

(b) Each indirect air carrier must 

ensure that each individual who has 

access to its cargo has either 

successfully completed one of the 

checks in paragraph (a) of this section 

or is escorted by such an individual. 

29. Add new § 1548.17 to read as 

follows:

§ 1548.17 Known shipper program. 

This section applies for cargo that an 

indirect air carrier offers to an aircraft 

operator operating under a full program 

under § 1544.101(a), or to a foreign air 

carrier operating under § 1546.101(a) or 

(b). 

(a) For cargo to be loaded on aircraft 

in the United States, each indirect air 

carrier must have and carry out a known 

shipper program in accordance with its 

security program. The program must: 

(1) Determine the shipper’s validity 

and integrity as provided in its security 

program; 

(2) Provide that the indirect air carrier 

will separate known shipper shipments 

from unknown shipper shipments. 

(b) When required by TSA, each 

indirect air carrier must submit to TSA, 

in a form and manner acceptable to 

TSA: 

(1) Information identified in its 

security program regarding an applicant 

to the known shipper program; and 

(2) Upon learning of a change to the 

information specified in subparagraph 

(b)(1) of this paragraph, corrections and 

updates of this information. 

30. Add new § 1548.19 to read as 

follows:

§ 1548.19 Security directives and 

information circulars. 

(a) TSA may issue an Information 

Circular to notify indirect air carriers of 

security concerns. When TSA 

determines that additional security 

measures are necessary to respond to a 

threat assessment or to a specific threat 

against civil aviation, TSA issues a 

Security Directive setting forth 

mandatory measures. 

(b) Each indirect air carrier required 

to have an approved indirect air carrier 

security program must comply with 

each Security Directive issued to the 

indirect air carrier by TSA, within the 

time prescribed in the Security Directive 

for compliance. 

(c) Each indirect air carrier that 

receives a Security Directive must—

(1) Within the time prescribed in the 

Security Directive, acknowledge in 

writing receipt of the Security Directive 

to TSA. 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 217 / Wednesday, November 10, 2004 / Proposed Rules 65291

(2) Within the time prescribed in the 

Security Directive, specify the method 

by which the measures in the Security 

Directive have been implemented (or 

will be implemented, if the Security 

Directive is not yet effective). 

(d) In the event that the indirect air 

carrier is unable to implement the 

measures in the Security Directive, the 

indirect air carrier must submit 

proposed alternative measures and the 

basis for submitting the alternative 

measures to TSA for approval. The 

indirect air carrier must submit the 

proposed alternative measures within 

the time prescribed in the Security 

Directive. The indirect air carrier must 

implement any alternative measures 

approved by TSA. 

(e) Each indirect air carrier that 

receives a Security Directive may 

comment on the Security Directive by 

submitting data, views, or arguments in 

writing to TSA. TSA may amend the 

Security Directive based on comments 

received. Submission of a comment 

does not delay the effective date of the 

Security Directive. 

(f) Each indirect air carrier that 

receives a Security Directive or 

Information Circular and each person 

who receives information from a 

Security Directive or Information 

Circular must: 

(1) Restrict the availability of the 

Security Directive or Information 

Circular, and information contained in 

either document, to those persons with 

a need-to-know. 

(2) Refuse to release the Security 

Directive or Information Circular, and 

information contained in either 

document, to persons other than those 

with a need-to-know without the prior 

written consent of TSA.

Issued in Arlington, VA, on November 3, 

2004. 

David M. Stone, 

Assistant Secretary.

[FR Doc. 04–24883 Filed 11–9–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P