# Official Journal C 304/14 S

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 304 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6314 September 2020 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 304

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6314 September 2020

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Court of Justice |
| 2020/C 304/01 | Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice

2020/C 304/01

Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European Union

1

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | COURT PROCEEDINGS |
| | Court of Justice |
| 2020/C 304/02 | Case C-630/19: Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 26 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) — Portugal) — PAGE International Lda v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax (VAT) — Deduction of input tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Articles 168 and 176 — Exclusion from the right to deduct — Acquisition of food services — Standstill clause — Accession to the European Union) | 2 |
| 2020/C 304/03 | Joined Cases C-632/19 and C-633/19: Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2020 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen — Belgium) — Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën, Openbaar Ministerie v Metalen Galler NV (C–632/19 and C–633/19), LW–Idee GmbH (C–632/19 and C–633/19), KGH Belgium NV (C–632/19), Vollers Belgium NV (C–633/19) (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Articles 53(2) and 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Dumping — Importation of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China — Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 — Validity and interpretation — Lack of sufficient details concerning the factual background of the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Manifest inadmissibility) | 3 |
| 2020/C 304/04 | Case C-839/19 P: Appeal brought on 16 November 2019 by Karolina Romańska against the order of the General Court delivered on 6 September 2019 in Case T-212/18, Romańska v Frontex | 3 |
| 2020/C 304/05 | Case C-101/20 P: Appeal brought on 19 February 2020 by Currency One S.A. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 19 December 2019 in Case T-501/18, Currency One v EUIPO — Cinkciarz.pl | 3 |
| 2020/C 304/06 | Case C-198/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 11 May 2020 — MN, DN, JN, ZN v X Bank S.A. | 4 |
| 2020/C 304/07 | Case C-202/20 P: Appeal brought on 12 May 2020 by Claudio Necci against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 March 2020 in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission | 5 |
| 2020/C 304/08 | Case C-212/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2020 — M.P., B.P. v A. operating through A. S.A. | 6 |
| 2020/C 304/09 | Case C-213/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2020 — G.W., E.S. v A. Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Życie S.A. | 7 |
| 2020/C 304/10 | Case C-219/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 26 May 2020 — LM | 8 |
| 2020/C 304/11 | Case C-231/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 3 June 2020 — MT v Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark | 8 |
| 2020/C 304/12 | Case C-300/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 7 July 2020 — BUND Naturschutz in Bayern e.V. v Landkreis Rosenheim | 9 |
| 2020/C 304/13 | Case C-306/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Latvia) lodged on 9 July 2020 — SIA Visma Enterprise v Konkurences padome | 10 |
| 2020/C 304/14 | Case C-315/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 13 July 2020 — Regione Veneto v Plan Eco Srl | 11 |
| 2020/C 304/15 | Case C-616/18: Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 2 March 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d'instance Epinal — France) — Cofidis SA v YU, ZT | 13 |
| | General Court |
| 2020/C 304/16 | Case T-444/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Société générale and Others v SRB | 14 |
| 2020/C 304/17 | Case T-445/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Crédit agricole and Others v SRB | 15 |
| 2020/C 304/18 | Case T-446/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Confédération nationale du Crédit mutuel and Others v SRB | 15 |
| 2020/C 304/19 | Case T-447/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — BNP Paribas v SRB | 16 |
| 2020/C 304/20 | Case T-448/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — BPCE and Others v SRB | 17 |
| 2020/C 304/21 | Case T-449/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Banque postale v SRB | 17 |
| 2020/C 304/22 | Case T-455/20: Action brought on 14 July 2020 — Roxtec v EUIPO — Wallmax (Representation of black circles placed over an orange square) | 18 |
| 2020/C 304/23 | Case T-467/20: Action brought on 22 July 2020 — Industria de Diseño Textil v EUIPO — Ffauf Italia (ZARA) | 19 |
| 2020/C 304/24 | Case T-468/20: Action brought on 24 July 2020 — LB v Parliament | 20 |
| 2020/C 304/25 | Case T-478/20: Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Bigben Connected v EUIPO — Forsee Power (FORCE POWER) | 21 |
| 2020/C 304/26 | Case T-479/20: Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Eurobolt and Others v Commission | 22 |
| 2020/C 304/27 | Case T-480/20: Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics and Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry v Commission | 23 |
| 2020/C 304/28 | Case T-481/20: Action brought on 31 July 2020 — Magnetec v EUIPO (CoolTUBE) | 24 |
| 2020/C 304/29 | Case T-484/20: Action brought on 3 August 2020 — SATSE v Commission | 25 |
| 2020/C 304/30 | Case T-485/20: Action brought on 5 August 2020 — Junqueras i Vies v Parliament | 25 |

V   Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Court of Justice

2020/C 304/02

Case C-630/19: Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 26 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) — Portugal) — PAGE International Lda v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax (VAT) — Deduction of input tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Articles 168 and 176 — Exclusion from the right to deduct — Acquisition of food services — Standstill clause — Accession to the European Union)

2

2020/C 304/03

Joined Cases C-632/19 and C-633/19: Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2020 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen — Belgium) — Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën, Openbaar Ministerie v Metalen Galler NV (C–632/19 and C–633/19), LW–Idee GmbH (C–632/19 and C–633/19), KGH Belgium NV (C–632/19), Vollers Belgium NV (C–633/19) (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Articles 53(2) and 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Dumping — Importation of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China — Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 — Validity and interpretation — Lack of sufficient details concerning the factual background of the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Manifest inadmissibility)

3

2020/C 304/04

Case C-839/19 P: Appeal brought on 16 November 2019 by Karolina Romańska against the order of the General Court delivered on 6 September 2019 in Case T-212/18, Romańska v Frontex

3

2020/C 304/05

Case C-101/20 P: Appeal brought on 19 February 2020 by Currency One S.A. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 19 December 2019 in Case T-501/18, Currency One v EUIPO — Cinkciarz.pl

3

2020/C 304/06

Case C-198/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 11 May 2020 — MN, DN, JN, ZN v X Bank S.A.

4

2020/C 304/07

Case C-202/20 P: Appeal brought on 12 May 2020 by Claudio Necci against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 March 2020 in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission

5

2020/C 304/08

Case C-212/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2020 — M.P., B.P. v A. operating through A. S.A.

6

2020/C 304/09

Case C-213/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2020 — G.W., E.S. v A. Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Życie S.A.

7

2020/C 304/10

Case C-219/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 26 May 2020 — LM

8

2020/C 304/11

Case C-231/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 3 June 2020 — MT v Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark

8

2020/C 304/12

Case C-300/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 7 July 2020 — BUND Naturschutz in Bayern e.V. v Landkreis Rosenheim

9

2020/C 304/13

Case C-306/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Latvia) lodged on 9 July 2020 — SIA Visma Enterprise v Konkurences padome

10

2020/C 304/14

Case C-315/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 13 July 2020 — Regione Veneto v Plan Eco Srl

11

2020/C 304/15

Case C-616/18: Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 2 March 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d'instance Epinal — France) — Cofidis SA v YU, ZT

13

General Court

2020/C 304/16

Case T-444/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Société générale and Others v SRB

14

2020/C 304/17

Case T-445/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Crédit agricole and Others v SRB

15

2020/C 304/18

Case T-446/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Confédération nationale du Crédit mutuel and Others v SRB

15

2020/C 304/19

Case T-447/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — BNP Paribas v SRB

16

2020/C 304/20

Case T-448/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — BPCE and Others v SRB

17

2020/C 304/21

Case T-449/20: Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Banque postale v SRB

17

2020/C 304/22

Case T-455/20: Action brought on 14 July 2020 — Roxtec v EUIPO — Wallmax (Representation of black circles placed over an orange square)

18

2020/C 304/23

Case T-467/20: Action brought on 22 July 2020 — Industria de Diseño Textil v EUIPO — Ffauf Italia (ZARA)

19

2020/C 304/24

Case T-468/20: Action brought on 24 July 2020 — LB v Parliament

20

2020/C 304/25

Case T-478/20: Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Bigben Connected v EUIPO — Forsee Power (FORCE POWER)

21

2020/C 304/26

Case T-479/20: Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Eurobolt and Others v Commission

22

2020/C 304/27

Case T-480/20: Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics and Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry v Commission

23

2020/C 304/28

Case T-481/20: Action brought on 31 July 2020 — Magnetec v EUIPO (CoolTUBE)

24

2020/C 304/29

Case T-484/20: Action brought on 3 August 2020 — SATSE v Commission

25

2020/C 304/30

Case T-485/20: Action brought on 5 August 2020 — Junqueras i Vies v Parliament

25

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EN

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice

| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/1 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/1

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Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2020/C 304/01)

Last publication

OJ C 297, 7.9.2020

Past publications

OJ C 287, 31.8.2020

OJ C 279, 24.8.2020

OJ C 271, 17.8.2020

OJ C 262, 10.8.2020

OJ C 255, 3.8.2020

OJ C 247, 27.7.2020

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

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V Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Court of Justice

| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/2 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/2

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Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 26 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) — Portugal) — PAGE International Lda v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-630/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Deduction of input tax - Directive 2006/112/EC - Articles 168 and 176 - Exclusion from the right to deduct - Acquisition of food services - Standstill clause - Accession to the European Union)

(2020/C 304/02)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PAGE International Lda

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Operative part of the order

Article 168(a) and Article 176 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, after the accession of the Member State concerned to the European Union, reduces the scope of expenditure excluded from the right to deduct value added tax by authorising, under certain conditions, partial deduction of value added tax on such expenses, including inter alia those relating to food, even where the taxable person asserts that those expenses were entirely assigned to the exercise of his or her taxable economic activity.

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(1)  OJ C 389, 11.11.2019.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/3 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/3

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Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 July 2020 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen — Belgium) — Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën, Openbaar Ministerie v Metalen Galler NV (C–632/19 and C–633/19), LW–Idee GmbH (C–632/19 and C–633/19), KGH Belgium NV (C–632/19), Vollers Belgium NV (C–633/19)

(Joined Cases C-632/19 and C-633/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Articles 53(2) and 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Dumping - Importation of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China - Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 - Validity and interpretation - Lack of sufficient details concerning the factual background of the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2020/C 304/03)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën, Openbaar Ministerie

Defendants: Metalen Galler NV (C–632/19 and C–633/19), LW–Idee GmbH (C–632/19 and C–633/19), KGH Belgium NV (C–632/19), Vollers Belgium NV (C–633/19)

Operative part of the order

The references for a preliminary ruling made by the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen (District Court of Antwerp, Belgium) by decisions of 27 March 2019 are manifestly inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/3 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/3

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Appeal brought on 16 November 2019 by Karolina Romańska against the order of the General Court delivered on 6 September 2019 in Case T-212/18, Romańska v Frontex

(Case C-839/19 P)

(2020/C 304/04)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: Karolina Romańska-Kuć (represented by: A. Tetkowska, adwokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)

By order of 31 January 2020, the case was removed from the register.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/3 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/3

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Appeal brought on 19 February 2020 by Currency One S.A. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 19 December 2019 in Case T-501/18, Currency One v EUIPO — Cinkciarz.pl

(Case C-101/20 P)

(2020/C 304/05)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: Currency One S.A. (represented by: P. Szmidt, adwokat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Cinkciarz.pl sp. z o.o.

By order of the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) delivered on 28 May 2020, the appeal was not allowed to proceed.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/4 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/4

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 11 May 2020 — MN, DN, JN, ZN v X Bank S.A.

(Case C-198/20)

(2020/C 304/06)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: MN, DN, JN, ZN

Defendant: X Bank S.A.

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 4 of Directive 93/13 and its following recitals:






  — | whereas the consumer must receive equal protection under contracts concluded by word of mouth and written contracts regardless, in the latter case, of whether the terms of the contract are contained in one or more documents; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 4 of Directive 93/13 and its following recitals:

—

whereas the consumer must receive equal protection under contracts concluded by word of mouth and written contracts regardless, in the latter case, of whether the terms of the contract are contained in one or more documents;

| — | whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, of the unfair character of terms, in particular in sale or supply activities of a public nature providing collective services which take account of solidarity among users, must be supplemented by a means of making an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; whereas this constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account; |
| --- | --- |

—

whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, of the unfair character of terms, in particular in sale or supply activities of a public nature providing collective services which take account of solidarity among users, must be supplemented by a means of making an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; whereas this constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account;

| — | whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail;
  in the light of paragraphs 16 and 21 of the Court’s judgment of 3 September 2015, Costea (C-110/14, EU:C:2015:538) and points 20 and 26-33 of the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 23 April 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:271),
  be interpreted as meaning that every consumer is entitled to the consumer protection conferred by Directive 93/13?
  Or, as suggested by paragraph 74 of the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai (C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282), is consumer protection only available to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? In other words, can the national court find the terms of a contract concluded by any consumer to be unlawful or can it only find the terms of a contract concluded by a consumer who can be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, to be unlawful? |
| --- | --- |

—

whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail;

in the light of paragraphs 16 and 21 of the Court’s judgment of 3 September 2015, Costea (C-110/14, EU:C:2015:538) and points 20 and 26-33 of the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 23 April 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:271),

be interpreted as meaning that every consumer is entitled to the consumer protection conferred by Directive 93/13?

Or, as suggested by paragraph 74 of the Court’s judgment of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai (C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282), is consumer protection only available to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? In other words, can the national court find the terms of a contract concluded by any consumer to be unlawful or can it only find the terms of a contract concluded by a consumer who can be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, to be unlawful?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is that consumer protection under Directive 93/13 is not available to every consumer, but only to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, can a consumer who did not read a contract for a mortgage loan indexed to a foreign currency amounting to PLN 150 000, concluded for 30 years, before its conclusion, be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? Can such a consumer be granted protection under Directive 93/13? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is that consumer protection under Directive 93/13 is not available to every consumer, but only to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, can a consumer who did not read a contract for a mortgage loan indexed to a foreign currency amounting to PLN 150 000, concluded for 30 years, before its conclusion, be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? Can such a consumer be granted protection under Directive 93/13?

| 3. | If the answer to the first question is that consumer protection under Directive 93/13 is not available to every consumer, but only to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, can a consumer who, although he did read a draft contract for a mortgage loan indexed to a foreign currency amounting to PLN 150 000, concluded for 30 years, he did not fully understand it, and yet did not try to understand its meaning before its conclusion, and in particular did not ask the other party to the contract (the bank) to explain its meaning and the meaning of its individual provisions, be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? Can such a consumer be granted protection under Directive 93/13? |
| --- | --- |

3.

If the answer to the first question is that consumer protection under Directive 93/13 is not available to every consumer, but only to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, can a consumer who, although he did read a draft contract for a mortgage loan indexed to a foreign currency amounting to PLN 150 000, concluded for 30 years, he did not fully understand it, and yet did not try to understand its meaning before its conclusion, and in particular did not ask the other party to the contract (the bank) to explain its meaning and the meaning of its individual provisions, be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? Can such a consumer be granted protection under Directive 93/13?

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(1)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29,

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/5 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/5

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Appeal brought on 12 May 2020 by Claudio Necci against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 25 March 2020 in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission

(Case C-202/20 P)

(2020/C 304/07)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Claudio Necci (represented by: S. Orlandi, T. Martin, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the order of 25 March 2020 of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the order of 25 March 2020 of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission;

| — | refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for it to be adjudged afresh; |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for it to be adjudged afresh;

| — | reserve the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

reserve the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant seeks to have aside the order of 25 May 2020 in Case T-129/19, by which the General Court of the European Union dismissed his action for annulment as inadmissible and ordered him to pay the costs.

The appellant raises three grounds of appeal in that regard:

The first ground alleges a distortion of the subject matter of the dispute in so far as the General Court of the European Union took the view that the decision of 18 July 2011 adversely affected the appellant.

The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of his right to effective legal protection in so far as, if his appeal is inadmissible, the applicant will have no remedy to challenge the fact that he no longer enjoys any social protection, despite the fact that he has worked for his whole life.

The third ground of appeal alleges infringement of the principle of single applicable legislation in so far as the General Court of the European Union held that the loss of all social protection in Italy following the transfer ‘follows from the legal norms specific to the national law at issue and ... has no bearing whatsoever on his situation in respect of the JSIS’.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/6 |
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14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/6

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2020 — M.P., B.P. v ‘A.’ operating through ‘A.’ S.A.

(Case C-212/20)

(2020/C 304/08)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: M.P., B.P.

Defendant:‘A.’ operating through ‘A.’ S.A.

Questions referred

| 1. | In the light of Articles 3(1), 4(1) and 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) and its recitals, pursuant to which contracts must be drafted in plain and intelligible language and doubts must be interpreted in the consumer’s favour, must a contractual term setting out the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency in a loan agreement indexed to a foreign currency be worded unequivocally, that is to say, in a manner that enables the borrower/consumer to determine that rate himself on any given day, or, in the light of the type of contract as referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13, the long-term nature (spanning several decades) of the contract and the fact that the amount in foreign currency is subject to constant changes (may change at any time), is it possible to formulate a more general wording of the contractual term, that is to say, one that refers to the market value of the foreign currency, in a manner which prevents a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that directive? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In the light of Articles 3(1), 4(1) and 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) and its recitals, pursuant to which contracts must be drafted in plain and intelligible language and doubts must be interpreted in the consumer’s favour, must a contractual term setting out the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency in a loan agreement indexed to a foreign currency be worded unequivocally, that is to say, in a manner that enables the borrower/consumer to determine that rate himself on any given day, or, in the light of the type of contract as referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13, the long-term nature (spanning several decades) of the contract and the fact that the amount in foreign currency is subject to constant changes (may change at any time), is it possible to formulate a more general wording of the contractual term, that is to say, one that refers to the market value of the foreign currency, in a manner which prevents a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that directive?

| 2. | If the answer to the first [question] is in the affirmative, in the light of Article 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and its recitals, it is possible to interpret a contractual term concerning the determination by the creditor (bank) of the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency in such a manner as to resolve doubts in the consumer’s favour and to assume that the contract determines the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency not in an arbitrary manner, but on free-market terms, especially if both parties had the same understanding of the contractual terms determining the buying and selling rates of the foreign currency or if the borrower/consumer was not interested in the disputed contractual term at the time of conclusion of the contract and during its performance, and was also not familiar with the content of the contract at the time of its conclusion and throughout its duration? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first [question] is in the affirmative, in the light of Article 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and its recitals, it is possible to interpret a contractual term concerning the determination by the creditor (bank) of the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency in such a manner as to resolve doubts in the consumer’s favour and to assume that the contract determines the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency not in an arbitrary manner, but on free-market terms, especially if both parties had the same understanding of the contractual terms determining the buying and selling rates of the foreign currency or if the borrower/consumer was not interested in the disputed contractual term at the time of conclusion of the contract and during its performance, and was also not familiar with the content of the contract at the time of its conclusion and throughout its duration?

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(1)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29, Special edition in Polish: Chapter 15 Volume 002 P. 288 — 293.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/7 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2020 — G.W., E.S. v A. Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Życie S.A.

(Case C-213/20)

(2020/C 304/09)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy-Woli w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: G.W., E.S.

Defendant: A. Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń Życie S.A.

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, (1) in conjunction with point 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to provide the information indicated therein also covers the assured person if he is not at the same time the policyholder and he acts as a person acceding, as a consumer, to a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract, concluded between the assurance undertaking and the undertaking which is the policyholder, and as the actual investor in respect of the monies paid by way of the assurance premium? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, (1) in conjunction with point 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to provide the information indicated therein also covers the assured person if he is not at the same time the policyholder and he acts as a person acceding, as a consumer, to a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract, concluded between the assurance undertaking and the undertaking which is the policyholder, and as the actual investor in respect of the monies paid by way of the assurance premium?

| 2. | If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that set out in the first question, the obligation to provide information on the characteristics of the capital assets that are associated with the unit-linked fund also means that the consumer, the assured person, must be informed in a comprehensive and comprehensible manner of all the risks, and their kind and scale, associated with investment in a unit-linked asset (such as structured bonds or derivatives), or is it, for the purposes of the provision cited, sufficient to provide him with just basic information on the principal kinds of risk associated with investing monies by means of a unit-linked fund? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that set out in the first question, the obligation to provide information on the characteristics of the capital assets that are associated with the unit-linked fund also means that the consumer, the assured person, must be informed in a comprehensive and comprehensible manner of all the risks, and their kind and scale, associated with investment in a unit-linked asset (such as structured bonds or derivatives), or is it, for the purposes of the provision cited, sufficient to provide him with just basic information on the principal kinds of risk associated with investing monies by means of a unit-linked fund?

| 3. | Is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that described in the first and second questions, a consumer acceding to a life assurance contract as an assured person must be informed about all investment risks and associated terms and conditions about which the issuer of the assets (structured bonds or derivatives) making up the unit-linked fund informed the assurer? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that described in the first and second questions, a consumer acceding to a life assurance contract as an assured person must be informed about all investment risks and associated terms and conditions about which the issuer of the assets (structured bonds or derivatives) making up the unit-linked fund informed the assurer?

| 4. | If the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer acceding to a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract as an assured person must receive information on the characteristics of the capital assets and the risks associated with investing in those assets before conclusion of the contract, in a separate pre-contractual procedure, and does it therefore preclude a provision of national law [such as] Article 13(4) of the Ustawa o działalności ubezpieczeniowej z dn. 22 maja 2003 r. (Law on insurance business of 22 May 2003) (Dz.U. No 124, item 11510; consolidated text of 16 December 2009, Dz.U. 2010 No 11, item 66), under which it is sufficient for that information to be disclosed for the first time in the assurance contract and during the conclusion thereof, and the time at which the information is received is not unambiguously and clearly kept separate and distinct in the procedure for acceding to the contract? |
| --- | --- |

4.

If the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer acceding to a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract as an assured person must receive information on the characteristics of the capital assets and the risks associated with investing in those assets before conclusion of the contract, in a separate pre-contractual procedure, and does it therefore preclude a provision of national law [such as] Article 13(4) of the Ustawa o działalności ubezpieczeniowej z dn. 22 maja 2003 r. (Law on insurance business of 22 May 2003) (Dz.U. No 124, item 11510; consolidated text of 16 December 2009, Dz.U. 2010 No 11, item 66), under which it is sufficient for that information to be disclosed for the first time in the assurance contract and during the conclusion thereof, and the time at which the information is received is not unambiguously and clearly kept separate and distinct in the procedure for acceding to the contract?

| 5. | If the first three questions are answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, also to be interpreted as meaning that proper implementation of the obligation laid down therein to provide information must be regarded as an essential element of a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract and, consequently, may a finding that that obligation was not performed correctly have the effect of conferring on the assured consumer the right to claim repayment of all the assurance premiums paid on the ground of a possible declaration that the contract is invalid or is ineffective ab initio or that the individual declaration of accession to that contract is invalid or ineffective? |
| --- | --- |

5.

If the first three questions are answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, also to be interpreted as meaning that proper implementation of the obligation laid down therein to provide information must be regarded as an essential element of a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract and, consequently, may a finding that that obligation was not performed correctly have the effect of conferring on the assured consumer the right to claim repayment of all the assurance premiums paid on the ground of a possible declaration that the contract is invalid or is ineffective ab initio or that the individual declaration of accession to that contract is invalid or ineffective?

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(1)  OJ 2002 L 345, p. 1.

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 26 May 2020 — LM

(Case C-219/20)

(2020/C 304/10)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LM

Defendant: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld

Interested party: Österreichische Gesundheitskasse

Kompetenzzentrum LSDB

Question referred

Must Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 41(1) and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which provides for a mandatory five-year limitation period in the case of an offence committed as a result of negligence in administrative-offence proceedings?

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/8 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 3 June 2020 — MT v Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark

(Case C-231/20)

(2020/C 304/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: MT

Defendant authority: Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark

Questions referred

| 1. | In the context of criminal proceedings that are being conducted in order to protect a monopoly system, must the national court or tribunal examine the applicable criminal penalty rule in the light of the freedom to provide services if it has previously examined the monopoly system in accordance with the guidance provided by the Court of Justice and that examination has revealed that the monopoly system is justified? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In the context of criminal proceedings that are being conducted in order to protect a monopoly system, must the national court or tribunal examine the applicable criminal penalty rule in the light of the freedom to provide services if it has previously examined the monopoly system in accordance with the guidance provided by the Court of Justice and that examination has revealed that the monopoly system is justified?

| 2. | If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:








  (2a) | Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision according to which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, a fine must be imposed per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total fine imposed? |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

(2a)

Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision according to which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, a fine must be imposed per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total fine imposed?

| (2b) | Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for the mandatory imposition of a minimum penalty of EUR 3 000 per gaming machine? |
| --- | --- |

(2b)

Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for the mandatory imposition of a minimum penalty of EUR 3 000 per gaming machine?

| (2c) | Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for a custodial sentence in the event of non-payment per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total number of custodial sentences imposed? |
| --- | --- |

(2c)

Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for a custodial sentence in the event of non-payment per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total number of custodial sentences imposed?

| (2d) | Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, in the event of a penalty being imposed for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, requires the payment of a contribution to the costs of criminal proceedings amounting to 10 % of the fines imposed? |
| --- | --- |

(2d)

Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, in the event of a penalty being imposed for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, requires the payment of a contribution to the costs of criminal proceedings amounting to 10 % of the fines imposed?

| 3. | If Question 1 is answered in the negative:







  (3a) | Must Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a national provision according to which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, a fine must be imposed per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total fine imposed? |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

(3a)

Must Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a national provision according to which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, a fine must be imposed per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total fine imposed?

| (3b) | Must Article 49(3) of the Charter be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for the mandatory imposition of a minimum penalty of EUR 3 000 per gaming machine? |
| --- | --- |

(3b)

Must Article 49(3) of the Charter be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for the mandatory imposition of a minimum penalty of EUR 3 000 per gaming machine?

| (3c) | Must Article 49(3) of the Charter be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for a custodial sentence in the event of non-payment per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total number of custodial sentences imposed? |
| --- | --- |

(3c)

Must Article 49(3) of the Charter be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, by way of sanction for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, provides for a custodial sentence in the event of non-payment per gaming machine, with no absolute limit on the total number of custodial sentences imposed?

| (3d) | Must Article 49(3) of the Charter be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, in the event of a penalty being imposed for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, requires the payment of a contribution to the costs of criminal proceedings amounting to 10 % of the fines imposed? |
| --- | --- |

(3d)

Must Article 49(3) of the Charter be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, in the event of a penalty being imposed for making prohibited lotteries commercially available contrary to the Law on games of chance, requires the payment of a contribution to the costs of criminal proceedings amounting to 10 % of the fines imposed?

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 7 July 2020 — BUND Naturschutz in Bayern e.V. v Landkreis Rosenheim

(Case C-300/20)

(2020/C 304/12)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BUND Naturschutz in Bayern e.V.

Defendant: Landkreis Rosenheim

Other party: Landesanwaltschaft Bayern, representing the interests of the Federal Government before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a framework for future development consent of projects listed in Annexes I and II to Directive 2011/92/EU (2) (‘the EIA Directive’) is set where a regulation on nature conservation and landscape management provides for general prohibitions (with possible exemptions) and compulsory permits which do not specifically relate to projects listed in the annexes to the EIA Directive? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a framework for future development consent of projects listed in Annexes I and II to Directive 2011/92/EU (2) (‘the EIA Directive’) is set where a regulation on nature conservation and landscape management provides for general prohibitions (with possible exemptions) and compulsory permits which do not specifically relate to projects listed in the annexes to the EIA Directive?

| 2. | Is Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42 to be interpreted as meaning that plans and programmes were prepared for agriculture, forestry, land use, etc. if their objective was to establish a reference framework for one or more of those areas? Or does it suffice if, for the purpose of nature conservation and landscape management, general prohibitions and permit requirements are regulated which have to be assessed in the permit procedure for a variety of projects and uses and which may indirectly impact (‘by default’) one or more of those areas? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42 to be interpreted as meaning that plans and programmes were prepared for agriculture, forestry, land use, etc. if their objective was to establish a reference framework for one or more of those areas? Or does it suffice if, for the purpose of nature conservation and landscape management, general prohibitions and permit requirements are regulated which have to be assessed in the permit procedure for a variety of projects and uses and which may indirectly impact (‘by default’) one or more of those areas?

| 3. | Is Article 3(4) of Directive 2001/42 to be interpreted as meaning that a framework for future development consent of projects is set if a regulation adopted for the purpose of nature conservation and landscape management lays down prohibitions and permit requirements for a variety of projects and measures in the protected area which are described in abstract terms, where there are no actual foreseeable or envisaged projects when it is adopted and therefore it does not specifically relate to actual projects? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Is Article 3(4) of Directive 2001/42 to be interpreted as meaning that a framework for future development consent of projects is set if a regulation adopted for the purpose of nature conservation and landscape management lays down prohibitions and permit requirements for a variety of projects and measures in the protected area which are described in abstract terms, where there are no actual foreseeable or envisaged projects when it is adopted and therefore it does not specifically relate to actual projects?

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(1)  OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30.

(2)  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1).

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/10 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Latvia) lodged on 9 July 2020 — SIA Visma Enterprise v Konkurences padome

(Case C-306/20)

(2020/C 304/13)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā apgabaltiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SIA Visma Enterprise

Defendant: Konkurences padome

Questions referred

| 1. | On a correct interpretation of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, may the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors (under which the distributor who was first to register a potential transaction with the producer enjoys priority in progressing the sale process with the end user concerned for 6 months from that registration, unless the user objects) be regarded as an agreement between undertakings which has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) [TFEU]? |
| --- | --- |

1.

On a correct interpretation of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, may the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors (under which the distributor who was first to register a potential transaction with the producer enjoys priority in progressing the sale process with the end user concerned for 6 months from that registration, unless the user objects) be regarded as an agreement between undertakings which has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) [TFEU]?

| 2. | Does the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, contain indications from which it can be found not to be exempt from the general prohibition on collusion? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Does the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, contain indications from which it can be found not to be exempt from the general prohibition on collusion?

| 3. | May the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be found to constitute an exception? Does the exception permitting the conclusion of vertical agreements which restrict active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group that the supplier has reserved exclusively for itself or has allocated exclusively to another buyer, where such a restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the buyer and where the market share of the supplier (the applicant) does not exceed 30 %, apply only to exclusive distribution systems? |
| --- | --- |

3.

May the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be found to constitute an exception? Does the exception permitting the conclusion of vertical agreements which restrict active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group that the supplier has reserved exclusively for itself or has allocated exclusively to another buyer, where such a restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the buyer and where the market share of the supplier (the applicant) does not exceed 30 %, apply only to exclusive distribution systems?

| 4. | May the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, constitute a prohibited agreement on the basis solely of the unlawful conduct of a single economic operator? Is it possible to find evidence in the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that a single economic operator participated in a prohibited agreement? |
| --- | --- |

4.

May the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, constitute a prohibited agreement on the basis solely of the unlawful conduct of a single economic operator? Is it possible to find evidence in the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that a single economic operator participated in a prohibited agreement?

| 5. | In the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is it possible to find evidence that competition was reduced (distorted) within the distribution system, that there was an advantage benefiting the applicant or that competition was adversely affected? |
| --- | --- |

5.

In the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is it possible to find evidence that competition was reduced (distorted) within the distribution system, that there was an advantage benefiting the applicant or that competition was adversely affected?

| 6. | In the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if the market share of the distribution network does not exceed 30 % (the applicant is a producer, and its market share therefore also includes the sales volumes of its distributors), is it possible to find evidence of negative effects on competition in the distribution system and elsewhere, and is that agreement subject to the prohibition on collusion? |
| --- | --- |

6.

In the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if the market share of the distribution network does not exceed 30 % (the applicant is a producer, and its market share therefore also includes the sales volumes of its distributors), is it possible to find evidence of negative effects on competition in the distribution system and elsewhere, and is that agreement subject to the prohibition on collusion?

| 7. | In accordance with Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2 in conjunction with Article 4(b) of Commission Regulation No 330/2010 (1) of 20 April 2010:






  — | Does the exemption apply to a distribution system under which i) the distributor (trader) itself chooses the potential customer with which it is going to work; ii) the supplier has not previously determined, on the basis of clearly known and verifiable objective criteria, a specific group of customers to which each distributor will provide its services; iii) the supplier, at the request of the distributor (trader) reserves potential customers for that distributor; iv) the other distributors are not aware that the potential customer has been reserved or are not previously informed of that fact; under which v) the sole criterion on the basis of which a potential customer is reserved and on which the resulting exclusive distribution system favouring a specific distributor is established is not a decision by the supplier but a request by that distributor; or under which vi) the reservation remains in force for 6 months from registration of the potential transaction (after which the distribution ceases to be exclusive)? |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.

In accordance with Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2 in conjunction with Article 4(b) of Commission Regulation No 330/2010 (1) of 20 April 2010:

—

Does the exemption apply to a distribution system under which i) the distributor (trader) itself chooses the potential customer with which it is going to work; ii) the supplier has not previously determined, on the basis of clearly known and verifiable objective criteria, a specific group of customers to which each distributor will provide its services; iii) the supplier, at the request of the distributor (trader) reserves potential customers for that distributor; iv) the other distributors are not aware that the potential customer has been reserved or are not previously informed of that fact; under which v) the sole criterion on the basis of which a potential customer is reserved and on which the resulting exclusive distribution system favouring a specific distributor is established is not a decision by the supplier but a request by that distributor; or under which vi) the reservation remains in force for 6 months from registration of the potential transaction (after which the distribution ceases to be exclusive)?

| — | Should it be found that passive sales are not restricted where the agreement between the supplier and the distributor includes a term providing that the buyer (final user) may object to the reservation in question but that buyer has not been informed of the term in question? Can the behaviour of the buyer (final user) influence (justify) the terms of the agreement between the supplier and the distributor? |
| --- | --- |

—

Should it be found that passive sales are not restricted where the agreement between the supplier and the distributor includes a term providing that the buyer (final user) may object to the reservation in question but that buyer has not been informed of the term in question? Can the behaviour of the buyer (final user) influence (justify) the terms of the agreement between the supplier and the distributor?

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(1)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ 2010 L 102, p. 1).

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 13 July 2020 — Regione Veneto v Plan Eco Srl

(Case C-315/20)

(2020/C 304/14)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Regione Veneto

Respondent: Plan Eco Srl

Question referred

In a case where mixed municipal waste which does not contain hazardous waste has been mechanically treated at a facility for the purpose of energy recovery (operation R1/R12 under Annex C to the Codice dell’Ambiente (Italian Environment Code)) and, following the treatment operation, it appears, in theory, that the treatment has not substantially altered the original properties of the mixed municipal waste, to which is assigned the code EWC 19.12.12., which the parties do not contest; for the purpose of the judgment as to the legitimacy of the objections to the request for prior consent for shipment of the treated waste to a production facility in a Member State of the European Union for use in co-combustion or other means of generating energy, raised by the competent authority in the country of origin on the basis of the principles of Directive 2008/98/EC, (1) and specifically objections such as those, in this case, based:

| — | on the principle of protection of human health and the environment (Article 13); |
| --- | --- |

—

on the principle of protection of human health and the environment (Article 13);

| — | on the principle of self-sufficiency and proximity laid down in Article 16(1), according to which ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures, in cooperation with other Member States where this is necessary or advisable, to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste disposal installations and of installations for the recovery of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, including where such collection also covers such waste from other producers, taking into account best available techniques’; |
| --- | --- |

—

on the principle of self-sufficiency and proximity laid down in Article 16(1), according to which ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures, in cooperation with other Member States where this is necessary or advisable, to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste disposal installations and of installations for the recovery of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, including where such collection also covers such waste from other producers, taking into account best available techniques’;

| — | on the principle, also laid down in the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 16(1), according to which ‘Member States may also limit outgoing shipments of waste on environmental grounds as set out in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006’; (2) |
| --- | --- |

—

on the principle, also laid down in the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 16(1), according to which ‘Member States may also limit outgoing shipments of waste on environmental grounds as set out in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006’; (2)

| — | on recital 33 of Directive 2008/98/EC, according to which, ‘for the purposes of applying Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 ... on shipments of waste, mixed municipal waste as referred to in Article 3(5) of that regulation remains mixed municipal waste even when it has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties’: |
| --- | --- |

—

on recital 33 of Directive 2008/98/EC, according to which, ‘for the purposes of applying Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 ... on shipments of waste, mixed municipal waste as referred to in Article 3(5) of that regulation remains mixed municipal waste even when it has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties’:

does the European Waste Catalogue and its classifications (in the present case, EWC 19.12.12., designating waste produced by mechanical treatment facilities for recovery operations R1/R12), interfere — and, if so, in what terms and to what extent — with the rules [of EU law] on the shipment of waste which, prior to mechanical treatment, was mixed municipal waste;

and, in particular, with regard to shipments of waste resulting from the treatment of mixed municipal waste, do the provisions of Article 16 of Directive 2008/98/EC and recital 33 thereof, specifically concerning the shipment of waste, take precedence over the classification based on the European Waste Catalogue;

specifying, if the Court of Justice deems it appropriate and useful, whether that catalogue is regulatory in nature or whether it is simply a technical certification intended for the uniform traceability of all waste?

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(1)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2008 L 312, p. 3).

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste (OJ 2006 L 190, p. 1).

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Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 2 March 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d'instance Epinal — France) — Cofidis SA v YU, ZT

(Case C-616/18) (1)

(2020/C 304/15)

Language of the case: French

The President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 436, 3.12.2018.

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General Court

| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/14 |
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Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Société générale and Others v SRB

(Case T-444/20)

(2020/C 304/16)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Société générale (Paris, France), Crédit du Nord (Lille, France), SG Option Europe (Puteaux, France) (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision No SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision No SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment in that the methods of calculation of ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) laid down in the SRM Regulation and the Delegated Regulation do not reflect the actual size or the actual risk of the institutions. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment in that the methods of calculation of ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) laid down in the SRM Regulation and the Delegated Regulation do not reflect the actual size or the actual risk of the institutions.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality in that the mechanism of ex ante contributions to the SRF laid down in the SRM Regulation and the Delegated Regulation is based on an assessment that artificially exacerbates the risk profile of large French institutions, such as the applicants, and therefore leads to disproportionately high contributions in the light of the actual risk posed by those institutions. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality in that the mechanism of ex ante contributions to the SRF laid down in the SRM Regulation and the Delegated Regulation is based on an assessment that artificially exacerbates the risk profile of large French institutions, such as the applicants, and therefore leads to disproportionately high contributions in the light of the actual risk posed by those institutions.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty since the calculation of the amount of the ex ante contributions fixed by the SRM Regulation, the Delegated Regulation and the Implementing Regulation, first, cannot be predicted with sufficient clarity and, second, does not depend so much on the inherent situation and risk profile of the institution but rather on its relative situation compared to the other contributing institutions. Finally, the applicants consider that the Commission should not have had responsibility for determining risk indicators in the context of the Delegated Regulation since those criteria have an extremely fundamental and decisive function in determining the amounts of the contributions (Article 290 TFEU). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty since the calculation of the amount of the ex ante contributions fixed by the SRM Regulation, the Delegated Regulation and the Implementing Regulation, first, cannot be predicted with sufficient clarity and, second, does not depend so much on the inherent situation and risk profile of the institution but rather on its relative situation compared to the other contributing institutions. Finally, the applicants consider that the Commission should not have had responsibility for determining risk indicators in the context of the Delegated Regulation since those criteria have an extremely fundamental and decisive function in determining the amounts of the contributions (Article 290 TFEU).

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration in that the SRB does not apply, for the calculation of the risk-adjusted variable, all the risk criteria laid down in the Delegated Regulation. In addition, the applicants take the view that the contested decision does not put forward sufficiently clear and precise information to allow them to recalculate the amount of the contribution owed, which also entails infringement of Article 296 TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration in that the SRB does not apply, for the calculation of the risk-adjusted variable, all the risk criteria laid down in the Delegated Regulation. In addition, the applicants take the view that the contested decision does not put forward sufficiently clear and precise information to allow them to recalculate the amount of the contribution owed, which also entails infringement of Article 296 TFEU.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/15 |
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Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Crédit agricole and Others v SRB

(Case T-445/20)

(2020/C 304/17)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Crédit agricole SA (Montrouge, France) and the 48 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-444/20, Société générale and Others v SRB.

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Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Confédération nationale du Crédit mutuel and Others v SRB

(Case T-446/20)

(2020/C 304/18)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Confédération nationale du Crédit mutuel (Paris, France) and the 25 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-444/20, Société générale and Others v SRB.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/16 |
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Action brought on 8 July 2020 — BNP Paribas v SRB

(Case T-447/20)

(2020/C 304/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: BNP Paribas (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicant;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-444/20, Société générale and Others v SRB.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/17 |
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Action brought on 8 July 2020 — BPCE and Others v SRB

(Case T-448/20)

(2020/C 304/20)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: BPCE (Paris, France) and 44 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-444/20, Société générale and Others v SRB.

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Action brought on 8 July 2020 — Banque postale v SRB

(Case T-449/20)

(2020/C 304/21)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: La Banque postale (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicant;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-444/20, Société générale and Others v SRB.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/18 |
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Action brought on 14 July 2020 — Roxtec v EUIPO — Wallmax (Representation of black circles placed over an orange square)

(Case T-455/20)

(2020/C 304/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Roxtec AB (Karlskrona, Sweden) (represented by: J. Olsson and J. Adamsson, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Wallmax Srl (Milan, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark (Representation of black circles placed over an orange square) — European Union trade mark No 14 784 375

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 April 2020 in Case R 2385/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred in these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred in these proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/19 |
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Action brought on 22 July 2020 — Industria de Diseño Textil v EUIPO — Ffauf Italia (ZARA)

(Case T-467/20)

(2020/C 304/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Industria de Diseño Textil; SA (Arteixo, Spain) (represented by: G. Marín Raigal and E. Armero Lavie, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Ffauf Italia SpA (Riese Pio X, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark ZARA — Application for registration No 89 29952

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 May 2020 in Case R 2040/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | partially annul the contested decision in so far as it upheld the opposition for goods and services in classes 29, 30, 35 and 43 and reject the existence of likelihood of confusion within the meaning of article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council for all the contested goods and services; |
| --- | --- |

—

partially annul the contested decision in so far as it upheld the opposition for goods and services in classes 29, 30, 35 and 43 and reject the existence of likelihood of confusion within the meaning of article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council for all the contested goods and services;

| — | order EUIPO and if the case might be, the other party in proceedings before the EUIPO, to pay the costs of the current appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and if the case might be, the other party in proceedings before the EUIPO, to pay the costs of the current appeal.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 47(2) and (3) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Rule 22(3) and (4) of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EC) 2868/95; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 47(2) and (3) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Rule 22(3) and (4) of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EC) 2868/95;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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Action brought on 24 July 2020 — LB v Parliament

(Case T-468/20)

(2020/C 304/24)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: LB (represented by: O. Schmechel, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should

| — | annul the defendant’s decision of 2 July 2020 to transfer the applicant to the European Parliament’s liaison office in Luxembourg with effect from 1 September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant’s decision of 2 July 2020 to transfer the applicant to the European Parliament’s liaison office in Luxembourg with effect from 1 September 2020;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action is based on the following pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law: failure to state reasons






  — | The transfer decision is formally unlawful, since it does not contain any statement of reasons. A statement of reasons was required under Article 41(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 296 TFEU, since the applicant’s interest herein was clearly identifiable by the defendant. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law: failure to state reasons

—

The transfer decision is formally unlawful, since it does not contain any statement of reasons. A statement of reasons was required under Article 41(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 296 TFEU, since the applicant’s interest herein was clearly identifiable by the defendant.

| 2. | Second plea in law: failure to comply with the procedure under the terms of the decision






  — | The applicant was allowed to refuse the post at the Liaison Office of the European Parliament (EPLO) in Luxembourg under the terms of the decision and did so. The transfer to that post was therefore no longer an option. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law: failure to comply with the procedure under the terms of the decision

—

The applicant was allowed to refuse the post at the Liaison Office of the European Parliament (EPLO) in Luxembourg under the terms of the decision and did so. The transfer to that post was therefore no longer an option.

| 3. | Third plea in law: breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. The transfer to another place of employment was contrary to the employer’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, since it was incompatible with several fundamental rights laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, the following rights have been infringed:






  — | The right to private and family life (Articles 7 and 33) and the right of the daughter, a minor, to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both her parents (Article 24) were infringed, since the applicant’s family would have to live separately. The daughter would remain in Berlin with the father, the applicant would move to Luxembourg alone. |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law: breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. The transfer to another place of employment was contrary to the employer’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, since it was incompatible with several fundamental rights laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, the following rights have been infringed:

—

The right to private and family life (Articles 7 and 33) and the right of the daughter, a minor, to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both her parents (Article 24) were infringed, since the applicant’s family would have to live separately. The daughter would remain in Berlin with the father, the applicant would move to Luxembourg alone.

| — | The right to equality before the law (Article 20) and non-discrimination (Article 21) was infringed. As a married EPLO official and mother of a minor daughter, for whom she shares custody with her husband, the applicant is subject to mobility on the basis of which she is to be transferred to Luxembourg. Separated and divorced officials of an EPLO with shared custody of a minor child remain exempt from mobility until the majority of the child, without there being any objective reason for this unequal treatment. |
| --- | --- |

—

The right to equality before the law (Article 20) and non-discrimination (Article 21) was infringed. As a married EPLO official and mother of a minor daughter, for whom she shares custody with her husband, the applicant is subject to mobility on the basis of which she is to be transferred to Luxembourg. Separated and divorced officials of an EPLO with shared custody of a minor child remain exempt from mobility until the majority of the child, without there being any objective reason for this unequal treatment.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law: Disproportionate character of the transfer to another place of employment






  — | There was no balancing of the interests of the applicant and the defendant, although the defendant was obliged to do so in the context of its duty of good administration (Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law: Disproportionate character of the transfer to another place of employment

—

There was no balancing of the interests of the applicant and the defendant, although the defendant was obliged to do so in the context of its duty of good administration (Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).

| — | The protected interests of the applicant clearly outweigh the defendant’s interest in the transfer. |
| --- | --- |

—

The protected interests of the applicant clearly outweigh the defendant’s interest in the transfer.

| — | The transfer from the EPLO in Berlin to the EPLO in Luxembourg was not in the interests of the service. |
| --- | --- |

—

The transfer from the EPLO in Berlin to the EPLO in Luxembourg was not in the interests of the service.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law: Improper use of discretion






  — | The defendant does not recognise its discretion and therefore has not exercised it. |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law: Improper use of discretion

—

The defendant does not recognise its discretion and therefore has not exercised it.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law: Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations






  — | Since the applicant was appointed in 2001 until the adoption of the 2018 mobility decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament, the principle that AST officials, like the applicant, are not subject to mobility was applicable. This principle has been in force since the 1998 mobility decision and was reaffirmed in the 2002 and 2004 mobility decisions of the Bureau of the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law: Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

—

Since the applicant was appointed in 2001 until the adoption of the 2018 mobility decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament, the principle that AST officials, like the applicant, are not subject to mobility was applicable. This principle has been in force since the 1998 mobility decision and was reaffirmed in the 2002 and 2004 mobility decisions of the Bureau of the European Parliament.

| — | The applicant’s legitimate expectations in the continued existence of the mobility exception were protected. A change of rules therefore requires appropriate transitional arrangements and appropriate exceptions. The proposed three-year transitional period is inappropriate, since it does not eliminate the separation of the applicant’s family. An exception for the applicant is missing. |
| --- | --- |

—

The applicant’s legitimate expectations in the continued existence of the mobility exception were protected. A change of rules therefore requires appropriate transitional arrangements and appropriate exceptions. The proposed three-year transitional period is inappropriate, since it does not eliminate the separation of the applicant’s family. An exception for the applicant is missing.

| 7. | Seventh plea in law: Forfeiture






  — | The defendant forfeited the possibility of ordering mobility with the consequence of a change of place of employment against the applicant, since, by repeatedly exempting AST officials from mobility with the applicant, it created the impression that a change of place of employment was not to be expected by the applicant. |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.

Seventh plea in law: Forfeiture

—

The defendant forfeited the possibility of ordering mobility with the consequence of a change of place of employment against the applicant, since, by repeatedly exempting AST officials from mobility with the applicant, it created the impression that a change of place of employment was not to be expected by the applicant.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/21

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Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Bigben Connected v EUIPO — Forsee Power (FORCE POWER)

(Case T-478/20)

(2020/C 304/25)

Language in which the application was lodged: French

Parties

Applicant: Bigben Connected (Fretin, France) (represented by: M. Chaminade, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Forsee Power (Paris, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU figurative mark FORCE POWER — Application for registration No 16 541 377

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 May 2020 in Case R 2184/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO and the opposing party to pay the costs, including those of the proceedings before the Opposition Division and those of the appeal before the Board of Appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the opposing party to pay the costs, including those of the proceedings before the Opposition Division and those of the appeal before the Board of Appeal.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---

| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/22

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Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Eurobolt and Others v Commission

(Case T-479/20)

(2020/C 304/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Eurobolt BV (‘s-Heerenberg, Netherlands), Fabory Nederland BV (Tilburg, Netherlands), ASF Fischer BV (Lelystad, Netherlands), Stafa Group BV (Maarheeze, Netherlands) (represented by: S. De Knop, B. Natens and A. Willems, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | declare the application admissible; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the application admissible;

| — | annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/611 of 30 April 2020 re-imposing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not (1); and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/611 of 30 April 2020 re-imposing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not (1); and

| — | order the European Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that by retroactively ‘repairing’ a violation of an essential procedural requirement, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Articles 266 and 264 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the principle of effective judicial protection. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that by retroactively ‘repairing’ a violation of an essential procedural requirement, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Articles 266 and 264 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the principle of effective judicial protection.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that because it has no valid legal basis, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (2), Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’) and the principle of good administration. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that because it has no valid legal basis, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (2), Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’) and the principle of good administration.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that by prohibiting repayment and ordering collection of repaid anti-dumping duties, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Articles 5(1) and 5(2) TEU. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that by prohibiting repayment and ordering collection of repaid anti-dumping duties, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Articles 5(1) and 5(2) TEU.

---

(1)  OJ 2020 L 141, p. 1.

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009 L 343, p. 51).

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/23

---

Action brought on 28 July 2020 — Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics and Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry v Commission

(Case T-480/20)

(2020/C 304/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Hengshi Egypt Fiberglass Fabrics SAE (Ain Sukhna, Egypt), Jushi Egypt for Fiberglass Industry SAE (Ain Sukhna) (represented by: B. Servais and V. Crochet, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt (1) and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt, in as far as it relates to the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt (1) and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt, in as far as it relates to the applicants;

| — | order the Commission and any intervener who may be allowed to support the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission and any intervener who may be allowed to support the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s methodology for calculating the applicants’ subsidy margin violates Articles 1(1), 5(1), 6, 12(1)(c) and 24(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union. (2) |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s methodology for calculating the applicants’ subsidy margin violates Articles 1(1), 5(1), 6, 12(1)(c) and 24(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union. (2)

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail financial contributions granted by Chinese public bodies violates Articles 2(a), 2(b), 3(1)(a), 4(2) and 4(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail financial contributions granted by Chinese public bodies violates Articles 2(a), 2(b), 3(1)(a), 4(2) and 4(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision regarding the provisions of land to Jushi violates the applicants’ rights of defence and Article 30 as well as Articles 3(2), 5 and 6(d) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision regarding the provisions of land to Jushi violates the applicants’ rights of defence and Article 30 as well as Articles 3(2), 5 and 6(d) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail the import tariff rebate scheme for imported materials for Jushi violates Articles 3(1)(a)(ii), 3(2) and 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail the import tariff rebate scheme for imported materials for Jushi violates Articles 3(1)(a)(ii), 3(2) and 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail the tax treatment of foreign exchange losses violates Articles 3(2) and 4(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail the tax treatment of foreign exchange losses violates Articles 3(2) and 4(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law alleging that the Commission’s methodology for the determination of the undercutting margin with regard to the applicants violates Articles 1(1), 2(d), 8(1), 8(2) and 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law alleging that the Commission’s methodology for the determination of the undercutting margin with regard to the applicants violates Articles 1(1), 2(d), 8(1), 8(2) and 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

---

(1)  OJ 2020 L 189, p. 1.

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union (codification) (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 55).

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/24

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Action brought on 31 July 2020 — Magnetec v EUIPO (CoolTUBE)

(Case T-481/20)

(2020/C 304/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Magnetec — Gesellschaft für Magnettechnologie mbH (Langenselbold, Germany) (represented by: M. Kloth, R. Briske and D. Habel, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark CoolTUBE — Application for registration No 18 022 606

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 May 2020 in Case R 1755/2019-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/25

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Action brought on 3 August 2020 — SATSE v Commission

(Case T-484/20)

(2020/C 304/29)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Sindicato de Enfermería (SATSE) (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: M. Sesmero González, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | Annul Commission Directive (EU) 2020/739 of 3 June 2020 amending Annex III to Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the inclusion of SARS-CoV-2 in the list of biological agents known to infect humans and amending Commission Directive (EU) 2019/1833, published in the Official Journal of the European Union of 4 June 2020 (OJ 2020 L 175, p. 11). |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul Commission Directive (EU) 2020/739 of 3 June 2020 amending Annex III to Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the inclusion of SARS-CoV-2 in the list of biological agents known to infect humans and amending Commission Directive (EU) 2019/1833, published in the Official Journal of the European Union of 4 June 2020 (OJ 2020 L 175, p. 11).

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 2 and 18 of Directive 2000/54/EC and Annex III thereto.






  — | In that regard, the applicant relies on the absence of any effective treatment or prophylaxis for the biological agent SARS-CoV-2, the fact that it is a virus that is considered to be highly contagious and which mutates and, therefore, is highly likely to spread to the community and the fact that the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 causes serious conditions and symptoms resulting in severe human disease, presenting a serious hazard to workers. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 2 and 18 of Directive 2000/54/EC and Annex III thereto.

—

In that regard, the applicant relies on the absence of any effective treatment or prophylaxis for the biological agent SARS-CoV-2, the fact that it is a virus that is considered to be highly contagious and which mutates and, therefore, is highly likely to spread to the community and the fact that the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 causes serious conditions and symptoms resulting in severe human disease, presenting a serious hazard to workers.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements on account of the failure to state reasons for the classification of the biological agent SARS-CoV-2 in group 3.






  — | In that regard, the applicant submits that although the Commission acknowledged that there was no vaccine or effective treatment and despite what was provided for in Article 2 of Directive 2000/54/EC, it classified SARS-CoV-2 in risk group 3 rather than in risk group 4. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements on account of the failure to state reasons for the classification of the biological agent SARS-CoV-2 in group 3.

—

In that regard, the applicant submits that although the Commission acknowledged that there was no vaccine or effective treatment and despite what was provided for in Article 2 of Directive 2000/54/EC, it classified SARS-CoV-2 in risk group 3 rather than in risk group 4.

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| 14.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 304/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 304/25

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Action brought on 5 August 2020 — Junqueras i Vies v Parliament

(Case T-485/20)

(2020/C 304/30)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Oriol Junqueras i Vies (Sant Joan de Vilatorrada, Spain) (represented by: A. Van den Eynde Adroer, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

Annul the Decision of the European Parliament/ Directorate General for Finance — Directorate for Members’ Financial and Social Entitlements notified by letter of Mr Didier KLETHI, of 7 May 2020, providing that the salary of the MEP Oriol Junqueras i Vias may be paid only for the period from 25 September 2019 to 2 January 2020, in accordance with Article 10 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, and order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union, of 19 December 2019, in the preliminary ruling proceedings C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, in so far as that judgment allowed Mr Junqueras to take his seat as an MEP from 13 June 2019, as, in accordance with that judgment, that was not contrary to Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union, of 19 December 2019, in the preliminary ruling proceedings C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, in so far as that judgment allowed Mr Junqueras to take his seat as an MEP from 13 June 2019, as, in accordance with that judgment, that was not contrary to Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging the need, in the case in point, for a non-formalistic interpretation of Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976, in so far as, given the Parliament’s failure to take action to protect Mr Junqueras’s immunity, he was materially and physically prevented, against his will, from resigning as a deputy in the Congress of Deputies and taking up his duties as a Member of the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the need, in the case in point, for a non-formalistic interpretation of Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976, in so far as, given the Parliament’s failure to take action to protect Mr Junqueras’s immunity, he was materially and physically prevented, against his will, from resigning as a deputy in the Congress of Deputies and taking up his duties as a Member of the European Parliament.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging the need, in the case in point, for a specific and non-formalistic interpretation of Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976, in so far as it was not materially incompatible with that act for Mr Junqueras, who was suspended from his position as a deputy in the Congress of Deputies at the relevant time and whose remuneration and other entitlements related to that office were also suspended and who was, in addition, maintained in that role against his will by being prevented physically and materially and against his will from resigning, to resign from that position in order to take up his position as a Member of the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the need, in the case in point, for a specific and non-formalistic interpretation of Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976, in so far as it was not materially incompatible with that act for Mr Junqueras, who was suspended from his position as a deputy in the Congress of Deputies at the relevant time and whose remuneration and other entitlements related to that office were also suspended and who was, in addition, maintained in that role against his will by being prevented physically and materially and against his will from resigning, to resign from that position in order to take up his position as a Member of the European Parliament.

---